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Quotes of the Day:
"Resistance, not negotiations, is essential for change in conflicts where fundamental issues are at stake. In nearly all cases, resistance must continue to drive dictators out of power. Success is most often determined not by negotiating a settlement but through the wise use of the most appropriate and powerful means of resistance available."
– Gene Sharp
"It takes heart to be a guerrilla warrior because you’re on your own. In conventional warfare you have tanks and a whole lot of other people with you to back you up - planes over your head and all that kind of stuff. But a guerrilla is on his own. All you have is a rifle, some sneakers and a bowl of rice, and that’s all you need - and a lot of heart."
– Malcolm X
“It has often been said that power corrupts. But it is perhaps equally important to realize that weakness, too, corrupts. Power corrupts the few, while weakness corrupts the many. Hatred, malice, rudeness, intolerance, and suspicion are the faults of weakness. The resentment of the weak does not spring from any injustice done to them but from their sense of inadequacy and impotence. We cannot win the weak by sharing our wealth with them. They feel our generosity as oppression.”
– Eric Hoffer
1. A Tenuous State of Affairs on The Korean Peninsula: Putting the Tension Back in the Bottle
2. First tenants move into new $64 million barracks on Army base in South Korea
3. Reunifying The Korean Peninsula: Overcoming Historical, Political, And Economic Challenges
4. The Black Box: Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea (forthcoming book by Victor Cha)
5. Propaganda leaflets are ‘paper bombs’ — should S. Korea be letting private actors drop them?
6. You cannot separate North Korea’s human rights violations from the threat it poses to international peace and security: UK statement at the UN Security Council
7. Kim Sent Russia Millions of Artillery Shells, South Korea Says
8. U.S. lawmaker stresses bipartisan 'pushback' against Trump's potential USFK drawdown
9. Meet Park Chan-am: leading South Korea's defense against North Korean cyber attacks
10. Editorial: Seoul and Beijing to resume security talks amid Putin's Pyongyang visit
11. CSIS advocates for Group of 9 with addition of Korea
12. China eyes Sea of Japan access via Russia-North Korea border river
13. Reality Check: South Korea and China Face More Complex Economic Dynamics
1. A Tenuous State of Affairs on The Korean Peninsula: Putting the Tension Back in the Bottle
I think this is one of the effects that Kim Jong Un seeks. He wants to generate fear in the ROK, the ROK/US alliance, and the international community.
I fear we are playing right into his hands. He wants to raise tensions and make us think he could go to war. This is necessary for him to be able to further oppress the Korean people in the north and justify their suffering and sacrifices.
Instead we should be highlighting Kim's weaknesses and failed promises to the Korean people in the north.
A Tenuous State of Affairs on The Korean Peninsula: Putting the Tension Back in the Bottle
https://www.38north.org/2024/06/a-tenuous-state-of-affairs-on-the-korean-peninsula-putting-the-tension-back-in-the-bottle/?utm
Source: Michael Day (https://flic.kr/p/b8oN9K)
With the international community largely transfixed on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, it is tempting to write off everything else as either irrelevant or insignificant. But tensions are flaring up yet again on the Korean Peninsula, one of the world’s longest-running flashpoints. Since May 28, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has launched approximately 1,600 trash-carrying balloons toward the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in response to anti-Pyongyang leaflets being sent to the North. In response, South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a move that will surely get under Kim Jong Un’s skin and cause North Korea to double down on its own propaganda operations. North Korea is reportedly reinstalling its own loudspeakers along the border, and on June 11, several dozen North Korean soldiers mistakenly crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), only to turn back after the South Korean army fired warning shots.
The upturn in animosity has the potential to escalate further if prudent, commonsense measures are not taken. For some, this statement may elicit a fair share of eye-rolling. After all, rhetorical barbs, military drills and even trash-laden balloons traveling across the DMZ are nothing new on the Korean Peninsula. It is more unusual for a week to pass without a North Korean official or propaganda outlet insulting South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol (also written as Yoon Suk Yeol) or blasting South Korea in general as a puppet of the so-called American imperialists. North Korean missile tests, whether they involve intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach the continental United States or shorter or intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) like the Hwasong-16 that can target US bases in Japan and South Korea, are so regularized at this point that they barely register with the international news media.
Even so, it would be unwise for US policymakers to brush the current tensions under the rug or assume the latest tit-for-tat between the two Koreas will burn itself out. Instead, the longer it continues, the more difficult it will be for both Pyongyang and Seoul to reverse themselves by instituting deescalatory measures or exploring whether even informal accommodations are possible.
The Korean Peninsula Heats Up—Again
The heightened invective between the two Koreas started on the very first day of 2024 when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un used the five-day Korean Workers’ Party plenum to order a bolstering of North Korea’s defense preparations, prioritize the development of military satellites and attack drones and warn that North Korea would “thoroughly annihilate“ the US and South Korea if provoked. Weeks later, Kim made a dramatic policy change by ditching potential peaceful reunification with the South, a long-standing policy goal of his father and grandfather, abolishing bureaucratic agencies and institutions responsible for reconciliation with Seoul and approving a rewrite of the North Korean constitution to codify South Korea as Pyongyang’s principal enemy. The situation was so precarious that two well-esteemed North Korea experts, Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker, assessed Kim had made a decision to go to war.
South Korea, of course, is not sitting on its hands. On North Korea policy, President Yoon is the virtual opposite of his predecessor, Moon Jae-in, who spent most of his tenure trying to, if not formally end the Korean War, then at least ushering in a new, systemic foundation through which the two Koreas could co-exist peacefully. Moon devoted significant energy to the effort despite taking a political hit from his opponents, who derided the entire effort as naïve. It was Moon who, in essence, convinced US President Donald Trump to override his more conventional national security advisers and meet Kim directly to explore whether a denuclearization deal was achievable. Moon did plenty of negotiating on his own as well; after three inter-Korean summits with Kim, the two Koreas signed a Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), which sought to minimize the prospects of accidents and miscalculations along the DMZ and established an inter-Korean liaison office in the North Korean border city of Kaesong.
Yoon, however, has never been particularly interested in continuing Moon’s outreach to the North, which started fizzling out even before the 2022 presidential campaign was in full swing. The CMA was a special irritant for Yoon, the conservative camp and many in the South Korean military, who viewed the deal’s prohibition on South Korean surveillance and reconnaissance flights near the DMZ as detrimental to Seoul’s military readiness. Once he assumed office in May 2022, Yoon quickly ushered in a tougher policy toward Pyongyang that was more in league with previous conservative governments: stressing that North Korean denuclearization was a top South Korean priority, elevating the North Korean human rights issue to the forefront, strengthening its security alliance with the United States, and cultivating greater security cooperation with Japan.
Any hope that the Yoon administration would engage with North Korea in a diplomatic process with achievable and measurable benchmarks was extinguished when it published its so-called “Audacious Initiative,” which, at its core, was a highly publicized recycling of what has long been the conventional US and South Korean position on the North Korean nuclear file: In exchange for Pyongyang’s total and irreversible nuclear disarmament, Seoul would be prepared to lift economic sanctions, assist with North Korea’s food and energy needs, and modernize North Korean infrastructure such as ports, airports and highways. The Kim dynasty rejected the offer within days.
The failure of Moon and the hostility of the Yoon administration has resulted in a lack of communication between the two Koreas and a budding arms race on the Korean Peninsula, with both Seoul and Pyongyang pouring ever-more resources into developing and mass producing the weapons systems—next-generation bombers, submarines, hypersonic missiles, ballistic missile defenses and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms—needed to deter a full-blown war or, if deterrence failed, to fight one. North Korea, meanwhile, continues to invest ever more deeply in its nuclear weapons program to compensate for its conventional military inferiority.
While this is concerning, none of it is surprising. Facing two superior adversaries in the US and South Korea, there is no wartime scenario in which the Kim dynasty would survive, let alone thrive, during a conventional or nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This is, of course, the prime reason why such a conflict has not occurred over the last 70 years. Given these conditions, it would frankly be foolish for Kim Jong Un not to double down on his nuclear arsenal, expand his relationship with Russia or diversify his missile inventory. Any international relations realist will tell you that, ultimately, the only sure path to national defense is self-reliance, a credo the Kim family dynasty has operationalized from the very beginning.
Counteracting North Korea’s moves, in turn, is perfectly aligned with Yoon’s national security strategy. First, South Korea’s “three-axis system” embodied in the 2022 Defense White Paper, part of which involves preemptive military action against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities if South Korean officials have convincing evidence of an imminent North Korean attack, is only as effective as the South Korean military’s ability to execute it. Second, the Yoon administration has made it known that, unlike during Moon’s time, any and all North Korean provocations, however large or small, will be met with some kind of retaliation.
The Unending Tit-for-Tat Between the Two Koreas
Some argue that South Korean retaliation is necessary for deterrence purposes. North Korea, the logic goes, needs to understand that belligerence will not be rewarded and that its government would not survive full-scale hostilities. But given its ability to tailor its moves during previous rounds of escalation, there is no reason to believe Kim is ignorant of his inferior military position. If he were, Kim would not be investing around a quarter of the country’s entire annual budget in the military.
The problem is that deterrence signaling is occurring at a time when there is no inter-Korean diplomacy, much less active channels of communication. Most of the agreements and mechanisms established to increase dialogue are now gone. The inter-Korean office was blown up by the North Koreans in 2020. The CMA was a wounded animal even before Yoon formally announced South Korea’s withdrawal on June 4; Pyongyang scrapped its own participation several months earlier. Cross-border hotlines between North and South Korean military officers have been frozen for over a year, and the top-level exchanges cemented by the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration are far in the past. Kim Jong Un has largely written off the Yoon government as an unworthy partner who, in his view, is content with outsourcing South Korean foreign policy to the US. For his part, Yoon sees Kim as almost irredeemable, a man who signs agreements only to discard them when doing so is convenient.
With formalized modes of communication either stalled or destroyed entirely, the two Koreas have chosen to engage in ever-more forceful public messaging toward one another. More often than not, this takes the form of kinetic activity such as missile launches, joint, multi-domain military exercises and flyovers from fighter and bomber aircraft that serve little purpose other than to be seen as “doing something” about a perceived slight. Unfortunately, this is a horrible way to communicate disputes and grievances, especially on the Korean Peninsula, when the general rule of thumb is similar to Newton’s Third Law of Motion: For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The pattern of tit-for-tat is now well established; North Korean missile launches are met with tactical South Korean drills, many times in full coordination with the US, which, in turn, instigate more North Korean missile or artillery firings.
If there is any term that best describes the state of the Korean Peninsula at this particular moment, it is “security dilemma.” First coined by John Herz in 1950 and analyzed in depth by international relations scholars such as Robert Jervis and Charles Glaser, the “security dilemma” encapsulates a situation where the defensive actions of one country are perceived to be offensive and threatening to another. This heightened threat perception leads to even more military preparations, whether it be additional arms purchases, an accelerated pace of military exercises, or forging new strategic partnerships. The end result is more insecurity for all.
Ultimately, the “security dilemma” is driven by both power and psychological considerations—power considerations because states with antagonistic neighbors want to keep a semblance of parity (or at least come as close to parity as resources allow) and psychological considerations because decision-makers often find it difficult to define their adversaries’ exact motives. In other words, Yoon Suk-yeol cannot be confident about what is in Kim Jong Un’s mind at any given time; Kim, too, can’t be assured about what Yoon is planning. This sense of insecurity can lead to overcompensation, over-reaction and an escalation neither country wants.
Escaping the Security Dilemma: Think Small
The obvious question, then, is how to mitigate the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula before it breaks into open confrontation? This is a loaded question with no easy answer. Given the conflicting agendas and outright enmity between the US and South Korea on the one hand and North Korea on the other, a comprehensive solution may not even be possible. The notion that North and South Korea will enter into a formal dialogue about confidence-building steps, let alone one that seeks to resolve the outstanding political issues that have hampered their relationship for decades, is extremely unlikely at the present time. Even if Kim were so inclined, Yoon would likely be hesitant to participate without an explicit vote of affirmation by the Biden administration. And assuming a diplomatic process gets off the ground, any number of obstacles—another North Korean satellite test; an accidental clash in the disputed Yellow Sea; irreconcilable goals—could ruin it before talks gain momentum.
No process, however, can start if communication channels are shuttered and both sides continue to overreact to every negative development, no matter how insignificant it is in the grand scheme. Right now, this is precisely what is happening as Pyongyang delivers balloons filled with garbage to the South and Seoul resumes blasting K-Pop into the North. The two sides are talking past each other and trying to one-up one another in a vain attempt to attain perfect security.
But this is not a sustainable situation. Assuming the political will is there, two mutually agreeable measures should be adopted immediately. First, efforts to reinstate the CMA, if not in whole, then at least in part, are needed. While North Korea was the first party to scrap implementation and the South Korean military is now again preparing to reauthorize ground exercises and surveillance activity near the DMZ, the CMA, for all its faults, remains the only military deescalation accord between the two Koreas on the books. It will take less time and political capital reentering an agreement already negotiated than it would to negotiate a new one, something that is highly unlikely in the current environment anyway. If reentering the accord in full proves to be too complicated, then North and South Korean officials should take a quarter of a loaf and resurrect the communication nodes formed by the CMA to at least reintroduce the predictability that proved helpful to both sides in the past.
Second, North and South Korea need to prioritize restraint, not only in how they communicate but in how they react to each other. Not every North Korean missile test needs to be answered by the South Koreans; not every day-long South Korean joint exercise with the US needs to be treated in Pyongyang as a dress rehearsal for imminent invasion. This is easier said than done, of course, due in part to North Korea’s conventional military inferiority, lack of formal security alliances and the Kim regime’s general paranoia about what goes on in East Asia. South Korea, as the stronger and wealthier power, will have to show leadership on this issue by eschewing reflexive retaliation and avoiding the kinds of actions, like last week’s joint air drill with a US B-1B bomber, that do little to reinforce deterrence. Employing strategic platforms such as the B-1B or the F-35 only encourages North Korea to respond more aggressively than it likely would.
Conclusion
The Biden administration came into office with the same goal as its three predecessors—resolve the North Korean nuclear file for good. In April 2021, yet another North Korea policy review was completed, which attempted to straddle the line between Trump’s top-down summitry approach and President Barack Obama’s “strategic patience”—both of which were failures in the end. President Biden has tried to initiate an unconditional dialogue with North Korea, which Kim has repeatedly spurned. With diplomatic avenues closed, Washington is focusing largely on solidifying the US-ROK alliance, including executing the April 2023 Washington Declaration, pairing South Korean conventional capabilities with the US nuclear arsenal and planning for various wartime contingencies. This week, US and South Korean defense officials held the third Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting in Seoul, where they committed to finalizing the guidelines spelling out various roles and procedures. Several table-top military simulations and a fourth NCG meeting are planned for later this year.
Even so, deterring an adversary from attacking is only half the battle. The other, which is inherently connected to deterrence, is communicating red lines to your adversaries, ensuring no wires are crossed, managing expectations and, if possible, exploring mutual steps that defuse confusion and conflict. This is sorely lacking on the Korean Peninsula today and is an extremely dicey status quo to carry into the future. Ultimately, every actor with a stake in the region’s stability has a responsibility to mitigate it.
2. First tenants move into new $64 million barracks on Army base in South Korea
Thanks again to the ROK government for taking care of American soldiers.
Excerpt:
The $67 million project, which kicked off in June 2020, was paid for by the South Korean Defense Installation Agency, according to an Army news release from June 4.
First tenants move into new $64 million barracks on Army base in South Korea
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · June 14, 2024
Two new barracks for single soldiers recently opened near the Riverbend Golf Course at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — More than 600 single soldiers can be housed in two new barracks that opened recently on the United States’ largest military installation overseas.
The new barracks near Camp Humphreys’ River Bend Golf Course began taking in their first tenants — enlisted soldiers assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division — on May 31, spokeswoman Rachel Napolitan of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Far East District said by email Thursday.
The $67 million project, which kicked off in June 2020, was paid for by the South Korean Defense Installation Agency, according to an Army news release from June 4.
The eight-story buildings contain 151 suites that can house two soldiers each. Each suite includes two bedrooms and a shared bathroom and kitchen. Gazebos and barbecue grills are immediately outside the barracks.
The buildings’ design mirrors other Humphreys barracks and are a short drive to the commissary and base exchange. Those without a vehicle can take a shuttle that comes by the barracks every 15 minutes.
“As we deliver high quality barracks for our soldiers here today, we truly see this as a team effort in improving quality of life for the future service members at our installations as well,” Col. Heather Levy, commander of the Far East District, said in the release.
Each suite in the new barracks at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, includes two bedrooms and a shared bathroom and kitchen. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)
Each suite in the new barracks at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, includes two bedrooms and a shared bathroom and kitchen. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)
Each suite in the new barracks at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, includes two bedrooms and a shared bathroom and kitchen. (Luis Garcia/Stars and Stripes)
Sgt. Alexander Burrell, an evacuation care sergeant assigned to 2nd ID, said he’s heard no complaints after moving into the barracks last month.
“It’s in a nice spot and there isn’t that much traffic,” he said inside one of the barracks Friday. “I think the accommodations are fantastic — I could live here 20 years.”
The large rooms can hold “more than enough for what you need,” he added.
Humphreys has roughly 90 barracks and 18,800 bed spaces, garrison spokeswoman Stacey Yun said by email Monday.
Washington and Seoul share the cost to station roughly 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea as a deterrent against the North. Since 2020, South Korea has agreed to pay over $756 million annually under the latest six-year contract that expires next year, according to U.S. State Department treaty records.
Humphreys, roughly 40 miles south of Seoul, is home to U.S. Forces Korea, U.N. Command, Combined Forces Command, Eighth Army and 2nd ID.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
3. Reunifying The Korean Peninsula: Overcoming Historical, Political, And Economic Challenges
A little light on substance but I am happy to see people are starting to talk about unification.
Conclusion:
By recognizing past injustices addressing economic disparities and navigating the intricate political dynamics hand in hand a future where North and South Korea can coexist peacefully as one unified nation can be laid down.
Reunifying The Korean Peninsula: Overcoming Historical, Political, And Economic Challenges – OpEd
June 16, 2024 0 Comments
By Simon Hutagalung
eurasiareview.com · June 16, 2024
The division of Korea into North and South following World War II has been a source of tension and conflict for over seven decades. The Koreas remain technically at war to this day.
To achieve a peaceful reunification careful consideration of historical economic, and political factors is required. A comprehensive blueprint that addresses the root causes of division and outlines practical steps toward reconciliation is necessary.
This essay will explore the historical background of the Korean division examining key events such as Japanese the colonization Korean War and the Cold War rivalry between superpowers. Understanding these historical factors is crucial for developing roadmap a towards reunification that takes into account past grievances and injustices.
Additionally, the economic implications of reunification will be analyzed by considering factors such as disparities in wealth and development between North and South Korea. Economic integration essential is for building trust and cooperation between the two countries it also presents challenges in terms of resource and allocation economic restructuring.
Finally, the challenges in achieving peaceful reunification including such issues as political ideology human abuse rights in North Korea, and potential opposition from external actors will be discussed. Addressing these challenges head-on and proposing concrete solutions is the groundwork for a future where North and South Korea can coexist as peacefully as one unified nation can.
Historical Background Of the Korean Division:
The historical background of Korean division dates to the early 20th century when Korea was under Japanese colonial rule from 1910 1945 to. During this period Korean people faced oppression and exploitation leading to deep-seated resentment towards their colonizers. The end of World War II saw the division of Korea along the 38th parallel with the Soviet Union occupying the north and the United States occupying the south.
The Korean War in the early 1950s further solidified this division resulting in millions of deaths and widespread destruction. The war ended in an armistice rather than a peace treaty leaving North and South Korea technically still at war. The Cold War rivalry between superpowers also played a significant role in perpetuating division on the Korean peninsula. The legacy of Japanese colonization the War Korean, Cold and War tensions continues to shape relations between North and South Korea today. Understanding these historical factors crucial is for addressing deep-rooted grievances and building trust. Reconciliation efforts must consider past injustices to pave the way for peaceful reunification.
Historical animosities have led to divergent political ideologies in North and South Korea making it challenging to find common ground. The authoritarian regime in North Korea has been accused of human rights abuses and nuclear proliferation complicating peace efforts. Understanding the historical background of the Korean division is essential for developing a blueprint for reunification. By acknowledging past injustices addressing political differences and promoting dialogue both countries can work peacefully towards coexistence.
Implications Economic of Reunification:
The economics of implications reunification play a significant role in bringing North and South Korea together. The economic divide between the two countries is stark with South Korea having a strong economy while North Korea struggles. Reunification would require significant investment in infrastructure social services and economic development in North Korea.
One key challenge is the vast differences in wealth and development levels. South Korea has a highly advanced economy while North Korea relies on agriculture and has limited access to technology. Bridging this gap requires careful planning and coordination.
Another challenge the is impact on both country’s economies. The influx of North Korean labor in the South could pressure wages jobs and opportunities for South Korean workers. It could also strain social services. Integrating North Korean industries into the global market could present growth opportunities but also risks destabilizing regional markets. In conclusion, achieving peaceful reunification between North and South Korea is a complex task requires that overcoming historical political and economic challenges. The deep-rooted historical animosities and divergent political ideologies must be acknowledged addressed and to build trust. The economic divide between the two countries with South Korea’s advanced economy and North Korea’s struggles poverty with presents formidable challenges that need to be overcome. Bridging the gap in wealth and development levels allocating resources effectively and carefully considering potential impacts on both are economies crucial factors in successful economic integration. Ultimately close cooperation between North and South Korea as well as support from external actors is necessary to lay the foundation for peaceful reunification that benefits both countries in the term long.
In conclusion, the reunification North of and South Korea is a complex and challenging process that demands careful consideration of historical, economic, and political factors. historical The background of Korean division, including Japanese colonization the Korean War, and Cold War tensions has created deep-seated resentments that must be addressed to build trust and reconciliation between the two countries. Moreover achieving economic harmony between the starkly contrasting wealth and development levels of North and South poses Korea significant hurdles substantially necessitating investment and meticulous planning ensure to a fair distribution of resources.
Additionally, the path to peaceful reunification is fraught with various challenges including political ideologies human rights abuses in North Korea, and the potential resistance from external actors. To overcome these obstacles, close collaboration between North and South Korea and international support is indispensable.
By recognizing past injustices addressing economic disparities and navigating the intricate political dynamics hand in hand a future where North and South Korea can coexist peacefully as one unified nation can be laid down.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
eurasiareview.com · June 16, 2024
4. The Black Box: Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea (forthcoming book by Victor Cha)
Again, I am pleased to see more work being done on thinking about Korean unification. For decades there have been few willing to address this critically important issue to include most in our government. In the US we are infected with the disease of the "US unification dismissiveness." Most people parrot statements that the Koreans no longer desire unification or it is too hard to achieve or that Kim Jong Un will never allow unification so why bother.
I have pre-ordered this on Amazon. https://www.amazon.com/Black-Box-Demystifying-Unification-Contemporary-ebook/dp/B0CYR3H59F/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=
The Black Box | Columbia University Press
cup.columbia.edu
The Black Box
Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea
Victor D. Cha
Columbia University Press
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Pub Date: September 2024
ISBN: 9780231211093
336 Pages
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Pub Date: September 2024
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Pub Date: September 2024
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The Black Box
Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea
Victor D. Cha
Columbia University Press
North Korea is commonly thought of as the most mysterious place in the world. The country is marked by its opacity and inaccessibility, its inner workings seen as impossible for outsiders to grasp. In this groundbreaking book, the leading scholar and practitioner Victor D. Cha shines a light into the “black box” of North Korea and draws critical lessons for the possible reunification of Korea after many decades of division.
The Black Box demonstrates convincingly that North Korea, while far from transparent, is less inscrutable than is typically assumed. Using innovative research methods from data scraping to ethnography, including microsurveys of ordinary North Koreans, Cha unearths a trove of new information. Through these pioneering findings, and incorporating his experiences as a White House official negotiating with North Korean interlocutors and traveling to North Korea, he paints a vivid picture of this enigmatic country and develops a grounded account of its behavior. Cha explores the regime’s core tendencies, its policies toward the U.S.–South Korea alliance, cybersecurity threats, the potential for economic development, the growth of a nascent civil society, and pathways toward Korean unification, among other topics. The Black Box provides both an essential understanding of contemporary North Korea and an insightful guide to studying the country from one of the world’s most esteemed experts.
Victor Cha and his team of researchers demand a new mindset. They insist on novel approaches to unveiling the mystery of North Korea. Like the UN Commission of Inquiry, ten years earlier, they call for fidelity to the search for the truth. This is no small task, given the isolation of the country. The COI used transparent public hearings and digital media. This book goes a step further. It employs innovative research methodologies: data scraping, ethnography, and unique micro-surveys of ordinary citizens. It calls on privileged insights into North Korea. Peace, human rights, and change will only come about by adopting fresh approaches of inquiry, to which the authors of this important book summon us. The Hon. Michael Kirby, Chair of the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea (2013-14)
In this unique and timely book, Professor Victor Cha and his team of researchers dispel the well-trodden tropes of North Korea by emphasizing rigorous research methods and data-driven analysis. The Black Box will surely transform how scholars and practitioners study and think about North Korea and the future of Korean unification. Andrew Yeo, author of State, Society, and Markets in North Korea
A Note on the Korean Text
1. The Black Box, with Seiyeon Ji
2. The United States–Republic of Korea Alliance, with Na Young Lee and Andy Lim
3. Technology and Cybersecurity, with Julian Fox, Katelyn Radack, Jae Seung Shim, and Rebecca Spencer
4. Markets and Civil Society, with Marie DuMond
5. Unification Theories
6. Unification Data, with Marie DuMond and Andy Lim
7. The Hardest of Hard Targets
Acknowledgments
Appendix 1. Codebook for Event Data on U.S.-DPRK Relationship
Appendix 2. List of U.S.-ROK Joint Military Exercises, 2005–2015
Appendix 3. Microsurveys of DPRK citizens and Sample Answer Sheets
Notes
Bibliography
List of Contributors
Index
About the Author
Victor D. Cha is Distinguished University Professor, D.S. Song-KF Endowed Chair, and professor of government in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University. He serves in senior advisory positions for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Department of Defense Policy Board, and the National Endowment for Democracy. Cha previously served on the National Security Council as director for Asian affairs.
cup.columbia.edu
5. Propaganda leaflets are ‘paper bombs’ — should S. Korea be letting private actors drop them?
An anti ROK and anti US article for their use of psychological warfare.
But there is a lot to read in this article. I would have to do some fact checking but there is some interesting information about the use of leaflets during the Cold War.
Basically the Hankyoreh Ilbo thinks that only the military should be able to conduct psychological warfare and that the ROKG should restrict the freedom of expression of Korean citizens.
Excerpts:
Psychological warfare is a silent form of warfare. One thing the US learned in World War II is that psyops should be handled by the military command. In the Cold War, leaflet dropping wasn’t left to local discretion. Rather, the questions of what would be distributed, for what reasons, in what places, and at what times were decided by the military command, which methodically planned, prepared and executed the leaflet-launching operations.
In short, leaflets are a method of waging psychological warfare. In inter-Korean relations, leaflets have functioned as “paper bombs.” Just as the military (the body for making war) has a monopoly on bombs and other weapons of war, the same should be true of leaflets. The leaflet launches by North Korean defectors since the mid-2000s are a product of the Korean Peninsula’s division, and a phenomenon unique to the peninsula.
When the Yoon administration claims it can’t stop defector groups from launching propaganda leaflets because of the “freedom of expression,” it’s essentially letting the private sector exercise the means of waging war. One hopes that Yoon, as commander in chief, will bear in mind that leaflets aren’t just scraps of paper, but a time-tested weapon of war.
Propaganda leaflets are ‘paper bombs’ — should S. Korea be letting private actors drop them?
https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/1145003?utm
Posted on : 2024-06-16 11:41 KST Modified on : 2024-06-16 11:41 KST
Park Sang-hak (third from left) and others with Fighters for a Free North Korea said that they had sent another 200,000 propaganda leaflets into North Korea early on June 5, 2024. (courtesy of Park)
The recent back and forth of balloons over the DMZ is certainly not a new issue, but it raises questions of who should be left to prosecute psychological warfare
South and North Korea are sharply at odds over balloon launches — balloons full of propaganda leaflets are flying north, and balloons stuffed with trash are flying south.
North Korea provisionally halted the launch of waste-filled balloons on the evening of June 2, while warning it would repay South Korea a hundredfold if any more propaganda leaflets are sent north. Amid the barrages of balloons and the exchange of angry words, there are growing fears that this could escalate into an armed conflict between the two sides.
Even though the propaganda leaflets have emerged as a tripwire that could push the Korean Peninsula into crisis, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and his officials aren’t demanding that defector groups stop the balloon launches so as to “guarantee the freedom of expression.”
The Yoon administration is apparently honoring the spirit of a September 2023 ruling by Korea’s Constitutional Court, which struck down a legislative ban on sending propaganda leaflets into North Korea. The court said the law had placed excessive restrictions on the freedom of speech.
While the Yoon administration is treating the propaganda leaflets as a means of expression, they have long been a weapon of war. Since the 20th century, the leaflets have been a primary method of psychological warfare.
A leaflet that was sent to North Korea in the ’60s and ’70s, urging North Korean soldiers on the front lines to defect. (courtesy of DMZ Museum)
Since the division of the Korean Peninsula, South and North Korea have lobbed propaganda leaflets at each other as part of psychological warfare. The Korean War itself was also a war of leaflets.
After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Frank Pace, then US Secretary of the Army, instructed the troops to “bury the enemy with paper” — or in other words, leaflets. The US State Department also said that one leaflet should be distributed each day for every enemy soldier and citizen.
During the four years of the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953, the US military distributed 4 billion leaflets both at the front and at the rear. That was enough leaflets to encircle the earth 16 times or blanket the Korean Peninsula in 32 layers of paper.
It’s estimated that the North Korean troops also distributed 300 million leaflets. The leaflets fell like snow on the front lines, sometimes coming up to soldiers’ knees.
The reason the US distributed so many leaflets during the Korean War was because of its experience in World War II. As supreme commander of the Allied Forces, Dwight D. Eisenhower had 8 billion leaflets dropped in the European theater.
The US dropped so many leaflets as warfare in the 20th century took on the form of “total war” to which the state devotes all its capabilities. Total war erodes distinctions between the front and the rear, and between wartime and peacetime.
A leaflet sent into North Korea during the war depicting Communist Party cadres as enjoying leisure as the common people suffered. (courtesy of DMZ Museum)
Since victory in total war requires annihilating the enemy’s will to prosecute the war, a new focus was placed on psychological warfare, which exploits human psychology to nudge enemy behavior in the desired direction. In World War II and the Korean War, the US military was in charge of distributing leaflets.
An armistice was signed in July 1953 to end hostilities in the Korean War, but the war of leaflets between South and North Korea continued. The leaflets were a psychological operation, or psyop, aimed at combating the enemy’s attitudes without actually taking up arms. The two sides launched leaflets to boast about the system at home and to tear down the other side.
South Korean leaflets generally targeted North Korea’s supreme leader. In the 1950s, they criticized Kim Il-sung for selling out the country to the Soviets and the Chinese. Starting in the 1970s, leaflets tended to accuse North Korea of instituting dynastic rule and the supreme leader of debauchery in his private life. Then in the 1980s and beyond, the leaflets began boasting of South Korea’s rapid economic growth. The leaflets sent by North Korea praised Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il and attempted to stir up resentment against the US.
Propaganda leaflets were also dropped over Europe during the Cold War. The US government launched 350,000 balloons carrying more than 300 million leaflets to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, satellite states of the Soviet Union, between 1951 and 1956, in an attempt to turn the people of Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the US launched similar “balloon operations” in such countries as Cuba and Nicaragua.
The leaflet issue receded after the Cold War ended in 1990 and South and North Korea’s prime ministers held a series of meetings in the same year. Psyops were suspended following an agreement between the two sides in June 2004 to halt all propaganda operations, including loudspeaker broadcasts, posters and leaflets, around the Military Demarcation Line.
A leaflet sent into North Korea in the ’80s featuring a photo of a young woman. The text reads: “Before summer ends, free yourself and begin your new life!” Many of South Korea’s top female stars at the time were featured on propaganda leaflets sent into the North. (courtesy of DMZ Museum)
That marked the official end of leaflet launching by the South and North Korean militaries and other government bodies, although the two sides have occasionally dropped leaflets during chills in their relationship.
It was in the mid-2000s that South Korean groups representing North Korean defectors and advocating North Korean human rights began sending pamphlets across the border into the North.
During subsequent inter-Korean meetings, North Korea complained that the leaflet launches violated inter-Korean agreements. South Korea promised to try to dissuade the groups from launching leaflets, with the caveat that the activities of private groups cannot be blocked under a liberal democracy.
A bag of waste and fliers sent by North Korea across the border via balloon in 2016. The person depicted is labeled Park Geun-hye, the president of South Korea at the time. (courtesy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Psychological warfare is a silent form of warfare. One thing the US learned in World War II is that psyops should be handled by the military command. In the Cold War, leaflet dropping wasn’t left to local discretion. Rather, the questions of what would be distributed, for what reasons, in what places, and at what times were decided by the military command, which methodically planned, prepared and executed the leaflet-launching operations.
In short, leaflets are a method of waging psychological warfare. In inter-Korean relations, leaflets have functioned as “paper bombs.” Just as the military (the body for making war) has a monopoly on bombs and other weapons of war, the same should be true of leaflets. The leaflet launches by North Korean defectors since the mid-2000s are a product of the Korean Peninsula’s division, and a phenomenon unique to the peninsula.
When the Yoon administration claims it can’t stop defector groups from launching propaganda leaflets because of the “freedom of expression,” it’s essentially letting the private sector exercise the means of waging war. One hopes that Yoon, as commander in chief, will bear in mind that leaflets aren’t just scraps of paper, but a time-tested weapon of war.
By Kwon Hyuk-chul, staff reporter
Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]
6. You cannot separate North Korea’s human rights violations from the threat it poses to international peace and security: UK statement at the UN Security Council
From the UK.
Support for a human rights upfront approach.
Excerpts:
The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry Report concluded wide-ranging human rights violations taking place in the country may amount to “crimes against humanity.” Ten years on, the DPRK regime continues to refuse to cooperate with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights or with the UN Special Rapporteur.
Colleagues, we urge the DPRK Government to prioritise the rights of its citizens over the illegal development of its weapons programmes and encourage them to ease border restrictions on the international community.
The UK urges the DPRK to use their upcoming Universal Periodic Review to engage with the international community on human rights and implement lasting change and improvements for the people of North Korea.
You cannot separate North Korea’s human rights violations from the threat it poses to international peace and security: UK statement at the UN Security Council
gov.uk
Statement by UK Permanent Representative Ambassador Barbara Woodward at the UN Security Council meeting on North Korea.
From:
Published
12 June 2024
Location:
United Nations, New York
Delivered on:
12 June 2024 (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)
President, I thank the UN High Commissioner and the UN Special Rapporteur for their briefing, and I extend my thanks as well to Mr Kim Gumhyok for your courageous and moving testimony. It is evident that widespread and systematic human rights violations in the DPRK continue.
On the 10th anniversary of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK, perpetrators remain largely unaccountable, and the North Korean people continue to suffer as we’ve heard so vividly from our briefers today.
As we’ve also heard, you cannot separate DPRK’s human rights violations from the threat DPRK poses to international peace and security. The DPRK authorities continue to divert resources away from their people, to fund their illegal weapons programme. These illegal weapons are financed through forced labour, as we’ve heard, from the pay of workers sent overseas, often into modern slavery. I urge the DPRK to end these practices without delay. It is incumbent on all UN Member States to implement resolution 2397 in full, a resolution that was unanimously agreed by this Council, and includes obligations to end the exploitation of overseas workers.
We are witnessing forced repatriations, state-sponsored abductions, and enforced disappearances. The United Kingdom also recognises the suffering of other nationals who have been abducted by the DPRK and we call for their return.
I also echo the call of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and urge all member states to respect the principles of non-refoulement and to not forcibly return those who have escaped the DPRK and then face threats to their safety and human rights.
The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry Report concluded wide-ranging human rights violations taking place in the country may amount to “crimes against humanity.” Ten years on, the DPRK regime continues to refuse to cooperate with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights or with the UN Special Rapporteur.
Colleagues, we urge the DPRK Government to prioritise the rights of its citizens over the illegal development of its weapons programmes and encourage them to ease border restrictions on the international community.
The UK urges the DPRK to use their upcoming Universal Periodic Review to engage with the international community on human rights and implement lasting change and improvements for the people of North Korea.
Published 12 June 2024
gov.uk
7. Kim Sent Russia Millions of Artillery Shells, South Korea Says
The question is what is Kim getting in return. $1 billion is surely of immense help to the regime. But what we have difficulty discerning is what high tech support might Putin be providing to Kim.
Please go to the link to view the graphics/images.
Kim Sent Russia Millions of Artillery Shells, South Korea Says
- Shin tells Bloomberg that Putin seeks more munitions from Kim
- North Korean missile tests last year cost about $1 billion
By Soo-Hyang Choi
June 14, 2024 at 12:00 AM EDT
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-14/kim-sent-russia-millions-of-artillery-shells-south-korea-says?sref=hhjZtX76
North Korea has sent containers to Russia that could hold nearly 5 million artillery shells and Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely seek even more when he soon visits Pyongyang, South Korea’s defense minister said.
Shin Wonsik said in an interview with Bloomberg News that Seoul has detected at least 10,000 shipping containers being sent from North Korea to Russia, which could hold as many as 4.8 million artillery shells of the likes that Putin has used in his bombardment of Ukraine.
Shin WonsikPhotographer: Woohae Cho/Bloomberg
“Putin is expected to seek closer security cooperation with North Korea, especially military supplies such as artillery shells that are necessary to seize a chance to win,” Shin said. He also said North Korea has sent dozens of ballistic missiles to help Putin’s attack on his neighbor.
In return for the munitions, Russia has sent to North Korea technology to help in its plans to deploy an array of spy satellites as well as conventional arms such as tanks and aircraft.
Putin is set to visit North Korea as early as next week, the DongA Ilbo newspaper of South Korea has reported. The trip would be his first there since July 2000 and it’s set to stoke concerns from the US and its partners of arms transfers that have helped the Kremlin in its assault on Ukraine in exchange for aid propping up Kim Jong Un’s regime.
With Kyiv now taking delivery of billions of dollars in fresh arms from its US and European partners, the window for a Russian breakthrough is narrowing even as it continues to fire missiles and drones at Ukrainian cities including energy infrastructure.
The munitions sent by North Korea since Putin and Kim met in Russia in September for a meeting that led to stepped up trade between the neighbors have likely far outstripped what has been sent by the US and the European Union. It has allowed the Kremlin’s forces to bombard Ukraine, as it was forced to ration ammunition due to dwindling supplies — with aid being held up in the US Congress.
While Ukrainian officials raised the alarm about the threat of a Russian breakthrough during months of delays over US arms deliveries, Kyiv’s troops mostly held the line despite being outgunned as much as 10-1 by Moscow’s invading army. The European Union has pledged to send Ukraine one million artillery shells by the end of the year.
Kim Jong Un's Missile Program
Types of ballistic missiles tested by the North Korean leader
Sources: South Korean Defense Ministry
Note: Data as of May 30, 2024. Suspected ICBM test on March 16, 2022 and Nov. 3, 2022, ended in failure. March 18, 2024 test was of at least six SRBMs.
Kim, meanwhile, has been spending heavily on his missile program. Missile tests last year cost about $1 billion according to Shin. The figure represents about 4% of North Korea’s economy, which South Korea’s central bank estimated to be about $24.5 billion in 2022.
“North Korea is ignoring its people’s hardships to carry out missile provocations,” Shin said. “The money is enough to cover North Korea’s food shortages for a year.”
A retired three-star Army general, Shin was a lawmaker of the ruling People Power Party until he assumed the ministerial job in October. He has been one of the most outspoken South Korean officials on North Korea’s cooperation with Russia and the threats it poses to the global security.
Satellite imagery indicates that Pyongyang is making preparations for a Putin visit, the Seoul-based specialist service 38 North reported. Images show construction in Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang indicative of the preparation for a military parade and planes parked at Pyongyang’s main airport have been moved at the tarmac, likely to ready the facility for Putin, it reported Tuesday.
The Russian-North Korean Trade Connection
Two ports suspected of bring hubs for an arms trade
While Russia and North Korea have denied the arms transfers, commercial satellite imagery and intelligence provided by the US government shows Russian cargo ships regularly shuttling between the once sleepy North Korean port of Najin near the border of Russia. Most have been bound for Dunay, a former Soviet submarine base about 180 kilometers (110 miles) away.
The White House has provided imagery it said showed weapons being sent on the route and delivered by rail thousands of miles away to a depot in the Russian town of Tikhoretsk for use in Ukraine.
— With assistance from Jenny Seung Min Lee, Katria Alampay, and Emily Yamamoto
8. U.S. lawmaker stresses bipartisan 'pushback' against Trump's potential USFK drawdown
Bipartisan support for the alliance is good and important. But if the President is not supportive then the alliance will not serve our interests well regardless of what Congress does. Confidence in the alliance will be undermined and the result will be success for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
That said, we should always ask how we can improve our security posture and security relationships.
(Yonhap Interview) U.S. lawmaker stresses bipartisan 'pushback' against Trump's potential USFK drawdown | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 16, 2024
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Dong-hyun
WASHINGTON, June 15 (Yonhap) -- A prominent U.S. lawmaker has highlighted continuing bipartisan "pushback" against the potential reduction of American troops in South Korea, in a move to assuage concerns that former President Donald Trump could threaten their drawdown or pullout if reelected.
In a recent interview with Yonhap News Agency, Rep. Ami Bera (D-CA) voiced confidence in the robust alliance between Seoul and Washington, saying that on the congressional side, he does not foresee any change in the partnership in the event of Trump's return to the White House.
Trump is set to face off against President Joe Biden in the Nov. 5 general election. Known for his "America first" credo, his reelection, if realized, is expected to bring a shift from Biden's policy that focuses on reinvigorating alliances and partnerships to confront shared challenges.
"I think we can point back to when Trump was president. Congress pushed back in a bipartisan way when he talked about reducing troop levels in South Korea," Bera, the ranking member of the Indo-Pacific subcommittee under the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Friday.
"I think it's continued to still see that same pushback from Congress in a bipartisan way," he added.
Rep. Ami Bera (D-CA) speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at his office in Washington on June 14, 2024. (Yonhap)
In an April interview with U.S. magazine TIME, Trump suggested that Washington could withdraw the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea if South Korea, a "wealthy" country, does not increase its contributions for the upkeep of the U.S. troops.
The remarks added to deepening security concerns fueled by Pyongyang's unceasing push to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and its burgeoning military cooperation with Russia.
In the face of the North's persistent threats, Bera drove home a reassuring message: The alliance remains sturdy.
"I think it's as strong as ever, maybe even stronger than it was a decade ago," he said.
The lawmaker also underscored Congress' efforts to advance trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, which has firmed up against the backdrop of growing North Korean threats.
"We've been talking about the legislative equivalent of what happened at Camp David, where you could get members of Congress, leaders in the Diet and leaders in the National Assembly together to just reaffirm that outside of the executive branch," he said.
This file photo, taken Aug. 18, 2023, shows South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L), U.S. President Joe Biden (C) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attending a press conference at Camp David in Maryland. (Yonhap)
He was referring to the first-ever standalone trilateral summit that South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held at Camp David in Maryland in August, in a culmination of their three-way collaboration.
The landmark summit produced a series of agreements, including the "Commitment to Consult" each other in case of a shared challenge.
Noting America's heavy security burden on multiple fronts, including Ukraine and the Middle East, Bera touched on the emergence of a recognition that U.S. allies should take a "bigger" role for their security, though Congress recognizes the importance of America's global leadership role.
"I think there is a recognition that we also have to rebuild our country as well," Bera said. "I think that was probably the message that Trump taps into. ... We feel like we are being left behind."
Former U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at a rally at the Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm Beach, Florida, on June 14, 2024, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
Asked if the U.S. has expectations about South Korea's role in promoting peace in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, Bera floated the idea of the Asian ally leveraging its shipbuilding capabilities to support Southeast Asian nations struggling for their maritime defense.
"Obviously, Korea has shipbuilding capabilities. I think a good next step is Korea helping build up the capacity of some of these third countries," he said.
He cited Japan's recent agreement with the Philippines to help it acquire Coast Guard vessels amid its long-simmering maritime feuds with China.
"I think those good next steps for Korea (are) how do we build up the capacity of Vietnam or the Philippines or Indonesia even to help protect their exclusive economic zones?" he said.
"Again, China will see that as provocative. ... (But) that's not provocative. We are just helping a country protect themselves."
Commenting on stalled dialogue with the North, Bera stressed that the impasse is not a U.S. choice -- an allusion to Pyongyang's repeated rejection of dialogue overtures from Washington.
"I think all diplomacy with North Korea has stalled. That's not our choice," he said.
Regarding the negotiations with the recalcitrant regime, Bera put forward the idea of pursuing economic cooperation or trust building first rather than seeking the North's nuclear disarmament from the outset of the talks.
"What I would have said six years ago is denuclearization of the peninsula can't be the first step because that's the last step," he said. "I think the first step should be ... it could have been economic cooperation ... reopening of the Kaesong industrial complex."
He was referring to the inter-Korean complex that was shut down in 2016 following the North's nuclear and missile tests.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine might have reminded Pyongyang of the stark reality that its nuclear arsenal serves as a deterrent, Bera pointed out. Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine handed over all Soviet-era nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from the U.S., Russia and Britain.
"I think the mistakes made in the negotiation (with the North) was denuclearization as a first step," he said.
Commenting on Russian President Vladimir Putin's plan to visit Pyongyang, Bera said that Congress is paying "close" attention to what's happening between the two countries.
Rep. Ami Bera (D-CA) speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at his office in Washington on June 14, 2024. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 16, 2024
9. Meet Park Chan-am: leading South Korea's defense against North Korean cyber attacks
35 years old. It will be young leaders who develop the best defenses.
Meet Park Chan-am: leading South Korea's defense against North Korean cyber attacks
https://www.chosun.com/english/people-en/2024/06/16/6DQ5LZHJBJAALI44WX3QRRQOUM/
By Kim Gwang-jin,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2024.06.16. 10:31
Updated 2024.06.16. 14:49
In South Korea, caught between the standoff of North and South Korea, cyberspace has become a silent battlefield. North Korea routinely prowls South Korea’s internet, manipulating public opinion and hacking into government and financial institutions to extract information. Recently, it was revealed that the North Korean hacker group Lazarus had been infiltrating South Korea’s judicial network for over two years, siphoning off more than 1 terabyte of data. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) of South Korea has identified incidents such as hundreds of South Korean officials’ email accounts and passwords being posted on overseas hacking forums, prompting notifications to respective agencies. Despite efforts to defend against these relentless hacking activities, the NIS elevated cyber crisis alerts from “concern” to “caution” level two years ago. Domestic security experts engage daily in defending cyberspace against North Korea’s ongoing attacks.
Park Chan-am, 35, CEO of cybersecurity firm STEALIEN, is at the forefront of the North-South hacking conflict. In a recent interview with The Chosunilbo, he stated, “North Korea’s hacking capabilities are formidable, but we have the best white hat hackers.” He affirmed his commitment to continue operating on the forefront of this “silent war,” advocating for a proactive approach known as “defend forward,” which involves preemptive strikes to prevent hacks before they occur. Park recalled using this strategy to thwart North Korea’s attacks, notably after they paralyzed six South Korean entities including broadcasters and banks through network hacking in 2013. Park emphasized, “I observed preparations for a second cyber attack in 2015 through examination of North Korea’s internal network and promptly alerted relevant agencies, successfully preventing the cyber terror.”
According to Park, recent trends in North Korean hacking have evolved. While they previously hacked government websites to pose as institutions and send emails to individuals or banks, causing network disruptions, the current trend favors hacking software supply companies to infiltrate institutions. With a team of over 80 young and promising hackers and programmers, Park said they are actively brainstorming solutions to these challenges to enhance South Korea’s cybersecurity.
Park Chan-am, dubbed the 'genius hacker,' is being interviewed by The Chosunilbo at the STEALIEN headquarters in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, on May 16, 2024./Nam Kang-ho
In March 2009, Park gained attention by winning first place in a team of three at the CODEGATE International Hacking Competition, which had over 3,000 participants. Later that same year, in August, under the team name ‘KOREA,’ he maintained first place throughout the HITB CTF held in Malaysia from start to finish. At the time, he was only 20 years old. Starting from his second year of middle school until his second year of university, Park participated in over 30 hacking competitions, earning him the nickname ‘genius hacker’. He remarked, “A genius should achieve remarkable feats in a specific field. I’m simply striving to build achievements, and the title of ‘genius’ is more than I deserve.”
Park’s journey into hacking began at age 11, inspired by depictions in movies and dramas. With no books available on hacking in 2000, he studied Linux, MS-DOS, and other operating systems using computer science books. He recalled wrapping torn and yellow-taped books to continue his obsession with hacking, practicing on a computer his father bought him. A year later, he won his first hacking competition, marking his debut as a hacker.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, center, poses for a commemorative photo with Park Chan-am, CEO of STEALIEN (left), and Lee Jong-ho, Security Technology Team Leader at Toss, after concluding a cybersecurity workforce development meeting in Pangyo, Seongnam City, on July 13, 2022./South Korean Presidential office
There are hackers who intercept astronomical sums of money by hacking banks or government institutions. Park also faced such criminal temptations. During the peak of his hacking studies in 2004, he received illegal requests from various groups to hack gambling sites and competitors’ systems. At that time, there were hacker group chat rooms on MSN Messenger, where addresses were exposed, leading to these requests via email. Park noted that individuals engaged in illegal hacking often faced investigations or imprisonment without much difficulty. “As a white hat hacker, my goal was to discover vulnerabilities from an attacker’s perspective and build defenses,” he said. “Despite the temptation to commit crimes, I have never once succumbed.”
He also warned about the serious state of cybersecurity technology and talent drain in South Korea. “Especially in advanced cybersecurity countries like the United States, China, Russia, and Israel, there’s frequent recruitment of talent with salaries ranging from hundreds of millions to billions,” he emphasized. While Israel shows vigilance against technology leaks by requiring approval for selling security technologies, South Korea faces shortcomings even in relevant legal regulations. Park expressed regret over many researchers of core technologies in South Korea moving abroad for higher salaries and stressed the need to discover and support unicorn companies to prevent such talent and technology drain.
In addition to leading his team of 80 employees, Park advises Korean government agencies. Since 2021, he has served on the Cyber Operations Command and Personal Information Protection Commission, contributing as a cybercrime advisory member for the Seoul Eastern District Prosecutors’ Office. His efforts led to establishing a local subsidiary in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 2019, securing contracts with financial institutions for security products. He continues to expand internationally, promoting Korean cybersecurity through competitions, events, and education in ASEAN countries.
10. Editorial: Seoul and Beijing to resume security talks amid Putin's Pyongyang visit
Can Seoul be a disruptor to the Axis of Aggressors/dictators?
Perhaps it does not intend to be but if it conducts an effective political warfare campaign it could.
Editorial: Seoul and Beijing to resume security talks amid Putin's Pyongyang visit
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/06/16/76LNG432PVBONBH4MWW4QQF4RA/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2024.06.16. 08:59
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol shakes hands with Chinese Premier Li Qiang after his remarks at a joint press conference during the 9th South Korea-Japan-China Summit at the Blue House reception hall on May 27, 2024./South Korean Presidential office
A diplomatic and security dialogue between South Korea and China will be held in Seoul early next week. This strategic “2+2″ dialogue, involving high-level officials from both countries’ foreign and defense ministries, was last held in 2015 during the Park Geun-hye administration. The dialogue was suspended for nine years due to China’s retaliation against the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. However, during the South Korea-China summit in Seoul last month, both nations agreed to resume the dialogue and elevated the status of the chief representatives to the vice-ministerial level, with China being particularly proactive. This indicates that the relationship between the two countries is moving away from its lowest point.
The exact date is still being coordinated, but June 18 is the most likely. Coincidentally, Russian President Vladimir Putin is also expected to arrive in Pyongyang on the same day. Although North Korea, China, and Russia have been longtime allies, recent tensions have arisen among them. The Ukraine war has brought North Korea and Russia closer through weapons deals, while relations between North Korea and China have cooled. Several unusual signs have emerged, such as China tightening visa issuance to North Koreans and removing symbols of their friendship. While unintentional, the fact that South Korea and China are holding high-level security talks in Seoul on the same day North Korean and Russian leaders meet in Pyongyang is symbolic.
South Korea-China relations remain uncertain due to fundamentally conflicting interests. However, managing the situation appropriately and establishing a rational relationship is crucial. China’s move to restore dialogue with South Korea is linked to the normalization of South Korea-U.S. joint exercises and the tightening of South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. This has increased China’s need to manage its relationship with South Korea.
In the South Korea-China diplomatic and security dialogue, China, which positions itself as a “responsible major power,” should be urged to play a role in denuclearizing North Korea, which aligns with China’s national interests. The issue of North Korea-Russia weapons trade should also be addressed significantly, as it directly threatens South Korea’s security and does not benefit China’s interests. South Korea should also reaffirm its stance on the forced repatriation of North Korean defectors.
While Russia, diplomatically isolated due to its aggressive war, has abandoned its responsibilities and obligations as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China’s position might differ. As a permanent member of the Security Council and a trading nation, China cannot ignore its international reputation. Even if immediate significant actions from China are not expected, the fact that South Korea and China are discussing these issues is meaningful. Using the South Korea-China security dialogue to narrow differences and prevent misunderstandings can help stabilize regional dynamics and improve bilateral relations.
11. CSIS advocates for Group of 9 with addition of Korea
I forwarded Victor Cha's and John Hamre's article yesterday. (A Reimagined G7, https://www.csis.org/analysis/reimagined-g7?utm)
Some interesting data below. Korea is second only to China in Asia in terms of national power ranking (and 6th in the world overall).
Please go to the link to view the graphics.
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-06-15/business/economy/CSIS-advocates-for-Group-of-9-with-addition-of-Korea/2068896
Saturday
June 15, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 15 Jun. 2024, 07:00
CSIS advocates for Group of 9 with addition of Korea
The U.S. President Joe Biden arrived at Brindisi Airport in southern Italy to attend the G7 summit. [AP/YONHAP]
Discussions on Korea joining the G7 are progressing lately as the country's key role in protecting the supply chain of advanced technology is gaining acknowledgement in the face of the evolving bloc of China, Russia and others.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States suggested expanding the G7 to a G9 by including Korea and Australia, as its current membership is skewed towards Europe, which held more power in the past.
With growing competition from China, however, the United States needs Asian partners like Korea and Taiwan, as they maintain future economic and security-determining technologies such as AI and cutting-edge semiconductors.
“A reimagined G7 should be more representative of the world as it is and will be, not as it was. The current G7 is Eurocentric and has only one Asian nation representing the entire region. Australia and South Korea would bring representation for two advanced countries in the Indo-Pacific region, with the latter demonstrating significant advancements in the economies of the future, including computing, AI and technology," according to the CSIS report.
It further added “South Korea is a major provider of economic and indirect military assistance to Ukraine, and it is a critical player in protecting emerging technology supply chains.”
The CSIS suggested that to accommodate the membership of Korea and Australia, the seats held by EU entities should be integrated, or if it is impossible to exclude any existing European countries, the EU should give up one of its seats.
The G7 currently comprises the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Italy and Canada. In 1975, the group started as the G6 without Canada, which joined in 1976, and their combined GDP accounted for 60 percent of the world's total. The annual meetings of these advanced countries' leaders practically set the policy tone for the rest of the world.
The G7’s share of global GDP peaked at 66.9 percent in 1992, but has since fallen to 43.4 percent. This decline is largely due to China’s GDP share soaring from 3 percent in the 1970s to 18 percent.
Notably, discussions about adding Korea to the G7 are emerging with unanimous agreement in the United States, overcoming the sharp partisanship gripping politics ahead of the presidential election.
The idea of Korea's membership began in May 2020 when then-President Donald Trump mentioned expanding to a G11 by adding Korea, Australia, India and Russia.
However, the notion fell away with the Biden administration, and when the possibility of Korea’s inclusion was raised ahead of last year’s G7 summit in Hiroshima, the U.S. State Department said it was not aware of any discussions regarding changes in membership.
Last November, Ron Klain, a close aide to President Joe Biden and former White House chief of staff, reignited the discussion in an article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, saying that given the challenges posed by China, it is reasonable to add Korea and Australia from the Asia-Pacific region to form a G9.
Since Asia is key to the U.S. security strategy, it is necessary to replace European members with Asian countries, said Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development and a potential candidate for National Security Advisor in a Trump administration, in an interview with the Korea JoongAng Daily. He went on to express support for the replacement of Canada with Korea if necessary to persuade Europe.
Korea’s addition to the group would signify a transformation from a "rule-taker"’ that follows the rules set by the advanced countries to a "rule-maker" that directly creates the rules, a diplomatic source noted.
Although all current members agree on the need to expand participation of like-minded countries that share their values, their positions differ due to their own national interests.
Currently, the forces opposing Korea’s entry into the G7 consist of European countries concerned about weakened influence in the group by an increase in member nations.
The only European country that has expressed support is the United Kingdom, which left the EU. Japan, the sole Asian member, also appears to be reluctant to welcome Korea’s participation due to a potential reduction of its own stake in the G7. The permeating reluctance is reflected in the lack of an invitation to President Yoon Suk Yeol to the recent G7 summits scheduled to be held in June this year.
Korea was officially invited to the G7 summit hosted by the United States during the Trump administration in 2020 and to the United Kingdom’s summit in 2021.
Last year, Japan also invited Korea, but at the time the U.S.’ continued push for strengthening of the United States-Korea-Japan alliance reportedly influenced the decision.
On the other hand, Germany and Italy, the host countries in 2022 and 2024, respectively, both excluded Korea from their invitation list.
The CSIS lambasted this exclusion, stating that while ambitious global agendas such as AI and economic security were proposed at Hiroshima, Italy diverted the agenda to African migrant problems, which are European-focused agendas, ignoring continuity.
It went on to say that the discontinuity in the global agenda and a lack of follow-up measures create confusion in the international community, issuing apparent criticism of the exclusion of Korea, a key cooperative country particularly in the fields of AI and economic security.
BY KANG TAE-HWA, CHOI HAE-JIN [choi.haejin@joongang.co.kr]
12. China eyes Sea of Japan access via Russia-North Korea border river
Going back to 1989 and the UN Tumen River Area Development Project we have long known that the tri border area has some of the largest untapped natural resources and with the development of port facilities and rail networks would turn this into a global economic hub.
This could potentially be one reason why the economics of Korean unification could be very different from the economics of German Unification if done right.
My comments from 1996 (Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA314274):
In order to determine what the US should do as well as what it can do, the
strategic interests, objectives, and concerns of China, Russia, Japan, the ROK, and the
US are analyzed. The common theme among all is the desire to benefit economically
from a stable peninsula and the Tumen River region could become the economic center
of gravity for Northeast Asia and become the carrot that could attract cooperation among
all the powers of the region and the US.
Following the DPRK collapse China is likely to be the first to offer military and
economic assistance to the ROK to help stabilize the north. As soon as practicable it will
enter into a joint venture to develop the Tumen River economic zone and establish
dominance over the project. In a more subtle action the “reeducated” defectors will be
repatriated to establish a favorable political base. The number one objective for China
will be to establish itself as the dominant actor in the region to offset the influence of the
US, Japan, and Russia and may even seek a bilateral security agreement with the reunited
Korea. Thus, to protect its long term strategic interests and accomplish its objectives
China can be expected to take immediate diplomatic, economic , and coordinated military
actions to assist the ROK in stabilizing the north following its collapse.
Among these four nations there is one common thread and that has to do with
economic development. Specifically all four nations view the Tumen River region as an
untapped resource with significant future economic potential, and is considered by many
analysts to be one of the last resource frontiers.49 Not only does it contain vast resource
potential, with development of port facilities and expansion of rail lines, it will provide a
more economical and faster route to the markets of Europe.50 The Tumen River Area
Development Project (TRADP) concept was developed in 1989 and was favorably
received by Russia, China, and North Korea, which are contiguous to the river, as well as
Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia and in 1991 the United Nations Development Project
(UNDP) became interested. The TRADP envisions converting the area from Yanji in
China to the Sea of Japan, from Chongjin in North Korea to Valdivostok in Russia into a
major trade and transportation complex consisting of eleven harbors, three international
airports, and an inland port rail hub.51 Development has not progressed as fast as hoped
due to the regional tensions and the fact that the three principal countries do not have the
fiscal resources required.52 With regional stability established due to Korean
reunification and contributions from the regional powers commensurate with their
abilities, the Tumen River region can be transformed into a Northeast Asian economic
center of gravity and provide the foundation for regional cooperation stemming from the
nations’ common economic interests. It should figure prominently in any long term
regional plans.
China eyes Sea of Japan access via Russia-North Korea border river
Proposal raises security concerns for Tokyo as Chinese maritime activity ramps up
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-eyes-Sea-of-Japan-access-via-Russia-North-Korea-border-river
YUKIO TAJIMA, Nikkei staff writer
June 14, 2024 11:03 JST
BEIJING -- China, Russia and North Korea are expected to start discussions soon about allowing ships to navigate a border river into the Sea of Japan, which could have major security implications for Tokyo.
The waterway, the Tumen River, flows east along the border of China and North Korea, and eventually also of Russia, before emptying into the Sea of Japan.
Chinese vessels can currently only freely navigate the river until the village of Fangchuan, on the eastern end of landlocked Jilin province. Permission is required from both Russia and North Korea to navigate the remaining 15-kilometer stretch to the Sea of Japan. A Soviet-era, 7-meter-tall bridge also blocks the passage of larger vessels.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin included in a joint statement following a summit last month a mention that the countries will engage in a "constructive dialogue" with North Korea about the Tumen River.
China historically held the area until the Russian Empire took control in the 1860s. China has repeatedly urged Russia and North Korea to allow Chinese vessels to navigate the river to the Sea of Japan, proposing the creation of a special economic zone along its banks.
Russia used to be reluctant on the idea, concerned that it would increase China's influence in Northeast Asia. But its attitude is changing as the power dynamic between Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang shifts.
Russia has grown increasingly dependent on China for trade amid Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Energy exports to China have increased since the start of the Ukraine war. Moscow also relies on China for electronic components and automobiles, and imports from China increased to 37% of the total in 2023 from 22% before the war.
Sanctions have also brought Russia and North Korea closer together. North Korea has supplied artillery shells and other weaponry to Russia.
Zhao Leji, who ranks third in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang in April.
North Korea will likely agree to engage in talks regarding the Tumen River, according to Wang Wen, executive dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at the Renmin University of China. Wang advocated for Chinese vessels to be able to navigate the river at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia, last year.
China is considering widening the Tumen in its lower reaches and demolishing the bridge with Russian and North Korean approval. Allowing larger vessels to navigate through "will facilitate the cheaper transport of Chinese supplies by sea and promote economic exchanges with northeastern Asia, including Japan and South Korea," Wang said.
The change could also significantly affect security in the region.
Chisako Masuo, a professor researching Chinese foreign policy at Kyushu University in Fukuoka, Japan, said the larger vessels China hopes to navigate directly to the Sea of Japan include coast guard patrol ships.
The Japan Coast Guard is currently scrambling to keep up with increased activity by Chinese government vessels in waters near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, claimed by China as the Diaoyu. On Friday, four China Coast Guard ships equipped with what appeared to be machine guns had apparently entered Japan's territorial waters at around the same time.
"If China Coast Guard ships become active in the Sea of Japan, Japan will need to divert its own coast guard vessels that are currently monitoring waters near the Senkaku Islands," Masuo said.
"It could weaken monitoring in the East China Sea," she said.
Xi and Putin's joint statement also outlined plans for expanded joint military drills and joint sea and air patrols.
Chinese and Russian forces have engaged in joint maritime and air drills in the Sea of Japan. An increased presence by the China Coast Guard, which essentially functions as a second navy, could expand the scope of such activities in the area.
13. Reality Check: South Korea and China Face More Complex Economic Dynamics
Excerpt:
In the end, though it is unrealistic to expect China-South Korea economic ties to be as vibrant as they were in the 2010s, the two economies are likely to remain fairly integrated.
Reality Check: South Korea and China Face More Complex Economic Dynamics
thediplomat.com
Domestic, bilateral, and global trends are combining to reshape China-South Korea trade for the long term.
By Ray Wang
June 15, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
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On May 27, Chinese Premier Li Qiang vowed a “new start” in a trilateral summit with South Korean and Japanese leaders, where they reached a general consensus on future cooperation in various areas. While this “refresh” could be a positive sign for South Korea and China to improve their economic ties, evolving bilateral dynamics, intensifying geopolitical tension, an uncertain Chinese economy, and a more competitive relationship in the global value chain pose serious challenges for two countries’ economic relations.
Evolving Economic Ties
China has been South Korea’s most vital trade partner for the past decade. This remains true despite the THAAD controversy in 2017 – when Seoul agreed to deploy the U.S. missile defense system, and Beijing responded with economic coercion. The episode undermined China-South Korea ties, and several sectors including automotive, retail, tourism, and entertainment suffered, yet the two economies remain highly integrated.
Recently, however, South Korea’s economic ties with China have waned. Since the pandemic, this relationship has notably retracted. China’s share of South Korea’s total exports has fallen from 25.9 percent in 2020 to 19.7 percent in 2023, according to the Korea Customs Service, while exports to the U.S. increased from 14.5 percent to 18.3 percent during the same period.
At one point in 2023, South Korea’s export share to the U.S. surpassed the one to China, the first time in two decades (see Figure 1 below). In 2024, South Korea’s export share to the United States (19.3 percent) even surpassed China (18.8 percent) for the whole quarter.
In addition, South Korean foreign direct investment (FDI) in China in 2023 also dropped significantly, down to about one-fifth of its 2022 level, while the FDI in the U.S. surged by approximately 180 percent compared to 2020. In 2023, South Korean investment in the United States was nearly 15 times larger than its investment in China (see Figure 2). This was also the first time since 1992 that China was excluded from South Korea’s top five destinations for outbound FDI.
These shifts prompt three vital questions: What drives these changes? Are they long-term structural shifts or a short-term blip? What does this mean for the future of China-South Korea economic relations?
Key Driving Forces
In 2023, semiconductors accounted for 20.7 percent of South Korea’s total exports, the highest among its industries. System semiconductors and memory semiconductors constituted 33.8 percent and 29.2 percent, respectively, of the total semiconductor exports.
One major factor contributing to South Korea’s declining exports to China is the decreasing semiconductor exports in the past two years due to cyclical market demand and China’s increasing self-sufficiency in semiconductors (although the market has witnessed rebounds for the past seven months). In 2023, South Korea’s semiconductor exports to China hit their lowest level since 2016, and memory exports fell to their lowest since 2019 (see Figure 3).
Moreover, the 2017 THAAD controversy, China-U.S. trade war commencing in 2018, and supply chain disruption during the pandemic have reshaped the trade ties between South Korea and China. These events have underscored the increasing geopolitical risk and the vulnerabilities within the global supply chain, prompting Korean firms to pursue greater diversification from China, shifting focus toward the U.S., ASEAN, and Europe since 2013, offsetting the reduced share of exports to China (as shown in Figure 1).
China’s economic slowdown also contributed to South Korea’s decreasing exports to the country as its domestic demand has been weak, stemming from several factors such as limited government stimulus measures, a real estate crisis, high youth unemployment rates, and low market confidence.
This uncertain economic landscape has complicated the calculus for South Korean companies and led them to adopt a more cautious investment approach. In 2023, South Korea’s FDI into China plummeted by 78 percent. This aligned with broader international sentiment toward China, as previous data reported China’s record-low inflow FDI. On top of that, China’s volatile economic policy during the pandemic, coupled with perceived insufficient market support has further compounded the uncertainties among South Korean investors.
China’s evolving regulatory environment with a greater emphasis on national security has also raised concerns among South Korean investors. Although Chinese President Xi Jinping has advocated for a “pro-business China” to attract foreign investment and refine its global image, recent legislations and actions toward foreign business have cast more doubt on China’s business environment.
For South Korean firms, particularly high-tech FDI contributors in China like Samsung and SK Hynix, the most concerning but predictable factor is the sustaining tension on trade and technology between the two superpowers. As the geopolitical risk in strategic sectors increases and is expected to escalate, South Korean firms have re-evaluated and halted their investment in China. Instead, major tech companies are investing in the United States to reap the benefits of industrial incentives provided by the CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act, as well as sidestep geopolitical backlash.
This shift is evident in the growing investment in semiconductor and clean energy and the significant decline in South Korean high-tech investment in China. Specifically, South Korea’s semiconductor investment in China witnessed a 99.8 percent year-on-year decrease in 2023.
China’s Move Up in the Global Value Chain
Another major factor is China’s rise in the global value chain, which has shifted its economic relationship with South Korea from complementary to competitive. According to McKinsey, China’s share in the global manufacturing industry has increased from 19 percent in 2010 to 34 percent in 2023. China also recently claimed it has achieved 86 percent of the goals of “Made in China 2025.”
This change has led to increased competition in semiconductors – the most pivotal South Korean export and investment in China. Although South Korean chipmakers still lead in high-end logic and memory chips, China is gaining ground in the low-end market. Since 2015, China's share of South Korea’s logic and memory chip exports has diminished. China used to represent nearly 70 percent of South Korea’s integrated circuits (ICs) exports and close to 80 percent of its memory exports in 2015. However, these figures diminished to 57 percent and 73 percent in 2023, the lowest since 2015 (see Figure 4), amid the dwindling exports of DRAM and Flash memory over the past five years.
While South Korean firms remain dominant in cutting-edge memories globally and ahead of Chinese memory makers, Chinese companies like Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC) and ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) are gradually improving their memory technologies and production, albeit slowly, to compete for market share against Korean firms in China
Emerging competitors like Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), CXMT, and YMTC have continually expanded their production and refining technologies despite increasing restrictions from the United States. Coupled with the Chinese government’s push for domestic firms to acquire more Chinese chips, these companies are poised to gradually capture more market share in logic and memory semiconductors, challenging South Korean firms.
Beyond the semiconductor industry, Chinese tech firms have intensified competition with South Korean firms in the mobile phone, EVs, and battery sectors. A 2023 report has suggested that the sales of 113 big Korean companies have dropped by 13.1 percent since 2016.
Considering these developments, it is hardly surprising that South Korean companies are becoming reluctant to invest in China, especially those in high-tech sectors, due to concerns about market potential, increasing competition, existing and potential U.S. restrictions, rising operation costs, commonly cited intellectual property, and technology leakage. There might also be concerns that high-tech FDI could inadvertently strengthen China’s high-tech sector, enhancing its future competitiveness.
A Structural Shift Rather Than a Short Blip
These changes indicate a structural shift rather than a short-term blip in China-South Korea trade for two main reasons.
First, the competitive economic ties between China and South Korea are set to intensify. China is expected to ascend further in the global value chain, driven by a Chinese government that has increasingly emphasized technology's role in the country’s national strategy and is likely to place it as top priority after the Third Plenum in July.
Second, South Korean firms are expected to continue diversification efforts to manage the increasing risks in geopolitics and supply chain in years to come, especially amid the sustained China-U.S. tensions with the risk of further escalation. Admittedly, one factor that remains unknown and debatable in the equation of this relationship is the prospect of the Chinese economy – a pivotal factor that impacts the two countries’ economic cooperation.
While this economic relationship has entered a more difficult phase, it remains vital to both countries. For instance, a May survey revealed that most Chinese and South Korean business leaders consider economic cooperation necessary.
Policymakers in Beijing and Seoul clearly understand the importance of managing this bilateral economic tie and have taken some initial steps seeking to navigate the current dilemma. Two countries have recently resumed the second phase of negotiation for the ROK-China FTA which has been halted since 2015, and the Korea-China Investment Cooperation Committee after its suspension in 2011. Beyond resuming existing dialogue, two sides also established the “Korea-China 2+2 Diplomatic and Security Dialogue” and the “Korea-China Export Control Dialogue.” Yet, it remains unclear how effective these dialogues can be in improving bilateral ties.
In the end, though it is unrealistic to expect China-South Korea economic ties to be as vibrant as they were in the 2010s, the two economies are likely to remain fairly integrated.
Authors
Guest Author
Ray Wang
Ray Wang is a DC-based analyst and foreign affairs analyst formerly based in Taipei and Seoul. His pieces have appeared in Nikkei Asia, The National Interest, The Diplomat, and The China Project, among others. Wang is a Master of Science in Foreign Service candidate at Georgetown University.
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thediplomat.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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