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Quotes of the Day:
"The oldest, shortest words— "yes" and "no"— are those which require the most thought."
– Pythagoras
“We are ready to die for an opinion but not for a fact: indeed, it is by our readiness to die that we try to prove the factualness of our opinion.”
– Eric Hoffer
“Courage is fire, and bullying is smoke.”
–Benjamin Disraeli
1. Exclusive / Pentagon split over Trump’s Israel policy
2. Strikes Hit Revolutionary Guard Command Centers in Tehran, Israeli Military Says
3. Israel Takes Control of Iran’s Skies—a Feat That Still Eludes Russia in Ukraine
4. The Fordow Imperative—for Trump and Israel
5. Israel and Iran exchange attacks; Trump vetoes plan to target Khamenei, US officials say
6. Cyberattack on Washington Post Strikes Journalists’ Email Accounts
7. China Wants Our Hearts. Literally.
8. Taiwan’s military reform is failing where it matters most
9. Chinese FM holds phone calls with Israeli, Iranian counterparts
10. Global Fragility Act in Coastal West Africa: Policy Lessons from US Engagement in the Sahel
11. Book Review | Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine
12. Why China Missed Its Golden Philippines Opportunity
13. Philippine Navy Launches First Rajah Solayman-class Offshore Patrol Vessel
14. Rare Earth, Raw Power: How China Plays the Carrot and Stick Game of the Century
15. India breaks with China, Russia on Israel-Iran war
16. Breaking News: U.S. Army plans initial production of new XM30 infantry fighting vehicle to replace Bradley in late 2027.
17. A Regime On The Brink
18. Too Much Tech Can Ruin Wargames
19. We Need a Marine Corps, Part I: A Corps in Crisis
20. A Soldier For Life
21. I was worried about Trump’s Army parade — until I saw it
22. Exclusive Report: New version of U.S. Army M-SHORAD air defense vehicle to feature next-generation short-range missile.
23. Report to Congress on U.S. Army Dark Eagle Hypersonic Weapon
24. The West has forgotten the art of strategy China and Russia are the new grandmasters
25. Special Operations News - Monday, June 16, 2025
1. Exclusive / Pentagon split over Trump’s Israel policy
I do not think Mr. Colby really cares about South Korea in the way it is depicted in this excerpt. It is likely only mentioned because it reinforces his view on Asia (re China) first because of the redeployment of THAAD to the Middle East..
Excerpts:
The surprise attack on Tehran raised the stakes in a long-running internal dispute, whose stakes could increase as Israel’s need for support grows in response to Iranian retaliation. As early as February, newly-appointed acting Pentagon officials with roots in the “restrainer” foreign policy movement — which argues that an overextended US military needs to focus its resources on containing China — had argued against moves like April’s relocation of a Patriot missile battery from South Korea to the Middle East, one of the people, who was directly involved in those arguments, told Semafor.
Colby has long argued that moves like the missile relocation would imperil US military readiness in a possible conflict with China or North Korea. And Trump — despite his administration’s ongoing assistance to Israel — has at times bridled at the appearance of close US coordination. Former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz was pushed out, in part, over his “intense coordination” with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Washington Post reported in May.
And Colby is “so focused on Asia, he’s gotten crosswise with anyone who does anything else on foreign policy, including Trump loyalists,” one Capitol Hill aide who favors more support of Israel said.
(After this story was published, Pentagon chief spokesman Sean Parnell said in an emailed statement that reporting on any internal division is inaccurate and Colby “is totally synced up with the leadership team and has been every step of the way.“)
Exclusive / Pentagon split over Trump’s Israel policy
Ben Smith
Co-Founder and Editor-in-Chief, Semafor
Updated Jun 14, 2025, 5:55pm EDT
https://www.semafor.com/article/06/14/2025/a-split-in-trumps-israel-policy
Oren Ben Hakoon / Reuters
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The Scoop
Top Pentagon officials have been divided over the extent of US military support for Israel, a split whose resolution will shape President Donald Trump’s second-term foreign policy.
US military leaders, including the chief of US Central Command, Gen. Michael Kurilla, have requested more resources to support and defend Israel. But their requests have drawn resistance from undersecretary of defense for policy Elbridge Colby, who has long opposed moving US military assets from Asia to the Middle East, people sympathetic to each side of the argument told Semafor.
The surprise attack on Tehran raised the stakes in a long-running internal dispute, whose stakes could increase as Israel’s need for support grows in response to Iranian retaliation. As early as February, newly-appointed acting Pentagon officials with roots in the “restrainer” foreign policy movement — which argues that an overextended US military needs to focus its resources on containing China — had argued against moves like April’s relocation of a Patriot missile battery from South Korea to the Middle East, one of the people, who was directly involved in those arguments, told Semafor.
Colby has long argued that moves like the missile relocation would imperil US military readiness in a possible conflict with China or North Korea. And Trump — despite his administration’s ongoing assistance to Israel — has at times bridled at the appearance of close US coordination. Former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz was pushed out, in part, over his “intense coordination” with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Washington Post reported in May.
And Colby is “so focused on Asia, he’s gotten crosswise with anyone who does anything else on foreign policy, including Trump loyalists,” one Capitol Hill aide who favors more support of Israel said.
(After this story was published, Pentagon chief spokesman Sean Parnell said in an emailed statement that reporting on any internal division is inaccurate and Colby “is totally synced up with the leadership team and has been every step of the way.“)
The Middle East-focused news organization Al-Monitor reported earlier this month that Gen. Kurilla had requested a second aircraft carrier strike group move to the Middle East.
Know More
Kurilla appears to have won at least part of the argument. The New York Times reported Friday that the US is moving warships and other military assets into the region, including destroyers and fighter aircraft.
The Pentagon has not said whether it will send a second carrier group to the Middle East. But the US Embassy in Hanoi announced Friday that it was canceling a visit by the USS Nimitz “due to an emergent operational requirement,” according to a German think tank official and others who posted the announcement.
Ben’s view
The Iran conflict embodies the central dynamic that provokes Colby and his allies: US policymakers have long planned the “pivot to Asia” then-President Barack Obama announced in 2011, but have found that regional priorities and domestic politics bring their attention and their assets forever back to the Middle East.
Trump’s appointment of Colby raised concerns among hawks and Israel supporters who saw it as one of a number of signs that the US might look to cut its support for Israel, if not reorient its policy more broadly. The dismissal of Waltz seemed to confirm that direction. And Trump’s decision to allow Israel strike Iran alone also seemed to signal a hands-off orientation.
But the shift only goes so far, and Colby appears to be losing the core argument about US policy.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth purged some of Colby’s allies in a complicated internal political spat in April, and the person directly involved in some of the internal arguments said Hegseth tends to side with Kurilla in the arguments over the Middle East.
Room for Disagreement
The Free Press’s Eli Lake spoke to Trump allies alarmed by the “restrainer” presence in the Pentagon, reflected by Colby and allies including the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Michael Dimino.
“You have a guy who is going to be the deputy for Middle East policy who doesn’t think the United States should be in the Middle East. Somebody should call Elon at DOGE,” one said.
The View From the Pentagon
After this story was published, a DoD official emailed a statement from chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell:
“Like all of us, Under Secretary of Defense Colby supports the President’s efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon through negotiations. He has been a vital member of the Secretary’s team developing a range of credible options to support negotiations and to deny Iran a nuclear weapon if negotiations fail.
“This story relies on inaccurate speculation from anonymous sources to paint sensational divides that do not exist. Colby is totally synced up with the leadership team and has been every step of the way.”
Notable
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“Considering that I’m the one that developed ‘America First,’ and considering that the term wasn’t used until I came along, I think I’m the one that decides that,” Trump tells The Atlantic’s Michael Scherer.
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A hub for the “restrainer” movement is the group Defense Priorities, which is funded by Stand Together, backed by the conservative libertarian figure Charles Koch. (Stand Together is also an investor in Semafor.) Stand Together recently posted a careful position paper on the US-Israel relationship, attempting to argue both for continued US support for the Jewish state and reduced Israeli dependence on American security commitments: “A more secure, diplomatically connected Israel would rely less on American military support and more on regional partnerships to ensure its future,” the statement says.
—Shelby Talcott contributed reporting to this story.
2. Strikes Hit Revolutionary Guard Command Centers in Tehran, Israeli Military Says
As an aside, I ask the rhetorical question of why Israel, Ukraine, and like minded democracies strike military targets while authoritarian dictatorships such as Iran and Russia strike civilian targets?
Strikes Hit Revolutionary Guard Command Centers in Tehran, Israeli Military Says
Netanyahu says conflict could lead to regime change in Iran, but a U.S. official says Trump opposed killing Iran’s supreme leader.
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-attack-news
Last Updated:
June 16, 2025 at 7:38 AM ET
Explosions after an Israeli airstrike in Tehran. (Getty Images)
Israel’s military said it had hit command centers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, following days of attacks focused on Tehran’s nuclear program, senior leadership and infrastructure. Iranian strikes overnight killed several people, while several Tel Aviv buildings not far from the U.S. Consulate have been destroyed.
Meanwhile, President Trump nixed Israel’s plan to kill Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, according to a U.S. official. Calling Iran’s leadership “weak,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggested in a Fox News interview on Sunday that the conflict could result in a regime change.
An Iranian missile barrage over the weekend triggered a partial shutdown of an oil refinery in Israel as the two countries struck each other’s energy facilities. The hits mark an escalation that brings the conflict closer to an industry vital to the global economy and markets.
What to know:
Iran said at least 224 civilians have been killed in Israeli attacks. Israel said its death toll from Iranian strikes had risen to 24 since the beginning of the confrontation.
Israel's air force has destroyed about one-third of Iran’s surface-to-surface missile launchers since the beginning of the confrontation, Israel's military spokesman said
Residents of Tehran reported long lines at gas stations and traffic jams as people rushed to flee the city, anticipating more attacks from Israel.
President Trump said Sunday that Iran was interested in making a deal. Later, he told reporters, “I think it's time for a deal and we'll see what happens, but sometimes they have to fight it out.”
Democratic Sen. Tim Kaine is set to introduce a war-powers resolution to force a debate and vote ahead of any possible U.S. military force against Iran.
For months, Israel’s spy agency smuggled drone parts to attack Iran from within.
3. Israel Takes Control of Iran’s Skies—a Feat That Still Eludes Russia in Ukraine
Air superiority is still an important capability. Imagine how Putin's War in Ukraine would change if either Ukraine or Russia had air superiority. The question is if there is a conflict over Taiwan who will be able to to gain and maintain air superiority?
Israel Takes Control of Iran’s Skies—a Feat That Still Eludes Russia in Ukraine
Power mismatch in Israel-Iran war shows importance of air superiority
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-takes-control-of-irans-skiesa-feat-that-still-eludes-russia-in-ukraine-846ccb95
By Yaroslav Trofimov
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June 15, 2025 11:00 pm ET
Smoke rose following an explosion in central Tehran on Sunday. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Key Points
What's This?
- Israel achieved air superiority over western Iran within 48 hours of starting its war, a feat Russia couldn’t achieve in Ukraine.
- Israel exploited its air advantage to eliminate surface-to-air missiles in western Iran and key Iranian military leaders.
- Analysts highlight Israel’s superior air-force capabilities, training and integration compared with Russia and Iran.
Within 48 hours of starting its war on Iran, Israel said it gained air superiority over the western part of the country, including Tehran. Israeli warplanes began dropping bombs from within Iranian skies instead of relying on expensive long-range missiles.
That is a feat that the giant Russian air force has been unable to achieve in Ukraine in 3½ years of war. This setback is one of the reasons why Moscow’s troops have been bogged down in grinding trench warfare, sustaining staggering losses, ever since they failed to rapidly seize Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, in February 2022.
On Sunday, Israel was exploiting its advantage, saying it had taken out dozens of surface-to-air missiles in western Iran and killed the intelligence chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with his deputy.
The two wars are very different in many respects—for one, there is no conventional land component to the Israeli campaign in Iran. But the experience of these two conflicts, closely observed by militaries around the world, reinforces what war planners have known for decades: Control over air is everything, if you can get it.
“The two campaigns are showing the fundamental importance of air superiority in order to succeed in your overall military objectives,” said retired U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, who oversaw allied air operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001.
“In the case of Russia-Ukraine war, you see what happens when neither side can achieve air superiority: stalemate and devolution to attrition-based warfare,” he said. “In the case of the Israel-Iran war, it allows them unhindered freedom to attack where they possess air superiority over segments of Iran.”
An Israeli jet fighter refueled in the air above Netanya on Sunday. Photo: jack guez/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The initial Israeli airstrikes were using the fifth-generation stealth F-35 aircraft, enhanced with Israeli modifications. Now that most of Iranian air defenses have been suppressed, older warplanes such as F-15 and F-16 are joining the fight. Israel has also started dropping short-range JDAM and Spice guided bombs, which are cheaper and much more abundant than missiles, to devastating effect.
“Over the past 24 hours, we completed an aerial route to Tehran and conducted an aerial breaching battle. IAF pilots are flying at great risk to their lives, hundreds of kilometers away from Israel, striking hundreds of different targets with precision,” said Israeli military Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir.
The Israelis now have “the ability to use the whole suite of their offensive weapons—in greater mass, more efficiently, and spreading them out,” said retired British Air Marshal Martin Sampson, who directed British air operations against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and now heads the Middle East office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “From Israel’s side, the campaign objective is to destroy and degrade—and Iran doesn’t have that ability.”
A poster of Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, Iran’s top military officer who was killed in a wave of attacks by Israel. Photo: Vahid Salemi/Associated Press
The Israelis have certainly learned from Russian failures—and Ukrainian successes—as they planned their own campaign against Iran. But, military officials and analysts say, the most obvious lesson so far is that the Israeli air force is intrinsically more capable than the Russians—while Ukraine is much better at defense than Iran.
“Israel achieved surprise and overmatch over Iran’s air defenses, which represented a much easier target set than Ukraine’s air defenses in almost every respect,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and an expert on Russian and Ukrainian militaries. “The asymmetry in qualitative capability between Israel’s air force and Russia is also vast and can be easily observed.”
Retired British Air Marshal Edward Stringer, who ran the air campaign in Libya in 2011 and headed operations for the British Ministry of Defense, said the overall culture, sophisticated training and innovation of the Israeli air force, combined with its integration into intelligence and cyber capabilities, are a key reason why the Israelis succeeded where the Russians have failed. “All the Russians have is pilots. They grow these pilots to drive flying artillery, and that’s it,” he said.
Just like Ukraine, whose Soviet jet fighters were badly outdated by 2022, Iran doesn’t have warplanes capable of surviving air-to-air combat with its foe. Unlike Ukraine, however, Tehran has spectacularly failed to organize ground-based air defenses in ways that could have significantly impeded the ability of enemy aircraft to operate over its territory.
This was, above all, the result of a fatal political miscalculation. Over decades, Tehran underinvested in air defenses and bet instead on the deterrent firepower of its own missile forces and those of its regional proxies.
“Iran never relied on air defenses alone to ward off attacks like this. The idea was always to use deterrence,” said Fabian Hinz, a military expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Smoke billowed in the aftermath of an Israeli air raid in Beirut, Lebanon, last year, as Israel targeted Hezbollah. Photo: Marwan Naamani/Zuma Press
But the main component of Iranian deterrence—Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia—was decimated by Israel last year, and then physically severed from Iran by the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. Subsequent Israeli bombing of Syrian air-defense installations created a superhighway that Israeli aircraft can use unimpeded on their way to Iran.
Ukrainian air defenses—primarily the Soviet-vintage S-300 and Buk systems—were much more robust and better integrated in 2022 than Iran’s turned out to be once Israel attacked. Tehran relies on a mishmash of S-300, Chinese batteries and locally made air-defense systems.
Equally critical was the element of surprise. Thanks to U.S. intelligence warnings about the impending Russian invasion, the Ukrainian military command dispersed and concealed the bulk of its mobile air-defenses in February 2022. After a handful of Russian jets were downed over Ukrainian cities, manned Russian aircraft stopped operating beyond the front line—the situation that remains in place today. To strike targets deep inside Ukraine, Russia must rely on the limited supply of cruise or ballistic missiles, or on drones, which are slow and carry a limited payload. Ukraine is using its own drones to strike back.
Unlike Ukraine in 2022, Iran was caught by surprise—in part because of deceptive Israeli threats to launch the attack should U.S.-Iranian talks scheduled for June 15 fail to produce progress. Instead, the war began two days earlier.
A Ukrainian unit fires an antiaircraft cannon toward a Russian drone. Photo: Sofiia Gatilova/Reuters
Israeli special-operations teams got into Iran covertly and destroyed key Iranian air-defense assets with short-range drones at the start of the campaign, using a method similar to how Ukrainian intelligence barely two weeks earlier blew up several Russian strategic bombers. At the same time, Israel was able to assassinate much of Iran’s military leadership—another operation made possible by superior spywork.
“Basically, what Israel did with Iran is what Russia wanted to do with Ukraine: They thought they could pull off some cloak-and-dagger thing, and infiltrate and decapitate the Ukrainian regime,” said Michael Horowitz, an Israeli geopolitical analyst. “But it turned out that the Ukrainian society has a resilience and cannot be so easily penetrated—whereas when it comes to Iran, the regime is so unpopular that it’s easy to find people there who will agree to work with Israel.”
Despite Israeli strikes, which resulted in numerous civilian casualties alongside military targets, Iran continues to lob ballistic-missile salvos at Israeli cities, also causing death and destruction. Time, however, now appears to be on Israel’s side—at least in the immediate future.
“It’s a numbers game, and it seems like Israel has the upper hand because they can now go after the missiles that are shooting at them with direct attack. After all, the best way to shoot a missile is on the ground while it’s in a container, and not in the air while it’s flying,” said retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Timothy Ray, a former U.S. Global Strike Command commander. “What the Israelis are doing is just steadily leveraging an advantage.”
Israel has launched
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WSJ explains Iran’s military capabilities and strategy. Photo Illustration: BEDIN TAHERKENAREH/EPA/Shutterstock/Jeremy Shuback
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
4. The Fordow Imperative—for Trump and Israel
Why would we want to allow Iran to continue to operate Fordow if it can be destroyed?
Excerpts:
Mr. Trump posted on social media Sunday that “we can easily get a deal done” to end the war. But that prospect will be more likely if he helps Israel finish the military job. Israel is signaling that its campaign can take either a few days or many weeks. If Mr. Trump won’t help on Fordow, Israel will need more time to achieve its strategic goals. A neutral U.S. means a longer war.
The President is no doubt concerned that Iran or its proxies will hit U.S. troops or bases in the Middle East. But it isn’t clear how much damage Iran could do given how much Israel has degraded Iran’s forces. Iran also knows that attacking U.S. forces would mean a far more devastating U.S. response. The U.S. could destroy Iran’s navy, oil and gas production facilities and export terminals.
***
Mr. Trump’s other concern may be criticism from his MAGA isolationist wing. The podcast Metternichs are already attacking Mr. Trump merely for approving of the Israeli strikes. Asked about those critics on Saturday, the President gave an excellent answer.
“Well, considering that I’m the one that developed ‘America First,’ and considering that the term wasn’t used until I came along, I think I’m the one that decides that,” Mr, Trump told a writer for the Atlantic. “For those people who say they want peace—you can’t have peace if Iran has a nuclear weapon. So for all of those wonderful people who don’t want to do anything about Iran having a nuclear weapon—that’s not peace.”
The Fordow Imperative—for Trump and Israel
MAGA isolationists want the President to pressure Israel to stop the war before Iran’s nuclear sites are destroyed.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-fordow-imperative-for-trump-and-israel-nuclear-enrichment-site-iran-7981fbc0
By The Editorial Board
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June 15, 2025 4:46 pm ET
Welcome to the "Journal Editorial Report."
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Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.)
Israel continues to bomb key Iranian military sites, while Iran is firing missiles at Israeli cities. Central to an Israeli strategic victory will be whether it can destroy Iran’s main nuclear-weapons sites, and that effort deserves American help.
Israel’s bombing is first and foremost an anti-nuclear-proliferation campaign. Other goals include attriting Tehran’s ballistic-missile capacity, which the regime had been escalating to be able to produce hundreds a month. Israel has also begun to target Iran’s domestic oil and gas supply chains after Iran’s attacks on Israeli civilian populations.
But the immediate strategic goal is to destroy, or at least significantly degrade, Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear bomb. As we write this, that goal hasn’t been achieved. Iran’s largest uranium enrichment site at Natanz has been damaged as has the Isfahan facility. Israel has also killed as many as 14 of Iran’s top scientists working on the program.
Isfahan is where Iran converts raw uranium into uranium feed gases for enrichment. “The strike dismantled a facility for producing metallic uranium, infrastructure for reconverting enriched uranium, laboratories, and additional infrastructure,” the Israel Defense Forces said on Friday. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which is in touch with Iranian officials, confirms that Isfahan has sustained considerable damage.
The damage to Natanz, where enrichment capacity is buried underground, is less clear. Veteran nuclear monitor David Albright finds that Israeli strikes destroyed Iran’s Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the electrical infrastructure powering the site. This could knock its centrifuges out of commission.
Meanwhile, the enrichment site at Fordow, which is buried deep under a mountain, has barely been touched. The enriched uranium at Fordow is believed to be enough to produce several bombs. The danger is that if Iran retains the nuclear fuel it has already highly enriched, as well as its centrifuges to enrich more, the country could sprint to make a bomb.
This is where the U.S. comes in. Israel lacks the deep penetrating bombs, and the heavy bombers to deliver them, that could do more damage to buried sites. The U.S. has both, and Israel would like U.S. help in taking out those nuclear sites.
President Trump seems reluctant to do so for reasons he and the Administration haven’t explained. Mr. Trump endorsed the initial attacks, though he continues to suggest that the bombing could increase the chances of a negotiated deal to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program. So far Iran has shown no such interest, and it chose not to attend scheduled talks in Oman on Sunday.
Mr. Trump posted on social media Sunday that “we can easily get a deal done” to end the war. But that prospect will be more likely if he helps Israel finish the military job. Israel is signaling that its campaign can take either a few days or many weeks. If Mr. Trump won’t help on Fordow, Israel will need more time to achieve its strategic goals. A neutral U.S. means a longer war.
The President is no doubt concerned that Iran or its proxies will hit U.S. troops or bases in the Middle East. But it isn’t clear how much damage Iran could do given how much Israel has degraded Iran’s forces. Iran also knows that attacking U.S. forces would mean a far more devastating U.S. response. The U.S. could destroy Iran’s navy, oil and gas production facilities and export terminals.
***
Mr. Trump’s other concern may be criticism from his MAGA isolationist wing. The podcast Metternichs are already attacking Mr. Trump merely for approving of the Israeli strikes. Asked about those critics on Saturday, the President gave an excellent answer.
“Well, considering that I’m the one that developed ‘America First,’ and considering that the term wasn’t used until I came along, I think I’m the one that decides that,” Mr, Trump told a writer for the Atlantic. “For those people who say they want peace—you can’t have peace if Iran has a nuclear weapon. So for all of those wonderful people who don’t want to do anything about Iran having a nuclear weapon—that’s not peace.”
The podcast critics won’t be any more vitriolic if the President helps end the war sooner by giving Israel the military capability to destroy Fordow and Natanz. Those are the real stakes. Now that the war is underway, the U.S. has a strategic and moral interest in destroying Iran’s nuclear threat and a rapid Israeli victory.
Appeared in the June 16, 2025, print edition as 'The Fordow Imperative'.
5. Israel and Iran exchange attacks; Trump vetoes plan to target Khamenei, US officials say
Why would we not want to eliminate Khamenei? The bigger question is are we (Israel, the region, and the international community) prepared for a new emerging leadership in Tehran? Are the policies in place to deal with a new emerging leader?
Excerpts:
When asked about the Reuters report on a plan to kill Khamenei, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Fox News on Sunday: “There’s so many false reports of conversations that never happened, and I’m not going to get into that.”
“We do what we need to do,” he told Fox’s “Special Report With Bret Baier.”
Regime change in Iran could be a result of Israel’s military attacks on the country, Netanyahu said, adding that Israel would do whatever is necessary to remove what he called the “existential threat” posed by Tehran.
Israel’s military spokesperson has said the current goal of the campaign is not a change in regime, but the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and removing its capabilities “to annihilate us”.
Israel and Iran exchange attacks; Trump vetoes plan to target Khamenei, US officials say
By Steve Holland, Maayan Lubell and Parisa Hafezi
theprint.in · by Reuters · June 15, 2025
In Israel, rescue teams combed through rubble of residential buildings destroyed by Iranian missiles, using sniffer dogs and heavy excavators to look for survivors after at least 10 people, including children, were killed, raising the two-day toll to 13.
Sirens rang out across the country after 4 p.m. on Sunday in the first such daylight alert, and fresh explosions could be heard in Tel Aviv.
In Iran, images from the capital showed the night sky lit up by a huge blaze at a fuel depot after Israel began strikes against Iran’s oil and gas sector – raising the stakes for the global economy and the functioning of the Iranian state.
Iran has not given a full death toll but said 78 people were killed on Friday and scores more have died since, including in a single attack that killed 60 on Saturday, half of them children, in a 14-storey apartment block flattened in Tehran.
Trump said the conflict – which has raised fears of a wider conflagration – could be ended easily, while also warning Iran that the U.S. could get involved if Iran hits any American targets.
When asked about the Reuters report on a plan to kill Khamenei, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Fox News on Sunday: “There’s so many false reports of conversations that never happened, and I’m not going to get into that.”
“We do what we need to do,” he told Fox’s “Special Report With Bret Baier.”
Regime change in Iran could be a result of Israel’s military attacks on the country, Netanyahu said, adding that Israel would do whatever is necessary to remove what he called the “existential threat” posed by Tehran.
Israel’s military spokesperson has said the current goal of the campaign is not a change in regime, but the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and removing its capabilities “to annihilate us”.
Financial markets are holding their breath to see whether oil prices surge further when trading resumes on Monday after the weekend, with potentially punishing consequences for the global economy, or settle down on hopes that Gulf exports will escape relatively unscathed.
Oil prices already shot up by 9% on Friday before Israel had struck any Iranian oil and gas targets.
‘OPERATION RISING LION’
Israel launched “Operation Rising Lion” with a surprise attack on Friday morning that wiped out the top echelon of Iran’s military command and damaged its nuclear sites, and says the campaign will continue to escalate in coming days.
Iran has vowed to “open the gates of hell” in retaliation in what has emerged as the biggest ever confrontation between the longstanding enemies.
The Israeli military warned Iranians living near weapons facilities to evacuate.
“Iran will pay a heavy price for the murder of civilians, women and children,” Netanyahu said from a balcony overlooking blown-out apartments in the town of Bat Yam, where six people were killed.
An official said Israel still had a long list of targets in Iran and declined to say how long the offensive would continue. Those attacked on Saturday evening included two “dual-use” fuel sites that supported military and nuclear operations, he said. Israel also said it hit an aerial refuelling aircraft in eastern Iran in its longest-range attack of the conflict.
President Masoud Pezeshkian said Iran’s responses will grow “more decisive and severe” if Israel’s hostile actions continue.
TRUMP WARNS IRAN NOT TO ATTACK
Israeli skies have been streaked with barrages of Iranian missiles and Israeli interceptor rockets. Some 22 of Iran’s 270 ballistic missiles fired over the past two nights breached Israel’s anti-missile shield, Israeli authorities say.
Trump has lauded Israel’s offensive while denying Iranian allegations that the U.S. has taken part in it.
“If we are attacked in any way, shape or form by Iran, the full strength and might of the U.S. Armed Forces will come down on you at levels never seen before,” he said in a message on Truth Social. “However, we can easily get a deal done between Iran and Israel, and end this bloody conflict.”
Trump had earlier said the U.S. had no role in Israel’s attack and warned Tehran not to widen its retaliation to include U.S. targets. The U.S. military has helped shoot down Iranian missiles that were headed toward Israel, two U.S. officials said on Friday.
Trump has repeatedly said Iran could end the war by agreeing to tough restrictions on its nuclear programme, which Iran says is for peaceful purposes but Western countries say could be used to make a bomb.
The latest round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, due to be held on Sunday, was scrapped after Tehran said it would not negotiate while under Israeli attack.
Israel has said its operation could last weeks. Netanyahu has openly urged Iran’s people to rise up against their Islamic clerical rulers.
OIL PRICE: TENSE WAIT FOR MARKETS TO OPEN
Since Saturday, Israel has hit the oil depot in Tehran and facilities at Iran’s huge South Fars gas field, the world’s largest, which produces gas for domestic consumption.
Israel so far has spared targets associated with Iran’s oil exports, while Tehran has yet to follow through on hinted threats to hinder shipping in the Gulf.
With markets due to reopen within hours, traders say oil buyers have loaded up on long-term contracts for protection in case of supply disruption, but uncertainty could drive wild price swings.
Iran said the situation at the burning Shahran oil depot in the capital was under control. It told citizens to seek shelter in mosques, schools and subways.
(Reporting by Reuters; Writing by Jonathan Spicer; Editing by Daniel Wallis, Raju Gopalakrishnan, Lincoln Feast, Kevin Liffey, Peter Graff and Giles Elgood)
Disclaimer: This report is auto generated from the Reuters news service. ThePrint holds no responsibility for its content.
theprint.in · by Reuters · June 15, 2025
6. Cyberattack on Washington Post Strikes Journalists’ Email Accounts
Why would they go after journalists? And of course the question is what cyberattacks against other journalists have gone undetected?
While many attack journalists for supposed bias and agenda driven reporting (which are really the result of publishers and corporate heads and not journalists), our adversaries know that our professional journalists are among some of the best informed on national security and economic issues; therefore the information they possess is valuable because they elicit much more information from sources than they are able to publish (with thin the narrow confines of the publisher's and corporate head's agendas).
Perhaps we should pay as much attention to journalists as our adversaries do. They seem to know something we do not.
Cyberattack on Washington Post Strikes Journalists’ Email Accounts
Reporters covering national security and economic policy were among the employees affected
https://www.wsj.com/tech/cybersecurity/cyberattack-on-washington-post-compromises-email-accounts-of-journalists-70bf1300
By Dustin Volz
Follow, Isabella Simonetti
Follow and Robert McMillan
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Updated June 15, 2025 3:41 pm ET
The Washington Post headquarters in Washington, D.C. Photo: eric baradat/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Key Points
What's This?
- Cyberattack on Washington Post compromised journalists’ email accounts.
- Intrusion targeted national-security and economic-policy reporters.
- Investigation started; additional steps taken to secure systems.
A cyberattack on the Washington Post compromised email accounts of several journalists and was potentially the work of a foreign government, company officials told some affected staffers in recent days, according to people familiar with the situation.
Staffers were told the intrusions compromised journalists’ Microsoft accounts and could have granted the intruder access to work emails they sent and received, some of the people said. The reporters targeted include those on the national-security and economic-policy teams, including some who write about China, the people said.
In an internal memo on Sunday, Post Executive Editor Matt Murray said he wanted to notify staff about a “possible targeted unauthorized intrusion into our email system,” adding that the Post believes a limited number of journalists’ accounts were affected. He said the company discovered the issue on Thursday evening and has begun an investigation.
Murray previously helped manage a similar incident during his tenure as editor in chief of The Wall Street Journal.
Microsoft declined to comment.
Staffers affected by the hack were notified in recent days and have been instructed not to discuss the matter.
Alongside senior security officials and politicians, journalists are among the most fruitful targets for nation-state hackers seeking to gain intelligence on behalf of foreign governments, according to law-enforcement officials and cybersecurity experts.
Reporters often speak to sources who might have valuable or sensitive information. Powerful surveillance tools have been frequently used against journalists and human-rights activists.
In a breach of Wall Street Journal parent News Corp, disclosed in 2022 and dating back to at least early 2020, hackers were able to search emails and documents of journalists, including drafts of articles. They appeared to be interested in a range of issues of importance to Beijing, such as Taiwan and China’s Uyghur ethnic group, the Journal reported.
News Corp’s cybersecurity consultant said at the time that the hack was likely meant to gather intelligence to benefit China’s interests.
The hack of the Post might be narrower, as it was believed to only breach emails, people familiar with the matter said. Reporters at the newspaper said they seldom put sensitive information into emails and instead prefer to use Slack for internal coordination and encrypted messaging services such as Signal to speak with sources.
Murray, in his staff note sent Sunday afternoon, said the news outlet has taken additional steps to secure its digital systems, including a forced credential reset for all Post employees.
“We do not believe this unauthorized intrusion impacted any additional Post systems or has had any impact for our customers,” Murray said.
Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com, Isabella Simonetti at isabella.simonetti@wsj.com and Robert McMillan at robert.mcmillan@wsj.com
Appeared in the June 16, 2025, print edition as 'Washington Post Is Hit By Cyberattack on Email'.
7. China Wants Our Hearts. Literally.
Excerpts:
U.S. critical infrastructure providers will not be able to defend their way out of a cyber war if China makes the technology they are trying to operate. China has disabled our ability to use deterrence by denial – China remains in our systems because it built them. The only way to restore deterrence by denial is to rip China out of our networks.
But that alone won’t be enough. President Trump and the new administration must deploy deterrence by punishment, including but not limited to sanctions, freezing of the assets of Chinese decisionmakers, counter-cyberattacks, and non-kinetic shows of force. It is past time for the United States to land a punch.
Time and American heartbeats are ticking.
China Wants Our Hearts. Literally.
13 June, 2025
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/china-medical-devices
By Samantha F. Ravich
Chair of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Dr. Samantha Ravich is the chairwoman of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and was a commissioner on the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission.
By Johanna Yang
Research and Editorial Associate, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Johanna “Jo” Yang is a research and editorial associate at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Her research focuses nation-state cyber threats, critical infrastructure protection, and U.S. cybersecurity policy.
OPINION — China is pre-positioning itself on U.S. networks for disruptive and destructive attacks against our critical infrastructure. In the past year, the American public learned that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can shut off our power and throw the country into darkness. Then, the news broke that the CCP compromised much of America’s telecommunication services, giving Beijing the capability to thwart our nation’s ability to speak privately, share information, and conduct business. And just in time for summer, the CCP is turning up the heat, capturing Americans’ most intimate personal information — our heart beats.
Masimo, a U.S.-based medical technology company that develops noninvasive monitoring solutions like pulse oximetry and brain function monitoring, suffered a cyberattack in late April that caused manufacturing and order fulfillment interruptions. The company identified unauthorized network activity on its servers, meaning patient health data may have been stolen or compromised. While the culprits still remain publicly unknown, China has previously stolen this kind of information. And if any cyber actor can compromise a patient care device, China can.
related
And China did. Earlier this year, researchers discovered that two widely used patient monitors manufactured by a Chinese healthcare technology company were sending patient data back to a Chinese university. According to an investigative report by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the monitors contain an embedded backdoor — not the result of a sloppy update but a deliberate code insertion — intended to allow Chinese access to American patient data.
These monitors house personally identifiable information and protected health information, as well as data on critical vital signs, including blood oxygen saturation, electrocardiogram, respiration rate, and blood pressure. The function allows the immediate exfiltration of everything the monitor displays, in addition to physician and patient chart information. The backdoor also allows an external IP to remotely download, execute, and overwrite unverified files on the monitor.
Most horrifying is that the vulnerability also allows for “remote code execution and device modification,” according to CISA, allowing bad actors to remotely control and input intentionally incorrect information on the device, potentially altering the monitor’s outputs. With incorrect data, physicians might prescribe the wrong treatment plan. To paint a grisly picture: The monitor may show that your heart rate is too high when in fact, your heart rate is normal. Medical staff could administer treatment to slow your heart rate, thinking that was the correct course of action, when instead the treatment is dangerous and even deadly.
With the way the function is executed, the hospital may never know that the incorrect treatment was the result of an intentionally faulty patient monitor.
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Hospitals are constantly facing the threat of ransomware attacks, forcing healthcare providers to return to analog charting. Typically, hospitals can see this network traffic and adjust. In the case of Contec monitors, healthcare providers have no way of knowing whether the data is altered in an emergency.
Enough is enough. To stop China’s malign meddling and defend U.S. national security, we must remove all Chinese technology from the American ecosystem. First, the government should provide actionable guidance to healthcare providers on how to immediately disconnect the devices from the network; to stop use of the devices if they rely on remote monitoring features; to unplug and replace the monitor with an alternative device; and to report any signs of tampering or data inconsistencies.
Next, the federal government should ban the purchase, and require the removal, of all Chinese-manufactured medical devices, because any Chinese technology means Chinese control of data and operations. The American public should not be in a position where an adversary can decide, at a time of its choosing, to shut off power, water, communications, and adequate medical care. We must stop buying medical technology — and any other technology used in critical infrastructure — made in China.
U.S. critical infrastructure providers will not be able to defend their way out of a cyber war if China makes the technology they are trying to operate. China has disabled our ability to use deterrence by denial – China remains in our systems because it built them. The only way to restore deterrence by denial is to rip China out of our networks.
But that alone won’t be enough. President Trump and the new administration must deploy deterrence by punishment, including but not limited to sanctions, freezing of the assets of Chinese decisionmakers, counter-cyberattacks, and non-kinetic shows of force. It is past time for the United States to land a punch.
Time and American heartbeats are ticking.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
8. Taiwan’s military reform is failing where it matters most
We cannot want to defend Taiwan more than the Taiwan people.
Taiwan’s military reform is failing where it matters most
Defense News · by Patrick Ko · June 13, 2025
When young conscripts in Taiwan refer to themselves as “cannon fodder,” it signals a crisis in trust that the government must not ignore. Taiwan’s government changed the duration of its mandatory military service from four months to one year beginning in 2024. A year into the reform, the Ministry of Defense admitted that it was falling behind schedule in training conscripts. Meanwhile, conscripts have shown growing dissatisfaction with the current system. Taiwan should seek a better and more efficient system based on its existing ROTC program, taking inspiration from the U.S. ROTC and Switzerland’s military service system.
One year after the conscription reform implementation, Taiwan’s military faced several setbacks in the enactment of its plan. According to a 2024 report by the Washington Post, Defense Minister Wellington Koo acknowledged that equipment and instructor shortages have delayed plans to improve training for reserves. In 2024, only 6% of conscripts eligible for the one-year military service chose to enlist, with most choosing to defer service to attend university. Due to the small intake of one-year conscripts, drones, surface-to-air Stinger missiles and antitank rocket training was postponed for the cohort.
These disappointing results demonstrate that without properly addressing systemic flaws within the military and the conscription system at large, reform efforts could fail. The conscription reform has demonstrated that systemic issues have had a negative effect on the military conscription system. Taiwan’s military personnel fell from 165,000 in 2022 to 153,000 in 2024.
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Train like you fight: Taiwan comes to grips with an old military adage
Military planners have vowed to inject a greater degree of realism into military training, as China readies new tactics for a potential invasion.
Meanwhile, conscripts are seen as temporary helping hands for full-time military staff; thus, one of the main reasons for the decrease in military training is understaffing and a lack of instructors. The military’s staff and instructor shortages could be addressed by either hiring veterans to act as instructors or enabling a path for conscripts in the final stages of conscription to teach new conscripts basic training skills.
Additionally, the alarmingly high suicide rates in Taiwan’s military have shaken public trust in the military. According to an exclusive report by the Reporter, from 2016 to 2024, 134 deaths of military personnel by suicide have been recorded. The report indicated that overwhelming workload and understaffing had a tremendous psychological impact on soldiers. Legislator Wu Szu-Yao pointed out that the ratio of “full-time psychological counselors with professional certificates” to all personnel was 1:2318. This begs the question: If soldiers cannot fight the psychological battle, how would they be able to fight an external enemy? Thus, to build trust and resilience, Taiwan should seek inspiration from its democratic partners for a more effective conscription system.
The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) in the U.S. and Switzerland’s mandatory military service are excellent models to take inspiration from. Taiwan already has a ROTC program, which was introduced by the Ministry of National Defense (MND), but it remains fairly limited in scope compared to the U.S. model. According to TVBS, the MND has signed agreements with 11 education centers and 129 schools, targeting recruitment of those aged 18 to 26. The program requires a commitment to serve in the military for five years upon graduation in exchange for three years of financial aid plus stipends during the participant’s education. Under the current ROTC program, cadets can attend civilian universities and attend regular classes, while also undertaking military training such as weekly military courses and military training during winter and summer breaks. Graduates from the program are assigned the rank of second lieutenant and receive specialized military training after graduation.
Taiwan’s MND should leverage the program by expanding and making it more flexible, such as giving the option for conscripts to choose, after college graduation, whether they wish to remain in the force or not. For those who desire to join the military, the MND could continue providing stipends and financial aid for their studies, while those unwilling to commit to the military after graduation would be limited to the usual stipend paid during military conscription.
Some might criticize the lack of military discipline that the ROTC program would bring to conscripts. A solution to this issue would be to conduct a basic training camp, similar to the ones regular conscripts go on, which could take five weeks. After graduating from basic training, conscripts could attend university while enrolled in the ROTC.
Taiwan could develop two pathways for Taiwanese male students as an alternative to the one-year military service, which would be applicable for both those who want to study in domestic and international universities. This reform would be crucial to reduce the personal, academic, and professional toll that one year of military service would take on conscripts and would accommodate those with academic ambitions domestically and abroad.
For the former, Taiwan could adopt the current U.S.-based ROTC model to replace the one-year conscription system. Students would attend weekly classes on ethics, tactics, leadership and military science alongside academic courses, regular physical training, summer camps, and field training exercises. Upon graduation, students could be committed to serving in the military for a specific time or join the reserve.
Meanwhile, students who choose to further their education abroad could opt for a digital curriculum, participating in online military education programs mirroring the domestic ROTC route. To complement their online learning and maintain physical conditions, intensive-mandatory training sessions would be required during academic breaks. Upon graduation, these students could potentially choose to join the active-duty service or participate in the reserve program.
Strengthening the training of reserve forces is equally important. Similarly to Taiwan, the Swiss army is made mostly of its conscripts, with men instantly joining the reserve after military service, but the Swiss reserve forces are regularly obligated to participate in periodic retraining courses. Taiwan’s military personnel are currently backed by a large reserve force of 1.66 million which could benefit from periodic retraining courses akin to the Swiss model.
According to Article 58 of the Swiss Constitution, every citizen must take on public duties to serve their community. The duty to serve is deeply ingrained in Switzerland and is a crucial part of its society. In contrast, Taiwanese society lacks a consensus on the effectiveness of the conscription system and lacks trust in the military. Revamping mandatory military service to be more flexible would improve public perception of the military.
Incorporating the U.S. and Swiss models could provide long-term benefits for young Taiwanese men in terms of their personal, academic and professional development, as it enables them to balance their personal plans with the duty to their country.
Taiwan has a long path to effectively reforming its conscription system. This comprehensive reform should appease conscripts’ anxieties and improve the conscription system’s structure by taking inspiration from the U.S. and Switzerland. To ensure young citizens are willing and ready to serve, Taiwan must change its approach to the conscription system as an opportunity for conscripts’ development. A smart conscription system is not only about defense but also about empowering Taiwan’s future.
Patrick Ko is a policy analyst at Safe Spaces, a policy consulting firm based in Taiwan and Washington, D.C. His work focuses on East Asian and Latin American international affairs.
9. Chinese FM holds phone calls with Israeli, Iranian counterparts
The CRInK is sticking together.
Chinese FM holds phone calls with Israeli, Iranian counterparts
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed Beijing's support for Tehran and called Israel's behaviour "unacceptable".
channelnewsasia.com
16 Jun 2025 12:21PM
BEIJING: China's top diplomat Wang Yi held phone calls with his Israeli and Iranian counterparts on Saturday (Jun 14), the foreign ministry said, in which he made clear to both Beijing's support for Tehran.
The two Middle Eastern powers exchanged fire on Saturday, a day after Israel unleashed an unprecedented aerial bombing campaign that targeted Iranian nuclear and military facilities.
International calls for restraint are multiplying as fears grow the region could be on the threshold of a broader conflict.
China's foreign ministry released separate statements late on Saturday announcing Wang's phone calls with his counterparts.
Wang first spoke to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, telling him Beijing "supports Iran in safeguarding its national sovereignty, defending its legitimate rights and interests, and ensuring the safety of its people".
China enjoys close ties with Iran - Beijing is its largest commercial partner and the main buyer of its oil, with Tehran still under crushing US sanctions.
Wang told Araghchi that Israel's actions "seriously violate ... the basic norms governing international relations", and noted the attacks on Tehran's nuclear facilities "have set a dangerous precedent with potentially catastrophic consequences".
A second statement released shortly afterwards detailed Wang's talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar.
Wang told Saar that "China clearly opposes Israel's violation of international law by attacking Iran with force", calling its behaviour "unacceptable".
Wang recounted his phone call with Araghchi to Saar, the statement said.
"Diplomatic means for the Iranian nuclear issue have not been exhausted and there is still hope for a peaceful solution. Force cannot bring lasting peace," Wang was quoted as saying.
He told both men that China was willing to play "a constructive role" in de-escalating the conflict.
Source: AFP/lk
Newsletter
10. Global Fragility Act in Coastal West Africa: Policy Lessons from US Engagement in the Sahel
Excerpts:
Based on these findings, there are several recommendations that policymakers should consider to gain a strategic advantage over great power competitors like Russia in Africa. First establish a working redeployment framework that would assist in case contingencies occur where US forces are summarily expelled from countries like Niger. To avoid similar cases, the DoD should base future deployments on a democracy resiliency assessment, which weighs democratic vulnerabilities like the history of coup d’états. Second, advocate for waivers under section 7008 in countries where US national security interests are at risk and civilian governance remains a viable option so that DoD access can be maintained. Third, establish civil-military cells in high-risk border regions to facilitate regional coordination among coastal West Africa states. Finally, enhance early warning mechanisms by creating emergency operations coordination centers in vulnerable areas where Civil Affairs assessments can be fed into an interagency database that maps instability factors in communities.
The lessons learned from the United States’ counterterrorism strategy failure in the Sahel could inform future security partnerships in West Africa. The complex security crisis in the Sahel will eventually spread to coastal West Africa and negatively impact these more prosperous states. It would be a mistake to take a heavily security-focused approach rather than one focused on good governance practices. An increased emphasis on civil-military relations, themed assessments, fact-finding, and furthering dialogue between at-risk groups in the northern border regions can increase resiliency against the expansion of violent extremism.
The local dynamics found in these assessments, such as farmer-herder tensions and civil vulnerabilities like crop shortages, are then mitigated to prevent conflict. In the near term, recommendations for stabilization should also include regional information sharing centers, intelligence fusion cells, and blended command systems to foster that interagency collaboration which the regional strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability was designed for.
Global Fragility Act in Coastal West Africa: Policy Lessons from US Engagement in the Sahel
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/16/global-fragility-act-in-coastal-west-africa/
by James Tchokogoue
|
06.16.2025 at 06:00am
US Army photo by Sgt. Ashlind House. The appearance of US Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.
Introduction
With the recent United States Department of Defense (DoD) completion of its withdrawal from Niger and redeployment of US military personnel and equipment to coastal West Africa, it would be prudent for the DoD to consolidate gains from the civil-military engagements and partnerships that built strong community resilience against violent extremist expansion. Since 2012, when jihadists began expanding from Mali into other neighboring Sahelian countries such as Niger and Burkina Faso, there has been several tactics that groups like Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb have used to consolidate their presence. These tactics have included co-opting or creating jihadist groups, integrating themselves into communities where conflict or grievance exists, exploiting those grievances to gain support, stifling dissent, and exploring other areas in which to expand once their base is fully consolidated.
The security partnership between the DoD and Niger’s Ministry of National Defense is a case study of how Civil Affairs personnel can assist with the prevention and resiliency against violent extremist expansion into communities in the region where civil vulnerabilities exist. As Russia steps in to fill the security void and conduct disinformation campaigns in the Sahel, the DoD and the wider United States Government (USG) should preserve the lessons learned from these previous civil-military engagements. By conducting similar assessments and engagements, Civil Affairs personnel can reduce the impact of further attempts by violent extremist groups to expand into coastal West Africa while reducing the appeal of the Russian way of war.
Background
Current US military engagement efforts in northwest Africa can be traced back to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership initiative, which is by all accounts now considered a failure. Despite the strategic blunders, there have been some successes in tactical operations across the region with US Army Special Operations Forces units like Civil Affairs. Since 2009, Civil Affairs teams operating in the Sahel region of Africa have worked to integrate defense, diplomatic, and development objectives within US Embassy Country teams in the region. By specializing in governance, assessing socioeconomic issues, and resilience building, they have extended the US DoD lines of effort to project stability in under-governed spaces, as evidenced by their success in Mali. However, as the political realities in the Sahel shifted as a result of differing objectives between France and countries like Mali, militaries overthrew their governments.
This activity can be very destabilizing to the region. As the USG implements the Global Fragility Act (GFA) through its 10-year strategic plan to prevent conflict and promote stability, military governments make it impossible for regional collaboration. The GFA was passed by US Congress in 2019 to address some of the vulnerabilities that states have that can be conducive to conflict and facilitate increased cooperation amongst the US interagency to address such vulnerabilities. However, DoD security cooperation with governments overthrown by their militaries is blocked, which misses a key stability piece as the GFA countries of Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire are bordered by Mali or Burkina Faso. Thus, a lack of stability in Mali or Burkina Faso has inevitably spilled over into the coastal West African states.
According to law, in section 7008 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, the DoD is prohibited from providing military training and equipment to a country’s military forces where an overthrow of an elected head of government by force or a coup has taken place. This creates a potential conundrum for the potential redeployment of DoD personnel to other countries in the region where democratic values are not as entrenched. DoD security cooperation partnerships with countries with new or emerging democracies can be fragile, so it is imperative that partners are thoroughly assessed for democratic vulnerabilities before an agreement is signed to avoid future complications like in Niger.
Since 2020, most of the countries that the DoD has partnered with in the Sahel have, one way or another, fallen due to military coups, changing the nature of future security cooperation partnerships in the wider West Africa region. For example, the DoD had a drone base in Niger in the northern city of Agadez which was finally opened in 2018. This drone base was used for surveillance of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel and was vital for the support of French military operations in the region. However, in July 2023, the leader of the Presidential Guard, Abdourahamane Tiani, deposed the democratically elected President Mohammed Bazoum in a coup d’état. Despite this politically tenuous situation, the US military remained in the country until a delegation from the State Department and DoD visited the country in March 2024. After this visit, the US military was quite arbitrarily ordered to leave the country without delay, which culminated in a complete withdrawal by September 2024.
With this, great power competitors like Russia have stepped into the void left by France and the United States. France, being the former colonial power of many countries in West Africa, with military bases and strong economic ties, has recently faced a wave of anti-French sentiment. This has given rise to the popularity of military strongmen who took control of the governments in the Sahel. Russia has propped up authoritarian governments in the Sahel that the United States or the West at large would never support. By copying its playbook from the Central African Republic, where they trade regime protection and arms transfers for mining concessions, Russia has become the new partner of choice instead of the United States. American and Russian presence in Africa dates back to the times of the Cold War, where there was a geopolitical competition for influence. Many countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia, in their quest for regional supremacy in the 1970s, relied on Soviet (current day Russia) or US security assistance to resist against foreign occupation. With the fall of the Soviet Union and Russia’s resurgent behavior on the continent, US security cooperation in Africa now has a competitor who navigates some of the political realities in West Africa better than the US, despite current efforts.
Coastal West Africa Security Implications
In Côte d’Ivoire, episodic engagements such as joint combined exchange training and joint exercises like Flintlock with participation by Civil Affairs forces have occurred frequently since 2020. These exchanges focused on the tactical, medical, and dental capacity of the security forces of Côte d’Ivoire to provide essential services to their civilian population. The intended goal of these activities is to improve the civil-military relations of security forces in the country to prevent a localized jihadist sentiment in the northern border areas. However, just as in Niger with the neighboring jihadist incursions from Mali, the northern border areas of Cote d’Ivoire face similar security threats originating from Burkina Faso. Jihadist groups have taken advantage of security vacuums surrounding porous borders to spread into these neighboring countries. Since 2020, there have been sporadic jihadist attacks within 50 kilometers of the border between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire or within the territory of Côte d’Ivoire itself.
With the recent political turmoil in the central Sahel States of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the security situation will only get worse before it gets better. As a result of the military junta’s stance in power in the aforementioned states, and Russian private military contractors’ conduct during operations, an overly enemy-centric approach from them will only exacerbate the conflict dynamics in the Sahel. Russian PMCs have capitalized on anti-French sentiment to entrench themselves with central Sahel states by providing security protection for the juntas in exchange for mining rights. This will further drive up the number of refugees, internally displaced people, and jihadist group movements as they plan to seek areas that are considered safe havens. Coupled with disinformation campaigns from the Russians and the juntas themselves, neighboring countries are at risk of destabilization due to the spread of false information.
In fact, the military juntas in the Sahel are playing into the tactics of Al-Qaida-aligned groups who hope to capitalize on grievances and overly abusive security forces in their operations. By deliberately targeting the Fulani ethnic group that is heavily discriminated against by the Sahelian security forces, this has led to some of them being driven into the ranks of the jihadist groups. The Mali-based Fulani commander Amadou Koufa of the Al-Qaida subgroup named the Macina Liberation Front has leveraged these grievances and tasked other jihadis in Burkina Faso to recruit in Côte d’Ivoire.
Regional Strategy Implementation
As the DoD conducts its potential redeployment due to the coup d’états in the Sahel to coastal West Africa, with Cote d’Ivoire considered a high priority as a location as a result of its relative stability, it would serve American policymakers to invest more in civil-military support in the northern border areas of Cote d’Ivoire. The United States’ ten-year strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability in coastal West Africa outlines commendable objectives, including the enhancement of social cohesion and the improvement of government and security force responsiveness. However, it lacks coordinated efforts from the US interagency to advance them. This strategy stems from the GFA, which is a document that outlines the US government’s strategy from the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, and the DoD to jointly address factors negatively impacting stability in fragile countries. From the DoD scope of support to the plan, Civil Affairs personnel are well-suited to address all three objectives. Beyond the medical-focused events that have happened so far in Côte d’Ivoire, Civil Affairs can positively improve community relations by organizing and conducting peace dialogues held between security forces and civilians. Initially, once identified, themes such as justice and topics such as civil protection are discussed at the forums between diverse groups, like Fulani refugees and other groups in the area, to see which issues may arise.
These forums, which may include stakeholders from all walks of society, such as tribal elders, religious leaders, or local prefects, can increase the social contract between the government and the population. Civil vulnerabilities identified by Civil Affairs personnel and addressed with these engagements taking place in or near centers where refugees processed from Burkina Faso can mitigate conflict. Once a social bond is formed between the populace and local security forces, this entity can serve as an early warning mechanism to prevent radicalization or implantation of jihadist ideology. It would be foolhardy to ignore the problems of the Sahel by only focusing on the coastal West African States’ security, governance, and development issues. Many of the sub-regions’ ethnic groups traverse borders across the Sahel into coastal West Africa due to family or economic ties. The problems that negatively impact the Sahel will impact the stability of neighboring countries. It is all connected.
How Can Civil Affairs Forces be Resourced Through Personnel and Policy to Mitigate Refugee Exploitation?
The northern border regions of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana have, in recent years, received an influx of Burkinabé refugees and asylum seekers fleeing violence and instability from Burkina Faso. In 2023 alone, approximately 40,000 Burkinabé have sought safety in host communities and government-run transit centers in the northern border regions of Côte d’Ivoire. The asylum seekers are Fulani pastoralists, and the cattle they have brought with them are consuming crops and straining water resources that are already scarce in the host community. This has increased the burden of hosting the Burkinabé refugees on the local Ivorian population. As a result, increased farmer-herder tensions may lead to a decrease in social cohesion and increased interethnic violence, which may be exploited by jihadist groups. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire’s policy of expulsion of certain refugees in the northern border region back into Burkina Faso will likely further exacerbate tensions and create grievances among groups vulnerable to jihadi recruitment. This might lead to further destabilization as jihadist groups recruit and entrench where poverty, lack of employment, and other grievances fester. Politically, there exist some vulnerabilities as Côte d’Ivoire is in an election year, has recently faced civil wars, and has a president who is strongly anticipated to run for a fourth term in office. All of these risk factors play into how the careful employment of Civil Affairs forces can strengthen a strategic opportunistic landscape for the USG.
Civil Affairs forces can support security forces and civil authorities of Côte d’Ivoire to address these issues. By co-locating four-person Civil Affairs teams augmented with functional specialists directly with units in the northern region, some of these civil vulnerabilities can be addressed. Based on the needs of the mission, these functional specialists can vary, but for this example, military government specialists in the skill identifier of agri-business/food, and law/border enforcement would be well suited to address the issues in these communities. For example, Civil Affairs teams, along with the agricultural specialists, can identify the specific crop or water issue that the livestock of refugees are consuming, which may negatively impact the local Ivorian farmer in the host community. Civil Affairs could then propose the appropriate sustainable solutions for watershed management, livestock management, or soil practices. Law and border enforcement specialists can advise Ivorian security forces on the rule of law, efficient practice of biometrics, and processing of refugees. This can lead to the identification and surveillance of refugees who are arriving from Burkina Faso.
Importantly, these Civil Affairs activities should be conducted in collaboration with the interagency, such as the Department of Agriculture or USAID Foreign Service Officers and Department of Justice advisors from the US Embassy. An interagency approach is recommended not just because of the Global Fragility Act but also because of the nature of the problem in West Africa at large. It requires not a heavily security-focused approach, but a governance and development-led one. Ultimately, by conducting these activities, civil vulnerabilities can be addressed, such as food insecurity and potential infiltration of jihadists or jihadist sympathizers. If the conditions in the communities in the northern border region of Côte d’Ivoire are neglected, there could be an increase in conflict and an opportunity for groups like Al Qaida to come in and exploit the situation. As a result of such instability, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire would face an insurgency that could threaten its existence in one of the most economically prosperous countries in the West African region. This would spread chaos into stable countries like Ghana.
Policy Recommendations
Based on these findings, there are several recommendations that policymakers should consider to gain a strategic advantage over great power competitors like Russia in Africa. First establish a working redeployment framework that would assist in case contingencies occur where US forces are summarily expelled from countries like Niger. To avoid similar cases, the DoD should base future deployments on a democracy resiliency assessment, which weighs democratic vulnerabilities like the history of coup d’états. Second, advocate for waivers under section 7008 in countries where US national security interests are at risk and civilian governance remains a viable option so that DoD access can be maintained. Third, establish civil-military cells in high-risk border regions to facilitate regional coordination among coastal West Africa states. Finally, enhance early warning mechanisms by creating emergency operations coordination centers in vulnerable areas where Civil Affairs assessments can be fed into an interagency database that maps instability factors in communities.
Conclusions
The lessons learned from the United States’ counterterrorism strategy failure in the Sahel could inform future security partnerships in West Africa. The complex security crisis in the Sahel will eventually spread to coastal West Africa and negatively impact these more prosperous states. It would be a mistake to take a heavily security-focused approach rather than one focused on good governance practices. An increased emphasis on civil-military relations, themed assessments, fact-finding, and furthering dialogue between at-risk groups in the northern border regions can increase resiliency against the expansion of violent extremism.
The local dynamics found in these assessments, such as farmer-herder tensions and civil vulnerabilities like crop shortages, are then mitigated to prevent conflict. In the near term, recommendations for stabilization should also include regional information sharing centers, intelligence fusion cells, and blended command systems to foster that interagency collaboration which the regional strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability was designed for.
Tags: Africa, Civil Affairs, Global Fragility Act, Sahel, US Department of Defense, USAID
About The Author
- James Tchokogoue
- James Tchokogoue is a Regional Expertise & Culture instructor at 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne). He was also a Fulbright Public Policy Fellow to West Africa and a Civil Affairs Non-Commissioned Officer. He has presented on a diverse set of topics related to the nexus of development, security, and governance to the State Department, US embassy country teams, and the Fulbright Program. He holds a Master of Public Health degree and is currently in a Master’s program in International Relations with a focus on Intelligence. He is a distinguished honor graduate of the US Army Civil Affairs qualification course.
11. Book Review | Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine
Excerpts:
Putin’s Wars offers critical insights into the wars themselves and the strategic thinking behind them. The book is especially valuable for military professionals, political analysts, policymakers, and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of modern international relations, the worldview of Russian elites, and Russia’s approach to global politics.
Several key ideas are worth emphasizing: Russia and its foreign policy should not be seen as straightforward, transparent, or honest. The wisest approach is to interpret all official statements in the exact opposite manner. For instance, when they declare, “We do not seek war,” it serves as a signal to prepare for defense. The second and more crucial point concerns external interference and the destabilizing influence exerted on the political systems of other nations and alliances through hybrid methods, as previously discussed. Unfortunately, bureaucratic systems in democratic countries lack effective countermeasures against this particular threat.
Book Review | Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/16/putins-wars-book-review/
by Mykyta Zhuiko
|
06.16.2025 at 06:01am
Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. By Mark Galeotti. Osprey Publishing, 2022. ISBN: 978-1472847546. Pp. 384. $22.00.
Summary
Mark Galeotti’s Putin’s Wars offers a detailed analysis of how Vladimir Putin has employed military force, including regular and special operations units, as well as the Federal Security Service (FSB), to shape Russia’s political system, consolidate domestic power, and advance the country’s global position. Galeotti, an internationally recognized expert on Russian security affairs, demonstrates that Putin’s wars – from Chechnya in the 1990s to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – follow a consistent pattern, with methods of warfare continuously refined and adapted to both immediate adversaries and the evolving global politico-economic environment. The book serves as both a historical chronicle and a warning to democratic world leaders about how military power is employed by authoritarian regimes, particularly those with nuclear capabilities and substantial financial resources. Galeotti’s central thesis is that Putin’s wars are carefully calculated moves within a long-term strategy to maintain Russia’s status as a “great power.” At times, war reinforces Putin’s domestic authority by combating separatist movements or diverting public attention from internal problems; at other times, war extends influence abroad or sends strategic signals to the West. Galeotti elucidates how each conflict—Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, Syria, and Ukraine—fits into this overarching strategic framework.
The book begins with the First Chechen War (1994–1996), during which the Russian military was still recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union. It then moves to the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), marked by extreme brutality and bloodshed but instrumental in propelling Putin to power. By employing ruthless force alongside unconventional tactics, Putin not only reestablished control over Chechnya but also crafted his image as a strong and decisive leader. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 demonstrated Russia’s growing military capabilities and willingness to use force to assert its interests in its near abroad. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 further exemplified Putin’s strategy of employing limited military intervention combined with political manipulation to achieve strategic objectives. Russia’s involvement in Syria allowed it to test its air force, evaluate new weaponry, develop special forces tactics in localized operations, and demonstrate its capacity to project power far from its borders. The final section of the book is dedicated to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine—the most significant armed conflict in Europe since World War II. Galeotti explains that Russia anticipated a swift victory but encountered fierce Ukrainian resistance. The war revealed numerous vulnerabilities within the Russian military, including poor planning, logistical failures, corruption, and unrealistic objectives. Galeotti emphasizes that this failure does not imply Putin will abandon the use of military force, warning that an excessive concentration of power in the hands of a single individual leads to perilous decision-making and poses enduring risks, as defeat could equate to both the political and literal demise of the leader.
Authoritarian leaders often surround themselves with loyalists who reinforce their biases instead of offering critical perspectives. This leads to flawed intelligence assessments, unrealistic military ambitions, and policies driven by personal survival rather than national interest. Russia’s miscalculations in Ukraine can be seen as a direct consequence of such insulated decision-making, where Putin relied on distorted assumptions about Ukrainian resistance and Western unity instead of pragmatic assessments. Many authoritarian leaders equate military defeat with both their political and physical downfall, driving them to escalate conflicts in desperate attempts to secure their power. This dynamic increases the likelihood of prolonged wars, reckless strategies, and further destabilization. Unfortunately, this creates the idea that there is no way for Putin to stop the current war in Ukraine.
Analysis
Hybrid Warfare
Galeotti’s analysis of “hybrid warfare” is one of the book’s most compelling aspects. He illustrates how Russia has learned to integrate unconventional warfare into regular military forces, e.g., fake news, social media propaganda, cyberattacks, and private military contractors, particularly the Wagner Group. This multifaceted approach complicates efforts to counter Russia’s military strategies and allows operations to be conducted covertly or without formal attribution. Galeotti contends that this method reflects Russia’s anxiety about being marginalized in the contemporary global order and its desire to act in ways distinct from Western norms. Utilizing all available methods that democratic nations cannot access due to legal or ethical constraints, Russia aims to establish itself as a fully-fledged actor on the global stage.
Comparative Perspectives
Galeotti’s work provides valuable insights into Putin’s strategic thinking. His detailed examination of Russia’s military operations offers a clear understanding of the evolution of Russian military doctrine and its adaptation to various geopolitical contexts. To fully appreciate Galeotti’s contribution, it is helpful to consider his work in the context of other analyses of Russian military history and the broader study of authoritarian warfare. Scholars such as Catlin Talmadge, in The Dictator’s Army, have explored military power dynamics in authoritarian regimes, highlighting how personalist dictatorships can shape military effectiveness and strategic decision-making. These works often emphasize the risks of centralized control and the potential for miscalculation, themes that resonate with Galeotti’s analysis of Putin’s leadership. Furthermore, studies of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) approach to military power, which emphasizes a different blend of economic, diplomatic, and military tools, provide a comparative perspective.
Russia’s dependence on direct military aggression and hybrid warfare creates instability and immediate confrontation, while the CCP’s focus on economic leverage and technological dominance enables long-term systemic influence without resorting to direct military conflict. This contrast underscores the varying degrees of sustainability and global acceptance of authoritarian power projection. While Russia’s strategy often provokes significant resistance and sanctions, China’s approach promotes deeper integration into global markets and institutions, making its influence more enduring.
Limitations
Putin’s Wars is a timely and significant contribution to understanding contemporary authoritarian warfare. The book is well-written and balanced. Galeotti renders complex military and political concepts understandable to readers without a background in security studies. He refrains from depicting Russia as purely malevolent or Putin as a caricatured villain; instead, he provides a nuanced analysis of decision-making processes while maintaining a critical stance. However, some shortcomings should be noted. First, the coverage of the earlier conflicts, particularly the conclusion of the Second Chechen War, is somewhat superficial. Second, the book devotes considerable attention to the leadership of security agencies and their influence on the development (or degradation) of the Russian armed forces, as well as detailed descriptions of the structure and composition of various Russian military units, which might feel excessive to some readers.
Considering the events after 2022, Galeotti’s analysis essentially holds up. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine has tragically validated his warnings about the dangers of unchecked authoritarian power and the potential for devastating conflict. As a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, I can attest to the accuracy of his assessment of Russia’s military vulnerabilities, particularly regarding planning and logistics. However, the scale and intensity of the Ukrainian resistance may have exceeded Galeotti’s initial expectations, highlighting the importance of national will and resilience in modern warfare.
Conclusion
Putin’s Wars offers critical insights into the wars themselves and the strategic thinking behind them. The book is especially valuable for military professionals, political analysts, policymakers, and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of modern international relations, the worldview of Russian elites, and Russia’s approach to global politics.
Several key ideas are worth emphasizing: Russia and its foreign policy should not be seen as straightforward, transparent, or honest. The wisest approach is to interpret all official statements in the exact opposite manner. For instance, when they declare, “We do not seek war,” it serves as a signal to prepare for defense. The second and more crucial point concerns external interference and the destabilizing influence exerted on the political systems of other nations and alliances through hybrid methods, as previously discussed. Unfortunately, bureaucratic systems in democratic countries lack effective countermeasures against this particular threat.
Written in Ukrainian and translated into English with Grammarly.
Tags: Book review, Crimea, Georgia, Hybrid Warfare, Russia-Ukraine War, Russian military strategy, Vladimir Putin
About The Author
- Mykyta Zhuiko
- Colonel Mykyta Zhuiko has served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 20 years and last held the position of Chief of the Analysis and Monitoring Department in the Strategic Communication Directorate. Throughout his career, he advanced from a psychological operations (PSYOPS) officer to a position in the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
12. Why China Missed Its Golden Philippines Opportunity
Conclusion:
Finally, this case demonstrates that future efforts to counter Chinese grand strategy will be most successful when U.S. policymakers can identify instances where China’s foreign policy apparatus breaks down due to the fragmentation of relevant Chinese actors or a fixation on nationalist paradigms over realist thinking. While it is unlikely that there will be many cases such as the Philippines where a foreign policy establishment and public are so well-aligned with the United States to start with, less dramatic opportunities may arise for the United States to pull third parties into its orbit or counter Chinese efforts to do the same.
Why China Missed Its Golden Philippines Opportunity
China missed the chance to win over the Philippines under Duterte because of a breakdown in its foreign policy apparatus. Duterte’s poor credibility did not help either.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/why-china-missed-its-golden-philippines-opportunity/
By Nathan McQuarrie
June 14, 2025
The Philippines’ then-President Rodrigo Duterte and China’s President Xi Jinping shake hands prior to their bilateral meetings at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, Oct. 20, 2016.
Credit: King Rodriguez/ Philippine Presidential Department
In a 2016 speech in Beijing, the then-recently elected president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, declared that it was time for the Philippines “to say goodbye” to its 70-year economic and security partnership with the United States. Instead, Duterte declared, the Philippines would “charter a new course” and align with China.
For the United States, the Philippines’ realignment with China was a disaster and seemingly toppled one of the key pillars of its “Pivot to Asia” strategy. And yet, less than four years after his declaration in Beijing – and despite his best efforts – Duterte found himself begrudgingly pivoting back to the United States. Today, under Duterte’s successor Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines-U.S. alliance is stronger than it has been in decades.
How did this happen? Why did China fail to exploit a golden opportunity to pull the Philippines out of the United States’ orbit?
While much has been written about why Duterte made the seemingly inextricable choice to align with China, few have examined why Beijing decided to pursue a strategy that ultimately pushed the Philippines back toward the U.S. alliance, or the implications that this case has for China’s future foreign policy behavior.
In this case, four potential explanations for China’s behavior stand out, with the first two finding weak support from the events that unfolded during Duterte’s presidency, and the second two finding stronger support.
The Trade-Offs Argument
The simplest explanation is that Beijing believed the tradeoffs it would have to make to cement a China-Philippines alignment were too costly, especially any tradeoffs involving territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The value that Beijing places in these claims is difficult to understate. First, food security has long been an acute concern for Chinese leaders, and the South China Sea is a rich fishing ground. Second, as China’s trade has grown, so too has its reliance on the sea lines of communication that extend through the South China Sea. Finally, China’s military installations in the South China Sea provide Beijing with significant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the region, and contribute to China’s focus on achieving information superiority as part of its “informationized warfare” concept.
If China were to compromise with the Philippines on those claims, it could send a signal to others, especially Vietnam, that Beijing lacked the resolve to uphold its outstanding claims against them as well, potentially leading to an erosion of its position.
However, this explanation is not particularly convincing. Had Beijing left current Philippine installations alone while standing firm on its current possessions, it could have courted the Philippines while sill deterring Vietnam, thus avoiding costly tradeoffs. Such a strategy would not have sacrificed most of China’s fishing activities, its sea line of communications, or its existing military bases.
At the very least, depriving the United States of one of its key allies in the Indo-Pacific should have been seen as worth the risk of moderately increasing Vietnam’s boldness in the South China Sea, or even sacrificing some fishing activities. Accordingly, Beijing’s decision-making around the Philippines does not appear to have been informed by an intensive cost-benefit analysis. At the very least, such an analysis was unduly weighted by a nationalist view, or an overinflated valuation, of China’s South China Sea claims.
The Audience Costs Argument
A second potential explanation for China’s missed Philippines opportunity is that President Xi Jinping faced significant audience costs due to his government’s increasingly nationalist rhetoric. When discussing the South China Sea, Chinese officials often invoke the pride of China’s people, insisting that they would never accept any infringement on their sovereignty. Risking public backlash by backing down may have been seen as too costly by a regime that prizes internal security above all else.
Again, however, this argument finds little support. It is unclear whether Xi can truly generate audience costs given the increasingly personalist nature of his regime, and his ability to largely suppress public discontent. In addition, multiple analyses suggest that while Chinese policymakers do consider public opinion when it comes to South China Sea policy, thus far public opinion has not decisively shaped it.
The Credibility Argument
A third argument, which is better supported by the facts on the ground, is that Beijing never fully believed that Duterte’s overtures were credible. While Duterte himself repeatedly lavished praise on China and signaled his intent to move away from the United States, he failed to present a unified message. When Duterte visited Beijing in 2016 and declared the end of the Philippines’ relationship with the United States, his finance and economic planning secretaries hurriedly issued statements to clarify that the Philippines was not seeking to cut ties wholesale with the West. Before Xi’s visit to Manila in 2018, Duterte’s secretary of foreign affairs undercut a proposed deal to jointly develop gas and oil in the South China Sea.
Leaders of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were even more reluctant than Duterte’s Cabinet to align with China. When an Islamic State affiliate took over the Philippine city of Marawi, senior AFP commanders apparently went over Duterte’s head to enlist U.S. military support. Additionally, those commanders ignored Duterte’s orders to cease joint South China Sea patrols with the United States and rebuffed invitations from the Chinese military to participate in joint exercises. One senior naval official claimed that “it will take more than one term of a president to shift seventy or more years of relations with the U.S.”
To Beijing, it may have seemed that Duterte was the only significant Philippine actor who wanted alignment. The Philippine public, while seemingly offering China a chance in 2017, continued to hold much more favorable views of the United States.
Duterte’s volatile personality did not help his case either. When Duterte visited Beijing, one Chinese scholar claimed that “he still could change his words in the future,” and that he was a “very, very volatile guy” who would be difficult to trust. Accordingly, Chinese policymakers likely asked why they should risk watering down China’s South China Sea claims or devote more resources to courting the Philippines if the mercurial Duterte or his successor were likely to renege on a deal later.
The Foreign Policy Breakdown Argument
A final explanation for this case, which also finds strong support, is that China’s foreign policy apparatus failed to align its policies on the Philippines – or the operations of key actors – with wider Chinese grand strategy. Despite how many Western observers portray China, its foreign policy is not the result of a unitary process, but the result of “competition and compromise” among various actors. While Xi leads the direction of long-term strategy and sets policy goals through Leading Small Groups, many of the details are left for lower authorities to iron out.
A factor that further erodes Chinese foreign policy cohesion, especially in the South China Sea, is the partial autonomy of China’s maritime militia fishing fleet. Rather than use naval vessels to stake its territorial claims, China has primarily utilized its maritime militia. Doing so allows the navy to focus on blue water activities and provides China with some level of deniability as it engages in gray zone operations. However, the maritime militia’s lines of authority are entangled, as the militia is not a coherent body but is constituted of various groups operating under local and provincial authorities as well as different military authorities.
The lack of cohesion among various Chinese foreign policy actors was evident throughout the Duterte years. From 2018 onward, Beijing continually engaged in provocative actions in the South China Sea, even at key moments when Duterte extended olive branches. For instance, only six days after Duterte announced in 2020 that he would terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States – a pillar of Philippines-U.S. military cooperation – a Chinese naval ship targeted a Philippine Navy ship on patrol with its gun control director. A day later, as many as 76 maritime militia vessels were seen in the waters around Thitu Island, the Philippines’ largest outpost in the South China Sea.
A truly aligned and functional Chinese foreign policy apparatus would have seized the opportunities that Duterte repeatedly offered – especially his suspension of the Visiting Forces Agreement in 2020 – to pull the Philippines further away from the United States. Instead, Beijing either failed to perceive the significance of the suspension, or it failed to sufficiently coordinate the operations of naval and maritime militia units to forestall any actions that might antagonize the Philippines. As a result, Duterte’s olive branches were repeatedly rejected, forcing him to back pedal. Duterte eventually had no choice but to stand up for Philippine claims in the South China Sea and restore the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States in full.
A smooth foreign policy process would also have placed a higher priority on the Philippine development projects undertaken by Chinese state-owned enterprises. When Duterte visited Beijing in 2016, he secured $24 billion in development assistance from China. And yet only 5 percent of that pledge had come to fruition by the end of Duterte’s presidency. Additionally, the rebuilding of Marawi, spearheaded by Chinese companies, also progressed extremely slowly, further damaging Philippine public opinion of China.
Implications for U.S. Policymakers
In sum, Beijing’s actions on the ground during Duterte’s presidency suggest that it responded cautiously to the Philippines’ overtures due to Duterte’s perceived low credibility, and that it simultaneously failed to align its Philippines strategy with wider grand strategy due to a dysfunctional and fractured foreign policy apparatus. Had Beijing not placed such great emphasis on its South China Sea claims, it is possible that it would have developed a more flexible and tailored strategy toward the Philippines under Duterte.
In contrast, the flexibility of the United States under former President Joe Biden – who was willing to overlook Marcos Jr.’s familial past and populist rhetoric – enabled Washington to seize the moment in 2022 to pull the Philippines back into its orbit and construct an even stronger alliance than existed before.
Should China’s foreign policy community learn from its mistakes during the Duterte years, then a more accommodating Philippine leader after Marcos might find a more aligned and worthwhile partner in China, especially if that Philippine leader is less volatile than Duterte. Whether Xi’s China has enough flexibility to learn from its mistakes and pursue a more aligned strategy is an open question, but U.S. policymakers should not underestimate Chinese flexibility or assume that the Philippines will automatically remain in its orbit. The Philippines-U.S. relationship will require constant attention, and the early signals thus far from President Donald Trump’s second administration towards the Philippines are encouraging.
Finally, this case demonstrates that future efforts to counter Chinese grand strategy will be most successful when U.S. policymakers can identify instances where China’s foreign policy apparatus breaks down due to the fragmentation of relevant Chinese actors or a fixation on nationalist paradigms over realist thinking. While it is unlikely that there will be many cases such as the Philippines where a foreign policy establishment and public are so well-aligned with the United States to start with, less dramatic opportunities may arise for the United States to pull third parties into its orbit or counter Chinese efforts to do the same.
Authors
Guest Author
Nathan McQuarrie
Nathan McQuarrie is a recent Master in Public Affairs graduate from Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs.
13. Philippine Navy Launches First Rajah Solayman-class Offshore Patrol Vessel
Good for the Philippines.
South Korea again demonstrates it is a partner in the arsenal of democracy.
Philippine Navy Launches First Rajah Solayman-class Offshore Patrol Vessel
https://news.usni.org/2025/06/13/philippine-navy-launches-first-rajah-solayman-class-offshore-patrol-vessel
Aaron-Matthew Lariosa
June 13, 2025 9:06 AM
BRP Rajah Sulayman. Hyundai Photo
Philippine defense officials launched the first in a new class of offshore patrol vessels in South Korea this week.
Named for a 16th-century Filipino hero, BRP Rajah Solayman (PS20) is the first of a six-ship class procured by the Philippine Navy in 2022 from Hyundai Heavy Industries. Originally conceived as a 1,500-ton patrol vessel, the Korean shipbuilder increased the tonnage of the ship under its HDP-2200+ design to 2,400 tons, expanding its range and capabilities.
“The launch of Offshore Patrol Vessel No. 1, the BRP Rajah Sulayman, is not merely the unveiling of a new ship—it is a bold declaration of our commitment to maritime security and the defense of our sovereignty. This vessel marks a new chapter for the Philippine Navy, reflecting our resolve to enhance our operational capabilities and extend our presence across our vast maritime domain,” Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Gen. Romero Brawner, said during the launch ceremony in Ulsan.
The new offshore patrol vessel is equipped with an OTO Melara 76mm main gun and two Aselsan SMASH 30mm remote-controlled weapon systems. Media released from the ceremony confirmed that the Philippines proceeded with a modified version of the HDP-2200+ design, opting for more armament and room for future capabilities. Hyundai Heavy Industries sales materials say the design could accommodate close-in weapon systems, electronic warfare suites, unmanned aerial vehicles and larger rigid-hulled inflatable boats.
Manila currently relies on an overstretched Navy and Coast Guard to patrol its 7,461 islands and exclusive economic zone. Aside from the massive maritime domains they must cover, these vessels have come under strain from repeated harassment by Chinese naval forces. The six-ship offshore patrol vessel are designed to help the Philippines address these issues, replacing warships and amphibious vessels currently used as patrol assets and supplementing forces deployed to key maritime areas, such as the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait.
Rajah Solayman is capable of operating out to 5500 nautical miles for up to 30 days. While the offshore patrol vessels do not carry the level of armament as the service’s new guided missile frigates, which were also procured from Hyundai, these ships will bolster the service’s maritime presence.
The Rajah Solayman is one of ten newly built warships split between three classes sold by South Korea to the Philippines since 2016. These vessels have been at the centerpiece of Philippine naval engagement with allies and partners, as seen during last week’s combat drills between the recently commissioned BRP Miguel Malvar (FFG-06) and American forces in the South China Sea. Hyudai’s Ulsan yard has produced frigates, corvettes and now offshore patrol vessels for the Philippine fleet. While the Rajah Solayman-class is slated to conclude production by 2028, Seoul is already eyeing a future frigate and corvette program under Manila’s third phase of military modernization in the 2030s.
Related
14. Rare Earth, Raw Power: How China Plays the Carrot and Stick Game of the Century
Rare earths: the most important strategic minerals.
Excerpts:
Rare earths are likely to become an increasingly prominent tool for China to wield both as a stick and a carrot amid intensifying geopolitical tensions. As seen in the ongoing technology rivalry between China and the United States, the competition has expanded into resource-based conflicts, where control over upstream segments of the supply chain – such as in mining – provides significant strategic leverage.
China currently holds a dominant position in the rare earth industry, bolstered by state subsidies and relatively lenient environmental regulations. However, this dominance is not assured in the long term. By 2050, recycling and reuse are estimated to meet 30–40 percent of rare earth demand in the United States, China, and Europe. Although Beijing is expected to maintain a central role in rare earth supply chains in the near term, increasing efforts to enhance circularity of the rare earth supply chain may progressively diminish global dependence on China. Over time, this shift could erode China’s capacity to leverage these materials as instruments of geopolitical influence.
Rare Earth, Raw Power: How China Plays the Carrot and Stick Game of the Century
Beijing is more openly leveraging its control over rare earths, using them both as a stick to pressure geostrategic rivals and as a carrot to incentivize cooperation with partners.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/rare-earth-raw-power-how-china-plays-the-carrot-and-stick-game-of-the-century/
By Xinyue Hu and Meng Kit Tang
June 13, 2025
Credit: AI Generated Photo 320886146 © Petr Kahanek | Dreamstime.com
Just as oil drove geopolitical tensions in the 20th century, rare earth elements could shape the rivalries of the 21st. These 17 metals – including the 15 lanthanides, plus scandium and yttrium – are essential to modern technologies, from smartphones and electric vehicles to wind turbines, radar systems, and fighter jets. They are the key enablers of the advanced technologies and military capabilities that underpin modern global power.
China accounts for approximately 60 percent of global rare earth raw material production, processes about 85 percent of the world’s output, and manufactures nearly 90 percent of the world’s rare earth magnets. It controls nearly all the refining capacity for heavy rare earth elements such as dysprosium and terbium, which are essential for high-performance magnets.
China dominates this sector not by chance, but thanks to a strategic effort spanning decades. Despite being a latecomer, China steadily overtook the United States. In the 1980s, the U.S. led rare earth production, primarily through the Mountain Pass mine in California. However, strict environmental regulations increased costs, leading to mine closures by the early 2000s. China capitalized on this opportunity by leveraging its relatively lax environmental regulations and extensive state subsidies, reducing its production costs and eventually surpassed the U.S.
By 2025, Beijing is more openly leveraging its control over rare earths, using them both as a stick to pressure geostrategic rivals like the U.S. and as a carrot to incentivize cooperation with states such as Malaysia.
China’s Geopolitical Playbook: Carrots and Sticks
China uses a two-pronged strategy to influence power politics, combining rewards and pressure in what is often called a “carrot and stick” approach. It offers technology transfers and access to resources to countries with relatively stable ties to Beijing, while enforcing export controls and other restrictions on its geostrategic competitors. Using rare earths to advance its geostrategic interests has proven to be relatively effective for China.
China has started extending rare earth partnerships to countries that maintain a neutral stance or avoid siding with the West. In April 2025, it proposed sharing rare earth separation technology with Malaysia, a nation with significant deposits but limited processing capabilities. Kuala Lumpur accepted the offer, seizing the opportunity to advance its industrial capacity while deepening economic ties with Beijing. In June 2025, Beijing stated its willingness to “enhance communication” on strategic minerals and emphasized that it has approved qualified export applications of rare earth in accordance with the law.
As tensions between the United States and China intensify, both sides are racing to secure and build resilient supply chains. In this context, Beijing is likely to increasingly utilize the carrot approach. The intended signal from Beijing is clear: steering clear of alignment with the West can bring tangible rewards – not only access to critical resources vital for national security, but also valuable technological cooperation to support industrial upgrading.
On the other hand, China has imposed rare earth export restrictions on its geopolitical rivals. These sanctions serve as sticks, enabling Beijing to exert pressure on countries that challenge its strategic objectives.
China’s use of rare earths as a geopolitical tool has a longer history. It first weaponized these resources in 2010, when it halted exports of rare earth to Japan for two months amid a territorial dispute. In April 2025, amid the tariff war with the U.S., Beijing introduced new export controls on seven key rare earths and associated magnets, which are essential for defense technology, renewable energy, and automotive sectors.
The global repercussions of China’s rare earth export restrictions have begun to surface. By June 2025, the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA) reported that several production lines were halted after exhausting their supplies. Additionally, Japan’s Suzuki Motor suspended production of its flagship Swift subcompact due to China’s rare earth export restrictions.
The U.S. is also feeling the pain of rare earth restrictions. A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies warns that these constraints will cause disruption to U.S. companies. In June 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump initiated talks with China’s President Xi Jinping, with rare earths reportedly a key focus. However, a potential relief from China is likely to be undermined by U.S. restrictions on sensitive technologies and industries such as semiconductors.
According to the Trump administration, China had committed to lifting the rare earths restrictions after talks in May, only to slow-walk implementation. It’s unclear if the latest agreement reached in London will fare any differently.
The Global Counterplay Still Falls Short
The international community has responded with growing concern over China’s use of the “stick” approach in rare earth policy, but efforts to push back remain fragmented and face significant challenges.
The United States has resumed operations at Mountain Pass, which is the only operating rare earth mine in the U.S. now. A new magnet manufacturing facility in Texas, supported by General Motors, is expected to begin production by late 2025. Additionally, the U.S. passed the Critical Minerals Security Act of 2025, requiring reports on critical mineral and rare earth elements resources globally to secure the U.S. rare earth supply chain.
Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths became the first producer of heavy rare earth outside China. It has commissioned additional processing capacity at a plant in Malaysia to produce up to 1,500 tonnes of heavy rare earths.
However, a major obstacle for the U.S. and the West in replacing China lies in the high environmental costs. Producing one ton of rare earth generates approximately 13 kg of dust, 9,600-12,000 cubic meters of waste gas, 75 cubic meters of wastewater, and one ton of radioactive residue. Furthermore, rare earth ores are often laced with radioactive thorium and uranium, posing severe health risks to workers. Environmental movements and regulatory pressures in the U.S. and other Western countries may hinder rare earth mining projects, as they have done in the past.
Recycling presents a potential game-changer. By recovering rare earth elements from end-of-life products, countries can reintroduce them into the supply chain and reduce their dependence on China. For example, Apple has surpassed 99 percent of its goal to use 100 percent recycled rare earth elements in all magnets. The European Union is also investing in urban mining and e-waste recovery to decrease reliance on mined supply.
However, less than 1 percent of rare earths in electronic waste are recycled globally, due to the limited maturity of recycling technologies. Furthermore, the high costs and logistical difficulties involved in collecting rare earth-rich components from discarded electronics also pose major challenges.
To address supply chain vulnerabilities in essential minerals like rare earths, the United States launched the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) with key countries such as Australia, India, and Japan. Nevertheless, the MSP has reportedly attracted minimal investment and lacks sufficient technological expertise, raising questions about its effectiveness as a realistic alternative to China’s dominance in this field.
Additionally, a major barrier for these countries to replacing Chinese rare earth supplies is price. The Chinese government has long provided subsidies and promoted oversupply in the sector, making it difficult for alternative suppliers to compete due to reduced profitability. For instance, the price of neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) dropped by 20 percent between January and July 2024. However, China’s rare earth industry can absorb such losses because the government is willing to sacrifice short-term profits to retain strategic control over these critical materials. This low-profit environment further reinforces China’s dominance in the global rare earth market.
Conclusion: The Future of Rare Earth Security
Rare earths are likely to become an increasingly prominent tool for China to wield both as a stick and a carrot amid intensifying geopolitical tensions. As seen in the ongoing technology rivalry between China and the United States, the competition has expanded into resource-based conflicts, where control over upstream segments of the supply chain – such as in mining – provides significant strategic leverage.
China currently holds a dominant position in the rare earth industry, bolstered by state subsidies and relatively lenient environmental regulations. However, this dominance is not assured in the long term. By 2050, recycling and reuse are estimated to meet 30–40 percent of rare earth demand in the United States, China, and Europe. Although Beijing is expected to maintain a central role in rare earth supply chains in the near term, increasing efforts to enhance circularity of the rare earth supply chain may progressively diminish global dependence on China. Over time, this shift could erode China’s capacity to leverage these materials as instruments of geopolitical influence.
Authors
Guest Author
Xinyue Hu
Xinyue Hu is a senior analyst and a Ph.D. student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.
Guest Author
Meng Kit Tang
Meng Kit Tang is a Singaporean freelance analyst and commentator who works as an aerospace engineer. He graduated from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore in 2025.
15. India breaks with China, Russia on Israel-Iran war
Excerpt:
More than likely, Indian diplomats might soon discreetly request a clarification from Russia about why the group that it co-founded with China arguably kept their country out of the loop when issuing its latest statement.
India breaks with China, Russia on Israel-Iran war - Asia Times
India distances from joint Shanghai Cooperation Organization statement that condemned Israel’s strikes on Iran
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Korybko · June 16, 2025
India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MEA) clarified over the weekend that India “did not participate in the discussions” on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) statement earlier that day condemning Israel for its latest strikes on Iran.
The absence of any clause in the group’s statement indicating that India disagreed with them initially suggested consensus (including with rival Pakistan), but after the MEA’s clarification, it now suggests that India was kept out of the loop. This could have political ramifications if that’s indeed what happened.
The SCO was founded to peacefully resolve border issues between China and the former Soviet Republics after the USSR’s dissolution and then united them all in their opposition to the shared threats of terrorism, separatism and extremism.
The group has since taken on economic and other connectivity functions after expanding to include India and Pakistan in 2015, with these additional interests increasingly taking center stage since those two accuse each other of fomenting the aforesaid threats. Iran joined the SCO in 2023.
Article 16 of the SCO Charter clearly states that “The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no member State has raised objections during its consideration (consensus)… Any member State may state its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete issues of the decisions taken which shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a whole. This opinion shall be placed on record.”
Accordingly, given the absence of any clause in the SCO’s statement indicating that India disagreed with what was written, it therefore compellingly appears that it was kept out of the loop.
That arguably being the case, Western-friendly policy influencers and policymakers in India might now feel vindicated after claiming for a while already that the group no longer aligns with their country’s interests as much as before.
This could, in turn, lead to pressure upon India to more publicly distance itself from the SCO.
It’s premature to conclude that India will react in that way, especially since it has remained in the SCO thus far, despite the aforementioned interpretations among some, aimed at averting the scenario of China dominating that group, with the possibly attendant consequence of Russia becoming its junior partner.
From India’s perspective, that would pose a major national security threat if China then leveraged its influence over Russia to deprive India of military equipment in the event of another border crisis.
To avoid any misunderstanding, there are no credible signs that any such Russian subordination to China is imminent, nor that Russia would comply with speculative demands from China to cut India off ahead of or during a future crisis, thereby giving Beijing the edge over Delhi.
Nevertheless, such fears might now be lent renewed credence among some important people in India given what just happened with the SCO, which follows concerns that Russian policymakers’ perception of India might be changing.
Readers can learn more about that here and here, with the second analysis explaining why Russia lent credence to Trump’s claim that he personally stopped the latest Indo-Pak conflict, which India has repeatedly refuted.
More than likely, Indian diplomats might soon discreetly request a clarification from Russia about why the group that it co-founded with China arguably kept their country out of the loop when issuing its latest statement.
This article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Korybko · June 16, 2025
16. Breaking News: U.S. Army plans initial production of new XM30 infantry fighting vehicle to replace Bradley in late 2027.
Ahhh. My fond memories of AirLand Battle and Division 86 are fading away with the Bradley.
I think the editor missed a couple of issues where the Navy may be used incorrectly in place of the Army.
But what is missing in this article is the number of troops this IFV will carry. E.g., will it carry a nine man squad or only 6 dismounted infantry like the Bradley?
Is the priority on this system as a weapons firing platform (e.g., a light tank) or a fighting vehicle that carries soldiers and supports infantry operations? I think the reporter and this media organization needs to do a little more homework and learn about the Army's concept for employment of this system.
Breaking News: U.S. Army plans initial production of new XM30 infantry fighting vehicle to replace Bradley in late 2027.
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/breaking-news-us-army-plans-initial-production-of-xm30-infantry-fighting-vehicle-to-replace-bradley-in-late-2027
15 Jun, 2025 - 18:52Defense News Army 2025
According to information released in the June 2025 report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Army’s XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle program is set to complete its critical design review and transition to the development start between April and June 2025, with low-rate initial production planned between October and December 2027. The XM30, envisioned as the next-generation solution to replace the aging U.S. Army Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, is being developed to provide unmatched firepower, superior mobility, and advanced protection capabilities, all within a modular and future-proofed design.
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In October 2022, during the AUSA exhibition in Washington, D.C., German company Rheinmetall presented a concept model of the XM30 based on its Lynx KF41 infantry fighting vehicle platform. (Picture source: Army Recognition Group)
Currently engaged in Phases 3 and 4 of its five-phase roadmap, covering detailed design and prototype build/testing, the U.S. Army XM30 program is utilizing the Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) rapid prototyping model. Two competing vendors are constructing full-scale physical prototypes, supported by an independent software development effort tailored for rapid updates and integration. The U.S. Army expects to complete this prototyping phase between April and June 2025. Following this, a single contractor will be selected for low-rate initial production, scheduled for October to December 2027.
The two defense contractors selected for this high-stakes competition are General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and American Rheinmetall Vehicles (ARV). GDLS is offering the Griffin III Infantry Fighting Vehicle, derived from the ASCOD 2 platform, focusing on modular design, enhanced protection, and a powerful armament suite. Meanwhile, ARV leads the Team Lynx consortium, which includes Textron Systems, Raytheon Technologies, L3Harris Technologies, Allison Transmission, and Anduril Industries. Their solution is based on the Lynx KF41 platform, customized to meet XM30’s requirements with cutting-edge digital engineering and modular open system architecture.
The future XM30 tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) is designed with an advanced lethality profile, including a 50mm automatic cannon that surpasses the Bradley’s current 25mm armament in both range and destructive capability. It will also be equipped with next-generation anti-tank guided missiles and fully digital fire control systems. These systems are expected to support precision engagement and joint targeting interoperability, aligning with the U.S. Navy’s broader vision for multi-domain combat effectiveness. The Navy’s role in defining joint capability requirements ensures that the XM30 supports operations alongside air and maritime forces in distributed and amphibious combat scenarios.
In terms of mobility, the XM30 is being developed with hybrid-electric propulsion to reduce its acoustic and thermal signatures, improve fuel efficiency, and enable agile maneuvering across difficult terrain. This aligns with U.S. Navy and Marine Corps demands for expeditionary vehicles capable of rapid deployment and movement in contested littoral zones. The vehicle’s suspension and traction systems are being engineered to handle diverse environments, from dense urban battlefields to rugged, off-road operations.
Protection is another cornerstone of the XM30’s design philosophy. The vehicle will integrate a modular armor system to adapt to varying threat levels and mission types. Active protection systems, potentially including advanced solutions such as Trophy or StrikeShield, will provide defensive countermeasures against incoming projectiles and missiles. Furthermore, it will feature full CBRN defense, electronic warfare protection, and cyber-resilience to ensure survivability against a range of threats in high-intensity conflicts.
The urgency behind replacing the U.S. Army Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle with the XM30 stems from critical operational limitations of the legacy platform. The Bradley, which entered service in the 1980s, is no longer capable of accommodating modern technologies such as modular open system architectures, high-powered electronics, or advanced situational awareness sensors. Its aging drivetrain and conventional power systems cannot support future energy-intensive systems like hybrid-electric propulsion or electronic warfare tools. Survivability is another area where the Bradley falls short, lacking the structural design to host active protection systems or provide adequate protection against top-attack munitions and modern anti-tank guided missiles. In contrast, the XM30 is built from the ground up to address these deficiencies, ensuring it can operate effectively in high-threat, multi-domain environments and remain adaptable to technological advancements for decades to come.
Despite this progress, the GAO report warns that identifying the XM30’s critical technologies as late as Q3 FY2025 carries significant risk. Should any technologies prove immature or incompatible, the need for redesigns could delay the program’s transition to the Major Capability Acquisition (MCA) phase. However, the Army maintains that the current phased approach and dual-path prototyping strategy will allow for sufficient testing and refinement to mitigate these risks before full-scale production.
The XM30 stands as a centerpiece of the U.S. Army’s Next-Generation Combat Vehicle portfolio, representing a strategic shift in how mechanized forces will operate across future battlefields. As joint integration becomes the standard across services, the XM30 is being shaped not only by Army needs but also by Navy and Marine Corps operational demands, ensuring its relevance in a full-spectrum, multi-domain force structure prepared for the challenges of 2030 and beyond.
17. A Regime On The Brink
Are we ready for a change in leadership in Tehran?
Excerpts:
In a best-case scenario, Iran could re-emerge in a few years as a nation at peace with its people and neighbours. No longer isolated, no longer pursuing nuclear weapons, and focused on prosperity. This would transform the Middle East. Imagine Iran’s vast human and economic potential redirected from proxy wars to development and trade. Arab states might eagerly court a friendly Iran, and even the Israel-Iran hostility could fade if a new Tehran renounces calls for Israel’s destruction. However, we must remain clear-eyed. Such positive change would require deft management of the immediate aftermath. The transition could be as perilous as the conflict itself. As TIME magazine noted, “things may get much worse before they get even worse” in this region. That tongue-in-cheek phrasing reflects the volatility of the situation. A collapsing regime can unleash forces that are hard to control.
The collapse of Iran’s Islamic Republic, once almost unthinkable, is now a distinct possibility amid the onslaught of war and internal discontent. Here, I have sketched how it might occur, through a mix of military blows, popular uprisings, and psychological breaking points; and what might follow, ranging from hopeful renewal to chaotic strife. From a military analyst’s perspective, while ending a brutal regime could open the door to a better future for Iran and the world, it also opens Pandora’s Box. Decision-makers in Jerusalem, Washington, and beyond are surely considering these scenarios as they weigh each next step.
The coming days will test whether Iran’s 85 million people can seize this tumultuous moment to build something new, or whether the aftermath of regime collapse becomes a new tragedy of its own. One thing is sure: the end of the Ayatollahs’ rule would mark a historic turning point, and its full consequences, for the nuclear programme and regional stability, would be felt for years to come. The world can only watch, hope, and, where possible, help steer events toward the most peaceful outcome.
A Regime On The Brink
Commando raids, regime change, and options for what comes next
https://mrandrewfox.substack.com/p/a-regime-on-the-brink
Andrew Fox
Jun 15, 2025
Israel’s lightning campaign has shattered Iran’s air defences, decapitated its military command, and sent members of the regime’s leadership fleeing to Russia. With the last fortified nuclear site at Fordow remaining untouched, a moment of global consequence looms: will this signal the fall of the Islamic Republic, and what will rise from its ruins? Drawing on my own military experience, this analysis explores how a commando strike on Fordow could unfold. With my academic head on, it identifies the military, social, and psychological thresholds that could precipitate Iran’s collapse, as well as the options that might be available for the day after.
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In a matter of days, Israel’s pre-emptive strikes have shattered Iran’s defensive shield. Iran’s air defence systems were swiftly eliminated, opening the skies to unimpeded Israeli air power. Simultaneously, precision strikes and covert operations decapitated key nodes of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command, missile bases, nuclear facilities, and other military targets; too many to list here. The above-ground buildings at Natanz, once the centrepiece of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, lie in ruins, their destruction confirmed by the UN atomic watchdog.
Several senior Iranian political and religious leaders have reportedly fled to safe havens in Russia: a dramatic signal of collapsing confidence. This exodus of the ruling elite, if accurate, delivers a decisive psychological blow. We are not there yet, but Khamenei himself fleeing would be comparable to the Shah of Iran boarding a plane in 1979 or Afghanistan’s president fleeing Kabul in 2021. It telegraphs to both regime loyalists and the public that the ship of state is sinking, potentially eroding any remaining will to resist.
Israel’s offensive seems aimed beyond just neutralising nuclear threats. It is “clearing the path” for Iranians to reclaim their freedom, as Prime Minister Netanyahu put it in a direct appeal to Iran’s people. In other words, regime change is an implicit objective of this campaign. The strikes have been calibrated to hit the regime’s instruments of repression and war (nuclear sites, IRGC bases, top generals) while minimising civilian casualties, in hopes that ordinary Iranians will not rally around the flag but instead turn on their weakened rulers.
So far, Iran’s retaliation has consisted of a barrage of missiles and drones, along with reported attempts at subversion within Israel itself. It has largely been thwarted. Israel’s multi-layered air defences (aided by US early warning and support) are performing effectively, mirroring past confrontations where massive Iranian missile salvoes were largely repelled by Israeli interceptors. Deprived of its most potent means of striking back and observing its military hierarchy in disarray, the regime in Tehran finds itself in an unprecedentedly fragile state.
One looming issue remains unresolved: the Fordow uranium enrichment complex. Fordow is Iran’s most challenging nuclear site, buried half a mile deep under a mountain, and it has survived the initial onslaught intact. As long as Fordow remains operational, Iran’s regime keeps a dangerous ace up its sleeve. The facility houses advanced centrifuges enriching uranium to near-weapons-grade levels and could potentially expedite a crash nuclear weapons effort if the leadership feels cornered. In Israeli eyes, allowing Fordow to remain unscathed would be a grave mistake. It might even provoke Tehran to race for a bomb out of desperation or vengeance openly. For Israel’s campaign to genuinely eliminate the nuclear threat, Fordow must be neutralised one way or another.
Iran's Fordow nuclear facility. (X/@TheIntelLab)
The Fordow Dilemma
Fordow presents a nightmarish target for military planners. It was explicitly designed to withstand the kind of airstrike that destroyed the Natanz facility. The complex is tunnelled into solid rock, beyond the reach of ordinary munitions. Only the US Air Force possesses bombs powerful enough (the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster) and the heavy bombers to deliver them.
Israel, lacking these super-bunker-busters and strategic bombers, is unlikely to be able to pulverise Fordow by air alone. This is precisely why Israeli officials are urgently courting US involvement in the operation. If American B-2 bombers do not join the fray, Israel faces two unenviable options. (1) Attempting to jury-rig a solution with repeated air strikes on the same spot (to gradually bore into the mountain) or (2) sending in special forces on a high-risk mission to infiltrate and demolish the site from within.
A commando raid on Fordow would be a daring, last-resort gamble; something out of a Tom Clancy novel, yet not without precedent. In September 2024, Israel executed a similar operation in Syria. Codenamed “Operation Heavy Roads,” an elite Israeli special forces unit (Shaldag) clandestinely raided an underground Iranian-run missile factory near Masyaf, Syria. Over just two hours on the ground, the commandos neutralised guards, planted explosives throughout the facility, and reduced it to rubble without losing a single soldier.
This feat, once thought impossible, proved that a highly guarded underground site in a foreign country could indeed be infiltrated and destroyed by a well-executed special op. Fordow, however, is a far tougher nut to crack than the Syrian site. It lies on Iranian soil, at a far greater distance from Israel than Syria, protected by layers of security and burrowed deeper into the earth. A raid would likely require hundreds of special forces personnel. The team would need to breach reinforced tunnels or blast open access points, hold off or neutralise security forces inside, and emplace demolition charges on critical infrastructure (centrifuge halls, control systems, power supply), all before reinforcements arrive. The operation would rely on surprise, speed, and intelligence: real-time intelligence on Fordow’s layout and defences (possibly aided by insiders or years of Mossad surveillance) and deception to keep Iranian forces confused.
Such an endeavour would be extraordinarily perilous. A large assault force deep inside Iran could be encircled by the IRGC or trapped underground if anything goes awry. The commandos might need to fight their way out following the explosions or find an exfiltration route, perhaps via helicopter pickup at a pre-secured landing zone or an overland escape to a neighbouring country.
Despite these dangers, Israel may conclude that a commando strike is preferable to leaving Fordow untouched. The success of the Maysaf raid served as proof of concept that what was once dismissed as fantasy is now on the table. If Israel proceeds, a Fordow raid would likely involve multiple special forces units in a coordinated assault, supported by diversionary strikes and cyber-attacks to blind Iranian sensors. The world has not seen an operation of this complexity since perhaps the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden, and even that pales in comparison to the scale and stakes here. The elimination of Fordow might be the final, most dramatic chapter of this campaign, achieved either by US bunker-busters or the courage (and luck) of Israel’s most skilled commandos.
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When Does a Regime Collapse?
Military pressure alone, irrespective of its intensity, does not automatically lead to regime collapse. The breaking point of the Iranian regime will depend on a convergence of social, military, and psychological triggers that ultimately tip the balance. Drawing from historical precedents and Iran’s unique context, we can split this into social, military, and psychological thresholds that must be met.
- Mass civil unrest (social threshold). Widespread, sustained protests and chaos in the streets could signal that the regime’s authority is irreparably eroded. Iran has witnessed waves of mass protests before, but the difference now lies in the regime’s weakened coercive power. If news of the leadership’s flight emerges, ordinary Iranians may lose their fear and surge into the streets in vast numbers, sensing that the regime is on its last legs. A general strike, protesters overrunning government buildings, or large crowds gathering in Tehran’s Azadi Square to celebrate an anticipated “liberation” would exert enormous pressure on what remains of the security forces. Unlike past uprisings, protesters would now carry the morale boost of having seen the once-mighty IRGC humbled by Israeli strikes. Exiled opposition figures are openly encouraging civil resistance. Reza Pahlavi, the ex-crown prince, urged Iranians and even security personnel to seize this moment, declaring, “The regime is weak and divided… Iran is yours to reclaim”. If the populace answers that call en masse, sheer people power could overwhelm the regime’s remaining loyalists.
- Fracturing of Security Forces (military threshold). The Iranian regime’s survival has long hinged on the loyalty of its armed organs, such as the IRGC, the Basij militia, and the regular army. A collapse becomes likely if these forces fracture or stand down. We may see signs like mid-level commanders refusing orders to fire on crowds, garrisons surrendering or deserting, or even firefights between factions (e.g. IRGC hardliners vs Army units) as the chain of command breaks down. The decapitation strikes that killed or incapacitated many top generals and IRGC commanders are crucial here. They removed a vital component of the regime's stability, potentially throwing the security establishment into confusion and leaderless disarray. With communications disrupted and commanders dead, frontline units might act on their instincts. The military rank-and-file, who are themselves Iranians with families suffering under the regime, could decide not to die for a lost cause. Even pockets of the IRGC, especially those deployed outside their home regions, might choose to abandon posts or negotiate with local communities. A pivotal moment would be if a major military unit or division openly switches sides to support the people, as happened in some instances of the 1979 revolution. Once security forces cease to function as a united repressive tool, the regime’s physical power collapses.
- Psychological shock at the top (psychological threshold). Authoritarian regimes often project an aura of invincibility. Shattering that illusion can trigger a rapid unravelling. In Iran’s case, the sight (or rumour) of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and his inner circle fleeing by plane to a foreign haven could be that shock. If the Supreme Leader is perceived to have given up or gone into hiding, it is game over for regime cohesion. Mid-level officials and clerics would begin defecting or disappearing, anticipating the regime’s fall. The remaining loyalists might resort to desperate, vicious measures, but their morale would be in free fall. Each additional blow, be it the fall of a major city to protesters or a live broadcast of a prominent ayatollah or Revolutionary Guard general announcing his resignation, would reinforce the collective sense that “this is the end.” We saw similar dynamics in other collapses: once fear shifts sides, the regime that once terrified everyone suddenly finds itself the one frightened of its people. As we saw last year in Syria, psychological tipping points can be abrupt. One day, a dictatorship seems securely entrenched; the next day it is melting away like ice in the sun.
Other factors could also accelerate the collapse. Information and communication will play a significant role. The regime has attempted to shut down the internet to prevent coordination, but reports suggest systems like Starlink are circumventing the blackout. This means that news of regime weakness and battlefield defeats spreads quickly, fueling the cycle of discontent. Meanwhile, economic paralysis (with banks closed and markets in a state of panic) and the breakdown of basic services (power outages resulting from strikes on infrastructure) contribute to a sense of impending chaos, convincing many Iranians that change is both inevitable and urgent.
Taken together, these social, military, and psychological triggers feed off one another. We may not pinpoint the exact moment of no return until we have the benefit of hindsight, but it could arrive soon. Perhaps it will be when a protester’s video goes viral, showing IRGC troops laying down their arms and joining the crowd, or when Friday prayers in a major city evolve into open defiance of the mullahs. When that moment arrives, the Islamic Republic’s 46-year reign could unravel with astonishing speed, ending not with a negotiated handover but with a sudden vacuum at the centre of power.
The Day After
What might Iran look like immediately after the regime falls? This is the great unknown hanging over the current crisis. History offers both hopeful examples and dire warnings. Optimists might recall how relatively smoothly Eastern European regimes fell in 1989 or how Portugal’s regime collapsed in 1974 without descending into anarchy. However, the recent past of the Middle East, including Syria’s civil war, Libya’s post-Gaddafi chaos, and Iraq’s violent power vacuum, urges caution. Several broad scenarios are possible for a post-regime Iran, each with very different implications.
Scenario 1: fragmentation and civil conflict
This is one nightmare outcome. Iran could fracture into warring fiefdoms and sectarian strife, akin to Syria or Libya. If the central authority were to collapse suddenly, Iran’s diverse society might split along regional, ethnic, or ideological lines. The IRGC or its factions could retreat to strongholds and effectively become warlords. Different parts of the country (the Kurdish northwest, Balochi southeast, the Persian heartland, and Azeri north) might witness the emergence of local power brokers or separatist groups, each claiming autonomy. Outside powers could exacerbate tensions by fuelling proxies. For example, Turkey might seek influence in Turkic/Azeri regions, while Saudi Arabia could quietly support anti-IRGC Sunni groups, etc.
In this scenario, a protracted war for power and chaos unfolds on Iranian soil. The humanitarian toll would be immense, and Iran’s vast arsenal (including missiles and the remnants of the nuclear programme) could fall into multiple hands. A civil war could also spill across borders, sending refugees into Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and beyond. No one desires this, not even Iran’s adversaries, because a failed state of 85 million people in such a strategic location would be catastrophic.
Scenario 2: hardliner military junta
Another, even worse, possibility is that the clerical leadership’s fall paves the way for an even harder-line authoritarian regime; essentially a military junta led by the IRGC. In this case, the Revolutionary Guard, or a coalition of the most ruthless elements within it, may suppress rivals and seize complete control of what remains of the state. Imagine martial law under a charismatic IRGC general or a “council” of hardliners who deem the mullahs too indecisive.
Such a regime could be much more militarised and potentially more dangerous. Free from the pretence of clerical rule, an IRGC junta might be unabashed in pursuing a nuclear weapon as swiftly as possible, viewing it as the guarantor of their survival. Those who insist nothing could be worse than the current theocracy may be naïve; recent history tells us it can always be worse. For Israel and the world, an embittered military dictatorship in Tehran, particularly one born from the ashes of war, could be just as hostile as the old regime, if not more so. It might impose internal crackdowns even more severely and double down on alliances with countries like Russia or China for survival. Essentially, the faces at the top would change, but the repression and regional aggression could continue in a new form.
Scenario 3: transitional council and hopeful reform
In a more optimistic scenario, responsible elements within Iran and the opposition could step into the vacuum to stabilise the country. Perhaps moderate figures from the regular Army, some reformist politicians, and exile leaders could form a provisional “national salvation council.” This interim leadership might restore order in major cities, call off any further fighting, and initiate talks for a new political system (be it a republic or even a constitutional monarchy restoration). They would almost certainly seek emergency economic aid and diplomatic recognition.
The Iranian diaspora, long fractured but united in its desire for an end to the Islamic Republic, would likely play a key role in providing technocrats and funding to rebuild. Under this scenario, Iran’s new leaders would distance themselves from the old regime’s policies. They would move to cease uranium enrichment and invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to inventory nuclear materials. The nuclear weapons programme would be halted in exchange for sanctions relief and reconstruction support.
Regionally, a post-Islamist Iran might stop funding militias like Hezbollah and Hamas, seeking normal relations with neighbours. This is the “best case” vision: Iran emerging from turmoil relatively quickly, with a chance to build a freer society. It is not guaranteed. Such a smooth transition would require unity among very disparate factions and likely some form of international peacekeeping or monitoring to prevent score-settling. However, it is not impossible, especially if most Iranians, exhausted by decades of repression and the trauma of war, embrace a unifying call and focus on rebuilding their nation.
Scenario 4: partial continuity (regime fragments strike a deal)
Another possibility is a semi-managed collapse. Perhaps elements of the regime, sensing the writing on the wall, negotiate a handover of power to a temporary authority rather than fight to the bitter end. For example, if some senior Revolutionary Guard officers and politicians oust the hardline core (or if Khamenei dies or flees and there is no clear successor), they might reach out to opposition figures to form a transitional government. In effect, part of the old elite could try to save the country (and themselves) by facilitating a change.
This scenario would align with scenario 3 in terms of outcomes. A new, more moderate government would arise from an internal coup or pact. It might preserve more of the state’s institutions intact (preventing total collapse). The risk here is that it could also maintain some unsavoury elements of the old regime in power, possibly disappointing protesters who wanted a clean break. Nonetheless, it could avert civil war. Under such continuity, Iran’s territorial integrity is upheld, and the new government would likely still abandon the nuclear weapons quest under international supervision (both to get sanctions lifted and because many of those pushing for change internally know the nuclear path brought ruin).
Final Thoughts
In all the above scenarios, Iran’s nuclear programme and regional posture will be central concerns. A collapsed or transitioning Iran would immediately face international demands to secure nuclear materials. One can expect US and Israeli intelligence (and possibly special units) to move swiftly to account for enriched uranium and prevent any covert “last resort” use or transfer of fissile material by die-hard factions. If chaos reigns, securing Fordow and other nuclear sites might even require an international task force. There would be the grim prospect of foreign troops in Iran, which could stir nationalist resentment.
Conversely, a cooperative new Iranian authority would likely invite the IAEA and perhaps UN-mandated teams to help dismantle the weapons-related parts of the programme. Regional stability would, in the short term, be shaky. Iran’s proxies and allies (Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen) would suddenly lose their patron and could either wither or act unpredictably. Some might try to go it alone (for example, Hezbollah could lash out or attempt to survive via other sponsors). In contrast, others might lay low or enter political processes if conflicts wind down without Iranian funding. Israel and the Gulf Arab states would certainly celebrate the end of the Islamic Republic, but they would remain wary until a clear picture of the new order emerges. If Israel succeeds in removing Iran’s leadership, there is no guarantee the successor would not be even harderline.
For the United States and global powers, a post-collapse Iran presents a strategic dilemma. On one hand, the elimination of a hostile regime and the hopeful end of Iran’s nuclear ambitions would represent a significant victory for non-proliferation and regional peace. On the other hand, the international community could face a substantial stabilisation and rebuilding effort. Consider post-2003 Iraq, but on an even larger scale. Mistakes made then, such as disbanding the army overnight or allowing a security vacuum, would serve as painful lessons when approaching Iran’s situation. There may be calls for a UN peacekeeping mission to maintain order in key cities or safeguard minority communities during the transition. Major humanitarian aid and economic packages would be necessary to address Iran’s damaged economy and infrastructure, especially as the conflict has devastated refineries, power plants, and so on.
In a best-case scenario, Iran could re-emerge in a few years as a nation at peace with its people and neighbours. No longer isolated, no longer pursuing nuclear weapons, and focused on prosperity. This would transform the Middle East. Imagine Iran’s vast human and economic potential redirected from proxy wars to development and trade. Arab states might eagerly court a friendly Iran, and even the Israel-Iran hostility could fade if a new Tehran renounces calls for Israel’s destruction. However, we must remain clear-eyed. Such positive change would require deft management of the immediate aftermath. The transition could be as perilous as the conflict itself. As TIME magazine noted, “things may get much worse before they get even worse” in this region. That tongue-in-cheek phrasing reflects the volatility of the situation. A collapsing regime can unleash forces that are hard to control.
The collapse of Iran’s Islamic Republic, once almost unthinkable, is now a distinct possibility amid the onslaught of war and internal discontent. Here, I have sketched how it might occur, through a mix of military blows, popular uprisings, and psychological breaking points; and what might follow, ranging from hopeful renewal to chaotic strife. From a military analyst’s perspective, while ending a brutal regime could open the door to a better future for Iran and the world, it also opens Pandora’s Box. Decision-makers in Jerusalem, Washington, and beyond are surely considering these scenarios as they weigh each next step.
The coming days will test whether Iran’s 85 million people can seize this tumultuous moment to build something new, or whether the aftermath of regime collapse becomes a new tragedy of its own. One thing is sure: the end of the Ayatollahs’ rule would mark a historic turning point, and its full consequences, for the nuclear programme and regional stability, would be felt for years to come. The world can only watch, hope, and, where possible, help steer events toward the most peaceful outcome.
This will be the topic of discussion for my weekly podcast with Shana Meyerson, “A Paratrooper and a Yogi Walk Into A Bar”, so please do subscribe in advance! Find it in the podcast section of my Substack page, or:
18. Too Much Tech Can Ruin Wargames
In the 1990s after computer simulation exercises the commander questioned the results and specifically the length of time it took to complete a Corps sized offensive operation in accordance with the war plan. So he tasked our group of planners to conduct an annual analysis of the attack that took some 19 days to complete during the exercise that used the world class OPFOR and the computer simulations from Leaenworth. (if my memory serves me). The command's Operations Analysis Branch (OAB) conducted simulations to validate the war plans and it determined that it would take 23 days to complete the attack.
So the planners used the low tech (or no tech) system of putting a map on the wall and using unit symbols stuck on the map, and correlation of force ratios, then analyzed the terrain, and maneuvered the forces down to the company level. The result was it took the force 22 days to complete the mission. However, it took the planners 3 days to do this manually while the computers conducted the analysis in minutes (and probably seconds today). On the other hand at the end of the exercises we had a deep appreciation for the terrain and the enemy forces and understood how the enemy would defend and how we would fire and maneuver. Any of the planners were now ready to command the battalions in the Corps that was to conduct this attack (perhaps a little over the top exaggeration but please get the point). I am not advocating for computer versus manual wargaming as both play important roles. We need computers (and hopefully AI) for rapid analysis of COA options but commanders and planners still need the knowledge, insight, and wisdom to understand those results and apply them effectively which can arguably only be gained by study that includes manual wargaming. Commanders and planners need the "PhD-level" of knowledge, research, and education behind them in order to be able to effectively exploit the benefits of AI and computer support. Reliance on AI and computers without deep knowledge (e.g., Clausewitz' coup d'oiel) is a recipe for failure. And I only use "PhD" as an analogy. Our commanders and planners do not need to earn conventional PhDs but they need sophisticated PME combined with years of operational experience to prepare them for war. The goal should be to develop coup d'oiel in every leader (which is a continuous career long effort).
Excerpt:
Military wargames should progress into the future while preserving the power of what a wargame is and what it does — and we can do that even without advanced technology. Pushing AI and modeling into games without a clear understanding of their limits is not modernization — it’s misapplication. Wargames work because they create spaces where smart people wrestle with hard problems in real time. That’s where insight lives. That’s what we should protect.
Too Much Tech Can Ruin Wargames – War on the Rocks
Jonathan Compton, Joseph Mroszczyk, and Matthew Tattar
warontherocks.com · June 16, 2025
The U.S. defense community has developed a healthy obsession with innovation. AI, modeling and simulation, machine learning — these are the buzzwords driving conversations about the future of warfare. But when it comes to integrating these technologies into one of the military’s most valuable tools for strategic insight — the wargame — the defense community would do well to proceed with caution.
Over the past few years there has been increasing discussion within the wargaming community about the need to integrate AI, data-driven models, and computer simulations into military wargames. There have been a series of articles, books, special issues of journals, conference panels, and presentations devoted to this topic. Those advocating for more technology in wargames focus on a variety of benefits, such as enhanced player experience, assistance in processing vast amounts of data, and greater analytic rigor. For instance, integrating generative AI can replicate adversary tactics, improve operational planning efforts, and create diverse scenarios. We agree that there are many benefits of integrating more technology into the wargame process, but do not agree that more technology in wargames necessarily equates to greater analytic rigor.
There’s been a growing chorus of critics arguing that wargaming within the U.S. Navy and at the U.S. Naval War College is behind the times when it comes to adopting new technologies to strengthen the analytic rigor of our wargames. They say that our methodology hasn’t evolved, that it ignores modern data science, and that it resists incorporating powerful new technological tools. Our colleagues at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School have also felt the pressure to “modernize,” which many equate to blanket “computerization” of wargaming processes such as adjudication of game outcomes. This push for what is perceived as enhanced analytical rigor is driven by the rationale that incorporating data-driven models and algorithmic adjudication will lead to more valid and informative wargame outcomes. But it is wrong to believe that greater integration of technology into wargames necessarily increases their analytic rigor. Although the aspiration to improve the validity of wargames is understandable, this approach is fundamentally problematic and does not deliver the value that proponents often anticipate.
The practice of wargaming has long served as a cornerstone of military education and planning. Since its formal introduction into the U.S. Naval War College in 1887, it has provided a vital space for military leaders and strategists to simulate complex conflict scenarios, hone their analytical and decision-making skills, and explore strategic and operational concepts.
But wargaming is not a relic. It’s a research method with a specific purpose: to explore human decision-making under stress, in competition, and with incomplete information. That doesn’t mean it’s perfect or that it can’t evolve. But layering in AI and simulation tools without a clear understanding of the purpose of wargames risks distorting the method — and, worse, producing bad analysis with a false sense of precision. Given the wide-ranging influence of wargames in the U.S. Navy and broader defense community, one should be clear-eyed about the trade-offs and risks involved. Military wargamers should be cautious in how they integrate new technologies into a well-established research method.
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What a Wargame Is (and Isn’t)
Wargames are often misunderstood. They’re not predictive models. They don’t produce precise measures of effectiveness or deliver statistically significant forecasts of conflict outcomes. Seeking quantitative rigor in a wargame represents a basic misunderstanding of what the method can produce.
Instead, they are structured exercises that simulate aspects of military conflict to generate qualitative insights about strategy, operations, risk, and decision-making. Francis McHugh defines a wargame as “a simulation of selected aspects of a conflict situation in accordance with predetermined rules, data, and procedures to provide decision-making experience or to provide decision-making information that is applicable to real-world situations.” They’re especially powerful when exploring so-called “wicked problems” — messy, complex challenges like contested logistics, multi-party deterrence, alignment of force structure to future threats, and other aspects of high-end, multi-domain warfare. The enduring value of wargaming, therefore, has historically resided in its capacity to immerse participants in a simulated environment where they grapple with the complexities of warfare, make critical decisions, and learn from the consequences, all within a framework that acknowledges the vital role of human agency and the inherent unpredictability of conflict.
In a typical game, players develop courses of action, make operational decisions, and write orders. An opposing team does the same. An adjudication team — often made up of subject-matter experts — assesses the outcome using best-available data and professional military and scientific judgment. They debate and discuss the combat engagements, using stochastic processes to assist (yes, even including dice).
This method has limits. It’s not meant to answer every research question, nor does it deliver quantitative rigor in the way some analysts might prefer or require. But dismissing wargames because they aren’t “data-driven” enough misses the point. That’s like criticizing a historian for not using regression analysis. It’s the wrong tool for the job.
Comparison of Wargaming and Models & Simulation
False Precision and the Tech Temptation
Integrating AI or models and simulation into wargames might sound like a natural evolution. Why not make the adjudicated outcomes more accurate? Why not use models to adjudicate combat engagements more efficiently?
Because in most cases, wargamers don’t need more precision to have better wargames.
When a human adjudicator makes a call on some combat engagement — say, on whether a carrier survives a missile salvo — their reasoning is transparent, debatable, and adjustable. When a model makes the same call, human beings often accept the result without question — so called “automation bias,” mistaking precision for analytical usefulness. AI and modeling tools can create a veneer of scientific authority, especially when they output detailed charts, probabilistic kill chains, or dynamic visualizations. But these tools are only as good as the data and assumptions they’re built on — and when it comes to future warfare, that data is incomplete and speculative.
Modeling an operational-level conflict involving thousands of interacting platforms across land, air, sea, cyber, and space requires assumptions on everything from adversary behavior to the physics of untested systems. This creates black boxes — systems that produce outputs that analysts can’t fully or easily explain, interrogate, or trust. In many cases, those assumptions are hidden deep in code.
The attempt to enhance accuracy through the inclusion of modeling and simulation inadvertently creates an illusion of precision that leads to overconfidence in wargame results. This overconfidence fosters a perception of accurate outcome prediction rather than a more nuanced understanding of the causal mechanisms and the influence of the decisions made by the participants. That’s a dangerous foundation for conceptualizing future conflict, particularly when those concepts inform policies, plans, and investments critical to future warfare.
And that’s not just an epistemological problem. It changes how players behave. If they’re reacting to an algorithm instead of a dynamic adversary or a team of experienced adjudicators, the game shifts from a strategic decision-making exercise to an attempt to “beat the machine.” This raises the risk for negative learning among military commanders participating in the game and faulty conclusions for analysts developing the wargame report.
For example, agent-based models require programmed behaviors for all adversary platforms for virtually all possible interactions they may have with U.S. forces. Often, these behaviors are based upon assumptions of adversary behavior, and when these assumptions compound across thousands of platforms over multiple days’ combat, the outcome may appear to be scientific or predictive, yet is built upon shaky analytic foundations. This may give players a false sense of how the adversary will fight, leading to negative learning outcomes and potentially unjustified changes in war plans to beat a contrived model of adversary behavior.
Although it is tempting to integrate new technologies into wargames, wargamers can’t let these technologies distort what matters most. Wargames should focus on operational art and adaptation, not turn into exercises in outguessing a model’s algorithm. The latter approach leads to brittle thinking, not better planning. By creating instances of perceived confidence in the knowledge of how events will unfold based on simulation outputs rather than cultivating the capacity to visualize and understand the systemic complexity of the environment, wargamers risk generating a false sense of security that could have catastrophic consequences in reality.
This over-reliance on simulated outcomes might hinder the development of the critical thinking skills necessary to adapt to the unforeseen challenges and the dynamic nature of actual warfare.
Models Can Help — Just Not Like That
This doesn’t mean wargamers should reject the integration of modeling, simulations, and AI into wargaming outright. There are smart ways to integrate these into the wargaming process to improve the value of wargames while also guarding against faulty conclusions and negative learning. Used carefully, technology can support, not replace, wargame adjudication and analysis.
For example, models can help pre-test tactical engagements to support faster adjudication during games. Wargamers know going into a game that certain combat engagements will be likely, e.g., submarines versus mines, ballistic missile versus surface combatant, etc. Running simulations of these engagements ahead of time can provide adjudicators with a range of probabilistic outcomes that they can then draw upon during the game. At the U.S. Naval War College, we have hosted several adjudication forums where experts from across the military and scientific communities meet to discuss best-available data and determine common combat engagement probabilities. These feed into our wargames as trusted and validated “look up” tables to assist adjudicators as wargames unfold. Models can contribute to this process.
Models and simulations can also support adjudicators in parsing complex interactions in the information environment — especially when multiple sensor systems are involved across space and cyber domains. The interactions of these systems are often harder for humans to rapidly discern in the midst of a wargame adjudication period, so models can assist in determining “who sees whom” in the battlespace. Often, the ways in which these various electronic sensors interact with one another are governed more by physics than anything else, and models and simulations are well suited to determine these interactions.
AI tools could also assist analysts after the game, sifting through notes, surveys, orders, and debriefs to identify patterns or extract key themes more efficiently. This is currently a manually intensive process for wargame analysts. AI assistance could help analysts turn around game reports and briefs to decision-makers more rapidly, ultimately increasing the velocity of the research cycle.
But these approaches to technological integration support human judgment — they don’t replace it.
Let the Method Lead
Wargaming doesn’t need to resist data modeling, computer simulation, and AI. But it should resist bad methodology. Moving forward, it is crucial to rebalance the equation in military analysis by advocating for a judicious and conceptually sound approach that leverages the native strengths of both wargaming and simulation.
The central value of a wargame lies in what people do when the unexpected happens. How do commanders respond when a carrier is sunk? How does an adversary react when a plan fails? Those are the insights that matter. The true power of wargames is not what happens in the adjudication cell, but rather resides in the dialogues that occur in the game cells. Those are the dynamics that shape strategy. And they can’t be automated.
Wargames have proven to be valuable tools for military planners throughout history, often only involving model ships on a game floor. Wargames during the inter-war period at the Naval War College were of the most rudimentary design, yet were highly impactful in their educational value for future naval commanders in the Pacific during World War II. Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz famously concluded in a lecture at the U.S. Naval War College that “The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game rooms here by so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise — absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war; we had not visualized those.” Future commanders had a decision-making edge over their adversary by the exposure they received in wargames to plausible dilemmas in the Pacific. The value came from thinking, not computing.
Military wargames should progress into the future while preserving the power of what a wargame is and what it does — and we can do that even without advanced technology. Pushing AI and modeling into games without a clear understanding of their limits is not modernization — it’s misapplication. Wargames work because they create spaces where smart people wrestle with hard problems in real time. That’s where insight lives. That’s what we should protect.
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Jonathan Compton, Ph.D., is chair of the War Gaming Department at the U.S. Naval War College and was formerly a senior analyst and wargame subject-matter expert in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He holds a Ph.D. in formal research methods and world politics.
Joseph Mroszczyk, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the War Gaming Department at the U.S. Naval War College and serves as lead analyst on chief of naval operations-directed wargames. He also serves as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Northeastern University.
Matthew Tattar, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the War Gaming Department at the U.S. Naval War College and serves as lead analyst on chief of naval operations-directed wargames. He is also the author of Innovation and Adaptation in War (MIT Press, 2025) and serves as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. He holds a Ph.D. in politics from Brandeis University.
The views expressed here are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the official views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.
Image: Staff Sgt. Jessica Avallone via DVIDS
warontherocks.com · June 16, 2025
19. We Need a Marine Corps, Part I: A Corps in Crisis
Ben, I wish you would not make this a comparison (or competition) with SOF and the Army. They are not quite apples and oranges but perhaps more like tangerines and oranges.
I think we are still reeling from SECDEF Rumsfled' infamous "directive" to make SOF more CIA like, the Marines more SOF like, and the Army more expeditionary. I think the Army is expeditionary, the Marines do perform some SOF-like missions and SOF has an excellent mutual support relationship with the CIA.
But I personally would be adamantly opposed to folding the Marines into the Army. We need a Marine Corps just like we need an Army and a Special Operations Force.
Excerpts:
What does this all mean? In my interpretation, it means that responding to technical, tactical, and manpower demands from the White House and Congress is a necessary but insufficient step to reverse the existential slide. As the Marine Corps edged away — and was pushed away — from its traditional crisis response mission, both special operations forces and the U.S. Army stepped in to pick up difficult-to-recover core purposes. And over time, as collective memory of the Marine Corps’ greatest era continues to fade, once ephemeral existential fears — folding the Marine Corps into the Army, shrinking it to the point of irrelevance, or doing away with it altogether — are likely to solidify.
In the next installment, I seek to bring this into the operational present. I look into and then beyond the nine-dash line, beyond the stand-in force, and beyond the chaotic and thus-far unproductive public debate over the future of the Marine Corps.
We Need a Marine Corps, Part I: A Corps in Crisis – War on the Rocks
Ben Connable
warontherocks.com · June 16, 2025
Marines have spent too much energy in the past five years debating the merits of former Commandant David H. Berger’s Force Design 2030 plan. Force Design is now part of the Marine Corps. It is time for all marines on and off active duty to set aside their disagreements and focus forward, towards the vision articulated by current Commandant Eric M. Smith. And it is time for the allies of the Marine Corps to lean in and support this reorientation. The U.S. Marine Corps is facing a relatively slow moving but all too real existential threat.
This threat emerged well before anyone first envisioned Force Design. A long and dangerous slide towards institutional irrelevance began about 20 years ago, coinciding with the shift from an era of crisis response and into the Global War on Terror. This slide may be existential, but it can be stopped and reversed with a series of low cost force and concept adjustments.
In this three-part series of articles, I describe this existential threat and then build a case for keeping a robust and globally relevant Marine Corps. This is a necessarily complex build: If we want to solve these problems we need to first understand them in detail. I lay bare both the institutional and cultural threats to the Marine Corps. I provide an evidence-driven challenge to the mistaken assumptions about modern war that have fed the current crisis. I then wrap up the series with recommendations for action. These recommendations focus on better integrating the enduring parts of Force Design while creatively supporting the Marine Corps’ recentering on the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit.
I start here by describing what has been a remarkable narrowing of the service’s global roles and missions. This decline in operational relevance was paralleled by the dwindling cultural significance of the Marine Corps. In both cases, the Marines have lost out to special operations forces, most specifically to the U.S. Navy SEALs, and also to the U.S. Army. While some changes were beyond the service’s control, a few bad leadership decisions along the way made things worse.
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General-Special Purpose Forces: A Delicately Balanced Middle Ground Service Culture
Building on its legacy from the two world wars, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and a range of smaller but high-profile operations in the 20th century, the Marine Corps commanded a remarkable niche. It was simultaneously a fast-moving crisis response force for noncombatant evacuation missions, etc.; a robust ground combat force for major contingencies like the 1991 Gulf War; and a pseudo-special operations organization trusted to execute raids, counterdrug operations, and even some daring off-the-books missions unsuitable for publication here.
This kind of middle ground position between conventional and special operations force has generated tension within the Marine Corps. Opponents to the creation of special operations marines have long tried to protect the broader force from being watered down by the creation of specialized units or any kind of individual super-soldier elites. This has been a central force preservation issue: When some marines are special and more trusted than others, then what is the real value of a “regular” marine to either the joint force or the American public?
Simultaneous evolution of two specialized units in World War II laid the foundation for current debate. Marine infantry divisions needed small teams to reconnoiter beaches. These teams evolved into organic amphibious reconnaissance companies. In parallel, then-Lt. Col. Evans Carlson and Maj. James Roosevelt leveraged their high level political connections (Roosevelt was the son of the president) to create the hand-picked Marine Raiders. By the end of the war, top generals had incorporated the reconnaissance companies into Marine divisions. But they also purposefully watered down and then eliminated the Raiders for three broad reasons: they didn’t like Carlson, they didn’t like independent specialists, and they didn’t want the existence of special, independent marines to undercut the Marine Corps’ distinct cultural identity. Somewhat special, quiet, and internally controlled was okay — but elite, high-profile, and separate was unacceptable.
Marine leaders maintained this delicate general-special balance through the 20th century, even when pressed to lean harder into the special operations world. Arguably, the fulcrum for this balance was the afloat-ready amphibious unit, now called a Marine expeditionary unit.
Culmination of the General-Special Concept
Marine expeditionary units are central to both the story of declining Marine relevance in the 21st century and to my recommendations. A brief history is useful here.
The Marine Corps’ first notable amphibious assault took place in the Bahamas in 1776, and small Marine security teams were attached to most Navy ships well into the 20th Century. But Navy-Marine amphibious assault was mostly an ad hoc affair through at least the 19th century. Interest in permanently stationing large, ground-combat-capable units of marines aboard Navy ships first arose in the late 1800s. In 1898, the Marine Corps created the 1st Marine Battalion (Reinforced) and put it aboard the USS Panther, just in time to participate in the blockade of Cuba and Battle of Cuzco Well. By the 1960s, the first official afloat-ready units were operational and were soon continually engaged in global crisis response operations.
Afloat-ready units provided the Marines with a safe middle-ground capability until the early 1980s. Three years after the failed hostage rescue operation in Iran in 1980, the Office of the Secretary of Defense mandated that each service generate more specialized capabilities. In sequential response, Commandants Paul X. Kelly and Alfred M. Gray deftly managed this order by doubling down on what had become the Marine Corps’ most relevant, high-demand asset: its afloat expeditionary units.
Kelly bought the Marine Corps time and then Gray stepped in to build the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable). With these reformatted units, the Marines would provide constantly afloat combined arms teams capable of flexing mid-range combat power while also conducting hostage rescue operations, long-range raids, night assaults, deception operations, electronic attacks, and other specialized actions. Each deploying unit would go through a rigorous training and certification program that allowed them to execute complex tasks at scale within six hours from initial mission order.
Through 2001, these special operations capable, afloat-ready units represented what I and many others would describe as the best version of the Marine Corps’ mid-range, general-special mindset and capability. They were called on for just about every mission imaginable, including the rescue of Air Force Capt. Scott O’Grady in Bosnia in 1995. Success of the Marine expeditionary units elevated the value of all marines for the U.S. military. Both military and political leaders in the United States generally held a common view through mid-2001: If you want something difficult done right, send in the Marines.
Post-9/11 Shift to Special Operations Command
That narrative started to unravel almost immediately after 9/11.
While a Marine unit led by then-Brig. Gen. James N. Mattis launched what may have been the longest-range amphibious deployment in history to secure parts of Afghanistan after landing on the Pakistani coast, Army Special Forces and CIA officers had been called upon earlier to lead the daring operation that defeated the Taliban. Senior leaders drew some distinct lessons from the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and some of his acolytes saw Afghanistan as a validation of their defense transformation plans centered on small, distributed, and increasingly specialized units. Rumsfeld rammed through a paradigm shift in the Pentagon and the White House: If a handful of highly skilled, mature special operators could easily overthrow a country, then special operations forces could do anything marines could do. And it looked like special operators could do it at a fraction of the cost. Moreover, given the deceptively minimal casualties in 2001 and early 2002, they also could operate with negligible risk. So, if Washington wanted something difficult done right, send in special operations forces.
Iraq cemented this special operations forces-centric viewpoint. Marines and soldiers constituted the vast majority of deployed American ground forces across the country. They were not just sitting by idly to support special operators: By volume, these so-called “general purpose forces” certainly conducted a large majority of all combat operations in the Iraq War. But special operators grabbed the narrative by the horns and never let go.
While infantry units probably also executed the majority of dangerous raids across Iraq, special operators perfected and then loudly trumpeted their mastery of the targeted raid. Joint Special Operations Command, led by then-Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, gave the special operations raid an almost magical aura. While Marine units ashore struggled with all the confounding and often dissatisfying aspects of counter-insurgency, special operations raids consistently produced clean, tangible, and quantifiable results: dead and captured bad guys.
Putting aside the debate over whether raids won the Iraq War (and I think that is an absurd proposition), one had to respect both McChrystal’s performance and salesmanship. At the height of Joint Special Operations Command’s activities in 2006, he was leading more senior generals around by the nose. Tangible and well-sold results generated compounding interest: From 2001 to 2021, U.S. Special Operations Command grew by over 60 percent. And as it grew, so did its appetite to eat missions that had typically been given to the Marines.
In the years following the first phase of the Iraq War, both military and political leaders increasingly leaned on Special Operations Command to answer the crisis hotline. Ongoing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations continued to fall below the threshold for high-order conventional war. These high demand missions included tactical targeted raids, hostage rescue operations, destruction of mid-sized extremist militia units, clandestine infiltration, and small unit training activities. Ongoing global, low-spectrum conflicts and the absence of another large-scale war like the 2003 invasion of Iraq ensured special operators remained the hot ticket item on every combatant commander’s menu. Even after Rumsfeld left federal service in 2006, his plan to transform the military towards special, small unit capabilities and away from general purpose forces was constantly reinforced.
Raiders Revived and SEALs Take the Lead
Following the tremendous success of special operations forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, Rumsfeld forced the Marine Corps to pay a service-wide tax to the special operations community by establishing what became the Marine Forces Special Operations Command.
Built in 2006 from a small foreign internal defense detachment and existing Force Reconnaissance units at each Marine Corps division, the command grew from a few hundred specialists to nearly 3,000 marines by the mid-2010s. The Marine Corps now mans and equips the nostalgically named Raiders, but these elite marines effectively work for the Special Operations Command in Florida. Arguably, the Marine Corps created an elite organization that continually drew thousands of talented marines away from the broader force while it also encroached on the missions that might otherwise have been tackled by a special operations capable expeditionary unit
Indeed, when the Raiders were created, the justification for special operations capable expeditionary units faded out. Gone was the mid-range, general-special balance that service leaders had long struggled to maintain. Expeditionary units were (albeit temporarily) stripped of their special operations qualifications. With most Marine units tied up in deployments to Iraq and the Navy edging away from amphibious shipbuilding, the century-old afloat-ready concept then faded out with remarkable rapidity.
Worse still, even the elite Raiders could never hope to compete with the popularity and global flexibility of the Navy SEALs. Within the special operations community, SEALs became the go-to force in readiness for small, irregular crises. The rise of the SEALs both within the Department of Defense and in popular culture paralleled a relative decline in both military and popular interest in marines. As I argue below, this shift in perception has real consequences for the future of the Marine Corps.
Afghanistan: The Bleeding Wound
As Iraq wound down, then-Commandant James T. Conway volunteered the Marine Corps for an expanded role in Afghanistan. Over the next half-decade, tens of thousands of marines were tied up in counter-insurgency operations in Helmand Province. Another decade of dissatisfying counter-insurgency rotations simply accelerated the marine to special operations forces shift started in Iraq.
Across Afghanistan, the Marines were characteristically aggressive. They took high casualties from improvised explosives in places like Sangin and tried (but rarely succeeded) to prop up a flailing Afghan partner force. Meanwhile, top-tier special operators ran their own brutally tough and often costly missions. While the whole operation ultimately failed — the United States effectively surrendered to the Taliban and then abandoned its Afghan partners — special operations forces had further amplified their prevailing narrative.
A Pivot Away from Ground Combat Towards a Long Range Fires War with China
Even as the surge in Afghanistan dominated national security news from 2009 to 2012, a quieter but increasingly frenetic struggle was underway within the Beltway. It is hard to articulate the speed and intensity with which the entire national security community moved to erase Iraq and Afghanistan from the country’s collective memory and from the military’s operational mindset.
In January 2012, before the surge in Afghanistan had really ended, President Barack Obama’s Defense Department published strategic guidance that stated “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” In other words, no more Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. In a mid-1970s redux, Obama and his advisors were wiping their hands of counter-insurgency. They were done with the Middle East and with Southwest Asia. They were ready to pivot away from messy irregular ground combat towards conceptually clean long range missile warfare against China.
Service leaders and plenty of the rank and file were receptive to this shift. As a whole, the country was ready to move on. By the mid-2010s, mentioning counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, or certainly any prospective hot war with a mid-threat country like Iran would earn you a virtual persona non grata sticker on your Pentagon access badge. Land warfare was out, “AirSea” warfare — a super high-order reimagination of the revolution in military affairs focused on the Chinese threat in the contested waters of the Western Pacific — was in.
In my book, Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War, I argue that in our collective haste to erase the uncomfortable prospect of any future mid-intensity irregular warfare, we embraced a fantastical, historically unsubstantiated, and strategically maladroit understanding of modern warfare. As they had in previous interwar periods, shimmering illusions of clean, mechanistic war emerged. A new threat — in this case, the modern Chinese military — was and continues to be painted with sometimes ham–fisted exaggeration. And the proposed solution to the Chinese military threat in “AirSea” warfare was a bad fit for the Marine Corps as it existed in the 2010s. So, the pressure to change increased.
Amos at the Pivot Point
Gen. James F. Amos took over as commandant in 2010, inheriting the inevitable drawdown in Afghanistan, the pivot to Asia, and the country’s ostrich-like efforts to avoid messy, mid-level warfare. In order to address what he rightly viewed as a prospective challenge to future Marine Corps roles and missions, Amos sent a letter to then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta titled “Role of the United States Marine Corps,” in which he described the Marine Corps as a “middleweight force.” Marine units could, in Amos’s words, be dialed up or down like a rheostat to tackle any mission anywhere in the world — and particularly in a maritime-heavy theater like the Indo-Pacific — all while sustaining themselves at sea.
This was a clear, logical case for continuing relevance. It anchored back directly to the era of the ready-afloat force and it signaled a reset from the counter-insurgency era to global maritime crisis response and interdiction. Really, it put the Marine Corps back to its pre-9/11 general-special settings, neither over- nor under-committing to any one role. But at this narrow point in time, it was the wrong message to send. In the minds of Beltway staffs, there was no “middleweight force” case to be made.
One could easily blame Amos for misreading the room. I thought he made a good argument at the wrong time. Looming budget sequestration certainly did not make things easier. But Amos received a great deal of flak throughout and after his tenure as commandant for what I view as more serious missteps. His almost myopic fixation on materiel, and particularly on exquisitely expensive aircraft and vehicles, cratered the Marine Corps’ budget and further narrowed maneuver room for future commandants.
“The ACE That Ate the Marine Corps” and the Joint Force Black Hole
Amos was the first aviator to lead the Marine Corps, and he did not disappoint his fellow aviators. He leaned in hard on the MV-22 Osprey and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. One can only imagine the pressure he was under from Congress to commit to these buys given the brilliant manufacturers’ strategy to spread their construction across nearly all 50 states. But Amos appeared to be genuinely enthusiastic about both platforms. He emphatically argued that investment in these two airframes would go a long way towards supporting the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia by providing the kind of long range, joint force reach needed in a prospective war with China.
In 2014, James W. Hammond III published a now famous — or depending on perspective, infamous — article in the Marine Corps Gazette entitled, “The [Aviation Combat Element] That Ate the Marine Corps.” Hammond patiently laid out both the top-line and hidden institutional costs imposed by the F-35 and MV-22 buys. Hammond’s article was a subtle but compelling rebuttal to what some read as Amos’ “all-in” approach to advanced aviation.
Even a rounded acceptance of Hammond’s numbers shows the prospective impact on the Marine Corps’ legacy amphibious mission: approximately $110 billion naval investment in high-end aviation compared to an approximately $77 billion investment in amphibious ships, more marines tied down to maintaining and supporting exquisite aircraft, and higher fuel and parts costs.
Money spent on advanced aircraft (and also new vehicles) at least indirectly reduces money available for the expert infantry marines who arguably constitute the Marine Corps’ most enduring and important asset. Perhaps more importantly, the acquisition of ultra high-end joint aircraft significantly increases the likelihood that Marine commanders will not retain control over those aircraft in a prospective war with China, or even another mid-level war with an Iranian or North Korean adversary. Joint commanders will be inclined to simply take high tech, joint enabled Marine aircraft away and toss them into the big purple airpower blob. That very real risk directly threatens the central and longstanding Marine operating concept: organic, combined arms, air-ground warfighting.
I am not the only marine to raise this concern. In general, the more technical and specialized the Marine Corps becomes — special aircraft, special operators, special technical experts — the more likely the service is to transform into something like a joint force temp agency rather than a cohesive combined arms force. While staying relevant also means willingly responding to piecemeal force requests at any scale from fireteam on up, in the long run, nobody really needs an approximately $50 billion a year temp agency.
Into the Force Design Maelstrom
In the years between Amos and Gen. David Berger, Gens. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. and Robert B. Neller struggled to shoehorn the Marine Corps into the increasingly narrow operational guidance driving Pentagon plans and budgets: How could the Marines, at low cost, make a relevant contribution to the anticipated China war along the nine-dash line in East Asia?
Experimentation flourished, and the expeditionary advanced base operations concept emerged. It can be hard for the layperson to keep track of what all these concepts mean, so I will briefly explain: A small, cost-effective, mobile, hard to detect Marine unit can operate within range of enemy weapons. There, it can spot targets for coordinated attacks, support other military forces, and prevent enemy movement through coastal waters and shorelines. It seems that Neller tried to push through this concept but was thwarted by some of his generals and executives. An internal bureaucratic revolt was slowing innovation.
Berger took over as commandant a year after the near parallel release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Sen. John McCain’s 2018 statutory demand for the services to explain how they would reorient towards great power competition. Working from these directives, Berger picked up Neller’s experimental concepts and made a strong bid to reshape the Marine Corps for the war in China’s backyard. Given his narrow wiggle room within the remaining budget, he appears to have felt the need to be decisive where he could. He immediately cut all the service’s tanks, slashed its artillery, cut three infantry battalions, and chopped away at the F-35 to pay for what would become the stand-in force, an evolution of Neller’s expeditionary advanced base operations.
I outline my concerns with Berger’s analytical approach and with the stand-in force as it is currently envisioned in Ground Combat. Briefly, it looked thinly sourced and methodologically shaky. Even if Force Design had been perfect, Berger was not always the best salesperson. A number of simple structural and rhetorical fixes could have made his plan far more palatable than it turned out to be for many high-ranking critics. But I have no interest in trying to reset the clock. I am put off by the explosive and often unseemly public debate that ensued. In the next two installments of this series, I accept the stand-in force with some modest recommended improvements and move forward to address broader concerns.
Do Americans Still Want a Marine Corps?
Cultural factors compound all of the aforementioned challenges. Most articles describing existential threats to the Marine Corps paraphrase Lt. Gen. (ret.) Victor H. Krulak: America doesn’t need a Marine Corps, America wants a Marine Corps. He followed this thought by itemizing all the ways in which the Marine Corps’ capabilities — infantry, amphibious operations, aviation, etc. — could be easily replicated by the other services. In other words, there was no tangible need for the Marine Corps to exist. Its true value was intangible. Krulak wrote (emphasis in the original), “We exist today — we flourish today — not because of what we know we are, or what we know we can do, but because of what the grassroots of our country believes we are and believes we can do.”
My doctoral research focused on the intersection between the Marine Corps and American popular culture, particularly between World War I and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan when the Marine Corps was deeply embedded in the American zeitgeist. I found that in all the books, films, and television shows, marines were America’s tough guys of choice for about a century. Many Americans love tough guys. So at least through the 1990s, Americans wanted a Marine Corps even if they couldn’t always explain why they needed one. But those halcyon days are gone. The iconic battle at Iwo Jima was fought nearly 80 years ago, Khe Sanh in Vietnam 56 years ago, and even Fallujah in Iraq was over 20 years ago. Collective memory in the 2020s is marked by the latest daily TikToks, not by distant historical battles.
While it is impossible to prove the Marine Corps is less centered in the American mind than special operations forces, something has clearly changed. Even before American culture was atomized by social media, special operators had already eclipsed Marines as America’s tough guys. Big studio SEAL movies like Zero Dark Thirty (2012), Lone Survivor (2013), and American Sniper (2014) are far more likely to influence young Americans today than Sands of Iwo Jima (1949) or even the Marine Corps movies of my late teenage years, Heartbreak Ridge (1986) and Full Metal Jacket (1987). The last big studio movie really featuring U.S. marines was the 2011 sci-fi flop, Battle of Los Angeles.
Anyone who believes hard-to-measure cultural shifts don’t matter or are overblown might be more sobered by what is happening in Congress, where service budgets are made and broken. Only 36 percent of the 25 marines who ran for Congress from both parties in 2024 won their contests. In 2025, the 119th Congress has 15 former marines in both houses. That is about half as many as in 1995. By comparison, this Congress has seven SEALs, two more than in the last Congress. No SEAL lost his 2024 race. The tiny active duty SEAL community of about 2,500 sailors comparatively has over 3,000 percent more congressional representation than the approximately 175,000 marines presently on active duty.
A Brewing Storm
What does this all mean? In my interpretation, it means that responding to technical, tactical, and manpower demands from the White House and Congress is a necessary but insufficient step to reverse the existential slide. As the Marine Corps edged away — and was pushed away — from its traditional crisis response mission, both special operations forces and the U.S. Army stepped in to pick up difficult-to-recover core purposes. And over time, as collective memory of the Marine Corps’ greatest era continues to fade, once ephemeral existential fears — folding the Marine Corps into the Army, shrinking it to the point of irrelevance, or doing away with it altogether — are likely to solidify.
In the next installment, I seek to bring this into the operational present. I look into and then beyond the nine-dash line, beyond the stand-in force, and beyond the chaotic and thus-far unproductive public debate over the future of the Marine Corps.
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Ben Connable, Ph.D., is a retired Marine officer, executive director of the Battle Research Group, adjunct professor at Georgetown University, adjunct principal research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses, and the author of Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War.
Image: Lance Cpl. Charis Robertson via DVIDS
warontherocks.com · June 16, 2025
20. A Soldier For Life
I regret that I missed this on our birthday on Saturday and did not send this out sooner.
But it is a sentiment that applies to all 365 days of the year so it is never too late to read this.
A Soldier For Life – War on the Rocks
Gen. (ret.) Martin E. Dempsey
warontherocks.com · June 14, 2025
A few days ago, I put on my favorite blue sports jacket for a graduation ceremony. My “Retired: Soldier For Life” lapel pin is always affixed to it. I’m proud of that pin and what it represents.
My 41 years of service are a fraction of the 250 years our Army celebrates today. But there are things from those 41 years that seem to me worth reflecting on as we step off tomorrow into our next 250 years of service to the nation.
There is nothing more complex and more demanding, nothing with higher stakes for our way of life than war. To be successful in that unpredictable clash of wills, the men and women we ask to manage that violence must be both trained and educated: trained to be the most skillful warriors on the battlefield and educated to be thoughtful, agile, and resilient. They must come to understand and embrace the values of our military profession. It has always been our people, not our weapons, that have truly set us apart from our adversaries.
Those we select and develop to lead our military should be both competent and they should be men and women of character. An Army with one but not the other of those qualities would be vulnerable and would not serve our country with the skill, honor, and integrity it requires.
Trust is the glue that holds us together. This is true on the battlefield, in our relationship with the American people, and in the relationship between the civilian and military leaders entrusted to manage our national security. We generate trust best when our Army upholds the values and principles on which the Constitution rests and when our Army reflects the society it serves. We ought to be unequivocally clear that we serve all of the citizens in this country.
When I entered the Army in 1974, the world’s population was 4 billion. Today it’s more than 8 billion. It will continue to grow, and with growth will come greater complexity and more risk. In my judgment it’s inconceivable that any single country could be capable of solving all of its problems alone. We will always need friends, allies, and partners who share our values. We should embrace our allies, learn from them, and train with them so that we are prepared and interoperable when our security is threatened.
Civilian and military leaders, active and retired, should keep the military out of politics. George Washington established this standard in the very beginning. Over our first 250 years, we have sometimes lived up to his example well and sometimes fallen short. But as the world’s exemplar of democracy, the U.S. military needs to be non-partisan in both appearance and nature. As elections and political issues come and go, there should never be any doubt that the military is loyal to the country, its laws, and to the civilian leaders elected to lead us regardless of party or politics. In my experience, all of our elected officials, from both sides of the aisle, support our military. They may not agree how to use it, but they respect the capabilities it provides and the people who serve. Nothing would be more harmful to the culture of our military and to the relationship we enjoy with the American people than the implication that we are merely one more politicized actor in the partisan struggle.
To deal with the future as it appears to be evolving, our Army will need leaders who are deeply and persistently committed to expanding their thinking as they progress through their careers, leaders who are especially skillful at communicating their ideas and insights, leaders who in an AI-enabled decision making environment know how to ask the right questions, leaders who in that same machine-enabled environment can be a bit skeptical without becoming cynical, leaders who are inclusive because they recognize that they absolutely need the perspectives of others. Today we encourage leaders to “centralize the what” but “decentralize the how” in accomplishing their missions. Tomorrow that will not just be a better approach to leadership; it will be the only effective approach to leadership.
The distinction matters. Even today, real leadership relies more on influence than on authority. Real power is based on capability of course but also on reputation. Real leaders demonstrate expertise and a moral compass in using it. Deciding how to do something can matter as much as deciding what to do.
Things that reduce our influence, taint our reputation, and tarnish our character diminish us.
On this 250th birthday of the U.S. Army, I am proud not only of what we have accomplished throughout our history but also proud of how we have accomplished it. But my pride is not oblivious to the reality that we’ve made mistakes. It’s foolish and dangerous to think otherwise.
That’s why I have always believed that a measure of humility should be prominent in the celebration of our accomplishments: humility at the incredible responsibility we bear, at the remarkable sacrifices we’ve made, and at what lies ahead.
Happy birthday, Army. Thank you to those men and women who throughout our history have worn our uniform, trained, served, fought, and sacrificed to ensure we live up to our motto: “This We’ll Defend.”
Gen. (ret.) Martin E. Dempsey was the 37th chief of staff of the U.S. Army and the 18th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Image: U.S. Army photo by Eric Tagayuna
warontherocks.com · June 14, 2025
21. I was worried about Trump’s Army parade — until I saw it
Good words for our Army. I just hope that the anti-Maga tone does not blowback on our Army. Mr. Boot is able to get in a good bit of Maga criticism while complimenting our great Army.
Excerpts:
This was not a menacing, goose-stepping parade a la Moscow or Pyongyang. It was America’s army on display, and I appreciated how many of the GIs were women or ethnic minorities — a reminder of the limits of Hegseth’s anti-DEI purges in a force that truly represents the entire country.
I think it was a good thing for Americans to be reminded of the glorious history of their army — a force for freedom that has defeated some of the most monstrous evils of the past two centuries, including the Confederacy, Imperial and Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet empire. Granted, the Army has also engaged in reprehensible conduct over the centuries, from the American Indian Wars to Abu Ghraib, but it makes sense on a day like this to celebrate, rather than criticize, the soldiers who put their lives on the line to defend us.
Opinion
Max Boot
I was worried about Trump’s Army parade — until I saw it
For the army, this was mission accomplished.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/06/15/military-parade-worth-watching-patriotism/
June 15, 2025 at 12:13 p.m. EDTYesterday at 12:13 p.m. EDT
5 min
2253
A U.S. Army tank crew waves at attendees during a celebration of the Army’s 250th anniversary on Flag Day, Saturday in Washington. (Tom Brenner/For The Washington Post)
I arrived for the U.S. Army’s 250th anniversary parade in Washington on a drizzly Saturday afternoon with considerable consternation and concern.
I knew that President Donald Trump had been agitating for such a spectacle since 2017, but that his first secretary of defense, Jim Mattis, had refused, because he viewed this as something that occurred in dictatorships such as Russia and North Korea. In private, Mattis reportedly said he would rather “swallow acid” than have troops parading through the capital.
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Now, Trump has a far more accommodating, and far less qualified, secretary of defense in Pete Hegseth, thereby opening the door to the politicization of the U.S. armed forces. That danger has been on display in the past week, with Trump deploying the National Guard and U.S. Marines to Los Angeles over the protests of local leaders and delivering a campaign-style speech at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that produced disturbing video clips of 82nd Airborne troops cheering while he bashed Democrats and the media.
My worry was that Trump would turn the Army parade into just another political pageant. Those concerns only grew when I saw how many of the spectators were wearing MAGA hats or shirts.
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But my apprehension began to melt away as soon as the music started to play and the soldiers began to march. Dear reader, I hope you do not think I am going soft on Trump if I tell you that I thoroughly enjoyed the entire parade.
As a military history nerd, I loved to see the soldiers marching by in period uniforms from the American Revolution, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. I thrilled to the flybys from historic aircraft — including a C-47 transport, P-51 fighter aircraft and a Huey helicopter — and the daring skydiving of the Army’s Golden Knights Parachute Team. I thought it was cool to see some soldiers going by on horseback, while others drove historic vehicles such as Jeeps and M4 Sherman tanks. Near the end, the Army even showcased its weapons of the future with a drone flyby and a walk-by from drones resembling dogs.
One of the more controversial aspects of the parade was the participation of 70-ton M1 Abrams tank, which had the potential to tear up city streets and to recall unpleasant images from other countries of what happens when tanks enter the capital. (“Thanks but no tanks,” read a protest sign I glimpsed on my way in.) But I enjoyed seeing the smoke-belching monsters rattle down the street, and it was hard to see anything threatening about it when the crew members were smiling and waving at the spectators and, in some cases, making heart gestures with their hands.
This was not a menacing, goose-stepping parade a la Moscow or Pyongyang. It was America’s army on display, and I appreciated how many of the GIs were women or ethnic minorities — a reminder of the limits of Hegseth’s anti-DEI purges in a force that truly represents the entire country.
I think it was a good thing for Americans to be reminded of the glorious history of their army — a force for freedom that has defeated some of the most monstrous evils of the past two centuries, including the Confederacy, Imperial and Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet empire. Granted, the Army has also engaged in reprehensible conduct over the centuries, from the American Indian Wars to Abu Ghraib, but it makes sense on a day like this to celebrate, rather than criticize, the soldiers who put their lives on the line to defend us.
My enjoyment of the parade, admittedly, was heightened by the fact that I was sitting at the corner of Constitution Avenue and 14th Street, safely out of sight of the reviewing stand on the Ellipse where Trump sat glowering as the troops marched past. I was greatly relieved that Trump, in a rare amount of self-control, kept his remarks short and focused on the Army — not, as is usually the case, on glorifying himself or bashing his political opponents.
I even secretly enjoyed the post-parade ceremony where Trump led a group of new soldiers in taking their oath of enlistment. I hope he noted that they swore to “support and defend the Constitution,” not the MAGA movement, and that while they vowed to obey the president’s orders and those of “officers appointed over me,” there was an important addendum: “according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” (Those regulations prohibit “partisan political activity.”)
Rolling Stone headlined its story about the day: “Trump’s military birthday was a gross failure.” I think that’s right, but the flip side is that the Army’s military parade was an absolute success. In other words, Trump did not hijack the event. For the Army, this was mission accomplished. With night falling on Washington and the skies clearing up, I’m sure that the generals left the festivities with as much relief as I did.
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The comments on the article reflect a largely negative sentiment towards the military parade, with many criticizing it as a political stunt by President Trump. Several commenters express disdain for the event's cost and its perceived purpose of boosting Trump's ego rather than... Show more
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By Max Boot
Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend," which was named one of the 10 best books of 2024 by the New York Times.
22. Exclusive Report: New version of U.S. Army M-SHORAD air defense vehicle to feature next-generation short-range missile.
Exclusive Report: New version of U.S. Army M-SHORAD air defense vehicle to feature next-generation short-range missile.
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/exclusive-report-new-version-of-u-s-army-m-shorad-air-defense-vehicle-to-feature-next-generation-short-range-missile
15 Jun, 2025 - 18:53Defense News Army 2025
According to information published by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) in June 2025, the U.S. Army is advancing its Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Increment 3 program to enhance its short-range air defense capabilities. This initiative, developed under the Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) rapid prototyping framework, aims to replace the legacy FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missile with the Next Generation Short Range Interceptor (NGSRI). The NGSRI is designed to provide improved range, targeting precision, and lethality against modern aerial threats including fast-moving drones, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft.
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Current U.S. Army M SHORAD air defense vehicle based on Stryker A1 equipped with Stinger surface-to-air missiles along with 30mm automatic cannon and radar sensor suite. (Picture source: U.S. DoD)
The current U.S. Army M-SHORAD air defense vehicle, based on the Stryker A1 8x8 armored vehicle, is equipped with a comprehensive weapons suite. This includes four FIM-92 Stinger missiles, two AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire missile launchers, a 30mm XM914 automatic cannon, and a 7.62mm M240 machine gun. The system also features a multi-mission radar and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors for autonomous target detection, tracking, and engagement across a 360-degree arc.
However, operational feedback and technical assessments have led the U.S. Army to reconsider the use of the Hellfire missile on the M-SHORAD vehicle. Mounting the Hellfire launchers on the sides of the Stryker has caused wear and tear on the missiles due to vibration and field conditions, raising safety concerns. As a result, the Army plans to remove the Hellfire missile system from future M-SHORAD configurations. Instead, the launchers will be replaced with additional Stinger missile pods, increasing the loadout from four to eight Stinger missiles per vehicle. This modification will simplify logistics and improve the platform’s survivability in sustained operations.
The replacement of the Stinger with the Next NGSRI (Generation Short Range Interceptor) in M-SHORAD Increment 3 marks a transformative leap in combat capability. While the Stinger surface-to-air missile has served effectively since the early 1980s, it is constrained by its single-mode infrared guidance, a maximum range of approximately 4,800 meters, and a ceiling of 3,800 meters. The Stinger’s 3 kg high-explosive warhead is effective against traditional aircraft but lacks the power and precision required to defeat modern, maneuvering, and hardened aerial threats.
The NGSRI is being engineered to overcome these limitations with advanced technology. It is expected to incorporate multi-mode seekers, combining radar, infrared, and electro-optical tracking to ensure high hit probability in environments where countermeasures and low-signature threats are common. The new interceptor is projected to have an extended engagement range of over 6 to 8 kilometers and superior maneuverability, enabling it to intercept high-speed, agile targets more effectively. The warhead will likely be more powerful, possibly using focused blast or fragmentation effects to guarantee destruction of both conventional and advanced threats.
To support this missile modernization, the U.S. Army is also developing a new type of 30mm ammunition tailored for the M-SHORAD Inc 3 platform. This new ammunition will improve accuracy and terminal effect against airborne threats, providing the vehicle with a multi-layered engagement capability that is not solely reliant on missile systems.
According to the U.S. GAO (Government Accountability Office), the M-SHORAD Increment 3 program is expected to transition from the rapid prototyping phase to a major capability acquisition program. A low-rate initial production decision is scheduled for fiscal year 2028. This timeline reflects the Army’s urgency in addressing the growing complexity and volume of aerial threats on future battlefields.
With the integration of the NGSRI, advanced 30mm munitions, and the restructuring of its missile configuration, the M-SHORAD Inc 3 vehicle will offer the U.S. Army a state-of-the-art mobile air defense system. This platform is set to provide unmatched protection for maneuvering units in high-threat environments, reinforcing the Army’s layered defense architecture. Army Recognition will continue to follow the development and fielding of this vital capability as it progresses toward operational deployment.
23. Report to Congress on U.S. Army Dark Eagle Hypersonic Weapon
The 3 CRS page report can be downloaded here: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25974731-if1199135/
Report to Congress on U.S. Army Dark Eagle Hypersonic Weapon
U.S. Naval Institute Staff
June 13, 2025 8:52 AM
The following is the June 12, 2025 Congressional Research Service report, U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle.
From the report
What Is the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon?
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also known as Dark Eagle, with a reported range of 1,725 miles, consists of a ground-launched missile equipped with a hypersonic glide body and associated transport, support, and fire control equipment.
The Army further notes,
The LRHW system provides the Army a strategic attack weapon system to defeat Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, suppress adversary long-range fires, and engage other high payoff/time critical targets. The Army is working closely with the Navy in the development of the LRHW. LRHW is comprised of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB), and the Navy 34.5-inch booster.
On April 24, 2025, the Army formally designated the LRHW as the Dark Eagle.
LRHW Components
Missile
The missile component of the LRHW is reportedly being developed by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. When the hypersonic glide body is attached, it is referred to as the Navy-Army All Up Round plus Canister (AUR+C). The missile component serves as the common two-stage booster for the Army’s LRHW and the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) system, which can be fired from both surface vessels and submarines.
Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB)
The C-HGB is reportedly based on the Alternate Re-Entry System developed by the Army and Sandia National Laboratories. Dynetics, a subsidiary of Leidos, is currently under contract to produce C-HGB prototypes for the Army and Navy. The C-HGB uses a booster rocket motor to accelerate to well above hypersonic speeds and then jettisons the expended rocket booster. The C-HGB, which can travel at Mach 5 or higher on its own, is planned to be maneuverable, potentially making it more difficult to detect and intercept.
LRHW Organization and Units
The LRHW is organized into batteries. According to the Army “a LRHW battery consists of four Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) on modified M870A4 trailers, each equipped with two AUR+Cs (eight in total), one Battery Operations Center (BOC) for command and control, and a BOC support vehicle.”
The 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, was designated to operate the first battery of eight LRHW missiles. The battalion, also referred to as the Long-Range Fires Battalion, is part of the Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), a unit in the Indo-Pacific-oriented I Corps stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. Other LRHW batteries are planned for Long-Range Fires Battalions in the remaining MDTFs scheduled for activation.
LRHW Testing and Program Activities
According to a 2023 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Study, “U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives,” “Extensive flight testing is necessary to shield hypersonic missiles’ sensitive electronics, to understand how various materials perform, and predict aerodynamics at sustained temperatures as high as 3,000° Fahrenheit.” The Army originally planned for three flight tests of the LRHW before the first battery fielding in FY2023. On October 21, 2021, the booster rocket carrying the C-HGB vehicle reportedly failed a test flight, resulting in what defense officials characterized as a “no test” as the C-HGB had no chance to deploy. Reportedly, a June 2022 test of the entire LRHW missile also resulted in failure.
Flight Test Delays
In October 2022, it was reported the Department of Defense (DOD) delayed a scheduled LRHW test in order to “assess the root cause of the June [2022] failure.” Reportedly, the delayed test would be rescheduled to the first quarter of FY2023.
24. The West has forgotten the art of strategy China and Russia are the new grandmasters
Well, we should see this as the gauntlet being thrown down. We should not let this criticism stand. We must prove him (and China and Russia) wrong.
Can we stop making "those serial misjudgements?"
Excerpts:
The trouble with our misjudgements is they have no corrective mechanism. If you are a financial trader, your misjudgements cost you money. You cannot keep getting everything wrong and expect to stay solvent. That is not the case in foreign policy, because the people who keep on making those serial misjudgements are not the same people who are paying the price. It is also why dysfunctional economic theories persist even if there is no empirical evidence that supports them. Economists, State Department officials and journalists live in a space of mutually reinforced misjudgements. They celebrate each tactical victory — and never win wars.
The West did have a strategy once, which is what put us into the position of superiority in the first place. It originated in science and was leveraged by smart political decisions. But it all happened a long time ago. The Second World War was the beginning of a breathtaking series of innovations that started with the Manhattan Project and that were co-sponsored by the US Army: the transistor, the semiconductor, the integrated circuit, the personal computer, the internet, and now AI. It was technology that gave the West a strategic advantage. European integration was in that category of big strategic moves until it turned into a sprawling mess with EU enlargement.
China made two big strategic moves in succession. The first was the policies of economic modernisation by Deng Xiaoping, who came to power in 1978. As Frank Dikötter, the Dutch historian, explained in his masterpiece China After Mao, the West misjudged Deng’s reforms as a transition from communism to capitalism. The real goal was to make communism work better. Deng’s reforms were a long-term project. His reforms started in the 1980s and were continued by his successors. When he died in 1997, China was still at an early stage of industrialisation. Today, it is one of the world’s most advanced industrial nations.
China’s second important strategic move was Xi Jinping’s decision to leverage critical raw materials, like rare earth magnets, to turn China into the world’s indispensable producer. The US still enjoys the fruits from the digital revolution. But it is no longer alone. And China is about to take a lead in this area too.
The West has forgotten the art of strategy China and Russia are the new grandmasters
unherd.com · by Wolfgang Munchau · June 15, 2025
World-class chess players know the difference between strategy and tactics better than politicians do. To win in chess you need to start with a strategy — a long-term plan that gets you to a position of superiority. Then you close in with a sequence of tactical moves. As Max Euwe, the Dutch chess grandmaster of the 1930s, once observed: “Strategy requires thought. Tactics require observation.”
The West is all tactics. The East is mostly strategy. You need both because even the most brilliant short-term moves do not add up to a strategy. Just look at the history of US military intervention since World War II. Each of them had their short-term rationale, even Iraq. But has it made the US safer? Has it made the world safer? Has it brought democracy? Has anyone become more civilised as a result?
Israel’s strike against Iran is a classic case of a trade-off where a short-term tactical manoeuvre is bought at the expense of a weaker strategic position in the long run. I am not the first commentator to observe that Israel’s attack against Iran will succeed tactically, possibly with sensational success, but it will not stop Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. Any future Iranian strategic planner will logically conclude from the last series of attacks that Iran absolutely needs the bomb. Other countries in the region might too. Ukraine’s biggest regret is having agreed to give up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons. Had the country kept them, Putin would never have attacked.
Lack of strategic thinking plays an important part in the decline of the West. The biggest strategic own-goal of all has been to drive China and Russia closer together — and Iran closer to both. These countries do not form an alliance in the Western sense. What they have in common is an overriding strategic goal: to become independent of Western coercion.
Our sanctions, our bans, our wars and proxy-wars have had the opposite effect of what we intended. Some, like the sanctions, failed tactically. Russia has outgrown the West and has shifted to a war economy that the Europeans struggle to keep up with. But the most consequential failure of the policy was strategic. The financial sanctions persuaded China and Russia to develop a joint payment system.
Until a few years ago, the world of finance depended on the US dollar and Western-controlled global payments infrastructure. Part of that infrastructure was Swift, a Brussels-based quango that provides the main networks through which international banks communicate. When Russia invaded Ukraine, one of the first actions taken by Western governments was to cut off some Russian banks from Swift, so they could no longer transact. The West also froze Russian financial assets, a large chunk of which is held in vaults in Belgium. Russia was essentially cancelled by the global financial markets.
The result is that Russia, China and other countries have been developing their own parallel financial infrastructure. The first part is called Brics Pay. Brics stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The name “Brics” came up 25 years ago as a short-form to denote the five newly-developing economies most likely to succeed. The group has since grown to ten countries, and now includes Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. They are not like Nato or the European Union. India is a bit of an odd-one out here. What they have in common is a desire to be independent of Western infrastructure monopolies.
Payment systems are to financial capitalism what plumbing is to the water supply — not something we talk about until we have a problem with it. The Western payment monopoly makes it possible for the US and Europe to impose financial sanctions in the first place. But financial sanctions are like the cake you can either have or eat. When you start abusing your monopoly powers and impose sanctions on too many countries, you give an incentive to break out of the system.
“When you start abusing your monopoly powers and impose sanctions on too many countries, you give an incentive to break out of the system.”
Brics Pay was developed by scientists from Saint Petersburg State University. It works differently from Western payment systems. Brics Pay is decentralised. It has no hub, no owner. It is based on the same underlying technology as crypto currencies — the blockchain. Brics Pay is sanctions-proof. No member can sanction any other member. If you want to make yourself independent from the US, starting with the payment system is the smartest thing to do.
I lost respect for virtually every single Russia or China expert in prominent think-tanks because they kept on misjudging this key element of China’s and Russia’s strategy. They still tell us that China and Russia will never align, or that China would step in and stop Putin from using a nuclear bomb. The misjudgements continue on all levels. The previous US administration misjudged the dynamics of the semiconductor ban, through which they hoped to keep China in the digital dark ages for a little while longer. They expressed surprise when Huawei succeeded in integrating a state-of-the-art chip into one of its latest models. The semiconductor ban is a classic case of the unintended consequences of sanctions. China learned how to make semiconductors, and the Russians learned how to build a payment system.
Officials in the US State Department think of the dollar as a political weapon through which they can force their will on others. They got bad advice from macroeconomists who told them that no other currency in the world could ever challenge the dollar. They are not telling the whole story. What is true is that no other official currency will challenge the dollar. The euro started as the world’s second-largest currency for foreign exchange reserves and has now been pushed into third place by gold. Where the observation goes wrong is that it fails to see the true threat. It comes from alternative payment systems, crypto currencies and blockchain technologies that allow other countries to diversify away from the US without having to create new currencies of their own. Macroeconomists still live in the world of fiat money and central banks — all creations of modern industrial society. But China and Russia are changing the game. It’s not cricket anymore.
The trouble with our misjudgements is they have no corrective mechanism. If you are a financial trader, your misjudgements cost you money. You cannot keep getting everything wrong and expect to stay solvent. That is not the case in foreign policy, because the people who keep on making those serial misjudgements are not the same people who are paying the price. It is also why dysfunctional economic theories persist even if there is no empirical evidence that supports them. Economists, State Department officials and journalists live in a space of mutually reinforced misjudgements. They celebrate each tactical victory — and never win wars.
The West did have a strategy once, which is what put us into the position of superiority in the first place. It originated in science and was leveraged by smart political decisions. But it all happened a long time ago. The Second World War was the beginning of a breathtaking series of innovations that started with the Manhattan Project and that were co-sponsored by the US Army: the transistor, the semiconductor, the integrated circuit, the personal computer, the internet, and now AI. It was technology that gave the West a strategic advantage. European integration was in that category of big strategic moves until it turned into a sprawling mess with EU enlargement.
China made two big strategic moves in succession. The first was the policies of economic modernisation by Deng Xiaoping, who came to power in 1978. As Frank Dikötter, the Dutch historian, explained in his masterpiece China After Mao, the West misjudged Deng’s reforms as a transition from communism to capitalism. The real goal was to make communism work better. Deng’s reforms were a long-term project. His reforms started in the 1980s and were continued by his successors. When he died in 1997, China was still at an early stage of industrialisation. Today, it is one of the world’s most advanced industrial nations.
China’s second important strategic move was Xi Jinping’s decision to leverage critical raw materials, like rare earth magnets, to turn China into the world’s indispensable producer. The US still enjoys the fruits from the digital revolution. But it is no longer alone. And China is about to take a lead in this area too.
A report by Stanford University tells us China publishes more AI research papers than anyone in the world. The big prize in AI will go to those who can leverage it to create AI-based manufacturing: plants that are operated by intelligent robots and are linked to large data centres that optimise the production flow. What is known as Industry 4.0 still requires raw materials as inputs, but China is better placed in this area too. I call that a strategy.
You can think of a tactic as a shiny gift, and of strategy as a gift that keeps on giving. We Westerners are, by our inclination, more tactical than strategic. We like to close in. That is not necessarily a bad thing, for as long as you have an underlying strategy in place.
Chess players know that. One of the greatest chess grandmasters of all time, the American Bobby Fischer, said: “Tactics flow from a superior position.” The West has lost that superior position. So has Israel. We are the ageing grandmasters of geopolitics, eager to play one more game.
Wolfgang Münchau is the Director of Eurointelligence and an UnHerd columnist.
25. Special Operations News - Monday, June 16, 2025
Special Operations News - Monday, June 16, 2025 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · June 16, 2025
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo / Image: An East-coast-based U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operator (SEAL) prepares to descend below the surface during dive training with Polish special forces, June 27, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Katie Cox)
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SOF News
General Officer Promotion for AFSOC Officers. The following officers have been nominated for promotion:
- Air Force Brig. Gen. Leslie S. Hadley has been nominated for appointment to the grade of major general. Hadley is currently serving as mobilization assistant to the commander, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida.
- Air Force Col. Jeremy S. Bergin for appointment to the grade of brigadier general. Bergin is currently serving as chief of staff, Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida.
- Air Force Col. Ethan P. Hinkins for appointment to the grade of brigadier general. Hinkins is currently serving as mobilization assistant to the director of Operations, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida.
NSW Officer Promotion. Navy Capt. Christopher A. Carter for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half). Carter is currently serving as commander, Navy Reserve Naval Special Warfare Task Force Eighteen, San Diego, California.
SOF and Neurotechnology. Anna M. Gielas, PhD, writes on how rapid advancements in neurotechnology will present opportunities that could amplify the inherent strengths of Special Operations Forces. Tip of the Spear, Edge of the Mind: Neurotechnolgy’s Roles in the Future of Special Operations, Joint Special Operations University Press, May 28, 2025.
https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/277
SEALs and Cold War II. The Navy’s SEALs have been transitioning, like the rest of the military, to a force emphasizing competition with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. This transition began a few years back. An intelligence officer assigned to a US Navy special warfare unit writes on how her unit conducted this transition. “The US Navy SEAL Teams Can Bring the Heat in the New Cold War, And I Saw the Spark”, by Jill Gentry, Small Wars Journal, June 9, 2025.
SECDEF on SOF Funding. During a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, says that the proposed defense budget for fiscal year 2026 has adequate funding for the special operations community. Although figures have not been released, it is understood that there will be an increase over last year. (Defense.gov, June 12, 2025)
Base Named for SF MoH Recipient. Fort Gordon will regain its former name, but in honor of Master Sgt. Gary L. Gordon. He was a Delta Force soldier awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in Somalia in 1992 during the Battle of Mogadishu.
IWC Spotlight. The monthly newsletter for the Irregular Warfare Center (May 2025) has been published. Two pages, PDF. https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/news/newsletter/may-2025-newsletter/
International SOF
Israeli Commandos Strike From Inside Iran. Some news reports are saying that Israeli commandos and Mossad agents infiltrated Iran ahead of the air strikes to attack air defense systems and radars with drones. Read more in “Israeli Commandos Attacked Iranian Air Defenses With Drones From Inside the Country”, TWZ, June 13, 2025. and “How Mossad covertly prepared Israel’s attack from deep inside Iran”, The Washington Post, June 13, 2025. (subscription)
Cheap Drones, SOF, and Airpower. Israel’s recent attack against Iran shows how warfare is changing with the use of commandos, small drones, and airpower all combined to inflict a devastating blow on air defense system and radars. This allowed the Israeli Air Force to inflict attack Iran’s strategic and time sensitive targets. “Ungentlemanly Robots: Israel’s Operation Rising Lion and the New Way of War”, by Benjamin Jensen, Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 13, 2025.
Decapitation and Strategic Surprise Using SOF. Doug Livermore, a U.S. Special Forces officer, provides an analysis of Israel’s recent operation where Mossad and commandos infiltrated Iran to conduct strikes against key targets that enabled the Israeli air attacks to successfully engage targets in Iran. “By fusing intelligence and special operations, Israel’s strikes on Iran are a lesson in strategic surprise”, Atlantic Council, June 14, 2025.
Belgian SFG. Established in April 2000, the SOF component of the and Component of the Armed Forces of Belgium stands as Belgium’s Tier 1 special operations group. It has participated in various theatres of operation over its history. This article provides info on its history, organization, equipment, and more. “The Belgian Special Forces Group (SFG)”, by Edwin Taylor, Grey Dynamics, June 11, 2025.
SOF History
On June 17, 1983, The Department of the Army authorized a Special Forces tab for wear by qualified soldiers. The tab bore the same colors as those used for Special Forces Shoulder Sleeve Insignia.
On June 19, 1942, the 1/75th was established in World War II.
On June 19, 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. https://www.specialforceshistory.info/groups/10sfga.html
Ukraine Conflict
Russian Casualties. There are many organizations attempting to track the number of casualties Russia has suffered since it invaded Ukraine a few years back. Some estimates say that it has had over 300,000 killed with a total of over one million casualties. Many open-source reports say that Russia suffers about 1,000 casualties a day while only gaining meters on the ground. Russia has seized less than 1 percent of Ukrainian territory since January 2024. In addition to the human cost, Russia’s military equipment inventory has been severely diminished. “Vladimir Putin has incurred one million casualties in his pointless war”, The Hill, June 12, 2025.
CRS Report – “Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook”, IF12150, by Andrew S. Bowen, updated June 13, 2025. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has updated a report that the military situation on the ground. Topics include manning of the UAF, equipment, U.S. and western security assistance, training, and current military outlook. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12150
References:
Israeli Attack on Iran
Operation Rising Lion. Early on Friday, June 13, 2025, hundreds of Israeli jets attacked numerous targets in Iran. Among the targets were air defense systems, nuclear program facilities, senior military leaders, and leading scientists for Iran’s nuclear program. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that Iran was months away from having a nuclear weapon that could be used against Israel; thereby compelling his country to preemptively strike Iran. U.S. administration officials were reportedly briefed on the strike plans ahead of time. The commander of U.S. Central Command had days earlier cancelled an appearance before Congress due to rising tensions in previous days to the strike. Iran’s Quds Force, an elite part of the Revolutionary Guard, has been a high priority target for the Israelis.
Iran Responds. The Iranians answered hours later with more than 100 drones; however, Israel claims that they were all shot down. In time, Iran launched ballistic missiles from mobile missile launchers; they have more than 120 launchers so waves of about 100 missiles are being launched into Israel. Many of the missiles are landing in the Tel Aviv area. The air strikes, drone attacks, and missile launches ensued throughout most of the weekend. Some of the missiles were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome system while others hit military targets and civilian areas. By Sunday, the number of Iranian launched missiles in each wave had dwindled in number. Early on Monday morning the Israelis announced that they had air superiority over the skies of Iran. (AP News, June 16, 2025)
U.S. Helps in Defense. There are reports in the news media that the US is helping Israel shoot down some of the Iranian missiles with ground-based Patriot missile defense systems and one or more Navy destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. has about 40,000 military personnel on bases around the Middle East, up from the normal complement of 30,000. (The Hill, 13 June 2025)
National Security and Commentary
Alcohol and Veterans. Many studies have pointed to the drinking habits of veterans and the negative effect on their health. Alcohol use will contribute to liver ailments, heart problems, and other health ills. It also has an effect on mental health; especially those with PTSD. “Alcohol Use Disorder Among U.S. Veterans”, Rand.org, June 10, 2025.
“Dark Eagle” – Army’s LRHW. The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon has a reported range of 1,725 miles. The LRHW provides the Army a strategic attack weapon system to suppress adversary long-range fires and other high payoff/time critical targets. The Army’s LRHW was designated as the Dark Eagle on April 24, 2025. The system has yet to achieve full operational capability. “The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), IF11991, June 12, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11991
M10 Booker Production to be Shut Down. The Army’s light tank program will soon come to a close. The modifications of the M10 Booker kept piling on, turning the light tank into a medium tank. “Dead on arrival: Army pulls plug on M10 Booker light tank”, Defense News, June 12, 2025.
China and Political Warfare. Eric Chan and Kerry Gershaneck provide a 22-page essay on how China uses political warfare in Chinese military operations. Of course, their primary target is Taiwan. Read “Political Warfare against Intervention Forces“, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Spring 2025.
U.S. Military Reserve Components. “The term reserve component (RC) refers collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the Armed Forces. Congress exercises authority over the reserve components under its constitutional authority “to raise and support Armies,” “to provide and maintain a Navy,” to “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”, and “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia,” Read more in “Defense Primer: Reserve Forces”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), IF10540, June 13, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10540
Information Operations
VoA Recalls Iranian Language Staff. Most of the staff of Voice of America, the federally funded news network, were put on administrative leave by the Trump administration in March. In a reversal, the staff working the “Iranian Desk” have been brought in off admin leave. Unfortunately, the Farsi language service has lost a lot of its Iranian audience since early spring. The VoA Farsi service provided news to a country where the news reports are severely censored. “Voice of America Recalls Staff for Iranian Language News Service From Leave”, The New York Times, June 13, 2025. (subscription)
Russia, AI, and Africa. Russian intelligence and Wagner Group assets are associated with a clandestine pro-Russian online operation that seeks to expand Moscow’s influence in Africa. The campaign is using grassroot activists and social media. The information operations (IO) is being conducted through the “African Initiative“. This organization publishes in five languages, including French and English. “Russia targeted French speakers in Africa with AI-generated posts”, Le Monde, June 13, 2025.
Africa
Al-Shabaab on Offensive. A strategic village, El Hareri (Google Maps), in central Somalia has been seized by the jihadist group. The insurgents have stepped up operations in Somalia prompting concern that the President is more concerned with politics than fighting Al-Shabaab. “Al-Shabaab Seizes Strategic Area Amid Fierce Clashes in Central Somalia”, Garowe Online, June 12, 2025.
RSF Drone Strikes. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been targeted the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with drone strikes since early May. Power stations and ammunition depots are among the targets being hit at Port Sudan – the current temporary capital of the government of Somalia. The drone strikes have caused disruption in civil aviation, damaged oil infrastructure, and more. Some reports say that MALE-class drones are being provided by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These drones are referred to as medium altitude long endurance (30 hours 30,000 feet).
Russia Increases Military Presence in Africa. Moscow is delivering sophisticated weaponry to sub-Saharan conflict zones. Ships sailing out of the Baltic Sea are making nearly a one-month journey carrying howitzers, radio jamming equipment, tanks and other military supplies – evading international sanctions. Much of the equipment is destined for Russia’s Africa Corps, which has been replacing Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group. “Russia skirts Western sanctions to ramp up its military footprint in Africa”, AP News, June 10, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/russia-africa-weaponry-ships-mali-ukraine-f3383b5bbc8120b445d3df9062bf7f14
Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies
Book Review – The Ethics of Special Ops. Ian North reviews a book entitled The Ethics of Special Ops: Raids, Recoveries, Reconnaissance, and Rebels, Cambridge University Press, 2023. Published by the Australian Army Research Centre, the review examines how the authors of the book present ethical concerns of how special operations are conducted by examining SOF missions and operations through time and around the world. The reviewer of the book concludes that “. . . this book is well researched, well written and hugely timely for Western militaries dealing with multiple instances of degraded ethical decision-making by SOF.”
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sof.news · by SOF News · June 16, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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