Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 

Quotes of the Day:


“The modern state is therefore practically in vulnerable to a direct result. Two alternatives remain: guerrilla warfare in the coup d'état. The first works by a slow erosion of the human and physical infrastructure of the state, a long and bloody process. The coup d'état, on the other hand, relies on the use of precisely those parts of the state apparatus which guerrilla warfare six to destroy: the Armed Forces, the police, and the security agencies. The technique of the coup d'état is the technique of judo: the planners of the coup must use the power of the state against its political masters. This is done by a process of infiltration and subversion in which a small but critical part of the security forces are totally subverted, while much of the rest is temporarily neutralized.” 
– Edward Luttwak

“Frederick Douglass taught that literacy is the path from slavery to freedom. There are many kinds of slavery in many kinds of freedom, but reading is still the path.” 
– Carl Sagan

“Loyalty is a noble quality, so long as it is not blind and does not exclude the higher loyalty to truth and decency.”
– B.H. Liddell Hart, Why Don't We Learn from History?



1. Russia’s Putin to visit North Korea, amid growing military cooperation

2. South Korea's loudspeakers face questions over reach into North

3. North Korea estimated to possess ‘up to 50 nuclear weapons’: think tank

4. Role of nuclear weapons grows as geopolitical relations deteriorate—new SIPRI Yearbook out now

5. P​utin to Visit North Korea, a Newly Crucial Ally as Ukraine War Drags On

6. Putin to visit N. Korea on June 18-19: KCNA

7. Russia unlikely to transfer advanced military technology to N. Korea: minister

8. US, South Korea, Japan to Lock In Security Ties Before Inauguration

9. High-level exchanges between N. Korea, Russia hit record high this year

10. Putin’s Pyongyang trip highlights need for bond in isolation

11. Inter-Korea tensions subside as both sides review cross-border tit-for-tat

12. North Korea building apparent anti-tank barriers along border: ROK military

13. N. Korean youth organization calls for more education to repay the love of Kim Jong Un

14. Editorial: North Korea can't stop young people's admiration for S. Korea

15. Civic groups, border residents urge restrictions on activists' anti-Pyongyang leafleting

16. Asia on Edge: What MAGA Think Tanks Reveal About a Trump 2.0 Presidency




1. Russia’s Putin to visit North Korea, amid growing military cooperation


The axis of aggressors unite.


Will the meeting take place this week?


Excerpts:

The White House has repeatedly accused North Korea of sending “equipment and munitions” to Russia to replenish its dwindling supplies for the war in Ukraine, including ballistic missiles with a range of roughly 550 miles and missile launchers.
North Korea is believed to have a large stockpile of dated artillery shells and rockets that would be compatible with Soviet and Russian weapons systems used in Ukraine, as well as a production capacity that would help Russia maintain its high ammunition burn rate as the Kremlin seeks to scale up domestic production.
Pyongyang, for its part, is seeking to boost its beleaguered economy — it is grappling with financial hardship and food insecurity following pandemic isolation and years of sanctions — and get access to Moscow’s advanced technology for its satellite and nuclear weapons programs.


Russia’s Putin to visit North Korea, amid growing military cooperation

The pair will use the visit to pledge support for each other, rebuffing U.S.-led efforts to isolate Putin over Ukraine and Kim over his pursuit of nuclear weapons.


By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

June 17, 2024 at 7:20 a.m. EDT


In this photog distributed by Sputnik agency, Russia's President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un visit the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Amur region on Sept. 13, 2023. (Vladimir Smirnov/Sputnik/Pool/AFP/Getty Images)

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · June 17, 2024

SEOUL — Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea for talks with leader Kim Jong Un on June 18 and 19, furthering concerns about the growing military cooperation between the two pariah states at a time when Moscow is hungry for munitions for its war against Ukraine.

The pair will likely use the visit to again pledge public support for each other, rebuffing U.S.-led efforts to isolate Putin over his invasion of Ukraine and Kim over his pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

The visit will also highlight the longevity of autocratic leadership in both countries: Putin last visited North Korea 24 years ago, soon after he became president for the first time, when the country was led by Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father.

The visit was announced by Russian and North Korean media.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Thursday hailed the state of relations between the two countries.

“The potential for developing our bilateral relations is very deep,” Peskov said, according to Interfax. “We believe that our right to develop good relations with our neighbors should not cause concern to anyone and cannot and should not be disputed by anyone.”

Putin’s trip will reciprocate Kim’s visit to Russia’s Far East in September last year, when the North Korean leader called his country’s relations with Russia his top priority and pledged support for Moscow’s “sacred struggle” against Ukraine.

The White House has repeatedly accused North Korea of sending “equipment and munitions” to Russia to replenish its dwindling supplies for the war in Ukraine, including ballistic missiles with a range of roughly 550 miles and missile launchers.

North Korea is believed to have a large stockpile of dated artillery shells and rockets that would be compatible with Soviet and Russian weapons systems used in Ukraine, as well as a production capacity that would help Russia maintain its high ammunition burn rate as the Kremlin seeks to scale up domestic production.

Pyongyang, for its part, is seeking to boost its beleaguered economy — it is grappling with financial hardship and food insecurity following pandemic isolation and years of sanctions — and get access to Moscow’s advanced technology for its satellite and nuclear weapons programs.

During the September trip, Putin took Kim to the Vostochny Cosmodrome, which symbolizes Moscow’s ambitions for pioneering space technology. At the time, U.S. and South Korean officials warned that North Korea might be seeking critical technologies from Russia to boost Pyongyang’s nuclear and weapons ambitions as missiles and rockets use much of the same technology.

North Korea’s space agency in November put a “space launch vehicle” — its name for what appears to be a military satellite — into orbit after two failed attempts. Kim lauded the satellite as a “space guard” that would intensify his regime’s hostile reconnaissance on enemy nations, and the North Korean state media claimed it had photographed sensitive military and political sites in South Korea and the United States, although it did not release any imagery.

Still, experts said in February that the satellite was “alive” after observing maneuvers that suggest Pyongyang was controlling the spacecraft.

Lyric Li in Seoul and Robyn Dixon in Riga, Latvia, contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · June 17, 2024


2. South Korea's loudspeakers face questions over reach into North


There is no single method that is optimal. All capabilities must be employed. And we know from escapees that these do have effects. 




​South Korea's loudspeakers face questions over reach into North

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-loudspeakers-face-questions-over-reach-into-north-2024-06-17/

By Hyun Young Yi

June 17, 20246:36 AM EDTUpdated an hour ago



0 seconds of 15 secondsVolume 0%




 

The Korean loudspeaker war: does it really work?

SEOUL, June 17 (Reuters) - The loudspeakers deployed by South Korea to wage psychological warfare against North Korea faced audits and legal battles claiming they are too quiet, raising questions over how far into the reclusive North their propaganda messages can blast.

South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts directed at North Korea on June 9 for the first time since a now-defunct inter-Korean agreement banned them in 2018.

The current speakers were among 40 systems purchased in 2016 after the two Koreas exchanged artillery fire in a 2015 dispute over the broadcasts.

The military says the systems were designed to blare pop music and political messages as far as 10 kilometres (6.21 miles), enough to reach the city of Kaesong and its nearly 200,000 residents.

But audits released at the time, seen by Reuters, showed the new speakers did not meet those standards and were not as powerful as the military called for.

According to former navy officer Kim Young-su, although the speakers passed two out three initial tests in 2016, the trials took place in the morning or at night, when sound travels furthest.

South Korea rarely operates the speakers during those times now, so as not to disturb nearby South Korean residents as much, said Kim, who investigated and raised the issues to government corruption watchdogs and the police.


The issues led the Ministry of National Defence to sue the manufacturer, but a court dismissed the case, saying that too many environmental factors can affect the performance.


South Korean soldiers work next to a military facility (Green box) where loudspeakers dismantled in 2018 used to be, near the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas in Paju, South Korea, June 10, 2024. REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Tests in 2017 showed that messages or songs from the speakers could not be understood further than 7 kilometres, and more often closer to 5 kilometres, according to the audit and Kim, not enough to reach a city such as Kaesong.

The ministry told Reuters in a statement that performance may vary depending on conditions such as temperature, humidity, and terrain, but that it did not consider the loudspeakers' performance to be restricted.

Kim Sung-min, who defected from the North in 1999 and runs a Seoul radio station that broadcasts news into North Korea, said the mountainous border terrain and North Korea’s own loudspeakers in the area further diminish the reach of South Korea’s psychological warfare.

North Korea's broadcasts are less aimed at winning over people in the South and more at "suppressing" the South's broadcasts by overpowering or muddling the message, he said.

Still, for North Koreans who hear the South Korean messages or catchy K-pop tunes that are banned in the North, the broadcasts can have a significant psychological impact, Kim Sung-min said.

"These broadcasts play a role in instilling a yearning for the outside world, or in making them realize that the textbooks they have been taught from are incorrect," he said.

At least two North Korean soldiers from the frontlines defected to the South in 2017 after listening to loudspeaker broadcasts, local media reported, citing South Korean officials.

The angry North Korean reaction to the broadcasts also suggests the loudspeakers strike a nerve with the authoritarian country, said Steve Tharp, a retired U.S. Army officer who spent years working along the border.

"We know that the North Koreans find them partly effective because they have spent a lot of time getting them turned off," he said.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here.

Reporting by Hyun Young Yi; Additional reporting by Josh Smith; Writing by Josh Smith. Editing by Gerry Doyle



3. North Korea estimated to possess ‘up to 50 nuclear weapons’: think tank


SIPRI



North Korea estimated to possess ‘up to 50 nuclear weapons’: think tank

The number jumped from 30 last year, according to a Swedish group.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/northkorea-nuclear-weapons-06172024004832.html

Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.06.17

Taipei, Taiwan


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends what state media reported was a launching ceremony for a new tactical nuclear attack submarine in North Korea, in this picture released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Sept. 8, 2023.

 KCNA via REUTERS

North Korea may have assembled up to 50 nuclear weapons, a significant increase over the past year, and could produce more, says a Swedish think tank.

“North Korea’s military nuclear programme remains central to its national security strategy,” said the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, in its Yearbook 2024 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

“North Korea has produced plutonium for use in nuclear weapons but is believed to be producing HEU [highly enriched uranium] for nuclear weapons as well,” it added.

Last year, the institute estimated that North Korea had up to 30 nuclear weapons. 

North Korea has tested a nuclear device six times since 2006 and says its missiles are capable of striking anywhere in the world. 

The think tank said the number of nuclear warheads in the world stood at 12,121 as of January, down from 12,512 a year earlier.

The SIPRI classifies nine countries as nuclear powers: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel.

Of these, the United States and Russia possess about 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.

Globally during 2023, 14 United Nations arms embargoes and 22 European Union arms embargoes aimed at limiting the spread of weapons were in force.

But the efficacy of U.N. arms embargoes has been under strain in 2023 amid widespread allegations that Russia procured weapons from North Korea and the continued ineffectiveness of an embargo on Libya, according to the think tank.

Outside armed conflict, there was a shift towards greater use of cyber capabilities for longer-term intelligence gathering and away from large-scale or one-off operations, said SIPRI.

Some middle-power states, including Iran and North Korea, increased the sophistication of their cyber-espionage techniques and operations in 2023, it added. 

Edited by RFA Staff.



4. Role of nuclear weapons grows as geopolitical relations deteriorate—new SIPRI Yearbook out now


The 97 pages of Chapter 7 World Nuclear Forces can be downloaded here: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB24%2007%20WNF.pdf


The north Korean section begins on page 339. 





Role of nuclear weapons grows as geopolitical relations deteriorate—new SIPRI Yearbook out now

https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/role-nuclear-weapons-grows-geopolitical-relations-deteriorate-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now

17 June 2024

The 55th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook

(Stockholm, 17 June 2024) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) today launches its annual assessment of the state of armaments, disarmament and international security. Key findings of SIPRI Yearbook 2024 are that the number and types of nuclear weapons in development have increased as states deepen their reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Read this press release in Catalan (PDF), French (PDF), Spanish (PDF) or Swedish (PDF).

Click here to download the sample chapter of SIPRI Yearbook 2024 on world nuclear forces.

Nuclear arsenals being strengthened around the world

The nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2023.

Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12 121 warheads in January 2024, about 9585 were in military stockpiles for potential use (see the table below). An estimated 3904 of those warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft—60 more than in January 2023—and the rest were in central storage. Around 2100 of the deployed warheads were kept in a state of high operational alert on ballistic missiles. Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, but for the first time China is believed to have some warheads on high operational alert. 

‘While the global total of nuclear warheads continues to fall as cold war-era weapons are gradually dismantled, regrettably we continue to see year-on-year increases in the number of operational nuclear warheads,’ said SIPRI Director Dan Smith. ‘This trend seems likely to continue and probably accelerate in the coming years and is extremely concerning.’

India, Pakistan and North Korea are all pursuing the capability to deploy multiple warheads on ballistic missiles, something Russia, France, the UK, the USA and—more recently—China already have. This would enable a rapid potential increase in deployed warheads, as well as the possibility for nuclear-armed countries to threaten the destruction of significantly more targets.

Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes of their respective military stockpiles (i.e. useable warheads) seem to have remained relatively stable in 2023, although Russia is estimated to have deployed around 36 more warheads with operational forces than in January 2023. Transparency regarding nuclear forces has declined in both countries in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and debates around nuclear-sharing arrangements have increased in saliency. 

Notably, there were several public claims made in 2023 that Russia had deployed nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, although there is no conclusive visual evidence that the actual deployment of warheads has taken place. 

In addition to their military stockpiles, Russia and the USA each hold more than 1200 warheads previously retired from military service, which they are gradually dismantling. 

World nuclear forces, January 2024

Table with 9 columns and 10 rows.Deployed warheadsaStored warheadsbMilitary stockpile

c


Retired warheads

d


Total inventory

e


Country20242024202320242023202420232024 United States1 7701 9383 7083 7081 5361 3365 2445 044 Russia1 7102 6704 489f4 3801 4001 2005 889f5 580 United Kingdom120105225225g––225225g France28010290290––290290 China24h476410500––410500 India–172164172––164172 Pakistan–170170170––170170 North Korea–503050i––3050i Israel–909090––9090Total3 9045 6819 576f9 5852 9362 53612 512f12 121

– = nil or a negligible value.

Notes: All estimates are approximate. SIPRI revises its world nuclear forces data each year based on new information and updates to earlier assessments. The data for Jan. 2024 replaces all previously published SIPRI data on world nuclear forces. Countries are ordered by date of first known nuclear test; however, there is no conclusive open-source evidence that Israel has tested its nuclear weapons. Russia and the USA no longer publish aggregate numbers for strategic nuclear forces limited by the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).


Click here for additional notes.












Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2024.

 

SIPRI’s estimate of the size of China’s nuclear arsenal increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, and it is expected to keep growing. For the first time, China may also now be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade, although its stockpile of nuclear warheads is still expected to remain much smaller than the stockpiles of either of those two countries.

‘China is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country,’ said Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). ‘But in nearly all of the nuclear-armed states there are either plans or a significant push to increase nuclear forces.’ 

Although the UK is not thought to have increased its nuclear weapon arsenal in 2023, its warhead stockpile is expected to grow in the future as a result of the British government’s announcement in 2021 that it was raising its limit from 225 to 260 warheads. The government also said it would no longer publicly disclose its quantities of nuclear weapons, deployed warheads or deployed missiles.

In 2023 France continued its programmes to develop a third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a new air-launched cruise missile, as well as to refurbish and upgrade existing systems.

India slightly expanded its nuclear arsenal in 2023. Both India and Pakistan continued to develop new types of nuclear delivery system in 2023. While Pakistan remains the main focus of India’s nuclear deterrent, India appears to be placing growing emphasis on longer-range weapons, including those capable of reaching targets throughout China.

North Korea continues to prioritize its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled around 50 warheads and possesses enough fissile material to reach a total of up to 90 warheads, both significant increases over the estimates for January 2023. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions in 2023, it appears to have carried out its first test of a short-range ballistic missile from a rudimentary silo. It also completed the development of at least two types of land-attack cruise missile (LACM) designed to deliver nuclear weapons. 

‘Like several other nuclear-armed states, North Korea is putting new emphasis on developing its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons,’ said Matt Korda, Associate Researcher with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Senior Research Fellow for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. ‘Accordingly, there is a growing concern that North Korea might intend to use these weapons very early in a conflict.’

Israel—which does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons—is also believed to be modernizing its nuclear arsenal and appears to be upgrading its plutonium production reactor site at Dimona.

Tensions over Ukraine and Gaza wars further weaken nuclear diplomacy

Nuclear arms control and disarmament diplomacy suffered more major setbacks in 2023. In February 2023 Russia announced it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces. As a countermeasure, the USA has also suspended sharing and publication of treaty data.

In November Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing ‘an imbalance’ with the USA, which has failed to ratify the treaty since it opened for signature in 1996. However, Russia confirmed that it would remain a signatory and would continue to participate in the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Meanwhile, Russia has continued to make threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the context of Western support for Ukraine. In May 2024 Russia carried out tactical nuclear weapon drills close to the Ukrainian border. 

‘We have not seen nuclear weapons playing such a prominent role in international relations since the cold war,’ said Wilfred Wan, Director of SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme. ‘It is hard to believe that barely two years have passed since the leaders of the five largest nuclear-armed states jointly reaffirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.’

An informal agreement reached between Iran and the USA in June 2023 seemed to temporarily de-escalate tensions between the two countries, which had intensified over Iran’s military support to Russian forces in Ukraine. However, the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October upended the agreement, with proxy attacks by Iran-backed groups on US forces in Iraq and Syria apparently ending Iranian–US diplomatic efforts. The war also undermined efforts to engage Israel in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

More positively, the June 2023 visit to Beijing by the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, seems to have increased space for dialogue between China and the USA on a range of issues, potentially including arms control. Later in the year the two sides agreed to resume military-to-military communication.

Global security and stability in increasing peril 

The 55th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses the continuing deterioration of global security over the past year. The impacts of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are visible in almost every aspect of the issues connected to armaments, disarmament and international security examined in the Yearbook. Beyond these two wars—which took centre stage in global news reporting, diplomatic energy and discussion of international politics alike—armed conflicts were active in another 50 states in 2023. Fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan saw millions of people displaced, and conflict flared up again in Myanmar in the final months of 2023. Armed criminal gangs were a major security concern in some Central and South American states, notably leading to the effective collapse of the state in Haiti during 2023 and into 2024. 

‘We are now in one of the most dangerous periods in human history,’ said Dan Smith, SIPRI Director. ‘There are numerous sources of instability—political rivalries, economic inequalities, ecological disruption, an accelerating arms race. The abyss is beckoning and it is time for the great powers to step back and reflect. Preferably together.’

In addition to the usual detailed coverage of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues, the SIPRI Yearbook presents data and analysis on developments in world military expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, multilateral peace operations, armed conflicts and more. Special sections in SIPRI Yearbook 2024 explore the role of Russian private military and security companies in conflicts; efforts to reduce the peace and security risks related to artificial intelligence, outer space and cyberspace; and issues around the protection of civilians in the wars in Gaza and Ukraine.

For editors

The SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of cutting-edge information and analysis on developments in armaments, disarmament and international security. Three major SIPRI Yearbook 2024 data sets were pre-launched in 2023–24: total arms sales by the top 100 arms-producing companies (December 2023), international arms transfers (March 2024) and world military expenditure (April 2024). The SIPRI Yearbook is published by Oxford University Press. Learn more at www.sipriyearbook.org.

For information or interview requests contact Mimmi Shen (mimmi.shen@sipri.org, +46 76 628 61 33) or Stephanie Blenckner (blenckner@sipri.org, +46 8 655 97 47).



5. P​utin to Visit North Korea, a Newly Crucial Ally as Ukraine War Drags On


This is one effect Putin and Kim desire - the mainstream western media reporting on their meeting so they can spin this as an act of fear in the west. Today we have both the NY Times and WAPOST reporting on the potential meeting.





P​utin to Visit North Korea, a Newly Crucial Ally as Ukraine War Drags On



By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

June 17, 2024, 7:52 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · June 17, 2024

​Needing munitions to fight in Ukraine, President Vladimir V. Putin plans to return to North Korea this week for the first time in nearly a quarter century.

Listen to this article · 1:47 min Learn more


A photograph provided by the North Korean government showed President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia offering flowers at the Freedom Memorial Tower in Pyongyang with the North Korean leader at the time, Kim Jong-il, in 2000.

June 17, 2024, 7:52 a.m. ET

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia will make a state visit in North Korea beginning Tuesday for a meeting with its leader, Kim Jong-un, the Kremlin and North Korean state media said Monday. It will be their second meeting in nine months, as the two countries deepen military ties to support Mr. Putin’s war in Ukraine with North Korean weapons.

Mr. Putin last visited North Korea in 2000, when he became the first Russian or Soviet leader to visit the nation. The trip highlights North Korea’s growing strategic importance for Mr. Putin, especially its ability to supply badly needed conventional weapons for the war in Ukraine.

For Mr. Kim, it was a rare moment of his country, a pariah in the West, being sought after as an ally.

“At the invitation of the Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, Vladimir Putin will pay a friendly state visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on June 18-19,” the Kremlin said.

​Days before Mr. Putin’s ​arrival in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, the Kremlin​ vowed to foster cooperation with North Korea “in all areas.” This new era of relations between the two countries was apparent when the two leaders met in the Russian Far East in September.

Pyongyang and Moscow were Cold War-era allies whose relations cooled after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But in the past couple of years, they have again grown closer as they shared hostilities toward the United States — Russia over its war against Ukraine and North Korea over its nuclear weapons program.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun

See more on: Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un


The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · June 17, 2024



6. Putin to visit N. Korea on June 18-19: KCNA


Here is the entire KCNA report:


Russian President to Visit DPRK

Date: 17/06/2024 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source

https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1718624309-429101583/russian-president-to-visit-dprk/

Pyongyang, June 17 (KCNA) -- At the invitation of Kim Jong Un , president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, will pay a state visit to the DPRK from June 18 to 19. -0-


www.kcna.kp (Juche113.6.17.)



Putin to visit N. Korea on June 18-19: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 17, 2024

SEOUL, June 17 (Yonhap) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea on June 18-19, Pyongyang's state media reported Monday, amid deepening military cooperation with North Korea following his summit with the North's leader Kim Jong-un in September.

Putin will "pay a state visit" to North Korea at the invitation of the North's leader Kim, the Korean Central News Agency said in a one-sentence dispatch.

The visit is part of his tour that will also include a stop in Vietnam from Wednesday to Thursday.

It will mark Putin's first trip to the reclusive regime since July 2000, when he traveled to Pyongyang to meet former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the late father of the current leader.

Putin had accepted Kim's invitation to visit North Korea during the summit held at Russia's Vostochny spaceport in September, the Kremlin earlier said.

North Korea and Russia have been deepening military cooperation amid suspicions that Pyongyang has provided weapons and munitions to Moscow for use in Russia's war in Ukraine in return for Moscow's food aid and possible transfer of weapons technology.


This file photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 14, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin holding a summit at Russia's Vostochny spaceport the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 17, 2024



7. Russia unlikely to transfer advanced military technology to N. Korea: minister


Interesting analysis from the MINDEF.


Excerpt:


"If Russia decides to transfer, that would mean Russia completely losing leverage over North Korea. So they will likely leave it as a last resort and I don't think North Korea has much to give Russia to entice it to give up on its last resort," Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said in a Bloomberg interview published earlier in the day.



Russia unlikely to transfer advanced military technology to N. Korea: minister | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · June 17, 2024

SEOUL, June 17 (Yonhap) -- The possibility of Russia transferring its most advanced military technology to North Korea is "very low" despite their deepening military cooperation, as Moscow will likely opt to save it as a "last resort," Seoul's defense chief said Monday.

"If Russia decides to transfer, that would mean Russia completely losing leverage over North Korea. So they will likely leave it as a last resort and I don't think North Korea has much to give Russia to entice it to give up on its last resort," Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said in a Bloomberg interview published earlier in the day.

Shin made the remarks amid views that Pyongyang and Moscow will seek to elevate their military ties beyond arms transactions during Russian President Vladimir Putin's impending visit to the North.

During the upcoming visit, Shin expected Putin to ask North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for more munitions and ballistic missiles for use in its war with Ukraine, noting that Seoul has detected at least 10,000 shipping containers delivered from the North to Russia.


Defense Minister Shin Won-sik heads for a meeting with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference in Singapore, in this file photo taken June 2, 2024. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

In regards to views that Russia provided North Korea with technological assistance in developing military spy satellites, Shin said Moscow appears to have provided the engine technologies used for the North's botched launch attempt last month.

North Korea attempted to launch a second military spy satellite on May 27, but the space rocket carrying the satellite exploded shortly after liftoff. North Korea's state media attributed the failure to the operational reliability of a new "liquid oxygen plus petroleum" engine.

In the face of growing military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, Shin said he plans to soon meet with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts to sign a document aimed at bolstering their joint efforts against North Korean threats.

During their meeting in Singapore, held on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference earlier this month, the defense chiefs agreed to come up with the framework document for security cooperation and launch a trilateral multidomain exercise this summer.

"A priority would be to establish a system to more effectively, promptly and coherently respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, and to make that irreversible," Shin said in the interview.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · June 17, 2024



8. US, South Korea, Japan to Lock In Security Ties Before Inauguration



Excerpts:


“A priority would be to establish a system to more effectively, promptly and coherently respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats among South Korea, the US and Japan, and to make that irreversible,” he said in the interview in his office in Seoul on Friday.
...
Shin said Russia appears to have provided new engine technology to North Korea, although a trouble in integrating the system likely led to the launch ending in failure. North Korea’s state media said the trouble was caused by problems with a newly developed engine that used liquid oxygen and petroleum.
“They are exactly Russia’s latest engine technologies,” Shin said, adding Pyongyang has effectively admitted to receiving support from Russia by listing the cause of the accident. “North Korea is believed to be continuing engine tests at the moment and we believe they will try another launch in the second half.”


US, South Korea, Japan to Lock In Security Ties Before Inauguration

  • South Korea defense minister said deal to be signed this year
  • Shin says North Korea had trouble with Russia’s rocket tech

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-16/us-south-korea-japan-to-lock-in-security-ties-before-inauguration?sref=hhjZtX76

By Soo-Hyang Choi

June 16, 2024 at 6:00 PM EDT


The US, South Korea and Japan will sign a deal to formalize their security partnership against threats from North Korea’s nuclear weapons, cementing ties before America inaugurates its next president in January.

South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wonsik said in an interview with Bloomberg News that he will soon meet his US and Japanese counterparts to sign the pact known as the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework.

“A priority would be to establish a system to more effectively, promptly and coherently respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats among South Korea, the US and Japan, and to make that irreversible,” he said in the interview in his office in Seoul on Friday.


Shin WonsikPhotographer: Woohae Cho/Bloomberg

The framework would likely build on a landmark summit among the leaders of the three countries last year that included practical steps to counter threats by North Korea such as real-time data sharing on missile launches, and moves to bind the trilateral relationship so tightly that it would be hard to unravel.

Read more: Five Takeaways From the US, Japan and South Korea Summit

“It will be signed within the second half of this year. We are arranging the schedule to meet as soon as possible,” Shin said.

Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara told parliament he was looking at a 2+2 meeting of the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries, Kyodo News reported. When asked on this, Shin said nothing has been specifically planned yet although he wants to further develop ties with Japan.

The three countries over the past year have held joint military exercises for countering missile strikes and hunting for submarines. Later this month, they are planning drills in air, sea and cyberspace in what is billed as a first of its kind trilateral multidomain exercise, Yonhap News reported, adding the US plans to dispatch its USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier group for the training.

There has been speculation South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida could again meet President Joe Biden when the Asian leaders are expected to travel to Washington in July for a NATO summit. The cooperation among the US and its two powerful allies has reached some of their strongest levels, after facing troubles during former President Donald Trump’s term.


Trump caused friction with Tokyo and Seoul by demanding hefty spending increases for hosting US troops. He also scaled back or halted major joint training drills while he held talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who modernized his missile arsenal, developed new nuclear warheads and increased his stockpile of fissile material during Trump’s tenure. North Korea for decades has demanded a halt to joint drills, calling them a prelude to an invasion.

Putin Visit

Kim is likely to meet President Vladimir Putin this week, South Korea’s DongA Ilbo newspaper reported, in what would be the Russian leader’s first trip to North Korea in 24 years. The visit would stoke concerns from the US and its partners over arms transfers that have helped the Kremlin in its assault on Ukraine in exchange for aid to prop up Kim’s regime.


Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin in Russia in Sept. 2023.Source: Getty Images

During a meeting between the two in September in Russia, Putin pledged to help Kim in his plan to put an array of spy satellites into orbit. Kim had suffered an embarrassing setback in May when a rocket to deploy a satellite blew up in a fireball shortly after liftoff.

Shin said Russia appears to have provided new engine technology to North Korea, although a trouble in integrating the system likely led to the launch ending in failure. North Korea’s state media said the trouble was caused by problems with a newly developed engine that used liquid oxygen and petroleum.

“They are exactly Russia’s latest engine technologies,” Shin said, adding Pyongyang has effectively admitted to receiving support from Russia by listing the cause of the accident. “North Korea is believed to be continuing engine tests at the moment and we believe they will try another launch in the second half.”


An explosion of a flying object launched from North Korea on May 27.Source: The Yomiuri Shimbun/AP Photo

Read more: North Korea Rocket Explodes in Blow to Kim’s Satellite Plans

Seoul has detected at least 10,000 shipping containers being sent from North Korea to Russia, which could hold as many as 4.8 million artillery shells of the likes that Putin has used in his bombardment of Ukraine, Shin said. He expects Putin to ask for even more munitions and ballistic missiles from Kim during the visit.

It’s unclear if Putin would transfer Russia’s most advanced military technology, Shin said, adding the possibility is “very low.”

“If Russia decides to transfer, that would mean Russia completely losing leverage over North Korea. So they will likely leave it as a last resort and I don’t think North Korea has much to give Russia to entice it to give up on its last resort,” Shin said.

— With assistance from Emily Yamamoto, Katria Alampay, and Jenny Seung Min Lee




9. High-level exchanges between N. Korea, Russia hit record high this year



High-level exchanges between N. Korea, Russia hit record high this year

The Korea Times · June 17, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk during a summit at Russia's Vostochny spaceport in this picture provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency, Sept. 13, 2023. Yonhap

The number of exchanges between high-level officials from North Korea and Russia has reached a record high this year, Seoul's unification ministry said Monday, marking another indication of the deepening ties between the two nations.

According to the ministry, there have been 18 exchanges involving officials of the vice-minister level or higher between the two countries in 2024, surpassing the total of 18 exchanges recorded for the entire year of 2019, the ministry said, citing information disclosed by both nations.

The exchanges include North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui's meeting with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow in January, and Vice Public Security Minister Ri Song-chol's visit to Moscow on June 11.

Among the 18 high-level exchanges this year, 15 involved North Korean officials visiting Russia, the ministry said.

North Korea and Russia have been strengthening military ties and broadening cooperation in various fields following the summit between the North's leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia's Far East last September.

A South Korean presidential official indicated that Putin is expected to visit North Korea "in a few days." Meanwhile, Japanese broadcaster NHK reported that Putin might travel to North Korea "as early as next week" as part of a tour that includes a stop in Vietnam. (Yonhap)


The Korea Times · June 17, 2024


10. Putin’s Pyongyang trip highlights need for bond in isolation


Putin’s Pyongyang trip highlights need for bond in isolation

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 16, 2024

From 2000 detente to 2024 alienation, drastic shift in climate surrounds impending North Korea-Russia summit

By Kim Arin

Published : June 16, 2024 - 18:26

Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (The Korea Herald database)

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s impending trip to North Korea, which Seoul authorities say could happen any moment, reflects a mutual interest in building a closer bond for the two countries facing self-inflicted isolation from the West, experts say.

The last time Putin was in Pyongyang in 2000, he was stopping by on his way to the summit of the Group of Eight or G8 in Japan, long before Russia was suspended indefinitely from the group of leading industrialized countries over the annexation of Crimea.

It was also in 2000 that North Korea’s Kim Jong-il reciprocated South Korea’s liberal President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine” policy of detente with a historic summit in Pyongyang and a joint inter-Korean declaration.

Twenty-four years later, North Korea and Russia find themselves more alienated and disengaged in the international landscape amid sanctions and severed ties with Western powers and other countries around the world.

Sydney Seiler, who was a senior defense analyst at US Forces Korea in 2016-20, said at a forum in Seoul on Thursday that North Korea’s attitudes in recent years have been “marked by a lack of interest in diplomacy, a lack of interest in sanctions relief, a lack of interest in foreign aid or assistance.”

He called this period “an inward policy of isolation and austerity” by North Korea, which he said began in the second year of the Moon Jae-in administration in late 2018. The expert on Korean Peninsula security issues added that South Korea and the US were now dealing with a North Korea “that refuses to sit down and talk with us.”

While North Korea and Russia may bond over the shared plight of isolation for now, the war in Ukraine is a defining factor that would determine how long their partnership could last, according to Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.

“Putin would have no reason to entertain Kim Jong-un to such a degree if it weren’t for the Ukraine war,” he told The Korea Herald on Sunday.

In a meeting with the press earlier this month, the Russian president had said he appreciated South Korea for not directly supplying weapons to Ukraine. In the remarks Putin appears to have revealed his wish to stabilize ties with South Korea while continuing to depend on North Korea for weapons, according to Park.

“In this context, Putin meeting with Kim can be seen as a largely reciprocal gesture in response to what North Korea has done to support Russia’s war against Ukraine,” he said.

“The kind of close cooperation between North Korea and Russia that we are witnessing right now will not last once the war subsides.”

Park said the South Korean government commenting on the possible dates of Putin’s visit earlier this week in a rare move was “an instance of strategic communication, a message to Russia that we are paying close attention.”

But there is a chance North Korea and Russia may seek to cement their ties on written terms over this visit, according to a report by the National Intelligence Service-affiliated Institute for National Security Strategy.

The INSS noted in the report issued Friday that North Korea and Russia have earlier stated their intention to reestablish their relations on a “new legal basis.”

As the September summit between Kim and Putin “stopped at being symbolic, without a joint declaration or a press conference,” it was possible their meeting this time could lead to “an official document of some sort outlining the direction and vision of the relations of the two countries,” the INSS said.

The interest in North Korea for deepening ties with Russia would be to “get help building its weapons and space programs while showing off its success in diplomacy,” according to Yang Uk, a research fellow at the Asan Institute of Policy Studies.

The defense and intelligence authorities in Seoul have similarly noted that North Korea likely received assistance in exchange for the weapons it provided to Russia.

Following the July 2022 visit of then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang, North Korea appears to have shipped artillery shells, anti-tank weapons, portable anti-aircraft missiles and other weapons via Russian ships and planes, according to an NIS assessment issued in January.

The NIS said that Russia is believed to have offered “basic advice” to North Korea in launching a military reconnaissance satellite that successfully made it into orbit in November 2023.



koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 16, 2024



11. Inter-Korea tensions subside as both sides review cross-border tit-for-tat


Monday

June 17, 2024

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 17 Jun. 2024, 16:32

Updated: 17 Jun. 2024, 18:14


Inter-Korea tensions subside as both sides review cross-border tit-for-tat

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-06-17/national/northKorea/InterKorea-tensions-subside-as-both-sides-review-crossborder-titfortat-/2070004


From left, waste balloons sent by North Korea are seen near Jamsil Bridge, the coast off of Incheon and Geumcheon-dong in Paju, Gyeonggi. [YONHAP]

 

Tensions triggered by North Korea’s sending of waste-laden balloons to South Korea have entered a lull. Detecting subtle changes in North Korea’s public stance toward South Korea, Seoul adjusted its loudspeaker broadcasts to North Korea per the principle of proportionality.


 

 

Venting after a failed satellite launch?






On May 28 and 29, North Korea launched about 350 waste balloons toward South Korea. It was two days since Kim Kang-il, North Korea’s vice minister of defense, declared on May 26 that “mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border areas and the interior of the ROK and it will directly experience how much effort is required to remove them.”

 

On the surface, the waste balloons were a response to anti-North Korea leaflets sent by a private South Korean organization, but some analysts say it could be a reaction to the embarrassment caused by its failed launch of a military reconnaissance satellite on May 27.


 

At the time of the launch, Japan’s NHK broadcast a video of a North Korean satellite exploding in mid-air filmed near the border between North Korea and China, while South Korean military authorities released a video of the explosion filmed by a patrol ship on duty along the inter-Korean maritime border in the Yellow Sea. The entire world witnessed North Korea’s failed satellite launch virtually in real-time.


 

 


A military reconnaissance satellite from North Korea explodes in this video capture image released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 28. [YONHAP]

 

Ignored warnings of 'unbearable measures'




Even after North Korea's first wave of waste-laden balloons, North Korea continued its so-called hybrid provocations by alternately using GPS radio interferences and missile launches. Accordingly, the South Korean government warned on May 31 that if North Korea did not stop, the government would take "measures unbearable to North Korea.”


 

However, Pyongyang released a second wave of 720 waste-laden balloons on the night of June 1. Balloons fell in Seoul, Gyeonggi and the Chungcheong and Gyeongsang areas, and photos of car windshields being damaged by waste balloons were posted on social media such as Facebook.


 

As actual damage from the balloons emerged and security concerns grew, Seoul decided on June 2 to make good on its threat. The "unbearable measures" took the form of resumed loudspeaker broadcasts to North Korea, given the regime's vulnerability to external information.


 

“Such dirty threats do not work against our government,” a senior official from South Korea's presidential office said on June 2.


 

 


Gu Byung-sam, spokesperson for Ministry of Unification, speaks during a press briefing at the Governmental Complex in Seoul on June 10. [YONHAP]

 

Passing responsibility to the South




About five hours later on the same day, North Korea announced in a statement signed by Vice Minister Kim that it would temporarily stop sending waste-laden balloons.


 

However, the North conditioned this suspension on private South Korean organizations ceasing their launch of anti-regime leaflets into the country. In effect, it tried to pressure those private organizations to stop while passing responsibility for the situation onto the South Korean government.

 

Observers believe the North employed a "hit and run" strategy, with the regime believing it would lose more than it gained if the South fully resumed its loudspeaker broadcasts.

 

Some experts say the North failed in its initial goal of stoking conflict inside South Korea by heightening security fears as a disgusted South Korean public quickly gravitated in favor of action against the North.  

 

The South Korean government did not turn back, quickly suspending the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement. This provided a basis for resuming loudspeaker broadcasts and opened the way for restarting military exercises in frontline areas.

 

A senior South Korean official said North Korea's recent behavior substantially backfired, with the regime deciding it needed to break the vicious cycle of hybrid provocation.

 

 


National Security Office Director Chang Ho-jin, right center, spekas during an emergency meeting of the National Security Council regarding North Korea's sending of waste balloons at the presidential office building in Yongsan District, central Seoul, on June 2. [YONHAP]

 

 

Breaking out the loudspeakers

 

Amid this intense confrontation, North Korea used another launch of anit-North leaflets as an excuse to send a third wave of waste-laden balloons on June 8 and 9. Experts say North Korea tried to back up its threats with action and maintain the initiative on the Korean Peninsula.


 

On June 9, the South Korean government responded by resuming loudspeaker broadcasts to North Korea for the first time in six years. The ball was back in North Korea’s court, with Seoul saying it was entirely up to the North to determine whether broadcasts continued.


 

In a June 9 statement by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s powerful sister, Kim Yo-jong, North Korea warned, “If the ROK simultaneously carries out the leaflet scattering and loudspeaker broadcasting provocation over the border, it will undoubtedly witness the new counteraction of the DPRK.”

 

The ROK and DPRK are the acronyms of South Korea and North Korea's official names.


 

 


Loudspeaker vehicles and equipment are seen during a training exercise in this file photo. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]

 

 

Truce for now




The South Korean government, which had previously declared it would respond to North Korea’s successive provocations proportionally and step-by-step, did not transmit additional loudspeaker broadcasts despite North Korea’s fourth wave of waste-laden balloons.

 

Subtle changes in North Korea’s stance were presumed to have been detected through the balloons' contents and Kim Yo-jong’s statement.


 

In fact, Kim Yo-jong said, “As you will see, we have only scattered empty waste paper without any political agitation,” adding, “Our minimum reaction is only the just and reflective reaction at the very low level.”

 

Kim's equating of anti-North Korea leaflets and loudspeakers was noteworthy.

 

The third and fourth waves of balloons carried only waste paper and plastic, unlike the first and second waves, which carried excrement and other materials. This suggested Pyongyang was subtly adjusting its provocation level.


 

Accordingly, the South Korean government seems to have adjusted its response, calculating that continuing to respond strongly could lead to additional North Korean provocations.


 

The Unification Ministry said on June 11 that although the government continued to regard anti-Pyongyang leaflets as a free speech issue, it was seeking a meeting with the private organizations involved.

 

Observers inside and outside the government say this could be an opportunity for Seoul to indirectly request restraint from the groups in question by explaining the need to ease tensions with Pyongyang.


 


BY CHUNG YEONG-GYO, LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]




12. North Korea building apparent anti-tank barriers along border: ROK military






North Korea building apparent anti-tank barriers along border: ROK military

Seoul says Pyongyang has also been reinforcing roads and laying mines in move that may aim to broadcast war readiness

https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/north-korea-building-apparent-anti-tank-barriers-along-border-rok-military/

Joon Ha Park June 17, 2024


(From left) ROK K-2 tanks conduct live-fire drills on May 10, and North Korean soldiers stand guard in front of an anti-tank barrier at the DMZ | Images: ROK Marine Corps, Eric Lafforgue, edited by NK News

North Korea has built what appear to be anti-tank barriers along the inter-Korean border, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in a move that experts identified as part of Pyongyang’s efforts to broadcast its readiness for war amid escalating military tensions.

A JCS official confirmed the discovery in a defense ministry briefing on Monday, after it was first revealed by Seoul’s National Security Director Chang Ho-jin in an interview with Yonhap News TV. 

“What has been identified so far is closer to barriers similar to anti-tank obstacles,” Chang said during the interview, while discussing reports of the North Korean military’s recent construction activities along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).  

The JCS official added that the military has also identified ongoing DPRK activity related to the “reinforcement of tactical roads, the laying of mines and the clearing of wasteland.”

NK News previously identified six areas where North Korea has cleared vegetation across the DMZ, based on satellite imagery. While the South Korean defense ministry declined to comment on the findings at the time, the U.N. Command told NK News that North Korea had been taking measures to “harden its boundaries.”

Shin Seung-ki, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, explained that anti-tank barriers are typically concrete structures designed to physically block the advance of tanks. 

“They sometimes include rockfall mechanisms that collapse into pointed or rectangular shapes to impede movement,” he told NK News, noting that such barriers have been installed to block the advance of U.S. and ROK military tank units in the event of a conflict. 

Experts assessed that North Korea’s motivation for installing such structures reflects North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s frequent calls for the military to prepare for war with the South and the U.S.

“The detection of anti-tank barriers indicates preparations not just for localized skirmishes but for a full-scale war, seeking to send the message that North Korea is speeding up preparations for a potential second Korean War,” Ban Kil-joo, a professor at the Ilmin International Relations Institute from Korea University, told NK News.

Shin added that “since [North Korea] is weaker in conventional forces compared to South Korea, they are considering methods to delay or obstruct an advance using defensive structures.”

Ban also assessed the DPRK’s installations “may be a part of the North’s shifting of the blame for heightened tensions across the border onto South Korea by framing the barriers as a defensive response to potential U.S.-ROK attacks.” 

As a result, the expert suggested that it is likely that the DPRK’s actions along the border will continue and even intensify as the year progresses. 

Inter-Korean tensions have heightened in recent weeks following a spate of balloon launches by both sides, Seoul’s redeployment of loudspeakers along the border and South Korea’s firing of warning shots after North Korean soldiers “encroached” on the Military Demarcation Line. 

Edited by Alannah Hill


13. N. Korean youth organization calls for more education to repay the love of Kim Jong Un


There is nothing more important for the regime than ideological education.



N. Korean youth organization calls for more education to repay the love of Kim Jong Un - Daily NK English​

The Socialist Patriotic Youth League urged that young people be made the pillars of the nation's future and to be instilled with hate of the country's enemies

By Jeong Seo-yeong - June 17, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · June 17, 2024

"A national convention of the Korean Children's Union to celebrate the 78th anniversary of its founding was held in Pyongyang on July 6," Rodong Sinmun reported on June 7. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

After the June 6 events marking the anniversary of the founding of the Korean Children’s Union, the Central Committee of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League held lectures calling for intensifying activities to educate future generations, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Daily NK source in South Pyongan Province said last Wednesday that the Central Committee of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League sent an order to the league’s provincial, city and national branches nationwide on June 8 to hold lectures for leaders and educators of the Korean Children’s Union calling for “intensified activities to educate future generations to repay the love and consideration of the Supreme Leader [North Korean leader Kim Jong Un] who made it possible to hold grand celebrations for the anniversary of the founding of the Korean Children’s Union this year.”

In the run-up to this year’s anniversary of the founding of the Korean Children’s Union, Kim Jong Un ordered that the events to mark the anniversary of the founding of the union be held at the national and provincial levels in a larger and more spectacular style than ever before. In response to this order, the party and the organizations of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League held a series of grand events.

In its lecture, the Socialist Patriotic Youth League pointed out issues of tasks, plans and measures and stressed the need to step up activities to educate future generations to repay Kim Il Sung’s love and consideration in making such large-scale celebrations possible.

“The lecture material focused on the need for persistent political education and ideological indoctrination in advance so that the members of the Korean Children’s Union, the stars of the future, will be loyal to the Supreme Leader and love the party and the motherland,” the source said. “It presented five major tasks and measures one by one.”

First, it prioritized ideological education for the youth, calling for various kinds of ideological education programs to provide young people with a solid ideological foundation. The Socialist Patriotic Youth League said that this would play an important role in promoting loyalty and devotion to the socialist system and blocking negative influences from the outside world.

Second, the lecture material stressed the importance of strengthening education so that members of the Korean Children’s Union can gain a deeper understanding of the country’s history and traditions. The Socialist Patriotic Youth League encouraged efforts to instill a sense of national pride in young people, to make them the pillars of the nation’s future, and to hate enemies of the nation through history and classroom education.

Thirdly, the lecture material emphasized the importance of various activities and methods for developing the ethical character of the members of the Korean Children’s Union as an important factor in helping young people grow into healthy members of society through a sense of collective ideology and mutual cooperation.

Fourth, the material emphasized the importance of science and technology education, stressing the need to develop young people into creative and skilled talents who can contribute to national development by teaching them about the latest science and technology and helping them apply it in their daily lives.

Finally, the material mentioned the importance of sports activities and health management to promote the physical well-being of the members of the Korean Children’s Union, calling on educators to help young people grow up vibrant and healthy based on the principle of a healthy mind in a healthy body.

“The Central Committee of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League ordered the Korean Children’s Union leaders and educators to hold organized general meetings after the lecture based on the ideas presented,” the source added.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · June 17, 2024



14. Editorial: North Korea can't stop young people's admiration for S. Korea


Information and the example of a prosperous and free South Korea are more powerful than the Kim family regime.  The Kim family regime cannot compete with the ROK on any level.



Editorial: North Korea can't stop young people's admiration for S. Korea

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/06/17/4NHRZ66WYZG6XFL2XZIC6INKL4/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2024.06.17. 09:14




North Korea is constructing a barrier along the armistice line, signaling a significant escalation in its efforts to isolate itself from South Korea and prevent defections amidst growing internal and external pressures. /Chai Seung-woo

It has been reported that North Korea is constructing a barrier along the armistice line.South Korean military surveillance has detected construction activities in the North that appear to be for a barrier, approximately 1 km north of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) in the western, eastern, and central fronts.

Recently, an incident occurred where about 10 North Korean soldiers crossed 50 meters into our territory on the central front, likely related to the barrier construction. North Korea is also laying military roads to connect the barrier to frontline units and planting additional mines north of the MDL. If barriers and mines are added to the barbed wire along the armistice line, the North and South will be completely separated.

At the end of last year, Kim Jong-un defined the inter-Korean relationship as a ‘hostile relationship between two states’ and a ‘belligerent relationship.’ In fact, North Korea is eliminating all terms, organizations, and sculptures related to ‘unification.’

During the 2018 inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong-un promised to work towards unification, end hostile relations, increase exchanges, and visit Seoul. Former President Moon Jae-in even said in a speech in Pyongyang, “We have confirmed how much Kim yearns for national reconciliation.”

However, after his attempt to lift sanctions through the pretense of denuclearization failed, and with internal turmoil due to COVID-19 and economic difficulties, Kim Jong-un revealed his true colors. It seems like he views South Korea’s growing prosperity as the greatest threat to the Kim dynasty rather than the U.S. or China.

In late 2020, Kim Jong-un enacted the ‘anti-reactionary thought law’ to block the Korean Wave (Hallyu). The law states that those who watch or distribute S. Korean dramas will be executed, even specifying to ‘break their spines to death.’

He fears that admiration for South Korea could destabilize the Kim family’s hereditary rule. Defectors who attempted to go to S. Korea or had contact with S. Koreans or churches were sent to political prison camps or summarily executed. To prevent North Korean residents from escaping, Kim Jong-un sealed the entire 1,400 km North Korea-China border with barbed wire.

The North Korean MZ generation, known as the ‘Jangmadang (market generation),’ is different from previous generations. Having experienced that it is the market, not the Workers’ Party, that feeds them, therefore they do not unconditionally obey Kim Jong-un’s authority.

Currently, 500,000 to 600,000 MZ generation North Koreans are serving at the armistice line. If loudspeaker broadcasts to North Korea resume, frontline North Korean soldiers will inevitably be exposed to the Korean Wave and external information. Considering the structure of the North Korean regime, information from the free world is far more threatening than American missiles. The barrier at the armistice line is primarily to prevent the defection of ‘MZ’ North Korean soldiers.

East Germany built the Berlin Wall in 1961 but could not stop the influx of information from the free world. When internal dissatisfaction and contradictions exploded, the wall collapsed in an instant. The same could happen in North Korea.



15. Civic groups, border residents urge restrictions on activists' anti-Pyongyang leafleting


In the history of balloon launches no one has ever been hurt by north Korea as a result of the launches.


It is not reckless and it is not intended to provoke. Information n is provided to help the Korean people in the north and overcome one of the many human rights abuses of the Korean people living in the north as identified by the 2014 un commission of Inquiry.


Excerpt:


"Reckless dangerous border-area propaganda acts that provoke the opposite side, even by a private organization, should be restricted," he said.



Civic groups, border residents urge restrictions on activists' anti-Pyongyang leafleting

The Korea Times · June 17, 2024

Balloon carrying garbage sent by North Korea is seen in Jeongseon County, Gangwon Province, June 10. Yonhap

Civic groups and border residents urged the government Monday to restrict activists from launching anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets into North Korea, citing concern it could provoke Pyongyang to send trash-carrying balloons into South Korea again.

The plea came as officials of the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), a major civic group, border residents and opposition lawmakers held a discussion at the National Assembly to explore ways to reduce inter-Korean tensions.

On four occasions from late May through early June, North Korea launched more than a thousand balloons carrying trash and manure over to South Korea, apparently in response to South Korean activists' cross-border leaflet launches.

Those balloons flew as far south as the southeastern county of Geochang and damaged a plastic greenhouse and the windscreen of a vehicle, but police chief Yoon Hee-keun has said that such campaigns by South Korean activists cannot be stopped under the current law.

Lee Tae-ho, head of the PSPD's peaceful disarmament center, said that such campaigns "could threaten border residents' rights to peaceful and safe living," calling for their restriction.

"Reckless dangerous border-area propaganda acts that provoke the opposite side, even by a private organization, should be restricted," he said.

Hong Min, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, stressed that propaganda leaflets and balloons, historically used as tools in modern warfare, cannot be recognized as a means of freedom of expression.

Border residents and others participating in the debate also called for legislation requiring advance notification for leaflet campaigns and other restricting measures.

Ahn Jae-young, a village head of the border town of Heyri in Paju, urged the National Assembly to "fundamentally block leaflet sending" by promptly addressing shortfalls in a law that was struck down by the Constitutional Court last year.

In September, the court struck down the law banning leaflet launches by South Koreans, saying it excessively restricts the right to freedom of expression. Since then, Seoul's unification ministry has reaffirmed its stance not to urge civic groups to refrain from sending leaflets across the border. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · June 17, 2024



16. Asia on Edge: What MAGA Think Tanks Reveal About a Trump 2.0 Presidency



Conclusion:


The obvious limitations of our analysis stem from the unpredictability of Trump’s decision-making style and the potentially diverse, heterogeneous reactions in Asia if the aforementioned policies and instruments were to be applied. Nonetheless, even if some of the proposals outlined above never transition from the “chattering class” into policy, they do contribute to a further shift in the public debate by further normalizing economic nationalism, launching a trade war with China and entrenching zero-sum great power confrontation as the prime strategic frame of reference of U.S. foreign policy.


Asia on Edge: What MAGA Think Tanks Reveal About a Trump 2.0 Presidency

thediplomat.com

It seems unlikely Trump 2.0 would upend security structures in the region. In trade and commerce, however, Trump’s potential return has Asian officials and observers hugely worried.

By Aneek Das and Felix Heiduk

June 13, 2024



Credit: Depositphotos

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The United States is in the middle of campaign season for an election whose outcome could very well significantly alter Washington’s diplomatic, security, and economic orientation vis-à-vis Asia. The specter of a second presidency for Donald Trump, especially, has U.S. allies and “like-minded” partners in Asia worried. His “America First” approach is well-established, and media reports have warned that a second administration might well be one of “Trump unhinged.”

Ideas and policy proposals circulated by think tanks in the United States that are aligned with Trump and his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) slogan can give us a preview into a second Trump term. Drawing on such materials, we argue that it is a potential escalation of a trade war with China, rather than military brinkmanship, that will most likely have the biggest impact not only on China-U.S. relations but on the entire region.

Defense and Security

In the field of security and defense, Trump’s potential return to the White House would most certainly pose a challenge for U.S. allies and “like-minded” partners, which in the past have relied on the U.S. for balancing or hedging against a growing Chinese assertiveness in the region.

First, a reinvigoration of Trump’s “America First” doctrine, coupled with a transactional view on alliances and partnerships could prompt at least a gradual scaling back of U.S. military presence in cases where U.S. allies or partners are deemed to “free ride” on U.S. security guarantees. Trump is expected to pressure Japan and South Korea to increase their financial contributions for the stationing of U.S. troops, particularly targeting South Korea, which he has accused of enjoying a “free ride.”

Trump himself, in a recent interview, considered the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. He has said as much and also halted joint military exercises with South Korea in the past. A similar, perhaps more assertive, stance might be adopted again if he returns to power. At least partially in response to this (as well as to a general rise in regional tensions) Tokyo and Seoul have begun to raise their defense spending substantively.

However, all in all NATO allies in Europe, rather than U.S. allies in Asia, will most likely bear the brunt of a Trump 2.0 security and defense policy. Trump believes that European allies in particular have made the U.S. carry most of the costs for Europe’s defense over the past decades.

While Trump has refused to answer whether the United States will come to Taiwan’s aid in case of an invasion launched by Beijing, MAGA-aligned think tank experts propose that Taiwan should continue to receive considerable diplomatic and military support from Washington to deter China. Taiwan will also almost certainly remain a major regional geopolitical flashpoint as well as a bone of contention in China-U.S. relations for years to come. Likewise, Trump’s stance on the South China Sea and commitment to the alliance with the Philippines is expected to remain firm.

The possibility of re-engaging with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un through summits remains uncertain due to the failure of the previous Hanoi summit. Instead, it is suggested that under a second Trump administration, Washington needs to openly challenge the evolving North Korea-Russia-China partnership.

Trump will also very likely maintain the general adversarial stance vis-à-vis China that shaped his first term in office as well as that of the current U.S. administration under Biden. After all, the overall strategic aim of retaining Washington’s pre-eminent position in the region through the pursuit of military primacy has broad bipartisan support in the United States.

With regard to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Trump’s security policies are expected to align closely with Biden’s, particularly regarding support for minilateral initiatives aimed at balancing or deterring China such as AUKUS and the Quad. However, there might be an increase in bilateral or regional military exercises among allies like Japan and Australia, who are wary of Trump’s unpredictable decision-making.

Enhanced security cooperation with India is also likely, given Trump’s rapport with Prime Minister Narendra Modi – who just began his third term in office – and India’s strategic role in countering China. This includes suggestions to waive the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions imposed on India over its purchases of Russian arms to allow India greater access to the U.S. defense industry market.

At the same time, however, it is unlikely that a Trump 2.0. administration will be able (and willing) to alter the relative decline in U.S. military power in Asia that the region has witnessed over the last decades. The United States has only gradually increased its military presence in the region since the end of the Cold War.

Trump might increase the number of U.S. missile interceptors and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles deployed in the region to counter the dual threats of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Trump might also implement, at least partially, his idea to deploy more U.S. naval ships in the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s growing military presence in the region. None of this, however, will alter the relative decline of U.S. military power. Neither is it likely that Trump would be able or willing to revise the “absolute decline in American resolve.”

Trade

While the changes in U.S. foreign policy put forward by MAGA-aligned think tanks would certainly pose challenges for Asian allies and partners, the ideas floated do not have the potential to significantly alter the structures or practices of security cooperation in Asia. In the field of trade and commerce, however, Trump’s potential return has Asian officials and observers hugely worried.

Almost all Asian states have over the last two decades derived increasing trade and investment from China to the extent that regional supply and value chains have become increasingly China-centric. The ideas floated regarding a 10 percent across-the-board tariff on U.S. imports, with even higher rates on goods from China, have set alarm bells ringing.

While the Biden administration recently imposed a set of new tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles and related components, MAGA-aligned think tanks as well as Trump himself have suggested his administration would increase tariffs on China further. They seek to tackle what they perceive as Beijing’s “strategy for global dominance” with even more tariffs, an assertive trade policy, and a further decoupling of American supply chains from China.

Seeing the United States as locked in a zero sum game with China, MAGA think tankers suggest it should be U.S. policy to ultimately harm China’s economy. Rather than managing competition with China, Washington under a new Trump administration should win the competition instead.

As Washington intensifies efforts to reduce its trade with China through hiking tariffs, Chinese exports to, and imports from, the rest of Asia would likely increase as a result. And exports from other Asian states, who often rely on Chinese imports for many of their exports, to the United States will likely increase further. For example, exports to the U.S. from countries like Vietnam or Indonesia have surged as a result of Trump’s first “trade war” with China, leading to growing trade imbalances.

However, reducing trade surpluses with the United States – with China and the EU especially, but also other states – is a designated core interest of Trump. A Trump administration would very likely put Asian countries with trade surpluses like Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, or Indonesia under the spotlight.

MAGA-aligned think tanks have also proposed the introduction of a “U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act.” This would allow a future Trump administration to impose tariffs on countries that refuse to lower theirs. This approach would adversely affect U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea, but also other countries like India would be impacted. Trump has specifically criticized India’s high tariff rates, referring to it as the “tariff king.” It has also been suggested that the U.S. Congress should review China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status, which gives China preferential trade treatment via, for example, lower tariffs or the absence of import quotas.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), launched by the Biden administration, is widely regarded as a positive initiative by the think tank community. However, there are calls for modifying the IPEF to focus more on trade issues and reduce the emphasis on non-trade topics such as climate change. Meanwhile, Trump himself has threatened to withdraw the U.S. from the IPEF, echoing his previous decision to exit the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during his first term in office.

The IPEF, unveiled in May 2022 by President Joe Biden, has been viewed as the lynchpin of a broadening of stronger economic U.S. engagement in the region, with the intention of providing Asian states with an alternative to China’s growing economic dominance. The proposed collapse of IPEF could have far-reaching consequences for the regional economic order.

Initially launched to enhance economic integration, supply chain resilience, and sustainable development, IPEF is seen as a critical tool for countering China’s growing influence. U.S. partners had high expectations for the framework to deliver tangible benefits, such as robust supply chains, collaborative decarbonization efforts, and fair economic practices. However, the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal raises not only serious questions about American reliability but also increased economic overdependence on China by Asian states – a scenario many Asian policymakers seek to avoid.

MAGA-aligned think tanks also propose further economic decoupling from China as well as increased “friend-shoring” of U.S. trade and investment. This would amount to changes in the regional supply chains as goods would be re-routed to or assembled in other states, which in turn could lead to increased exports from India and Southeast Asia to the United States. Vietnam, with its already significant trade surplus with the U.S., could be heavily affected, particularly in its electronics sector. However, it would very likely also tie those economies more closely to China, because that’s where much of the capital, supply chains, and funding of new infrastructure will come from.

It has also been suggested to use USAID assistance strategically to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), providing aid only to countries loyal to Trump or the U.S. government. This transactional approach to foreign aid could further strain bilateral relationships with developing countries in Asia and undermine the broader U.S. strategic positioning. If Trump pressures Asian countries to economically align with the U.S., their strong economic ties with China might push them closer to Beijing, thereby further bolstering China’s influence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, if the proposed policies and instruments outlined above were to be applied by a Trump 2.0 administration this could significantly alter the strategic landscape in Asia. Close examination of the ideas floated by MAGA-aligned think tanks suggests that changes pertaining to the region’s strategic landscape will be visible in various policy areas with trade and commerce particularly affected. It is in this field where MAGA-aligned think tanks have floated the most drastic proposals.

This is because instead of managing the competition with China, various think tanks suggest that Washington’s general strategy should shift to outright winning the competition. In the process, China’s economy is to be hollowed out through tariffs, decoupling of supply chains, and other measures. The proposal made by Trump himself to withdraw from IPEF and the potential introduction of a U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act could further negatively impact regional supply chains and economic stability.

The obvious limitations of our analysis stem from the unpredictability of Trump’s decision-making style and the potentially diverse, heterogeneous reactions in Asia if the aforementioned policies and instruments were to be applied. Nonetheless, even if some of the proposals outlined above never transition from the “chattering class” into policy, they do contribute to a further shift in the public debate by further normalizing economic nationalism, launching a trade war with China and entrenching zero-sum great power confrontation as the prime strategic frame of reference of U.S. foreign policy.

Authors

Guest Author

Aneek Das

Aneek Das is an Erasmus + Research Intern at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. He is a Master’s student in World Politics and International Relations at the University of Pavia.

Guest Author

Felix Heiduk

Felix Heiduk is the head of the Asia Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

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thediplomat.com




De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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