Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Greetings from Mongolia

Quotes of the Day:

“Conquering the world on horseback is easy; it is dismounting and governing that is hard.”

- Genghis Khan

“Who questions much shall learn much and retain much.”

- Francis Bacon

“Never be afraid to raise your voice for honesty and truth and compassion against injustice, and lying and greed. If people all over the world… would do this, it would change the earth.”

- William Faulkner

1. The Imperative for Irregular Warfare Education in Special Operations Forces

2. Will Putin or Zelenskiy Win the War in Ukraine? Probably Neither

3. Blinken Meets Chinese Counterpart on Delayed Trip to Mend Ties

4. China Had Better Listen to What Blinken Has to Say

5. China Has a Problem That Needs Solving – What their problem-solving solutions mean for AUKUS and the US

6. Wargaming as a Social Science Experiment

7. Tailoring U.S. Outreach to Indo-Pacific Allies, Partners

8. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 17, 2023

9. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Meetings in Japan

10. What war elephants can teach us about the future of AI in combat

11. Three key priorities in crucial US-China talks

12. Top Russian general killed in Ukraine missile strike

13. De-dollarisation unstoppable, BRICS cooperation fostering multi-polar currency world

14. The Next Global Superpower Isn’t Who You Think

15. Google claims it caught China government hackers redhanded breaking into hundreds of networks around the world

16. Killnet Threatens Imminent SWIFT, World Banking Attacks

17. The Futility of Grand Strategy

1. The Imperative for Irregular Warfare Education in Special Operations Forces

How do we create Irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters in order to campaign to win in the gray zone of strategic competition?

I just heard a rumor that SWCS is "hibernating" (which I understand means cancelling) its IW campaign planners course that has educated some 1200 SOF personnel (as I knew last December when I spoke with the instructors). Some complained there is "too much UW" in the course. As someone said to me about that comment, they must not understand the essence of IW and the relationship of UW. There can never be too much UW education.

And I would add whoever would make that comment does not understand USSOCOM's description of the "SOF way:"

“The ‘SOF Way’ is unconventional, irregular, asymmetric, asynchronous, and done alongside the U.S. Government Interagency Team as well as with allies and partners.”

“SOCOM is focused on winning in highly complex and ambiguous environments. For a small investment (2% of the DOD budget) SOCOM solves highly complex, politically sensitive, ambiguous problems – in any environment using highly trained problem solvers.”

“We live in a volatile, uncertain world with a challenge of keeping peace. SOCOM solves problems that pose significant political, economic and strategic risk when discretion, precision, and speed are essential – and failure is not an option.”

Conclusion:

In the complex world of great power competition, irregular warfare forms a significant part of the battlespace. A more in-depth, widespread understanding of its principles and applications within the Special Operations Forces is necessary to navigate this reality successfully. To truly lead in this domain, the SOF community must marry action with intellect, strength with wisdom, and strategy with understanding. By embracing education as a critical aspect of their training, they will enhance their ability to adapt, overcome, and ultimately prevail in the ever-evolving challenge of irregular warfare.

The Imperative for Irregular Warfare Education in Special Operations Forces

linkedin.com · by Sal Artiaga

Introduction

As the contours of global power dynamics evolve, the United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) find themselves increasingly deployed in contexts characterized by irregular warfare. Simultaneously, a resurgent era of great power competition has underscored the importance of these operations, posing new strategic challenges. To maintain their edge and efficacy in this environment, it is imperative that SOF personnel receive thorough, continual education in the intricacies of irregular warfare. It is time to reflect on the reasons behind The Office of Strategic Services (the World War II-era predecessor of the CIA), which reportedly described their ideal recruit as “a Ph.D. who could win a bar fight.” Those criteria would build a military better suited to this new way of war.

Understanding the Necessity of Education

Irregular warfare, by its nature, is a complex, adaptive form of conflict that requires a deep understanding of socio-political contexts, cultural nuances, and multi-dimensional strategies. It involves asymmetrical methods such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare. All of these demand more than just tactical proficiency; they necessitate a comprehensive understanding of the larger strategic landscape.

In the contemporary era of great power competition, countries like China and Russia employ hybrid strategies that blend conventional and irregular warfare tactics. SOF, as the tip of the spear in this competition, must be well-versed in these tactics to effectively counter them.

The Case for More Education

While the SOF community has a storied history in irregular warfare, dating back to the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, it is necessary to enhance and update education continually to meet evolving challenges. The ever-changing global landscape necessitates equivalent adaptability in educational approaches. Furthermore, knowledge cannot remain siloed within the realm of higher leadership; it must permeate all levels of the SOF.

As an illustration, an understanding of the socio-political dynamics in Afghanistan could have been valuable in building relationships with local leaders and civilians, an essential component of irregular warfare. In-depth regional studies, therefore, should form a core part of SOF education, providing the understanding necessary to win hearts and minds and bolster legitimacy.

Moreover, as peer and near-peer adversaries become more sophisticated in their use of digital and cyber warfare, SOF must also expand their knowledge in these areas. This would facilitate their ability to fight and win in the information environment, a critical aspect of modern irregular warfare.

Addressing Concerns

Some might argue that the tactical and physical training, which constitutes the essence of SOF, could be diluted by placing additional emphasis on education. However, a closer look reveals that the two are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary in building a well-rounded SOF operator. Tactical acumen fortified with intellectual understanding creates an unparalleled force, capable of assessing and reacting to fluid situations in a comprehensive manner. How many courses on irregular warfare does The Special Warfare Center and School currently provide? The truth is, today we do not have experts on irregular warfare, and we do not have the "Center of Excellence" expertise necessary to propagate the cognitive acumen in irregular warfare necessary to win in global competition. It is a hard truth, but it is the truth.

Conclusion

In the complex world of great power competition, irregular warfare forms a significant part of the battlespace. A more in-depth, widespread understanding of its principles and applications within the Special Operations Forces is necessary to navigate this reality successfully. To truly lead in this domain, the SOF community must marry action with intellect, strength with wisdom, and strategy with understanding. By embracing education as a critical aspect of their training, they will enhance their ability to adapt, overcome, and ultimately prevail in the ever-evolving challenge of irregular warfare.

linkedin.com · by Sal Artiaga

2.Will Putin or Zelenskiy Win the War in Ukraine? Probably Neither

Conclusion:

TH: Finally, the X-factor: What would it take to force Putin to the negotiating table?

SC: You're not the only one asking that question. In fact, it’s one I’ve heard in several NATO capitals recently. The short answer is that no one really knows, and we should be humble about our ability to anticipate the decisions of a personalist autocrat. This challenge is compounded by the reality that there is no negotiating table being offered to him — and neither the West nor Ukraine (since May 2022) has tested the proposition that Putin (or his representatives) would show up if there were one. At the moment, the view is that we need to “give war a chance” to improve the Ukrainians’ position before such a table is offered. My suggestion is that there should be open channels now so we can know if and when he’s prepared to talk.

Will Putin or Zelenskiy Win the War in Ukraine? Probably Neither

A Q&A with political scientist Samuel Charap, who says it’s not clear what would force Russia to the negotiating table.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-06-17/ukraine-spring-offensive-will-zelenskiy-or-putin-win?sref=hhjZtX76

When President Vladimir Putin sent his Russian troops into Ukraine last February, he likely thought they’d be swilling vodka in the streets of Kyiv within days. Obviously, things haven’t turned out that way.

Now, with Ukrainian troops mounting their first major offensive of the war, and Russian troops dug in to defend themselves, it may be Putin’s chance for revenge. But one thing is all but certain: neither side is going to win or lose this conflict in the coming weeks. Or months. Or, perhaps, ever. Nobody seems even to know what victory looks like. As Bloomberg Opinion columnist and longtime war correspondent Max Hastings wrote nearly a year ago: “Once upon a time, it was deemed a mark of virility to insist that a war must end with a victory … throughout history the word has had a seductive resonance for political and military leaders. Yet in the 21st century, such an outcome of conflict has become elusive.

You can put Samuel Charap in the Hastings camp. Charap, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and a co-author of Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia, served on the State Department policy planning staff during President Barack Obama’s administration. He is also the author of an influential article in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs entitled “An Unwinnable War.” As you can guess, it’s a sobering read. This week, Charap and I had a lengthy exchange on the future of the conflict; here is a lightly edited transcript.

Tobin Harshaw: Fifteen months ago, did you imagine that Ukraine would be holding strong and the West would have solidified in support?

Samuel Charap: No, the situation we have today is one that no one could have predicted. The consensus inside the US government and among nongovernmental regional specialists was that Russia would be able to harness its considerable capability advantages and prevail early in the conflict. Remember, the weapons delivered [to Ukraine] in the run-up to the war — Javelins and Stingers — were intended to enable an insurgency. The assumption was that Russia would quickly overthrow the democratically elected Ukrainian government. The Ukrainians have outperformed all expectations and, equally important, the Russians made a series of early catastrophic mistakes that led them to squander any advantages they had.

TH: How important is the success of Ukraine’s new offensive, both on the battlefield and in terms of keeping international backers?

SC: If the offensive is successful, it will clearly be an important inflection point in the war. But even the Ukrainians aren’t saying that it’s likely to be the final and decisive battle. Generally speaking, success in an operation like this breeds optimism about the prospects of future success; a failure breeds pessimism. So the outcome of the offensive will certainly have a major impact on the Ukrainians’ desire to keep fighting.

There is a narrative out there that somehow the future of Western assistance depends on Ukraine’s performance in the offensive. But it’s not a linear relationship — that no success means no more weapons. For example, if Ukraine starts losing very badly it’s possible — even likely — that Western governments will up their assistance further to prevent Kyiv from being defeated. By the same token, modest losses could diminish Western appetites to enable future offensives, since they might seem futile. Regardless, in the medium term it is the state of Western weapons stockpiles — already significantly diminished — that will be the most significant determinant of the future of military aid.

TH: The Russians are dug in, added hundreds of thousands of troops, and the Ukrainians are untested on the offensive. Do you think the advantage has switched to Moscow?

SC: I think it’s pretty clear that Russia doesn't have an offensive advantage at the moment. They tried to go on the offense in January and failed miserably. As for the outcome of the current Ukrainian push, it’s really too early to say. So much of this war has been unpredictable. As you note, the Ukrainians, particularly their newly Western-trained units, are untested in combined arms operations on the offensive, and we don’t know how well the Russians defensive fortifications will hold up under sustained pressure.

TH: On the flip side, are you concerned the offensive could be too successful, and Ukraine may raise its ambitions to taking much of Donbas to the pre-2014 line and perhaps Crimea?

SC: I think a so-called catastrophic Ukrainian success scenario is low probability in this current phase, but it can’t be ruled out completely. In other words, restoration to Ukraine’s international recognized borders is not a likely outcome of this offensive.

TH: Statistically, wars that last more than a year tend to last up to a decade. Would a very long timeframe help Russia, given its size and industrial base? Could this simply devolve into another of Putin’s “frozen conflicts” as in Moldova and South Ossetia-Abkhazia?

SC: The question of which side time favors is extremely important — and very difficult to answer, since it all depends on what period you’re examining. The 12- to 18-month timeframe might favor one side but the 18-24 month timeframe might work against it. (For example, based on when new military industrial capacity comes on line.) And it’s important to keep in mind that if there is continued Western political will to support Ukraine, Russia is not just fighting Ukraine; it’s fighting Ukraine plus Western military and economic resources.

As for a frozen conflict: definitions are really important. I define a frozen conflict as one where there is a sustained ceasefire but no political settlement. So, in Moldova there essentially has not been a shot fired for 30 years but there’s no political settlement; the same is true for 70 years in Korea. If we could get this conflict to the stage where the hot phase is definitively over, where Russia’s assault on Ukraine has come to an end, that would be a major achievement rather than a negative outcome.

TH: You write in Foreign Affairs that, “After over a year of fighting, the likely direction of this war is coming into focus. The location of the frontline is an important piece of that puzzle, but it is far from the most important one.” Can you explain?

SC: Many observers are keenly focused on the blow-by-blow on the battlefield and which side is pushing the frontline how many kilometers or even meters this way or that. And while the question of territorial control is immensely important to both of the governments directly involved in the fighting, and certainly to the Ukrainians living in the contested areas, it is not going to change certain structural realities that will define this conflict for years if not decades to come.

Those are twofold. First, neither Russia nor Ukraine is in a position to take the other’s capital, overthrow the other’s regime, or destroy the other’s military. So both sides at the end of this war will have significant military capabilities with which they could pose a threat to the other in the future. Second, neither side is likely to achieve its territorial objectives. In all probability, the line of contact when the guns fall silent will not be recognized by either side as a legitimate border. Therefore, the two countries will remain locked in a confrontation long after the hot phase is over. Those two factors will be more important in determining the nature of the war than the precise location of the frontline.

TH: If we are going to move past the hot phase, what sort of peace agreement, and promises from the West, would give Ukraine the territory and stability it feels it needs? Is EU or NATO membership thinkable?

SC: I cannot speak for Ukrainians. And they are the ones fighting and dying. Ultimately, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will have to decide what is necessary for his country’s security. But Ukraine’s partners can and should provide their best counsel and advice.

The two fundamentals of the conflict I discussed earlier suggest that this war will likely end in an armistice, not a peace treaty or settlement. The divides between Ukraine and Russia are too fundamental and irreconcilable. Neither is likely to change their respective positions on the location of their countries’ borders.

So the key question is how to ensure a secure, prosperous and democratic Ukraine on the territory controlled by Kyiv without ceding the long-term goal of restoring the country’s internationally recognized borders. Robust cease-fire maintenance mechanisms, and external commitments to Ukraine’s security could prove important. The former includes demilitarized zones, military disengagement and peacekeepers; some set of these or other measures could make a shaky cease-fire into a durable one that allows the rest of Ukraine to recover. Security commitments could both reassure Ukraine that it will not be on its own if Russia attacks again and deter Russia from such an attack.

Actual membership in either the EU or NATO is unlikely in the short term and tying that process to an end to the war would be a mistake. As part of a possible negotiated end to the fighting, we need to have bespoke commitments for Ukraine outside of and in addition to its integration with the EU and NATO. Additionally, it’s not in the interests of current members or Ukraine to undermine the integrity of the accession process. Particularly for EU membership, the benefits for transforming aspirant countries come through the long, complex process of approximating EU rules and norms. Linking that to the conflict would limit its effectiveness as a lever for reform in Ukraine.

TH: Finally, the X-factor: What would it take to force Putin to the negotiating table?

SC: You're not the only one asking that question. In fact, it’s one I’ve heard in several NATO capitals recently. The short answer is that no one really knows, and we should be humble about our ability to anticipate the decisions of a personalist autocrat. This challenge is compounded by the reality that there is no negotiating table being offered to him — and neither the West nor Ukraine (since May 2022) has tested the proposition that Putin (or his representatives) would show up if there were one. At the moment, the view is that we need to “give war a chance” to improve the Ukrainians’ position before such a table is offered. My suggestion is that there should be open channels now so we can know if and when he’s prepared to talk.

Blinken Meets Chinese Counterpart on Delayed Trip to Mend Ties

Top US diplomat meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang
Saga over alleged spy balloon derailed earlier trip by Blinken
ByIain Marlow
June 18, 2023 at 3:44 AM GMT+8Updated onJune 18, 2023 at 4:58 PM GMT+8
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-17/blinken-set-to-land-in-china-on-delayed-trip-to-stabilize-ties?sref=hhjZtX76

Secretary of State Antony Blinken met his Chinese counterpart in Beijing on Sunday as the Biden administration seeks to stabilize strained ties between the world’s two biggest economies.

The top US diplomat, whose previous attempt to visit China in February was scrapped at the last minute when the US revealed an alleged Chinese spy balloon was floating over American territory, will have a series of meetings with senior officials over the two days after landing Sunday morning.

On Sunday afternoon, Blinken met Foreign Minister Qin Gang at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, a former imperial garden where Chinese officials host foreign dignitaries. The two men shook hands and exchanged pleasantries about Blinken’s flight before sitting down with their respective delegations across the table from each other. Journalists were asked to leave before anyone spoke.

A smaller meeting and then a dinner were to follow, according to a senior State Department official who briefed reporters in Tokyo en route to China. Blinken may also have a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and deliver remarks at a news conference before he departs.

Blinken, the most senior US official to visit China in five years, is making his trip at a tumultuous time in US-China relations, with the two sides sparring over everything from human rights and technology to trade and weapons sales to Taiwan.

Despite the high-profile nature of the trip, senior US officials have downplayed expectations of Blinken accomplishing any sort of dramatic reset with China or resolving any of the fundamental disagreements between Washington and Beijing.\

The primary goal of Blinken’s trip will be to try and reestablish senior-level communications channels with Chinese\ counterparts, including between their militaries, to manage the intense competition between the countries, the senior official said.

Before he departed from Washington, Blinken said on Friday his main goals are to build empowered communications channels, raise candid US concerns about Chinese policies, and push for cooperation on global issues including climate change and macroeconomic stability.

“We’re not going to Beijing with the intent of having some sort of breakthrough or transformation in the way that we deal with one another,” Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told reporters before the trip. “We’re coming to Beijing with a realistic, confident approach and a sincere desire to manage our competition in the most responsible way possible.”

Blinken’s visit is part of a renewed flurry of high-level US-China engagement that has gradually picked up momentum after the balloon incident derailed an attempt by Biden and Xi — who met late last year in Bali, Indonesia — to establish a steadier path for bilateral relations. Biden said Saturday he’s “hoping that over the next several months I’ll be meeting Xi again.”

Some of the meetings have taken place in public, including when Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao visited the US. But other meetings have been out of the limelight. White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan recently met with his counterpart for a low-key meeting in Vienna, while CIA Director Bill Burns made a secret trip to Beijing last month to discuss intelligence issues.

At the same time, US and China ties have not exactly been on a steady path toward more normalized relations. The two sides are well aware of the state of bilateral relations, and there’s a recognition by both parties that senior-level interactions are needed to help stabilize the relationship, the senior State Department official said in Tokyo.

Also: US Accuses China of Risky Encounter Over the South China Sea

Understand power in Washington.

Get the Bloomberg Washington Edition newsletter to find out how the worlds of money and politics intersect in the US capital, delivered daily.

The US and Chinese militaries recently had two dangerous confrontations between naval vessels and jets in the South China Sea, which the Pentagon characterized as “unnecessarily aggressive” and “dangerous.” Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu — who is sanctioned by the US government in relation to Russian arms purchases — also recently rejected a meeting with his US counterpart Lloyd Austin when the two men attended a defense forum in Singapore this month.

The turbulent nature of US-China relations, as well as the prospect that another incident related to Taiwan could again send ties into a tailspin, have tempered expectations for Blinken’s visit and what the top US diplomat can hope to accomplish.

“A good outcome would be a better understanding of each side’s concerns and red lines as well as modest progress on areas of overlapping interest,” said Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor of China and Asia-Pacific studies at Cornell University. “Ultimately, one hopes that the two sides can make progress in the next several months toward a principled framework to manage US-China relations, one backed by small but credible signs of a shared interest in stabilizing the relationship.”

— With assistance by Qi Ding and Philip Glamann

(Updates with Blinken meeting Qin.)

4. China Had Better Listen to What Blinken Has to Say

Now that they have met, the question is did they listen?

China Had Better Listen to What Blinken Has to Say

Washington wants to set up stronger military guardrails; China doesn’t think they’re needed. One of them is wrong.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-06-15/china-should-heed-blinken-s-demand-for-military-guardrails?sref=hhjZtX76

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will no doubt press to establish “guardrails” — safeguards against accidental clashes between the US and Chinese militaries — during his visit to Beijing this weekend. Chinese leaders are equally certain to resist. They’d be making a mistake.

As with many other disagreements between the two rivals, China and the US have diametrically opposed views on the need for military hotlines and formal codes of conduct at sea and in the air. Informed by its experience of détente with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the US believes that adversaries can only safely jostle with each other in unfriendly military and intelligence activities if they can agree to rules designed to prevent accidental conflicts. Such safeguards, as President Joe Biden told President Xi Jinping at a virtual summit in November 2021, are only “commonsense.”

About the Author(s)

4Sight

6. Wargaming as a Social Science Experiment

Conclusion:

Building wargames as social science experiments is not easy. In our case, we had to carefully construct the experiment to not detract from the overall learning outcomes of our course. We had to ensure we didn’t artificially inflate the value of gender intelligence and information. While the WPS Wargaming Assessment has been a significant undertaking, the initiative has already improved our course and professorate. Going forward, we hope to continue building JSOU’s social science experimentation experience and expertise. We also hope our efforts might lead other institutions to take similar initiatives. The result would enhance wargaming’s credibility as a tool, not just to assess plans and operations but also to gain insights into the larger, wickedly complex problems of irregular warfare and special operations.

Fri, 06/16/2023 - 11:53am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/wargaming-social-science-experiment

Wargaming as a Social Science Experiment

By Andrew L. Crabb

In August of 2022, my supervisor at the Joint Special Operations University challenged me with an unusual task. She wanted me to find ways to embed into our courseware operational factors identified in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Strategic Plan and Implementation framework. Although my first thought was that we might be stepping into a political minefield, as she explained the WPS factors—looking at the operational environment (OE) via the lens of gender culture, dynamics, and perspectives—it became readily apparent that this was a facet of planning that was new and held merit.

Since special operations forces often claim the “human domain” as its operating milieu (Cleveland, 2016), gaining better and more nuanced insights into the OE was a worthy goal. Examining an OE’s gender culture, dynamics, and perspectives for operational advantages and considerations was an aspect that, in 30 years of operational planning and teaching operational planning, I had never considered. As I assessed the challenge, I began a long process that would lead us to embed a social science experiment in a wargame during Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)’s Special Operations Planning Course (SOPC).

This article relays the challenges and initial benefits of utilizing a wargame as the basis for a social science experiment. It is presented as a primer for those considering doing something similar, and with the understanding that the lessons I learned were as a fledgling social scientist under the tutelage of others with far greater experience. Since the experiment continues to be run and the data continues to be interpreted, the experiment’s final conclusions and findings will be published separately at a later date.

Militaries have long utilized wargaming to gain insights into operational plans and human decision-making. Wargames are commonly classified as analytical, educational, and experiential; the typology and desired outcomes help drive the wargame’s design (Appleget, 2020, 5). US military members often first encounter wargames when large headquarters use them to assess emerging operational concepts or to gain insights into their own and their adversary’s plans and capabilities. Another way those in uniform experience wargames is during operational planning.

In the US military’s Joint Planning Process, the Course of Action Analysis & Wargaming step utilizes an analytical wargame to assess the strengths and weaknesses of a proposed course of action. While both situations are common ways military members participate in wargames, a less common occurrence is using wargames as social science experiments. The social sciences (anthropology, sociology, history, economics, political science, psychology, etc.) are generally said to study human behavior, culture, and norms at the individual and group levels. This includes armed conflict and the systematic employment of violence. Social science experiments utilize controlled and repeatable conditions to understand the effects of different variables on given outcomes. If properly constructed, utilizing wargames as a vehicle for social science experiments can provide useful data and insights into the complex problems of armed conflict.

Because over the academic year, SOPC would have multiple iterations, we could meet both the “repeatable” experimental criteria and produce a relatively large “N” (the data’s sample size) (Yang, 2015, 13). Additionally, as course proctors, we could re-design the course’s wargame specifically to meet other goals of the experiment. Finally, it was important that the addition of the experiment did not compromise the course’s learning outcomes.

After taking some time to ponder the task, I developed a pathway that drew on several recent experiences, including attendance at the US Army War College’s Game Design Course and as a student in an international relations doctoral program. The pathway I developed took me through three significant challenges. With help from colleagues and outside institutions, these challenges all proved surmountable.

Challenge #1: The Research

Our first step was to learn more about WPS. During my doctoral program, we were taught that “the path of all knowledge leads through the question (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013).” We formulated a WPS-related research question. “What gender-related information exists in Joint doctrine and best practices to plan and execute Joint operations?”

We then conducted a literature review to see if there were gaps in the literature. Knowledge gaps can lead researchers to areas in which original work, or furthering the work of others, might be conducted. Through research, we learned that WPS was an initiative sparked by a United Nations resolution that sought to include women in the processes of conflict cessation; it also established protections for women, children, and oppressed communities during times of war (United Nations (UN), 2000). The UN’s WPS goals gained attention and momentum, ultimately finding expression in 2017 as a bi-partisan Act of Congress. The DoD followed the law with the WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (DoD, 2020).

Among other things, the DoD WPS Strategic Plan mandated that the DoD “train personnel on the needs, perspectives, and security requirements of men and women; protecting civilians from violence, exploitation, and trafficking in persons; and international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Apply gender analyses to improve DoD program design and targeting.” It was the last portion that drew my attention. In the operations world, program design could be interpreted to mean building operational concepts, targeting recalled operational limitations and considerations (e.g., constraints and restraints, operational risk).

Surprisingly, the literature review of doctrinal Joint Publications demonstrated that, before the enactment of the 2017 WPS legislation, the main Joint Publications (2-0 Intelligence, 3-0 Joint Operations, 5-0 Planning, 3-05 Special Operations) had no references (i.e., zero attributions) to women, gender, or children. After 2017, all the updated publications had a significant amount of information concerning women and gender. More surprisingly, we found the new information extremely insightful and useful (e.g., operational-level gender considerations for targeting, gender patterns of life, gender cultural insights, and gender-political power dynamics).

In addition to the literature review, we also met with leading experts in the WPS field. They provided outside readings to enhance our overall understanding of WPS. They also reviewed the experiment and survey designs. We then held a workshop with subject matter experts from the WPS Community of Interest. Their input and assistance were of immeasurable value. In sum, there was broad consensus that many WPS factors had yet to be operationalized and that our initiative had great promise and merit.

Employing the gap spotting technique (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013), we identified that there was a doctrinal gap in assessing considerations for children in the operational environment (i.e., still no references, even in the updated publications); we decided not to pursue this gap until doctrine addressed it better. However, as educators, we identified a second gap that further work needed to be done to formally incorporate WPS factors into operational-level planning. This was the gap we would pursue.

So, after completing the literature review, meeting with experts in the field, and going through the gap-spotting process, the research challenge was complete. WPS was newly incorporated into doctrine but, as an operational-level planning consideration, was largely absent from our courseware and unit-level best practices. To determine how best to teach and incorporate this new doctrine into operational planning, we would investigate the question via a wargaming social science experiment.

Challenge #2: Experimental Design

To do this, we first constructed hypotheses concerning the outcomes of operationalizing WPS factors (e.g., gender analyses provided via intelligence and information updates). Our hypotheses were:

Hypothesis #1: Operational Planners will assess that comprehension of gender dynamics, perspectives, and culture in the OE can aid the successful conduct of special operations.
Hypothesis #2: Operational Planners will assess that comprehension of gender dynamics, perspectives, and culture in the OE will be more beneficial to the conception and execution of indirect special operations.
Hypothesis #3: Operational Planners will assess that education and training in gender dynamics, perspectives, and culture in the OE will make them more effective planners.

To test the hypotheses, we then began constructing an outline of what a social science experiment might look like. The classic experimental design identifies a dependent variable (sometimes known as the outcome variable). Then it utilizes an independent variable (sometimes known as a predictor variable) to identify relationships between the outcome and the independent variable (Abiodun-Oyebanji , 2017, 48). We identified the assessed value of gender analyses (i.e., the value of assessments derived from gender culture, dynamics, and perspectives) as the dependent variable, and education on gender analyses & provision of such analyses during planning as the independent variable.

As mentioned previously, the specifics of our design had the experiment occur within the confines of SOPC. SOPC is a two-week course that takes place six times per year. SOPC prepares students to design, plan, and present a concept for a Joint special operations forces (JSOF)-focused operational-level campaign. During the latter portion of the course, students (2-4 groups of 6-8 individuals) participate in a wargame to evaluate their operational plan’s strengths and weaknesses. During the wargame, each participant is assigned to play a role as one of the operational actors (Friendly, Enemy, Neutral Forces, Operational Environment). Before the wargame, all participants received an “intelligence packet” with supplemental information to aid their participation.

The experiment established a control group of students who did not receive gender analysis education and whose intelligence update packet contained no gender analyses. The independent variable groups received the gender analysis education; the intelligence packets had the same intelligence updates as the control group, with the addition of the gender analyses.

An important aspect of the SOPC wargame is that it is a matrix wargame. Matrix games utilize structured argumentation for different actors to advocate for the success of their proposed actions (Mouat, 2018). The Wargame Facilitator then crowd-sources (i.e., surveys the group) to determine the probability of success, with each player providing their assessed probability of success. The Facilitator listens to who has the most convincing arguments for probability, finalizes the probability percentage, and the actor rolls the dice. The dice roll’s outcome determines success or failure, and the Facilitator provides context and answers questions concerning the outcome. One key aspect of the experiment is if those provided gender intelligence use it in the wargame to strengthen their argumentation and thus increase their success probability.

The crucial portion of the experiment comes following the wargame. Students complete a survey that asks them to assess (among other things) the value of gender intelligence in operational planning. Survey design is a high art, and the best advice we received concerned survey adjustment.

The student post-wargame survey design begins with biographical data, transitions to general wargame and operational questions, and ends with specifics on gender intelligence and considerations for operational planning. Concerning the biographical data, I received coaching on what to ask without compromising anonymity—if respondents sense their background could reveal their identity, they often won’t take the survey! I also was mentored to build a menagerie of Likert-scale questions mixed with other question types (e.g., matching, fill-in-the-blank, etc.) and open-ended narrative questions for students to fill out.

The Likert scale and other numerical valuation questions can provide data that can be quantified. Narrative questions can be assessed using thematic-coding techniques (with computer-based tools like NVivo) to quantify data better. Another great recommendation provided by a subject matter expert was to “triangulate” the results by having observers and facilitators also fill out records. Observers can provide objective data (e.g., the number of times gender intelligence was utilized, which players using or not using gender intelligence won or lost each turn) and subjective data (e.g., assessments on the students’ comprehension and use of gender intelligence). Taken together, the result was a mixed-method experiment with both qualitative and quantitative data. As we continue the experiment, we will seek to improve the experimental design while maintaining the consistency of the assessed data.

Challenge #3: The Institutional Review Board

As we approached finalization, one outlier task stubbornly refused our repeated attempts for resolution. To conduct human subjects research (HSR), Federal guidelines and regulations mandate that the research go through an Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval. Through her previous work, my supervisor had significant experience going through the IRB process. Because our experiment was essentially an assessment focused on how best to educate students, she was confident that an IRB would find our work educationally exempt from further HSR requirements (which can be onerous).

The difficulty was that my institution does not have an IRB. Finding an outside IRB willing and able to review our experiment proved challenging in the extreme. Several times an adjacent DoD educational institution would assure us they’d provide a review, only to have something arise that would force us to look elsewhere. Finally, as our third of six SOPC iterations (for FY23) approached, we found a partner to review the assessment.

As expected, before approval, the IRB did mandate some revisions and clarifications. It also required that I complete further HSR training (provided online by Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Program). After a several weeks-long process, the IRB completed its review and did find the experiment exempt from additional HSR requirements [Author’s note: specifically, the IRB found that because the results of the WPS Wargaming Assessment were not generalizable to the larger Non-DoD population, the experiment was exempt from further review].

Initial Impressions and Takeaways

To date, we have conducted one formal iteration of the WPS Wargaming Assessment and have three more before completion in September 2023. As previously mentioned, we intend to seek publication of the social science experiment’s findings once the academic year is complete. While it is too early to draw final conclusions, several trends and factors have become apparent.

As frequently happens in survey work, we had students who declined to take the survey, along with surveys that were only partially filled out or otherwise missing answers. The answers to narrative questions were generally thin and had the highest rates of non-responses. We also have learned that each survey needs to be coded or have a unique filename for easy reference and cataloging. Finally, we are transitioning the survey fully to our Blackboard Ultra website, which can better assure anonymity and has tools for data assessment. All these challenges are correctable and attainable but require additional work. We are moving out on them all.

Concerning the experiment’s hypotheses, our initial takeaway is that when operational planners are provided gender education and intelligence, they find it valuable for planning and executing simulated special operations. However, currently, our N is small, and there are many caveats to that general impression. Among our students, that finding is also not universal.

The biggest surprise was that the social science experiment effort, research-to-design-to-implementation, uncovered a gap in our own courseware and unit-level practices (as observed through our work with special operations units). While we make great efforts to maintain the currency of our course, we did not pick up on the post-2017 additions of gender analysis to the Joint doctrinal family of publications.

Expounding on that last point, like most operational planning courses, we have taught different ways to assess human culture and how to utilize those assessments in operational planning; protection of vulnerable populations usually expresses itself through operational limitations (constraints/restraints) and operational risk. More specifically, collateral damage mitigation and protection of civilians/non-combatants is usually considered most prominently during the targeting process at the tactical level of war. However, we have now incorporated gender analyses as one method to evaluate the human element of the operational environment. We have also added the protection of civilians and vulnerable populations as a prominent operational-level consideration, even in the incipient stages of operational-level planning. This also aligns with the emerging DoD mandates related to the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHRM-AP).

[Note: Professor Andrew L. Crabb will speak on Wargaming as a Social Science Experiment during a panel presentation at the Connections 2023 Wargaming Conference. The conference will be held in Ft. McNair, Washington D.C. from 21-23 June 2023.]

Bibliography

Abiodun-Oyebanji, Olayemi. (2017). Research Variables: Types, Uses, and Definition of Terms.

Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2013). The context of constructing and formulating research questions. SAGE Publications Ltd, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270035

Appleget, Jeff. 2020. The Craft of Wargaming. Naval Institute Press.

Cleveland, Charles, James Linder, and Ronald Dempsey. "Special Operations Doctrine: Is It Needed?" Prism 6, no. 3 (2016): 5-19. Accessed May 31, 2023.

“Experimental Wargames to Address the Complexity--Scarcity Gap.” In Spring Simulation Conference (SpringSim 2020). Fairfax, VA, USA: Society for Modeling and Simulation International (SCS), 2020. https://doi.org/10.22360/SpringSim.2020.ANSS.010.

Mouat, Tom. "Practical Advice on Wargaming." 2018. http://www.mapsymbs.com/PracticalAdviceOnMatrixGames.pdf.

Perla, Peter P., and Michael C. Markowitz. “Conversations With Wargamers:” Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2009. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA494298.

Perla, Peter P, Michael Markowitz, and Christopher Weuve. “Game-Based Experimentation for Research in Command and Control and Shared Situational Awareness,” n.d.

Reddie, Andrew W, and Bethany L Goldblum. “Evidence of the Unthinkable: Experimental Wargaming at the Nuclear Threshold.” Journal of Peace Research, October 14, 2022, 002234332210947. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221094734.

Rubel, Robert C. “THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF WAR GAMING,” 2023.

U.N. Security Council, 4213th Meeting. "Resolution 1325 (2000) [Women, Peace & Security]" (S/RES/1325). 31 October 2000. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement

Valeriano, Brandon G., and Benjamin Jensen. “Wargaming for Social Science.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888395.

Weuve, Christopher A., Peter P. Perla, Michael C. Markowitz, Robert Rubel, Stephen Downes-Martin, Michael Martin, and Paul V. Vebber. “Wargame Pathologies:” Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 1, 2004. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA596774.

"Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan." Department of Defense Public Affairs. Department of Defense, June 1, 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/11/2002314428/-1/-1/1/WOMEN_PEACE_SECURITY_STRATEGIC_FRAMEWORK_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.PDF.

Yang, Keming. Making Sense of Statistical Methods in Social Research. 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road, London EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2010. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473914636.

About the Author(s)

Andrew ‘Buster’ Crabb

Andrew ‘Buster’ Crabb (Colonel (ret), US Marine Corps) retired from active duty in 2015 after serving for over 25 years in a variety of operational and training assignments. A career infantry officer, Mr. Crabb was a plank holder in the establishment of US Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC).

Mr. Crabb spent over four years at the MARSOC where he served as the S-3 Operations Officer for the Foreign Military Training Unit, as an Operational LNO from CJSOTF-Afghanistan to a special missions unit, and as the Director of the Training Branch at the Marine Special Operations School. As a Colonel, Mr. Crabb served as the J-5 Director for Plans and Future Operations, US Central Command – Forward (CF-J) (2013-2014); he also served as the G-3 Operations Officer for US Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (MARCENT) (2014-2015).

While in uniform, Mr. Crabb’s nine deployments abroad included participation in Operations RESTORE HOPE & ENDURING FREEDOM, deployment to Colombia as a Brigade advisor in support of PLAN COLOMBIA (where he provided planning assistance for operations against the FARC and for recovery of US hostages), and a tour as a Brigade advisor to the United Arab Emirates’ Presidential Guard.

Following his retirement, Mr. Crabb immediately went on to be an Operations Analyst in USSOCOM’s J33 Current Operations Division’s Ground-Fires-Maritime Branch (2015-2019). Mr. Crabb holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science from The Citadel, a Master of Arts degree in Latin American Security Affairs from the University of Tulane and is a Foreign Area Officer for Latin America. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer’s Course, US Army Ranger School, USMC Mountain Leaders Course, Marine Corps Instructor of Water Survival Course, Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Control Warfare Course, Command & Staff College, Joint Staff College, and the Strategic Planners Course.

7. Tailoring U.S. Outreach to Indo-Pacific Allies, Partners

Tailoring U.S. Outreach to Indo-Pacific Allies, Partners

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

The Indo-Pacific is a vast complicated region with nations of varying capabilities, capacities and needs, and U.S. strategy in the region must be equally varied, said Lindsey W. Ford, deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia.

At the Center of Strategic and International Studies 2023 Indo-Pacific Conference today, Ford emphasized that the United States' network of allies and friends are the basis for maintaining peace, prosperity and stability in the region.

Ford Meeting

Lindsey Ford, deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, speaks with Navy Rear Adm. Mark Melson, commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific/Task Force 73, and Navy Capt. Frank Okata, Singapore Area Coordinator, about the amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha during a scheduled visit to Singapore Naval Installation, Jan. 17.

Download: Full Size (1.55 MB)

Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Heath Zeigler

VIRIN: 230116-N-JC800-0054Y

Ford directly pushed back on the idea that U.S. troops in the Indo-Pacific are somehow destabilizing and provocative. "I would say the United States military has been forward and present in the Indo-Pacific region for decades," she said. "I think you can look back, historically, and that there is solid evidence for the fact that the presence has helped … maintain peace and stability in the region."

Changes to U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific are "a response to changes in the security environment, not forcing changes in the security environment," she said. "And I think if that were not true, we would not have allies and partners who are so interested in having the United States there more."

Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific

Globally and regionally, China is "the pacing threat" for the United States. China is actively seeking to overturn the international rules-based order that has kept the peace in the region since World War II. The United States works with allies and partners to maintain security and stability in the region.

South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand are treaty allies of the United States, and strategy with those countries is tied to those mutual defense treaties. The United States is also partnered with many nations in the region and deals with them bilaterally, multilaterally and through international organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Ford used U.S. engagements with ASEAN; the Quad — India, Japan, Australia and the United States; and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States agreement as examples of the breadth of U.S. efforts in the Indo-Pacific. "I think we've been pretty clear repeatedly that we see ASEAN, the Quad, AUKUS as complementary efforts that are not in competition with each other," she said. "We're constantly providing reassurance … that we do not believe that something like an Asian NATO is relevant to the Indo-Pacific."

"That's true," she continued. "But I think if you believe that, then you also have to be comfortable with the idea that there are going to be varied and complimentary kinds of security groupings and networks that you engage through because there's not going to be any single one size fits all model in the Indo-Pacific."

AUKUS is very specific and is aimed at drawing the industrial bases of the three nations closer together and strengthening deterrence in the region.

While the Quad has a defense portion, the biggest portion is economic and political, Ford said. The organization delivers a lot of public good in the region including sharing vaccines, cyber and cybersecurity infrastructure development and more.

ASEAN is a unique forum for defense leaders in the region to talk about transnational threats, like maritime security, cybersecurity and military medicine, Ford said. The organization "is the only kind of institution that is really all encompassing like that and touches on so many broad different areas in the Indo-Pacific," she said. "I think that's one reason we think it's very unique and special."

There is a move toward a more multilateral approach to security in the region. She used the Shangri-la Dialogue held earlier this month as an example. In the past, the U.S. secretary would meet with fellow defense ministers individually. "Increasingly, when we go to the Shangri-la Dialogue, we meet with allies and partners together," she said.

Defense Ministers Meeting

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III delivers remarks at the 9th Association of Southeast Asia Nations Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus in Siem Reap, Cambodia, Nov. 22, 2022.

Download: Full Size (1.28 MB)

Photo By: Chad J. McNeeley, DOD

VIRIN: 221122-D-TT977-0188Y

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III participated in two trilateral meetings with allies and informal meetings with a group of four. "We met with all of the Southeast Asian defense ministers together," she said. "The bottom line is, we feel that what we are working with partners right now to deliver results to make a more resilient, more practically oriented security network that is actually delivering results for everybody."

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

8. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 17, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2023

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front.
A delegation representing seven African states met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on June 16 to propose a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade.
The Kremlin will likely exploit this proposal to promote Russian information operations aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine and has not demonstrated any intent to meaningfully engage with any peace process.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to signal his disinterest in formally subordinating the Wagner private military company (PMC) to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
The New York Times (NYT) released a report supporting ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces most likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna.
Russian forces and Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in the Bakhmut area and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar likely in response to Ukrainian territorial gains in the area on June 16.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).
Russian officials are planning several infrastructure projects connecting occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to occupied Crimea, likely to secure new ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 17, 2023

Jun 17, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

June 17, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2 pm ET on June 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[2] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.[3] Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[4] Ukrainian forces also conducted counteroffensive operations southwest and southeast of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in multiple unspecified directions in southern Ukraine.[6]

A delegation representing seven African states met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on June 17, following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on June 16, to propose a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade. The Egyptian prime minister, a Ugadan presidential envoy, and the presidents of South Africa, Zambia, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, and Senegal previously visited Kyiv and met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 16, and notably had to take shelter during Russian missile strikes targeting Kyiv.[7] South African President Cyril Ramaphosa corrected his spokesperson’s earlier denials that Russian forces did not conduct attacks on Kyiv during the visit and acknowledged that “such activity does not bode well for establishing peace.”[8] Ramaphosa presented a ten-point generalized peace plan on June 16 calling for an end to hostilities and a negotiated peace settlement that would respect sovereignty and establish security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia.[9] The proposal also calls for securing the movement of grain and fertilizers from both Ukraine and Russia and closer cooperation with African states.[10] Zelensky reiterated that negotiations are only possible after the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine and that Ukraine will not pursue negotiated settlements reminiscent of the Minsk Accords.[11]

Putin stated that the Kremlin welcomes the African states’ “balanced” approach to resolving the war in Ukraine in his meeting with the delegation, but did not comment on the feasibility of Ramaphosa’s suggested peace plan.[12] President of Comoros and current African Union Chairperson Azali Asoumani notably used language similar to the Kremlin’s preferred ”Russian world” rhetoric about the war in Ukraine while meeting with Putin, stating that stability in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the world depends on fraternal relationships between neighboring Slavic “friendly nations.”[13] Asoumani also highlighted that peace in Ukraine is important for addressing international food and energy security.[14] Asoumani’s comments and the peace plan’s inclusion of grain shipment guarantees suggest the states involved in the proposal view resolving the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine as their paramount concern. The delegation likely seeks to balance Ukraine and Russia to maintain longstanding bilateral relationships with Russia without fully tying themselves diplomatically to the Kremlin’s war.

The Kremlin will likely exploit this proposal to promote Russian information operations aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine and has not demonstrated any intent to engage with any peace process meaningfully. ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has routinely signaled a false willingness to negotiate a settlement to the war to prompt Western concessions and dissuade Western officials from sending further support to Ukraine.[15] The Kremlin previously intensified this effort to set conditions for its winter-spring 2023 offensive and is likely reamplifying this information operation in an effort to weaken Western support for Ukraine during counteroffensive operations.[16] The Kremlin also used the equally vague peace plan presented by China in the spring of 2023 to amplify this information operation and has not yet attempted to expound upon the broad suggestions in that plan.[17] The Kremlin instead attempted to use stated Chinese interest in negotiating a settlement to the war in Ukraine to pursue desired closer ties with China.[18] The Kremlin will likely use the outreach by these African states to pursue strengthened bilateral and multilateral engagement.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to signal his disinterest in formally subordinating the Wagner private military company (PMC) to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Prigozhin sarcastically criticized the MoD’s formalization efforts on June 17 after previously portraying himself as compliant with the Russian MoD’s order for volunteer formations to sign formal contracts by July 1 and claimed he attempted to submit a contract to formalize Wagner under the Russian MoD.[19] Prigozhin implied that the Russian MoD will confiscate weapons that volunteer units obtained outside of the Russian MoD’s weapon deliveries and noted that inexperienced Russian commanders with higher military education will replace what he claimed are more combat-effective volunteer commanders.[20] Prigozhin added that formalization will destroy hierarchies within volunteer formations and force volunteers to serve in the military without the Russian MoD respecting military contract deadlines. Prigozhin noted that the Russian MoD will not provide sufficient supplies or weapons for volunteers and will mistreat irregular forces. Prigozhin did not discuss the contents of his claimed formalization contract with the Russian MoD on June 17, but a Wagner-affiliated milblogger suggested that Prigozhin demanded a series of powers and concessions from the Russian military command discussed in the force generation section of this update.[21] Prigozhin’s behavior indicates that he is unlikely to subordinate Wagner forces to the Russian MoD unless such a move would grant him more political power within Russia.

The New York Times (NYT) released a report supporting ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces most likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[22] NYT cited multiple US and Ukrainian engineering experts who examined diagrams of the KHPP dam, imagery of the destroyed dam foundation, footage of the initial breach, and seismic data. The experts determined that the degree of damage to the dam’s internal structures is consistent with an explosion from within the dam’s internal structures rather than from prior damage. NYT also quoted a senior US military official as saying that the US ruled out an external attack, such as from a missile, rocket, or other projectile, as causing the explosion, and that the US believes that Russian forces most likely caused the internal explosion that caused the dam’s collapse. ISW has assessed since the destruction of the KHPP dam on June 6 that the preponderance of available evidence, reasoning, and rhetoric suggests that Russian forces deliberately damaged the dam.[23]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front.
A delegation representing seven African states met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on June 16 to propose a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade.
The Kremlin will likely exploit this proposal to promote Russian information operations aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine and has not demonstrated any intent to meaningfully engage with any peace process.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to signal his disinterest in formally subordinating the Wagner private military company (PMC) to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
The New York Times (NYT) released a report supporting ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces most likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna.
Russian forces and Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in the Bakhmut area and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar likely in response to Ukrainian territorial gains in the area on June 16.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).
Russian officials are planning several infrastructure projects connecting occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to occupied Crimea, likely to secure new ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Berestove (30km northwest of Svatove), Novoselivske (19km northwest of Svatove), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances near Terny (17km west of Kreminna) and attacked near Spirne (11km southeast of Siversk).[25] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Rozdolivka, Vesele, and Vyimka (all 25-30km south of Kreminna).[26]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna on June 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanka (11km east of Siversk).[27] The Russian Southern Group of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Rozdolivka, Vesele, and Yakovlivka (35km south of Kreminna).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked in the Serebrianska forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[29] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar acknowledged that Ukrainian forces continue both counteroffensive and defensive operations in eastern Ukraine.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 17. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made marginal advances north of Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut) as of June 17.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[32] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that the intensity of combat operations in the Bakhmut direction has decreased and that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive efforts around Bakhmut.[33] The Russian Center Group of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Berkhivka and Yahidne (both within 3km northwest of Bakhmut).[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted sporadic ground attacks northeast and southwest of Bakhmut but that Russian forces still control Berkhivka, Yahidne, and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[35]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Stepove (2km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, and Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made gains north of Marinka, attacked southeast of Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka), and are consolidating areas near Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City) reportedly captured within the last week.[37] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces made gains near Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka) on June 16 and near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) on June 17.[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar on June 17, likely in response to Ukrainian territorial gains in the area on June 16.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Novomykhailivka (19km northeast of Vuhledar) and Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar).[41]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian artillery units repelled three Ukrainian attacks and reconnaissance-in-force attempts southwest and southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[42] A Russian moblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced between Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Novodonetske (13km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[43] The milbloggger also claimed that elements of the “Kaskad” Operational Tactical Combat Formation and Russian regular forces continue to defend against Ukrainian attacks south of Velyka Novosilka. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in Novodonetske and in areas southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[44] Another Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) regained nearly all lost positions in the Vremivka salient area and suggested that “Storm Z” assault detachments composed of convicts are operating in the division.[45]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 17.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Pyatykhatky (41km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) and Novopokrovka (16km southeast of Orkhiv).[47] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Pyatykhatky but retreated to the settlement’s northern outskirts towards the end of the day.[48] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a foothold on the Russian first line of defense south of Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv) but that elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian advances in the area.[49] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov also noted that elements of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army) are defending against Ukrainian attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces killed a Ukrainian mechanized brigade commander, but ISW cannot confirm this claim at the time of this publication.[51]

Russian occupation officials reportedly stopped the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation from taking pictures of Russian fortifications near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Rogov claimed that Russian officials “politely but very insistently” asked IAEA inspectors to delete footage of Russian defensive structures and checkpoints during their visit to the ZNPP.[52] Rogov accused IAEA officials of working for foreign intelligence agencies.[53]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited a military-industrial production facility in Omsk Oblast that produces tanks and thermobaric artillery systems on June 17.[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the facility has significantly increased output in the past few months, and Russian MoD Main Armored Directorate Head Major General Alexander Shestakov stated that all the armored vehicles are modified to meet security requirements. Shoigu also visited an arsenal storage facility for artillery and missile ammunition in Omsk Oblast, and MoD Head of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate Lieutenant General Nikolai Parshin reported to Shoigu that the facility has sent 4,000 artillery systems to Russian forces in Ukraine and plans to send an additional 700.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to rely heavily on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire critical components for missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on June 17 that Russian forces do not have the capability to produce the semiconductors, chips, and processors that missiles require, but are still able to produce missiles by obtaining these components from countries that sympathize with Russia.[55] Ihnat added that Russian forces have been using recently manufactured missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure. Ihnat reported that Russia is rushing the production of missiles and that recently acquired missile fragments show that some missiles do not even have production labels.[56] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is pursuing a broad diplomatic outreach campaign to alleviate strain on the overextended Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and circumvent Western attempts to limit Russian access to microchips and other critical components of Russian military equipment.[57]

A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that a contract, which Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted to present to the Russian MoD, asked for a wide range of concessions and powers. Prigozhin previously attempted to deliver an alleged MoD-Wagner contract to the MoD on June 16 in response to the MoD’s order to formalize volunteer formations.[58] The Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that the contract included clauses that would ensure that Wagner would receive requested supplies and ammunition and provide Wagner with access to Russian military training grounds and organizational facilities.[59] The milblogger claimed that the contract would allow Wagner personnel to conduct special operations in other countries, train specialists in a wide range of military specialties, and conduct regime change operations on behalf of Russia. The contract reportedly would grant Wagner the power to send representatives to the MoD, request the Russian defense minister’s presence at Wagner’s meetings, and access most MoD infrastructure (except the Strategic Missile Forces).[60] The contract also reportedly stipulates that Wagner personnel would remain Wagner employees - not MoD employees - and would allow Wagner personnel to veto decisions in special operations in which they are involved.[61] If accurate, Prigozhin’s contract was an intentionally ludicrous offer he knew the MoD would reject. Prigozhin has not disclosed what was in the contract or if the contract specifically pertains to the MoD order for all personnel in volunteer formation to sign contracts with the MoD by July 1.[62]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

A Russian occupation official announced that Russian officials plan to implement several infrastructure projects connecting occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to occupied Crimea, likely to secure new ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian occupation officials plan to establish a ferry passenger service between Zaporizhia and Crimea by the end of 2023 and will begin to build a planned railway from occupied Crimea to Melitopol and Berdyansk in Zaporizhia Oblast in August.[63] Russian officials also announced on June 16 efforts to strengthen highways connecting Russia and occupied Ukraine.[64]

Russian occupation administrations continue to sign cooperation agreements with Russian business organizations and other Russian federal subjects at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).[65] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration signed cooperation documents with Kabardino-Balkira Republic to strengthen existing patronage programs and an economic agreement with Belgorod Oblast pertaining to production cooperation.[66] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that his administration signed 25 cooperation agreements at SPIEF, including with Chelyabinsk Oblast on deepening existing patronage programs and with KamAZ Public Joint Stock Company (PJSC) for the construction of two repair plants in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[67] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Administration Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that his administration signed agreements with Republic of North Ossetia-Alania on business exchanges.[68] The Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration also claimed that its officials met with representatives of the United Arab Emirates to discuss export deals for agricultural products.[69]

Russian occupation officials claimed that evacuation efforts on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast are declining as flood waters continue to subside. Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that the flow of evacuees is decreasing as most people have evacuated flooded areas.[70] Saldo claimed that 7,800 residents in occupied Kherson Oblast have evacuated, with 2,000 staying in temporary accommodation centers. Saldo added that water levels have receded in occupied Nova Kakhovka as well as Oleshky. Ukrainian Oleshky Administration Head Yevhen Ryshchyk stated that only some areas of Oleshky hromada are no longer flooded and that some areas near the Dnipro River are still flooded.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

9. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Meetings in Japan

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Meetings in Japan

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

June 17, 2023 |×

Department of Defense Spokesman Lt. Col. David Herndon provided the following readout:

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl visited Japan for a series of productive counterpart talks with the Government of Japan, June 16-17.

Reaffirming the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Under Secretary Kahl met with Vice Minister of Defense SUZUKI Atsuo, Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs OKA Masami, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs MORI Takeo, and National Security Advisor AKIBA Takeo. Under Secretary Kahl’s engagements advanced efforts to strengthen and modernize the U.S.-Japan Alliance, optimize force posture, and enhance cooperation with likeminded Allies and partners.

The Under Secretary’s visit to Japan underscores the progress of the U.S.-Japan Alliance following the historic January 2023 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Meeting and Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III’s recent visit to the region. It also reaffirms our commitment to working in close partnership to preserve peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

10. What war elephants can teach us about the future of AI in combat

Conclusion:

Mahouts who trained their war elephants did not do so with the intention of sending these magnificent creatures into battle alone. Rather, they cultivated a deep symbiotic relationship, enhancing the collective strengths of both humans and animals through cooperation and leading to greater overall outcomes. Today’s AI operators can learn from this historical precedent, striving to create a similar partnership between humans and AI in the context of modern warfare.

By nurturing the synergy between human operators and AI systems, we can transform our commitment to ethical values from a perceived limitation into a strategic advantage. This approach embraces the fundamental unpredictability and confusion of the battlefield by leveraging the combined strength of human judgment and AI capabilities. Furthermore, the potential for this collaborative method extends beyond the battlefield, hinting at additional applications where ethical considerations and adaptability are essential.|

What war elephants can teach us about the future of AI in combat

By Eric Velte and Aaron Dant

c4isrnet.com · by Eric Velte · June 14, 2023

The use of artificial intelligence in combat poses a thorny ethical dilemma for Pentagon leaders. The conventional wisdom is that they must choose between two equally bad alternatives: either enforce full human supervision of the AI systems at the cost of speed and accuracy or allow AI to operate with no supervision at all.

In the first option, our military builds and deploys “human in the loop” AI systems. These systems adhere to ethical standards and the laws of war but are limited by the abilities of the human beings that supervise them. It is widely believed that such systems are doomed to be slower than any unsupervised, “unethical” systems used by our adversaries. The unethical autonomous systems appear to boast a competitive edge that, left unchallenged, has the potential to erode Western strategic advantage.

The second option is to completely sacrifice human oversight for machine speed, which could lead to unethical and undesirable behavior of AI systems on the battlefield.

Realizing that neither of these options is sufficient, we need to embrace a new approach. Much like the emergence of the cyber warrior in the realm of cybersecurity, the realm of AI requires a new role – that of the “AI operator.”

With this approach, the objective is to establish a synergistic relationship between military personnel and AI without compromising the ethical principles that underpin our national identity.

We need to strike a balance between maintaining the human oversight that informs our ethical framework and adopting the agility and response time of automated systems. To achieve this, we must foster a higher level of human interaction with AI models than simply stop/go. We can navigate this complex duality by embedding the innate human advantages of diversity, contextualization, and social interaction into the governance and behavior of intelligent combat systems.

What we can learn from ancient war elephants

Remarkably, a historical precedent exists that parallels the current challenge we face in integrating AI and human decision-making. For thousands of years, “war elephants” were used in combat and logistics across Asia, North Africa, and Europe. These highly intelligent creatures required specialized training and a dedicated operator, or “mahout”, to ensure the animals would remain under control during battles.

War elephants and their mahouts provide a potent example of a complementary relationship. Much like we seek to direct the speed and accuracy of AI on the battlefield, humans were once tasked with directing the power and prowess of war elephants -- directing their actions and minimizing the risk of unpredictable behavior.

Taking inspiration from the historical relationship between humans and war elephants, we can develop a similar balanced partnership between military personnel and AI. By enabling AI to complement, rather than replace, human input, we can preserve the ethical considerations central to our core national values while still benefiting from the technological advancements that autonomous systems offer.

Operators as masters of AI

The introduction and integration of AI on the battlefield presents a unique challenge, as many military personnel do not possess intimate knowledge of the development process behind AI models. These systems are often correct, and as a result, users tend rely too heavily on their capabilities, oblivious to errors when they occur. This phenomenon is referred to as the “automation conundrum” – the better a system is, the more likely the user is to trust it when it is wrong, even obviously so.

To bridge the gap between military users and the AIs upon which they depend, there needs to be a modern mahout, or AI operator. This specialized new role would emulate the mahouts who raised war elephants: overseeing their training, nurturing, and eventual deployment on the battlefield. By fostering an intimate bond with these intelligent creatures, mahouts gained invaluable insight into the behavior and limitations of their elephants, leveraging this knowledge to ensure tactical success and long-term cooperation.

AI operators would take on the responsibilities of mahouts for AI systems, guiding their development, training, and testing to optimize combat advantages while upholding the highest ethical standards. By possessing a deep understanding of the AI for which they would be responsible, these operators serve as liaisons between advanced technology and the warfighters that depend on them.

Diverse trainers, models can overcome risk of system bias

Just as war elephants and humans possess their own strengths, weaknesses, biases, and specialized abilities, so do AI models. Yet, due to the cost of building and training AI models from scratch, the national security community has often opted for tweaking and customizing existing “foundation” models to accommodate new use cases. While this approach may seem logical on the surface, it amplifies risk by building upon models with exploitable data, gaps, and biases.

This approach envisions the creation of AI models by different teams, each utilizing unique data sets and diverse training environments. Such a shift would not only distribute the risk of ethical gaps associated with individual models but also provide AI operators with a broader array of options, tailored to meet changing mission needs. By adopting this more nuanced approach, AI operators can ensure AI’s ethical and strategic application in warfare, ultimately strengthening national security and reducing risk.

Mahouts who trained their war elephants did not do so with the intention of sending these magnificent creatures into battle alone. Rather, they cultivated a deep symbiotic relationship, enhancing the collective strengths of both humans and animals through cooperation and leading to greater overall outcomes. Today’s AI operators can learn from this historical precedent, striving to create a similar partnership between humans and AI in the context of modern warfare.

By nurturing the synergy between human operators and AI systems, we can transform our commitment to ethical values from a perceived limitation into a strategic advantage. This approach embraces the fundamental unpredictability and confusion of the battlefield by leveraging the combined strength of human judgment and AI capabilities. Furthermore, the potential for this collaborative method extends beyond the battlefield, hinting at additional applications where ethical considerations and adaptability are essential.|

Eric Velte is Chief Technology Officer, ASRC Federal, the government services subsidiary of Arctic Slope Regional Corp., and Aaron Dant is Chief Data Scientist, ASRC Federal Mission Solutions.

11. Three key priorities in crucial US-China talks

Low expectations:

A satisfactory outcome from this trip for both sides might be simply the opening of communication channels that prevent an incident leading to military conflict.

Three key priorities in crucial US-China talks

Published
13 hours ago

IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS

Image caption,

Presidents Xi Jinping and Joe Biden smiled for the cameras at the G20 summit in November

By Anthony Zurcher

Travelling with the US secretary of state

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's first visit to China on Sunday comes nearly five months after a major rupture in relations over a Chinese spy balloon.

His original trip was abruptly cancelled because the balloon, which China says was monitoring weather, drifted across the continental US before being destroyed by American military aircraft.

Mr Blinken's visit includes meetings with China's top foreign policy officials but there is no word yet on whether he will also meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, who appeared with Microsoft founder Bill Gates in Beijing on Friday.

The two global superpowers have a long list of issues that concern them, including high-profile disagreements as well as potential areas of co-operation.

Here are three key areas that could be at the top of the agenda.

Mending relations

First and foremost, Mr Blinken's visit is about re-establishing diplomatic interactions of any kind.

Last month there was an initial breaking of the ice when senior US officials met in Vienna, Austria.

But Mr Blinken is the most senior Biden administration official to travel to China, and it marks the first visit by a US secretary of state to Beijing since October 2018.

Now is a good time to be talking again because that in itself reduces the risk of conflict, said Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, in a pre-trip briefing.

High-altitude spying marks new low for US-China ties

"We can't let the disagreements that might divide us stand in the way of moving forward on the global priorities that require us all to work together."

IMAGE SOURCE,REUTERS

Image caption,

The Chinese balloon spotted in Montana

The Chinese response to the Blinken visit has been somewhat frosty, however.

In the official Chinese account of a call with Mr Blinken on Wednesday night, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang is reported to have told him that "it is very clear who is to blame" for the recent deterioration in relations.

"The United States should respect China's concerns, stop interfering in China's internal affairs, and stop undermining China's sovereignty, security and development interests in the name of competition," Mr Qin reportedly said.

The US has downplayed any significant announcements coming out of this visit. It seems the only "deliverable" from the meetings, in diplomatic parlance, will be that the meetings have happened at all.

Can the US live in Xi Jinping's world?

Don't expect some sort of breakthrough or transformation in the way that the two deal with one another, said Daniel J Kritenbrink, the State Department's senior East Asia diplomat.

If the meeting leads to further interaction between US and Chinese officials, that would be something both sides could build on.

Easing trade conflicts

President Biden's relations with China started off on a rocky note, in part because he has been unwilling to cancel trade measures enacted by his predecessor, Donald Trump.

That includes billions of dollars in import tariffs on Chinese-made products.

In some areas, Mr Biden has squeezed even harder, with restrictions on US computer-chip exports to China in an effort to maintain US superiority in the most advanced electronics technologies.

China responded by enacting its own ban on computer memory chips sold by Micron, the largest US manufacturer.

The US is beating China in the battle for chips

Mr Campbell acknowledged China's concerns but said the US would defend and explain what it's done so far and what could lie ahead.

If computer technology is an area destined for fierce competition between the two superpowers, the illicit drug trade may provide more room for co-operation.

The US wants to limit the export of Chinese-produced chemical components used to make fentanyl, a synthetic opioid many times more powerful than heroin.

The rate of US drug overdose deaths involving fentanyl has more than tripled in the last seven years.

Help stop American drug deaths, US asks China

"This is an absolutely critical and urgent issue for the United States," said Mr Kritenbrink - but it is one that presents its own challenges.

Averting war

After the balloon incident, there were reports that China was considering sending weapons to Russia, where they would be immediately used in the war against Ukraine.

US government officials have backed away from those accusations of late, removing what could have been a particularly contentious issue for the two nations that risked turning the Ukraine-Russia conflict into a proxy war between the US and China.

IMAGE SOURCE,LINDLE MARKWELL/BBC

Image caption,

Remote Philippine islands are on the frontlines of US-China tensions

But expect Mr Blinken to echo warnings given to the Chinese in Vienna that there would be serious consequences if China gives military and financial assistance to Russia.

US and Chinese warships have been facing off in a high-stakes game of chicken over the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. China claims the area as their own, while the US insists they are international waters.

The paradise islands caught in the US-China crosshairs

Mr Blinken and his diplomatic team have said that his goal in this trip is to "de-risk" the tensions, and renewed communication is the place to start.

Achieving more may be a tall task for now - and more extensive co-operation could become more difficult for Mr Biden as anti-China rhetoric in Washington is sure to heat up when the 2024 presidential elections approach.

A satisfactory outcome from this trip for both sides might be simply the opening of communication channels that prevent an incident leading to military conflict.

12. Top Russian general killed in Ukraine missile strike

Confirmation?

Top Russian general killed in Ukraine missile strike

washingtontimes.com · by Mike Glenn

By - The Washington Times - Friday, June 16, 2023

British officials have confirmed that a top Russian general died in a Ukrainian missile strike this week during Kyiv’s counteroffensive against occupying forces.

Maj. Gen. Sergei Goryachev was “almost certainly” killed Monday in the attack on a Russian command post in southern Ukraine. He is the first Russian general killed in combat in Ukraine this year, British military officials said Friday.

At the time of the attack, Gen. Goryachev was the chief of staff of Russia’s 35th Combined Arms Army.

In their latest assessment of the battlefield in Ukraine, British military intelligence officials said there was a “realistic possibility” that Gen. Goryachev was acting commander at the time. Lt. Gen. Alexandr Sanchik, who has been appointed commander of the 35th CAA, is reportedly filling a temporary leadership position at higher headquarters.

The 35th CAA has a war record that is “both difficult and controversial,” British officials said on Twitter. Russian soldiers assigned to the unit were present during the March 2022 massacre of Ukrainian civilians in Bucha. In June 2022, the 35th CAA was routed during the battle of Izyum. Ukrainian officials said their troops “almost completely annihilated” the force.

Analysts said that remnants of the 35th CAA were sent to help defend occupied territory in the Kherson region along the West Bank of the Dnieper River.

• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.

Click to Read More and View Comments

Click to Hide

washingtontimes.com · by Mike Glenn

13. De-dollarisation unstoppable, BRICS cooperation fostering multi-polar currency world

If this happens the world will change a we know it.

De-dollarisation unstoppable, BRICS cooperation fostering multi-polar currency world

iol.co.za · by Supplied

By Yawen Xu

Amidst the growing flaws of the dollar-centric financial system and the concerning geopolitical weaponisation of the reserve currency, participants at this week’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) convened to discuss the transition from a unipolar currency-based international financial system to a new world order centred around a multipolar currency.

Moreover, the forum will explore the significant role of BRICS partnerships in shaping this emerging economic landscape.

De-dollarisation is occurring ten times faster than the decline witnessed in the previous two decades. From 2021 to 2022, the dollar’s share in global reserves dropped eight points, from 55% to 47%, compared to 73% in 2001.

What has led to this rapid de-dollarisation in recent years? Sanctions played a significant role. As Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and SpaceX, warned in a recent tweet: “If you weaponise currency enough times, other countries will stop using it.”

In response to the Ukraine crisis, the US-led West imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Russia.

Some financial sanctions involved banning Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system and freezing $300 billion worth of assets from Russia’s Central Bank reserves. The economic sanctions have backfired, serving as a wake-up call for many countries worldwide, particularly in the Global South.

“Every night I ask myself why all countries are forced to do their trade backed by the dollar. Why can’t we do our trade backed by our own currencies?” Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva asked these soul-searching questions during his state visit to China in April, which summed up the growing sentiment and frustration regarding the dollar hegemony in international trade.

While actively advocating for local currency settlements among BRICS countries, Brazil signed an agreement with China to conduct trade settlements in their respective currencies before Lula visited China, meaning the annual bilateral trade flow of US$150 billion would be conducted using the Chinese and Brazilian currencies, rather than using the US dollar as an intermediary.

Meanwhile, as a member of the BRICS, Brazil has also been striving to encourage other Latin American countries to join the bloc. During a visit by Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to Brazil in late May, he expressed a clear desire to join BRICS, a sentiment supported by Lula, who emphasised his dream of using local currencies for settlements and reducing reliance on the US dollar.

While Brazil is leading the movement to de-dollarise Latin America, South Africa, another BRICS member, is also actively involved. Earlier this year, South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor expressed her concern and emphasised the importance of creating a fairer payment system as an alternative to the dollar. He believes that the current dollar-centric financial system tends to “privilege” wealthy countries, but developing nations like South Africa must incur additional costs when making payments in dollars. Pandor highlighted this as one of the reasons why the BRICS bloc established the jointly-run New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014.

In the face of the weaponisation of the dollar, Europe also seems to be taking steps to undermine the dollar’s supremacy. French President Emmanuel Macron recently called to reduce the European continent’s reliance on the “extra-territoriality of the US dollar”. Also, Macron has reportedly requested an invitation from South African President Cyril Ramaphosa to attend the BRICS Summit scheduled for August in Pretoria.

While Ramaphosa did not make any commitments to Macron, this bold and innovative move by the French president indicates that his vision, at least regarding international financial reform, aligns with that of the BRICS countries.

So how can the New Development Bank assist in building a multi-polar currency system that is friendly to developing countries and emerging markets?

Firstly, let’s delve into the vision behind establishing the NDB. As the first new multilateral development bank created by developing countries since the end of World War II, the NDB aims to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS countries and other emerging economies. Its ultimate goal is to contribute to building a fair, just, and diverse international economic order.

Contrary to the goals of the NDB, the World Bank and the IMF, the two pillars of the Bretton Woods system, have long been focused on establishing and maintaining an international financial system with the United States at the helm and other Western countries and Japan playing supporting roles. Their objective has not been to serve the interests of developing countries genuinely. This is where the NDB steps in to fill the void and address this shortcoming.

Current NDB members include the five founding nations of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as well as Bangladesh, Egypt, the UAE, and Uruguay. More countries are applying to enter or are in the process of joining the bank, such as Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe, and Honduras.

It’s worth noting that the combined GDP of the five BRICS nations (31.5% of the global total) surpassed that of the G7 nations (30.7%) this year, making it the world’s largest economic bloc. It is expected that by 2030, as more countries join BRICS Plus, the disparity between the two groups will further widen. This will increase the economic influence of the BRICS nations, making the New Development Bank even more attractive to other developing countries.

Secondly, the NDB has demonstrated institutional innovation in its operational processes, particularly in equitable governance structure, local currency financing, and sustainable infrastructure projects.

In terms of governance structure, unlike the World Bank’s approach to shareholding, the NDB has equally split shareholding among its five founding member countries. With an equal contribution totalling $100 billion as the initial authorised capital, each member country has equal voting and decision-making rights. More importantly, no country holds veto power, ensuring equal mutual benefits and respect among the nations.

Regarding local currency financing, the NDB stands out from the IMF and the World Bank, which primarily use the U.S. dollar as the dominant currency for international transactions. This new development bank for the Global South offers loans in multiple currencies, including the US dollar, euro, Chinese yuan, and other local currencies. And the approach effectively mitigates exchange rate risks associated with loan projects, reduces the vulnerabilities stemming from excessive reliance on the US dollar, and fosters the growth of member countries’ domestic capital markets.

For instance, as of the first quarter of 2023, loans in local currencies accounted for 21.5% of the NDB’s loan portfolio. And the bank aims to increase the share of project financing conducted in the national currencies of its member countries to 30% during the strategic cycle of 2022-2026.

This objective underscores the NDB’s commitment to promoting financial stability, enhancing regional cooperation, and bolstering the economic resilience of its members.

Regarding investment projects, the NDB focuses on sustainable infrastructure initiatives, including renewable energy, digital infrastructure, smart cities, water resources, and sanitation facilities.

Infrastructure development represents a significant bottleneck for economic growth in developing countries. Existing international multilateral development banks often adopt a cautious approach towards infrastructure investment due to the high costs, complex processes, and politically sensitive nature of environmental concerns and resettlement issues. However, the NDB is determined to make a unique and significant contribution.

The NDB’s “2017-2021 General Strategy“ shows that about two-thirds of its investments are dedicated to sustainable infrastructure projects. In its ”2022-2026 General Strategy“, 40% of the funds are allocated to projects that promote climate change mitigation and adaptation. These strategies highlight the bank’s commitment to addressing global development challenges by prioritising sustainable infrastructure investments.

Lastly, the BRICS emergency reserve fund, also known as the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), complements the role of the NDB. With a full scale of US$100 billion, China has pledged the largest share of US$41 billion, while South Africa has committed US$5 billion, and the remaining BRICS countries have each pledged US$18 billion. The function of the CRA is to provide liquidity support through currency swaps when a member state faces a long-term shortage of U.S. dollars and struggles to repay foreign debts. This mechanism allows fellow member states to offer assistance, reducing dependence on U.S. dollar reserves and ensuring stability within the bloc’s financial system.

In summary, the vision of the BRICS bloc and its New Development Bank is focused on enhancing financial autonomy for participating nations, providing assistance to emerging markets and developing countries, and diversifying and stabilising the global financial system. The Global South has been neglected for far too long. They deserve sovereign development and the opportunity to thrive.

* Yawen Xu is a journalist and commentator with CGTN, based in Beijing.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

iol.co.za · by Supplied

14. The Next Global Superpower Isn’t Who You Think

Conclusion:

All three of these scenarios are wholly plausible. None is inevitable. Which one we end up in will depend on how the explosive nature of artificial intelligence drives changes in existing power structures, whether governments are able and willing to regulate tech companies, and—most critically—how tech leaders decide they want to use their newfound power.

The Next Global Superpower Isn’t Who You Think

What happens when the world is no longer unipolar, bipolar, or even multipolar?

By Ian Bremmer, the president of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media.

Foreign Policy · by Ian Bremmer · June 17, 2023

Editors’ Note: The following is adapted from a TED Talk. Another version of this speech appears on the website GZERO Media.

Who runs the world?

This used to be an easy question to answer. If you’re over 45, you grew up in a world dominated by two superpowers. The United States and its allies set the rules on one side of the Berlin Wall, while the Soviet Union called the shots on the other. Nearly every other country had to align its political, economic, and security systems with one side or the other. That was a bipolar world.

Then, in 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving the United States as the world’s sole superpower. The U.S. dictated outcomes both through its dominant role in international organizations and by exerting raw power. That was a unipolar world.

About 15 years ago, the world changed again—and it got more complicated. The United States became less interested in being the world’s police officer, the architect of global trade, and even the cheerleader of global values. Other countries, getting more powerful, were increasingly able to ignore rules they didn’t like and, occasionally, set some themselves. That’s a “G-Zero” world: a nonpolar world without global leaders.

Three things happened to cause this geopolitical recession, when the global architecture no longer lines up with the underlying balance of power.

First, Russia wasn’t brought into the Western-led international order. Now a former great power in serious decline, Russia has become extremely angry and sees the West as its primary adversary on the global stage. Whether most of the blame for this lies with the United States and its allies or with Russia, the fact is that is where we are.

Second, China was brought into U.S.-led institutions—but on the presumption that as the Chinese became more integrated, wealthy, and powerful, they would also become more American (i.e., a free-market democracy willing to become a responsible stakeholder in the U.S.-led order and play by the rules without wanting to change them). As it turns out, they’re still Chinese—and the United States is not ready to accept that.

And third, the United States and its allies ignored the tens of millions of their own citizens who felt left behind by globalization. Their grievances were further fueled by growing income and wage inequality, shifting demographics and identity politics, and polarization from new media technologies. After decades of benign neglect, most of these citizens have grown fundamentally mistrustful of their governments and of democracy itself, in turn making their leaders less able or willing to lead.

All the geopolitical crises you see in the headlines every day? The war in Ukraine, confrontation over Taiwan, nuclear tensions with Iran and North Korea, you name it—some 90 percent of them are directly or indirectly because of the geopolitical recession caused by these three issues. In other words, the crises are not about individual leaders. They are a structural feature of our geopolitical landscape.

Yet for better or worse, geopolitical recessions don’t last forever. And the coming global order is something very, very different from what we’ve become used to.

We no longer live in a unipolar or bipolar or multipolar world. Why? Because we no longer have multidimensional superpowers—as in, countries that exert global power in every domain. That’s right, the United States and China are not superpowers today—at least not in the way we’ve always used the term. And no superpowers means no single global order. Instead, what we have today is multiple world orders, separate but overlapping.

First, we have a unipolar security order. The United States is the only country that can send soldiers, sailors, and military hardware to every corner of the world. Nobody else comes close. America’s role in the security order today is more essential—and, indeed, more dominant—than it was a decade ago.

China is rapidly growing its military capabilities in Asia, but nowhere else in a significant way. That’s increasingly concerning to America’s Indo-Pacific allies, who now rely on the U.S. security umbrella more than before. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has similarly made Europe the most dependent on U.S.-led NATO it has been in decades. Meanwhile, Russia’s military has been weakened by the loss of some 200,000 troops and much of its critical materiel in Ukraine, all of which it’ll find hard to rebuild in the face of Western sanctions.

Yes, China, Russia, and others have nuclear weapons, but actually using them is still tantamount to suicide. The United States is the world’s sole security superpower—and will remain so for at least the next decade.

But military might doesn’t allow Washington to set the rules for the global economy, because the economic order is multipolar. The U.S. has a robust and dynamic economy, still the world’s largest, but global power here is widely shared.

Despite all the talk about a new cold war, the United States and China are far too economically interdependent to decouple from each other. Bilateral trade between the two keeps making new highs, and other countries want access to both American muscle and the growing Chinese market (soon to become the world’s largest). You can’t have an economic cold war if there’s no one willing to fight it.

Meanwhile, the European Union is the world’s largest common market, and it’s able to set rules and standards that the Americans, Chinese, and others must accept as the price of doing business with it. Japan is still a global economic power, if barely. India’s economy is growing rapidly, and with it, so is its influence on the global stage.

The relative importance of these and other economies will continue to shift over the coming decade, but what’s certain is that the global economic order is and will remain a multipolar order.

Between the security and economic orders are tensions. The United States wants to define more and more areas of the economy as critical for national security, and it’s pressuring other countries to align their policies accordingly, on semiconductors, critical minerals, and maybe soon on TikTok. For its part, China wants to use its commercial and trade leverage to increase its diplomatic influence. Europe, India, Japan, and other countries want to ensure that neither the security nor the economic order dominates the other—and they’ll most likely succeed.

Those are the two world orders we already see. But there’s a third, rapidly emerging order that will soon have more influence than the others: the digital order. There, unlike every other geopolitical order past and present, the dominant actors setting rules and exerting power aren’t governments but technology companies.

You’ve heard how NATO weapons, intelligence, and training have helped Ukrainians defend their land. But if Western tech companies hadn’t quickly come to the rescue in the early days of the invasion—fending off Russian cyberattacks and allowing Ukrainian leaders to communicate with their soldiers on the front lines—Russia would have knocked Ukraine completely offline within weeks, effectively ending (and winning) the war. Arguably, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wouldn’t be in power today if not for tech companies and their power in the new digital order.

Tech companies decide whether former U.S. President Donald Trump can speak without filters and in real time to hundreds of millions of people as he runs for president again. Without social media and its ability to promote conspiracy theories, there is no Jan. 6 insurrection on Capitol Hill, no trucker riots in Ottawa, no Jan. 8 revolt in Brazil.

Tech companies even define our identities. We used to wonder whether human behavior was primarily the result of nature or nurture. No longer. Today, it’s nature, nurture, and algorithm. The digital order is becoming a critical determinant in how we live, what we believe in, what we want—and what we’re willing to do to get it.

That’s a staggering amount of power that tech companies have amassed—so much so that they have become geopolitical players in and of themselves. These for-profit actors already control aspects of society, the economy, and national security that were long the exclusive preserve of the state. Their private decisions directly affect the livelihoods, interactions, and even thought patterns of billions of people across the globe. Increasingly, they also shape the global environment in which governments themselves operate.

But how will technology companies use their newfound power? There are three possible scenarios.

If American and Chinese political leaders continue to assert themselves ever more forcefully in the digital space, and if the tech companies line up with their home governments, we’ll end up in a technology cold war between the U.S. and China. The digital world will be split in two, other countries will be forced to choose sides, and globalization will fragment as these decoupled strategic technologies become the commanding heights of national security and the global economy.

If the tech companies stick with global growth strategies, refusing to align with governments and preserving the existing divide between the physical and digital fields of competition, then we’ll see a new globalization: a globalized digital order. Tech companies will remain sovereign in the digital space, competing largely with each other for profits—and with governments for geopolitical power, much in the same way that major state actors presently jockey for influence in the space where the economic and security orders overlap.

But if the digital space itself becomes the most important arena of great-power competition, with the power of governments continuing to erode relative to the power of tech companies, then the digital order itself will become the dominant global order. If that happens, we’ll have a post-Westphalian world—a technopolar order dominated by tech companies as the central players in 21st-century geopolitics.

All three of these scenarios are wholly plausible. None is inevitable. Which one we end up in will depend on how the explosive nature of artificial intelligence drives changes in existing power structures, whether governments are able and willing to regulate tech companies, and—most critically—how tech leaders decide they want to use their newfound power.

Foreign Policy · by Ian Bremmer · June 17, 2023

15. Google claims it caught China government hackers redhanded breaking into hundreds of networks around the world

Google claims it caught China government hackers redhanded breaking into hundreds of networks around the world

BYFRANK BAJAK AND THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

June 16, 2023 at 1:43 AM GMT+8

Fortune

“This is the broadest cyber espionage campaign known to be conducted by a China-nexus threat actor since the mass exploitation of Microsoft Exchange in early 2021,” Charles Carmakal, Mandiant’s chief technical officer, said in a emailed statement. That hack compromised tens of thousands of computers globally.

In a blog post Thursday, Google-owned Mandiant expressed “high confidence” that the group exploiting a software vulnerability in Barracuda Networks’ Email Security Gateway was engaged in “espionage activity in support of the People’s Republic of China.” It said the activity began as early as October.

The hackers sent emails containing malicious file attachments to gain access to targeted organizations’ devices and data, Mandiant said. Of those organizations, 55% were from the Americas, 22% from Asia Pacific and 24% from Europe, the Middle East and Africa and they included foreign ministries in Southeast Asia, foreign trade offices and academic organizations in Taiwan and Hong Kong. the company said.

Mandiant said the majority impact in the Americas may partially reflect the geography of Barracuda’s customer base.

Barracuda announced on June 6 that some of its its email security appliances had been hacked as early as October, giving the intruders a back door into compromised networks. The hack was so severe the California company recommended fully replacing the appliances.

After discovering it in mid-May, Barracuda released containment and remediation patches but the hacking group, which Mandiant identifies as UNC4841, altered their malware to try to maintain access, Mandiant said. The group then “countered with high frequency operations targeting a number of victims located in at least 16 different countries.”

Word of the breach as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken departs for China this weekend as part of the Biden administration’s push to repair deteriorating ties between Washington and Beijing.

His visit had initially been planned for early this year but was postponed indefinitely after the discovery and shootdown of what the U.S. said was a Chinese spy balloon over the United States.

Mandiant said the targeting at both the organizational and individual account levels, focused on issues that are high policy priorities for China, particularly in the Asia Pacific region. It said the hackers searched for email accounts of people working for governments of political or strategic interest to China at the time they were participating in diplomatic meetings with other countries.

In a emailed statement Thursday, Barracuda said about 5% of its active Email Security Gateway appliances worldwide showed evidence of potential compromise. It said it was providing replacement appliances to affected customers at no cost.

The U.S. government has accused Beijing of being its principal cyberespionage threat, with state-backed Chinese hackers stealing data from both the private and public sector.

In terms of raw intelligence affecting the U.S., China’s largest electronic attacks have targeted OPM, Anthem, Equifax and Marriott.

Earlier this year, Microsoft said state-backed Chinese hackers have been targeting U.S. critical infrastructure and could be laying the technical groundwork for the potential disruption of critical communications between the U.S. and Asia during future crises.

China says the U.S. also engages in cyberespionage against it, hacking into computers of its universities and companies.

——

AP Business Writer Zen Soo contributed from Hong Kong.

Fortune

16. Killnet Threatens Imminent SWIFT, World Banking Attacks

Buckle up.

Killnet Threatens Imminent SWIFT, World Banking Attacks

darkreading.com · June 16, 2023

The pro-Russian hacktivist collective known as Killnet claims to be working in concert with a resurgent form of the notorious ReVIL ransomware gang. The goal? To mount an attack on the Western financial system.

The group is warning that attacks are imminent, as in the next day or so; but it's unclear whether the threats amount to anything more than bluster and saber-rattling, particularly given Killnet's past track record of, at most, carrying out mildly disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

Even so, in a video posted on a Russian Telegram channel on June 16, Killnet made ominous threats against the SWIFT banking system (famously targeted by Lazarus in 2018); the Wise international wire transfer system; the SEPA intra-Europe payments service; central banks in Europe and the US (i.e., the Federal Reserve); and other institutions.

"The post claims that threat actors from Killnet, REvil, and Anonymous Sudan will unite for the campaign," according to ZeroFox researchers, writing in a flash alert on the threat. "Killnet indicates that the attack is motivated by the US providing weapons to aid Ukraine, stating: 'repel the maniacs according to the formula, no money — no weapons — no Kiev regime.'"

Killnet's New Besties: Real or Imaginary?

When it comes to the claimed partnerships, Anonymous Sudan is an emergent DDoS player that targeted entities in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden earlier this year, ostensibly in retaliation for perceived anti-Islamic activity in each of these countries. However, despite this religious persona, Trustwave researchers in the past have tied Anonymous Sudan to Killnet, noting it could simply be a masked subsidiary.

As for ReVIL, which imploded in 2022 after a Russian takedown, evidence of a re-emergence is one day old: On June 15, a Telegram channel called, fittingly, "REvil," was created. It was used to circulate a shout-out ("Hello Killnet") that went on to be heavily re-posted in a Killnet-affiliated Telegram channel, according to ZeroFox.

"This is the only post in channel to date and no additional evidence substantiating the partnership has been observed," the researchers noted.

A previous whiff of ReVIL's resurrection came more than a year ago, when rumors surfaced that some members were regrouping — but nothing more came of it.

Killnet could be fabricating the ReVIL partnership to lend some heft and gravitas to its threats against some tough targets. While Killnet has successfully gone after big game before, such as the White House and SpaceX satellite comms in Ukraine, these had "limited impact, causing short service outages and disrupting access to information," ZeroFox researchers said. A ReVIL partnership that's more than a flight of fancy "would allow them greater access to vulnerability exploitation, network intrusion, and data exfiltration."

Absent that, "the [threatened attacks], if legitimate, are unlikely to result in mass or prolonged outages to Western banking infrastructure, despite the newly claimed relationships with REvil and Anonymous Sudan," they added.

Even so, the publicity push around a supposedly imminent financial catastrophe could be simply an effort to harry Western governments and financial institutions, ZeroFox concluded — or, given Killnet's penchant for shenanigans, just an attempt to garner attention and notoriety.

darkreading.com · June 16, 2023

17. The Futility of Grand Strategy

I just received my copy of the New Makers of Modern Strategy just as I was leaving to travel. I would have taken it on this trip but it is so large and heavy my baggage would have been overweight. It is quite a tome.

Excerpts:

The New Makers of Modern Strategy is far superior to the prior iterations of the book. It is a useful corrective to the wealthy conservative war against everyone in strategic studies who does not think strategy begins and ends with folks such as Henry Kissinger. The volume demonstrates the added value that comes from reading about Sun Tzu; David Ben-Gurion, the founder and first prime minister of Israel; Jawaharlal Nehru, the anti-colonial Indian leader and prime minister; or even the Kim dynasty of North Korea. Brands has taken a mediocre classic and pumped new life into it.

Still, the Clausewitz Trap suggests that there are inherent limits to any exercise to develop a timeless science of strategy. Perhaps analysts need to consider the possibility that the best strategic innovations wind up being self-defeating. Today’s brilliant strategist will often prove to be tomorrow’s cautionary tale.

The Futility of Grand Strategy

Today’s brilliant strategist is tomorrow’s headstrong fool.

By Daniel W. Drezner, a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University and the author of The Ideas Industry.

Foreign Policy · by Daniel W. Drezner · June 18, 2023

Today’s great powers face some serious strategic quandaries. How much effort and resources should the United States allocate toward combatting Russia when China clearly possesses greater power? To what extent should China assist Russia in a war that has so far seemed to accomplish little but degrade Moscow’s resources and global standing? Is it possible for states in the Indo-Pacific to balance between China and the United States? And should the European Union attempt to create its own autonomous pole or rely on a United States bedeviled with partisan divisions?

If ever there was a need for strategy, it would seem to be now. So, who are the world’s leading international relations strategists to guide us through it all? Here’s a good rule of thumb: They are whoever you think is likely to meet their comeuppance in the next few years.

The book cover of The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age, ed. Hal Brands

The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age, ed. Hal Brands, Princeton University Press, 1200 pp., $45, May 2023

If you believe this prediction is cynical, recall the past two decades. Experts on grand strategy, such as John Lewis Gaddis, praised then-U.S. President George W. Bush’s post-2001 national security strategy—a doctrine that led to 20 years of costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with very little to show for them. Then-U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy was all the rage a few years later; it is safe to say that Petraeus’ star has dimmed since then. More recently, it was Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Gerasimov Doctrine, which stressed the gray zone of conflict between declared states of war and peace, that was praised as both tactically nimble and strategically daring. But after nearly 16 months of grueling conflict in Ukraine, Putin now looks like a leader mired in quicksand who will lose even if he wins. And Valery Gerasimov, the Russian general for whom the doctrine is named, is the object of mockery and scorn from Russian paramilitary leaders.

In some ways, those elevated to the strategic stratosphere resemble the stock market gurus and financial entrepreneurs once celebrated on the cover of business magazines. The chances are decent that anyone the business press exalts will ultimately wind up bankrupt and scandal-ridden. Whether in business or great power politics, today’s brilliant strategist is tomorrow’s headstrong fool; what might now seem to be a nugget of fresh insight could look like a rotten, gnarled piece of fruit just a few years from now.

This all begs the question of whether it is possible to craft a book on the science of strategy that has a half-life of more than a few years. I have contributed to edited volumes on grand strategy and written repeatedly about the futility of such an exercise, so I have my doubts. Call it the Clausewitz Trap, in honor of the author of On War and one of the most widely cited strategists in history, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz: Anyone who acquires celebrity from their strategic acumen inexorably believes in their own strategic genius and makes ego-driven mistakes. The best strategic advice is humility in the face of success—but the very exaltation of strategists makes this very difficult to do in practice.

Enter Hal Brands. He is the Henry A. Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a Bloomberg opinion columnist, and the editor of The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age. Given Brands’s productivity and prolixity, it is quite possible that he has already written another book in the time it took me to write this sentence. The point is, if anyone can avoid the Clausewitz Trap, it is Brands.

Brands’s The New Makers of Modern Strategy does possess some natural advantages. As its title suggests, this is a new edition of an existing project. Edward Mead Earle edited the first edition of Makers of Modern Strategy, published in 1943, quite the date to release a volume on the state of strategic thinking (that book’s subhead was Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler). Peter Paret edited the second edition of the book, published in 1986. The odds are excellent that you will find that edition stowed on the top shelf of your international relations professor’s office bookcase. That is a mixed signal: Paret’s edition is one of those big, important collections that many professors like to display in their stacks—but its hard-to-reach location suggests the book was seen far more than it was read. After the 1980s, no one really cared what former French President Charles de Gaulle thought about strategy.

There are multiple reasons why Paret’s edition is acknowledged but not beloved within the strategic studies community. Although both Zhou dynasty-era Chinese general Sun Tzu and Clausewitz warned against viewing strategy through a strictly military lens, Paret’s definition of strategy was incredibly narrow: “the use of armed force to achieve the military objectives and, by extension, the political purpose of the war.” Even the security studies community viewed this as far too restrictive. As FP’s Stephen M. Walt lamented in his 1987 review for International Security: “Paret and company passed up a golden opportunity to show how a broader conception of strategy might yield important new insights.”

Brands learned well from his predecessor’s mistake; the definition of strategy he provides—“the craft of summoning and using power to achieve our central purposes, amid the friction of global affairs and the resistance of rivals and enemies”—is far more capacious. That description enables Brands to note in his introductory essay that “some of the greatest American strategists, such as John Quincy Adams and Franklin Roosevelt, have been diplomats and politicians rather than soldiers.” The New Makers of Modern Strategy includes numerous entries devoted to the nonmilitary pillars of strategy. One chapter by James Lacey and another by Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner tackle the economic foundations of strategy. Tanvi Madan explores strategies of nonalignment; Priya Satia writes about anti-imperial strategies ranging from Mahatma Gandhi to Frantz Fanon.

Brands also corrects for the other principal way that Paret’s volume fell short: Of the 28 chapters in the 1986 volume, 27.5 were devoted to Western concepts and practices of strategy (Japan’s World War II strategy made the cut). Not even Sun Tzu merited a chapter. Brands does not neglect the Western canon in The New Makers of Modern Strategy; Walter Russell Mead writes about Thucydides, John Maurer explores U.S. naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Michael Leggiere covers Napoleon Bonaparte. But there are plenty of chapters about non-Western strategies, ranging from Toshi Yoshihara’s analysis of Sun Tzu to Kori Schake’s take on Shawnee chief Tecumseh to Seth Jones on Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and Gerasimov’s reliance on irregular warfare.

Still, the problem with Brands’s volume is the same as with the prior iterations: There are inherent limits to articulating a timeless science of strategy. Brands contradicts himself on this point in his introduction. He writes that “the field of strategic studies is rooted in the belief that there is a basic logic of strategy that transcends time and space.” But just two pages later, Brands acknowledges that the prior editions of this book “have aged, unavoidably, since publication, and so both remind us that the state of the art does shift over time.” There is a tension in claiming that there are timeless principles of strategy if the state of the art keeps evolving. While individual chapters might be of immense historical value, perhaps the underlying concept that strategy is enduring needs to be interrogated further.

One way to remain modern is to project how strategy might evolve in the future, but Brands omits any chapters devoted to that question. This is puzzling. To be sure, trying to predict strategic trends for the next few decades is a fool’s errand. And The New Makers of Modern Strategy does cover a variety of new areas, ranging from Thomas Rid’s chapter on intelligence to Joshua Rovner’s chapter on new strategic domains. That said, anticipating future strategic challenges is not that hard. It was surprising to see no chapter devoted to how strategists will need to think about the challenges posed by climate change, artificial intelligence, pandemics, and the demographic slowdown enveloping much of the world.

The New Makers of Modern Strategy is far superior to the prior iterations of the book. It is a useful corrective to the wealthy conservative war against everyone in strategic studies who does not think strategy begins and ends with folks such as Henry Kissinger. The volume demonstrates the added value that comes from reading about Sun Tzu; David Ben-Gurion, the founder and first prime minister of Israel; Jawaharlal Nehru, the anti-colonial Indian leader and prime minister; or even the Kim dynasty of North Korea. Brands has taken a mediocre classic and pumped new life into it.

Still, the Clausewitz Trap suggests that there are inherent limits to any exercise to develop a timeless science of strategy. Perhaps analysts need to consider the possibility that the best strategic innovations wind up being self-defeating. Today’s brilliant strategist will often prove to be tomorrow’s cautionary tale.

Books are independently selected by FP editors. FP earns an affiliate commission on anything purchased through links to Amazon.com on this page.

Foreign Policy · by Daniel W. Drezner · June 18, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website