Quotes of the Day:
"In all history there is no war which was not hatched by the governments, the governments alone, independent of the interests of the people, to whom war is always pernicious even when successful."
- Leo Tolstoy
"No pessimist ever discovered the secrets of the stars, or sailed to an uncharted land, or opened a new heaven to the human spirit."
- Helen Keller
"By three methods we may learn wisdom: First, by reflection, which is noblest; Second, by imitation, which is easiest; and third by experience, which is the bitterest."
- Confucius
1. Ukraine SITREP 6/1/22
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 1 (PUTIN'S WAR)
3. Documents Reveal Hundreds of Russian Troops Broke Ranks Over Ukraine Orders
4. U.K. seeks U.S. approval to send rocket systems to Ukraine
5. Phoenix Ghosts are part drones, part missiles. How does that change combat?
6. US military hackers conducting offensive operations in support of Ukraine, says head of Cyber Command
7. Why the Office of War Information Still Matters
8. The Human Element: The Other Half of Warfare
9. The Marine Corps’ debate with its generals is amusing, but dangerous
10. Never Underestimate Ukrainians
11. Army prepares for its first-ever Patriot missile exercise on Palau this summer
12. Russia tightens grip on Ukrainian factory city, decries U.S. rocket supplies
13. Kremlin accuses U.S. of "deliberately" heating up Ukraine war
14. How Lessons from Afghanistan are playing out in Ukraine
15. Do Targeted Strikes Work? The Lessons of Two Decades of Drone Warfare
16. Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design
17. US military may need innovation overhaul to fight future wars, Milley says
18. U.S., Taiwan to launch trade talks after island excluded from Indo-Pacific group
19. Laydown of US troops in Europe will depend on how Ukraine war ends
20. FBI director blames Iran for 'despicable' attempted cyberattack on Boston Children's Hospital
21. Biden’s pledge to send rocket systems to Ukraine is no silver bullet
22. FDD | Enlist Quad, France to take China on in the South Pacific
23. FDD | The War in Ukraine and the Western Balkans
24. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Stavridis: Zelenskyy beats Putin on military calculus
25. Western Support for Ukraine Has Peaked
26. Putin World Descends Into Fury Over New U.S. Rocket Delivery
1. Ukraine SITREP 6/1/22
CDS Daily brief (01.06.22) CDS comments on key events
Humanitarian aspect
On June 1st, International Children's Day is celebrated in Ukraine. However, in current reality, Ukrainian children foremost should be protected from Russian bombs and shellings.
According to official figures alone, 243 children have died, and 446 have been injured in Ukraine since the beginning of the war. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, the temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.
1,042 criminal cases were opened for crimes the occupiers committed against Ukrainian children during the war, as reported by the Office of the Prosecutor General. Of these, 491 - on the facts of armed attacks on institutions for children, 551 - war crimes against children.
139 children are considered missing in Ukraine during the war. Another 234,000 children were taken to Russia illegally from the temporarily occupied territories, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The Russian forces fired at Mykolaiv from artillery. According to preliminary information, one person was killed, and three were injured. The wreckage damaged a playground and residential buildings.
The aggressor fired a missile from a Su-35 aircraft at Bilopillya, Sumy Region. According to the preliminary information, six missiles had been fired in the Sumy region. Data on the destruction and casualties are being clarified, stated the head of the Regional Military Administration (RMA), Dmytro Zhyvytsky.
The enemy struck with missiles with a cluster charge on one of the towns in the Kharkiv Region. Civilians were injured as a result of the blow: one woman was killed, and four others, including a 13-year-old girl, were injured, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
A rocket attack was carried out on Slovyansk, Donetsk Region, this morning, destroying three private houses.
The occupiers use weapons prohibited by international conventions. Among the most frequently used are anti-personnel mines, which Russian Federation troops plant even in human corpses, stated the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
In occupied Kherson, Ukrainian mobile service and internet have disappeared (as reported in CDS Brief 31.05.2022). The Russian Federation occupation forces are selling Russian SIM cards on the condition that Kherson residents present their passports.
In the liberated territories, 45% of railway connections have been restored. Electricity was restored in 85% of unoccupied cities, towns, and villages, announced the Deputy Head of the
Office of the President, Kyrylo Tymoshenko. In addition, medical institutions have resumed operation in 326 municipalities, and pharmacies have opened in more than 400 towns.
The first modular housing for internally displaced persons was opened in Borodyanka. It will be equipped with residential and sanitary modules and laundry, dining, recreation, and office spaces.
Operational situation
The 98th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces against Ukraine continues ('Donbas Defense Operation' in the official Russian terminology). The enemy is trying to establish full control over the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and maintain the land corridor with the temporarily occupied Crimea; they are continuing their offensive in the East of Ukraine with the aim of encircling and defeating the Ukrainian Joint Forces.
With the aim of forward presence and to prevent the transfer of Ukrainian Defense Forces to other areas, the enemy maintains Armed Forces units in the Russia-Ukraine border areas of the Bryansk and Kursk regions. Enemy units are fortifying their positions in the Bryansk region (Russia) within 3 km of the Ukrainian border.
The aggressor air struck from Su-35 at Bilopillya and fired artillery at Seredyna-Buda, Sumy region.
The primary efforts of the Belarusian Armed Forces are focused on strengthening the protection of the state border. No signs of the enemy forming offensive groups have been identified. Tanks and armored personnel carriers are being taken out of storage at Belarusian bases; their subsequent transfer to the Russian Armed Forces to make up for current losses is not ruled out. The combat readiness review of certain Belarusian military units continues.
Over the past 24 hours, Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled nine enemy attacks in the Donetsk and Luhansk directions. Two tanks, 13 artillery systems, eight armored combat vehicles, and six enemy vehicles were destroyed. In the Kherson and Mykolaiv regions, in addition to military equipment, the Russian occupiers lost about 70 people.
The morale of the personnel of the invasion forces remains low.
Kharkiv direction (approximate length of the battle line: 100 km; Russian Federation Armed Forces battalion tactical groups: 5; average width of one battalion tactical group's combat area: 20 km)
Enemy groupings, consisting of units of the Western Military District, try to hold positions and prevent the Ukrainian Defense Forces from advancing in the direction of the state border. The enemy fired artillery at Oleksandrivka, Slatyne, and Tsyrkuny. They struck aircraft near Vesele and Ternova. Russian Federation railway troops completed repairing the railway bridge near Kupyansk to restore the logistics supply on the railway branch Kupyansk-Lyman. In order to strengthen the protection and defense of logistics routes, the enemy moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk to strengthen its grouping.
Izyum direction (approximate length of the battle line: 60 km; Russian Federation Armed Forces battalion tactical groups: 22; average width of one battalion tactical group's combat area: 2.7 km) Ukrainian units continue to withstand; in some areas, they orderly retreat in the southern direction.
With the support of Ka-52 helicopters, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Lyman-Staryi Karavan. Fighting continued, although the aggressor withdrew some forces from the Lyman and transferred them to Sievierodonetsk.
As a result of losses near Dovhenke, the enemy took some units for restoration to Izyum. The enemy conducted reconnaissance of Ukrainian troop positions with Orlan-10 UAV in the areas of Izyum, Pervomaisky, and Velyka Komyshuvakha. The enemy is preparing to resume the offensive in the direction of Slovyansk.
Sievierodonetsk direction (approximate length of the battle line: 100 km; Russian Federation Armed Forces battalion tactical groups: 25; average width of one battalion tactical group's combat area: 5.3 km)
Units of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Wagner private military company (PMC), Russian National Guard (Rosguard), and proxy forces of so-called "separatists" captured the northern outskirts of Sievierodonetsk, including a bus station and hospital. They advanced towards the city palace of culture in the city center and also advanced in Sirotyne, located further south.
Units of the Ukrainian National Guard's 4th Rapid Response Brigade, the 115th Territorial Defense Brigade, the 17th Tank Brigade, and the 81st Airborne Brigade continue to defend the city, although in some areas they retreated through Sieviersky Donets to Lysychansk.
Enemy transfers reserves of up to three BTGs and an artillery division from the 58th Combined Arms Army to Sievierodonetsk and Avdiivka. Several echelons loaded with T-72 and T-80 tanks were transferred from Rostov-on-Don to Melitopol. The enemy is preparing for an offensive in the directions of Siversk and Raihorodok.
Popasna direction (approximate length of the battle line: 20 km; Russian Federation Armed Forces battalion tactical groups: 12-15; average width of one battalion tactical group's combat area: 1.6 km)
The enemy is trying to displace Ukrainian troops from positions in Bilohorivka and Vrubivka by using assault and army aircraft in Komyshuvakha, Berestov, and Nirkove. Enemy units, the Wagner PMC, and proxy forces of so-called "separatists" suffered heavy losses and were exhausted. There are 200-250 servicemen and up to 10-15 combat vehicles in each of the 12- 15 BTGs operating in the direction.
Donetsk direction (approximate length of the battle line: 140 km; Russian Federation Armed Forces battalion tactical groups: 20; average width of one battalion tactical group's combat area: 7 km)
Wagner PMC units were transferred to Sievierodonetsk [from this direction]. This almost stopped the enemy's advance in the Bakhmut direction, although the enemy continued the
active assault in some areas. Earlier, Russian forces' positions from Komyshuvakha in the north to several villages around Horlivka came under heavy fire from Ukrainian artillery, including those supplied by NATO.
The Russians unsuccessfully stormed Novobakhmutivka and Vesele, north of Avdiivka. The Russians reinforce their artillery in the area, particularly with Tulpan self-propelled mortars.
In the Kurakhiv and Novopavliv directions, the enemy holds its occupied positions, inflicts fire from mortars and artillery to restrict Ukrainian troops' actions, and prevent them from being transferred to other threatening directions.
Zaporizhzhya direction (approximate length of the battle line: 130 km; Russian Federation Armed Forces battalion tactical groups: 14; average width of one battalion tactical group's combat area: 10 km)
The enemy carried out engineering work to improve the fortification of the second line of defense; relocated to the area of Vasilievka [up to] a T-62 Battalion and [up to] a Motorized Rifle Battalion.
Kherson direction (length of the battle line: 160 km; Russian Federation Armed Forces battalion tactical groups: 7; average width of one battalion tactical group's combat area: 22.8 km)
Analysis of the enemy forces and equipment of the 49th Combined Arms Army shows a lack of resources, especially personnel and conventional weapons: e.g., one BTG of the grouping has to cover up to 25 km of the combat area. They continue equipping the second line of defense.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces of the 60th Separate Motorized Brigade and the 63rd Separate Infantry Brigade liberated Davydiv Brid and made a successful deception maneuver. They pretended to advance in the southern direction, suddenly struck east and attacked from the rear the Russian positions between Bila Krynytsia and Novohryhorivka, broke through them, and crossed the border of Sukhy Stavok-Bruskinskoe. The breakthrough forced the Russian division to retreat in panic from Mykolaivka. Fighting continues in the area of Snihurivka. The Russian garrison resists.
The enemy launched airstrikes by army aircraft in Davydiv Brid, Mykolaivka, Novopavlivske, and Shiroke. They carried out massive shelling with MLRS, artillery, and mortars.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area: Russian troops continue efforts to seize Ukrainian cities and ports to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black and Azov Seas.
Currently, five Russian Black Sea Fleet ships are on patrol in the Black Sea, mainly in the coastal zone, and patrol ship Dmitry Rogachev is in the area of gas towers. The group is headed by the Admiral Makarov frigate with eight Kalibr missiles on board.
There are no signs of forming a landing detachment; all amphibious ships are located at bases in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk.
The accumulation of enemy weapons on Snake Island continues; it recently housed three Grad MLRSs. Air defense of Snake Island is provided by five Pantsir and Tor self-defense SAMs. In addition, means of radio and EW have been deployed. About 4-6 speedboats patrol the island from the sea. The main task of the contingent on the island is probably to gather intelligence on the southern coast of Ukraine and the coast of Romania on the activities of NATO forces.
A storm tore off two enemy naval mines: one was carried by waves to the shores of the Odesa region, where a Navy subversive team neutralized it, and Ukrainian sailors blew up the other in the sea.
The European Union plans to ban insuring tankers carrying Russian oil as part of the sixth package of sanctions against Russia. The ban on insurance, which will take effect in six months, is a severe blow, say traders and shipowners. Few companies are willing to transport oil on uninsured tankers.
Shipowners and traders use two main types of insurance to protect against potential losses due to oil spills and other hazards. One type is hull and equipment insurance against physical damage to ships. This insurance is usually purchased at the Lloyd's Market in London, an international insurance market whose members act as syndicates to insure and share the risks of various businesses, organizations, and individuals. The other type of insurance is protection and indemnity, which covers third parties' liability. An international P&I group with member clubs in Norway, the UK, the EU, and other countries provides this type of insurance for approximately 95% of the world's tanker fleet. Officials in the group have announced they will suspend insurance for Russian oil vessels if the EU bans it.
An insurance ban will make it more difficult for Russia to sell oil to Asia and increase the likelihood that oil prices will remain high or rise.
The enemy's total combat losses from February 24 to June 1 amounted to approximately:
Personnel - almost 30,700 people (+200)
Tanks - 1,361 (+3)
Armored combat vehicles (APC) - 3,343 (+41) Operational tactical missile systems - 4 (0) Artillery systems - 659 (+10)
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 207 (0) Vehicles and fuel tanks - 2,290 (+15)
Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 94 (+1)
Aircraft - 208 (0)
Helicopters - 175 (+1)
UAV operational and tactical level - 519 (+4) Intercepted cruise missiles - 120 (0)
Boats / cutters - 13 (0)
Ukraine, general information
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine does not intend to attack Russian territory with long-range weapons. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken confirmed it during a press conference with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg: Ukraine will not use missile systems provided by the United States to strike at Russian territory.
Ukraine lost more than 200 factories and 35% of its GDP due to the war, while direct losses have amounted to more than $600 billion, according to the head of the Office of the President, Andriy Yermak. He also noted that 5 million people left the country because of the war, while the same number were forced to move to other [safer] locations within Ukraine. According to Yermak, tens of thousands of people have died. Earlier, the country's Prime Minister, Denis Shmyhal, said that the forecast of falling GDP is 30-50%, and 35% of Ukraine's economy is not working today.
Russia has destroyed Europe's largest salt plant in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. Salt has been mined in Soledar since the 17th century. Artemsol is 141 years old.
International diplomatic aspect
Switzerland vetoed Denmark's request to send Swiss-made armored personnel carriers to Ukraine. Denmark planned to send about 20 Piranha III AFVs to Ukraine. Switzerland is neutral and does not supply weapons to conflict zones itself and requires other countries to obtain re-export permits.
The New York Times published an article by President Joe Biden on what the United States will do and will not do in Ukraine. The President defined the U.S. strategic goal as "a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression." To achieve this, as well as to enable Ukraine to end the war with Russia through diplomatic channels on favorable terms, the United States is providing weapons. President Biden has decided to supply MLRS, which will allow the destruction of any targets within [the battlefield of] Ukraine. He stressed that the United States does not encourage strikes on, or provide means of destruction in, Russian territory. The U.S. President also stated that he would not put pressure on Ukraine to make territorial concessions for the sake of peace. Biden also stressed that the United States would avoid a direct confrontation with Russia, and warned that "any use of nuclear weapons in this conflict on any scale would be completely unacceptable to us as well as the rest of the world and would entail severe consequences." However, in response to non-interference and warnings about the unacceptability of using nuclear weapons, Moscow has decided to conduct the exercise of its strategic nuclear force. They are based on Yars complexes, which have a range of 11,000 km. The Kremlin has not abandoned the view that nuclear saber-rattling could affect
U.S. support for Ukraine. Obviously, such saber-rattling was the factor for the U.S. decision to provide Ukraine with shorter range MLRS, but it still did not stop the decision to provide these systems.
The German Chancellor stated that he would provide Ukraine with the advanced IRIS-T air defense system. At the same time, they could also provide a modified SLM with a range of 40 km and an altitude of 20 km, and SLS with a range of 12 km and an altitude of 8 km. The first, previously mentioned as an option for Ukraine in the German press, is still under development and will be ready for delivery no earlier than in three or four years. Chancellor Olaf Scholz also
said that under an agreement with Greece, Germany would supply them with the latest Marder armored vehicles, allowing Greece to hand over modernized BMP-1s to Ukraine. According to German officials, this is in the interests of Ukrainians, because they [still] operate Soviet equipment. However, German officials overlooked the fact that Kyiv had already asked for Marder, and German manufacturers were ready to fulfill this order. It is unlikely that old German vehicles are more challenging to master for Ukrainian Armed Forces than modern armored vehicles, which have already been provided by other European countries and are already in operation on the battlefield. Germany supplied Ukraine with more than 15 tons of ammunition, 100,000 hand grenades, and more than 5,000 anti-tank mines. However, the promised heavy weapons were not delivered, which is difficult to explain given the critical importance of time.
The EU and the United Kingdom have agreed to coordinate actions to block insurance for Russian oil tankers. Given that European insurance companies account for 95% of oil tanker insurance globally, this step will be a powerful blow to Russia's export potential. Of course, the Russian government can introduce its own insurance for ships under the Russian flag. However, this will mean fewer resources for war, and more corruption offsets and inefficiency. In addition, the number of available vessels is declining, as Sovcomflot, one of the world's largest tanker operators, has already sold more than a dozen ships. Russia's toxicity will continue to grow, so opportunities to reorient energy exports to Asian markets will become much more difficult.
Relevant news from Russia
Gazprom has completely cut off gas supplies to Denmark's Ørsted and Shell Energy Europe Limited to Germany due to non-payment in rubles.
Russia's Gazprom cut gas production by 4.8% in January-May, compared to the same period last year, to 211.4 billion cubic meters. Gas exports outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) fell by 27.6%.
Russian billionaires have lost $41.48 billion since the beginning of the year, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.
Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020 and are involved in security studies, defence policy research and advocacy. Currently all our activity is focused on stopping the ongoing war.
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2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 1 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 1
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
June 1, 5:30pm ET
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast has gotten the attention of Russian forces in the area, and the Russians are scrambling to secure the vital ground line of communication (GLOC) the Ukrainians have threatened. Ukrainian forces carried out a series of organized counterattacks targeting settlements on the eastern bank of the Ihulets River that are very close to a key highway supporting Russian forces further north. The Russians have responded by destroying the bridges the Ukrainians used in one of those counterattacks and other bridges across the river in an effort to hold their line against anticipated continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are likely still close enough to the highway to disrupt its use as a main supply route, potentially undermining the Russians’ ability to hold against Ukrainian counter-offensives from the north.
Russian milbloggers are expressing growing alarm about the threat of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the areas Russian forces have deprioritized while concentrating on Severodonetsk. Russian milbloggers have increasingly focused on tracking the rate of Ukrainian counterattacks in late May.[1] Pro-Russian Telegram channel “Dmitriyev” (over 100,000 followers) reported that Ukrainian forces are fully capable of inflicting ”painful and cutting blows” on Russian GLOCs in Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by July-August due to lack of adequate Russian defensive forces in the areas.[2] Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces “will grope for weakness” in Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers are effectively criticizing the Russian military command for endangering Russian territorial gains across other axes by prioritizing the Donbas offensive operation so heavily.
Russian authorities are likely anticipating Ukrainian partisan pressure in Luhansk Oblast. The Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on June 1 the launch of the “Luhansk partisan” project to galvanize resistance to Russian attempts to consolidate control of Luhansk Oblast.[4] A Russian Telegram channel reported that the Russian Internal Ministry is sending a special detachment of its employees on “leave” to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), which is a likely attempt to reinforce Russian administrative presence in the LNR in the face of growing internal and partisan discontent.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk, a Russian-controlled city in eastern Kharkiv Oblast along the P07 highway within 30 kilometers of the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.[6] Kupyansk is far from the front lines and in no apparent danger of imminent Ukrainian conventional attack. Taken together, the reported deployment of Internal Ministry employees and a BTG suggest that Russian forces are anticipating partisan resistance against their attempts to gain control of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continue to undermine the economic viability of areas they are attempting to capture. Russian forces reportedly hit the “Azot” fertilizer production plant in Severodonetsk on May 31 and caused the dissemination of toxic nitric acid smoke.[7] The production plant was an economically-significant resource for Severodonetsk and the Luhansk region and it would have been prudent for Russian forces to maintain and take control of the pla
3. Documents Reveal Hundreds of Russian Troops Broke Ranks Over Ukraine Orders
Documents Reveal Hundreds of Russian Troops Broke Ranks Over Ukraine Orders
Desertions and refusal to engage in the invasion have put Moscow in a bind over how to punish service members without drawing attention to the problem
June 1, 2022 10:36 am ET
Hundreds of Russian soldiers have escaped the fighting in Ukraine or refused to take part during the early stages of the war, according to military decrees viewed by The Wall Street Journal as well as accused soldiers and lawyers defending them.
Military analysts and Ukrainian officials say there have been many more.
Russia’s army stumbled badly early in its invasion of Ukraine and suffered thousands of casualties and the loss of an estimated quarter of its deployed military hardware, a senior Pentagon official said in April. Desertions and insubordination among soldiers, Interior Ministry troops and members of the National Guard are compounding the problem.
The desertions place Russian authorities in a bind over how to punish those who refuse to serve without drawing more attention to the issue, defense experts said. The Russian military is short on manpower and seeking recruits to help turn the tide in Ukraine.
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Penalties have so far been largely limited to formal dismissals from service. Because Russia hasn’t declared war on Ukraine, there also are few legal grounds for criminal charges against those who refuse to serve abroad, according to a lawyer and former military prosecutor’s assistant who is defending soldiers fired for insubordination.
“So many people don’t want to fight,” said Mikhail Benyash, a Russian lawyer representing a dozen members of the National Guard, a domestic military force that quashes protests in Russia. Mr. Benyash is assisting soldiers appealing their dismissals after they refused orders to enter Ukraine in February, according to National Guard documents. Members of the guard were sent into Ukraine to patrol streets and suppress dissent in occupied areas.
Photo of Russian soldier Albert Sakhibgareev, provided by his lawyer Almaz Nabiev.
Government officials in Moscow didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Russian soldier Albert Sakhibgareev, 24 years old, was ordered to Russia’s Belgorod Region on Feb. 8 for military exercises, he said. After President Vladimir Putin gave his Feb. 21 speech dismissing Ukraine’s right to statehood, Mr. Sakhibgareev said most of the troops at his base had their phones confiscated and were told to wear bulletproof jackets. They unloaded projectiles and ammunition from Soviet-era trucks but didn’t know what was to come.
He was startled awake by close artillery fire around dawn on Feb. 24. Two shells landed a mile and a half from his barracks on Russia’s side of the border with Ukraine. Military helicopters and other aircraft flew overhead, appearing to head into battle. Mr. Sakhibgareev said he learned what was happening only after furtively scrolling a news headline on Telegram: “Russia Invades Ukraine.” He got scared, fled the army base and went into hiding.
“None of us wanted this war,” Mr. Sakhibgareev said. His mother, Galina Sakhibgareeva, said her son enlisted out of patriotism and because there were few other career opportunities in their small town in Russia’s Ufa region, located about 700 miles east of Moscow.
A military career was a chance to make a life for himself. “I brought up a tall, athletic son and gave him away for the defense of the country,” she said.
A satellite image from Feb. 21 shows Russian troops and materials gathered near Belgorod, Russia.
PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/REUTERS
By the book
Mr. Benyash, the lawyer, said that within several days of publishing a March 24 post about his National Guard cases, more than 1,000 service members and employees of the Interior Ministry, which oversees policing in Russia, reached out for legal assistance. Many had defied orders to enter Ukraine for combat or to suppress protests in towns occupied by Russian forces, he said.
On March 17, Russian human-rights group Agora launched a Telegram channel where service members and their relatives could seek legal help for refusing orders. Pavel Chikov, the group’s director, said 721 members of the army and security forces responded over the following 10 days.
A March 4 military decree signed by a Russian base commander ordered the dismissals of several hundred army servicemen who refused orders while on duty near the Ukraine border, according to a copy of the document viewed by the Journal. It is unclear if the ex-soldiers faced further penalties.
Another document viewed by the Journal, signed by a judge at a military court in the city of Nalchik and dated May 25, rejected an appeal by 115 members of Russia’s National Guard who were dismissed from service for refusing to enter Ukraine in late February and early March.
Russian law calls for penalties of up to 10 years in prison for service members who abandon sworn duties. Deserters can be spared criminal charges if they can prove they acted under immense pressure or had personal issues that prompted them to flee. Service members also have a right to refuse orders they believe are illegal.
Punishment for refusing orders in what Mr. Putin calls a “special military operation” in Ukraine has so far been limited to firing soldiers without paying back wages or by stripping them of special mortgage plans and other service benefits, said Pavel Luzin, a Moscow-based defense expert.
“If it hypes these cases, the government will inadvertently amplify the scale of desertion, which is small in percentage terms but will continue to grow,” he said.
Pavel Chikov accepting a 2014 award on behalf of Russian human-rights group Agora during a ceremony and speech in Bergen, Norway.
PHOTO: PAUL SIGVE AMUNDSEN/NTB SCANPIX/ASSOCIATED PRESS
A message stamped on one discharged Russian soldier’s military identification said: “Prone to treason, deception and dishonesty. Refused to participate in the special military operation,” according to a photograph of it published last month by the soldiers’ lawyer, Maksim Grebenyuk.
‘Bring your lawyers’
Transcripts from two audio files purportedly recorded by soldiers and published April 22 by Russian independent outlet Mediazona documented instances of soldiers who refused orders.
“You can’t not go,” a base commander said in a recording heard by the Journal. “If you don’t go there, you’ll spend 15 years stamping across a [prison] courtyard.”
The soldier said he had talked to lawyers who said he didn’t risk prison for refusing to fight in Ukraine.
“Bring your lawyers here,” the commander replied. “We’ll have a chat with them.”
Western intelligence agencies say there is broad evidence of chaos and disorder among Russian forces in Ukraine.
A senior U.S. defense official told reporters last month that Russian “mid-grade officers at various levels, even up to the battalion level…have either refused to obey orders or [are] not obeying them with the same measure of alacrity that you would expect an officer to obey.”
In the First Chechen war, from 1994 to 1996, thousands of Russian soldiers deserted after being sent to fight in the mountains of the Caucasus, often with little more than a month of training, military experts said.
Afterward, Moscow imposed stiffer penalties for desertion, including the maximum 10-year prison sentence. Mr. Putin made revamping the military a priority after the country’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 exposed shortcomings in equipment and training.
Debris marked the passage of a Russian army column on Feb. 23 about 18 miles from the Ukraine border in the Rostov-on-Don region.
PHOTO: THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Low pay, corruption and hazing of new service members continue to undermine morale, according to an April report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, an international network of investigative journalists.
Lawyers defending Russian deserters, as well as journalists reporting about the cases, are endangered. On April 13, Mr. Benyash was charged with “discrediting Russia’s armed forces” for statements he made in a YouTube video published in the first days of the war, according to documents viewed by the Journal. The case has since been dropped.
On the same day Mr. Benyash was charged, Mikhail Afanasyev, a journalist who had earlier published an article about 11 National Guardsmen in the Khakassia region of Siberia who refused orders to enter Ukraine, was arrested. He was charged with spreading “fake news” about the Russian military.
“My whole life I’ve fought for my right to be a journalist and tell the truth,” he said before his arrest. He faces 10 years in prison.
Military prosecutors eventually reached Mr. Sakhibgareev and his mother by phone and persuaded him to return to service. They allowed him a transfer to another base, one far from the front lines.
Mr. Sakhibgareev faced more serious criminal charges the longer he stayed away, his lawyer Almaz Nabiev said. Authorities are awaiting the results of Mr. Sakhibgareev’s medical examination. They could pronounce him unfit for service or decide to press charges for desertion.
Mr. Benyash said many soldiers who refuse orders to go to Ukraine figure it is easier to risk a criminal case than risk their lives to fight.
Ukrainian servicemen inspecting a Russian tank around the Kyiv region in April.
PHOTO: EMANUELE SATOLLI FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
4. U.K. seeks U.S. approval to send rocket systems to Ukraine
Excerpts:
The HIMARS and MLRS provide similar capabilities and ranges, but the HIMARS is a lighter version that moves on a wheeled chassis. The MLRS moves on tracks, meaning it doesn’t move as quickly as the HIMARS, which can reach speeds of over 50 miles per hour, giving the Ukrainians the ability to fire and flee before Russian drones can spot them. The HIMARS can fire six rockets at a time, while MLRS can launch 12.
Fourteen countries from Finland to South Korea field versions of the U.S.-made MLRS, and the list of operators aligns with countries that have attended two recent high-level meetings dedicated to finding ways to further arm Ukraine, the latest of which happened on May 23. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group is scheduled to meet again in Brussels on June 15.
Only the U.S., Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Romania operate the HIMARS, making it a relatively rare asset that places Ukraine in a small club. Poland and Australia have each ordered 20 HIMARS in recent years but have not yet received them.
U.K. seeks U.S. approval to send rocket systems to Ukraine
By ALEXANDER WARD, LARA SELIGMAN and PAUL MCLEARY
06/01/2022 12:16 PM EDT
The proposal to send U.S.-made Multiple Launch Rocket Systems comes after the White House announced it is sending similar weapons.
An M270 multiple launch rocket system fires during a live fire training exercise at Rocket Valley, South Korea, Sep. 25, 2017. 2nd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment , 210th Field Artillery Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division ROK-US Combined Division, certified 16 crews in five hours as they completed their Table VI certification. | U.S. Army Photo/Sgt. Michelle Blesam/210th Field Artillery Brigade
06/01/2022 12:16 PM EDT
The United Kingdom is asking the U.S. to sign off on a plan to send advanced, medium-range rocket systems to Ukraine within a few weeks, according to a person familiar with the matter and a document outlining the proposal, a move that follows President Joe Biden’s announcement that he’s sending similar weapons.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson spoke with Biden about the transfer of the U.S.-made M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems on Wednesday morning, to be followed by a discussion between U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Thursday morning, the person familiar with the schedule said. The U.S. must officially approve the move due to export regulations, though the Biden administration is near certain to give the green light.
The person asked for anonymity in order to speak freely about sensitive discussions. The National Security Council, State Department and the British Embassy in the U.S didn’t return immediate requests for comment.
The M270 can strike targets roughly 50 miles away. The range of the rockets has been a sticking point in discussions over the past few weeks, as Ukrainian officials have clamored for the weapons as their troops in the East have endured heavy Russian artillery barrages. Western officials have worried that providing Kyiv with rockets that could strike inside Russian territory could provoke President Vladimir Putin into escalating the conflict, including using chemical or even nuclear weapons.
The news comes a day after the Biden administration announced that it had decided to send the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and munitions with a range of 48 miles to Kyiv. The HIMARS is a mobile rocket launcher that can strike targets from 40 to 300 miles away, depending on what type of rocket it fires. The administration ultimately opted to send the shorter-range munitions.
Another person familiar with the discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine told POLITICO this week that one factor that weighed into the Biden administration’s decision to send the more modern HIMARS to Ukraine instead of the MLRS was a desire to lead by example and push allies to send their own MLRS to Ukraine. The U.K. would be the first country to send the U.S.-made MLRS.
The HIMARS and MLRS provide similar capabilities and ranges, but the HIMARS is a lighter version that moves on a wheeled chassis. The MLRS moves on tracks, meaning it doesn’t move as quickly as the HIMARS, which can reach speeds of over 50 miles per hour, giving the Ukrainians the ability to fire and flee before Russian drones can spot them. The HIMARS can fire six rockets at a time, while MLRS can launch 12.
Fourteen countries from Finland to South Korea field versions of the U.S.-made MLRS, and the list of operators aligns with countries that have attended two recent high-level meetings dedicated to finding ways to further arm Ukraine, the latest of which happened on May 23. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group is scheduled to meet again in Brussels on June 15.
Only the U.S., Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Romania operate the HIMARS, making it a relatively rare asset that places Ukraine in a small club. Poland and Australia have each ordered 20 HIMARS in recent years but have not yet received them.
5. Phoenix Ghosts are part drones, part missiles. How does that change combat?
Excerpt:
The ecosystem of armed drones has changed radically since the General Atomics Predator conducted its first missile launch just over two decades ago. Bomblet-dropping quadrotors and lightweight precision munitions have contributed to the democratization and miniaturization of the armed drone. The emerging popularity of loitering munitions represents a further acceleration of these trends, creating new challenges for those who wish to manage drone proliferation.
Phoenix Ghosts are part drones, part missiles. How does that change combat? - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Phoenix Ghosts are part drones, part missiles. How does that change combat?
A US Marine launches a lethal miniature aerial missile system during an exercise at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif. on Sept. 2, 2020. Credit: Jennessa Davey, US Marine Corps.
On April 21, the US Defense Department announced an $800 million military assistance package to Ukraine that included over 121 Phoenix Ghost drones. This previously unknown, one-time-use weapon is designed primarily to attack targets, though it is also capable of conducting non-lethal missions, according to John F. Kirby, a Pentagon spokesperson. Kirby likened the drone to the AeroVironment Switchblade—a loitering munition. Such weapons combine the maneuverability, usability, and flight time of a drone with the lethal effects of a missile.
In recent years, the number of countries producing loitering munitions has more than doubled from fewer than 10 in 2017 to nearly two dozen today. Loitering munitions are increasingly integrated into a variety of air, ground, and sea vehicles and are among the technologies that military planners believe could transform ground combat. Their growing access and wide applicability present challenges to longstanding beliefs about precision weapons.
The category of loitering munitions includes a diverse group of aircraft, ranging from small gun- and hand-launched drones to those weighing as much as 200 kilograms (440 pounds). Initially conceived as an anti-radar weapon, loitering munitions are today meant to attack a variety of other battlefield targets such as enemy personnel, armored vehicles, ships, and even adversary drones.
The Phoenix Ghost is produced by the California-based Aevex Aerospace and was designed to help the Ukrainian military confront Russia in the Donbas region, according to Kirby. The 645th Aeronautical Systems Group led the effort to create the Phoenix Ghost for Ukraine, according to Defense Department officials. (The 645th is the successor to a program known as Big Safari, which contributed to the development of first military combat drones in the 1950s.)
Though the Defense Department has not yet elaborated on the Phoenix Ghost’s dimensions or performance specifications, journalists have uncovered some information. The Phoenix Ghost can take off vertically and operate at night, according to Politico. It is also reportedly capable of attacking medium-armored targets and flying for six hours or more. If true, the Phoenix Ghost may be among the largest loitering munitions, one able to carry enough fuel and payload to target far-away armored vehicles. Of the dozens of loitering munitions on the market today, only a handful claim an endurance of more than two hours. Still, the Phoenix Ghost’s operational capabilities remain ambiguous.
The growing prominence of loitering munitions. In addition to the Phoenix Ghosts, the United States is sending more than 700 Switchblade loitering munitions to Ukraine. These orders appear to be for the lightweight Switchblade 300, though they may include the Switchblade 600—a heavier variant with a larger warhead, according to Bloomberg. The Defense Department has also ordered an unknown number of AeroVironment RQ-20 Puma AE surveillance drones for Ukraine. These small drones are launched by hand.
The US military has purchased hundreds of Switchblades in recent years. The Army introduced the Switchblade 300 in 2012 and has since selected the Switchblade for its Lethal Miniature Aerial Munition System program. The Marine Corps and US Special Operations Command have also ordered a limited number of Switchblades.
Although the Switchblade is predominantly viewed as an infantry weapon, AeroVironment has lately integrated the drone into a variety of air and ground vehicles. Last year, AeroVironment launched a Switchblade 300 from a Jump 20 drone, which is intended to replace the Army’s aging RQ-7 Shadow. Also in 2021, Kratos launched a Switchblade from an Airwolf drone, and General Dynamics unveiled a tracked robotic vehicle that can deploy 50 Switchblades.
The Switchblade’s increasing ubiquity is emblematic of the Defense Department’s widening embrace of loitering munitions. The Army’s Air-Launched Effects and Marine Corps’ Organic Precision Fires programs envision a future in which air, ground, and sea vehicles will serve as launch platforms for drones, namely loitering munitions. The US Special Operations Command also has several programs aimed at procuring loitering munitions for ground and maritime platforms.
Loitering munitions beckon organizational change. In March, Gen. David H. Berger, commandant of the Marine Corps, touted the advantages of loitering munitions. “This is the first time the infantry on the ground can strike targets beyond the range of their organic mortars [and] artillery with precision,” Berger said, adding that loitering munitions offer ground forces the “power of an air wing in your hands.”
Loitering munitions are among the core enabling technologies underpinning Berger’s sweeping, much debated vision for Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps’ modernization plan that was unveiled in March 2020. This plan aims to transform the Marine Corps into a more agile, expeditionary force by eliminating its fleet of battle tanks. It would also reduce tube artillery in favor of long-range precision firepower in the form of rockets, missiles, and loitering munitions.
Force Design 2030 has the potential to usher in major changes to the organization of Marine infantry units. The plans for infantry companies and battalions, which continue to undergo experimentation, could see loitering munitions largely supplant the longstanding 60-millimeter mortar. Loitering munitions will provide small units with the “the close-combat lethality enhancements long-envisioned by infantry Marines,” according to the US Marine Corps. In its 2023 fiscal year, the Marine Corps will initiate the Organic Precision Fires Light initiative to evaluate lightweight, portable loitering munitions.
“An investment in loitering munitions for our infantry companies will exponentially increase their lethality,” Maj. Gen. Julian D. Alford, head of Marine Corps Training Command, wrote in February’s Marine Corps Gazette. “These capabilities will also enable the company commanders to shorten kill chains in support of the maneuver elements while, importantly, maintaining all-weather organic fires capabilities with ranges that extend dozens of miles.”
Infantry-carried loitering munitions are but one element of the Marine Corps’ plans for the weapons. The other track, known as Organic Precision Fires-Mounted, integrates loitering munitions into light armored vehicles, as well as future platforms like small autonomous boats. The Marines awarded Israel’s UVision Air a contract in June 2021 to supply the Hero-120, a loitering munition roughly midway between the size of a Switchblade 300 and Switchblade 600, for this program.
A global phenomenon. The Marine Corps and Berger have repeatedly cited the use of loitering munitions in recent military conflicts as evidence of an urgent need to transform the service. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June of last year, Berger attributed Azerbaijan’s success in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 to its “precision strike regime to include swarms of loitering munitions and lethal unmanned systems.”
The effect that drones and loitering munitions have had on the conduct of military operations in recent armed conflicts remains contested. Still, these systems are providing state and non-state actors with a slate of advanced capabilities. In the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan is believed to have used four types of loitering munitions acquired from four manufacturers in two countries.
Increasingly, producers are offering families of loitering munition solutions, with individual aircraft designed to meet specific operating requirements. Poland’s WG Group Warmate series, for example, includes five systems, and Israel’s UVision’s Hero series features nine. Events like the 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbijian and the emergence of new producers in the Middle East and Asia are adding to the demand for loitering munitions. Illicit transfers of loitering munitions from states such as Iran to non-state actors and research and development partnerships like that announced last year between Israel Aerospace Industries and South Korea are also contributing to the sustained spread of these weapons.
The ecosystem of armed drones has changed radically since the General Atomics Predator conducted its first missile launch just over two decades ago. Bomblet-dropping quadrotors and lightweight precision munitions have contributed to the democratization and miniaturization of the armed drone. The emerging popularity of loitering munitions represents a further acceleration of these trends, creating new challenges for those who wish to manage drone proliferation.
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows, nuclear threats are real, present, and dangerous
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6. US military hackers conducting offensive operations in support of Ukraine, says head of Cyber Command
Excerpts:
Crucial to how hunt forward works is Cyber Command sharing the intelligence they find with the host nation.
"If you're an adversary, and you've just spent a lot of money on a tool, and you're hoping to utilise it readily in a number of different intrusions, suddenly it's outed and it's now been signatured across a broad range of networks, and suddenly you've lost your ability to do that," the general said.
In one such hunt forward deployment, US military specialists had been present in Ukraine very close to the date of the invasion.
"We went in December 2021 at the invitation of the Kyiv government to come and hunt with them. We stayed there for a period of almost 90 days," the general said.
A spokesperson confirmed this team withdrew in February, alongside other Department of Defence personnel, before the invasion.
Sky News will publish a full feature from our exclusive interview in the coming days.
US military hackers conducting offensive operations in support of Ukraine, says head of Cyber Command
In an exclusive interview with Sky News, General Paul Nakasone confirmed for the first time that the US had "conducted a series of operations" in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Wednesday 1 June 2022 13:03, UK
US military hackers have conducted offensive operations in support of Ukraine, the head of US Cyber Command has told Sky News.
In an exclusive interview, General Paul Nakasone also explained how separate "hunt forward" operations were allowing the United States to search out foreign hackers and identify their tools before they were used against America.
Speaking in Tallinn, Estonia, the general, who is also director of the National Security Agency (NSA), told Sky News that he is concerned "every single day" about the risk of a Russian cyber attack targeting the US and said that the hunt forward activities were an effective way of protecting both America as well as allies.
General Nakasone confirmed for the first time that the US was conducting offensive hacking operations in support of Ukraine in response to the Russian invasion.
He told Sky News: "We've conducted a series of operations across the full spectrum; offensive, defensive, [and] information operations."
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The four star general did not detail the activities, but explained how they were lawful, conducted with complete civilian oversight of the military and through policy decided at the Department of Defence.
"My job is to provide a series of options to the secretary of defence and the president, and so that's what I do," he said. He declined to describe those options.
But he noted how in contrast to Russia, which conducts information operations by beginning with a lie, the US aims to strategically tell the truth.
"A classic example is in 2020, when we saw a series of different proxies, in this case troll farms that were starting to develop in Africa," he said.
Image: General Nakasone is also director of the National Security Agency
Cyber Command and the NSA shared this information with the FBI and also with CNN, providing "a flashlight that suddenly exposes this type of malicious behaviour".
This strategic disclosure has been developing since 2018, General Nakasone added, and has informed the Western response to the invasion of Ukraine.
"We had an opportunity to start talking about what particularly the Russians were trying to do in our midterm elections. We saw it again in 2020, as we talked about what the Russians and Iranians were going to do, but this was on a smaller scale.
"The ability for us to share that information, being able to ensure it's accurate and it's timely and it's actionable on a broader scale has been very, very powerful in this crisis," he said.
Ukraine's intriguing resilience
General Nakasone disagreed with commentators who suggested that the cyber aspects of the Russian assault on Ukraine had been overblown and praised the Kyiv government and defenders for their resilience.
"If you asked the Ukrainians, they wouldn't say it's been overblown. If you take a look at the destructive attacks and disruptive attacks that they've encountered - you wrote about it in terms of the attack on [satellite company] Viasat - this is something that has been ongoing," he added.
Image: Viasat offices at the company's headquarters in Carlsbad, California
The general continued: "And we've seen this with regards to the attack on their satellite systems, wiper attacks that have been ongoing, disruptive attacks against their government processes.
"This is kind of the piece that I think sometimes is missed by the public. It isn't like they haven't been very busy, they have been incredibly busy. And I think, you know, their resilience is perhaps the story that is most intriguing to all of us."
Concern about Russian attacks targeting America
Asked how high the risk was of Russian attacks targeting the US, General Nakasone said: "We remain vigilant every single day. Every single day. I think about it all the time."
"This is why we're working with a series of partners to ensure we prevent that, not only against the United States but against our allies as well," he added.
General Nakasone had delivered a keynote speech at CyCon, an international conference on cyber conflict, hosted by NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, and praised the partnerships between democratic states as a key strategic benefit.
Hunt forward - an activity developed under General Nakasone's leadership - is a key aspect of the Cyber Command's partnerships. It is "so powerful... because of the fact that we see our adversaries and we expose their tools".
Cyber Command specialists have been deployed abroad to 16 other nations where they can seek intelligence from the allies' computer networks - always on a consensual, invitation basis, General Nakasone said.
Crucial to how hunt forward works is Cyber Command sharing the intelligence they find with the host nation.
"If you're an adversary, and you've just spent a lot of money on a tool, and you're hoping to utilise it readily in a number of different intrusions, suddenly it's outed and it's now been signatured across a broad range of networks, and suddenly you've lost your ability to do that," the general said.
In one such hunt forward deployment, US military specialists had been present in Ukraine very close to the date of the invasion.
"We went in December 2021 at the invitation of the Kyiv government to come and hunt with them. We stayed there for a period of almost 90 days," the general said.
A spokesperson confirmed this team withdrew in February, alongside other Department of Defence personnel, before the invasion.
Sky News will publish a full feature from our exclusive interview in the coming days.
7. Why the Office of War Information Still Matters
I look forward to Matt Armstrong's comments on this.
Excerpts:
OWI was disbanded immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, its domestic elements wound down and its foreign elements transferred to the State Department. The Harry Truman administration had accepted a report early that summer that argued that information work was an essential component of foreign policy. It seems that an innate discomfort with the idea of a government presence in communication at home in general and the OWI’s track record of controversy hastened the process.
Seen in retrospect, the experience of OWI shows that communication is inherently difficult to manage. OWI had extreme difficulty reconciling the government’s need to communicate policy and ideology with the interest of journalists at VOA in delivering objective coverage or, in some cases, advancing personal political agendas. The military were reluctant partners throughout. OWI got a lot wrong. Its exaggerations set the United States up for a disruptive postwar reality check. Over-reliance on left-of-center journalists in its early years made OWI a favorite target of anti–New Deal Republicans.
Why the Office of War Information Still Matters
Established in 1942, the OWI popularized a global vision for the war effort—underscoring the importance of public diplomacy for U.S. national security today.
BY NICHOLAS J. CULL
OWI research workers in May 1943.
Library of Congress
The Office of War Information produced this large color poster, of which 4 million sets were printed from 1943 to 1945. The poster features the four freedoms as illustrated by Norman Rockwell whose paintings famously depict American culture and everyday life.
State Library of Ohio
Eighty years ago, in 1942, in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States government launched a new federal agency to oversee wartime communication work at home and abroad. The Office of War Information became an essential element of America’s domestic war effort in World War II, shaping a swathe of Hollywood films, mounting radio broadcasts and designing posters that remain in the collective imagination (think of Norman Rockwell’s groaning Thanksgiving table to illustrate “Freedom from Want”).
Fully 80 percent of OWI’s budget was devoted to its international work, and in this respect, this predecessor to the U.S. Information Agency marked a milestone in U.S. statecraft. Despite the evolution of communication technologies in the intervening years, OWI’s foreign activity still merits attention. Seen in retrospect, it shows that communication is full of dilemmas and inherently difficult to manage—whether one is dealing with the tension between policy and ideology on the one hand and a reporter’s objectivity or personal agenda on the other, or with the inevitability of “unintended consequences,” or with disinformation and psychological warfare.
More than anything else, however, OWI’s history points to and illustrates the vital importance of public diplomacy to national security that is no less true today than it was 80 years ago.
A Belated Realization
OWI’s international work was born from a belated realization in Washington, D.C., that propaganda and global communication had become essential to modern statecraft. During World War I, the United States had virtually overnight built a global communications network under the Committee on Public Information, successfully propagating Woodrow Wilson’s vision of the peace abroad if not at home. But the structure had not survived into peacetime. Moreover, though friendly nations and competitors alike stepped up media outreach with state-sponsored radio stations and international cultural agencies during the interwar period, the U.S. government had remained largely aloof.
The United States had no equivalent to the BBC Empire Service radio (established in 1932) or the British Council (established in 1934). When, in 1929, Weimar Germany stunned the world with its cutting-edge contribution to the Barcelona Expo, the U.S. government was absent. The U.S. contribution to the Expo in Paris in 1937 underwhelmed, whereas the pavilions built by Nazi and Bolshevik propagandists at the height of their game put the competition quite literally in the shade.
The Roosevelt administration used sophisticated media tools to sell its New Deal at home but was late to develop a capacity for communication in foreign policy. Initiatives were initially limited to educational exchanges with Latin America launched as part of the Good Neighbor policy. The fall of France in the spring of 1940 prompted a change of heart, and a flurry of U.S. government communication activity followed, including external programs.
At times, Voice of America broadcasts were at odds with U.S. foreign policy.
In the summer of 1940, FDR appointed Nelson Rockefeller to the new role of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs to further develop cultural and economic contact with Latin America with a dedicated office of the same name within the Office of Emergency Management. Then, in 1941, Roosevelt launched a Foreign Information Service, which included U.S. Information Service (USIS) posts around the world to assist foreign media. In the early weeks of 1942, FIS began shortwave broadcasts that eventually became known as Voice of America (the name was surprisingly fluid during the war). But the patchwork of activity lacked coherence.
Seeking to bring a level of order to wartime communication, FDR signed Executive Order 9182 on June 13, 1942, establishing a single Office of War Information.
Establishing the Centrality of Public Diplomacy
OWI drew VOA and almost all wartime communication initiatives into a single home. Only Nelson Rockefeller’s Latin America work remained outside the corral. (It helped to be a friend of the president.) An avuncular CBS radio journalist, Elmer Davis, oversaw the new agency as its director. New Deal speechwriter and playwright Robert Sherwood oversaw foreign activity. The agency’s constituent elements included offices encouraging helpful content in movies, domestic broadcasting and magazines, and even popular fiction.
Overseas, OWI further developed the Foreign Information Service program. It expanded the USIS network and opened libraries in major cities around the world. It worked in partnership with the Office of Strategic Services (precursor agency to the CIA) and the British Political Warfare Executive to create a Political Warfare Division that used propaganda effectively as a force multiplier on the battlefield. Its achievement after D-Day in accelerating enemy surrender in the European theater turned General Dwight D. Eisenhower into a true believer in the value of a psychological approach.
Though separate from State, OWI’s range of overt communication activities toward Allied and neutral publics established media as an enduring component of U.S. diplomacy. It was the predecessor to postwar U.S. public diplomacy work, overseen during the Cold War by the United States Information Agency. During World War II, State had its own cultural attachés, and an assistant secretary of State for public and cultural relations position was created in December 1944 to which Archibald MacLeish was appointed. OWI offices overseas were subject to chief-of-mission authority, and some were collocated in embassy buildings. State simply took over OWI’s international functions in the immediate postwar period.
While OWI increased its reach by guiding the media production of others, it had its own in-house creations for export, including the bimonthly magazine Victory, which launched in December 1942. OWI also made and distributed its own documentary films, which mixed representation of the war effort with insights into American civic life. Prime examples included “The Town,” a portrait of Madison, Indiana, created by the great Austrian filmmaker Josef von Sternberg in 1943.
An audience favorite, “Autobiography of a Jeep” told the story of the GI’s favorite vehicle as if in its own words. The high point in the documentary war came in 1945 when OWI won an Academy Award for a color documentary feature co-created with the U.K. about the Allied advance from D-Day, “The True Glory.” Some of these films remained in circulation through USIA for decades to come.
Handling Disinformation
This poster came from the U.S. Office of Facts and Figures in 1942, months before the Office of War Information was established. There were six posters in the series, each with a soldier from a different Allied country.
University of North Texas Libraries
The experience of OWI can be instructive for today’s communication dilemmas; its response to disinformation at home is a case in point. OWI experts were convinced that Germany would use disinformation to undermine the U.S. war effort and began systematically studying U.S. public opinion for signs of German rumors, using a network that included teachers and hairdressers as rumor collectors. Analysis of the rumors suggested that Americans were quite capable of undermining their country without Hitler’s help. Homegrown rumors predominated, mostly based in the enduring cancer of domestic racism. While some in the agency suggested a radio program to repeat and rebut rumors, wiser heads at OWI realized that rebuttals tended to increase the currency of rumors.
OWI resolved rather to focus on the greater vision: selling the positive image of an America in which racial difference was subsumed within an integrated war effort. OWI pressed for African American service characters to join radio soap operas as a reminder of the Black community’s role in the war. Similarly, at a time when racist fantasists reported that Jews were exempt from military service, OWI’s Bureau of Motion Pictures encouraged war films in which brave Jewish characters served shoulder-to-shoulder with other American ethnicities in the plane, platoon and submarine. Today the films are remembered, but the rumors are long forgotten.
OWI’s international broadcasting had its own ambitions and issues. Broadcasts in the German-language transmission began with the admirable promise: “The news may be good. The news may be bad. But we shall tell you the truth.” OWI broadcasts were, however, more complicated. The out-put sometimes included material that was deliberately tendentious, such as programming intended to demoralize U-boat crews. (It was only later, during the Cold War, with the division of labor between Voice of America as a softball voice and the CIA-sponsored Radio Free Europe and its sister Radio Liberation [later renamed Radio Liberty] playing propaganda hardball that the VOA’s identity as a bastion of objectivity could truly emerge and be eventually enshrined in the charter of 1960.)
The effectiveness of the OWI broadcasts was widely noted. On one occasion, when the captured captain of U-662, Heinrich Eberhard Müller, not only confessed his enjoyment of the broadcasts but also asked to meet the broadcaster known as Commander Bob Norden, a meeting was duly arranged with the man behind the nom de guerre Norden, Ralph G. Albrecht of the U.S. Naval Reserve. A skilled German-language speaker, Albrecht went on to serve on the prosecution team at the Nuremberg war crimes trial.
Conflicting Aims and Unintended Consequences
Tension between government policy and the political views of individual reporters also surfaced. Some Voice of America writers were overly enthusiastic about the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union, and a few at OWI and VOA were explicitly affiliated with the Communist Party. At times, Voice of America broadcasts were at odds with U.S. foreign policy. One of the most notorious clashes came as Italy left the war in July 1943. A VOA report included a reference to the “moronic little king” of Italy and dubbed the interim leader of the country a “high-ranking fascist.” The slip made the front page of The New York Times. Other slips became visible only in retrospect.
As concerns increased, the Roosevelt administration cleaned house. Some leftwing writers bridled at the turn to what they saw as boilerplate patriotic propaganda at home and left the agency. The administration moved out other political writers associated with the New Deal and promoted veterans of the commercial media as voices of the mainstream. Some communists were explicitly fired. The widespread OWI sympathy toward the Soviets led to misrepresentation of some important episodes during the war. VOA misreported the massacre of 20,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forest, for instance, as a Nazi atrocity rather than a crime committed by the forces of Stalin.
Part of the effort in foreign policy must include explaining the approach to the domestic audience.
In other battles, Director Elmer Davis argued for the integration of Japanese Americans into the war effort and for a more honest representation of the battlefield, including images of American dead. In due course, the War Department conceded and deployed Japanese Americans in the European theater. On the latter issue, understanding the need to damp down the expectations of the victory-hungry audience at home, the War Department allowed more of the horror of war to be visible in the work of combat photographers such as Robert Capa. OWI worked hard to ease the passage of American troops into Allied and, eventually, former-enemy territory, and helped to avoid major tensions with locals. Its outposts were often celebrated for their contributions. The OWI library in Cape Town, South Africa, for example, was remembered for many years as a major influence in the modernization of that country’s libraries and a voice for political reform.
Perhaps most important was OWI’s central role in popularizing a global vision for the war effort. Yet even here there was a catch. All propaganda comes at the price of unintended consequences. The agency’s output emphasized the need for a collective effort, not just to win the war but to rebuild the world afterward. OWI helped lay the foundation for creation of the United Nations structure and ensured the domestic American enthusiasm for this project that had been missing in 1919. OWI built up expectations of the postwar system, overstating the degree to which the machinery would align with U.S. interests, exaggerating the capacity of some allies and the willingness of others to help. The bump of reality was damaging at home. When the valiant Chinese ally depicted by OWI crumbled under the pressure of a communist insurgency, the United States did not ask who misrepresented China between 1942 and 1945 but rather who lost China in 1949.
An Essential Capability
Elmer Davis, here seated at his desk, was appointed the first OWI director by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1942. Before joining, he worked as a reporter for The New York Times and later as a popular news analyst for CBS Radio.
Library of Congress
OWI was disbanded immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, its domestic elements wound down and its foreign elements transferred to the State Department. The Harry Truman administration had accepted a report early that summer that argued that information work was an essential component of foreign policy. It seems that an innate discomfort with the idea of a government presence in communication at home in general and the OWI’s track record of controversy hastened the process.
Seen in retrospect, the experience of OWI shows that communication is inherently difficult to manage. OWI had extreme difficulty reconciling the government’s need to communicate policy and ideology with the interest of journalists at VOA in delivering objective coverage or, in some cases, advancing personal political agendas. The military were reluctant partners throughout. OWI got a lot wrong. Its exaggerations set the United States up for a disruptive postwar reality check. Over-reliance on left-of-center journalists in its early years made OWI a favorite target of anti–New Deal Republicans.
The controversies continued into the postwar period, though by the 1950s, when Senator Joseph McCarthy took aim at VOA, real cases of disloyalty were a thing of the past. VOA had a rough passage into its postwar incarnation as an official international radio station with a core mission to report objective news. Its enemies included the Associated Press, which hated the idea of the government providing the same commodity for free—news—for which AP charged.
Eighty years on from the launch of OWI, it is important to look honestly at the agency’s record. Then, as now, the bottom line is that engagement of foreign publics matters, and that part of the effort in foreign policy must include explaining the approach to the domestic audience. It needs effort, creativity, leadership and a structure to reconcile the internal tensions between policy and reporting. Then, as now, we need international partnerships to overcome our shared problems; and partnerships require someone to articulate a compelling vision of a shared destination.
Today, like 80 years ago, is no time to neglect public diplomacy. It seems absurd that budgets for public diplomacy are so hard fought, and that positions like the under secretary of State for public diplomacy and public affairs kept vacant. A neglect of the military would provoke an outcry. It is time for a similar concern over the neglect of what Dwight Eisenhower called the psychological factor in foreign affairs.
Nicholas J. Cull is professor of public diplomacy at the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. He is a historian of public diplomacy, and his works include The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge, 2008).
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8. The Human Element: The Other Half of Warfare
As Matt Armstrong always points out to me it is not "hearts and minds," it is "minds and will."
Excerpts:
U.S. military doctrine principally seeks the destruction of an adversary’s will through the destruction of that adversary’s material means to resist and fight. Moreover, the destruction of an adversary’s will is often viewed as a derivative of morale during combat operations. For example, enemy morale is discussed briefly as particularly low during an enemy withdrawal, but the U.S. Army’s principle guidance on offense and defense FM 3-90-1 treats morale as an incidental effect of regular combat operations without any real consideration of how to influence it directly or as the actual objective.[13] This effectively ignores that some operations may instead boost enemy willingness to resist rather than diminish it, and that the destruction of the morale may require a change in the time, place, or type of operation itself. Friendly morale similarly receives only passing attention as the commander’s responsibility, and its primary tools are through religious services, human resources, and sustainment.[14] Like the treatment of enemy morale, there is no guidance on how to conduct combat operations to maintain or even enhance friendly morale.
The U.S. military’s default approach to enduring success in war thus neither speaks to how to influence friendly morale during actual combat operations nor how to counter any enemy attempts at influencing it. It is further still from any considerations on affecting the will of enemy non-combatants and civilians that provide support for the conflict. This approach, in effect, treats high friendly morale in combat as nearly a foregone conclusion and degraded enemy morale only as a consequence of continued material destruction. Only contemporary Military Information Support Operations doctrine focuses on deliberately affecting enemy morale in combat and only narrowly by using information means. Principles and methods of information operations are accepted but largely within support of traditionally planned military operations that prioritize physical destruction of enemy capabilities.
...
Even a brief survey of the theories of war show that the U.S. has largely forgotten the other half of warfare—the psychological complement to the physical—even as its significance in conflict increases. Against several centuries of claims to the contrary, U.S. doctrine has errantly privileged the physical over rational and emotional factors. This is not to suggest that the physical is not important or plays no role in modern or future warfare. Rather, the proper practice of strategy is to start with the human or psychological components, like will and morale, as avenues to affect the physical. This represents a near-inverse of the current paradigm wherein the physical is used to get to the psychological, and one that may benefit enemies that may be all-to-willing to draw upon the psychological to wage a prolonged conflict.
The U.S. is unprepared for a future of human-centric warfare. Its military doctrine acknowledges morale and other psychological factors but does not provide guidance on how to shape it. This represents a disconnect between war as a material affair and war as a human affair. Such a misconception of warfare leaves the U.S. and its allies vulnerable to adversaries and enemies seeking to exploit this lacuna. The U.S. therefore critically constrains itself despite its material strengths if it fails to embrace a psychologically grounded view of war.
The Human Element: The Other Half of Warfare
"Hence most of the matters dealt with in this book are composed in equal parts of physical and of moral causes and effects. One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade."
—Carl von Clausewitz[1]
On Thursday, February 24th 2022, one of the United States’ near-peer adversaries crossed the Ukrainian border with a significant portion of its substantial military power. At the outset Ukrainian forces suffered from material combat power disparities with their Russian invaders, but the Ukrainian people themselves seemed to enjoy high morale overall.[2] Despite Russian technical and numerical military superiority, Russian forces did not quickly overwhelm the Ukrainian defenders and achieve a decisive victory.[3] Nearly two months into the conflict, not only have the high-spirited Ukrainian people proven unwilling to accept defeat as a consequence of material destruction, they are rallying international support for their cause.[4] Conversely, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby remarked that low Russian morale may in fact affect the outcome.[5] As the gap between Ukrainian and Russian morale continues to yawn, the ultimate outcome of the conflict is still very much in question. Although the Russia-Ukraine conflict may not ultimately be decided solely by the gap between Russian and Ukrainian morale, it has so far been an intangible yet critical aspect that will have effects on its enduring outcome.
The body of a Russian serviceman outside Kharkiv on February 26, 2022. (AFP/Getty)
Will and morale now represent critical aspects of warfare that the U.S. military has neglected in favor of material factors. The deleterious consequences of that neglect have prodded leaders across the U.S. joint force to acknowledge that an emphasis on the physical destruction of enemy capabilities as the primary goal for military operations translates to operational and tactical success and not necessarily enduring strategic successes.[6] Even before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan provide ample justification for these concerns. The outcomes of these conflicts challenge the current U.S. military assumption that more physical destruction can achieve enduring success, and the implication that non-Western perspectives to warfare do not accommodate this type of war’s outcome long-term. In response, there is newly placed importance on the potential for affecting the most fundamental motivations for adversaries—the will and morale to develop, reconstitute, and fight.[7] This emphasis on intangible human factors such as will and morale embodies a glaring current omission in Western thinking on the conduct and outcome of war, and represents the human or psychological element that has historically been considered the other half of warfare.
The Importance of People
The strategic environment is now defined by human-oriented considerations as much as it is defined by increasing complexity and interconnection. The world is progressively more online and connected, and this migration on to social media is increasing at a much faster rate than the population itself.[8] Much of the world is now watching the Russia-Ukraine war play out in real time on their smartphones, bypassing traditional media corporations and providing a direct linkage to those intimately involved in the fighting.[9] Although much of this change is attributable to advances in technology-enabled information capabilities, it also highlights the importance of the human-centric aspect of global affairs empowered by the ability to connect instantaneously across the globe. These connections further highlight the importance of perceptions, emotions, beliefs, and ultimately the willingness to become involved in conflict or to accept its outcomes.
The joint staff has recognized the importance of people and that military power must be re-imagined to accommodate these changes in order “to alter behavior of relevant actors to support the achievement of enduring strategic outcomes.”[10] This statement does not mean simply an acknowledgment of information or non-lethal operations. Given the increased importance of human connections, it is an expansion of the relevant actors beyond the immediate participants that accommodates those who may be geographically distant and otherwise only indirectly involved. It serves as an emphasis on influencing the will of the people involved as the ultimate objective in competition and conflict over simply the physical destruction of enemy means to resist. However, this acknowledgement has not yet translated into practical application.
U.S. Army Treatment of Will and Morale
The U.S. military has not fully exploited this long-acknowledged assertion operationally, especially in the U.S. Army. Even as the seminal U.S. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 recognizes that a military operation is a human endeavor, it characterizes breaking the enemy will only as a result of ground combat.[11] Beyond advising to limit harm and adhering to international laws of war, the doctrine is devoid of how to conduct operations in a manner that accounts for enemy, friendly, or civilian will. The somewhat more tactically focused Field Manual (FM) 3-0 again only acknowledges will as the focus of the “Dominate” phase, which itself is characterized as “overmatching enemy capabilities at the right time and place.”[12] There is no guidance on how to conduct operations to affect will and morale, such as timing an offense to exploit morale considerations.
U.S. military doctrine principally seeks the destruction of an adversary’s will through the destruction of that adversary’s material means to resist and fight. Moreover, the destruction of an adversary’s will is often viewed as a derivative of morale during combat operations. For example, enemy morale is discussed briefly as particularly low during an enemy withdrawal, but the U.S. Army’s principle guidance on offense and defense FM 3-90-1 treats morale as an incidental effect of regular combat operations without any real consideration of how to influence it directly or as the actual objective.[13] This effectively ignores that some operations may instead boost enemy willingness to resist rather than diminish it, and that the destruction of the morale may require a change in the time, place, or type of operation itself. Friendly morale similarly receives only passing attention as the commander’s responsibility, and its primary tools are through religious services, human resources, and sustainment.[14] Like the treatment of enemy morale, there is no guidance on how to conduct combat operations to maintain or even enhance friendly morale.
The U.S. military’s default approach to enduring success in war thus neither speaks to how to influence friendly morale during actual combat operations nor how to counter any enemy attempts at influencing it. It is further still from any considerations on affecting the will of enemy non-combatants and civilians that provide support for the conflict. This approach, in effect, treats high friendly morale in combat as nearly a foregone conclusion and degraded enemy morale only as a consequence of continued material destruction. Only contemporary Military Information Support Operations doctrine focuses on deliberately affecting enemy morale in combat and only narrowly by using information means. Principles and methods of information operations are accepted but largely within support of traditionally planned military operations that prioritize physical destruction of enemy capabilities.[15]
The Threat
This dearth of meaningful institutional commitment to the influence of will and morale ironically contrasts with U.S. warnings of foreign state hybrid threats and subversion activities designed to undermine the will and morale of the U.S. and its allies.[16] China, for example, has closely observed U.S. military actions in the previous decades and has concluded that intangible factors are increasingly significant for modern warfare.[17] China’s emphasis on intangibles is especially evident in the division of a Chinese technology-based information domain and an equally important cognitive domain.[18] The Chinese seek victory by forcing the enemy to lose “the will and ability to resist” and “paralysis” through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means, as a part of its systems destruction warfare concept. Realizing the vulnerability within these domains to destroy the enemy’s morale and will to fight, the systems destruction warfare concept emphasizes the capabilities of psychological warfare to exploit opportunities.[19] The Chinese have also introduced a concept of Strategic Psychological Warfare that proposes to win wars through means independent from fighting by preemptively overpowering an enemy psychologically.[20]
Historical Considerations for the Two Halves of Warfare
The substantial absence of human considerations in U.S. doctrine is, all things considered, relatively new and represents a departure from the view in numerous traditions. An enduring theme throughout writings on the theory of warfare is the duality of the physical with the psychological. Ancient works such as Homer’s The Odyssey highlighted intelligence and cunning, or métis, while Sun Tzu wrote of the importance of morale for controlling maneuvers, the effectiveness of surprise, and even that the ultimate goal was winning without a fight.[21] Napoleon, a master of the decisive battle, emphasized the importance of the psychological aspect of war with his dictum that “in war morale forces are to physical as three to one.”[22] Revolutionary France’s ability to harness the collective will of the nation through levée en masse, reduced desertion, and rendered its fighting spirit reliant on psychological factors for its advantage rather than new technical or material means.[23] Not surprisingly, students of the Napoleonic Wars, such as Carl von Clausewitz, exalted the psychological over the physical for securing an enduring outcome.[24]
“La Liberté Guidant le Peuple (Liberty Leading the People)” by Eugène Delacroix (Wikimedia)
There have been previous attempts at operationalizing the concept of a psychologically-driven way of war. Psychological warfare as a theory provides one of the earliest that attempted to capture the intangible factors in warfare. However, the value of these factors was quickly lost as the term psychological warfare became plagued with misconceptions and derided as an imprecise description of the concepts it was meant to describe.[25] Rather than a mere support mechanism to traditional military operations, J.F.C. Fuller originally envisioned psychological warfare in the early half of the 20th century as a future way to wage wars beyond the physical domain.[26] Paul M.A. Linebarger later refined Fuller’s idea at the onset of the Cold War. Linebarger characterized it instead as “warfare psychologically waged,” wherein psychological objectives provided the driving force for operations in all domains, not isolated to the information domain, and as a way to wage a war that was not focused primarily on destroying the physical means of the enemy.[27] This concept represented the other half of war long-discussed, and most recently forgotten in the West.
Conclusion
Even a brief survey of the theories of war show that the U.S. has largely forgotten the other half of warfare—the psychological complement to the physical—even as its significance in conflict increases. Against several centuries of claims to the contrary, U.S. doctrine has errantly privileged the physical over rational and emotional factors. This is not to suggest that the physical is not important or plays no role in modern or future warfare. Rather, the proper practice of strategy is to start with the human or psychological components, like will and morale, as avenues to affect the physical. This represents a near-inverse of the current paradigm wherein the physical is used to get to the psychological, and one that may benefit enemies that may be all-to-willing to draw upon the psychological to wage a prolonged conflict.
The U.S. is unprepared for a future of human-centric warfare. Its military doctrine acknowledges morale and other psychological factors but does not provide guidance on how to shape it. This represents a disconnect between war as a material affair and war as a human affair. Such a misconception of warfare leaves the U.S. and its allies vulnerable to adversaries and enemies seeking to exploit this lacuna. The U.S. therefore critically constrains itself despite its material strengths if it fails to embrace a psychologically grounded view of war.
Bryan Terrazas is an Army officer and future planner. He holds masters degrees from Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and is currently a student at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. This article is adapted from his recently submitted monograph that explores psychological components to warfare through the lens of psychological warfare theory. This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense.
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Header Image: “Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow “ by Adolph Northen (Wikimedia)
Notes:
in[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 184–85.
[2] Alexander S. Vindman, “Morale Remains High. Ukraine Is Fighting for Freedom and Democracy and, Most Importantly, for Their Homes. Https://T.co/Zzxxumofdz,” Twitter, February 24, 2022, https://twitter.com/avindman/status/1496932285773488131.
[3] Angela Dewan, “Ukraine and Russia's Militaries Are David and Goliath. Here's How They Compare,” CNN, Cable News Network, February 25, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/russia-ukraine-military-comparison-intl/index.html.
[4] Megan Specia, “'Like a Weapon': Ukrainians Use Social Media to Stir Resistance,” The New York Times, March 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/world/europe/ukraine-war-social-media.html.
[5] John F. Kirby, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing, March 22, 2022,” March 22, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2975214/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-holds-a-press-briefing-march-22-2022/.
[6] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO) (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2016), 1.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Simon Kemp, “Digital 2022: Global Overview Report,” (January 26, 2022), https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2022-global-overview-report.
[9] Kyle Chayka, “Watching the World’s ‘First TikTok War’” The New Yorker (March 3, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/infinite-scroll/watching-the-worlds-first-tiktok-war.
[10] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE) (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), iii-9.
[11] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1-4 to 1-5.
[12] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), 1-13.
[13] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1, Offense and Defense Volume 1, Change 2 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, April 2015), 5-6, 5-10, 6-32, 9-1, B-12.
[14] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, Security, And Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, March 2013), 6-6.; U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-0, Human Resources Support (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, August 2021), 1-6, 1-8, 4-24.; U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 4-0, Sustainment (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, July 2019), 1-10.
[15] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-53, Military Information Support Operations, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, June 2013), 1-4, 5-5.; U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), I-1.; U.S. Joint Staff, JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, December 2011), xvi-xxi.
[16] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, July 2016), 7, 44.
[17] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Brattleboro, VT: Echo Point Books, 1999), 1–5.
[18] Cindy Hurst, “A Chinese Concept of “Cognitive Confrontation” In Future Warfare,” OE Watch 11, issue 9 (September 2021): 5.
[19] Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and Systems Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 71-72, 76-77, 116.
[20] Timothy Thomas, The Chinese Way of War: How Has It Changed? (McLean, VA: MITRE Corporation, June 2020), 3, 15-19, accessed November 5, 2021, https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/docpreview-s/00-00-16-68-30/20200611-China-Way-of-War-_2800_Timothy-Thomas_2900_.pdf.
[21] Sun Tzu, The Wart of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 63-101.
[22] Arthur Upham Pope, “The Importance of Morale,” The Journal of Educational Sociology 15, no. 4 (December 1941): 195, https://doi.org/10.2307/2262466.
[23] Steven T. Ross, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare,” In The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987, edited by Harry R. Borowski, 309–24 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1988), 1-11.
[24] 127, 184-186; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, indexed ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 92-93, 184-185; Baron Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Project Gutenberg, last updated September 28, 2004), 60-65, 122, 178-179, 321-323. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/13549/13549-h/13549-h.htm.
[25] William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), 1-3, 18.
[26] U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 525-7-1, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, Volume One (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1976), 19.
[27] Paul M.A. Linebarger, “Psychological Warfare,” Naval War College Information Service for Officers 3, no. 7 (1951): 19-24, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44792590.
9. The Marine Corps’ debate with its generals is amusing, but dangerous
I give some credit to the LTC(R) (resigned) for accurately describing his relationship to his former service.
Excerpts:
Van Riper asked, “How could we let this happen?”
My counterquestion would be, “Does a tactical observation of the problem address how we change the culture of a losing organization?”
Van Riper’s asset focused argument didn’t win his war in Vietnam. And it didn’t win my wars in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Leadership establishes culture ― and accountability is the bedrock of leadership.
But when I study the problem, ironically, I arrive at the same conclusion as Van Riper, “how could we let this happen?”
The Marine Corps’ debate with its generals is amusing, but dangerous
Marine Corps generals of the past recently communicated concerns about the current Marine Commandant Gen. David H. Berger and his tactical reorganization of the force.
Two relevant quotes illustrate their arguments:
• “The U.S. Marine Corps is undertaking a top-to-bottom restructuring called Force Design 2030. The move is well-intended, but we believe it is wrong. It will make the Marines less capable of countering threats from unsettled and dangerous corners of the world … The national security ramifications of reducing the capabilities of our nation’s most ready, agile and flexible force are seismic.” ― Charles Krulak, Jack Sheehan and Anthony Zinni in The Washington Post, April 22, 2022.
The conversation about the military’s tactical composition between a group of past and current generals is amusing, but in many ways dangerous.
There is a critical fact hidden from the debate: Not a single general officer in the current conversation has won a war.
What if we allow ourselves to reexamine the problem?
RELATED
One retired 3-star says he is "saddened beyond belief" knowing the Corps won't soon be "the ready combined-arms force that our nation has long depended upon."
By Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper (Retired)
The military compels an enemy’s acceptance of political objectives through violence. It is a national instrument used by America’s representatives. Thus, the military’s purpose can never be isolated from political objectives.
When politicians set war objectives, military leaders should be held responsible for accomplishing those objectives. Wars are won and lost in the seam between the National Security Council and the general officer-led combatant commands.
Continued focus on the tactical level, with unnecessary emphasis on the junior service member only deflects from the true source of repeated failure.
Following Vietnam, Marine Corps generals were quick to point to the draft and drugs as the source of the war’s failure. Reference Commandant Gen. Louis H. Wilson’s post-war focus on raising standards for the junior service member.
But often forgotten in the revisionist version of history are the inabilities of the military generals to implement military strategy capable of achieving political objectives within the restraints of the Vietnam campaign.
For example, Khe Sanh was at one point a critical piece of terrain on the Ho Chi Minh trail, worth sacrificing thousands of lives to disrupt the flow of NVA weapons, troops and supplies. Then suddenly and unceremoniously the generals deemed the terrain irrelevant despite heavy sacrifices from the junior service members.
Failures to achieve political objectives can also be observed in smaller campaigns since Vietnam such as Beirut, Kosovo, Somalia, Libya and Syria.
The American military succeeds on the tactical level, but consistently falls short of the objectives laid forth by politicians without accountability for military leadership. ISIS and the Taliban are only the most recent reminders of our military leadership’s inability to achieve political objectives even after decades of chances.
As if the pattern wouldn’t be identified, following the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the generals again raised the standards on the junior service member utilizing the same post-Vietnam justification: ensuring our military will succeed in a future conflict.
Despite a long list of failures since Vietnam, senior military leaders have not been held accountable.
Currently, military generals fail to achieve political objectives, while absolving themselves of responsibility by deflecting blame toward junior service members, politicians and adjacent foreign diplomacy departments. Reference Gen. Frank McKenzie’s excuse in his Congressional testimony when asked why the Afghanistan evacuation was a failure. These excuses cannot be tolerated much longer without great risk to the American people.
George Marshall prior to World War II reformed the Army by firing complacent and apathetic general officers. In many ways, Eisenhower’s assentation and the victory of World War II are a result of Marshall’s “force design.”
Marines don’t need generals of the Vietnam era illustrating tactical level focused requirements. Marines don’t need current generals raising the standards of junior enlisted. Marines need a George Marshall type of leader with the insight to identify the true source of our repeated failures. A leader who will confront, reform and change the culture of a failing organization by holding senior leaders accountable.
Van Riper asked, “How could we let this happen?”
My counterquestion would be, “Does a tactical observation of the problem address how we change the culture of a losing organization?”
Van Riper’s asset focused argument didn’t win his war in Vietnam. And it didn’t win my wars in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Leadership establishes culture ― and accountability is the bedrock of leadership.
But when I study the problem, ironically, I arrive at the same conclusion as Van Riper, “how could we let this happen?”
Lt. Col. Stuart Scheller, resigned, is author of, “Crisis of Command,” set to be released on Sept. 6.
This article is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the authors. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please email Military Times Editor Andrea Scott.
10. Never Underestimate Ukrainians
There is that word again -" will." Do we pay enough attention to it? Ours, our friends, partners, and allies, and our competitors and adversaries?
underestimating Ukrainians and their will to fight
One of the key lessons we must learn is that we must anticipate requirements. Since 2014 we have been consistently late in helping to arm and equip the Ukrainians. Thankfully their will to fight has filled the gap. But think how much better the tactical and strategic situations would be had we taken a comprehensive approach to arming and equipment ahead of the needs.
Conclusion:
But the reluctance to provide much of this lethal aid in the lead-up to the war, based, it seems, on the faulty premise either that it wouldn’t matter or that the fighting would be over quickly with Ukraine’s defeat and the removal of Zelenskyy from power, proved costly for many Ukrainians. Putin and his forces have learned a painful lesson from underestimating Ukrainians and their will to fight. In a different sense, so have we. We should never again underestimate Ukrainians, who are fighting for their land and their freedom. They earned our support long ago and have made an even stronger case for it in the past few months.
Never Underestimate Ukrainians | Bush Center
SPRING 2022
ISSUE 23
Essay by David J. Kramer, the Bradford M. Freeman Managing Director of Global Policy at the Bush Institute
Vladimir Putin and his forces have learned a painful lesson from underestimating Ukrainians and their will to fight. In a different sense, so has the United States.
Ukainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (center) walks in the town of Bucha, northwest of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, on April 4, 2022. (Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP via Getty Images)
The U.S. intelligence community certainly got it right when it predicted Vladimir Putin would invade Ukraine for the second time, the first being back in 2014. The community got it very wrong, however, as did many others, when it anticipated that the renewed war would be over quickly with the fall of Kyiv, the capital, within days, and Ukraine’s subjugation to Russia.
Of course, Putin, his generals, and Russia’s own intelligence services thought the same thing. They expected the invasion of Ukraine would be a cakewalk, with Ukrainians welcoming them with open arms.
In fact, the war has gone very badly for Putin and his forces because of the tremendous courage and determination of the Ukrainian people and their leader, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in defending their country and their freedom. Western military assistance, albeit tragically delayed, has also helped considerably. The toll on Ukraine has been horrible, with thousands of Ukrainians injured and killed, millions displaced from their homes, and billions of dollars in damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure.
Secretary Mattis on how he would approach the crisis in Ukraine
Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis discusses the importance of ensuring Ukraine remains an independent nation while deterring Russia and Vladimir Putin from further aggression.
Russia pays a price for underestimating Ukraine
But Ukrainians have inflicted real losses on Russian forces, with Ukraine counting more than 26,000 Russians killed in action, more than 10 percent of the force that was mobilized for the invasion. Estimates that nearly a dozen Russian generals have been killed in the fighting in two-plus months in Ukraine are vastly more than in the decade of fighting by Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
The Kremlin also was forced to withdraw its plans to capture Kyiv and redeployed troops to Ukraine’s east and south, where they are struggling to make inroads. Morale among Russian troops appears very low, whereas morale among the Ukrainians remains extremely high.
People driving back into Kyiv stop to take photographs of a destroyed Russia battle tank on May 20, 2022. (Photo by Christopher Furlong/Getty Images)
In a recent survey by the International Republican Institute (disclosure: this author is an IRI board member), 97% of Ukrainians are confident their country will prevail in the war, despite the barbaric attacks and war crimes being committed by Putin’s forces. 83% believe that the war will end before the close of 2022. Putin’s underestimation of Ukrainians’ readiness and determination to fight and defend their land and freedom has proven very costly for Russia.
Putin’s underestimation of Ukrainians’ readiness and determination to fight and defend their land and freedom has proven very costly for Russia.
We underestimated Ukraine, too
And yet many experts in and out of the U.S. government underestimated Ukraine, too. They grossly overestimated Russia’s military capabilities and grossly misjudged Ukraine’s capabilities. Before the invasion, the Biden administration was publicly criticizing Zelenskyy for not taking U.S. warnings about an imminent invasion seriously enough. It turns out Zelenskyy and his military, along with the entire citizenry, were preparing; Zelenskyy simply didn’t want to cause undue panic among the population and exacerbate the harm already being done to Ukraine’s economy.
The failures of the U.S. intelligence community were on display in a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Senator Angus King, Independent from Maine, grilled Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier on whether the intel community failed to predict and understand Ukraine's will to fight. Here is part of that exchange:
King: "The assessment was Ukraine would be overrun in a matter of weeks. That was grossly wrong."
Berrier: "Grossly wrong. But not a question of will to fight...we assessed their capacity to face the size of the Russian forces that were massed on their border was going to be very difficult for them."
King: "Well, all I'm saying is the intelligence community needs to do a better job on this issue."
Berrier: "I think the intelligence community did a great job on this issue, Senator."
King: "General, how can you possibly say that when we were told explicitly Kyiv would fall in three days and Ukraine would would fall in two weeks, you're telling me that was accurate?"
Berrier: "I look at the totality of the of the entire operation. I think the enormity rests on the predictions of what the Russians were going to do versus whether or not the [Ukrainians] were going to be successful."
Policy implications
The failure to appreciate Ukrainians’ determination to defend their land and freedom ferociously had major policy implications. Some analysts argued against providing Ukraine with military assistance because it “wouldn’t make any difference” in helping Ukraine fend off a Russian invasion. Too many people in the Biden administration initially bought into this capitulationist line of argument that the war would be over quickly and that American military aid wouldn’t make a difference.
Their unwillingness to provide massive military assistance to Ukraine in the lead-up to Putin’s invasion out of fear such a move would be seen as provocative in Moscow cost untold numbers of Ukrainian lives. They believed accurately that Putin was going to invade anyway and yet they somehow concluded that helping Ukraine prepare for such an invasion would provoke Putin into acting. That simply makes no sense.
Ukraine is the only country in the world to stage two popular, revolutionary movements within the span of a decade – 2004 with the Orange Revolution and 2013-14 with the Revolution of Dignity – in support of democracy, a Euro-Atlantic orientation, an end to corruption, and an escape from being under the Russian thumb.
Ukraine is the only country in the world to stage two popular, revolutionary movements within the span of a decade ... in support of democracy, a Euro-Atlantic orientation, an end to corruption and an escape from being under the Russian thumb.
Without doubt, Ukrainians have been plagued by massive corruption and their leaders often have been a disappointment. Viktor Yushchenko, who represented hope for change following the Orange Revolution, was rejected soundly by voters in 2010 when he ran for re-election as president. Viktor Yanukovych, the winner in that year’s election, adopted an unambiguous pro-Russian line and fled to Russia in February 2014 after ordering a brutal crackdown on peaceful protestors in downtown Kyiv.
Ukraine’s Winston Churchill
Petro Poroshenko, who was elected president following the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, was trounced at the polls in 2019. His successor, Zelensky, won 72 percent of the vote, as many Ukrainians wanted a real break from the past and elected a popular television personality with no political experience.
Before Russia’s invasion, Zelensky’s approval ratings were dropping significantly as many Ukrainians felt he was not living up to his campaign promises to root out corruption, among other complaints. But Zelensky has stepped into the role of wartime president like few could – President Bush has compared him to Winston Churchill – and has rallied his country against the invading Russian forces. His leadership and the bravery and determination of the Ukrainian people were not anticipated by the intelligence community and many analysts.
President George W. Bush meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, May 5, 2022. (Office of George W. Bush)
Ukraine’s need for military assistance
Ukrainian officials had pleaded with their counterparts in the Biden administration for a major ramp-up in military assistance in the lead-up to the war. Those pleas largely fell on deaf ears, just as they did back in 2014 when Ukrainian officials asked those in the Obama administration for military assistance after Putin’s first invasion of the country. Many in Obama’s administration believed this was the right and smart thing to do – but President Obama refused out of fear that doing so would risk escalation with Moscow.
The Trump administration reversed this position and agreed to provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine in late 2017. But Trump then tried to drag Zelenskyy, newly elected at that point, into American politics, leading to Trump’s first impeachment. Trump wasted the critical opportunity to engage constructively with the new Ukrainian leadership. As a result, from 2019 until the arrival of the Biden administration in Washington, U.S.-Ukrainian relations were in bad shape.
Bilateral ties improved significantly once Biden entered office, though even he took longer than Zelensky had hoped to host the Ukrainian president in the Oval Office. Biden and his administration deserve enormous credit for rallying allies in support of an unprecedented and lightning-fast sanctions regime on Russia and Putin’s cronies. It also has done well in beefing up the U.S. military presence in NATO member states bordering Russia and/or Ukraine.
Equally important, the administration has ramped up military assistance significantly, providing vital anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles and other weapons, including drones and long-range artillery, that have had a huge impact on levelling the battlefield. Other countries have also provided much-needed assistance, including tanks. This assistance has made a world of difference and sent an important morale boost to the Ukrainian side.
But the reluctance to provide much of this lethal aid in the lead-up to the war, based, it seems, on the faulty premise either that it wouldn’t matter or that the fighting would be over quickly with Ukraine’s defeat and the removal of Zelenskyy from power, proved costly for many Ukrainians. Putin and his forces have learned a painful lesson from underestimating Ukrainians and their will to fight. In a different sense, so have we. We should never again underestimate Ukrainians, who are fighting for their land and their freedom. They earned our support long ago and have made an even stronger case for it in the past few months.
We should never again underestimate Ukrainians, who are fighting for their land and their freedom. They earned our support long ago and have made an even stronger case for it in the past few months.
David J. Kramer Bradford M. Freeman Managing Director, Global Policy, George W. Bush Institute
11. Army prepares for its first-ever Patriot missile exercise on Palau this summer
We need to continue to train as well as demonstrate our missile defense capabilities. Someday I would like to see an integrated missile defense training exercise with the ROK, Japan, and the US in the region.
Army prepares for its first-ever Patriot missile exercise on Palau this summer
Soldiers of 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, fire the MIM-104 Patriot to destroy a drone target at Camp Growl in Queensland, Australia, on July 16, 2021. (Alyssa Chuluda/U.S. Marine Corps)
The U.S. Army is planning its first Patriot missile air-defense exercise on Palau amid efforts by China to woo other Pacific island nations with offers of economic and security cooperation.
Okinawa-based soldiers from 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Battalion are expected to fire the Patriot during a June 15 drill, Capt. Nicholas Chopp, a spokesman for the 94th Air and Missile Defense Command at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, told Stars and Stripes by phone Wednesday.
“It’s going to be the first time we have done [a Patriot live-fire drill] on Palau,” he said. “And it’s the second one west of the International Date Line.”
Palau, one of a handful of nations that recognize Taiwan as independent of China, was excluded from Beijing’s recent offer of economic and security assistance to 10 Pacific island nations, including nearby Micronesia, The Associated Press reported Saturday.
Chinese outreach to small states in the region, which included a security pact signed with the Solomon Island in April, has alarmed U.S. allies and partners such as Australia and New Zealand.
This month’s exercise in Palau has been in the works for more than a year and isn’t a response to China’s diplomatic moves, Chopp said.
The Army is sending a pair of Patriot launchers as well as radar and command and control systems and an unspecified number of soldiers to Palau for the exercise, he said.
Patriot Advanced Capability-2 missiles can travel up to 60 miles and reach as high as 20 miles, according to the Missile Defense Agency.
Palau has been involved in other U.S. exercises, including Operation Christmas Drop in December, an annual humanitarian assistance exercise involving the 374th Airlift Wing out of Yokota Air Base, Japan.
In December 2020, following a visit by then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper, Palauan President Tommy Remengesau Jr. proposed building joint-use military facilities in his country, which the U.S. could use as needed.
The Patriot drill signals “renewed interest and commitment” by the U.S., Ralph Cossa, president emeritus of the Pacific Forum think tank in Hawaii, said by phone Wednesday.
The Army has moved its Patriot batteries around the Pacific frequently in the past year.
In March, a U.S. Navy hovercraft delivered one of the surface-to-air systems to a Philippine beach for the first time during amphibious drills by U.S. and Philippine troops.
That same month, four launchers and 130 soldiers from the Army’s Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment deployed from Okinawa for the annual Balikatan 22 drills involving 5,100 U.S. and 3,800 Philippine troops.
On Guam in September and November, a theoretical Patriot battery was incorporated into air-defense tests involving a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, battery and an Iron Dome system brought from Texas by the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment.
A Patriot battery deployed to Japan’s southern island of Amami during last summer’s annual Orient Shield exercise. Also last summer, 65 soldiers from the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade deployed to Australia with a pair of Patriot launchers, a radar, power plant, control station and brigade and battalion command posts during the biennial Talisman Sabre drills.
12. Russia tightens grip on Ukrainian factory city, decries U.S. rocket supplies
Putin is not happy with our "missile restraint." I would guess that if we only sent fireworks or blank training ammo Putin would still complain.
Russia tightens grip on Ukrainian factory city, decries U.S. rocket supplies
- Summary
- Russian forces advance in Sievierodonetsk, other areas
- Russia says U.S. weapons add fuel to the fire
- Biden to meet NATO chief
KYIV, June 2 (Reuters) - Russian forces tightened their grip on an industrial Ukrainian city as part of their drive to control the eastern Donbas region and targeted rail links used to ferry in weapons from Kyiv's Western allies as the war approaches its 100th day on Friday.
Russia has accused the United States of adding "fuel to the fire" after President Joe Biden announced a $700 million weapons package for Kyiv that will include advanced rocket systems with a range of up to 80 km (50 miles).
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Ukraine had promised it would not use the systems to hit targets inside Russia. Biden hopes extending Ukraine's artillery reach will help push Russia to negotiate an end to a war in which thousands of people have been killed, cities and towns flattened and more than six million people forced to flee the country.
"Ukraine needs weapons to liberate Ukrainian territory that Russia has temporarily occupied. We are not fighting on Russian territory, we are interested in our sovereignty and territorial integrity," said Andriy Yermak, the Ukrainian president's chief of staff, shrugging off Moscow's criticism of the U.S. decision.
Moscow has said it regards Ukrainian infrastructure used to bring in Western arms as a legitimate target in what it calls its "special military operation" to disarm Ukraine and rid it of ultra-nationalists the Kremlin says threaten Russian security.
Four Russian missiles hit railway infrastructure targets in two places in the western Lviv region bordering Poland late on Wednesday, governor Maksym Kozytskyi said, injuring five people and causing significant damage.
DONBAS CITY IN FOCUS
Russian forces, backed by heavy artillery, control most of Sievierodonetsk - now largely in ruins - after days of fierce fighting in which they have taken losses, Britain's defence ministry said in its daily intelligence report.
"The enemy is conducting assault operations in the settlement of Sievierodonetsk," Ukraine's armed forces general staff said, adding that Russian forces were also attacking other parts of the east and northeast.
At least four civilians were killed and 10 wounded in the east and northeast, other officials said.
Russia denies targeting civilians.
If Russia fully captures Sievierodonetsk and its smaller twin Lysychansk on the west bank of the Siverskyi Donets river, it would hold all of Luhansk, one of two provinces in the Donbas that Moscow claims on behalf of separatists.
Donetsk's regional governor said Lysychansk was under constant Russian shelling but remained in Ukrainian hands.
Britain's defence ministry said Ukrainian forces had destroyed bridges over the river to Lysychansk. It also expected Russian forces to pause after taking Sievierodonetsk before moving its focus towards taking the rest of Donetsk.
Capturing all of Luhansk would fulfil one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's main aims and solidify a shift in battlefield momentum after his forces were pushed back from the capital Kyiv and from northern Ukraine.
Luhansk's regional governor, Serhiy Gaidai, told Reuters that civilians were sheltering from Russian attacks under a Sievierodonetsk chemical plant that he said was hit by an air strike on Tuesday, releasing a large pink cloud. read more
He said about 15,000 people remained in a city that had been home to around 101,000 before Russia's invasion on Feb. 24.
GLOBAL IMPACT
The war is having a massive impact on the world economy. Russia has captured some of Ukraine's biggest seaports and its navy controls major transport routes in the Black Sea, blocking Ukrainian shipments and deepening a global food crisis.
Russia and Ukraine together account for nearly a third of global wheat supplies, while Russia is also a key fertilizer exporter and Ukraine a major supplier of corn and sunflower oil.
Ukraine's foreign ministry spokesman, Oleg Nikolenko, said Kyiv was working with international partners to create a U.N.-backed mission to restore Black Sea shipping routes and allow the export of Ukrainian farm produce. read more
Moscow criticised as "self-destructive" a decision by the European Union this week to cut 90% of oil imports from Russia by the end of 2022, saying the move would likely destabilise global energy markets. read more
The conflict has also jolted Europe's security arrangements, prompting Finland and Sweden to seek NATO membership, though NATO member Turkey has blocked that move, accusing Stockholm and Helsinki of harbouring people linked to Kurdish militants.
The issue is likely to be on the agenda when Biden hosts NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at the White House on Thursday. Stoltenberg told reporters he would soon convene a meeting in Brussels with Swedish, Finnish and Turkish officials to discuss the matter.
Besides the advanced rocket systems, called HIMARS, the new U.S. military support package includes ammunition, counter fire radars, air surveillance radars, additional Javelin anti-tank missiles and anti-armour weapons.
Ukraine has been seeking Multiple Rocket Launch Systems such as the M270 and M142 HIMARS to provide more firepower at longer range to hit Russian forces well behind the front line. The Pentagon said Kyiv would initially receive four HIMARS systems.
The new supplies come on top of billions of dollars worth of equipment such as drones and anti-aircraft missiles.
Separately, U.S. Cyber Command Director Paul Nakasone confirmed that the United States had conducted "offensive, defensive and information" cyber operations to support Ukraine. He gave no specific details in comments to Sky News.
Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Rami Ayyub, Robert Birsel and Gareth Jones; Editing by Stephen Coates, Raju Gopalakrishnan and Nick Macfie
13. Kremlin accuses U.S. of "deliberately" heating up Ukraine war
Our "missile restraint" hardly matters to the Russians and Putin.
Kremlin accuses U.S. of "deliberately" heating up Ukraine war
Axios · by Ivana Saric · June 1, 2022
Russia rebuked the U.S. on Wednesday for its plans to provide Ukraine with new longer-range missile systems, claiming the move was a way to deliberately escalate the war.
Driving the news: In an op-ed in the New York Times on Tuesday, President Biden said the new advanced rocket systems would be used to ward off Russian advances in Ukraine, but wouldn't be used to launch attacks on targets in Russia.
- The missiles have a range of about 48 miles and will be provided as part of a forthcoming $700 million aid package, a senior administration official said on a call with reporters on Tuesday.
What they're saying: "We believe that the U.S. is deliberately pouring oil on the fire," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters Wednesday, Reuters reported.
- "The U.S. is obviously holding the line that it will fight Russia to the last Ukrainian," he added.
Axios · by Ivana Saric · June 1, 2022
14. How Lessons from Afghanistan are playing out in Ukraine
Excerpts:
Focusing on two of the failures, the report says, “In Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States spent years and billions of dollars training and equipping national armies, only to see them quickly collapse in the face of far less-equipped insurgencies once U.S. logistical, equipment enabler, and air support were withdrawn. The exception is South Korea—but the SSA effort there has taken seven decades at a cost of roughly $3 billion a year.”
I would note that Iraq has been costly in human, diplomatic and financial terms with the final outcome still in some doubt.
The report also put a light on risks that may loom ahead when it comes to Ukraine. With fighting now entering its fourth month and no end in sight, the Sopko report illustrates that a few lessons have been learned while some past mistakes have so far been avoided.
How Lessons from Afghanistan are playing out in Ukraine
Fine Print
Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010.
OPINION — How much has the United States learned from past history about undertaking major, large-scale military assistance efforts such as the one now underway in Ukraine and another looming in Taiwan?
I raise that question after reading a report entitled, “Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise,” that was published May 12 by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, John F. Sopko.
In a short appendix to the report called, “Historical Comparisons of the U.S. Approach in Korea with that of Vietnam and Afghanistan,” Sopko’s team notes, “The U.S. military has mounted four large-scale security sector assistance (SSA) efforts in the last 72 years [Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan] and three of the four have been catastrophic failures.”
Focusing on two of the failures, the report says, “In Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States spent years and billions of dollars training and equipping national armies, only to see them quickly collapse in the face of far less-equipped insurgencies once U.S. logistical, equipment enabler, and air support were withdrawn. The exception is South Korea—but the SSA effort there has taken seven decades at a cost of roughly $3 billion a year.”
I would note that Iraq has been costly in human, diplomatic and financial terms with the final outcome still in some doubt.
The report also put a light on risks that may loom ahead when it comes to Ukraine. With fighting now entering its fourth month and no end in sight, the Sopko report illustrates that a few lessons have been learned while some past mistakes have so far been avoided.
For example, Sopko’s report describes one basic reason why past U.S. military assistance failed was because “superpower ways of waging war [cannot] be transplanted to smaller, poorer countries without factoring in the political or cultural context in which those armies operate, or adapting our methods to the means at hand.”
However, Ukraine and its military could hardly be compared to Afghanistan and Vietnam armies. With the latter, the American military found it difficult, “working with unstable and corrupt governments, and with the clock ticking on self-imposed deadlines for U.S. withdrawal. In both places, however, the result was the creation of national armies that had a crippling dependence on U.S. methods, combat enablers, and equipment. That, combined with corruption and failures of leadership in their own ranks, eroded the will to fight and allowed a smaller and less-equipped enemy to prevail.”
Instead, training for the Ukrainians, which began in 2015, “included anti-tank weapons systems, doctrine, operations and, importantly, the development of a competent noncommissioned officer corps,” according to a description provided to Pentagon reporters during a May 4 press conference. The training “also integrated all aspects of war fighting to include maneuver, fires and air defense…[and] focused on increasing their capacity and capability for self-defense while building readiness and NATO interoperability…[That included] opportunities for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to participate in other U.S. exercises really across the [European] theater.”
But today, Ukraine is totally dependent on arms, ammunition, and financing being supplied by the U.S., NATO and other coalition partners.
Then and now, Washington’s staying power, along with these other nations remain another factor.
“In Vietnam and Afghanistan, the final goal was either unclear, unattainable, constantly shifting, or some combination of all three,” according to the Sopko report. “And in both places, the United States made it clear from the outset that its plan was to eventually leave the fight in the hands of a local fighting force—a strategy that placated an American public unhappy with sending its soldiers to fight, but also told the enemy that sooner or later, U.S. troops would
leave.”
In Afghanistan, according to Sopko’s report, after then-President Obama’s original buildup, the military situation had already begun to deteriorate by 2015, when the U.S. and its coalition partners moved from active local combat operation to a lesser support and training mission. For example, there were no advisors to the Afghan police below the regional zone level, according to the report.
The incoming Trump administration in 2017, initially rebuilt military operations and even dropped the GBU-43, informally known as the ‘Mother of All Bombs’, in Nangarhar Province, targeting the Islamic State. In 2018, the U.S. Army’s 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade to partner with Afghan Army units below the corps level. In 2019, the United States conducted 7,423 airstrikes, the most since at least 2009.
However, that buildup set the stage for negotiations with the Taliban, without the Afghans, that would eventually lead to a bilateral agreement stipulating U.S. withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel and contractors from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021. In return, the Taliban promised not to attack the United States or allow attacks from Afghanistan on the United States or its allies.
The Sopko report called that agreement “the single most important factor in the ANDSF’s [Afghan National Security Forces’] collapse.” The U.S. signed the agreement despite “the fact that the ANDSF was still dependent on the U.S. military for support,” the report said.
The Sopko report said there were “secret written and verbal agreements between U.S. and Taliban envoys…[that] detailed U.S. and Taliban restrictions on fighting” which “we were not able to obtain…despite official requests to DoD [Defense Department] and State [Department].”.
Nonetheless, within months of the agreement’s signing, the Taliban initiated offensive actions against Afghan territory. “The highest number of Taliban-initiated attacks against the ANDSF since the agreement occurred from September to November 2020,” according to the report.
In all of 2020, the U.S. conducted only 1,631 airstrikes, with almost half occurring in the two months prior to the U.S.-Taliban agreement. At the same time, the U.S. reduced its troop level from 13,000 to slightly more than 2,500.
The information war was stepped up. “The Taliban’s fight was a holy jihad and its members were liberators fighting a corrupt, abusive government propped up by a foreign military. This narrative proved powerful, despite the Taliban’s own foreign dependencies,” the report said, adding, “The Afghan government failed to counter Taliban messaging, and never disseminated a compelling counter-narrative of its own.”
While the new Biden administration was determining its Afghan policy in March 2021, the Taliban threatened to renew attacks on American and coalition forces if the U.S. did not live up to the Trump-agreed departure of all forces by May 1, 2021. Biden pushed the departure date back to September 11, 2021. Meanwhile, the Taliban kept their advances, seizing some provinces and negotiating for others, with the Sopko report saying the decision to announce a certain departure date, sealed the fate of the Afghan government.
What is the goal in the Ukraine War for President Volodymyr Zelensky? He has most often said the Russians should go back at least to the pre-invasion borders but implies the 2014 borders, which would mean return of Donbass territory and even Crimea. For President Biden and the coalition, the ending is not clear. Perhaps more important, where does Russian President Vladimir Putin want to end up?
Keep in mind Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines’ May 10 statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee: “We assess President Putin is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine, during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbass.”
Putin’s forces have re-grouped and are grinding on despite the early setbacks and heavy losses.
Last week, 99-year-old Henry Kissinger suggested that the time has come for compromise that perhaps includes giving up Ukrainian territory to Putin’s invaders.
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“In my view, movement towards negotiations and negotiations on peace need to begin in the next two months,” the former Secretary of State said speaking to an audience in Davos, “before it [the current fighting] could create upheaval and tensions that will be ever-harder to overcome.”
He added, “Ideally, the dividing line should be a return to the status quo ante…[But] pursuing the war beyond that point would not be about the freedom of Ukraine, which has been undertaken with great cohesion by NATO, but into against Russia itself.”
Kissinger did not say it directly, but it’s clear he was worried about the U.S. and NATO getting directly into Ukraine’s war with Putin’s Russia.
In his proposed negotiations, Kissinger said he hoped the Ukraine side matched “the heroism that they have shown in the war with wisdom, for the balance in Europe and in the world at large.”
He also said that, “one has to look both at the relationship of Europe to Russia over a longer period and in a manner that is separated from the existing leadership [Putin] whose status, however, will be affected internally over a period of time by its performance in this period.”
Zelensky quickly responded to Kissinger’s remarks, comparing them to “appeasement” as in 1938, when Hitler was gobbling up European territories before World War II.
Meanwhile, there was another lesson learned in the U.S. It’s doubtful that Biden would, as Trump did in 2020 with the Taliban, and without the Afghans, get involved in negotiations with Putin to end the war without Zelensky’s participation. Biden’s administration has made clear that the Ukrainian President would lead any ceasefire or peace negotiations.
Still, all of that seems premature since at the present time, serious Kyiv-Moscow negotiations appear nowhere in sight.
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15. Do Targeted Strikes Work? The Lessons of Two Decades of Drone Warfare
There is much more to irregular warfare than the employment of UAS (drones).
Excerpts:
Findings from such research are neither uniform nor unqualified. On the whole, however, they do suggest several broad conclusions. First, the US targeted strike campaign has not caused the decline of al-Qaeda or reduced the number of attacks by the group worldwide. This reflects the fact that al-Qaeda is a network in which local affiliates do not require instruction from leadership in order to conduct attacks, but can exercise discretion within general leadership guidelines. This is consistent with research on other campaigns finding that targeting the leadership of groups that are not organized in hierarchical fashion or dependent on a charismatic leader has minimal impact on these groups’ survival or attacks. Furthermore, al-Qaeda was a relatively mature organization by the time strikes began. Research suggests that targeting leadership early in the life of a militant group is more likely to cause a group to collapse. As groups age, however, many develop quasi-bureaucratic features that make them resilient in the face of targeting.
Second, qualitative evidence, especially from al-Qaeda correspondence, indicates that strikes in Pakistan significantly weakened top al-Qaeda leadership, known as al-Qaeda core (AQC). Along with substantial strengthening of other counterterrorism measures, this probably contributed to reducing the risk of al-Qaeda attacks against the “far enemy” in the United States and the West.
Conclusion:
Finally, analysts and policymakers need to appreciate the limits of empirical research. It can inform, but not substitute for, judgments about the legal and ethical justifiability of targeted strikes. Nonetheless, it’s important to affirm the value of research that aims to provide the best possible understanding of life and death matters in a complex world.
Do Targeted Strikes Work? The Lessons of Two Decades of Drone Warfare - Modern War Institute
One of the most controversial US tools of irregular warfare over the last twenty years has been targeted strikes by remotely piloted aircraft, or drones, against terrorist threats in areas outside conventional war zones. These strikes have been conducted overwhelmingly in Pakistan, mostly in northwest Pakistan in what used to be known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); in Yemen; and in Somalia.
Both supporters and critics make claims about the impacts of strikes, but these are often based on armchair theories that rely on minimal or selective empirical evidence. There are, however, more than sixty studies on targeted killing in general, including the US campaign in particular, that have the potential to offer insights. My new book Drone Strike: Analyzing the Impacts of Targeted Killing reviews this research, along with extensive al-Qaeda correspondence, in order to identify what we do and do not know about the impacts of targeted strikes on terrorist groups, civilian casualties, and local populations. As the United States resets its counterterrorism policy after withdrawing from Afghanistan, it would do well to study the lessons of the last two decades of drone warfare.
State of the Field
Findings from such research are neither uniform nor unqualified. On the whole, however, they do suggest several broad conclusions. First, the US targeted strike campaign has not caused the decline of al-Qaeda or reduced the number of attacks by the group worldwide. This reflects the fact that al-Qaeda is a network in which local affiliates do not require instruction from leadership in order to conduct attacks, but can exercise discretion within general leadership guidelines. This is consistent with research on other campaigns finding that targeting the leadership of groups that are not organized in hierarchical fashion or dependent on a charismatic leader has minimal impact on these groups’ survival or attacks. Furthermore, al-Qaeda was a relatively mature organization by the time strikes began. Research suggests that targeting leadership early in the life of a militant group is more likely to cause a group to collapse. As groups age, however, many develop quasi-bureaucratic features that make them resilient in the face of targeting.
Second, qualitative evidence, especially from al-Qaeda correspondence, indicates that strikes in Pakistan significantly weakened top al-Qaeda leadership, known as al-Qaeda core (AQC). Along with substantial strengthening of other counterterrorism measures, this probably contributed to reducing the risk of al-Qaeda attacks against the “far enemy” in the United States and the West.
This is because AQC is the component of al-Qaeda that has been most committed to such attacks, on the basis that such attacks will cause the West to withdraw from the Islamic world, thus enabling al-Qaeda to establish Sharia law there by deposing heretical regimes that have depended on Western support. With its reasonably safe haven in the FATA, AQC was able to plan, coordinate, and train people for attacks against the far enemy, as well as lend assistance to other groups to do so. More than half the major terrorist plots against the West between 2004 and 2011, for instance, had links to Pakistan. The absence of a major al-Qaeda attack on the United States since 9/11 is not attributable solely to the strikes on AQC, but it is reasonable to believe that such strikes helped reduce the risk of such an attack.
Third, studies of targeting in Pakistan generally, although not uniformly, indicate that strikes can have local effects by reducing the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities for one to four weeks in locations where strikes occur. Researchers suggest that this is a function of both “kinetic” effects from the loss of valuable individuals and “anticipatory effects” that reflect changes in terrorist operations to avoid strikes that render those operations less efficient.
Research in Pakistan suggests that the ability of strikes to achieve these local effects requires an ongoing intensive campaign of surveillance, intelligence gathering, and persistent strikes. Effects may continue as long as strikes do, but there may be limits on how long there is political will to engage in such a campaign. Strikes by themselves will not necessarily permanently weaken a terrorist group, but they may reduce violence enough to create the opportunity to pursue initiatives that could do so. Several observers maintain that these initiatives include local governance and security reforms, and the creation of meaningful economic opportunities, in order to lessen the appeal of extremism. While the potential of such initiatives seems plausible, there has been little rigorous research that isolates the effect of these measures and other factors that influence propensity toward extremism. One reason is that there have been few sustained reform efforts in areas in which extremism has flourished.
Fourth, the best data available refutes the claim that drone strikes tend to kill more civilians than intended targets. In 2013, the United States adopted targeting standards that have reduced civilian casualties. My calculations, based on New America’s database, for instance, find that 11.2 percent of casualties were civilians from 2002 to 2012, while 3.5 percent were from 2013 to 2020. Similarly, calculations based on the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s database are 23.3 percent from 2002 to 2012 and 4.4 percent from 2013 to 2020. In both cases, I used the mean figure for estimates expressed in terms of a range. Other research finds a sharp decline in civilian casualties in Pakistan dating from July 2011, which is when the United States began to follow the standards subsequently announced in 2013. At the same time, the US government has consistently underestimated civilian casualties compared to credible estimates from other sources, suggesting that it has not met its standard of near certainty of no civilian casualties outside areas of active hostilities.
The reason is that drone strike precision is not simply a function of technology, but of the organizational processes that are put in place to deploy that technology. Minimizing civilian casualties requires collecting accurate data on casualties, aggregating this data in order to identify root causes of casualties, disseminating lessons across all US entities involved that use force, and revising operations in ways that incorporate these lessons. The United States will fail to realize the full potential of drone strike precision if it fails to institutionalize these measures.
Next, research consistently finds that there is strong local opposition to drone strikes in the areas in which they occur. The most rigorous research does not, however, support the claim that this translates into greater support for terrorist groups and increases in terrorist recruitment. Local residents also harbor considerable resentment toward terrorist groups in their areas. Opposition to strikes nonetheless can impair the effectiveness of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations by, for instance, reducing local willingness to provide information and by undermining the perceived legitimacy of what may be fragile partner governments. These consequences need to be considered in a full assessment of the impact of targeted strikes.
The Next Drone Wars?
What do these lessons suggest about the potential future role of targeted strikes outside war zones as a tool of US irregular warfare? First—with one important caveat—continued targeting of top al-Qaeda leadership may not appreciably reduce the risk of attacks in the United States and the West. Targeting success in Pakistan’s FATA reflected the distinctive importance and influence of AQC at that time, and the resources it had to plan, organize, and attempt such attacks without the need to rely on affiliates to do so. Today, al-Qaeda’s leadership is more dispersed and can provide general guidance, but it has few other resources to encourage affiliates to attack the far enemy. Some groups may have the capability to conduct such attacks without assistance from AQC. At the same time, however, they must devote considerable resources to local conflicts and may not give much weight to AQC’s call for attacks in the West.
The caveat is that this calculus could change if AQC regains a safe haven in Afghanistan from which it could resume coordinating attacks overseas. The United States would not, however, be able to rely on a relatively, if not consistently, cooperative local partner for intelligence and law enforcement assistance as it was able to do in Pakistan. The result could be more difficulty in locating targets and a larger number of civilian casualties. This suggests that even if AQC regroups in Afghanistan, it may not be feasible for strikes to play as prominent a role as they did in Pakistan. If used, they will need to be complemented by extensive other counterterrorism measures, such as the disruption of terrorist financing, information and cyber operations, and security and counterterrorism assistance to states in the region.
Second, without efforts to analyze and address the underlying causes of extremism, the most that strikes may accomplish on the local level is, as Israel puts it, to “mow the grass.” This would involve periodically weakening groups as they become a threat to the United States, or preventing them from becoming such a threat—while recognizing that the effect will be temporary and that future strikes may be necessary. If the United States eventually concludes that it is no longer in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, using strikes in this way could be controversial because some may see it as inconsistent with the international law requirement that force be used only to prevent an imminent attack.
Finally, analysts and policymakers need to appreciate the limits of empirical research. It can inform, but not substitute for, judgments about the legal and ethical justifiability of targeted strikes. Nonetheless, it’s important to affirm the value of research that aims to provide the best possible understanding of life and death matters in a complex world.
Mitt Regan is McDevitt professor of jurisprudence and co-director of the Center on National Security at Georgetown Law Center, and senior fellow at the Stockdale Center on Ethical Leadership at the US Naval Academy.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson, US Air Force
16. Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design
Not specifically stated in the article, but I think very much implied: you have to invest in more than "little green men." Little green men are no substitute for infantry,
What do nations do about the shortage of military age manpower to serve in the infantry? e.g., The US and South Korea? For the foreseeable future (or forever) warfare will always be manpower intensive as long as it takes place in the human domain.
And yes it is all about assumptions, to include political assumptions.
Conclusion:
The arguments we make here are preliminary, and not meant to be predictive of the outcome of battles in the Donbas, or the course of this war. However, contemporary debates on force structure and military strategy would benefit greatly by looking at the choices the Russian military made and how they ended up in this position. There’s much to be said about the primacy of political assumptions, which is one of the most decisive factors in how the Russian armed forces were initially thrown into this war, but equally, it is structural choices that have limited its military’s ability to adjust and sustain combat operations.
Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design - War on the Rocks
MICHAEL KOFMAN AND ROB LEE
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a deeply flawed military operation, from Moscow’s assumptions about an easy victory, to a lack of preparation, poor planning, and force employment. Less attention has been paid, however, to Russian force structure and manpower issues as a critical element now shaping outcomes in this war. Plans rarely survive first contact with an opponent and militaries invariably must adapt, but strategic force structure choices can prove decisive. Force structure reveals a great deal about a military and its assumptions of what wars it plans to fight and how it plans to fight them.
Some of the most significant problems being experienced by the Russian armed forces are the result of conscious choices and tradeoffs. These decisions help explain many of the observed struggles the Russian armed forces have had in combined arms operations, fighting in urban environments, and attempts to hold terrain. The full extent of Russia’s personnel weaknesses has become clear during this war. As it stands, the Russian military has a shortage of manpower — especially infantry. The Russian military also compromised by establishing a partial mobilization force. Consequently, the Russian army was optimized for a short and sharp war while lacking the capacity to sustain a major conventional conflict at “peace time” manning levels. The Russian armed forces are now pressed to sustain operations in Ukraine and attempting what amounts to a partial mobilization to stem the prospect of significant reversals on the battlefield.
The Best or Worst of Both Worlds?
To understand why this happened to one of the largest militaries in the world, we must start with examining the major tradeoffs made in Russian force design. Successive Russian military reforms since the fall of the Soviet Union sought to abandon the old conscript-heavy mobilization army by consolidating formations and equipment, converting an unwieldy Soviet inheritance into a smaller standing force. The Russian military was primarily composed of conscripts, which it drafted twice a year, and contract servicemen — considered “enlisted professionals” who volunteered for several years of service. Russia focused on making contract servicemen the majority of its armed forces. Along with the United States, Russia came to believe that a smaller but better equipped and trained military could handle a range of conflicts. This process took place largely between 2008 and 2012.
The Russian military then rolled back some of these reforms starting in 2013, not only because several proved deeply unpopular, but also because the force was considered too small for a regional or large-scale war against a superior opponent. Hence, the ground forces adopted a mixed-force structure, with divisions and brigades, increasing overall force structure.
The staffing approach to brigades and divisions was the same. Russia regressed to a partial-mobilization force, hoping to have the best of both worlds: more forces and equipment, reduced staffing and cost, plus the ability to generate substantial combat power on short notice. The military sought to have a high-readiness force within the former Soviet approach of large formations requiring a degree of mobilization. It also struggled to reconcile keeping about 250,000 conscripts in the military, with their generally poor suitability for military operations, and political restrictions on employing them in conflicts.
The Russian military eventually came to adopt a force structure that could deploy as battalion tactical groups, or as the entire formation, such as a regiment or brigade. Battalion tactical groups were task organized combined arms formations with habitual training relationships, centered around a maneuver battalion within a regiment or brigade. They were expected to have higher readiness in terms of equipment and manpower and be able to deploy on short notice. These formations were composed of infantry, armor, artillery, and supporting assets. The battalion tactical group was not a recent development, but it became a yardstick within the Russian military to measure readiness and the force’s capacity to generate units on short notice. In theory, this offered flexibility, although how it would work in practice on a large scale remained guesswork. As this war aptly demonstrates, what a military can do with 10 battalions in a limited war can’t necessarily be replicated with more than a hundred in a complex, large-scale military operation.
What did this yield in practice? As a tiered-readiness force, Russian ground formations (including the airborne and naval infantry) were staffed somewhere between 70 to 90 percent. Consequently, a 3,500 sized brigade might only have 2,500 men at peacetime. When accounting for 30 percent conscripts likely to be in the unit, this meant that no more than 1,700 would be considered deployable. If actual readiness levels were being padded, or there were insufficient numbers of contract servicemen to fill out two battalion tactical groups, then the real number of forces available was even further reduced.
Russia’s operational level command on the battlefield is usually the Combined Arms Army. Armies are comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District. Armies ranged in size, but the resulting effect is that a number of these formations had a standing strength closer to 1.5-2 brigades. Airborne divisions also had reduced manning in practice relative to their end-strength authorized levels. Over time, the force was spread more and more thinly. The hardware was there, but the people were not. The gaps encouraged Russian military officials to engage in habitual forms of cooking the books.
The Russian military is well-suited to short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery. By contrast, it is poorly designed for a sustained occupation, or a grinding war of attrition, that would require a large share of Russia’s ground forces, which is exactly the conflict it has found itself in. The Russian military doesn’t have the numbers available to easily adjust or to rotate forces if a substantial amount of combat power gets tied down in a war. Their big assumption was that in the event of a crisis with NATO, political leadership would authorize mobilization to raise manning levels and deploy staffed-up formations.
Enter Putin’s “special operation,” which meant launching a major war in Europe, against the continent’s second largest country, with a force operating at peacetime manning levels. Putin assumed that Ukraine would quickly surrender, and a regime change operation could be conducted without the need to plan and organize for a major war. The resulting debacle, which will be studied for decades to come, proceeds from the intersection of terrible Russian political assumptions with those of the armed forces regarding the forces that would be made available for a war of this scale (as conceived in the design).
Revisiting the Battalion Tactical Group
After Russia’s initial invasion with offensives against Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, the Russian military prioritized having more permanent readiness battalion tactical groups exclusively manned by contract soldiers and officers. Since 2016, each regiment or brigade was supposed to be able to form two battalion tactical groups with only officers and contract soldiers, while conscripts would comprise the third battalion. In practice, the situation varied across units, depending on their overall level of readiness. According to Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, Russia had 66 battalion tactical groups in 2016 with plans to rapidly increase the figure to 96 by the end of the year, 115 in 2017, and 126 in 2018. Shoigu said Russia had 136 battalion tactical groups in 2019 and 168 in August 2021. These are supposed to have between 700 to 900 servicemembers, but as the official number of battalion tactical groups was rapidly increasing, the number of soldiers serving under contract plateaued, and the annual draft figure has remained largely unchanged over the past four years. Consequently, contemporary depictions of the Russian battalion tactical group’s typical size and composition were inaccurate.
The Russian military set a target to reach 425,000 contract soldiers by 2017 and later to reach 499,200 by 2019. Instead, according to Russian officials, it reached 384,000 in 2016, 394,000 in 2019, and 405,000 in 2020, which was the last time a figure was publicly released. As the Ministry of Defense kept releasing the same contract servicemen numbers several years in a row, it became evident that they were probably declining. The delta between official figures and actual contract manning levels was the subject of debate in analytical circles.
It appears the Russian armed forces achieved this target by reducing the number of personnel in each battalion, including the number in each company, which has had a significant effect on operations in Ukraine. There were two important outcomes of this decision. First, Russia’s offensive maneuver formations, assuming around 125 to 130 battalion tactical groups as disclosed by official U.S. sources, were in practice much smaller when we consider their actual strength. This force was approximately 80,000 in overall size, not including auxiliaries, and other supporting elements (total force size likely exceeded 100,000). Second, these formations were heavily weighted towards artillery, armor, support, and enablers rather than motorized rifle infantry and the availability of dismounted units. The effect on Russia’s ability to operate in urban terrain, support armor with dismounted infantry, and control terrain was profound. There were also shortages of key personnel, from enablers to logistics, and the force was far more brittle than many (including us) had assumed.
Based on captured documents published by Ukraine, and credible personnel rosters that appear to have been disclosed via hacks, it appears Russia decided to change its table of organization for motorized rifle units by reducing the number of personnel. Instead of 539 or 461 personnel for motorized rifle battalions, the new table of organization for motorized rifle battalions appears to be approximately 345. However, even with this reduced T/O, many Russian battalions appear to only be at 2/3 or 3/4 strength, often having only 230 to 280 soldiers. The new authorized strength for a motorized rifle company seems to be approximately 75 to 76, instead of 101 or 113 as before, and just 22 for platoons. Previous motorized rifle platoons had 30 or 32 personnel with three eight or nine-man squads and a platoon headquarters.
Data Source: Henry Schlottman (based on leaked documents)
The new motorized rifle platoon has three squads of seven soldiers without a platoon headquarters. Only the platoon commander isn’t part of one of the squads, and the first squad is led by the deputy platoon commander. A seven-man squad would mean that each BMP or BTR vehicle would have four available dismounts not including the crew of three. But many of these squads only have five or six soldiers. In practice, this means that many Russian motorized rifle squads only have enough soldiers to operate their vehicles, but not to dismount and fight on foot. Indeed, there have been cases where Russian BTR and BMPs only had a crew of three, without any dismounts. As a result of these reductions and manning issues, many Russian platoons deployed to Ukraine are closer to the size of a U.S. Marine Corps squad, which is currently 13 with plans to increase the size to 15, and many Russian battalions are the size of a Marine reinforced company with 182 marines and sailors plus enablers, etc.
With attachments, the size of many of these battalion tactical groups based around a motorized rifle battalion is between 400 to 600 personnel, well below the 700 to 900 figure that was reported by Russian officials. For example, the two battalions deployed to Ukraine from the 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly had 310 and 226 personnel, and the battalion tactical groups formed from these battalions had 666 and 499 personnel, respectively. Captured documents indicate this is an issue for units in different military districts — the Southern Military District appears to be the best manned but its units still suffer from this problem — and with coastal defense and even airborne units as well.
There is also substantial variation in the size of the battalion tactical groups deployed to Ukraine. Some are 900 strong, but many are half that size, which means the regularly released or updated figure by various defense officials is of relatively limited to no relevance when assessing Russia’s ground combat power in Ukraine. In practice, battalion tactical groups may have ranged as much as 350 to 900 in personnel, and some units did not deploy as battalion tactical groups, but as entire regiments with their headquarters units. In these cases, artillery and other regimental or division assets were not always attached to battalion tactical groups but instead held at a higher level, further reducing the size of these units. Indeed, the high number of regimental and brigade commanders who have been killed in Ukraine is one indication that Russian units are fighting as regiments or brigades and not necessarily with independent battalion tactical groups. Another reason for the variation is that brigades and regiments could come up with one battalion tactical group, but the second was often short, revealing a dearth of manpower on hand.
Where Is the Infantry?
Another problem is that the battalion tactical groups with the greater number of soldiers have a greater share of support attachments, such as artillery, air defense, engineers, or electronic warfare, to maneuver companies (e.g., motorized rifle or tank). Depending on the task, those other attachments are important, but the smaller share of maneuver companies to support assets means these formations are less capable at maneuver or seizing terrain. Battalion tactical groups formed from tank battalions typically have fewer personnel because tank battalions only have a table of organization of 151, so they are even smaller because of the reduced motor rifle component.. Indeed, it appears Russia also changed the table of organization and equipment of tank regiments by in some cases reducing their motorized rifle battalion to a single company. That meant that a tank regiment could not form two full-strength battalion tactical groups since each tank battalion tactical group is supposed to have at least one motorized rifle company. As an example, Russia’s 2nd Motorized Rifle Division’s 1st Tank Regiment only had a single motorized rifle company with 70 personnel, which is clearly insufficient.
The end result is that the Russian military deployed maneuver formations with few available dismounted infantry, but still brought many of their armored vehicles with them. This situation begins to resemble the problems Russian forces faced in Grozny-1995: tons of metal, little manpower. Russian tank units require infantry support for various situations, and dismounted infantry are critical when fighting in urban settings or seizing or holding terrain. Tanks and armored vehicles are vulnerable without infantry to protect them from anti-tank teams, among other threats. By bringing minimal infantry, motorized rifle battalions are suffering from the same vulnerabilities as tank units. The high ratio of armored vehicles to soldiers in many Russian units also likely accounts for many of the vehicles that were left abandoned by Russian forces during the beginning of the war. The lack of organic motorized rifle troops also helps explain the poor performance by many Russian tank units, who were vulnerable to ambushes by light Ukrainian anti-tank teams armed with Javelin, NLAW, and Stugna-P anti-tank weapons. The problem was exacerbated by losses among infantry components in the first several weeks of the war.
The Russian military especially lacks sufficient light infantry forces for many of the situations it has faced in Ukraine. Even with motorized rifle, airborne, or naval infantry units, armored vehicles are organic at all levels. Thus, entire platoons or companies, including NCOs and officers, cannot dismount as cohesive units because they have to man the vehicles in situations where light infantry units with a mobile unit in support might be preferable. Airborne battalions face the same problem. Indeed, the heavy losses sustained by airborne units near Kyiv in the Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel areas may partially be a result of this lack of infantry. Russia is compensating for this infantry shortage in motorized rifle units by leaning heavily on its naval infantry, as well as separatist militia forces, which did most of the fighting in Mariupol. Arguably Russian naval infantry, a small component of its armed forces, has been the best performing element within the ground force, but they have also sustained heavy losses. Mobilized militia fighters from Donetsk and Luhansk were also deployed to regions beyond the Donbas, and Wagner private military contractors have reportedly played a critical role in the fighting. Indeed, it is fair to ask whether some Wagner detachments and separatist permanent readiness units are in fact more elite and capable than regular Russian motorized rifle units, at least when operating as a dismounted force.
Russia also compensated by deploying units from Russia’s National Guard (Rosgvardia) to serve in a light infantry role. These included spetsnaz units similar to police SWAT teams, and OMON riot police. Although Rosgvardia is a paramilitary organization, its units aren’t trained or equipped for a conventional war, and many Rosgvardia troops invaded Ukraine in riot police trucks with little to no armor. At this stage, the Russian military is scrambling for manpower anywhere it can get it, particularly to fill in for the endemic shortage of infantry relative to equipment. Russia invaded Ukraine with understrength battalion tactical groups, which then suffered the brunt of the casualties.
The Russian military likely would have been better off with fewer, but fully manned battalion tactical groups. It appears Russian forces once again pulled contract soldiers or officers from different battalions to form them right before the invasion, but units perform best when they’ve had an opportunity to train together, develop standard operating procedures, and build cohesion. It also seems clear that many Russian regiments and brigades could only field one full strength battalion tactical groups instead of two as Russian officials have claimed. Interestingly, one of the previously identified weaknesses of these formations was that they lacked a sufficient staff to properly execute command and control over the numerous attachments. Instead, it appears the Russian ground forces in Ukraine were top-heavy, with too many officers commanding smaller units without enough infantry privates.
The fact that the Russian force was spreading itself thinly, reducing readiness to get new divisions and regiments, was known in the analytical community. However, the extent of the problems was not apparent until the war. The evidence points to two initial conclusions. Some of these changes and reductions were relatively recent, likely over the past three years, and parts of the Russian military were systemically overstating readiness. Consequently, senior military leadership may not have known how bad the problem was, and the secrecy surrounding Russian invasion plans within the system compounded the sudden discovery of rot, giving commanders little time to address those problems.
A Lack of Non-Commissioned Officers?
Many commentators have focused on the lack of NCOs as the key personnel weakness of the Russian military. This is unsurprising since they feature prominently in Western militaries. The Russian armed forces have contract NCOs, but these soldiers do not have leadership roles with responsibilities and a division of duties vis-à-vis the commanding officer. These differences are important, but overemphasized. For example, Ukraine had not built an effective NCO corps by the time of this war — it was at best nascent and aspirational. Some of the supposed differences between Russia and Ukraine, brought up in popular discourse, are simply not explanative of the divergent performance between these militaries. It will take time to have a more informed conversation on what mattered, and what did not, in this war.
Instead, the greater personnel problem is the lack of contract privates. Indeed, the reduced-size companies mean that NCOs are less critical because officers are leading fewer soldiers. In many cases, Russian lieutenants led platoons that were approximately the same size as a 13-man U.S. Marine rifle squad, which is led by a NCO. The smaller battalion tactical groups indicate that Russia is failing to recruit enough contract servicemen to properly man maneuver battalions. The priority assignments for contract servicemen are NCO positions, elite units, and highly technical specialties. Conscripts don’t serve long enough to be properly trained on these technical skills, so they are almost exclusively manned by contract soldiers.
Because the Russian Aerospace Forces, Navy, and Strategic Missile Forces have a higher percentage of technical assignments, they receive a higher share of contract soldiers than the army. Within the Ground Forces, the priority is ensuring all NCOs are filled by contract soldiers as well as assignments like air defense, electronic warfare, and other equipment operators. Elite units like the airborne, naval infantry, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units are also a higher priority for receiving contract soldiers. As a result, motorized rifle battalions don’t have enough contract privates, and it appears Russia decided to compensate by reducing the number of personnel in these battalions, instead of reducing the number of permanent readiness battalion tactical groups. It wasn’t just infantry soldiers. Russian maneuver units didn’t have enough contract privates to serve as drivers for logistics convoys and relied too heavily on conscripts. This meant they had a deficit of drivers once they invaded, which exacerbated their logistical problems.
Why Did This Happen?
Russian thinking on strategy and operational concepts played a significant role in these design choices. Organizational culture and bureaucratic preferences should not be ignored, but the reason the Russian military was set up in this manner ultimately ties back to core tenets of Russian military thought. Militaries have ideas about what kind of wars they’re likely to fight, how they plan to fight them, and the best way to balance capability, capacity, and readiness. While we cannot go in-depth into Russian military thinking here, the core choices were not just driven by an attempt to balance resources and attain force flexibility, but also by a coherent set of beliefs about how the Russian armed forces should organize to fight NATO. These drove the development of a force with less infantry, and less logistical capacity for sustaining ground offensives or holding territory, but more fires and support for enablers.
This does not explain the problems Russian armed forces demonstrate in a host of areas, from lack of secure communications to the poorly demonstrated integration of air support, fires, and reconnaissance on the battlefield. There are clear problems with competence, scaled-up employment, and integration. But conventional wars often come down to attrition, where manpower and materiel matters more over time than many other elements. A force with enough hedge in its structure can try to compensate for a terrible plan, recover from initial failure, and try to adjust. The Russian military has no such option and is further constrained by the political framing of this war.
Indeed, it is an open question as to whether Putin may have had an inflated sense of Russian military capability. Alternatively, he may simply let political assumptions that Ukraine would quickly surrender drive his thinking. Sometimes the military is dishonest about what it can actually do, but often political leaders simply do not want to listen to military advice because it’s not what they wish to hear. Most likely, the Russian failure is some combination of both.
Russia’s manning issues suggest that future mobilization will face serious problems. In the Russian military, conscripts are sent to units where they receive most of their training, instead of centralized schools. However, the training officers and non-commissioned officers from units either either were deployed in some cases or are likely to be used to form additional battalions. This means the remain-behind element for Russian regiments and brigades might not have the personnel to properly train the conscripts currently arriving. The longer this war continues, the greater the disruptive effects will be on training and recruitment. At this stage, it appears Russia is attempting piecemeal solutions by creating reserve battalions on the basis of officers and NCOs allocated to the tentative “third” battalion remaining in current formations. This is a form of partial mobilization, but it cannibalizes an important training component of these units.
Having mobilized substantial manpower, and with access to Western military support, Ukraine now appears positioned to sustain this fight. The Russian campaign floundered not just because it pursued unrealistic political goals, but also because the plan for the invasion did not account for the choices made on force structure, and the limitations they imposed. Russian force employment exacerbated the disadvantages inherent in the force they built. Currently, Russia lacks the manpower to rotate current forces on the battlefield or to conduct further offensives beyond the current campaign in the Donbas. However, Russian forces do appear to enjoy a local-force advantage in the Donbas, and overall long-term challenges raised here may not impede Russian progress in the short term. Much is contingent, and this assessment is not meant to be deterministic.
The arguments we make here are preliminary, and not meant to be predictive of the outcome of battles in the Donbas, or the course of this war. However, contemporary debates on force structure and military strategy would benefit greatly by looking at the choices the Russian military made and how they ended up in this position. There’s much to be said about the primacy of political assumptions, which is one of the most decisive factors in how the Russian armed forces were initially thrown into this war, but equally, it is structural choices that have limited its military’s ability to adjust and sustain combat operations.
Michael Kofman is director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA and a fellow at the Center for New American Security.
Rob Lee is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. He is a Ph.D. student researching Russian defense policy at King’s College London’s War Studies Department and a former Marine infantry officer.
17. US military may need innovation overhaul to fight future wars, Milley says
Platforms, systems and technology versus manpower, training, and education. How do we find the sweet spot between the two?
We need to not only be able to outfight our adversaries but outthink them too.
We need just as much innovation in the human domain as we do in the technological domain.
US military may need innovation overhaul to fight future wars, Milley says
LONDON ― The U.S. military may need to reorganize to fight future wars, which will be profoundly changed by artificial intelligence, robotics and other advanced technologies, according to Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The nation’s top military officer said during a trip to Europe this week that he’s working on recommendations that could lead to a high-level reorganization. After launching Army Futures Command in 2018 to drive modernization when he was that service’s chief of staff, Milley said he’s mulling a similar effort for the joint force.
“You’re going to have to do really fundamental changes to our military in order to take advantage of this change in the character of war. In order to do that, you need organizations to drive that,” he told reporters. “You look at what the Army did with Army Futures Command, for example. Can that be done at the joint level, at the DoD level?”
How Army Futures Command could be adapted across the services, which have innovation efforts of their own, is unclear, and Milley wasn’t ready to say whether he’d be proposing an umbrella “Joint Futures Command.” Army civilian leaders have moved some of the service’s command’s powers back to its senior civilian acquisitions office, though it shepherded 24 modernization programs since its inception.
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Four years into Army Futures Command, experts say the effort is on track, but they warn that leadership changes, potential budget cuts and a few contracting and technological hiccups could put it at risk.
The comments follow a warning he gave graduating cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point last week that the military’s technological edge is in danger. No longer the unchallenged global power, America is being tested in Europe by Russian aggression and in Asia by China’s dramatic economic and military growth.
“We’re going to have to really think hard about fundamental shifts to our military,” Milley said in London. “The country that maximizes development of these technologies with their doctrines and organizations, in the time we have available, could be decisive in the next conflict ... I would suggest, in 10 to 15 years, you have to do these fundamental changes.”
The Pentagon has been trumpeting its stepped up investments in emerging technologies and last week made its latest tech-focused organizational move. An Emerging Capabilities Policy Office will help integrate autonomous systems, hypersonic tech, directed-energy weapons, and other innovations into the department strategy, planning guidance and budget processes.
The principal military advisor to the president and the secretary of defense, Milley said he is also thinking through the implications of emerging technologies, following the lead of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. The military is examining options for operational design and structure of the force ― its brigades, divisions and fleets ― but also its institutions.
“The institutions we have today may or may not be optimally designed to leverage these technologies,” he said.
Drawing a parallel with the horse bit and stirrups that allowed for mounted warfare some 3,000 years ago, Milley said that the existing technology behind Fitbits and iPhones allow soldiers to sense their environment like never before while accurate, long-range precision munitions let them destroy targets like never before.
Coupled with AI’s potential to speed battlefield decision-making and the robotics and the autonomous technologies that are transforming the character of labor, militaries and warfare could be entirely transformed. Trucking, which is already adapting to driverless vehicles, and other industries that lend themselves to robotics will fundamentally change, Milley said.
“With respect to the military, that’s no less true. We have a wide variety of tasks that can be and probably will be conducted by some form of robot,” he said. “The unmanned aerial vehicle is an example, but you could see in the future, pilotless air forces ― manned/unmanned teaming where you have one aircraft that’s got a human in it and the rest of the squadron are robots.
“You could see tank formations where maybe one armored vehicle is manned and the rest are robotic,” Milley said. “You could see a sailor-less Navy where one or two ships are command-type ships and the rest are all robotic ships.”
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“There’s enough technology in existence from programs that we’ve already conducted, it convinces me that’s not a crazy idea,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said.
With the potential to reduce casualties and manpower costs, and revamp logistics, the implications are “almost infinite,” he said, adding that the Pentagon should be investing in those technologies, and changing the concepts of how it fights, its doctrine, organizations, leadership development.
“I believe we that we are in a fundamental change in the character of war, and by that I mean how you fight, where you fight, the doctrine, the equipment, the tactics, techniques and procedures, and so on,” Milley said. “We’re in the middle of a real, unbelievable fundamental change, which is probably the biggest fundamental change in the history of warfare.”
With Jen Judson in Washington, D.C.
Joe Gould is senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry.
18. U.S., Taiwan to launch trade talks after island excluded from Indo-Pacific group
I would establish a Northeast Asia Economic Coordination Center in Taiwan.
U.S., Taiwan to launch trade talks after island excluded from Indo-Pacific group
WASHINGTON, June 1 (Reuters) - The United States will launch new trade talks with Taiwan, U.S. officials said on Wednesday, just days after the Biden administration excluded the Chinese-claimed island from its Asia-focused economic plan designed to counter China's growing influence.
Washington and Taipei will "move quickly to develop a roadmap" for the planned U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade in the coming weeks, which would be followed by in-person meetings in the U.S. capital later in June, two senior U.S. administration officials told reporters during a phone briefing.
The initiative would aim to "reach an agreement with high standard commitments that create inclusive and durable prosperity" on issues that include customs facilitation, fighting corruption, common standards on digital trade, labor rights, high environmental standards, and efforts to curb state-owned enterprises and non-market practices, one of the U.S. officials said.
The bilateral initiative in some ways parallels U.S. President Joe Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an economic partnership with 13 Asian countries that he launched last week during a visit to Seoul and Tokyo. But the United States did not invite democratically self-governed Taiwan to join the IPEF talks.
Countries approached by Washington were reluctant to join a grouping with the island for fear of angering Beijing, according to a U.S. official involved in the initial talks. Over 200 members of the U.S. Congress had urged Taiwan's inclusion in IPEF. read more
The announcement on Taiwan talks came after a virtual meeting on Wednesday between Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Sarah Bianchi and Taiwan's chief trade negotiator John Deng.
Speaking in Taipei, Deng said they hoped there would be an opportunity soon to seal a free trade deal that Taiwan has long sought with the United States, adding the island was also still striving to participate in the IPEF.
The talks with Taiwan, led for Washington by the U.S. Trade Representative's office, would supplement several existing dialogues with the island, including one led by the Commerce Department on export controls and other supply chain issues, the U.S. official said.
NO TARIFF CUTS, 'MARKET ACCESS'
Like IPEF, the initiative with Taiwan would not need congressional approval because it will not include market access requirements or reduced tariffs, the official added. The so-called U.S. "fast track" negotiating authority for major trade agreements expired in July 2021, and the Biden administration has not asked Congress to renew it.
"We think there's a lot of robust areas that we can cover, that would really deepen our economic engagement, our economic ties, without dealing with market access issues. But of course, obviously, we're not ruling anything out for the future," the official said.
A second official said the new initiative added to other efforts to "highlight the U.S. commitment to the region, specifically economically."
The United States had lacked an economic pillar to its Indo-Pacific engagement since former President Donald Trump quit a multinational trans-Pacific trade agreement, in part out of concern over U.S. jobs.
But trade experts have questioned whether Washington could build momentum behind any framework that didn't offer increased access to the U.S. market.
The United States doesn't have official relations with Taiwan, a major producer of semiconductors, but has been stepping up engagement with the island as China seeks to isolate it from global institutions.
Matthew Goodman, a trade expert at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, said there was significant content overlap between the Taiwan initiative and IPEF.
"I think it's reasonable to conclude that, yes, the administration is looking at this initiative with Taiwan as a possible parallel pathway to its ultimate participation in IPEF itself," Goodman said, adding that U.S. officials were unlikely to emphasize it publicly.
Reporting by David Lawder and Michael Martina; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei and Trevor Hunnicutt in Washington; Editing by Kim Coghill and Mark Potter
19. Laydown of US troops in Europe will depend on how Ukraine war ends
Does Ukraine render the last Global Force Posture review obsolete? What will be the balance between Europe and Asia?
Personally I would like to see a greater overseas presence through the stationing of US forces. I would have two thirds forward stationed, especially forces such as SOF as well as critical enabling infrastructure for generating combat power in Europe and Asia. I would forward stationed 2/3 of US SOF at least the SOF that is primarily focused on special warfare and irregular warfare activities.
We forget that this is Army doctrine in ADP 3-05 Army Special Operations:
Special Warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.
Forces conducting these activities are much more useful and effective when forward stationed.
Laydown of US troops in Europe will depend on how Ukraine war ends
The number of American troops stationed in Europe has swelled from 80,000 to nearly 100,000 this year, as Russian’s invasion of Ukraine has thrown the continent’s security into turmoil, and there’s a possibility that this increased presence could last beyond the war.
This heightened urgency has forced the U.S. to take a look at its Europe force posture, weighing the requests of NATO countries against the conditions on the ground. That last part is going to be a sticking point going forward.
“Obviously, these countries have legitimate security concerns, particularly if Russia decides to keep ― you know, before Feb. 24, Russia had 30,000 troops in Belarus ― we’ll have to see how Ukraine proceeds, what Russia leaves either in Ukraine or in Belarus,” Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, told Military Times on Wednesday during a Defense Writers Group event.
The Biden administration has repeatedly voiced its wishes that the war will end with all of Russia’s forces expelled from Ukraine.
“We hope Russia will stop the war, or leave Ukraine, not keep any weapons or troops in Belarus,” Smith said. “But there are open-ended questions for these allies about their security, depending on how things progress inside Ukraine.”
RELATED
The Western response to Russian’s “brutal” war in Ukraine shows the world is aligning not on geography, “but in terms of values," the president told newly commissioned ensigns and second lieutenants.
Military officials have offered a range of possibilities for the troop presence in Europe. The temporary deployments of thousands of troops earlier this year have been extended. But the discussion about raising the number of permanently based troops above 80,000 has been going on since last year.
Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, currently the head of U.S. Europe Command, told lawmakers in March that he has pushed for a plus-up.
“It’s got to change,” he said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing. “And certainly, this is an opportunity, as a result of this senseless act on behalf of Russia, to reexamine the permanent military architecture that exists not only in Eastern Europe, but in our air policing activity, in aviation and in our standing naval maritime groups.”
His nominated successor, Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, told senators in May that he expects some additional movements, especially if Finland and Sweden enter NATO.
“I think exercises and occasional presence, like we do with any ally, will increase,” he said.
But he shied away from the discussion of permanently basing more troops in Europe, which requires a host of infrastructure to support not only service members, but also their families.
Instead, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs suggested earlier this year, there may be more rotational forces.
“My advice would be to create permanent bases, but don’t permanently station,” Army Gen. Mark Milley told HASC in April. “So you get the effect of permanence by rotational forces cycling through permanent bases.”
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. Follow on Twitter @Meghann_MT
20. FBI director blames Iran for 'despicable' attempted cyberattack on Boston Children's Hospital
Excerpts:
The FBI was able to help thwart the hackers before they did damage to the hospital’s computer network, according to Wray, but he cited it as an example of the potential high-impact hacking threats that the US faces from the governments of Iran, Russia, China and North Korea.
“We cannot let up on China or Iran or criminal syndicates while we’re focused on Russia,” Wray said in a speech at Boston College.
The hack, which took place in June 2021, saw the attackers exploit popular software made by California-based firm Fortinet to control the hospital’s computer network, according to US officials.
FBI director blames Iran for 'despicable' attempted cyberattack on Boston Children's Hospital | CNN Politics
CNN · by Sean Lyngaas · June 1, 2022
CNN —
Iranian government-backed hackers were behind an attempted hack of the Boston Children’s Hospital computer network last year, FBI Director Christopher Wray alleged Wednesday, calling it “one of the most despicable cyberattacks I’ve ever seen.”
The FBI was able to help thwart the hackers before they did damage to the hospital’s computer network, according to Wray, but he cited it as an example of the potential high-impact hacking threats that the US faces from the governments of Iran, Russia, China and North Korea.
“We cannot let up on China or Iran or criminal syndicates while we’re focused on Russia,” Wray said in a speech at Boston College.
The hack, which took place in June 2021, saw the attackers exploit popular software made by California-based firm Fortinet to control the hospital’s computer network, according to US officials.
It’s unclear what the ultimate goals of the attackers were. Boston Children’s Hospital is a more than 400-bed facility and is considered one of the premier pediatric centers in the US.
Wray had previously said in March that the Iranian government-linked hackers were behind a cyberattack on a children’s hospital, but he didn’t name the hospital.
CNN has requested comment from the hospital and from Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations.
The incident was one of several that prompted a public warning last November from the FBI and other agencies that Iranian government-backed hackers were targeting a range of organizations across the transportation and health care sectors.
It was a rare case of the US government publicly linking Iran with ransomware, which is typically used by cybercriminals rather than governments. But US officials and private analysts have long warned of collusion between foreign governments and criminal hacking groups.
When it comes to potential Russian hacking threats to the US, the FBI has been on a “combat tempo,” with a 24/7 command post, during the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, Wray added.
“We’ve seen the Russian government taking specific preparatory steps towards potential destructive [cyber]attacks, both here and abroad,” he added.
Such a “destructive” hack — in which data or systems are destroyed — hasn’t been reported in the US since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But suspected Russian hackers have conducted a slew of destructive hacks in Ukraine, and US officials are warning business to let their guard down.
The same network access gained by Russian operatives to collect intelligence could be used for a destructive hack, Wray warned. “That’s why, when it comes to Russia today, we’re focused on acting as early – as far ‘left of boom,’ as they say – as we can.”
“We’re watching for their cyber activities to become more destructive as the war keeps going poorly for them,” Wray said Wednesday.
CNN · by Sean Lyngaas · June 1, 2022
21. Biden’s pledge to send rocket systems to Ukraine is no silver bullet
There are no silver bullets in war.
It seems that too often we forget the laws of physics: Time and Distance. It takes time to deploy these systems over long distance. And it takes time to train soldiers on new systems (though I know the Ukrainians are fast learners and highly motivated). But, again, think if we have deployed these systems months (or even years ago).
Biden’s pledge to send rocket systems to Ukraine is no silver bullet
Analysis: the long-delayed US deal offers just four systems that will take weeks to become operational, suggesting concerns about imposing a heavy defeat on Putin
The Himars (High mobility artillery rocket system) and the ammunition that Washington is sending with them, will allow Ukrainian forces to hit targets nearly 80km away with high accuracy. That’s twice the range of the US howitzers they have now, and about the same as the most powerful Russian rocket systems. US officials suggested they would help turn the withering artillery duel underway in the Donbas into a fairer fight.
However, the small print of the deal was underwhelming. This first Himars delivery comprises just four systems, and although they have been pre-positioned in the region for fast delivery, it will take three weeks to train Ukrainian gunners to use them, and another two weeks to train maintenance crews.
In the meantime, Russian artillery is blanketing Ukrainian positions in the east. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in an interview on Wednesday that up to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are being killed a day and another 500 are wounded. Without stand-off weapons that can target the Russian guns from afar, Ukrainian lines are being pummelled and national morale, one of the decisive factors in the successful defence of Kyiv, is also taking a beating.
Zelenskiy’s government has been screaming for multiple launch rockets for weeks, as it became clear that the battle for the east and south had become one of attrition, so why did it take this long for Biden to make the decision to respond?
Amanda Sloat, the senior director for Europe in the National Security Council (NSC) insisted the administration had been as responsive to Ukrainian military needs as possible but timing had been determined in part by a congressional vote to approve a $40bn aid package for Ukraine.
“Once we got the additional funding from Congress, which was provided on a very solid bipartisan basis, the administration moved quickly in response to the Ukrainians latest request,” Sloat told PBS television.
The bill was passed by the Senate on 19 May and then was hand-carried by an aide on a commercial flight to Seoul where Biden was on an east Asia trip so he could sign it into law as quickly as possible.
However it took another 10 days to make the critical decision, and judging by the leaks from inside the administration, there was a debate over whether to hand over the Himars and over what kind of range to provide.
The underlying concerns were evident in Biden’s op-ed comment piece for the New York Times that coincided with the Himars announcement on Tuesday evening.
The president’s emphasis was on setting parameters for the US involvement in the war. It was titled “What America will and will not do in Ukraine”, and aimed at diplomatic signalling to contain the risk of an escalation of the conflict into a Russia-Nato war.
“As much as I disagree with Mr Putin, and find his actions an outrage, the United States will not try to bring about his ouster in Moscow,” Biden said, as a corrective to his off-the-cuff remark in March that the Russian despot “cannot remain in power”.
Furthermore, the Himars come with strings attached. They cannot be fired into Russian territory, and the very long range munitions have been denied to Kyiv, to help ensure that does not happen.
Biden has made clear that he will not allow a catastrophic failure of Ukrainian defences, but it is just as evident he has concerns about the implications of catastrophic success, a rout of Russian forces with the decisive help of western weapons, bringing with it the danger of a defeated Putin lashing out.
Despite the Kremlin’s near-incessant nuclear sabre-rattling, Biden reassured Americans that: “We currently see no indication that Russia has intent to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.”
However, Biden’s director of national intelligence, Avril Haines, told Congress last month that Putin could reach for the nuclear arsenal if he felt he was losing the war in Ukraine. If he did take that desperate path, Biden warned in his commentary, it “would entail severe consequences”.
What the president did not say was that the US would “respond in kind”, the phrase he mistakenly used in March in reference to the possibility of a Russian chemical weapons attack.
Few believe that the US would respond with a nuclear weapon to a “demonstration detonation” by the Russians, over the sea for instance. During the Obama administration, the National Security Council conducted a war game in similar circumstances and decided that a non-nuclear response was the best of bad options.
In any case, catastrophic success looks a long way off for the Ukrainians right now as they continue to lose territory slowly, and their soldiers considerably faster.
The weapons the US is sending will staunch the losses but not decisively turn the tables.
“No system is going to turn the war,” Colin Kahl, the under secretary of defence for policy, said on Tuesday. “This is a battle of national will. You have ... hundreds of thousands of men mobilised on each side. It is a grinding, hard conflict, and it’s likely to be a conflict [which] will stretch on for a long time.”
22. FDD | Enlist Quad, France to take China on in the South Pacific
Excerpts:
Australia should be willing to work with a wide range of partners in the region, depending on the needs of the island country involved, without feeling threatened. While there are many partners to work with, in many ways, Australia doesn’t have to lead, do it alone, or even be there if someone else can do it better.
The people of the Pacific want democracy, transparency, accountability and rule of law. From there, they can build their economies and become islands of stability in a free and open Indo-Pacific, benefiting all. We should be working flexibly, with like-minded countries, to use our strengths in an appropriate and co-ordinated manner to reinforce each other’s weaknesses. It’s that sort of burden sharing that truly scares Beijing and gives hope to the people of the Pacific and far beyond.
FDD | Enlist Quad, France to take China on in the South Pacific
Anthony Bergin
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Cleo Paskal
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
fdd.org · by Cleo Paskal Non-Resident Senior Fellow · June 1, 2022
In the recent statement from the Quad meeting in Tokyo, a grouping consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the US, the Pacific Islands feature prominently. Each of the Quad members have their own unique track records and capabilities to contribute.
From June through to October Japanese naval ships will make port calls to seven Pacific island countries. But perhaps Japan can be persuaded to become even more engaged, especially in the Micronesian zone, where three of the five countries (Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau) have free association agreements with the US, and three (Marshall Islands, Nauru and Palau) recognize Taiwan. It’s no accident that of the five Micronesian countries, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi only landed in one, Kiribati, on his recent tour.
Japan should co-operate more in surveillance of various island exclusive economic zones. The Palau marine surveillance co-ordination center that Japan supports could, for example, become one of the fusion centers for the flagship Quad partnership for maritime domain awareness through which risks to undersea cables and other maritime crimes could be evaluated.
Similarly, Australia should work more with the US in Micronesia. If the US is able to capitalize on Palau’s offer to Washington to establish a base, then we should offer some military assets there. Australia is now building 12 offshore patrol vessels. There could be a rotational access of say four OPVs through the area. Being in-country, buying provisions from local shops and building people-to-people ties goes a long way. We should also be working more with the US on Guam, the centerpiece of US-led north Pacific security.
More broadly, there’s a wide range of possibilities to work with the US. Australian and US defense forces could deliver health assistance to the islands with regular rotation of teams of military clinicians through host-nation hospitals for around four weeks each, incorporating local training along the way. If requested to assist, we should encourage our engineering firms to work with the islands in land reclamation. Given the importance of maritime transport and safety in the Pacific, we should team with the US and possibly South Korea to design and construct safe ferries to be operated under the islands’ ownership. Taiwan can help with IT and perhaps EEZ surveillance.
France is a key Pacific player with nearly 3000 defense personnel in the region. We need to get our relationship back on track for that reason alone. These forces protect French territories and offshore zones, as well assist in disaster response. France plays an important role in the South Pacific defense ministers meeting. We should enhance co-operation with France in fisheries surveillance and patrolling the high seas.
India is well placed to play a bigger role in creating options for the island states. China’s expansion is largely achieved through political warfare. That’s a battlefield on which India has proven skills: India has helped its neighbors weaken China’s grasp on their economies and elites, including in Maldives and Nepal.
Maritime security training could be facilitated with India’s new theatre command, and through that with the Quad. Exchanges with Indian MPs and island parliaments would build understanding and contribute to pushing back on China’s attempts to shape and control international rules and norms.
Daniel Suidani, the Premier of Malaita, the most popular province in Solomon Islands, recently pointed out that China wants to work with Solomon Islands on policing and centralization of control, but that policing won’t bring us development. Rather he argued that we have a lot to gain from working more closely with India. It innovates and leads in so many sectors, including affordable healthcare, education, pharmaceuticals, IT, communications satellites and so much more, all the while being vibrant, open, and diverse. We feel a natural warmth towards India.
Australia should be willing to work with a wide range of partners in the region, depending on the needs of the island country involved, without feeling threatened. While there are many partners to work with, in many ways, Australia doesn’t have to lead, do it alone, or even be there if someone else can do it better.
The people of the Pacific want democracy, transparency, accountability and rule of law. From there, they can build their economies and become islands of stability in a free and open Indo-Pacific, benefiting all. We should be working flexibly, with like-minded countries, to use our strengths in an appropriate and co-ordinated manner to reinforce each other’s weaknesses. It’s that sort of burden sharing that truly scares Beijing and gives hope to the people of the Pacific and far beyond.
Anthony Bergin is a senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Cleo Paskal is a non-resident senior fellow for the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington D.C. Follow Cleo on Twitter @CleoPaskal. FDD is a non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Cleo Paskal Non-Resident Senior Fellow · June 1, 2022
23. FDD | The War in Ukraine and the Western Balkans
FDD | The War in Ukraine and the Western Balkans
fdd.org · by Ivana Stradner Advisor · May 31, 2022
Excerpt
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine is merely a continuation of the war it began 2014. Although he thought he would be able to seize Kyiv in a matter of days and install a pro-Kremlin regime, he likely miscalculated his military capabilities and the resolve of the Ukrainian army. Putin is now focusing on the next phase of Russia’s war, which focuses on the Donbas region. Given Russia’s military shortcomings in Ukraine, many in the West are already celebrating his failure. However, it is too early to do so, in part because Putin still has a powerful non-military tool at his disposal: information weapons. Russia has intensively used these information weapons since Putin came to power, and it is searching for weak links to distract the West. In particular, Russia is exploiting Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkans as potential new avenues to undermine Europe where Russia resorts to its well-known playbook of exploiting existing divisions and exacerbating secessionist tensions. The war in Ukraine also has an impact on the Western Balkans and the West should look for early warnings in the information space, as they are good indicators of Russia’s moves. Understanding these operations is essential in shaping an appropriate response from the West. That response must actively challenge and counter Russia’s information operations in the Western Balkans.
THE WAR IN UKRAINE
Russia launched its illegal invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which is the continuation of Russia’s war since 2014. The initial Russian offensive consisted of 4 main advances: on Kiev from the North, on Kharkiv from the Northeast, on Donbass from the East, and on Kherson/Mariupol from the South. Russia’s advance on Kiev reached the outskirts of the city, but failed to take the capital city. Russia’s advance on Kharkiv similarly failed to advance beyond the outskirts of the city. Russia’s offensive in Donbass succeeded in reaching Mariupol from the East, but failed to achieve a broader breakout. Russia’s offensive in the South was the most successful, capturing Kherson and reaching and capturing Mariupol from the West.
Russia retreated back to the Belarusian border from its failed assault on Kiev in late March, and retreated from its failed assault of Kharkiv in early May. Russia then redirected those troops to the Donbass front where it began the second phase of its offensive. With much more limited war aims, Russia is currently attempting to seize the entirety of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. Despite the increased concentration of Russian forces in the Donbass, Russian troops are making slow and limited gains. A recent breakthrough near Papsna may allow Russian forces to encircle the large Ukrainian city of Severodonetsk. However, even if Russia seizes these cities, they still have to capture the well-defended cities of Slavyansk and Kramotorsk to seize the entirety of the Donbass. If the rest of this war is anything to go by, achieving this task will be a long and bloody affair.
How did we get to this point in the war in Ukraine? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should not surprise the West given that Putin has been working on his goals for more than two decades. The West failed to counter Russian hybrid wars and actively challenge Moscow’s information operations. The West has taken numerous defensive measures to prevent Russia from interfering in their elections or manipulating the information space. However, the West did not use offensive information measures to counter Russian information operations globally. The West also failed to constrain Putin’s financial illicit activities and global corruption. The West also naively treated Putin as a partner and allowed him to escalate military tensions and then de-escalate the crisis that he manufactured by positioning Russia as a mediator.
PUTIN’S GOALS AND THE WESTERN BALKANS
Putin described the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, which prevented Russia from remaining one of the world’s great powers. During his two-decade tenure, Putin has worked to restore a multipolar world. Putin also wants to recreate a sphere of influence within the former Soviet Union and control his near-abroad, especially Ukraine and Belarus. Putin has also aimed to break NATO and demonstrate that the alliance will not honor its Article 5 commitment to its members. Although Russia does not have a “grand strategy” for the Western Balkans, the region is Europe’s weak link and it is part of Moscow’s game. Putin has no intention of occupying the Western Balkans. Putin wants to profit from creating the risks of conflict in the Western Balkans and then de-escalating the crisis he created by positioning himself as a mediator.
Given the ethnic and religious differences rife among the Western Balkan states, Putin understands well that a “divide and conquer” strategy works well in the region. Putin’s campaign in the Western Balkans is a case study of the methods it uses to pursue its global objectives. Now that the Kremlin is using those differences to trigger new tensions via its proxies in the Western Balkans, continued peace in the region is no longer a guarantee. Russia’s “modern war” and “nonmilitary methods” playbook is well-known – It includes demonstrations, sabotage or subversion accompanied with the information campaign. This is a prelude to Russia’s mediation process and conducting peacekeeping operations.
Why does Putin continue to push the region to the brink? Because doing so allows him to accomplish three of his chief foreign policy objectives in one fell swoop: to invalidate the collective self-defense of NATO, to weaken the EU; and to distract the West from the war in Ukraine. By successfully escalating tensions in the Western Balkans towards outright violence, Putin can functionally demonstrate that neither NATO, the EU, nor their constituent societies are credible partners for any of the peoples of the region.
Dr. Ivana Stradner serves as an advisor to FDD’s Barish Center for Media Integrity, where her research focuses on Russia’s information operations and cybersecurity, particularly Russia’s use of advanced forms of hybrid warfare and the threat they pose to the West. Ivana studies Russia’s security strategies and military doctrines to understand how Russia uses information operations for strategic communication. Ivana also analyzes Russian influence in international organizations. Follow her on Twitter @ivanastradner. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Ivana Stradner Advisor · May 31, 2022
24. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Stavridis: Zelenskyy beats Putin on military calculus
Excerpts:
Understanding yourself truly is the work of a lifetime, and Zelenskyy has shown us that kind of vital inner knowledge and confidence. Every life and career is a string of both successes and failures, but the common thread is the resilience to continue the voyage. Zelenskyy seems to have fully inculcated this level of self-knowledge, from the moment he shed his suits and ties and donned military-green garb for the duration for the war.
Often, the greatest rewards of our lives stem from those moments of the greatest risk. Napoleon said, "
A leader is a dealer in hope." Zelenskyy is very much that kind of leader. Like him, we should all strive to be the kind of person who knows what we value and who understands who we are, long before the crisis comes.
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Stavridis: Zelenskyy beats Putin on military calculus
USA Today · by James Stavridis | Former NATO commander
I believe that the Ukrainian leader has demonstrated a far better grasp on the crucial calculus of risk and reward.
Show Caption
Hide Caption
Senate approves $40 billion in weapons, food aid to Ukraine
The bill now heads to President Joe Biden for his signature. This is triple the amount of aid the U.S. has already committed to Ukraine for the war.
Staff Video, Associated Press
As Russia's war against Ukraine grinds on into its third brutal month, it is clearly a battle not only of blood and treasure in the fields, cities and skies of Ukraine, but also a very personal contest between Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
They are locked into a battle of wills, and each has made a calculation about the level of risk they and their nations are willing to absorb.
After a lifetime of thinking about risk in the context of military operations, I believe that Zelenskyy has demonstrated a far better grasp on the crucial calculus of risk and reward. What can we learn from his performance about the decisions we need to make in our own lives?
Zelenskyy went into this war knowing what he'd risk
To understand risk and decision, you must accomplish something relatively straightforward: knowing what you value. The time to figure out what you value is not when the storm is blowing at full strength, like mad King Lear finally did. The time to understand what you value is when the sun is still shining before the crisis descends. And most of all, you need to answer to the question, “For what are you willing, quite literally, to risk it all?”
Don’t answer too quickly.
If I’ve learned anything along the long voyage of my life, it is that you really don’t know what you value until you are faced with a very stark choice about losing it. That applies to a job, a friend, a spouse, a nation, an idea or anything else that really matters to you. Zelenskyy went into this war clearly knowing exactly what he valued.
Today, we watch a brave and free people in Ukraine make those brutally stark choices every day. Faced with a ruthless, implacable and immoral foe in the Russian dictator, the Ukrainian people have made the hardest of choices to stand and defend their nation. Zelenskyy is the personification of their will and spirit, the true center of gravity of this war.
When Ukrainian citizens go to fight on what literally have become the front lines of freedom, they must pause and look over their shoulder. Behind them they see their children, spouses, parents and elders. Their cities, many shattered by indiscriminate and illegal bombing. Their civilization and their language. They know what they value.
A year or so ago, most of them would not have contemplated standing on those front lines, quite literally risking it all. But in life, everything can change forever in an instant. It can happen to you and with little or no warning, in a medical emergency, a mass shooting, a crisis at work, or for those who have chosen a military career in a combat deployment. When it happens, the choices are narrow.
Time seems to slow down and speed up simultaneously, and the moment is full of risk. Be ready. Think of those ordinary Ukrainians, not unlike their heroic president, suddenly thrust into making choices about risk and doubling down on what truly matters to each of them. Know what you value before the moment of crisis.
Ukrainian leader shows inner knowledge, confidence
The second point is also deceptively simple: Know yourself. The ancient Greeks carved those words, which they believed lay at the heart of a life well lived, on the high walls of the great temple of Apollo at Delphi. We all think we know who we are, but until a moment of real risk comes, we really don’t know what lies in the deepest part of our hearts.
Understanding yourself truly is the work of a lifetime, and Zelenskyy has shown us that kind of vital inner knowledge and confidence. Every life and career is a string of both successes and failures, but the common thread is the resilience to continue the voyage. Zelenskyy seems to have fully inculcated this level of self-knowledge, from the moment he shed his suits and ties and donned military-green garb for the duration for the war.
Often, the greatest rewards of our lives stem from those moments of the greatest risk. Napoleon said, "A leader is a dealer in hope." Zelenskyy is very much that kind of leader. Like him, we should all strive to be the kind of person who knows what we value and who understands who we are, long before the crisis comes.
Retired Adm. James Stavridis was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO. This essay is adapted from his graduation address to the class of 2022 at The Citadel. His twelfth book is “To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision.”
USA Today · by James Stavridis | Former NATO commander
25. Western Support for Ukraine Has Peaked
Excerpts:
Russia will note and be delighted by increasing fissures between Ukraine and its supporters. But Putin should not take too much comfort in what he sees. The sanctions his country faces are uniquely sticky: They’re not likely to quickly go away, regardless of whether the United States sends long-range missiles or just shorter-range rockets to Ukraine. And losses in the junior ranks of Russia’s officer corps alone tell the story of an army flirting with combat ineffectiveness. Russia is capable of absorbing immense pain on the battlefield, but despite minor territorial gains, its strategic situation has not improved.
Ukraine, for its part, may decide that although an uneasy truce by the early fall might not be an acceptable final settlement, it would nevertheless allow it to stiffen its defenses in the east, where the terrain favors Russian armor and artillery, and refit its own exhausted combat units. Such a truce would also give the brutal sanctions on Russia more time to weigh on the minds of Russian leaders. And an armistice, even if temporary, would no doubt be quietly welcomed in Western capitals.
Western Support for Ukraine Has Peaked
The honeymoon that Ukraine’s leaders have enjoyed with the West will not last.
We’ve likely reached the high-water mark of the grand alliance to defeat Russia in Ukraine. In the coming months, relations between the Ukrainian leadership and its external supporters will grow strained, and the culprit will be economic pain exacerbated by the war.
When our children and grandchildren study this conflict, they will marvel at the speed and audacity with which the Western powers—Europe and the United States, primarily—mobilized to arm the Ukrainian people in the face of Russia’s onslaught. In stark contrast to the Winter War of 1939–40, when Russia invaded Finland and various Western powers hemmed and hawed before providing only token assistance to the plucky Finns, Europeans have fallen over themselves to provide lethal aid to the Ukrainians.
And it really is lethal aid, which amazes me: I had the misfortune of helping deconflict allied and Russian operations over Syria from 2015 through 2017, when we went to extraordinary lengths to avoid killing any Russians, for fear of starting World War III.
Today, meanwhile, we are sending some of our most advanced anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons systems to the Ukrainians with the express purpose of killing as many Russians as possible. Not only the United States but the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden—Sweden!—were quick to provide anti-tank weapons. Sweden and Finland, meanwhile, seem likely to join NATO at the first available opportunity (and once Turkey’s demands on arms sales and the Kurds are met).
The remarkable Western response confirms the extent of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s miscalculation, but it also stands in stark contrast to the way the West handled previous Russian military offensives in Georgia, in 2008, and Ukraine, in 2014. In each of those conflicts, the European states dragged their feet before imposing any costs on Russia. That reluctance to take any action almost certainly informed Russian calculations prior to this latest offensive.
The war has now dragged on for months, though, and shows no signs of stopping anytime soon. As the British strategist Lawrence Freedman observed, you could detect the outlines of what Russia might settle for in Putin’s May 9 speech to commemorate the Allied victory in World War II: protection of Crimea; nothing that could be characterized as Ukrainian aggression in the Donbas region; and a guarantee that Ukraine will not host nuclear weapons on its soil.
But Ukraine is unlikely, in the extreme, to settle for any territorial concessions. The Ukrainians must also sense, recent losses notwithstanding, that they can still win this war.
So Ukraine continues to press its Western allies for more support. What it wants now, however, is the kind of support that it would need to not only resist Russian advances but also win back territory and duel with Russia’s powerful artillery. The Biden administration is more reluctant to provide this aid, and it is hard to see other countries getting much further out ahead than the Americans.
All of that pain makes this a really crummy time to be a democratically elected incumbent almost anywhere in the world—and a very good time to be a populist. Recent elections in Colombia, France, Australia, and Germany have illustrated the headwinds facing both incumbents and mainstream parties.
The twin pressures of an ailing economy and surging populism will be on the minds of Western decision makers as they wrestle with a war that will continue to take a toll on the world’s leading economies.
For that reason, the conversations between Ukraine and its supporters abroad are likely to grow harder, not easier, as the year progresses. Ukraine will come under more pressure, and not just from Henry Kissinger, to concede some territory and allow Russia to save face.
Even a hasty termination of the conflict, however, seems unlikely to arrest the world’s slide into greater economic pain. Putin’s war, of course, has little to do with China’s zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy or the efficiency of West Coast ports. Yet the war—like all wars—captivates the imagination of onlookers in a way that port operations never seem to do. The grumbling from Western capitals about the duration of this conflict will continue, and the honeymoon that Ukraine’s leaders have enjoyed with the West will end soon.
Russia will note and be delighted by increasing fissures between Ukraine and its supporters. But Putin should not take too much comfort in what he sees. The sanctions his country faces are uniquely sticky: They’re not likely to quickly go away, regardless of whether the United States sends long-range missiles or just shorter-range rockets to Ukraine. And losses in the junior ranks of Russia’s officer corps alone tell the story of an army flirting with combat ineffectiveness. Russia is capable of absorbing immense pain on the battlefield, but despite minor territorial gains, its strategic situation has not improved.
Ukraine, for its part, may decide that although an uneasy truce by the early fall might not be an acceptable final settlement, it would nevertheless allow it to stiffen its defenses in the east, where the terrain favors Russian armor and artillery, and refit its own exhausted combat units. Such a truce would also give the brutal sanctions on Russia more time to weigh on the minds of Russian leaders. And an armistice, even if temporary, would no doubt be quietly welcomed in Western capitals.
26. Putin World Descends Into Fury Over New U.S. Rocket Delivery
Putin is predictable.
Putin World Descends Into Fury Over New U.S. Rocket Delivery
THE AUDACITY
America’s latest gift to Ukraine has the Kremlin accusing the U.S. of adding “fuel to the fire.”
Updated Jun. 01, 2022 4:07PM ET / Published Jun. 01, 2022 3:06PM ET
Photo Illustration by Kelly Caminero / The Daily Beast / Getty
President Joe Biden’s latest plan to send advanced rocket launch systems to Ukraine to help defend against Russian advances is already sending Moscow into a rage.
Ukrainian officials have been pleading for months for the U.S. to send the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which will allow them to better target Russian forces from afar, but the Biden administration had held off on providing them out of a concern that the Kremlin might interpret the transfer as an escalation.
And while administration officials have received assurances from Ukrainian officials that they won’t use weapons they’re receiving from the United States on targets in Russia, Russian officials are already sounding the alarm.
The U.S. Department of Defense formally announced its plan to send Ukraine HIMARS Wednesday as part of the latest $700 million security package for Ukraine. But the Biden administration is only sending medium-range rockets, which can travel nearly 50 miles, according to Army specifications. And while the systems can use longer-range rockets capable of traveling nearly 200 miles, those are not in the mix for the current aid package, administration officials said.
“It’s just a bizarre concept of war.”
Nonetheless, Kremlin officials said they aren’t convinced the Ukrainians won’t strike into Russia.
“We believe that the United States is deliberately and diligently adding fuel to the fire,” Peskov said.
Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to fire missiles throughout Ukraine and attack Ukrainian infrastructure as the war nears its 100th day, according to a Wednesday U.K. intelligence brief.
The hypocrisy of the Kremlin’s fears that Ukraine might fight back is just another example of how Russia wants to have its cake and eat it too, said Steve Pifer, a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.
“It's a very strange war that the Kremlin wants to fight in which the Russians reserved the right to strike a target anywhere in Ukraine, but it's somehow out of bounds for Ukraine to attack targets in Russia,” Pifer, who previously also worked at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, told The Daily Beast.
“If the Russians are trying to define rules of war, where 'we get to strike the other guy whenever we want, and they can’t strike us in certain places,' it’s just a bizarre concept of war—particularly a war that the Russians launched,” Pifer said.
U.S. Defense Undersecretary for Policy Colin Kahl acknowledged Wednesday that there are risks for escalation, but noted that Russia can't have a veto over what the Biden administration sends to Ukraine while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.
“We are mindful of the escalation risks,” Kahl told reporters Wednesday, adding that the United States received guarantees from Ukraine that they would only use the systems defensively. “We are constantly assessing this. But we are not the ones provoking Russia, and Ukraine is not the one provoking Russia. The Russians engaged in this further invasion of Ukraine completely unprovoked.”
Russia’s Foreign Ministry said it is concerned that Ukraine is trying to broaden the war, which Russia continues to claim is just a “special” military operation. Ukrainian leadership’s repeated demands that the West supply weapons and equipment to Ukraine represent an attempt to rope the West into the war, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed Wednesday.
“This is a direct provocation aimed at drawing the West into hostilities,” Lavrov said in Riyadh Wednesday.
Reading between the lines, the Kremlin statements are likely aimed at trying to get the Biden administration to back off from providing support to Ukraine, Pifer said.
“The Russians want to make it look like anything that the West does to support Ukraine is escalatory because they are trying to intimidate the West and dissuade the West from doing that,” Pifer said.
Biden said early this week he hopes that in providing the rocket systems, the Ukrainians will be both better-defended and better able to negotiate peace with Russia. The weapons will increase Ukraine’s ability to “fight on the battlefield and be in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table,” Biden predicted in a New York Times op-ed published Wednesday.
The advanced rocket systems might help Ukraine defend against Russian forces, but Moscow’s response so far indicates that rather than hasten a peace deal, the Kremlin is leaning on the news as a way to further hamper talks.
“Such deliveries do not contribute to the awakening of the desire of the Ukrainian leadership to resume peace talks,” Peskov said.
The Kremlin’s reaction is the latest signal coming from Russia that the war is likely not drawing to a close in the near future. U.S. intelligence officials have said for weeks now that Russia’s war in Ukraine, which is launched in February, is entering a protracted stage and stalemate.
U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken acknowledged Wednesday that the Biden administration is not sure when peace negotiations may begin again, but reiterated the administration’s position is that Russia can choose to end the war whenever it wants.
“It is fully within Russia’s power to stop what they started and to end the aggression. That’s what we seek,” Blinken told reporters Wednesday.
This “could be over tomorrow if Russia chose to end the aggression. We don’t see any signs of that right now,” Blinken said. “As long as this goes on we want to make sure that Ukraine has in hand what it needs to defend itself.”
For now, the State Department assesses the war is set to continue for “many months,” Blinken said.
Although the Kremlin is warning that it sees the new transfer of weapons as a potential threat to Russia, the U.S. intelligence community still doesn’t see Moscow taking any realistic steps towards using nuclear weapons, Biden clarified Monday.
“We currently see no indication that Russia has intent to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, though Russia’s occasional rhetoric to rattle the nuclear saber is itself dangerous and extremely irresponsible,” Biden said in his op-ed.
Lavrov, too, suggested the tensions, for now, aren’t bubbling up into any dramatic escalations with Western countries entering the war at the moment.
“Of course, sane Western politicians are well aware of these risks,” Lavrov said Wednesday.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
