Quotes of the Day:

"Not even a mighty warrior can break a frail arrow when it is multiplied and supported by its fellows. As long as you brothers support one another and render assistance to one another, your enemies can never gain the victory over you. But if you fall away from each other your enemy can break you like frail arrows, one at a time."

- Genghis Khan

"People are like dirt. They can either nourish you and help you grow as a person or they can stunt your growth and make you wilt and die." 

- Plato

"What we observe is not nature herself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning." 

- Werner Heisenberg

1. Blinken and Xi pledge to stabilize deteriorated US-China ties, but China rebuffs the main US request

2. Secretary Blinken’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

3.  When it comes to a war with Taiwan, many Chinese urge caution

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2023

5. Analysis | U.S.-China ties are no longer in freefall, but it’s a rough road ahead

6. Russia attacks Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities in overnight air strikes

7. Beijing Plans a New Training Facility in Cuba, Raising Prospect of Chinese Troops on America’s Doorstep

8. China’s Rebound Hits a Wall, and There Is ‘No Quick Fix’ to Revive It

9. They Were Captured by the Russians. Then the Hardest Fight Began.

10. China Accepts the New Indo-Pacific Reality

11. India’s Modi Sees Unprecedented Trust With U.S., Touts New Delhi’s Leadership Role

12.  Carrier USS Ronald Reagan Now in the South China Sea

13. Where Did We Go Wrong in Afghanistan? (Review of Mike Vickers' new book)

14. Russia Sought to Kill Defector in Florida

15. Inside Phoenix Challenge — the conference series seeking to shape and bolster information operations

16. US DoD moves to secure domestic munitions production

17. Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Leila Fadel of NPR Morning Edition

18. Putin's 'Big Lie' Might Be a Scheme to Exit the Ukraine War

19. The Once and Future Need for SOF in the Great Power Competition

20. A lack of diversity is a national security risk

21. Is it any wonder military recruitment has fallen so dramatically over the past two years?

22. SOCKOR Change of Command June 2023 | SOF News

1. Blinken and Xi pledge to stabilize deteriorated US-China ties, but China rebuffs the main US request

We have to wonder why they are opposed to military to military communications? Is it because we seem to want it so bad? 

Blinken and Xi pledge to stabilize deteriorated US-China ties, but China rebuffs the main US request

AP · by MATTHEW LEE · June 19, 2023

BEIJING (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met on Monday with Chinese President Xi Jinping and said they agreed to “stabilize” badly deteriorated U.S.-China ties, but America’s top diplomat left Beijing with his biggest ask rebuffed: better communications between their militaries.

After meeting Xi, Blinken said China is not ready to resume military-to-military contacts, something the U.S. considers crucial to avoid miscalculation and conflict, particularly over Taiwan.

Still, China’s main diplomat for the Western Hemisphere, Yang Tao, said he thought Blinken’s visit to China “marks a new beginning.”

“The U.S. side is surely aware of why there is difficulty in military-to-military exchanges,” he said, blaming the issue squarely on U.S. sanctions, which Blinken said revolved entirely around threats to American security.

Yet Blinken and Xi pronounced themselves satisfied with progress made during the two days of talks, without pointing to specific areas of agreement beyond a mutual decision to return to a broad agenda for cooperation and competition endorsed last year year by Xi and President Joe Biden at a summit in Bali.

And, it remained unclear if those understandings can resolve their most important disagreements, many of which have international implications. Still, both men said they were pleased with the outcome of the highest-level U.S. visit to China in five years.

The two sides expressed a willingness to hold more talks, but there was little indication that either is prepared to bend from positions on issues including trade, Taiwan, human rights conditions in China and Hong Kong, Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea, and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Blinken said later that the U.S. set limited objectives for the trip and achieved them. He told reporters before leaving for a Ukraine reconstruction conference in London that he had raised the issue of military to military communications “repeatedly.”

“It is absolutely vital that we have these kinds of communications,” he said. “This is something we’re going to keep working on.”

Speaking to reporters Monday during a campaign fundraising trip to California, Biden said Blinken did a “hell of a job.” The president said “you know” progress was made with relations between the U.S. and China because of the meeting.

The U.S. has said that, since 2021, China has declined or failed to respond to over a dozen requests from the Department of Defense for top-level dialogues.

According to a transcript of the meeting with Blinken, Xi said he was pleased with the outcome of Blinken’s earlier meetings with top Chinese diplomats and said restarting the Bali agenda were of great importance.

“The Chinese side has made our position clear, and the two sides have agreed to follow through the common understandings President Biden and I had reached in Bali,” Xi said.

That agenda had been thrown into jeopardy in recent months, notably after the U.S. shot down a Chinese surveillance balloon over its airspace in February, and amid escalated military activity in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Combined with other disputes over human rights, trade and opiate production, the list of problem areas is daunting.

But also Xi suggested the worst could be over.

“The two sides have also made progress and reached agreement on some specific issues,” Xi said without elaborating, according to a transcript of the remarks released by the State Department. “This is very good.”

In his remarks to Xi during the 35-minute session at the Great Hall of the People, a meeting that was expected but not announced until an hour before it started, Blinken said “the United States and China have an obligation and responsibility to manage our relationship.”

“The United States is committed to doing that,” Blinken said. “It’s in the interest of the United States, in the interests of China, and in the interest of the world.”

Blinken described his earlier discussions with senior Chinese officials as “candid and constructive.”

Despite the symbolism of his presence in China, Blinken and other U.S. officials had played down the prospects for any significant breakthroughs on the most vexing issues facing the planet’s two largest economies.

Instead, these officials have emphasized the importance of the two countries establishing and maintaining better lines of communication.

Thus, China’s refusal to resume the military-to-military contacts was a hitch.

“Progress is hard,” Blinken told reporters. “It takes time, it takes more than one visit.”

Blinken’s trip is expected to herald a new round of visits by senior U.S. and Chinese officials to each other’s countries, possibly including a meeting between Xi and Biden in India or the U.S in the coming months.

Before meeting with Xi, Blinken met earlier Monday with China’s top diplomat Wang Yi for about three hours, an encounter that produced a harsh assessment of the talks.

China’s foreign ministry said “it is necessary to make a choice between dialogue or confrontation, cooperation or conflict.” It blamed the “U.S. side’s erroneous perception of China, leading to incorrect policies towards China” for the current “low point” in relations.

And, it said the U.S. bore responsibility for halting “the spiraling decline of China-U.S. relations to push it back to a healthy and stable track.” It added that Wang had “demanded that the U.S. stop hyping up the ‘China threat theory,’ lift illegal unilateral sanctions against China, abandon suppression of China’s technological development, and refrain from arbitrary interference in China’s internal affairs.”

In it’s readout of the meeting, the State Department said Blinken “underscored the importance of responsibly managing the competition between the United States and the PRC through open channels of communication to ensure competition does not veer into conflict,” using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China.

In the first round of talks on Sunday, Blinken met for nearly six hours with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang, after which both countries said they had agreed to continue high-level discussions.

Both the U.S. and China said Qin had accepted an invitation from Blinken to visit Washington but Beijing made clear that “the China-U.S. relationship is at the lowest point since its establishment.” That sentiment is widely shared by U.S. officials.

Blinken’s visit came after his initial plans to travel to China were postponed in February after the shootdown of a Chinese surveillance balloon over the U.S.

In his meetings, Blinken also pressed the Chinese to release detained American citizens and to take steps to curb the production and export of fentanyl precursors that are fueling the opioid crisis in the United States.

Since the cancellation of Blinken’s trip in February, there have been some high-level engagements. CIA chief William Burns traveled to China in May, while China’s commerce minister traveled to the U.S. And Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with senior Chinese foreign policy adviser Wang Yi in Vienna in May.

But those have been punctuated by bursts of angry rhetoric from both countries over the Taiwan Strait, their broader intentions in the Indo-Pacific, China’s refusal to condemn Russia for its war against Ukraine, and U.S. allegations from Washington that Beijing is attempting to boost its worldwide surveillance capabilities, including in Cuba.

And, earlier this month, China’s defense minister rebuffed a request from U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin for a meeting on the sidelines of a security symposium in Singapore, a sign of continuing discontent.

___

Associated Press writer Emily Wang contributed.

AP · by MATTHEW LEE · June 19, 2023

2. Secretary Blinken’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

I am sure the staff put a lot of work into crafting this to get it just right.

Secretary Blinken’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc/

READOUT

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

JUNE 19, 2023

The following is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken traveled to Beijing, the People’s Republic of China for meetings with President Xi Jinping, Director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang from June 18-19.

The two sides had candid, substantive, and constructive discussions on key priorities in the bilateral relationship and on a range of global and regional issues. The Secretary emphasized the importance of maintaining open channels of communication across the full range of issues to reduce the risk of miscalculation. He made clear that while we will compete vigorously, the United States will responsibly manage that competition so that the relationship does not veer into conflict. The Secretary stressed that the United States would continue to use diplomacy to raise areas of concern as well as areas of potential cooperation where our interests align.

The two sides agreed to continue discussions on developing principles to guide the bilateral relationship, as discussed by President Biden and President Xi in Bali.  They also welcomed ongoing efforts to address specific issues in the bilateral relationship, and encouraged further progress, including through the joint Working Groups. Noting the importance of ties between the people of the United States and the PRC, both sides welcomed strengthening people-to-people exchanges between students, scholars, and business. This includes a commitment to working to increase the number of direct flights between the two countries.

Secretary Blinken emphasized that it remains a priority for the United States to resolve the cases of American citizens who are wrongfully detained or subject to exit bans in China. He underscored the importance of working together to disrupt the global flow of synthetic drugs and their precursor chemicals into the United States, which fuels the fentanyl crisis.

The Secretary addressed the PRC’s unfair and nonmarket economic practices and recent actions against U.S. firms. He discussed U.S. de-risking policies and the historic domestic investments the Administration has made. The Secretary raised concerns about PRC human rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, as well as individual cases of concern. He emphasized that the United States will always stand up for our values.

The Secretary underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and reiterated there has been no change to the U.S. one China policy, based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.

The two sides discussed a range of global and regional security issues, including Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the DPRK’s provocative actions, and U.S. concerns with PRC intelligence activities in Cuba. The Secretary made clear that the United States will work with its allies and partners to advance our vision for a world that is free, open, and upholds the rules-based international order.

The two sides underscored that the United States and China should work together to address shared transnational challenges, such as climate change, global macroeconomic stability, food security, public health, and counter-narcotics. The Secretary encouraged further interaction between our governments on these and other areas, which is what the world expects of us.

Both sides agreed on follow-on senior engagements in Washington and Beijing to continue open lines of communication. The Secretary invited State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin to Washington to continue the discussions, and they agreed to schedule a reciprocal visit at a mutually suitable time.

3. When it comes to a war with Taiwan, many Chinese urge caution

But what kind of power and influence do online netizens really have to affect Xi's decision making?

Excerpts:

Some netizens have even been airing misgivings about going to fight. In April a screenshot of such a post, with its origin unspecified, circulated on Weibo. “If there’s a war, I wouldn’t go and I wouldn’t let my child go,” it said, a few days after China’s armed forces staged threatening exercises around Taiwan in response to a meeting in America between Ms Tsai and the speaker of America’s House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy. “I live at the bottom rung of society. No one pays attention to us in peacetime. They only think of us at a time of difficulty,” the message said. Nationalists responded with outrage. “This kind of person will always be at the bottom, their thinking is at the bottom…” wrote one to his nearly 4.2m followers. But among hundreds who responded to his invective, some took issue. “I won’t go. Let the children of leading cadres go first, they have good red genes,” said one. Officials may be weighing up such words.

China | Conflicting thoughts

When it comes to a war with Taiwan, many Chinese urge caution

Even some ardent nationalists

The Economist

Jun 19th 2023

IT TAKES LITTLE to spark fury among nationalist netizens in China, especially when the topic is Taiwan. Any action that could be viewed as a challenge to China’s claim to the island arouses a chorus of calls for war. Their voices alarm Western officials, who fret that Chinese policymakers may make concessions to their public’s swelling nationalism and the bellicosity it has spawned. Last year China’s leader, Xi Jinping, hinted that the West may be right to worry. He warned President Joe Biden that, concerning Taiwan, the views of Chinese citizens “cannot be defied”.

During a just-concluded trip to Beijing, Antony Blinken, the first American secretary of state to visit China in five years, met Mr Xi, who made conciliatory comments about “stabilising China-US relations”. But for the rest of Mr Blinken’s visit the message was clear. “There is no room for compromise or concessions on Taiwan,” China’s most senior foreign-affairs official, Wang Yi, warned him. Qin Gang, the foreign minister, declared that Taiwan was the “core of the core interests” and “the most prominent risk” in bilateral relations.

Many online commentators in China argue that it is no longer worth trying kid-glove tactics with Taiwan. “Separatists”, they say, have become too entrenched there; only war can secure it for China. If Mr Xi agrees, he does not say so openly. His language strikes more of a balance. At a Communist Party congress last October, he said China would “continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort” while not ruling out the use of force and reserving “the option of taking all measures necessary”. Despite his stated respect for public opinion, he does not want his hands to be tied by it.

For now, Mr Xi may well prefer caution. War with Taiwan, after all, could mean taking on a nuclear-armed superpower, too. He may also wonder how much his own public would support it. The internet offers a crude guide. Lacking helpful clues that might be provided by a free press and open political debate, Chinese officials pay much attention to online opinion. They must sense that amid the clamour on social media for military action, some influential netizens oppose the idea. Even among ardent nationalists there are fissures. Some urge caution about going to war, or even argue that fighting may never be necessary: Taiwan will naturally capitulate when it becomes evident that China’s power has eclipsed America’s.

In a recent paper, Adam Liu of the National University of Singapore and Xiaojun Li of New York University Shanghai and the University of British Columbia argued that support for a near-term war, to the exclusion of all other options, was tiny. Their conclusions were based on a survey they conducted in China between late 2020 and early 2021. Of more than 2,000 respondents, a mere 1% wanted their country to mount a military assault on Taiwan (not just on its outlying islands) before the island’s presidential election in January 2024. The ballot will see a new leader elected to replace Tsai Ing-wen, who is retiring and whose centre-left Democratic Progressive Party angers China by stressing Taiwan’s separate identity.

Even if China were to decide to go to war by next January, only 55% said that would be acceptable. One-third said it would not be. The authors said their data did not support the idea that demand for the swift mounting of a full-blown attack had grown sharply since Ms Tsai became president in 2016. On the contrary, their survey, taken together with other academics’ findings, suggested that “public support for armed unification has remained relatively stable, despite the rapid deterioration in Beijing’s relations with both Washington and Taipei,” the scholars wrote.

Their research was conducted before Vladimir Putin launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia’s unexpected setbacks in that war, and the West’s solidarity in response to it, must have been sobering for some supporters of rapid steps towards wutong, the common shorthand in Chinese for reunification by force (online, to confuse censors, they often use the characters for “parasol tree”, which are also pronounced wutong—though censors usually do not mind calls for war as long as the party and its leaders are not being criticised for failing to act).

Calls abound for caution about the scale of the task of conquering Taiwan militarily. One such has come from Wu Haipeng, the editor-in-chief of the government’s main portal, China.com. Last month Mr Wu wrote on his blog that China had to resolve various “problems” before it could use military means. His proposals for doing so sounded like distant goals. One problem, said Mr Wu, was America’s arms supplies to Taiwan and its strengthening of military deployment around the island. To counter this, he suggested, China should beef up its air and rocket forces, as well as its navy—implying that China’s rapid military buildup in recent decades has yet to give it the strength required. He also said China needed to enable its economy to resist sweeping American sanctions that a war would entail. Achieving that will not be easy for a country so dependent on global trade.

In January Hu Xijin, a former editor-in-chief of Global Times, a nationalist tabloid, set out three conditions for launching a war. First, China should have at least 1,000 nuclear warheads (the Pentagon believes that it currently has more than 400 and will not achieve Mr Hu’s goal until 2030). Second, it should have more missiles and bombs ready for use in the conflict than do the combined arsenals of America, Japan and Taiwan. Finally, it should be able to launch a rapid, crippling strike against all of Taiwan’s military facilities. He said this task would require “far more” munitions per day than the most intense periods of bombardment by America during the wars in Iraq and Kosovo in the 1990s and 2000s. Implicit in his message: much more time is needed.

Like several other prominent nationalists (as opposed to the many who flood social media with short messages like “When are we going to attack? It needs to be quick!”) Mr Wu and Mr Hu do not appear to be braying for war as soon as some in America fear. In a memo in January General Michael Minihan, the head of America’s Air Mobility Command, wrote: “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025.” In 2021 Admiral Philip Davidson, then chief of the US Indo-Pacific Command, said: “I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years.”

Underneath the parasol tree

Some of China’s most radical nationalists (the “parasol-tree faction”, as netizens often call them) have faced fierce criticism online. One of them is Li Yi, a commentator with more than 16,000 followers on Weibo, a Twitter-like service. Last month, in an online video, he said that even if China were to lose 140m people (one-tenth of its population) in a war over Taiwan “it wouldn’t be much at all” and that “with a bit of education” young Chinese would all agree that, for the sake of unification, casualties on such a scale would be fine.

The backlash against Mr Li has come from within the nationalist camp as well as from more liberal types. “Which stupid people have given him the cloak of ‘patriot’?” said one nationalist blogger with 335,000 followers, calling Mr Li “cold-blooded”. Another, with 798,000 followers, asked: “How should we deal with such inhuman, Nazi language?” On June 3rd Huang Jisu—co-author of a book, “Unhappy China”, that became a huge hit among China’s nationalists in 2009—gave an online lecture to a neo-Maoist group (a flag-waving lot). Referring to Mr Li’s remarks without naming him, he described people who held such views as “fascists”.

Some netizens have even been airing misgivings about going to fight. In April a screenshot of such a post, with its origin unspecified, circulated on Weibo. “If there’s a war, I wouldn’t go and I wouldn’t let my child go,” it said, a few days after China’s armed forces staged threatening exercises around Taiwan in response to a meeting in America between Ms Tsai and the speaker of America’s House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy. “I live at the bottom rung of society. No one pays attention to us in peacetime. They only think of us at a time of difficulty,” the message said. Nationalists responded with outrage. “This kind of person will always be at the bottom, their thinking is at the bottom…” wrote one to his nearly 4.2m followers. But among hundreds who responded to his invective, some took issue. “I won’t go. Let the children of leading cadres go first, they have good red genes,” said one. Officials may be weighing up such words. ■

Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

The Economist

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the frontline and made gains on June 19.
• Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine on June 19.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reported that the Chinese government reiterated that it is not providing, and will not provide, lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine.
• US defense manufacturer Lockheed Martin indicated that it is ready to help Ukraine fly and maintain Lockheed’s F-16 fighter jets if NATO states agree to send them to Ukraine.
• Kremlin-affiliated Russian tech giant Yandex claimed that international sanctions against Russia prevented the company from providing the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with user data in compliance with a Russian security law, resulting in a significant fine.
• Russian forces made gains in the Kupyansk area and continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations while Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Bakhmut.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Wagner Group continues efforts to expand its recruitment pool in the wake of significant losses in Ukraine.
• Russian sources claimed that a car carrying a Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official exploded in Simferopol, occupied Crimea.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 19, 2023

Jun 19, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2023

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark

 June 19, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2 pm ET on June 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the frontline and made gains on June 19. A Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian troops continued attacks northwest, northeast, and southwest of Bakhmut on June 19 and claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Krasnopolivka (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut).[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar additionally announced that over the past week, Ukrainian troops in the Tavrisk (Zaporizhia) direction have advanced up to seven kilometers and liberated 113 square kilometers of territory, including eight settlements in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked south of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[3] Geolocated footage posted on June 19 confirms that Ukrainian troops liberated Pyatykhatky, about 25km southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] Milbloggers also reported fighting south and southwest of Orikhiv over the course of the day on June 19.[5] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed on June 19 that Russia has likely deployed large portions of the Dnipro Grouping of Forces from the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to the Zaporizhia and Bakhmut directions to respond to Ukrainian counteroffensive actions over the past 10 days.[6]

Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine on June 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched four Kalibr cruise missiles and four Shahed-131/136 drones at Ukraine and stated that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed all the drones and missiles.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched the Kalibr cruise missiles from a submarine in the Black Sea and the Shahed drones from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.[8]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reported that the Chinese government reiterated that it is not providing, and will not provide, lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine. Blinken reported on June 19 that the United States has not seen evidence contradicting Beijing’s claims.[9]Blinken expressed concern that Chinese companies may be providing Russia technology that it can use in the war against Ukraine, however.

US defense manufacturer Lockheed Martin indicated that it is ready to help Ukraine fly and maintain Lockheed’s F-16 fighter jets if NATO states agree to send them to Ukraine.[10]The Financial Times quoted Lockheed Martin Chief Operating Officer (COO) Frank St. John as stating that Lockheed is prepared to build new F-16s; modify existing airframes; and provide F-16 training, equipment, and systems support if NATO agrees to supply Ukraine with F-16s. US and other Western officials have recently signaled an increased willingness to provide Ukraine with F-16s, as ISW has previously reported.[11]

Kremlin-affiliated Russian tech giant Yandex claimed that international sanctions against Russia prevented the company from providing the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with user data in compliance with a Russian security law, resulting in a significant fine. A Moscow court imposed a two million ruble (roughly $23,795) fine against Yandex on June 18 for failing to provide the FSB with unspecified user data for national security reasons.[12]A Yandex representative claimed that Yandex did not intend to break Russian law but that international sanctions prevent Yandex from purchasing, installing, and configuring the foreign hardware and software necessary to comply with the law. A Moscow court previously imposed a 400,000 ruble (roughly $4,759) fine against Yandex for the same violation in 2022.[13] While it is unclear how foreign technology products would help Yandex comply with Russian law, the situation demonstrates that international sanctions have impacted some aspects of the Russian technology sector and national security apparatus.

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the frontline and made gains on June 19.
• Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine on June 19.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reported that the Chinese government reiterated that it is not providing, and will not provide, lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine.
• US defense manufacturer Lockheed Martin indicated that it is ready to help Ukraine fly and maintain Lockheed’s F-16 fighter jets if NATO states agree to send them to Ukraine.
• Kremlin-affiliated Russian tech giant Yandex claimed that international sanctions against Russia prevented the company from providing the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with user data in compliance with a Russian security law, resulting in a significant fine.
• Russian forces made gains in the Kupyansk area and continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations while Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Bakhmut.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Wagner Group continues efforts to expand its recruitment pool in the wake of significant losses in Ukraine.
• Russian sources claimed that a car carrying a Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official exploded in Simferopol, occupied Crimea.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces made gains in the Kupyansk area and continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on June 19. Geolocated footage posted on June 19 shows that Russian forces advanced into the northern part of Vilshana (about 15km northeast of Kupyansk) on an unspecified date.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivkse (15km northwest of Svatove), Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), Torske (14km west of Kreminna), west of Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Hryhorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[15] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar noted that Russian forces are conducting active offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Lyman line in an effort to regain the initiative.[16] One Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 76th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division conducted offensive operations near Kreminna.[17] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully attempted to break through Russian defensive lines in the Kreminna area.[18] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Central Grouping of Forces repelled three Ukrainian sabotage groups west of Kreminna.[19]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations while Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Bakhmut on June 19. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Krasnopolivka (12km northeast of Bakhmut) and conducted additional attacks near Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut), Yahidne (immediately north of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Kurdyumivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Ozarianivka (13km south of Bakhmut).[20] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continued to advance on the flanks of Bakhmut in the last week.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled limited Russian offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[22]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains as of June 19. Geolocated footage posted on June 18 shows that both Ukrainian and Russian forces have advanced near Pobieda (just southwest of Donetsk City), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced southeast of Pobieda and Russian forces south of Pobieda.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka), Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City), Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka (about 30km southwest of Donetsk City).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka) and that Ukrainian troops made marginal advances near Vesele (3km northeast of Avdiivka).[25] Geolocated footage published on June 18 shows Russian forces using a T-54 or T-55 tank as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) near Pobieda, but Ukrainian forces destroyed the tank before it reached Ukrainian positions.[26] Russian forces have previously used older vehicles as VBIEDs.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on June 19. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Novodonetske (10km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 1st Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Battalion (Donetsk People‘s Republic “Slavic” Brigade) and the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) repelled Ukrainian forces near Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka).[29] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled an attack near Pryiutne (17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Vuhledar (30km due east of Velyka Novosilka).[31]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 19. Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows that Ukrainian forces liberated Pyatykhatky (23km southwest of Orikhiv).[32] Some Russian sources either claimed that Russian forces then recaptured Pyatykhatky or characterized the settlement as a “grey zone.”[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv) and Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[34] Russian sources claimed that elements of the volunteer “Sudaplatov” Battalion are operating near Pyatykhatky and that elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating near Orikhiv.[35]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against a Russian rear area in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on Volnovakha (54km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[36]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Wagner Group continues efforts to expand its recruitment pool in the wake of significant losses in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 19 that Wagner recruiters are disseminating messages on social media platforms calling for individuals aged 21 to 35 years old with a “gaming background” to join Wagner as UAV specialists.[37] Verstka noted that these recruits are not required to have any military experience.[38] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) also posted an audio intercept on June 18 wherein a Russian soldier and his interlocuter discuss a renewed Wagner recruitment campaign due to extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine.[39] The new Wagner recruitment campaign reportedly advertises training with well-prepared instructors, health and life insurance, modern equipment, and guarantees that all recruits will receive all promised payments.[40]

Russian military authorities continue to rely on cadets from Russian military academies to bolster the security of border regions. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 19 that third- and fourth-year cadets from the St. Petersburg Mykhailiv Military Artillery Academy will soon deploy to border areas after training with mortars and other artillery systems.[41] The Resistance Center noted there are shortages in Russian personnel covering border areas and that the deployment of newly graduated cadets is in large part meant to compensate for that.[42]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian sources claimed that a car carrying a Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official exploded in Simferopol, occupied Crimea on June 18. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that the gas tank of the assistant to the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy prime minister, Vladimir Epifanov, exploded, injuring Epifanov and two other passengers.[43] Rogov claimed that the cause of the explosion is unknown but that unspecified actors inspected the gas tank on June 17, implying possible sabotage.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Russia confirmed that it intends to permanently station tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated on June 19 that Russia’s agreement on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus is not bound by any specific timeframe and that Russia will only return the weapons to Russia on the condition that the US and NATO make several concessions, including the “withdrawal of all American nuclear weapons to US territory” and the dismantling of all nuclear infrastructure in Europe.[44] This statement, along with the unreasonable requirements set for the US and NATO, suggests that Russia intends to keep tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus on a permanent basis. ISW has long assessed that Russia will likely keep tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in order to consolidate de facto control of Belarus but maintains that this deployment is extraordinarily unlikely to have battlefield impacts in Ukraine.[45]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 

4. Analysis | U.S.-China ties are no longer in freefall, but it’s a rough road ahead

Excerpts:

Chinese officials have their own red lines. They reiterated to Blinken that there was “no room” for compromise over Taiwan and accused the United States of seeking to change the delicate equation around the island. A broader geopolitical standoff in the region appears to only be getting more entrenched, as traditional U.S. allies in Asia tighten their security cooperation with Washington.

Zhu Feng, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University, told my colleagues that the Biden administration shows little interest in changing course on its confrontation with China, a position that further fuels a tense dynamic. “China can still use this opportunity to express that if the U.S. cannot effectively respond to its concerns, then of course China cannot effectively respond to [the United States’],” he said.

Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. diplomat, mused that the big question following Blinken’s trip to China is “whether we really don’t understand one another … or whether we understand one another only too well.”

Analysis | U.S.-China ties are no longer in freefall, but it’s a rough road ahead

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · June 20, 2023

You’re reading an excerpt from the Today’s WorldView newsletter. Sign up to get the rest free, including news from around the globe and interesting ideas and opinions to know, sent to your inbox every weekday.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s two-day trip to China arguably went about as well as it could. The United States’ top diplomat said he had “constructive” and “substantive” conversations with Chinese President Xi Jinping and his other interlocutors in Beijing, which included top foreign policy official Wang Yi and foreign minister Qin Gang. Both sides indicated their desire to stabilize a relationship that seems to be locked in a “downward spiral,” as Wang put it. They put out readouts of the many hours of discussion that spotlighted a shared desire to find ways to get along, despite the roiling ocean of tensions between the two countries.

Given the deterioration in U.S.-China ties in recent months, that Blinken received an audience with Xi at all was a welcome development. The Chinese president customarily meets with a visiting U.S. Secretary of State, as was the case in 2018, the last time such a senior-level mission happened. But Blinken’s meeting with Xi on Monday was only announced 45 minutes before it took place, a sign of the high-wire choreography surrounding the visit, my colleagues noted.

Blinken canceled a scheduled trip to Beijing in February after a Chinese surveillance balloon floated over the continental United States, provoking an uproar in Washington. Chinese officials were displeased with the decision and the broader American reaction to the balloon incident, given the vast footprint of military and surveillance assets that the United States deploys around the world. In the months that followed, Beijing’s foreign ministry published a treatise about the global harms caused by U.S. “hegemony” and Chinese officials hardened their rhetoric about Washington’s “Cold War mentality.”

On Monday, Xi seemed somewhat upbeat, suggesting the two sides “made progress and reached agreement on some specific issues.” Speaking in the Great Hall of the People alongside Blinken, Xi said what happened between the two countries has a “bearing on the future and destiny of mankind” and that their two governments “should properly handle Sino-U. S. relations with an attitude of being responsible to history, the people and the world.”

Before leaving the Chinese capital, Blinken said in an interview that arresting the slide in U.S.-China ties was “not the product of one visit, even as intense and in some ways productive as this was.” He added that the past two days were a “good” and “important start.”

Still, for those hoping for happier relations, there’s a long, winding road ahead, littered with obstacles. Whatever the rhetoric during Blinken’s time in Beijing, strategists and policymakers in both the United States and China see the other as a rival power, and view competition of some substantive form as inevitable. Tensions over long-standing issues like the status of self-governing Taiwan or China’s activities in the South China Sea have grown all the more acute, while critical lines of communication have gone silent. Blinken was unable to get China to agree to reopen military-to-military channels, something U.S. officials have urged in recent months as fears over the possibility of an accidental military encounter and escalation grow.

In Washington, leading congressional Republicans attacked Blinken for even making the trip. Mounting bipartisan hawkishness on China among lawmakers has given the Biden administration little wiggle room in navigating the current moment, not least as the 2024 election cycle kicks into gear. Meanwhile, China’s autocratic government is also, to a certain extent, sensitive to nationalist sentiment at home, especially as it copes with flagging economic growth.

“It is symptomatic of how bad the relationship has gotten that it’s an achievement to talk,” John Delury, a China expert at Yonsei University in Seoul, told the Financial Times. “That it is almost a sign of political courage to meet with your counterparts.”

There were some small signs of tacit agreement or understanding. “On Ukraine, Blinken said U.S. and European leaders ‘appreciate’ China’s assurances that it is not providing lethal assistance to Russia,” my colleagues reported. “He welcomed Xi’s involvement in bringing a ‘just’ and ‘durable’ end to the war in Ukraine. The hopeful tone stood in contrast to long-standing pessimism from U.S. officials that China will play a supportive role with regards to Russia.”

Blinken also stressed that the United States did not want to jeopardize the enormous bilateral trade relationship between the countries. “We don’t want to decouple, we want to de-risk,” he said, gesturing to U.S. export controls on sensitive technologies to China such as advanced semiconductors. That’s a message echoed by the leadership of many major Western powers, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who received Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Berlin on Monday evening ahead of bilateral talks.

Had a candid, substantive, and constructive conversation with People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping in Beijing today. We discussed a range of important issues, including the need to manage our relationship responsibly. pic.twitter.com/Q8kuMm6kly

— Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken) June 19, 2023

Xi, for his part, insisted that China had no plans to “challenge” or “replace” the United States. But he said that “neither party can shape the other according to its own wishes, let alone deprive the other of its legitimate right to development,” a statement of China’s frustration at what it sees as American attempts to bully it on the world stage and constrain its rise.

China has little patience for American talk of setting “guardrails” on the relationship, the phrase that Biden administration officials have repeatedly deployed. It’s language that Beijing considers little more than an admission of intent to keep China down. Earlier this month at a security forum in Singapore, Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu scoffed at U.S. invocations of the “rules-based international order” — asking “who made these rules” — and also questioned the right of (or need for) the U.S. military to transit through the strategic Taiwan Strait. Both sides see themselves as guarantors of the status quo and the other as a dangerous, destabilizing actor.

The next phase of top-level diplomacy between the two countries may involve visits by Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and U.S. climate envoy John F. Kerry. There’s a chance President Biden and Xi may meet at the sidelines of the APEC summit in San Francisco in November, roughly a year after the two last sat down in Bali at the summit of the Group of 20 major economies.

Some analysts in Washington suggest a sensible confidence-building measure could be the dropping of some of the Trump-era tariffs on Chinese goods, which have hurt American consumers. But it’s unclear whether the White House believes it can risk the furor such a move may provoke on the U.S. right, which would cast the Biden administration as being soft on China’s single-party Communist regime.

Chinese officials have their own red lines. They reiterated to Blinken that there was “no room” for compromise over Taiwan and accused the United States of seeking to change the delicate equation around the island. A broader geopolitical standoff in the region appears to only be getting more entrenched, as traditional U.S. allies in Asia tighten their security cooperation with Washington.

Zhu Feng, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University, told my colleagues that the Biden administration shows little interest in changing course on its confrontation with China, a position that further fuels a tense dynamic. “China can still use this opportunity to express that if the U.S. cannot effectively respond to its concerns, then of course China cannot effectively respond to [the United States’],” he said.

Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. diplomat, mused that the big question following Blinken’s trip to China is “whether we really don’t understand one another … or whether we understand one another only too well.”

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · June 20, 2023

6. Russia attacks Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities in overnight air strikes

Russia attacks Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities in overnight air strikes

Reuters · by Reuters

KYIV, June 20 (Reuters) - Russia attacked military and infrastructure targets across Ukraine early on Tuesday, including in the capital Kyiv and the western city of Lviv, Ukrainian officials said.

Ukraine said it had shot down 32 of 35 Iranian-made Shahed drones launched from Russia's Bryansk region and the Azov Sea.

But a "critically important facility" was struck in Lviv, far from the front lines and around 70 km (43 miles) from the border with NATO member Poland, regional governor Maksym Kozytskiy said. He gave no other details of the facility.

There was no mention of any casualties in the overnight air strikes, the latest carried out by Moscow since Kyiv began a counteroffensive in which it says it has recaptured 113 square km (44 square miles) of land from Russian forces.

The air force said on the Telegram messaging app that air defences had been in action in most regions of Ukraine.

"However, the main direction of attack by Iranian drones was the Kyiv region. More than two dozen Shaheds were destroyed here," it said.

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's office said drones attacked the Kyiv region in several waves, with the air alert lasting for over four hours. Several commercial and administrative buildings and some private houses were damaged, it said.

[1/5] An explosion of a drone is seen in the sky over the city during a Russian drone strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine June 20, 2023. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich

The Energy Ministry said debris from falling drones damaged electricity lines in the Kyiv region and also in the Mykolaiv region in the south, cutting off electricity for hundreds of residents.

Air force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat said in a radio interview that it was simply not possible for air defence systems to cover all of a country as large as Ukraine.

The air force said Russia had also hit the southeastern industrial city of Zaporizhzhia with Iskander and S-300 missiles.

Yuriy Malashko, head of the military administration of the Zaporizhzhia region, said Russia had targeted telecommunication infrastructure and agriculture and farming properties.

Ukraine's military said that, according to preliminary information, Russia had fired seven missiles at Zaporizhzhia.

The prosecutor's office said a 70-year-old woman was killed and three people wounded on Monday during a Russian artillery attack on the Sumy region in the northeast.

Reuters could not independently verify the reports. There was no immediate comment from Russia.

Reporting by Olena Harmash in Kyiv and Lidia Kelly in Melbourne; Editing by Timothy Heritage

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

7. Beijing Plans a New Training Facility in Cuba, Raising Prospect of Chinese Troops on America’s Doorstep

Excerpts:

China has no combat forces in Latin America, according to U.S. officials. Meanwhile, the U.S. has dozens of military bases throughout the Pacific, where it stations more than 350,000 troops. Chinese officials have pointed this out when they push back on American efforts to counter their military expansion outside of the Indo-Pacific.

Some U.S. officials cautioned that the parameters of China’s plans in Cuba aren’t fully known, and said the two countries would move cautiously to expand security ties.

“The intelligence community has assessed for several years that the PRC intends to expand its reach globally, and in this case, it is premature to draw firm conclusions about recent reporting,” a U.S. intelligence official said. “At this stage, it does not appear to be anything that provides much of an enhancement to the current suite of capabilities.”

Beijing Plans a New Training Facility in Cuba, Raising Prospect of Chinese Troops on America’s Doorstep

Biden administration scrambles to forestall China’s ambitions in the Caribbean

By Warren P. StrobelFollow

, Gordon LuboldFollow

, Vivian SalamaFollow

 and Michael R. GordonFollow

Updated June 20, 2023 5:03 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-plans-a-new-training-facility-in-cuba-raising-prospect-of-chinese-troops-on-americas-doorstep-e17fd5d1?mod=hp_lead_pos1

WASHINGTON—China and Cuba are negotiating to establish a new joint military training facility on the island, sparking alarm in Washington that it could lead to the stationing of Chinese troops and other security and intelligence operations just 100 miles off Florida’s coast, according to current and former U.S. officials.

Discussions for the facility on Cuba’s northern coast are at an advanced stage but not concluded, U.S. intelligence reports suggest. The Biden administration has contacted Cuban officials to try to forestall the deal, seeking to tap in to what it thinks might be Cuban concerns about ceding sovereignty. Beijing’s effort to establish a military training facility in Cuba hasn’t been previously reported.

The White House declined to comment.

The heightened anxiety in Washington over China’s ambitions in the Caribbean and Latin America comes as the administration is seeking to tamp down broader tensions with Beijing that have been stoked by a host of other issues, including U.S. support for Taiwan. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was on a high-profile visit to China these past few days, meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

The trip appeared to halt a downward spiral in relations. But Blinken failed to secure China’s agreement to a U.S. proposal that the two countries resume military-to-military communications to avoid misunderstandings. He also raised U.S. concerns about Chinese intelligence activities in Cuba, according to a State Department statement.

U.S. officials said reference to the proposed new training facility in Cuba is contained in highly classified new U.S. intelligence, which they described as convincing but fragmentary. It is being interpreted with different levels of alarm among policy makers and intelligence analysts.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing on Monday. PHOTO: LEAH MILLIS/PRESS POOL

The Wall Street Journal reported on June 8 that China and Cuba had reached an agreement in principle for a new eavesdropping site in Cuba; the White House characterized that reporting as inaccurate but didn’t elaborate. Two days later, the White House declassified intelligence to confirm publicly that Chinese intelligence collection facilities have existed in Cuba since at least 2019.

Current and former U.S. officials said a new military facility could provide China with a platform to potentially house troops permanently on the island and broaden its intelligence gathering, including electronic eavesdropping, against the U.S.

Most worrying for the U.S.: The planned facility is part of China’s “Project 141,” an initiative by the People’s Liberation Army to expand its global military base and logistical support network, one current and one former U.S. official said.

China and Cuba already jointly run four eavesdropping stations on the island, according to U.S. officials. That network underwent a significant upgrade around 2019, when a single station expanded to a network of four sites that are operated jointly, and Chinese involvement deepened, according to the officials.

There also are signs of changes in the arrangement for those facilities that officials say could signal greater Chinese involvement, though the details are scant. A U.S. intelligence report earlier this year referred to the “centralization” of the management of the four joint sites, but what precisely that entails isn’t clear.

Other Project 141 sites include a deal for a Chinese naval outpost in Cambodia and a military facility whose purpose isn’t publicly known at a port in the United Arab Emirates, a former U.S. official said. None of the previously known Project 141 sites are in the Western Hemisphere.

Some of those facilities include intelligence gathering capabilities as well, including a Chinese base in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, Beijing’s only military base outside the Pacific region, where China has been working to build a facility for gathering signals intelligence.

An official with the Chinese Embassy in Washington referred to comments from a senior foreign ministry spokesman in Beijing on June 9, saying he wasn’t aware of any deal between China and Cuba and saying the U.S. is an “expert in chasing shadows” in other countries and meddling in their affairs.

“We hope that relevant parties can focus more on things that are conducive to enhancing mutual trust and regional peace and stability development,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said when asked about the Cuba negotiations at a regular briefing in Beijing on Tuesday.

Cuba’s embassy in Washington had called the Journal’s earlier report “totally mendacious and unfounded.” The embassy didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment on Monday.

U.S.-China tensions have soared in recent months over issues including a Chinese spy balloon that flew over the U.S. before the U.S. military shot it down, and close encounters between the nations’ militaries in the skies and at sea.

Some intelligence officials say that Beijing sees its actions in Cuba as a geographical response to the U.S. relationship with Taiwan: The U.S. invests heavily in arming and training the self-governing island that sits off mainland China and that Beijing sees as its own. The Journal reported that the U.S. has deployed more than 100 troops to Taiwan to train its defense forces.

The opening ceremony at China’s military base in Djibouti in 2017. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Taiwan is roughly 100 miles from mainland China, about the same distance Cuba is from Florida.

China has no combat forces in Latin America, according to U.S. officials. Meanwhile, the U.S. has dozens of military bases throughout the Pacific, where it stations more than 350,000 troops. Chinese officials have pointed this out when they push back on American efforts to counter their military expansion outside of the Indo-Pacific.

Some U.S. officials cautioned that the parameters of China’s plans in Cuba aren’t fully known, and said the two countries would move cautiously to expand security ties.

“The intelligence community has assessed for several years that the PRC intends to expand its reach globally, and in this case, it is premature to draw firm conclusions about recent reporting,” a U.S. intelligence official said. “At this stage, it does not appear to be anything that provides much of an enhancement to the current suite of capabilities.”

Any increase in security coordination between China and Cuba “is going to go slowly,” the U.S. intelligence official said.

Cuba, several officials said, has reason to move cautiously, to avoid provoking the U.S. at a time when its economy is in disastrous shape and it is seeking the easing of economic sanctions and travel restrictions imposed by Washington.

The U.S. had been tracking a planned visit to Beijing by a senior Cuban defense official that U.S. officials said they interpreted as representing the next step in the negotiations over the training facility. It wasn’t immediately clear from the latest intelligence if the visit had taken place, but officials said it reflected how close the plans were to becoming formalized.

The Biden administration contacted Cuban officials in Washington to express its concern about the planned facility, officials said.

“We’ve made our concerns known” to the Cuban government, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said earlier this month.

A White House official said Monday that the Chinese government “will keep trying to enhance its presence in Cuba, and we will keep working to disrupt it.”

Sen. Mark Warner (D., Va.) and Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), the chair and vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a joint statement earlier this month that they were “deeply disturbed by reports that Havana and Beijing are working together to target the United States and our people.”

Write to Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com, Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com, Vivian Salama at vivian.salama@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the June 20, 2023, print edition as 'China Seeks Site In Cuba For Joint Training'.

8.  China’s Rebound Hits a Wall, and There Is ‘No Quick Fix’ to Revive It

Excerpts:

China’s economic weakness holds benefits and dangers for the global economy. Consumer and producer prices have fallen for the past four months in China, putting a brake on inflation in the West by pushing down the cost of imports from China.But weak demand in China may exacerbate a global slowdown. Europe already dipped into a mild recession early this year. Rapid interest rate increases in the United States have prompted some investors to bet on a recession late this year there as well.

Beijing has already taken some steps to revitalize economic growth. Tax breaks are being introduced for small businesses. Interest rates on bank deposits have been reduced to encourage households to spend more of their money instead of saving it. The latest government measure was announced on Tuesday, when the state-controlled banking system reduced its benchmark interest rates for corporate loans and home mortgages.

But many economists, inside and outside China, worry about the effectiveness of the new measures.

China’s Rebound Hits a Wall, and There Is ‘No Quick Fix’ to Revive It

By Keith Bradsher, Daisuke Wakabayashi and Claire Fu

Keith Bradsher reported from Shanghai. Daisuke Wakabayashi and Claire Fu reported from Seoul.

June 19, 2023

The New York Times · by Claire Fu · June 19, 2023

Policymakers and investors expected China’s economy to rev up again after Beijing abruptly dropped Covid precautions, but recent data shows alarming signs of a slowdown.

After a flurry of activity in late winter, investment in China has stagnated this spring.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

June 19, 2023

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

When China suddenly dismantled its lockdowns and other Covid precautions last December, officials in Beijing and many investors expected the economy to spring back to life.

It has not worked out that way.

Investment in China has stagnated this spring after a flurry of activity in late winter. Exports are shrinking. Fewer and fewer new housing projects are being started. Prices are falling. More than one in five young people is unemployed.

China has tried many fixes over the last few years when its economy had flagged, like heavy borrowing to pay for roads and rail lines. And it spent huge sums on testing and quarantines during the pandemic. Extra stimulus spending now with borrowed money would spur a burst of activity but pose a difficult choice for policymakers already worried about the accumulated debt.

“Authorities risk being behind the curve in stimulating the economy, but there’s no quick fix,” said Louise Loo, an economist specializing in China in the Singapore office of Oxford Economics.

China needs to right its economy after closing itself off to the world for almost three years to battle Covid, a decision that prompted many companies to begin shifting their supply chains elsewhere. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, met on Monday with the secretary of state of the United States, Antony J. Blinken, in an attempt by the two nations to lower diplomatic tensions and clear the way for high-level economic talks in the weeks ahead. Such discussions could slow the recent proliferation of sanctions and counter measures.

China’s halting economic recovery has seen only a few categories of spending grow robustly, like travel and restaurant meals. And those have increased in comparison with extremely low levels in spring 2022, when a two-month lockdown in Shanghai disrupted economic activity across large areas of central China.

Fewer and fewer new housing projects are being started in China.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

The economy has been particularly weak in recent weeks.

“From April to May to now, the economy has experienced significant unexpected changes, to the point where some people believe that the initial judgments may have been overly optimistic,” Yin Yanlin, a former deputy director of the Chinese Communist Party’s top economic policymaking commission, said in a speech at an academic conference on Saturday.

Chinese government officials have been dropping hints that an economic stimulus plan may be imminent.

“In response to the changes in the economic situation, more forceful measures must be taken to enhance the momentum of development, optimize the economic structure, and promote the continuous recovery of the economy,” the country’s State Council, or cabinet, said after a meeting on Friday led by Li Qiang, the country’s new premier.

China’s economic weakness holds benefits and dangers for the global economy. Consumer and producer prices have fallen for the past four months in China, putting a brake on inflation in the West by pushing down the cost of imports from China.

Travel is one of only a few categories of spending that are growing this year.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

But weak demand in China may exacerbate a global slowdown. Europe already dipped into a mild recession early this year. Rapid interest rate increases in the United States have prompted some investors to bet on a recession late this year there as well.

Beijing has already taken some steps to revitalize economic growth. Tax breaks are being introduced for small businesses. Interest rates on bank deposits have been reduced to encourage households to spend more of their money instead of saving it. The latest government measure was announced on Tuesday, when the state-controlled banking system reduced its benchmark interest rates for corporate loans and home mortgages.

But many economists, inside and outside China, worry about the effectiveness of the new measures.

Consumers are hoarding cash and investors are wary of putting money into China’s companies. Private investment has actually declined so far this year compared with 2022. Housing remains in crisis, with developers borrowing more to pay existing debts and to complete existing projects, even as China already suffers from an oversupply of homes.

Consumers have remained wary in part because the housing market, a source of wealth, is in a precarious state.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

China’s housing market stands at the heart of its troubles. Construction has accounted for as much as a quarter of China’s economic output. But would-be homeowners have been put off as developers have defaulted on their debts and failed to finish apartments buyers had paid for in advance.

Housing construction has fallen nearly 23 percent in the first five months of the year, compared with the same months last year. That suggests the real estate sector has further to fall in the coming months.

Chen Leiqian, a 27-year-old marketer in Beijing, started looking for an apartment with her boyfriend in 2021 after five years of dating. But they then decided to stay put in a rental apartment when they married.

“Housing prices across the country are falling, and the economy is very bad — there are just too many unstable elements,” Ms. Chen said.

Two-thirds of Ms. Chen’s co-workers in her department at an online tutoring company were laid off after China cracked down on the for-profit, private education industry in 2021. She also had a friend who could no longer pay a mortgage after losing a job in the tech sector, and lost the home in foreclosure.

The caution of middle-class families like Ms. Chen’s may pose the biggest dilemma for policymakers as they search for an effective formula for another round of economic stimulus.

“You can throw money on people but if they are not confident, they will not spend,” said Alicia Garcia-Herrero, the chief economist for Asia-Pacific at Natixis, a French bank.

As households struggle to pay their debts and refrain from big-ticket purchases, spending on restaurant meals is growing.Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

Households are not alone in struggling to pay their debts — so are local governments, which has limited their ability to step up infrastructure spending.

The government is wary of starting another credit binge of the sort seen in 2009, during the global financial collapse, and in 2016, after China’s stock market plunged the preceding year.

Although the sagging real estate sector has hurt demand inside China, exports have been flat this year and actually declined in May. The weakness of China’s normally powerful exports is particularly noteworthy because Beijing has allowed its currency, the renminbi, to lose about 7 percent of its value against the dollar since mid-January. A weaker renminbi makes Chinese exports more competitive in foreign markets.

More exports help create jobs and could compensate for the otherwise slack domestic economy. But it’s not clear how much China will be able to count on exports to help as some of China’s biggest trading partners have moved some purchases to other countries in Asia.

In the United States, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on a wide range of Chinese industrial goods, making it more expensive for American companies to buy from China. Then President Biden persuaded Congress last year to authorize broad subsidies for American production in categories like electric cars and solar panels. China’s exports to the United States were down 18.2 percent last month compared with May last year.

The United States has enacted subsidies for American production of electric cars, trying to counter China’s exports. Credit...Qilai Shen for The New York Times

Now as China considers how to reinforce the economy, it must contend with a loss of confidence among consumers.

Charles Wang runs a small travel company with eight employees in Zhangjiakou, in northern China. His business has almost fully rebounded after the pandemic but he has no plans to invest in expansion.

“Our economy is actually going down, and everyone doesn’t have so much time and willingness to spend,” Mr. Wang said. “It’s because people just don’t want to spend money — everyone is afraid again, even the rich.”

Li You contributed research.

Keith Bradsher is the Beijing bureau chief for The Times. He previously served as bureau chief in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Detroit and as a Washington correspondent. He has lived and reported in mainland China through the pandemic. @KeithBradsher

Daisuke Wakabayashi is an Asia business correspondent for The Times, based in Seoul. @daiwaka

Claire Fu covers news in mainland China for The New York Times in Seoul. @fu_claire

A version of this article appears in print on , Section B, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: For China, No Easy Fix As Recovery Hits a Wall

202

The New York Times · by Claire Fu · June 19, 2023

9. They Were Captured by the Russians. Then the Hardest Fight Began.

They Were Captured by the Russians. Then the Hardest Fight Began.

Ukrainian captives released in prisoner exchanges say that beatings were common, and that they suffered from woefully inadequate health care and food.

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · June 20, 2023

While in Russian custody, Maksym Kushnir said he was left on a bed to die, with his jaw shattered and gangrene spreading across his tongue.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

Ukrainian captives released in prisoner exchanges say that beatings were common, and that they suffered from woefully inadequate health care and food.

While in Russian custody, Maksym Kushnir said he was left on a bed to die, with his jaw shattered and gangrene spreading across his tongue.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

By

Carlotta Gall traveled to Odesa and Kyiv, Ukraine, to interview Ukrainians who were prisoners of war.

• June 20, 2023

Shot through the jaw and tongue by a sniper’s bullet last year in the last days of the grinding siege at the Azovstal steel plant in Ukraine, Senior Sgt. Maksym Kushnir could not eat or talk, and could barely breathe.

But when he hobbled out of a bunker last May with hundreds of other wounded Ukrainian soldiers in a surrender negotiated with Russian forces, there was no medical help or any sign of the Red Cross workers they had been promised.

Instead, Sergeant Kushnir, nine years a soldier and a poet since childhood, said he was taken on a two-day bus journey into Russian-controlled territory and left on a bed to die, with his jaw shattered and gangrene spreading across his tongue.

“I thought it was the end,” he said. “For the first three to four days, they did not do anything. They expected me to die on my own.”

That Sergeant Kushnir survived and returned home to tell the tale is one of the success stories of the war. Even as the two sides are locked in full-scale conflict, Ukrainian and Russian officials have been exchanging hundreds of prisoners of war almost weekly.

Yet the prisoner exchanges have also revealed a grim reality. Ukrainian soldiers have come home with tales of appalling suffering in Russian captivity — executions and deaths, beatings and electric shocks, a lack of health care and near-starvation rations.

Ukraine allows the International Committee of the Red Cross access to the Russian prisoners of war it is holding, an indication that it is meeting its obligations under international conventions of war. Russia does not. It restricts outside monitoring and has confirmed the identities of only some of those it is holding.

Ukrainian officials and former prisoners say Ukrainian captives were in a visibly worse state than the Russian prisoners at exchanges.

“We were skinny like this,” Sergeant Kushnir said, holding up his little finger. “Compared to us, they looked well. We were thin and bearded. They were shaved and washed.”

“It’s a classic abusive relationship,” said Oleksandra Romantsova of the Center for Civil Liberties, a Ukrainian organization that was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year, summing up the treatment of Ukrainian prisoners.

It is unclear how many Ukrainian soldiers are prisoners of war or missing in action. Russia has provided only partial lists of those it is holding, and Ukraine does not release any numbers. But human rights organizations say there are at least 8,000 to 10,000 prisoners, and Ukrainian officials did not dispute those figures.

Maj. Dmytro Andriushchenko was in a penal colony at Olenivka when an explosion ripped through a barracks, killing 60 members of a Ukrainian battalion. Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

And more Ukrainians have been taken in the fighting in and around the city of Bakhmut in recent months, according to people working to bring prisoners home. There are believed to be far fewer Russians held by Ukraine.

Some Ukrainian soldiers have also been placed on trial in Russia on dubious charges, and have received lengthy sentences in the Russian penal system, said Oleksandr Pavlichenko of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union.

Five hundred medical personnel and hundreds of female soldiers and wounded are among the prisoners of war, said Andriy Kryvtsov, the chairman of Military Medics of Ukraine. He said 61 military medics remained in captivity and called for their release.

Dr. Yurik Mkrtchyan, 32, an anesthetist, was among more than 2,000 taken prisoner after battles at the Ilyich steel plant in Mariupol in April last year, many of them wounded soldiers he was caring for.

He said the Russians provided medical assistance only when he begged them and transferred the wounded to a hospital only when they were close to death.

Dr. Mkrtchyan, who was released after a prisoner exchange in November, said he remained anxious about the conditions of the wounded, including amputees.

“They were just the boys who protected our hospital,” he said. “Most of them are still in captivity, and I see no excuse or explanation for that because they are already disabled, they cannot fight, there is no reason to keep them in prison.”

Former prisoners and human rights groups say Ukrainian captives, including the wounded and pregnant female soldiers, have been subjected to relentless beatings.

Dr. Mkrtchyan described how new arrivals had to run a gantlet of prison guards who beat them with sticks, a hazing ritual known as a “reception.” He recalled running, head down, through the torrent of blows, and seeing a fellow prisoner on the ground. The soldier, a wounded prisoner with serious burns named Casper, was killed by the beating, he said.

Maksym Kolesnikov, 45, was among more than 70 Ukrainian soldiers and four civilians who were captured in the days just after the Russian invasion in February 2022, when Russian troops overran his base near the town of Hostomel, north of Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital.

Maksym Kolesnikov, who was among more than 70 Ukrainian soldiers and four civilians who were captured just after the Russian invasion, said he was subject to a “reception” beating by Russian guards that lasted five hours.Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

The men were taken for interrogation to a filtration camp in a disused factory, where their commander was beaten within earshot of the whole unit. The Russian network of filtration camps, where military and civilian Ukrainians are screened and interrogated, have been widely criticized for violations of human rights.

After a few days, Mr. Kolesnikov and his fellow detainees were moved to a Russian prison in the Bryansk region, near the Ukraine border.

The “reception” beating lasted five hours. “I was kneed in the face,” he said. The beatings continued daily for a month. The guards used rubber truncheons, plastic piping, wooden rulers and knotted pieces of rope, or just kicked prisoners, he said.

Prisoners nicknamed one group of guards “the electricians” because they tormented prisoners with electric shocks.

The captives were dangerously malnourished, Mr. Kryvtsov said.

“It was a good day when you found a potato in your soup,” said Mr. Kolesnikov, who added that he lost about 75 pounds in captivity.

He said he suffers from a compressed spine from malnutrition, and hip and knee injuries from the prolonged beatings.

Oleh Mudrak, 35, the commander of the First Azov Battalion, was unrecognizable and painfully thin when he returned from four months in captivity after being taken prisoner at the Azovstal plant in Mariupol, said his nephew Danylo Mudrak.

He regained the weight and underwent surgery on his shoulder, but five months after his release, he died of a heart attack, Danylo Mudrak said.

Oleh Mudrak, the commander of the First Azov Battalion, shown on a cellphone, was unrecognizable and painfully thin when he returned after four months in captivity. He died five months after his release. Credit...Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

Members of the Azov battalions, long painted as neo-Nazis by Russia as part of its justification for the war, came in for especially harsh treatment, according to Maj. Dmytro Andriushchenko, who was a deputy commander of the Second Azov Battalion when he was taken prisoner at Azovstal. “Azov was like a red rag for them,” he said.

Major Andriushchenko was in a penal colony at Olenivka in July when an explosion ripped through a barracks, killing at least 50 Azov members. Like several former inmates of Olenivka who were interviewed, he accused Russia of orchestrating the explosion.

The prison guards closed the gates to the barracks, preventing survivors from escaping, Major Andriushchenko said.

Dr. Mkrtchyan, who was in the same penal colony, said he and other Ukrainian medics urged the guards to let them help the wounded, but they were not allowed out of their building.

Russia has blocked calls for an independent investigation into the explosion and blames it on a Ukrainian strike.

For some of the wounded from Azovstal, visits by Russian television crews may have been a lifeline. The publicity created pressure on the Russian authorities to care for the prisoners, who were already weak from their time under siege in Azovstal with little food and water, Sergeant Kushnir said.

With his broken jaw and gangrenous tongue, Sergeant Kushnir could not lie down and sat with his head in his arms for several days without painkillers or antibiotics.

Eventually, he was moved to another hospital where doctors amputated his tongue and wired his jaw closed.

He dreamed of eating. He wrote some verse:

“Have mercy on me, fate. I’m alive.

Don’t punish me mercilessly.”

The physical pain was not as hard to bear as the uncertainty of being a captive, he said.

“When you don’t know what to prepare for, what the next day will bring,” he said, “especially after seeing what the Russians were doing to our men, and being in constant expectation of death, it is not a cool feeling at all.”

At the end of June, Sergeant Kushnir and other wounded men from Azovstal were loaded onto buses and driven to the front line to be exchanged.

Back in Ukraine, he has been through multiple operations and spent months learning to talk again by exercising the scar tissue at the back of his throat.

His surgeon, Dr. Vasyl Rybak, 44, the head of the department of rehabilitation and reconstructive surgery at a hospital in Odesa, took bone from his hip to reconstruct his jaw, but when that did not work, he inserted a titanium jaw, created at a 3-D printing lab in the city of Dnipro.

Next, Dr. Rybak plans to learn from pioneers in India how to create a new tongue for his patient from muscle tissue in his chest.

“He’s a hero,” he said of Sergeant Kushnir, during a break after surgery. “They all are.”

Oleksandr Chubko and Dyma Shapoval contributed reporting.

Carlotta Gall is a senior correspondent currently covering the war in Ukraine. She previously was Istanbul bureau chief, covered the aftershocks of the Arab Spring from Tunisia, and reported from the Balkans during the war in Kosovo and Serbia, and from Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2001. She was on a team that won a 2009 Pulitzer Prize for reporting from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · June 20, 2023

10. China Accepts the New Indo-Pacific Reality

Somewhat wishful thinking?

A positive perspective here:

Mr. Blinken’s visit demonstrated the importance of an old truth in diplomatic relations: It is always better to negotiate from a position of strength. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization so far has weathered the storm of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The U.S.-India relationship is going from strength to strength. Japan and South Korea have moved to ease their often-strained relationship. The American-led campaign to limit Chinese access to sensitive computer technology is chalking up important wins. Passage of the flawed but consequential inflation-reduction and semiconductor laws demonstrated America’s economic resilience and, along with the recent debt-ceiling agreement, refuted claims that Washington is hopelessly gridlocked.

These trends are creating a new reality in the Indo-Pacific, and Beijing’s leadership is smart and pragmatic enough to adapt. So far, so good, and Americans in both parties should applaud the Biden administration’s successes across the region.

But the alliances and partnerships that give the U.S. the strength to manage its relationship with Beijing depend on military heft and the depth of economic relationships with other leading powers. American military spending remains woefully inadequate, and the Biden administration has no serious trade strategy. Until these critical gaps are addressed, the edifice of American power the administration hopes to erect in the Indo-Pacific rests on a foundation of sand.

China Accepts the New Indo-Pacific Reality

Xi’s meeting with Blinken signals a limited but welcome thaw in relations.

By Walter Russell MeadFollow

June 19, 2023 5:37 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-accepts-the-new-indo-pacific-reality-blinken-xi-jinping-defense-spending-a9a9065d?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

It’s been a good week for the Biden administration’s diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares for his visit to Washington, officials in both countries indicated that they have reached important agreements on deepening cooperation. Meantime, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing was a solid though limited success. Chinese President Xi Jinping signaled that high-level U.S.-China discussions are back on track and that China shares the Biden administration’s interest in stabilizing the relationship between the world’s two leading powers.

While Mr. Xi’s decision to re-engage with the U.S. doesn’t mean he is abandoning his long-term goal of reasserting Chinese primacy in the region and beyond, it is significant. Mr. Blinken hasn’t backed away from such Biden administration policies as imposing controls over tech exports and outbound investment or strengthening defense ties with countries in China’s front yard. Mr. Xi’s meeting with Mr. Blinken indicates that the Communist Party is reluctantly accepting the new status quo rather than freezing relations and confronting the U.S. at every turn to force the Biden administration to change course.

China’s policy making isn’t transparent, but reasons for Mr. Xi’s willingness to engage aren’t hard to find. The Chinese economy is far from robust, and access to foreign investment, technology and markets remains critical to its success. Beijing’s efforts to drive a wedge between European nations and the U.S. have achieved limited results, in part because of Europe’s shocked response to China’s support for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. A Chinese rejection of Mr. Blinken’s offer of bilateral talks on climate change and trade relations would have further alienated Europe and isolated Beijing.

China also hasn’t had much luck at disrupting America’s growing network of security cooperation in the region. Alarmed by Chinese saber-rattling and heavy-handed diplomacy, traditional American allies like Japan, Australia and South Korea and important new partners like India are beefing up defense budgets and strengthening their ties with the U.S. Last month’s agreement with Papua New Guinea will give the U.S. access to six sites in the strategically located, mineral-rich island state. Another Pacific island nation, Palau, has asked for American help in fending off aggressive behavior by Chinese ships.

READ MORE GLOBAL VIEW

• Russia, China and Iran in America’s BackyardJune 12, 2023
• What if Putin Loses His War in Ukraine?June 5, 2023
• Putin’s War Is America’s OpportunityMay 29, 2023

These partners welcome America’s focus on the region but don’t want competition to get out of hand or disrupt the regional economy. Given these concerns, Mr. Blinken’s mission to Beijing was shrewd. It demonstrated to American allies and swing states in Asia that Washington wants to limit and manage the consequences of U.S.-China competition. If Mr. Xi refused to shake Mr. Blinken’s outstretched hand, Beijing would be held responsible for any further deterioration in the regional environment.

Under the circumstances, and with China also concerned about Mr. Xi’s reception if he attends the Asia-Pacific economic summit in San Francisco in November, Beijing has sensibly chosen the path of least resistance. The result is a limited but welcome thaw in an increasingly chilly relationship. Serious problems remain. China rejected Mr. Blinken’s request to reopen military-to-military communication channels that U.S. officials believe are necessary to avoid crises in the seas and airspace around China.

Mr. Blinken’s visit demonstrated the importance of an old truth in diplomatic relations: It is always better to negotiate from a position of strength. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization so far has weathered the storm of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The U.S.-India relationship is going from strength to strength. Japan and South Korea have moved to ease their often-strained relationship. The American-led campaign to limit Chinese access to sensitive computer technology is chalking up important wins. Passage of the flawed but consequential inflation-reduction and semiconductor laws demonstrated America’s economic resilience and, along with the recent debt-ceiling agreement, refuted claims that Washington is hopelessly gridlocked.

These trends are creating a new reality in the Indo-Pacific, and Beijing’s leadership is smart and pragmatic enough to adapt. So far, so good, and Americans in both parties should applaud the Biden administration’s successes across the region.

But the alliances and partnerships that give the U.S. the strength to manage its relationship with Beijing depend on military heft and the depth of economic relationships with other leading powers. American military spending remains woefully inadequate, and the Biden administration has no serious trade strategy. Until these critical gaps are addressed, the edifice of American power the administration hopes to erect in the Indo-Pacific rests on a foundation of sand.

WSJ Opinion: Is Biden Doing Enough About China?

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Appeared in the June 20, 2023, print edition as 'China Accepts the New Indo-Pacific Reality'.

11. India’s Modi Sees Unprecedented Trust With U.S., Touts New Delhi’s Leadership Role

Isn't that what China wants as well -- overhaul international institutions?

Excerpts:

Modi linked many of the world’s problems, such as terrorism, proxy wars and expansionism, to a failure of global institutions created during the Cold War to adapt, saying that smaller and regional groupings have emerged in the vacuum. He said global institutions such as the U.N. must change​.​

“Look at the membership of key institutions—does it truly represent the voice of democratic values?” he said. “A place like Africa—does it have a voice? India has such a huge population and is a bright spot in the global economy, but is it present?”

He signaled India’s desire to be on the U.N. Security Council, pointing to India’s role as a contributor of troops for peacekeeping operations around the world. “There has to be an evaluation of the current membership” of the council “and the world should be asked if it wants India to be there.”

Modi has often drawn parallels between his own rise and that of his country. Born in a small town in the western state of Gujarat three years after India gained independence, he has recalled working as a child in a family-owned tea stall.

1. WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE

India’s Modi Sees Unprecedented Trust With U.S., Touts New Delhi’s Leadership Role

In Wall Street Journal interview, prime minister calls for overhaul of global institutions

https://www.wsj.com/articles/indias-modi-sees-unprecedented-trust-with-u-s-touts-new-delhis-leadership-role-35e151b4?mod=hp_lead_pos6

By Rajesh RoyFollow

, Brendan Moran and Gordon FaircloughFollow

Updated June 20, 2023 12:04 am ET

NEW DELHI—Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said ties between New Delhi and Washington are stronger and deeper than ever as India moves to secure what he sees as its rightful place on the world stage at a moment of geopolitical turmoil.

“There is an unprecedented trust” between the leaders of the U.S. and India, Modi said in an interview ahead of his first official state visit to Washington after nine years in office. He hailed growing defense cooperation between the two countries as “an important pillar of our partnership,” which he said extends to trade, technology and energy.

In Washington this week, Modi is expected to complete deals to manufacture jet-fighter engines in India to power advanced light combat aircraft, and to purchase high-altitude armed Predator drones from the U.S. in a multibillion-dollar agreement to boost surveillance efforts over the Indian Ocean and near its disputed border with China in the Himalayas.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi campaigned for his Bharatiya Janata Party in Bengaluru, India, last month. PHOTO: JAGADEESH NV/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

As the West squares off against Moscow and, increasingly, China, New Delhi stands to gain. Washington has courted India hoping that it will be a strategic counterweight to Beijing. The U.S. has moved to deepen defense ties even as New Delhi makes large purchases of Russian oil at discounted prices, providing financial support for Moscow as it wages war in Ukraine.

Modi—who gives many speeches but fewer news conferences and interviews—spoke with The Wall Street Journal about India’s foreign policy, its efforts to build a more modern and sustainable economy and a range of other topics in a nearly hourlong interview in his office at his sprawling official residence in the heart of New Delhi.

Overall, Modi’s message was that—from India’s role in global politics to its contributions to the world economy—the country’s time has come. He sought to portray New Delhi as the natural leader of the global South, in sync with and able to give voice to developing countries’ long-neglected aspirations.

“India deserves a much higher, deeper and wider profile and a role,” said Modi, wearing a yellow kurta and light-brown jacket. Peacocks squawked in the garden outside.

The 72-year-old leader called for changes to the United Nations and other international organizations to adapt them for an increasingly multipolar world order and to make them more broadly representative of the world’s less-affluent nations and their priorities, from the consequences of climate change to debt reduction.

Unlike the vision of nonalignment advanced by Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru in the early years of the Cold War, Modi’s foreign policy is one of multiple alignments, seeking to advance India’s interests in partnership with a range of global powers, including those in conflict with each other.

Modi is one of India’s most popular prime ministers. He and his Bharatiya Janata Party won nationwide elections in 2014 and 2019 by comfortable margins. With national elections due next year, Modi’s approval rating is high.

Political opponents and human-rights advocates have accused Modi’s party, which has roots in Hindu nationalism, of fostering religious polarization and democratic backsliding, pointing to issues such as restrictions on the press and removal of the special status of Indian-administered Kashmir to more closely integrate the Muslim-majority region into the country.

Modi said that India not only tolerates but celebrates its diversity.

“For thousands of years, India has been the land where people of all faiths and beliefs have found the freedom to coexist peacefully and prosper,” he said in a statement. “You will find people of every faith in the world living in harmony in India.”

On the economic front, Modi has won praise for eliminating bureaucracy, relaxing rules and opening the way for more foreign direct investment. The country has surpassed China as the world’s most populous. What’s more, its population is young, promising a significant demographic dividend.

The government has invested enormously in education and infrastructure, and it is poised to gain as multinationals look to diversify manufacturing and supply chains in an era of geopolitical tension.

A new Apple store drew a crowd in Mumbai in April as the company expanded its investment in India. PHOTO: DHIRAJ SINGH/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Apple is among the companies making significant new investments in southern India, with supplier Foxconn Technology Group planning new facilities in the states of Karnataka and Telangana and expanding iPhone production in the state of Tamil Nadu.

“Let me be clear that we do not see India as supplanting any country. We see this process as India gaining its rightful position in the world,” Modi said. “The world today is more interconnected and interdependent than ever before. To create resilience, there should be more diversification in supply chains.”

One thing India and the U.S. share are relationships with China that have grown increasingly fraught in recent years, marked by deepening military and economic rivalries. For India, that challenge is at its doorstep, with rising tensions centering around its decadeslong dispute with Beijing over the 2,000-mile border separating the two countries, known as the Line of Actual Control. The countries have been building infrastructure and deploying more troops in the region since a deadly 2020 clash in the Himalayas.

Indian officials have blamed China for violating border agreements, and the two countries have held 18 rounds of military talks since 2020 aimed at preventing the dispute from spiraling into wider conflict.

“For normal bilateral ties with China, peace and tranquility in the border areas is essential,” Modi said. “We have a core belief in respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, observing the rule of law and peaceful resolution of differences and disputes. At the same time, India is fully prepared and committed to protect its sovereignty and dignity.”

China’s Defense Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment sent via the State Council Information Office.

In drawing closer to Washington, the Indian government has had to overcome deep skepticism about the U.S. that dates back to the Cold War, when New Delhi became more closely aligned with Moscow after Washington declined to supply arms to India in 1965. The U.S. instead became a military backer of India’s neighbor and rival, Pakistan.

India’s relationship with the U.S. has strengthened in recent years in part because of economic ties. Trade between the two countries reached a record $191 billion in 2022, making the U.S. India’s largest trading partner. The U.S. is India’s third-biggest source of foreign direct investment, and one of the top five destinations for investment from India.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the G-7 meeting in May. PHOTO: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN/REUTERS

At the same time, India has maintained close ties with Russia, which still provides about 50% of the country’s military supplies, including arms, ammunition, tanks, jet fighters and S-400 air defense systems. Washington has put pressure on India to reduce its dependence on Moscow for arms, and some in the U.S. have criticized Modi’s government for not taking a more forceful stance against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. India has abstained from U.N. votes condemning the invasion.

“I don’t think this type of perception is widespread in the U.S.,” said Modi, referring to criticism of its stance on Russia. “I think India’s position is well known and well understood in the entire world. The world has full confidence that India’s topmost priority is peace.”

When it comes to the Ukraine conflict, “Some people say that we are neutral. But we are not neutral. We are on the side of peace,” said Modi. “All countries should respect international law and the sovereignty of countries.” Disputes should be resolved with “diplomacy and dialogue,” not war, Modi said.

He said he has spoken several times to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He said he most recently spoke to Zelensky on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Japan in May. “India will do whatever it can” and supports “all genuine efforts to bring an end to the conflict and ensure enduring peace and stability,” he said.

Modi linked many of the world’s problems, such as terrorism, proxy wars and expansionism, to a failure of global institutions created during the Cold War to adapt, saying that smaller and regional groupings have emerged in the vacuum. He said global institutions such as the U.N. must change​.​

“Look at the membership of key institutions—does it truly represent the voice of democratic values?” he said. “A place like Africa—does it have a voice? India has such a huge population and is a bright spot in the global economy, but is it present?”

He signaled India’s desire to be on the U.N. Security Council, pointing to India’s role as a contributor of troops for peacekeeping operations around the world. “There has to be an evaluation of the current membership” of the council “and the world should be asked if it wants India to be there.”

Modi has often drawn parallels between his own rise and that of his country. Born in a small town in the western state of Gujarat three years after India gained independence, he has recalled working as a child in a family-owned tea stall.

He got his start in politics after joining the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or RSS, an organization that is closely associated with the cause of Hindu nationalism. His work in the organization and later the Bharatiya Janata Party got the attention of a BJP prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who tapped him to become the chief minister of Gujarat in 2001.

As a politician, Modi tends to ignite intense feelings in both supporters and opponents, but no one would dispute that he has come a long way from that tea stall.

Modi was once denied a visa to enter the U.S. after the 2002 Gujarat riots that killed more than 1,000 people, mostly Muslims. In 2012, an investigative panel appointed by India’s Supreme Court said it found no evidence of wrongdoing by Modi. The U.S. said it would grant him a visa to visit after he was elected prime minister in 2014.

That year he delivered a Hindi-language speech to a jubilant crowd of more than 18,000 at Madison Square Garden who were chanting his name. In the years since, more U.S. appearances have followed, including an address to a joint session of Congress in 2016 and a “Howdy, Modi” rally with President Donald Trump in Houston in 2019. He returns this week for an official state visit.

There is a sense too in India that the country’s moment on the global stage has arrived. Across the Indian capital, Modi’s image appears on signs promoting the Group of 20, with some bearing the motto India has chosen for its presidency, “One Earth, One Family, One Future.”

“I am the first prime minister to be born in free India,” Modi said. “And that’s why my thought process, my conduct, what I say and do, is inspired and influenced by my country’s attributes and traditions. I derive my strength from it.”

“I present my country to the world as my country is, and myself, as I am,” he said.

Write to Rajesh Roy at rajesh.roy@wsj.com, Brendan Moran at brendan.moran@wsj.com and Gordon Fairclough at Gordon.Fairclough@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the June 20, 2023, print edition as 'Modi Stresses Ties To U.S., Global Role Ahead of State Visit'.

12. Carrier USS Ronald Reagan Now in the South China Sea

Carrier USS Ronald Reagan Now in the South China Sea - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · June 19, 2023

Sailors man the rails as the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam (CG-54) approaches the U.S. Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) for a replenishment at sea in the South China Sea, June 17, 2023. US Navy Photo

The Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group is operating in the South China Sea, according to imagery posted by the Pentagon over the weekend.

Carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and cruiser USS Antietam (CG-54) were shown during a replenishment at sea operation in the South China Sea. A separate imagery set showed destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG-115) in the same area. USS Nimitz (CVN-68) ands its strike group had been operating in the area in April before moving to the Philippine Sea in May. The Nimitz CSG now expected to be on the homeward-bound transit of its deployment.

The two carrier strike groups held drills with Japanese, French and Canadian ships from June 7-10 in the Philippine Sea and East China Sea as part of Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) Large Scale Global Exercise 2023 (LSGE23). The Reagan CSG participated in Exercise Noble Typhoon from June 10 to Wednesday with the three countries, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) said in a release on Thursday. The drill, part of LSGE23, took place from near Okinawa to the South China Sea.

JS Izumo (DDH-183), the lead ship of in the Izumo class of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), steams in the Philippine Sea, June 11, 2023. US Navy Photo

Ships included were:

U.S. Navy

Carrier

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76)

Cruisers

USS Antietam (CG-54), USS Robert Smalls (CG-62)

Destroyers

USS Rafael Peralta DDG-115), USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93)

Fleet Oiler

USNS Rappahannock (T-AO-204)

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

Helicopter Destroyer

JS Izumo (DDH-183)

Destroyer

JS Samidare (DD-106)

Royal Canadian Navy

Frigate

HMCS Montreal (FFH336)

French Navy

Frigate FS Lorraine (D657)

Noble Typhoon involved anti-surface, anti-air, anti-submarine and replenishment at sea drills between the ships and a French Navy social media post on Saturday stated that Lorraine was integrated into the Reagan CSG for the exercise.

Meanwhile Japan and the U.S. carried out deterrent demonstrations in response to North Korea launching two ballistic missiles into Japan’s Economic Exclusion Zone on Thursday.

Four F-2 fighters of the Japan Air Self Defense Force 8th Air Wing conducted tactical exercises with 4 U.S. F-35 Lightning II fighters and a KC-135 tanker over the Sea of Japan, the Joint Staff Office (JSO) of Japan’s Ministry of Defense said on Friday.

“This bilateral exercise reaffirms the strong will between Japan and the United States to respond to any situation, the readiness of Japan Self Defense Force and U.S. Armed Forces, and further strengthens the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance” stated the release.

On Monday, destroyers JS Haguro (DDG-180) and USS John Finn (DDG-113) carried out tactical exercises in the Sea of Japan in response to the North Korean launches, the JSO said in a statement.

Haguro is the second of the two Maya class destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system and has a ballistic missile defense capability. The ship was commissioned in March 2021, making it the JMSDF’s youngest destroyer. Japan has a total of eight BMD capable destroyers comprising of four Kongo class, two Atago class and two Maya class destroyers with a new class of two Aegis destroyers planned to join them in 2027 and 2028. The exercises with Japan followed Friday’s announcement of the Ohio-class guided-missile submarine USS Michigan (SSGN-727) arriving in Busan, South Korea.

The Ohio-class guided-missile submarine USS Michigan (SSGN-727) departs Guam, on March 1, 2023. US Navy Photo

On Thursday, the U.S. Navy, JMSDF and Royal Australian Air Force wrapped up a maritime patrol aircraft exercise that began on June 3 and was carried out over the Pacific Ocean waters off Japan according to a Friday JMSDF release.

The exercise was held out of Misawa airbase and consisted of mission planning, a ground link exchange and aircraft rider exchanges. The RAAF No. 11 Squadron “Black Cat” is equipped with two P-8A aircraft, the JMSDF Air Patrol Squadron 2 “Odin” with one P-3C aircraft, and the USN Patrol Squadron (VP) 26 “Tridents” with one P-8A aircraft.

“It has been a great opportunity to host the Royal Australian Air Force in Japan and conduct trilateral exercises demonstrating the interoperability of the global maritime patrol force,” said Cmdr. Curtis White, executive officer of VP-26 in the Navy release.

The Navy release added that the participants also familiarized themselves with the maritime environment regarding maritime patrol during the exercise and that during the exercise the squadrons worked together to improve USN-JMSDF-RAAF data-link connectivity and enhanced interoperability. The JMSDF release stated that a JMSDF submarine took part in the exercise.

Related

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · June 19, 2023

13. Where Did We Go Wrong in Afghanistan? (Review of Mike Vickers' new book)

I am looking forward to reading this when I get back from my trip (Amazon told me the book arrived this week). I have heard Mike speak on this twice in the last two weeks so I know he will provide some very important insights and put the personal history he participated in in some perspective. (even if Bacevich pans the book).

Excerpts:

Today, Vickers concedes, “the underlying conditions that gave rise to global jihadist terrorism remain largely intact.” If true, then the methods devised to deal with Brzezinski’s stirred-up Islamists have been inherently defective, with further efforts to achieve escalation dominance — even with whole fleets of missile-laden Predators — unlikely to yield anything like definitive success.

The final minutes of “Charlie Wilson’s War” suggest that terrorism took root in Afghanistan and blossomed on 9/11 because the United States did not invest in nation building after the Soviets left. In his memoir, Vickers instead focuses his regrets on military strategy: if only they had gotten the mujahedeen bigger guns earlier; if only they had kept a closer eye on foreign insurgents, like Osama bin Laden, who were spurred by the fighting.

He does, however, gesture at something more than perpetual war. “Operationally dismantling” terrorist networks “is necessary but not sufficient,” he writes. “You also have to defeat their ideology and prevent their reconstitution.”

Defeat their ideology? On that issue, no one in the U.S. national security apparatus has a clue about where even to begin.

Where Did We Go Wrong in Afghanistan?

The New York Times · by Andrew J. Bacevich · June 18, 2023

Nonfiction

In “By All Means Available,” the veteran strategist Michael G. Vickers tallies achievements and missteps across the Cold War and the war on terror.

Michael G. Vickers speaks with a member of the Yemeni special forces in Sana.Credit...via Michael G. Vickers

By

June 18, 2023

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BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy, by Michael G. Vickers

An implicit question haunts this illuminating and richly detailed memoir by Michael G. Vickers, the senior intelligence official at the center of America’s long war for the greater Middle East. It’s a question that has acquired greater immediacy since it was posed in 1998 by Jimmy Carter’s former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski: “What is more important in the history of the world?” he said. “Some stirred-up Islamists or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?”

That comment appeared in an interview with the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur. Asked whether he regretted sending covert U.S. aid to Afghanistan in 1979, all but ensuring the Soviet invasion and the subsequent rise of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Brzezinski demurred. “Drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap,” he replied, had been “an excellent idea.”

In 1983, a few years into the Russian invasion, a 30-year-old Vickers left an early career as a Green Beret to join the C.I.A. The Cold War of the 1980s was mostly quite cold; covert operations promised action. At the agency, Vickers rose fast. Before the end of the decade, the young operative had become an architect of the Russian defeat in Afghanistan. This was, he writes, the “decisive battle” in the struggle that brought “an end to the Soviet Empire.”

After a stretch of graduate education and a turn at a Washington think tank, Vickers earned a new job, this time at the Pentagon. For eight years, he oversaw operations in various far-flung theaters of the global war on terror. Yet it was Afghanistan, occupied by U.S. forces beginning in 2001, that once more became the focal point of his attention.

In America’s very long confrontation with stirred-up Islamists, Vickers became the nation’s pre-eminent silent warrior. He brought to the science of war the same qualities that Ted Williams brought to the science of hitting a baseball: preternatural aptitude coupled with a relentless determination to master his craft.

The combination can cause myopia. In Vickers’s case, it manifested as a lack of appreciation for war’s political dimensions. His military strategy reduces to a single imperative: the pursuit of “escalation dominance.” When embarking upon war, “go in on the offense and with what it takes to win.” Don’t pussyfoot. Don’t worry about costs. A well-endowed nation like the United States always has another log to throw on the fire.

Vickers writes that Afghanistan in the ’80s was “my great war of liberation.” Other members of the U.S.-led anti-Soviet coalition — Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Britain — entertained their own disparate notions about the war’s purpose. Few of them were seeking to advance the cause of human freedom. Vickers suggests he was also heeding a more basic impulse: “I wanted to follow the sound of guns.”

His keys to victory were a plentiful supply of advanced arms — especially U.S.-manufactured Stinger antiaircraft missiles — plus “the indomitable fighting spirit, toughness and resilience of the Afghan people” along with the “wildly unrealistic” Soviet expectations of creating in Kabul a “foreign-dominated, centrally directed, secular, cohesive” state.

Vickers’s C.I.A. training included disguise work and not-quite-simulated torture survival tests. But he was not into spycraft. “Charlie Wilson’s War,” the Aaron Sorkin-scripted 2007 film about covert ops in Afghanistan, presents Vickers as a wiry, hyperconfident wunderkind with a deep knowledge of military weaponry.

The portrait is largely accurate. In addition to providing munitions, he orchestrated a comprehensive suite of logistical support for the Afghan resistance fighters known as the mujahedeen. The insurgents got sophisticated “frequency-hopping” tactical radios, and new training camps offered courses in command. By the end of 1987, Vickers writes, the mujahedeen “had become equipped with more technologically advanced weapons than any insurgent force had been in history.” (They also got 20,000 mules shipped in from China for battlefield transport.)

The pain inflicted on Russian forces proved to be more than the sclerotic Soviet regime was willing to endure. In the winter of 1989, the Russian military withdrew. Three years later, the Kremlin-installed government in Kabul collapsed. Washington lost interest in Afghanistan and Vickers retreated into studies of Thucydides and Sun Tzu. The Afghans, meanwhile, claimed the fruits of their victory: anarchy and civil war leading to draconian rule by the Taliban.

The events of 9/11 prompted senior members of the George W. Bush administration to rediscover Afghanistan and to embark upon their own wildly unrealistic state-building project there. In 2007, the Pentagon called up Vickers to be its point man in this ill-fated enterprise. This time, he trained his strategy of “escalation dominance” against the indigenous resistance, now backed by elements of Al Qaeda.

The book loses its swagger as it moves closer to the present, reading less like an action-packed memoir and more like an official history. There is much to account for. Afghanistan was only one front in what Vickers characterizes as the “Battle for the Middle East.” His fight against Qaeda franchises and offshoots unfolded in Libya, Yemen, Syria and the Indian subcontinent, with Marxist insurgents and drug cartels in Colombia and Mexico thrown in for good measure.

Vickers addressed this hydra-headed threat with a buildup of Predator drones, the tool that would become part of Barack Obama’s legacy in the region. Critics have charged that this reliance on drones resulted in many needless civilian deaths. Drone warfare is not “collateral-free,” Vickers writes. But Predator strikes, he insists, “are what has kept America safe.”

A signed photograph from President Barack Obama. Vickers, center, was a significant proponent of the American drone program.Credit...via Michael G. Vickers

Still, winning meant above all prevailing in Afghanistan, the site of his great victory in the 1980s. Vickers labors mightily to demonstrate that his strategy there, centered on President Obama’s 30,000 troop “surge,” was a viable one. Few readers will find the argument convincing. And, when U.S. forces finally departed in 2021, the Afghan state created at a cost of $2.3 trillion over a period of 20 years fell apart in a matter of days, rendering a definitive judgment on the entire enterprise.

Vickers holds Donald Trump and Joe Biden jointly responsible. By initiating and then committing to U.S. withdrawal, the two presidents had turned a useful “stalemate” into a “self-inflicted defeat.” This “major and completely unnecessary strategic blunder,” according to Vickers, has “greatly emboldened the global jihadist movement.”

In fact, by the time Vickers left government, in 2015, the U.S. effort to achieve escalation dominance in Afghanistan had devolved into an open-ended campaign of attrition. “Though beaten down by the surge,” he admits, the Taliban “never left.” The enemy’s persistence obliged Washington “to accept the fact that Afghanistan would be a much longer war.” How much longer he does not say. America’s wars in Afghanistan consumed Vickers for most of his adult life. In his memoir, he almost seems sad to see them go.

Today, Vickers concedes, “the underlying conditions that gave rise to global jihadist terrorism remain largely intact.” If true, then the methods devised to deal with Brzezinski’s stirred-up Islamists have been inherently defective, with further efforts to achieve escalation dominance — even with whole fleets of missile-laden Predators — unlikely to yield anything like definitive success.

The final minutes of “Charlie Wilson’s War” suggest that terrorism took root in Afghanistan and blossomed on 9/11 because the United States did not invest in nation building after the Soviets left. In his memoir, Vickers instead focuses his regrets on military strategy: if only they had gotten the mujahedeen bigger guns earlier; if only they had kept a closer eye on foreign insurgents, like Osama bin Laden, who were spurred by the fighting.

He does, however, gesture at something more than perpetual war. “Operationally dismantling” terrorist networks “is necessary but not sufficient,” he writes. “You also have to defeat their ideology and prevent their reconstitution.”

Defeat their ideology? On that issue, no one in the U.S. national security apparatus has a clue about where even to begin.

BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy | By Michael G. Vickers | Illustrated | 599 pp. | Alfred A. Knopf | $35

Andrew J. Bacevich is chairman and co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is at work on a novel.

The New York Times · by Andrew J. Bacevich · June 18, 2023

14. Russia Sought to Kill Defector in Florida

Just in case you missed this.

Excerpts:

The plot, along with other Russian activities, elicited a harsh response from the U.S. government. In April 2021, the United States imposed sanctions and expelled 10 Russian diplomats, including the chief of station for the S.V.R., who was based in Washington and had two years left on his tour, two former American officials said. Throwing out the chief of station can be incredibly disruptive to intelligence operations, and agency officials suspected that Russia was likely to seek reprisal on its American counterpart in Moscow, who had only weeks left in that role, the officials said.

“We cannot allow a foreign power to interfere in our democratic process with impunity,” President Biden said at the White House in announcing the penalties. He made no mention of the plot involving Mr. Fuentes.

Sure enough, Russia banished 10 American diplomats, including the C.I.A.’s chief of station in Moscow.

Russia Sought to Kill Defector in Florida

By Ronen Bergman, Adam Goldman and Julian E. Barnes

June 19, 2023

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · June 19, 2023

A failed plot to assassinate a C.I.A. spy in 2020 in part led to expulsions of the agency’s chief in Moscow and his Russian counterpart in Washington.

The clandestine operation represented a brazen expansion of President Vladimir V. Putin’s campaign of targeted assassinations.Credit...Gavriil Grigorov/Sputnik, via Reuters

June 19, 2023

As President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has pursued enemies abroad, his intelligence operatives now appear prepared to cross a line that they previously avoided: trying to kill a valuable informant for the U.S. government on American soil.

The clandestine operation, seeking to eliminate a C.I.A. informant in Miami who had been a high-ranking Russian intelligence official more than a decade earlier, represented a brazen expansion of Mr. Putin’s campaign of targeted assassinations. It also signaled a dangerous low point even between intelligence services that have long had a strained history.

“The red lines are long gone for Putin,” said Marc Polymeropoulos, a former C.I.A. officer who oversaw operations in Europe and Russia. “He wants all these guys dead.”

The assassination failed, but the aftermath in part spiraled into tit-for-tat retaliation by the United States and Russia, according to three former senior American officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss aspects of a plot meant to be secret and its consequences. Sanctions and expulsions, including of top intelligence officials in Moscow and Washington, followed.

The target was Aleksandr Poteyev, a former Russian intelligence officer who disclosed information that led to a yearslong F.B.I. investigation that in 2010 ensnared 11 spies living under deep cover in suburbs and cities along the East Coast. They had assumed false names and worked ordinary jobs as part of an ambitious attempt by the S.V.R., Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, to gather information and recruit more agents.

In keeping with an Obama administration effort to reset relations, a deal was reached that sought to ease tensions: Ten of the 11 spies were arrested and expelled to Russia. In exchange, Moscow released four Russian prisoners, including Sergei V. Skripal, a former colonel in the military intelligence service who was convicted in 2006 for selling secrets to Britain.

The bid to assassinate Mr. Poteyev is revealed in the British edition of the book “Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West,” to be published by an imprint of Little, Brown on June 29. The book is by Calder Walton, a scholar of national security and intelligence at Harvard. The New York Times independently confirmed his work and is reporting for the first time on the bitter fallout from the operation, including the retaliatory measures that ensued once it came to light.

According to Mr. Walton’s book, a Kremlin official asserted that a hit man, or a Mercader, would almost certainly hunt down Mr. Poteyev. Ramón Mercader, an agent of Joseph Stalin’s, slipped into Leon Trotsky’s study in Mexico City in 1940 and sank an ice ax into his head. Based on interviews with two American intelligence officials, Mr. Walton concluded the operation was the beginning of “a modern-day Mercader” sent to assassinate Mr. Poteyev.

The Russians have long used assassins to silence perceived enemies. One of the most celebrated at S.V.R. headquarters in Moscow is Col. Grigory Mairanovsky, a biochemist who experimented with lethal poisons, according to a former intelligence official.

Mr. Putin, a former K.G.B. officer, has made no secret of his deep disdain for defectors among the intelligence ranks, particularly those who aid the West. The poisoning of Mr. Skripal at the hands of Russian operatives in Salisbury, Britain, in 2018 signaled an escalation in Moscow’s tactics and intensified fears that it would not hesitate to do the same on American shores.

Photographs of Sergei V. Skripal, a former colonel in Russia’s military intelligence service who was convicted in 2006 for selling secrets to British intelligence.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

The attack, which used a nerve agent to sicken Mr. Skripal and his daughter, prompted a wave of diplomatic expulsions across the world as Britain marshaled the support of its allies in a bid to issue a robust response.

The incident set off alarm bells inside the C.I.A., where officials worried that former spies who had relocated to the United States, like Mr. Poteyev, would soon be targets.

Mr. Putin had long vowed to punish Mr. Poteyev. But before he could be arrested, Mr. Poteyev fled to the United States, where the C.I.A. resettled him under a highly secretive program meant to protect former spies. In 2011, a Moscow court sentenced him in absentia to decades in prison.

Mr. Poteyev had seemed to vanish, but at one point, Russian intelligence sent operatives to the United States to find him, though its intentions remained unclear. In 2016, the Russian news media reported that he was dead, which some intelligence experts believed might be a ploy to flush him out. Indeed, Mr. Poteyev was very much alive, residing in the Miami area.

That year, he obtained a fishing license and registered as a Republican so he could vote, all under his real name, according to state records. In 2018, a news outlet reported Mr. Poteyev’s whereabouts.

The C.I.A.’s concerns were not unwarranted. In 2019, the Russians undertook an elaborate operation to find Mr. Poteyev, forcing a scientist from Oaxaca, Mexico, to help.

The scientist, Hector Alejandro Cabrera Fuentes, was an unlikely spy. He studied microbiology in Kazan, Russia, and later earned a doctorate in the subject from the University of Giessen in Germany. He was a source of pride for his family, with a history of charitable work and no criminal past.

But the Russians used Mr. Fuentes’s partner as leverage. He had two wives: a Russian living in Germany and another in Mexico. In 2019, the Russian wife and her two daughters were not allowed to leave Russia as they tried to return to Germany, court documents say.

That May, when Mr. Fuentes traveled to visit them, a Russian official contacted him and asked to see him in Moscow. At one meeting, the official reminded Mr. Fuentes that his family was stuck in Russia and that maybe, according to court documents, “we can help each other.”

A few months later, the Russian official asked Mr. Fuentes to secure a condo just north of Miami Beach, where Mr. Poteyev lived. Instructed not to rent the apartment in his name, Mr. Fuentes gave an associate $20,000 to do so.

In 2019, the Russians undertook an elaborate operation to find a C.I.A. informant, forcing Hector Alejandro Cabrera Fuentes, a scientist from Mexico, to help.Credit...GDA, via Associated Press

In February 2020, Mr. Fuentes traveled to Moscow, where he again met with the Russian official, who provided a description of Mr. Poteyev’s vehicle. Mr. Fuentes, the Russian said, should find the car, obtain its license plate number and take note of its physical location. He advised Mr. Fuentes to refrain from taking pictures, presumably to eliminate any incriminating evidence.

But Mr. Fuentes botched the operation. Driving into the complex, he tried to bypass its entry gate by tailgating another vehicle, attracting the attention of security. When he was questioned, his wife walked away to photograph Mr. Poteyev’s license plate.

Mr. Fuentes and his wife were told to leave, but security cameras captured the incident. Two days later, he tried to fly to Mexico, but U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers stopped him and searched his phone, discovering the picture of Mr. Poteyev’s vehicle.

After he was arrested, Mr. Fuentes provided details of the plan to American investigators. He believed the Russian official he had been meeting worked for the F.S.B., Russia’s internal security service. But covert operations overseas are usually run by the S.V.R., which succeeded the K.G.B., or the G.R.U., Russia’s military intelligence agency.

One of the former officials said Mr. Fuentes, unaware of the target’s significance, was merely gathering information for the Russians to use later.

Mr. Fuentes’s lawyer, Ronald Gainor, declined to comment.

The plot, along with other Russian activities, elicited a harsh response from the U.S. government. In April 2021, the United States imposed sanctions and expelled 10 Russian diplomats, including the chief of station for the S.V.R., who was based in Washington and had two years left on his tour, two former American officials said. Throwing out the chief of station can be incredibly disruptive to intelligence operations, and agency officials suspected that Russia was likely to seek reprisal on its American counterpart in Moscow, who had only weeks left in that role, the officials said.

“We cannot allow a foreign power to interfere in our democratic process with impunity,” President Biden said at the White House in announcing the penalties. He made no mention of the plot involving Mr. Fuentes.

Sure enough, Russia banished 10 American diplomats, including the C.I.A.’s chief of station in Moscow.

Adam Entous contributed reporting.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House.

Adam Goldman reports on the F.B.I. and national security from Washington, D.C., and is a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. He is the coauthor of “Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD's Secret Spying Unit and bin Laden's Final Plot Against America.” @adamgoldmanNYT

Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Russia Sought To Kill Defector In U.S. in 2020

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · June 19, 2023

15.  Inside Phoenix Challenge — the conference series seeking to shape and bolster information operations

Just remember that the first problem they need to solve is this: It is easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of an enemy than it is to get permission to put an idea between his ears. Until we are willing to accept risk in the information space and learn to lead with influence all will be for naught.

We must get over our information and influence risk averseness.

We must get comfortable in the information space and accept that politics is war by other means in addition to our Clausewitzian view that war is politics by other means. (Or as Mao said, politics is war without bloodshed and war is politics with bloodshed.).

Excerpts;

The conference seeks to provide a forum for information professionals to get together, discuss and devise solutions through working groups.

As the information environment becomes significantly more important with adversaries seeking to use subterfuge and influence from halfway across the globe to achieve their objectives and influence local populations, Phoenix Challenge has sought to gather experts from across the community to devise solutions and policies to combat malicious activity.

Inside Phoenix Challenge — the conference series seeking to shape and bolster information operations

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · June 16, 2023

Next week, members of government, industry and academia will gather in Atlanta for the latest iteration of an ongoing conference series aimed at bringing professionals together to tackle difficult challenges within the information environment.

Phoenix Challenge, which kicks off June 20 at the Georgia Tech Research Institute, is sponsored by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy — who the Department of Defense appointed as the statutorily mandated principal information operations adviser — and the Office of Information Operations under the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

The conference seeks to provide a forum for information professionals to get together, discuss and devise solutions through working groups.

As the information environment becomes significantly more important with adversaries seeking to use subterfuge and influence from halfway across the globe to achieve their objectives and influence local populations, Phoenix Challenge has sought to gather experts from across the community to devise solutions and policies to combat malicious activity.

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“We see that the competition in the information environment is acute, our threats are increasing and even more sophisticated in this space,” Austin Branch, professor of practice at the University of Maryland’s Applied Research Lab for Intelligence & Security and Technology (ARLIS), told DefenseScoop.

ARLIS supports the conference by providing expertise, content and follow-up with applied research.

There is a prevailing narrative that the U.S. is losing the information fight, as adversaries have invested heavily in these tactics while America was busy combating technologically inferior and more parochial counterterrorism threats in the Middle East.

“What we failed at, I think, as a society is we’ve let this space on autopilot and our adversaries have seized upon that and have made some significant inroads in terms of infrastructure, in terms of quality of production, in terms of analysis of vulnerabilities, in terms of output of effort,” Andrew Whiskeyman, who formerly worked in the J39 directorate at U.S. Central Command and now is affiliated with ARLIS, told DefenseScoop. “But Russia and China saw it differently and saw what the power of it was … and we’ve abdicated that space.”

Now, significantly more attention and investment is being paid to the information environment by the Department of Defense — with updated doctrine and strategies from the services — and Phoenix Challenge seeks to be a place where this community can gather to discuss and solve problems.

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Rising from the ashes

The Phoenix Challenge series originally began in the early 2000s and was hosted by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, who at the time, was the primary adviser for information operations.

However, the conference took a multiyear hiatus following the GSA conference scandal in the early 2010s.

The GSA scandal created barriers for hosting conferences and around the same time, DOD shifted policy oversight for information operations and the like, placing a burden on a smaller staff, which did not possess the capacity to carry on Phoenix Challenge given more pressing issues.

As a result, the conference went dormant.

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But a few years ago, Central Command realized there was a gap within the field of information and it lacked a common place to bring in the broader community. They hosted their own event and eventually, in discussions with others, the idea to resurrect Phoenix Challenge was born.

It started small during the Covid pandemic with virtual options and has since grown to include in-person events and working groups that produce real outcomes.

“This sort of gathering has been missing for at least a decade. The fact that it’s back together again and moving out with more rigor and a bigger tent than it had the last time in its previous iteration, is all good news,” Whiskeyman said.

Thus far, officials have explained that the conference has helped to influence policy and drive solutions.

“These events have helped us better shape policy and strategy within the information environment by providing a forum for the Office of Information Operations Policy to socialize unclassified tasks prescribed by statutory requirements and various National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs),” Todd Breasseale, principal director for the Pentagon’s Office of Information Operations Policy and former deputy assistant to the secretary for public affairs, told DefenseScoop.

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“Information Operations are inherently cross-cutting, touching upon almost every mission area of the department. Phoenix Challenge convenes experts and thought leaders to assist in developing solutions for extraordinarily complex issues. It’s been a powerful mechanism to ensure we as a department, take into consideration input from other entities for a more holistic approach. But to be sure, best practices are just that: they are what work the best. They’re as beneficial for our allies and partners as they are for us,” he said.

Not your typical conference

People explained that Phoenix Challenge is not like the typical conference in which attendees socialize, exchange business cards and listen to speeches. Rather, there are specific outcomes from working groups that are expected to be produced in order to advance policy.

“Phoenix Challenge is not just another conference to get people together to talk about things. It is a conference with working groups and an agenda with report-outs back up to the Secretary of Defense with projects and agenda items that are being done and being advanced,” John Bicknell, vice president of the Information Professionals Association (IPA) — an apolitical, nonprofit organization that seeks to bring like minded professionals in this space together to develop technological solutions to the information sphere — told DefenseScoop. “It’s a like an ongoing dialogue and working groups that are designed to advance projects and technological initiatives that align on the information and the cognitive security problem for our friends and allies.”

IPA helps with the conference along with ARLIS and government sponsors.

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One of the big differentiators from Phoenix Challenge to other forums, Bicknell said, is the Pentagon has expectations that the event will be advancing projects in order to engage more productively and appropriately with the national security information problem.

The working groups and outcomes aim to help the department inform changes to doctrine, policy and even funding cycles.

“All of those things start to now be informed by the corpus of work that’s going on within Phoenix Challenge,” Whiskeyman said. “I realized that the new framework has only been in place for this working through this past year. But that’s the big picture mark of where we’re trying to go with putting this together to be able to provide that sort of analysis for senior leaders.”

The DOD has already seen results and the working groups have helped advance policy by providing a place for the community to gather.

“These events have helped us advance the mission in the information space by providing a venue that brings together stakeholders and thought leaders for discourse on ongoing and emerging issues and to set a common azimuth to recommend courses of action or areas for further research and investment to our and our allied and partnered leadership,” Breasseale said. “The participants, working group leads, speakers, and panelists span from across U.S. government agencies, the various Under Secretaries of Defense, the services, DoD components, international allies and partners, leaders in relevant industry, and academia beyond federally funded research and development centers and university affiliated research centers.”

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Each conference has a specific theme and builds upon the last.

“You got to have continuity between these events, otherwise, they just turned out to be … conferences [and] that doesn’t meet our objectives,” ARLIS’ Branch said.

The most recent event, co-hosted with the DOD and the U.K. Ministry of Defense, took place in London in February and had a strong focus on allied partnerships. It also included participation from a raft of international partners.

“There was a lot of bilateral engagements, but having a multilateral kind of a venue like that really generated a ton of collaboration and relationships that are necessary to getting some of this work,” Branch said.

While there were two days of plenary sessions in London — which were important given it was the first time they did an international event and got to hear from several speakers — one of the lessons was they needed more time for working groups.

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“What we realized was the working groups need more time than just a day because of the complexity of some of the challenges that they’re facing,” Whiskeyman said.

Breasseale said they intend to build on the momentum from London.

“In Atlanta, we’re looking for tangible and as importantly — actionable outputs from each of our six working groups we’ll assemble there: Sensitive Activities; Inputs to the R&D Roadmap for OIE Technologies; Implementing Effective Technological Solutions to Emerging OIE Threats; Assessments; an Implementation Plan Framework for the upcoming Strategy for OIE; and Resilience to Adversary Disinformation,” he said. OIE is an acronym that refers to operations in the information environment.

The conference in Atlanta will have a bit more of a narrow focus, one main area being engaging the academic community.

Whiskeyman said the intent in Atlanta is to move forward with some recommendations in support of NDAA priorities.

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“I think what you will see is, over the course of the next six months, you’ll be able to trace outcomes from Atlanta deliberately into where that work helps support policy position or a resource recommendation or some sort of operational approach to a given challenge of how we go after that as a nation or a group of nations, in terms of a collective response or a collective way of presenting … a cohesive narrative,” he said.

Going forward, Whiskeyman noted that what comes out of the working groups will determine the effort’s fruitfulness.

“It’s the work that has to go on in the working groups and beyond of really showing that return on investment,” he said. “Those coming to Atlanta have been forewarned — ‘Have a good time, it’s Atlanta, that’s great, get together, but it is meant that there are outcomes from this.’ Even if the outcome is, ‘Hey we don’t know something, we need to do more research,’ that’s fine. But the fact that we put the rigor in to be able to be at that point, is good thing.”

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · June 16, 2023

1​6. US DoD moves to secure domestic munitions production

A strategic imperative.

US DoD moves to secure domestic munitions production

army-technology.com · by Richard Thomas · June 19, 2023

Richard Thomas

Launch of a PAC-3 missile during a stockpile reliability test at White Sands missile test range. Credit: US DoD

The US Department of Defense’s (DoD) Office for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy (OASD (IBP)) has entered into an agreement with Arconic Corporation to increase production of missiles and munitions.

The purpose of the $45.5m agreement with Arconic is to increase production of High Purity Aluminum (HPA) at its facility in Davenport, Iowa. The low-cost production of HPA by foreign smelters has resulted in decreased production of HPA in the US, according to a 16 June release by the DoD.

In order to fund the programme, the DoD is utilising Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities and funds appropriated by the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, which will provide the US with “much-needed” surge capacity for HPA production and “mitigate risks to national security” in the event of industrial mobilisation.

The funds will be used for infrastructure at the facility and modifications to accommodate the increased capacity and new equipment. Among the improvements are the design and installation of a new furnace and the implementation of new control and automation systems.

“The Office of Industrial Base Policy continues to support industrial sectors of strategic importance to protect American national security and deter adversarial aggression,” said Dr Laura Taylor-Kale, ASD(IBP). “The company receiving funding is involved in a manufacturing sector identified by President Biden as critical for protecting domestic supply chains.”

The US and its weakened supply chain

In the wake of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and China’s ambition to fashion a multi-polar world and lessen US influence in key regions, Washington has sought to secure its own industrial base and develop a capacity to ramp up productions of materials, munitions, or equipment, as required.

HPA is a critical material for many military and commercial systems, including aerospace platforms and tactical ground vehicles.

The US is also providing Ukraine with hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition and ground-based air defence missiles to aid Kyiv in its operations against Russia.

Much of the equipment and munitions will have come from existing reserve stocks already in the US’ inventory, or else procured from international markets where necessary. However, the US will be keen to ensure that its own munitions stocks are not depleted as a result, given the potential for conflict in the Pacific should China seek to seize neighbouring Taiwan by force.

According to a DoD news piece on the country’s defence industrial base in May this year, the sector was facing “serious challenges”, with the need to support key business and capabilities increasingly crucial.

A post-Cold War peace dividend had seen the umber of workers in the US defence sector decrease from three million in 1985 to 1.1 million currently, according to David Norquist, president and chief executive officer of the National Defense Industrial Association and the deputy secretary of defence from 2019 to 2021.

According to the US Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), its vendor base of companies able or willing to work on defence related projects has significantly reduced. From 2016 to 2022, the DLA lost around 22%, or 3,000 vendors, with small businesses accounted for 2,300 of those losses. Overall, the DoD lost 43.1% of its small businesses in the same timeframe.

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army-technology.com · by Richard Thomas · June 19, 2023

17. Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Leila Fadel of NPR Morning Edition

Excerpts:

QUESTION: I spoke with Secretary Blinken this morning and asked him about a diplomatic visit that has not been matched by a meeting between the top military officials in Beijing and Washington.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: These military-to-military contacts are hugely important if we’re going to avoid an unintentional conflict, and that was only reinforced over the last couple of weeks. We saw incidents on the seas and in the skies that were really dangerous, and – in our judgment, unprofessional. So that’s exactly why I’ve raised it. I don’t have any immediate progress to report on that. I can tell you it’s an ongoing priority and that’s something that we’ve made clear and we’ll continue to work on.

Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Leila Fadel of NPR Morning Edition

INTERVIEW

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE

U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING

BEIJING, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JUNE 19, 2023

QUESTION: Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with China’s President Xi Jinping today, capping the first visit by a top U.S. diplomat to Beijing in five years.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Keeping those lines of communication open and in effect reopening them is in and of itself very, very important. Direct engagement – sustained communications at senior levels – is the best way to responsibly manage our relationship. It’s the best way to responsibly manage the differences, the deep differences that we have, to make sure that the competition that we’re in doesn’t veer into conflict.

QUESTION: I spoke with Secretary Blinken this morning and asked him about a diplomatic visit that has not been matched by a meeting between the top military officials in Beijing and Washington.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: These military-to-military contacts are hugely important if we’re going to avoid an unintentional conflict, and that was only reinforced over the last couple of weeks. We saw incidents on the seas and in the skies that were really dangerous, and – in our judgment, unprofessional. So that’s exactly why I’ve raised it. I don’t have any immediate progress to report on that. I can tell you it’s an ongoing priority and that’s something that we’ve made clear and we’ll continue to work on.

QUESTION: One of the areas in which really there is global concern around conflict is Taiwan. Beijing blames Washington, or really, Beijing and Washington are trading blame for the rising tension. China blames the U.S. for bringing up its human rights record, for what China perceives as growing support of Taiwan. With presidential elections in Taiwan in January, are you concerned things may escalate?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, Taiwan is a question, a challenge that we’ve actually managed successfully for nearly five decades. And it really is, in a way, a hallmark of the success of responsible management, because we’ve succeeded in preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait for four decades. But we have real concerns about the direction that this has taken in recent years where China has taken reckless actions.

What we’ve said and what I’ve said repeatedly and very clearly is that we have a fundamental understanding that differences with regard to Taiwan will be resolved peacefully, that neither side will take any unilateral actions that could upset the status quo. We reiterated the policy that we’ve followed from administration to administration, Republican and Democrat alike, of the “one China” policy. That’s not changed. I made that very clear. We don’t support Taiwan’s independence. And again, we oppose any unilateral actions by either side that would change the status quo.

So, it was important both – for China to understand that there has been no change to our policy. The concern that we have is China changing its policy, when it comes to resolving these differences peacefully. And I also shared that this is not just our concern; it’s the concern of many countries around the world. And there’s a very good reason for that. If there were to be a crisis over Taiwan, you’ve got about 50 percent of the global commercial container traffic that goes through the Taiwan Strait every day. Fifty percent. Half of the world’s trade, in effect, goes through there every day. You got about 70 percent of high-end semiconductors that are produced on Taiwan.

If either of those things were taken offline as a result of a crisis, it could have devastating consequences for the global economy – which is why countries around the world are looking with increasing concern at actions that are being taken that could disrupt the status quo, that could produce some kind of conflict or result in – a crisis that has these consequences. So that’s something that I shared as well.

It’s tremendously important that we communicate clearly, directly about Taiwan. That’s something, of course, that’s a primary concern for China. So here we had really some very direct, very detailed, very explicit conversations, and at the very least, that brings more clarity to each of us about what the other is thinking.

QUESTION: In the U.S., there’s pressure on both sides of the aisle here to be tough on China, and that seems like it will grow as the 2024 election approaches. China’s leadership is surely constrained by domestic perceptions of the U.S. as well. How do you prevent those domestic pressures and constraints from pushing you into policy choices that aren’t optimal on either side?

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  We have a responsibility to defend, protect, and advance the interests of the United States and its people. And that is what motivates us in our relationship with China and, for that matter, with any other country. And we believe the best way to do that is to do exactly what we’ve done over the last two and a half years.

We’ve made major investments, historic investments, at home – in our infrastructure, in our technology, in our research and development capacity, in our competitiveness. And at the same time we re-engaged with allies and partners and we created much greater alignment, convergence with them, on the approach to China.

The result is that we’re now dealing with the challenges that China poses from a position of much greater strength than when we started. And so, from that new foundation that we built, we’re better able to deal with the profound differences as well as – again, to look for areas where it makes sense to cooperate. But the lead instrument we have now in doing that is our diplomacy. And so it would be irresponsible not to engage, and counterproductive to our interests.

It’s the best way to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to conflict. It’s the best way to make clear, as I said, our position and intent when it comes to our profound differences. It’s the best way to stand up for human rights. It’s the best way to explore whether we can work together in our mutual interest. It’s probably the only way to do things like get some detained Americans home; to produce cooperation on fentanyl – the leading killer of Americans aged 18-49; to defend the interests of our workers and our companies who are operating in China.

So, I think we’ve set a very strong foundation. And now, we’re using engagement to try to advance our interests and to protect them.

QUESTION:  So talking, really, in your view, is the way to avoid conflict. I do want to ask about China’s bold diplomatic moves on the global stage, offering to be between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, brokering a deal between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran; offering to broker peace in Ukraine while refusing to condemn Russia’s invasion. Is China replacing the U.S. as global mediator, especially when you look at places like the Middle East?

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, I was just in the Middle East, in fact, in Saudi Arabia. And while I was there, I met with not just the Saudis but the – all the membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and then a much broader coalition of countries that have come together years ago to deal with the threat posed by ISIS. And what I can report from that is that the United States remains, far and away, the preferred partner for virtually all of these countries.

At the same time, if China takes initiatives that actually help solve problems and advance peace, that’s a good thing, and we support it. That they hosted the final round of discussions between Iran and Saudi Arabia that had been going on for two years, and the result was an agreement that at least has the possibility of reducing tensions between them and solving one of the problems, one of the many problems, that Iran poses. If China can play a constructive role in – when the time is right – finding a just and durable peace in Ukraine and ending the Russian aggression, that would be a good thing.

And we’ve applauded some of the – some parts of the peace principles that they put out – very consistent with our own, particularly when it comes to protecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. It’s good, helpful, important, for significant countries like China to engage in ways that produce positive results. That’s one of the things that I also shared with them.

But it’s also important – more than important – that if they’re engaged in these efforts, they are towards good and appropriate ends. So when it comes to Ukraine, it’s not enough to have – just to have a peace. It has to be just and durable. It actually has to reflect the principles at the heart of the United Nations Charter, like territorial integrity and sovereignty. And it has to help ensure that Russia can’t simply repeat the exercise two or three years later. So it’s very useful here again for us to be able to talk clearly, directly, and in some detail about what the objectives should be and to see if we’re in the same place on it.

QUESTION:  Secretary of State Antony Blinken, speaking to us from Beijing as he wraps up his visit. Thank you for taking the time.

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Good to be with you.

18. Putin's 'Big Lie' Might Be a Scheme to Exit the Ukraine War

Conclusion:

That may be too clever by half for Putin and Co. Alternatively, as Samuel Johnson said in 1777, “Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”

Putin's 'Big Lie' Might Be a Scheme to Exit the Ukraine War

Imagine that Putin and his comrades in arms know that the war is going badly. After all, despite the incessant bluster to the contrary, how can they not? Imagine as well that they’re looking for an elegant way out of the mess. So, why not declare victory and use it as the rationale for a gradual draw-down?  

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · June 19, 2023

You may recall that Russian dictator Vladimir Putin launched his second invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 with two goals in mind: Ukraine’s “demilitarization” and “de-Nazification.”

Both goals were absurd, as Ukraine posed absolutely no military threat to Russia and the number of bona fide Ukrainian Nazis could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Both goals were especially absurd as it was Putin’s Russia that threatened Ukraine militarily and adopted all the earmarks of a fascist regime: authoritarianism, chauvinism, a bloodthirsty dictator, and a cult of personality.

Whatever the case, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently announced the good news: Ukraine has been demilitarized! Here are his exact words:

“Indeed, Ukraine was heavily militarized at the time of the beginning of the Special Military Operation. And, as Putin said yesterday, one of the tasks was to demilitarize Ukraine. In fact, this task is largely completed. Ukraine is using less and less of its weapons. And more and more it uses the weapons systems that Western countries supply it with.”

Peskov’s is a strikingly bizarre interpretation of demilitarization. True, Ukraine has used up much of the equipment and ammunition that hailed from Soviet days. Equally true, it’s been the recipient of far more effective and modern and NATO-compatible weapons systems from the fifty-plus countries in the Ramstein group.

Just how this amounts to demilitarization, especially at a time when Ukraine has launched what appears to be a successful counteroffensive, is unclear.

By the same logic, Peskov could claim that NATO enlargement has been stopped because Finland joined the alliance and there’s no one to its east.

On the other hand, Peskov’s illogic makes perfect sense. Since, as the Kremlin claims, Russia never attacked Ukraine, its bombs never fell on civilians, the Kakhovka dam explosion was the handiwork of those crazy Ukrainians, the Bucha massacre never happened, and, oh yes, Putin is a true-blue democrat—why not continue substituting delusion for reality?

Of course, there may be more than just silliness at work here. Imagine that Putin and his comrades in arms know that the war is going badly. After all, despite the incessant bluster to the contrary, how can they not? Imagine as well that they’re looking for an elegant way out of the mess. So, why not declare victory and use it as the rationale for a gradual draw-down?

That may be too clever by half for Putin and Co. Alternatively, as Samuel Johnson said in 1777, “Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books.

From 19FortyFive

Ukraine Footage Shows U.S. M982 ‘Excalibur’ Cut Through Russian Artillery

How To Sink A $3 Billion Dollar Submarine: Leave A Hatch Open

Smashed To Pieces: Video Shows Ukraine Hitting Russian Air Defenses

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · June 19, 2023

​

​19. The Once and Future Need for SOF in the Great Power Competition

The Once and Future Need for SOF in the Great Power Competition

By Thomas Trask & Phil Anderson

June 19, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/06/19/the_once_and_future_need_for_sof_in_the_great_power_competition_941529.html?mc_cid=6ee5babd2b&mc_eid=70bf478f36&utm_source=pocket_saves

Congress Must Protect and Expand Special Operations

As the U.S. competes globally in the Great Power Competition (GPC) with China and Russia, Special Operation Forces (SOF) remain the highest return on investment in the entire U.S. military by helping to win the struggle even before direct conflict begins. Sadly, there are crippling SOF manpower cuts being proposed for the FY24 and FY25 defense budgets. Put simply, this move to reduce the investment in SOF must be stopped by Congress. In fact, SOF budgets and rosters should be increased. The history of SOF proves this point.

In 1962 President Kennedy signed the memorandum authorizing the use of the Green Beret for U.S. Special Forces, a recognition of the value of special operations in the execution of the Cold War. Kennedy called special operations the “Subterranean War” and viewed the capability as critical to winning the power competition with the Soviet Union and China. The Cold War effort to stand up to communist expansion by the Soviet Union and China required building military partnerships globally, expanding counterinsurgency capabilities, and developing “Unconventional Warfare” (UW) skills to prevent a major military conflict. Kennedy recognized the importance of robust U.S. engagement with all elements of national power and stood up the U.S. Peace Corps during the same period.

President Reagan doubled down on expanding the nation’s SOF capabilities by establishing the U.S. Special Operations Command in 1987, and most importantly, giving it Military Service-like responsibilities that included its own budget. This move recognized the substantial contribution by SOF to U.S. Cold War efforts, but also set SOF on a path to achieving the exquisite precision strike capabilities that were honed in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

After the attacks of 9/11, SOF began a classic UW campaign in Afghanistan which quickly led to the fall of the Taliban government. President Bush immediately began to increase the size of the force as SOF efforts shifted to a focus of “finding, fixing, and finishing” terrorist organizations across the globe. Throughout the GWOT, SOF employed both their counterterrorism (CT) and long-term relationship building and training skills, although the CT successes were always more visible.

President Bush’s decision to increase SOF operators was important, but actual numbers were relatively minor because you cannot build SOF capability rapidly. SOF recruits are generally older, more experienced Service members, and it takes additional years to assess and train them. This means that once the SOF operator “muscle” is cut from the DoD body, it will take years to replace. Accordingly, even as sequestration became the law of the land, President Obama protected USSOCOM from mandated budget reductions recognizing the importance of protecting the investments in SOF.

And this is where we find ourselves now: a refocused national security strategy toward China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. We aim to prevent a major conflict while in strategic competition with China and Russia with an emphasis on partnerships and leveraging all elements of national power. SOF was built specifically for this purpose. SOF creates dilemmas for adversaries by building capacity and capability among partners, providing access and intelligence, and deterring major armed conflict in Great Power Competition. Today, this is called “Irregular Warfare” executed in the Competition phase (pre-major theater warfare) in an effort to prevent war​.​

As an example, the decade of SOF activities with Ukrainian forces prior to the 2022 invasion by Russia has paid incredible dividends. The tremendous success by Ukrainian forces has been largely impacted by that relationship. This provides a clear example of using small, low-cost touchpoints with partners to build SOF capabilities to deter potential adversaries. Syria is another case that demonstrates the impact that an inexpensive SOF presence can have as a small SOF task force has been able to deter Russian (and Turkish) territorial aggression.

Stunningly, with today’s shift to Great Power Competition, there are some looking to reduce SOF resources and manpower – even though the National Defense Strategy charges SOF with maintaining its fight against terrorism while simultaneously shifting to Cold War activities as a deterrence campaign against China and Russia. Combatant commanders are requesting more SOF to do both mission sets, not less. There are major shortfalls in psychological operations, civil affairs, maritime mobility, and warfare capability. The global engagement of SOF to meet the outreach of China in Africa, South America, and the Indo-Pacific region has never been more critical. Meanwhile, the GWoT still remains.

Despite historically high DoD budgets, SOF has been taking reductions in actual program dollars. Reviewing the FY2024 President Budget submission, SOF’s top line, at $13.9B (less than 1.7% of the DoD total budget) has remained “flat.” This is despite inflation that has resulted in a 14% reduction in buying power since 2019. It would take an FY2024 top line of about $16B just to protect the buying power USSOCOM had in 2019. With the expanded expectations put on SOF to hold the line on terrorist groups worldwide, while simultaneously increasing SOF roles in GPC, it would take an incremental increase in USSOCOM budgets over the 5-year Future Year Defense Program to about $20B!

Given the multifaceted and critical role of SOF, the following steps are most important to accomplish in this year’s National Defense Reauthorization Act:

• Protect – not cut - the investment made to build a SOF capability that is critical to preventing major conflict in GPC;
• Empower USSOCOM with the statutory right to disapprove any military end strength cuts suggested by the Service Branches and force a Secretary of Defense decision; and
• Require a study on the appropriate SOF end strength and modern SOF requirements with a goal of funding SOF at levels above 3% of the defense budget.

Continuing to cut this small piece of the Defense pie isn’t going to buy more aircraft carriers or advanced fighters, but it may have irreparable effects on the nation’s ability to prevent a major conflict in the future. America must win the never ending “Subterranean War” to prevent the next World War.

Lt. Gen. Thomas Trask, U.S. Air Force, ret., is the former vice commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Phil Anderson is the President of the Ukraine Freedom Alliance.

20. A lack of diversity is a national security risk

I agree that diversity is important and we must absolutely do better. The author though seems to use this articl to tout his success at Boeing. Maybe that is unfair, I do think I have to give him credit for stepping up to the diversity issue which is such a lightning rod.

A lack of diversity is a national security risk

Defense News · by Ted Colbert · June 19, 2023

Diversity is a force multiplier. Bringing together different perspectives, experiences and identities and celebrating those differences unlocks greater problem-solving and innovation, and positively impacts the bottom line.

Conversely, a lack of diversity is a national security risk, and a huge business opportunity to drive growth and innovation.

In 2020, businesses across America came to a collective realization of the urgent need to address systemic racism and create more equitable, diverse and inclusive workplaces. Hundreds of billions of dollars were committed, countless initiatives launched, and Juneteenth — the day commemorating when the last enslaved Africans were told they were free — became a federal holiday.

But a federal holiday doesn’t change reality overnight. So, what has changed since 2020? It depends on who you ask.

The data shows that there continues to be a disconnect between senior leaders and their teams when it comes to racial equity in the workplace. When 60% of executives believe their organization is making meaningful progress on addressing racism and inequities at work, but just 18% of their associates feel the same, there is a problem.

Leaders cannot take the necessary steps to continue advancing equity if they cannot face the truth about the current situation. In the defense industry, failure to take those steps leaves our armed forces vulnerable in an increasingly complex threat environment.

Our military is facing significant recruiting challenges. Generation Z wants to work for employers that share their values — diversity is a priority for it more than any other generation — and 40% of workers would consider leaving their employers if they couldn’t trust their employer to follow-through on equity, diversity, and inclusion commitments.

Those figures present a clear mandate for leaders to get their strategy and execution right if they intend to maintain their competitive advantage. Further, companies that extend equity, diversity and inclusion strategies to their supply chains stand to unlock access to new markets, enable greater innovation and have, overall, more agile and resilient operations.

Boeing has made progress on creating a more diverse and equitable workplace, but like many organizations, there is much more work to do. The first step to ensuring we continue to treat equity, diversity and inclusion with the urgency it requires is through regular, transparent reporting.

In our 2023 Global Equity, Diversity & Inclusion Report, Boeing reported that the Black representation rate in the company’s U.S. workforce has increased to 7.1% in 2022 from 6.4% in 2020, in alignment with our 2025 goal of increasing the Black representation rate in the U.S. by 20%. I am proud of the work we have done and our progress so far. I also know the work is never actually done.

Today’s threat environment is rapidly changing and requires speed, agility and innovation to maintain competitive advantage — and diversity has been shown to drive all three. As business leaders, let’s recommit to grounding our perspectives in how employees actually feel — not how we think they feel — and addressing workplace equity with urgency and intentionality. The success of our U.S. armed forces depends on it.

Ted Colbert is president and chief executive of Boeing Defense, Space & Security. In 2022, the Black Engineer of the Year Awards named him Black Engineer of the Year, the organization’s top honor.

21. Is it any wonder military recruitment has fallen so dramatically over the past two years?

Here is a journalist who has her spin down to blame all recruiting issues woes to diversity activities.

Is it any wonder military recruitment has fallen so dramatically over the past two years?

Washington Examiner · by Elizabeth Stauffer · June 19, 2023

It’s been widely reported that recruitment levels across all branches of the United States military fell well short of expectations in 2022. The Army missed its target of 60,000 new troops by 15,000, or 25% . Navy and Air Force recruitment were down as well. And the outlook for 2023 looks equally dismal.

According to Military.com , Army planners estimate that “only about 23% of 17- to 24-year-olds can meet the service's expectations, with many applicants failing the military's SAT-style entrance exam or being too overweight to serve.”

BIDEN DRILLS DOWN ON FIVE KEY TOPICS AS HE BEGINS HIS FINAL CAMPAIGN

While it’s true that obesity among U.S. children has been rising for decades, the forced COVID-19 lockdowns surely exacerbated the problem. The lockdowns are also responsible for the growing number of students who fail to achieve grade-level math and reading competency. Maybe the time teachers devote to indoctrinating students with useless racial and gender theories would better be spent on basic academics.

The military has always been one of America’s most highly-revered institutions. Even as we watched the scourge of wokeness spread its venomous tentacles into all aspects of American culture, including academia and our government agencies, the U.S. military appeared to be largely immune to this trend, remaining apolitical, as intended.

However, under the leadership of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley, the apolitical nature of the military has changed — dramatically so.

Taking his cue from the Biden administration, one of Austin’s first initiatives was to target “far-Right extremism” in the military, which he considered a serious threat to U.S. national security. Weeks after taking office, he put out a memo calling for a military-wide “stand-down to address extremism in the ranks.” He intended to purge the military of such “corrosive behaviors” as “discrimination, hate, and harassment.”

Along with the stand-down order, he also called for the introduction of critical race theory into all professional military training, including service academy curriculums. For this defense secretary, wokeness trumps the ages-old “band of brothers” bond, the very real connection between soldiers that only one who has “been there” can understand.

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) told Breitbart at the time this was a very bad idea “[b]ecause they [troops] need to look to their right and their left and see not the representative of a racial group, but a battle buddy, a comrade in arms who will lay down their lives in defense of each other and their nation.”

Austin’s second priority was fighting climate change, which he declared was “an existential threat.” Speaking in April 2021, he said , "Today, no nation can find lasting security without addressing the climate crisis. We face all kinds of threats in our line of work, but few of them truly deserve to be called existential. The climate crisis does. … Climate change is making the world more unsafe, and we need to act."

Milley defended Austin’s push to teach CRT to service members in June 2021 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. He told lawmakers, “I do think it’s important, actually, for those of us in uniform to be open-minded and be widely read. And it is important that we train and we understand.”

He continued, “I want to understand white rage, and I’m white. And I want to understand it. … I’ve read Mao Zedong. I’ve read Karl Marx. I’ve read Lenin. That doesn’t make me a communist.”

“So what is wrong with understanding, having some situational understanding about the country for which we are here to defend?” he asked. “And I personally find it offensive that we are accusing the United States military, our general officers, our commissioned, non-commissioned officers, of being ‘woke’ or something else because we’re studying some theories that are out there.”

Milley insisted, “It [CRT] matters to our military and the discipline and cohesion of this military.”

Actually, in general, support for these woke ideals is divisive and destructive, and nowhere is it more dangerous than in the military. The prioritization of anti-racism and climate change initiatives by those whose duty it is to keep Americans safe, is a betrayal of their oath of office.

But the hits from Austin and Milley just keep on coming. Consider a recent Army recruitment ad that features a female soldier touting her “two moms” and their triumphant wedding day. I am without words.

Retired U.S. Army Captain Jason Church joined Fox News last summer and summed up the military’s woke new direction. Church, who lost his legs in an IED explosion in Afghanistan, said the Biden administration is trying to “change the fundamental ground that is our military service. They’re trying to uproot it and completely change it all in the name of woke idealism. The military doesn’t exist to promote social activism. It exists to protect America from external threats.”

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Just a little something for Austin to think about as he considers the next pointless policy proposal that lands on his desk.

Elizabeth Stauffer is a contributor to the Washington Examiner, Power Line, the Western Journal, and AFNN and is a past contributor to RedState, Newsmax, and Bongino.com . Her articles have appeared on many sites, including RealClearPolitics, MSN, and the Federalist. Please follow Elizabeth on Twitter or LinkedIn .

Washington Examiner · by Elizabeth Stauffer · June 19, 2023

22.  SOCKOR Change of Command June 2023 | SOF News

SOCKOR Change of Command June 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · June 20, 2023

Brig. Gen. Derek Lipson replaced Maj. Gen. Michael Martin as the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command – Korea (SOCKOR) during a change-of-command ceremony at Camp Humphreys, South Korea on June 12, 2023.

The position is a dual-hat role, as both commander of SOCKOR and the United Nations Command Special Operations Component (UNCSOC). Senior members of the U.S. and South Korean military and governments attended the event. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Christopher Maier, was in attendence.

Martin took command of SOCKOR on June 23, 2021. Prior to that he was the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Director of Operations. Martin began his career as an enlisted Airman in 1985 serving as an Electronic Warfare Technician. After his first enlistment he left the Air Force to attend college and join ROTC. Upon graduation in 1992 from Texas A&M University he received his commission in the Air Force. He began his career in the Combat Control field. He has spent his career in special operations, the air staff, and has had numerous combat deployments. Martin is moving on to be the J3, Director of Operations at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Florida.

Photo: Major General Martin, SOCKOR commander, hosts senior RoK Officers at Osan Air Base in March 2023. This meeting took place during Exercise Teak Knife.

Lipson was previously assigned as the deputy commanding general support for the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He started his career in the Army in 1990 as a Infantry Platoon Leader. In 1993 he began his long career in Special Forces. Lipson has had numerous overseas and combat deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations around the world.

Maps by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

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Video – SOCKOR CoC Ceremony, Defense Now, YouTube, June 13, 2023, 43 minutes. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/886523/sockor-change-command

Biography – Major General Michael E. Martin, U.S. Air Force

Biography – Brigadier General Derek N. Lipson, U.S. Army

Top photo: Image by Special Operations Command Korea, June 12, 2023. Posted on SOCKOR Twitter account.

sof.news · by SOF News · June 20, 2023

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com