Quotes of the Day:

"Be of one mind and one faith, that you may conquer your enemies and lead long and happy lives."

- Genghis Khan

“Ideas should be neutral. But man animates them with his passions and folly. Impure and turned into beliefs, they take on the appearance of reality.” 

- Emile M. Cioran

"It takes more courage to dig deep in the dark corners of your own soul and the back alleys of your society than it does for a soldier to fight on the battlefield."

- William B Yeats

1. Get Moving on That Irregular Warfare Center, DOD Leaders By SEN. MARK KELLY and SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM

2. The Constant Fight: Intelligence Activities, Irregular Warfare, and Political Warfare

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2023

4. Russia, Learning From Costly Mistakes, Shifts Battlefield Tactics

5.‘Russian soldier’ in Ukraine was deep fake agitator in China

6. The Folly of India’s Neutrality

7. China lashes back as Biden labels Xi a 'dictator'

8. Senators introduce bill restricting retired troops’ work for foreign governments

9. Special Operations Profile: David Goggins Navy SEAL

10. Six Lessons from Ukraine for Japanese Defense Planners

11. Getting Artificial Intelligence Procurement Right: The Cautionary Tale of the Defense Department’s Counter-IED Fight

12. Southeast Asian nations plan navy drills in disputed South China Sea

13. Ukraine War Highlights a New Threat to the American Homeland

14. U.S. Tracked Huawei, ZTE Workers at Suspected Chinese Spy Sites in Cuba

1. Get Moving on That Irregular Warfare Center, DOD Leaders By SEN. MARK KELLY and SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM

 Note as an aside I just learned at this is alleged the new DOD approved definition of IW:

"Irregular Warfare (IW) is a form of warfare wherein states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric military activities. IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare (TW).

I have heard this will be established at NDU.

Our recent thoughts over the past months on this issue:

Defense Department needs to capitalize on historic opportunity

BY CHARLES T. CLEVELAND, DANIEL EGEL, RUSSELL HOWARD, DAVID MAXWELL, HY ROTHSTEIN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 11/06/22 9:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3721929-defense-department-needs-to-capitalize-on-historic-opportunity/

Developing a mastery of irregular warfare

BY CHARLES T. CLEVELAND, DANIEL EGEL, DAVID MAXWELL AND HY ROTHSTEIN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 12/14/22 10:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3774711-developing-a-mastery-of-irregular-warfare/

Preparing for strategic competition: The need for irregular warfare professional military education

BY CHARLES T. CLEVELAND, DANIEL EGEL, DAVID MAXWELL AND HY ROTHSTEIN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 01/31/23 12:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3837521-preparing-for-strategic-competition-the-need-for-irregular-warfare-professional-military-education/

Maximizing the potential of American irregular warfare in strategic competition

BY CHARLES T. CLEVELAND, DANIEL EGEL, DAVID MAXWELL AND HY ROTHSTEIN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 03/31/23 5:30 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3928259-maximizing-the-potential-of-american-irregular-warfare-in-strategic-competition/

Get Moving on That Irregular Warfare Center, DOD Leaders

defenseone.com · by Sen. Mark Kelly

Irregular Warfare Center

Stalled by bureaucratic indecision, the Pentagon is operating its new center in an interim capacity that risks dangerously narrowing its field of vision.

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June 20, 2023 08:00 AM ET

• Commentary
• Irregular Warfare
• Congress
• Pentagon

It’s hard to list all the ways our friend and fellow veteran, John McCain, left his mark on our country, especially when it comes to our national security. He saw a lot of things more clearly than others, not least of which was that in 2014, Vladimir Putin’s ambitions to rebuild the Russian Empire went far beyond Crimea. But John saw something distinctive in the strategy that Russia deployed to invade and eventually annex Crimea: with their intelligence branches funding and organizing Russian sympathizers, they destabilized the region and set the stage for invasion. John recognized a reality that now stares us all in the face, that in order to outcompete our adversaries in the 21st century, it’s not enough to just have more and better missiles, ships, and aircraft. We must also compete before the war, in the gray zone of irregular warfare.

We all talk a lot about great power competition, but the practical details of what that means and how we engage in it are less understood. When it comes to irregular warfare, it’s not just Russia with their tactics in Crimea and sweeping disinformation campaigns. It’s also Iran employing proxies in an effort to eliminate the Jewish State and gain regional influence. It’s China trying to coerce foreign governments into economic deals in Asia, South America, Central America, and Africa—the latter of which we saw during our travel there in February. Often without a shot fired, our adversaries are trying to build their influence in a way that can displace our own critical relationships around the globe and put our troops at a disadvantage if a conflict ever came to pass. How we understand cultures, use information, and shape relationships in competitive spaces is critical to achieving our national security goals against these adversaries, without starting a war.

In 2021’s defense policy bill, Congress authorized the creation of what is now called the John S. McCain III Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare. The vision was a center that would synthesize our recent learnings on irregular warfare and improve upon them as a whole-of-society effort. To accomplish this, the center would draw upon critical national expertise in our civilian universities, non-defense agencies, and our partners and allies around the world.

The point is not to have another think tank that publishes high-minded reports no one reads. The McCain Irregular Warfare Center will synthesize learnings across a vast network of partners and build them back into our own defense policy to our military’s advantage.

Done right, the McCain Irregular Warfare Center will leverage the strongest attributes across the various elements of our society and expertly incorporate them for success. We need the innovation and broad viewpoints that reside in our university and civilian communities to pair with the expertise and authority of the Defense Department.

But three years later—as the Wagner Group, Russia’s private military, sows discord in Africa and commits war crimes in Ukraine; and China stretches the bounds of international order in the Taiwan Strait—that vision for the McCain Irregular Warfare Center has yet to be carried out. Stalled by bureaucratic indecision, the Pentagon is presently operating the Center in an interim capacity in an internal office that risks dangerously narrowing its field of vision before takeoff. We can’t afford the mistake of limiting perspectives to the ones we already have. And we shouldn’t be reinforcing the existing bureaucracy that has been unable to comprehensively tackle this challenge. We need to be scanning the horizon and reaching outside our comfort zone, not talking to ourselves in the mirror.

If you look back to the original authorization in 2021, Arizona State University, or ASU, is explicitly highlighted as a potential location in the accompanying report. And that’s for good reason. Regularly recognized for being among the most innovative universities in the country, with a proven track record of transdisciplinary success and a vast network of global partnerships including among our closest allies who are necessary partners in this work, ASU has always been a sensible home for this critical initiative. ASU is nationally ranked in DOD research expenditures, leads a Center on the Future of War, and hosts the online platform for Air University, to name a few reasons they are well suited to lead this initiative.

What’s more, there is no better way to honor and further John McCain’s legacy in this arena than to locate the center that will bear his name in his home state of Arizona.

Congress has been watching closely and has given the Pentagon a clear mandate. From our positions, one of us on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the other on the Appropriations Committee, we have repeatedly issued guidance in federal legislation and provided the resources necessary to get the Center back on track.

The stakes are high. If we want to succeed in maintaining our competitive edge over our adversaries, we need to try something we haven’t tried yet. Congress has backed a good bet with the McCain Irregular Warfare Center, but it can’t be allowed to get lost in the maze of bureaucracy. It’s past time to execute this vision of bringing the best of our civilian and military resources to bear against the challenge of irregular warfare that may well define our success in the 21st century.

Sen. Mark Kelly, a Democrat, is the junior U.S. Senator from Arizona. Sen. Lindsey Graham, a Republican, is the senior U.S. Senator from South Carolina.

2.  The Constant Fight: Intelligence Activities, Irregular Warfare, and Political Warfare

Occam's razor and the simplest thing: traditional warfare vs non-traditional warfare. All others be damned (note: said with only some sarcasm - maybe there is something to this.)

Editor’s Note: This is the inaugural article for Foreign Policy Research Institute’s new Center for Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare.

The Constant Fight: Intelligence Activities, Irregular Warfare, and Political Warfare

https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/the-constant-fight-intelligence-activities-irregular-warfare-and-political-warfare/?utm

By Philip Wasielewski fpri.org

June 20, 2023

View Original

Bottom Line

• The study of intelligence and nontraditional warfare is essential to fully understand the various, and sometimes indirect, means by which the United States can solve or manage national security threats beyond the traditional tools of diplomacy and military power.
• Intelligence and nontraditional warfare activities are conducted daily to bring policymakers information necessary for decision-making, protect secrets, and implement policy decisions below the threshold of significant military action
• Unfortunately, the constant fight of intelligence and nontraditional warfare are often not as well studied or understood as other traditional statecraft tools. Therefore, this new center at the Foreign Policy Research Institute will conduct scholarly research on intelligence and nontraditional warfare to facilitate understanding by the general public, as well as government and academic experts, on how these specialties provide for the nation’s security, caveats in their application, and lessons learned from past actions to inform future policy decisions.

Editor’s Note: This is the inaugural article for Foreign Policy Research Institute’s new Center for Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare.

– Wisdom is better than weapons of war.

Ecclesiastes 9:18

With the war in Ukraine and fears of war over Taiwan, America’s national security focus has turned from the threat of terrorism to the more traditional threats of inter-state competition and conventional or even nuclear war. The concern about threats posed by major state competitors, particularly Russia and China, is understandable. Both are nuclear-armed revisionist powers. Russia’s war in Ukraine aims to overturn the rules-based order in Europe and establish regional hegemony over its former Soviet empire; China’s growing capability to seize Taiwan possibly presages a similar effort in East Asia. Hence, efforts to revive and strengthen America’s strategic and conventional warfighting capabilities and industrial base are wise and overdue.  

Fortunately, major conventional wars are relatively rare. In the 125 years since the Spanish-American War made the United States a world power, it has engaged in major conventional warfare for only seventeen years of those years. Unfortunately, conflict is not rare. In that same time frame, US military forces have engaged in what was once known as “small wars” and are now characterized as irregular wars in at least ninety-two of those 125 years. 

In addition to military interventions, after World War II the United States fought the Cold War, which featured a major peacetime intelligence establishment to discern the capabilities and intentions of our enemies as well as to provide early warning of aggression—the worst-case early warning scenario being the possibility of surprise nuclear attack. The Cold War utilized a wide variety of elements of overt and covert methods, from information to paramilitary operations, as part of the struggle. With the end of the Cold War, many of these capabilities were left to atrophy in the belief that they were no longer necessary. The events of 9/11 proved otherwise and after two decades of struggle with nonstate threats, we have returned to the aforementioned concern over major state conflict.

As the United States concentrates its national security efforts to deter or prevail in wars against peer competitors, we should remember the parallel activities taking place every day that also keep our nation safe against these and other threats. Behind the backdrop of major conventional wars or the threat of such wars is the constant fight of intelligence and nontraditional warfare activities conducted daily to bring policymakers information necessary for decision-making, protect secrets, and implement policy decisions below the threshold of significant military action to deal with national security threats and problems. The statecraft tools (i.e., elements of national power used to implement policy) of intelligence and nontraditional warfare are focused on both major nation-state threats and threats posed by lesser powers and non-state actors. If still waters run deep, then intelligence activities and irregular and political warfare operations are what flow unseen along those underwater currents. They are as essential as any strategic or conventional military capability and are used more often. 

It is because of the essential nature of these tools of statecraft to US national security that the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) has created a Center for Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare within its National Security Program. The center’s mission is to facilitate the study of intelligence activities and nontraditional warfare to help educate and explore how they best support national security. Nontraditional warfare is the term FPRI has picked to emphasize the joint nature of the strategic ways of political warfare and irregular warfare to solve or manage national security problems and to encourage them to be thought of together as complementary vice competitive approaches. This term also recognizes that there are overlapping facets between the two strategic ways and hopes to encourage thinking of both ways seamlessly and not limited by boundaries. 

The announcement of the center and the release of this article on June 13, 2023, also coincide with the eighty-first anniversary of the founding of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942, which conducted human intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, paramilitary operations, and information operations towards the common goal of victory over the Axis powers. This center will follow the OSS example by combining the study of intelligence with the study of political and irregular warfare, under the term of nontraditional warfare, to provide a better understanding of all these statecraft tools that are part of the constant fight and pay the same degree of attention to them that national security study programs provide to the more traditional statecraft tools of diplomacy, nuclear deterrence, and conventional military power. 

As part of the inauguration of this center, this article will define the terms and scope within which the center will operate. It will then explain why the center’s areas of study are necessary, since many of today’s national security issues (and many past disasters) have a nexus with intelligence and nontraditional warfare, and because of the paucity of resources outside the government committed to studying them. The article will conclude with a brief description of the center’s way forward. 

Defining Terms 

Intelligence is easy to define but difficult to discuss due to its inherent requirements for secrecy and even misdirection. Conversely, irregular warfare is easy to discuss but hard to define due to the difficulty in determining what exactly in warfare is “regular” and what is “irregular.” Political warfare, first defined by George Kennan, has never been a fully accepted term but it has existed for decades as a separate if unacknowledged form of statecraft. To study these three statecraft tools involved in the constant fight, we must first define them, however imperfectly.

What Is Intelligence? 

In essence, intelligence is knowledge and analysis designed to assist action. Per Executive Order 12333, which provides guidance for how the US intelligence community operates, intelligence includes both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists. Counterintelligence is described as information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.

What Is Irregular Warfare? 

The Department of Defense’s dictionary of military terms defines irregular warfare as, “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” In 2007, the Defense Department Joint Operating Concept (JOC) publication, Irregular Warfare, provided an expanded definition of irregular warfare by adding that, “Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” The JOC labeled irregular warfare as a form of armed conflict, replacing the term “low-intensity conflict,” and stated that it encompasses both insurgency and counterinsurgency; terrorism and counterterrorism. The Pentagon’s most recent JOC on irregular warfare, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, released in 2010, stated that activities to counter irregular warfare threats, undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or blended into a campaign plan, include counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.

However, this is not the only definition of irregular warfare. Congress introduced its own definition in Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018. This section provided the fiscal authorities to conduct irregular warfare activities, which were described as 

Activities in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict. 

Since he who pays the piper calls the tune, this description has legal standing although it does not seem to have been adopted in any Defense Department doctrinal publications. Even within Defense Department there are differing definitions. US Army manual FM 3-0 (Operations) defines irregular warfare as

the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. 

Besides these official definitions, there are numerous competing viewpoints of what is irregular warfare. One expert on Defense Department irregular warfare doctrine, Lt. Col. (ret.) Mark Grdovic, argues that, “defining irregular warfare as a ‘struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population’ is defining it by its Ways, without consideration of the Ends.” 

With his emphasis on the ends vice ways, Grdovic recommends an alternative definition: 

Irregular Warfare is a methodology of waging warfare that degrades an opponent’s resolve, legitimacy or capabilities while simultaneously mitigating their strengths and avoiding direct conflict. The associated activities are generally carried out by some variety of irregular forces. 

He believes that irregular warfare is a way that a party in a conflict wages war because it is often its only viable option. Per Grdovic, insurrection, terrorism, and subversion are irregular warfare activities, and counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, stability operations, etc., are how nations counter irregular warfare threats. He believes that until Defense Department determines if irregular warfare is a strategy, a portion of the conflict continuum or just a grouping of activities, it will never achieve the desired results for this topic.

The point of this has not been to delve too deeply into doctrinal and definitional disputes similar to ancient theological debates of how many angels can dance on the top of a pin. Instead, it is meant to illustrate that irregular warfare has several definitions and even more interpretations, which can lead to confusion and even conflict over how the subject is to be understood. These differences, however, should not cause analysis/paralysis. There may not be one totally inclusive and agreed-upon definition for irregular warfare but, to quote a former Supreme Court justice, we know it when we see it. 

We have seen it throughout history in guerrilla wars fought by people resisting occupiers or repression. We saw it on almost every continent after World War II as colonies fought for independence. We saw it used as a tool by communists to take power and later as a tool by anti-communists to reclaim power. These struggles featured battles fought in mountains, jungles, deserts, alleys, and other venues but all as a part of an armed struggle for people’s hearts and minds. We have seen it for the past several decades across the Islamic world as violent Salafist extremists attempt, and sometimes succeed, to impose their form of belief above all others. We see it still today in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Africa’s Sahel region where numerous and competing armed groups have been engaged for years in either revolution, separatism, holy war, brigandry, or some combination of all four, which shows that motivations can vary even if techniques are similar. Finally, we see it today in occupied Ukraine whenever a collaborating policeman’s car blows up or anti-Russian slogans are painted on a building at night. What generations ago Robert Taber called the “War of the Flea,” Bernard Fall described as “Revolutionary Warfare,” and Frank Kitson named “Low-Intensity Operations,” we again call irregular warfare, using the same term T.E. Lawrence did over a century ago.

Therefore, while the 2007 JOC on irregular warfare stated that, “Irregular Warfare is a complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition,” it still must be defined to provide scope for future studies even if there is no single concise legal definition as provided for intelligence and intelligence activities. Since the Department of Defense definitions change with time or changes of command, and the one statutory definition seems to be honored only in the breach, the FPRI Center on Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare will take a flexible approach towards defining irregular warfare to allow for study of both its application in military operations short of declared wars as well as an enabler during major conventional hostilities. 

The center’s definition for irregular warfare will be 

A form of warfare by state or non-state groups in which one side fights another to achieve political goals via indirect methods such as insurgency, subversion, and terrorism and the methods used by the other side to defeat that effort. 

We are sure this additional definition will cause controversy and raise objections. They are welcome because our goal for the Center is to increase the study and awareness of irregular warfare, amongst other things, and the more that this issue is debated, the more practitioners and policymakers can see which ideas match best with the circumstances they face.

What Is Political Warfare? 

In 1948, George Kennan proposed that the United States conduct political warfare against the Soviet threat. He defined this term very broadly as, “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.” He specifically mentioned the application of overt means such as political alliances, economic measures (the Marshall Plan), and “white” propaganda as well as covert methods such as the clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare, and support to underground resistance in hostile states. To Kennan, political warfare was the logical extension of Clausewitz’s doctrine of war “being a continuation of policy with other means” in peacetime.

Political warfare is a term that never caught on as many of the departments and agencies within the government who conduct it do not like to think of what they do as warfare. When various elements of the US Agency for Global Media (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, etc.) broadcast, they consider their work as journalism and not warfare. The same applies to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control whose enforcement of economic and trade sanctions implements US law. Certainly, when US Agency for International Development officials work to help a foreign country battle poverty and disease or build its infrastructure, they do not see their efforts as warfare. Possibly the term “activities,” used most often to describe intelligence operations, would be more palatable and make the concept more acceptable.

Still, the use of these various statecraft tools could be considered a type of warfare, the continuation of policy with other means, if conducted as part of a coercive strategy against a hostile threat or to protect ourselves and others against that threat. Political warfare operations are simply the conduct of international relations between states in conflict. For want of a better term, warfare can apply in the Clausewitz-Kennan sense of the word. For the purposes of determining the scope of study of political warfare, the Center for Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare will use this definition that borrows heavily from Kennan’s initial concept: 

​Th​e overt or covert employment of elements of national power including cyber, economic, financial, informational, paramilitary, and political statecraft tools short of declared war against a hostile state or non-state actor to achieve political goals or to protect the United States, allies, and partners from the employment of similar methods by a hostile state or non-state actor.

In this context, political warfare should be seen as a statecraft tool normally, but not always, operating below the threshold of armed conflict. It can be debated where paramilitary covert action fits in as either a tool of irregular warfare because of its lethal character or as a part of political warfare because of its covert nature. Since paramilitary covert action in peacetime is conducted by non-Defense Department personnel, this article suggests it belongs as a tool of political warfare. There will be overlap between the two. The Defense Department’s irregular warfare doctrine recognizes that the successful application of its principles requires a whole-of-government approach and nonlethal measures, especially for counterinsurgency. Political warfare at times can certainly utilize Defense Department assets and expertise and/or run parallel to irregular warfare operations. This is why the two should be seen as complementary forms of statecraft and not competitive ones.

Why Study Intelligence Activities and Nontraditional Warfare?

The study of intelligence activities and nontraditional warfare is necessary to properly use and not misuse these tools, by understanding their advantages and pitfalls, just as we must understand the same for every other tool of statecraft. 

Because intelligence is such a protected and sensitive subject, what should and can be studied within that field? What should be studied is not tradecraft, which is for practitioners, but utilization. Both intelligence consumers in government and the general public should understand intelligence as an art and not as a science with guaranteed outputs based on verifiable inputs. They should understand that the intelligence community is proficient at stealing and analyzing secrets but less so at unlocking mysteries (i.e., anticipating the decisions of hostile parties that have not yet been made). The study of intelligence should provide an understanding of how intelligence works including its basic cycle of operation and the capabilities and limitations of its various specialties such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, and many others. Such study should educate about the challenges of collecting and analyzing information on hard targets be they nearly hermetically sealed countries such as North Korea or small, amorphous groups of security-conscious people banded together in terrorist groups or espionage networks. Understanding these issues can hopefully lead to intelligence consumers being less mystified by intelligence activities and more knowledgeable of capabilities and limitations so they can constructively engage intelligence providers about their requirements.

The study of intelligence should also help in understanding what is an “intelligence failure” to better inform public debate when such incidents occur. Is an intelligence failure simply a surprise attack that comes about because of a paucity of collection or the improper analysis of a threat, or is any foreign policy failure an intelligence failure? What happens when warnings are ignored or are deemed too vague to act on? When is an intelligence failure also a policy failure? What responsibilities do policymakers have in following intelligence warnings or prognostications when history is replete with examples of both successes and failures from when policymakers followed intelligence recommendations or ignored them and used their own instincts? The study and hopefully understanding of these issues can enhance how policymakers and intelligence consumers utilize intelligence in their jobs. It can also better inform discussions on intelligence shortfalls beyond simplistic accusations about “a failure to connect the dots” or similar remarks that miss both real problems and the ways to correct them.

The study of nontraditional warfare’s two component parts of irregular and political warfare is equally important. The sad fact is that there are many lessons that still need to be learned from past mistakes. Vietnam and Lebanon prefaced our twenty-first-century challenges in irregular warfare. As Afghanistan and Iraq have again demonstrated, the United States may be the world’s predominant military power, but it still does not understand how to fight an enemy who does not wear a uniform and when the conflict has no discernable front lines. Political warfare techniques could also bear additional scrutiny and improvement when one considers the challenges modern technology create in the areas of information warfare and disinformation or the challenges of using economic and financial sanctions against countries whose leaders do not care how much their own people suffer. However, proper understanding and utilization of political warfare means can bring benefits greater than the sum of their parts by achieving goals without having to resort to traditional warfare and its associated costs in blood and treasure. As a 2018 RAND study concluded, political warfare offers a chance to achieve political objectives by extending the range of conflict beyond conventional warfare to achieve effects at lower costs. The study caveats that this result is most likely if the objectives are sufficiently modest and if political warfare is conducted under conducive economic and social conditions within a targeted society to capitalize on existing discontent.

These are just a few reasons why the study of intelligence activities and irregular and political warfare is necessary, and even essential, to improve our national security capabilities and hopefully prevent the repetition of past mistakes. If one looks at national security reverses starting with Pearl Harbor, most of these have had some connection to a failure to properly analyze capabilities and intentions; a failure to provide warning of impending hostilities; a failure to deal with the challenges of irregular warfare; or the misuse of political warfare statecraft, especially covert action. 

This is not to point fingers but to point out that there is much to study and learn from history, especially US history since 9/11. There are many recent events, which with study could provide beneficial lessons to the entire national security community. For example, after almost two decades, have the post-9/11 intelligence reforms produced any discernible advantages or solved any specific problems or have they just added more bureaucracy to the system? Where do we go now with irregular warfare after the fall of Afghanistan? What have we really learned in two decades of irregular warfare operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere? How useful is our public diplomacy at winning hearts and minds or countering disinformation? What should we really expect from economic and financial sanctions imposed on hostile states? Should peacetime offensive cyber operations be a military function or a covert action? Why is it that despite numerous programs and reforms, we never have sufficient foreign language expertise amongst our diplomatic, intelligence, and military personnel? 

These are just a few illustrative examples but enough to show that there are important questions to be examined and that the fields of intelligence activities, irregular warfare, and political warfare need to be studied and understood with the same seriousness we provide to other fields such as diplomacy, nuclear strategy, and conventional warfare.

Unfortunately, there are limited opportunities for policymakers to study these questions other than via on-the-job training. There are very few institutions of higher learning granting advanced degrees in intelligence studies or irregular warfare. For intelligence, part of this is due to the inherent secrecy of intelligence activities, which makes academic research nearly impossible until original documents are declassified. Many universities also do not consider intelligence activities to be worthy of study. It is a rare few who participate in the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) scholar-in-residence program. While because of secrecy and compartmentalization, intelligence practitioners may be best placed to conduct such studies, there are few mechanisms for them to do so beyond the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence. The other limiting factor is that since these operations are the “constant fight,” practitioners are constantly engaged in them with no downtime to conduct lessons learned research and then study their conclusions.

Fortunately, for irregular warfare and to a more limited extent political warfare, the opportunities for study and education are greater but not extensive. Recent legislation established an Irregular Warfare Center to serve as a central mechanism for developing Defense Department irregular warfare knowledge, concepts, and doctrine. Part of its charter is to prevent a recurrence of the “boom-or-bust” approach towards studying irregular warfare as happened after previous peaks of interest in the subject during the 1960s and 1980s. Other military resources include the Modern War Institute’s Irregular Warfare Initiative at West Point, and the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups at the Naval War College. The Defense Intelligence Agency’s intelligence college has been repurposed as the National Intelligence University and since 2021 has been under the control of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The military’s various war colleges provide instruction on national security strategy but naturally focus mostly on conventional military operations although each has representatives from the intelligence community and courses on intelligence, irregular warfare, and aspects of political warfare. The Defense Department’s primary expertise for teaching irregular warfare is found at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs, whose mission is to serve as the flagship for education and the building of partner capacity in combating terrorism, irregular warfare, and integrated deterrence at the strategic level. This effort is supplemented by the Joint Special Operations University of the US Special Operations Command.

Regrettably, there are almost no similar resources for most civilians to become educated in irregular and political warfare. Few colleges and universities provide studies in irregular warfare because they also do not conduct war studies as part of a general academic aversion to the study of war. Exceptions exist but academia rarely provides the seedbeds for research and knowledge on these subjects as it did in the past for nuclear deterrence theory and various area studies programs, which had their roots in the National Defense Education Act of 1957. This is unfortunate because the academic and think tank communities could greatly enhance national security via the study of intelligence activities, irregular warfare, and political warfare and the publishing of their results. 

Conclusion

Foreign intelligence informs national security decisions, counterintelligence protects national security secrets, political warfare challenges enemies below the threshold of declared war, and irregular warfare is the form of warfare the United States is most likely to face throughout the world and for which we do not have the best track record. This article considers intelligence activities and nontraditional warfare to be the constant fight whose operations occur daily but (hopefully) rarely see the light of day. Their sheer ubiquitousness can make them seem almost like background noise to the national security leadership especially as it refocuses on major nation-state threats. 

While we concentrate attention and resources on possible, and admittedly dangerous, fights with nuclear-armed states, there is a danger of not keeping a similarly concentrated attention on the constant fight. There is a pattern in American history that as Washington, D.C., focuses on one object, it often loses focus on many others. That is why efforts to study intelligence and nontraditional warfare, understand their capabilities and limitations, and catalog lessons learned from past operations are essential to prevent another reoccurrence of the boom-or-bust phenomenon that leads to neglect and atrophy despite the daily demands put on the elements that conduct these operations.

It goes without saying that intelligence activities and nontraditional warfare are just as effective and useful in protecting against peer competitors as they are against other threats. Intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of peer competitors is essential, as is the intelligence community’s ability to provide warnings of attack and detect attempts at denial and deception to mask possible aggressive intents. Every conventional war has an irregular aspect that can serve as an effective force multiplier. Political warfare can also serve as a force multiplier in a variety of functions, seen and unseen. 

However, since large conventional wars, despite their awesome consequences, are not the norm historically, and there are often long periods between them, the constant fight of intelligence collection, counterintelligence efforts, counterterrorism operations, economic and financial sanctions enforcement, public diplomacy, and many other efforts will always be the majority of national security activities even if they do not receive the lion’s share of the budget or of policymakers attention. For example, while there are several references to intelligence and even one mention of counterintelligence in the 2022 National Security Strategy, there is no mention of information operations, public diplomacy, or irregular warfare. The 2022 National Defense Strategy mentioned irregular warfare only twice in passing, which is interesting since it was only four years ago that the 2018 National Defense Strategy had an entire irregular warfare annex. Hopefully, this omission is not a harbinger that the “bust” part of the boom-or-bust cycle for irregular warfare is about to repeat itself.

It is for these reasons that FPRI has created a Center for Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare within its National Security Program to facilitate the study of these subjects. FPRI recognizes that irregular warfare and political warfare are two distinct entities. However, as stated above, FPRI also recognizes that these two separate tools of statecraft complement each other and that there can be overlap between them in their policy applications.

The decision to use the word “nontraditional” to describe the combination of irregular and political warfare activities stems from the Department of Defense Directive on irregular warfare, which describes “traditional warfare” as 

A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. 

FPRI’s use of “nontraditional” simply applies the opposite of the traditional warfare construct for conflict with states or nonstate entities short of declared war in which the primary actors are not regulated militaries and the objective may not be the defeat of an armed force, destruction of war-making capacity, or the seizure or retention of territory but is to force a change in the adversary’s government, or policies or in the case of nonstate actors, such as terrorist groups, to defeat them and their ideology. Therefore, the center’s description of nontraditional warfare will be “the combination of irregular and political warfare to achieve political goals short of declared war or to serve as force multipliers in the event of a declared war.”

FPRI has eschewed calling this combination of irregular and political warfare activities “hybrid warfare” because that term has become a conglomeration of numerous and often conflicting definitions and interpretations. Nontraditional warfare for FPRI is our way of describing two different types of statecraft tools, each of which has numerous facets, to encourage the study of both in tandem and not separately. It is not meant to describe a military strategy or type of threat but a way of looking at policy options for the best ways to respond to national security problems that cannot be solved via direct military conflict. As two sides of a coin, irregular and political warfare provide most of the statecraft tools to address issues that cannot be managed solely with diplomacy or by resorting to conventional military action or war. 

The center’s scholarly research on intelligence and irregular warfare and political warfare combined as nontraditional warfare, aims to facilitate understanding by the general public, as well as government and academic specialists, on how these specialties provide for the nation’s security, caveats in their application, and lessons learned from past actions to inform future policy decisions. It will do this via two methods:

• Educate to help others navigate: The Center will conduct scholarly research of the past to help educate the general public on intelligence and nontraditional warfare, and why they are important to US national security. It will also assist practitioners with lessons learned from history to guide them in their current duties.
• Trailblaze new paths: The Center will investigate current challenges in the fields of intelligence and nontraditional warfare and recommend possible solutions to these challenges, with an emphasis towards the unorthodox or the revolutionary. It will also explore the horizon for both oncoming challenges and threats to America’s ability to conduct these operations.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s motto is, “A nation must think before it acts.” Hopefully, the inauguration of this center will help fulfill that motto. Please stay tuned.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities. 

Image: Department of Defense

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on June 20.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations with a relatively high degree of rhetorical coherence, suggesting that the MoD has learned from its past mishandling of the information space during previous Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike on Ukraine on June 20.
• Russian forces continued a slightly intensified pace of ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to lower the requirements for Russian military service in an effort to increase recruitment.
• Russia aims to use the annual International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2023” to diversify and expand its defense industrial base (DIB).

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 20, 2023

Jun 20, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

June 20, 2023, 4:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on June 20 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on June 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts and in western Zaporizhia oblast.[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled four Ukrainian assaults near Orikhiv, Zaporizhia Oblast, and in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on June 19 that Russian forces have committed significant forces to stop Ukrainian offensives, making Ukrainian advances difficult.[3] Malyar added that ongoing Ukrainian operations have several tasks that are not solely focused on liberating territory and that Ukrainian forces have yet to start the main phase of counteroffensive operations.[4]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations with a relatively high degree of rhetorical coherence, suggesting that the MoD has learned from its past mishandling of the information space during previous Ukrainian counteroffensives. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the MoD Collegium on June 20 and began his speech by addressing ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[5] Shoigu claimed that the counteroffensive began on June 4, consistent with ISW’s previous assessment of when the counteroffensive began.[6] Shoigu additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops have launched 263 attacks on Russian positions since June 4 but denied that Ukrainian forces have made gains anywhere in the theater, contrary to publicly available geolocated evidence of Ukrainian advances. The fact that Shoigu addressed the counteroffensive in such a public and relatively even-keeled manner (even while maintaining typical MoD denial of Ukrainian successes) is a notable inflection from the Russian MoD’s failure to prepare a unified response to Ukraine‘s Kharkiv and Kherson Oblast counteroffensives in 2022 and the resulting panic in the Russian information space, indicating the Russian information space has somewhat adapted to and learned from past moments of informational collapse.[7]

Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike on Ukraine on June 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed-131/136 drones, seven S-300 missiles, and one Iskander-M missile targeting Kyiv Oblast and civilian infrastructure facilities in Zaporizhia Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down 32 Shahed drones.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched the Shahed drones from Bryansk Oblast and the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.[9]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on June 20.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations with a relatively high degree of rhetorical coherence, suggesting that the MoD has learned from its past mishandling of the information space during previous Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike on Ukraine on June 20.
• Russian forces continued a slightly intensified pace of ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to lower the requirements for Russian military service in an effort to increase recruitment.
• Russia aims to use the annual International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2023” to diversify and expand its defense industrial base (DIB).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued a slightly intensified tempo of ground attacks near Kreminna on June 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations west of Kreminna near Yampolivka (17km west), Torske (15km west), and western Dibrova (7m southwest), and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka (10km south) and Spirne (25km south).[10]  Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces conducted over 21 ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions in the past day and noted that Russian forces are actively using “Storm-Z” assault units comprised of former prisoners to conduct highly attritional assaults on Ukrainian positions in these directions.[11] The recent commitment of “Storm-Z” units to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast frontline likely explains the increased number of attacks reported near Kreminna over the previous few days, as it appears that Russian forces have committed a relatively large quantity of low-quality forces to frontal infantry assaults. Several Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that elements of the 76th and 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Divisions are operating near Kreminna.[12] It is unclear whether elements of the 76th and 98th VDV Divisions have formed “Storm-Z” formations staffed with prisoners or whether the “Storm-Z” formations are fighting alongside VDV elements but operating under a different command and control structure.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut on June 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[13] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that there were three combat clashes in Bakhmut.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces employed a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system against Ukrainian positions in Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited attacks around Bakhmut, including localized attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut), Vasyukivka (16km north of Bakhmut), and Yahidne (3km northwest of Bakhmut).[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced to within 1.5km of Klishchiivka and approached a section of the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway.[17]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), and Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City).[18] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 33rd and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 20th Motor Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) made gains near the “Zverients” fortified area near Novomykhailivka (just southwest of Donetsk City).[19]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on June 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions along the Novodarivka-Priyutne line (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka to 17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Rivnopil-Makarivka line (11km southwest of Velyka Novosilka to 7km south of Velyka Novosilka).[20]  The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian units of the Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled three Ukrainian assaults in the Velyka Novosilka area on June 19.[21] A prominent milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 200m into Russian defensive positions southeast of Velyka Novosilka on June 19.[22]

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions along the Novodanylivka-Robotyne line (6km south of Orikhiv to 15km south of Orikhiv).[23] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian assaults in the Orikhiv direction.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured previously lost positions near Robotyne and pushed Ukrainian forces further away from the settlement on June 19.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured Pyatykhatky (24km southwest of Orikhiv) on June 19 after elements of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) recaptured positions west of the settlement, partially encircling the Ukrainian grouping in the settlement and forcing Ukrainian forces to retreat.[26] Russian sources claimed that a small Ukrainian grouping maintained positions on the outskirts of Pyatykhatky and that Ukrainian forces continued assaults on the flanks around the settlement on June 19.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, the “Sudoplatov” volunteer battalion, and unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) continued counterattacks near Pyatykhatky after recapturing the settlement.[28] Another prominent milblogger claimed that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control Pyatykhatky and that fighting was ongoing in the settlement as of the morning of June 20.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 20 that Ukrainian forces are continuing assaults near Pyatkhatky.[30] Footage published on June 19 indicates that Russian forces conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on a Ukrainian position in an unspecified location in Zaporizhia Oblast with an infantry fighting vehicle loaded with explosives.[31] These VBIED attacks are likely incredibly imprecise (as they reportedly cannot be steered, driving straight forward until detonated by remote control unlike more advanced VBIEDs used by some actors in other conflicts) and are meant to disrupt Ukrainian operations more than cause actual damage to Ukrainian forces.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported on June 20 that Russian forces mined additional areas at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), including the facility’s cooling pond.[32] Russian forces may be mining additional areas at the ZNPP to dissuade potential Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the area. 

Ukrainian forces continue to target rear Russian positions in southern Ukraine and Crimea. Satellite imagery published on June 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on Russian positions in Rykove, Kherson Oblast (48km southwest of Melitopol).[33] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on June 20 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Urzuf, Donetsk Oblast (37km southwest of Mariupol).[34] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed on June 20 that Russian electronic warfare (EW) units downed a Ukrainian drone in northern Crimea.[35]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues to lower eligibility requirements for Russian military service in an effort to increase its recruitment pool. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 20 that the Russian State Duma adopted the third and final reading of a law that would allow citizens with a criminal record and citizens deemed “partially fit” for military service to sign contracts with the Russian military during periods of wartime, mobilization or martial law.[36] Head of the independent Russian human rights organization “Rus Sidyashchaya” (Russia Behind Bars) Olga Romanova claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has already recruited about 15,000 prisoners to serve in the Russian military since February 1, 2023.[37] ISW has previously reported on the Russian MoD’s efforts to recruit prisoners and individuals with criminal records in order to compensate for shortcomings with Russian force generation efforts.[38]  

Russia likely aims to use the annual International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2023” to diversify and expand its defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the Army-2023 Forum will focus on the diversification and development of the DIB as well as the IT and AI sectors and will showcase military and dual-use products.[39] Shoigu also claimed 41 countries are interested in attending the Army-2023 Forum from August 14 to 20. The Russian MoD may attempt to use the Army-2023 Forum to purchase technology or dual-use products in an effort to evade sanctions. ISW has previously reported on Russian efforts to acquire dual-use technology to use in the war in Ukraine.[40]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian regions and occupied territories in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin met with Republic of Sakha Head Aisen Nikolaev on June 20 to discuss various public infrastructure projects that the Republic of Sakha is funding.[41] Pushilin also claimed that doctors from the Sakha Republic will work on an ongoing basis in a hospital in Khrestivka in occupied Donetsk Oblast starting on June 30. ISW has previously reported on the Republic of Sakha’s involvement in patronage programs with occupied regions of Ukraine.[42]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

The Belarusian General Staff confirmed that Belarus has amended the language of its constitution to renounce its neutrality and non-nuclear status. Deputy Head of the Faculty of the Belarusian General Staff Colonel Andrey Bogodel stated on June 20 that in order to respond to “external challenges and threats,” Belarus has made requisite changes to its constitution renouncing its neutrality and removing the wording on its non-nuclear status.[43] ISW previously reported on Russian efforts to further consolidate the political subjugation of Belarus through constitutional reform in 2020 and early 2021, and the official constitutional renunciation of neutrality and non-nuclear further advances these Russian efforts.[44]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

4. Russia, Learning From Costly Mistakes, Shifts Battlefield Tactics

Excerpts:

As it begins its long-awaited counteroffensive, Ukraine is well armed, backed by improved communication technology and American and European weaponry.

But Moscow’s forces have improved their defenses, artillery coordination and air support, setting up a campaign that could look very different from the war’s early days. These improvements, Western officials say, will most likely make Russia a tougher opponent, particularly as it fights defensively, playing to its battlefield strengths. This defensive turn is a far cry from Russia’s initial plan for a full-scale invasion and Ukrainian defeat.

To be sure, along a roughly 600-mile front line, Russia’s military abilities remain uneven. Prison inmates have become part of its operations, having emerged prominently in the battle for Bakhmut, despite their lack of training. The Kremlin’s increasing reliance on “kamikaze” drones or airdropped glide bombs reflects an ammunition shortage as much as an innovative strategic shift.

“They are trying to find rear command posts of companies, brigades, and destroy them at long range to disrupt communication between units as much as possible,” said Graf, a Ukrainian drone unit commander. Mostly neutered since the invasion, the Russian air force has adapted its tactics and munitions, including glide bombs, to attack Ukrainian forces without risking their aircraft.

American officials acknowledge that Russian tactics have improved. But those officials believe, based on battlefield intelligence reports, that the success in Bakhmut was largely because of Wagner’s willingness to throw prisoners into the fight, no matter the cost in lives.

Russia, Learning From Costly Mistakes, Shifts Battlefield Tactics

By Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Julian E. Barnes and Natalia Yermak

Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak reported from Kramatorsk, Ukraine, near the front lines of the war. Julian E. Barnes reported from Washington.

June 17, 2023

The New York Times · by Natalia Yermak · June 17, 2023

Moscow’s forces remain uneven. But while bracing for a counteroffensive, they have improved discipline, coordination and air support, foreshadowing a changing war.

Russian conscripts training in October near Rostov-on-Don, Russia.Credit...Arkady Budnitsky/EPA, via Shutterstock

Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak reported from Kramatorsk, Ukraine, near the front lines of the war. Julian E. Barnes reported from Washington.

June 17, 2023

KRAMATORSK, Ukraine — The team of soldiers had been out of their Ukrainian armored personnel carrier for only a matter of minutes when the tree line in front of them erupted in Russian gunfire. The dozen or so soldiers, sent to reinforce a trench, found themselves pinned down for hours.

“Never seen that much fire, from so many positions,” a soldier recounted in a mission report obtained by The New York Times.

One soldier fighting for Ukraine was killed and nine were wounded in the battle, which took place in March near the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut. Russian troops, the report said, showed a “high level of skill and equipment.”

The ambush was part of a patient, disciplined operation that was in contrast to the disorderly Russian tactics that marked much of the first year of the war, which began in February 2022. It was a deadly demonstration that the Russian military was learning from its mistakes and adapting to Ukrainian tactics, having grossly underestimated them initially.

Russia won ground early in the war with sheer firepower. Interviews with 17 Ukrainian soldiers, a Russian prisoner of war, officers, foreign fighters and Western officials, as well as a review of documents and videos, show that, in recent months, the Kremlin’s gains, especially in Bakhmut, have come in part because of a series of adaptations.

A Russian tank driving last year through Popasna, Ukraine.Credit...Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

Russian armored columns, for instance, no longer rush into areas where they can be quickly damaged or destroyed. Troops are more often using drones and probing attacks — and sometimes just shouting — to find Ukrainian trenches before striking. And the mercenary Wagner Group has shown an ability to outpace Ukrainian defenders with a combination of improved tactics and disposable ranks.

As it begins its long-awaited counteroffensive, Ukraine is well armed, backed by improved communication technology and American and European weaponry.

But Moscow’s forces have improved their defenses, artillery coordination and air support, setting up a campaign that could look very different from the war’s early days. These improvements, Western officials say, will most likely make Russia a tougher opponent, particularly as it fights defensively, playing to its battlefield strengths. This defensive turn is a far cry from Russia’s initial plan for a full-scale invasion and Ukrainian defeat.

To be sure, along a roughly 600-mile front line, Russia’s military abilities remain uneven. Prison inmates have become part of its operations, having emerged prominently in the battle for Bakhmut, despite their lack of training. The Kremlin’s increasing reliance on “kamikaze” drones or airdropped glide bombs reflects an ammunition shortage as much as an innovative strategic shift.

“They are trying to find rear command posts of companies, brigades, and destroy them at long range to disrupt communication between units as much as possible,” said Graf, a Ukrainian drone unit commander. Mostly neutered since the invasion, the Russian air force has adapted its tactics and munitions, including glide bombs, to attack Ukrainian forces without risking their aircraft.

American officials acknowledge that Russian tactics have improved. But those officials believe, based on battlefield intelligence reports, that the success in Bakhmut was largely because of Wagner’s willingness to throw prisoners into the fight, no matter the cost in lives.

But the soldiers on the ground saw something else happening.

A drone image of the destruction in Bakhmut taken in May while embedded with the 93rd Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Army.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Soldiers fighting for Ukraine in Bakhmut described a fight that ended much differently from how it began. Prisoners were not as prevalent. Instead, they said, Wagner’s professional fighters coordinated ground and artillery fire on Ukrainian positions, then quickly outflanked them using small teams.

As Ukrainian territory shrunk to a final few blocks, for example, Russian forces saturated a Ukrainian-held building with artillery. Moments after they retreated, Russian troops were inside.

“The Ukrainians just couldn’t keep up,” said one foreign legion soldier. To counter Russia’s strategy, Ukrainian forces wired buildings to explode, detonating them as they retreated.

The March mission report shared with The Times alluded to this type of enemy: “Assumed to be Wagner group,” the report read. “Evidence of being well-trained.”

“Used effective fire and maneuver,” it continued, describing “the best equipped Russian soldiers.”

Ukrainian soldiers west of Bakhmut in May, after rotating out following a month of fighting inside the city.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

But prowess in one area or during one mission has not yet translated widely. And American officials say that while Russia has adapted its tactics, its troops overall are not growing more sophisticated.

Most experienced Russian soldiers died early in the war. Those fighting today, including lesser trained recently mobilized forces, struggle to conduct offensive operations and coordinate the movements of large military units. And Russian tanks, having suffered significant losses throughout 2022, are now frequently held back from the front line for use as a sort of artillery.

“They don’t have enough tanks right now,” Graf said. “They don’t have enough artillery to create a barrage of fire.”

The change in Russian tactics can be seen from both drone surveillance and from the depths of a Ukrainian trench.

Near the eastern Russian-occupied town of Svatove, Ruslan Zubariev, a Ukrainian soldier who goes by the call sign Predator, said the Russians used textbook tactics to try to break through his line of trenches in February.

“They have changed tactics in the last six months,” he said, describing an assault that relied on a certain degree of strategy atop brute force.

A funeral this month in Shlisselburg, Russia, for a Russian soldier who was killed in the war.Credit...Anton Vaganov/Reuters

For four days, Russian shelling destroyed the foliage overhead to reveal Ukrainian positions. Then, he said, they advanced with an armored personnel carrier flanked by about a dozen soldiers.

But in an indication of the limits of tactical improvements, Mr. Zubariev said, the Russians did not have enough intelligence about the locations of the Ukrainian trenches. In the ensuing battle, which he captured on video, Mr. Zubariev, 21, managed to stop the Russian assault almost single-handedly.

“They did everything perfectly,” he said. “But something didn’t work out for them. Not enough information, as always.”

Around the eastern town of Kreminna, where Russian forces dug in after being pushed back in the northeast in September, both sides take turns launching small offensive operations in a sort of a dance.

“Both sides are trying to prove to the enemy that we will now advance,” Graf said. “And no one is sure who will do it, or where it will be done.”

Ukrainian soldiers firing toward Russian fortifications last year inside the city of Kreminna, Ukraine.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Around Bakhmut, Ukraine has gained territory in recent days to take key high ground. Russian forces are hemorrhaging casualties trying to defend the city that sits in a sort of bowl. Russian troops have turned to former prison inmates, a tactic first used by Wagner, to dig trenches, according to a recently captured Russian soldier who was a former inmate.

Russian trenches have frequently proved better built than their Ukrainian counterparts, Ukrainian soldiers said. The March mission report said the bunkers were akin to “Vietnam-style spider holes” and “so deep as to be undetectable by drone.”

Such defensive positions will pose formidable challenges, said one American official, and it is too soon to judge whether Ukraine can overcome them. Russian defenses are arrayed in layers and, despite months of setbacks and casualties, have shown a resolve to keep fighting.

Russia’s air defenses remain punishing, as do its abilities to jam radios and down drones. As Ukrainian forces advance, troops will be more exposed to Russian air support.

“What will happen next — who the hell knows,” Mr. Zubariev said. “Paying with how many losses — they do not care.”

Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a Ukraine correspondent and a former Marine infantryman. @tmgneff

Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Russia Learns Firepower Alone Is Not Enough

437

The New York Times · by Natalia Yermak · June 17, 2023

5. ‘Russian soldier’ in Ukraine was deep fake agitator in China

Excerpts:

The man’s cover was blown when suspicion rose with his growing popularity. His IP address was found to be from the Chinese province and his local accent was distinct despite his efforts to fake a Russian accent. In response, Douyin has indefinitely suspended the account, citing that its owner was spreading misinformation.

The account owner has since removed all video clips and changed its name to Wang Kangmei, or “resisting the US”. The case has further fuelled public concern over the proliferation of deep fakes, prompting calls for greater regulation of the technology.

‘Russian soldier’ in Ukraine was deep fake agitator in China

The Times · by Didi Tang, Beijing · June 21, 2023

“Hello, Chinese friends,” the soldier in Ukraine tells his admirers many thousands of miles away. “I’m from Chechnya, Russia. Behind me is a nuclear power plant in Ukraine. We just conquered this place and caught some big fish. One of them was a US consultant.”

The bearded man, who just happened to speak Mandarin, soon became a social media sensation on Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, popping up across Ukraine to issue regular updates from the battlefield. “Salute. The red flag stands tall, Huzzah,” he says in another video from the front line, in front of a car. “The extended Lincoln behind me is Zelensky’s car that we’ve seized.”

Yet all the while the soldier, who gave himself the name of Baoer Kechatie, apparently inspired by Pavel Korchagin, the protagonist in the Russian novel How the Steel was Tempered, which is well known in China, was actually a man in Henan province.

Authorities said the unidentified suspect had used “deep fake” technology to dupe his 400,000 followers, many of whom expressed support for the Russia-China friendship and spent money at his ecommerce store which sold Russian vodka, milk powder and honey.

The man’s cover was blown when suspicion rose with his growing popularity. His IP address was found to be from the Chinese province and his local accent was distinct despite his efforts to fake a Russian accent. In response, Douyin has indefinitely suspended the account, citing that its owner was spreading misinformation.

The account owner has since removed all video clips and changed its name to Wang Kangmei, or “resisting the US”. The case has further fuelled public concern over the proliferation of deep fakes, prompting calls for greater regulation of the technology.

This year, a Chinese businessman was defrauded of nearly £500,000, when a conman used artificial intelligence to pose as a friend on a video call. Last year, a Chinese woman gained two million followers when she pretended to be a Russian woman, using AI-powered filters and faking a Russian accent.

On China’s ecommerce platforms, sellers are pretending to be celebrities to hawk their goods. A Chinese law on AI-generated content stipulates that such content must be clearly marked, but the rule apparently has been difficult to enforce.

The Times · by Didi Tang, Beijing · June 21, 2023

6. The Folly of India’s Neutrality

Excerpts:

There is no doubt that both sides have in the past missed vital opportunities to transform the relationship. The exigencies of domestic politics, the imperatives of the Cold War, and fundamentally different policy orientations in both capitals prevented them from forging a strong, enduring partnership. Despite these errors, current circumstances are perhaps the most propitious for the future of the bilateral relationship. New Delhi, now more than ever, needs to shed its hesitation about adopting a pragmatic and forward-looking approach in its dealings with the United States.

The benefits that could accrue to both sides from a strong partnership are considerable. India could build up its domestic defense industrial base, access the most sophisticated defense technologies, and gradually reduce its dependence on Russia, an increasingly unreliable defense supplier. Most important, closer defense and security ties with the United States would enable it to ward off the inexorable threat from China.

A closer security partnership could also have significant spillover effects in other arenas. A secure, stable, and confident India would become a more attractive destination for American investment. At a time when the United States is increasingly concerned about the viability of important supply chains, India could become an important manufacturing hub for a range of components in various industrial products. The United States, in turn, would be able to count on India as a bulwark against China’s growing assertiveness across Asia. Furthermore, Washington could be in a better position to eventually elicit and count on Indian diplomatic support on fraught issues such as the future of Taiwan.

Over the last few decades, several U.S. administrations have prioritized the relationship with India despite considerable diffidence on the part of New Delhi. Instead of remaining content with incremental and fitful improvements in the bilateral relationship, New Delhi must trust Washington and move forward in constructing a multifaceted partnership that fosters peace and stability in Asia.

The Folly of India’s Neutrality

In the Face of Chinese Aggression, New Delhi Must Align With Washington

By Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree

June 20, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree · June 20, 2023

Narendra Modi is preparing to make his eighth visit to the United States as India’s prime minister. Although previous U.S. administrations have received Modi warmly, the fanfare surrounding this trip—the Indian prime minister’s first official state visit to Washington—will be unparalleled. He is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress. And, as a parting gift, Modi will likely leave the United States having secured a long-coveted deal for General Electric to share technology and jointly produce military jet engines with India.

Such an enthusiastic reception is undoubtedly intended to reset relations with India. Although both countries are ostensibly committed to a partnership, the U.S.-Indian relationship has not lived up to its potential in recent years. The United States must shoulder some of the blame for this failure. Successive U.S. administrations ignored India’s warnings about negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Biden administration has continued to pursue a relationship with India’s rival Pakistan even after U.S. priorities in Asia have shifted toward dealing with China. Washington has also flubbed more routine diplomatic issues such as visa processing, with record backlogs in U.S. consulates in India that only recently ebbed. And it took more than two years for the U.S. Senate to confirm former Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti as ambassador to India, hampering Washington’s ability to advance its interests in New Delhi.

For their part, U.S. officials seem to be waking up to the promises—and the limits—of a strong relationship with India. It is unclear whether the same can be said for Indian leaders. New Delhi continues to harbor a range of misgivings about forging a genuine partnership with the United States. Despite ongoing clashes at the disputed border with China, India has resisted embracing its security partnership with Australia, Japan, and the United States—known as the Quad, or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—designed to protect the Indo-Pacific from Chinese aggression. At the same time, both Modi and his foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, have been praised at home for their staunch refusal to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This stance of neutrality, they have argued, best serves India’s interests. Since the invasion in February 2022, India has undoubtedly benefited from a steady supply of cheap Russian oil as the Kremlin has scrambled to secure alternative buyers for its energy commodities. But New Delhi’s relations with Moscow occupy a shrinking portion of Indian foreign policy. In the long run, Russia’s growing dependence on China will make it an unreliable partner.

India rightly wants to guarantee itself strategic autonomy as it continues to rise in the world. But such a vision will not be fully realized if India continues to imagine that it can indefinitely play to all sides. Nonalignment may work in specific instances, but it will not serve India well in the long term. Instead, India should forge a strong partnership with the United States. With U.S. support, India can reassert its control over South Asia and emerge as a strong pole of regional order in the Indo-Pacific.

TIME WARP

Most of India’s concerns about the United States hark back to another era in global politics. New Delhi, it seems, is caught in a time warp. Key members of India’s foreign policy elite remain fixated on the United States’ relationship with Pakistan during the Cold War and fear its renewal. This belief, although perhaps understandable given the record of U.S. policy toward South Asia, is nevertheless flawed: the United States and Pakistan have never been and are not now as close as Indian policymakers tend to imagine them to be. It is to the credit of the Trump administration that the United States finally called Pakistan’s bluff and terminated all military aid. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, some in the Biden administration have proposed a limited strategic relationship with Pakistan focused on counterterrorism. But Washington’s efforts to secure this new partnership with Islamabad have been halting at best. Although some U.S. foreign policy thinkers still support Pakistan over India, the Beltway establishment is finally recognizing India’s primacy in South Asia. There is little reason to believe that the United States, whether under this administration or a future one, would want to resurrect its old alliance with Pakistan, especially if it comes at the expense of a partnership with India.

India’s supremacy in its neighborhood is not challenged by Pakistan or the United States but instead by China. In Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and even within India’s own borders, China represents an existential threat to New Delhi’s strategic autonomy. Indian and Chinese soldiers have massed along the disputed mountainous border between the two countries, with bloody skirmishes breaking out sporadically. India presently possesses neither the domestic military capabilities (what scholars of international security refer to as “internal balancing”) nor the foreign partnerships (“external balancing”) to guarantee its security interests and protect its northern borders from the Chinese incursions that have been accelerating since 2019.

Some within India’s security establishment continue to believe that Russia may yet serve as a possible bulwark against China. These expectations stem from the Soviet Union’s role during the Cold War and India’s continuing dependence on Russia for defense equipment and spare parts. Recent developments, however, suggest that this hope is rather fanciful. Russia, preoccupied with its disastrous invasion of Ukraine, has already failed to deliver some military supplies that it had contracted to provide India. And New Delhi’s assiduously cultivated neutral position on the invasion has not prevented Moscow from turning to Beijing, India’s long-term competitor and adversary. Russia has grown only closer to and more dependent on China since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine. It simply cannot play the role India wants it to in checking China.

THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN

If India cannot rely on Russia to serve as a counterweight to China, might it be able to turn to other emerging and middle powers? India has strong relationships with several countries in Europe, but these countries don’t have the diplomatic, economic, or military clout to guarantee India’s security interests. India cannot count on European countries or the European Union writ large to assist it in containing China. And its ties with other Asian powers, including Iran and Japan, are of limited or no use in the context of it competition with China. Likewise, other emerging powers, such as Argentina and Brazil, are unlikely to choose India over China in the coming years. Bluntly stated, India’s external balancing options—beyond support from the United States—are quite limited.

India’s much-vaunted commitment to maintaining its neutrality is no longer a viable option. This approach poorly serves India’s interests in fending off the political and economic advance of China in South Asia and the broader region. Without a reliable external partner that can help India by sharing intelligence, shoring up its grossly inadequate defense capabilities, and cooperating with it in other security areas, New Delhi will remain woefully exposed to Beijing’s machinations.

Playing to all sides will not guarantee India’s strategic autonomy.

The United States is and will remain the only global power capable of playing this role. It has a compelling interest in keeping China, its principal challenger and rival, at bay. To that end, its interests clearly dovetail with those of India. Across recent administrations, Washington has made repeated efforts to persuade India that these overlapping interests make it an almost ideal security partner in Asia. In 2016, the Obama administration declared India to be a “major defense partner,” thereby better enabling defense sales. During Donald Trump’s presidency, New Delhi and Washington signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, further strengthening bilateral military cooperation. And under President Joe Biden, the two parties have agreed on the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, which will promote cooperation in high-technology areas. However, what New Delhi urgently needs to realize is that there is a narrow window to secure American support. As the political scientist Ashley Tellis makes clear in his recent essay in Foreign Affairs, the United States cannot possibly afford to expend both domestic capital and critical diplomatic resources to continue to meet India’s needs without some form of tangible reciprocity from New Delhi. By limiting its engagement with the United States—while also pursuing deals with U.S. adversaries such as Russia—India is fundamentally compromising its long-term strategic autonomy rather than guaranteeing it.

Equivocal Indian responses to the United States will, almost invariably, lead Washington to simply bolster security ties with other partners and allies, such as Australia and Japan. India, although strategically significant, cannot continue to sit on the fence; to ensure peace and stability in Asia, it has to throw in its lot with the United States. Indian vacillation will convince U.S. officials that despite their best efforts, New Delhi is either incapable of mustering the requisite political will to build a long-term security partnership with Washington or reluctant to do so.

PROPITIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

There is no doubt that both sides have in the past missed vital opportunities to transform the relationship. The exigencies of domestic politics, the imperatives of the Cold War, and fundamentally different policy orientations in both capitals prevented them from forging a strong, enduring partnership. Despite these errors, current circumstances are perhaps the most propitious for the future of the bilateral relationship. New Delhi, now more than ever, needs to shed its hesitation about adopting a pragmatic and forward-looking approach in its dealings with the United States.

The benefits that could accrue to both sides from a strong partnership are considerable. India could build up its domestic defense industrial base, access the most sophisticated defense technologies, and gradually reduce its dependence on Russia, an increasingly unreliable defense supplier. Most important, closer defense and security ties with the United States would enable it to ward off the inexorable threat from China.

A closer security partnership could also have significant spillover effects in other arenas. A secure, stable, and confident India would become a more attractive destination for American investment. At a time when the United States is increasingly concerned about the viability of important supply chains, India could become an important manufacturing hub for a range of components in various industrial products. The United States, in turn, would be able to count on India as a bulwark against China’s growing assertiveness across Asia. Furthermore, Washington could be in a better position to eventually elicit and count on Indian diplomatic support on fraught issues such as the future of Taiwan.

Over the last few decades, several U.S. administrations have prioritized the relationship with India despite considerable diffidence on the part of New Delhi. Instead of remaining content with incremental and fitful improvements in the bilateral relationship, New Delhi must trust Washington and move forward in constructing a multifaceted partnership that fosters peace and stability in Asia.

• SUMIT GANGULY is Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University Bloomington and a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is currently a Visiting Professor in the Institute of Politics at the University of Heidelberg.
• DINSHA MISTREE is a Research Fellow in the Program on Strengthening U.S.-India Relations at the Hoover Institution.

Foreign Affairs · by Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree · June 20, 2023

7. China lashes back as Biden labels Xi a 'dictator'

Excerpts:

Attending a fundraiser in California, Biden said Xi was very embarrassed when a suspected Chinese spy balloon was blown off course over U.S. airspace early this year, making a personal comment on the Chinese leader when Blinken said on Monday the "chapter" should be closed.

"The reason why Xi Jinping got very upset in terms of when I shot that balloon down with two box cars full of spy equipment in it was he didn't know it was there," Biden said.

"That's a great embarrassment for dictators. When they didn't know what happened. That wasn't supposed to be going where it was. It was blown off course," Biden added.

China lashes back as Biden labels Xi a 'dictator'

By Trevor Hunnicutt and Ryan Woo

June 21, 20235:58 PM GMT+8Updated 39 min ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-calls-chinese-president-xi-dictator-2023-06-21/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_campaign=Daily-Briefing&utm_term=062123

KENTFIELD, California/BEIJING, June 21 (Reuters) - China hit back on Wednesday after U.S. President Joe Biden referred to President Xi Jinping as a "dictator", saying the remarks were absurd and a provocation, in an unexpected spat immediately following efforts by both sides to lower tensions.

Biden's comments came just a day after top U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing to stabilize bilateral relations that China says are at their lowest point since formal ties were established.

Attending a fundraiser in California, Biden said Xi was very embarrassed when a suspected Chinese spy balloon was blown off course over U.S. airspace early this year, making a personal comment on the Chinese leader when Blinken said on Monday the "chapter" should be closed.

"The reason why Xi Jinping got very upset in terms of when I shot that balloon down with two box cars full of spy equipment in it was he didn't know it was there," Biden said.

"That's a great embarrassment for dictators. When they didn't know what happened. That wasn't supposed to be going where it was. It was blown off course," Biden added.

Xi became China's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong after securing a precedent-breaking third term as president in March and head of the Communist Party in October.

Biden also said China "has real economic difficulties."

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said Biden's remarks were "extremely absurd" and "irresponsible".

Expressing China's strong dissatisfaction, foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Biden's comments seriously violated facts, diplomatic protocol and China's political dignity.

"They're an open political provocation," she told a news conference.

[1/2]Chinese President Xi Jinping looks on as he meets with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (not pictured) in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, June 19, 2023. REUTERS/Leah Millis/Pool

Asked how aware Xi had been about the balloon's movements, Mao reiterated China's previous explanation that the passage of the balloon through U.S. airspace had been unintended and caused by circumstances beyond its control.

'BIG MOUTH'

"Biden's big mouth is a loose cannon," said Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

"Mutual trust is what China has been stressing, so Biden's comments are very destructive and damaging," Wu said, while adding that the remarks may not totally undo what Blinken had achieved on his China visit.

Blinken and Xi agreed in their meeting on Monday to stabilize the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing so it did not veer into conflict.

While no breakthroughs were made during the first visit to China by a U.S. secretary of state for five years, both sides did agree to continue diplomatic engagement with more visits by U.S. officials in the coming weeks and months.

Biden said later on Tuesday that U.S. climate envoy John Kerry may go to China soon.

A day earlier, on Monday, Biden said he thought relations between the two countries were on the right path, and he indicated that progress was made during Blinken's trip.

Chiming in from Moscow, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Biden's comments contradicted the efforts of his secretary of state to ease tensions with Beijing, describing the remarks as "incomprehensible".

"These are very contradictory manifestations of U.S. foreign policy, which speak of a large element of unpredictability," Peskov told reporters on Wednesday.

"However, that's their business," Peskov said. "We've our own bad relations with the United States of America and our very good relations with the People's Republic of China."

Reporting by Trevor Hunnicutt; additional reporting by Ryan Woo, Ethan Wang and Albee Zhang in Beijing; Writing by Kanishka Singh; Editing by Stephen Coates & Simon Cameron-Moore

8. Senators introduce bill restricting retired troops’ work for foreign governments

Excerpts:

Under current federal law, retired troops are allowed to work for foreign powers if they first receive approval from their military branch and the State Department.

But the Post found that the approvals process receives little scrutiny, with the State and Defense departments granting authorization about 95 percent of the time.

What’s more, though anyone who works for a foreign government without first seeking permission risks losing retirement pay, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service has only punished fewer than five people for this, the Post reported.

Senators introduce bill restricting retired troops’ work for foreign governments

BY ELLEN MITCHELL - 06/20/23 6:59 PM ET

The Hill · by Brad Dress · June 20, 2023

Two top senators introduced a bill Tuesday seeking to better bring to light the secretive process in which retired U.S. service members work as consultants and contractors for foreign governments.

The bipartisan Retired Officers Conflict of Interest Act, co-sponsored by Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), would rewrite some of the ethics and lobbying rules that affect former military officials, imposing new restrictions with an eye toward “closing the revolving door.”

Among the added constraints would be a ban on service members negotiating a post-retirement job with a foreign government or a private contractor that works for one while still on active duty; a 30-month gap after retirement before military intelligence personnel can work for another country other than close allies; a requirement that the name, job duties and salary details of a person allowed a role with a foreign power be publicly reported; and higher financial penalties for those who don’t get approval or fail to report such employment to the Defense Department.

With a companion bill introduced in the House by Reps. Jason Crow (D-Colo.) and Suzan DelBene (D-Wash.), the issue could end up becoming a major debate over the fiscal 2024 defense authorization bills.

“The Department of Defense is letting too many retired military officers trade their military service and experience to foreign governments for cash – creating serious risks to our national security,” Warren, who chairs the Senate Armed Services personnel subcommittee, said in a statement announcing the new bill. “This system needs serious transparency and accountability.”

Grassley, meanwhile, said it’s “no surprise that foreign governments would wish to capitalize on the knowledge and expertise of retired U.S. military members,” but that the current safeguards in the process aren’t sufficient for national security.

The lawmakers are tackling the matter after a Washington Post report last year detailed scores of retired military officers — more than 500 including generals and admirals — who took lucrative jobs with foreign governments since 2015.

Under current federal law, retired troops are allowed to work for foreign powers if they first receive approval from their military branch and the State Department.

Special Report: Roe v. Wade Falls — One Year Later Drug industry launches furious legal fight against Medicare negotiating powers

But the Post found that the approvals process receives little scrutiny, with the State and Defense departments granting authorization about 95 percent of the time.

What’s more, though anyone who works for a foreign government without first seeking permission risks losing retirement pay, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service has only punished fewer than five people for this, the Post reported.

Pentagon and State Department officials insist the agencies jointly and thoroughly review all foreign employment requests, though at an April Senate Armed Services subcommittee hearing Pentagon lawyers allowed that they were revisiting their policies.

The Hill · by Brad Dress · June 20, 2023

9. Special Operations Profile: David Goggins Navy SEAL

Special Operations Profile: David Goggins Navy SEAL

military.com · by Tiffini Theisen · June 20, 2023

Who Is David Goggins?

David Goggins, a triathlete, ultramarathoner and retired Navy SEAL, is often nicknamed "the toughest man alive" or "the world's toughest man" for his extreme athletic feats.

Born in 1975 in Buffalo, New York, David was the son of Trunnis Goggins and his much younger companion Jacqueline, or "Jackie." David's father, who died in 2013, was a handsome, gregarious and successful businessman who owned a skating rink and bar in Buffalo that often drew celebrity customers.

But behind closed doors, David revealed in his memoir, his father was a cruel tyrant who brutally beat his children and their mother on a regular basis. When David was 8 years old, his mother left her abuser and took David and his older brother to her parents' house in rural Indiana.

"For the first time in my life, we were free from the Devil himself," Goggins wrote in his memoir.

But their new life in Brazil, Indiana, was a struggle. On top of the family's poverty, Goggins experienced academic and social problems in school. He was bullied and admitted cheating his way through his classes. Then, in another tragic milestone of his young life, his mother's new love interest -- a kind man who could have been a stable, loving stepfather to David -- was shot and killed in front of his home.

On top of that loss, as a teenager, Goggins, who is Black, became the target of hate-filled racism from classmates, from the father of a white girl he liked and from random local bigots.

David Goggins Military Career

Still, Goggins had hope for his future and dreamed of joining the Air Force, following in his grandfather's footsteps. He signed up for a weeklong parachuting course one summer. While still in high school, he later took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and failed, earning only a 20.

The failure was a wake-up call for the young man. To try to turn his life around, Goggins began cleaning up his personal grooming, paying attention in school and rising early to run and lift weights.

"From then on, I brainwashed myself into craving discomfort. ... As a result, I became tougher. And being tough and resilient helped me meet my goals," he wrote in his memoir.

Goggins was finally accepted into training with the Air Force Pararescue Team, but after he enrolled, he was diagnosed with sickle cell anemia and had to drop out. He could have returned to training later but decided not to, mostly because he so disliked the swimming aspect of it.

However, he did complete training for the Air Force Tactical Air Control Party and served as a member of the TACP from 1994 to 1999.

David Goggins, Navy SEAL

Goggins' Navy SEAL training is legendary.

After his Air Force stint, it took him two years to reach his next goal of becoming a Navy SEAL. His weight had ballooned, and he was 297 pounds when this dream took root. Plus, he was getting older, and at the beginning, he had a hard time even getting a recruiter to talk to him.

Yet eventually, he graduated from Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training with Class 235 in 2001 and was assigned to SEAL Team 5. But he had to endure three Hell Weeks before getting there.

At the time of his first Hell Week, he suffered a stress fracture and came down with pneumonia. He wanted to try again, but his second Hell Week was scrapped for him because he fractured his kneecap. Yet he tried again two weeks later and made it through.

After completing BUD/S, Goggins and his SEAL team deployed to Iraq just a few weeks after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

"In 2004, he was the only SEAL in his class to graduate from Army Ranger School," according to the VA. The part of the Ranger creed that says "my country expects me to move further, faster and fight harder than any other soldier" seems custom-made for Goggins.

David Goggins and Operation Red Wings

By the mid-2000s, Goggins still had not gotten into long-distance running. It was a tragic event that threw him into this world.

Goggins vowed to compete in the Badwater 135 without fully realizing it's one of the toughest races in the world: a nonstop,135-mile run in the mountains in brutal heat. It's a feat to even qualify for the event.

His motivation was to earn money for the Special Operations Warrior Foundation, which pays for the college tuition of children whose parents were special operators killed in combat.

Goggins was searching for a way to make a difference after the tragedy of Operation Red Wings in Afghanistan in 2005. Twelve Navy SEALs were killed, and Goggins knew each of them personally.

"I wanted to find a way that I could raise money for their families," he told the U.S. Navy's All Hands publication.

In July 2006, he finished the Badwater 135 in Death Valley, California, in fifth place.

He has raised more than $2 million for the Special Operations Warrior Foundation.

David Goggins Athletic Accomplishments

Goggins has completed more than 70 ultra-distance races -- many of them more than 100 miles -- and has often finished in the top five.

In one of the more notable of these events, he took first place in 2016 in the Infinitus 88k, one of the world's toughest races.

Other athletic accomplishments include:

• First place in the Music City Ultra 50k in 2016
• First place in the McNaughton 150 Miler in 2008
• Second place in the Ultraman World Championship in 2006
• Ranked in the top 97th percentile in the Moab 240 Endurance Run in 2020, at age 45

Setting a Guinness World Record

David Goggins' pull-up record is often cited. He's a former Guinness World Record holder for completing 4,030 pull-ups in 17 hours in 2013. He tore up his hands in the process.

In November 2022 in Australia, Jaxon Italiano claimed this record, achieving 8,008 pull-ups within a 24-hour period.

David Goggins Public Speaking

Goggins began putting himself out there as an inspirational and motivational speaker who covers such topics as achievement, performance, personal growth and overcoming adversity.

He charges about $150,000 per event, according to his profile on Speaking.com.

"His 'no excuses; suck it up' approach has made him a favorite of the talking circuit, and he's regularly invited to speak at college campuses and business forums and address top sports teams like the Seattle Seahawks," his Speaking.com profile reads.

He also gives lectures to high school students, professional athletes and employees of Fortune 500 companies.

Among the most cited David Goggins quotes are, "You are in danger of living a life so comfortable and soft that you will die without ever realizing your true potential," and "It's a lot more than mind over matter. It takes relentless self-discipline to schedule suffering into your day, every day."

In April 2023, Goggins was honored at the statehouse in Indianapolis for his military service and charitable contributions.

"During his time in the Navy, David risked his life to protect the freedoms we hold dear," state Sen. Jon Ford, R-Terre Haute, said in a statement. "This honor given to him by the Indiana Senate is just a small token of appreciation on behalf of all Hoosiers for his dedication to his fellow Americans. He has certainly made the people of Brazil and Indiana extremely proud."

David Goggins' Book 'Can't Hurt Me'

Goggins' book, "Can't Hurt Me: Master Your Mind and Defy the Odds," was published in 2018. It details his journey to heal from his traumatized childhood through the self-discipline of athleticism and his other accomplishments.

In the New York Times best-selling memoir, Goggins details his viewpoint that most humans use only 40% of their potential and shares his opinions about how to overcome fear and limitations.

"Can't Hurt Me" has 4.36 out of 5 stars among nearly 180,000 ratings on Goodreads, a social media site for books. Many readers said they appreciated Goggins' determination, drive and willpower. But some were turned off by what they saw as his extremism, machismo and seemingly ego-fueled need to dominate and to always prove himself.

"This book should be called 'How I got famous for making really stupid decisions that ruined my relationships, body, and mental health,'" one reviewer summarized.

In 2022, Goggins' follow-up book, "Never Finished: Unshackle Your Mind and Win the War Within" was released. In it, he reveals more about his strategies for success.

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military.com · by Tiffini Theisen · June 20, 2023

10. Six Lessons from Ukraine for Japanese Defense Planners

The six:

Preparing for a protracted conflict

Ensuring an adequate logistics posture

Preparing to fight in active combat

Assisting the broader fight

Using unmanned capabilities

Sustaining the will to fight

Conclusion

Japan is making huge strides to improve its defenses in ways that most analysts thought were not possible even a few years ago. All of that is exceptional. Yet, as the Ukraine conflict has taught us, wars can drag on for a long time. Ukraine benefits from having a committed set of international partners that are not engaged in the war itself. In a Taiwan conflict, by contrast, the United States might well be directly involved. That puts a premium on Japan ensuring that it has the ability to not just withstand the first volley, but months and possibly years of fighting. By drawing lessons from Ukraine, Japanese planners can better prepare for that risk.

Six Lessons from Ukraine for Japanese Defense Planners - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jeffrey W. Hornung · June 21, 2023

Japanese leaders have already begun internalizing key lessons from Ukraine. As shown in a triad of strategic documents released last December, Tokyo is ramping up spending on munition stocks, maintenance, and base hardening and readiness, as well as making new investments across all domains. But despite this, Japanese officials are silent on whether they are preparing for a short conflict or a long one. This matters because, as the Ukrainian war demonstrates, a protracted struggle could require different plans from the ones Japan is possibly making.

Any conflict involving China and the United States is unlikely to be a short one. For Japan to participate effectively in any East China Sea conflict — even in its own defense — Japanese forces should take six key lessons from the current fight in Ukraine: prepare for a protracted conflict; ensure an adequate logistics posture; be ready for active combat; assist the broader fight; use unmanned capabilities; and sustain the will to fight. Addressing these issues can help Japan — and the alliance — become better prepared to rapidly respond in support of U.S. operational timelines.

Become a Member

Preparing for a protracted conflict

The first step in preparing for a protracted conflict involves stockpiling and prepositioning critical materiel like fuel, parts, equipment, supplies, and medical supplies close to the units that will need them. Ukraine’s experience also suggests Japan should place a priority on ensuring equipment and units are in high states of readiness.

Arguably the most critical lesson is to ensure adequate stockpiles of munitions are available where fire units are located. Like pre-war Russia, China will start any war with a vastly numerically superior aircraft and ship inventory compared to what the allies currently have in theater. This, along with their large inventory of missiles, will hold the entire Japanese archipelago at risk. In addition to putting a premium on both passive and active Japanese base defenses, this reality also highlights the importance of Japan maintaining its industrial base and robust munition stockpiles. To be fair, Japan identified the importance of increasing munition stockpiles in its 2022 National Defense Strategy, but it is unknown what the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces have assessed to be sufficient. This brings us back to what type of conflict the Ministry of Defense is preparing for.

Prepositioning and stockpiling for a short-burst conflict versus a long-term protracted conflict like Ukraine involves very different levels of effort. The U.S. Army, for example, has confronted the issue of how to refill dwindling weapon stockpiles that have been diverted to provide support to the Ukrainian military. The war in Ukraine is one in which the U.S. is providing indirect support. Stockpiles would go down much faster if the U.S. were directly involved in the fighting. For Japan, part of the government’s current objective is to backfill stocks of critical munitions during peacetime. Unknown is what sort of deals the Ministry of Defense has made with weapon suppliers for increased production in a conflict. Given the small number of suppliers, does Japan have the ability to increase capacity in wartime? Also unknown is whether Japan is working with U.S. suppliers to deconflict its orders with those of the U.S.

Ensuring an adequate logistics posture

This raises the issue of how Japan intends to get critical supplies where they are needed once its stockpiles and materiel start to run low. One deficit in Russian operations was logistics, due potentially to poor training and, more observably, to poor planning. As U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth notes: “The Russian military has struggled with moving equipment around the battlefield…[displaying] a notable and somewhat surprising deficiency in this area.” Seth Jones provides further elaboration, arguing that without access to rail transport and with roads clogged with Russian vehicles, “Russian ground forces failed to move fuel, munitions, spare parts, and other matériel quickly and efficiently to forward-deployed units,” making supply lines unable to keep up with long combat pushes. The result of these failures in logistics has been borne out on the battlefield where supply lines are bogged down, leading to floundering offensives and loss of land when faced with Ukrainian counter-offenses.

Any conflict involving Japan will immediately involve a logistics trail spread across multiple islands separated by hundreds, sometimes thousands, of miles of water. Because it is fighting from its territory, the Self-Defense Force will always have bases, stockpiles, and supplies somewhere nearby — but that “somewhere” may be separated by mountains or large swaths of ocean. In peacetime, Japan tends to rely on commercial assets to supplement the Self-Defense Force in moving supplies and equipment around. This creates significant vulnerabilities and potential legal issues in the run-up to a crisis, not to mention during an actual conflict.

For a contingency, ensuring the Self-Defense Force has the capacity and capabilities to transport munitions, fuel, and supplies quickly to where it needs to go will be critical to remaining in any fight. I have written about what I view as Japan’s paucity of sealift and airlift previously. Because there is no significant focus on lift capabilities in the 2022 documents (although there is some mention of small watercraft and private capabilities like civilian ferries), I still believe there is a danger. The Self-Defense Forces may confront limitations in quickly moving supplies and personnel throughout the archipelago in a sustained manner where significant attrition is expected to take place. While civilian options are always possibilities to make up for shortfalls, their use in a conflict will be highly constrained.

Preparing to fight in active combat

While it is important to focus on ways to keep the Self-Defense Forces in the fight, an often-unasked question is whether they are prepared for active combat. One of the surprising aspects of the war in Ukraine has been the incompetence of the Russian military. Prior to the war, articles argued that Putin’s military was modern and competent, leading to the expectation that Russian military superiority would make quick work of Ukraine. Instead, whether it be combined arms operations, fuel and logistics supply, planning and combat readiness, or command and control, the Russian military has made critical mistakes, compounded by corruption on a massive scale.

It is not uncommon to view the People’s Liberation Army as a similarly daunting military giant. Yet, its military competence is untested, with the last conflict it fought — and lost — coming in 1979 against Vietnam. Nevertheless, even that decades-old operational failure by the People’s Liberation Army amounts to more combat experience than the Self-Defense Forces have had. While Japanese forces have decades of experience in responding to disasters, experience related to active combat is limited to exercises and training. The Self-Defense Forces are said to not routinely conduct realistic exercises or practice realistic training. Some exercises that would be necessary for high-end combat readiness, like missile training, cannot even be performed in Japan because of domestic political considerations.

Recent joint statements have identified “realistic training and exercises” as an area of focus for the alliance. It is unknown to what extent Ukraine’s battlefield successes have influenced efforts to improve Self-Defense Force tactical combat skills and readiness levels. For example, is Japan watching the war and looking at ways to improve its combined arms operations as a joint force? The U.S. Army, for its part, has been talking about the importance of joint training exercises that offer experience in large-scale maneuvers. Given the Self-Defense Forces’ sophisticated equipment and plans to procure more in the years ahead, the more Japan can improve high-quality, realistic training to build capacity and train junior leaders and non-commissioned officers to make battlefield decisions and seize the initiative, the more ready it can be to put its sophisticated equipment to the most effective use against a numerically superior adversary. The planned establishment of the permanent joint headquarters also suggests a greater seriousness about jointness, which could pay dividends against a much larger Chinese force.

Assisting the broader fight

In addition to being ready to fight, a more fundamental question for Japanese political leadership is what role it sees itself playing in a Taiwan contingency. I have written extensively about how Japan’s legal framework delineates what it can and cannot do in different scenarios. In this context, planners should begin thinking creatively about all the different ways Japan could assist Taiwan in maintaining its ability to fight.

One of the most critical forms of cooperation that has benefited Ukraine is the West’s resupply of arms and munitions. While this has slowed as the war drags on, at one point the U.S. and NATO supplied Ukraine with more than 17,000 anti-tank weapons in less than a week. Japan provided Ukraine with supplies, but not combat materiel. If maintaining a viable government in Taipei is a critical interest for Tokyo, Japan would presumably also be willing to support Taiwan in a similar manner. Would Japan resupply Taiwan with weapons and munitions in an active contingency? It is impossible to know if a future Japanese prime minister would find that too provocative. If it were, perhaps non-kinetic support like Self-Defense Force C-130s and C-2s supporting airdrops of non-combat materiel into Taiwan would be more realistic. And if flights near or over Taiwan prove politically or operationally difficult in a contested environment, Japanese forces should at least be able to use some of their KC-46 aerial tankers to help sustain refueling efforts of coalition forces flying from Guam or Alaska. This kind of non-kinetic, rear-area support over international waters should prove the least politically and operationally difficult.

Regarding combat operations, a fight for Taiwan will involve multiple missions. If Tokyo does enter the fight, the big question will be whether it limits its support strictly to Japan’s defense or if it will expand its support to defending U.S. forces in and around Japan. If it takes the latter approach, consistent with the stated intent of its 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow collective self-defense, the question then turns to what types of missions it would engage in. The 2015 mutual defense guidelines provided an answer, as that document offers a general roadmap of the expected roles and missions each ally will participate in. But with Japan having taken a more proactive stance, the expected roles and missions for the Self-Defense Forces will depend wholly on who occupies the Kantei at that time.

Can the United States only count on critical non-combat, rear-area support tasks such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, refueling, maintenance, and search and rescue? What about air or maritime operations that involve kinetic activities outside of Japanese waters and airspace, including combat search and rescue, in support of allied forces? What about defending the flow of critical U.S. materiel into the theater and onward to the forward point of need, even if that includes Taiwan itself? While the United States would no doubt want Japan to provide a robust response, it should not come at the expense of the Self-Defense Forces fulfilling their core responsibility of defending Japan.

Arguably one of the biggest unknowns is how Japan intends to utilize its long-range precision fires. Most Western security analysts and defense planners consider such capabilities to be offensive in nature, but the debate in Japan has focused on how they can be used for self-defense purposes. Much of this debate has centered on targeting adversary airfields or fixed military facilities. Aside from the fact that these number in the thousands and airfields can be relatively quickly repaired, a broader question is what mission objective such strikes would serve.

Since strikes on airfields alone will do very little to deter further Chinese aggression, an important lesson Self-Defense Force commanders could learn from Ukraine is the need for long-range precision fires to sink ships and destroy supply convoys, hit command posts or command ships, and destroy critical logistical and munition nodes. Should the Self-Defense Forces develop concepts of operations that expand their use to these targets, it will be much more likely to complicate People’s Liberation Army operations. Japan may one day acquire an independent kill chain architecture to employ these fires. For the foreseeable future though, it will remain dependent on U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, targeting, and mission planning for these types of operations, requiring close cooperation with Washington.

Using unmanned capabilities

One of the more interesting lessons to come out of Ukraine concerns not just the pervasive use of unmanned platforms by both sides, but the creative ways in which they have been used. Ukrainians have proven very skillful at creating targeting software and other battlefield innovations that can be readily used by soldiers in the field. All of these have demonstrated the effectiveness of unmanned systems for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, kinetic attacks, and targeting purposes.

In Japan’s 2022 National Defense Strategy, the importance of developing unmanned platforms is listed as a priority. And the successful deployment of U.S. unmanned platforms to Misawa, Yokota, and Kanoya Air Bases is proof Tokyo supports big-platform drone operations from Japan. But questions remain about how Tokyo intends to use unmanned capabilities since it is still very much in the exploratory phase of this technology. For example, prior to Russia’s invasion, most Japanese thinking on unmanned platforms centered on procuring big platforms, like the Global Hawk. But the war in Ukraine suggests that all the important roles in a conflict can be carried out by small and cheap platforms, such as loitering munitions.

For Japanese planners looking to find ways to penetrate China’s anti-access, area-denial bubble, more consideration should be given to smaller “attritable” platforms — cheap, single-use weapons that can be purchased in much greater numbers. Similarly, it would make operational sense for the Self-Defense Forces to train small tactical units with the ability to discretely deploy on the battlefield, even beyond line-of-sight distances. Critically, it is still unknown to what extent Japanese planners are working to update their command-and-control networks to integrate the rapid intelligence these unmanned platforms provide into strike platforms currently being procured.

What does not appear to have gotten as much attention in Japan is the risk Chinese unmanned platforms could pose to Self-Defense Force bases and capabilities. The use of drones in Ukraine has become similar to the use of improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan. From a defense perspective, it is unknown what lessons the Self-Defense Forces have learned when it comes to preparing for China’s possible use of large numbers of loitering munitions. For example, in the new strategic documents, there do not appear to be efforts to defend against new, smaller, loitering capabilities that can attack from above. Nor does there appear to be a robust debate on improving counter-drone technology as part of a broader modernization of Japan’s integrated air and missile defense systems.

Sustaining the will to fight

One final lesson from Ukraine may be the hardest to talk about in Japan. In a major conflict, widespread destruction would not necessarily be limited to Self-Defense Force bases. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine have been indiscriminate, targeting civilians and attacking infrastructure that civilians depend on. For Japanese planners, the first question that should be asked is whether its current air and missile defense systems, which largely concentrate around Japanese and U.S. bases, are sufficient for saturation attacks. What about defending large population centers?

The December strategic documents suggest that there is a heightened sense of concern over low stockpiles, for example, but other types of investments are also needed. Possible measures could include robust electronic warfare capabilities to degrade incoming missiles, space-based sensors to detect, track, and target incoming missiles, and some combination of more interceptor capabilities for both ballistic and cruise missiles. These in turn could include the Thermal High Altitude Area Defense system, Aegis Ashore, Indirect Fire Protection Capability, or a more robust anti-cruise missile capability not yet developed. All of these are important means to prevent widespread destruction coming from the sky, which could sap the public’s confidence in any prime minister trying to stay in the fight.

To date, much of the domestic debate in Japan over counterstrike missiles has focused on deterrence by denial. But the consequences of their use do not always appear to be discussed in public debates. If Japan uses these capabilities to strike People’s Liberation Army targets but accidentally hits a non-military target or a target that also houses a strategic asset, China may choose to respond with much greater force, including attacks on civilian infrastructure or population centers. Is Japan ready for this? In a protracted fight in which Japan is being attacked daily, will it become more difficult for a Japanese prime minister to sustain Self-Defense Forces’ participation? Or will the Japanese population become more determined to resist the aggressor in the face of regular loss of life? Even more critically, is there a point or redline at which it will become difficult for a prime minister to allow U.S. forces to continue to prosecute the war from bases in Japan?

Conclusion

Japan is making huge strides to improve its defenses in ways that most analysts thought were not possible even a few years ago. All of that is exceptional. Yet, as the Ukraine conflict has taught us, wars can drag on for a long time. Ukraine benefits from having a committed set of international partners that are not engaged in the war itself. In a Taiwan conflict, by contrast, the United States might well be directly involved. That puts a premium on Japan ensuring that it has the ability to not just withstand the first volley, but months and possibly years of fighting. By drawing lessons from Ukraine, Japanese planners can better prepare for that risk.

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Jeffrey W. Hornung is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

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warontherocks.com · by Jeffrey W. Hornung · June 21, 2023

11. Getting Artificial Intelligence Procurement Right: The Cautionary Tale of the Defense Department’s Counter-IED Fight

Excerpts:

The undeniable power of AI stands poised to revolutionize defense capabilities. With AI’s unmatched data processing capabilities, DoD is on the brink of an era in which new tools will dramatically transform battlefield dynamics. However, harnessing this transformative technology will be no small feat; it requires careful navigation between the extraordinary potential of AI and the dangers of misstep and misuse.

Drawing from the costly lessons of counter-IED efforts, where thousands of American service members lost their lives and billions of taxpayer dollars were spent, the procurement and implementation of revolutionary AI technology demand a higher level of prudence, understanding, and transparency. For DoD, integrating AI into its operations involves rigorous scrutiny of potential partners and solutions. This includes a firm commitment to leveraging AI to enhance defense capabilities without compromising ethical standards or national security. Meticulous evaluation of AI technology and prioritizing data quality, unbiased training, and interoperability are essential. Furthermore, a realistic assessment of long-term costs and benefits is imperative. Undoubtedly, the stakes are high in navigating this advanced technology landscape. Still, by adopting these measures, DoD can prevent strategic missteps and strengthen its defense posture amid an ever-changing geopolitical environment.

Getting Artificial Intelligence Procurement Right: The Cautionary Tale of the Defense Department’s Counter-IED Fight - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Nicholas Dockery · June 20, 2023

During Iraq and Afghanistan wars, American service members grappled with not merely an elusive adversary but also a terrifyingly rudimentary yet lethal innovation—the improvised explosive device (IED). Accounting for a staggering 48 percent (2,640) of known cause-of-death operations for US soldiers, these makeshift weapons underscored a bitter paradox of modern warfare: technological preeminence does not necessarily confer battlefield supremacy.

For decades, the US Department of Defense has committed prodigious resources to preserve a technological advantage in military engagements, an undertaking that has catalyzed groundbreaking innovation yet has also been mired in instances of profligate expenditure and, distressingly, adoption of inferior technological solutions. This long-standing approach is now set to be applied to artificial intelligence. As the AI revolution introduces a new dimension of complexity to warfare, senior policymakers are captivated by the potential to integrate this transformative technology into the DoD operational ecosystem seamlessly.

Yet, the US military’s experience with the IED—a weapon as cost-effective as it was devastating—should serve as a cautionary tale. As the world ventures into AI integration, DoD must remain cognizant of the lessons gleaned from the post-9/11 wars and the inefficacious efforts of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). It is insufficient to simply procure the most advanced technology; understanding its intricate workings, fostering transparency in its acquisition, and nurturing synergies between the government and defense contractors are essential to circumventing past pitfalls. As we stand on the brink of the AI epoch, the DoD approach must be one of both eager anticipation and judicious caution.

Fiscal Mismanagement and Strategic Missteps in the Counter-IED Effort

A Government Accountability Office report revealed that JIEDDO received $18 billion in funding from 2006 to 2011. Even with years of funding and a DoD directive, JIEDDO failed to develop a comprehensive strategic plan to account for total research and development costs or to measure the effectiveness of the technology purchased. The absence of a comprehensive plan rendered it impossible to assess the efficacy of counter-IED efforts and facilitated the creation of subpar defense contracting technologies. As a result, millions of dollars went to defense contracting firms that produced equipment that lacked end-user feedback, necessitated extensive reliance on on-site contractor maintenance, or exhibited substandard performance.

Despite the disappointing outcomes and inefficiencies of JIEDDO, DoD surprisingly amplified its efforts, evolving JIEDDO into the even more expansive Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA). With the expansion came a 33 percent increase in the budget, accompanied by a substantial staff of three thousand. In 2015, the DoD inspector general discovered that JIDA neglected to evaluate the efficacy of over $100 million of counter-IED equipment. Out of the ninety-five counter-IED initiatives that were either approved for further funding or terminated from 2012 to 2015, eight had funding or termination decisions made without adequate assessments, costing $112.5 million. Furthermore, the systematic failure extended to the military services and combatant commands, which did not provide sufficient data to JIDA, thereby hindering the determination of the effectiveness of these counter-IED efforts.

As the lessons from the counter-IED program illustrate, DoD must employ careful judgment and thorough scrutiny when embracing new technologies such as AI. It’s incumbent upon senior national security and DoD officials to prevent wasteful spending and inferior performance by meticulously evaluating AI contracts before their procurement. Despite the transformative potential of advanced AI technologies, their ethical and efficacious deployment is paramount. Failure to manage this properly could expose us to severe national security threats and significant financial losses, especially if opportunistic vendors take advantage of DoD. To navigate the complexities inherent in adopting AI programs, DoD must devise comprehensive strategies involving all pertinent stakeholders, ensure judicious budget allocation, and implement measures to thwart contractor exploitation.

Ensuring Prudent AI Procurement

There are many ways to exploit the government, but a lack of transparency often allows companies to charge exorbitant prices for products and services. One example is TransDigm, a sole-source supplier of parts to DoD, which charged the government up to 4,451 percent more than the actual cost of the items purchased. After a congressional scolding and DoD inspector general investigation confirmed the predatory practices, TransDigm agreed to refund the Pentagon $16 million. Shockingly, TransDigm did this legally without violating regulations or DoD policies.

Instances of defense contractors exploiting legal loopholes (e.g., labeling goods and services as specialized military products to exempt them from providing cost or pricing data during contract negotiations) underscore the importance of accountability and transparency within DoD programs. The case of TransDigm’s price predation is a stark reminder of this fact. Senior officials pursuing cutting-edge AI technologies must guard against the risk of adopting these solutions hastily and without thorough scrutiny. Therefore, a stringent vetting and oversight process is not just desirable but essential to ensure the responsible utilization of AI in defense programs.

In May 2021, the Department of Defense took a significant step forward by issuing a memorandum outlining its strategic approach to implementing what it calls RAI—responsible artificial intelligence. The RAI pathway prioritizes ethical and lawful AI use, governance modernization, system operator proficiency standardization, and risk reduction measures throughout the AI product and acquisition life cycle. The RAI strategy could serve as a blueprint for a broader, government-wide plan to coordinate efforts around AI technology acquisition effectively. However, while this is a step in the right direction, more must be done.

In light of JIDA’s failures to effectively address issues with counter-IED equipment, the Department of Defense must prioritize accountability and transparency in AI-specific defense contracting. These changes include but are not limited to giving special attention to the POM (program objective memorandum) cycle, revising pricing regulations, and eliminating exemptions that allow for withholding cost or pricing data. By doing so, the department will promote ethical AI use and safeguard taxpayer dollars and the integrity of defense programs.

The budgeting POM cycle is an annual process that DoD leverages to devise its budget requests for the forthcoming fiscal year. Aimed at aligning strategic objectives with the efficient use of taxpayer dollars, this complex process draws input from diverse stakeholders, including military leaders, civilian officials, and Congress. By integrating a broad spectrum of viewpoints, DoD can prioritize mission-critical programs and subject them to comprehensive evaluation and review.

However, the POM cycle has its shortcomings. Its time-consuming, bureaucratic, and resource-intensive nature may be at odds with the agility required to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Furthermore, the process can be skewed by biases, leading to discord and potential compromise, which may culminate in suboptimal decision-making. To address these limitations, DoD officials must initiate measures to streamline the POM process, ensuring it is an effective tool in selecting AI project partners.

Promoting transparency and stakeholder collaboration is vital for enhancing efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the POM process. We can achieve these improvements by incorporating end-user feedback, leveraging data and analytics for informed decision-making, and periodically reassessing and adjusting the process to confront emerging challenges. Clear criteria and standards for evaluating AI proposals are essential, as is engaging with a diverse range of potential partners to ensure a broad perspective on available options. The ultimate goal is to streamline the POM process and enable DoD to identify and partner with the most innovative and capable AI vendors and suppliers.

Considering AI’s inherent uncertainty and complexity, expectation management and heightened risk awareness become indispensable. DoD must approach AI adoption cautiously, avoiding overly optimistic vendor projections or promises of guaranteed results. Contracts must align with national security interests above all else, with all parties clearly understanding their roles and responsibilities. Transparency between the vendor and the government is paramount. DoD should require vendors to offer comprehensive insights into their AI algorithms, machine learning procedures, neural network development, data sourcing, and overall methodologies in a way that senior officials can understand. Senior officials, in turn, must understand the intricacies of AI technologies and effectively communicate them to all involved parties—from their teams within DoD to vendors and, when necessary, the public. These officials must also exercise transparency about the processes and decisions made within AI adoption.

Moreover, the performance of AI models fundamentally depends on the quality of their training data. A biased or discriminatory dataset can trigger adverse effects and jeopardize the safety of DoD service members and broader national security interests. This reality underscores the necessity for AI model training to utilize unbiased and diverse datasets. Therefore, DoD must require vendors to implement stringent privacy measures, identify and mitigate biases proactively, and swiftly eliminate discriminatory data.

DoD, and the US government as a whole, must ensure that what it procures are not substandard products or those unwanted by the civilian market that the vendor is attempting to offload onto the military. Commitment to interoperability and open standards from vendors is also key, as it prevents vendor lock-in and ensures adaptability to evolving needs and technologies. Lastly, DoD must navigate the adoption of AI with an understanding of its long-term financial and operational implications. Beyond just evaluating the costs, DoD needs to examine how AI might enhance productivity, streamline tasks, and bolster decision-making capabilities while being conscious of the potential security vulnerabilities it could introduce. Furthermore, this analysis must consider the need for extensive training for uniformed personnel, potentially hiring specialized civilian personnel, and the responsibility of managing emerging ethical and legal issues related to AI. Ultimately, DoD should look beyond immediate effects to evaluate how AI could mold its long-term operations, financial state, and overall capabilities.

By prioritizing these factors, DoD can make informed decisions about AI implementation and avoid the potential consequences of ineffective AI software and wasteful contracts. Given AI’s significant impact on national security, it’s essential to be vigilant in this process and ensure its use is ethical and effective.

Navigating the AI Revolution Responsibly

The undeniable power of AI stands poised to revolutionize defense capabilities. With AI’s unmatched data processing capabilities, DoD is on the brink of an era in which new tools will dramatically transform battlefield dynamics. However, harnessing this transformative technology will be no small feat; it requires careful navigation between the extraordinary potential of AI and the dangers of misstep and misuse.

Drawing from the costly lessons of counter-IED efforts, where thousands of American service members lost their lives and billions of taxpayer dollars were spent, the procurement and implementation of revolutionary AI technology demand a higher level of prudence, understanding, and transparency. For DoD, integrating AI into its operations involves rigorous scrutiny of potential partners and solutions. This includes a firm commitment to leveraging AI to enhance defense capabilities without compromising ethical standards or national security. Meticulous evaluation of AI technology and prioritizing data quality, unbiased training, and interoperability are essential. Furthermore, a realistic assessment of long-term costs and benefits is imperative. Undoubtedly, the stakes are high in navigating this advanced technology landscape. Still, by adopting these measures, DoD can prevent strategic missteps and strengthen its defense posture amid an ever-changing geopolitical environment.

Maj. Nicholas Dockery is a Downing scholar, a graduate of the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs, and an active duty Special Forces officer.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs

mwi.usma.edu · by Nicholas Dockery · June 20, 2023

12. Southeast Asian nations plan navy drills in disputed South China Sea

Southeast Asian nations plan navy drills in disputed South China Sea

militarytimes.com · by Edna Tarigan, The Associated Press · June 20, 2023

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is moving ahead with plans for joint naval exercises in September, the first held by countries in the bloc on their own, at a time when several are responding more strongly to increasing Chinese assertiveness in the area.

The Indonesian military said Tuesday that ASEAN member countries held an initial planning conference for the joint exercises, to be held Sept. 18-25 near a disputed area of the South China Sea, despite skepticism from Cambodia.

China says the vast majority of the South China Sea lies within its “nine-dash line,” which it uses to demarcate what it considers its maritime border. That has brought it into tense standoffs with the ASEAN nations of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, with Chinese fishing boats and military vessels becoming more aggressive in the disputed waters.

Indonesia’s military chief, Adm. Yudo Margono, initially said the exercises would take place in an area of the South China Sea which Indonesia renamed the North Natuna Sea in 2017 to underscore its claim that the area, which includes natural gas fields, is part of its exclusive economic zone. Similarly, the Philippines has named part of what it considers its territorial waters the West Philippine Sea.

In a statement Tuesday, however, Indonesia, which holds the rotating chair of ASEAN, said the exercise is now being planned for the waters of South Natuna, just outside the nine-dash line.

ASEAN members Cambodia and Myanmar, which maintain close ties with China, declined to take part in the planning conference, according to the Indonesian military.

After Indonesia announced the exercises earlier this month following meetings of defense officials in Bali, Cambodia denied that anything had been decided, issuing a statement that it had been asked to join a military drill and was establishing a working group to look into it.

Cambodia’s Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the revised plan for the exercise.

China has in the past explained its presence in disputed waters on the basis of what it said were its “traditional fishing rights.” Chinese ships also regularly patrol off the island of Borneo and near James Shoal, east of the Natuna islands, which is China’s southernmost territorial claim and is also claimed by Malaysia.

In one well-publicized incident, a Chinese coast guard ship on Feb. 6 aimed a military-grade laser at a Philippine patrol boat off a disputed reef, temporarily blinding some crew members and prompting Manila to intensify its patrols in the disputed waters.

ASEAN nations have taken part in naval exercises before with other countries — including both the United States and China — but the September drills would be the first involving just the bloc and are being read by many as a signal to China.

Teuku Rezasyah, an international relations expert at Indonesia’s Padjajaran University, said Indonesia needs to explain in detail what it is planning in order to avoid any misunderstandings about what message, if any, it might be trying to send to Beijing.

“This must be explained to the public, because if not, it will give the impression that we are taking actions that will make China unhappy,” he said. “The navy moving around the Natuna Sea will give the impression we are harassing China’s nine-dash line.”

militarytimes.com · by Edna Tarigan, The Associated Press · June 20, 2023

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is moving ahead with plans for joint naval exercises in September, the first held by countries in the bloc on their own, at a time when several are responding more strongly to increasing Chinese assertiveness in the area.

The Indonesian military said Tuesday that ASEAN member countries held an initial planning conference for the joint exercises, to be held Sept. 18-25 near a disputed area of the South China Sea, despite skepticism from Cambodia.

China says the vast majority of the South China Sea lies within its “nine-dash line,” which it uses to demarcate what it considers its maritime border. That has brought it into tense standoffs with the ASEAN nations of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, with Chinese fishing boats and military vessels becoming more aggressive in the disputed waters.

Indonesia’s military chief, Adm. Yudo Margono, initially said the exercises would take place in an area of the South China Sea which Indonesia renamed the North Natuna Sea in 2017 to underscore its claim that the area, which includes natural gas fields, is part of its exclusive economic zone. Similarly, the Philippines has named part of what it considers its territorial waters the West Philippine Sea.

In a statement Tuesday, however, Indonesia, which holds the rotating chair of ASEAN, said the exercise is now being planned for the waters of South Natuna, just outside the nine-dash line.

ASEAN members Cambodia and Myanmar, which maintain close ties with China, declined to take part in the planning conference, according to the Indonesian military.

After Indonesia announced the exercises earlier this month following meetings of defense officials in Bali, Cambodia denied that anything had been decided, issuing a statement that it had been asked to join a military drill and was establishing a working group to look into it.

Cambodia’s Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the revised plan for the exercise.

China has in the past explained its presence in disputed waters on the basis of what it said were its “traditional fishing rights.” Chinese ships also regularly patrol off the island of Borneo and near James Shoal, east of the Natuna islands, which is China’s southernmost territorial claim and is also claimed by Malaysia.

In one well-publicized incident, a Chinese coast guard ship on Feb. 6 aimed a military-grade laser at a Philippine patrol boat off a disputed reef, temporarily blinding some crew members and prompting Manila to intensify its patrols in the disputed waters.

ASEAN nations have taken part in naval exercises before with other countries — including both the United States and China — but the September drills would be the first involving just the bloc and are being read by many as a signal to China.

Teuku Rezasyah, an international relations expert at Indonesia’s Padjajaran University, said Indonesia needs to explain in detail what it is planning in order to avoid any misunderstandings about what message, if any, it might be trying to send to Beijing.

“This must be explained to the public, because if not, it will give the impression that we are taking actions that will make China unhappy,” he said. “The navy moving around the Natuna Sea will give the impression we are harassing China’s nine-dash line.”

13. Ukraine War Highlights a New Threat to the American Homeland

Excerpts:

“Ukraine is this perfect example of what’s going to happen with us,” Townsend said. “High-end drone capabilities will be part of any enemy’s air campaign against us. We haven’t had to deal with that spectrum of threats yet, and I’m not sure we’re moving as fast as we can. That’s the bottom line.”

With an eye toward improving its counter-drone defenses, the Department of Defense established the Joint Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office in 2019. Even so, the Pentagon is still not working fast enough to develop workable and cost-effective defense systems against small and medium-sized armed drones. To meet that need, the American private sector has stepped up, and a handful of start-ups have already developed innovative counter-drone interception systems that minimize the risk of collateral damage on the ground.

The technology exists to protect America from these novel threats from the sky, but it’s up to lawmakers to invest in nationwide counter-drone defenses before the next war comes.

Ukraine War Highlights a New Threat to the American Homeland

By Nolan Peterson

June 19, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/06/19/ukraine_war_highlights_a_new_threat_to_the_american_homeland_941540.html?utm_source=pocket_saves

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Ukraine has become a proving ground for many of the tactics, techniques, and technologies that will transform that next era of warfare. One recent development foreshadows a novel, potentially strategic threat against the U.S. homeland.  

CNN reported last week that pro-Ukraine partisan forces have conducted drone strikes, covertly launched from within Russian territory, against targets of both material and symbolic importance — including the Kremlin, a neighborhood in Moscow, and an oil refinery. While those strikes have, for the most part, caused limited damage, their psychological impact has been more significant, undercutting the myth of Russia’s military superiority, as well as the overall rationale of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s so-called special military operation.  

No doubt America’s contemporary adversaries are taking note and imagining how their own covert teams — equipped with small, armed drones — might carry out a nationwide surprise attack against the American homeland. It’s not hard to imagine Chinese agents infiltrating U.S. territory, buying some quadcopter drones from Best Buy, and then arming them with homemade explosives. These operatives would be ready at a moment’s notice to launch a nationwide wave of attacks against American powerplants and airports.

Even if they are armed with relatively weak munitions, small drones offer America’s adversaries a low-cost, plausibly deniable way to spread panic and paralyze our economy. The drone incursions at London’s Gatwick Airport in December 2018 highlighted that threat. By simply flying drones within the airport’s vicinity, the unidentified perpetrators were able to ground traffic and strand more than 100,000 travelers for three days. A similar incident could easily happen in America — and just imagine the propaganda impact of a cheap, armed drone destroying a multi-million-dollar American warplane parked on the tarmac at some Air Force base.

Such a scenario is not far-fetched. Last December, remember, two Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia’s Engels Airbase killed multiple Russian servicemen and damaged at least two bombers. According to news reports, a Ukrainian military reconnaissance unit coordinated those strikes from within Russian territory.

Russia’s air defenses have performed poorly against attacks by Ukraine's small- and medium-sized drones, and the drone attack against the Kremlin last month was particularly embarrassing. Yet, one wonders if America’s domestic air defense network would fare much better against a massive drone attack. Such low-flying, bird-sized targets pose a challenge to air defense systems designed to shoot down missiles and warplanes — especially when they’re launched in swarms. Moreover, a skilled drone pilot can use buildings and foliage to conceal his vehicle’s approach path. Thus, the most effective counter-drone defenses may be ones with narrower fields of view, specially tailored to detect slow, low-altitude threats, and co-located on the sites they are meant to defend. Along that line of thinking, it may be up to the Department of Homeland Security and local law enforcement agencies across America to provide the first line of defense against drone attacks by a peer adversary such as China or Russia. 

In 2018, Congress granted the Department of Homeland Security the authority to destroy drones that pose “a credible threat to public safety or national security.” That law — the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 — was tailored toward drone threats from terrorist groups, such as Islamic State and al Qaeda. It also limited DHS agencies to counter-drone missions at selected high-risk sites, events, and assets. According to the legislation, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies must request DHS support to provide counter-drone defenses at mass gatherings or important events.

Those provisions left a lot of America without 24/7 counter-drone defenses — a loophole that any peer adversary is likely to exploit during wartime. Further complicating matters, the 2018 bill came with a five-year sunset provision and is set to expire this September.  

The Preventing Emerging Threats Act needs to be renewed and updated to reflect the fact that small- and medium-sized drone attacks are now a staple of conventional, state-on-state combat — a new reality that threatens the American homeland, as well as our military units on the battlefield.

“This problem set straddles both conventional and unconventional warfare,” Stephen Townsend, a retired Army general who commanded the multinational task force against Islamic State from 2016 to 2017, recently told me about the current state of drone warfare.

“Ukraine is this perfect example of what’s going to happen with us,” Townsend said. “High-end drone capabilities will be part of any enemy’s air campaign against us. We haven’t had to deal with that spectrum of threats yet, and I’m not sure we’re moving as fast as we can. That’s the bottom line.”

With an eye toward improving its counter-drone defenses, the Department of Defense established the Joint Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office in 2019. Even so, the Pentagon is still not working fast enough to develop workable and cost-effective defense systems against small and medium-sized armed drones. To meet that need, the American private sector has stepped up, and a handful of start-ups have already developed innovative counter-drone interception systems that minimize the risk of collateral damage on the ground.

The technology exists to protect America from these novel threats from the sky, but it’s up to lawmakers to invest in nationwide counter-drone defenses before the next war comes.

Nolan Peterson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and an independent defense consultant based in Kyiv and Washington. A former U.S. Air Force Special Operations pilot and veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Peterson has more than nine years of experience reporting from Ukraine's front lines.

14. U.S. Tracked Huawei, ZTE Workers at Suspected Chinese Spy Sites in Cuba

U.S. Tracked Huawei, ZTE Workers at Suspected Chinese Spy Sites in Cuba

Intelligence bolstered suspicions telecom giants might be playing role in expansion of China’s capabilities on island

By Kate O’Keeffe

Updated June 21, 2023 12:08 am ET

WASHINGTON—During the Trump administration, U.S. officials reviewed intelligence that tracked workers from the Chinese telecom giants Huawei Technologies and ZTE entering and exiting facilities suspected of housing Chinese eavesdropping operations in Cuba, according to people familiar with the matter. 

The intelligence contributed to suspicions within the Trump administration that the telecommunications companies might be playing a role in expanding China’s ability to spy on the U.S. from the island, according to people familiar with the matter. It couldn’t be learned whether the Biden administration has pursued that line of inquiry.

While neither Huawei nor ZTE is known to make the sophisticated tools governments would use for eavesdropping, both specialize in the technology needed to facilitate such an operation, such as servers and network equipment that could be used to transmit data to China, the people familiar with the matter said.

In a statement, Huawei said it denied “such groundless accusations,” adding that it was “committed to full compliance with the applicable laws and regulations where we operate.”

ZTE didn’t respond to a request for comment.

China has maintained a spy base in Cuba since at least 2019, when Donald Trump was president, and the two countries already jointly run four eavesdropping stations on the island, according to U.S. officials. In addition, Beijing and Havana are negotiating to establish a new joint military training facility on Cuba’s northern coast, The Wall Street Journal has reported. 

Beijing’s efforts to expand its intelligence gathering from Cuba are ongoing, the White House has said. Following a 2019 upgrade to its intelligence-collection facilities on the island, Beijing “will keep trying to enhance its presence in Cuba, and we will keep working to disrupt it,” a White House official said Monday.

U.S. officials have long said China’s government might use the nation’s telecom companies to spy. The U.S. has been engaged in a yearslong campaign to persuade allies to shut Huawei in particular out of their next-generation telecommunications networks. Huawei has said it wouldn’t spy for China.

The Chinese Embassy didn’t respond to requests for comment. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has denied that China is spying in Cuba. The Cuban Embassy in Washington didn’t respond to a request for comment, but has called the Journal’s earlier report on a Chinese spy station on the island “totally mendacious and unfounded.” 

The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence didn’t respond to requests for comment.

On Tuesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he had told his counterparts in Beijing that the U.S. had “deep concerns” about Chinese spying and military activities in Cuba. 

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.) at a hearing on China’s economy in May. PHOTO: ROD LAMKEY/CNP/ZUMA PRESS

“This is something we’re going to be monitoring very, very closely, and we’ve been very clear about that,” he told reporters. “And we will protect our homeland; we will protect our interests.”

The White House didn’t respond to a request for comment on Huawei’s and ZTE’s potential roles in China’s spying operation in Cuba. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Tuesday it was “no secret or surprise that the PRC has been trying to improve their influence, their reach, and their intelligence collection capabilities in the Western Hemisphere and that includes the relationship that they had had for quite some time with Cuba.”

“It’s not like we aren’t aware of it, it’s not like we haven’t been monitoring it,” he said. “And quite frankly, it’s not like we haven’t taken steps and we’ll continue to take steps to thwart it and to be able to protect our own secrets and our own national security, and that’s the case in this space as well.”

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.), chairman of the bipartisan Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, on Tuesday sent a letter to Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and Commerce Department Secretary Gina Raimondo seeking clarity on U.S. policies to control the export of U.S. technology to Chinese telecom companies.

In the letter, which was viewed by the Journal, he said that Huawei has assisted the Cuban government in modernizing its telecommunications and internet infrastructure since the 2000s and that the company, along with ZTE and Great Dragon Information Technology Group, maintains a regular business presence on the island. 

Great Dragon couldn’t be reached for comment.

Gallagher wrote that because of China’s official policy of using Chinese commercial entities to build up its military, any enhancement of China’s intelligence capabilities in Cuba “is likely” to be aided by Chinese telecommunications companies. 

He speculated that these companies’ existing business operations in Cuba could provide cover for Chinese intelligence officials to travel to and from the island without creating the same suspicion as official travel.

Gallagher posed a series of questions to the officials regarding the intelligence community’s awareness of the connections between Chinese signals-intelligence operations and commercial activities in Cuba and whether the information has been used to inform ongoing export-licensing decisions.

In 2019, the U.S. Commerce Department added Huawei to a so-called entity list requiring companies to get licenses to ship many goods to Huawei. In 2020, officials significantly expanded the licensing requirements. But the Commerce Department has issued many such licenses, enabling exporters to continue selling large amounts of tech to Huawei.

The chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Michael McCaul (R., Texas), has been spearheading an effort to pressure the Commerce Department to change its policy. In 2021, he released data showing the department had granted 113 export licenses enabling companies to sell about $61 billion of goods to Huawei from Nov. 9, 2020, through April 20, 2021.

The Commerce Department had restricted exports to ZTE on and off since 2016 until Trump said in 2018 that he would allow the company to resume buying U.S. goods in exchange for a fine of $1.3 billion and a leadership shake-up. 

Alan Estevez, the Commerce Department’s undersecretary for industry and security, has told lawmakers that his team is reviewing its policies and doing everything possible to prevent sensitive U.S. technology from getting into the hands of adversaries.

A Commerce Department spokesman said Huawei still faces “significant export restrictions” and noted that the agency in April imposed the largest stand-alone civil penalty in its history against a U.S. company for selling hard-disk drives to Huawei without a license.

The spokesman added that ZTE remains subject to a settlement agreement with the Commerce Department that subjects it to additional oversight.

William Mauldin, Vivian Salama and Liyan Qi contributed to this article.

Write to Kate O’Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com