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Quotes of the Day:
“It is also important to realize that each great power, again in its own way, is an imperial one. Russian historical imperialism (going back to the conquests of the Romanov dynasty) was obviously evident in Ukraine. Chinese historical imperialism (going back at least to the conquest of the Qing dynasty) is evident in its longing to rule Taiwan. As for the United States, since the end of World War II, given its globe-spanning economic and military power, it has been an empire in all but name. Thus, the decline of the great powers signals another death knell for the stabilizing virtues of imperialism and the relative political order it brings—which go back to the dawn of history, however out of fashion imperialism has been since the second half of the 20th century.”
But, because the declines of the three great powers are relative to one another, there will be twists and turns in this process. For example, because Russia is declining at a faster rate than China, China’s leverage over Russia has increased. This has led to Russia becoming a sphere of Chinese influence, as China extracts hydrocarbons from Russia at bargain-basement prices, overwhelms Russian influence in former Soviet Central Asia, and so forth. China, in other words, because of Russia’s weakening position, has gone from being a Pacific and Asian power to becoming a Eurasian one. For most of history the super-continent of Eurasia was too big to have any graspable meaning. But as I wrote in The Revenge of Geography (2012) and The Return of Marco Polo’s World (2018), the very shrinkage of the earth through geography has created a situation where Eurasia is suddenly imaginable in geopolitical terms. China’s emergence as a Eurasian power, encompassing Russia, is only an early sign of this.”
— Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis by Robert D. Kaplan
https://a.co/10PYp20
"A man, as a general rule, owes very little to what he is born with — a man is what he makes of himself."
– Alexander Graham Bell
"Without education, we are weaker economically. Without economic power, we are weaker in terms of national security. No great military power has ever remained so without great economic power."
– Jon Meacham
1. North Korea Denounces U.S. Strike
2. North Korea overtakes Iran as Russia's partner of choice
3. Seoul's Lee and Tokyo's Ishiba off to a surprisingly warm start
4. Lee's top security aide to attend NATO summit in Netherlands: presidential office
5. Lee Jae Myung's ‘pragmatic' diplomacy comes into focus
6. Trump struck Iran — but North Korea is a different story
7. Who is Lee Jong-seok, Seoul's new spy chief?
8. How South Korea Became a Cultural Powerhouse, and What’s Next
9. U.S. Iran strike raises concerns in Korea
10. U.S. bombing of Iran might convince North Korea it was right to build nukes
11. Lee's decision to skip NATO summit sparks concerns over lost opportunity to meet Trump
12. Japan Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to skip NATO summit, source says
13. South Korea steps up crackdown on anti-North Korea leaflets near border
14. Trump’s Iran airstrikes test Kim Jong Un’s nerves — and his appetite for talks
1. North Korea Denounces U.S. Strike
No surprise. Is the CRInK sharing talking points?
3 hours ago
North Korea Denounces U.S. Strike
By
Peter Saidel
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-israel-us-latest-news/card/north-korea-denounces-u-s-strike-zphjIiNN47EfSr4VPSwa?page=1
North Korea denounced the U.S. attack on Iran as a violation of the territorial integrity of a sovereign state and accused Washington and Israel of sowing global instability, in a statement issued Monday by state media.
The international community “should raise the voice of unanimous censure and rejection" of the U.S. and Israeli actions, a North Korean foreign ministry spokesperson said, according to the state media report. North Korea and Iran don’t have a formal alliance but often describe their relationship as one of friendship and cooperation.
2. North Korea overtakes Iran as Russia's partner of choice
Cracks in the CRInK?
But north Korea is kind of like the utility infielder that can play any position for any member of the CRInK. And it has its dirty little hands in everything.
Excerpts:
While a belligerent North Korea serves China and Russia’s mutual interest of undermining the Western-dominated international order, it remains uncertain whether this wartime alignment will evolve into a lasting partnership once the guns fall silent in Ukraine.
Despite Russia being heavily sanctioned, it still seeks to resume trade with the US, raising doubts about the long-term growth of Russia-North Korea relations.
However, beyond the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia may use North Korea as leverage against China’s growing presence, economic influence, and territorial ambitions in the Russian Far East, strengthening economic, political, and military ties to form a buffer state.
In turn, North Korea maintains its autonomy by balancing ties between Russia and China, with its nuclear arsenal providing a strategic backstop against regime change.
With Iran sidelined and China’s shadow growing, North Korea is fast becoming Russia’s most dangerous and dependable ally, fueling its war machine, fortifying its eastern flank, and tilting Eurasia’s strategic balance in Russia’s favor.
North Korea overtakes Iran as Russia's partner of choice - Asia Times
As Iran falters and China looms, N Korea arming Russia’s war, fortifying its frontier and tilting regional balance on Moscow’s terms
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · June 23, 2025
North Korea is no longer just supplying Russia with manpower and missiles. It is embedding itself deep within Russia’s war economy, sending thousands of workers to the heart of its drone industry and reshaping the balance of power in Eurasia.
This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that 25,000 North Korean workers are being sent to Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with the manufacturing of Shahed drones, part of a deal reportedly brokered during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang.
Satellite imagery reveals new dormitory construction at the Alabuga site, indicating Russia’s intention to increase drone production from 2,000 to 5,000 units per month.
Ukrainian intelligence chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov confirmed this development, citing the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea and warning of the strategic implications for both Ukraine and South Korea. He added that some North Korean workers may be contracted into the Russian defense service.
The Alabuga plant, repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian strikes, remains a critical node in Russia’s standoff strike capability, particularly amid high attrition from its war in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly assisting North Korea in enhancing the accuracy of KN-23 missiles, long-range air-to-air munitions, and submarine-launched systems. The transfer of labor and technology underscores tightening bilateral military ties as both regimes confront isolation and intensifying global scrutiny.
Russia may be shifting its partnership of convenience from Iran to North Korea. As Iran falters under Israeli and US airstrikes and unfulfilled Russian arms deals, North Korea pulls ahead, embedding itself in Russia’s war machine and Far Eastern strategy.
While Russia and Iran have a long history of distrust and conflict, their mutual disdain for the Western-dominated international order, autocratic governments and heavily sanctioned economies in the aftermath of the former’s invasion of Ukraine has placed them in the same boat.
Iran has sought to make itself indispensable to Russia’s war effort by supplying Shahed drones, tactical gear, and artillery in exchange for revenue and to avoid diplomatic isolation. It may have also sought Russian investment in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
Yet as Russia transitioned to a war economy and began producing Shahed drones locally, Iran’s leverage may have declined, undercutting the latter’s efforts to extract security guarantees or financial backing from the former.
Furthermore, while Iran has consistently requested advanced Russian equipment, such as Su-35 fighter jets, these deliveries have not yet materialized, as Russia may need those fighters more urgently in its conflict with Ukraine.
In October 2024, Israel destroyed Iran’s prized S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, leaving the latter exposed to current air attacks. While Iran has downplayed the need to purchase the more advanced S-400 from Russia, citing the superior capabilities of its domestic systems, this could be a cover-up for Russia’s refusal to provide such systems for the same reason it has withheld Su-35 fighters.
However, Israeli strikes on Iran present mixed implications for Russia. For one, while such strikes may have undermined Russia as a credible partner, strikes on Iranian oil and gas infrastructure may have eliminated Iran as a competitor to Russian energy exports.
Yet, these gains may be short-lived. Israel admits that its strikes are not sufficient to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and that the goal is to pressure Iran back into negotiations.
Furthermore, it is unknown how Iran would respond in the aftermath. A nuclear-armed Iran may ultimately undermine Russia’s influence. Russia may have less leverage over a nuclear-armed Iran, potentially triggering a Middle East nuclear arms race, with Saudi Arabia stressing that it will develop nuclear weapons if Iran gets the bomb.
Despite that possible long-term setback, Israeli strikes may distract the US from Ukraine, drawing attention and resources away from confronting Russia. It also allows Russia to point out US “double standards,” with the US distancing itself from Israeli combat operations in Gaza while supporting Israeli strikes on Iran that have caused civilian casualties.
As Iran buckles under sustained Israeli and now US strikes, North Korea is stepping into the breach, presenting an entirely different set of nuances.
North Korea and Russia share deep ties dating back to the Korean War, and the former’s nuclear arsenal arguably makes it a safer long-term investment for the latter. North Korea has deepened its role in Russia’s war effort, providing matériel and manpower while reaping combat insights, hard currency, and access to advanced systems.
North Korea’s interest in supporting Russia in Ukraine may be to reduce its overdependence on China, its main political and economic lifeline, to maintain strategic autonomy and regime survival.
These aims may clash with China’s goal of maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula. Arguably, North Korean missile tests pose a threat to China just as much as they are to Japan and South Korea, prompting China to threaten to scale down political and economic ties with North Korea.
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To those ends, North Korea is actively developing nuclear delivery systems with possible Russian assistance, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the US mainland and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that ensure a second-strike capability.
While a belligerent North Korea serves China and Russia’s mutual interest of undermining the Western-dominated international order, it remains uncertain whether this wartime alignment will evolve into a lasting partnership once the guns fall silent in Ukraine.
Despite Russia being heavily sanctioned, it still seeks to resume trade with the US, raising doubts about the long-term growth of Russia-North Korea relations.
However, beyond the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia may use North Korea as leverage against China’s growing presence, economic influence, and territorial ambitions in the Russian Far East, strengthening economic, political, and military ties to form a buffer state.
In turn, North Korea maintains its autonomy by balancing ties between Russia and China, with its nuclear arsenal providing a strategic backstop against regime change.
With Iran sidelined and China’s shadow growing, North Korea is fast becoming Russia’s most dangerous and dependable ally, fueling its war machine, fortifying its eastern flank, and tilting Eurasia’s strategic balance in Russia’s favor.
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · June 23, 2025
3. Seoul's Lee and Tokyo's Ishiba off to a surprisingly warm start
This is really good news on two levels.
First, it is in the mutual interest of all three countries – JAROKUS (Japan, ROK, and US).
Second, it indicates that President Lee is not going to automatically reject the policies and strategic direction of the previous administration.
Will President Lee sustain the 8.15 Unification Doctrine.
Seoul's Lee and Tokyo's Ishiba off to a surprisingly warm start - Asia Times
The governments still voice support for trilateral cooperation with the US, but the real emphasis is on bilateral links
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · June 23, 2025
Attendees at a reception last week by the South Korean Embassy at Tokyo’s New Otani Hotel, held to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan, were pleasantly surprised when Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba showed up to deliver a warm address.
He was followed by former prime ministers Fumio Kishida and Yoshihide Suga and accompanied by a host of Japanese dignitaries.
The celebratory mood reflected the view in Japan following the meeting between newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Prime Minister Ishiba at the Group of Seven (G7) Summit. That meeting was marked by not only cordiality but also a clear mutual desire to tighten cooperation.
Unspoken, but implicit, was the shared interest that both leaders have in countering the growing chaos in global affairs, from trade wars to actual wars, and their growing sense that the South Korea-Japan partnership is an effective response to the advent of Donald Trump’s America-First regime.
“We have an inseparable relationship, like neighbors who share the same garden,” Lee said. “Even if we have small differences of opinion, I hope we can develop a relationship in which we cooperate and help each other in various areas.”
While the two governments continue to voice support for trilateral cooperation with the United States, it was evident that the real emphasis of their meeting was on bilateral links.
“With difficulties intensifying in terms of the international trade environment and international relations, South Korea and Japan can be of great help to one another when they cooperate in many areas in a relationship that is both close and complementary.” Lee reportedly said at the summit meeting.
Contrary to some expectations, Lee went out of his way to dispel the idea that he is bound to a hostile view toward Japan. He emphasized building a stable and respectful relationship as the two countries neared the sixtieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations on June 22.
Lee has by no means abandoned a critical view of Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula and the ongoing problems of apology and compensation for abuses, including sexual slavery and forced labor.
“We cannot dwell on the past,” Lee said in an interview with Time Magazine before the presidential election. “But Japan continues to deny its history and does not sincerely apologize, which hurts us Koreans.”
But Lee also called for separating those issues from the need for cooperation, particularly in dealing with common issues such as trade wars and challenges from China, Russia, and even North Korea.
This “two-track” approach is reminiscent of the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration from 2003 to 2008. President Roh proclaimed a commitment to a pragmatic handling of ties with Japan while retaining a critical view of Japan’s past.
Former Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo hinted he was cautiously optimistic about the new South Korean president’s initial approach.
“For the time being, it is true that the Lee Jae Myung government has shifted gear in handling the thorny bilateral ties with Tokyo drastically, given his past record of words and deeds that had been strongly anti-Japanese,” he told this writer in an email. “I hope that he and his administration will keep this path for a long time.”
The view in Japan
This mirrors the view in Japan, where cautious optimism is widely shared – particularly in official circles.
“Lee has made an amiable debut in Japanese eyes that contradicts prior expectations,” a veteran Japanese journalist for the liberal Asahi Shimbun, with deep experience in foreign affairs, told this writer. As he recounted, officials in the prime minister’s office told Japanese journalists that they were pleasantly surprised by Lee’s behavior during his first meeting with Ishiba, including the wide smile that Lee flashed in official photos.
“They took it a sign that the Korean general sentiment to Japan has improved so much as to let Lee feel safe performing diplomatically in public with a Japanese leader,” the Asahi journalist said. “There is a little bit of wishful assessment probably, but I sense that Lee’s slogan ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ started well.”
According to this analysis, what happened in Canada was assisted by Trump and his rather abrupt and rude departure from the summit. “In that sense, as a short-term effect, Trump’s arrogance resulted in bringing about a favorable mood between South Korea and Japan,” the Japanese diplomatic correspondent told this author.
‘Trump’s arrogance resulted in bringing about a favorable mood between South Korea and Japan.’
a japanese diplomatic correspondent
Along with the Trump effect, there is evidence of a growing convergence of public opinion in both countries, particularly due to the perception of shared external threat from China, North Korea, and Russia.
A recent joint poll by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun and South Korea’s Dong A Ilbo showed support for strengthening defense cooperation in both countries. Compared with a similar poll conducted at the time of the fiftieth anniversary, there was a clear upswing in positive views of each other, reflecting growing cultural, economic, and other ties – a product in part of the massive flow of tourists between the two countries and the impact of the popular Korean wave in Japan.
Still, South Korean and Japanese citizens remain far apart on certain issues. In the joint poll, respondents were asked about historical issues arising out of Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. In Japan, opinions were evenly split: 46% of respondents said the issues had been “resolved,” while the same percentage of respondents said they had “not been resolved.”
In contrast, only 17% of Koreans said the issues had been “resolved,” still up from 2% a decade ago, while 80% said they had “not been resolved,” a slight drop from 95% in the previous poll.
The Roh precedent
The Roh Moo-hyun presidency offers grounds for caution about the future course of the relationship.
Roh began his term with similar goals of separating history from future relations, while simultaneously insisting that Japan confront its past. But within a year, a series of issues sent the relationship spiraling into deep discord, including conflicts over the competing territorial claims, Japanese textbook revisions, and the Japanese prime minister’s continued visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.
Lee Jong-seok, who served as Roh’s national security advisor and has returned as head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) under Lee, recounted this spiral in his memoir.
“Throughout its tenure, the administration could not find a point of diplomatic balance with Japan over the history issue. Each time history became a topic, ROK-Japanese relations lurched,” Lee Jong-seok wrote. “We are still living in a time when all our citizens are victims of the Japanese empire.”
He added: “There was no room for future-oriented ROK policy toward Japan as long as Japan constantly tried to legitimize its history of aggression.”
That danger could easily resurface, argues Ambassador Shin, who remains an active player in 1.5-track diplomacy between the two countries.
“We should not forget that there lurk many diverse landmines ahead in our sensitive bilateral ties,” Shin told this writer. “President Lee should not repeat President Roh’s mistake that he vowed not to raise history issues at his inauguration, but made an about-face abruptly in his mid-term.”
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Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba also has work to do to avoid this outcome. This includes gestures and steps to reassure South Koreans that he is also ready to face the past. He could use the upcoming anniversaries, such as the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II, and strongly restate Japan’s apologies to urging Japanese companies to contribute to the South Korean fund to compensate wartime forced laborers.
For that, Ishiba must deal with his own domestic political challenges – a right-wing faction of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party that opposes such moves and his own weak minority government facing a crucial test in elections for the upper house of the National Diet in July.
“Ishiba has signaled an interest in a more constructive relationship with South Korea in the past, based on a more forthright reckoning with Imperial Japan’s conduct on the Korean peninsula,” observes Tobias Harris, founder of the political risk firm Japan Foresight. “But the LDP’s right wing still makes it difficult to be overly solicitous of South Korea without facing domestic resistance.”
Harris adds: “While a victory in the upper house elections will not make this resistance disappear, it may give him more space to express his own views – in remarks on the anniversary of the end of the war, for example. In general, other things being equal, if Ishiba can hold power instead of a more right-wing alternative, it’s positive for the bilateral relationship.”
Looking to the future
Ultimately, external events may shape whether relations deepen or fray. From North Korean belligerence to Trumpist isolationism and chaos, developments beyond South Korea and Japan are likely to continue driving the two neighbors closer together, whether they like it or not.
Daniel C. Sneider is a non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America and a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University.
This article was originally published by The Peninsula, the newsletter of the Korea Economic Institute of America. It is republished here with permission.
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · June 23, 2025
4. Lee's top security aide to attend NATO summit in Netherlands: presidential office
I think it is a strategic error not to attend mitigated somewhat by sending the NSA. BUt he could have made a powerful national security statement by attending and desomsintring that NATO is important and has relevance to South Korea.
I fear that he may be signaling that South Korea is stepping back from being a global pivotal state most likely as a political move to separate himself from the previous administration.
This raises the question of what will be the South’s foreign policy position. Will it also step back from all the good work it was doing as a partner in the arsenal of democracies? Will the South step back from defending the rules based international order and support to a free and open Indo-Pacific?
The South has been cultivating a positive relationship with NATO. Is this a rejection of the South Korean relationship with NATO. Many NATO nations are also member states of the United Nations Command. Does this portend a negative view of the UNC and the unique role it could play in the defense of Korea should hostilities resume?
This single act can create strategic uncertainty which can undermine Korean relationships and ultimately harm its security.
- Foreign Affairs
Lee's top security aide to attend NATO summit in Netherlands: presidential office
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250623/lee-jae-myungs-top-security-aide-to-attend-nato-summit-in-netherlands-presidential-office
By Yonhap
Published Jun 23, 2025 5:04 pm KST
Updated Jun 23, 2025 5:18 pm KST
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National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, the top security aide of President Lee Jae Myung, will attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit to be held in the Netherlands this week, the presidential office said Monday.
Wi will attend the NATO summit slated for Tuesday and Wednesday in The Hague on behalf of Lee, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said in a written briefing, without elaborating on his detailed schedule.
Lee decided not to attend the NATO summit due to domestic priorities and the uncertainties in the Middle East following the United States' strikes on three nuclear sites in Iran.
Lee was invited to the NATO summit alongside the leaders of Japan, Australia and New Zealand — collectively known as the Indo-Pacific Four. However, three of the four leaders -- excluding New Zealand's prime minister — opted not to attend the summit amid rising tensions between Israel and Iran.
Lee had initially considered participating, hoping to hold his first in-person meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump to discuss trade tariffs and alliance issues, but he decided to forgo the trip at the last minute.
At this year's summit, NATO members are expected to agree to raise their defense spending targets to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in response to demands from Trump.
While Korea is not a NATO member, there has been increasing pressure from Washington for Asian allies to join Europe in raising the defense spending threshold to 5 percent, as part of broader efforts to counter China's growing influence.
Korea's defense spending stood at 61.2 trillion won ($44.6 billion) for this year, accounting for 2.32 percent of its GDP.
Raising it to meet the 5 percent threshold would require Korea to more than double its defense spending to around 132 trillion won.
5. Lee Jae Myung's ‘pragmatic' diplomacy comes into focus
Some troubling signs.
Will Korea remain a global pivotal state?
Will it be influenced by China? And does President Lee understand China Unrestricted Warfare and Three Warfares?
Is Korea going to drop out of the arsenal of democracy?
Lee Jae Myung's ‘pragmatic' diplomacy comes into focus
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · June 23, 2025
Conservatives accuse Lee of neglecting national interests, while experts note possible consideration of China ties and missed arms export opportunities
President Lee Jae Myung (right) speaks with reporters on June 16 while boarding the Air Force One, while en route to Canada to attend the Group of Seven summit. (Yonhap)
President Lee Jae Myung's decision not to attend the NATO summit in the Netherlands has brought his “pragmatic” foreign policy approach into renewed focus, while triggering attacks from conservatives.
Lee had considered participating in the NATO summit but decided not to, his office said Sunday, in the face of "various domestic issues and uncertainties due to developments in the Middle East."
Following the announcement by Lee's office, NATO revealed that a meeting between the NATO Secretary General, US President Donald Trump and the leaders of NATO partners in the Indo-Pacific region is set to take place at 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday in The Hague. Lee's office has declined to comment on whether Lee was aware of the event before his decision not to fly to the Netherlands.
Skipping the NATO trip deprives Lee of a chance to sit down for talks with Trump, as well as with leaders of European countries that South Korea sees as partners in the defense industry and regional security, prompting criticism from the conservative main opposition People Power Party.
"We are facing a serious diplomatic test due to the US precision strike on Iran's nuclear sites, the heightened tensions in the Middle East, and President Lee's decision not to attend the NATO summit," said Rep. Kim Seok-ki, a lawmaker with the People Power Party on Monday.
"We express deep concern that the ruling bloc's response is 'pragmatic diplomacy' in name only. ... They are not fulfilling their responsibility for our national interests."
Rep. Kim Eun-hye of the People Power Party also told reporters that the decision taken soon after the power transition to the liberals "will likely raise concerns among NATO member states" that South Korea might be a weak link in the Western bloc, and that Seoul might be factoring in the perceptions of "totalitarian states."
One expert suggested that Lee may have considered South Korea’s ties with China in his decision, while also noting his interest in confidence-building with North Korea — though signs of reengagement remain limited, aside from his move to halt propaganda loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border.
"President Lee decided not to attend given that the focus of Trump’s attention is on Iran and allied defense spending, rather than on a tariff deal with Seoul, and perhaps also out of concern that a strongly worded joint statement could offend China," said Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
"Seoul will be on alert for how conflict in the Middle East reverberates in Asia," Easley added.
While most observers will understand that Lee has pressing domestic priorities, including staffing his new administration, Easley said, "not attending the NATO summit isn’t only a missed opportunity to help defend the international order by supporting Ukraine and coordinating responses to conflict in the Middle East."
Another expert called Lee's decision not to attend the NATO summit a "mistake" because his presence there could have convinced Seoul's Western partners that he values Europe and understands the connection between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions.
"This is diplomatic low-hanging fruit that Lee is not grabbing," said Mason Richey, professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
"It's also a chance to further cement South Korea's role as an arms exporter to Europe, and perhaps make some connection with European leaders of states who could become future South Korean weapons customers," he added.
consnow@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · June 23, 2025
6. Trump struck Iran — but North Korea is a different story
How much deeper can north Korea get in China-Russia's orbits? It is a proton or neutron already and not simply an election.
Trump struck Iran — but North Korea is a different story
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 23, 2025
Iran strike hardens Kim Jong-un’s nuclear resolve, pushes Pyongyang deeper into China-Russia orbit, say experts
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un watches a firing contest among artillery subunits of large combined units of the Korean People's Army at an unspecified location on May 29, 2025, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (Yonhap)
US President Donald Trump’s decision to authorize airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities has been widely seen as reinforcing North Korea’s long-held belief: That nuclear weapons are essential for regime survival.
The strikes are likely to have furhter dimmed the prospects for nuclear dialogue with Washington and accelerate Pyongyang’s push for deeper military cooperation with Russia.
Still, analysts in Seoul stressed that North Korea’s case is fundamentally different from Iran’s.
Not only does Pyongyang already possess nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems, it also maintains a distinct rationale and motivation for nuclear armament — unlike Tehran, whose program is framed around deterrence and national pride, Pyongyang’s is centered on the survival of the Kim regime.
One of the most significant differences, observers noted, is that the likelihood of Trump ordering a similar strike on North Korean nuclear facilities is considered extremely low.
A key reason lies in North Korea’s counterstrike capabilities: intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US mainland and massed artillery aimed at densely populated areas of Seoul.
Joung Kyeong-woon, a senior research fellow at the Seoul Defense Forum, pointed out that densely populated areas — including the Seoul metropolitan area and the city of Goyang — are well within range of North Korean artillery.
“The primary reason North Korea cannot be attacked lies in the fact that we are essentially held hostage by its artillery — far more easily usable than nuclear weapons,” Joung told The Korea Herald. "This reality was confirmed when South Korea opposed, and then-US President Clinton ultimately abandoned, the idea of a surgical strike."
Then-President Kim Young-sam opposed the US plans to strike the Yongbyon nuclear facility during the 1994 nuclear crisis under the Clinton administration.
North Korea can launch immediate strikes on the densely populated South Korean capital and its surrounding areas using artillery systems such as 170mm self-propelled guns and 240mm multiple rocket launchers. North Korea also possesses missiles mainly designed to target South Korean territory, including nuclear-capable solid-fuel short-range missiles like the KN-23.
“Since then, North Korea has secured layered deterrence through its possession of various medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, in addition to nuclear weapons,” Joung said.
A firing contest among artillery subunits of large combined units of the Korean People's Army, inspected by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, is conducted at an unspecified location on May 29, 2025, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (Yonhap)
Joung further explained that North Korea’s deeply fortified underground nuclear facilities are nearly impossible to neutralize.
“North Korea’s key nuclear and missile facilities are located hundreds of meters underground, beneath solid bedrock in the mountainous regions of the country’s northwest," Joung said. “There are no existing weapons capable of directly destroying them — not even tactical nuclear weapons.”
Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, pointed out that “North Korea’s possession of a nuclear arsenal of 40 to 50 operational warheads, along with its retaliatory capabilities, are the biggest constraint on a US airstrike."
In April 2025, Gen. Xavier Bruson, the commander of US Forces Korea, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the “DPRK’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and formidable missile force (ballistic and cruise) pose a threat to the US homeland, US forces in the Indo-Pacific, and allied nations." The DPRK is an abbreviation of North Korea's official name.
Pyongyang has also formalized a preemptive, or first-use nuclear policy in accordance with the law on North Korea’s policy on nuclear forces, promulgated in September 2022.
“This marks a shift from its previous stance of using nuclear weapons solely for defensive purposes, allowing their use also for repelling or retaliating against an enemy’s invasion or signs of an impending attack,” Lim said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (right) meets with Russia's Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Pyongyang on June 4, 2025, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. The two sides discussed cooperation in various fields and exchanged views on the situation surrounding the Ukrainian crisis and the Korean Peninsula. (Yonhap)
The roles of Russia and China also set North Korea apart from Iran.
“Unlike the case of Iran, Russia is obligated to intervene automatically under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between North Korea and Russia," Lim said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which stipulates a mutual defense obligation, in June 2024, during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang.
“China is likely to view a US airstrike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities as a direct threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula and to security along the China–North Korea border," Lim added.
Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, pointed out that “China and Russia are better positioned to help Pyongyang than Tehran.”
“The North Korean case is very different," Easley said.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on June 14, 2025, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (left) inspecting a munitions factory the previous day to review the state of the production of artillery shells in the first half of the year. (Yonhap)
Experts in Seoul said that the US strike on Iran's nuclear facilities is likely to have implications for North Korea — reinforcing Pyongyang’s nuclear posture, deepening its distrust of Washington, and reshaping its approach to diplomacy and strategic alignment.
Kim Dong-yub, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, pointed out that what matters to South Korea is “the impact on the Korean Peninsula and how North Korea perceives the situation."
“North Korea is likely thinking that its choice was the right one following the US bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities. It will further solidify its belief that ‘possessing nuclear weapons is the only means of survival’ and will continue to maximize the legitimacy of its nuclear possession,” Kim said.
“Beyond the economic shock, the incident is also likely to lead to a fundamental shift in the strategic environment, triggering widespread security instability on the Korean Peninsula,” Kim added.
Lim underscored that Trump’s decision to strike the Iranian nuclear facilities “has a significant impact on North Korea’s foreign policy.”
“North Korea will reinforce the legitimacy of its existing policy that prioritizes regime survival and nuclear weapons development, and expand military cooperation rooted in anti-Western solidarity — particularly with Russia and China,” Lim said.
“It will also shift further toward deepening skepticism of inter-Korean dialogue and negotiations with the US.”
The US military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities will further deepen North Korea’s distrust of the US — already hardened by Washington’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, or JCPOA, in 2018 and the breakdown of the 2019 North Korea–US summit in Hanoi during the first Trump administration.
“North Korea is expected to further accelerate the strengthening of its nuclear and missile preemptive strike capabilities,” Lim underscored.
dagyumji@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 23, 2025
7. Who is Lee Jong-seok, Seoul's new spy chief?
Important background.
Does his north Korea experience mean he understands the nature, objectives,and strategy of the Kim family regime? Or has he been co-opted by the regime?
Excerpt:
Lee has been a scholar of North Korea for over 30 years. His main area of concentration was the Workers' Party of Korea.
...
According to the record he submitted to the National Assembly, Lee had been to North Korea at least 13 times.
Who is Lee Jong-seok, Seoul's new spy chief?
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 23, 2025
Lee Jong-seok (right), then-nominee for the National Intelligence Service director, shakes hands with Rep. Shin Sung-bum, chair of the parliamentary intelligence committee, at the June 19 confirmation hearing. Lee Sang-sub/The Korea Herald
Lee Jong-seok, the new director of the National Intelligence Service, is a North Korea strategist and scholar who played key roles during the era of inter-Korean rapprochement in the early 2000s.
Taking his oath at the start of his confirmation hearing on June 19, Lee picked "building a peaceful and safe South Korea, founded on two pillars of cooperation and a strong military," as one of his priorities as the head of the country's top spy agency.
Lee said he saw it as his job to support the success of a "national interest-based, pragmatic diplomacy" -- the phrase that has come to define the new administration's foreign policy vision.
Speaking to The Korea Herald after his confirmation hearing, Lee said, "reducing inter-Korean tensions and restoring dialogue with North Korea" is the "demand of the people."
Lee was the unification minister and deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council under another liberal president, the late Roh Moo-hyun.
Rapprochement era minister of unification
Lee was a key national strategist in the Roh administration. He was appointed Roh's minister of unification in February 2006 to oversee inter-Korean affairs, only to resign in December that same year in the aftermath of North Korea's first nuclear test.
At the confirmation hearing, Lee was grilled over whether he thinks the broad economic assistance to North Korea, given over two liberal administrations under presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung, had been helpful to the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
Lee said he believes economic aid to North Korea "had helped thaw strained ties," which was met by protests from the opposition lawmakers who said that it had only funded Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.
Lifetime North Korea scholar
Lee has been a scholar of North Korea for over 30 years. His main area of concentration was the Workers' Party of Korea.
When Lee was not in public office, he served as a policy adviser to the unification and national defense ministries. He also worked at top research institutions in the country, including the Sejong Institute, where he stood as an emeritus senior fellow up until his appointment. He was a visiting professor at Beijing University in 2017-18.
At the confirmation hearing, Lee denied accusations of being a "North Korea dove."
Calling himself a "pragmatist," Lee said he did not subscribe to any particular schools of thought or associate with particular factions when it comes to North Korea. "I have followed the principle of pragmatism throughout my professional life," he said.
Lee's past public remarks from years back came under scrutiny at the confirmation hearing, including his referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as "someone who has the qualities of both a CEO and an absolute ruler," speaking at the Jeju Forum in June 2021.
When asked by an opposition lawmaker if he considered the North Korean leader to be a dictator, Lee replied, "He is a dictator."
Lee was also asked to elaborate on his opposition to the introduction of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system for defending against North Korean missiles, or the signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, the information sharing pact with Japan.
Lee said extra THAAD deployments required a "careful consideration of factors such as South Korea's national interests and the South Korea-US joint defense posture."
As for GSOMIA, Lee said that as the scheme is "already agreed upon and in place, it should be complied with."
13 trips to North Korea
According to the record he submitted to the National Assembly, Lee had been to North Korea at least 13 times.
His first visit to Pyongyang was in June 2000 for the inter-Korean summit. In 2006, he visited North Korea five times during his time as unification minister, for a ministerial summit and other business, including two site visits to the joint industrial park in Kaesong. His last trip to North Korea was in December 2018 for a ceremony marking the start of the construction of coastal railways connecting the North and South.
Six former spy chiefs of South Korea had visited North Korea while they were in office, the latest one being Suh Hoon. Suh, who was the NIS director for former President Moon Jae-in, was part of the Seoul delegation for the 2018 inter-Korean summit.
Long history with president
President Lee Jae Myung and his new spy chief go back a long way.
The two are believed to have first met around 2010 when the president had just been elected mayor of Seongnam. The NIS director worked for the president at his Seongnam mayoral office as well as his Gyeonggi Province gubernatorial office.
The NIS director was part of the president's 2022 and 2025 campaigns.
arin@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 23, 2025
8. How South Korea Became a Cultural Powerhouse, and What’s Next
As an aside, here in Mongolia I met a group of Korean students in the hotel. They were here on a university trip doing volunteer work. I asked what kind of work they were doing and one of them explained that he is a K-beauty consultant and was here to share K-beauty techniques with Mongolian women.
How South Korea Became a Cultural Powerhouse, and What’s Next
With BTS poised to reunite, “Squid Game” returning and a Broadway show winning awards, the Korean cultural wave keeps on rolling.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/asia/south-korea-kpop-culture.html
Listen to this article · 7:55 min Learn more
A fan event in Brooklyn on Friday to publicize the third season of “Squid Game.”Credit...Jason Mendez/Getty Images for Netflix
By Jin Yu Young
Reporting from Seoul
June 21, 2025
A Tony Award-winning play on Broadway. The finale of a record-breaking Netflix show. And a reunion of arguably the world’s biggest pop band.
South Korean culture is having a moment. Again.
“Maybe Happy Ending” clinching the best musical Tony this month added a new art form to South Korea’s growing list of international cultural successes. It followed “Parasite,” which in 2020 was the first foreign-language film to win an Oscar for best picture, and Han Kang, who won last year’s Nobel Prize in Literature.
On the K-pop front, the last member of BTS has completed his mandatory national service, stirring the hopes of fans worldwide about a reunion. And Blackpink will start a global tour next month with a gig near Seoul.
Next week, the third season of “Squid Game” will arrive on Netflix, the final installment of a show whose first season set viewership records.
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“Maybe Happy Ending” won the award for best musical this month at the 78th Tony Awards.Credit...Sara Krulwich/The New York Times
But the so-called Korean Wave shows no signs of subsiding. Global interest in seeking out all things Korean, from cosmetics to food, is surging.
How did K-culture become so popular?
Experts say the nation’s cultural wave, known as “Hallyu” in Korean, began in the late 1990s, when South Korean soaps started gaining popularity in China and Japan. The rise of the internet spread these exports further.
In 2012, Psy’s horseback dance moves and rap melody made “Gangnam Style” the first video on YouTube to surpass one billion views. The breakout hit brought global attention to K-pop. But it was BTS — a group of seven handsome young men who rap, dance and sing (all at the same time) — that took K-pop into the global mainstream. During the pandemic, BTS broke several Guinness World Records for streams and views of their tracks “Dynamite” and “Butter.”
Editors’ Picks
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Psy spoke with The New York Times in 2022 in Seoul about the 10th anniversary of “Gangnam Style.” Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
Well before K-dramas lit up screens in homes across the world, South Korean restrictions on Hollywood film screenings in the country strengthened domestic filmmaking. The Busan Film Festival, which started in 1996, grew to become one of the most prominent in Asia. In 2004, the director Park Chan-wook won a Cannes Grand Prix for “Oldboy,” a violent revenge thriller.
Another surge in global interest came with “Squid Game,” which debuted in 2021 and kicked off so much discussion worldwide that it created a “cultural zeitgeist,” said Minyoung Kim, Netflix’s vice president of content in Asia. It remains the platform’s biggest show.
Is Korea becoming a cultural superpower?
Many experts believe that K-culture is ensconced in the global mainstream. But some say there is still far to go before the country’s cultural might reaches the international influence of countries like the United States, France, Italy and Japan that are globally known for things like food, fashion and cinema.
There are geopolitical hurdles, too. After a dispute over the deployment of a missile system in South Korea, China placed an unofficial ban on K-pop performances in 2016. And in North Korea, music and shows from the South, and even slang they have popularized, are banned because its leader, Kim Jong-un, sees them as a threat to his regime.
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A K-pop class at Danceworks Studio in London’s Mayfair neighborhood in 2021.Credit...Andrew Testa for The New York Times
The Korean exports have only a sliver of the global market for their respective categories, and experts say it is still too early to tell if K-culture has already peaked or will have lasting power.
While K-pop is extremely popular, it has yet to influence other music genres, said Prof. Andrew Eungi Kim, who studies culture at the International Studies Department at Korea University.
But the popularity of K-pop and K-drama can spark interest in other aspects of South Korean culture, said Cha Woo-jin, a music critic in Seoul. People want to taste the food the stars eat, wear the makeup they use and even learn the language they speak.
“People used to think of Hallyu as entertainment,” Mr. Cha said. “But now, it’s a lifestyle.”
Is K-beauty the next frontier?
South Korean celebrities are envied for their flawless skin. Overseas consumers, especially younger ones, are eager to copy their skin care routines, which can be rigorous.
Korean cosmetic exports soared nearly 21 percent to a record $10.2 billion in 2024, according to government data. They topped French cosmetic exports to the United States last year. South Korea is now ranked as the third-largest exporter of makeup after those two countries.
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The TirTir makeup brand went viral on TikTok.Credit...Kim Soo-Hyeon/Reuters
Lyla Kim, who works for TirTir, a Seoul-based makeup brand, said its sales nearly doubled to about $300 million last year after its cushion foundation went viral on TikTok.
What about K-food?
Viral videos of kimbap — seaweed-wrapped rice rolls stuffed with meat, fish or vegetables — have caused American grocery store shelves to be cleared out. Samyang Foods, the maker of the superspicy Buldak instant noodles, has said its exports have quadrupled in recent years. Overall exports of Korean agricultural food products reached a record $2.48 billion in the first quarter, up nearly 10 percent from last year, according to government data.
Korean food also got a plug from the Netflix show “Culinary Class Wars,” which was released in September. It pitted 80 underdog, or “black spoon,” chefs against 20 renowned chefs.
And it may be only a matter of time before the world comes to view a Korean dish like bibimbap, a medley of rice, vegetables, meat and fermented chili paste, as being as universal as pizza, pasta or sushi, said Choi Jung-Yoon, who has been a chef in South Korea, Spain and Australia and heads Nanro, a food research nonprofit.
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The Korean section at Food Bazaar on Northern Boulevard in Queens.Credit...An Rong Xu for The New York Times
“K-pop and K-dramas may have led to the interest of South Korean food, but it’s K-food that will carry Korea’s cultural legacy into the future,” Ms. Choi said.
How has the K-wave changed South Korea?
As interest in South Korea grows, the number of tourists, foreign residents and exchange students in the country has steadily increased over the past four years, according to government figures. Some arrivals say they were inspired by the life that its dramas and popular culture icons depicted on social media.
Onjira Mahitthafongkul, who grew up in Bangkok, first visited South Korea after finishing high school, when Big Bang was her favorite pop group. She has lived in Seoul, the nation’s capital, for five years, getting her master’s degree at Yonsei University and working in marketing. The nation’s “rich food scene” and “convenient lifestyle” drew her to stay in the country, she said. Its lively drinking culture helped her make friends.
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The landmark Namsan Seoul Tower illuminated in purple to celebrate the 10th anniversary of BTS in 2023.Credit...Jung Yeon-Je/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Still, she said, “there is always some level of discrimination as a foreigner, and I’ve come to accept that.”
Government surveys show that many immigrants have experienced some form of discrimination.
“South Korean society has been pretty strict in that you need to look or act a certain way to be accepted,” said Mr. Cha, the music critic. But as it draws more visitors, he said it is only a matter of time before the nation becomes more accepting.
Jin Yu Young reports on South Korea, the Asia Pacific region and global breaking news from Seoul.
9. U.S. Iran strike raises concerns in Korea
Hmmmm..."the normative foundation of the international order??? Are north Korea and Iran examples of such a normative foundation?
Excerpts:
U.S. foreign policy and its lack of predictability now looks dangerous for South Korea—and that’s without considering the second and third-order effects.
The greatest concern for South Korea is the strike’s immediate impact on the normative foundation of international order. With this act, the United States—long the self-declared steward of global rules—formally abandoned any pretense of playing by them. This was not preemption. It was not protection. It was not even politics cloaked in legality. It was raw, unmediated power.
Commentary
U.S. Iran strike raises concerns in Korea
https://www.junotane.com/p/us-iran-strike-raises-concerns-in-korea?utm
The days of assuming strategic alignment and democratic solidarity are over. What remains is risk calculation. America is now a variable, not a constant.
Jun 23, 2025
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So, the U.S. joined Israel with strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. There was no Security Council resolution, no ultimatum, no final warning. There were no reports of an imminent and immediate Iranian threat, no visual evidence of noncompliance with international agreements. In fact, Iran had continued to abide by the core obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and remained under partial inspection by the IAEA.
There were a few bizarre Trump tweets conflating Israel with the US; implied threats on the location of the Iranian leader; and an ambiguous presser with Trump saying “we’ll see” and something equally blase about how Iran had “two weeks”.
U.S. foreign policy and its lack of predictability now looks dangerous for South Korea—and that’s without considering the second and third-order effects.
The greatest concern for South Korea is the strike’s immediate impact on the normative foundation of international order. With this act, the United States—long the self-declared steward of global rules—formally abandoned any pretense of playing by them. This was not preemption. It was not protection. It was not even politics cloaked in legality. It was raw, unmediated power.
For decades, the liberal international order has functioned not simply as a web of treaties or institutions, but as a system of expectations: that powerful countries would constrain their behavior with reference to international norms, and that weaker states could navigate global affairs with some assurance that outcomes were not determined purely by might.
The U.S. strike on Iran demolishes that premise. It was not just highly questionable under international law; it was casually so, undertaken with no clear justification beyond “we can.”
There was no moral rationale on offer, not even the strained logic of humanitarian intervention or helping Iranians to choose their own leader. The justification offered was incredibly opaque and illogically strategic—centering vaguely on deterrence and the elimination of potential threats. But Iran had not attacked, and even by Washington’s own standards, had not crossed any red lines. There was no triggering event, no escalation, no provocation except Iran’s refusal to renegotiate under threat! The up to “two weeks” Trump spoke of passed in eerie silence—and lasted three days!
This was a move not designed to punish illegal behavior, but to punish defiance. The U.S. struck because Iran refused to play ball. That the sites hit were non-operational or undergoing inspection is, in this light, irrelevant. The purpose was never arms control. It was to remind the world who rules - but misses the fact that the U.S. will now be occupied in the Middle East and neglect Asia.
For U.S. allies, the implications are staggering. Not because they fear the same fate, but because the underlying principle of strategic reliability has evaporated. In theory, the U.S.-led order provided predictability, balance, and a shared sense of direction. But today, the United States acts on impulse, not deliberation. It issues threats in vague terms, waits a few days, and then acts without consulting even its closest partners.
Nowhere is this more consequential than in South Korea. For decades, Seoul has built its security architecture around the assumption of American reliability. The U.S.-ROK alliance has rested not just on shared interests but on shared rules and habits of coordination. But what happens when that predictability disappears?
South Korea must now contend with the possibility that alliance politics are being conducted on a whim. Trump’s strike on Iran was not preceded by coalition-building or burden-sharing. It was a decision made in isolation, reflecting domestic political incentives more than any calculable security logic.
For South Korea, this introduces a dangerous uncertainty in any North Korea crisis.
If North Korea escalates tensions, will Washington respond proportionately—or will it react impulsively, using South Korean territory or bases without adequate consultation?
Worse, would a provocation elsewhere suddenly draw U.S. resources away from the Korean Peninsula? This erosion of reliability is not abstract. It forces a recalibration. If the United States cannot be counted on to act rationally, legally, or transparently, then it ceases to be a dependable strategic partner.
South Korea, already balancing its relations with China, may now be pushed further into the logic of hedging—not out of preference, but necessity. A partner that ignores international law, acts unilaterally, and behaves with escalating unpredictability is not simply burdensome—it is dangerous.
The U.S. decision to strike Iran without warning, justification, or legal grounding also invites global instability. It sets a precedent that powerful states can act without constraint, that legal compliance offers no shield, and that diplomacy is subordinate to force.
Worst of all for every smaller state, the strike empowers actors—Russia, China, India—to model their behavior on this new norm: strike first, explain later, if at all.
There is no liberal international order now. There is only a loose framework of still-functioning institutions slowly being hollowed out from the top down. The U.N. was not consulted. NATO was not convened. The IAEA was not referenced. Instead, the U.S. acted like an empire, not a republic.
It may take years before historians agree on when the liberal order truly ended. Some may point to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Others may cite Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Accord or the U.N. Human Rights Council. But the June 2025 attack on Iran will stand as the moment the U.S. dropped even the language of legality, morality, or multilateralism. It did not just violate the rules. It declared them irrelevant.
And for allies like South Korea, that declaration is not only sobering—it is clarifying. The days of assuming strategic alignment and democratic solidarity are over. What remains is risk calculation. America is now a variable, not a constant. Less reward, more risk. Welcome to the post-order world South Korea.
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10. U.S. bombing of Iran might convince North Korea it was right to build nukes
So is Kim saying, "See, I told you so?"
Monday
June 23, 2025
dictionary + A - A
U.S. bombing of Iran might convince North Korea it was right to build nukes
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-06-23/national/northKorea/US-bombing-of-Iran-might-convince-North-Korea-it-was-right-to-build-nukes-/2335870
Published: 23 Jun. 2025, 17:31
- SEO JI-EUN
- seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr
Korea JoongAng Daily
U.S. bombing of Iran might convince North Korea it was right to build nukes
8 min
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
U.S. President Donald Trump, left, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un cross into the South after greeting each other at the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. [YONHAP]
[NEWS ANALYSIS]
When the United States bombed deep into Iran’s nuclear heartland, it was a show of force aimed at halting Iran’s nuclear trajectory for Washington. But for Pyongyang, it was a flashing red light.
The U.S. military on early Sunday launched precision strikes on three of Iran’s most fortified underground nuclear facilities — Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan — in what President Donald Trump hailed as a "spectacular military success."
North Korea was quick to respond.
On Monday, it issued a rare Foreign Ministry statement condemning the U.S. strike as a “grave violation” of international law, while carefully avoiding any direct provocation — a measured response analysts say reflects Pyongyang’s desire to avoid being seen as the next target.
Yet, rather than serving as a deterrence message for Pyongyang, experts say that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, long convinced that nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy for regime survival, likely interprets the U.S. strike on Iran as further justification for accelerating its nuclear and missiles weapons program and deepening military ties with Russia and China.
Despite structural parallels, a similar strike on North Korea is seen as far less likely. Experts point to Pyongyang's possession of dozens of nuclear warheads, codified first-use doctrine and the immediate threat of devastating retaliation on Seoul and U.S. bases as key deterrents to any U.S. military action.
A satellite view shows an overview of Fordow underground complex, after the United States struck the underground nuclear facility, near Qom, Iran, on June 22. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
A message and a threat
North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesperson called the U.S. attack a "grave violation" of the UN Charter and international law and accused Washington of endangering global stability in a statement published Monday.
The statement criticized Israel and the West, blaming the Middle East crisis on Israel’s "military arrogance" and what it called the West’s enabling of Tel Aviv’s unilateral ambitions.
Given that Pyongyang released the condemnation in a Q&A format with a ministry spokesperson rather than a higher-level official or central party organ, analysts say it reflects a deliberate lowering of rhetorical intensity.
"By delivering its response through a mid-level spokesperson, North Korea is distancing itself from direct linkage to the Iran situation," said Yang Moo-jin, president at the University of North Korean Studies. "This is also a way to deflect the narrative of ‘Iran today, North Korea tomorrow’ and to push back against comparisons between the two."
North Korea’s ruling elite has long emphasized nuclear weapons as its ultimate guarantee against foreign intervention.
With an estimated arsenal of 40 to 50 nuclear warheads and multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States, Pyongyang already has the means to inflict devastating retaliation — not only against South Korea and U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam, but potentially even against the U.S. mainland. But the Iran strike still serves as a sharp reminder of U.S. capabilities, especially against underground facilities like those in North Korea.
From Pyongyang’s perspective, the Iran operation may be interpreted as reinforcing the belief that the only reason the United States was willing to carry out pre-emptive strikes on hardened sites in Iran was because Tehran possessed no nuclear weapons.
Analysts say Kim’s regime will likely respond by doubling down on its deterrent posture.
Lim Eul-chul, professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, says that North Korea’s foreign policy — centered on regime survival through nuclear armament — will be “fundamentally reinforced” by the Iran strike.
“The strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is likely to catalyze changes in North Korea’s external policy, particularly by accelerating and deepening military cooperation with Russia," Lim said.
For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin has already signaled expanded defense cooperation with North Korea, including technology and equipment transfers. In practical terms, this could mean North Korea incorporating more Russian defenses — like antiaircraft systems or electronic warfare — and training alongside Russian units.
North Korea recently deployed thousands of troops to Russia for the Ukraine war and reportedly supplied Moscow with artillery and missiles.
Those battlefield exchanges have likely given Kim’s generals new insights — and concerns — about aerial and missile warfare. Seeing how Israel’s advanced F-35 jets and drones overcame Iran’s air defenses, Pyongyang may push even harder to improve its own antiaircraft and missile shield, possibly with Russian assistance.
U.S. President Donald Trump, center, speaks from the East Room of the White House in Washington on June 21, after the U.S. military struck three Iranian nuclear and military sites, directly joining Israel's effort to decapitate the country's nuclear program, as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth listen. [AP/YONHAP]
Why striking North Korea isn’t like Iran
North Korea prides itself on having achieved what Iran has not: a deliverable nuclear arsenal.
Pyongyang, in its last underground nuclear test in 2017, succeeded in miniaturizing warheads, and its ICBMs could put the U.S. mainland in reach. In theory, this should have cemented its status as untouchable by American strikes.
Experts caution that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons also make it a far more lethal target than Iran was.
Former Pentagon official Michael Green notes in a commentary that in Kim’s case, “Pyongyang already had an extensive arsenal of [ …] artillery tubes and missile launchers pointed at Seoul” before it even developed nukes. In other words, attacking North Korea — even just its nukes — risks instant, massive retaliation.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un observes a joint strike drill involving long-range artillery and missile systems on May 8, in a photo released by the state media Korean Central News Agency the following day. [YONHAP]
North Korea’s nuclear-warhead-equipped missiles provide a “powerful nuclear strike capability” that Kim himself has called the “most perfect deterrence.” Even its constitution now proclaims it a nuclear-armed state.
And since September 2022, Pyongyang codified a nuclear law that authorizes pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes under broad conditions. Unlike Iran — which is a non-nuclear state — North Korea legally permits nuclear use even against conventional military attacks, meaning that any U.S. strike could immediately trigger a North Korean first-use response under its doctrine.
North Korea’s key sites, like the Yongbyon reactor and Kangson enrichment facility, are deeply buried and widely dispersed.
Military experts believe even massive bunker-busting bombs might not entirely eliminate them. A strike could degrade but likely not destroy the program, possibly provoking an all-out nuclear or chemical counterattack if Kim feels cornered.
Given these factors, analysts agree that a unilateral U.S. strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities would be far riskier than the Iran operation.
It would likely require full coordination with Seoul; acting alone could shatter the South Korea-U.S. alliance and trigger domestic backlash.
South Korea’s capital, Seoul, sits only up to 50 kilometers from the heavily fortified demilitarized zone (DMZ) and is within range of thousands of North Korean artillery tubes and shorter-range missiles. In a worst-case scenario, Kim’s forces might retaliate with conventional barrages or even chemical weapons on South Korean cities.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, meets with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu on June 17. According to state media, the two confirmed areas of cooperation under their treaty framework. [YONHAP]
Moreover, unlike Iran, North Korea’s security ties with Russia and China could draw them directly into any conflict.
Russian intervention — as guarantor in their June 2024 mutual defense treaty — or Chinese intervention — as Kim’s top ally — could quickly escalate a regional strike into a global crisis.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, second row, fifth from left, poses with G7 and invited leaders for a group photo at the G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, on June 17. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
A diplomatic balancing act for Seoul
Amid this volatile situation, Seoul is walking a diplomatic tightrope.
President Lee Jae Myung scrapped plans to attend the NATO summit in The Hague this week, citing pressing domestic issues and the “uncertainties stemming from the situation in the Middle East” after the Iranian strikes. Instead, his government will send a lower-level delegation and brief NATO partners privately on North Korea’s latest moves, such as its troop dispatch to Russia.
The Lee administration has underscored a two-track strategy: deterrence through the U.S. alliance, while keeping diplomatic channels open to Pyongyang.
In his inauguration speech, Lee pledged to pursue dialogue with the North “from a position of strength,” and officials have floated reviving U.S.-led multilateral talks as conditions allow.
At the same time, Seoul is reinforcing its military preparedness in lockstep with Washington.
For example, U.S. pressure for higher defense spending is nothing new — Trump recently urged Asian allies to aim to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense — and Lee will have to balance those demands while safeguarding South Korea’s interests.
On the diplomatic front, Seoul has stressed that the Iran strike underscores the global stakes of nuclear proliferation.
Lee’s office announced that officials will use forums like NATO to highlight that Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions now have ripple effects far beyond Northeast Asia.
Seoul also recognizes that Washington’s extended deterrence may not be permanent.
Recent U.S. signals — from troop withdrawal hints to blunt negotiations on alliance costs — leave South Korea eager to diversify its security options. Economic levers, intelligence-sharing with allies, and regional partnerships will all be part of Seoul’s hedging strategy.
"The rapidly changing international environment triggered by the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has exposed the limitations of conventional, routine diplomatic approaches," Lim said. "To manage security on the Korean Peninsula and broader global crises, we need a bold and creative diplomatic strategy of a different caliber."
BY SEO JI-EUN [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]
11. Lee's decision to skip NATO summit sparks concerns over lost opportunity to meet Trump
Perhaps he does not wnat to meet him yet?
Monday
June 23, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Lee's decision to skip NATO summit sparks concerns over lost opportunity to meet Trump
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-06-23/national/diplomacy/Lees-decision-to-skip-NATO-summit-sparks-concerns-over-lost-opportunity-to-meet-Trump/2336401
Published: 23 Jun. 2025, 16:59
Updated: 23 Jun. 2025, 17:40
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during his first senior secretaries and aides meeting at the presidential office in Yongsan District, central Seoul, on June 23. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
President Lee Jae Myung's decision made Sunday to skip the upcoming NATO summit — announced just two days before the event — has raised concerns that Korea may forgo its first opportunity for a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Those worries heighten after reports that Trump plans to convene leaders from the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) — South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand — on the sidelines of the event.
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Trump abruptly left the Group of 7 (G7) summit in Canada on June 17, citing turmoil in the Middle East, which canceled what could have been his first summit meeting with Lee.
President Lee’s decision to skip the NATO summit makes a summit meeting at a multilateral forum unlikely for now.
Heightened uncertainty in the Middle East adds complexity to planning bilateral trips — either Trump to Seoul or Lee to Washington.
Their first in‑person summit may now wait until the UN General Assembly in New York in September or the APEC summit in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang, in October.
Immediately after the G7, the presidential office celebrated that “democratic Korea is back,” highlighting a return to summit diplomacy.
However, Lee’s sudden absence from NATO drew criticism that his foreign policy consistency has faltered.
The Nikkei reported on Monday, citing a senior NATO official, that Trump was preparing a separate IP4 meeting — and that Lee was expected to attend.
Though Trump’s summit attendance remained unconfirmed, the report emerged immediately after President Lee announced his decision to skip the meeting, prompting observers to note the awkward timing.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks from the East Room of the White House in Washington on June 21. [AP/YONHAP]
The presidential office responded that it needed to “check the facts.”
“After the G7, we’ve seen growing bonds with fellow liberal democracies,” said Kim Jae‑cheon, a professor at Sogang University’s Graduate School of International Studies. “Lee’s decision to skip NATO amid Middle East concerns may give the impression that it’s a temporary pause.”
In a June 22 roundup of reactions to U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, the New York Times noted that South Korea's top security officials "huddled on Sunday to discuss the potential impact on [South] Korea's security and economy."
South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said that “the government places importance on resolving the Iranian nuclear issue from a non‑proliferation perspective and is monitoring closely developments regarding attacks on nuclear facilities in Iran.”
"The government hopes regional tensions ease quickly and will continue contributing to international efforts,” the ministry said.
But critics say the South Korean government has stopped short of addressing the illegality of Iran’s nuclear program or directly evaluating the recent U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, instead signaling its stance by withdrawing from the upcoming NATO summit.
Some observers warn that such a response — particularly from a country directly involved in the North Korean nuclear issue — could send the wrong message internationally, especially as Seoul continues to distance itself from the Middle East conflict.
“The latest crisis could have been a chance for South Korea to reframe global nuclear concerns and build international consensus, including on North Korea,” said Kang Jun-young, a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies’ Graduate School of International and Area Studies. “Regardless of whether Trump attends the NATO summit, Korea’s absence might appear overly mindful of China and Russia.”
Washington, meanwhile, has made clear it expects Seoul to adopt NATO-level defense spending guidelines.
NATO members recently agreed to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense by 2035. South Korea currently allocates 2.3 percent, meaning it would have to nearly double military expenditures to match the target.
Germany's President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, center left, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, right, participate in a wreath laying ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary of Germany's accession to NATO at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on April 28. [AP/YONHAP]
Critics say by missing the summit, Seoul has lost an opportunity to engage with NATO members facing similar budgetary pressures and to coordinate high-level security responses.
The presidential office said it would consult with NATO on sending a delegate, but delays in appointing a prime minister and cabinet, including a foreign minister, have made it difficult to name a replacement on short notice.
Australia, another member of the IP4, has had Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles attend the NATO summit in place of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese both this year and last.
When then-U.S. President Joe Biden met with IP4 leaders at last year’s summit, Australia also sent its deputy prime minister.
However, since Marles also holds the defense portfolio, Australia has more experience delegating top-level diplomatic functions to deputy leaders than South Korea.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY PARK HYUN-JU [paik.jihwan@joongang.co.kr]
12. Japan Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to skip NATO summit, source says
Perhaps they are synchronizing their activities?
Monday
June 23, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Japan Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to skip NATO summit, source says
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-06-23/national/diplomacy/Japan-Prime-Minister-Shigeru-Ishiba-to-skip-NATO-summit-source-says/2336482
Published: 23 Jun. 2025, 16:38
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba holds a press conference after the Group of 7 Leaders' Summit, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, on June 17. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is planning to cancel his attendance at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit in The Hague, a source with direct knowledge said on Monday.
Broadcaster Fuji Television said Ishiba was canceling the trip because a planned meeting between NATO and a group of four Indo-Pacific nations (IP-4) would likely not take place, and because a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump was also unlikely.
13. South Korea steps up crackdown on anti-North Korea leaflets near border
Is the ROK government open to getting information into north Korea through other methods?
Would it all Korean communications companies to design devices to penetrate north Kora's cell phone network? Would it allow the installation of cell phone towers along the South Barrier Fence line to extend signals into north Korea to connect to South Korean cell phones.
South Korea steps up crackdown on anti-North Korea leaflets near border
Cheorwon County posts warning signs, coordinates police patrols after president calls for measures to deter launches
https://www.nknews.org/2025/06/south-korea-steps-up-crackdown-on-anti-north-korea-leaflets-near-border/
Joon Ha Park June 23, 2025
A banner installed in Cheorwon County, Gangwon Province, warning against the launch of anti-North Korea leaflets near the inter-Korean border | Image: NK News (June 21, 2025)
South Korean authorities are ramping up enforcement against the launch of anti-North Korea leaflets near the inter-Korean border, with local officials in Cheorwon County, Gangwon Province, posting warning banners following President Lee Jae-myung’s order to crack down on such activities and penalize those involved.
The banners, which read, “Designated danger zone for anti-North Korea leaflet launches and prohibition of all related activities,” were installed in 20 locations across Cheorwon beginning June 17, with no specified end date, according to the local administration division at the Cheorwon County Office.
“We coordinated the installation with the police,” an official at the division told NK News. “We also notified the military, since areas controlled by military units are excluded from the campaign.”
Asked whether any individuals had attempted to launch leaflets or if authorities had tracked related activity following the banner installations, the official said no such cases had been reported.
“Our local government has limited authority to respond directly to leaflet launches,” the official explained. “So we issued a formal request for cooperation to the police, asking them to strengthen patrols and investigate any violations of administrative orders. If incidents occur, we’ll continue coordinating with law enforcement.”
From left: South Korean President Lee Jae-myung receives a military readiness briefing at the ROK Army’s 25th Division on June 13, the Abductee’s Family Union prepares to launch balloons carrying leaflets on June 2 | Image: ROK Presidential Office, Abductee’s Family Union, edited by NK News
The county’s measures follow President Lee Jae-myung’s June 14 directive ordering “concrete countermeasures” after a civil society group launched leaflets from Ganghwa Island, near the inter-Korean border. In response to Lee’s order, officials from the unification, defense, interior, trade and transport ministries, along with police and the presidential office, convened for a cross-agency meeting.
The unification ministry said authorities are reviewing several existing statutes — including the Aviation Safety Act, Disaster Management Act and Public Waters Management and Reclamation Act — to regulate balloon-borne leaflet campaigns. The goal is to sidestep the need for a new version of the anti-leaflet law, which was ruled unconstitutional in 2023. Officials also plan to propose targeted amendments to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act ahead of Liberation Day on Aug. 15.
By leaning on existing legislation, the government appears to aim at preempting concerns that it may introduce new legislation along the lines of the controversial anti-leaflet law enacted during a period of heightened inter-Korean tensions in 2020.
Ahead of the interagency meeting, a unification ministry spokesperson was keen to emphasize that the measures taken would not violate the Constitutional Court’s 2023 decision.
“The Constitutional Court’s ruling found that, under the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, broad criminal penalties and restrictions were unconstitutional due to issues of causality and scope,” the spokesperson stated during a press briefing. “However, even in its 2023 ruling, the Court left open the possibility of a legislative solution to regulate leaflet distribution.”
President Lee has repeatedly criticized leaflet campaigns and propaganda broadcasts reinstated under his predecessor, calling them provocations that risk escalating tensions with Pyongyang.
Edited by Alannah Hill
14. Trump’s Iran airstrikes test Kim Jong Un’s nerves — and his appetite for talks
Doesn't Kim know Churchill? "It's better to jaw jaw than war war."
Trump’s Iran airstrikes test Kim Jong Un’s nerves — and his appetite for talks
Experts tell NK News Kim Jong Un must now weigh fear of a first strike against confidence in nuclear deterrence
https://www.nknews.org/2025/06/trumps-iran-airstrikes-test-kim-jong-uns-nerves-and-his-appetite-for-talks/
Chad O'Carroll June 23, 2025
GIFT THIS ARTICLESHARE PRINT
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and fires rage after an Israeli strike on Tehran on June 15, 2025 | Image: KCTV (Jan. 1, 2023), Avash Media via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 4.0), edited by NK News
The U.S. airstrikes that crippled Iran’s nuclear sites over the weekend are likely reshaping the strategic calculus in Pyongyang. However, analysts are divided over whether Kim Jong Un will interpret Washington’s show of force as a warning that pushes him back to the negotiating table — or as evidence that North Korea must accelerate its nuclear programs to deter a similar attack.
The dramatic U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s underground nuclear sites at Fordow and Natanz have injected fresh uncertainty into an already frozen diplomatic relationship, coming as North Korean diplomats in New York have repeatedly rebuffed Trump’s written overtures to Kim, according to an informed source who recently spoke to NK News.
“I think that North Koreans are [only] likely to talk in two cases: when they are terrified or when they smell money,” said Andrei Lankov, a director at Korea Risk Group and professor at Kookmin University.
And now, the Iran campaign “has demonstrated that under certain circumstances, the United States and to be more precise, Donald Trump’s administration is perfectly capable of delivering the first blow,” he said, “increasing the chances of North Korean willingness to negotiate”.
Lankov added that another factor Pyongyang will likely take into consideration is its air defenses, which are much less sophisticated than the ones neutralized by Israel at the beginning of the conflict, even if North Korea’s society is more difficult for South Korean and U.S. intelligence to penetrate than for Israel in Iran.
However, other experts remain deeply divided on whether the strikes will actually push Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.
Frank Aum, a former expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, told NK News that “Trump’s strikes can [not] coerce North Korea into engagement since it has stronger [nuclear weapons] deterrence than Iran.”
Instead, he suggested the attacks may have the opposite effect, noting that if the Israel-Iran conflict “pulls the United States into a broader war, Washington will have less bandwidth to pursue talks with Pyongyang seriously.”
Dan Pinkston of Troy University was even more pessimistic, stating bluntly that engagement “was unlikely and remains unlikely.”
If the Iran strikes push “the needle slightly, I would say in the direction of not engaging,” he said, adding that “Trump’s reputation and behavior have introduced more instability in the world.”
Hoo Chiew Ping, a senior fellow from the East Asian International Relations Caucus, agreed, telling NK News that U.S. attacks would be unlikely to convince Kim Jong Un to pursue dialogue.
President Donald Trump, Monday, April 14, 2025, in the Oval Office. | Image: Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok
MILITARY CALCULATION SHIFT
The Iran attacks could fundamentally reshape North Korea’s military planning for the remainder of Trump’s presidency, experts suggest, potentially accelerating programs designed to ensure regime survival against a similar U.S. strike.
Lankov stressed that the Iran strikes have likely heightened Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability, noting that “North Korean leaders likely feel a great deal of unease about the ongoing bombing campaign.”
Hoo warned that internal debates in Pyongyang may now center on “whether it’s best to de-risk through re-engagement, or assert a more credible deterrent posture.”
And in this light, she suggested the U.S. may have inadvertently “opened a new pathway to North Korea: to accelerate the completion of counterstrike capabilities against U.S. targets.”
Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum, a former three star ROK general, said that as a consequence of the strikes, “North Korea will accelerate its strike capability towards the U.S.” and “only conduct dialogue if [Kim Jong Un] needs time to delay a U.S. decision and use that time to increase readiness”.
Similarly, Aum said the strikes have likely reinforced Pyongyang’s existing nuclear justifications.
“North Korea likely feels vindicated in its choice to achieve and maintain a nuclear deterrent,” he noted, adding that any lingering perception in Pyongyang “that Trump always chickens out” from the 2017 “fire and fury” episode “has probably been dispelled.”
The strikes, which exposed the vulnerabilities of Iran’s much-touted S-300 air defense systems and deeply buried nuclear sites to coordinated suppression tactics, may prompt North
Korea to reinforce its focus on developing asymmetric capabilities — assets that proved more survivable in Iran’s experience.
“They may cause Kim to have second thoughts about increasing tensions through nuclear or long-range ballistic missile tests,” Aum suggested, though this restraint might be temporary.
Further, when the damage to Iran’s underground capabilities becomes clear, Lt. Gen. Chun said that this could result in the DPRK adjusting its own underground capabilities accordingly.
More concerning, perhaps, is how the attacks could lower Kim’s threshold for nuclear use. North Korea’s 2022 nuclear doctrine already “mandated automatic and immediate nuclear launches if the leadership was placed in danger,” Aum noted.
The successful targeting of Iranian military commanders — over 20 were killed within days — will likely reinforce these hair-trigger policies.
Kim Jong Un walks past rows of centrifuges at the uranium enrichment site with top nuclear officials including Hong Sung Mu (right) | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Sept. 13, 2024)
LOOKING AHEAD
The strikes’ timing creates additional complications for regional stability, particularly given the potential for long-term strain on U.S. military resources.
“Japan and South Korea are highly anxious about the implications of North Korea’s unpredictable strategic maneuvering following the strikes on Iran, as they may be targeted by the DPRK as part of spillover threat dynamics,” warned Hoo.
Meanwhile, some believe U.S. attacks against Iran could create opportunities for conflict elsewhere in Asia.
“There are risks in the Taiwan Strait too,” Pinkston warned, with some observers speculating that Beijing might get ideas to invade in the event the U.S. gets bogged down in an extended war with Iran.
If military conflict were to [soon] break out over Taiwan, the cascading effects could be extremely bad for the Korean Peninsula and [Northeast] Asia,” Pinkston said.
This scenario would present North Korea with both risks and opportunities.
A distracted United States might embolden Kim to advance his nuclear program more aggressively. Conversely, a regional conflict could quickly spiral to involve the Korean Peninsula, especially given the potential of DPRK support to the PRC over Taiwan and the growing regional role of U.S. forces in South Korea.
Meanwhile, on North Korea talks specifically, Lankov said if DPRK leaders feel vulnerable enough to negotiate, “we should not think about denuclearization as a likely outcome.”
However, if the U.S. “gets into a swamp of a prolonged war,” North Korea “will definitely make a lot of additional demands and will be less willing to make concessions once negotiations start.”
The fundamental question remains whether Kim interprets the Iran strikes as a credible threat requiring eventual negotiations or as final proof that only credible nuclear weapons can guarantee regime survival.
“Kim Jong Un may also subscribe to ‘peace through strength’ doctrine,” Hoo observed, “which explains his relentless focus on advancing nuclear weapons and ICBM programs.”
But if Kim continues spurning Trump’s outreach —- while avoiding major escalations —- Aum believes “the Korean Peninsula can continue to trudge along at the precipice of instability.”
However, he cautioned that without dialogue, “U.S.-DPRK relations are guaranteed to be non-existent and the risk of miscommunication or miscalculation leading the two countries to go over the precipice increases.”
The Iran strikes may simply accelerate this trajectory rather than alter it.
Edited by Alannah Hill
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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