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Quotes of the Day:
“The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. It includes the Philippines. It does not include Formosa or Korea.”
– Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, Speech at the National Press Club, January 12, 1950
“Korea has little strategic value.”
– General Omar Bradley – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, late 1949
“It would be a tragic mistake to commit American ground forces to the mainland of Asia.”
– General Douglas MacArthur, September 1948 (Statement to Congress)
“There is no basis for believing that the Communists would launch a full-scale invasion of South Korea.”
– Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1949
“Korea is a frontier for freedom, but it must stand on its own feet.”
– John Foster Dulles, Special U.S. Envoy to Asia (Later Secretary of State), Early June 1950 (during visit to Korea)
“North Korea is unlikely to undertake large-scale offensive operations without clear Soviet or Chinese support, which appears unlikely in the near term.”
– The U.S. Army’s G-2 (Intelligence) Estimate, 1949–50,
1. New South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is playing with dynamite
2. Lee skips NATO, sending his adviser instead. Will that be enough?
3. South Korea’s Nato no-show: pragmatism or diplomatic shift?
4. Unification minister nominee voices need for changing name of ministry to highlight peace
5. Acting U.S. envoy cites 'other' defense costs to discuss beyond U.S. troops cost-sharing with S. Korea
6. N. Korea holds key party meeting on H1 performance without disclosing leader Kim's speech
7. Kim Jong Un holds party plenum in remote mountains, keeps outcomes unclear
8. Abductee family group to consider not sending leaflets to N. Korea
9. S. Korea, U.S. launch joint shipbuilding education program
10. Tehran's Fatal Miscalculation? Thinking A North Korean-Style Pariah Could Stay Safe In The Middle East
11. North Korean Missile Debris Found in Kyiv After Deadly Russian Strike
12. Lee Jae Myung stresses peace on peninsula ahead of Korean War anniversary
13. South Korea’s new leaders seek continuity on key defense issues
14. President Lee picks South Korea’s first civilian defense chief in 64 years
15. Drunken fight between soldiers and militia leaves three dead in Samjiyon
16. US Strikes On Iran May Strengthen North Korea’s Nuclear Resolve – Analysis
17. Five Challenges For South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung – Analysis
18. N. Korea now holds all the cards but can it last? Consequences of Russia-NK rapprochement
19. Joe Rogan Revives Dennis Rodman’s North Korea Meltdown as Kim Jong-un Chaos Revealed
1. New South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is playing with dynamite
While in Mongolia this week I met a number of Korean friends who are associated with President Lee and they reassured me that President Lee is focused on defense, the ROK/US alliance, and trilateral cooperation but wants to try to engage north Korea to reduce tensions and that includes re-establishing the CMA.
They also reminded me that Japan also is not attending the NATO summit.
New South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is playing with dynamite - Asia Times
Skipping the NATO summit, Seoul signals retreat just as the free world faces its most dangerous post-Cold War moment
asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · June 24, 2025
American political leaders have often likened politics to sports. Former presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have all described politics as a “contact sport.” Others have echoed the sentiment with lines like: “Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.”
While phrases may vary, the message is the same: politics – and by extension, national foreign policy – requires taking a clear side.
President Lee Jae Myung, like former President Moon Jae-in, has chosen to steer the country’s foreign policy through what they term “strategic ambiguity.” This approach seeks to balance ties between the US and China, maintain engagement with North Korea and avoid formal alignment.
In line with that approach, Lee has chosen not to attend the NATO Summit being held on June 24–25, 2025.
This stands in stark contrast to former President Park Geun‑hye, who launched the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) – a NATO‑supported diplomatic framework aimed at enhancing regional dialogue.
Similarly, Yoon Suk Yeol, Lee’s immediate predecessor, attended three consecutive NATO summits as part of the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) – with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand – to reinforce ties amid growing global instability and authoritarian alignment.
Global criticism over Lee’s decision
Lee’s decision to skip this year’s summit has drawn strong criticism.
On June 23, Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies called IP4 a “strong ad hoc coalition” and criticized South Korea’s NATO withdrawal. He suggested that leftist forces in the Lee administration had pushed the move, fearing that tough statements on China would come out of the session.
As the US operates various small multilateral frameworks to contain China – pursuing both independent and coordinated efforts among them – Cha pointed out that, apart from the Korea-US-Japan cooperation represented by the “Camp David Agreement,” South Korea is not a member of any security alliances such as the Quad or AUKUS. Because of this, China has long viewed South Korea as the “weakest link” in the US-led front to contain China.
David Maxwell of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy called the decision a “strategic mistake,” while Andrew Yeo of the Brookings Institution urged stronger alliance cooperation amid US uncertainty.
Experts also warn that skipping the summit weakens South Korea’s credibility and defense posture, especially since most NATO members are part of the UN Command.
Echoes of the Yoshida doctrine
South Korea’s ambiguity today echoes Japan’s postwar Yoshida doctrine – a strategy of non-involvement in global conflicts, centered on pacifism and total reliance on the US for defense.
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, the architect of that policy, used Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to justify non-participation in collective security.
This allowed Japan to avoid internal division and the burdens of war, while still enjoying the benefits of belonging to the free world.
In a revealing exchange with future Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, Yoshida once said that the day for Japanese rearmament
will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our heaven-bestowed good fortune that the constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the constitution gives us a perfect justification.
In John Welfield’s An Empire in Eclipse, Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda summed up (source no. 2) Japan’s evasion bluntly:
The Americans were always asking us to do this and to do that, take over part of their Far Eastern policies. But all their efforts were sabotaged by one Japanese cabinet after another. That’s why Eisaku Sato got the Nobel Prize. He got it for his accumulated achievements in the field of sabotage. I suppose he is the only prime minister ever to have got the Nobel Prize for sabotage.
Yoshida’s regrets
Yet, as Japan modernized and became one of the world’s leading economies, Yoshida expressed regret about the foreign policy he had crafted. In his 1963 book Sekai to Nihon, he wrote (source no. 3):“During my many overseas trips, especially my recent trip to Europe and America, I have visited many countries in the free world and met face-to-face with their leaders.
I was deeply moved by the sight of these countries having already overcome the pain of war and their leaders striving to contribute to world peace and prosperity under their own responsibility.
I have come to feel that Japan, too, should strive to contribute to the free world with its own capabilities and responsibilities.
As for Japan’s own defense capabilities… for an independent Japan, which is among the first-rank countries in economics, technology, and learning, to continue to be dependent on another country is a deformity of the state.
It would be selfish to expect the benefits of being a member of the United Nations, as Japan has done up until now, but refuse to help the United Nations’ peacekeeping mechanisms.
This is certainly not what we mean by placing importance on the international community. With regard to the above-mentioned constitutional principles and national policies, I myself cannot escape responsibility for the use of the Constitution as a pretext for this way of conducting national policy.
Strategic clarity in uncertain times
As the US wavers in its commitments – at times even threatening to leave NATO altogether – South Korea cannot afford to drift into passive ambiguity. Precisely because US reliability is uncertain, Seoul must strengthen its collective security arrangements with other democracies.
South Korea has long benefited from its place in the free world. To help preserve the current international order, it must now demonstrate a willingness to shoulder not just the rewards of prosperity but the burdens of responsibility, as well.
asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · June 24, 2025
2. Lee skips NATO, sending his adviser instead. Will that be enough?
This is concerning.
Lee skips NATO, sending his adviser instead. Will that be enough?
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/06/24/SMX6ASWGFVCDPEBZHX36KTA6OA/
As Seoul seeks to balance alliance-building with domestic priorities, some question what was gained—and what wasn't—by staying home
By Park Sang-ki,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.06.24. 08:49
Updated 2025.06.24. 08:58
President Lee Jae-myung has decided not to attend this week’s NATO summit in the Netherlands, a late-stage decision that raises fresh questions about the foreign policy direction of his nascent administration. On June 23, the presidential office announced that Wi Sung-lac, Lee’s national security adviser, would attend in his place.
The move is unusual: it is rare for a sitting president to delegate attendance at a major multilateral gathering to a senior aide, particularly one of Wi’s rank. Observers say the appointment of Wi—currently the most senior figure in South Korea’s foreign and security establishment—signals that the president is acutely aware of both the domestic and international scrutiny his absence may provoke.
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac gives a briefing on G7 summit diplomacy at the presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul, on June 15, 2025./News1
Lee had initially weighed attending the summit, partly in the hopes of arranging a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. A similar attempt during the recent G7 summit in Canada fell through when Trump returned to Washington early amid escalating tensions in the Middle East.
Without a firm commitment from Washington for a one-on-one meeting in the Netherlands, Lee ultimately chose to stay in Seoul. “Had the summit with President Trump been confirmed, we would have gone despite the situation in the Middle East,” a presidential official said. “But given the uncertainty, it was judged more beneficial to focus on economic issues and cabinet appointments at home.”
Still, analysts warned that Lee’s absence could send the wrong message to Western allies. The NATO summit is expected to focus heavily on joint responses to security threats posed by Russia, China, and North Korea. Lee’s decision to sit out the gathering could be perceived as a “conspicuous absence,” some experts said, particularly as his predecessor attended the last three summits in a row—part of a broader shift toward tighter engagement with the transatlantic alliance.
President Lee Jae-myung attends an expanded session of the G7 summit over a working lunch in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, on June 17, 2025./Presidential Office
Presidential officials downplayed the implications. “No South Korean president attended NATO before the Yoon administration,” one official noted, arguing the move was not without precedent. But critics countered that with South Korea now a regular participant in NATO summits, skipping one without a clear explanation risks appearing inconsistent.
Complicating matters further is one of the summit’s core agenda items: the U.S.-led push for NATO members to significantly raise their defense spending. Trump has repeatedly called on allies to boost military budgets to 5 percent of GDP. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has proposed a model allocating 3.5 percent to direct military expenditure and another 1.5 percent to broader security initiatives—a framework with potential implications for South Korea’s own defense cost-sharing negotiations with Washington.
Against this backdrop, some analysts questioned whether Lee’s absence undermines his administration’s repeated emphasis on the strength of the U.S.-Korea alliance. Even without a formal summit with Trump, they said, attending the NATO meeting could have reinforced Seoul’s commitment to the Western security bloc.
Uncertainty over scheduling a face-to-face with Trump is not unique to South Korea. “Even other heads of state rarely get guarantees from Trump,” said one official. Still, in Seoul, the decision to forgo a key multilateral stage in pursuit of a meeting that never materialized has led some to question whether Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy” is veering into reactive territory.
“There are competing voices within the Lee government’s foreign policy team,” one political insider noted. “How they handle future situations like this may depend less on strategy than on which faction ends up louder.”
3. South Korea’s Nato no-show: pragmatism or diplomatic shift?
My Korean friends who are associated with prudent Lee's camp assure that his priorities are national security, the ROK/US alliance, Korean prosperity, and north Korea to reduce tensions. They also assured me that he is not pro-China but instead pro-US.
They also wanted to note that there was no presidential transition so President Lee is playing catchup.
South Korea’s Nato no-show: pragmatism or diplomatic shift?
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While some see a tactical move, critics fear the no-show might undermine Seoul’s ties with Western allies and signal a broader reorientation
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 11:42am, 23 Jun 2025Updated: 3:39pm, 23 Jun 2025
With the Middle East in turmoil and his own government barely weeks old, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has opted to forgo this week’s Nato summit in the Netherlands – a move that analysts say shows the shifting sands of regional diplomacy.
Unlike his conservative predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, who attended the transatlantic security alliance’s summits three times in as many years, Lee’s expected Nato absence has prompted speculation over Seoul’s diplomatic intentions. Observers warn against reading too much into the move, however.
“President Lee would have attended the Nato summit but for the US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities,” Lim Eul-chul, an international relations specialist and professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies think tank, told This Week in Asia on Monday.
“It would be reading too much into it to see this decision as a signal to China or a shift in South Korea’s diplomatic calculus under the new government,” Lim added, noting that the Lee administration was still formulating its regional and global strategies.
But other observers cautioned that optics matter when it comes to geopolitics.
Anti-Nato protesters rally in The Hague on Sunday before this week’s summit. Photo: Xinhua
Lee might have been concerned “that a strongly worded joint statement could offend China”, suggested Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
The South Korean president’s decision was also likely motivated by the fact that “Trump’s attention [is] focused on Iran and allied defence spending, rather than on a tariff deal with Seoul”, Easley said.
Lee’s office announced on Sunday that he would not travel to The Hague for the summit, scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday, after weighing the deteriorating Middle East situation and urgent matters at home.
He had initially considered attending, hoping for talks with US President Donald Trump on trade and security. But the intensifying conflict between Iran and Israel ultimately shifted Seoul’s calculus.
“Despite numerous pressing state affairs following the president’s inauguration, the government had actively considered President Lee’s attendance at the Nato summit,” presidential spokeswoman Kang Yu-jung said in a statement.
“However, after comprehensively reviewing various domestic matters and the volatile situation in the Middle East, the president decided not to attend.”
South Korea would have had limited opportunity to shape the agenda
Lim Eul-chul, Institute for Far Eastern Studies
Over the weekend, the United States carried out precision air strikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities, an operation Trump hailed as a “spectacular” success that had “obliterated” Tehran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure. Denouncing Iran as “the world’s No 1 state sponsor of terror” and “the bully of the Middle East”, Trump warned of further US action should Iran fail to pursue peace.
Lee was undecided on attending the Nato summit until the latest Middle East developments tipped the scales, according to Lim and other analysts.
“With the summit expected to focus heavily on the Middle East crisis, South Korea would have had limited opportunity to shape the agenda,” Lim said, adding that a bilateral meeting with Trump was highly unlikely given a packed schedule.
Lee had also hoped to meet the US president on the sidelines of last week’s G7 summit in Canada, but that meeting was scrapped after Trump’s abrupt return to Washington amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung shakes hands with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney (left) at last week’s G7 summit. Trump left the G7 summit early amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran. Photo: EPA-EFE
Domestic considerations also played a decisive role, according to Lee Jun-han, a political-science professor at Incheon National University.
“With urgent issues at home, including cabinet appointments and economic recovery, President Lee simply couldn’t justify the trip,” he said. “And with the summit dominated by the Iran-Israel conflict, there was no certainty he would even meet Trump. Otherwise, he likely would have gone.”
The opposition People Power Party criticised Lee’s choice, urging him to attend and reaffirm South Korea’s alignment with democratic allies.
“In countries that share our liberal democratic values – such as the United States, Japan, and Europe – there’s growing sentiment that President Lee’s attendance would serve as a litmus test of South Korea’s position,” party spokesman Jung Gwang-jae said in a statement.
Easley said that Lee, who had expressed interest in improving ties with Beijing, might seek to engage Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Apec summit in Seoul this autumn.
He added that Lee had so far exercised rhetorical restraint regarding North Korea, showing interest in confidence-building but avoiding rushed engagement – mindful of the nuclear threat Pyongyang poses, as well as its intransigence and opportunistic ties with Moscow.
Former South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol and Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s then-secretary general, pose with an agreement on military airworthiness certification at last year’s Nato summit in Washington. Photo: Yonhap/dpa
Looking ahead, Easley emphasised the need for South Korea to “deepen trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan, further engage Nato” as one of the alliance’s Indo-Pacific (IP4) partners, and relaunch the New Southern Policy “to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia and India”.
He further warned that Russia’s role further complicated the regional picture. It was “no coincidence” that Moscow had hosted Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi after the US strikes, or that Putin dispatched top defence official Sergei Shoigu to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un while G7 leaders gathered in Canada, Easley said.
“Russia’s coordination with Iran and North Korea shows how security across multiple regions is increasingly linked”, Easley said.
“Putin and Kim currently need each other for illicit trade in weapons, labour and military technology – and it’s highly likely there’s more going on behind the scenes than what they disclose.”
In response, Easley urged Nato and its Indo-Pacific partners to act “faster and more decisively to outlast Putin and Kim’s alliance of convenience by raising its costs”.
“The leadership of Trump and Lee is key for coordinating sanctions enforcement, intelligence sharing, and defence procurement,” he added, pointing to last week’s trilateral air drills involving US, Japanese, and South Korean fighter jets as a reassuring step in reinforcing integrated deterrence.
Japan, Australia also skip summit
On Monday, Reuters reported that Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was also planning to cancel his attendance at this week’s Nato summit, citing a source with direct knowledge of the matter.
Tokyo’s Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya would represent Japan, the source said, declining to be identified because the plan was not public.
Japanese broadcaster Fuji Television said Ishiba was cancelling the trip because a planned meeting between Nato and the IP4 would likely not take place, and because a meeting with Trump was also unlikely.
Australia has also said its leader will not attend the Nato summit meeting.
Additional reporting by Reuters
Park Chan-kyong
FOLLOW
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate Schoo
4. Unification minister nominee voices need for changing name of ministry to highlight peace
This is very troubling, Is the Lee administration going to give up on unification? Interestingly here at the Mongolian forum (a Track II event) today there was broad and enthusiastic consensus for Unification first, then denuclearization from a wide range of international participants including from South and north Korea (escapees), China, Russia, Mongolia, India, Malaysia, and the US among others.
But do we really think a name change will really make Kim Jong Un change his behavior and seek peace? To him it will probably become the "Prince Ministry," as in the "Ministry formerly known as Unification" (just like the musician Prince was a "formerly known as" when he changed his name to that weird symbol).
Unification minister nominee voices need for changing name of ministry to highlight peace | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 24, 2025
SEOUL, June 24 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young on Tuesday raised the need to change the name of the unification ministry in a bid to highlight the government's efforts to promote peace and stability with North Korea.
Chung made the remarks as members of the country's state affairs committee exchanged views about the possibility of changing the official name of the Ministry of Unification by dropping the unification reference amid North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's animosity toward South Korea.
In late 2023, Kim defined inter-Korean relations as those between "two states hostile to each other," vowing not to pursue unification and reconciliation with South Korea.
"I think there is a need to actively consider changing (the name of the ministry) as unification can be sought on the basis of peace and stability," Chung told a group of reporters.
Chung, a journalist-turned-lawmaker, was nominated Monday as the first unification minister under the Lee Jae Myung administration. He previously serviced as unification minister in 2004-05 under former liberal President Roh Moo-hyun.
The nominee cited the restoration of the now-suspended inter-Korean communication channels as the top policy priority if his nomination is endorsed at a parliamentary confirmation hearing. Since April 2023, the North has not responded to daily routine calls with South Korea.
Chung also called launches of anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border a "catalyst" of spurring inter-Korean tensions, emphasizing that activists here should halt such leaflet campaigns.
Chung said he supports a potential summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and the North's leader Kim, saying that the move will "greatly" help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young speaks to reporters on June 24, 2025, after being nominated to lead the unification ministry the previous day, as he prepares for a parliamentary confirmation hearing. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 24, 2025
5 Acting U.S. envoy cites 'other' defense costs to discuss beyond U.S. troops cost-sharing with S. Korea
.
I just checked the nominee tracker on the Washington Post and there is still no nominee for the ambassador to the ROK (and many other countries remain unfilled as well). https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2025/trump-appointee-tracker/?itid=sr_2_de4234a7-e62c-4e66-818b-11c8fa457abd_dc965587-3056-4fa3-8c8f-489c72678f85
Can anyone tell me what is the magic about 5% of GDP for defense spending?
Acting U.S. envoy cites 'other' defense costs to discuss beyond U.S. troops cost-sharing with S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · June 24, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, June 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have "other costs" to discuss in their defense sharing besides the cost sharing for the U.S. troop presence in South Korea, and that is a key current challenge for the alliance, the acting U.S. ambassador to Seoul said Tuesday.
Joseph Yun, the U.S. charge d'affaires ad interim, made the remarks at a seminar, describing the bilateral agreement on determining Seoul's costs for the upkeep of American troops here as "one part" of the overall defense cost sharing between the allies.
"There are three areas of costs for the SMA -- construction, labor and utility -- and then there are other costs as well, so we need to discuss how to share those," Yun said at the seminar hosted by the Korea Press Foundation, speaking in both Korean and English.
"Of them, we should discuss, 'Is South Korea's defense spending enough?'" Yun said.
Joseph Yun, acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, speaks during a seminar hosted by the Korea Press Foundation in Seoul on June 24, 2025. (Yonhap)
The SMA stands for the Special Measures Agreement on Seoul's share of the costs for stationing the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) on its soil. Under the latest agreement effective through 2030, Seoul will pay 1.52 trillion won (US$1.1 billion) next year, up 8.3 percent from 2025.
Yun's remarks could appear to contradict South Korea's position on the SMA, as Seoul has maintained that the cost-sharing deal for hosting the USFK is confined to the three specific categories only.
U.S. President Donald Trump has demanded South Korea and other wealthy allies shoulder a greater share of their own defense, rather than relying on U.S. protection.
His remarks also came after the Pentagon said that its call for European allies to increase their defense spending to 5 percent of their gross domestic product also applies to its Asian allies.
With China being the primary strategic concern for Washington, these discussions could also include readjusting the U.S. regional posture, such as its military assets and defense capabilities, as well as the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea and Japan, Yun said.
Joseph Yun, acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, speaks during a seminar hosted by the Korea Press Foundation in Seoul on June 24, 2025. (Yonhap)
On tariff negotiations, Yun said he is hoping to see the two sides reach an agreement on a "framework" that would include detailed deals by specific sectors.
"They are not readily mixed and bagged," Yun said. "What's important is to have a framework agreement that includes all of those elements, but each stream, it may take a while to finally get all the details," he said, without elaborating.
Asked about the possible resumption of dialogue between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Yun called it "unfinished business" for Trump.
"I have no doubt that Trump considers his engagement with North Korea, as an unfinished business, as homework," he said.
"But it takes two to tango. We have not heard from the North Korean side whether they too want to meet. That's the big unknown, whether they want to reengage with the U.S. or South Korea," Yun added.
On the prospect for a summit between Trump and President Lee Jae Myung, Yun voiced optimism that it will take place very soon, since the two leaders missed out on the opportunity at the Group of Seven summit in Canada last week.
"It was very unfortunate that the summit did not take place purely due to scheduling issues," Yun said. "I hope that President Lee will visit Washington for substantive bilateral (talks). I have no doubt that in a short time there will be a summit between President Trump and President Lee."
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · June 24, 2025
6. N. Korea holds key party meeting on H1 performance without disclosing leader Kim's speech
How long will we have to wait? I am sure all the "Korean hands" want to assess this.
(2nd LD) N. Korea holds key party meeting on H1 performance without disclosing leader Kim's speech | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 24, 2025
(ATTN: REWRITES headline; UPDATES with more details in last 3 paras; ADDS byline)
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, June 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has held a key party meeting to review the implementation of state policies in the first half of the year, state media reported Tuesday, without disclosing details of a speech by its leader Kim Jong-un in a rare move.
The North convened the 12th plenary session of the eighth Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) from Saturday to Monday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The meeting was held to review policy performances in the first half and discuss policy directions for the second half, the KCNA said.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on June 24, 2025, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un presiding over the 12th plenary meeting of the eighth Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, which took place from June 21-23. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The North's leader Kim, who presided over the latest party meeting, delivered a speech, but state media did not disclose details. It remains uncertain whether Kim issued any message targeting the United States or South Korea during his speech.
South Korea's unification ministry said it was rare for North Korea to forgo disclosing Kim's speech and exclude diplomacy from areas of discussions at the meeting.
The North's party meeting had garnered attention over whether Kim would issue messages toward Washington and Seoul as U.S. President Donald Trump and President Lee Jae Myung have shown a conciliatory gesture toward North Korea.
"North Korea is presumed to have not disclosed (details of the meeting), given that South Korea and the U.S. have not finalized their North Korea policy and the international security situation remains fluid amid Russia's war with Ukraine and the Israel-Iran conflict," a ministry official said.
At the party meeting, North Korea also did not deal with how to handle party officials responsible for the warship accident that occurred in May. Kim earlier blamed the accident on "absolute carelessness" and "irresponsibility" and ordered the ship's restoration before the WPK meeting.
A new 5,000-ton destroyer tipped over and became partially submerged during a launch ceremony in late May in the northeastern port of Chongjin. The North launched it at the Rajin shipyard after weeks of repair.
Meanwhile, North Korea said it unanimously approved a plan to convene the ninth party congress at the latest party meeting, calling the event an important "watershed" for the development of the WPK.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on June 24, 2025, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un presiding over the 12th plenary meeting of the eighth Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, which took place from June 21-23. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korea's last party congress, a key party event held every five year, was held in January 2021, where the regime unveiled a list of sophisticated weapons Kim had vowed to develop, such as military spy satellites and solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The unification ministry said the North may convene the party congress at the end of this year or early next year.
"North Korea apparently intends to focus on preparing for the WPK's 80th founding anniversary set for October and the ninth party congress while hurriedly covering up defects and errors related to the warship accident," the ministry official noted.
Citing photos carried by the North's state media, the ministry said Ri Hee-yong, a party secretary, is presumed to have been promoted to a presidium member of the party's politburo from a member.
Ri Pyong-chol, general adviser for the party's munitions policy, was apparently demoted to a member from a member of the presidium of the political bureau. Ri Il-whan, a party secretary believed to be under punishment, was not seen attending the meeting.
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 24, 2025
7. Kim Jong Un holds party plenum in remote mountains, keeps outcomes unclear
I wonder if he did team building events in the "wilderness" at his "off-site?"
Kim Jong Un holds party plenum in remote mountains, keeps outcomes unclear
North Korean report on secretive meeting thin beyond praise for ‘achievements,’ plans for major anniversaries
https://www.nknews.org/2025/06/kim-jong-un-holds-party-plenum-in-remote-mountains-keeps-outcomes-unclear/
Colin Zwirko June 24, 2025
Kim Jong Un delivers a speech at the June 21-23 plenum | Image: Rodong Sinmun (June 24, 2025)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw a three-day party plenum which concluded on Monday, according to state media, discussing significant state business but choosing not to reveal any details on the content publicly.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and other state outlets published a short report Tuesday that included platitudes about “successes” and “achievements” in all sectors and plans to “accelerate” development through “practical measures,” without naming any specific examples.
The report also did not mention personnel purges or last month’s naval disaster involving a ship capsizing during a major ceremony attended by Kim, after he said those responsible “would have to be dealt with at the plenary meeting” scheduled for late June. Some officials were already arrested and deleted from photos in a forceful sign of punishment.
It also did not mention foreign policy or military issues, coming amid increasing military cooperation with Russia, the Israel-Iran crisis and just weeks after South Korea’s election of a new pro-engagement president.
NK News analysis of photos of the reported June 21-23 event show it was once again held deep in the mountains of Myohyangsan in the north of the country, like previous plenums in June of 2021 and 2024.
The “Enlarged Meeting of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea” was held from June 21 to 23. Photos show the building interiors are the same as plenums and politburo meetings previously confirmed in Myohyangsan. | Images: Rodong Sinmum (June 24, 2025)
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State media has yet to reveal the purpose of the retreats, but it could be related to enhancing security and getting officials together in a secluded place for team building.
Besides vague statements on economic development, Tuesday’s report said the plenum discussed inner-party structures and “the line of Party building in the new era,” a reference to Kim’s efforts in recent years to ensure party members properly worship him and execute his orders at all levels.
It also announced plans to “significantly celebrate” the 80th anniversaries of the country’s liberation from Japan on Aug. 15 and the Workers’ Party of Korea’s (WPK) founding on Oct. 10. The latter holiday is expected to involve a major military parade and other large events.
In addition, the report mentioned the “campaign to greet the Ninth Congress of the WPK as the one of victors and glory.”
Official propaganda throughout the year so far has used the planned congress to encourage workers to meet production goals, but the date has yet to be announced. The Eighth Party Congress took place in Jan. 2021.
This week’s meeting — the 12th plenum since the Eighth Party Congress — also followed the typical procedure of such events, according to KCNA. It included two days of sectoral meetings on “carrying out the plans for the second half of the year,” followed by Kim convening the 25th Politburo meeting to discuss the final resolution, before gathering for concluding speeches and votes.
Further pointing to intentional efforts to keep the contents of the plenum secret from unauthorized view, the KCNA report said Kim Jong Un’s full speech and adopted resolutions will be “published as inner-party documents” and distributed only to party organizations.
While state media does not usually offer minute detail on proceedings, plenum reports typically include parts or all of Kim Jong Un’s speeches including statements on the U.S. and South Korea, as well as information on personnel reshuffles.
This week’s plenum and politburo meetings were both the first since Dec. 2024.
Updated at 8:36 a.m. KST on June 24 with additional details from state media. Edited by Alannah Hill
8. Abductee family group to consider not sending leaflets to N. Korea
Excerpt:
The remarks came after Choi told reporters a week ago that his group is willing to halt the leaflet distribution if President Lee Jae Myung helps confirm the life or death of abductees through dialogue with the North and meets and comforts families of the abductees, particularly those in their 90s.
(LEAD) Abductee family group to consider not sending leaflets to N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · June 24, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS unification ministry official's remarks in paras 4-6)
SEOUL, June 24 (Yonhap) -- A South Korean civic group representing families of abductees held in North Korea said Tuesday it will consider suspending the distribution of anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border.
Choi Seong-ryong, the head of the group, said he received a positive message by phone from a high-ranking government official on Monday and will later decide whether to stop sending leaflets to North Korea after discussions with group members.
The remarks came after Choi told reporters a week ago that his group is willing to halt the leaflet distribution if President Lee Jae Myung helps confirm the life or death of abductees through dialogue with the North and meets and comforts families of the abductees, particularly those in their 90s.
Choi Seong-ryong, head of the Association of the Families of Those Abducted by North Korea, poses after paying his respects at the Belgium-Luxembourg War Memorial in Dongducheon, north of Seoul, on June 24, 2025, to mark the 75th anniversary of the Korean War. (Yonhap)
The unification ministry, in charge of inter-Korean affairs, said its new vice minister has held a phone conversation with Choi.
"In phone talks with Choi held Monday afternoon, Vice Unification Minister Kim Nam-jung delivered a message requesting a halt in distributing leaflets and promised to listen to the opinion of abductee families," a ministry official told reporters.
The official said Choi appears to have accepted the government's request in earnest but did not elaborate on whether the government will seek to arrange a meeting with Lee as he had requested.
This year, Choi's group sent anti-North Korean leaflets across the border by balloons or drones from Imjingak in Paju on April 27, from Cheorwon in Gangwon Province on May 8 and from a border area in Paju on June 2.
But the Lee government has said it will consider revising the relevant laws and take steps to block the distribution of anti-North leaflets from the border areas.
"The current government officials understand the abduction issue better than anyone else, and they have helped us a lot in the past. I hope this government will definitely create an opportunity to confirm the life or death of the abduction victims through inter-Korean dialogue," said Choi in a meeting with reporters after paying his respects at the Belgium-Luxembourg War Memorial in Dongducheon, north of Seoul, to mark the 75th anniversary of the 1950-53 Korean War.
Choi's father was kidnapped in 1967 while fishing near Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea and executed in North Korea in 1972 due to his history of cooperating with the U.S. military during the Korean War.
ycm@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · June 24, 2025
9. S. Korea, U.S. launch joint shipbuilding education program
A partner in the arsenal of democracies will teach American students about shipbuilding.
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S. Korea, U.S. launch joint shipbuilding education program | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · June 24, 2025
SEOUL, June 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will launch an educational exchange program inviting students and faculty members from major American universities starting next year to receive short-term training in shipbuilding engineering, Seoul's trade ministry said Tuesday.
The initiative comes as the two countries seek to deepen cooperation in the shipbuilding sector, which has emerged as a key point of discussion in ongoing bilateral tariff negotiations.
A new memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed among Seoul National University, San Diego State University and HD Hyundai Co., according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.
Beginning in 2026, 20 to 30 students and faculty specializing in shipbuilding engineering will be invited to South Korea for short-term training sessions hosted by Seoul National University. HD Hyundai will also provide practical on-site design training for the participants.
The agreement builds on a similar partnership signed in July 2024 among Seoul National University, the University of Michigan and Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co.
The two countries plan to gradually expand the scope of cooperation beyond academia to include ship design professionals at U.S. shipyards, the ministry added.
This undated image, provided by HD Hyundai Co., shows company officials. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · June 24, 2025
10. Tehran's Fatal Miscalculation? Thinking A North Korean-Style Pariah Could Stay Safe In The Middle East
There can be only one. (north Korea that is).
Tehran's Fatal Miscalculation? Thinking A North Korean-Style Pariah Could Stay Safe In The Middle East
Iran’s revolutionary regime imagined it could assure its survival by becoming an armed bunker like North Korea, ready to shoot if threatened. They seemed to forget that, for its location and resources, Iran is too important for the world to tolerate a “crazy” regime threatening vital oil routes.
by Homayoun Naderifar
June 22, 2025
worldcrunch.com · by Cecilia LAURENT MONPETIT · June 22, 2025
-Analysis-
The leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have long held on to a strategic vision that followed the path taken by the communist Kim regime in North Korea: ensuring survival of the regime through military threats, nuclear program expansion, domestic repression and geopolitical blackmail of world powers.
The comparison was not only superficial and mistaken, but involved a dangerous miscalculation for the Islamic regime’s own survival. And the U.S. decision early Sunday to enter directly into Israel’s war against Iran — unleashing major bombing raids on multiple Iranian nuclear sites — is the ultimate sign of that miscalculation.
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North Korea instead is an isolated, poor and fundamentally non-strategic country in terms of energy markets, global trade and geopolitical influence. Iran is a country with much more at stake. It shares borders with seven Asian countries and controls access to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy arteries. Broadly speaking, it possesses a crucial location at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Caucasus, Middle East and the Indian subcontinent.
This strategic position makes Iran’s presence in regional and international developments inevitable, but also burdens its governments with greater responsibilities. The world cannot simply ignore or isolate Iran as it has tried to do with North Korea, as the consequences for the region and the world are much more profound.
Proxy play
Then there’s the question of behavior. Despite its nuclear and missile threats, and the loud rhetoric that goes with it, North Korea does not interfere much in the internal affairs of other countries. Instead, the Iranian regime has been involved for years in backing proxy groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria, and even sought to exert influence in Africa and South America.
Such activities have earned the Tehran authorities a reputation of a constant factor of instability and a transnational threat, transforming the regime’s problematic nature from mere domestic crisis to international threat. Arab countries, Israel, the United States, Europe and even some Asian countries view the Islamic Republic not simply as a closed dictatorship, but as a “transnational destabilizing actor.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is seen at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/TASS via ZUMA
Domestic differences
Unlike North Korean society, Iran’s is a youthful and educated society with a relative level of access to cyberspace and a history of protest movements. From the Green Movement of 2009 to the nationwide protests of November 2019 and the Mahsa Movement of 2022, Iran has managed to develop into a vibrant society with the potential for transformation from within. In contrast, North Korean society is under complete military control, lives in absolute poverty and lacks the capacity for widespread internal resistance.
The way to save Iran is not to imitate Pyongyang, but to return to reason, legality and convergence with the world.
The Islamic Republic’s leaders imagined and still imagine they can continue to exist with nuclear weapons, internal repression and “blackmail” diplomacy, like the Kim Jong-un regime. But it was a seriously naive calculation. Iran is not North Korea, and the world is not ready to treat a destabilizing, ideological and terror-sponsoring power with the same appeasement approach, in such an important region as the Middle East.
WORLDCRUNCH EXTRA!
Elsewhere in the press • As Iran’s regime faces an existential threat from the unprecedented Israeli assault, The Financial Times also questions the strategic choices the regime in Tehran has made over the past two decades.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has employed what’s come to be known as the “no war, no peace” strategy—using proxies and covert actions to deter adversaries without engaging in open conflict.
However, regional dynamics shifted after the October 7 Hamas attack in southern Israel, exposing Iran’s vulnerabilities and miscalculations. Israel swiftly and decisively countered by decimating Tehran’s “proxy” militias, not only Hamas in Gaza, but also Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Israel is now directly targeting Iranian military infrastructure, destroying key missile launchers and compromising command and control capabilities with advanced U.S.-supplied equipment.
The explosive escalation underscored Iran’s strategic gamble, now forcing it into an unwinnable confrontation that threatens its survival. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to enter the war, Tehran’s precarious position highlights the high stakes and unstable power balance in an already volatile Middle East. — Cecilia Laurent Monpetit (read more about the Worldcrunch method here)
Finally, we have seen how continuing this path and the clerical regime’s miscalculation have not only further isolated Iran and worsened the economic and security pressures of recent years, but ultimately provoked a war that is now inflicting an immense cost on Iran and Iranians.
The way to save Iran is not to imitate Pyongyang, but to return to reason, legality and a constructive understanding and convergence with the world. That can happen with a fundamental change in the structure of governance, and a change of regime.
worldcrunch.com · by Cecilia LAURENT MONPETIT · June 22, 2025
11. North Korean Missile Debris Found in Kyiv After Deadly Russian Strike
north Korea is a key contributor to the arsenal of the CRInK.
North Korean Missile Debris Found in Kyiv After Deadly Russian Strike
Emergency crews found parts of a North Korean missile after a mass strike on Kyiv overnight June 22–23 that killed at least 7 and injured some two dozen, officials said.
by Jeremy Dirac, Devin Woodall | June 23, 2025, 4:27 pm
kyivpost.com · by Jeremy Dirac, Devin Woodall · June 23, 2025
Emergency crews found parts of a North Korean missile after a mass strike on Kyiv overnight June 22–23 that killed at least 7 and injured some two dozen, officials said.
by Jeremy Dirac, Devin Woodall | June 23, 2025, 4:27 pm
Photo:Devin Woodall
Emergency workers sifting through the debris of a deadly overnight missile and drone attack confirmed that fragments of a North Korean missile were recovered from the wreckage in Kyiv on Monday.
“It was a Korean missile, they just found some parts,” said a firefighter at the scene around 3 pm local time, speaking on condition of anonymity as recovery operations continued.
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The attack overnight Sunday-Monday targeted multiple regions of Ukraine with a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and kamikaze drones, according to Ukrainian military officials.
Kyiv was among the hardest hit, with at least seven people killed and more than two dozen injured. Authorities warned that the casualty count could rise as rescue teams continued to search through rubble in Kyiv’s Shevchenkivskyi district where a residential building was struck about 1 kilometer (0.6 miles) from the US embassy.
The presence of North Korean missile components marks the latest confirmation of the ongoing military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Ukrainian air defense systems intercepted many incoming threats, but some ballistic missiles got through in urban areas, causing widespread destruction to residential neighborhoods and critical infrastructure.
On June 11, Russia reportedly used North Korean ballistic missiles in another overnight onslaught that killed three people in Kharkiv, having also reportedly been used in a June 9 attack.
Other Topics of Interest
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has ordered strikes on Tehran after Israel reported incoming Iranian missiles despite a US-brokered ceasefire, which Iran denies violating.
In April, a North Korean KN-23 (Hwasong-11A) ballistic missile also reportedly struck a residential block in Kyiv’s Sviatoshynskyi district.
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Jeremy Dirac
Jeremy Dirac is the Deputy Managing News Editor for Kyiv Post. He’s been working in journalism for many years and has been focused on Ukrainian issues. Before joining Kyiv Post, he served as the Ukraine Desk Editor for WhoWhatWhy.org and as the Online News Editor for UATV Channel. He graduated from UMass Amherst in 2005 and learned the ropes as a cub reporter for The Recorder newspaper in Greenfield, Massachusetts.
Devin Woodall
Devin Woodall is a photojournalist and documentarian with a focus on civilian life, wartime society, and the ins and outs of adaptation amid the Ukrainian war. Originally from a working-class background, he’s held all manner of jobs from factory floor laborer to commander of a chaotic full-service kitchen. He currently writes, photographs, and reports on life and the human experience in critical frontline areas.
kyivpost.com · by Jeremy Dirac, Devin Woodall · June 23, 2025
12. Lee Jae Myung stresses peace on peninsula ahead of Korean War anniversary
Excerpts:
"When we think about the concept of national security, people tend to think it's important to achieve it through a victory in battle. But what's more important is that we win without a fight," Lee said at a Cabinet meeting he presided over Tuesday at his office.
"National security will certainly be guaranteed in a situation when there is no need to fight -- in other words, when peace prevails -- and politics has a role to play in building peace," added the liberal president.
Lee's remarks came a day before South Korea was to mark the anniversary of the Korean War, which broke out on June 25, 1950, with North Korea's invasion of South Korea.
Lee Jae Myung stresses peace on peninsula ahead of Korean War anniversary
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · June 24, 2025
South Korean national flags are placed next to graves of fallen heroes at the Seoul National Cemetery in Dongjak-gu, Seoul on Tuesday. (Yonhap)
President Lee Jae Myung said Tuesday, the day before the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of the 1950-53 Korean War, that national security can only be guaranteed when South Korea achieves peace on the peninsula.
"When we think about the concept of national security, people tend to think it's important to achieve it through a victory in battle. But what's more important is that we win without a fight," Lee said at a Cabinet meeting he presided over Tuesday at his office.
"National security will certainly be guaranteed in a situation when there is no need to fight -- in other words, when peace prevails -- and politics has a role to play in building peace," added the liberal president.
Lee's remarks came a day before South Korea was to mark the anniversary of the Korean War, which broke out on June 25, 1950, with North Korea's invasion of South Korea.
The United Nations forces and the communist side signed a ceasefire agreement on July 27, 1953, after about two years of negotiations, meaning the two Koreas remain technically at war to this day. The tragic war resulted in around 1 million South Korean civilian casualties, while over 160,000 South Korean soldiers were either killed or missing.
Lee, who assumed the presidency on June 4, is widely expected to pursue inter-Korean detente and resume Seoul's engagement with Pyongyang, as did his liberal predecessors Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in.
Lee's disgraced conservative predecessor Yoon Suk Yeol tended to take a hard-line stance against North Korea's provocations, and accused Pyongyang of heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
During Yoon's presidency, Pyongyang amended its Constitution to refer to South Korea as a "hostile state," suspended an inter-Korean military pact signed in 2018, destroyed inter-Korean roads and railways, and resumed propaganda broadcasts, among other things.
Soon after his inauguration, Lee ordered a halt to the operation of South Korea's propaganda loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border.
"In our reality, national security and the national economy are intertwined," Lee's spokesperson Kang Yu-jung told reporters.
President Lee Jae Myung convenes a Cabinet meeting held at the presidential office in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, Tuesday. (Yonhap)
During the Cabinet meeting, Lee also pledged to compensate those who "made extraordinary sacrifices" for their country.
"At a moment when fighting (against enemies) is inevitable, it is mostly helpless ordinary citizens who find themselves on the front line. There are many instances when ordinary people have sacrificed themselves in the fight to defend their communities," Lee said.
He continued, "Come to think of it, I don't believe those who made extraordinary sacrifices for their communities were rewarded correspondingly by the groups they belonged to."
This is aligned with Lee's speech commemorating Memorial Day on June 6. During that speech, delivered to an audience that included the bereaved families of Navy officers and commissioned officers who perished in a maritime patrol aircraft crash in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province, in May, and a firefighter who was killed during a massive fire at a tangerine warehouse on Jeju Island in 2023, Lee said, “Extraordinary sacrifices made for the good of all deserve to be met with extraordinary rewards.”
Also at the Cabinet meeting, Lee urged civil servants to shield the marginalized from external crises that stem from the recent conflict in the Middle East.
"The entire world, including South Korea, is now in great trouble," Lee said. "Crises inflict greater pain on the people who are poor and helpless. As we discuss measures to counter the rise in consumer prices and stabilize the cost of living, I hope our meeting can serve as an opportunity to minimize damage to the marginalized with extra care."
The Cabinet later on Tuesday approved presidential decrees extending the temporary tax relief on oil and gas and imposing tariff quotas to lower tariffs on certain goods, including liquefied petroleum gas, mackerel and processed egg products.
consnow@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · June 24, 2025
13. South Korea’s new leaders seek continuity on key defense issues
Good news perhaps.
South Korea’s new leaders seek continuity on key defense issues
Defense News · by Leilani Chavez · June 23, 2025
MANILA, Philippines — After winning this month’s snap elections, South Korea’s President Lee Jae-myung appointed lawmaker Ahn Gyu-back as defense minister in a role historically held by retired military generals.
Ahn has been a lawmaker since 2008 and leads the parliamentary special committee that investigates former President Yoon Suk Yeol, whose brief December declaration of martial law led to his arrest and subsequent impeachment.
Ahn’s appointment also marks a significant shift in the civilian-military balance in the South, analyst Kim Ju Hyung, President of Seoul-based Security Management Institute, told Defense News. Kim specializes in U.S.-Korea relations and SMI is a think tank affiliated with the National Assembly.
Ahn has “deep legislative and defense oversight experience,” says Kim, and being chosen to lead the ministry of defense means pushing reforms and transparency. It also signals “continuity and reliability” to Washington since Ahn is “not anti-alliance.”
“Rather, he’s a reform-minded moderate who may emphasize technological upgrades and alliance coordination without being overly deferential,” Kim said.
Lee’s recent victory raised uncertainties over the continuity of South Korea’s security and defense policies. Former President Yoon has taken a hardline stance against the North while Lee’s Democratic Party pushed for peaceful unification talks.
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As a lawmaker, Lee lamented the breakdown of negotiations with North Korea, openly criticized security ties with the U.S. and Japan, and panned increases in cost-sharing agreements that sustained the U.S. Forces Korea footprint on the peninsula.
Despite these, Lee will keep existing defense and security mechanisms, including the landmark Camp David trilateral summit talks and the nuclear-sharing pact with the U.S., Kim said.
“Initially, Lee will very likely pursue a status quo strategy since he needs to reassure South Korean conservatives,” Kim said. North Korea remains “antagonistic” even with Lee in office, he added.
This month, North Korea relaunched a 5,000-ton destroyer named Kang Kon, the first in a series of warships Pyongyang plans to build and deploy in the Pacific. The North also fired 10 rounds of rockets into the Yellow Sea last week after South Korea held air drills with the U.S. and Japan.
“Any major departures from Yoon-era security policy would be politically risky at this stage, especially without clear shifts in North Korea’s behavior,” Kim said.
This means Lee will keep the three-axis defense system, a comprehensive chain of counteroffensive military operations against a North Korean first strike.
He is also expected to maintain real-time data sharing and missile defense coordination with the U.S. and Japan despite Seoul’s plans to renew economic ties with Beijing and revive peaceful unification talks, Kim said.
While Lee will not attend the NATO Summit this week, he is expected to meet with President Donald Trump to discuss tariffs, a negotiation that may also include defense spending and the cost of keeping 28,000 American troops in the Korean peninsula.
Washington has pushed allies to double defense spending to address threats from China, Russia and North Korea. South Korea already spends 2.7% of its GDP on defense — and the increase will be a fiscal burden, Kim said.
“Domestically, a leap to 5% would be politically contentious and fiscally difficult,” Kim said.
“The Lee administration may rhetorically align with the broader rationale — especially given the dual contingency threat from China and North Korea — but actual movement will be cautious.”
Washington is also reportedly reassessing defense cost-sharing agreements with South Korea, and Trump wants significant increases to Seoul’s contributions under the Special Measures Agreement.
In 2024, Seoul and Washington sealed the deal for a new five-year term with payment on the first year amounting to $1.41 billion (1.51 trillion won) beginning in 2026.
Lee’s Democratic Party has voiced concerns over the South’s overdependence on the United States, including the presence of American troops there. Lee will likely follow this playbook and approach the negotiations with caution, Kim said.
The two countries could also open renegotiations, Kim said, but Seoul should handle it with deft, quiet diplomacy since it will likely negotiate to reduce costs or restructure payment terms.
“Although they haven’t publicly called for a formal revision of the most recent SMA, a change in administration could open the door to soft renegotiation — such as seeking more flexibility in implementation, redirecting funds toward mutually beneficial projects like joint AI or space-based capabilities, or slowing the pace of ROK [Republic of Korea]’s financial increases,” Kim said.
Seoul, however, should also reframe the agreement as a “joint strategic investment” rather than burden-sharing, and include defense exports, overseas deployments, and tech and infrastructure contributions in the negotiations, Kim said.
“The Lee administration should adopt a dual-track strategy: proactively demonstrate Seoul’s value as a high-capability security partner in the Indo-Pacific, while quietly negotiating terms that avoid abrupt shifts or public confrontation,” he said.
About Leilani Chavez
Leilani Chavez is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. Her reporting expertise is in East Asian politics, development projects, environmental issues and security.
14. President Lee picks South Korea’s first civilian defense chief in 64 years
President Lee picks South Korea’s first civilian defense chief in 64 years
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
SEOUL, South Korea -- South Korean President Lee Jae Myung nominated a five-term liberal lawmaker as defense minister Monday, breaking with a tradition of appointing retired military generals.
The announcement came as several prominent former defense officials, including ex-Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun, face high-profile criminal trials over their roles in carrying out martial law last year under then-President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was indicted on rebellion charges and removed from office.
Ahn Gyu-back, a lawmaker from Lee’s Democratic Party, has served on the National Assembly’s defense committee and chaired a legislative panel that investigated the circumstances surrounding Yoon’s martial law decree.
Yoon’s authoritarian move involved deploying hundreds of heavily armed troops to the National Assembly and election commission offices in what prosecutors described as an illegal attempt to shut down the legislature and arrest political opponents and election officials.
That sparked calls to strengthen civilian control over the military, and Lee promised during his election campaign to appoint a defense minister with a civilian background.
Since a 1961 coup that brought military dictator Park Chung-hee to power, all of South Korea’s defense ministers have come from the military — a trend that continued even after the country’s democratization in the late 1980s.
While Ahn will face a legislative hearing, the process is likely to be a formality, since the Democrats hold a comfortable majority in the National Assembly and legislative consent isn’t required for Lee to appoint him. Among Cabinet appointments, Lee only needs legislative consent for prime minister, Seoul’s nominal No. 2 job.
“As the first civilian Minister of National Defense in 64 years, he will be responsible for leading and overseeing the transformation of the military after its mobilization in martial law,” Kang Hoon-sik, Lee’s chief of staff, said in a briefing.
Ahn was among 11 ministers nominated by Lee on Monday, with longtime diplomat Cho Hyun selected as foreign minister and five-term lawmaker Chung Dong-young returning for another stint as unification minister — a position he held from 2004 to 2005 as Seoul’s point man for relations with North Korea.
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
15. Drunken fight between soldiers and militia leaves three dead in Samjiyon
Not a good sign at all. Recall how we defined regime collapse in the 1990s when we wrote the plan for north Korean instability and regime collapse. The regime will collapse when the party loses central governing effectiveness from Pyongyang combined with the loss of coherency and support of the military.
This could be a minor indication of a breakdown in the three chains of control (military, political, and security). Or it could just be a drunken brawl - though soldiers in most militaries who get into a drunken brawl do kill each other. Still, it bears watching.
Drunken fight between soldiers and militia leaves three dead in Samjiyon
In their drunken, agitated state, they grabbed anything at hand—pickaxes, shovels, stones—and swung wildly
By Jeong Seo-yeong - June 24, 2025
dailynk.com
Drunken fight between soldiers and militia leaves three dead in Samjiyon - Daily NK English
A panorama view of Samjiyon, Ryanggang Province. (Rodong Sinmun)
A source recenlty told Daily NK that a violent clash between soldiers and civilian militia in Samjiyon, Ryanggang province, left three dead and sent shockwaves through the local community.
According to a Daily NK source in Ryanggang province on June 19, the incident occurred at around 10 PM on June 6—Children’s Union Day—in an open field near the rural housing district’s drinking-water construction site in Samjiyon.
Three military construction workers and nine civilian assault detachment members were drinking together when a quarrel erupted and quickly escalated into a fierce brawl, leaving two soldiers and one militia member dead. The source added that the entire Samjiyon community was thrown into a state of shock.
“That afternoon, the militia members bought moonshine from a private home and shared it with the military builders,” the source explained. “When one soldier said, ‘We do all the labor while you just watch,’ hostile words were exchanged, and tensions boiled over into a bloody fistfight.”
In their drunken, agitated state, they grabbed anything at hand—pickaxes, shovels, stones—and swung wildly. The intense fight lasted over an hour, resulting in multiple casualties, the source said.
Dozens of children’s union members returning home from the event, along with nearby residents, witnessed the scene. “When I saw the soldiers covered in blood, it felt like I was watching a scene straight out of the Korean War,” eyewitnesses told Daily NK.
People who witnessed the clash alerted personnel at a nearby guard post, who then called the military unit. About 20 armed officers from the Guard Bureau arrived and subdued the soldiers and militia members, the source said.
He added they kept lunging at each other despite the efforts of the Guard Bureau officers until Samjiyon city public security officers, alerted by residents, arrived along with the military unit’s security department and restored order.
All those involved were arrested and placed in separate custody by the city’s public security department and the military’s security department.
The incident was reported directly to both the Samjiyon city Party Committee and the military unit’s Party Committee, prompting a joint emergency meeting of senior officials.
“The city party condemned this unprecedented incident for tarnishing Samjiyon’s status as a sacred revolutionary site and demanded to know who supplied the alcohol,” the source said.
Furthermore, the source said the incident exposed failures in controlling mixed military-civilian personnel and in preventing public drinking. Judging that urgent measures are needed to prevent recurrence, the city party has launched a full review of the civilian assault detachment’s operations and is working with the military party committee to develop steps to restore trust in military-civilian relations.
Read in Korean
Jeong Seo-yeong
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK's freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
16. US Strikes On Iran May Strengthen North Korea’s Nuclear Resolve – Analysis
US Strikes On Iran May Strengthen North Korea’s Nuclear Resolve – Analysis
https://www.eurasiareview.com/24062025-us-strikes-on-iran-may-strengthen-north-koreas-nuclear-resolve-analysis/
June 24, 2025 0 Comments
By RFA
By Han Do-hyung
The U.S. air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities will have reinforced North Korea’s perception that possessing nuclear weapons is essential for its survival and may even prompt Pyongyang to accelerate the development of its nuclear capabilities, warned South Korean experts.
U.S. President Donald Trump on Saturday announced that the U.S. had conducted “massive precision strikes” on three Iranian nuclear sites – Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan – that has “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities.
The attack on Iran’s nuclear sites marks the first offensive U.S. military action in Israel’s war with Iran – a major escalation in tensions in the Middle East – which South Korean analysts warn will make North Korea increasingly resistant to any diplomatic efforts or talks aimed at convincing Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program.
“North Korea must have thought it was a good idea to have nuclear weapons after seeing the U.S. airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities,” Jeong Seong-jang, deputy director of the Sejong Institute, told Radio Free Asia on Monday.
In a statement Monday, a spokesperson for the North Korean Foreign Ministry criticized the U.S. airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, saying it “violated the U.N. Charter and international law, which have as their basic principles respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs,” North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported.
Despite calls by the U.S. and its allies for denuclearization, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has pushed for his country to bolster its nuclear capabilities to defend itself, warning earlier this year that “confrontation with the most vicious hostile countries is inevitable.” While the “hostile countries” were not named, North Korea regards the U.S. and its ally, South Korea, as its main enemies.
In 2003, North Korea withdrew after acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), shortly after the U.S. invaded Iraq. It cited concerns, at the time, that the U.S. was planning a preemptive strike against Pyongyang.
“North Korea is (likely to be) concerned that if it gives up its nuclear weapons, it will end up in a situation similar to Iran, and will not accept future proposals for denuclearization discussions.”
He warned the strikes may even prompt North Korea – which conducted its first underground nuclear test in 2006 – to accelerate the development of nuclear submarines in an effort to secure so-called ‘second-strike’ capabilities – or the ability to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes after a preemptive one.
Other South Korean experts echoed similar concerns.
“Kim Jong Un will probably order the relocation, hiding, and concealment of nuclear facilities, as well as the expansion of air defense systems,” Professor Nam Seong-wook of Sookmyung Women’s University told RFA.
In a social media post, Kim Dong-yeop, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, argued that the U.S. strikes would cause North Korea to further solidify its perception that “only possession of nuclear weapons can lead to survival” and provide much-needed validation for Pyongyang to hold on to its nuclear arsenal.
Since 2006, North Korea has tested nuclear devices six times and has developed missiles believed to be capable of reaching the U.S. mainland.
During his first term, Trump held historic summits with Kim Jong Un, hoping to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief, but his high-level diplomacy ultimately failed to achieve a breakthrough. The North has continued to build its nuclear and missile programs.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that North Korea has assembled around 50 warheads and possesses enough fissile material to produce up to 40 more warheads and is accelerating the production of further fissile material.
Earlier this year, Pyongyang reiterated that it has no intention of giving up its nuclear program.
North Korea would now view diplomatic engagement with the United States as “foolish” and any future negotiations of denuclearization as futile, Kim Dong-yeop wrote in a social media post on Sunday.
“North Korea will use the Iran situation as an excuse to strengthen its criticism of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation,” he added.
RFA
Radio Free Asia’s mission is to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press. Content used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.
17. Five Challenges For South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung – Analysis
Excerpts:
After assuming the president’s post, Lee Jae-myung has talked about the need to unite a divided South Korean society.
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The second challenge for Lee Jae-myung will be revitalising the sluggish economy.
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The third big challenge for Lee Jae-myung will be to determine how to engage with China in the economic domain while moving closer to South Korea’s military ally, the US.
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The fourth challenge for Lee Jae-myung will be to determine his approach towards North Korea.
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The fifth challenge will be to maintain and improve relations with Japan.
Five Challenges For South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung – Analysis
https://www.eurasiareview.com/21062025-five-challenges-for-south-korean-president-lee-jae-myung-analysis/
June 21, 2025 0 Comments
By IPCS
By Dr. Sandip Kumar Mishra
Lee Jae-myung became the 21st President of South Korea on 4 June 2025 after a tumultuous six months for South Korean politics, which began with the sudden announcement of emergency martial law by the previous President Yoon Suk-yeol on the night of 3 December 2024. Although martial law was withdrawn within six hours as the National Assembly rejected the decision, the process of President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and the election of a new leader were cumbersome. Once the Constitutional Court of South Korea approved the impeachment on 4 April 2025, the whole process of choosing a new leader was completed within two months.
The Democratic Party of South Korea, which enjoys a comfortable majority in the National Assembly, was swift in choosing its candidate for president, but the People’s Power Party (PPP) took longer to get it done. In post-martial law South Korea, the People’s Power Party hasn’t been able to decide if it should fully distance itself from Yoon Suk-yeol or not. The dilemma has created a gap between their formal pronouncements and their actual behaviour.
However, election results show that despite martial law, factionalism in the PPP, and the late announcement of the presidential candidate, PPP candidate Kim Moon-soo was able to get 41.15 per cent of the votes. This means that most of the support bases of the PPP remain loyal. The election results also show that South Korean men in their 20s and 30s are feeling discontented with the Democratic Party along with the older generation which generally supports the conservative party.
After assuming the president’s post, Lee Jae-myung has talked about the need to unite a divided South Korean society. He has promised to communicate more with opposition party leaders and people, and has also promised greater cooperation and transparency in the making and implementation of policies. However, the task ahead is not easy. His pledges of constitutional reform and reforming the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office as well as instituting a two four-year term limit on the presidency will be challenging. The Democratic Party, because of its comfortable majority in the National Assembly, will try to take up all these issues, leading to political contestation with the opposition PPP. Uniting the Korean people and political reform will be the first challenge for Lee Jae-myung.
The second challenge for Lee Jae-myung will be revitalising the sluggish economy. He said that he considers it the most important task ahead. South Korea’s growth rate in 2025 is projected to be 0.8 per cent. For several years, the country’s growth rate has been slow and the ‘citizen economy’ needs to be dealt with urgently. Lee has already created a task force to address it. It remains to be seen how he will bring back economic vitality to South Korea’s export-led economy when many regions of the world are facing military conflict.
The third big challenge for Lee Jae-myung will be to determine how to engage with China in the economic domain while moving closer to South Korea’s military ally, the US. With the US, Lee Jae-myung has to resolve tariff issues that are looming large. He also has to convince Trump to maintain the status quo in cost-sharing for American soldiers stationed in South Korea. The US may demand more active participation from South Korea in areas of contestation with China and Russia. Lee Jae-myung may do so, but he will likely be less loud than his predecessor.
The fourth challenge for Lee Jae-myung will be to determine his approach towards North Korea. His party and he have been in favour of engagement with North Korea, but at present North Korea doesn’t appear keen. North Korea has a more sophisticated missile and nuclear inventory than in the past, is relatively less isolated after the mutual defence agreement with Russia last year, has also officially abandoned the goal of unification, and designated South Korea as a “hostile state.” Immediately after coming to power, Lee put a stop to the broadcasting of propaganda loudspeakers at the border and also wanted to stop sending propaganda balloons to North Korea. North Korea responded positively to his moves by also stopping North Korean loudspeakers, but moving forward would be a test of the president’s resolve, tactfulness, and sincerity.
The fifth challenge will be to maintain and improve relations with Japan. Usually, under progressive presidents in South Korea, except Kim Dae-jung, South Korea’s relations with Japan have deteriorated. Lee Jae-myung has to show he is a leader like Kim Dae-jung, who can build good relations with Japan as well as with other regional countries.
In brief, the new president of South Korea faces formidable domestic and foreign policy challenges. That said, Lee Jae-myung is considered a pragmatic, sharp, decisive, and hardworking leader, and he will certainly try to deal with these challenges positively.
- About the author: Dr. Sandip Kumar Mishra is Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies in SIS, JNU, and Distinguished Fellow, IPCS.
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Source: This article was published by IPCS
18. N. Korea now holds all the cards but can it last? Consequences of Russia-NK rapprochement
How does this bode for President Lee's desire to engage with north Korea? Kim Jong Un is in even a more advantageous position to execute hsi political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.
N. Korea now holds all the cards but can it last? Consequences of Russia-NK rapprochement
The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia is widely seen as reducing North Korea’s dependence on China and providing the DPRK with greater strategic independence
By Dr. Gerald Pech - June 23, 2025
dailynk.com
N. Korea now holds all the cards but can it last? Consequences of Russia-NK rapprochement - Daily NK English
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un held a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia on Sept. 13 last year, according to the Rodong Sinmun on Sept. 14, 2023. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia has brought immediate benefits to the North Korean leadership. In addition, it has further strengthened North Korea’s position in its relationship with China, as reflected in China’s continued accommodation despite North Korea’s increased belligerence and the apparent unease that it has caused in Beijing. An implication is that – for as long as North Korean interests are best served by maintaining the status quo – any hope of fundamentally changing the situation on the Korean peninsula is remote. Yet, while for the moment, the North Korean leadership is a main beneficiary of the shifts in the balance of power in Northeast Asia, this may not last.
The Russia-North Korea rapprochement
Relations between Pyongyang and Moscow have historically developed countercyclically to relations between Pyongyang and Beijing.[1] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea became more dependent on China but since the first meeting of their current presidents in June 2023, Russia-North Korea relations have experienced a turnaround, leading to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Pact”, signed in June 2024 which commits both countries to provide military assistance if the other is subjected to armed aggression.[2]
The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia is widely seen as reducing North Korea’s dependence on China and providing the DPRK with greater strategic independence.[3] In official trade data, North Korea-China trade still dwarfs North Korea-Russia trade even though the latter was expected to triple in 2024.[4] However, since September 2023, there has been a steady flow of weapons shipments from North Korea to Russia[5] to make up for ammunition shortages that had emerged during Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and, by October 2024, North Korea had begun with the deployment of troops to Russian Kursk Oblast. Olena Guseinova of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul[6] estimated that by October 2024 the weapons deliveries alone had reached a value of between $1.7 billion and $5.5 billion. While this estimate excludes any earnings from North Korean troop deployments in Russia, it already puts trade with Russia at a similar level as official trade with China of about $2.3 billion in 2023.[7]
North Korea appears to have used part of its earnings from trade with Russia to cushion the inflationary impact of a short-terminist policy of increasing wages in the state sector which was rolled out in late 2023.[8] The partnership agreement also includes cooperation in scientific and technological research, in particular in space and peaceful atomic energy, raising fears of Russian support for the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and missile program, directly enhancing North Korean capacity for belligerence. Shortly after concluding the agreement, in November 2023, North Korea finally succeeded – reportedly with the help of Russia – to launch a reconnaissance satellite.[9]
While the frequency of serious provocations such as missile tests has remained consistently high since the end of the pandemic restrictions in January 2022,[10] there has been a recent hardening of North Korean policy towards South Korea, including the destruction of border crossings, the renunciation of the aim of unification and, as reported in late 2024, a constitutional amendment that classifies South Korea as an enemy state.[11]
China-North Korea relations
As direct neighbors, the relationship between North Korea and China is ambivalent. North Korea is the only country with which China has a defense treaty – going back to 1961. While North Korea depends on China for an overwhelming share of its trade, the level of trust in the relationship is low: North Korea fears China’s meddling in its affairs and relations have been strained by North Korea’s policy of developing nuclear weapons.
For China, North Korea serves as a buffer against the United States and its allies Japan and South Korea that it perceives as a threat to its own security.[12] Yet North Korea’s belligerence also creates a risk for China of getting drawn into a conflict – a fear which it tried to address when the defense treaty was renewed in 2021: mutual obligations were explicitly limited to cases of aggression instigated by third parties.[13]
China-North Korea relations were traditionally managed through summit diplomacy, with China showing some success in reining in North Korean belligerence.[14] China’s long-standing objectives in this relationship are peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the denuclearization of North Korea. However, with Xi Jinping’s accession to the CPC leadership in November 2012, the drive for denuclearization took a greater precedence in China-North Korea relations. In February 2013, North Korea’s three missile tests signaled a clear disregard for China’s calls for restraint. In response, China scaled back diplomatic and military engagements, and ties between the leaders of the nominal allies cooled significantly.[15] Moreover, the common interest in bringing North Korea to the negotiation table over its nuclear weapons program saw China align with the United States in support of increasingly stringent UN Security Council resolutions in 2016 and 2017, aimed at coercing North Korea into abandoning its nuclear weapons program.
China’s approach shifted again in 2018,[16] when the prospect of a US-North Korea settlement emerged, leading to the high-profile – but ultimately unsuccessful – summits between the US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore and Hanoi. Following the announcement of the first Trump-Kim summit on March 8, 2018, Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping held two meetings, with two additional meetings taking place thereafter.[17]
Subsequent Chinese government visits to North Korea, however, have produced a lack of tangible outcomes. In 2019, tensions surfaced when North Korea appeared to snub China diplomatically. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was not received by Kim Jong-un, and North Korea sent only a lower ranking government official to the second Belt and Road Forum.[18] Despite this, China, alongside Russia, vetoed UN Security Council resolution 2022/431, which condemned the intercontinental ballistic missile test of March 24, 2022. This marked a strong contrast to the Council’s unanimous condemnation of similar tests in 2017.[19] In May 2025, a joint statement by Russia and China, issued on the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, called to stop unilateral sanctions and military pressure against North Korea. [20]
China-Russia relations
The Ukraine war also brought about a deepening of the relationship – dubbed a “no limit partnership” – between Russia and China, with Russia becoming increasingly dependent on China as a supplier of technology and a market for fossil fuels. Amid growing hostility between China and the United States, the US administration’s recent attempt to improve relations with Russia must have raised some concerns in Beijing.[21] While the Russia – North Korea rapprochement negatively affects Chinese interests in Northeast Asia and Russia has no alternative to the partnership with China in the short term, China’s interests would be ill served if a repetition of the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s happened in the medium term.
China’s response to the Russia-North Korea rapprochement
Amid China’s increasingly adversarial relationship with the United States – dating back to the first Trump presidency – and concerns of losing leverage over North Korea, the prospect of a US-DPRK rapprochement appears to have shifted China’s stance toward its neighbor. While the Russia-North Korea rapprochement is, arguably, less threatening, China still seems to view their relationship with unease.
North Korean belligerence remains a key concern for China. Since 2018, China has tended to shift blame for tensions on the Korean peninsula from North Korea to the United States and its trilateral alliance.[22] But more recently, China’s uneasiness about North Korea has been growing:[23] in October 2024, the Chinese CCTV news channel expressed concern about the complexity of the situation created by the Russia-North Korea alliance, and its impact on the Korean peninsula.[24] Ultimately, however, China has few other options than continue to accommodate North Korea if it wishes to avoid even further destabilization of the situation on the Korean peninsula and there are no signs that it is willing to undermine its own partnership with Russia.
As the North Korean leadership has shown in the past, it is quite adept at playing off different stakeholders against each other. Therefore, it must perceive the current strategic environment – marked by competing interests among partners and adversaries – as highly advantageous. Soon these dynamics will include South Korea, under a new Lee Jae-myung Presidency. While North Korea is likely to seek ways to further enhance its position – possibly including fresh advances to the United States[25] – it would be hard pressed to give up advantages tied to the present geopolitical situation. This is likely to frustrate hopes that the second Trump presidency is going bring about a change in the status quo on the Korean peninsula.[26]
The future, however, looks less promising for North Korea: it remains unclear to what extent the United States is willing to re-engage on the Korean peninsula. While Russia is likely to remain focused on maintaining and rebuilding its military power, an eventual end to its war in Ukraine is likely to shift priorities to its military-industrial complex at home. A China interested in shifting the geopolitical balance in Northeast Asia in its favor might be less interested in an unreliable ally. While it lasts, though, North Korea is unlikely to be the wedge with which to effect change in the balance of power in Northeast Asia.
References:
[1]Lee, Choong-Koo (2025), “China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity.” War on the Rocks. Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/chinas-ties-with-north-korea-are-in-a-ditch-and-therin-lies-opportunity/.
[2]Von Essen, Hugo, “Putin’s June 2024 Visit to North Korea Sends Ripples Through Both East and West”, SCEEUS Commentary No. 10, 2024, https://sceeus.se/en/publications/putins-june-2024-visit-to-north-korea-sends-ripples-through-both-east-and-west/
[3]Institute for the Study of War, “China-Taiwan Weekly Update”, May 2, 2025, https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-2-2025
[4] In the first half of 2024, North Korea – Russia trade was $53mn, up from $34mn in the entire year 2023, see Frederic Spohr (2024), New ties between North Korea and Russia, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, October 28, 2024, https://www.freiheit.org/new-ties-between-north-korea-and-russia.
[5]https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/NORTHKOREA-RUSSIA/lgvdxqjwbvo/
[6] Olena Guseinova, “Putin’s Partner”, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Korea, October 2024, https://shop.freiheit.org/#!/Publikation/1807.
[7]Official North Korea – China trade was about $2.3 billion in 2023, see https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/prk. In the first half of 2024, North Korea – Russia trade was $53mn, up from $34mn in the entire year 2023
[8]Andrei Lankov, “How North Korea has clawed back control over the economy by hiking state wages”, NK News, May 13, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/how-north-korea-has-clawed-back-control-over-the-economy-by-hiking-state-wages/. See also Bang, Chan Young, “Why North Korea’s bold experiment with raising wages is destined to fail”, NK News, May 27, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/why-north-koreas-bold-experiment-with-raising-wages-is-destined-to-fail/
[9]See e.g. Institute for the Study of War, “North Korea Joins Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Operational and Strategic Implications in Ukraine and Northeast Asia”, November 1, 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications
[10] See https://beyondparallel.csis.org/database-north-korean-provocations/.
[11] ”North Korea Construction at the East and West Border Crossings”, 38 North, October 25, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/10/north-korea-construction-at-the-east-and-west-border-crossings/ and “North Korean constitution now calls South ‘hostile state” , BBC News, October 17, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wnxlxxwq2o.
[12] See, e.g., Mearsheimer, John (2014), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated edition, WW Norton, 372.
[13]Vu, Khang (2021), “Why China and North Korea Decided to Renew 60 Year-old Treaty”, Lowly Institute July 30, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-north-korea-decided-renew-60-year-old-treaty
[14]See, e.g. Lee, Yongjae (2023), “China’s Diplomatic Leverage on North Korean Provocations: Effect of High-Level Meetings Between China and North Korea on North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests”, Journal of East Asian Studies, 23: 517–546, https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2023.12.
[15]Snyder, Scott, “Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?” Council on Foreign Relations March 31, 2016, www.cfr.org/expert-brief/will-china-change-its-north-korea-policy.
[16]Min, Kyung-tae 2023), “Navigating Geopolitical Change in Northeast Asia: A Realist Approach to Analyze the Matrix Scenario of US-China Conflict and US–North Korea Relations”, Pacific Focus 38: 378–408, https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12236.
[17]CICS (2017), List of China-North Korea High Level Visits Since 1953, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/china-dprk-high-level-visits-since-1953-2/
[18]Frohman, Ben, Emma Rafaelof, Alexis Dale-Huang (2022), The China-North Korea Strategic Rift: Background and Implications for the United States, Staff research report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/China-North_Korea_Strategic_Rift.pdf
[19]UN Security Council Resolution 2371, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2371
[20]Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Further Deepening Relations of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation in the New Era to Commemorate the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, the Victory of the Chinese People in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the Establishment of the United Nations, p.26. May 8, 2025. Retrieved from http://kremlin.ru/supplement/6309/, see also Sokolin, Anton. 2025. “Putin, Xi demand end to sanctions and ‘military pressure’ against North Korea. NK News. Retrieved from https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/putin-xi-demand-end-to-sanctions-and-military-pressure-against-north-korea/?t=1747050244.
[21] Jie, Yu (2025), China’s partnership with Russia needs to have limits, Financial Times, February 28, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/880bfd61-c1d6-40e4-9df0-ddf67a4a2b4d.
[22]Park Sang-joon, Han Yong-joon. (2023). “The dilemma of North Korea-China relations”. The Korean Journal of Area Studies 41(2), 55-86. https://scholar.kyobobook.co.kr/article/detail/4010047507932.
[23]Lee, Choong-Koo (2025), “China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity”, War on the Rocks, February 19, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/chinas-ties-with-north-korea-are-in-a-ditch-and-therin-lies-opportunity/
[24]While stopping short of blaming its allies, Chinese state media has expressed serious concern about the tensions on the Korean peninsula after the Russia-DPRK rapprochement: “However, this has also led to a complex situation of “Russia North Korea vs. the United States, South Korea, and Japan” in the Korean Peninsula and even East Asia, causing great concern from the outside world.“ see “Who is stirring up the situation on the peninsula from melting ice to falling to freezing point?”, CCTV News, October 21, 2024, https://content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/index.html?item_id=1747617345351656070&toc_style_id=feeds_default&share_to=copy_url&track_id=8dd60738-109b-4786-bfd9-2c75121d9133.
[25] Defector interviews suggest that if the Russia-North Korea partnership were to fail in providing benefits, North Korea might “turn” to the US according to John Everard on the RTE1 Today program on November 11, 2024.
[26] see, e.g., Dmitri Alperovitch and Sergey Radchenko, “Trump-Kim, Part II, Could Shake Up the World”, New York Times, December 29, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/29/opinion/us-north-korea-china-russia-axis.html.
Dr. Gerald Pech
Dr. Gerald Pech is a researcher at the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP University and associate professor of economics at KIMEP University.
dailynk.com
19. Joe Rogan Revives Dennis Rodman’s North Korea Meltdown as Kim Jong-un Chaos Revealed
Not my usual type of natonal security article.
Joe Rogan Revives Dennis Rodman’s North Korea Meltdown as Kim Jong-un Chaos Revealed
essentiallysports.com · by Ishan yadav · June 23, 2025
“Seth Rogen and Evan Goldberg wrote a version of this script before Rodman went to North Korea. It was actually long enough ago, it was Kim Jong-un’s father,” explained James Franco while discussing the highly controversial film The Interview. Franco pointed out the eerie timing of the movie’s release, as its storyline ended up mirroring real-world events—specifically Dennis Rodman’s bizarre visits to North Korea. The unexpected overlap drew laughter from fans, especially among movie lovers who appreciated the strange coincidence.
What makes it even more surreal is that the filmmakers wrote and finalized The Interview well before Rodman’s documentary took shape. In the film, Franco’s character, Dave Skylark, befriends North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un (credited as “Kim”). They hang out, play basketball, and build an unusual bond — a fictional scenario that ended up reflecting Rodman’s real-life friendship with Kim. Comedian humorously recounted that backstory Big Jay Oakerson during his recent appearance on The Joe Rogan Experience.
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Joe Rogan’s guest shares wild story about Dennis Rodman’s North Korea trip
Back in 2013, retired NBA legend Dennis Rodman made headlines when he meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The former Chicago Bulls star had flown to Pyongyang to film a documentary under the pretense of organizing a friendly basketball game between North Korean players and a group of former NBA athletes — a bizarre gesture later dubbed “basketball diplomacy.” HBO aired the event, marked the beginning of Rodman’s unexpected friendship with the Supreme Leader.
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Rodman’s relationship with Kim Jong-un quickly deepened — to the point where he reportedly became the first known foreigner to meet Kim’s daughter, Ju-ae. Despite its strange significance, the documentary remained under the radar for some. During episode #2239 of The Joe Rogan Experience, the podcaster admitted he hadn’t seen it. His guest, comedian Big Jay Oakerson, described it with enthusiasm,
“He goes over there and hangs with Kim Jong. It’s the best documentary… as soon as humanly possible to Dennis Rodman’s Big Bang in Pyongyang.”
As Oakerson recounted the surreal events of the basketball game, he didn’t mince words, calling the whole experience “nonsense.” He recalled how Rodman, who was expected to play, suddenly bailed on the game — in a scene that felt like it came straight from The Interview movie — and instead chose to spend time with Kim Jong-un,
“Dennis Rodman stops playing — he just changes out of his uniform and puts on street clothes, and goes and hangs out with Kim Jong-un right away… He also has the audience try to sing along Happy Birthday to Kim Jong-un at the start of the game. But the audience doesn’t know what he’s singing, so they just start clapping too fast while he’s singing.”
USA Today via Reuters
MMA: UFC 274-Cortez vs Gatto, May 7, 2022 Phoenix, Arizona, USA UFC host Joe Rogan during UFC 274 at Footprint Center. Mandatory Credit: Mark J. Rebilas-USA TODAY Sports, 07.05.2022 15:43:40, 18687974, UFC, Joe Rogan, MMA PUBLICATIONxINxGERxSUIxAUTxONLY Copyright: xMarkxJ.xRebilasx 18687974
Over the years, Dennis Rodman has traveled to North Korea five times, with his final visit taking place in 2017. That trip, which drew global headlines, was sponsored by the cryptocurrency company PotCoin. At the time, U.S.–North Korea relations were highly tense, and Rodman stated that his visit was intended to promote peace and mutual understanding. Since then, Rodman hasn’t returned to the country, despite continued diplomatic strain. Still, it’s notable that during that period, Rodman maintained a Neutral relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump.
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Donald Trump shares details of Kim Jong-un relationship with Rogan
While North Korea has long had a tense and hostile relationship with the United States, Donald Trump’s approach to the regime — and its leader, Kim Jong-un — has been anything but conventional. Known for his off-the-cuff humor, Trump didn’t shy away from taunting the North Korean dictator, both publicly and online. One of their most memorable exchanges saw Trump tweeting thatthe dictator was “short and fat” after the North Korean leader called him “old.”
Despite the public barbs and mounting global concern over North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal, Trump never viewed Kim as America’s biggest threat. In fact, he often claimed to have developed a personal rapport with the leader. Appearing on episode #2229 of The Joe Rogan Experience, Trump reflected on that unusual dynamic, saying he actually knows Kim Jong-un “very well.” He even recalled a moment when he offered the dictator a piece of advice,
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“I said: ‘Do you ever do anything else? Why don’t you go take it easy? Go to the beach, relax.’ I said, ‘You’re always building nuclear, you don’t have to do it. Relax!’ I said, ‘Let’s build some condos on your shore.’”
Today, however, Donald Trump appears to have turned his attention away from North Korea — a nation that has largely gone quiet in recent times. His current focus has shifted toward the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel, a crisis that has significantly reshaped the global geopolitical landscape.
essentiallysports.com · by Ishan yadav · June 23, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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