Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The Soviet invasion caught U.S. policymakers by surprise, and President Carter was not happy about it. Right up to the invasion, the CIA's view was that the Soviets wouldn't go in. As the former Director of Central intelligence Robert Gates would later write, “CIA’s Soviet analysts just couldn't believe that the Soviets actually would invade… They saw all the reasons why it would be foolish for the Soviets to do so… [and] thought that the Soviet leaders thought as they did.” The same error was made by U.S. officials before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in in 1990, and, reportedly, by some senior officials in the Biden White House in the summer, and fall of 2021 before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Each of these moves was telegraphed in advance. The moral of the story is that when dictators tell you what they're going to do, believe them.

– Michael G Vickers, By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life and Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy

Some say, the world will end in fire,

Some say in ice.

From what I've tasted of desire,

I hold with those who favor fire.

But if I had to perish twice

I think I know enough of hate

To say that for destruction ice

Is also great

And would suffice.

- Robert Frost

“I have no right to call myself one who knows. I was one who six, and I still am, but I no longer seek in. The stars are in the books; I'm beginning to hear the teachings of my blood pulsing within me. My story isn't pleasant, it's not sweet and harmonious like the invented stories; it tastes a Foley in bewilderment, of madness and dream, like the life of all people who no longer want to lie to themselves.”

- Hermann Hesse

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2023

2. Exclusive: Army secretary talks force structure cuts, SOF ‘reform’

3. Suspending U.S.-Chinese military ties is no longer a low-risk proposition

4. Putin Moves to Seize Control of Wagner’s Global Empire

5. Forget About Those Faulty Timelines for Ukraine’s Success

6. Chinese Balloon Used American Tech to Spy on Americans

7. After Wagner Group’s failed coup, spread the word: Putin is vulnerable

8. Zaporizhzhian Cossack traditions are making a comeback during the war

9. Is Another Chornobyl Looming at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

10. US Green Berets are looking to troops from NATO's newest member as 'mentors' for harsh winter combat

11. Getting U.S.-Japanese Command and Control Right

12. US approves $15 billion in Patriot and missile defense upgrades for Poland

13. Modi’s US Visit Illustrates Growing Complexities of the Indo-Pacific

14. Green Beret with a Mission builds bridges and raises spirits

15. Why war with China over Taiwan could ruin the global economy

16. 10 questions Congress should ask incoming Joint Chiefs nominees

17. There’s No Such Thing as a Great Power

18. West Virginia Guard Hosts Irregular Warfare Exercise

19. Echoes of the Past: The Burma Campaign and Future Operational Design in the Indo-Pacific Region

20. A More Perfect Union: Black Soldiers and the Promise of America

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2023

Key Takeaways

Continued reporting about the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion suggests that involved parties may still be negotiating the specifics of the agreement.
Russian sources speculated that Wagner’s rebellion is already having widespread impacts on the Russian command structure.
Russian authorities reportedly arrested Army General Sergei Surovikin on June 28, possibly indicating that the Kremlin intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal.
The Kremlin will likely attempt to balance a desire to mitigate the widespread disdain for MoD establishment figures that fueled Wagner’s rebellion while also trying to disempower those who may have sympathized with the rebellion.
The Russian Duma is considering additional measures to increase control over the information space and promote self-censorship within broad internet communities.
Belarus formally ratified an agreement on the establishment of joint Russian-Belarusian training centers in Belarus on June 28.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu held a phone conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Major General Mohammad Bagheri on June 28.
Unconfirmed reports claim that Russian military police allegedly detained Wagner Group commanders in Syria.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the front.
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted a strike on civilian infrastructure in Kramatorsk in Donetsk Oblast on the night of June 27.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and conducted limited probing attacks on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge in Kherson Oblast on June 27 and 28.
Russian sources reported on continued Russian efforts to clarify terms and conditions for military service.
Russian and occupation officials continue efforts to deconflict legal discrepancies as part of the incorporation of occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 28, 2023

Jun 28, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kita Fitzpatrick, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 28, 2023, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on June 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Continued reporting about the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion suggests that involved parties may still be negotiating the specifics of the agreement. Independent Belarusian monitoring group The Hajun Project cited flight tracking data on June 27 suggesting that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s jet took off from the Machulishchy airfield in Belarus towards Russia, flew to Moscow, and then immediately took off for St. Petersburg.[1] Former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Prigozhin returned to Russia to negotiate with unspecified Russian officials and the Wagner Commander’s Council.[2] ISW cannot independently confirm if Prigozhin did in fact return to Russia, nor the details of the purported visit, but Prigozhin may have returned briefly to work out further details of the deal negotiated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko.

Russian sources continued to speculate on the specifics of this deal on June 28. A Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger posted an interview with a Belarusian Wagner fighter wherein the fighter claimed that Wagner has opened a “new combat direction” in Belarus and that some Wagner fighters will “work in Russia” while some “work in Belarus.”[3] Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing a source within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that only 1,000 Wagner fighters went to Belarus with Prigozhin, however.[4] Belarusian opposition channel Belamova additionally claimed that satellite imagery from June 27 shows the construction of a new military object in the Osipovichi raion that was not visible as of June 13, suggesting that the imagery could show the construction of a Wagner training camp in Belarus.[5] It is unclear if construction of the military object appeared before the announcement of the Prigozhin-Lukashenko deal on June 24, and ISW cannot independently confirm if the object is in any way related to Wagner.[6] However, the pervasive speculation surrounding Wagner’s position in Belarus suggests that certain aspects of the deal are still being worked out.

Russian sources speculated that Wagner’s rebellion is already having widespread impacts on the Russian command structure. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner’s rebellion has prompted “large-scale purges” among the command cadre of the Russian armed forces and that the Russian MoD is currently undergoing a “crash-test” for loyalty.[7] The milblogger claimed that the Russian Federal Protective Service (FSO) is conducting a review of the Russian military leadership as well as the individual unit commanders.[8] The milblogger claimed that Russian officials are using the MoD’s “indecisiveness” in suppressing the rebellion and “support for paramilitary companies (PMCs)” as pretexts to remove “objectionable” personnel from their positions. The milblogger notably claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) commander and rumored deputy theater commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky assumed responsibilities as overall theater commander in Ukraine from Chief of the General Staff and current overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov on an unspecified date, but likely after the rebellion. The milblogger emphasized that Gerasimov will retain his post as Chief of the General Staff but will no longer have responsibilities for Russian operations in Ukraine. Another Russian source claimed that an “atmosphere of suspicion has enveloped the General Staff” and that affiliates of Gerasimov are accused of indecision and failure while the affiliates of deputy commander of the joint grouping of forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin are accused of complicity in the rebellion.[9] The sources publishing these speculations have largely been accurate in previous reporting on Russian command changes, although the ongoing disruption to human networks and the severe potential consequences related to Prigozhin’s armed rebellion may affect these sources’ accuracy. ISW cannot confirm any of these speculations about the command changes at this time, but it is evident that the armed rebellion is continuing to have substantial ramifications in the information space.

Russian authorities reportedly arrested Army General Sergei Surovikin on June 28, possibly indicating that the Kremlin intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal. Russian opposition source The Moscow Times reported on June 28 that two sources close to the MoD confirmed that the Russian authorities had arrested Surovikin because he chose to side with Prigozhin during the rebellion.[10] The New York Times reported on June 28 that US officials briefed on US intelligence stated that Surovikin had advance knowledge of the rebellion, but that US intelligence is still trying to ascertain if Surovikin directly supported Prigozhin’s effort.[11] It is unclear what transpired that would have forced Surovikin to call on Prigozhin to end the rebellion only several hours after its start, although it is possible that he did so under duress instead of out of support for the Russian military leadership. If Russian authorities did arrest Surovikin then the Kremlin will likely use Surovikin and his affiliates as scapegoats to publicly explain why the Russian military and Russian internal security apparatuses responded poorly to the rebellion and to justify a potential overhaul of the Russian military leadership. ISW has previously reported on Surovikin‘s notable Wagner affiliations and alleged support for Wagner, and Surovikin is a prime candidate for a scapegoat regardless of the actual level of support he gave to the rebellion.[12]

The Kremlin will likely attempt to balance a desire to mitigate the widespread disdain for MoD establishment figures that fueled Wagner’s rebellion while also trying to disempower those who may have sympathized with the rebellion. Segments of the pro-war ultranationalist community and the Russian military have routinely criticized Gerasimov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for their management of the war in Ukraine, and Prigozhin’s avowed goal of forcibly removing the two generals suggests that the Kremlin may view Gerasimov’s and Shoigu’s unpopularity as a direct threat to Putin’s ability to retain support among key constituencies and the military.[13] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely attempting to signal that Shoigu will maintain his position, but the Kremlin has yet to promote Gerasimov in a similar way in the days following the rebellion.[14] The Kremlin may attempt to placate disdain for the MoD establishment by reducing Gerasimov’s role in operations in Ukraine, although he is highly likely to maintain, at least nominally, the position of overall theater commander and his long-term role as Chief of the General Staff. ISW has previously assessed that Gerasimov’s removal from either position would be too damaging to Putin’s and the MoD’s reputation. Putin could attempt to avoid fallout from future command changes by increasingly rewarding commanders with responsibility beyond their official positions.[15] Putin is likely further incentivized not to publicly replace Gerasimov out of fears of legitimizing rebellion as a successful means of blackmail. The speculations that Gerasimov’s role is diminishing in Ukraine may suggest that Putin is diverting Gerasimov to another effort instead of completely demoting him. Putin likely values Gerasimov for his loyalty above all else, and he may task Gerasimov with staff changes within the MoD focused on loyalty should the Kremlin decide to overhaul the Russian military leadership.[16]

The Kremlin may have chosen Teplinsky as a de facto overall theater commander because he is reportedly widely popular among the Russian rank-and-file and the Russian ultranationalist community.[17] Teplinsky previously commanded forces alongside Wagner around Bakhmut in the winter of 2023, but it is not immediately clear if Teplinsky supported Wagner more generally as Surovikin reportedly did, and Teplinsky remained silent during the armed rebellion.[18] Teplinsky reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with the current military command directly to Putin in late February and assumed a leading military command position in April 2023, becoming one of the most notable anti-Gerasimov commanders aside from Surovikin.[19] Teplinsky is allegedly in charge of sectors of the front where Russian forces are currently defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and speculations of his de facto appointment to overall theater commander may indicate that the Kremlin sought to reward Teplinsky for overseeing doctrinal Russian defensive operations in these areas of the front or to find a public face for the war effort who can claim credit for showing at least basic military competence to offset or distract from the attention Prigozhin had received for the seizure of Bakhmut.[20] The Kremlin may choose to assign responsibilities for command in Ukraine in such a way that Russian military officials privately recognize that an anti-Gerasimov figure controls the war effort in Ukraine without the Kremlin having to acknowledge that fact publicly. The Kremlin will likely struggle to balance between appeasing discontent with the MoD and purging it of disloyal figures without contradicting its rhetoric and actions. Should it find that balance too hard to strike it may choose to pursue only one of the goals. In that event, the Kremlin will almost certainly choose the effort of purging disloyal figures regardless of continued ire towards the MoD leadership.

Russian sources claimed that the Kremlin is punishing Russian forces that it perceives to have failed in their response to the rebellion. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian pilots who refused to strike the Wagner convoys and Russian border guards who refused to open fire on Wagner are now facing unspecified criminal prosecution.[21] The Kremlin may punish lower ranking Russian servicemen to create additional scapegoats for their response to the rebellion, although refusal to obey legal and direct orders would be grounds for courts martial in any military, and an order to fire on forces engaged in armed rebellion would very likely be legal. ISW cannot confirm these milblogger claims at this time.

The Russian Duma is considering additional measures to increase control over the information space and promote self-censorship within broad internet communities. First Deputy Chairperson for the State Duma Education Committee Yana Lantratova stated on June 27 that the State Duma will propose to appoint a body “authorized to monitor the activities of bloggers.”[22] Lantratova also stated that Duma deputies will submit an additional bill on the registration of bloggers as “mass media” and that defines the rights and obligations of bloggers.[23] While reporting on this bill does not specify military correspondents or milbloggers, it is likely that milbloggers will fall into the broad category of “bloggers” and will be subject to increased regulation and control by the proposed monitoring body and resultant bill. ISW has previously reported on the efforts of Russian authorities to increase censorship of milbloggers and military commentators.[24] The Duma may have suggested this law using the broad category of “blogger” to avoid drawing specific ire from milbloggers, who largely did not comment on these updates on July 28.

Belarus formally ratified an agreement on the establishment of joint Russian-Belarusian training centers in Belarus on June 28. Belarusian media reported that Belarusian deputies adopted a draft law on the ratification of an agreement between Russia and Belarus on the “establishment and operation of combat training centers for joint training of military personnel” of Belarusian and Russian military personnel.[25] Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin noted that the main tasks of these combat training centers is the “unification of combat training” by Russian and Belarusian forces.[26] ISW previously assessed in April of 2021 that Russia opened such training centers in Belarus to set conditions for further permanent military basing as part of the wider Russian effort to entirely subordinate Belarus under Kremlin control.[27] The agreement on joint training centers was previously signed on March 28, 2023, on the basis of an October 31, 2022, draft treaty law.[28] The ratification of the pre-existing agreement is the next step in the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign to secure the military subordination of Belarus and is not related to the reported deal between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko on Wagner’s exile to Belarus following the June 23-24 armed rebellion.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu held a phone conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Major General Mohammad Bagheri on June 28. Russian media reported that Shoigu and Bagheri discussed issues of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation, regional security, and the wider international situation and announced their intention to deepen bilateral dialogue and develop additional defense contracts.[29] Bagheri is responsible for Iranian military policy and strategic guidance, and previously met with Shoigu in Moscow in October 2021.[30] Bagheri's senior role within Iran's security apparatus suggests that he could be discussing arms sales with Shoigu. Iranian officials have previously expressed interest in receiving Russian fighter jets and air defense systems in return for Iran's support for the Russian war effort, though these sales have not yet materialized.[31] ISW and the Critical Threats Project had previously assessed that Iran is seeking to leverage arms sales to generate revenue for the Iranian economy.[32]

Unconfirmed reports claim that Russian military police allegedly detained Wagner Group commanders in Syria. Saudi Arabian TV channel Al Hadath reportedly stated on June 27 on air that Russian military police detained the head of Wagner’s branch in Suwayda, Syria, and three other “high-ranking” Wagner commanders at the Hmeimim Air Base and visited Wagner offices in Damascus, Hama, and Deir ez Zor.[33] Russian news outlet Kommersant reported that Wagner commander Dmitry Utkin later denied these claims of Wagner personnel arrests in Syria on his Telegram channel.[34] Another Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel also denied the arrests.[35] ISW is unable to independently verify these claims at this time.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the front. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction, along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia administrative border, and in western Zaporizhian.[36] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks south of Kreminna.[37] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated in an interview with Financial Times published on June 28 that the “main event” of the Ukrainian counteroffensive has not yet started.[38]

Key Takeaways

Continued reporting about the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion suggests that involved parties may still be negotiating the specifics of the agreement.
Russian sources speculated that Wagner’s rebellion is already having widespread impacts on the Russian command structure.
Russian authorities reportedly arrested Army General Sergei Surovikin on June 28, possibly indicating that the Kremlin intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal.
The Kremlin will likely attempt to balance a desire to mitigate the widespread disdain for MoD establishment figures that fueled Wagner’s rebellion while also trying to disempower those who may have sympathized with the rebellion.
The Russian Duma is considering additional measures to increase control over the information space and promote self-censorship within broad internet communities.
Belarus formally ratified an agreement on the establishment of joint Russian-Belarusian training centers in Belarus on June 28.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu held a phone conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Major General Mohammad Bagheri on June 28.
Unconfirmed reports claim that Russian military police allegedly detained Wagner Group commanders in Syria.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the front.
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted a strike on civilian infrastructure in Kramatorsk in Donetsk Oblast on the night of June 27.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and conducted limited probing attacks on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge in Kherson Oblast on June 27 and 28.
Russian sources reported on continued Russian efforts to clarify terms and conditions for military service.
Russian and occupation officials continue efforts to deconflict legal discrepancies as part of the incorporation of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on June 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces successfully conducted assaults on Ukrainian positions near Kreminna. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 28 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on June 27 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced north of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut), Zalizyanske (13km north of Bakhmut), Paraskoviivka (3km northeast of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdiumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Klishchiivka and conducted unsuccessful attacks from Berkhivka.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks along the entire line of contact from Yakovlivka (14km northeast of Bakhmut) to Kurdiumivka.[44] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vasyukivka (15km north of Bakhmut) and Rozdolivka and that elements of the 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division repelled a Ukrainian attack near Soledar (12km northeast of Bakhmut). [45]Geolocated footage published on June 28 and from June 26 shows that Russian forces have advanced west of Dubovo-Vasylivka (about 6km northwest of Bakhmut).[46] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Berkhivka.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rozdolivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[48]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pervomaiske (6km southwest of Avdiivka) and that Russian forces are conducting assault operations south of Marinka from captured positions in the “Zverinets” fortified area.[50] Footage published on June 27 purportedly shows the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Slavic Brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction.[51]

Russian forces conducted a strike on civilian infrastructure in Kramatorsk in Donetsk Oblast on the night of June 27. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Pavlo Kyrylenko reported that Russian forces struck a residential area and a restaurant.[52] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that the second missile struck Bilenke (on the northeastern outskirts of Kramatorsk).[53] Russian sources attempted to justify the strike on Kramatorsk by claiming that Ukrainian commanders had been at the restaurant, although ISW has not observed evidence to verify this claim.[54] Russian forces likely violated international law by conducting an indiscriminate attack on civilian infrastructure.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on June 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border).[56] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks in the Rivnopil area towards Staromaiorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops took up new positions along the Rivnopil-Staromaiorske line and advanced towards Priyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 28. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attempted to advance along the Pyatykhatky-Zherebryanky line (25km southwest of Orikhiv) and that elements of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), unspecified naval infantry units, and the “Sudoplatov” volunteer battalion, and a North Ossetian battalion repelled Ukrainian attacks on this sector.[59] A Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops attempted to attack southeast of Orikhiv near Luhivske and towards Robotyne (13km due south of Orikhiv).[60]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited probing attacks on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge on June 27 and 28. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian ground and artillery units destroyed a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to land on the east bank near the Antonivsky Bridge.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that as of the end of the day on June 27, Russian aerospace forces unsuccessfully attempted to strike Ukrainian positions in this area with aircraft but were ultimately unsuccessful because Ukrainian forces deployed S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to shoreline areas on the west (right) bank.[62] Several Russian milbloggers warned that the Ukrainian forces are preparing for additional offensive operations to cross the Dnpiro River in this sector.[63] Geolocated footage posted on June 27 shows Russian airborne (VDV) forces operating in Oleshky (about 5km due south of the Antonivsky bridge on the east bank).[64]

Ukrainian forces targeted rear areas of Zaporizhia Oblast on June 27-28. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported the sounds of explosions following likely Ukrainian missile strikes near Prymorsk (west of Berdyansk) and Kamianka (north of Berdyansk).[65] Russian and Ukrainian sources additionally reported explosions in occupied Melitopol on June 27 and 28.[66]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian sources reported on continued Russian efforts to clarify terms and condition for military service. Russian opposition media reported that the Russian State Duma rejected or returned for revision 10draft laws specifying further expectations or deferrals from military service, including entrepreneurs, medical personnel in rural areas, recipients of PhDs, persons with a disabled dependent child, persons whose relatives had died in military service, and persons serving in an alternative civilian capacity.[67] Russian opposition media also reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law permitting prisoners and those under criminal investigation to be released from punishment if they sign a contract with the MoD.[68]

Russian authorities continue efforts to promote social benefits for families of servicemen in order to frame military service as more attractive. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian government is sponsoring two weeks of free summer camp for 3,000 children of Russian military personnel serving in Ukraine from Moscow Oblast.[69]

A Ukrainian source claimed that residents of the occupied territories are weary of continued mobilization. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko claimed that the wives of mobilized Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces have begun to complain about their husbands’ continued service and are advocating for their husbands’ return home since the DNR is technically part of Russia under new Russian laws and the active phase of partial mobilization has ended in Russia.[70] Andryushchenko amplified a Russian DNR official’s Telegram post reporting that the status of mobilized DNR forces is “not defined” under current Russian law, which prevents them from being demobilized.[71] Andryushchenko claimed that under the current conditions it is possible that the mobilized DNR forces will fight and die for Russia and never return home.[72] The continued incongruity between laws pertaining to the mobilization of DNR forces and those pertaining to Russian forces is likely to continue having adverse impacts of force generation capabilities in occupied territories.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation officials continue efforts to deconflict legal discrepancies as part of the incorporation of occupied territories. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian authorities oversaw the transfer of the sham trials of 22 “Azov militants” accused of “participating in a terrorist organization and forcibly seizing power” from Mariupol in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast.[73] The milblogger claimed that bureaucratic challenges delayed the criminal case after the court decided to try the case in accordance with Russian laws despite the fact that the case was initiated under the Criminal Codes of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR).[74] Russian authorities are clearly continuing to face issues streamlining criminal law in occupied territories with Russian criminal code.

Russian occupation administrations continue forced passportization in occupied territories. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian occupation administrations are withholding free medical care from civilians who do not have or have not applied for Russian passports in Hornostaivka, Kairy, and Zavodivka in occupied Kherson Oblast.[75] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces have intensified raids and detention of civilians without Russian passports in Enerhodar and other surrounding settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast and have later subjected detained residents to the confiscation of their personal property, psychological pressure, and torture.[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian forces are detaining minors in order to pressure parents who have pro-Ukraine sentiments or have not yet acquired Russian passports.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that occupation administrations are simplifying the procedure to attain Russian citizenship and work permits in pursuit of Russian efforts to relocate residents from occupied territories to Russia.[78] Russian Senator Konstantin Basyuk claimed that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs has designed a simplified process for dual Russian-Ukrainian citizens to voluntarily renounce their Ukrainian citizenship under a law on signed on March 18, 2023 .[79]

Russian and occupation administrations continue the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Russian opposition media reported that Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed that Russia has taken 380 Ukrainian children from the occupied territories and placed them with Russian families since the end of 2022.[80] Russian opposition media claimed that it’s possible that up to three times as many children have been placed with Russian families according to a 2022 report that found 1,184 children arrived in Rostov Oblast from the occupied territories “without legal guardians.”[81] Chair of Kherson Oblast occupation government Andrey Alekseyenko reported on June 27 that over two thousand children from Kherson Oblast will be sent to camps throughout Russia, including camps in Krasnodar Krai, Crimea, and the Republic of Agydea.[82] Alekseyenko claimed that more than two thousand graduates will be sent to summer programs at Russian universities and another four thousand children will be sent to 78 “school camps” in the occupied Kherson Oblast.[83] A pro-Russian Telegram channel associated with the Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed that 185 children from the Henichesk Raion of occupied Kherson Oblast were sent to a 21 day “health camp” in the Republic of Agydea in Russia.[84]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Exclusive: Army secretary talks force structure cuts, SOF ‘reform’

So riddle me this: If the Army is going to cut SOF enablers from USASOC/USSOCOM using the justification that the Army can provide this support, are BCTs and other operational Army units going to provide the necessary SOF enabling forces? Are we going to sub-optimize both our regular and special operations forces? We are going to provide non-SOF trained enabling forces from the conventional military while damaging the readiness of conventional forces while we provide intelligence, logistics, and communications enabling forces from operational units?

This seems like an ass backwards way of doing things. To make numbers work we are going to undercut the operational capabilities of both our SOF and regular forces. This proves a point I once heard in the Pentagon back in the 1990s when we needed a force in PACOM that three CINCS wanted for warfighting capabilities; CINCPAC, CINCSOC. and CINCUNCCFC. As the services fought over budget dust on who would provide the base support funding I naively asked how could the Army and Air staffs seem to want to deny the importance of warfighting capabilities that were demanded by three CINCs? The following words from a Pentagon Colonel are indelibly inked in my brain: "LTC, you don't understand. We do not give a shit about warfighting capabilities. The only thing that matters in this building is force structure and budget."

And the pendulum is swinging away from SOF and away from irregular warfare – though the Secretary says COIN and CT -– which I think may indicate a lack of understanding of irregular warfare - and the absolute necessity to be able to campaign to win through irregular warfare in the gray zone of strategic competition.

it is 1973-75 all over again. Only the consequences of failure in 21st century strategic competition could be much greater.

Excerpts:

The secretary noted that the Army’s special operations community has more than doubled in size since the Sept. 11 attacks. “We’re looking at their functions…that can be provided by conventional Army forces,” she said.

Wormuth identified “enablers,” or non-special operations qualified support personnel, as a target for cuts, arguing that “general purpose forces can provide that support.”

But she offered little detail about the fourth area in which the service plans to draw down: “close-combat forces,” including those “parts of our formations that were purpose-designed for those kinds of fights [such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism] where we may not need quite as much capacity going forward.”

Exclusive: Army secretary talks force structure cuts, SOF ‘reform’

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · June 28, 2023

The Army is preparing to axe some units and restructure others, the service’s top civilian told Army Times in an exclusive phone interview Friday, but it’s still not clear when and how the changes will play out.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth also attributed “some” of the moves to “the recruiting challenges that we’ve been experiencing…if we don’t turn our recruiting situation around, we will likely have to contemplate additional force structure changes, because we can’t have unready forces; we can’t have hollow formations.”

Wormuth detailed a four-pronged effort to identify and eliminate excess units — and restructure others to remove unnecessary billets — that she said will allow the force to stand up purpose-built units for short-range air defense, indirect fires protection and multidomain operations. “We are transforming...to an Army that is focused on multidomain operations against a near-peer competitor, and that requires us to bring in new capabilities [and] new force structure,” she argued.

The cuts will come following an analysis of force needs at the soldier level, based on unit purpose; at the unit level, based on deployment rates; restructuring of Army special operations; and reducing or eliminating “close-combat forces” that were purpose-built for the War on Terror.

A soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group pulls security during a training exercise at Camp McGregor, New Mexico, April 2, 2020. (Spc. Peter Seidler/Army)

Military analyst Thomas Spoehr, a retired Army lieutenant general who heads the conservative Heritage Foundation’s defense policy center, agreed with Wormuth’s assessment of the force’s needs. But Spoehr, whose comments came via email, criticized some elements of the service’s approach and argued that Congress should further scrutinize whether the Army has enough people to man its 31 brigade combat teams today.

“We don’t know yet what the Army will have to cut, but it cannot sustain the force structure it has, the 31 brigade combat teams, at an acceptable level of readiness at an end strength of 452,000,” Spoehr said. Before recruiting collapsed, the service wanted 485,000 soldiers to support the same number of brigades.

The secretary, however, said that changes to manning guidance — headquarters-issued guidelines that prescribe manning percentages across the force by variables like unit or career field — can help ensure critical units, such as those on the Immediate Response Force, “remain highly ready.” She likened manning guidance to “the bridge from where we are today, with a considerable amount of overstructure, to where we’re trying to go.”

Spoehr described Wormuth’s intended use of manning guidance as “completely understandable, and the Army has no choice.”

But the Heritage Foundation analyst argued the situation is dire if this is what’s required to keep the service’s on-call units ready.

“[Manning guidance] represents only a band-aid on a sucking chest wound,” Spoehr said. “It lowers expectations but does nothing to solve the fundamental readiness problems.”

How will the Army decide what to cut?

The service’s efforts to create space for the new units requires significant reduction of what Wormuth termed “overstructure,” or units and positions that don’t align with the Army’s projected mission, she said.

One way to find it, she said, is the ongoing “people night court” process that she described to Congress in May. Each of the service’s career fields were asked to “lay out where their people are in which formations and provide an assessment — do we really need every single one of those people at every echelon?” One example from her May testimony to a Senate committee focused on cooks.

Christine Wormuth testifies to Congress in the Rayburn House Office Building on Capitol Hill on March 3, 2015 in Washington, D.C. (Gabriella Demczuk/Getty Images)

“Do we need to have 60 cooks [in a unit]?” Wormuth told lawmakers. “Or can we use 40 cooks?”

The secretary also told Army Times the service developed a “unit priority list” from an analysis of historical deployment data. Units that hadn’t deployed recently — or perhaps at all — were evaluated as potential candidates for reductions.

“That became another place where we could make some reductions without necessarily having to take down any flags,” she explained.

Spoehr of the Heritage Foundation decried the unit priority list as “a gamble” by which the Army is “hollowing out units in the hope they won’t actually have to be deployed.”

But some of the service’s most heavily utilized units, those in the special operations community, face cuts amid a broader “reform” process that Wormuth said the Army will approach “in a very careful way, obviously, given…[their] highly specialized nature.”

The secretary noted that the Army’s special operations community has more than doubled in size since the Sept. 11 attacks. “We’re looking at their functions…that can be provided by conventional Army forces,” she said.

Wormuth identified “enablers,” or non-special operations qualified support personnel, as a target for cuts, arguing that “general purpose forces can provide that support.”

But she offered little detail about the fourth area in which the service plans to draw down: “close-combat forces,” including those “parts of our formations that were purpose-designed for those kinds of fights [such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism] where we may not need quite as much capacity going forward.”

A soldier conducts partner training in Afghanistan in 2021. (Lt. Matt Chandler/Navy)

Asked to elaborate on what types of combat units she believes are on the chopping block, Wormuth demurred and quipped, “That’s the kind of thing…that I need to talk to the [Congressional] oversight committees about,” before commenting publicly.

Spoehr warned against cutting too deep in this arena, even if falling end strength numbers mean the Army “will have no choice” but to do so.

“The Army promised not to repeat the lessons of Vietnam when after that conflict the service cut all its counter-insurgency forces and the supporting intellectual foundations, with the idea that we will ‘never do that again,’” he said.

Despite her optimism that the Army is progressing well in its force structure evolution, the service’s top civilian cautioned, though, that the recruiting crisis could derail the plan or damage the Army’s ability to stay ready in the interim.

“We really need to continue to work hard to solve our recruiting challenges,” she added, lest it force “additional” cuts.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

3. Suspending U.S.-Chinese military ties is no longer a low-risk proposition

Conclusion:

Neither the Pentagon nor the PLA is anxious for an incident between their forces, let alone a conflict. This is the one thing both sides agree on. Yet, the longer that the lines of communication remain severed, the larger the possibility of a crisis in the Pacific or strategic-level miscalculation. It is time to get past the politics, the polemics and the pique and get back to the serious business of responsibly managing the most potentially dangerous part of U.S.-Chinese tensions: the military dimension.

Suspending U.S.-Chinese military ties is no longer a low-risk proposition

The Hill · · June 27, 2023

BY DAVID M. FINKELSTEIN, OPINION EDITOR - 06/27/23 1:00 PM ET

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent meetings with Chinese leaders in Beijing were a positive development in an otherwise fraught period in U.S.-China relations. While it is still too early to know for sure, the visit holds out the prospect that serious high-level political and economic discussions may once again take place in an attempt to arrest the downward trajectory in the relationship.

Conspicuously absent, however, was movement on restarting communications channels between the two military establishments. When asked at a news conference about progress on this front, the secretary stated, “at this moment, China has not agreed to move forward with that.”

Meaningful U.S.-PRC (People’s Republic of China) military communication has been moribund for almost a year. In retaliation for former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, Beijing suspended the various channels and forums that make up the lines of communication between the two forces. It is through these mechanisms — such as the Defense Consultative Talks and the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement — that both sides air concerns and manage tensions. For months now, these channels have been severed, with only the most perfunctory working-level communications taking place.

Except for the early- to mid-1980s, when both countries shared common concerns about the Soviet Union, military ties have always been the weakest link in U.S.-China relations. With the demise of the USSR, common strategic concerns were replaced by mutual strategic mistrust. Over the years, both sides have chosen at times to severely curtail or completely suspend military relations to signal displeasure over specific incidents or policies. This has been the historical record, and it must end.

Today, suspending military channels of communication is no longer the relatively low-risk move it has been in the past. To the contrary, in the context of the today’s military situation in the western Pacific, the absence of meaningful communication between the U.S. and Chinese militaries is a high-risk and increasingly dangerous proposition.

Strategically, given ever-rising levels of mutual distrust, senior American and Chinese defense and military leaders and their key lieutenants must be able to speak to each other in the most direct fashion possible to clarify strategic intent, provide messages of reassurance and even convey warnings. They must be able to hear directly from their counterparts the rationales for policies or actions that either side finds problematic. And they must be able to understand each other’s threat perceptions.

In the absence of direct channels of communication, the risks of misperception leading to miscalculation are all too real. For example, in the autumn of 2020, prior to the U.S. presidential election, analysts in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had convinced themselves that the U.S. military was preparing to stage an attack against Chinese forces for domestic political reasons. Lines of communication were opened, assurances provided, and the possibility of an incident was avoided.

ESG is an enduring social contract Something is rotten in the state of Russia

U.S. and Chinese military forces are regularly operating in close proximity in the air and on the seas: exercising, surveilling and transiting. The number of publicly reported incidents and near-accidents between U.S. and Chinese forces seem to be increasing. The possibility of an accident or a kinetic incident between the two militaries is part of the new reality in the western Pacific. At the moment, the ability of the two sides to communicate in order manage a potential incident is dangerously weak, and the possibility of escalation is real.

Neither the Pentagon nor the PLA is anxious for an incident between their forces, let alone a conflict. This is the one thing both sides agree on. Yet, the longer that the lines of communication remain severed, the larger the possibility of a crisis in the Pacific or strategic-level miscalculation. It is time to get past the politics, the polemics and the pique and get back to the serious business of responsibly managing the most potentially dangerous part of U.S.-Chinese tensions: the military dimension.

David M. Finkelstein is a retired U.S. Army Officer and currently Director of China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs at CNA, an independent research institute in Arlington, Virginia. The views expressed herein are strictly his own.

The Hill · · June 27, 2023

4. Putin Moves to Seize Control of Wagner’s Global Empire

Russia is having a hard time managing Putin's War in Ukraine. Won't managing Wagner operations in Africa and the Middle East further complicate things for Russia? I would not be reassured if I were a Russian client state.

Putin Moves to Seize Control of Wagner’s Global Empire

The Kremlin assured nations in Africa and the Middle East that it would manage Wagner forces, which have spread Russian power at little cost to Putin

By Benoit FauconFollow

, Joe ParkinsonFollow

and Drew HinshawFollow

June 28, 2023 9:28 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-moves-to-seize-control-of-wagners-global-empire-26d49286?mod=world_lead_pos1

In the hours after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s army of ex-convicts and mercenaries halted their advance on Moscow, the Kremlin set out to seize full control of the global empire built by the notorious military entrepreneur.

Russia’s deputy foreign minister flew to Damascus to personally deliver a message to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: Wagner Group forces would no longer operate there independently. Senior Russian foreign ministry officials phoned the president of the Central African Republic, whose personal bodyguards include Wagner mercenaries, offering assurances that Saturday’s crisis wouldn’t derail Russia’s expansion into Africa. Government jets from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations shuttled from Syria to Mali, another of Wagner’s key foreign outposts.

The rush of diplomatic activity reflected Vladimir Putin’s attempt to play down the chaos at home and to assure Russia’s partners in Africa and the Middle East that Wagner operations there would continue without interruption according to diplomats and intelligence officers, Wagner defectors, people briefed on the conversations and a review of international flight data. From now on, however, in Moscow’s preferred outcome, those operations would be under new management.

Russia, which for years denied any association with Wagner, appears to be trying to take over the far-flung mercenary network managed by Prigozhin and his lieutenants. After Saturday’s failed mutiny, it isn’t clear how much it can or how quickly.

“Wagner helped Russia build its influence, and the government is loath to give it up,” said J. Peter Pham, former special envoy for the West African Sahel region. “Wagner gave the state deniability. The question is whether they can manage its complexity and deal with additional scrutiny.”

An image released Monday by the official Syrian Arab News Agency, showing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, center-right, and Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin in Damascus. PHOTO: SANA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A worker removing an advertisement for the Wagner Group on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, Russia. PHOTO: ANTON VAGANOV/REUTERS

At minimal cost and at an arm’s length, Wagner helped the Kremlin amass international influence and collect revenues, managed by Prigozhin’s holding company Concord and a network of shell companies that helped funnel funds to the Kremlin, according to Western officials and documents viewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Wagner companies generate hundreds of millions of dollars a year in Africa, a crucial source of funding to maintain both Russia’s influence on the continent and to finance operations in Ukraine, Western officials said. The group’s sources of income include exports of Sudanese gold to Russia, as well as diamonds from the Central African Republic to the United Arab Emirates and wood to Pakistan, these officials said.

For years, Wagner Group has worked as a security force for autocratic regimes across the Middle East and Africa, and, more recently, it has been tiptoeing toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Including Ukraine and Russia, Wagner employs more than 30,000 fighters.

Wagner’s mercenaries—backed by political strategists, financiers and geologists to prospect for mineral resources—have become entrenched in Mali, Syria and the Central African Republic. The group has offered help suppressing antigovernment protests in Venezuela and Sudan. Prigozhin’s associates had planned a secret trip to Haiti, as late as February, to offer their services to the government, which is struggling to keep control of Port au Prince, according to classified U.S. military documents leaked onto the videogame chat group Discord. Haiti’s foreign ministry didn’t return a request for comment.

PHOTOS: THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S WAGNER GROUP

TASS/ZUMA PRESS

Around 6,000 or so Wagner personnel perform varied work outside of Russia and Ukraine—from safeguarding mines and politicians in the Central African Republic, whose civil war dates back a decade—to defending oil wells and government-held territory in Syria. In Mali, Wagner fighters, backed by Russian-made jet fighters and helicopters, deploy alongside Malian soldiers to Saharan villages falling under the sway of Islamists. Militants have battled the state since 2012.

The fate of Wagner operations now hinges on whether the Kremlin can simultaneously marginalize Prigozhin and maintain the empire he built on three continents. Some national security officials, sizing up the prospects, say Washington may have an opening to regain influence on a continent where Russia and China have been digging in.

The Biden administration and European governments have been pushing leaders in Africa to stop working with Wagner and have been tightening sanctions on the group. In January, CIA director William Burns pressured a top Libyan commander to expel Wagner, amid fears the group could tap in to the country’s oil riches. The Treasury Department designated Wagner as a transnational criminal organization over its actions in the Ukraine war on behalf of Russia.

The U.S. levied sanctions Tuesday against Africa-based gold firms allegedly used by Wagner to help fund its fighting in Ukraine. A State Department spokesman said more actions would soon be announced.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin during his address in Moscow. PHOTO: SERGEI GUNEYEV/TASS/ZUMA PRESS

After years denying any Kremlin connections to Wagner, Putin said on Tuesday that the group had been financed by the Russian state for the year ending in May. In the Central African Republic, the Russian defense ministry—which first sent Wagner there in 2018—is paying for 3,000 of Prigozhin’s mercenaries, said Fidèle Gouandjika, the nation’s presidential security adviser.

The governments of Mali and Sudan didn’t respond to requests for comment. The Kremlin didn’t respond to emailed questions for comment.

In Russia, Wagner’s men have until July 1 to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry. Prigozhin, whose plane landed Tuesday in Belarus, has repeatedly said his men would reject the contracts. He hasn’t said whether or not he would try to keep control of Wagner’s foreign operations while in exile.

Wagner’s Telegram and communication channels, which went dark on Saturday, are back online, said Lou Osborn, an analyst at All Eyes on Wagner, an open-source research group. They are largely all carrying the same message, Osborn said, that Prigozhin is being hailed as the man who could topple Putin.

Changing forces

To counter such an idea, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Sergei Vershinin flew to Damascus over the weekend to urge Assad to stop Wagner fighters from leaving Syria without Moscow’s oversight, people briefed on the conversation said. A statement issued by Assad’s office after the meeting said they discussed coordination, especially in “light of recent events.”

War footing

Since Putin launched his war on Ukraine, Wagner has taken aggressive steps to expand its footprint in Africa and beyond. At the start of the year, Wagner posted new recruitment ads for experienced fighters, trumpeting its expansion on the continent.

In January, Wagner held talks about sending a military force to Burkina-Faso, a West African nation also threatened by jihadists and which had decided to expel French troops. The group’s propaganda outlets signaled it was setting its sights next on Ivory Coast, a potential foray into Africa’s Atlantic coast.

The U.S. shared intelligence in February that purported to reveal a Prigozhin plot to help rebels destabilize the Chad government and potentially kill the president, an important Western ally.

A U.N. report this year said Russian instructors were working with local soldiers in the Central African Republic to gain control over regions known for artisanal diamond mining. The goal was to form a corridor from Wagner-controlled regions through Sudan, the reports said, on to the mineral-trading hub of Dubai.

Wagner group fighters exiting the Russian military headquarters on Saturday in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. PHOTO: ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS

Yevgeny Prigozhin meeting with Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense Yunus-Bek Yevkurov at the headquarters of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, in an image from an undated video. PHOTO: VIDEO OBTAINED BY REUTERS

Marat Gabidullin, a former Wagner commander in Syria, isn’t sure how the organization can survive without its founder. If Wagner were to leave the Central African Republic, a civil war would break out, he said in an interview last month. For now, there is little evidence of any change in the CAR.

Gouandjika, the country’s presidential security adviser, chalked up Saturday’s armed advance on Moscow to an argument between Putin and Prigozhin—“a domestic matter,” he said, with little consequence for his nation.

To make his point, Gouandjika paused while a Russian-piloted Sukhoi aircraft took off from an airport in the capital of Bangui on a reconnaissance mission.

“It’s reassuring to see nothing’s changed,” he said.

“If Moscow decides to recall them and send us Beethovens or Mozarts,” he added, “we will have them.”

Summer Said contributed to this article.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com, Joe Parkinson at joe.parkinson@wsj.com and Drew Hinshaw at drew.hinshaw@wsj.com

5. Forget About Those Faulty Timelines for Ukraine’s Success

Excerpts:

Support for Ukraine remains strong in NATO, particularly from front-line states who understand the threat that Russia poses in Europe. Estonia, Poland and Finland, for example, are in no mood to abandon Ukraine. The argument that U.S. support may soon wane seems to ignore the critical support provided by our European allies. The war, after all, is on their doorstep.

Moreover, support appears to remain strong in Congress, including among some national security-minded Republicans. Reps. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), Michael Turner (R-Ohio), Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) and Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) are important voices in the GOP who favor robust, long-term assistance to Ukraine. They have even criticized the Biden administration at times for not doing enough. Yes, there is much irritating noise from the hard right, but it is just that — noise. Reps. Lauren Boebert (R-Colo.) and Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.), for example, may generate headlines with their far-right pushes and outrageous comments, but they have no real weight when it comes to this issue.

President Biden, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) appear to generally agree regarding assistance to Ukraine, including that long-term U.S. support is not contingent on short-term Ukrainian success in the counteroffensive.

So, let’s be cautious about our expectations for this counteroffensive and not hype its significance. U.S. officials would do well to stop leaking information along this line of thinking to the news media, and pundits should stop echoing it. A Ukrainian victory is not reliant on this counteroffensive alone; it is also based, in part, on long-term, institutionalized support from NATO, including the promised F-16s and hoped-for ATACM long-range missiles. These ultimately will help Kyiv to win.

Forget About Those Faulty Timelines for Ukraine’s Success

Published 06/27/23 11:00 AM ET

Marc Polymeropoulos

themessenger.com

There seems to be a prevailing thought in Washington these days that Ukrainian success in their counteroffensive against Russia is critical to maintaining Western support for Ukraine. This emanates from some foreign policy pundits and U.S. officials. The argument goes that a failure for Ukraine to show real progress over the next several months may force Washington to pressure Kyiv to come to the negotiating table because support in the West will wane.

I find this analysis to be troubling, for several reasons. First, the U.S. has been late in providing advanced weaponry to Ukraine. Although the Biden administration’s support has been historic, with more than $40 billion in hardware sent to Ukraine, the hand-wringing over the overblown concern about “escalation” with Russia has meant that sophisticated systems such as F-16 fighters are not yet in play. And if we have not provided Ukraine with all the means necessary to show real progress, the argument that it must do so rings hollow. We are essentially asking them to win the fight with “one arm tied behind their backs.”

Second, an abbreviated timeline does not mesh with the realities of war. Having spent time on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, as an operations officer for the CIA, I can assure you that the enemy gets a vote — that prevailing in armed conflict is a marathon, not a sprint. Artificial timelines placed by Washington bureaucrats are typically unrealistic. In fact, Ukraine may get bloodied in its current counteroffensive and require time to further attrit the entrenched Russian forces.

We will continue to see evidence of destroyed Western equipment; it is unrealistic to think that Ukraine would ever overcome Russia unscathed. Some military analysts, whose opinions I trust, understand the difficulty in defeating militaries that are in fortified positions, and they urge caution in predicting a quick Ukrainian victory. Nonetheless, I am confident that Ukraine will prevail — an ossified Russian military has proven itself to be a third-world fighting force. Moreover, the Ukrainians are resolute, fighting for their survival. Western armaments and training are valuable, but any victory will take time.

Let us also not forget that Russia has shown no willingness to negotiate an end to the war. Those who push for a diplomatic solution seem to forget that Russian intransigence on Ukraine may negate any chance for a negotiated settlement. Forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table — which would follow a stalled offensive — will be folly if the other side has zero interest in coming to any accommodation. It takes two to tango, as they say. Has Vladimir Putin shown any willingness to end this war? No. Has Russia put forward a reasonable peace plan? No. So, there is no reason to expect that Putin and his pariah state will turn into peacemakers overnight.

Instead, the only way this war ends is with Russian defeat. This is an important lesson of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny this past weekend, stopped only after Putin accepted some humiliating conditions that will allow Prigozhin to escape essentially unscathed. As such, we need to stop the “face-saving” and “off-ramp” arguments that many in the foreign policy world seem to hold onto. Putin will back down when beaten and humiliated. I saw this firsthand in Syria in 2018, somewhat ironically in the engagement between U.S. special operations forces and the Wagner Group, when the U.S. soundly defeated Russian forces, with zero response from Putin.

After Prigozhin's coup attempt, the stability of the Russian regime is in question. Perhaps we once again have overestimated Putin’s hold on power and ability to withstands tens of thousands of additional casualties. Can he really outlast the West? This makes it even more incumbent for the West to double down on assisting Ukraine. When you have your boot on the enemy’s neck, do not take it off. The past weekend's events in Russia are an opportunity for Kyiv and NATO to take full advantage of.

Support for Ukraine remains strong in NATO, particularly from front-line states who understand the threat that Russia poses in Europe. Estonia, Poland and Finland, for example, are in no mood to abandon Ukraine. The argument that U.S. support may soon wane seems to ignore the critical support provided by our European allies. The war, after all, is on their doorstep.

Moreover, support appears to remain strong in Congress, including among some national security-minded Republicans. Reps. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), Michael Turner (R-Ohio), Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) and Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) are important voices in the GOP who favor robust, long-term assistance to Ukraine. They have even criticized the Biden administration at times for not doing enough. Yes, there is much irritating noise from the hard right, but it is just that — noise. Reps. Lauren Boebert (R-Colo.) and Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.), for example, may generate headlines with their far-right pushes and outrageous comments, but they have no real weight when it comes to this issue.

President Biden, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) appear to generally agree regarding assistance to Ukraine, including that long-term U.S. support is not contingent on short-term Ukrainian success in the counteroffensive.

So, let’s be cautious about our expectations for this counteroffensive and not hype its significance. U.S. officials would do well to stop leaking information along this line of thinking to the news media, and pundits should stop echoing it. A Ukrainian victory is not reliant on this counteroffensive alone; it is also based, in part, on long-term, institutionalized support from NATO, including the promised F-16s and hoped-for ATACM long-range missiles. These ultimately will help Kyiv to win.

Marc Polymeropoulos worked for 26 years at CIA, retiring in 2019 from the Senior Intelligence Service. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a national security analyst for MSNBC.

themessenger.com

6. Chinese Balloon Used American Tech to Spy on Americans

Should not be a surprise.

Lenin's prophecy: 'When time comes to hang the capitalists, the Capitalists themselves will sell the rope for that."

Chinese Balloon Used American Tech to Spy on Americans

Preliminary U.S. findings show the craft collected photos and videos but didn’t appear to transmit them, officials say

By Nancy A. Youssef

Updated June 29, 2023 12:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-balloon-used-american-tech-to-spy-on-americans-2e3f5039?mod=hp_lead_pos1

The Chinese spy balloon used off-the-shelf and specialized equipment, according to U.S. officials. PHOTO: LARRY MAYER/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Chinese spy balloon that floated over the U.S. early this year was loaded with American-made equipment that helped it collect photos, videos and other information, U.S. officials said, citing preliminary findings from a closely held investigation.

Several defense and intelligence agencies, along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have analyzed the debris retrieved after the U.S. military detected and shot down the balloon nearly five months ago in an event that added fresh, unexpected volatility to the already fraught U.S.-China relationship.

That analysis found the balloon was crammed with commercially available U.S. gear, some of it for sale online, and interspersed with more specialized Chinese sensors and other equipment to collect photos, video and other information to transmit to China, the officials said. Those findings, they said, support a conclusion that the craft was intended for spying, not weather monitoring as Beijing has said.

The officials described the Chinese balloon, with its mix of off-the-shelf and specialized equipment, as an inventive attempt by Beijing at surveillance.

After Wagner Group’s failed coup, spread the word: Putin is vulnerable

New York Post · by Ivana Stradner · June 27, 2023

More On: russia

‘Clash of Civilizations’: Why Russia can’t beat Ukraine

Ukrainians are baffled by the Russian non-coup, but know Putin must go

Putin opens probe into rebel Wagner Group leader who got $2B in government funds

Russian coup leader was warned he would be ‘crushed like a bug’ if troops reached Moscow

In response to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s threat over the weekend, Russian President Vladimir Putin refrained from any serious counteraction as Wagner troops neared the city.

Prigozhin ultimately called off his attack, but the event alone is a stark indication of Putin’s debilitated and humiliated position.

The Kremlin was quick to place the blame on the West, immediately stating that “the mutiny plays into the hands of Russia’s external enemies. . . . We warn Western countries against undertaking even the slightest attempts to use the domestic Russian situation to achieve their Russophobic goals.”

Hmm. What an excellent idea!

Washington should play off Moscow’s famous paranoia and launch new information operations to communicate Putin’s diminished strength, security failures and greatly reduced influence to Russia’s allies.

To be sure, Prigozhin’s “coup” failed; Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko negotiated an agreement for Prigozhin to be exiled in Belarus and for charges to be dropped.

Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to bring the “organizers” of the coup attempt to “justice.”

Photo by MIKHAIL TERESHCHENKO/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images

Later, reports indicated that even the rebel himself would not be charged.

Of course, Putin is not known to forgive betrayal.

And on Monday he vowed to bring “the organizers of this rebellion” to “justice.”

That was a vow surely intended to head off the likelihood that he will be seen as weak.

Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin eventually called off the attack and went to exile in Belarus.

Prigozhin Press Service via AP

Yet the Russian leader was humiliated by his former protégé (and caterer!), and if Prigozhin survives unscathed, it’ll make Putin look weaker still.

The United States should capitalize on the moment to convey Putin’s unreliability to his allies, via strategic information operations.

Zaporizhzhian Cossack traditions are making a comeback during the war

NPR · by Joanna Kakissis · June 28, 2023

On a wooded river island, a Ukrainian family guards the legacy of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, whose history and traditions are making a comeback during the war.

ARI SHAPIRO, HOST:

The Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine is now an active front line in the country's counteroffensive to push Russians out of occupied territory. In the 16th century, it was also run by warriors beating back invaders, including Russian czars. Those warriors are now revered, but they made a compromise that Ukrainians vow never to repeat. NPR's Joanna Kakissis reports.

(SOUNDBITE OF FOOTSTEPS)

JOANNA KAKISSIS, BYLINE: Khortytsia is a lush, wild island where horses run free. It's on the Dnieper River, just outside the southern city of Zaporizhzhia.

(SOUNDBITE OF ROOSTER CROWING)

KAKISSIS: Inside a thatched hut near an animal refuge, I meet Yuriy Kopishinskyi, a tall grandfather with a shaved head and a linebacker's build.

YURIY KOPISHINSKYI: Yeah, Yuriy Kopishinskyi.

KAKISSIS: He calls Khortytsia home. It was once the headquarters of his ancestors, the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks.

KOPISHINSKYI: (Through interpreter) We, the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, defended the people who lived in this particular area. And you have to think of, like, the history of the Cossacks, who were de facto border guards.

KAKISSIS: He says they defended their land against invaders, including Muscovite princes, and they took a blood oath before battle.

KOPISHINSKYI: (Through interpreter) So you have to understand that when you fight as brothers, you fight in a completely different way.

KAKISSIS: Kopishinskyi takes us to the edge of the island, to a fenced-in complex overlooking the river. For the last 20 years, he has trained locals and foreigners here to fight like the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. One of his best students is Andrii Lozovyi...

ANDRII LOZOVYI: (Non-English language spoken).

KAKISSIS: ...A cheery hulk with a drooping mustache and long oseledets, a traditional Cossack ponytail, on top of his mostly shaved head. It's a hairstyle I've seen all over Ukraine, even on women. Lozovyi calls it the haircut of champions.

LOZOVYI: (Through interpreter) Every adult, every child wants a hairstyle like that so we can look like our heroes.

(SOUNDBITE OF METAL DOOR OPENING)

KAKISSIS: Lozovyi opens the gate to take us inside the fenced-in complex, which is lined with old wooden houses that look like they came out of a Renaissance fair. This is the reconstruction of a Cossack sich, or a military administrative center. There's a church, some homes, a museum. Lozovyi disappears into the museum and returns with weapons.

UNIDENTIFIED PERSON: Just step aside, please.

(SOUNDBITE OF SWORD SWINGING)

KAKISSIS: The sound of that whoosh, whoosh, whoosh is Andrii swinging a big, heavy sword around. Now he's got two in his hand.

He's also got a couple of axes, and he can fight on horseback.

LOZOVYI: (Through interpreter) Whether we use horses and swords or howitzers and HIMARS, it all goes back to the same Cossack spirit to defend our land.

KAKISSIS: Lozovyi says he's been rejected from military service because of multiple bone fractures he suffered falling off horses. Kopishinskyi's other student warriors are all on the front line, and they're fighting other Cossacks who live in Russia and support Moscow.

KOPISHINSKYI: (Through interpreter) The Russian Cossacks were nothing but servants, and all they did was ever submit to the czar. The Zaporizhzhian Cossacks never submitted to anybody.

KAKISSIS: Except this one time, he says, and it was a terrible mistake. More than 450 years ago, the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks signed a treaty with Moscow for military protection. The Russian empire grew, and Cossacks in other regions pledged their loyalty to the czars. The Zaporizhzhian Cossacks held out until Catherine the Great, one of the Russian empire's most formidable leaders, disbanded them in 1775. But today, Kopishinskyi says, the Russians are weak.

KOPISHINSKYI: (Speaking Ukrainian).

KAKISSIS: And the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, he says, are fighting again.

Joanna Kakissis, NPR News, Khortytsia, Ukraine.

(SOUNDBITE OF MUSIC)

NPR · by Joanna Kakissis · June 28, 2023

9. Is Another Chornobyl Looming at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

Is Another Chornobyl Looming at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

Ukraine’s spymaster believes Russia has finished preparations to blow up Europe’s largest nuclear plant – and all that awaits is the order to go ahead based on the military situation.

by Pete Shmigel | June 29, 2023, 11:42 am | Comments ( 1)

kyivpost.com

Ukraine’s spy chief sounded the alarm that Russia has finished preparations for an attack at the occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP).

In an interview yesterday with New Statesman, Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence boss, provided unprecedented intel and insights on potential Russian readying of a nuclear incident in southern Ukraine.

The ZNPP is Europe’s largest nuclear power plant and one of the ten largest in the world. It is on the southern shore of the Dnipro River some 100 kilometers upstream from the destroyed Kakhovka dam, and its diminished reservoir, and 100 kilometers from the current frontline in western Zaporizhzhia region.

ZNPP has been occupied by Russian forces since February 2022.

Budanov said the decision to blow up ZNPP has already been taken by Russia. He told the media outlet he was confident the plan is fully “drafted and approved” and that the only element missing is the order to go ahead, depending on military circumstances.

“Then, it can happen in a matter of minutes,” Budanov said.

How the Incident Could Occur

Budanov also told New Stateman that:

· Russian troops have moved vehicles charged with explosives to four of the six power plant units.

· The ZNPP cooling pond of the plant has been mined by Russian troops.

· Without cooling, the plant’s nuclear reactors could melt down in a period of between ten hours and 14 days.

· Raising the voltage in the power supply lines to the plan could bring about a nuclear accident at the lower end of the timeframe.

“Technical means could be used to speed up the catastrophe,” Budanov said to New Statesman.

It is not clear if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was granted access to these units during its visit on 15 June.

The prospect of a staged “accident” at ZNPP has been raised before, including by President Zelensky on June 22, but Budanov told New Statesman that this time is different.

“The situation has never been as severe as now,” he said.

Two Scenarios for Nuclear Incident

Budanov described two scenarios for a Russian-made nuclear incident. He said the first would be to blow up ZNPP if Russian forces get ousted from the left bank of the Dnipro River. Russia would then create a zone of destruction and exclusion as a way to prevent Ukraine from advancing. The strategy may also serve as a threat not to attack Russian positions.

The second scenario involves Russia using a nuclear disaster as a “preventive measure,” in Budanov’s words. The goal in this case would be to stop Ukraine’s offensive before it starts and to freeze the line of contact as it exists. If Russia is convinced that it cannot stop a Ukrainian advance any other way, it would activate what Zelensky in his address called “a terrorist attack with radiation leakage.”

Zelensky: “Radiation has no borders”

On June 22, President Zelensky said that he had shared information about a potential terrorist act with partners including the United States China, Europe, Brazil and India.

“Radiation has no state borders. Whomever it will hit is deterred only by the direction of the wind,” he said.

“This time it should not be like Kakhovka,” he said, referring to the hydroelectric dam Moscow blew up earlier this month.

“The world has been warned, so the world can and must act.”

Zelensky separately said that allies and the international community are not sufficiently paying attention to the ZNPP situation and not taking sufficient steps to mitigate a staged incident.

Locals Prepare for Disaster

At Ministry of Health facilities in the city of Zaporizhzhia, teams are preparing for a worst-case scenario. Three rounds of training had already been held in case the nuclear power plant is targeted, according to local officials.

“We knew the Russians could blow up the Kakhovka dam and we know they could target ZNPP,” Taras Tyshchenko, a local health administrator, told The Independent.

“This incident will not be a local or even a national one. It is a global incident. It will have a significant impact on the environment not only in the Zaporizhzhia region, the Dnipro region, or in Ukraine as a whole,” he said. “This will be an incident that can definitely affect all our neighboring countries, especially those that have access to the Black Sea.”

A full-scale evacuation of the area under Ukrainian control surrounding ZNPP could be triggered within 15 minutes of the first reports of an explosion, according to Tyshchenko.

After that, inhabitants of the impacted area would be instructed to take cover. Potassium iodide tablets (which can help with radiation poisoning) were distributed in September. Emergency crews would then test the environment for safe routes out.

“Why they are doing this, only Russia knows,” Tyshchenko said.

Ukraine suffered the world's worst nuclear accident in 1986 when it was part of the Soviet Union. Clouds of radioactive material spread across much of Europe after an explosion and fire at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

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Pete Shmigel

Pete Shmigel is an Australian writer. With a background in politics, business, sustainability, the military and mental health, he has been published by the major newspapers in Australia. He helped initiate Lifeline Ukraine.

10. US Green Berets are looking to troops from NATO's newest member as 'mentors' for harsh winter combat

Every Green Beret knows we have a lot that we can learn from our friends, partners, and allies (and our adversaries as well).

"True wisdom comes to each of us when we realize how little we understand about life, ourselves, and the world around us." - Socrates

US Green Berets are looking to troops from NATO's newest member as 'mentors' for harsh winter combat

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

US Army Green Berets board a Finnish NH90 helicopter with the Utti Jaeger Regiment on March 12.

US Army/Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant

Finland became NATO's 31st member in April, but it has long worked closely with the alliance.
Finns are adept at winter warfare, an area of focus for militaries worried about the Arctic.
In March, US Green Berets trained in the Arctic with "mentors" from Finland's Utti Jaeger Regiment.

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One of the biggest shifts in European security prompted by the war in Ukraine has been Sweden's and Finland's decision to abandon non-alignment and apply to NATO.

After intense diplomacy, Finland officially joined the alliance in April, becoming NATO's 31st member. Sweden's application is pending, but officials say it will join soon.

Adding Finland doubled NATO's border with Russia to about 1,600 miles overnight, moving alliance territory much closer to some of Russia's most sensitive military outposts.

While much smaller than its eastern neighbor, Finland has a well-equipped military of about 30,000 troops, though in wartime it can call up 250,000 reservists.

Where the Finns truly excel is in winter warfare, and even the US special-operations community is taking lessons from Finnish commandos.

The Utti Jaeger Regiment

Utti Jaeger Regiment soldiers during training in May 2019.

US Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Scott Jenkins

Among the Finnish military's small professional force, the Utti Jaeger Regiment stands out. Its nearly 700 professional and conscript troops are divided into a headquarters unit and three components.

The Special Jaeger Battalion focuses on special reconnaissance, direct action, and unconventional-warfare missions. The battalion comprises a company of paratroopers that is largely composed of conscripts and a special Jaeger company of professional troops.

The regiment also has a helicopter battalion that supports Finland's special operators. The battalion operates 20 NH90 medium transport helicopters and seven MD500 light transport helicopters.

Finally, the regiment's support battalion provides logistical support to Finland's special operators. It also trains Finnish conscripts to perform support tasks.

The Utti Jaeger Regiment takes part in about 40 "executive assistance tasks," which likely includes training and real-world missions, each year. But where the Utti Jaeger Regiment really shines is in winter warfare.

Arctic operations

US Green Berets during training with Finnish special-operations forces in Lapland on March 8.

US Army/Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant

In March, US Army Special Forces soldiers trained with the Utti Jaeger Regiment on winter operations in Lapland, Finland's northernmost region.

Green Berets are no strangers to harsh conditions. The Special Operations Winter Mountain Operator Course, held twice a year at Fort Carson in Colorado, tests the ability of US special-operations troops to fight at high altitude and in severe weather. Green Berets also train regularly in Alaska alongside other elite US military units.

But Finnish forces live in those conditions, and the Special Forces soldiers looked up to them because of it.

The Green Berets saw the Utti Jaeger Regiment "as mentors because they operate in this environment, they live here; they're very good at winter warfare, so we look to them on how to do things the right way," an assistant detachment commander with 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) said in a press release.

US Green Berets and Utti Jaeger Regiment troops at a helicopter landing zone in Lapland on March 12.

US Army/Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant

Winter warfare is not just about patrolling skills, marksmanship, or small-unit tactics. In such an unforgiving environment, troops must work to stay alive. With a narrow margin for error — exposing skin for just a few minutes can be harmful or even deadly — small mistakes can lead to disaster.

"That one mistake you made with your socks or your glove liners on day one is now making you combat ineffective come day five," the assistant detachment commander said in the release.

The US commandos came to the exercise directly after a five-week winter-warfare course at the Swedish Subarctic Warfare Center and applied skills learned there to the training with the Finns.

US and Finnish soldiers "linked up and focused on interoperability" and synchronization of standard operating procedures, the assistant detachment commander said. "The exercise focused on deep strike operations, or neutralizing a target deep behind the front line."

The 10th Special Forces Group's area of operations is Europe, and Green Berets from the unit work closely with their European counterparts. Indeed, the 10th Special Forces Group has led much of the US's training and advising for Ukrainian special-operations forces.

US Air Force CV-22B Ospreys and a NH90 helicopter from the Utti Jaeger Regiment Helicopter Battalion at a base in Finland on March 30.

US Air Force/Tech. Sgt. Izabella Workman

Although Finland just joined NATO, its special-operations forces have worked closely with the alliance for some time, building interoperability that will allow the Utti Jaeger Regiment to get up to NATO standards in almost no time.

"Working with US forces, I'm really (impressed) with how we went straight from shaking hands to conducting missions in a very short amount of time, which tells a lot about our forces being interoperable and well-suited for combined missions together," a Finnish special-forces soldier assigned to the Special Jaeger Battalion said in the release.

The Green Beret training reflects the US Army's increasing focus on Arctic warfare. In 2021, the Army released a strategy document describing how it planned to defend US national security interests in the region. As a part of that, the Army has solicited help from allies and partners to increase its Arctic warfare capabilities.

Although the US special-operations community has credible Arctic warfare skills and has been honing them, the Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Danish militaries have experts with valuable knowledge and experience.

The Utti Jaeger Regiment's proficiency in winter warfare and its ability to train US and NATO special operators will only increase the alliance's ability to deter and respond to threats.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

11. Getting U.S.-Japanese Command and Control Right

Conclusion:

Experts will debate which of these three options (or others) makes the most sense. But one thing is clear: The status quo is untenable. Japan is taking steps that are unprecedented in its post-war evolution, with investments in new capabilities that have the potential to make a substantial contribution to regional deterrence. But making use of these new capabilities requires new thinking about allied operational arrangements. Washington should not stand by while Japan decides how and where to stand up its Permanent Joint Headquarters, because these decisions will shape U.S. options for regional command-and-control arrangements. The time is now for leaders in the United States to engage with counterparts in Japan about the Permanent Joint Headquarters and the future of the U.S. command structure in Japan. As Japan steps up, the United States should lean in, ensuring that the allies have a shared vision for evolving their respective command structures in the years ahead.

Getting U.S.-Japanese Command and Control Right - War on the Rocks

CHRISTOPHER B. JOHNSTONE AND ZACK COOPER

warontherocks.com · by Christopher B. Johnstone · June 28, 2023

Japan’s ambitious national security and defense strategies offer the opportunity to build a far more operationally effective and deeply integrated U.S.-Japanese alliance. As Japan moves to stand up its first Permanent Joint Operational Headquarters, the United States should act quickly to update its own command structure in Japan. Rather than wait for Japan to decide the details of the future headquarters — including its rank structure, role, and location — the United States should move now to establish a joint operational command element, based in Japan, to serve as its primary day-to-day U.S. interface. Acting now will give the United States the opportunity to shape Japanese choices. Otherwise, decisions made in Tokyo today will narrow Washington’s command structure options tomorrow.

Tokyo Steps Up

Last December, Japan unveiled a new defense strategy that is unprecedented in its scope and ambition, reflecting deep concern over the deteriorating security environment in East Asia. Under the strategy, Japan plans to increase defense spending by more than 60 percent over the next five years, from ¥5.4 trillion (about $40 billion at today’s exchange rates) in Japan’s fiscal year 2022 to about ¥9 trillion ($66 billion) in fiscal year 2027. The effort is off to a fast start: The budget for Japan’s fiscal year 20223 alone is more than 25 percent higher than last year’s. The strategy includes plans for investments in advanced capabilities that Japan has not had before — including long-range precision strike and active cyber defense — as well as long-neglected areas like munition stocks, readiness and maintenance, and hardening of facilities. According to some estimates, by 2027 Japan could have the third-largest defense budget in the world, after the United States and China.

Become a Member

The strategy promises structural reforms as well, including the establishment of a permanent joint operational headquarters to “unify command” of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces. No such dedicated operational command exists today in Japan. The existing Joint Staff Office, reorganized and nominally strengthened in 2006, provides both strategic-level command, advising the prime minister and the defense minister on military matters, and operational command of joint operations during wartime. Japanese defense officials have recognized the deficiencies of this system for some time. The unprecedented 2011 earthquake and tsunami accelerated the push toward greater jointness, and separating strategic and operational command, although in general the Self Defense Forces performed well during the crisis. Since then, Japan has placed an increased emphasis on strengthening jointness — the previous defense strategy in 2018 stated that the Self Defense Forces would “examine [a] future framework for joint operation[s]” — but the new defense strategy is the first time Japan has stated clearly the intent to establish a joint operational headquarters, separate from the Joint Staff Office.

The Ministry of Defense will request funds to establish the Permanent Joint Headquarters in the next budget cycle, with the goal of launching the command by March 2025. But key details remain unresolved, including the rank of the officer assigned to lead it, the size of its permanent staff, and even its location (although it appears likely that the headquarters will at least initially be housed at the Defense Ministry in Ichigaya). These details are the source of intense bureaucratic infighting within Japan’s defense establishment, since Defense Ministry officials and leaders in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces are seeking to protect their institutions and authorities. They have resisted the establishment of the headquarters in the past, and their buy-in will ultimately determine the effectiveness of the new command.

Washington Should Lean In

The United States has a deep interest in ensuring that Japan gets its new operational command right. Washington should therefore work to both shape the Permanent Joint Headquarters and take steps now to update its own command structure in Japan. Unlike Combined Forces Command in South Korea, the U.S.-Japanese alliance was never designed to “fight tonight,” and existing command-and-control arrangements reflect a bygone era. Throughout most of post-war history, Japan was generally viewed as a sanctuary and shield for U.S. forces, which provided the alliance’s spear — its true strike capabilities, operated solely by the United States.

The headquarters of U.S. Forces – Japan at Yokota Air Base is essentially a representational command today, designed to serve as a steward of the U.S. military presence in the country and to engage the Japanese government on issues related to basing under the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement. Despite the presence of nearly 50,000 military personnel in Japan, the command at U.S. Forces – Japan has no joint operational role. The commander, a three-star Air Force officer, commands the Fifth Air Force, which is headquartered at Yokota and reports to service headquarters in Hawaii and the Indo-Pacific Command. The Navy’s Seventh Fleet at Yokosuka, the Marine Corps’ Third Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, and the smaller U.S. Army elements all do the same. As a result, the Joint Staff Office’s counterparts today are Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii and the Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

This arrangement made sense during the Cold War, when Japan served primarily as a platform for U.S. military operations and few expected that Japan’s Self Defense Forces would be forced to take a leading role in a major contingency. But it makes no sense now, given the rapid evolution of the alliance, the advanced capabilities of the Self Defense Forces, and the critical role that Japan could play in a variety of contingencies. The prospect of a Japan with long-range precision strike capability — including the Tomahawk cruise missiles that Japan seeks to deploy on its ships by 2026 — lends particular urgency to this effort. For the first time, the United States and Japan will need the ability to coordinate strike operations in real time — including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and battle-damage assessment. At least at first, Japan will rely heavily on the U.S. “kill chain” architecture as it builds its own strike capabilities — doing so will require a far deeper level of alliance integration than exists today.

As Japan transforms its defense establishment with a major buildup and a stronger focus on jointness, alliance command and control should transform as well. The United States should move now to establish an operational element in Japan as the day-to-day counterpart for the Permanent Joint Headquarters. As the summary report of a task force organized by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA recently concluded, “a reexamination of US-Japan command relationships is needed urgently.” A fully combined U.S.-Japanese command under a single commander (like the Combined Forces Command in South Korea) might ultimately be the most effective command structure, but it is neither legally nor politically possible for Japan at this time. Nonetheless, the U.S. element should have more robust and dedicated staff responsible for planning and coordinating bilateral military operations from peacetime through a major contingency. Such efforts are needed to better address both the defense of Japan as well as the broader set of regional missions.

There are several principles to which Washington and Tokyo should adhere in order to maximize the effectiveness of the alliance’s new command elements. First, the U.S. operational headquarters should, like its Japanese counterpart, have a standing staff, lest it be forced to stand up amidst a major crisis or conflict. Second, the U.S. command should be joint, providing unity of command for managing the operations of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Space Force elements. Third, to the degree possible the American and Japanese operational commands should be co-located, since cooperation in a major contingency would otherwise be impaired. These basic principles should govern decisions going forward as the U.S. government considers not only its own command structure, but also how it looks to shape Japan’s parallel arrangements.

Options for Updating U.S. Command Structures

In December, Congress mandated creation of a joint force headquarters in the Indo-Pacific under Section 1087 of the National Defense Authorization Act. The legislation requires submission of an implementation six months after enactment, which places it in late June. Congress required that the headquarters be established by Oct. 1, 2024, which gives officials just over a year to stand up this new structure. The new joint force headquarters could be established in Japan, with both defense of Japan and regional responsibilities — although the latter role could be politically sensitive in Japan and limit U.S. freedom of action. Leaders in Tokyo might be nervous about this broader operational role for a U.S. command in Japan, but both countries should plan now for how they would coordinate joint responses to a variety of contingencies.

But even if the new joint force headquarters mandated by Congress is located elsewhere in the region, like Guam, standing up a U.S. operational joint headquarters in Japan as a day-to-day counterpart to the Permanent Joint Headquarters is an essential next step in the alliance. Officials and experts have debated several general models for transforming the U.S. command structures in Japan:

Indo-Pacific Command Forward. In this construct, the Indo-Pacific Command would forward-deploy a standing joint task force to Japan with a small permanent staff. Led by a flag officer, separate from U.S. Forces Japan, this element would report directly to the Indo-Pacific Command’s director of operations in Hawaii. The joint task force could be based at Yokota Air Base, to facilitate communication and coordination with U.S. Forces Japan. Alternatively, it might be located on the USS Blue Ridge, the flagship of the Seventh Fleet, which operates out of Yokosuka, Japan. This model would have the advantage of providing direct connectivity to the Indo-Pacific Command, but would function mainly as a liaison since it would struggle to serve a joint role in either location given that the Indo-Pacific Command staff and its component commands in Hawaii would remain the key decision-makers. It would also leave the existing U.S. Forces – Japan headquarters role unchanged, and create a parallel organization with separate functions, in effect resulting in two counterpart organizations for Japan, depending on the issue at hand.

Dual-Hat Component Commander. Under this construct, the United States would identify a component commander in Japan, presumably either the Seventh Fleet commander at Yokosuka or the Third Marine Expeditionary Force commander in Okinawa, as the U.S. joint operational counterpart for the Permanent Joint Operational Headquarters. Staff could be a mix of dedicated and dual-hatted component personnel. This approach would be the easiest to start, given that it could rely in part on personnel already on assignment in Japan. But a dual-hat construct would almost inevitably result in less focus on alliance operations, as U.S. unilateral activities would take priority for any component commander. Location would also be a challenge, as both Yokosuka and Okinawa are far from the headquarters, especially if it remains at Ichigaya.

Operationalize U.S. Forces – Japan. As noted earlier, the headquarters of U.S. Forces – Japan today has virtually no operational role in the alliance. This may have been acceptable in the past, but Japan’s growing operational role suggests a rethinking of this arrangement. The U.S. commander could be designated as lead of a revamped joint operational command subordinate to Indo-Pacific Command, with operational responsibilities to accompany the representational duties that exist today. U.S. Forces – Japan could be given the mandate of interfacing with Japan’s Permanent Joint Headquarters and built out accordingly. A flag officer could be designated deputy commander for operations, with equivalent rank to the existing deputy commander, a one-star Marine Corps general, who could continue the current role overseeing U.S. bases in Japan. The advantage of this approach is simplicity — it would centralize military-to-military engagement with Japan under a single roof at Yokota. At the same time, it would represent a significant evolution in the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Forces – Japan and would require a more robust staffing complement than exists today.

As noted, each of these options has pluses and minuses. An Indo-Pacific Command forward model would have direct connectivity, but further confuse relationships by adding a parallel structure. A dual-hatted commander would be easiest to implement, but the second hat responsible for alliance operations would likely get short shrift. And building out U.S. Forces – Japan would centralize everything under one roof, but would require a significant revamp of the existing organization.

At the end of the day, operationalizing U.S. Forces – Japan would have a number of long-term advantages. An operationalized U.S. Forces – Japan could have a robust and joint standing staff. It could be co-located, at least in part, with Japan’s Permanent Joint Headquarters, if Washington engages now with Tokyo. Nonetheless, this approach would be bureaucratically difficult, and require fundamental changes to the command’s culture and staff.

Time for a Change

Experts will debate which of these three options (or others) makes the most sense. But one thing is clear: The status quo is untenable. Japan is taking steps that are unprecedented in its post-war evolution, with investments in new capabilities that have the potential to make a substantial contribution to regional deterrence. But making use of these new capabilities requires new thinking about allied operational arrangements. Washington should not stand by while Japan decides how and where to stand up its Permanent Joint Headquarters, because these decisions will shape U.S. options for regional command-and-control arrangements. The time is now for leaders in the United States to engage with counterparts in Japan about the Permanent Joint Headquarters and the future of the U.S. command structure in Japan. As Japan steps up, the United States should lean in, ensuring that the allies have a shared vision for evolving their respective command structures in the years ahead.

Become a Member

Christopher B. Johnstone is Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served for 25 years in the U.S. government, including at the National Security Council under the Biden and Obama administrations and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Zack Cooper is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a partner with Armitage International. He also previously served in the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Christopher B. Johnstone · June 28, 2023

12. US approves $15 billion in Patriot and missile defense upgrades for Poland

US approves $15 billion in Patriot and missile defense upgrades for Poland

Reuters · by Reuters

WASHINGTON, June 28 (Reuters) - The U.S. State Department has approved a possible $15 billion sale of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) and related equipment to Poland as it upgrades its air defenses, the Pentagon said on Wednesday.

Despite State Department approval, the notification did not indicate that a contract had been signed or that negotiations had concluded.

European interest in U.S. weaponry has increased with demand centered around such supplies as munitions, air defenses, communications equipment, shoulder-fired Javelin missiles and drones which have proven critical to Ukraine's war efforts.

The package would include 48 Patriot launch stations and 644 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 3 Missile Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptor missiles, network links, sensors, support equipment, spares and technical support, the Pentagon said.

The Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the possible sale on Wednesday.

The Pentagon said Raytheon Corp (RTX.N) and Lockheed Martin (LMT.N) were the prime contractor for the weapons.

Reporting by Rami Ayyub and Mike Stone in Washington; Editing by Ismail Shakil and Cynthia Osterman

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

13. Modi’s US Visit Illustrates Growing Complexities of the Indo-Pacific

Conclusion:

The China factor is perhaps the most compelling component of the existing love affair between Washington and New Delhi. In its National Security Strategy document released in last October, the Biden administration expressed its strategic intent toward India in these words: “As India is the world’s largest democracy and a major defense partner, the United States and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” PM Modi’s visit to Washington is a crucial component of the strategic vision outlined in the NSS. Modi’s glitzy state visit will certainly enhance his standing in domestic politics. However, it also exposes a significant foreign policy conundrum: how to manage the delicate balancing act between cozying up to Washington while navigating reservations and estrangements from Beijing and Moscow, with whom India maintains vital economic and military dependencies. Modi finds himself grappling with the complexities of aligning with the United States while ensuring that India’s relationships with other key players remain intact. This predicament highlights the challenges of maintaining a nuanced foreign policy, where the pursuit of one alliance may strain ties with others. The state visit serves as a stark reminder of the intricate web of dependencies India must deftly negotiate, walking a tightrope between competing interests and the potential consequences. The ultimate challenge lies in striking a delicate equilibrium that safeguards India’s strategic autonomy while advancing its economic and political interests.

Modi’s US Visit Illustrates Growing Complexities of the Indo-Pacific | Geopolitical Monitor

geopoliticalmonitor.com · by Dr. Imran Khalid · June 28, 2023

The pomp and grandeur displayed by the Biden administration during Indian Prime Minister Modi’s first-ever state visit to the United States, which included an address to the joint session of Congress and a state dinner, reeked of desperation. Eager to entice Modi, the Biden administration went to extraordinary lengths to convey an exaggerated sense of India’s strategic importance. Their apparent courtship of Modi is driven by a desperate desire to establish a tangible alliance aimed at countering China’s growing influence on the global stage, while simultaneously driving a wedge between New Delhi and Moscow. Through lavish ceremonies and diplomatic pleasantries, Washington left no stone unturned in its portrayal of India as an “indispensable friend” in today’s geopolitical landscape. With a raft of agreements and deals, spanning from defense, semiconductors, space, telecommunications, critical minerals and core technologies, Modi’s visit is perhaps one of the most important foreign policy venture in India’s recent history.

“The dark clouds of coercion and confrontation are casting their shadow in the Indo-Pacific. The stability of the region has become one of the central concerns of our partnership” said Modi in his “euphoric” address to the Congress yesterday. But, caught in the whirlwind of Washington’s excessive “generosity and hospitality,” PM Modi must not succumb to the allure of these calculated romantic overtures of Washington, which are destined to disrupt the delicate balance the Indo-Pacific, posing economic and political complications for all stakeholders. The strategic intent of the Biden administration towards Modi’s visit is twofold: firstly, to forge a robust tapestry of interconnected defense, technological, and trade alliances with India, thereby presenting a tangible counterweight to China’s ever-expanding clout in the Asia-Pacific sphere. Secondly, the administration aims to sow seeds of uncertainty and estrangement in the longstanding relationship between Russia and India.

However, the Biden administration’s pursuit of these objectives is fraught with complexities and potential pitfalls. The intricate web of challenges and potential obstacles that lie ahead for the American strategy of enticing India are too big. Beyond the symbolism and ceremonial gestures, the Biden administration has a strategic interest in drawing India closer within its manufacturing and defense sphere, a move that is targeted at reduction in New Delhi’s dependence on Russian military equipment but also to facilitate the diversification of US supply chains away from China. During the Trump era, the United States generously granted India Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 (STA-1) status. This strategic move effectively facilitated the export of cutting-edge high technology products from US companies to their Indian counterparts. Under the Biden Administration, this high technology partnership has further deepened. Among them, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, jointly spearheaded by the national security advisors of both nations, is of strategic nature. Additionally, the reinvigoration of the US-India Strategic Trade Dialogue, focusing on the controlled export of dual-use items, further underscores the mutual commitment to robust cooperation in the realm of advanced technology. Ironically, the majority of US policy makers think that if New Delhi were to weaken its ties with Moscow, it would inadvertently strengthen the bond between two “adversarial” powers – China and Russia – and this scenario would inversely lead to India’s inordinate reliance on the United States. But this will compel Modi to divert resources from developmental priorities to defense expenditures – certainly it will have a negative impact on the Indian economy. These hawks in the Biden administration, though frustrated over India’s oil purchases from Russia and its precarious balancing act on the Ukraine war, believe that India is the most viable option to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. For precisely this very reason, Modi’s visit has been granted a distinct and exceptional treatment by the Biden administration.

Over the past decade, the United States and India have witnessed a visible transformation in their relationship, characterized by numerous avenues of engagement. The strategic dialogues between the two nations encompass a range of initiatives, such as the Quad (involving Japan and Australia), I2U2 (including Israel and the United Arab Emirates), the 2+2 Dialogue featuring defense and foreign ministers, the Defense Policy Group (DPG), and the aforementioned Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) Initiative. Furthermore, there exist numerous forums for trade policy, commercial dialogue, economic and financial partnership, strategic trade, and CEO interaction, like the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership, Higher Education Dialogue, and India’s participation in three of the four pillars of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

The China factor is perhaps the most compelling component of the existing love affair between Washington and New Delhi. In its National Security Strategy document released in last October, the Biden administration expressed its strategic intent toward India in these words: “As India is the world’s largest democracy and a major defense partner, the United States and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” PM Modi’s visit to Washington is a crucial component of the strategic vision outlined in the NSS. Modi’s glitzy state visit will certainly enhance his standing in domestic politics. However, it also exposes a significant foreign policy conundrum: how to manage the delicate balancing act between cozying up to Washington while navigating reservations and estrangements from Beijing and Moscow, with whom India maintains vital economic and military dependencies. Modi finds himself grappling with the complexities of aligning with the United States while ensuring that India’s relationships with other key players remain intact. This predicament highlights the challenges of maintaining a nuanced foreign policy, where the pursuit of one alliance may strain ties with others. The state visit serves as a stark reminder of the intricate web of dependencies India must deftly negotiate, walking a tightrope between competing interests and the potential consequences. The ultimate challenge lies in striking a delicate equilibrium that safeguards India’s strategic autonomy while advancing its economic and political interests.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

geopoliticalmonitor.com · by Dr. Imran Khalid · June 28, 2023

14. Green Beret with a Mission builds bridges and raises spirits

Green Beret with a Mission builds bridges and raises spirits

Stars and Stripes · by Roberta Baker · June 28, 2023

Snapshots posted June 26, 2023, show moments experienced at the third annual Green Beret with a Challenge event held in New Hampshire. (Swim with a Mission/Facebook)

BRIDGEWATER, N.H. (Tribune News Service) — At a horse farm on the north side of Newfound Lake, on a three-mile course through the woods, 140 soldiers and would-be soldiers braved mosquitoes, mud and rain to learn what it's like to be a U.S. Army Green Beret.

The Green Beret with a Mission Challenge, an endurance, skill and obstacle course, simulates combat training and raises money to support Camp Resilence, a Gilford-based program that provides therapeutic outdoor experiences to military veterans, first responders and their families. Saturday marked the third annual event.

"It's kind of cool. It gives you an Army experience. If it were real it would be scary. Since it's fake, it's kind of fun," said 11-year-old Connor Culacz, a member of Boy Scout Troop 50 from Bridgewater. His troop's job was to ambush enemy soldiers by springing out of the brush and drenching them with super-soaker toy assault rifles.

"It's kind of putting you in the shoes of an Army person who went to war, and be stressed in a situation where you don't know what to do," Culacz said.

Fifteen teams of participants, ranging in age from 10 to 70, trekked through a battery of physical and mental tests. They forded an imaginary river by shimmying across a rope strung between trees, and crossed a swamp on a winding log trail. They carried 'injured soldiers' on stretchers — volunteers from their teams, and lugged water and ammo to the next clearing in the bush.

They shot paper targets with air rifles and air pistols. They wore backpacks weighing 10 to 40 pounds and held "rubber duckies" — imitation machine guns — as they progressed along rutted trails, listening for every rustling leaf and the faintest click or snap of enemy movement.

Snapshots posted June 26, 2023, show moments experienced at the third annual Green Beret with a Challenge event held in New Hampshire. (Swim with a Mission/Facebook)

Jake Bumbaca of Litchfield, a staff sergeant in the New Hampshire Air National Guard, crawled on his belly through a 30-foot sluice of soupy mud.

"Cold mud! Nothing like it," said Bumbaca. "That was refreshing compared to bringing jugs (5 pounds of water) up the hill."

Then he knelt behind sandbags and hurled a volley of mock grenades at a makeshift enemy bunker.

"This is obviously something we don't do every day. We're all mechanics," said Tech Sgt. Connor Curio of Farmington. "Any time we get to do Army-style training, we like to show off, participate and have a good time."

"They're not required to crawl through the mud. But we highly encourage it," said grenade station manager Chris Bank. "Some will yell, 'Frag out!' — warning others to exit harm's way. "But most of the drama involves crawling through the mud."

Saturday was a lesson in skills, surprise, survival and team-building when stakes are high. And it was a chance for service members, first responders and veterans to decompress and bond.

Each team had a "walker" — a retired Green Beret who was there to answer questions, who served as chief of the imaginary guerrilla unit they had come to assist, as they worked with resistance forces behind enemy lines in a fictional nation coined the "People's Republic of Pineland." The situations they encountered resembled Special Forces missions in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, according to retired military officers on hand.

"You had a chance to today to work with some of the most elite forces in the world," retired Lt. Col. Kurt Webber, board president and co-founder of Camp Resilience, told the group when they broke for lunch. Webber, who lives in Gilford, graduated from West Point and served as a U.S. Army Ranger and in the Special Forces, commonly known as the Green Berets. "It's a chance to see what life as a Green Beret is like. They all have a blast. It's challenging and hard. But it's fun."

Snapshots posted June 26, 2023, show moments experienced at the third annual Green Beret with a Challenge event held in New Hampshire. (Swim with a Mission/Facebook)

Jim Crispen of Woodstock, who served in the Army at Fort Devens, Mass., helped out at target shooting station. "It's got so many different phases to it that it challenges just about everybody," he said.

"This is all fun and games, but in the real world it's sketchy and scary, so don't take it lightly," National Guardsman and former U.S. Army Ranger Gred d'Arbonne of Brookline told his military unit for the day: the 11 members of Boy Scout Troop 50.

"It has a great purpose," said Gen. David Mikolaities of the New Hampshire National Guard. "It's good military team building for us, and it's an opportunity to honor our veterans. It's paying back to those who have gone before."

Julie Taub, co-founder and executive director of Swim with a Mission, the parent organization of veterans fundraisers including this one, said she hopes to raise $2 million through various events in New Hampshire this summer — including $50,000 for Camp Resilience through Saturday's Green Beret with a Mission.

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by Roberta Baker · June 28, 2023

15. Why war with China over Taiwan could ruin the global economy

Well that is a BFO (blinding flash of the obvious).

Why war with China over Taiwan could ruin the global economy

Taiwan makes the world’s most advanced memory chips — the brains inside every piece of technology from smartphones and modern cars to artificial intelligence and fighter jets.

NBC News · by Richard Engel, Charlotte Gardiner, Jennifer Jett and Alexander Smith

HSINCHU, Taiwan — A military conflict over Taiwan would set the global economy back decades because of the crippling disruption to the supply chain of crucial semiconductors, according to the head of one of the island’s leading makers of microchips.

Taiwan, a self-ruling democracy about 100 miles off China, makes the world’s most advanced microchips — the brains inside every piece of technology from smartphones and modern cars to artificial intelligence and fighter jets.

China claims Taiwan as its territory and has said it would be prepared to use force to take control of the island, although it has not laid out any timeline for doing so. Officially, the United States discourages conflict but takes a neutral stance, although President Joe Biden has repeatedly suggested he would step in to defend Taiwan.

If the industry were to be disrupted by military conflict, the impact on the global economy would be “huge,” said Miin Wu, the founder and chief executive of the Taiwanese chipmaker Macronix.

“My opinion is, you will be set back at least 20 years,” he told NBC News on Monday in the company’s showroom at Hsinchu Science Park in northwestern Taiwan.

The island is a microchip fabrication hotbed, producing 60% of the world’s semiconductors — and around 93% of the most advanced ones, according to a 2021 report from the Boston Consulting Group. The U.S., South Korea and China also produce semiconductors, but the market which was worth almost $600 billion in 2022 is dominated by Taiwan.

These technological wonders consist of tiny patterns, measured in nanometers, that are etched onto thin slices of silicon called “wafers.”

Wu, 75, played a major part in establishing Taiwan’s chip industry when he founded his company in 1989, having spent more than a decade working in Silicon Valley, including as senior manager at Intel. He brought some 40 senior Taiwanese engineers back with him.

If Taiwan’s semiconductor industry were disrupted by military conflict, it would set the global economy back at least 20 years, according to Miin Wu, founder of the Taiwanese chipmaker Macronix.Annabelle Chih / Getty Images file

The Macronix campus has a Silicon Valley vibe, with employees bouncing between work and an on-site gymnasium, a roller-blading area and a large park. Displays in the company’s showroom explain how the chips are made and showcase products in which they are used, from Fitbits and Nintendo game consoles to cars and medical equipment.

“I thought the only thing I want to do is I want to develop technology based on the U.S. standard and then move up,” Wu said.

He said he never anticipated that semiconductors would become one of the most important industries in the world — and one that is now at the heart of spiraling tensions between the U.S. and China, the planet’s two biggest economies.

Relations between the two countries have been at a low ebb in recent years as disputes have arisen over a range of issues including trade, human rights and Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as Taiwan, whose government the U.S. doesn’t recognize officially but is bound by law to supply with defensive weapons.

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has been described as a “silicon shield” that gives the U.S. and other supporters added incentive to promote the island’s security in the face of growing threats from China.

Since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 after a civil war, its ruling Communist Party has claimed sovereignty over the island, where the defeated Nationalist forces set up a rival government.

Like his predecessors, Chinese President Xi Jinping says China desires “peaceful unification” with Taiwan but has not ruled out the use of force.

The U.S. has a long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” in terms of how it would respond if China attacked Taiwan, the idea being to deter Beijing from invading and discourage Taipei from doing something — like declaring independence — that might provoke a military response from its neighbor.

House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, right, with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Calif., in April.Eric Thayer / Bloomberg via Getty Images file

Any instability in the Taiwan Strait “resulting from escalation, accident or use of force would have major economic and security implications for the region and globally,” according to a State Department readout of a call last week between Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland and her European Union counterpart, Stefano Sannino.

Biden, however, has appeared to move away from strategic ambiguity by saying on several occasions that Washington would step in to defend Taiwan. Each time, the White House later said that U.S. policy on the island had not changed.

Tensions with China threaten Taiwan microchip industry

June 27, 202302:48

Though Taiwan may be small, Malcolm Penn, chief executive of the British semiconductor industry consultant Future Horizons, agrees with Wu that a war over the island would “bring the world to its knees” because of the disruption to global chip supply.

“It would make Covid seem like a walk in the park,” he said, “and it would hurt China just as much as anyone else.”

Robert Tsao, a Taiwanese billionaire who made his fortune in semiconductors, agreed that a war would “ruin everything” and be “disastrous for the international interests” of the U.S. and the world.

As part of its territorial claims, China also says it owns most of the South China Sea, a vital shipping route abundant with natural resources. This claim isn’t recognized in international law, and Washington’s attempts to demonstrate this by sailing ships and flying aircraft through the region have been met by Chinese vessels and planes “buzzing” their unwelcome backyard guests.

A Chinese soldier during combat exercises in the waters around Taiwan last August.Xinhua News Agency / via Getty Images file

It is against this backdrop that the Biden administration says it wants to “de-risk” its relationship with China — keeping trade essentially open but restricting certain areas that Washington believes could give China the upper hand when it comes to national security or future-defining technology.

Last year, Biden imposed a sweeping set of export controls designed to block China’s access to certain kinds of semiconductor chips made with U.S. technology.

These export controls and other technology restrictions have had implications for companies all over the world and Macronix is no exception. Like other Taiwanese chipmakers, it is barred from selling advanced chips to China, the island’s largest trading partner.

China has criticized the export controls as an abuse of trade measures that is meant to protect U.S. “technological hegemony.” Many industry figures agree Washington’s attempt to control the market is counterproductive.

The U.S. export controls will “delay but not stop China” from achieving technological parity, said Penn at Future Horizons.

“It may take 10 years, but they’ll do it: They have the resources to do it, they have got the scientific know-how, they have got the money, they have got the market, and now they’ve got the need,” he said.

Penn is among the experts deeply critical of Washington's export controls, calling them counterproductive. And this week the chief financial officer of American tech firm Nvidia, Colette Kress, told an investor conference that introducing new restrictions would result in a "permanent loss of opportunities for the U.S. industry to compete and lead in one of the world’s largest markets."

The U.S., which produces about 10% of the world’s semiconductor chips and none of the most advanced ones, is also trying to boost domestic manufacturing, offering tax incentives for projects like the $40 billion factory being built in Arizona by the Taiwanese chip giant TSMC.

But building such a complex industry will take time, Wu said. “I would say 10 years,” he added.

Ultimately, he said, the stability of the semiconductor industry — and people’s access to the devices powered by it — depends on the leaders of China, Taiwan and the U.S.

“They have to make the right decision with their wisdom,” Wu said. “That is the solution.”

Richard Engel and Charlotte Gardiner reported from Hsinchu, Taiwan. Jennifer Jett reported from Hong Kong and Alexander Smith reported from London.

Richard Engel

Richard Engel has been NBC News' chief foreign correspondent since 2008.

Charlotte Gardiner

Charlotte Gardiner is an associate producer for NBC News, based in London.

Jennifer Jett

Jennifer Jett is Asia digital editor for NBC News, based in Hong Kong.

Alexander Smith

Alexander Smith is a senior reporter for NBC News Digital based in London.

Reuters contributed.

NBC News · by Richard Engel, Charlotte Gardiner, Jennifer Jett and Alexander Smith

16. 10 questions Congress should ask incoming Joint Chiefs nominees

Here are numbers 12 and 13. (okay 14+)

Who is the champion for the services' irregular warfare capabilities? (If no one, who should be the champion or do you consider irregular warfare a lesser military capability and a distraction?)

How will you develop irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters capable of prosecuting irregular warfare in support of competitive statecraft conducted by the interagency to campaign and win in the gray zone of strategic competition?

10 questions Congress should ask incoming Joint Chiefs nominees - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari · June 28, 2023

US President Joe Biden announces his nomination of Air Force General Charles Brown, Jr. (R), to serve as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, DC, May 25, 2023. (Photo by MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images)

The congressional confirmation process offers US lawmakers, and through them the American public, the important chance to ask direct questions of the nation’s military leaders about how they see threats abroad and weaknesses at home. In the op-ed below, AEI’s John Ferrari highlights 10 (okay, 11) key questions that he says should be on senators’ lips as the Joint Chief nominations come before them.

This summer, there will be a remarkable change in the leadership of our nation’s military, with four of five service chiefs changing out, in addition to the chairman.

Military nominees are a special class within our political system because the Constitution splits the responsibility for our military between the executive and legislative branches. While the president is the Commander in Chief, Congress is tasked with “raising and maintaining” the military. Thus, while the president interacts with the Joint Chiefs routinely, the Senate must ensure that they too have access to the unvarnished professional military advice of the chiefs, starting with real questions and real answers during confirmation.

To date, the Senate has held a hearing for only one of these key positions: the commandant of the Marine Corps. As they prepare for the other hearings, here are 10 essential questions, with one bonus question, that the Senate should consider asking of each nominee.

Do you think the United States will be engaged in war before 2030 or after 2030?

This is an important question to understand decision-making within the Pentagon. Current Pentagon leaders are willing to take on risk this decade to build out the force we may need in 2030. Knowing where the prospective members of the Joint Chiefs stand on this is crucial to informing Congress’s own role in building up American forces.

A Pentagon planning assumption is that we will fight one war at a time, do you believe this to be a realistic assumption?

In addition to assuming war is more likely in 2030 than today, current Pentagon leaders have assumed we will only fight one war at a time. As the leaders of our military, it’s critical to learn from our Joint Chiefs if they believe that our potential adversaries will respect this assumption or exploit it.

Do you believe our munition stockpiles are adequate to fight and win an extended war with China?

Over the past several decades, we have gone to war and run out of critical munitions specific to that war. For example, we ran short of bullets in Iraq, precision munitions in Syria, and now artillery shells in Ukraine. Congress should understand what the Joint Chiefs believe munitions expenditure may be like in a war with China and what munitions would be most effective in such a fight.

Do you think that the US needs a larger or smaller force posture in Europe?

Despite recent boosts in troop numbers, successive administrations have been reducing the US military presence in Europe over the past thirty years. There is talk that with Finland having joined NATO, and hopefully Sweden next, the US military can reduce its footprint further. Congress should be informed of the best military advice for presence in Europe given the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Do you believe that pulling capacity out of the Middle East and Africa was the correct strategic move for US security?

In order to prioritize Great Power competition, our military footprint has either decreased or seen attempted decreases in these two regions, only to find that China and Russia have filled the void we left.

Do you support providing a 30 percent pay raise to the junior enlisted force?

We are in the midst of one of the worst recruiting crises in the 50-year history of the all-volunteer force. House appropriators have proposed a 30 percent pay raise for junior enlisted service members. Many political actors believe the recruiting crisis is either because the military is too woke or not woke enough. These concerns may not be the most relevant factor, however, as a lack of recruits may just be a result of the military failing to take Economics 101 and not paying a fair market wage.

Do you believe that the increase in capabilities of military weapons has more than made up for the decrease in capacity?

To fund every exquisite and expensive new weapon system, as well as reduce costs due to inflation, the military has been shrinking. The justification for these new weapons is that since they are so much better than the old ones, we can have fewer of them. Understanding this tradeoff in capacity vs. capability is an important input from the Joint Chiefs.

Do you believe that going forward, we can continue to shrink the capacity of the force or are we already too small today?

Even more important than understanding where the chiefs are on the prior trade of capabilities vs. capacity is knowing where they stand on future trades of capacity. Knowing if they believe that the military can get smaller, or if it is too small now is critical for matching the military’s requirements to our national strategy.

Do you believe our current weapon systems are the best in the world, and if not, whose are better?

The chiefs run the requirements process inside the Pentagon from which the civilian leaders gain justifications to procure new weapons. Many military leaders have lamented that US weapons are falling behind other nations’ to justify buying newer equipment. Knowing if the incoming chiefs believe that our current systems trail or lead our adversaries is essential to helping Congress make decisions on weapons procurement.

As you set the requirements for military weapons, do you believe in incrementally improving current weapon systems or building new weapon systems from scratch?

While the acquisition of military systems is run by the civilian leadership within the Pentagon, understanding how the chiefs weigh the benefits and risks of incremental improvements that take a few years versus new build systems that take over a decade will help Congress shape the future path of acquisitions.

Bonus Question: On its current path, do you believe the United States Navy will be able to meet our national security needs in 2030?

Some might find it strange to ask each service chief about the Navy, but the United States is and always will be a maritime power. With Congress’s National Commission on the Future of the Navy (slowly) being stood up, it would be appropriate to understand what the incoming Joint Chiefs believe the Commission should be examining.

Our military leaders take an oath not to the president but to the Constitution of the United States. Congress is responsible for raising and maintaining the military. As such, it plays a vital role on behalf of the American people to perform this public job interview with each prospective nominee. Only with access to this professional military judgement can Congress do its job and the American people can be assured that if it provides the Pentagon with over $800 billion per year, the military can actually defend our nation and win our wars.

Another note: Given the gravity of the situation in the world and the responsibility that the Congress has to provide this advice and consent of the nominees, the Congress should immediately move forward with hearings and up/down votes for the nominees. Stalling the nominations of military leaders due to disagreements between the political branches does not enhance our national security and it does indeed hurt readiness and military families. First, it demeans the solemn constitutional responsibility that the Congress has because if stalling these nominations do no harm, then why bother with the process at all? If it does not matter, then the Secretary of Defense should just move and promote the military officers. If in fact it does matter, and just about everyone believes it does, then the mass hostage taking is just one more break of civil discourse in this country and the “they did it, so can we” argument will grind the promotions of our military leadership to a halt. If we want our military leaders to be above politics and non-partisan, then we should treat them that way.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari · June 28, 2023

17. There’s No Such Thing as a Great Power

Excerpts:

Western analysts and policymakers must not make the same mistakes in assessing Chinese power. China is certainly a full-spectrum power, with the ability to create and re-create powerful modern weapons and forces that far exceed Russian capabilities. That said, China would not fare well against a coalition of the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, perhaps supported by South Korea and Australia (with tacit or even overt backing from India and the EU). Such a coalition would boast productive capacities that are now almost twice as large as China’s, and its militaries have real experience conducting complex operations in war. It would also include societies that will want to fight for their freedom—something that would make a Chinese military defeat even more likely.

But if Chinese power should not be overstated, nor should Western prospects in any future war in the Indo-Pacific. Such a conflict would be a catastrophe for all sides. China would almost certainly suffer massive losses in military equipment if it tried to assault Taiwan. An amphibious assault is the most difficult and complex operation that a military can undertake, and China has never even attempted one before, so such an effort could easily turn into a fiasco. Even so, a U.S.-led coalition would suffer grievously in any such war.

A proper understanding of power would achieve two vital ends: it would make China seem less threatening to the West and puncture the illusion that power can be used decisively in war. The United States has no need to behave aggressively toward China. It leads a coalition that is in a superior position, one that China would take an enormous (and almost certainly self-destructive) risk by challenging. Far better to try to solidify the status quo with a nonconfrontational approach. For that reason, the concept of a full-spectrum power is not just helpful for understanding how states behave in the international realm; it can guard against the kind of analytical mistakes that led to the current catastrophe in Ukraine.

There’s No Such Thing as a Great Power

How a Dated Concept Distorts Geopolitics

By Phillips P. O’Brien

June 29, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Phillips P. O’Brien · June 29, 2023

In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, most Western analysts saw Moscow as a great power and Kyiv as a lesser one. Diminished though it was from its Soviet heyday, Russia still retained a large conventional military and a vast nuclear arsenal, earning it a spot in the top echelon of global powers. In January 2022, as Russian troops massed on Ukraine’s borders, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley warned that Moscow was capable of dealing a “horrific” blow to Ukraine. Michael Kofman, head of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analysis, argued that Russia had “the power to challenge or violently upend the security architecture of Europe” and “the conventional military power to deter the United States.”

This view of Russian power was widely held in the United States and Western Europe, and it prompted many analysts to argue that the United States and NATO should either stay out of a conflict between Russia and Ukraine or strictly limit military aid to Kyiv. For instance, the realist scholars John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt all labeled Russia a great power and argued that Moscow’s need to dominate Ukraine should be indulged. Posen went even further, suggesting that Russia had the military might to impose its desired outcome. As he put it just days before the Russian invasion began, “Ukrainian units would no doubt fight bravely, but given the geography of the country, the open topography of much of its landscape, and the overall numerical superiority that Russia enjoys, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to defend itself successfully.”

But once Russian President Vladimir Putin unleashed his war machine, that narrative of Russian power swiftly unraveled. The Ukrainian army, supposedly outgunned and with little chance of resisting conventionally, fought back with brains and ferocity. And Ukrainian civilians, whom many experts thought to be divided over the question of the country’s relationship to Russia, rallied to defend their homeland. Meanwhile, Putin’s military floundered. Its weapons and doctrine proved to be lackluster at best, and its soldiers performed far worse than expected, thanks in part to corruption and poor training. Hundreds of thousands, maybe more than a million, Russian men of military age fled the country to avoid conscription. And just last week, the Wagner paramilitary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin briefly seized control of the southern city of Rostov-on-Don and threatened to plunge the country into civil war, sending his mercenary fighters to within 120 miles of Moscow.

This stunning revelation of Russian weakness calls into question not just Moscow’s status as a great power but also the very concept of a great power. Even realists who frequently use the term have never provided a clear and convincing definition of what makes a power great. Rather, they tend to use the term to describe everything from true superpowers such as the United States and China, which wield the full spectrum of economic, technological, and military might, to better-than-average military powers such as Russia, which have nuclear weapons but little else that would be considered indicators of great power. Such imprecision not only distorts analysis of state power and its use in war but can also make countries seem more militarily threatening than they really are. For these reasons, analysts should stop asking what makes a country a great power and start asking what makes it a “full spectrum” power. Doing so would have helped avoid overestimating Russia’s might before February 2022—and will help avoid exaggerating the threat posed by China, going forward.

POTEMKIN POWER

The “great power” moniker has never been especially useful. On the eve of World War I, Europe was thought to be dominated by its great powers: Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom. But the war showed that there were really only two dominant European powers: Germany and the United Kingdom. The power differentials between these countries, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary and Italy, on the other, were so great that the latter two quickly became dependent on other countries, both desperately needing loans and eventually troops from their more powerful allies to keep fighting.

When the United States entered the war in 1917, it created a whole new class of power, one that was basically impervious to outside threats. Washington remained the world’s lone superpower through World War II, when it was able to fight in every domain (air, land, and sea) in every theater—and provide massive aid to its allies. No other power came close to matching these capabilities.

By no metric can Russia be considered an economic or technological great power.

Russia today is not a great power from this perspective and has not been part of one since years before the Soviet Union collapsed. Assertions to the contrary were grounded in a false view of Moscow’s military strength, one based on the most obvious trappings of power: weapons and supposed capabilities, troop numbers, performance in military maneuvers, and stated doctrine. By these measures, Russia looked like a heavily armed nuclear and conventional power that was able and willing to impose its will not just on its neighborhood but on countries around the globe. But beneath this menacing picture of the Kremlin was a much shabbier portrait of the underlying social, political, economic, and technological elements of power, all of which suggested that Russia was anything but great.

Take the question of troop morale. Analysts assumed that Russian forces were both well trained and well led, capable of competently executing military operations. Although Russian forces had not performed particularly well in Chechnya in the 1990s and the first decade of this millennium or in Georgia in 2008, analysts nonetheless minimized such concerns and focused instead on Russia’s more impressive weaponry.

If the military analysis of Russia was skewed, the overall picture of the country was even more flawed. By no metric could Russia have been considered an economic or technological great power. In 2021, Russia’s GDP was smaller than Canada’s, Russia was not a player in high technology, and it was growing more corrupt and dictatorial. Its economy was powered by resource extraction rather than manufacturing. And it was a demographic mess, with collapsing birth rates and an average male life expectancy of just 66 years. U.S. Senator John McCain’s quip in 2014 that Russia was “a gas station masquerading as a country” might have been a little too demeaning—but only a little.

THE FULL-SPECTRUM CLUB

More useful than the concept of a great power is that of a full-spectrum power, which takes into account the diverse factors that create military might, not just its outward manifestation in weapons. Few countries have ever achieved all the fundamentals on which superior military power is built and sustained; most that have been described as great powers were in fact midranking Potemkin states whose militaries served as façades for otherwise weak power bases. This was true of Benito Mussolini’s Italy, and it is true of Putin’s Russia.

In the last 150 years, there have been only a handful full-spectrum powers. One is obviously the United States, which became the largest economy in the world sometime in the 1890s and had few security concerns compared with most countries. The United Kingdom was certainly a full-spectrum power from the late nineteenth century until 1943, when it had to subordinate its preferred grand strategy to accommodate U.S. interests. Before then, the United Kingdom was capable of creating and deploying advanced and well-prepared forces almost anywhere in the world and maintaining a war economy that hardly any other state could match. Other countries that probably fit the full-spectrum bill were Germany from around 1900 to 1942, the Soviet Union from 1949 to the 1970s, and China from approximately 2010 to today. All three could compete in every strategic domain and produce high-quality military equipment. They did not always have true global reach, but they exercised great influence in a large part of the world.

What made them full-spectrum powers, however, was not only their military might but also the economic and technological prowess that enabled their armed forces. Military power is to a large degree based on the ability to make the best, most advanced military equipment, from small arms to highly complex aircraft and naval vessels. This ability cannot be faked, and it must have the capacity to scale up quickly when the need arises. A military is only powerful if it can be equipped—and then re-equipped. That is why the Soviet Union was in some ways the weakest member of this club and why it ceased to be a full-spectrum power sometime in the late 1970s.

Few countries have achieved all the fundamentals on which superior military power is built.

Not all economic powerhouses become full-spectrum powers. Take, for example, Germany and Japan, neither of which has developed into a major military power. That is because political and social factors matter as well as economic and technological ones. Politics and society shape the creation and use of power far more than many realist scholars acknowledge. Countries compete for global influence in different ways, and these differences often boil down to who leads, what type of system they lead, and whether their societies help or hinder the exercise of power.

Different leaders can perceive power balances differently. Often, they take actions that fit their particular worldview rather than those that reflect the actual balance of power or some abstract, objective national interest. Going to war, for instance, is almost always a choice that does not have to be made. Sometimes, leaders are more aggressive than they need to be, given the threats that they face. Often, their personal prejudices shape their perceptions of the national interest, leading them to make decisions that are not in the interest of the people they govern.

Politics and political systems also play a role in determining whether countries develop into full-spectrum powers. All leaders, from dictators to consensual democrats, operate within systems in which they want to maintain power. That imperative can either push them to act or restrain them. After France fell to the Nazis in May 1940, for example, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt believed that the United States would have to get into the war to destroy Germany’s power. But he was not convinced that the American public shared this belief—and he was right. So for a year and a half, he did everything possible to get the United States into the war but always stopped short of declaring war. In the end, it was Japan’s unexpected attack on Pearl Harbor that got Roosevelt out of his dilemma and the United States into the war.

Different leaders can perceive power balances differently.

The role that societies play in determining when and how military power is deployed is complex. Some societies are more supportive of military expansion than others. Some societies more efficiently and creatively transmit ideas and develop or adopt technological advances—both of which are key to generating military power—while others have different priorities. And some societies seem to favor military action that is far beyond what their governments are capable of undertaking.

Societal commitment is not easy to measure, but clearly it is making a big difference in the war in Ukraine. Although Russian leaders like to talk about national sacrifice, they have not asked elites in Moscow or St. Petersburg to take part in the war. By contrast, Ukraine has mobilized a far broader cross section of society. Such societal differences do not figure in the calculations of realists, whose writings before the outbreak of war seemed to deny the Ukrainians any agency in determining the future of their country. Thankfully, the Ukrainians thought otherwise.

But if societal commitment is an elusive quality, it is more often found in flexible and pluralistic political systems, which have had the most success in sustaining—if not achieving—full-spectrum power. Such systems create military power that is more adaptable and less prone to the whims of a dictator. Partly because they require societal support to sustain wars, they also create militaries designed to limit their own casualties, relying more on machines than on personnel. It is for these reasons that the United Kingdom and the United States have had the longest tenures as full-spectrum powers.

By contrast, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union failed to adapt to changing circumstances and so saw their powers wane. Germany was doomed by its dictatorial system, which allowed Adolf Hitler to launch a global war that was beyond the country’s means. The result was defeat so total that even after Germany regained its economic strength, neither its political leaders nor its people wished to restore its military power. For its part, the Soviet Union was brought low by economic weakness that was partly the result of an inflexible political system that had lost the support of much of the public.

FOOL ME ONCE

Misunderstandings of state power have had dire consequences in the last few years and could have even more catastrophic ones in the future. The tendency of Western policymakers to drastically overestimate Russian power no doubt influenced their decisions to severely limit military support for Ukraine before February 2022. Many argued that the West should not arm Ukraine, since Western arms would make little difference in a war—and even make things worse by giving Ukraine a false idea of what it could accomplish.

This mindset has helped limit aid to Ukraine throughout the course of the war, leading to higher casualty counts on both sides and a lengthened conflict. On February 24, 2022, Ukraine was armed almost entirely with legacy Soviet and Russian heavy weapons and aircraft. The only Western arms it had were lighter hand-held systems. It was thus severely outclassed by Russia’s more modern systems. If Ukraine had possessed anything close to the arsenal it has today—with its range of modern, NATO-standard weapons—the Russian military would already have been thoroughly beaten.

Western analysts and policymakers must not make the same mistakes in assessing Chinese power. China is certainly a full-spectrum power, with the ability to create and re-create powerful modern weapons and forces that far exceed Russian capabilities. That said, China would not fare well against a coalition of the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, perhaps supported by South Korea and Australia (with tacit or even overt backing from India and the EU). Such a coalition would boast productive capacities that are now almost twice as large as China’s, and its militaries have real experience conducting complex operations in war. It would also include societies that will want to fight for their freedom—something that would make a Chinese military defeat even more likely.

But if Chinese power should not be overstated, nor should Western prospects in any future war in the Indo-Pacific. Such a conflict would be a catastrophe for all sides. China would almost certainly suffer massive losses in military equipment if it tried to assault Taiwan. An amphibious assault is the most difficult and complex operation that a military can undertake, and China has never even attempted one before, so such an effort could easily turn into a fiasco. Even so, a U.S.-led coalition would suffer grievously in any such war.

A proper understanding of power would achieve two vital ends: it would make China seem less threatening to the West and puncture the illusion that power can be used decisively in war. The United States has no need to behave aggressively toward China. It leads a coalition that is in a superior position, one that China would take an enormous (and almost certainly self-destructive) risk by challenging. Far better to try to solidify the status quo with a nonconfrontational approach. For that reason, the concept of a full-spectrum power is not just helpful for understanding how states behave in the international realm; it can guard against the kind of analytical mistakes that led to the current catastrophe in Ukraine.

PHILLIPS P. O’BRIEN is Head of the School of International Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of St. Andrews.

Foreign Affairs · by Phillips P. O’Brien · June 29, 2023

18. West Virginia Guard Hosts Irregular Warfare Exercise

This has been a very successful ongoing exercise (used to be called an unconventional warfare exercise).

I mean no disrespect here but this illustrates how good we are at tactical operations and operations with partners. I say that because our weakness is at the campaign and strategic levels. That is why I suggest the IWCs time would be better spent working up and out rather than down and focused on tactical exercises here. This is an example of an ongoing problem in our military in which we default to what we know and what we do well rather than focus on the "too hard" thing. We need the IWC to focus at the campaign and strategic level and let. the excellent tactical forces continue to do what they do well.

West Virginia Guard Hosts Irregular Warfare Exercise

nationalguard.mil

KINGWOOD, W.Va. - The West Virginia National Guard and the Irregular Warfare Center hosted a two-week exercise for more than 420 members of the U.S. military, special operations community, allies and partners from 16 nations, and observers to provide validation for deploying special forces in an irregular warfare scenario.

The Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare Exercise 23-01 was held throughout West Virginia and wrapped up June 16 at Camp Dawson.

The Department of Defense’s summary of the Irregular Warfare annex to the National Defense Strategy defines irregular warfare as the struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy.

Ridge Runner focused on building long-term interoperability between U.S. and foreign national special operations and conventional forces, enabling mission essential tasks, and assessing readiness while enhancing strategic and operational irregular warfare capabilities.

Participants from Charlie Company, 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne); 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne); Bravo Company, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne); and the United States Marine Corps 193rd Special Operations Group, 4th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 4th Civil Affairs Group, and 4th Marine Corps Advisor Company Alpha trained alongside forces from the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, Polish Territorial Defense Force, Polish GRYF, and Polish JKW.

Observers from Canada, Georgia, Moldova, Qatar, Hungary, Germany, Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Australia, and the United Kingdom Special Air Service also attended.

“The Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare exercise helps provide critical cross-training and preparation of both special operations and joint forces to conduct irregular warfare activities while deployed into potentially hostile or contested environments,” said Maj. Gen. Bill Crane, adjutant general for the West Virginia National Guard. “Today’s complex environment demands we look to this type of realistic training to prepare our forces to combat malign and malicious activities by adversaries and peer competitors.”

Crane said the IWC partnership enabled the expansion of the Ridge Runner program to a premier training venue for domestic and international forces.

“In addition, we were able to work with other state adjutants generals through the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program to bring partner and allied forces to train in West Virginia on irregular warfare tasks,” he said.

Exercise participants assimilated into communities in two simulated nations in northern and southern West Virginia. Participants met with actual local government officials, law enforcement and emergency services personnel. They monitored simulated economic and political situations in each “nation” through simulated newscasts and media engagements, mirroring procedures and operations they would conduct during actual deployments.

Information from these engagements drove additional training and missions, eventually countering a simulated invasion by hostile forces from neighboring nations.

“These simulations are critical to ensuring America and our allies are prepared and ready to handle the destabilizing tactics we’re seeing Russia and China employ through organizations like the Wagner Group,” said Sen. Joe Manchin, a Senate Armed Services Committee member.

Before the exercise, attendees participated in a three-day irregular warfare academics program through the Joint Special Operations University.

“The benefit of what the IWC and Ridge Runner brings the knowledge of the non-kinetic skills and base knowledge to operate in an environment that is presenting the greatest non-kinetic threat to freedom around the world,” said 2nd Lt. Marek Zaluski, Polish Territorial Defense Forces. “Freedom of not only the United States but also its partners and allies.”

In another component of the exercise, the Ridge Healer event, the 193rd Special Operations Medical Group, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, tested its ability to support irregular warfare medical tasks in an austere environment.

Sen. Shelley Capito said the Ridge Runner exercise demonstrated “the strength and leadership of West Virginia authorities across all levels of government and allowed our Special Operators to train in unique settings across the entire state.”

U.S. Army Maj. Mikael Susick, Ridge Runner director, said lessons learned from the exercise would help improve future iterations.

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19. Echoes of the Past: The Burma Campaign and Future Operational Design in the Indo-Pacific Region

History can provide insights for the future.

Conclusion:

These inferences drawn from the Burma campaign can lead to significant implications for joint force operational design. The asymmetries of Allied firepower vis-à-vis Japanese proficiency counterbalanced each other throughout the campaign. The rate at which the People’s Republic of China has modernized its military dictates that the joint force cannot solely rely on superior firepower as a comparative advantage. Operational design should account for this aspect and seek to widen U.S. advantages in proficiency and leadership. Moreover, the diverse makeup of the Allied force in Burma delivered an advantage unavailable to a homogeneous adversary. Future operational designs should build on the joint force’s relationships with allies and like-minded partners, leveraging them as a qualitative edge in the Indo-Pacific region. Joint force operational design should also emulate the Allies’ superior use of operational art in Burma. Finally, the Burma campaign demonstrated the comparative advantage gained by maneuver and sustainment. The Allies’ ability to combine strategic and operational ends with logistical means determined tactical, operational, and strategic effectiveness. Future joint force operational designs must seize the initiative through timely maneuvers in multiple domains. These designs must also prioritize sustainment as a vital function to negate the tyranny of distance inherent in the Indo-Pacific theater. Ultimately, the Burma campaign of World War II provided a kaleidoscope of inferences for the contemporary joint force that color implications for future operational designs in the Indo-Pacific.

Echoes of the Past: The Burma Campaign and Future Operational Design in the Indo-Pacific Region

By Shane Williams, John Green, Richard Kovsky, and Edwin Sumantha Joint Force Quarterly 109

ndupress.ndu.edu

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Lieutenant Colonel Shane Williams, USAF, is the Executive Officer of U.S. Transportation Command J3, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Captain John Green, USN, is the U.S. Special Operations Command J8 Lead Assessment Director, Tampa, Florida. Colonel Richard Kovsky, USAF, is Chief of the Open Skies Department at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Colonel Edwin Sumantha, Indonesian Army, is the Staff Director of the Indonesian Army Command and General Staff College.

U.S. Army barge, powered by outboard motors, crosses Irrawaddy River near Tigyiang, Burma, with Soldiers, ammunition, and truck, December 30, 1944 (U.S. Army/William Lentz)

When you go home, Tell them of us and say, For your tomorrow, We gave our today.

—War Memorial at Kohima

The literature, personal accounts, and films documenting World War II over the past 80 years have generally overlooked a pivotal chapter of that conflict: the 1942–1945 Burma campaign. The few accounts that exist describe this “forgotten war” as one of the most remote, demanding, lengthy, and heroic struggles of the war. They tell stories of overcoming catastrophe to reach triumph, replete with leadership failures and successes, innovations in warfare and operational art, and astonishing endurance and courage. These stories offer poignant lessons for the U.S. joint force today. The interaction of technology, readiness, and tactical concepts in Burma provides inferences for the contemporary relationships among these factors. These inferences lead to implications for joint force operational design. Future Indo-Pacific battlefields require operational designs that stress proficiency over mass and firepower, emphasize maneuver and sustainment in contested environments, and leverage allies and partners against monolithic opponents. Joint force leaders must actively practice operational art and continually adapt these designs to recover quickly from losses and capitalize on success. Despite the passage of time, the Burma campaign provides penetrating insights into how the joint force may prevail in a contemporary conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

This article is organized into three parts. First, a historical narrative of the Burma campaign highlights the struggles of 1942–1943, then details the second Arakan operation, the second Chindit operation, the battle of Imphal-Kohima, and the final Allied operation to retake Burma. Second, inferences are drawn from the historical narrative applied to modern warfare. Finally, implications for future joint force operational design in the Indo-Pacific derive from these inferences, indicating lessons contemporary joint force commanders and staffs can learn from the Burma campaign.

Scouting detachment of armed Burmese patriot fighters, accompanied by two American Soldiers, cautiously wades through jungle stream in Northern Burma, circa 1944 (Chronicle/Alamy)

The Campaign

1942–1943. In his stirring account of the Burma campaign, Field Marshal Viscount William Slim described Burma as “some of the world’s worst country, breeding the world’s worst diseases, and having for half the year at least the world’s worst climate.” Natural barriers prohibited access to Burma, except by sea and mountain passes. Dense, malarial jungle and impenetrable elephant grass dominated the landscape. Mountain ranges of over 10,000 feet edged the country in a crescent moon, isolating it from India and China. Within Burma, the ranges extended north to south with steep-sided valleys where deep, swift rivers carved their way to swampy deltas and alluvial coastal plains in the south. From June through October, the monsoon season brought heavy rainfall that turned these rivers into torrents and made roads and trails a quagmire. Even in the dry season, few passable roads existed, and they and the nation’s limited railways followed the topography’s north-south orientation to converge on the port and capital of Rangoon. Overall, Burma’s forbidding geography would haunt the Allies as the Japanese commenced their invasion of the country in January 1942.

Following successful campaigns in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese invaded Burma from Thailand. Winning successive battles at Moulmein and the Sittang Bridge, they advanced swiftly to siege Rangoon. The capital fell in early March, initiating the longest retreat in Britain’s military history. With reinforcements and materiel flowing in through the port at Rangoon, the Japanese offensive steadily gained momentum. The combination of rugged terrain, narrow egress routes packed with refugees, and the Japanese tactic of outflanking and establishing rear-sector roadblocks disrupted the Allies’ capacity to feed, supply, and maneuver their forces. Despite Chinese reinforcements and attempts at a counteroffensive, the Allied retreat continued. Toungoo, Mandalay, Myitkyina, and Akyab fell in rapid succession. By the end of May, the exhausted, emaciated, and defeated Allied forces reached sanctuary in India when monsoon rains finally halted the Japanese advance. In 4 months of campaigning, the Japanese had completed their conquest of Burma.

Spurred to raise morale and satisfy political pressures, the Allies launched the first Arakan operation in December 1942. Traversing rugged terrain in a narrow front—“like fighting a modern war along stone-age tracks”—the Allied advance made initial successes before stalling at formidable Japanese bunker complexes. Repeated Allied assaults led only to heavy casualties. In April, a Japanese counteroffensive outflanked the Allied positions, and their collapse over the next month was, as Slim wrote, “too much like 1942 over again.” The Allies once more retreated to their Indian sanctuary in embarrassing failure as the monsoon rains fell. As this lamentable scene in the Arakan ended, however, a glimmer of hope materialized with the first Chindit operation.

The Chindits, a diverse force involving British, Gurkha, Burmese, and African units, had spent the previous 3 months penetrating 200 miles into Japanese-occupied Burma. Supplied only by air—their commander Brigadier General Orde Wingate had articulated, “The vulnerable artery is the line of communication winding through the jungle . . . [to] bring in the goods, like Father Christmas, down the chimney”—the long-range penetration group (LRPG) snaked its way through Burma’s treacherous topography, harassing Japanese rear areas and communications. The Chindits successfully cut the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway before attempting to cross the Irrawaddy River to sever the Mandalay-Lashio railway. The combination of exhaustion, disease, overextended air supply, and Japanese attacks forced Wingate to abandon this objective and exfiltrate back to India. Losses were heavy: a third of the force failed to return, and with no means of extracting the wounded, many were left in the jungle to die or be captured. The operation was controversial, delivering no tangible military gains in return for the losses suffered. Yet the audacity and endurance of the Chindits, meeting the Japanese in jungle warfare deep inside their lines, was perceived as a moral victory that inspired Allied forces in India and distracted from the failures in Arakan.

For the rest of the 1943 monsoon season, the Allies redressed deficiencies. The command structure reorganized under the newly formed South East Asian Command, appointing Slim as commander of the new XIV Army deployed along a 700-mile front from China to the Bay of Bengal. Changes in command led to a reorientation of strategic, operational, and tactical thinking. Profiting from experience, training expanded to reinforce jungle warfare and mobility, exchanging heavy equipment and motor transport for mule and foot. An offensive mindset ran paramount: Slim emphasized that isolated units would not retreat but stand fast, relying on air supply for sustainment. Slim recounted, “We planned the whole of our strategy of this campaign on air supply. There was no main operational plan made in the XIV Army which was not based on air supply.” With the monsoons easing, the Allies showed confidence they had confronted the problems that plagued their earlier defeats and enacted their plan for the reconquest of Burma.

The Second Arakan Operation. In January 1944, the Allied forces commenced their second operation into Arakan, seeking to seize the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road and destroy the Golden Fortress, a seemingly impregnable web of fortified, interlocking Japanese bunkers and tunnels. Met with fierce resistance, the Allied advance stalled. The Japanese opened their counteroffensive in early February, and its speed and magnitude surprised the Allies. Slashing into the rear and then surrounding the 7th Indian Division, the Japanese anticipated a large-scale Allied retreat. Instead, the 7th Indian Division entrenched within the “Admin Box,” a 1,200-yard-square semifortified position named for a mishmash of buildings, fuel dumps, and arsenals serving as corps headquarters.

For the next 18 days, the battle ebbed and flowed. Despite ferocious hand-to-hand fighting and raining artillery fire, the Japanese could make no impression against the stubborn Allied defense. Although the defenders were supplied with only 2 days’ rations when the Japanese attacked, the flat, open ground proved perfect for air supply. C-47 Dakotas braved intense antiaircraft fire for a total of 714 sorties, dropping 2,300 tons of critical relief supplies. Allied veterans of the battle would recall, “We only managed because the [Royal Air Force] and Yanks came with their transport planes and dropped ammo to us on parachutes. Barrels of rum, and grub too—same old bully and beans, but it was more than the Japs had.” Ironically, starvation loomed for the attackers, supplied with only 10 days of rations. The arrival of Allied reserves struck the victorious blow, and the Japanese withdrew, with 5,000 of their original 8,000 dead.

With the Japanese decisively defeated, the Allied forces regrouped and advanced on their original objectives. By May, the Allies had captured the Golden Fortress and secured an unequivocal victory. The second Arakan operation, as Slim declared, “was not of great magnitude, but it was, nevertheless . . . the turning-point of the Burma campaign.”

The Second Chindit Operation. The second Chindit operation commenced concurrently with the series of battles in Arakan. Codenamed Operation Thursday and the brainchild of Wingate, the plan aimed to infiltrate more than 150 miles behind enemy lines to support Allied operations on the Ledo Road, interdict Japanese supply lines, and damage their defenses in northern Burma. At Wingate’s disposal were the equivalent of two divisions of LRPGs, trained explicitly for austere jungle warfare from experiences garnered during the first Chindit operation, and the No. 1 Air Commando Group, a specially trained U.S. Army Air Forces unit of 500 aircraft including supply planes, troop carriers, towed gliders, bombers, helicopters, and fighters. In early February, a single brigade began its trek across challenging terrain into Burma. On March 5, 1944, the main assault began—not by ground but by air, ferried by glider.

That night, an armada of C-47s with gliders in tow launched from the airfield at Hailakandi to two landing areas, codenamed Broadway and Choringhee. The Chindits experienced no Japanese opposition and secured both landing areas by morning. In the next 6 days, 579 C-47 sorties landed, offloading 9,000 men, 1,300 animals, and 250 tons of stores without loss. Wingate now had 12,000 men “inserted in the enemy’s guts,” and the operation proceeded toward its objectives.

Overall, the second Chindit operation proved as controversial as the first. On March 24, Wingate died in a plane crash en route to Imphal, leaving a vacuum of leadership and vision. Subordinated under General Joseph Stilwell, the Chindits spent the following months attempting to capture impregnable Japanese defenses until they were evacuated on the verge of collapse in July. Casualties had soared, and no vital objectives had been met. Though an epic of courage and endurance, the operation became irrelevant to the decisive battles around Imphal and Kohima.

The Battle of Imphal-Kohima. In early March 1944, the Japanese launched a large-scale offensive into India. By March 29, the Japanese thrust had swiftly surrounded the 150,000-member IV Corps near Imphal and Kohima, severing overland routes for reinforcement or supply. The difference between success and failure depended on air supply.

The Allies anchored their defenses on the 600-square-mile Imphal plain around six airstrips. Granted his urgent appeal to divert air transports flying “the Hump”—the trans-Himalaya air supply route from India to China—Slim began the process of reinforcing IV Corps. Within 3 weeks, and 758 sorties later, the entire 5th Indian Division had flown in to bolster defenses. With the direct Japanese blow parried, Slim now shifted attention to the supply of Imphal-Kohima.

Aptly named Operation Stamina, the air campaign delivered 540 tons of supplies to IV Corps per day. Over the next 3 months, 404 C-47s transported more than 14 million pounds of rations, 835,000 gallons of fuel, 2.6 million pounds of grain for the pack animals, 12,000 bags of mail, and 43 million cigarettes to the beleaguered Allies. Concurrently, the transports airlifted more than 42,000 noncombatants and 13,000 casualties. As a result, air supply turned the grim battle of attrition in favor of the Allies.

The fighting around Imphal and Kohima had devolved into a rerun of the Western Front during World War I. Both sides dug in behind bunkers and trenches and fought for every knoll, ridge, and hill. Foreseeing a quick rout, the Japanese had commenced their offensive with only 20 days of supplies. With resupply and reinforcement nonexistent, they survived by hunting or capturing Allied airdrops, and the return of the torrential monsoon rains compounded their misery. By July, the ill-equipped and starving Japanese force withdrew across the Burma border in defeat.

The battle of Imphal-Kohima proved an Allied tour de force. Of the 84,000 Japanese who began their offensive, 53,000 became casualties; in contrast, the Allies lost 24,000. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the South East Asian Command Supreme Commander, would write, “It is the most important defeat the Japs have ever suffered in their military career.” As the monsoon rains subsided, the Allies launched their own offensive to finish the war in Burma.

To Rangoon. The great thrust, codenamed Operation Extended Capital, began in January 1945. Now refitted with mechanized transports and armor, XIV Army slashed its way across the Shwebo Plain of central Burma. With the Japanese entrenched in and around the city of Mandalay, the Allies made a secret dash for Meiktila, the “beating heart” of the Japanese supply effort in Burma and the gateway to Rangoon.

The Allies advanced 200 miles in 20 days, constructing airfields at 50-mile intervals to land supplies and evacuate wounded. Slim hid his true objective of Meiktila from the Japanese through elaborate deceptions, and he detached a diversionary force to Mandalay to fix the Japanese in place. Convinced by the ruse, the Japanese withdrew forces from the other Burma fronts to reinforce their positions around Mandalay. By the end of February, XIV Army had crossed the Irrawaddy River and clandestinely encircled the Japanese.

Meiktila fell in 4 days, and the Japanese immediately launched a counteroffensive to retake it by siege. Allied reinforcements, however, arrived by air transport to deflect the attack. With the Japanese distracted at Meiktila, Slim ordered the advance on Mandalay. A fierce siege commenced, and the Japanese capitulated on March 20, 1945. Subsequently, the Japanese ceased their attack on Meiktila and withdrew south. All eyes were now on Rangoon. Slim had only 30 days before the monsoon rains fell and 300 miles to traverse—speed was of the essence.

Sprinting across the countryside as a blitzkrieg, XIV Army surged south. The closer it came to Rangoon, the more important was air supply: air transport provided 90 percent of XIV Army’s supplies by April. Slim’s rapid success placed a significant stress on air supply, and payloads decreased with each additional mile as cargo weight was traded for fuel. Fortunately, a separate Allied offensive on the Arakan peninsula paralleled Slim’s advance into central Burma. By February, the Allies had conquered the peninsula and its offshore islands via land and amphibious assaults. By the end of March, they had completed the construction of airfields that brought Rangoon within easy range.

Early monsoon rains, however, beset XIV Army’s lunge south. The possibility of conducting a siege in these conditions led Slim to accept Operation Dracula. On May 1, an 800-member brigade parachuted into the outskirts of Rangoon, clearing the approach for an amphibious assault that occupied the city the following day. There was no resistance; the Japanese had already evacuated. Overwhelmed by torrential downpours, XIV Army halted 41 miles from Rangoon that same day. The campaign to reconquer Burma had come to an anti-climactic yet triumphant conclusion.

Bombs cascade from bomb bay doors of B-29 Superfortresseses during raid on Japanese supply depots near Mingaladon Airfield, February 28, 1945 (U.S. Army Signal Corps/Library of Congress)

Inferences for Joint Force Operations in the Indo-Pacific Region

Allied and Japanese experiences during the 1942–1945 Burma campaign are rich in data from which to draw inferences for future joint force operations in the Indo-Pacific region. The 80-year time span since those events qualifies the premises drawn from them: the character of warfare and its technology have changed. Air mobility and aerial resupply methods, emergent during the Burma campaign, continue as standard practices among all modern militaries. Long-range insertion and resupply of special operations forces (SOF), also pioneered during this campaign, are available to any military with the right troops, aircraft, and training.

Since the early innovations of Burma, the technologies to perform these methods of war are far more advanced, as are the countermeasures to oppose them. Transport aircraft have longer ranges and payloads than C-47 Dakotas and C-46 Commandos. Supplies can be airdropped in large quantities and with high precision. Modern rotary and tilt-rotor aircraft provide vertical air transport options. Unlike Wingate’s Chindits, modern special operations units are purpose-built and equipped to fight and survive in harsh environments. Conversely, the integrated air defenses that characterize advanced threat environments are deadly to aircraft and any troops they transport. Sensor networks that cue these defenses can easily detect all but stealth assets, and large ground formations are difficult to conceal. The means to destroy these forces once detected are orders of magnitude more rapid, precise, and lethal than in the 1940s. The Burma campaign differs markedly from modern campaigning in that the former relied explicitly on air mobility and the air supply of troops, whereas the latter must exist in advanced threat environments where the ability to perform these functions is highly contested.

Even with these caveats, the relevance of the Burma experience and its insights for modern joint force operations are striking. Though in a different adversarial configuration, the primary belligerents in Burma—the United States, United Kingdom, China, and Japan—would likely face each other in a significant conflict in the Indo-Pacific and indeed are engaged in competition today. The Burma campaign occurred near China’s border; a contemporary conflict in this same theater is plausible, and the physical terrain is virtually unchanged. The balancing effects of Allied mass versus Japanese proficiency seen in Burma might be reversed in a modern Indo-Pacific conflict, where U.S. warfighting proficiency would meet the mass of China’s People’s Liberation Army. The force-multiplier effect of partner forces, from international allies to local tribes, was crucial then, and it remains so. The functions of maneuver and resupply remain no less decisive, though the threats that oppose them are more intense.

One solution to a contested air environment is to fight for local air superiority at the time and place of necessity. In 1942, Japan had air superiority in Burma. By 1943, however, the Allies had regained this advantage, and it proved critical at Imphal-Kohima. Slim’s XIV Army capitalized on its ability to move troops and supplies in and casualties out, sustaining its forces to outlast a determined Japanese assault. In a contemporary conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies would be likely to operate in a persistently contested air environment. Air supremacy across the theater is unrealistic. Joint forces would need to fight for air superiority when and where needed and exploit temporary and local advantages.

Another solution to contested air is to fight through it despite the risk. During the second Arakan operation, Japanese antiaircraft fire and fighter opposition around the Admin Box proved so intense that resupply aircraft turned back. Brigadier General William Old rallied his airmen by personally flying an aircraft to supply the Box. Where air superiority cannot be achieved today, the joint force may employ remotely piloted, autonomous, and “attritable” aircraft to maneuver and supply ground troops. In cases where manned aircraft must be used and military necessity outweighs risk, the joint force must be prepared to face and recover from painful losses.

The Japanese army masterfully employed a simple countermeasure when facing overwhelming air superiority: they dug. Their underground bunkers and tunnels at Kohima withstood direct hits from artillery and fighter-bombers. Japanese infantry had to be blasted out of their bunkers at close range by tanks or buried alive when tanks drove over them. Simplistic as it may appear, modern joint forces can survive by digging in against superior firepower, including modern precision and standoff fires, and can expect adversaries to do the same.

Moreover, many operations in Burma depended on physical stamina. Despite the prevalence of airpower, artillery, and heavy weapons, battles were often fought in hand-to-hand combat with swords and bayonets. Wingate’s Chindits trained for months to patrol on foot at great distances, requiring extraordinary physical endurance. Clearing Japanese bunkers around Imphal-Kohima relied on bayonet attacks as much as tanks. Advanced technology cannot replace, but must complement, courage and physical strength at the individual level, with implications for joint force training and readiness.

Though the Chindit operations met with mixed tactical success, they presented operational dilemmas that forced the Japanese to contend with formations deep inside their lines. The joint force can employ special operations to similarly “expand the competitive space” in competition and achieve strategic surprise in conflict. Conventional forces operating at standoff ranges are likely to rely on SOF to stand in to perform functions including reconnaissance, terminal guidance, and battle damage assessments. Like the Chindits, they will need mobility and sustainment to bring supplies in and casualties out. The joint force must improve existing capabilities to maneuver small teams and supply them at long range, inside the weapons engagement zones of advanced threats. Noting the importance of river crossings and the use of frogmen and a special boat unit to reconnoiter the far bank of the Irrawaddy, future campaigns in the Indo-Pacific region will require undersea, surface, and riverine mobility to move and supply special operations and other stand-in forces in the littorals and inland waterways.

Chindits commander General Orde Wingate (wearing pith helmet) briefs members of 1st Air Commando, U.S. Army Air Force, in Burma, circa 1944 (PA Images/Alamy)

Implications for Future Operational Design

Beyond the tactical, readiness, and capability inferences drawn from Burma, there are significant implications for joint force operational design. First, the Burma campaign involved asymmetries of firepower on the Allied side and proficiency on the Japanese side, which could counterbalance each other depending on degrees of advantage and contextual factors. Second, the Allies’ use of diverse forces and capabilities proved an advantage against a homogeneous and cohesive adversary. Third, although they sometimes plodded at the tactical level, the Allies were agile and creative in the art of campaigning. Finally, successful maneuver and sustainment were decisive to the Allied campaign.

The superior proficiency of the Japanese infantry was remarkable. During the first Arakan campaign, the Allies had control of the skies, superior firepower, and numerical superiority. The Japanese, nevertheless, used carefully constructed bunkers to halt their advance and outmaneuvered Allied forces with infiltration tactics, night attacks, and jungle warfare. The Allied victory in the second Arakan operation dispelled the myth of Japanese invincibility, but the fact of Japan’s infantry advantage remained. At Imphal-Kohima, Japanese forces surrounded XIV Army and held on for 4 months in the face of overwhelming firepower despite debilitating infighting among senior commanders. Acknowledging this asymmetry, Slim urged his superiors to improve the proficiency of British forces and the Allies. Wingate’s Bush Warfare School took a step in this direction by training the Chindits to be physically tough and tactically proficient in jungle warfare. Given the pace at which the People’s Republic of China has modernized and built up its forces, the joint force and its allies cannot rely on superior firepower, mass, or qualitative technological advantages. To account for this situation, operational design should endeavor to widen advantages in proficiency and leadership to neutralize opponent strengths in mass and technology.

Furthermore, the Allied force in Burma consisted of British, Indian, Burmese, American, Chinese, and other forces, including local tribal partners. Although the Japanese founded the Indian National Army and Burmese National Army, their accomplishments were limited. In contrast, XIV Army leveraged the diversity within its force and built partnerships with local tribes. Similarly, the joint force of today is increasingly diverse. U.S. alliances and partnerships offer comparative advantages that authoritarian competitors cannot approach. Future operational designs should build on these relationships and leverage them as a qualitative edge for competition and campaigning in the Indo-Pacific region.

Joint force operational design should also emulate the Allies’ superior use of operational art in Burma. The Japanese fought well but hardly campaigned. Rather, they sought to aggregate small victories into large ones and repeated standard tactics even when those tactics stopped working. Their leadership at the operational level was feckless and failed to adapt to the changing conditions of battle. In contrast, the Allies overcame comparative disadvantages in training and proficiency with superior operational art. Innovations in air resupply, air mobility, and commando raiding followed from the creativity and adaptability of Mountbatten, Slim, and Wingate. If contemporary joint force commanders and staffs practice equally inspired operational art, emergent designs could prove decisive to competition and campaigning.

The Allies’ innovative use of operational maneuver was critical to their success in Burma and is equally critical to contemporary operational design. In Operation Thursday, the Chindits maneuvered above and penetrated well inside Japanese lines through the air domain, revealing the offensive potential of the Allies and instigating the disastrous Japanese assault on Imphal-Kohima. The blitzkrieg tactics of XIV Army in Operation Extended Capital, sweeping southward through central Burma toward Rangoon, denied the enemy options in time and space and exploited Japanese vulnerabilities at the operational level. Future operational designs in the Indo-Pacific can reprise these approaches. Future battlefields will contest theater access and maneuver. Operational design must incorporate new methods and technologies that remove barriers and facilitate actions through multiple domains simultaneously. Maneuvers executed with simultaneity and depth through cross-domain operations will dislocate the enemy and outpace its capacity to respond. Future operational designs can control the initiative by incorporating creative schemes of maneuver that sustain momentum throughout the operation, exploiting comparative temporal advantages that deny the enemy options.

Arguably, the Burma campaign was the singular World War II operation that required, not merely benefited from, sustainment and its capacity to alter the geometry of the battlefield. The historian David W. Hogan, Jr., notes, “The [Burma] theater lay at the end of long lines of communications extending halfway around the world from Britain to the United States. That, and strategic priorities, resulted in shortages of nearly every item of supply.” Slim’s ability to extend the operational reach of XIV Army through air supply represented a strategic shift that nullified Japanese tactical advantages. Absent their innovations in logistics and sustainment by air, the Chindit operations would never have launched, the second Arakan operation would have echoed the disasters of the first, Imphal-Kohima would have fallen to the Japanese, and the march to Rangoon would have stalled in quagmire. Future operational designs must place sustainment at the forefront of their concepts and methods. Joint force planners must envision sustainment as the lead enabler for strategic, operational, and tactical reach in the long-range battlefields of the Indo-Pacific. If future operational designs postulate unrealistic and unsustainable approaches, they will not succeed in leveraging the full warfighting potential of the joint force.

British infantrymen fire mortar bombs during Battle of Imphal in region around city of Imphal, in Northeast India, circa March–July 1944 (De Luan/Alamy)

Conclusion

The Burma campaign was a series of reversals in fortune. The Japanese triumph in 1942 devolved into the most significant defeat in Japanese army history in 1945, and the British tragedy of 1942 evolved into the decisive victory in 1945. The campaign was also a war of extremes. The belligerents operated in a theater as remote from Japan as from Britain. Battles were waged in impenetrable jungles, on steep mountainsides, and across raging rivers and scorching alluvial plains. Hand-to-hand combat existed alongside the airlift of whole divisions. Gliders inserted LRPGs into Burma’s jungles while soldiers marched through sheets of monsoon rain. Trench warfare gave way to blitzkrieg.

Although the details of the longest campaign of World War II are historically unique, the inferences gained concerning the relationships among technology, readiness, and operational and tactical capabilities are relevant today. The Burma experience reaffirms the aphorism that local air superiority is a prerequisite for any modern joint force operation. Despite the risk inherent in operating on future battlefields, joint force commanders and their staffs must acknowledge and recover from realistic and painful losses. As in Burma then and in the Indo-Pacific today, innovations in technology and methods can deliver qualitative advantages. One solution for survivability is subterranean defenses against superior firepower. Another is presenting operational dilemmas to the enemy that “expand the competitive space.” Furthermore, morale and physical elements proved critical in delivering an Allied victory in Burma. Modern technology cannot substitute for, but must supplement, courage and physical strength at the individual level.

These inferences drawn from the Burma campaign can lead to significant implications for joint force operational design. The asymmetries of Allied firepower vis-à-vis Japanese proficiency counterbalanced each other throughout the campaign. The rate at which the People’s Republic of China has modernized its military dictates that the joint force cannot solely rely on superior firepower as a comparative advantage. Operational design should account for this aspect and seek to widen U.S. advantages in proficiency and leadership. Moreover, the diverse makeup of the Allied force in Burma delivered an advantage unavailable to a homogeneous adversary. Future operational designs should build on the joint force’s relationships with allies and like-minded partners, leveraging them as a qualitative edge in the Indo-Pacific region. Joint force operational design should also emulate the Allies’ superior use of operational art in Burma. Finally, the Burma campaign demonstrated the comparative advantage gained by maneuver and sustainment. The Allies’ ability to combine strategic and operational ends with logistical means determined tactical, operational, and strategic effectiveness. Future joint force operational designs must seize the initiative through timely maneuvers in multiple domains. These designs must also prioritize sustainment as a vital function to negate the tyranny of distance inherent in the Indo-Pacific theater. Ultimately, the Burma campaign of World War II provided a kaleidoscope of inferences for the contemporary joint force that color implications for future operational designs in the Indo-Pacific. JFQ

Notes

1 Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941–45 (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), xvii–xx.

2 Viscount William Slim, Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945 (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 169.

3 Joe G. Taylor, Air Supply in the Burma Campaigns, USAF Historical Studies No. 75 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Research Studies Institute, 1957), 1–3, available at <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA529960.pdf>.

4 David Rooney, Burma Victory: Imphal, Kohima, and the Chindits, March 1944 to May 1945 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2014), 13.

5 Raymond Callahan, Burma, 1942–1945: The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1979), 34–36.

6 Richard Holmes, ed., The Oxford Companion to Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 160.

7 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 29; Frank McLynn, The Burma Campaign: Disaster Into Triumph, 1942–45 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 109.

8 Taylor, Air Supply in the Burma Campaigns, 4.

9 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 111–112.

10 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 98.

11 Allen, Burma, 97; Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 100–101.

12 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 160.

13 Callahan, Burma, 62–63.

14 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 88; Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 162.

15 Colin Higgs, Wingate’s Men: The Chindit Operations: Special Forces in Burma (Barnsley, Yorkshire, UK: Frontline Books, 2019), 4.

16 Allen, Burma, 123, 143.

17 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 162; Callahan, Burma, 66–67.

18 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 189, 209.

19 Callahan, Burma, 98.

20 Ibid., 132.

21 Gerald Astor, The Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders, and Madmen in the China-Burma-India Theater of World War II (Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons, 2004), 6.

22 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 250–252.

23 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 235.

24 Allen, Burma, 182–186.

25 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 253.

26 Roger Annett, Drop Zone Burma: Adventures in Allied Air-Supply, 1943–45 (Barnsley, Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2008), 81; S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. 3, The Decisive Battles (Uckfield, East Sussex, UK: Naval & Military Press, Ltd., 1961; rpt. 2004), 144.

27 Annett, Drop Zone Burma, 81.

28 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 254.

29 Ibid., 255.

30 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 246.

31 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 275.

32 Lowell Thomas, Back to Mandalay (London: F. Muller, 1962), 14–19.

33 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 281.

34 Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma, 1944 (New York: Macmillan, 1980), 110.

35 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 283.

36 Callahan, Burma, 138–139.

37 Allen, Burma, 244.

38 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 293.

39 Norman Franks, The Air Battle of Imphal (London: Kimber, 1985), 37.

40 Allen, Burma, 244.

41 Geoffrey Evans and Antony Brett-James, Imphal: A Flower on Lofty Heights (London: Macmillan, 1962), 204.

42 Allen, Burma, 244.

43 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 307.

44 Ibid., 326.

45 Callahan, Burma, 137; McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 323.

46 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 323.

47 Ibid., 415.

48 S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. IV, The Reconquest of Burma (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1965), 186; Allen, Burma, 403–405.

49 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 393, 436; Callahan, Burma, 157–158.

50 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 454; Callahan, Burma, 157–159; McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 159.

51 Ronald Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer (London: Cooper, 1976), 232–233.

52 Ibid., 217; Robert Lyman, Slim, Master of War: Burma and the Birth of Modern Warfare (London: Constable, 2004), 248.

53 United Kingdom Air Ministry, Wings of the Phoenix: The Official Story of the Air War in Burma (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949), 118.

54 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 458–464; Callahan, Burma, 159.

55 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 481.

56 McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 443.

57 Callahan, Burma, 160.

58 Allen, Burma, 154.

59 Ibid., 242–244.

60 Ibid., 187.

61 Ibid., 257, 272.

62 Ibid., 215.

63 Ibid., 123.

64 Ibid., 257–258.

65 Ibid., 417.

66 Ibid., 97–98.

67 Ibid., 307–308.

68 Ibid., 114, 123.

69 Ibid., 226–227.

70 Ibid., 147, 213, 230.

71 Ibid., 297.

72 Ibid., 150.

73 Slim, Defeat Into Victory, x.

74 Taylor, Air Supply in the Burma Campaigns, 148.

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20. A More Perfect Union: Black Soldiers and the Promise of America

A fascinating, interesting, and useful history. Well with the read.

A More Perfect Union: Black Soldiers and the Promise of America

By John Nagl and Charles D. Allen Joint Force Quarterly 109

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Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.), Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA (Ret.), is Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies at USAWC.

Buffalo Soldiers of 25th Infantry, some wearing buffalo robes, Fort Keogh, Montana, 1890 (Library of Congress)

Well into the third decade of the 21st century, the U.S. military is reassessing its connection to the society that it is chartered to protect and serve. While it is easy to declare and embrace the mission to fight and win the Nation’s wars, it is more challenging to forge and sustain an institution that lives its espoused values and holds its members accountable for the principles put forth in its founding documents. In 1775, American colonists protested that their rights as British citizens were not protected and subsequently established the fledgling Continental Army. A year later, the Declaration of Independence proclaimed, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Out of necessity the Continental Army would seek manpower from the diverse populations of the colonies—to include enslaved and freed Blacks as well as Indigenous peoples. The Nation began with gathering Soldiers from different races, ethnic groups, and nationalities. They joined in the hope of being members of a free and just society.

This century began with a unifying call to arms following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Army ranks were subsequently filled with volunteers from across the national landscape of race, ethnicity, and creed. We imagined a post-racial society with the election of the first African American President in 2008 and sought evidence in the photos of “Brothers at War” with the slate of Black general officers at the helm of theater operations in the war on terror. Three Black Army officers assumed the prestigious four-star rank, in charge of unified and subunified combatant commands and a major Army command. However, although the Army may boast and showcase minority individuals as leaders within the force, diversity, equity, and inclusion achievements cannot be taken for granted.

Accordingly, the Service identified diversity as a strategic outcome in its Army People Strategy, noting that “the Army is committed to equality of opportunity, providing all of our talented people with fulfilling and rewarding professional careers. As an inclusive and representative American institution, we ensure that our people possess a diversity of talent—knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences—drawn from all corners of our country and its vibrant, diverse population.”

The path for African American Soldiers—officer and enlisted—has been a long and arduous one. This article chronicles elements of that journey from its beginning with the American Revolutionary War through to the present day. It highlights the challenges, progress, and ever-present threats of regression encountered along the path of service. The aspirations of current diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) efforts will require awareness, intentionality, and commitment to bring to fruition. While the Army boasts of its “tradition as a global leader in DEI,” the focus must be on “Deeds, Not Words.”

The Army’s record on this issue, in both deeds and words, is mixed. In times of national crisis, the Army is among the first institutions to seek greater service and sacrifice from African Americans and in return to promise greater equality. But once the crisis passes, the Army has often been slow to serve as an engine of racial equality. This cycle nevertheless offers a kind of halting advance. Following each crisis, the retrenchment phase never fully returns the repression to the status quo ante; like waves on the beach during a rising tide, each makes incremental progress. Today’s Army leaders should become familiar with the role of the Service both in creating opportunity and—too often—in denying its full fruits to all Soldiers. Only by understanding this history can today’s Army leaders build a climate and a culture of true equality of opportunity.

Building on and updating the work of Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, this article surveys the Army’s mixed history as a provider of opportunity for racial integration and equal opportunity, beginning with General George Washington’s decision to forbid the recruitment of Black Soldiers into the Continental Army and following through to today’s disproportionately limited number of Black combat arms officers. Throughout American history, as David Halberstam notes in his foreword to Gail Buckley’s invaluable American Patriots, African Americans “remained loyal to concepts of freedom and democracy even when they were the most marginal beneficiaries of the very ideals they were defending.” Their experience should inspire today’s military leaders to build on their achievements and institutionalize the Army’s role as a leader in forming a more perfect union for all of America’s citizens.

The Birth of the Army and the Birth of America

Racism is America’s original sin. Long before independence, colonial legislatures passed laws governing every aspect of the slave trade. Colonial militias formed patrols to capture escaped slaves and suppress slave insurrection. In the face of such repression, the role of African Americans in the American Revolution is indeed remarkable. Crispus Attucks was the first American to die by British gunfire in the Revolution, cut down by Redcoat muskets at the Boston Massacre of 1770. As tensions continued to rise and the colonists decided to fight back, Prince Estabrook was wounded at the Battle of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775. Following “the shot heard round the world,” Massachusetts was desperate to create a force capable of resisting the British Empire. The colonial legislature opened the way to recruit free Black men to the state militia, and many of these recruits served at the Battle of Bunker Hill. On June 14, 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the raising of six companies of riflemen to join the Massachusetts militiamen around Boston, thereby creating the Army. Out of necessity, the colonial Army was created as a racially integrated institution in a racially segregated society. Black Americans volunteered to serve in this institution with their eyes open, fully aware of the injustices of their society yet hopeful that military service would create a more perfect union for themselves and their posterity.

African American Soldiers in the Revolution

Washington read two reports every day. One was the intelligence report derived from his carefully cultivated network of spies. The second was the strength report, showing the size and effectiveness of the Continental Army. When Washington took command, in June 1775, both reports gave cause for optimism. On the heels of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts militiamen flocked to the hills overlooking Boston. The newly formed Continental Army would fight the British to a standstill at Bunker Hill and ultimately compel the British to evacuate Boston. Soon after taking command, Washington bowed to political pressure and issued a decree forbidding the recruitment of Blacks into the Continental Army.

By January 1777, however, the reports Washington read were bleak. Injuries, illness, and diminishing patriotic zeal had thinned the ranks of the Continental Army. The British commanded the seas and occupied every major population center in the United States. At the outset of the war, the royal governor of Virginia issued a decree promising freedom to any African American held in slavery who would flee bondage and fight for the Royalist cause. Facing military defeat and constrained by necessity, Washington reversed his earlier decree and permitted Black Soldiers to serve. Ultimately, Black Americans would constitute 5,000 of the roughly 230,000 Soldiers to fight for independence, even though that independence would not extend to Americans of African descent. The colonial Army was likely the most integrated the Army would be until the Korean War, according to Glenn Williams of the U.S. Army Center for Military History. Nonetheless, in 1787, the U.S. Constitution codified slavery and forbade any legislation regulating the slave trade for another 20 years.

The Constitution and the Institutionalization of Repression

The first half of the 19th century witnessed the expansion and reinforcement of slavery throughout the United States. The Constitution institutionalized slavery with the infamous Three-Fifths Compromise and prohibited any restriction of the slave trade until 1808. For much of the first half of the 19th century, the Army remained a small constabulary force with little impact on national policy. The sole exception to this pattern was during the War of 1812, when, as in the Revolution, the United States turned to Black residents for support. Black Soldiers served in both integrated and all-Black regiments, while Black laborers served in construction and logistics roles. Once the crisis had passed, Black Soldiers were largely mustered out of the Army.

The Haitian Revolution of 1791 and Nat Turner’s slave rebellion of 1831 created enormous fear of slave rebellion, fueling the demand for slave patrols to prevent insurrection. State militias continued their practice of providing leaders and manpower for slave patrols, particularly in Virginia and South Carolina. Indeed, both the Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute were founded for the express purpose of providing a command structure for slave patrols. The passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 strengthened the legal standing of slave patrols for hunting escaped slaves and crushing any incipient slave rebellions.

African American Soldiers in the Civil War

As in previous conflicts, the U.S. Government initially minimized service opportunities for Black Soldiers in the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln only grudgingly admitted Black Soldiers to manual labor and other service and support roles. This concession was hardly an act of enlightenment; the Confederacy employed enslaved men in the same roles. Union General George McClellan went so far as returning fugitive slaves to their Confederate masters.

The exigencies of war and the agency of individual Black men and women, however, forced the Union to reverse these policies. The Union’s battlefield ineptitude and heavy losses forced the steady, bottom-up incremental expansion of the roles Black Soldiers played on the battlefield. Individual commanders, pressed for manpower, began using Black troops in combat roles. Some even issued decrees of emancipation far ahead of Lincoln’s famous proclamation. This trend culminated in the formation of Black regiments, perhaps most notably the 54th Massachusetts. Led by White officers and paid less than their Union compatriots, these regiments nevertheless performed heroically in combat. Black leaders had long understood the importance of military service in achieving full citizenship. Frederick Douglass was a leading advocate of the formation of Black regiments, and his son would serve as the command sergeant major of the 54th Massachusetts.

Beyond the battlefield, individual Black men and women escaping slavery compelled a change in Union policy. As Union armies moved south, slaves escaped to seek their protection and serve in their ranks. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation merely codified in policy what was already evident on the battlefield: Black men and women were not the property of their purported masters but were individual human beings with autonomy and agency. They played an invaluable role in the ultimate outcome of the conflict, constituting about 10 percent of Union forces, with some 190,000 in the Army and 19,000 in the Navy. Nearly 40,000 perished in their fight for freedom. There is no support—none whatsoever—for the trope that any served willingly for the Confederacy.

Black Citizens and Soldiers During Reconstruction

The issue of Black enfranchisement was central to Reconstruction in the postwar South. In the last speech before his assassination, Lincoln advocated granting the franchise to those Black men who were “very intelligent, and on those who serve our cause as Soldiers.” With the ratification of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, Black men gained full citizenship in law. Some 2,000 Black men served in political office from 1867 to 1876, from the local level up to the Senate. Black citizens made substantial gains in education, health, and literacy, aided by the Freedmen’s Bureau.

While Black citizens’ economic, social, and political gains were never equal to their numbers or their contributions, the pace of progress in this brief era was nevertheless remarkable. The achievement of full citizenship varied greatly depending on local conditions, and no condition was more important than the presence of Black Soldiers. Simply put, where Black Soldiers served, Black citizens thrived. Black Soldiers safeguarded their fellow citizens from voter suppression, enabling the full exercise of the franchise. Black Soldiers guaranteed their fellow citizens’ liberty and property, enabling educational and economic advancement. However, even this halting and limited progress proved too much for many Whites. Following a close and disputed election in 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes secured the White House through a “corrupt bargain.” In exchange for the support of Southern Democrats, Hayes would effectively end Reconstruction in the South.

On USS Stockholm, nine Soldiers of 369th Infantry Regiment, awarded French government’s Croix de Guerre for gallantry in action, pose for photo while awaiting disembarkation in New York City, February 12, 1919; left to right, front row, Private Ed Williams, Private Herbert Taylor, Private Leon E. Fraiter, Private Ralph Hawkins; back row, Sergeant Henry David Primas, Sr., Sergeant Daniel W. Storms, Jr., Private Joe Williams, Private Alfred S. Manley, and Corporal Tyler W. Taylor (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)

Jim Crow and the Black Codes

Even before the 1876 corrupt bargain, the halting progress Blacks achieved during Reconstruction was fomenting a White backlash. Often led by former Confederate officers, terrorist groups such as the Red Shirts and the Ku Klux Klan emerged to intimidate Black citizens attempting to exercise their rights in the South. With the end of Reconstruction and the withdrawal of the Union Army from the South, these efforts accelerated with a vengeance. Every former Confederate state passed “Black codes,” creating an apartheid system that regulated virtually every aspect of public life along racial terms—voting, jury duty, property sales, and every public accommodation from restaurants to toilets. Local law officials enforced these codes with the assistance of the same terrorist groups attacking Black citizens in the exercise of their rights.

Black Soldiers and veterans were targeted with vehemence in these terror campaigns. Vigilante groups would murder these men in grisly public spectacles with total impunity, with either tacit or overt support from local county sheriffs. These terror campaigns extended beyond the South and were particularly intense wherever large concentrations of Black Soldiers or veterans were found. Although forming “colored” regiments and admitting Black cadets to West Point, the Army turned a blind eye to the hazing and harassment that too many Black Soldiers suffered. Despite this sustained campaign of societal terror, Black Americans sowed the institutional seeds that would flower in times of later national crises, including Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute.

Pilots of elite, all-Black 332nd Fighter Group, “Tuskegee Airmen,” at Ramitelli, Italy; left to right, Lieutenant Dempsey W. Morgan, Lieutenant Carroll S. Woods, Lieutenant Robert H. Nelson, Jr., Captain Andrew D. Turner, and Lieutenant Clarence P. Lester, August 1944 (U.S. Air Force)

Buffalo Soldiers and the Rise of the African American Professional Soldier

Paradoxically, the terror campaign waged against Blacks in American society coincided with the emergence of the Black professional Soldier. An 1866 act of Congress established two regiments of Black infantry (the 24th and 25th) and two regiments of Black cavalry (the 9th and 10th). Previous eras had seen Black Soldiers enlisted in moments of crisis and mustered out the moment the crisis passed. These Soldiers, however, would be long-serving professionals. The cavalrymen would earn the moniker “Buffalo Soldiers” from their Native American adversaries, with the comparison to the sacred animal a mark of high respect.

Both the Black infantry and cavalry regiments served with distinction on the American frontier and in the Spanish-American War. Members of the regiments distinguished themselves when detailed to instructor duty. Black infantrymen were renowned for their marksmanship ability, and the cavalrymen served as riding instructors at West Point. Whether in the field or on instructional assignments, they often served alongside White Soldiers in close quarters. While far from achieving full integration and social equality, Black Soldiers nevertheless earned a degree of social status unthinkable not only in former Confederate states but also anywhere else in American society. This relative equality frequently rankled local White communities, resulting in conflicts ranging from small disputes over public accommodations to crises such as the infamous Brownsville Affair in 1906, when Buffalo Soldiers were falsely accused of murder and assault.

Black Doughboys, More at Home “Over There” Than Here

As in previous conflicts, America’s racism and its manpower needs collided in World War I, and the latter eventually overwhelmed the former. President Woodrow Wilson was a virulent racist who did not believe Black men possessed soldierly qualities. In the curious logic of racism acquired in his native Virginia, Wilson viewed Black men as both dangerous and cowardly. However, when the United States entered World War I, the manpower needs of the Allied Expeditionary Force demanded a massive conscription program without regard to race. Indeed, Black conscripts were more likely than their White counterparts to be found fit for service. Whenever possible, Black Soldiers were consigned to service and support roles rather than assigned direct combat duties. Nevertheless, the Army fielded two Black infantry divisions, the 92nd and 93rd, both of which were led in part by Black officers. While the 92nd was embroiled in controversies not completely of its own making, the 93rd Infantry Division won broad acclaim. The division’s first regiment, the 369th, earned the nickname “Harlem Hellfighters.” At least 71 members of the regiment received the French Croix de Guerre. In August 1917, Wilson pressured General John Pershing to issue a directive to the French military warning against decorating Black Soldiers to too great an extent for fear of “spoiling the Negroes.” The French largely ignored this directive, valuing Black Soldiers not only for their battlefield heroism but also for a gift that would continue long after the war ended: American jazz.

The Invisible Empire Strikes Back

When Black Doughboys returned home, their service was not forgotten but instead was actively resented by White America. Wasting no time, a White mob attacked returning Black Soldiers during a homecoming ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia, in the summer of 1919. The Doughboys’ return saw White mobs murder more than a dozen Black veterans. These incidents occurred in the context of the so-called Red Summer of 1919, with White mobs terrorizing Black communities on the smallest pretext or no pretext at all. The massacre in Elaine, Arkansas, alone accounted for as many as 100 deaths among African Americans. And throughout the 1920s, membership in the Ku Klux Klan and other White supremacist organizations exploded.

Beyond the campaign of violence and intimidation, White supremacists during this era waged a psychological campaign of “Lost Cause” mythology to glorify the Confederacy and White supremacy more generally. This campaign was waged on film, with D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation released in 1915. It occurred in literature, with Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind published in 1936 (and subsequently made into a box office smash movie in 1939). This psychological campaign relied heavily on iconography, as the period from 1890 to 1920 saw large numbers of memorials to Confederate officers erected throughout the South. The Army played its part as well during this time, naming several military installations after Confederate generals: Camp Beauregard (1917), Fort Benning (1917), Fort Bragg (1918), Fort Gordon (1917), and Fort Lee (1917).

African American Soldiers in World War II

As war clouds gathered in the late 1930s, African American leaders saw a familiar pattern recurring. As Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, and others had done before, President Franklin D. Roosevelt would call upon Black Americans to serve and sacrifice in the name of freedom, with only the smallest sense of irony. Black leaders met these demands with a level of preparation and organization heretofore not achieved. They demanded greater integration of the Armed Forces and greater inclusion in the burgeoning defense industry.

When the United States entered World War II, in 1941, African Americans were not content merely to fill the service and support roles to which they had long been relegated. Forced to choose between maintaining its racial caste system and winning the war, the Army reluctantly chose the latter. The 92nd Infantry Division, known as the Buffalo Soldier Division, was part of a segregated Army where Black Soldiers were assigned to formations under the command of White officers. Whereas several accounts disparage the performance of African American units in World War II, future general officer Frederic Davison commented, “We [the 366th Regiment] had two enemies to fight. We had to fight the Germans in the Apennines, and we had to fight the 92nd Division hierarchy.” In his judgment, “it almost seemed as though there was a design for failure” as units of the division were ill trained and under poor senior leadership.

Other Black Army units, however, distinguished themselves and were grudgingly acknowledged for their significant performance in the European theater of war. The Tuskegee Airmen flew 1,600 combat missions over Europe, and the 761st Tank Battalion fought in General George Patton’s dash across France and daring counterattack during the Battle of the Bulge. Black Soldiers also continued their service in support roles; Patton’s success at the Bulge would not have been possible but for the mostly Black truck drivers hauling fuel in the convoy system called Red Ball Express. These heroics notwithstanding, the Army maintained as much racial segregation as it could, going so far as maintaining separate blood banks. The war produced at least two generations of Black leaders who would alter the shape not only of the Army but of American society as well. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., commanded the Tuskegee Airmen during the war and became the first Black general in the newly formed Air Force following the war. He followed in the footsteps of his father, Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., the Army’s first Black brigadier general. In the waning days of the war, the Army court-martialed a Black lieutenant for refusing to sit in the colored section in the back of the bus. His name was Jack Roosevelt Robinson.

The Desegregation of the Armed Forces

Many Black World War II veterans were confronted with violence on the trains and buses that carried them home from the war. Civil rights organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People took up the cause of defending Black veterans. Throughout the war, civil rights groups had adopted the “Double V” campaign, fighting for democracy abroad and equal rights at home. With the former goal achieved, the latter came to the forefront.

In the wake of victory in Europe and Japan, civil rights groups pressured President Harry Truman to defend returning Black veterans against violence and discrimination. Truman was no natural ally of civil rights, having absorbed long and deeply held racist sentiment from his native Missouri. Nevertheless, due both to the injustice of the treatment Black veterans suffered at the hands of their own countrymen and to a desperate need for Black votes in the 1948 election, Truman formed a Presidential commission on civil rights in 1946. This commission recommended an end to racial segregation in the Armed Forces. On July 26, 1948, over the objections of “Dixiecrats” within his own party, Truman signed Executive Order 9981, officially ending racial segregation in the U.S. military. Truman’s political calculus proved correct, if narrowly so: the Black vote was instrumental in his razor-thin victory over Wendell Willkie. But the Services slow-rolled the implementation of the order. Truman’s Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall stated, “The Army is not an instrument for social evolution.” The last segregated unit in the Armed Forces was the Army’s 94th Engineer Battalion, which finally complied with Truman’s order in 1954.

The Korean and Vietnam Wars

The U.S. Army in both Korea and Vietnam simultaneously reflected and challenged the racism so ubiquitous in American society. In defiance of Truman’s executive order, the Army at the outset of the Korean War was largely segregated along racial lines. Army units were ill prepared at the outset of the Korean War, and most performed poorly. However, Army commanders singled out the all-Black 24th Infantry Regiment for special opprobrium, disbanding the unit and reassigning its Soldiers to majority-White units. Juxtaposed with such casual racism, the Army saw Black commanders leading White Soldiers in combat, including Distinguished Service Cross recipient First Lieutenant Ellison C. Wynn. Pressed by necessity, the Army began integrating combat units and assigning Soldiers without consideration to race.

The Army continued this practice in Vietnam, well ahead of an American society struggling to defend deeply held segregationist laws and customs. Nevertheless, during the Vietnam War, Blacks were more likely to be drafted, assigned to combat units, and court-martialed than were their White counterparts, and they were significantly underrepresented in the officer ranks. Black Soldiers and officers who fought with distinction included Captain Riley Leroy Pitts, the first Black officer to be awarded the Medal of Honor, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles Calvin Rogers, also awarded the Medal of Honor, who retired as a major general. As had been the case in Korea, integrated units performed well. Paradoxically but perhaps not surprisingly, racial tensions were more common in rear areas than among front-line combat forces. Perhaps no incident reflects this tension more clearly than the uprising in Long Bình Jail, where racial tensions exploded in 1968, leaving 1 dead and more than 100 injured.

Men of 24th Infantry Regiment move up to firing line in Korea, July 18, 1950 (U.S. Army Signal Corps/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)

The All-Volunteer Force and the Triumph of Market Forces

The Army emerged from Vietnam determined to purge itself of every aspect of the war’s legacy, from doctrine to manpower policy. No measure was more important in this process than the abandonment of conscription in favor of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Stung by the indiscipline and poor motivation of conscripts, the Army sought to recruit young people who saw the Service as offering a path to a better life. This appeal proved especially effective for African Americans, who were disproportionately represented in the enlisted ranks of the AVF. To its credit, the Army created a meritocracy less affected by racism than that of any other comparably sized institution in American society. Millions of African Americans served honorably and with distinction, with a few, most notably Colin Powell, wearing general’s stars. Twenty years after the establishment of the AVF, sociologist Charles Moskos offered his observation that “only in America do Blacks routinely boss Whites” as evidence of the progress of affirmative action in the U.S. Army.

Nevertheless, the AVF proved at best a mixed success in racial relations. Powell and a few others notwithstanding, African Americans to this day remain underrepresented in the senior ranks of the Army. Decades after the abolition of formal racial barriers to combat duty, African Americans remain overrepresented in service and support roles and underrepresented in combat units. This trend is especially prevalent in elite special operations forces, which remain predominantly White. The AVF relied on market forces to fill its ranks, allowing recruits to fill the roles where they felt most welcome. Ironically, the admirable degree of autonomy in the AVF produces some of the very same outcomes as formal policies of racial segregation.

Operations Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom

In 1991, the AVF went to war, and it has remained at war continuously ever since. The Army viewed the 1991 Gulf War as an affirmation of its purging the ghosts of Vietnam. In the Army’s telling, a well-led, well-trained volunteer force destroyed the Iraqi army in 100 hours of ground combat, affirming its post-Vietnam reforms. Similarly, the Army views the performance of the AVF in Iraq and Afghanistan as exceeding all expectations. The AVF was never designed for sustained combat over the course of decades; its designers assumed that such conflict would necessitate the return of conscription. While there is much to recommend this perspective, it is nevertheless incomplete. As was the case in the segregated Army, African Americans are less likely to serve as officers, more likely to serve in support roles, and far more likely to be court-martialed than their White counterparts. African Americans take great pride in being overrepresented in the ranks of the military, but even this point of pride comes with a caveat. Americans rightly worry that the Army is becoming isolated from the society that it serves.

Private First Class Milton L. Cook, from Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Mechanized Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, fires M60 machine gun while on search and destroy mission as part of Operation Cedar Falls, conducted in and around Filhol Plantation near Cu Chi, Republic of Vietnam, January 8, 1967 (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)

Toward a More Perfect Union: The Army as an Anti-Racist Institution

The history of racial integration in the Army is mixed; it adopted policies of racial equality when it needed combat readiness the most, only to retreat at least in part from those commitments once the crisis passed. The Army can and should be both proud of the role it has played in creating equality of opportunity for Soldiers of all colors, races, and creeds and simultaneously conscious of the fact that it has not done all that it can in the pursuit of that goal.

The Army can do more to accomplish its avowed goal of “providing all of our talented people with fulfilling and rewarding professional careers.” It can begin by acknowledging its role in the often racist policies and practices of the past. Positive next steps would include redefining recruitment policies with the explicit goals of achieving racial equality in the highest ranks and highest-profile missions of the Army, redesigning the Army’s organizational culture to purge the institution of Confederate base names that celebrate slave-holding traitors in military history, reexamining the heroes it celebrates, and recognizing the agency of individual Black citizens and Soldiers acting from a burning desire for freedom and marked by a willingness to pay for that freedom with their blood.

America would likely not exist today as a free and united country were it not for the courage and service of Black Soldiers throughout its history. They deserve more recognition and more gratitude for the role they have played in helping form a more perfect union—a fight that continues today. JFQ

Notes

1 Lloyd Austin, Commanding General, U.S. Central Command, and now Secretary of Defense; Dennis Via, Commanding General, Army Materiel Command; and Vincent K. Brooks, Commanding General, U.S. Forces Korea.

2 Army People Strategy (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2019), 5–6, available at

<https://issuu.com/usarmypeople/docs/army_people_strategy_2020_

7fac48d631b9c0?fr=sZmU4YzIwNjE1Mg>.

3 Army People Strategy: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Annex (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 1, 2020), 3, available at <https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_people_strategy_diversity_equity_and_inclusion_annex_2020_09_01_signed_final.pdf>.

4 “Deeds, Not Words” is the motto of the 22nd Infantry Regiment—an Army unit that was integrated with Black Seminole scouts.

5 Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

6 David Halberstam, “Foreword,” in Gail Buckley, American Patriots: The Story of Blacks in the Military From the Revolution to Desert Storm (New York: Random House, 2002), ix.

7 Nikole Hannah-Jones et al., eds., The 1619 Project: A New Origin Story (New York: One World, 2021).

8 See Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).

9 See the November 7, 1775, Proclamation of John Murray, Earl of Dunmore, in “Africans in America,” PBS, available at <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part2/2h42t.html>.

10 Elizabeth M. Collins, “Black Soldiers in the Revolutionary War,” Army.mil, March 4, 2013, available at <https://www.army.mil/article/97705/black_soldiers_in_the_revolutionary_war>.

11 See “The Revolutionary War” in “Africans in America,” PBS, available at <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part2/2narr4.html>.

12 Collins, “Black Soldiers in the Revolutionary War.”

13 “1784–1800: The Diplomacy of the Early Republic,” Office of the Historian, Department of State, available at <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/foreword>.

14 Jennifer L. Larson, “A Rebellion to Remember: The Legacy of Nat Turner,” in Documenting the American South: Primary Resources for the Study of Southern History, Literature, and Culture, University of North Carolina Library, available at <https://docsouth.unc.edu/highlights/turner.html>.

15 Robert Behre, “The Citadel’s Early Story,” Post and Courier, March 25, 2018, updated September 14, 2020, available at <https://www.postandcourier.com/news/the-citadels-early-story/article_21ae8ca2-1bfb-11e8-b533-2f6d6042759a.html>.

16 Good sources include Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953), and George W. Williams, A History of the Negro Troops in the War of the Rebellion, 1861–1865 (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1888).

17 Buckley, American Patriots, 81. This book, written by the daughter of civil rights activist Lena Horne, is an invaluable source on this topic. A shorter argument that parallels the one in this book can be found in Paul-Thomas Ferguson, “African American Service and Racial Integration in the U.S. Military,” Army.mil, February 23, 2021, available at <https://www.army.mil/article/243604/african_american_service_and_racial_integration_in_the_u_s_military>.

18 “Lewis Henry Douglass,” Library of Congress, available at <https://loc.gov/exhibits/civil-war-in-america/biographies/lewis-henry-douglass.html>.

19 “Black Soldiers in the U.S. Military During the Civil War,” National Archives and Records Administration, September 1, 2017, available at <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/blacks-civil-war>.

20 Sarah Pruitt, “What Lincoln Said in His Final Speech,” History, April 10, 2015, available at <https://www.history.com/news/what-lincoln-said-in-his-final-speech>.

21 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2014).

22 For the tragic but inspiring story of the first Black graduate of West Point, see Charles Allen, “The Legacy of Henry O. Flipper in the U.S. Army,” Army.mil, June 14, 2010, available at <https://www.army.mil/article/40763/the_legacy_of_henry_o_flipper_in_the_u_s_army>.

23 Richard Wormser, “The Brownsville Affair,” Thirteen Media With Impact, available at <https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_browns.html>.

24 Dick Lehr, “The Racist Legacy of Woodrow Wilson,” The Atlantic, November 27, 2015, available at <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/wilson-legacy-racism/417549/>.

25 Jami L. Bryan, “Fighting for Respect: African-American Soldiers in World War I,” National Museum of the United States Army, available at <https://armyhistory.org/fighting-for-respect-african-american-soldiers-in-wwi/>.

26 Mike Jason, John Nagl, and Paul Yingling, “Dear Mr. Secretary, You Can Rename Army Bases Right Now,” Defense One, June 9, 2020, available at <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/06/dear-mr-secretary-you-can-rename-army-bases-right-now/166025/>.

27 Charles D. Allen, “Army 2-Star Made History Before, After Military Integration,” Military Times, January 31, 2018, available at <https://www.militarytimes.com/military-honor/black-military-history/2018/01/31/army-2-star-made-history-before-after-military-integration/>.

28 Ibid.

29 “The Double V Victory,” The National WWII Museum, available at <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/double-v-victory>.

30 Farrell Evans, “Why Harry Truman Ended Segregation in the U.S. Military in 1948,” History, November 5, 2020, available at <https://www.history.com/news/harry-truman-executive-order-9981-desegration-military-1948>.

31 Charles D. Allen, “Maj. Gen. Charles C. Rogers: Talent Through Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion,” Military Times, January 28, 2021, available at <https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/28/maj-gen-charles-c-rogers-talent-through-diversity-equity-and-inclusion/>.

32 Sarah Kramer, “The Forgotten History of a Prison Uprising in Vietnam,” NPR, August 29, 2018, available at <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/08/29/642617106/the-forgotten-history-of-a-prison-uprising-in-vietnam>.

33 David Martin and Dan Rather, “Eye on America (Affirmative Action/United States Army),” CBS Evening News, May 31, 1995.

34 Helene Cooper, “African Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military, but Almost Invisible at the Top,” New York Times, May 25, 2020, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/us/politics/military-minorities-leadership.html>.

35 Army People Strategy, 5–6.

ndupress.ndu.edu

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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