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Quotes of the Day:
"The learned man knows that he is ignorant."
- Victor Hugo
"If the freedom of speech is taken away then dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter."
– George Washington
There are risks and costs to action. But they are far less than the long range risks of comfortable inaction.
– John F. Kennedy
1. Will Kim Jong-un and Trump Stay "Friends?"
2. Trump's 2nd term: A new opportunity for the vision of Korean unification
3. Lee Jae-myung’s Presidency: What’s Next for Inter-Korean Relations
4. AT THE EDGE OF THE KNIFE: AFTER 75 YEARS, KOREA’S LESSONS STILL CUT DEEP
5. Largest Patriot Missile Salvo In U.S. Military History Launched Defending Al Udeid Air Base Against Iranian Attack
6. South Korea Will Not Choose Between the US and China
7. Global Peace Foundation's forum in Mongolia explores Korean unification, climate action
8. North Korea’s Nuclear Modernization: Assessment and Outlook
9. Japan’s new hypersonic missile aims at China's navy, NoKo nukes
10. US overture meets Pyongyang's defiant rhetoric
11. Korea's defense industry makes room for women
12. Hyundai, Kia claim 11 pct U.S. market share in Jan.-May
13. Russian culture minister visits N. Korea amid deepening ties
14. Seoul hosts 1st remembrance ceremony for Korean War abductees, vows to address humanitarian issues
15. One month on, what are Lee Jae Myung's top policy priorities?
16. Will AI Make South Korean Democracy Stronger?
1. Will Kim Jong-un and Trump Stay "Friends?"
We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Excerpt:
Army Special Forces Colonel David Maxwell, the vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, highlights what many Americans don’t seems to understand about the Kim regime, “Kim Jong-un is conducting political warfare to subvert South Korea and drive a wedge in the ROK-US alliance. He must destroy the alliance to drive US forces off the peninsula, as this is the necessary condition for domination of the peninsula. He is conducting blackmail diplomacy, which can be described as using increased tension, threats, and provocations to achieve political and economic concessions to support the regime. He is also acquiring advanced military capabilities to support political warfare and blackmail diplomacy, and obtain the ability to dominate the peninsula by force when the conditions are right.”
Will Kim Jong-un and Trump Stay "Friends?"
The National Interest · by Brent M. Eastwood · June 27, 2025
Topic: Politics
Blog Brand: Korea Watch
Region: Asia
Tags: Donald Trump, Kim Jong-Un, North Korea, and South Korea
Will Kim Jong-un and Trump Stay “Friends?”
June 27, 2025
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Kim Jong-un seeks recognition, not compromise; Trump wants headlines, not hard deals. Without major concessions, another meeting may happen, but real progress remains unlikely amid mistrust and shifting priorities.
When will President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un head back to the negotiating table?
This is a frustrating time for the North Korean dictator, his country is an afterthought in the geopolitical order and he recently endured an embarrassing incident when one of his new warships capsized into the sea during a christening ceremony. Kim called it a “criminal event,” and the world greeted the incident with glee.
Trump is busy with the Israeli-Iranian conflict, the never-ending war in Ukraine, and the ever-present threat from China.
However, there is a chance the two mercurial leaders could meet later this year. Trump famously joined Kim for historic talks in 2019 after the American president claimed he stopped a war on the peninsula in 2017.
Despite such a historic interaction, the United States has not changed its stance on complete denuclearization on the peninsula. Meanwhile, Kim considers his country to be an unassailable nuclear power that leads the world in atomic weapons delivery.
Trump met with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on February 7 in Washington DC “We will have relations with North Korea and Kim Jong-un,” Trump said at a joint news conference.
What Will Kim Jong-un Gain from Seeing Trump Again?
Kim does not have much reason to extend the olive branch. He is happy to go his own way and continue to improve his country’s nuclear capability with no obstruction from South Korea or the West. Kim is looking for significant concessions, and the United States is not likely to yield, especially under a Trump administration.
Therefore, Kim will probably not “blink” anytime soon and give Trump the satisfaction of reaching a mutual consensus on the nuclear question.
What Are American Experts Saying About the Trump-Kim Relationship?
Army Special Forces Colonel David Maxwell, the vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, highlights what many Americans don’t seems to understand about the Kim regime, “Kim Jong-un is conducting political warfare to subvert South Korea and drive a wedge in the ROK-US alliance. He must destroy the alliance to drive US forces off the peninsula, as this is the necessary condition for domination of the peninsula. He is conducting blackmail diplomacy, which can be described as using increased tension, threats, and provocations to achieve political and economic concessions to support the regime. He is also acquiring advanced military capabilities to support political warfare and blackmail diplomacy, and obtain the ability to dominate the peninsula by force when the conditions are right.”
With this in mind, it will be difficult for Trump to score another breakthrough.
The White House has not articulated a clear policy for North Korea for Trump’s second presidential term. Maxwell further writes, “In this second term, President Trump could implement new policy and strategy elements that had never been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and support for the Korean people’s pursuit of a free and unified Korea.”
Said policies to foster a more “comfortable” relationship could be reducing the number of US troops in South Korea. The Wall Street Journal reported that 4,500 American soldiers would be redeployed from the Republic of Korea to Guam and other locations. While Pentagon sources refute that the plan has any validity, it likely remains a real policy option at the White House.
This wouldn’t be a good idea unless it includes North Korean concessions. For example, if the United States reduced its forces in the South, Kim could allow inspections of his nuclear infrastructure. That’s just a hypothetical and not likely to work, but Trump should make the North agree to concessions before he reduces troop levels in the South by attaching strings to such a move.
Another gambit that Trump could try would be to cancel combined military exercises between the US Army and South Korean personnel. Kim hates these drills and always claims they are a rehearsal for a joint US and ROK attack on the North. This should only be done if Kim made some improvements to his country, too, perhaps regarding human rights.
How Should Trump Approach North Korea?
Maxwell calls for “strategic strangulation” of the North. This would entail the United States and its allies pursuing a policy of “well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities [that] support the regime,” he said.
This is a tall order, and Trump is not likely ready to make such a comprehensive deal that would de-nuclearize the peninsula. There could be movement with US reductions in force and the cancellation of military exercises. Still, Kim is not likely to reciprocate by allowing the West to examine his nuclear weapons.
So, we are back to where we started: Trump wants diplomatic relations, but not to offer the kind of “carrots” that would encourage North Korea to change its behavior and Kim thinks he commands a state that should be respected as a legitimate nuclear power.
Expect no changes in this outlook. Trump may have another meeting with Kim, but diplomatic breakthroughs need huge concessions from both sides, a significant level of deal-making that may not be possible soon.
About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood
Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: A Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for US Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American, George Washington, and George Mason University. Brent is a former US Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.
Image Credit: Shutterstock/Rawpixel.com.
The National Interest · by Brent M. Eastwood · June 27, 2025
2. Trump's 2nd term: A new opportunity for the vision of Korean unification
This is a Google translation of a Donga Ilbo article.
No one will win a Nobel Peace Prize for denuclearization. But they will win it for solving the "Korea question" and achieving unification.
Trump's 2nd term: A new opportunity for the vision of Korean unification
2025 Mongolia Forum to be held… “Trump will move if he can win the Nobel Prize”
https://weekly.donga.com/society/article/all/11/5687008/1
Reporter Isul-ah
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Entered 2025-06-27 09:00:02
The '2025 Mongolia Forum' was held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia on June 24. Provided by Global Peace Foundation
“Mongolia is actively engaged in regional diplomacy and is ready to participate in all processes that contribute to dialogue and stability in Northeast Asia. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the vision of the ‘Korean Dream’.” (Former Mongolian Prime Minister Lynchinyam Amarjargal, June 24)
The 2025 Mongolia Forum, themed ‘Northeast Asian Peace and Development and Unification of the Korean Peninsula’, was held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia from June 20 to 25. Co-hosted by the Global Peace Foundation (GPF), One Korea Foundation, and People for Unification, the forum consisted of the official ceremony on the 24th, a pre-event called the Retreat (private discussion and forest restoration activities), and a parallel session called the Youth Leadership Forum. The Mongolia Forum has been held since 2018 with the aim of eliciting comprehensive cooperation from the international community for a ‘unified Korea’ in Mongolia, a country that has diplomatic relations with both South and North Korea and transitioned to democracy in the early 1990s.
Attendance of global political, diplomatic and security experts
The official event on June 24 began with an opening speech by Seo In-taek, co-chair of the People for Unification. Chairman Seo said, “The Korean Dream does not start with the question of ‘how to unify,’ but rather with a larger vision of ‘what kind of country to create after unification. ’” He added, “It is not simply about ending the division, but based on the founding ideology of our nation, ‘Hongik Ingan,’ I hope that a unified Korea will lead peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and become a country that gives hope to all of humanity.” He continued, “The true protagonists of unification are the citizens,” adding, “The aspirations that spring from the hearts of the citizens are the driving force behind unification, and that is why we have been sharing messages of hope through mass campaigns over the past several years.”
The event was attended by many experts in global politics, diplomacy, and security, including David Maxwell, Vice Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy (retired colonel in the U.S. Army Special Forces), Doug Bando, Senior Fellow at the conservative think tank CATO Institute, Robert Joseph, Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) (former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security), and Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan, Chairman of Blue Banner, a non-governmental organization (NGO) working
on the denuclearization of Mongolia (former Mongolian Ambassador to the United Nations). On that day, Vice Director Maxwell stated, “My philosophy on the Korean Peninsula issue can be summarized as ‘unification first, then denuclearization. ’” He added, “The U.S. has failed to denuclearize North Korea for the past 40 years, so now is the time for a new approach that includes free unification, and a ‘second Trump term’ is an opportunity to implement unprecedented new policies and strategies.” “The biggest challenge is to get the Trump administration involved in the complex issue of Korean unification,” said Senior Researcher Bando. “If we present a strong vision that supporting unification will help Trump’s diplomatic legacy, including the Nobel Prize, the United States will move positively, and we can make real progress toward unification.”
Immediately after the event, the participants announced the “2025 Mongolia Forum Joint Statement,” which stated, “We are confident that a unified Korean Peninsula will become a key axis of regional stability and development in line with the Hongik Ingan ideology, and that the Korean Dream Vision will become a transformative model for reconciliation, integration, freedom, human rights, and peace-building in this region.”
“Unification should not be approached solely through politics”
Participants of the 2025 Mongolia Forum plant trees at the IC Park in Ulaanbaatar on June 23. Courtesy of the Global Peace Foundation
The Youth Leadership Forum was attended by 60 Korean Dream Crew members aged 15 to 30 from 10 countries including the US, Japan, China, Thailand, the Philippines, and India. They shared their experiences of unification leadership in their respective countries under the theme of “Dreams and Challenges.”
Junta from Thailand said, “Peace on the Korean Peninsula is connected to world peace, so it cannot be said to be unrelated to me,” and added, “In many cases, conflicts arise from religious or ethnic conflicts, but North and South Korea have the same ethnicity, language, and culture, and there is no hostility toward each other, so unification is a very feasible future.” Yang Hye-won, a sophomore at Myongji University, said, “The reason the topic of unification feels distant is because it is approached from a political perspective,” and added, “I became interested after meeting defectors from North Korea and looking at the issue from the perspective of cooperation between citizens, and I hope that young people like me will learn more about unification.” During the Mongolia Forum, these young leaders also took on the challenge of riding horses 38km in the Nalaik region, symbolizing the “38th parallel.”
Meanwhile, all participants visited Ulaanbaatar IC Park on June 23 to plant 120 new trees to join the 'Plant a Billion Tree' campaign promoted by the Mongolian government as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The IC Park, which began construction in 2022, is a 350,000㎡ urban park that aims to prevent desertification and restore urban green space in Mongolia. The Mongolian forum organizers, including the Global Peace Foundation, plant trees here every year in conjunction with the forum.
“Unification will come if the US creates the environment and the citizens of North and South Korea support it”
Co-chair Seo In-taek “Mongolian Forum and Hangang Festival are the process of increasing people power”
Seo In-taek, co-chairman of the People for Unification, responds during an interview on June 24. Courtesy of the Global Peace Foundation
Seo In-taek, co-chairman of the People for Unification, met with reporters at the official event of the '2025 Mongolia Forum' and revealed the role he expects Mongolia to play in the unification of the Korean Peninsula and his future plans for activities, including the 'Korean Dream Hangang Festival' scheduled for August 15. The following is a Q&A with him.
- How do you think Mongolia can contribute to the unification process of the Korean Peninsula?
“Mongolia is a country that can inspire North Korea to peacefully transition its regime. The Communist Party, the predecessor of the Mongolian People’s Party, cooperated with the transition and is still the ruling party, maintaining its vested political interests. Also, the Mongolian economy has been developing at an astonishing rate since adopting a market economy. I think that Mongolia, which has had a very long relationship with North Korea, can become a model and have a real influence on North Korea. It is not true that this will only help South Korea. Mongolia is a landlocked country between China and Russia, and has enormous resources, but no economic feasibility at all. If the Korean Peninsula is unified and denuclearized, the Mongolian region will also become more stable in terms of security and its economy will grow rapidly. I believe that Mongolia will become a more active stakeholder in the Korean Peninsula issue through the ‘Six-Party Talks + 1’ format.”
- What are the goals you want to achieve through events such as the Mongolia Forum and the Hangang River Festival?
“First, let me explain the recent situation in North Korea. North Korea is currently showing signs of the end of its system. The distribution economy has already collapsed a long time ago, and by 2022, it has abandoned the concept of national unification, which is the core of the Juche ideology. Most recently, as economic dependence on China became difficult, it even chose to send troops to Russia. Meanwhile, externally, US President Donald Trump is approaching security issues in a Reagan-like manner, mentioning the ‘Golden Dome.’ In the 1980s, former US President Ronald Reagan brought down the Soviet Union with the ‘Star Wars Project’ (SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative) without any actual technology, and laid the foundation for German unification.
This means that now, more than ever, public support for unification is important. At the time of German unification, neighboring countries such as Britain and France all opposed it. The East German regime had no reason to give up power either. However, the US created the environment, and East and West Germans strongly desired unification like a huge wave, making it a reality. At a time when President Trump is likely to be interested in the unification of the Korean Peninsula beyond the denuclearization of North Korea, it is We need to quickly build civic consensus. We have never sent a proper message to North Korea saying, ‘This is our vision for unification’ or ‘Let’s create a unified country like this together.’ The Mongolian Forum and the Hangang River Festival are part of the process of presenting unification as an option to North Korea and increasing ‘people power’ related to it.”
- What are your plans for activities after the Hangang River Festival?
“(The North Korean regime’s continuation) is now at most 3 to 5 years. During this period, we need to convey the vision of the ‘Korean Dream’ to North Korea as much as possible. If we have indirectly imagined the image of a ‘unified Korea’ through Korean dramas and movies, we need to develop and share more specific content related to unification in the future. This means that we need to be able to properly inform people about why Korea is doing well, what a market economy is, and what freedom is. Also, regular education on this topic should be added so that the younger generation in Korea does not have negative attitudes based on the misunderstanding that ‘unification is economically damaging.’ After the Hangang River Festival, we plan to carry out these activities along with larger-scale citizen-led movements.”
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3. Lee Jae-myung’s Presidency: What’s Next for Inter-Korean Relations
When have we ever really deterred provocations?
We have successfully deterred a return to hostilities for the past seven decades and we have deterre the use of WMD/nuclear weapons for the past three decades. That is what we can and must do. But deterring provocations? They are integral to Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy. He will not stop provocations any more than he will give up his nuclear weapons.
Excerpts:
Given ongoing North Korean missile tests and nuclear development, the Lee administration must carefully manage domestic expectations, as unilateral overtures risk public backlash. While broad inter-Korean reconciliation remains unlikely absent a significant shift in Pyongyang’s strategic thinking, for now, a carefully calibrated, security-focused approach offers the most realistic and constructive path forward for his administration.
The US–South Korea alliance will remain central, with close coordination needed to deter North Korean provocations and enable future diplomatic initiatives. While hopes for a renewed Sunshine Policy may be premature, a more realistic approach, rooted in patience and pragmatism, will shape the Lee administration’s North Korea policy.
Lee Jae-myung’s Presidency: What’s Next for Inter-Korean Relations
The National Interest · by Sangsoo Lee · June 28, 2025
Topic: Symposia
Blog Brand: Korea Watch
Region: Asia
June 28, 2025
By: Sangsoo Lee
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President Lee Jae-myung seeks renewed inter-Korean engagement, but North Korea’s hostility and closer ties with Russia limit prospects. Realistic, security-focused steps may reduce tensions without expecting immediate breakthroughs.
The election of Lee Jae-myung as South Korea’s president signals a significant shift away from the previous hardline stance towards North Korea taken by his predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol. Immediately after taking office, Lee indicated his willingness to pursue engagement reminiscent of the earlier Sunshine Policy era.
His swift appointment of Lee Jong-seok, a prominent figure associated with the Sunshine Policy, as director of the National Intelligence Service, and decisions to ban anti-North Korean leaflet balloons and halt DMZ loudspeaker broadcasts demonstrate his commitment to a diplomatic approach. President Lee is expected to propose reestablishing inter-Korean dialogue channels and reviving suspended inter-Korean projects.
North Korea Does Not Need Better Relations with South Korea
Despite diplomatic overtures from Seoul, it is ultimately North Korea’s response that will determine the success of Lee’s approach. Pyongyang symbolically severed official relations by demolishing the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong in 2020 during the latter period of the Moon Jae-in administration.
Since then, North Korea has consistently maintained a hostile posture toward Seoul. Pyongyang has pivoted toward deeper strategic and military cooperation with Russia, particularly in the context of the Ukraine war, substantially diminishing its incentives for rapprochement with the South or the United States.
Recent diplomatic overtures from the United States have been unequivocally rejected by Kim Jong-un, underscoring Pyongyang’s deep distrust and its strategic preference for Moscow’s security guarantees over uncertain diplomatic engagement with Washington. Unless there are extraordinary developments, such as a severe economic crisis, catastrophic natural disasters, or a significant loss of support from Russia and China that could threaten regime stability, North Korea is unlikely to prioritize engagement with the South anytime soon.
North Korea Does Not Want Any Cooperation from the South
President Lee wants to resume limited humanitarian cooperation, focusing on initiatives such as family reunions and coordinated disaster management during monsoon seasons to mitigate flooding risks.
However, recent responses by Pyongyang show that even these minimal humanitarian initiatives have faced strong resistance. After the failed Hanoi Summit in 2019, North Korea systematically rejected nearly all low-level humanitarian proposals from the Moon administration, including COVID quarantine support and video reunions for separated families. Pyongyang dismissed these offers as “hypocrisy,” citing ongoing leaflet campaigns, joint military drills, and sanctions.
North Korea’s most recent actions: building barriers, destroying roads and bridges in the border areas, and publicly abandoning the rhetoric of unification, do not signal preparations for war. Instead, these steps reflect Pyongyang’s desire to avoid direct military clashes with the South. With North Korea currently committed militarily in support of Russia in Ukraine, and sending even more troops and engineering units, Pyongyang is unlikely to risk simultaneous wars in both Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula.
With this in mind, President Lee could strategically focus on reducing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Initial actions, such as banning leaflet balloons and halting loudspeaker broadcasts, are necessary confidence-building steps. Additional measures could include suspending reconnaissance drone flights near the border and strongly advocating for the restoration and full implementation of the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA).
Even if North Korea remains unresponsive mainly in the short term, unilateral tension-reduction steps taken by South Korea can help prevent unintended military incidents and lay a more positive environment for potential inter-Korean dialogue.
The Lee Administration Cannot Afford to Be Optimistic About North Korea
Given ongoing North Korean missile tests and nuclear development, the Lee administration must carefully manage domestic expectations, as unilateral overtures risk public backlash. While broad inter-Korean reconciliation remains unlikely absent a significant shift in Pyongyang’s strategic thinking, for now, a carefully calibrated, security-focused approach offers the most realistic and constructive path forward for his administration.
The US–South Korea alliance will remain central, with close coordination needed to deter North Korean provocations and enable future diplomatic initiatives. While hopes for a renewed Sunshine Policy may be premature, a more realistic approach, rooted in patience and pragmatism, will shape the Lee administration’s North Korea policy.
About the Author: Sangsoo Lee
Sangsoo Lee is an Associated Fellow at the European Center for North Korea Studies at the University of Vienna and a Strategic Linkages (SL) founder. Dr. Lee was the Deputy Director and head of the Stockholm Korea Center at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP). His areas of interest are Security and Conflict issues in Northeast Asia, focusing on the North Korean nuclear crisis and inter-Korean relations. Dr. Lee holds a PhD in Northeast Asian Studies from Peking University and has been a Visiting Researcher at the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (2007) and at the London School of Economics (LSE) (2011).
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Gyeonggi Provincial Government.
The National Interest · by Sangsoo Lee · June 28, 2025
4. AT THE EDGE OF THE KNIFE: AFTER 75 YEARS, KOREA’S LESSONS STILL CUT DEEP
Excerpts:
Therefore, as policymakers and military leaders reflect on the start of the Korean War 75 years ago—a fiery eruption that receded into a perpetual simmer—we can draw parallels to current events and ask questions about future scenarios. In his memoirs, President Harry Truman stated the decision to help South Korea was intended to prevent its collapse, which would, in turn, encourage “China and the Soviet Union to attack other nations, resulting in World War III.” The same logic applies today with the Russia-Ukraine war and a potential China-Taiwan conflict. The U.S. military has attempted to pivot to the Pacific for over a decade. However, many Americans still grapple with the reality of China’s rhetoric, preparation, and exercises to invade its democratic neighbor, Taiwan. Certainly, parallels can be drawn between the Korean War and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but we should view Russia’s ambitions in broader terms. Some agree with the opinion of Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a retired British Army officer, that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine “brought the Cold War back to Europe, which could at any time turn hot.” Other experts, such as former deputy national security advisor Elliott Abrams, take a broader perspective, arguing that a “new Cold War” has been “brought upon the West by the aggressive partnership of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.” Yet others, such as historian Philip Zelikow, imply we are potentially in the opening phases of World War III. If this is the case, then we may be where we started prior to the Korean War, and would be wise to consider This Kind of War, where T.R. Fehrenbach surmises,
Because the American people have traditionally taken a warlike, but not military, attitude to battle, and because they have always coupled a certain belligerence—no American likes being pushed around—with a complete unwillingness to prepare for combat, the Korean War was difficult, perhaps the most difficult in their history.
These words by Fehrenbach cut like a knife, one that remains sharp if we were to use them to examine America’s current preparedness for war. Is the United States postured with the right forces in the right places? Are decision-makers and military leaders vigilant and clear-eyed on the prospects for conflict with Russia and China? And finally, is the American public ready to stomach the costs of war if it is necessary?
While not the case on June 25, 1950, the U.S.-ROK alliance today serves as an excellent example of deterrence through forward posture, capable forces, and vigilance. The United States should strengthen this and other key alliances to promote economic strength, political stability, and technological advancement, which enables U.S. allies to build capable, professional militaries; invest in interoperable defense systems; and participate meaningfully in joint operations and peacekeeping. The U.S. alliance system thus becomes more than the sum of its individual parts—instead it evolves into a tightly woven mesh of burden-sharing states that reinforce regional stability, respond to crises, and reinforce the rules-based international order. In the end America and its allies can reinforce the shield of deterrence with forward postured, capable forces, possessing the will and capability to defend our interests and prove the lessons of the Korean War are not forgotten.
AT THE EDGE OF THE KNIFE: AFTER 75 YEARS, KOREA’S LESSONS STILL CUT DEEP
Andy Bogusky , John Nagl June 26, 2025
The beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1947 set the stage for the first “hot war” in Korea.
June 25, 2025, marks the 75th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, a war which technically continues. This date is so impactful that South Koreans refer to this war that continues to divide their homeland as the “6-2-5 War,” or simply as the numbers “6-2-5” (pronounced “yook-ee-o”). With over 1.2 million South Korean lives lost—both military and civilian—the Korean War wasn’t just a national crisis; it was a deeply personal catastrophe etched into the memory of nearly every household. In the United States, it is often referred to as “The Forgotten War,” a tragic misnomer considering over 36,000 Americans lost their lives in just three years. While less than the 58,000 Americans killed in Vietnam over 20 years, the toll reveals the striking intensity and rapid escalation of combat in Korea. But Americans and Koreans were not the only ones to experience loss, as the Korean War also served as the first real test of the United Nations as a military entity, with 14 other countries providing combat units under the United Nations Command, sustaining 3,100 dead.
The losses serve as a grave reminder of a war that offers many lessons. Just two takeaways are offered here: 1) gaps in preparedness invite aggression with the cost of restoring deterrence paid in blood, and 2) the remarkable recovery of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), underwritten by the long-term commitment of the United States, speaks to the continuing relevance of the ROK-U.S. alliance—and other alliances—in today’s volatile environment. While deterrence failed in 1950, this robust alliance has prevented the resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula since. Thus, seventy-five years on, the Korean War offers the United States and its allies pertinent lessons about the role of force posture and readiness for achieving deterrence in a world featuring the same players, just at a different time.
The beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1947 set the stage for the first “hot war” in Korea. This war would see communist-aligned North Korea (backed by Russia and China) square off against the United Nations Command-backed South Korea (de facto U.S.-led) along the 38th parallel. Prior to the invasion, the United States transferred the several army divisions that had been in Korea to Japan to oversee occupation and rebuilding efforts there. In the pre-dawn hours of June 25, 1950 North Korean forces, with Russian consent, mounted a surprise attack in which they encountered the reality of the U.S. post-World War II drawdown, which left only U.S. advisors and no combat divisions supporting South Korean forces. It took only three days for the capital of Seoul to fall, and it would take until 1 July for the first U.S. reinforcements to arrive in the form of Task Force Smith.
The next three years would see dramatic shifts in territorial control as the North Koreans forced the U.S.-led coalition into the southeastern-most city of Busan, then retreated to the Chinese border of the Yalu River, before counter-attacking back to the 38th parallel with Chinese assistance. The Forgotten War illustrates a simple—but not easy—lesson: deterrence requires forward-postured, capable forces and vigilance. Ultimately, deterrence fails when capability and will are in doubt.
Another lesson emerges here, revealing the power and potential of the U.S. alliance framework for mutual prosperity and security—prosperous nations aligned with the United States are not only better equipped to contribute to their own defense, but also to contribute to the collective security of the international system. Not only did the U.S.-led coalition restore the status quo ante bellum in terms of territory, but over time the entire weight of the U.S. instruments of national power were brought to bear, in cooperation with the Republic of Korea, to restore deterrence, establish a vibrant democracy, and transform a war-ravaged nation into the global technology and cultural powerhouse it is today.
An economic comparison between North and South Korea reinforces the compounding effects of partnership with the United States. South Korea, known as “the Miracle on the Han River,” evolved from a post-war per capita income of less than $100, to the world’s 13th largest economy. On the other hand, North Korea, despite sharing ethnic homogeneity and basic geographic position, ranks 89th. Not only is South Korea thriving economically, but it contributes globally to deterrence, security, and peace— unlike its northern neighbor, which is widely regarded as a destabilizing global pariah. South Korea provides over $1 billion annually to host 28,500 U.S. servicemembers and crossed $14 billion of annual defense exports to 12 countries in 2023. The Republic of Korea has been a reliable security exporter and global partner by contributing coalition forces to Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, anti-piracy operations, and peacekeeping operations. The takeaway is clear: alliances rooted in shared values and sustained through mutual investment are not only strategic assets and in the interests of the United States, they are also engines of transformation that multiply power, boost deterrence, and shape a more stable global order.
But South Korea still balances on the edge of several knives. While the ROK-U.S. alliance enforces an armistice that secures a fragile peace in a war that has not officially ended, skirmishes continue along the 155-mile blade designated as the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Occasional provocations by a nuclear-armed North Korea threaten to slice open the seams of conflict; as of this writing, North Korea conducted at least five missile launch events in 2025, including an alleged new hypersonic missile. Not only is deterrence and security of South Korea important to the Korean Peninsula, but it also represents an island of stability in a troubled region, where South Korea sits on a broader strategic knife-edge. The strategic geography of the Korean peninsula makes it a fulcrum in the Indo-Pacific—bordering China, Russia, and Japan. The commitment of military personnel in Korea not only deters North Korean aggression and its nuclear ambitions, but also serves as a regional hedge against China and Russia, especially with the Republic of Korea’s role in regional security frameworks such as U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation.
Is the United States postured with the right forces in the right places?
Therefore, as policymakers and military leaders reflect on the start of the Korean War 75 years ago—a fiery eruption that receded into a perpetual simmer—we can draw parallels to current events and ask questions about future scenarios. In his memoirs, President Harry Truman stated the decision to help South Korea was intended to prevent its collapse, which would, in turn, encourage “China and the Soviet Union to attack other nations, resulting in World War III.” The same logic applies today with the Russia-Ukraine war and a potential China-Taiwan conflict. The U.S. military has attempted to pivot to the Pacific for over a decade. However, many Americans still grapple with the reality of China’s rhetoric, preparation, and exercises to invade its democratic neighbor, Taiwan. Certainly, parallels can be drawn between the Korean War and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but we should view Russia’s ambitions in broader terms. Some agree with the opinion of Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a retired British Army officer, that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine “brought the Cold War back to Europe, which could at any time turn hot.” Other experts, such as former deputy national security advisor Elliott Abrams, take a broader perspective, arguing that a “new Cold War” has been “brought upon the West by the aggressive partnership of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.” Yet others, such as historian Philip Zelikow, imply we are potentially in the opening phases of World War III. If this is the case, then we may be where we started prior to the Korean War, and would be wise to consider This Kind of War, where T.R. Fehrenbach surmises,
Because the American people have traditionally taken a warlike, but not military, attitude to battle, and because they have always coupled a certain belligerence—no American likes being pushed around—with a complete unwillingness to prepare for combat, the Korean War was difficult, perhaps the most difficult in their history.
These words by Fehrenbach cut like a knife, one that remains sharp if we were to use them to examine America’s current preparedness for war. Is the United States postured with the right forces in the right places? Are decision-makers and military leaders vigilant and clear-eyed on the prospects for conflict with Russia and China? And finally, is the American public ready to stomach the costs of war if it is necessary?
While not the case on June 25, 1950, the U.S.-ROK alliance today serves as an excellent example of deterrence through forward posture, capable forces, and vigilance. The United States should strengthen this and other key alliances to promote economic strength, political stability, and technological advancement, which enables U.S. allies to build capable, professional militaries; invest in interoperable defense systems; and participate meaningfully in joint operations and peacekeeping. The U.S. alliance system thus becomes more than the sum of its individual parts—instead it evolves into a tightly woven mesh of burden-sharing states that reinforce regional stability, respond to crises, and reinforce the rules-based international order. In the end America and its allies can reinforce the shield of deterrence with forward postured, capable forces, possessing the will and capability to defend our interests and prove the lessons of the Korean War are not forgotten.
Andy Bogusky is an Air Force colonel and a Faculty Instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations at the U.S. Army War College. A B-52 and MQ-9 pilot, he is the President of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Korea Defense Veterans Association.
John Nagl is Professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College. He is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: The Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., honors the sacrifices of those who served in the Korean War (1950-1953). It features 19 stainless steel statues of soldiers, a mural wall with etched faces, and a Pool of Remembrance.
5. Largest Patriot Missile Salvo In U.S. Military History Launched Defending Al Udeid Air Base Against Iranian Attack
When the US Patriots units return to Korea and Japan their soldiers will be proven in combat.
Note the US strategic agility to deploy forces where they are needed around the world.
Excerpts:
The Patriot crews defending Al Udeid at this point were deployed from Korea and Japan “as part of our U.S. forces there to ensure that we had the most capable missiles in the CENTCOM area of responsibility,” Caine added. This was part of a much larger move to boost U.S. forces in the region as tensions with Iran over its nuclear program mounted. As we reported before, that included the influx of Navy vessels and Air Force F-16, F-22 and F-35 fighters and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers.
Largest Patriot Missile Salvo In U.S. Military History Launched Defending Al Udeid Air Base Against Iranian Attack
The Pentagon's top officer offered new details about how air defense crews at Al Udeid Air Base knocked down incoming Iranian missiles.
Howard Altman
Updated Jun 26, 2025 3:24 PM EDT
twz.com · by Howard Altman
The TWZ Newsletter
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
As Iranian ballistic missiles were flying toward a nearly empty Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on Monday, a small crew of air defenders stayed behind to protect the largest American military installation in the Middle East. Thursday morning, Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered new details about that effort, which he said resulted in the largest single-event launch of Patriot interceptors in U.S. military history. You can read more about that attack in our initial reporting here.
Monday morning, three days after the Operation Midnight Hammer attack by U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bombers dropping 14 30,000-pound GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bombs on Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities, “we began to receive indications and warnings that Iran intended to attack U.S bases in the region that morning,” Caine told reporters, including from The War Zone.
As a result, in consultation with U.S. CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered Al Udeid and other bases around the region to “assume a minimum force posture,” said Caine. As we previously noted, satellite images showed that most aircraft had left Al Udeid days before, and Navy ships departed from their base in Bahrain in anticipation of an Iranian response to any U.S. actions. You can see satellite imagery indicating the departure of aircraft from Al Udied below.
Very interesting: Low-res satellite images show Qatar’s Al-Udeid Air Base nearly empty, with aircraft parking areas cleared.
U.S., UK, and Qatari jets appear to have been relocated over fears of possible Iranian strikes. pic.twitter.com/HsGTOHPzHh
— Clash Report (@clashreport) June 18, 2025
“Most folks had moved off the base to extend the security perimeter out away from what we assessed might be a target zone,” Caine explained. “Except for a very few Army soldiers at Al Udeid.”
At that point, “only two Patriot batteries remained on base, roughly 44 American soldiers responsible for defending the entire base, to include CENTCOM forward headquarters in the Middle East…and all the U.S. forces there,” said Caine.
The oldest soldier was a 28-year-old captain,” Caine pointed out. “The youngest was a 21-year-old private who’s been in the military for less than two years.”
WATCH: @thejointstaff Chairman Gen. Dan 'Raizin' Caine tells the story of the brave Patriot missile defense crews who led the defense of Al Udeid air base from Iran's counter strikes:
"The oldest soldier was a 28-year-old captain. The youngest was a 21-year-old private who had… pic.twitter.com/mxg6HXysn6
— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) June 26, 2025
Caine tried to offer some insights into what it must have been like for those troops waiting for the Iranian barrage.
“So let’s put ourselves out there for a second,” Caine posited. “Imagine you’re that young First Lieutenant. You’re 25 or 26 years old, and you’ve been assigned as the tactical director inside the command and control element. Sitting next to you is the early warning operator, whose job is to notify you of an imminent attack. There’s five people inside a vehicle and five people outside of a vehicle around these for a total of, as I said, of 44. By the way, you’ve sat in the Middle East for years, deployed over and over again, extended multiple times, always being prepared but unsure of when that particular day will come that you must execute your mission and not fail at doing it.”
Pfc. Michael Schultz, 1-62 Delta Battery Air Defense Artillery Regiment Patriot station launcher operator and maintainer from Tampa, Fla., raises the launching station catwalks on a Patriot missile battery in preparation for reload operations during an operational readiness exercise at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, March 4. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman/Released) Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman
The Patriot crews defending Al Udeid at this point were deployed from Korea and Japan “as part of our U.S. forces there to ensure that we had the most capable missiles in the CENTCOM area of responsibility,” Caine added. This was part of a much larger move to boost U.S. forces in the region as tensions with Iran over its nuclear program mounted. As we reported before, that included the influx of Navy vessels and Air Force F-16, F-22 and F-35 fighters and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers.
“As the day continues, you start to hear more and more chatter in the information space about an impending attack. And, as the sun starts to set in the west, you get orders from your higher headquarters to make sure that your missile batteries are pointed to the north,” Caine further explained. “There are just a few other teammates. It’s hot. You’re getting nervous, and you expect an attack outside of those Patriot vehicles. Your hot crew, which is one NCO and four additional soldiers, turns a key and relinquishes control of those missiles to that young lieutenant inside the vehicle. And you wait, you know that you’re going to have approximately two minutes, 120 seconds to either succeed or fail.”
Adding to that stress on the troops is that their air defense battery would be at the top of Iran’s targeting list in a ballistic missile attack. Taking out the Patriots would have enabled a much easier path for the rest of the missiles and left the base vulnerable for follow-on attacks.
Pfc. James Weaver, 1-62 Delta Battery Air Defense Artillery Regiment Patriot station launcher operator and maintainer from Steelville, Mo., unlocks torque tubes behind a PAC-2 missile interceptor during an operational readiness exercise at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, March 4. The Patriot missiles at AUAB protect the base from a variety of airborne threats including tactical ballistic missiles and drones. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman/Released) Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman
At about 7:30 PM local time (12:30 Eastern), “as the sun sets in the west, Iran attacks as the targets were detected,” Caine told reporters. “Round after round of Patriot missiles are ejected from their canisters by an initial launch charge. Then the main solid rocket motor ignites. You can feel this in your body if you’ve ever been around a Patriot taking a shot. And round after round goes out and guides against those missiles coming in.”
The defense, said Caine, was historic.
“We believe that this is the largest single Patriot engagement in US military history,” Caine posited. “And we were joined in this engagement by the Qatari Patriot crews.”
Caine declined to say how many interceptors were fired, “but it was a bunch.”
Based on Army doctrine and the early warning, David Shank, a retired Army colonel and former commandant of the Army Air Defense Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, told us he estimated that there were between two and four interceptors fired per incoming missile. Trump previously said that Iran warned that it would launch 14 missiles at Al Udeid, a symbolic response to the number of MOPs dropped by the U.S. on its nuclear facilities.
LMAO…WATCH: Trump on the Iranian launches at the American base in Qatar: The Iranians asked us if one o'clock (US time) was convenient for us? I replied that it was okay… pic.twitter.com/sxHu33DDEN
— Raylan Givens (@JewishWarrior13) June 25, 2025
Caine went on to explain how much material was falling as the interceptions were taking place.
“What we do know is there was a lot of metal flying around between attacking missiles being hit by Patriots, boosters from attacking missiles being hit by Patriots, the Patriots themselves flying around, and the debris from those Patriots hitting the ground,” Caine stated. “There was a lot of metal flying around, and yet our U.S. air defenders had only seconds to make complex decisions with strategic impact.”
Those troops, he added, are awesome humans [who] along with their Qatari brothers and sisters in arms, stood between a salvo of Iranian missiles and the safety of Al Udeid. They are the unsung heroes of the 21st-century United States Army. And I know a lot of you have seen the videos online and the excitement as those Patriots departed their launchers and went up… This really demonstrates the combat capability and capacity of our Army air defenders. Simply stated, they absolutely crushed it.”
Footage of a US/Qatari PATRIOT surface to air missile system conducting a large ballistic missile engagement over Al-Udeid this evening, salvoing out dozens of PAC-3 interceptors at incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. pic.twitter.com/a7OHrs9svr
— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 23, 2025
More footage of US Patriot batteries intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
These ballistic missiles, fired by Iran, were directly targeting US personnel and assets in the middle-east, for clarity. https://t.co/E9jdpF6pwf pic.twitter.com/mcukeYqZVt
— FUNKER530 (@FunkerActual) June 23, 2025
Patriot PAC-3 Air Defence Systems intercepting incoming Iranian missiles aimed at Al-Udeid Base in Doha, Qatar. pic.twitter.com/iehXnWuZsv
— Javed Iqbal (@JavedIqbalReal) June 23, 2025
The success of the Al Udeid interceptions follows unprecedented experience garnered by Ukraine in defending against complex attacks from Russia with the Patriot system. Saudi Arabia’s fight against the Houthis prior to the Ukraine war also provided a lot of real-world data. These previous experiences have been used to update software, refine tactics, and develop improvements to the Patriot system that have significantly enhanced its capabilities and helped dictate its future growth pathway. This future will include the LTAMDS (Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor), a new radar that the Army is working to field now, primarily as an upgrade for the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. Among many other improvements, it will feature 360-degree coverage in a single radar system, something the Patriot lacks now.
Patriot batted 1000 today. A lot of software improvements for Patriot have come out of the war in Ukraine. Saudi's defense against the Houthis as well, but I have been told Ukraine was a huge leap. Mounds of constant data from real engagements used to tweak the system.
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) June 23, 2025
The Iranian barrage on Al Udeid came as air defense crews are among the most overly taxed in the U.S. military. The service only has 17 Patriot battalions in total, and they are heavily deployed, especially to the Middle East. That is in addition to many other obligations around the globe. Though this reflects the immense ability of the U.S. military to project power worldwide, it also underscores the stark limitations of its existing ground-based air and missile defense capacity. Concerns about what this means for the prospect of adequately defending U.S. forces deployed overseas, as well as the U.S. homeland, is something senior U.S. military leaders, as well as The War Zone, have been drawing attention to for some time.
In previous statements, U.S. officials said there were no casualties from the Iranian barrage.
Though Trump engineered a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, the region remains tense and officials have not ruled out another U.S. strike against Iran should it continue its nuclear weapons development.
Caine did not say when or if the troops and diverse collection of aviation assets normally at Al Udeid, will return. We will keep an eye on this and provide updates if new information is presented.
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com
Senior Staff Writer
Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard's work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.
6. South Korea Will Not Choose Between the US and China
South Korea has long ago chosen, going back to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the US. But it does not have to publiclay choose. In this case strategic ambiguity may be helpful though I have no doubt that China knows who the South chooses.
Excerpts:
Korea’s military expenditures have dropped from 4 percent of GDP in 1990 to 2.5 percent in 2024, while spending on education has increased by 3 to 4.8 percent. And that military spending is still overwhelmingly focused on North Korea contingencies, not Chinese ones. For most South Koreans, the most immediate and enduring security threat that remains is North Korea.
To conclude, all South Korean presidents, liberal or conservative, have recognized the need to work with China. Korea cannot afford to distance itself; geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and strategic realities demand a modus vivendi.
As a democracy, South Korea’s foreign policy must also reflect public sentiment. Polling data suggests that, like their policymakers, South Korean citizens do not view China’s rise as inherently threatening. Instead, they see the intensifying US–China rivalry, especially when it involves economic pressure and technological decoupling, as a more immediate and multifaceted source of insecurity.
While South Korea seeks to diversify its economic relations, there is little doubt that China will remain a critical partner in trade, investment, and innovation.
South Korea Will Not Choose Between the US and China
The National Interest · by Park Kyuri, David C. Kang · June 26, 2025
Topic: Symposia
Blog Brand: Korea Watch
Region: Asia
June 26, 2025
By: Park Kyuri, and David C. Kang
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South Korea under President Lee Jae-myung is returning to pragmatic diplomacy, maintaining its US alliance while rejecting confrontation with China, reflecting public sentiment and prioritizing peace, trade, and regional stability.
Despite the hopes of many China-hawks in Washington DC, South Korea’s new president Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party is expected to pursue a foreign policy more open to engagement with China and North Korea.
Signaling a departure from the confrontational stance of the now disgraced Yoon Suk-yeol administration, Lee reflects the swing of South Korea’s political pendulum back toward reassurance, placing renewed emphasis on reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and managing uncertainty in East Asia through dialogue and engagement.
South Korea Will Balance Their Relationship with America and China
What is often overlooked is that South Korea shares some, but not all, American priorities. This is not new and shows no signs of changing.
Every Korean president, whether liberal or conservative, has sought strong ties with the United States and upheld the existing alliance as a pillar of national security. At the same time, all have recognized the necessity of living with China. None have embraced a policy of containment or economic decoupling; the enduring orientation has been pragmatic coexistence.
In that sense, Yoon was the aberration. If his presidency served as a litmus test for how far to the right South Korea is willing to go, the results were telling: As a general rule, Seoul prefers to maintain cooperative ties with China.
Even President Yoon, arguably the most conservative South Korean leader in decades, did not abandon relations with Beijing in favor of an exclusive alignment with Washington.
For instance, when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022 and made a subsequent stop in Seoul, Yoon declined to meet her, citing “a comprehensive consideration for national interest.”
Foreign Minister Park Jin traveled to China the next day for his first official visit, and when Yoon’s top national security advisor was asked in mid-2023 whether South Korea still upheld the “One China” Policy, he replied, “We made our policy toward China when we normalized relations in 1992, and we haven’t changed that policy.”
Further, many Western analysts and media outlets focused on Seoul’s adoption of the term “Indo-Pacific” and the emphasis on the South Korea–US–Japan trilateral cooperation in its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, interpreting these signals as a major strategic realignment.
Yet this interpretation often overlooks a key element of the document: its simultaneous emphasis on cooperation with China. The strategy states, “We seek to contribute to regional peace and stability by harmoniously developing ROK–US–Japan cooperation and ROK–Japan–China cooperation [emphasis added].”
What Is President Lee’s Foreign Policy?
President Lee Jae-myung appears to prioritize the US–ROK alliance while also managing good relations with China.
His foreign policy stance marks a clear contrast with that of his predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, who championed “peace through strength” and emphasized deterrence and military alignment.
Instead, Lee promotes his vision of “peace through dialogue,” emphasizing that “peace and economy go hand in hand” and that “no matter how expensive, peace is better than war.” While not discarding deterrence, Lee places greater emphasis on reassurance, inter-Korean coexistence, and pragmatic diplomacy.
South Korea’s position, grounded in the “One China” policy, is unlikely to change regarding the Taiwan issue. When asked whether South Korea would come to Taiwan’s aid if attacked by China, Lee responded, “I will think about that answer when aliens are about to invade the earth.”
The remark implied that, realistically, South Korea does not intend to become militarily involved in cross-Strait relations in the foreseeable future. President Lee’s approach reflects broader South Korean public opinion: In 2024, most Koreans (53.3 percent) wanted no involvement if a war occurred over Taiwan and the US was involved; only 15.6 percent supported providing weapons and ammunition, and 5.9 percent supported sending combat troops.
South Koreans Do Not Think of China as a Threat
Similarly, while the South Korean public expresses some apprehension about China, it generally does not view China as the existential threat many in the United States perceive it to be. Surveys by the East Asia Institute (EAI), a leading research institute based in Seoul, consistently show that South Koreans are more concerned about being drawn into the escalating US–China rivalry and becoming collateral damage in a broader great power contest. When asked the reasons for having a negative view of China, 67 percent of Koreans replied “China’s coercive retaliation about the THAAD radar batteries,” but only 12 percent responded “China’s military power.”
Korea’s military expenditures have dropped from 4 percent of GDP in 1990 to 2.5 percent in 2024, while spending on education has increased by 3 to 4.8 percent. And that military spending is still overwhelmingly focused on North Korea contingencies, not Chinese ones. For most South Koreans, the most immediate and enduring security threat that remains is North Korea.
To conclude, all South Korean presidents, liberal or conservative, have recognized the need to work with China. Korea cannot afford to distance itself; geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and strategic realities demand a modus vivendi.
As a democracy, South Korea’s foreign policy must also reflect public sentiment. Polling data suggests that, like their policymakers, South Korean citizens do not view China’s rise as inherently threatening. Instead, they see the intensifying US–China rivalry, especially when it involves economic pressure and technological decoupling, as a more immediate and multifaceted source of insecurity.
While South Korea seeks to diversify its economic relations, there is little doubt that China will remain a critical partner in trade, investment, and innovation.
About the Authors: Dr. Park Kyuri and David C Kang
Dr. Park Kyuri is a Security and Foreign Policy Postdoctoral Fellow at the Global Research Institute (GRI) and a faculty affiliate of the College of William & Mary Public Policy Program. She is completing a book manuscript, Connection Strategies of Asia-Pacific Secondary States: Security Cooperation and Network Power.
David C Kang is the Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations at USC. His latest book is Beyond Power Transitions: the Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of US-China Relations (Columbia University Press, 2024) co-authored with Xinru Ma.
Image Credit: Shutterstock/LegoCamera.
The National Interest · by Park Kyuri, David C. Kang · June 26, 2025
7. Global Peace Foundation's forum in Mongolia explores Korean unification, climate action
Global Peace Foundation's forum in Mongolia explores Korean unification, climate action
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/others/20250629/global-peace-foundations-forum-in-mongolia-explores-korean-unification-climate-action
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Participating experts pose during the "Mongolia Forum and Retreat: Northeast Asian Peaceful Development and Korean Unification" at Best Western Premier Tuushin Hotel in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, June 24. Courtesy of Global Peace Foundation
By Jhoo Dong-chan
- Published Jun 29, 2025 10:23 am KST
- Updated Jun 29, 2025 10:23 am KST
Experts discuss Korean Dream, development of Northeast Asia
ULAANBAATAR, Mongolia — Visions for unification of the two Koreas should go beyond questions of process and power to focus on a more aspirational goal: a united Korea that serves humanity as a whole.
Mongolia may hold a unique key in the process with its rare diplomatic ties to Pyongyang and a history of peaceful transition from communism to democracy, according to experts attending the “Mongolia Forum and Retreat: Northeast Asian Peaceful Development and Korean Unification.”
The Global Peace Foundation (GPF) hosted the international forum to discuss the development of Northeast Asia and potential peaceful unification of two Koreas at Best Western Premier Tuushin Hotel in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, on June 24. Blue Banner, One Korea Foundation, Global Peace Leadership Corps and Action for Korea United co-hosted the forum alongside the nongovernmental organization.
Some 30 renowned experts from 10 countries joined the annual event to discuss not only the current international situation and possible unification of the two Koreas but also Mongolia’s efforts in countering climate change. The forum is the sixth of its kind since its inception in 2018.
Action for Korea United Chairman Seo In-teck introduced the organization’s vision for unification, “the Korean Dream,” during his opening remarks.
"Past talks about unification mostly focused on 'how' to unify, like the steps or methods. But the Korean Dream is very different,” Seo said.
“The Korean Dream does not want one side to take over the other. We want to draw a picture of how a united Korean Peninsula can bring hope and help all of humanity. It is Hyun Jin Preston Moon’s long vision for a new and united nation.”
Moon is the founder and co-chairman of Action for Korea United. He also founded the GPF.
Former Mongolian Prime Minister Amarjargal Rinchinnyam pointed out his country’s challenge amid climate change during his welcome remark for the forum.
“We gather at a time when the global community is confronting an array of interlinked challenges — from climate change and biodiversity loss to the degradation of natural resources,” Rinchinnyam said. “Mongolia is particularly vulnerable to these changes, especially desertification. Therefore, I welcome the forum's recent emphasis on environmental resilience.”
Mongolia is scheduled to host the 17th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in August 2026.
The highlight of this year’s Mongolia Forum was the joint statement developed and signed by the participating scholars.
“(We) believe that a united Korean peninsula shall serve as an important pillar of the region’s stability and development in line with the notion of Hongik Ingan,” the statement reads. Hongik Ingan is the founding principle of Gojoseon, Korea’s first ancient kingdom, translated as "for the benefit of all humanity."
“The Korean Dream of unifying aspiration offers a transformative model for reconciliation, integration, freedom, human rights and peace-building in the region for sustainable development.”
Action for Korea United Chairman Seo In-teck speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at Best Western Premier Tuushin Hotel in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, June 24. Korea Times photo by Jhoo Dong-chan
Mongolia holds key to change North Korea
Seo pointed out that Mongolia is a strategically important country that can influence North Korean people for possible change.
“Mongolia was the country that communized itself right after the Soviet Union did around 1920. For this reason, it is even now one of the very few countries with a North Korean Embassy,” Seo said during an interview with The Korea Times.
“It also managed to peacefully transform itself as a democratic country. Mongolia’s change could carry significant implications for the North Korean people. Former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj’s remarks during his visit to Pyongyang is probably one such example.”
Elbegdorj, who is a frequent lecturer on democracy and human rights, said in his speech during his 2013 visit to Kim Il Sung University in North Korea that “no tyranny lasts forever.”
Due to his bold remarks at the heart of the oppressive regime, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un refused to meet the Mongolian president at the time.
Seo added it is time for South Korea to display its aspiration for a unified Korea.
“This year marks the 80th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from colonial rule under Imperial Japan. We then faced the division, but we have never shown our aspirations for unification in all these years,” Seo said.
“The GPF will organize the largest rally for peaceful unification on the coming Liberation Day in August. It is driven solely by civil society.”
The GPF said it will host the Korean Dream Hangang Grand Festival along the Han River on Aug. 15 under the theme “Beyond the Miracle on the Han River, to National Harmony and a Unified Korea.”
The festival is also an outcome of the establishment of the Korean Dream 10 Million Unification Campaign Organizing Committee in 2022.
Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Fellow David Maxwell speaks during the "Mongolia Forum and Retreat: Northeast Asian Peaceful Development and Korean Unification" at Best Western Premier Tuushin Hotel in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, June 24. Korea Times photo by Jhoo Dong-chan
Unification first, then denuclearization
Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Fellow David Maxwell said it is nearly impossible to achieve the peninsula’s denuclearization under the current geopolitical platform.
“The U.S. has failed to achieve denuclearization in North Korea for four decades, and a new approach is needed,” Maxwell told The Korea Times.
“There are four paths to unification: war, regime collapse, peaceful unification and regime transformation. We must prevent war, and prepare to mitigate the effects of regime collapse. The U.S., along with South Korea, should support regime transformation by the Korean people in the North as the optimal path to peaceful unification.”
The path includes emphasizing human rights in the North while actively engaging information and influence campaigns to educate North Korean people to foster environment for peaceful unification.
“This is a radical departure from the long-held belief that we must be single focused on the nuclear threat. Unification first, then denuclearization. The path to unification is through human rights,” the former Green Beret colonel added.
“Kim can change. Or, Kim can be changed by the Korean people in the North.”
Participants of the "Dream and Challenge: Mongolia Youth Leadership Forum and Adventure Workshop" pose at IC Park in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, June 23. Korea Times photo by Jhoo Dong-chan
Youth leadership forum
As the forum’s side event, the organizers also hosted the “Dream and Challenge: Mongolia Youth Leadership Forum and Adventure Workshop,” a leadership program for youth under the age of 25.
Against the backdrop of Mongolia’s vast plains and historic heritage, participants experienced the country’s traditional nomadic life while studying the 13th-century Mongol Empire and its founder Temujin Genghis Khan. Some 30 participants from 10 countries joined this year’s program.
The program started with a horseback riding lesson from traditional Mongolian horsemen on June 21.
“Mongolian horses are different,” a staff member said during the program’s introduction session at a local ger, or traditional yurt, in the Mongolian Plateau, about 90 kilometers northeast of the country’s capital city of Ulaanbaatar.
“They are smaller than European breeds, but they are more enduring and resilient, covering longer distances. After some basic drills with the horsemen, participants are expected to travel 38 kilometers along the Mongolian Plateau.”
The 38-kilometer horseback riding activity symbolizes the 38th parallel, a demarcation line that divides the two Koreas, the staff member added. The participants traveled the trail, which used to be part of the Silk Road network.
The workshop also included a tree planting event in Ulaanbaatar.
According to the staff, Mongolia has long suffered the desertification of its nomadic plains near the Gobi Desert. Countering the desertification, youth leaders participating in the workshop have been planting trees on the city’s outskirts for the past six years.
“The desertification causes a series of problems especially among Mongolian nomads who raise horses or goats,” the staff member added.
“We need to do something. This isn’t just Mongolian nomads’ problem. In time, climate change will cause catastrophic consequences to all of us.”
8. North Korea’s Nuclear Modernization: Assessment and Outlook
[South Korea’s Nuclear Options Under Trump 2.0 ③] North Korea’s Nuclear Modernization: Assessment and Outlook
- Special Report
- June 23, 2025
Editor’s Note
Professor Hanbyeol Sohn emphasizes that North Korea's declared “new course” is a strategic shift toward the actual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and the acquisition of the capability to conduct limited nuclear warfare, suggesting that Pyongyang is seeking a qualitative leap in military power and the institutionalization of an offensive nuclear doctrine. In response, Son suggests that South Korea should upgrade its integrated command, control, and surveillance (C4ISR) system, substantially enhance its extended deterrence capabilities, and establish an integrated deterrence strategy that encompasses non-military means.
■ See Korean Version on EAI Website
I. North Korea’s “New Line of Bolstering Up the Nuclear Force”
In early 2025, North Korea persistently reiterated its “new line of bolstering up the nuclear force.” Beginning with a statement by the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 17, 2025, Pyongyang escalated its criticism of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises at the outset of the year (KCNA Watch, 17 Jan 2025). Following remarks by Chairman Kim Jong Un, the regime repeatedly reaffirmed its intention to advance nuclear-force modernization. Because North Korea has long pursued enhanced nuclear capabilities, the declaration of a “new” line naturally raises questions about the nature and implications of this shift.
On February 8, during a visit to the Ministry of National Defense commemorating the 77th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army, Kim Jong Un reaffirmed that the nation would “rapidly” implement a series of new plans to bolster “all deterrence including nuclear forces.” He asserted that expanding ROK-U.S. joint drills and trilateral security cooperation with Japan, led by the United States, was fomenting military imbalance in Northeast Asia and “raising a grave challenge to the security environment of our state.” This statement thus signaled an intention to adopt military countermeasures (Reuters, 8 Feb 2025).
Later that month, after the USS Alexandria (SSN-757), a Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine, docked at Busan, North Korea’s Ministry of National Defense condemned the “dangerous hostile military act” that may “lead the acute military confrontation in the region around the Korean peninsula to an actual armed force conflict.” It contended that North Korean armed forces will “unhesitatingly exercise the legitimate right to punish the provokers.” (Reuters, 11 Feb 2025).
Following a joint statement on the “complete denuclearization of North Korea” issued at the ROK-U.S.-Japan foreign-ministers’ meeting in Munich, Pyongyang expressed “grave concern over the adventurist antics of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, which incite collective confrontation and conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.” It reiterated its resolve to uphold “the new line of strengthening nuclear forces declared by the head of state.” In addition, it proclaimed its intent to “continue seizing new opportunities to elevate strategic strength” and asserted that “in the structure of U.S.–DPRK confrontation, we will secure a far more advantageous position” (Seo 2025).
On 8 May, during an inspection of combined long-range artillery and missile-strike drills, Kim emphasized the need to “steadily perfect the normal combat readiness of the nuclear force.” Reports added that he underscored the necessity of “direct efforts to steadily improving the long-range precision striking capability and efficiency of weapons systems” (Reuters, 8 May 2025).
Although the precise content and method of implementation of this newly emphasized policy remain ambiguous, the initiative clearly stems from a strategic ambition to obtain superiority over both South Korea and the United States. While North Korea’s commitment to nuclear-force modernization is not new, the regime’s current intentions and trajectory merit reassessment, particularly in light of shifting global dynamics surrounding the war in Ukraine and renewed speculation about the prospects for DPRK-U.S. dialogue.
II. Historical Precedents of the “New Line”
Within North Korea’s political system, only Chairman Kim Jong Un holds the authority to proclaim a “new line.” Historically, Kim has issued such declarations multiple times, presenting them either as broad revisions of national strategy or as initiatives to advance nuclear capabilities. He frequently labels these shifts with descriptors such as “new” or “significant.” Rather than accompanying technological milestones, these announcements have tended to coincide with pivotal domestic or international political events. The following examples illustrate this pattern:
1-① March 2013: North Korea adopted the “byungjin line” as a new strategic directive (Scott 2013). In the early phase of Kim Jong Un’s rule, the regime faced intensifying international sanctions and pressure. Stabilizing the system and achieving economic growth were primary concerns. In April 2012, North Korea amended its constitution to enshrine its nuclear weapons state status, and in February 2013, it conducted its third nuclear test. Shortly thereafter, during a plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee, the leadership proposed and formally adopted a “new strategic line” focused on simultaneously advancing economic construction and nuclear armament.
1-② April 2018: A new strategic line was adopted that emphasized full commitment to socialist economic construction. This shift reflected favorable external developments, particularly the acceleration of inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK dialogue. During the third plenary meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the regime declared its intent to concentrate all efforts on economic development. This marked a departure from the byungjin line by shifting the policy emphasis toward economic growth (National Committee on North Korea 2018).
2-① March 2014: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that North Korea could consider “a new form of nuclear test” in response to the U.S.’s hostile policy (Reuters 03/30/2014). At the time, President Park Geun-hye had outlined a unification vision in the “Dresden Declaration,” which Pyongyang may have perceived as a regime threat. The regime likely intended to escalate military tensions and solidify internal unity through the specter of nuclear testing. Although an actual test did not occur until 2016, this period nonetheless witnessed a dramatic acceleration in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.
2-② January 2020: Chairman Kim directly announced plans to develop “a new strategic weapon.” In a plenary session of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim proclaimed, “The world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the near future.” This statement followed the collapse of the February 2019 Hanoi Summit and was seen as a move to bolster bargaining leverage and respond to the United States’ continued hostile stance. Later that year, in October, North Korea unveiled the Hwasong-16, a new ICBM, and the Pukkuksong-4, a new SLBM, substantiating Kim’s claim (Arms Control Association 2020).
III. What Are North Korea’s Intentions and Objectives?
First, Pyongyang underscores the indispensability of nuclear force in guaranteeing regime security. North Korea regards nuclear weapons as the linchpin of the Kim regime’s survival. The Hanoi Summit revealed Pyongyang’s acute awareness of the Libyan precedent, where choosing the path of denuclearization precipitated regime collapse (Larison 2019). The war in Ukraine likely reinforced this lesson, as Ukraine’s past denuclearization failed to deter invasion (Sohn 2023). While the United States sends mixed signals by referring to itself as a “nuclear power” and calling for North Korea’s “complete denuclearization,” the regime views nuclear arms as an irreplaceable strategic asset for its survival.
Second, Pyongyang seeks to use this strategic line to consolidate internal cohesion. Facing acute economic hardship and sustained international sanctions, the regime must reinforce domestic unity to ensure political durability. Given the uncertainty surrounding a potential second Trump administration and the prospect of renewed pressure on the North, Pyongyang is likely to emphasize self-reliance and external defiance. The regime’s long-standing ideological framing of itself as the “nuclear power of the East” and embodiment of “Juche Korea” suggests that a new strategic line is inherently tied to reinforcing internal solidarity (Howell 2020).
Third, this posture constitutes a response to strengthening trilateral security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan. As strategic competition between Washington and Beijing intensifies, U.S. efforts to deepen trilateral defense cooperation are expected to continue or even accelerate under the second Trump administration. North Korea interprets the increasingly intricate joint military exercises among U.S. allies in East Asia as an existential threat, and seeks to leverage its nuclear arsenal in response.
Fourth, Pyongyang aims to increase its bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Washington. Although North Korea is drawing closer to Russia, it has not fully foreclosed the possibility of dialogue with the United States. To strengthen its position on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang appears intent on pursuing a more revisionist trajectory. The evolving dynamic surrounding potential ceasefire talks in Ukraine, and the respective maneuvering of Washington and Moscow, likely fuels North Korea’s strategic anxiety (AP News 6/5/2025). By adopting a more aggressive and forward-leaning posture, North Korea seeks to shape favorable conditions for future negotiations with the United States.
By proclaiming a “new line” for bolstering deterrence, North Korea can achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. First, it signals a change in national development priorities, which includes a recalibration of focus across warhead production, delivery systems, and operational doctrines. Second, it delivers a strategic message to the international community. Third, it showcases Kim Jong Un’s role as an innovative leader directing national progress, thereby reinforcing the regime’s legitimacy and stability. Fourth, it demonstrates policy flexibility, indicating that Pyongyang is capable of strategic recalibration as circumstances evolve.
Strategic Weapon Objectives
Development Progress
Development of diverse tactical nuclear weapons and production of ultra-large warheads
• Standardisation of 5-15 kt Hwasan-31 warheads and integration with eight delivery systems
• Pursuit of fission warheads or thermonuclear devices exceeding 1 Mt; orders for mass production and signs of expanded nuclear-facility capacity
Improving accuracy for targets within 15,000 km
• Mass production and operational deployment of the Hwasong-15 ICBM
• Ongoing research on the liquid-fuel Hwasong-17 and solid-fuel Hwasong-18, aiming for MIRV configurations with thermonuclear payloads and reliable re-entry technology
Prototype production of hypersonic glide-vehicle warheads
Test launch of the Hwasong-16Na in April 2024; development of two hypersonic vehicles (maneuvering and glide types)
Development of solid-propellant ICBMs for sea- and land-based launch
Lofted-trajectory test launch of the Hwasong-18 in 2023; TEL/silo and SLBM compatibility with potential MIRV payloads
Acquisition of nuclear submarines and underwater-launched strategic nuclear weapons
• Launch of the Kim Kun-Ok-class Hero submarine in 2023
• Exploration of strategic roles for the Haeil unmanned underwater nuclear attack craft, with indications of future strategic submarines capable of carrying MIRV nuclear payloads
IV. What’s next?
1) Evaluation of the “Five-Year Strategic Weapons Development Objectives”
Since Pyongyang has yet to specify the content of its “new” nuclear force development line, it is first necessary to evaluate its existing one. During the Eighth Party Congress on January 8, 2021, North Korea unveiled five strategic weapons development objectives that provided a clear blueprint for its nuclear ambitions. As 2025 marks the target year of the objectives, available evidence suggests that the regime has achieved a significant portion of its goals.
2) North Korea’s Strategic Trajectory
North Korea has now enshrined its nuclear-weapons status in its constitution. Drawing on Vipin Narang’s typology, some analysts contend that Pyongyang pursues a composite posture that blends assured retaliation with asymmetric escalation (Ham 2021). As the nation’s capabilities advance, however, its strategic objectives and operational priorities appear to be shifting. Anticipating the regime’s “new nuclear strategic objectives” allows inference of the underlying goals for further force enhancement.
Several developments illuminate this evolution: △Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on completing wartime readiness △the diversification of delivery platforms △the public unveiling of the Hwasan-31 warhead and the Haeil unmanned systems (Types 1 and 2) △simulated tactical-nuclear drills that include aerial detonation tests △the construction of an integrated command-and-control “nuclear trigger” (Jo 2025). Together, these trends suggest three major strategic adjustments.
First, territorial unification through limited nuclear war. By keeping the option of tactical nuclear use on the table, Pyongyang hopes to escalate conflict on its own terms and secure victory in a constrained, manageable engagement (Kim Taehyun 2024). Although some observers have argued that the “two-hostile-states doctrine,” announced in late 2023, represents a turn toward a status-quo posture (Kwon 2024; Chung 2024; Lee 2024; Kang 2024), statements during the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, as well as the 2024 policy address, reaffirm that North Korea has not abandoned its offensive ambitions. Kim plainly stated that, when internal and external conditions permit, the regime will pursue complete reunification of the Korean Peninsula.
— Toward the United States(對美): Deter, delay, and obstruct U.S. intervention and reinforcement by threatening full nuclear escalation.
— Toward South Korea(對南): Seek decisive military success by targeting key sites with integrated nuclear and conventional strikes.
Second, the emergence of “nuclear-conventional integration warfare.” This concept is designed to offset conventional weaknesses and exploit perceived gaps in the ROK-U.S. alliance (Kim Taehyun 2025). While a 2013 law described nuclear weapons as tools for deterrence, retaliation, and repulsion, the 2022 legislation openly endorsed preemptive strikes and first use in crisis scenarios.
Integration warfare envisions △mixed missile salvos △concurrent nuclear and long-range-artillery attacks △nuclear operations that incorporate cyber and electronic warfare. Such tactics are intended to achieve decisive effects across every phase of conflict: outbreak, U.S. reinforcement, strategic reversal, territorial incursions, and regime-threatening contingencies.
Third, North Korea’s nuclear force expansion goal is likely to center on acquiring an arsenal exceeding 300 warheads. Should the regime move beyond a posture of deterrence and retaliation toward one that includes preemptive use, two core objectives will shape its force structure: △optimizing the ratio between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons △ensuring the operational capability required to execute mission objectives.
To deter U.S. military intervention and wartime reinforcement, Pyongyang is expected to pursue a nuclear dyad of approximately 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic nuclear submarines capable of striking the U.S. mainland and regional strategic hubs. While the reliability of these strategic systems remains uncertain, all five pillars of the strategic objectives released in 2021 are geared toward establishing precisely such credibility. It is therefore anticipated that by the end of 2025, North Korea will have achieved a substantial level of confidence in its strategic deterrent.
To secure military dominance over South Korea, the regime will likely aim to acquire around 200 tactical nuclear weapons, designed to target key military objectives such as command centers, airbases, ports, and other primary or contingency assets. Tactical nuclear systems based on the Scud series and the KN-23 (Iskander-type) are already assessed to be operational, and further deployment is expected for the Pukkuksong-1 and 2, smaller tactical SLBMs, the Haeil types 1 and 2, and the Hwasal cruise missile variants.
3) The “New Line”: Three Strategic Options
Pyongyang’s “new line of bolstering up the nuclear force” is likely to represent a progression toward limited nuclear warfare and the integration of nuclear and conventional operations. Rather than constituting a radical departure from existing policy, this new line appears to be a transitional phase following the completion of the current Five-Year Plan. In this context, three potential strategic options emerge as plausible trajectories for Pyongyang’s evolving nuclear posture.
1. Further Expansion of Strike Capabilities
This option centers on expanding the accomplishments of the current Five-Year Plan while addressing remaining technological deficiencies, with a focus on both the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of nuclear weapons. Key objectives would include the development and mass production of new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles, the large-scale manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons, and the expansion of the overall warhead inventory (Radio Free Asia, May 14, 2025). Despite North Korea’s limited foundational military capabilities, this option holds the advantage of maximizing asymmetric power through the augmentation of strike capabilities. However, it also faces a critical weakness in the persistent difficulty of establishing credible deterrence against the United States and South Korea.
2. Operational Completion of Nuclear Strike Capabilities
If North Korea considers itself to have secured existential deterrence through the Five-Year Plan, the logical next step would be to pursue operational completeness for conducting limited nuclear warfare on the Korean Peninsula. With the Hwasan-31 warhead already miniaturized, standardized, and being mass-produced, what is now required is the development of a comprehensive operational plan for the use of tactical nuclear weapons (Tertrais 2021). This would involve the following components: targeting, which encompasses detection, identification, decision-making, and execution; force planning, which aligns targets, weapon systems, delivery platforms, and operational timing; weapon systems, which include surveillance and reconnaissance assets, nuclear warheads, delivery platforms, and command-control-communication (NC3) infrastructure; and force posture, which refers to the deployment readiness and positioning of these systems. Each component must be effectively structured to ensure the full integration of tactical nuclear weapons into battlefield operations.
3. Strategic Nuclear Expansion as Leverage Against the United States
North Korea may also prioritize the expansion of strategic nuclear forces as a means of applying pressure in negotiations with the United States. Assuming that the regime already holds nuclear superiority on the Korean Peninsula, it could seek to enhance the credibility of its deterrent by securing reliable strike capabilities against the U.S. mainland through improvements to its ICBMs and SLBMs. Although the cost-benefit ratio of this approach is relatively low and existential deterrence is already assessed to be in place, North Korea may seek to leverage its deepening ties with Russia to achieve rapid technological advancement. Next-step targets under this option would likely include strategic nuclear submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and improved reentry technology for ICBMs.
Given North Korea’s current circumstances, among the three options outlined above, 2. “Operational Completion of Nuclear Strike Capabilities” appears to be the most viable course of action. The expansion of strike capabilities, while building upon the Five-Year Plan, lacks sufficient differentiation from existing frameworks and therefore offers limited utility in terms of consolidating domestic unity or conveying a distinct strategic message to external actors. Likewise, a concentrated focus on strategic nuclear forces raises concerns regarding feasibility, as it would likely entail a high degree of dependence on Russian technological support. From South Korea’s perspective, should North Korea succeed in achieving full operational readiness for the deployment and use of tactical nuclear weapons, a severe strategic imbalance would emerge on the Korean Peninsula.
V. Realizing Nuclear-Conventional Integration through the Reconnaissance-Strike Complex
Should North Korea pursue “operational completion” of its nuclear capabilities, it would likely succeed in maximizing its strategic advantages. This ambition holds significance not only at the strategic level, where it implies the possibility of preemptive nuclear strikes or multidimensional deterrence, but also at the operational level, where it would allow for a wide range of nuclear-conventional integration (CNI) combinations. These could include scenarios such as a preemptive nuclear strike followed by a conventional ground offensive, integration with asymmetric capabilities such as cyber or special operations forces, or the parallel pursuit of coercive diplomacy under the shadow of nuclear threat.
If Pyongyang does indeed intend to achieve operational completeness for the execution of nuclear-conventional integration warfare, what specific capabilities will it seek to acquire? From North Korea’s strategic vantage point, the pursuit of comprehensive superiority across all operational domains remains an unattainable objective. Consequently, the regime is expected to concentrate its efforts on finely tuned, precision-oriented strike capabilities. This focus on achieving operational completeness in nuclear strike execution appears conceptually aligned with the Russian military doctrine of the Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (разведывательно-ударный комплекс, RYK) (Lester and Bartles 2018).
The Russian version of this concept refers to real-time strategic strikes against high-value targets. In contrast, North Korea, whose conventional and intelligence-gathering capabilities remain profoundly inferior, would adapt the model to a simplified operational structure that links real-time target information with strike assets. This system would connect data collection, precision strike mechanisms, fire control centers, and tactical missile forces to deliver strikes on selected targets. It may also be integrated with long-range precision-guided munitions, including missiles and aircraft-mounted smart weapons.
North Korea is therefore likely to pursue the active development of its own version of a reconnaissance-strike complex in parallel with its nuclear-conventional integration strategy. While it currently lacks the advanced weapons systems that support the Russian model, Pyongyang may attempt to compensate for these deficiencies through technological cooperation with Moscow, focusing particularly on enhancing interoperability across functional domains. This can be seen as an effort to preserve relative superiority by maximizing asymmetry through offensive nuclear strategy, while simultaneously minimizing its vulnerabilities in strategic intelligence and warfighting sustainability.
Drawing on the Russian case, five core capabilities can be abstracted as essential for implementing such a system: △surveillance and reconnaissance △information processing and analysis △strike assets △logistics support △command, control, and communications. As illustrated in [Figure 1], North Korea has thus far concentrated its efforts on expanding its strike assets, particularly nuclear warheads. With the exception of the most advanced technologies necessary for conducting direct strikes on the U.S. mainland, Pyongyang is assessed to have already secured a credible nuclear strike capability at the regional level.
[Figure 1]
However, as Kim Jong Un has stated, in order for nuclear force to function as part of a limited nuclear warfighting capability, it must possess not only destructive power but also precision and flexibility. From North Korea’s perspective, this necessitates △the development of advanced surveillance and intelligence-processing systems to enable effective targeting △the establishment of a reliable command and control architecture △the enhancement of resilient logistical support. Accordingly, it is evident that Pyongyang will prioritize the reinforcement of these relatively underdeveloped domains in its pursuit of a more balanced and integrated strategic capability.
Aligned with this trajectory, the next phase of North Korea’s effort to complete its reconnaissance-strike complex is likely to encompass the development of several key capabilities and weapons systems. In the domain of surveillance and reconnaissance, the regime is expected to invest in unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance satellites, ground surveillance radar, and signals intelligence platforms. For information processing and analysis, priority will likely be given to the advancement of data analytics systems and automated battlefield target identification technologies. In the area of strike assets, where North Korea already demonstrates relatively advanced capabilities, further development is anticipated in multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), reentry vehicle technologies, precision-guided munitions, and hypersonic missile systems. On the logistical front, the regime is expected to expand its inventory of mobile ammunition and fuel supply vehicles and to increase the deployment of transporter-erector-launchers. In terms of command and control, enhancements are likely to focus on mobile command centers, high-frequency and satellite communications infrastructure, and the development of more sophisticated cyber warfare capabilities (Smith and Bernstein 2022).
VI. South Korea’s Strategic Imperatives
North Korea’s 2025 promulgation of a “new line” of fortifying its nuclear forces may not be concretely articulated in the immediate term. Nevertheless, given the persistent nuclear threat posed by Pyongyang, it is imperative for Seoul to carefully examine the evolving priorities and objectives of the regime. Understanding the direction of these changes is particularly critical for assessing the state of strategic balance and deterrence between the two Koreas. Should North Korea shift from a focus solely on enhancing strike capabilities to addressing the operational vulnerabilities that constrain actual use, the regime would be departing from a path of positive nuclear learning and returning to the pursuit of offensive aims (Sohn 2023). In this context, South Korea must take deliberate steps to address its own strategic vulnerabilities and secure advantage within the emerging competitive landscape.
First, South Korea must secure strategic flexibility that transcends the debate over indigenous nuclear armament. While some advocate for the development of a domestic nuclear arsenal, such a path would entail significant costs in both practical effectiveness and normative legitimacy. Instead, Seoul should strategically leverage its advanced conventional capabilities and alliance-based extended deterrence framework to demonstrate normative leadership as a state capable of deterring nuclear threats without possessing nuclear weapons. This approach represents a strategic choice that simultaneously advances tangible security and international legitimacy, while also laying the foundation for the long-term sustainability of South Korea’s national security strategy.
Second, Seoul must construct a proactive defense architecture that reflects ongoing technological advancements. As North Korea reorganizes its military around the objective of operational completeness in nuclear warfare, encompassing preemption, retaliation, command and control, and logistical support, it is imperative for Seoul to move beyond the incremental enhancement of individual platforms and prioritize the establishment of an integrated force structure. This requires not only the effective linkage of reconnaissance assets such as UAVs, satellites, and electronic warfare systems with long-range precision strike capabilities, but also the simultaneous fusion of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The resulting framework should not be construed as a narrow preemptive strike capability, but rather as a comprehensive, real-time response system capable of supporting sustained deterrence and defense operations.
Third, the ROK-U.S. joint nuclear planning and operational framework must be significantly strengthened. In response to the operational deployment of North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons, the institutionalization of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) is essential for advancing a fully developed system of joint planning and operations. This effort must move beyond basic information sharing to realize a three-stage structure comprising joint planning, joint decision making, and joint execution. Such a framework can be formalized through revisions to existing combined operational plans and further evolution of the tailored deterrence strategy. In particular, under the concept of nuclear-conventional integration, the restructuring of the allied command architecture must proceed in tandem with the integration of South Korea’s Three-Axis System (Sohn 2025).
Fourth, South Korea must establish an integrated operational strategy that unifies its diplomatic, military, and unification policy instruments. As North Korea leverages its nuclear capabilities not only as a tool of military deterrence but also as diplomatic leverage, Seoul is compelled to move beyond fragmented military responses and construct a comprehensive strategic framework. The sustainability and political effectiveness of sanctions, the strategic utility of policy tools, and their interplay with military deterrence all necessitate the simultaneous employment of multifaceted deterrence options. These include measures across the domains of intelligence, cyber operations, diplomacy, and economic pressure. This approach represents an expanded form of integrated deterrence, requiring the structuring of complementarities and feedback loops among all instruments of national power.
Fifth, South Korea must recalibrate its multilateral security cooperation framework. The emerging alignment among Russia, North Korea, and China is reshaping the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia by constructing a new bloc structure. In response, Seoul should not only reinforce the existing trilateral security partnership with the United States and Japan, but also broaden strategic linkages with NATO, Australia, the Philippines, and other middle-power states to build a multilayered deterrence network. This network would serve as a foundation for integrating military and non-military tools alike, and would be essential to realizing the concept of network-based extended deterrence. By assuming the role of a planner in the formation of such coalitions, South Korea can enhance both its strategic influence on the global stage and the credibility of its deterrent posture. ■
References
Asan Institute for Policy Studies. 2022. “South Koreans and Their Neighbors (In Korean).” June 8. https://www.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreans-and-their-neighbors-2022/.
International Energy Agency (IEA). 2022. Nuclear Power and Secure Energy Transitions. June. https://www.iea.org/reports/nuclear-power-and-secure-energy-transitions.
Yoon, Suk-yeol. 2023. “President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Speech at Harvard University (In Korean).” Office of the President of the Republic of Korea. April 28. https://www.president.go.kr/president/speeches/UWTpwQnG.
■ Hanbyeol SOHN is Professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at Korea National Defense University (KNDU).
■ Translated and edited by Chaerin KIMResearch Assistant
For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr
9. Japan’s new hypersonic missile aims at China's navy, NoKo nukes
Is Japan stepping up? This seems like an important development.
Conclusion:
Japan’s rollout of hypersonic strike weapons marks a significant moment in Northeast Asian security. While they offer a powerful conventional deterrent against China’s carrier strike groups and North Korea’s dispersed nuclear forces, they also heighten the risk of arms racing, strategic miscalculation, and regional instability.
Japan’s new hypersonic missile aims at China's navy, NoKo nukes - Asia Times
New ground-based HVGP puts China’s carriers and North Korea’s nukes in range but risks sparking wider regional instability
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · June 27, 2025
Japan has unveiled a mobile hypersonic missile system designed to outmaneuver China’s layered carrier defenses and threaten North Korea’s survivable nuclear arsenal, marking a decisive shift from a purely defensive posture to a counterstrike capability.
This month, Asian Military Review reported that at Fuji Firepower 2025, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) unveiled the ground-launched Hyper Velocity Guided Projectile (HVGP), a mobile hypersonic strike missile system developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under contract from Japan’s Advanced Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA).
The HVGP program, launched in 2018, marked its first successful test firing in early 2024 at a US range. Its operational deployment has been advanced to 2026. The Block 1 HVGP, mounted on an 8×8 tactical truck with two containerized, solid-fuel boost-glide missiles, has a range of 500–900 km and reaches Mach 5.
Upgraded variants, Block 2A and 2B, are planned for 2027 and 2030, with their ranges extended to 2,000 kilometers and 3,000 kilometers, respectively. The HVGP employs satellite and inertial navigation, with a naval-targeting variant using RF imaging derived from Doppler shift and a land-attack version deploying explosively formed projectiles. Both are designed for high-speed maneuvering post-boost.
Planned deployments in Kyushu and Hokkaido underscore its strategic intent to counter regional threats. Concurrently, Japan is also developing the scramjet-powered Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCV) to extend strike capabilities further. These systems are at the core of Japan’s revised defense strategy, which aims to safeguard its territorial integrity amid increasing regional security pressures.
Previously, Asia Times reported that Japan announced four hypersonic missile tests conducted in California between August 2024 and January 2025. These systems are envisioned for strategic interdiction, counterforce, and even counter-leadership operations.
In line with developing strategic interdiction capabilities, Japan has recently conducted the first domestic test firing of its short-range Type 88 anti-ship missile and plans to develop the long-range Type 12.
However, James Conway and Jerry McAbee mention in a March 2024 RealClearDefense article that by 2030, subsonic cruise missiles and supersonic ballistic missiles may become obsolete against the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Japan’s current arsenal of subsonic cruise and ballistic missiles faces significant limitations: subsonic cruise missiles allow a longer intercept window despite their maneuverability, while ballistic missiles, though fast, follow predictable arcs that are easier to track. These constraints justify Japan’s shift toward maneuverable hypersonic systems, such as the HVGP.
Underscoring this point, Daniel Rice’s December 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) highlights that the PLAN carrier strategy is built around a three-layer defense system, enabling increasingly autonomous and far-reaching blue-water operations.
Rice explains that the carrier battlegroup’s defenses are arranged in concentric zones: the “Outer Defense Zone” (185–400 kilometers), maintained by submarines and J-15 fighters for long-range strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); the “Middle Defense Zone” (45–185 kilometers), secured by destroyers and frigates equipped with radar, vertical launch systems (VLS), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities; and the “Inner Defense Zone” (100 meters–45 kilometers), protected by close-in weapons and point-defense systems.
Aside from strategic interdiction, Japan’s hypersonic weapons may be poised to play a critical role in its counterstrike capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
In a March 2024 article for the United States Studies Center (USSC), Masashi Murano notes that Japan’s counterstrike capability focuses on long-range, conventional counterforce strikes against military assets, such as missile bases, rather than leadership or cities. To that end, Murano mentions that Japan is acquiring Tomahawk cruise missiles, improved Type 12 missiles, and hypersonic missiles.
However, Murano cautions that Japan still faces deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to hit time-sensitive targets such as transporter erector launchers (TEL), its counterstrike doctrine is still a work in progress, and the risks of escalation remain major issues it should tackle in building its counterstrike capabilities.
In addition, North Korea has taken several measures to harden its nuclear arsenal against a pre-emptive counterforce strike.
Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a July 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that North Korea is actively pursuing solid-fuel rocket intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-based platforms such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and tactical nuclear weapons, which together enhance survivability by making its arsenal more mobile, concealable, and less reliant on vulnerable fixed launch sites.
Kristensen and others note that North Korea’s deeply buried enrichment sites, continued fissile production, and development of tactical warheads all point to a doctrine that embraces redundancy and dispersion, hallmarks of a survivable deterrent.
Given that sanctions and threats of military action have failed to dissuade the North Korean regime from continuing its nuclear program and stopping its belligerent behavior, some strategists argue that targeting the regime itself might compel behavioral change.
In an April 2023 NK News commentary, Bruce Bennett notes that the Kim regime’s prioritization of military buildup over basic human needs, along with exhortations to the North Korean public to sacrifice for the country’s defense, reflects deep anxiety over regime survival and control.
Bennett observes that deployments like MQ-9 Reaper drones in Japan, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from B-52s flying over the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s new hypersonic systems may concern the Kim regime over its survival.
Yet, as Lauren Sukin points out in a February 2024 article for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), North Korea’s nuclear policy calls for automatic nuclear retaliation should its command and control system, including Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, be attacked.
Sukin adds that the US, and by extension, its allies, forcing regime change on North Korea could end, at best, in an even more anti-US regime than that headed by Kim Jong Un. At worst, she says such attempts could result in regional instability or North Korea using chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Japan’s rollout of hypersonic strike weapons marks a significant moment in Northeast Asian security. While they offer a powerful conventional deterrent against China’s carrier strike groups and North Korea’s dispersed nuclear forces, they also heighten the risk of arms racing, strategic miscalculation, and regional instability.
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · June 27, 2025
10. US overture meets Pyongyang's defiant rhetoric
Kim is asking, what's in it for me? And if he does get something just to talk he will assess his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy as successful.
US overture meets Pyongyang's defiant rhetoric
Trump says he's ready to "work it out"; North Korea presses anti-Western messaging
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/06/29/KUYMPNDT55F5LKDOIKM7QDQUHE/
By Kim Kyeong-pil,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.06.29. 10:51
Updated 2025.06.29. 11:25
A North Korean soldier is seen in tears as leader Kim Jong-un attends a completion ceremony for the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Area, in footage aired by Korean Central Television on June 26, 2025./Korean Central TV
U.S. President Donald J. Trump has voiced interest in resuming dialogue with North Korea, but Pyongyang has responded with a familiar volley of defiant rhetoric, branding the United States a “hostile force” and accusing Washington of engaging in “bandit-like” behavior.
On June 27, Trump told reporters at the White House that he had maintained a “really great” relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and expressed optimism about easing tensions. “Somebody’s saying there’s a potential conflict — I think we’ll work it out,” he said, though he stopped short of confirming reports that he had sent Kim a personal letter.
But just two days later, North Korea’s ruling party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, issued a series of editorials lambasting the United States and its allies. In an article commemorating what it called “the glorious 80-year revolutionary leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” the paper accused “hostile forces” of waging an unprecedented campaign of sanctions over the past decade, aimed at forcing the country to abandon its path of self-reliance.
The piece continued: “Even as the enemies raved about aggressive war maneuvers and tightened their sanctions to strangle us, and even when they showed signs of ‘relaxation’ out of fear of our military might, we never once let go of the banner of self-reliance.”
A separate commentary, titled “Establishing a Fair International Order Is an Urgent Requirement for Peace,” placed blame for global instability squarely on Washington and its Western allies. “The armed conflicts unfolding in Europe, the Middle East, and other regions stem from the predatory violations of sovereignty by the United States and Western countries,” the paper said.
It warned that relying on “appeals or begging” to defend sovereignty was a delusion in today’s world, and argued that “only by building strong power to protect national sovereignty and security from imperialist coercion and tyranny” could a just and peaceful international order be achieved.
The commentary offered no direct response to Trump’s overtures but underscored the persistent chill in U.S.–North Korea relations. Since the breakdown of denuclearization talks in 2019, Pyongyang has distanced itself from Washington and drawn closer to Moscow, especially in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The North has shown little sign of reengaging in talks, even as Trump has hinted at reviving the summit-driven diplomacy that once defined his first term.
11. Korea's defense industry makes room for women
Korea's defense industry makes room for women
As female engineers enter the ranks, defense firms overhaul outdated infrastructure and expand family-friendly policies
https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2025/06/29/OF7FZRX2OZDR5HKYNTQB7IWGXY/
By Kim Ji-hwan,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.06.29. 09:59
In a sector long dominated by men, South Korea’s defense industry is taking deliberate steps to attract more women—rolling out a host of family-friendly policies, including expanded parental leave and generous childbirth incentives. Once so overwhelmingly male that some factories lacked women’s restrooms, defense contractors are now seeing a steady increase in female hires—mirroring broader shifts in STEM education and workforce demographics.
A Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) production line for FA-50 fighter jets in Sacheon, South Gyeongsang Province./KAI
Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), the country’s sole aircraft manufacturer, hired women for nearly half—48%—of its research positions during the first round of 2025 recruitment. Of the 52 new researchers hired, 25 were women. The company plans to bring on around 130 new employees this year, indicating that the share of women in its workforce is likely to grow further.
KAI’s number of female employees rose from 355 in 2021 (7.5% of total staff) to 421 in 2024 (8.2%). Until 2020, the company’s main factory in Sacheon, South Gyeongsang Province, lacked a women’s restroom on the first floor—female engineers had to climb a flight of stairs just to use the bathroom.
Since then, the company has worked to modernize both its infrastructure and benefits. It now offers subsidies for maternity care, spousal medical costs, and fertility treatments. The childbirth incentive has also been expanded: previously capped at 10 million won ($7,200) for the first two children, it now rises to 30 million won ($21,600) for a third. Other programs include flexible working hours, reduced schedules for pregnancy and child-rearing, on-site daycare, lactation rooms, and a gender equality counseling center.
“We began reforming our internal policies in 2019,” a KAI official said. “The company was historically built around male employees, and many facilities or programs were lacking. But we are working to become a more family-friendly workplace.”
LIG Nex1, a leading defense electronics manufacturer, has also made notable strides. As of the end of Q1 2025, women made up 13% of its workforce, or 655 employees—nearly double the 335 reported in 2021. That is the highest female representation among South Korea’s major defense firms. Since 2017, LIG Nex1 has been certified by the government as a “family-friendly company.” It offers flexible 40-hour workweeks and reduced hours for employees during pregnancy and early parenting—and says it plans to expand such programs.
Demographic trends suggest the gender balance in the defense sector will continue to shift. According to a 2024 report from the Ministry of Science and ICT, women made up 23.7% of students in engineering programs in 2023—up from just 18.6% in 2014. Major corporations have also been gradually increasing their intake of female engineers through open recruitment.
Still, women remain underrepresented in defense compared to other industries. Experts say the specialized nature of defense work—where technical expertise and security clearances are built over years—makes sustained support critical.
“It’s not an area where skills can be acquired overnight,” said one industry official. “If companies want to attract and retain top talent, they’ll need to invest in longer-term infrastructure and support systems—especially for women.”
12. Hyundai, Kia claim 11 pct U.S. market share in Jan.-May
And I would guess that every one of these cars is made int he USA and bult by American workers.
Hyundai, Kia claim 11 pct U.S. market share in Jan.-May | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · June 29, 2025
SEOUL, June 29 (Yonhap) -- Hyundai Motor Co. and its smaller affiliate Kia Corp. claimed a combined 11 percent share of the U.S. auto market in the January-May period despite import tariffs, a U.S. market tracker said Sunday.
The two carmakers posted combined sales of 752,778 units in the first five months of the year, accounting for 11 percent of the U.S. market, according to U.S. Wards Intelligence.
The figure marks a 0.5 percentage-point increase from the 10.5 percent market share they recorded in the same period last year.
Hyundai accounted for 5.8 percent with 400,116 units sold, while Kia took up 5.2 percent with 352,662 units.
"The carmakers secured an ample supply of vehicles as part of efforts to minimize the impact of U.S. import tariffs, resulting in the record market share," an industry official said.
He added that the increased number of gasoline hybrid models in their lineups also helped boost market share in one of the world's most significant automobile markets.
Global demand for gasoline hybrid models is rising amid a slowdown in electric vehicle (EV) sales.
However, the companies remain cautious, as they may have to raise vehicle prices to reflect the 25 percent auto tariffs that took effect on April 3.
On top of the existing tariffs, U.S. President Donald Trump has said he might further increase auto tariffs "in the not-too-distant future" to defend American autoworkers.
Automobiles await shipment at a port in Pyeongtaek, about 65 kilometers south of Seoul, on June 13, 2025. (Yonhap)
kyongae.choi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · June 29, 2025
13. Russian culture minister visits N. Korea amid deepening ties
Russian culture minister visits N. Korea amid deepening ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · June 29, 2025
SEOUL, June 29 (Yonhap) -- Russia's Culture Minister Olga Lyubimova has visited North Korea to mark the first anniversary of the two countries' comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, the North's state media reported Sunday.
A Russian culture ministry delegation led by Lyubimova arrived in Pyongyang on Saturday at the invitation of the North's culture ministry to commemorate the treaty's anniversary, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The two countries signed the bilateral treaty, which includes a mutual defense clause, on June 19 last year during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Pyongyang for summit talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
Ahead of Lyubimova's visit, performers from the Pyatnitsky Choir and the Gzhel Moscow National Academic Theatre of Dance also arrived in Pyongyang.
While the KCNA did not mention any scheduled performances, they are expected to take part in celebratory and cultural exchange events.
The Pyatnitsky Choir is known for being invited to perform in the North's cultural festivals held around the time of the birth anniversary of its late founder Kim Il-sung on April 15.
The two countries have deepened ties since the signing of the treaty, with Pyongyang dispatching thousands of troops to Russia to fight in Moscow's war against Ukraine.
Russia's Culture Minister Olga Lyubimova (L) arrives in Pyongyang on June 28, 2025, in this photo released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · June 29, 2025
14. Seoul hosts 1st remembrance ceremony for Korean War abductees, vows to address humanitarian issues
Seoul hosts 1st remembrance ceremony for Korean War abductees, vows to address humanitarian issues | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · June 28, 2025
SEOUL, June 28 (Yonhap) -- The government on Saturday held its first official memorial ceremony for those abducted by North Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War, reaffirming its commitment to resolving long-standing humanitarian issues stemming from the country's division.
The inaugural Korean War Abductees Remembrance Day event was held at Imjingak Peace Park in the border city of Paju, north of Seoul. It marked the first official observance of Korean War Abductees Remembrance Day, which was designated by law last year to be held annually on June 28.
"Resolving humanitarian issues caused by the division of the Korean Peninsula is a fundamental duty of the state and a top priority," Vice Unification Minister Kim Nam-jung said during a speech at the event.
Kim described the issue of wartime abductions as "one of the darkest legacies of division and war," stressing that any future-oriented approach to inter-Korean peace and coexistence must also include efforts to heal past wounds.
Vice Unification Minister Kim Nam-jung delivers a speech at the inaugural Korean War Abductees Remembrance Day event held at Imjingak Peace Park in the border city of Paju, north of Seoul, on June 28, 2025. (Yonhap)
"We can no longer delay the urgent task of confirming the fate of abducted loved ones and easing the pain carried by their families," Kim said.
He added that the unification ministry under the new Lee Jae Myung administration will do its utmost to reduce military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and establish sustainable peace, ensuring that the tragedy of war is never repeated.
"We will address the problems born out of national division and war one by one by reopening channels of communication with the North and work to resume dialogue," Kim said. "In moving from confrontation to reconciliation, we will make efforts to heal the pain of national division and suffering of families of wartime abductees."
The Seoul government estimates that nearly 100,000 South Koreans have been kidnapped by the North since the war.
Vice Unification Minister Kim Nam-jung (L) pays tribute to South Koreans abducted by North Korea at the inaugural Korean War Abductees Remembrance Day event held at Imjingak Peace Park in the border city of Paju, north of Seoul, on June 28, 2025. (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · June 28, 2025
15. One month on, what are Lee Jae Myung's top policy priorities?
One month on, what are Lee Jae Myung's top policy priorities?
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 29, 2025
President Lee Jae Myung (third from left) shakes hands with lawmakers following his speech to the National Assembly on Thursday. Lee Sang-sub/The Korea Herald
Less than a month into the Lee Jae Myung administration, several of his key policy priorities are starting to take shape.
Below is a breakdown of top policy moves based on the announcements from the presidential State Affairs Planning Committee, tasked with coming up with a blueprint for how Lee will run the country for the next five years, and the ruling Democratic Party of Korea.
Prosecution overhaul
As a candidate, Lee had pledged to take away the public prosecution service's investigative functions entirely.
Shortly after Lee took office, the Democratic Party announced sweeping bills that would abolish the prosecution service and set up new bodies instead.
Under the bills, prosecutors would completely lose their authority to investigate, including any supplementary role in police investigations. Prosecutors would only decide whether or not to indict the accused, based on the results of an investigation they did not conduct.
This raises concerns that gaps in police investigations, which would have been revisited by prosecutors under the existing system, could be left open. It would also no longer be the prosecution's job to ensure an investigation is properly executed.
Until now, prosecutors have handled white-collar crimes involving powerful people, while the police have taken charge of "street crime."
According to the rival People Power Party, the Democratic Party's push to significantly slash the prosecution's role in the criminal justice process is motivated by the criminal charges against the president as well as the allegations surrounding his close aides.
Cash handouts
The Lee administration has proposed a supplementary budget totaling some 13.2 trillion won for cash handouts to all South Koreans. Each person would get up to 520,000 won in the form of digital vouchers under the proposal. This is intended to encourage spending and stimulate the economy, according to the Democratic Party.
On top of the direct cash aid, small businesses will be eligible for the cancelation of up to 50 million won per business in outstanding and defaulted loans. The Democratic Party says debts accumulated during national crises such as COVID-19 and the "insurrection" -- referring to former President Yoon Suk Yeol's controversial martial law decree that lasted six hours -- should be the government's responsibility.
The People Power Party says these stimulus measures only promote moral hazard and raise inflation concerns. "What kind of message does it send to people who have worked hard to pay back their loans themselves?" said Rep. Park Soo-young, a People Power Party member on the parliamentary finance committee.
Shift to renewable energy
A shift in emphasis away from nuclear power as an energy source and toward renewables was one of Lee's main policy pledges.
In the supplementary budget proposal, some 120 billion won has been set aside for renewable energy such as solar and wind. Key renewable energy clusters in the country are located in the Jeolla provinces, which are traditional Democratic Party strongholds. One policy challenge is how to build a system that will transport power generated in these southern provinces to Seoul and rest of the country.
This marks a reversal of the focus on nuclear power under the previous Yoon administration.
AI race
One of the most frequent key phrases in announcements by the Lee administration has been artificial intelligence.
Last week, Lee recruited two AI experts from the country's largest tech companies -- Ha Jung-woo from portal site Naver's AI innovation team as his chief aide for AI policies, and Bae Kyung-hoon of LG's AI research as minister of science and technology.
Lee pledged to make South Korea the world's top AI power, vowing to invest some 100 trillion won into the sector.
arin@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 29, 2025
16. Will AI Make South Korean Democracy Stronger?
Will AI Make South Korean Democracy Stronger?
nationalinterest.org
Will AI Make South Korean Democracy Stronger? - The National Interest
South Korea’s new leadership sees AI as a tech upgrade and a catalyst to redefine work, governance, and national purpose grounded in ethics, human dignity, and strategic sovereignty.
South Korea stands at the cusp of a transformation. It is not merely a digital one but something deeper and more consequential: the redefinition of work, governance, and national purpose in the age of AI. With the election of President Lee Jae-myung and a historic parliamentary majority behind the Democratic Party, the incoming administration has a rare and fleeting window to set the tone for Korea’s future, not just as a fast follower but as a first mover in the global AI race.
But first, we must answer a more elemental question: What role should AI play, not just in the economy but also in the democracy and public institutions, and how does one define the value of human work?
South Korea’s Employment Future Depends on AI
When Shopify’s CEO Tobi Lütke declared that “no new job can be posted unless AI has tried it first,” it felt like a line in the sand. Far from a cost-cutting gimmick, this was a philosophical wager: AI isn’t here just to replace jobs but to interrogate them.
Why does this role exist? What value does it create? If AI can do it, should it be done at all?
This provocation, imported from Silicon Valley, forces us to rethink the very scaffolding of labor. Are we building organizations on purposeful, creative, high-leverage work, or are we still shoring up bureaucratic redundancies?
In South Korea, a nation with one of the highest automation rates in the world and a rapidly aging population, these questions are not abstract. They are urgent. But rather than treating AI as a threat to jobs, we should see it as a magnifying lens, amplifying human excellence where it matters most, and casting light on the work that perhaps should never have existed.
AI Will Improve South Korea’s Job Market
Let’s be clear. AI can accelerate processes, summarize meetings, scrape massive datasets, and draft first-draft legislation, and it does not make a judgment.
It cannot sense the moral edge cases. It cannot feel the political winds shift. It cannot see around the corner. In public affairs, government relations, and policy making where timing, tact, and context are everything, AI alone cannot carry the weight.
This is especially true in Korea, where policymaking is often less a matter of process and more of choreography. Relationships, narrative, and national values guide the agenda, far more than data dashboards ever could. In such an environment, AI becomes not the final word but a mighty co-pilot. It is the assistant, not the strategist. It can sketch the map, but not choose the destination.
What Can AI Do to Improve South Korea?
We live in a time of exponential information and exponential confusion. In this world, the value of discernment, of being able to interpret noise, navigate ambiguity, and sense what matters, has never been higher.
AI can monitor legislation, track stakeholder sentiment, and run predictive analytics. However, someone must still understand the political culture and its unspoken taboos, interpret policy shifts’ legal and diplomatic nuances, build coalitions behind the scenes, make ethical decisions when the algorithm shrugs, and be accountable when the bet goes wrong.
This is the work of real public affairs, of authentic policy craftsmanship. And it cannot be outsourced to GPT-40 or GPT-4.
To be fair, AI is already transforming how we practice public affairs. Predictive analytics flags legislative risks before they become headlines. Stakeholder mapping tools could even identify the hidden influencers behind major policy moves. AI-generated messaging offers quick-fire draft speeches or social copy for ministers and officials. Sentiment analysis tools track shifting public moods across media platforms in real time.
But here’s the catch. None of these tools can explain why a policy was introduced, what the opposition plans behind closed doors, or how to shift the Overton window. That requires human presence, trust, and intuition, the oldest and most irreplaceable assets in public and government affairs.
Korea Must Decide If It Will Embrace AI or Not
The 2024 general election gave President Lee Jae-myung something no Korean president has had in decades: breathing room.
With a commanding majority in the National Assembly, there’s now a genuine chance to craft long-term, ambitious policy, not just the short-term firefighting that’s plagued past administrations.
This is the moment to launch a national AI strategy that isn’t just about industrial policy or R and D budgets, but about national identity. Korea must ask: Who do we want to be in the AI age? A supplier of semiconductors to the world’s AI powers? Or a sovereign architect of digital norms, ethics, and democratic innovation?
To seize this opportunity, the Lee administration should ground its AI vision in human dignity, democratic resilience, and strategic clarity.
That means: First, embedding AI ethics into public governance. Like America’s Executive Order on AI and the EU’s AI Act, Korea should lead in building regulatory guardrails, not as a constraint on innovation but as its foundation. Transparency, auditability, and explainability should be mandated for all public-sector AI applications.
Second, a serious investment must be made in the AI transition layer and human-AI augmentation. Korea’s future jobs will not be AI-proof; they will be AI-powered. We need a workforce that can interpret, audit, and creatively leverage AI, not just code it. Government-backed reskilling programs should focus on hybrid roles that combine policy acumen with AI fluency.
Third, we need to rethink or reframe public policy and advocacy as a future-proof profession. Government affairs are often maligned as opaque or transactional, but in the age of AI, they may become one of the last bastions of uniquely human judgment. Korea’s public affairs sector should be strengthened, not sidelined, in the name of automation.
Lastly, the new administration needs to start building sectoral AI blueprints. Korea should develop sector-specific AI transition plans that balance innovation with equity from agriculture to education to healthcare. These blueprints should be crafted with civil society, industry, and international partners, not behind closed doors.
AI Will Strengthen South Korea’s Democracy
Today, tech companies wield enormous influence over data, algorithms, and even access to lawmakers. That asymmetry is unsustainable. If left unchecked, we risk drifting into an AI oligarchy, where governance is driven by the few, for the few, under the guise of innovation.
Korea has a different path to chart. With its digital infrastructure, high-speed networks, and globally admired public service institutions, it can show how democratic innovation can outpace both authoritarian tech centralism and laissez-faire techno-nihilism.
But doing so requires boldness. It requires a public-private ethos that is neither anti-tech nor blindly pro-tech but strategically sovereign. One that says yes to AI, but on our terms. One that acknowledges AI’s immense utility while doubling down on the irreplaceable value of human vision.
Public policy is not just about passing laws. It’s about setting norms, aligning incentives, and telling a shared story about who we are becoming. As the future of work reshapes every industry, Korea’s policy community must lead this conversation.
The future of policy making and advocacy will not be about writing AI prompts. It’s about defining purpose, asking the hard questions before the code is written, and knowing when not to delegate. Indeed, the AI revolution may make public and government affairs more critical, not less so. When every organization has access to the same algorithms, the differentiator becomes interpretation, judgment, narrative, and, most importantly, relationship.
Let us not frame the AI age as one of extinction or escape. Let us see it as a canvas on which we can sketch a more meaningful, human-centered economy where AI handles the noise so humans can focus on the signal. Shopify’s “AI-first pass” is a compelling metaphor, not for job loss but for clarity.
What matters? What doesn’t? What is worthy of human time?
This is the defining question of our time for government, business, and policy specialists in Korea and beyond. AI will not make us obsolete, but it will make us choose to hide behind algorithms or lead with purpose. South Korea has the tools. It has the talent. And with this new administration, it now has the mandate.
Let’s use it wisely.
About the Author: Schoni Song
Schoni Song is Junior Partner and Global Business Lead at Macoll Consulting Group, Korea’s premier public and government affairs consultancy, where he advises Fortune 500s and global nonprofits on how to win influence and shape policy in one of Asia’s most dynamic markets. With a sharp eye for power dynamics and a track record across chemicals, crypto, defense, and global development, he crafts strategies that move decision-makers and shift narratives. Schoni also serves as Co-Chair of the Chemical Committee at AMCHAM Korea, and has served at the US State Department’s INL bureau, the Korean National Assembly, and the Asia Society. He holds a BA from Yonsei University and an MA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Opinions are his own.
Image Credit: Shutterstock.
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David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
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