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Quotes of the Day:
"Certain things catch your eye, but pursue only those that capture the heart." - Ancient Indian Proverb
“To be yourself in a world that is constantly trying to make you something else is the greatest accomplishment.”
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
For if you knew our hardships! – 0ur rough, quarters,
Ill, bedded on our galleys, crowded gangways…
Or, on the Trojan shore (more hateful still!),
To live encamped beneath a hostile rampart,
Drenched with a constant curse of rain from Heaven,
And dews of the field, that swarmed our clothes with vermin!”
- Aeschylus’s Agamemnon
1. FDD's Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker June Trends KOREA
2. Rising Sentiment in Seoul to Develop Nuclear Weapons
3. US, allies clash with Russia, China over North Korea's failed military spy satellite launch
4. Experts: North Korea's Satellite Launch Unlikely to Draw China's Action
5. S. Korea, U.S., Japan to operate system for sharing real-time N.K. missile warning data 'within this year': Seoul's defense chief
6. Challenges ahead for US efforts to quell South Korea’s nuclear ambitions
7. These may be the world's best warships. And they're not American
8. N.Koreans Starve as Kim Jong-un Stuffs Himself
9. Military continues salvage operation for North Korean rocket debris
10. S. Korea, U.S. agree on joint probe into N. Korean 'space rocket' debris once salvaged: Seoul official
11. EU's top diplomat discusses Ukraine's ammunition needs with S. Korea
12. Reasons to talk about North Korea
13. Pyongyang as lived experience: existentialism and identity in North Korea
14. S. Korean defense chief criticizes China, Russia for neglecting illegal NK actions
15. [Exclusive] North Korean leader ‘terrorized’ by South Korea’s closer ties with US, Japan
16. Turning 70, South Korea-U.S. alliance expands scope, defies frictions
17. Is this how North and South Korea reunite?
18. Fed up with corruption, North Koreans are attacking police, secret document shows
19. Failed 2018 Trump-Kim Summit And Biden’s Same approach: Time For US To Change Its Policy Towards North Korea – OpEd
1. FDD's Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker June Trends KOREA
Access the Korea section of the Foreign Policy tracker here. https://www.fdd.org/policy-tracker/2023/06/02/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-june/#Korea
This is my last contribution to FDD.
Korea
By David Maxwell
Previous Trend: Positive
North Korea did not conduct any missile tests or other provocations for six weeks, from April 13 to late May. But on May 31 (Korea time), it launched a space vehicle, purportedly to place a reconnaissance satellite in orbit. The launch violated UN Security Council resolutions. However, the launch failed.
The United States, South Korea, and Japan made progress on trilateral security cooperation at the G7 meeting in Hiroshima, which Seoul attended as an observer. President Biden held a joint meeting with ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, during which they discussed deepening trilateral cooperation. Yoon and Kishida also met separately on the summit’s sidelines. This followed Kishida’s positive visit to Seoul earlier in May.
Meanwhile, South Korea and the United States have begun work on implementing the Washington Declaration on extended deterrence. ROK and U.S. forces held their largest-ever live-fire combined military exercises on May 25 and will continue to do so four times per year to demonstrate strength and readiness.
On May 23, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four entities and one individual connected to Pyongyang’s malicious cyber activities and illicit revenue from overseas IT workers. South Korea issued a similar set of sanctions designations. Washington and Seoul continued to coordinate on cyber defense.
Julie Turner, Biden’s nominee to be the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, laid out her top five priorities during her Senate confirmation hearing on May 17. This position has been vacant since 2017. Turner’s confirmation will allow the United States to implement a human rights-upfront approach in coordination with South Korea.
2. Rising Sentiment in Seoul to Develop Nuclear Weapons
And I thought the Washington Declaration would have helped this sentiment to subside as some other analysts have assessed.
Excerpts:
Today, South Korea's neighboring countries have significant nuclear weapons, as in the case of the US, China, Russia, and North Korea, or can quickly develop them, as in the case of Japan. No country is able to directly attack a nuclear-armed state, given that such an attack could turn into a nuclear war and increase the possibility that its territory would be attacked in return.
Japan is saying that it cannot ignore the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the US is emphasizing its position that it seeks to prevent China's hegemonic rise. However, there is a good chance that China, Japan, and the US will refrain from directly attacking one another, considering they are armed with nuclear weapons. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the embers of a conflict would spread to the Korean Peninsula. If a non-nuclear South Korea is involved in war in Northeast Asia, what would happen to the Korean people's property and safety, and who can guarantee Korea's survival and peace? While the US and Japan are fiercely opposed to South Korea's nuclear armament, there are growing concerns in South Korea that the reason for emphasizing trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan is to turn the Korean Peninsula into a war zone on their behalf in case of an emergency. There seems to be no suitable alternative to guaranteeing South Korean security other than having independent nuclear arms.
Rising Sentiment in Seoul to Develop Nuclear Weapons
Distrustful of the west, three-quarters of South Koreans say yes
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/rising-sentiment-south-korea-nuclear-weapon?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
JUN 3, 2023
∙ PAID
By: Young-geun Kwon
There is intensive debate in South Korea over North Korea’s nuclear threat and whether, in response, Seoul should take more significant measures. Should it nuclearize? Do the US and neighboring powers really want denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula? Can the South Korea-US alliance and the US nuclear deterrent be trusted? How realistic is the Washington Declaration formulated during the recent Yoon Suk Yeol-Joe Biden meeting in Washington?
North Korea seems to be focusing on developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the mainland US, while already armed with enough nuclear warheads and missiles to strike South Korea and Japan. It is clear that conventional weapons such as aircraft, tanks, and warships will be insufficient to deter nuclear threats, as well as to respond to the North’s nuclear weapons in wars that conventional weapons might fail to deter. Also, given South Korea’s proximity to the North, the effectiveness of missile defense systems against the North’s nuclear threat would be extremely limited.
South Korea's options include developing its own nuclear arms, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and reliance on US deterrence, including extended deterrence. Some 76.6 percent of South Koreans desire independent nuclear arms, according to a January Korea Gallup survey. They do not seem to trust the international community’s efforts to denuclearize the peninsula or deterrence against the North, provided by cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the US, including extended deterrence from the US.
According to the Washington Declaration, the US believes South Korea should seek denuclearization while relying on cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan, as well as extended deterrence from the US. In order to strengthen deterrence, the US argues that South Korea's capabilities, including conventional power and missile defense systems, should be fully integrated into the South Korea-US joint command structure under the command of a US general.
There is also the view that if South Korea pursues its own nuclear arms, it would face strong international sanctions. However, the international community may not be able to properly sanction South Korea's nuclear armament efforts due to the importance of the Korean Peninsula in the context of hegemonic competition between the US and China. And even if the international community chose to sanction South Korean efforts, sanctions might not be effective because South Korea is a key producer of major technology components such as semiconductors.
For two reasons, South Koreans do not trust the deterrence against North Korea in the form of cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan.
Since 1945, when nuclear weapons first appeared, the US has led both the spread and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. The US government has actively tried to stop, delay, manage, or selectively accept or promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any country considering developing a nuclear weapon had to seriously consider possible US reactions before starting development. But today, the US, Russia, China, Britain, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea possess nuclear weapons.
So how did North Korea succeed in developing nuclear weapons? This is not a case of US support or acceptance. One argument is that North Korea succeeded because the US did not have the ability to block their nuclearization efforts. China's shield against international sanctions facilitated North Korea's initial progress in nuclear weapons development, allowing North Korea to explore different paths towards acquiring the bomb because China protected it against the West’s efforts to hinder and undo their efforts.
But there are three main objections to this argument. First, China wanted to denuclearize North Korea until 2000, before US-China competition escalated. Given that the possibility of inter-Korean unification seemed high before that point, a nuclear North Korea could have meant a nuclear unified Korea, which would have led Japan to become nuclear-armed, a threat to China. Second, the US may have been able to block North Korea's nuclear armament through military strikes. This argument is based on the judgment that China, which was considerably inferior militarily to the US at the time, could not have prevented the US from attacking North Korea's nuclear facilities. Third, if North Korea had pursued denuclearization through normalization of diplomatic relations with the US, there would have been little room for China to intervene.
On the other hand, the US may have been unable to strike the Yongbyon nuclear facility due to the possibility that North Korea would hit Seoul with long-range artillery, resulting in North Korea's eventual success in nuclear armament. However, the power of North Korea's long-range artillery may have been exaggerated. Considering the South Korea-US Combined Forces, which had strong capabilities including advanced stealth aircraft, it is convincing to argue that it could have neutralized North Korea's long-range artillery at the same time that a war started.
In the end, the argument that North Korea succeeded in arming itself with nuclear weapons because the US was not capable of blocking it seems less convincing.
On the other hand, there has long been a view that the US desire to denuclearize North Korea was weak. In 1993, then-US Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs said North Korea's denuclearization was not a "vital interest" for the US. From the George W. Bush administration to the end of the Barack Obama administration, when North Korea began developing nuclear weapons in earnest and developed enough nuclear weapons and missiles to strike South Korea and Japan, the US has consistently said it will not resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by force.
There are many arguments suggesting that the US had no intention of denuclearizing the North. Scott A. Snyder, a researcher at the US Council on Foreign Affairs, said, “South Korea’s aggregate conventional capabilities will continue to outstrip those of the North. However, North Korea’s emphasis on development of asymmetric capabilities, in particular its unchecked nuclear and missile development, is likely to remain a convincing argument for a continued US force presence on the Korean Peninsula. Mira Rapp-Hooper, a researcher at the Council on Foreign Affairs further noted that “The presence of US soldiers was already a major concern in Japan and South Korea when the Cold War ended…However, despite South Korea’s interest in diplomatic autonomy, no administration in Seoul could any longer deny the need for an American security guarantee. The North’s nuclear ambitions provided a new alliance rationale.”
Neighboring Countries Can’t Be Trusted to Want Denuclearization
Just as individuals value their lives the most, states value their survival the most. For this reason, powers such as the US consider preventing the rise of a competing hegemonic power as the most important security goal.
Countries such as the US, Japan, China, and Russia consider the Korean Peninsula to be a region of strategic interest. These countries are bound to make very complex calculations regarding unification out of the possibility that a unified Korea would maintain friendly relations with potentially hostile countries. China has no choice but to be cautious about inter-Korean unification, in case a unified Korea is likely to maintain the alliance with the US. Likewise, the US has no choice but to be cautious in calculating the unification of the Korean Peninsula, because it may be difficult for US troops to stay if a unified Korea maintains friendly relations with China.
Since 2003, when North Korea withdrew from the NPT and began nuclear armament in earnest, the US has pursued complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) while putting economic pressure on North Korea, along with the other countries in the Six-Party talks – China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Concerned about the possibility of reunification due to the collapse of North Korea, there is a view that sanctions against North Korea by China, Japan, and Russia, as well as the US, were not strong enough to force North Korea to denuclearize. Many argued that the CVID approach to North Korea's nuclear weapons was logically impossible. Even if possible, it was a situation that North Korea could never accept. Although the US claims that it seeks to denuclearize North Korea, the argument that the US repeatedly used tools and approaches to North Korea that were unrealistic and that could never achieve denuclearization has not subsided within the US. In this regard, reasonable doubts are raised about the US strategy for North Korea's denuclearization.
In the end, China, Russia, and Japan will not be free from complicated calculations related to inter-Korean unification and North Korean denuclearization at a time when the US-China hegemonic competition is intensifying. This is because countries will not want an uncertain future due to rapid changes in the buffer zone around the Korean Peninsula, which has geopolitical implications for their strategic interests.
Independent Nuclear Arms
Today, South Korea's neighboring countries have significant nuclear weapons, as in the case of the US, China, Russia, and North Korea, or can quickly develop them, as in the case of Japan. No country is able to directly attack a nuclear-armed state, given that such an attack could turn into a nuclear war and increase the possibility that its territory would be attacked in return.
Japan is saying that it cannot ignore the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the US is emphasizing its position that it seeks to prevent China's hegemonic rise. However, there is a good chance that China, Japan, and the US will refrain from directly attacking one another, considering they are armed with nuclear weapons. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the embers of a conflict would spread to the Korean Peninsula. If a non-nuclear South Korea is involved in war in Northeast Asia, what would happen to the Korean people's property and safety, and who can guarantee Korea's survival and peace? While the US and Japan are fiercely opposed to South Korea's nuclear armament, there are growing concerns in South Korea that the reason for emphasizing trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan is to turn the Korean Peninsula into a war zone on their behalf in case of an emergency. There seems to be no suitable alternative to guaranteeing South Korean security other than having independent nuclear arms.
Young-geun Kwon is a retired South Korean Air Force colonel. He served as a professor at the ROK Air Force Academy, a professor at Joint Forces Staff College, a Senior researcher at the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), a visiting researcher at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), and as an auditor at KIDA. This is an abridged version of an article available on the website of the East Asia Foundation, an influential Seoul-based think tank
3. US, allies clash with Russia, China over North Korea's failed military spy satellite launch
China and Russia are not only complicit in supporting north Korea's sanctions evasion, they are also providing diplomatic cover at the UN.
US, allies clash with Russia, China over North Korea's failed military spy satellite launch
AP · by EDITH M. LEDERER · June 3, 2023
UNITED NATIONS (AP) — The United States and its allies clashed with Russia and China on Friday over North Korea’s failed launch of a military spy satellite this week in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, which Moscow and Beijing refused to condemn.
The confrontation was the latest over the North’s escalating nuclear, ballistic missile and military programs, which U.S. deputy ambassador Robert Wood warned are threatening international peace and security. The failed launch “not only disrupted maritime and air traffic in the region, but it also caused alarm for its neighbors in Japan and the Republic of Korea,” he said.
Pyongyang is threatening another launch soon.
The Security Council imposed sanctions after North Korea’s first nuclear test explosion in 2006 and tightened them over the years in a total of 10 resolutions seeking — so far unsuccessfully — to rein in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and cut off funding. In the last sanctions resolution adopted by the council in December 2017, members committed to further restricting petroleum exports to North Korea if it conducted a ballistic missile launch capable of reaching intercontinental ranges.
China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-sponsored resolution in May 2022 that would have imposed new sanctions, including on petroleum exports, over a spate of intercontinental ballistic missile launches. Since then, they have blocked any council action including press statements.
U.N. political chief Rosemary DiCarlo told the council the last time North Korea conducted a similar satellite launch to Wednesday’s failed attempt was on Feb. 7, 2016 and it was condemned by the Security Council.
“The lack of unity and action in the Security Council does little to slow the negative trajectory on the Korean Peninsula,” she said, and North Korea “is unconstrained, and other parties are compelled to focus on military deterrence.”
But North Korea’s neighbor and ally China and Russia, which has drawn closer to Pyongyang since the war in Ukraine, blamed the West and especially the United States for the current tensions.
China’s deputy U.N. ambassador Geng Shuang said the situation on the Korean Peninsula is a remnant of the Cold War. He accused the United States of failing to respond to North Korea’s attempts at dialogue over the years and instead resorting to sanctions and pressure on Pyongyang, missing an opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue.
“By incorporating the (Korean) Peninsula into its Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. has continued its military activities and significantly increased its military presence both on the peninsula and in its surrounding areas, seriously undermining the strategic security interests of the peninsula and its neighboring countries,” Geng said
He also pointed to the recent U.S.-South Korea Washington Declaration, including plans to send strategic nuclear submarines to the peninsula.
Geng claimed U.S. policies are “driven by geopolitical self-interest” and told the council that blaming one party “will only exacerbate conflicts, provocations and inject new uncertainties into the already tense situation on the peninsula.”
He urged the council to adopt a resolution circulated by China and Russia in November 2021 that would end a host of sanctions on the North, saying this would be a starting point “to promote de-escalation, mutual trust and unity” among the 15 members.
Russia’s deputy ambassador Anna Evstigneeva blamed increased pressure on North Korea by the U.S. and its allies for “the spiral of tension we’re witnessing now.” And she criticized growing military activity by the U.S., Japan and South Korea, especially recent large-scale U.S.-South Korean military exercises, saying they are destabilizing not only for northeast Asia but for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
Russia is against “the dead end and inhumane policy of increasing sanctions pressure,” Evstigneeva said, stressing that U.N. resolutions that imposed sanctions also back efforts to resolve the situation on the Korean Peninsula by political and diplomatic means.
Russia calls on the United States to take steps to lower tensions and resume dialogue, instead of trying to shift responsibility “to other countries,” she said, also backing council action on the China-Russia resolution.
Wood, the U.S. envoy, countered that the Washington Declaration was a response to North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear and ballistic missile activities.
“It’s hard to imagine we would ease sanctions” as called for in the China-Russia draft resolution and reward Pyongyang while it continues to violate Security Council resolutions, he said.
As for diplomacy, Wood said the United States on many occasions has stated it is prepared to have an unconditional dialogue, but North Korea “has rejected our interventions on many occasions.”
He stressed that U.S.-South Korean military exercises are lawful efforts to defend against Pyongyang’s escalating activities that are allowing the country to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs – and to “continue to choose ammunition over nutrition” for its people.
AP · by EDITH M. LEDERER · June 3, 2023
4. Experts: North Korea's Satellite Launch Unlikely to Draw China's Action
Because China will protect north Korea.
More than sanctions we need to execute an information campaign to really put pressure on the regime.
Excerpts:
According to Anthony Ruggiero, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, what is more important than China's criticism or support for new sanctions is implementing current sanctions.
"Even if China says North Korean actions are violations of U.N. resolutions, those statements ring hollow" when Beijing is helping the North Koreans "get the items they need for those missiles."
Ruggiero also said that China has no incentive to pass new sanctions as North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons are not targeted at China but at the U.S.
I would offer these ideas rather than wasting our time on additional sanctions efforts.
North Korea has conducted sustained psychological warfare or information operations against its own people, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the U.S., and the international community. However, the ROK/U.S. alliance has not.
Psychological warfare and propaganda are critical to supporting the three major lines of effort of the Kim family regime. First, is political warfare to subvert the ROK and drive a wedge in the ROK/U.S. alliance. Second, is blackmail diplomacy – the use of increased tensions, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. Third is the development of advanced warfighting capabilities to conduct its campaign to unify the Korean peninsula by force and support its political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.
One of north Korea’s most important core objectives is subverting the democratic and prosperous South Korea to the rule of the north’s Kim family dynasty. Kim Jong Un, the current and third generation ruler, uses political warfare to shape the conditions to dominate the Korean peninsula under the rule of the “Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.” While the ROK/U.S. alliance has successfully deterred war on the Korean peninsula since the Armistice Agreement of 1953; it has done a poor job of aggressively employing their nations’ information capabilities to change the security conditions in the north. Perhaps counterintuitively information has always been the Kim family’s greatest vulnerability and is why they severely restrict the flow of information to the Korean people in the north. The use of psychological warfare or information operations is not a “silver bullet” but has the potential to alter the security situation in the north. The alliance must conduct a superior form of political warfare as a central component of a sound strategy.
President Yoon did state in June that he was considering suspending the Comprehensive Military Agreement and resuming information operations or psychological warfare in response to provocations. However, as of yet, there has been no visible effort to do so and nearly all information operations are being conducted by escapees from the north and other members of civil society. The question is whether the ROK/U.S. alliance will undertake information and influence activities that can potentially have effects on the full spectrum of challenges from provocation to unification?
Experts: North Korea's Satellite Launch Unlikely to Draw China's Action
June 01, 2023 9:06 PM
voanews.com
WASHINGTON —
China is unlikely to take any action against North Korea even if Pyongyang tries to relaunch a spy satellite after its first attempt failed, experts said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's powerful sister, Kim Yo Jong, said the regime would try for the second time to launch a military reconnaissance satellite "in the near future and start its mission."
She said through North Korea's state-run KCNA on Thursday that if North Korea's satellite launch is "censured," satellites that the U.S. and other countries have launched "should be denounced."
Her statement came after North Korea's Chollima-1 satellite launch rocket malfunctioned and splashed into the sea west of South Korea on Wednesday.
It was the first time since 2016 that North Korea tried to launch a satellite. North Korea started conducting its satellite launches in 2012, which drew international sanctions.
A satellite rocket uses ballistic missile technology that can also be used as a weapon, and the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) passed multiple resolutions banning North Korea from using such technology.
The failed launch Wednesday elicited widespread condemnations from the United States and the international community.
"We're going to continue to work with allies and partners on holding Kim Jong Un and his regime accountable," John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, told reporters Wednesday.
China has not joined the international community in criticizing North Korea's satellite launch. It has not condemned Pyongyang's record number of missile tests in 2022.
In response to North Korea's failed satellite launch, Chinese Embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu in Washington said Wednesday that "the situation today is not what China wants to see."
"The only way to prevent the situation from worsening is" to recognize "the absence of a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula" and resume talks under "the 'dual track' approach," the spokesperson said in an email to VOA's Korean Service.
China's dual track solution involves a freeze on North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile tests and halting U.S.-South Korean military exercises while pursuing "a parallel track" of denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula, according to Frank Aum, senior expert on Northeast Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Daniel Russel, who served as the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Obama administration, said, "Although that will be a destabilizing and threatening escalation by North Korea, there is no basis for expecting Beijing to either prevent the launch or criticize it after the fact."
Russel said China's remark "makes absolutely no mention of the fact that the launch was an egregious violation of the UNSC resolutions that China itself helped draft, voted for, and is obliged to implement."
China, a permanent UNSC member, helped to pass existing UNSC sanctions on North Korea but has been opposing UNSC actions against the regime in recent years.
China, along with Russia, vetoed a U.S.-led a resolution in May 2022 that sought to condemn the regime's ICBM launches that year. Their veto has paralyzed the UNSC from taking unified actions against North Korea.
Joseph DeTrani, who served as the special envoy for six-party denuclearization talks on North Korea that involved China during the George W. Bush administration, said Beijing "will continue to oppose sanctions" if the UNSC tries to pass a new resolution.
According to Anthony Ruggiero, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, what is more important than China's criticism or support for new sanctions is implementing current sanctions.
"Even if China says North Korean actions are violations of U.N. resolutions, those statements ring hollow" when Beijing is helping the North Koreans "get the items they need for those missiles."
Ruggiero also said that China has no incentive to pass new sanctions as North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons are not targeted at China but at the U.S.
An official at the U.S. mission to the U.N. told VOA's Korean Service on Thursday that the U.S. is calling for an open UNSC meeting on North Korea on Friday.
Jiha Ham contributed to this story.
voanews.com
5. S. Korea, U.S., Japan to operate system for sharing real-time N.K. missile warning data 'within this year': Seoul's defense chief
With every provocation, the trilateral cooperative relationship (ROK, Japan, and the US) gets stronger.
Kim only has himself to blame. His policies and strategy are failing.
(4th LD) S. Korea, U.S., Japan to operate system for sharing real-time N.K. missile warning data 'within this year': Seoul's defense chief | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · June 3, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 6-7, 17; RECONSTRUCTS)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SINGAPORE, June 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan agreed Saturday to operate a system to share North Korean missile warning data in real time "within this year," Seoul's defense chief said, in another move to beef up trilateral cooperation against Pyongyang's growing military threats.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup made the remarks after he met trilaterally with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Lloyd Austin and Yasukazu Hamada, respectively, on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, amid renewed tensions over the North's botched yet defiant launch of a purported space rocket earlier this week.
"While actively implementing the agreed-upon measures between the leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan, the three countries agreed to elevate security cooperation to another level," he told reporters, referring to the agreement from a trilateral summit in Cambodia last November.
"Especially regarding the real-time sharing of North Korean missile warning data, we decided to connect the respective information sharing systems -- one run between South Korea and the United States and the other between Japan and the United States -- and operate the combined one within this year," he added.
For this, the three countries will hold working-level talks at an early date, he said.
The warning data includes a missile's launch point, flight trajectory and expected point of impact, a Seoul official told reporters, requesting anonymity.
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is expected to serve as an intermediary to enable the three-way sharing of the data, he said.
The three countries have been working on the data sharing method in line with an agreement that President Yoon Suk Yeol and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Joe Biden and Fumio Kishida, respectively, reached during their summit in Cambodia last November.
Seoul's defense ministry said Saturday's agreement was reached in an effort to enhance each country's ability to detect and assess North Korean missiles.
"The three ministers discussed progress under way through working-level talks on technical issues, and affirmed that this is an important procedure for deterrence, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region," it said in a statement.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup (R) and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Lloyd Austin (C) and Yasukazu Hamada, respectively, pose for a photo as they meet trilaterally on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 3, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Currently, the real-time sharing of missile warning data is occurring between the South Korean military and the U.S. Forces Korea, and between the Japan Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Forces Japan, while South Korea and Japan do not have a similar direct mechanism, given that they are not treaty allies.
In line with last year's summit agreement, the three countries have been working on procedures for a real-time data-sharing method among the three nations based on a trilateral information sharing arrangement signed in 2014.
In their talks, Lee, Austin and Hamada "strongly condemned" the North's launch this week, which they described as a "long-range ballistic missile," the ministry said.
"(They) strongly condemned North Korea's recent long-range ballistic missile launch -- under the guise of a so-called satellite -- as a grave violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban any launches using ballistic missile technology," it said. "With the enhancing of trilateral cooperation, they agreed to sternly respond in cooperation with the international community."
They also urged the North to immediately stop "reckless" acts that create "tensions" on the Korean Peninsula and comply with the resolutions.
The trio agreed to regularly hold defensive exercises, such as anti-submarine and maritime missile defense exercises, and reaffirmed an agreement to swiftly resume maritime interdiction and anti-piracy exercises as agreed during working-level talks in April, it said.
The three sides plan to create an annual plan on such drills so that they are "predictable" and can be operated "efficiently," the official said.
The ministers expressed "strong opposition" to unilateral action that creates tension in the region and changes to the status quo through "force or coercion," saying they stand together with Ukraine in the ongoing war against Russian invaders, while stressing the importance of "peace and stability" across the Taiwan Strait.
Trilateral cooperation has gained traction in the wake of Pyongyang's saber-rattling earlier this year, including the firing of a purported solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile in April. Last year, the regime fired an unprecedented number of missiles.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · June 3, 2023
6. Challenges ahead for US efforts to quell South Korea’s nuclear ambitions
Many Koreans I speak to are very worried that the US presidential election in 2024 will undo the alliance.
Excerpts:
But the agreement may not prove satisfactory for resolving the South Korean public’s perceived vulnerability against North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Nor does it assuage nuclear proponents who desire the return of US nuclear weapons or US support for a South Korean nuclear weapons program. For some nuclear advocates, it is likely that only South Korean control over nuclear weapons — whether owned by the United States or South Korea — will resolve the current nuclear debate.
The ability of the NCG to quell South Korean desires for nuclear weapons may depend on the speed and robustness of its implementation. Still, the United States and South Korea will simultaneously need to explore alternative or additional measures for bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table. Extended deterrence and diplomacy should strengthen in conjunction with — rather than at the expense of — one another.
While the Washington Declaration may have moved forward the needle in addressing existing questions regarding US defence commitments to South Korea, South Koreans will continue assessing whether US extended deterrence could come under future threat and how South Korean defence capabilities should evolve alongside regional security threats.
The upcoming US presidential election and the international community’s response to continued North Korean testing will likely contribute to how South Koreans evaluate the path ahead.
Challenges ahead for US efforts to quell South Korea’s nuclear ambitions
eastasiaforum.org · by Jennifer Ahn · June 3, 2023
Author: Jennifer Ahn, Council on Foreign Relations
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s state visit to Washington to meet with US President Joe Biden in April 2023 marked the 70th anniversary of the US–South Korea alliance. The meeting provided an opportunity for the two leaders to highlight US–South Korean alignment and deepening cooperation on issues of peninsular, regional and global significance.
Of particular significance during the summit meeting was the unveiling of the Washington Declaration that established the US–South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). The Declaration represents a response to several consequential domestic and regional developments.
In South Korea, the public debate over developing nuclear weapons gained unprecedented attention after President Yoon’s comment in January 2023 about the possibility of South Korea going nuclear. Polls in South Korea show the percentage of domestic support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons ranging between the high 60s and mid-70s.
The factors driving the South Korean public’s sentiment include concerns over the US extended deterrence commitment and whether the United States would defend South Korea if North Korea were to simultaneously threaten the US mainland. Advocates of nuclearisation also call for nuclear balance with North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and greater autonomy and agency over South Korea’s ability to defend itself in the face of growing regional and global security challenges.
Regionally, North Korea has continued to advance its military capabilities. Within the first five months of 2023, the country has launched six short-range ballistic missile tests, three cruise missile tests and three intercontinental ballistic missile tests.
These tests — which have used a diverse set of launch sites and delivery systems — signify North Korea’s desire for continued progress within its weapons program through the operationalisation of potential nuclear-use scenarios. These advancements also underscore North Korea’s perception that it must continue strengthening its nuclear forces and maintain its readiness to counter what it views as long-term military threats to the survival of the regime.
In response to the growing threat posed by North Korea’s weapons program, the United States, Japan and South Korea have strengthened trilateral security cooperation with the expansion of military exercises.
In 2023, the three countries have conducted joint military drills for ballistic missile defence, anti-submarine warfare and search-and-rescue and maritime missile defence. These exercises aim to enhance force interoperability and showcase regional trilateral cooperation. Current discussions for the United States, Japan and South Korea to share North Korean missile warning data in real-time further reinforce efforts by the three countries to strengthen deterrence in the region.
The Washington Declaration does not represent a fundamental change in US nuclear policy towards South Korea, such as the redeployment of US nuclear weapons or sharing of US nuclear assets. Rather, the agreement assuages South Korean anxieties about North Korea and US defence commitments through joint planning, enhanced consultations and expanded training and tabletop exercises.
The NCG envisions an increased role for South Korea to consult and coordinate with the United States against a potential North Korean nuclear attack. This addresses the concerns of South Korean advocates who have argued since the early 2000s for strengthening extended deterrence efforts within the alliance and embedding US nuclear deterrence into a broader framework like the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. In this sense, opponents of a nuclear South Korea and moderate nuclear proponents now have a concrete agreement to point to when debating against independent nuclear acquisition.
But the agreement may not prove satisfactory for resolving the South Korean public’s perceived vulnerability against North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Nor does it assuage nuclear proponents who desire the return of US nuclear weapons or US support for a South Korean nuclear weapons program. For some nuclear advocates, it is likely that only South Korean control over nuclear weapons — whether owned by the United States or South Korea — will resolve the current nuclear debate.
The ability of the NCG to quell South Korean desires for nuclear weapons may depend on the speed and robustness of its implementation. Still, the United States and South Korea will simultaneously need to explore alternative or additional measures for bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table. Extended deterrence and diplomacy should strengthen in conjunction with — rather than at the expense of — one another.
While the Washington Declaration may have moved forward the needle in addressing existing questions regarding US defence commitments to South Korea, South Koreans will continue assessing whether US extended deterrence could come under future threat and how South Korean defence capabilities should evolve alongside regional security threats.
The upcoming US presidential election and the international community’s response to continued North Korean testing will likely contribute to how South Koreans evaluate the path ahead.
Jennifer Ahn is the Research Associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
eastasiaforum.org · by Jennifer Ahn · June 3, 2023
7. These may be the world's best warships. And they're not American
Japan and the ROK.
These may be the world's best warships. And they're not American | CNN
CNN · by Brad Lendon · June 3, 2023
Seoul, South Korea CNN —
It’s a growing problem that has United States naval commanders scratching their heads: How to keep up with China’s ever-expanding fleet of warships.
Not only is China’s navy already the world’s largest, its numerical lead over the US is getting wider, with the head of the US Navy warning recently that American shipyards simply can’t keep up. Some experts estimate China can build three warships in the time it takes the US to build one.
It is just one of the concerns, alongside Beijing’s increasing aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, that’s likely to be weighing on the mind of US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin as he joins top military figures from across the region at this weekend’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
The chance of a breakthrough on any of those issues this weekend appears slim, not least because China has pointedly rejected a US proposal for Austin to meet his Chinese counterpart Li Shangfu at the forum.
But experts who spoke to CNN before the summit say a potential solution to one of them – the Chinese fleet’s numerical advantage – is within reach, if the US is prepared to think outside the box.
Washington, they say, has something Beijing doesn’t: Allies in South Korea and Japan who are building some of the highest spec – and affordable – naval hardware on the oceans.
Buying ships from these countries, or even building US-designed vessels in their shipyards, could be a cost-effective way of closing the gap with China, they say.
Their warships are “certainly a match for their (Chinese) counterparts,” says Blake Herzinger, a research fellow at the United States Studies Center in Australia, while Japan’s warship designers “are among the world’s best,” says Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii.
Both countries have mutual defense treaties with the US, so why doesn’t the US team up with them to outbuild China?
The problem is, US law currently prevents its Navy from buying foreign-built ships – even from allies – or from building its own ships in foreign countries due to both security concerns and a desire to protect America’s shipbuilding industry.
Schuster, Herzinger and others are among a growing body of experts who say it may be time to rethink that law to give the US an edge in the battle for the seas.
A challenger for China’s world-beating Type 055s
The Pentagon estimates China’s navy to have around 340 warships at present, while the US has fewer than 300. It thinks the Chinese fleet will grow to 400 in the next two years, while the US fleet will take until 2045 to hit 350.
But it’s not just the increasing vastness of the Chinese navy that has raised concerns. Some of the ships China is churning out arguably have greater firepower than some of their US counterparts.
Take China’s Type 055, in many eyes the world’s premier destroyer.
Displacing 12,000 to 13,000 tons, the Type 055 is bigger than typical destroyers (it is nearer in size to the US Navy’s Ticonderoga class of cruisers) and packs a formidable punch.
It has 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells that fire surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, which is more than the 96 on the newest of the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. It also boasts sophisticated radio and anti-submarine weapons systems.
And China is pumping them out. It began building the Type 055s in 2014 and recently commissioned its eighth, the Xianyang. The US’s work on its Zumwalt-class destroyers has been much slower; construction began five years earlier, yet only two have entered service.
But some Western analysts say the Type 055 may have a peer in South Korea’s Sejong the Great-class destroyers.
At 10,000 to 12,000 tons displacement, the Sejongs are slightly smaller than China’s Type 055s, but they have more firepower, with 128 VLS cells and weapons that include surface-to-air, anti-submarine and cruise missiles.
The three Sejongs, which cost about $925 million each, are the pride of the South Korean fleet.
“With this one ship, (the South Korean Navy) can cope with multiple simultaneous situations – anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-surface – and defend from ballistic missiles,” the country’s Defense Media Agency says.
Retired South Korean Adm. Duk-ki Kim, the first person to captain a Sejong, says it’s more than a match for China’s Type 055.
“China is focusing on quantity and price competitiveness rather than the quality of its vessels,” Kim, now vice president of the Korea Association of Military Studies, told CNN.
High-spec, low cost
Japan, too, has “world class” destroyers, said Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy at King’s College in London.
The country’s newest Maya-class destroyers are armed with 96 VLS cells that can fire both anti-ballistic and anti-submarine missiles, while the “quality of its sensors and systems stands at the very top end of the spectrum,” according to Patalano. Last November, the Mayas demonstrated their ability to destroy ballistic missiles traveling outside Earth’s atmosphere.
Those 96 VLS cells put the Mayas on par with the newest of the US Arleigh Burkes, but there’s a crucial difference between them: The Arleigh Burkes cost $2.2 billion; the Mayas cost a billion dollars less.
In other words, the Mayas represent both “quantity and quality”: They are high-spec, (relatively) low cost and can roll off production lines at speed.
“If Chinese shipbuilding is showing a remarkable capacity for mass production, Japan’s is leading the way in affordable quality on a scale larger than most naval powers, without sacrificing commissioning times. That balance, and the experience in the philosophy, are a genuine edge,” Patalano said.
And it’s not just the Mayas. Take Japan’s Mogami-class frigates; speedy, stealthy 5,500-ton warships with 16 VLS cells that fire surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. All done with a crew of 90 and a price tag of about $372 million each.
By contrast, the first of the US Navy’s under development Constellation-class frigates are expected to cost three times as much and require twice as many crew. That’s less than ideal given the US Navy is having a hard time recruiting – the US vice chief of naval operations has said it is likely to miss its recruiting goal by 6,000 this year – though the Constellations are expected to have twice as many VLS cells as the Mogamis.
Cost comparisons with China’s Type 055s are harder due to the opacity of the Chinese system; estimates of their costs range anywhere from $925 million to $2.6 billion each.
An Asian secret weapon
So what’s making South Korean and Japanese shipyards so competitive?
Cost overruns, endemic in US defense contracting, are not common in Japan, Schuster says, because – unlike the US – the country holds manufacturers to their estimates.
“A Japanese shipbuilder’s bid is an absolute. If they finish it below expected cost, they make a larger profit. If they encounter delays and mistakes, the builder has to correct it at their own expense,” Schuster said.
That approach was “much wiser” than that of the US, he claims, pointing to the alleged problems with Zumwalt-class destroyers and littoral combat ships that have seen the Pentagon spend billions on platforms that critics say the US Navy doesn’t know what to do with.
The US Navy’s three Zumwalt destroyers have priced out at about $8 billion each, but it’s unclear how they fit into the rest of the fleet.
Meanwhile, some of the US’s littoral combat ships, which cost more than $350 million each, are expected to be decommissioned before they have even served a third of their life span.
Time for a rethink?
All these Japanese and South Korean vessels are designed to incorporate US technology, weapons, spy radars and the Aegis command and control system.
Partly this is so that the two navies can operate seamlessly alongside their US counterpart, as they did in joint exercises earlier this year.
But then if the US, Japanese and South Korean ships use similar technology and can operate together, why does the law prevent the US from building some of its ships in Japanese and South Korean shipyards?
The prohibition isn’t just about security concerns. It’s also aimed at keeping shipbuilding jobs and expertise within the US.
In 2019, total economic activity associated with the US shipbuilding industry accounted for nearly 400,000 jobs and contributed $42.4 billion in GDP, according to the Maritime Administration, with 154 shipyards spread across 29 states classified as active shipbuilders and more than 300 engaged in ship repairs or capable of building ships.
The US military is an important source of demand for these shipbuilders; while less than 3% of the vessels delivered in 2020 went to US government agencies, 14 of the 15 large deep-draft vessels went to a combination of the US Navy and the US Coast Guard.
Tough call to make
Any move that might be perceived as threatening such an important industry would therefore be politically fraught. Shipbuilding representatives argue more needs to be spent on the domestic industry, rather than less, recently telling Congress the single biggest issue facing shipyards was attracting and retaining a quality workforce, according to USNI News.
US Navy spokesperson Travis Callaghan said, “The Navy currently has a significant number of ships under construction and on contract across several shipyards. We have also made and continue to make significant investments in our shipyards to increase and maximize capacity. The Navy is committed to providing a ready, modernized, and capable naval force that continues to be the nation’s primary instrument of sea control both now and into the future.”
There are also those analysts who, while admiring the shipbuilding prowess of Japan and South Korea, say getting them to build ships for the US would be a step too far.
Speaking on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, Nick Childs, senior fellow for naval studies at the IISS, said US cooperation with its allies is already shifting the trajectory of naval power in Asia away from China.
There’s “a new phase of maritime balance” in the region that has it slowly edging back in Washington’s favor, Childs said. However, he doesn’t think the answer is building US ships overseas.
“I think the answer is to learn from the way they do it rather than get them to do it for you,” he said.
Still, proponents of outsourcing say employing the help of allies offers a more immediate fix – and point out the US already outsources designs overseas; its Constellation-class frigates are based on an Italian design and Japan has been mooted as a possible source for future blueprints.
But Schuster thinks designs aren’t enough – the US needs more ships now, he says.
“Since shipyard availability is at a premium in the United States, having a portion of that work done in Japan would address that problem until America can refurbish and expand its shipyards – a 10-year process in most defense analysts’ eyes,” Schuster said.
Retired South Korean admiral Kim thinks partnering on shipbuilding offers everyone “a win-win.”
Herzinger, too, thinks it’s time to rethink the law.
Japan and South Korea “both build very high quality ships on time and on budget, both things (the US has) lost the ability to do,” Herzinger said.
CNN’s Haley Britzky, Gawon Bae, Jiwon Jeong and Moeri Karasawa contributed to this report.
CNN · by Brad Lendon · June 3, 2023
8. N.Koreans Starve as Kim Jong-un Stuffs Himself
Kim's hypocrisy and lack of concern for the welfare of the Korean people in the north should be a theme and message for an influence campaign.
N.Koreans Starve as Kim Jong-un Stuffs Himself
english.chosun.com
June 01, 2023 11:54
Deaths from starvation in North Korea have tripled over the last year, the National Intelligence Service here told lawmakers Wednesday, while crime and suicide are on the rise.
It added that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is evidently well fed and weighs 140 kg but suffers from a severe sleeping disorder.
People Power Party lawmaker Yoo Sang-bum of the National Assembly Intelligence Committee told reporters, "We were told that corn prices in North Korea surged 60 percent and rice 30 percent from a year earlier, reaching the highest levels since Kim Jong-un rose to power."
He added that violent crimes also tripled over the same period to around 300, while suicides surged around 40 percent, prompting Kim to denounce them as crimes against the socialist revolution.
"Considering that North Korean officials gathered the latest medical information overseas recently on ways to treat insomnia, the NIS believes that Kim is suffering from a severe sleeping disorder," Yoo said.
The regime has recently been boasting that Kim works the whole night through until officials can barely keep their eyes open.
"North Korea is importing large amounts of Marlboro and Dunhill cigarettes and expensive delicacies, so the agency is looking at the possibility that Kim's reliance on alcohol and nicotine has increased and is making his insomnia worse."
During Kim's latest public appearance on May 16 he looked clearly fatigued, with dark circles under his eyes, while AI analysis assessed his body weight to be in the mid-140 kg range, according to the NIS.
Since late last year, scars have been observed on Kim's hand and bicep caused apparently by scratching, which the NIS believes be a skin condition caused by stress or allergies.
N.Koreans 'Starving to Death'
N.Korea Imports Thousands of Tons of Rice from China
N.Korean Economy on Its Knees
N.Korea Faces Famine
UN Warns of Severe Food Shortage in N.Korea
N.Koreans Gripped by Fears of Famine
Famine Fears as N.Korea Orders People to Conserve Food
N.Korean Regime Desperate to Keep Elite on Side
N.Korean Regime Hints at Straits of Pyongyang Elite
N.Korea Has Difficulty Importing Grains
Nutrition in N.Korea Improves Despite Sanctions
S.Korea Accounts for Largest Proportion of Aid to N.Korea This Year
N.Korea Boasts of Opulent Consumer Fair
Seoul to Donate Rice to N.Korea Despite Snub
N.Korea Wants 3 Million Tons of Food or Nothing
N.Korea Buys Record Amounts of Rice from China
N.Korea's Grain Imports from China Peak in September
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
english.chosun.com
9. Military continues salvage operation for North Korean rocket debris
I hope they can recover useful debris. Obviously we want to exploit it for intelligence purposes. It may also be useful for influence operations. A comparison between the north and South space programs could have effects on the elite, the military, and the Korean people in the north.
(LEAD) Military continues salvage operation for North Korean rocket debris | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 우재연 · June 3, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with latest info in last 2 paras)
SEOUL, June 3 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean military continued its operation Saturday to search and salvage the wreckage of a North Korean rocket that crashed into the Yellow Sea earlier this week.
Deep-sea divers from the Sea Salvage and Rescue Unit were deployed to the remote sea, 200 kilometers west of the western island of Eocheong, military officials said.
This photo, provided by South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 31, 2023, shows an object believed to be part of North Korea's space launch vehicle that was discovered in the Yellow Sea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The North launched what it claimed to be a satellite-carrying rocket Wednesday. But it crashed into the sea due to the abnormal starting of the second-stage engine, the North's state media said.
The salvage operation involves divers attaching high-strength ropes to the 15-meter-long debris, which sank to a depth of 75 meters on the seafloor. Three salvage ships have been deployed to the area for the operation.
The space vehicle, named Chollima-1, is estimated to have a length ranging from 29 to 30 meters.
The debris spotted by the South Korean military Wednesday is believed to be the second and third stages of the launch vehicle.
Officials said there is a possibility of finding the military reconnaissance satellite, Malligyong-1, mounted on the rocket.
In a text message sent to reporters at around 5:30 p.m., the military said it will wrap up the operation due to high ocean current conditions and resume Sunday.
"Depending on the progress of the work, we could salvage part of the space launch vehicle as early as tomorrow," it said.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 우재연 · June 3, 2023
10. S. Korea, U.S. agree on joint probe into N. Korean 'space rocket' debris once salvaged: Seoul official
S. Korea, U.S. agree on joint probe into N. Korean 'space rocket' debris once salvaged: Seoul official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · June 3, 2023
By Chae Yun-hwan
SINGAPORE, June 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States agreed Saturday to jointly examine the wreckage of a purported North Korean space rocket once it is retrieved from the Yellow Sea, a senior Seoul official said.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup and his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin, reached the agreement during a brief "pull-aside" meeting on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, as the South Korean military is carrying out a salvage operation to recover the sunken part of the rocket.
The rocket crashed into the waters some 200 kilometers west of the western South Korean island of Eocheong on Wednesday morning after an "abnormal flight," Seoul's military has said.
"South Korea and the U.S. have agreed on the joint investigation to be conducted once it's retrieved," the defense ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
During the meeting, the two sides also reaffirmed the need for attention to follow through with agreements that President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden made during their White House summit in April to bolster deterrence against North Korean threats.
The agreements include the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group, an entity to discuss nuclear and strategic planning issues, and a U.S. pledge to enhance the "regular visibility" of its strategic assets to South Korea, including a nuclear ballistic missile submarine.
Lee and Austin's meeting came just before they held trilateral talks with their Japanese counterpart, Yasukazu Hamada, where they agreed to operate a system for sharing real-time North Korean missile warning data within this year.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup (L) speaks with his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin, before their trilateral talks with Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 3, 2023, in this photo provided by Seoul's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · June 3, 2023
11. EU's top diplomat discusses Ukraine's ammunition needs with S. Korea
Global Pivotal State and a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy.
EU's top diplomat discusses Ukraine's ammunition needs with S. Korea
The Korea Times · June 3, 2023
European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell attends the inauguration of the EU partnership mission in the Republic of Moldova headquarters in Chisinau, Moldova, Wednesday, May 31. AP-Yonhap
The European Union's top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said he met South Korea's defence minister on Saturday to discuss Ukraine's needs for ammunition.
The meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's top security summit, came amid pressure from the United States and NATO countries for South Korea to provide weapons and ammunition for Ukraine.
"Good meeting with Korean Defence Minister Lee Jong-sup at #SLD23. Shared alarm at continued DPRK provocations and discussed Ukraine's needs for ammunition," Borrell said in a tweet.
A U.S. ally and major producer of artillery ammunition, South Korea had so far ruled out sending lethal aid to Ukraine, citing business ties with Russia and Moscow's influence over North Korea, despite mounting pressure from Washington and Europe to supply weapons.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, in an interview with Reuters in April, signalled the prospect of a change, saying it might be difficult for Seoul to adhere to only providing humanitarian and financial support if Ukraine faced a large-scale attack on civilians or a "situation the international community cannot condone".
Hundreds of thousands of South Korean artillery rounds are on their way to Ukraine via the United States, after Seoul's initial resistance toward arming Ukraine, the Wall Street Journal reported last month. (Reuters)
The Korea Times · June 3, 2023
12. Reasons to talk about North Korea
Talk ABOUT.
Important and useful insights from an escapee from north Korea.
Note that we should not call those who have escaped from north Korea "defectors." They should be described as escapees or refugees.
Reasons to talk about North Korea
The Korea Times · June 3, 2023
Lee Jeong-cheol, third from left in front row, poses with travelers visiting from the U.S. in Seoul, May 31. Courtesy of Casey Latigue
By Lee Jeong-cheolI occasionally give lectures to foreign travelers as a Freedom Speakers International (FSI) Keynote Speaker. The topics are mainly "The Reality of North Korea" or "The Lives of North Koreans."
The great thing is that FSI doesn't demand specific stories from North Korean refugee speakers. Instead, they assist the speakers in freely sharing their own stories.?
In my lectures, I try to convey an undistorted image of North Korea. I mainly aim to deliver the following messages:
1. Firstly, it is important to distinguish between the North Korean government and the North Korean people. The North Korean government should be criticized as a repressive dictatorship. However, except for the Kim family and the privileged elite, most ordinary North Korean citizens are suffering under tyranny. In reality, they live like slaves.
2. Secondly, it is important to understand that North Korean refugees are not betrayers. In English, the world (including South Korea) calls North Korean refugees "defectors." However, one of the meanings of "defector" is a traitor. When the North Korean government criticizes North Korean refugees, they label us as traitors.?
With the exception of high-ranking North Korean officials or those who come from relatively well-off cities like Pyongyang, most North Koreans escape the regime due to hunger. It is doubtful whether we can call those who flee due to hunger as being betrayers. During the conflict in Ukraine, people leaving their homeland for survival are not called "Ukrainian defectors." but Ukrainian refugees.
3. Thirdly, it's necessary to engage in dialogue even with the worst dictatorship, the North Korean government. Criticizing the North Korean government is inevitable, but engaging in dialogue with North Korea is not for the benefit of the regime itself but for the sake of the North Korean people. Advocating for North Korean human rights or emphasizing inter-Korean exchanges fundamentally aims to improve the lives of the North Korean people and ultimately create a better Korean Peninsula. In fact, if there was only the North Korean regime in North Korea, there would be no need for dialogue.?
Some argue that if we assist North Korea through inter-Korean exchanges or humanitarian aid, the North Korean government might exploit it for nuclear development. In that case, the question arises: "Does it mean it is okay for ordinary North Koreans to suffer until the nuclear issue is resolved?"
4. Lastly, there is freedom in South Korea. While the North Korean regime dictates North Koreans' future, South Korean society asks "What do you want to do or what do you want to be?" So, having a dream is almost impossible in North Korea. However, in South Korea, there is freedom of choice.
I'm always grateful that North Korean refugees have freedom of speech in South Korea.
The writer is a Keynote Speaker in Freedom Speakers International (FSI), a regular guest on Arirang TV Radio's "North Korea Now" segment of the show "Korea Now," and formerly a radio producer with Unification Media Group (UMG). This was edited for publication by Casey Lartigue Jr.
The Korea Times · June 3, 2023
13. Pyongyang as lived experience: existentialism and identity in North Korea
Pyongyang as lived experience: existentialism and identity in North Korea
The Korea Times · June 3, 2023
Courtesy of Dawn Kim
By David A. Tizzard
Concepts such as decolonization, orientalism, lived experiences and multiple truths are becoming more widespread in both academia and mainstream media. What was once merely derided as post-modernism has slowly become more engrained in the content we consume and how we ask each other to see and analyze the world. We have to account for the history of imperialist oppression when passing judgement; singular definitive narratives have given way to a slew of varied, contradictory, and impassioned tales. One can find evidence of such a change in the very first pages of Black Girl From Pyongyang by Monica Macias. The book is written conscious of these concepts and how they affect us. There is a questioning of truth, Western narratives, lived experiences, and much more.
It has been said that an eskimo doesn't dream of sandy beaches. In that sense, we are all victims of culture: our worldview is limited by the language, thoughts, and experiences we are raised with. However, over time, the growing technological and value-driven interconnectivity of the world has provided us access to a whole new realm of perspectives and realities. Imagine, if you can, what it must have been like for a tall, young, dark-skinned African girl to grow up in Pyongyang in the 1980s. How do ideas of culture work then? And would it ever be possible to dream of sandy beaches if you are raised in the mental maps of North Korean thought?
Culture as destiny?
Amidst a sea of silence and held tongues, a young woman at university raised her hand to question the philosophy teacher: "Sir, are the principles of the public distribution system really ideal? And if our society pursues much more collective wellbeing compared to a capitalist society, then why does the level of happiness or wealth vary so much from person to person?"
An astute and rather reasonable question, you might think. The contrasting economic fortunes of both South and North Korea over the past few decades are well documented. But how would such curiosity, insolence even, be received in Pyongyang where ideological consistency is seen as a politically and morally binding social good? The public imagination would have you believe there would quickly be goose-stepping soldiers marching the student capable of such audacity to be exiled to the countryside or, in more extreme cases, fed to wild dogs. Neither of these happened though, of course. The recent publication of Black Girl from Pyongyang is testament to that reality.
This is a story as much about Monica's identity as it is her two fathers: Francisco Macias and Kim Il Sung. This is a coming of age story about a young black girl in a North Korean boarding school. The youngest of her class at Mangyongdae Revolutionary Boarding School, her peers were generally two years older than her so as to better accommodate Monica's height. To be the youngest anyway is tough, to do so in a Korean setting with age and hierarchy wielding strong influence is something else altogether.
You might forgive yourself for having your mind race to other high-teen escapades such as Harry Potter or Wednesday. It screams Netflix adaptation. And this is testament to the way in which it is written and how the story unfolds. We see life through the eyes of a young girl. The wisdom, maturity, and experience will come later. The start is simply confusion, passion, and North Korea through the eyes of someone who still doesn't know who they are on even the most fundamental levels. You cheer for her throughout, growing up alongside her as she experiences the hunger and deprivation of military training, feels a sense of pride when she becomes a college student and attends the Pyongyang University of Light Industry, and sit beside her crying at night as she comes to terms with her existential searching of who exactly is a black girl in Pyongyang far removed from home and parents.
Exiting the cave
It is when she first leaves Pyongyang to visit her cousin in Beijing that a real change takes place. By leaving her home, she finally understood it. By encountering other people, she saw herself more clearly. Such enlightenment and intellectual development is normally lauded. However, for Monica, it was dangerous. It threatened to disrupt what normalcy she had achieved against all odds in her new home. The nascent danger presented itself most clearly in her philosophy class at university. She had been to China, interacted with Americans, seen South Korea people in the flesh, and realized they are not horned and decrepit.
However, Monica also comes to realize that North Korea is not her hometown either. Despite calling herself Korean, straightening her hair in the morning so that it is like her classmates, and trying so incredibly hard to be accepted, ultimately she comes to realize that her hometown is neither Pyongyang nor Wonsan. Moreover, she doesn't know what her hometown looks or smells like. What is a hometown? In this moment she recounts the classic Korean folktale of the Woodcutter and the Fairy ― a story of people estranged from their natural environment who nevertheless find their way home, whether they want to or not. In a wonderful ironic twist, Monica uses a traditional Korean folktale known to children both sides of the border to prove to herself that she is not, in fact, Korean. The postmodernists would be proud.
Challenging us
The book is not only about Monica coming to term with her own identity, it also challenges our perceptions of North Korea. We can't very easily imagine the situation of foreign students living in Pyongyang; nevertheless, that is a reality. And it has been for quite some time. When I told Korean people I was reading a story of an African girl raised in Pyongyang at the behest of Kim Il-sung, many looked at me askance. When I then showed them some pictures, they shook their heads in disbelief. This is why these books are important. They challenge us in ways we did not know existed. They create another narrative alongside the existing hegemonic thought practices.
Before leaving Pyongyang, Monica recounts the words of her friend Yun Mi. Raised abroad as the daughter of a diplomat, Yun Mi knew about the outside world and what it contained. "Wherever you go, the people of that country have their own fences constructed of self-made prejudices and stereotypes. If we're trapped, those people are trapped too. The only difference is that they have a few more things they can enjoy."
Yun Mi is certainly correct about us being able to enjoy much more than the average North Korean citizen. But is she right about us having our own ideological fences in our minds? That is a question asked by Monica Macias in this book, and it's why, everything else considered, it's worth reading. Are we really living free? Monica discovers that such a life outside North Korea means people having the freedom to criticize her biological father Francisco Macias, the country of her birth, the man who helped raise her, Kim Il-sung, and the country she called home for many years.
Truth and skin
Despite eventually leaving North Korea in search of her roots, it seems that North Korea never really left Monica. Wherever she went in the world, she would find memories and people curious about her story. Some would try to use it for their own gain, leveraging hate and politics; others would be open-minded and curious about a story they never believed could have existed.
In writing this review, I feel somewhat conscious of referring to Monica's skin color and ethnicity so frequently. She is clearly more than this. She is a thinker, a feeler and a philosopher. With an easy nature, the book skips between wonderful photos, lunch with friends, and references to Plato, Bertrand Russel, and Edward Said. To read Black Girl From Pyongyang is to hear a conversation a thinker has with oneself. And it is a great privilege to have done so. Read this book and understand Monica better. Doing so will help you understood yourself more.
Dr. David A. Tizzard (datizzard@swu.ac.kr) has a Ph.D. in Korean Studies and lectures at Seoul Women's University and Hanyang University. He is a social/cultural commentator and musician who has lived in Korea for nearly two decades. He is also the host of the Korea Deconstructed podcast, which can be found online. The views expressed in the article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.
The Korea Times · June 3, 2023
14. S. Korean defense chief criticizes China, Russia for neglecting illegal NK actions
MINDEF is right. We need to continue to call out China and Russia for their complicity in north Korean "illegal" actions.
S. Korean defense chief criticizes China, Russia for neglecting illegal NK actions
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 3, 2023
SINGAPORE — South Korean defense minister denounced China and Russia for neglecting their responsibility to hold North Korea accountable for its ongoing illegal actions, including ballistic missile launches.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup made the rare criticism in his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a gathering that attracted defense ministers and high-level delegates from over 40 countries, including Australia, the United States, China, Japan, Ukraine and the European Union.
Lee did not explicitly name China and Russia. But he clearly attributed blame to the veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council for their refusal to take action against North Korea's ongoing ballistic missile launches.
"Some countries are ignoring North Korea's unlawful behaviors that violate the rules-based order. This creates holes in sanctions against North Korea, passed at the UN Security Council," Lee said.
"And due to objections by countries with responsibilities, despite North Korea's unprecedented number of missile launches last year, not a single additional UNSC Resolution was able to pass."
Lee's speech came days after North Korea's announcement of its intention to launch a military reconnaissance satellite, following a failed attempt earlier this week. South Korea believes the launch to be of a long-range ballistic missile. This satellite launch by North Korea is in clear violation of multiple resolutions of the UN Security Council, as it involves the use of ballistic missile technologies.
But the UN Security Council’s 15 members on Friday failed to take any action against North Korea's latest launch as China and Russia openly defended North Korea's illegal act.
"North Korea is the only country that threatens a preemptive attack with nuclear weapons against a specific country," Lee said.
He also stressed the importance of the international community displaying "resolute and united strength by passing UNSC resolutions."
"With such a united action, we need to change the Kim regime's calculation," Lee said. "We also need to make the regime realize that coercion and threats will never be rewarded as showcased through the war in Ukraine."
Lee said that the reckless nuclear and missile development has been escalating concerns regarding nuclear proliferation, ultimately leading to a regional arms race.
"As a result, the security dilemma of rising security costs for each country is expanding."
In the given context, Lee emphasized the importance of enhancing bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, as well as trilateral security cooperation involving South Korea, Japan, and the United States. He highlighted that such collaboration is an "inevitable measure taken to protect regional freedom and peace from the advancing North Korean nuclear and missile threats."
"North Korean threats are that major a challenge that deeply agitates the structure of regional security."
In his speech, Lee also drew attention to the dire human rights situation in North Korea, and strongly condemned the Kim Jong-un regime for prioritizing the purchase of food over the development of nuclear weapons and missiles.
Lee highlighted that the deplorable human rights conditions in North Korea deviate from the universal values that the international community strives to uphold and "damage the values of freedom, rule of law, and human rights in the Indo-Pacific."
"The North Korean human rights challenge is no longer a problem of an individual country," he said. "Rather, it is a collective task, for which all members of the Indo-Pacific must together condemn and look for solutions."
Meanwhile, during his speech on "US leadership in the Indo-Pacific," US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin emphasized the ongoing efforts by the United States and South Korea to enhance US extended deterrence. Austin highlighted that these efforts are crucial as "North Korea continues its nuclear threats, missile tests, and other dangerous provocations."
Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Defense Secretary Austin outlined the collective efforts of the allies, which encompassed increased deployments of the US most advanced assets and the historic Washington Declaration signed by US President Joe Biden and President Yoon following the April 26 Summit in Washington.
"We're cooperating more deeply than ever with the ROK on joint planning, exercises, information-sharing, and more," Austin stated, using the acronym for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea
Austin further emphasized the significance of strengthening security cooperation among South Korea, the US and Japan in response to the ongoing missile and nuclear threats from North Korea. He acknowledged the notable strides taken by South Korea and Japan to enhance their collaboration, referring to these measures as "bold steps" by the two countries to work more closely together.
"Strong ties between Tokyo and Seoul are good for both countries -- and for the region," Austin said. "And we've made tremendous progress in our own trilateral cooperation with Japan and the ROK, including more regular military exercises and greater information sharing."
By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 3, 2023
14. North Korean leader ‘terrorized’ by South Korea’s closer ties with US, Japan
Is the NIS telling me what I want to hear? I surely want Kim to be intimidated but I do fear that he is unstable. Instability could lead to catastrophic consequences.
.
[Exclusive] North Korean leader ‘terrorized’ by South Korea’s closer ties with US, Japan
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · June 2, 2023
Fearful Kim Jong-un may act out with “more venturous military provocations”
By Kim Arin
Published : Jun 3, 2023 - 00:05 Updated : Jun 3, 2023 - 00:05
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is seen at a meeting with the members of the non-permanent satellite launch preparatory committee in Pyongyang on May 16. (KCNA-Yonhap)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is unstable and intimidated by deepening trilateral security ties between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington under Yoon Suk Yeol administration, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service believes.
The NIS has intelligence from multiple sources that the three countries strenthening security relationship to counter North Korea is “stoking anxiety” and “having an adverse effect” on Kim’s health. Kim views Japan's expanding role in the three-way security set-upas especially threatening.
Intelligence officials think Kim will go above and beyond to make sure the next launch of North Korea’s first spy satellite is successful, to make up for the humiliation caused by the failure of the first launch earlier this week, according to sources familiar with the matter.
The failed launch, coupled with the changing dynamics of the trilateral security cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the US may render Kim more unstable and unpredictable.
The NIS sees it as a possibility that the North Korean leader’s “psychological instability” may manifest as “venturous military provocations” and further “terrorization” of his own people.
On top of the spy satellite’s re-launch, North Korea may carry out provocations on multiple fronts including cyberattacks and firing of short-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
In a briefing Wednesday, Rep. Yoo Sang-bum of the National Assembly intelligence committee said the North Korean leader was drinking and smoking heavily and suffering from sleep disorders, citing the NIS. Based on an artificial intelligence-assisted analysis, Kim was thought to weigh around 140 kilograms.
By Kim Arin (arin@heraldcorp.com)
16. Turning 70, South Korea-U.S. alliance expands scope, defies frictions
Turning 70, South Korea-U.S. alliance expands scope, defies frictions
War-forged friendship has kept the peace, but faces a rising China
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
Subscriber-only
By - The Washington Times - Thursday, June 1, 2023
SEOUL — The South Korea-U.S. alliance, which marks its 70th birthday on July 27, has delivered significant dividends for both parties, but is also facing new frictions on both the strategic and economic fronts against the backdrop of a rising China.
The alliance — its past, present and uncertain future — were under the microscope at the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity Thursday, a global conference set on the resort island off South Korea‘s southern coast.
Calling it “an alliance of shared values,” U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg said it was exceptional not just for its durability, but also for its reach. “The partnership ensures peace in the region and cooperation with like-minded partners in the region,” he said.
The alliance was forged after the Korean War ended inconclusively in July 1953. Despite hundreds of clashes and testing crises since, ranging from commando raids and terrorist espionage to patrol boat battles and torpedo strikes, bilateral deterrence has kept a hostile, nuclear-armed North Korea — and a Korean War II — at bay.
Moreover, South Koreans fought under U.S. command in Vietnam, and subsequently took on non-combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the U.S., the peninsula provides GIs with a vital bridgehead on the Asian mainland.
Economically, the alliance has contributed to South Korea‘s astonishing rise from poverty and destruction to one of the globe’s economic superstars.
Seoul, unlike Pyongyang, which sacrificed its economy on the altar of its military, had spare capital to invest in infrastructure and industry. That investment, combined with access to the U.S. market and the global trade system and lubricated by the sweat equity of a highly educated populace, enabled Seoul to forge an “economic miracle.”
The country also trod a bumpy — and sometimes bloody — political path, finally transitioning to full democracy in 1987. Today a top-10 global economy, a major producer of leading products and technologies and a powerhouse in popular culture, South Korea is widely admired as a zero-to-hero national success story.
But with prominence and success have come new challenges, and new strains on generally solid bilateral ties.
South Korea‘s soaring global profile has dragged the alliance onto new terrain: “What was once a partnership for security on the peninsula has expanded into a comprehensive alliance,” Mr. Goldberg said.
South Korea‘s national rise is rebalancing what was formerly a lopsided partnership into a near-peer relationship with Washington. That, too, creates inevitable challenges as Seoul gains a louder voice, and as a partnership aimed at deterring North Korea now has ambitions far beyond the tense, divided peninsula.
Security frictions
In return for Seoul renewing its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the recent “Washington Declaration,” agreed to by President Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol during Mr. Yoon’s April state visit to the White House, established the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group. It also touched on a still-sensitive nerve here — Can the South truly rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella if North Korea launches a nuclear weapon its way?
Backers are hoping that the new consultative body, designed to reassure South Korea via nuclear sharing, will prove more effective than NATO’s comparable Nuclear Planning Group because of a far tighter circle of decision-makers.
“The NCG is bilateral, the NPG is multilateral,” said Lee Soo-hoon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute of Defence Analyses. “I think the NCG will be much more efficient in coming to synergistic agreement.”
But the Yoon government has taken flak from domestic critics who say Seoul should have its own independent nuclear deterrent. Relying on the U.S., they say, amounts to “violating ‘nuclear sovereignty.’” A recent poll found that over 70% of South Koreans agree with Mr. Yoon’s critics.
“I have heard that notion,” Mr. Lee admitted. He argued for not politicizing the issue, but suggested that a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted on whether it is better for South Korea to rely on the NGC on one hand or leave the international nonproliferation pact and develop a nuclear bomb of its own.
The nascent NGC needs further input as it takes shape, analysts say.
“The finger on the button remains in Washington, but the voice is in the ear of Washington every hour of every day,” said Patrick Cronin of the Hudson Institute. “That mechanism is going to grow.”
The NGC “is a very important first step,” said Kim Hyun-wook of the Korea Diplomatic Academy, but added, “I don’t think this is the final outcome.”
Ties with Japan
U.S. speakers at the Jeju gathering praised Seoul for patching up relations with Tokyo, where a feud between its two key East Asian allies has long bedeviled U.S. strategic policy for the region. “Trilateral security cooperation with Japan is a huge step forward,” said Alison Hooker of American Global Strategies. “I commend President Yoon for his huge step.”
While the forum was underway, a Japanese warship was drilling off Jeju with South Korean, U.S. and other counterparts. Earlier, while visiting the port of Busan, the Japanese vessel had flown a “Rising Sun” ensign.
The flag was met with angry protests by the prior Seoul government, due to its connections to Japan’s militarist past. The 2018 brouhaha led a Japanese vessel to cancel a visit to the Jeju naval review.
While South Korean-Japanese relations warm up, Seoul remains reluctant to commit to any role in the defense of Taiwan against a possible Chinese attack. Mr. Biden has been outspoken on the matter, stating that — regardless of the ambiguities of the Taiwan Relations Act — the U.S. military will fight for the island.
Mr. Lee noted that Japanese colleagues at the conference were “a little surprised” about South Korea‘s reluctance on Taiwan and questioned whether Washington has prepared allies to deal with what many say is an escalating crisis over the island democracy’s fate.
“If there is a contingency, there will be a question of [South Korean-based U.S. forces] regarding the Korea-U.S. alliance,” he said. He suggested that the issue will be discussed “in different steps,” with the roles of U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan and South Korea‘s own army and navy still to be determined.
Economic frictions
South Korea and the U.S., which signed a free trade agreement in 2012, last year did $227 billion in bilateral trade. (China remains the South’s single biggest import and export market.) South Korea is the world’s biggest market for U.S. beef, and since the Biden administration entered office, Korean firms have announced over $100 billion worth of investments in the U.S.
In addition to being leading providers of leading-edge components such as displays and semiconductors, “Korean companies produce critical components like EV batteries and solar panels,” said Mr. Goldberg, making Seoul a key player in the Biden administration climate policy hopes.
However, Washington’s policies to wall China off from key technologies could hurt trade and investment, with many believing it threatens the efficiencies of vital supply chains. The concerns are particularly acute here, given China‘s outsized impact as a trading partner.
“The U.S. is making efforts to garner support from like-minded countries to build a new international regime to replace the old one,” said Lee Hyo-young of the Korean Diplomatic Academy. “Unfortunately, the U.S. is trying to break up patterns of [cross-border] economic interdependence.”
South Korean chipmakers reportedly have discreetly voiced concerns over a lack of transparency and consultation in U.S. policymaking.
Likewise, with the Biden administration seemingly embracing approaches such as managed trade and industrial policy to confront the China challenge, new frictions have arisen over U.S. subsidies to domestic companies. South Korean automakers, for example, do not qualify for subsidies contained in Mr. Biden’s massive 2021 Inflation Reduction Act — despite huge investments in the U.S.
South Korean supplies may also be sideswiped by the sanctions and other restrictions on high-tech computer chip production because of Mr. Biden’s CHIPS Act, designed to cut off Beijing from cutting-edge technologies that could have military uses.
“Korean companies are concerned about the conditions of the IRA and the CHIPS Act,” said Ms. Lee, warning of an upcoming “subsidies war.”
“There are questions of, ‘Are they going to give up on the U.S. subsidies in order to keep their factories in China?’” she said.
All this creates a lot of alliance maintenance work to do.
“We have a lot of challenges, including power-sharing over extended deterrence and working out the details of de-risking high technologies to China, and working out the rules of future trade and how to deal with economic coercion and the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,” the Hudson Institute’s Mr. Cronin observed.
IPEF is a U.S. led-initiative, announced in May 2022, to set standards in future technologies with like-minded partners, along with pillars on trade, supply chain, clean energy and anti-corruption practices. It was introduced after the U.S. in 2017 pulled out of talks on the prior Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal with countries across the region.
But Mr. Cronin added, “All of these are exciting opportunities to be involved in.”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
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washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
17. Is this how North and South Korea reunite?
I am glad to see more talk of unification and the potential for regime collapse.
Is this how North and South Korea reunite?
A new history of the Korean peninsula examines its history of division – and unearths some surprising green shoots of progress
2 June 2023 • 12:00pm
The Telegraph · by Christopher Harding
Japan’s defeat in 1945 brought liberation for Korea, after 35 years under colonial rule. American intercepts of Japanese intelligence that summer suggested that Koreans seized the moment: local government offices were taken over, colonial police disarmed and collaborators punished. Newly-freed political prisoners, numbering in their thousands, began laying the foundations for self-rule.
It was not to be. As Victor D Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo point out early in Korea: A New History of South and North, three factors have long determined the fate of the peninsula: its location, the relative power of its rulers, and the intentions of the larger players that surround it. Over the centuries, it has been a Chinese satellite, a staging post for Mongol armies hoping to conquer Japan, and a 680-mile-long approach road for samurai intent on invading China. The post-war era brought more of the same. With the division of the peninsula into American and Soviet zones of occupation, Korean aspirations were sacrificed to the politics of an emerging Cold War.
Cha and Pacheco Pardo have years of expertise in Korean international relations, and the result here is a book that in style and focus – largely on big-picture geopolitics – occasionally reads like a briefing paper. This is not necessarily a bad thing: what A New History lacks in social or cultural analysis (the authors’ own anecdotes do much of the heavy lifting), it makes up for in a crisp and balanced account of how and why North and South have diverged since 1945.
One of the most compelling aspects of that account is the human cost associated with Korea being – as a local proverb puts it – a “shrimp among whales”. Three million Korean civilians died during the Korean War, and more than half of the peninsula’s factories, roads, railways, power-plants and homes were destroyed. Recovery was a matter, Cha and Pacheco Pardo write, of each side knowing how to play its “pawn status” to the best advantage. Under Kim Il-sung, handpicked for greatness by Stalin, North Korea had the more coherent economic and industrial plan. It was also richer in natural resources. The South took longer to get going, helped by billions of dollars of American aid, US troops and nuclear weapons on its soil, and lengthy periods of authoritarian rule.
A longstanding concern for Koreans, North and South, is the prospect of unification. The authors know this territory well: in 1997, Cha brought together officials from South Korea’s unification ministry with German bureaucrats who had worked on their own country’s reunification after 1990. Watching the South Korean delegation “furiously scribbl[ing] down everything that was said”, he was shocked to realise that after seven years they had yet to think seriously about the German example.
The challenges are daunting. Experts talk about “hard landing” scenarios – the collapse of the regime in the North; all-out war – and the “soft landing” of peaceful integration. Even in the latter case, the government of a united Korea would face the cost of raising living standards and upgrading infrastructure in the North, while managing enormous movements of people: northerners heading south for jobs; southerners travelling north to stake old claims to property. Still, say Cha and Pacheco Pardo, the rewards could be extraordinary: a “marriage of South Korean cutting-edge technology and capital with North Korean cheap labour and abundant mineral resources”, and a peninsula transformed from shrimp to “shaper and generator of change” in the region.
Given China’s reluctance to part with its North Korean ally – a source of cheap raw materials, and a buffer against the “iron triangle” of American, Japanese and South Korean power – Cha and Pacheco Pardo are right to be cautious about making predictions. They do, however, appear optimistic about the jangmadang phenomenon in North Korea: local markets for goods and services that began to emerge in the 1990s, some of them trading across the border with China and most of them run by women.
Tolerated (and taxed) by the regime, these markets appear to some observers like the seeds of a market economy, even a new civil society. Might this “entrepreneurial class” end up forcing the pace on the peninsula? It is, to say the least, an intriguing idea.
Korea: A New History of South and North by Victor D Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo is published by Yale University Press at £20. To order your copy for £16.99, call 0844 871 1514 or visit Telegraph Books
The Telegraph · by Christopher Harding
18. Fed up with corruption, North Koreans are attacking police, secret document shows
More indicators of potential internal instability. Is there a tipping point and how close could the Koreans in the north be to it?
Excerpt:
Tipping Point
The government has however been taking measures to prevent these types of violent outbursts against police.
Since June 2022, citizens have been required to attend educational sessions on following the law in the workplace and at home, and the country’s leader Kim Jong Un has enacted policies that treat violence against law enforcement as acts against the state that must be punished severely.
But the cases reported in the document show that some citizens are so far past their breaking points that they are willing to disregard the risk they take when they go after the police.
The sources said that it was likely that people in other parts of the country also feel animosity towards the police and that it is approaching a tipping point.
“Some of my friends insist that if a war breaks out, they will go out and kill the police first,” he said. “The people’s patience seems to be reaching its limit.
Fed up with corruption, North Koreans are attacking police, secret document shows
Paid nearly worthless wages, police exploit their positions to extract bribes to survive
By Ahn Chang Gyu for RFA Korean
2023.06.02
rfa.org
Disgruntled North Koreans are lashing out against police corruption by openly protesting against them and in some cases beating officers, according to a local government official who saw a secret document detailing the cases.
“Not long ago, I came across a secret document containing surprising information. Between July and December of last year, dozens of incidents of people protesting against the tyranny of police, or even extracting revenge by beating them up have occurred here in Ryanggang province,” an administrative official in the northern province told Radio Free Asia on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
The document had details on several violent attacks on police officers, he said.
“A resident from Paegam county and his son cornered a police officer on the roadside and he inflicted severe bruises on the officer’s head,” the official said.
“It was said to be revenge for the officer insulting his wife by treating her like a criminal in her workplace by forcing her to confess that she was responsible for a loss that occurred at her workplace,” he said.
People have come to view the police as bullies, another resident of Ryanggang province told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“The anger of the residents against the police, who use all kinds of tyranny under the pretext of law enforcement, is increasing,” he said. “When you go to the marketplace, you can often see women protesting or arguing loudly, and pointing fingers at the police who are in charge.”
Sometimes fights will break out at the marketplace between police and merchants, the resident said.
“Nearby people, like women who have come to shop, will take the side of the merchant and they’ll protest against the police together,” he said. “To see a weak woman directly confronting a police officer while he was on duty would have been unimaginable in the past”
Economic collapse
North Korea’s centrally planned economy collapsed in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, and since then, salaries for government-assigned jobs have become essentially worthless.
To survive, people have had to take on side jobs, start businesses, or – in the case of police officers – collect bribes.
The already struggling economy took a turn for the worse during the COVID-19 pandemic, and citizens who once tolerated the police making bribery rounds are now fed up, sources tell RFA.
In another incident, in the city of Hyesan, an officer stopped a driver and demanded gasoline and cash when the driver did not have the sufficient documents for driving on hand.
“In anger at the tyranny of the … officer, who detained him and his car for over two hours, the driver ran over the officer’s motorcycle with his car and beat him up until he was knocked out,” the official said.
In another incident, a woman from Kimjongsuk county visited the house of the police officer who had sentenced her husband to 6 months at a labor training camp. She said her husband had not shown up for work for family reasons but the officer had treated him like an unemployed gangster.
“She protested by ripping off the officer’s sleeves and tearing the epaulet off of [his uniform],” the official said, adding that the frequency of incidents similar to those detailed in the internal document caused the police to submit a report, with relevant data, to the central government, asking for help and guidance.
“Even the social security agents I know are very perplexed,” he said. “They say that unless those who fight against law enforcement officers are punished severely, they won't know what else could happen to them down the line.”
Tipping Point
The government has however been taking measures to prevent these types of violent outbursts against police.
Since June 2022, citizens have been required to attend educational sessions on following the law in the workplace and at home, and the country’s leader Kim Jong Un has enacted policies that treat violence against law enforcement as acts against the state that must be punished severely.
But the cases reported in the document show that some citizens are so far past their breaking points that they are willing to disregard the risk they take when they go after the police.
The sources said that it was likely that people in other parts of the country also feel animosity towards the police and that it is approaching a tipping point.
“Some of my friends insist that if a war breaks out, they will go out and kill the police first,” he said. “The people’s patience seems to be reaching its limit.
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
19. Failed 2018 Trump-Kim Summit And Biden’s Same approach: Time For US To Change Its Policy Towards North Korea – OpEd
A view from Islamabad.
Conclusion:
Leaders of North Korea starved their people to the death to possess nuclear technology and other military capabilities equivalent to the US just to ensure their survival and deter any kind of military threats from Washington. And there is no way they are giving up their nuclear or missile arsenal. Thus, the US needs to shift its policy away from denuclearisation and focus on constraining, not eliminating, the nuclear and missile arsenal of North Korea.
Failed 2018 Trump-Kim Summit And Biden’s Same approach: Time For US To Change Its Policy Towards North Korea – OpEd
June 2, 2023 0 Comments
https://www.eurasiareview.com/02062023-failed-2018-trump-kim-summit-and-bidens-same-approach-time-for-us-to-change-its-policy-towards-north-korea-oped/?
By Atiqa Tariq
On June 12, 2018, the President of the United States Donald J. Trump, and the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Kim Jong Un held a historic summit in Singapore. This was the first-ever meeting of the sitting US president with the North Korean leader.
Before the meeting, the officials of the US and DPRK were engaged in a series of talks to mitigate differences and established a framework for the summit. Both leaders had exchanged comprehensive opinions on the issues related to the new US-DPRK relations and the establishment of an enduring peace regime on the Korean peninsula. They also discussed their difference on the primary issue of denuclearisation. After the summit, President Trump declared the summit as a triumph. “Everybody can now feel much safer than the day I took the office” he stated on Twitter, “ There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea”.
Background: North Korean Nuclear and Missile negotiation
Since the 1990s, Washington has been trying to negotiate with Pyongyang to halt their nuclear and missile program. In 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty(NPT) as a nuclear-free state and allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) the inspection of its nuclear facilities. In 1992, the two Koreas signed The Joint Deceleration in which they agreed that they shall not manufacture, test, or use nuclear weapons. In February 1993, IAEA identified two undeclared sites suspected of possessing nuclear waste storage and demanded inspection. But North Korea rejected inspection and threatened that they would withdraw from NPT which marked the beginning of the first nuclear crisis of the state. After the series of talks between the US and IAEA on one side and North Korea on the other, the two sides signed the Agreed Framework in October 1994, which committed North Korea to remain the signatory member of NPT and freeze its plutonium production program which it started a year before.
Though the Agreed Framework had halted plutonium production North Korea continued its nuclear program and developed ballistic missiles of long range. In August 1998, North Korea tested its first long-range ballistic missile over Japan. President Bill Clinton’s administration conducted a series of negotiations aimed to eliminate the missile program of DPRK to which Pyongyang agreed in September 1999 in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions.
In October 2002, a new nuclear crisis began when North Korea confirmed the allegation of possessing a highly enriched uranium production program which was a clear violation of the Agreed Framework, the NPT, and the Joint Deceleration on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang issued a statement saying it was entitled to possess nuclear weapons and announced its withdrawal from NPT on January 11, 2003. Six-party Talks involving China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and the US began in 2003, which aimed at the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula but no progress was made.
On October 9, 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon and also tested seven short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles. These tests led the United Nations security council(UNSC) to impose strict trade sanctions against North Korea. In the meantime, the US also freeze dozens of North Korean foreign accounts with deposits of approximately $25 million. The Six-Party Talks resumed in February 2007 and they reached an agreement in which North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear facilities in exchange for the delivery of heavy fuel oil (to which the US previously agreed under the Agreed Framework) and the removal of US’s State Sponsors of Terrorism designations. North Korea shut down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon but very soon they refused to allow IAEA inspectors to its facilities because of the slowing down of benefits from other countries. In 2009, North Korea resumed its nuclear program, launched a long-range rocket, and in response to the UNSC condemnation of the launch it announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks.
Following years of diplomacy with the new North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, after the death of Kim Jong-il, the US, and North Korea separately announced an agreement in which North Korea agreed to the long-range missile testing moratorium, nuclear testing moratorium, allowed IAEA inspectors to the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. But, the new movement of US-DPRK talks terminated with North Korea’s launch of an earth observation satellite in April 2012, which was against the terms of the agreement. Diplomacy stalled for several years and the Obama administration expanded unilateral and international sanctions in hopes that the regime will return to the negotiation table but, in the meantime, North Korea carried out nuclear tests in 2013 and again in 2016.
High tensions in 2017 and rapprochement in 2018
President Donald Trump took office in January 2017 and adopted the policy of “maximum pressure” towards North Korea which includes continuous Twitter threats, ratcheting up economic sanctions, and giving threats of preemptive strikes and nuclear war in hopes that Pyongyang will agree to the denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula. On July 4, 2017, North Korea tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM), Hwasong-14, which was capable of reaching New York. On September 2017, Pyongyang conducted its sixth nuclear test which it claimed a hydrogen bomb. Due to these developments in Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile arsenal, Trump re-designated North Korea as a State Sponsors of Terrorism and led the UNSC to pass the resolution that banned up to 75% of North Korea’s export as well as most of its imports. The two leaders also exchanged antagonistic public insults with Trump calling Kim Jong-un a “little rocket man” while Kim calling Trump a “dotard” and said “he[Trump] made unprecedented rude nonsense one has never heard from any of his predecessors. A frightened dog barks louder.”
In 2018, after months of tensions between North and South Korea, Kim Jong-un accepted the invitation of South Korean President Moon Jae-in to participate in the 2018 Olympics that were held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. North Korea sent a high-level delegation to the Olympics which includes Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong who said that her brother welcomed the restoration of Inter Korean relations. After that, the South Korean National Security Advisor Chung Eui-Young, along with the delegation, met Kim Jong-un and reported that Kim said “DPRK would have no reason to possess nuclear weapons if military threats against North Korea were dissolved.” They also said that Kim declared that his country would cease ballistic missile and nuclear tests and they are willing to have an open-ended dialogue with the US to discuss the normalization of US-DPRK relations and denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Chung delivered the invitation of Kim Jong-un to President Trump which he accepted unexpectedly in April 2018.
The Singapore Summit of June 2018
On June 12, 2018, President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un hold a historic meeting in Singapore where they express their desire to change US-DPRK relations. Both leaders issued a joint statement in which Trump pledged to provide security guarantees to DPRK while Kim reaffirmed his resolute commitment to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The four principles of the summit, which was signed by both leaders, were:
1. US and DPRK will establish new bilateral relations
2. US and DPRK will work together to build a peace regime on Korean Peninsula
3. DPRK will work towards the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula
4. The two sides will cooperate in the recovery and repatriation of the remains of the American prisoners of war and missing in action during the Korean War
In the press conference, after signing the joint statement, Trump unilaterally announced that the United States will suspend the annual US-South Korean military exercise while putting good faith in the dialogue continuing with North Korea. He further stated that the two sides would continue negotiations with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and North Korean officials.
Implementation of the agreement
In the weeks following the summit, it appeared that the two sides were looking at each other to take tangible measures to initiate the new relations. Pyongyang was looking at the US to take palpable steps to establish a peace regime while Washington was looking for North Korea to take concrete steps towards denuclearisation. But the summit did not contain any time frame or mechanism for the implementation of the denuclearisation process. The process of denuclearisation, the establishment of a peace regime, the removal of economic sanctions, and normalizing diplomatic ties were all left uncleared in the summit. The only progress towards implementing the agreement was made when North Korea delivered 55 cases of the remains of US military members who disappeared in the Korean War. Despite continued bromance between Trump and Kim, the two sides did not hold any work-related talks until January 2019.
On February 27, 2019, the second Trump-Kim summit was supposed to be held in Hanoi, Vietnam. But the summit ended without any agreement due to disagreements regarding North Korean denuclearisation measures in exchange for the sanction relief and the two leaders left early. Trump wanted complete denuclearisation while Kim wanted relief from UNSC sanctions, security guarantees, and the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power. Because of different expectations, the two leaders walked out empty-handed. Shortly afterward, the US resumed its military exercise with South Korea which is known as Dong Maeng while Pyongyang initiated its missile tests in response to the military exercise. Kim issued the statement saying “they completely rattled us”, and further stated that this joint exercise is the evidence of Washington’s open hostility towards Pyongyang. He also announced that due to US policies to completely “strangle and stifle the DPRK”, there is no reason for North Korea to continue its nuclear and missile testing moratorium. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Son Gwon also issued a statement in which he labeled the historic summit an empty promise and accused Washington of hypocrisy.
Lessons learned and prospects
For all the rhapsodizing about his relationship with Kim Jong-un, the efforts of President Trump failed. From the claim that he has formed “a very, very good relationship” with Kim to the public musing that “we fall in love”, Trump failed to translate his relationship into a comprehensive nuclear deal. And if he thought he could then he was mistaken. In this world of realpolitik, Kim could never do personal favor to the US President while compromising his country’s nuclear weapons. After receiving numerous threats from US presidents about nuclear war, preemptive strikes, or Trump’s threatening to “destroy North Korea” in his address to the UN General Assembly, Kim Jong-un could not accept a deal that jeopardizes his nation’s security. If Washington has learned anything from these past diplomatic efforts and negotiations with Pyongyang then it should be to give up the vision that it could ever provide North Korea enough incentives to denuclearize.
Under Biden’s Presidency, US policy towards North Korea is; “The US will engage in a calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with North Korea with the goal of achieving its eventual complete denuclearisation.” Again, the US is repeating the same mistake. The US needs to change its strategic policy from denuclearisation to the limitations on the size of nuclear weapons and missiles of North Korea.
Conclusion
Leaders of North Korea starved their people to the death to possess nuclear technology and other military capabilities equivalent to the US just to ensure their survival and deter any kind of military threats from Washington. And there is no way they are giving up their nuclear or missile arsenal. Thus, the US needs to shift its policy away from denuclearisation and focus on constraining, not eliminating, the nuclear and missile arsenal of North Korea.
Atiqa Tariq is a student of BS International Relations at International Islamic University Islamabad, with areas of Interest in International politics, peace and conflict studies, Asian and African studies.
Sources
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https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-3/Grieco.pdf
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https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-singapore-summit
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/we-fell-in-love-trump-and-kim-shower-praise-stroke-egos-on-path-to-nuclear-negotiations/2019/02/24/46875188-3777-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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