​Quotes of the Day:

"Reading and writing, like everything else, improve with practice. And, of course, if there are no young readers and writers, there will shortly be no older ones. Literacy will be dead, and democracy - which many believe goes hand in hand with it - will be dead as well."

– Margaret Atwood

“What are the facts? Again and again and again – what are the facts? Shun wishful thinking, ignore divine revelation, forget what “the stars foretell,” avoid opinion, care not what the neighbors think, never mind the unguessable “verdict of history” – what are the facts, and to how many decimal places? You pilot always into an unknown future; facts are your single clue. Get the facts!”

– Robert A. Heinlein – Time Enough For Love

"And so, to those tempted by despair, I say: Remind yourself that the world is what we make it, and that to the making of it each one of us can contribute something. This thought makes hope possible: and in this hope, though life will still be painful, it will be no longer purposeless."

~Bertrand Russell

1. Exit polls project Lee will win around 50 pct of vote, leading Kim by at least 7.5 points

2. Lee Jae-myung 51.7%, Kim Moon-soo 39.3% in presidential election exit polls

3. New leader to take office immediately

4. Will Yoon Suk Yeol come to same bitter fate as his predecessors?

5. How South Korea’s election could realign the Indo-Pacific

6. Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia

7. Pyongyang slams monitoring group's report on N. Korea-Russia military cooperation

8. N. Korean leader Kim Jong-un calls new hospital construction 'great revolution'

9. South Korea set to elect liberal president after chaotic six months

10. Korea's new president

11. The Meaning of U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Korea

12. Korea Chair at CSIS warns of likely U.S. ground troop withdrawal from South Korea

13. Lee Jae-myung projected to win South Korean presidency in landslide: Exit poll

14. UK labels North Korea a ‘regional disruptor,’ warns of nuclear modernization

15. “I didn’t want to pass on the 4th generation inheritance”… North Korean defector testifies at Oslo Forum

16. North Korea censors phones, alters language automatically

17. Lee’s comment on top court stirs controversy

1. Exit polls project Lee will win around 50 pct of vote, leading Kim by at least 7.5 points

We can soon expect the allegations of election fraud which of course will only further divide (and sustain the divide of) the country which is of course at the heart of the political warfare strategies of the PRC/CCP and the Kim family regime.

(2nd LD) Exit polls project Lee will win around 50 pct of vote, leading Kim by at least 7.5 points | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · June 3, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with details, DP's reaction; ADDS photo)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, June 3 (Yonhap) -- Democratic Party (DP) candidate Lee Jae-myung will garner around 50 percent of the vote, leading People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo by at least 7.5 percentage points, four exit polls showed Tuesday.

A JTBC exit poll projected that Lee will garner 50.6 percent of the vote against Kim's 39.4 percent, while a Channel A exit poll showed Lee leading Kim 51.1 percent to 38.9 percent.

This combined file photo taken May 12, 2025, shows the presidential candidates of South Korea's major political parties -- (from L to R) Lee Jae-myung of the liberal Democratic Party, Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party and Lee Jun-seok of the minor conservative New Reform Party. (Yonhap)

An MBN exit poll projected that Lee will win 49.2 percent of the vote against Kim's 41.7 percent, while a joint exit poll by KBS, MBC and SBS showed Lee leading Kim 51.7 percent to 39.3 percent.

Lee Jun-seok, the candidate of the New Reform Party, was projected to win 7.9 percent, 8.7 percent, 7.8 percent and 7.7 percent in the JTBC, Channel A, MBN and KBS-MBC-SBS exit polls, respectively.

The JTBC poll had a margin of error of 0.9 percentage point while the Channel A poll had a margin of error of 0.93 percent point, both at the 95 percent confidence level.

The KBS-MBC-SBS exit poll's margin of error was 0.8 percentage point at the 95 percent confidence level.

DP campaign officials and leaders who were gathered in a situation room at the National Assembly erupted in applause and cheers when the exit poll results were announced.

"I believe the sovereign people have passed a severe judgment on the insurrection regime," Rep. Park Chan-dae, the DP election committee leader, told KBS.

"These are exit polls, so they are projections, but we will remain alert until our election is certain and look at what the people's judgment is, what the people's decision is."

Democratic Party leaders embrace at the National Assembly in Seoul on June 3, 2025, after exit polls show the party's candidate, Lee Jae-myung, is projected to win the presidential election. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · June 3, 2025

2. Lee Jae-myung 51.7%, Kim Moon-soo 39.3% in presidential election exit polls

Hardly a surprise.

Lee Jae-myung 51.7%, Kim Moon-soo 39.3% in presidential election exit polls

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/06/03/CALOIJ44XZDBPPI6QAC52XMH2M/

By Choi Hye-seung,

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2025.06.03. 20:18

Updated 2025.06.03. 20:18

Voters line up to cast their ballots at the No. 5 polling station in Janghan 2-dong, set up at Janghan Children’s Library in Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, on Jun. 3, the day of the 21st presidential election. /Newsis

In a joint exit poll released on Jun. 3 by South Korea’s three major terrestrial broadcasters—KBS, MBC, and SBS—Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung is projected to lead the 21st presidential election with 51.7% of the vote. People Power Party (PPP) candidate Kim Moon-soo is expected to secure 39.3%, while New Reform Party candidate Lee Jun-seok is forecast to receive 7.7%.

By age group, Lee Jae-myung is ahead of Kim Moon-soo among voters in their 20s through 50s, whereas Kim leads among those in their 60s and 70s. Lee Jun-seok garnered strong support from younger voters, particularly in their 20s, with 24.3% of the vote.

Regionally, in Seoul, Lee Jae-myung received 49.3%, followed by Kim Moon-soo at 40.1%, and Lee Jun-seok at 9.2%.

The exit poll was conducted by the Korea Election Pool (KEP), a joint forecasting committee formed by the Korea Broadcasters Association and the three terrestrial networks. The survey was carried out at 325 polling stations nationwide, collecting responses from 80,146 voters. The margin of error is ±0.8 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

3. New leader to take office immediately

​Note the photo below. Seems like a strategic angle because if it was taken more head on or to the left of the offices, the US Dragon Hill Lodge would have likely been in the picture frame. 

New leader to take office immediately

koreaherald.com · by Yoon Min-sik · June 3, 2025

President to begin five-year term with Yoon’s Cabinet and Yongsan office

The presidential office in Yongsan, central Seoul, is seen in this photo taken Monday, a day before the presidential election. (Yonhap)

As soon as the election results are confirmed by the National Election Commission, expected between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. Wednesday, the winner is expected to assume office immediately.

Exit polls Tuesday evening indicated Democratic Party of Korea candidate Lee Jae-myung held a decisive lead — by a margin of from at least by 7.5 percentage points to as much as 12.4 points — over his main rival Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party.

The winner will take over from acting President Lee Ju-ho, who has led the country in a caretaker capacity.

The early election to fill the vacancy in the nation’s top office became necessary after former President Yoon Suk Yeol was impeached in December and the Constitutional Court upheld his removal in April.

As such, the new leader will start his five-year term with a Cabinet appointed by the ousted predecessor and in the Yongsan office in central Seoul, the much-disputed site of relocation chosen by Yoon.

The Public Officials Election Act states that the winner of a presidential early election shall commence his or her term immediately after the win is confirmed, which would be during the general assembly of the National Election Commission on Wednesday morning. In normal circumstances, a state-funded transition team assists the president-elect in affairs related to the new administration, such as forming a Cabinet, preparing policies and other matters related to the takeover.

In the case of the 2017 presidential election on May 9, 2017 — the first-ever presidential early election after the direct election system was implemented in 1987 — Moon Jae-in's win was confirmed at around 8:09 a.m. on May 10. His inauguration took place at noon that day, although it was only a formality, given his term had already started the moment the NEC confirmed his win.

Yoon Cabinet to accompany new administration

The political turmoil following Yoon's martial law imposition in December not only led to his own early departure from office, it set off a series of resignations at the ministerial level, including two key positions of the Cabinet: the prime minister and the finance minister, who are next in line in the order of presidential succession.

The third in line, Education Minister Lee thus assumed the role of acting president, prime minister and finance minister to lead the administrative branch until the new president takes office.

A Cabinet meeting presided over by acting President Lee Ju-ho, the education minister, is held at the government complex in Seoul on May 28. (Yonhap)

Of a total 21 Cabinet seats, only 14 are now occupied. Vacant seats include core roles such as the interior minister and the defense minister. The next president will have to run the government with a short-staffed Cabinet.

Precedents set by the Moon administration suggest it will take a considerable period of time for the new president to fully replace the ministers to form the inaugural Cabinet. It took 76 days for Moon to hold his first Cabinet meeting in which all the members were his own appointments.

The appointment of a prime minister requires the approval of more than half of the National Assembly members in attendance at a session. This would not likely present a problem for the Democratic Party, which already has over half of the 300 seats in the parliament. The People Power Party, however, holds well below a majority in the parliament.

Should Lee be elected, his administration would lead to the relocation of the presidential office from the current spot in Yongsan-gu, Seoul. Lee has said Yongsan is just a provisional office, although the time constraint of the snap election would mean he would have to begin his term there.

Lee said he would first relocate to the former presidential office of Cheong Wa Dae before ultimately pushing for a move to the administrative town of Sejong, some 120 kilometers south of Seoul. Kim said he would maintain the current presidential office in Yongsan if elected.

minsikyoon@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Yoon Min-sik · June 3, 2025

4. Will Yoon Suk Yeol come to same bitter fate as his predecessors?

​Perhaps too soon to tell as we need to see what happens to Moon Jae In first so that the pattern of fallen leaders will be continuous. However, The new president will likely force the court cases against Mon to be discussed while Yoon will suffer the full brunt of the court.

Will Yoon Suk Yeol come to same bitter fate as his predecessors?

koreaherald.com · by Lee Si-jin · June 3, 2025

Former President Yoon Suk Yeol (left) and his wife Kim Keon Hee arrive at a polling station in Seocho-gu, southern Seoul, Tuesday. (Yonhap)

With ousted President Yoon Suk Yeol’s trial set to run until mid-December, he won't face a verdict until several months after the new president is elected.

The Criminal Act stipulates that those convicted of leading an insurrection face either the death penalty or life imprisonment. Experts The Korea Herald spoke to said he was likely to be found guilty and would face a prison sentence.

“Yoon’s martial law declaration did not cause significant injuries or deaths like ex-President Chun Doo-hwan’s Gwangju massacre in 1980. I expect the court to sentence him to life imprisonment rather than the death penalty,” a former research judge at the Constitutional Court, Noh Hee-bum, told The Korea Herald.

Lee Yun-ju, a law professor at Myongji University, expected a similar fate for Yoon.

“I think Yoon, who is a former prosecutor, knows that he cannot be acquitted in the criminal trial. He continues to politicize the trial, like how he expressed his support for conservative party’s presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo. Yoon plans to wait for a potential special pardon provided by the conservative People Power Party after the conservative party (hypothetically) retains power in the June 3 election,” said Lee.

Lee Jae-myung, the liberal Democratic Party of Korea candidate who was projected to win as of press time at 9:30 p.m. according to exit polls, previously announced that there would be no political retaliation targeting certain people if he is elected president. But Lee also said the crime of insurrection must be punished.

“Those who turned their guns on the people must be strictly punished so that such incidents never happen again,” Lee said via a local YouTube channel talk show on May 31.

Though the ousted president’s future remains uncertain until the Supreme Court hands down its final verdict, Yoon is expected to join the parade of the troubled history of South Korea’s former presidents.

Following is a list of presidents who once stood at the pinnacle of power, then saw their careers end in disgrace.

Former South Korean presidents at criminal trials

Former President Roh Tae-woo (left) and former President Chun Doo-hwan stand side by side during a court hearing at the Seoul District Court in this undated file photo. (The Korea Herald DB)

In 1995, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo became the first two former presidents to be arrested.

Chun, who not only seized power through a 1979 coup, but also masterminded the massacre that quelled the Gwangju Democratic Uprising in 1980, was indicted on charges of insurrection, treason, bribery and corruption in 1996.

Roh, who became president by emerging from a divided field in the democratic election that followed Chun's ouster, was tried for his role in the 1979 military coup as well.

Though the Seoul District Court sentenced Chun to death and handed down a prison term of 22 years and six months to Roh in its first trial verdict, the Supreme Court reduced Chun's punishment to life imprisonment and Roh's sentence by five years.

The two former presidents were pardoned by former President Kim Young-sam in 1997, at the advice of President-elect Kim Dae-jung, after serving less than two years in prison.

Then-President Park Geun-hye pays tribute at the April 19th National Cemetery in Gangbuk-gu, northern Seoul, in 2013, on the 53rd anniversary of the pro-democracy uprising on April 19, 1960. (Presidential Archives)

Two other former presidents — Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak — have seen cases advance all the way to a trial verdict.

Park, the first elected president to be both impeached by the National Assembly and removed from office by the Constitutional Court, was indicted in 2017 on multiple charges, including bribery, abuse of power and coercion.

In its 2018 ruling, the court found Park guilty of 16 out of the 18 charges and sentenced her to 24 years in prison. Park spent four years and nine months behind bars. She was eventually pardoned by her successor, President Moon Jae-in.

Then-President Lee Myung-bak delivers his New Year's speech in 2012. (Presidential Archives)

Ex-President Lee was charged in April 2018 on 16 criminal counts, including embezzlement and bribery.

A district court found him guilty of seven counts and sentenced him to 15 years in prison in its first trial verdict in October 2018. However, Lee only spent two years and six months in prison, as he was pardoned in 2022 by former President Yoon.

Meanwhile, former President Roh Moo-hyun died by suicide amid an investigation targeting him and his family over bribery charges in 2009.

sj_lee@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Lee Si-jin · June 3, 2025

5. How South Korea’s election could realign the Indo-Pacific

​Excerpts:

If Lee wins on Tuesday South Korea’s domestic politics, its regional alignment, and its US alliance could all shift dramatically.

“This is a turning point,” Chan said. “Not just for Korea, but for the entire Indo-Pacific. And the signals from Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington suggest that they all know it.”

South Korea election preview

gzeromedia.com · June 1, 2025

How South Korea’s election could realign the Indo-Pacific

South Korean presidential candidate Lee Jae Myung of the Democratic Party speaks at a campaign rally in Seoul on May 29, 2025.

Kyodo via Reuters Connect

Writer and Reporter

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Riley Callanan

Writer and Reporter

Fresh out of Barnard College with a degree in political science, Riley is a writer and reporter for GZERO. When she isn’t writing about global politics, you can find her making GZERO’s crossword puzzles, conducting research on American politics, or persisting in her lifelong quest to learn French. Riley spends her time outside of work grilling, dancing, and wearing many hats (both literally and figuratively).

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Riley Callanan

Jun 01, 2025

South Koreans head to the polls this Tuesday, June 3, to elect a new president. They’ll face a choice between two candidates with sharply contrasting visions for the country’s future — the outcome could determine whether Seoul stays closely aligned with the US and Japan, or shifts toward a more independent course that might favor closer ties with China.

Why is there an election now? The special election comes after former President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law in December — a move widely condemned as an unnecessary and unconstitutional power grab – and was subsequently impeached and removed from office. Ever since, South Korea has been facing “a slow-moving catastrophe,” according to Eurasia Group’s regional expert Jeremy Chan, one that’s rippled through Seoul’s economy, foreign policy, and image as a stable democracy.

Who’s running? Yoon’s conservative People Power Party party has nominated Kim Moon-soo, one of the few politicians to stand by Yoon during his impeachment drama. Kim would likely continue Yoon’s fiscal and foreign policies. The party is gambling that the tie to Yoon won’t hurt Kim too much with the moderates whose support he will need to win.

His opponent is Democratic Party nominee Lee Jae-myung, a former mayor, governor and lawmaker with a left-leaning track record.

“For two decades, Lee has been a classic progressive,” Chan explained. “Big government, high taxes on corporations and the wealthy, and redistribution.”

He has tacked to the center in his campaign, but, given that his party controls the legislature, he would face little opposition to a more classic progressive agenda. Chan expects him to govern from the left.

What do the polls say? Lee led by 14 points in a Gallup Korea poll from last week.

This vote could realign East Asia. Under Yoon, South Korea took major steps to normalize relations with Japan and deepen trilateral security cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, culminating in the Camp David summit in August 2023, something Chan says “would’ve been unthinkable under the previous DP administration.”

Lee, by contrast, has a long record of skepticism toward both Japan and the US. While he’s publicly committed to maintaining stable relations with Tokyo, his past rhetoric — calling Yoon’s Japan policy “subservient” — hints at a deeper ideological divergence.

China, it seems, is betting on that. Lee made waves on the campaign trail by saying that Seoul should stay out of any China-Taiwan conflict, though he insists he is not pro-Beijing. Earlier this year, the speaker of South Korea’s National Assembly – an ally of Lee’s – received an unusually warm welcome in Beijing, including an hour-long meeting with Xi Jinping.

“Beijing’s behavior is very telling,” Chan says. “They’re treating Lee as the next president — and as someone they can work with.”

Tensions with the US may surface quickly – especially around trade. South Korea is facing the imminent return of US President Donald Trump’s tariffs, unless a new deal is struck by July 8. But Lee is unlikely to offer concessions up front.

“He wants to go late in the negotiating queue,” said Chan, who thinks Lee will delay until similarly positioned countries like Japan, India, and Vietnam make deals that can be benchmarked against. “He doesn’t want to sign a bad deal early and look foolish later.”

If Lee wins on Tuesday South Korea’s domestic politics, its regional alignment, and its US alliance could all shift dramatically.

“This is a turning point,” Chan said. “Not just for Korea, but for the entire Indo-Pacific. And the signals from Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington suggest that they all know it.”

yoon suk yeollee jae-myungkim moon-soochinaunited statessouth korea

gzeromedia.com · June 1, 2025

6. Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia

​The 30 page report can be downloaded at the link: https://msmt.info/Publications/Reports

MSMT(Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team)

https://msmt.info/

Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia

https://msmt.info/Publications/Reports

Executive Summary and Key Takeaways

1. The rapid expansion of military, political, and economic cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and the Russian Federation in 2024 following the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine has resulted in ongoing flagrant violations of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) by both North Korea and Russia.

1. Evidence gathered and shared by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) participating states demonstrate that throughout 2024 North Korea and Russia engaged in myriad of unlawful activities explicitly prohibited under relevant UNSCRs, including but not limited to:

• transfers of arms and related materiel via sea, air, and rail including shipments of artillery, ballistic missiles, and combat vehicles from the DPRK to Russia for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine and air defense systems from Russia to the DPRK;
• training by Russian forces of North Korean troops deployed to Russia for direct

support of Russia’s war against Ukraine;

• supply of refined petroleum products to the DPRK that far exceed the yearly United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-mandated cap; and
• maintaining correspondent banking relations with the DPRK.

1. According to MSMT participating states, these forms of unlawful cooperation between the DPRK and Russia contributed to Moscow’s ability to increase its missile attacks against Ukrainian cities including targeted strikes against critical civilian infrastructure. It also provided the resources to allow North Korea to fund its military programs and further develop its ballistic missiles programs, which are themselves prohibited under multiple UNSCRs, and gain first-hand experience in modern warfare, in return for its military support to Russia against Ukraine in which over 11,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia since October 2024.

1. The signing of the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, frequent high-level exchanges between the two since 2024, the DPRK's deployment of additional troops to Russia in early 2025 and the official confirmation of North Korean military support to Russia by both governments in April 2025, suggest that, at least for the foreseeable future, North Korea and Russia intend to continue and further deepen their military cooperation in contravention

of relevant UNSCRs.

7. Pyongyang slams monitoring group's report on N. Korea-Russia military cooperation

​This is the best evidence of how thorough and effective is the report. It must be accurate if the regime is slamming it.

Pyongyang slams monitoring group's report on N. Korea-Russia military cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 2, 2025

SEOUL, June 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Monday denounced a monitoring group on the enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang for issuing a report on military cooperation between the North and Russia, calling the move a violation of a state's sovereign rights.

The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on Thursday issued the first report detailing illegal military cooperation carried out between North Korea and Russia in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.

The chief of the external policy office at North Korea's foreign ministry said the MSMT committed a "political provocation" by fabricating a report taking issue with cooperative ties between the North and Russia, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Calling the MSMT a "bogus group which has no legality in terms of existence and purpose," the official said the report is a "wanton" violation of international legal principles centering on sovereignty equality and non-interference in others' internal affairs.

"We give stern warning against the negative consequences to be entailed by its reckless acts," the North's official said in a statement carried by the KCNA.

North Korea said the MSMT is a "political tool" operating in line with the West's geopolitical interests, stressing, "It has no justification to investigate the exercise of sovereign rights of other countries," according to the KCNA.

The MSMT was established in October last year with the initiative of South Korea and the United States to continue the sanctions monitoring of North Korea following the disbandment of the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korean sanctions monitoring due to Russia's veto.

First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun (C) speaks about the launch of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) in a press conference at the foreign ministry in Seoul, together with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell (5th from L), Vice Foreign Minister Masataka Okano (7th from L) and the ambassadors of participating countries on the MSMT, in this file photo taken Oct. 16, 2024. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 2, 2025

8. N. Korean leader Kim Jong-un calls new hospital construction 'great revolution'

​Weren't they supposed to finish this in 2020 or 2021 during COVID? Or was that a different hospital?

(LEAD) N. Korean leader Kim Jong-un calls new hospital construction 'great revolution' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · June 3, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS photo)

SEOUL, June 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has hailed the construction of a new hospital as a "great revolution" in the country's public health care system, state media reported Tuesday.

The comment came during his inspection of a hospital complex under construction in Kangdong County, located on the northeastern outskirts of Pyongyang, on Monday, according to the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"The work of building modern public health facilities in cities and counties across the country is a great revolution for developing public healthcare, which has lagged behind other sectors, to surpass them within ten years," the KCNA quoted Kim as saying.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) visits the construction site for a hospital on the outskirts of Pyongyang on June 2, 2025, in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

During the visit, Kim toured various sections of the facility, including the outpatient ward, operating theater, inpatient ward and underground parking area.

He was accompanied by senior officials of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, including Kim Tok-hun, Kim Jae-ryong and O Su-yong, according to the KCNA report.

The North Korean leader emphasized the importance of advancing medical equipment and strengthening the country's health care workforce, calling for systematic and scientific training for health and medical workers.

This visit follows his attendance at the hospital's groundbreaking ceremony in February.

At that time, he ordered to build hospitals in three counties in a pilot project this year and construct 20 hospitals across cities and counties each year, starting in 2026.

North Korea launched the Regional Development 20X10 Policy in January 2024, pledging to build 20 modern factories in cities and towns annually to improve the material and cultural lives of the people. Later in August, Kim ordered an expansion of the policy to other areas, including hospitals and science and technology distribution centers.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) visits the construction site for a hospital on the outskirts of Pyongyang on June 2, 2025, in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) visits the construction site for a hospital on the outskirts of Pyongyang on June 2, 2025, in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

brk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · June 3, 2025

9. South Korea set to elect liberal president after chaotic six months

​Now the work begins for Lee. 

South Korea set to elect liberal president after chaotic six months

Exit polls show that Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party is on track for victory. His first task: Dealing with the economic fallout of Trump’s tariffs.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/03/south-korea-election-lee-jae-myung/?location=alert

June 3, 2025 at 7:45 a.m. EDTToday at 7:45 a.m. EDT

9 min

0

Lee Jae-myung speaks in Seoul on Monday. (Jintak Han/The Washington Post)

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

SEOUL — South Koreans are on track to elect Lee Jae-myung as president Tuesday, choosing a liberal whose vision to reshape his nation’s foreign policy could put him at odds with the Trump administration, particularly when it comes to China.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

Exit polls published shortly after voting ended at 8 p.m. local time showed that Lee had secured a commanding lead over his main rival, the conservative Kim Moon-soo.

Live footage of both campaign viewing rooms as the exit polls were released showed Democratic Party leaders cheering and clapping, as leaders of Kim’s People Power Party sat quietly, expressionless.

Lee, 61, was the clear front-runner in the race, which analysts said was largely a referendum on the previous government, led by Yoon Suk Yeol.

Yoon was impeached for declaring martial law in December, setting off six months of turmoil during a time of political upheaval in the United States. Yoon was formally removed from office in April, prompting an election to be called two years early.

South Koreans overjoyed after president gets impeached

1:37

South Koreans in favor of President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment celebrated after the Constitutional Court decided on April 4 to remove him from office. (Video: Julie Yoon/The Washington Post, Photo: Jintak Han/The Washington Post)

If Lee wins, he is expected to take office on Wednesday. He would arrive with a sweeping mandate and with his party in control of the National Assembly, giving him broad legislative power.

But he would face major challenges, including a polarized country, an economic slowdown and urgent foreign policy priorities that had largely been left in limbo after Yoon’s impeachment. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development forecast Tuesday that South Korea’s growth rate would slow to 1 percent this year.

While Seoul faced its worst political and constitutional crisis in decades, the Trump administration was plowing ahead with policies that affect South Korea’s economy and security interests.

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If elected, Lee would have to appeal to President Donald Trump on issues including the steep tariffs against South Korea’s key industries, including steel and autos, and his desire to scale back the number of U.S. troops based in South Korea.

“This is really a story of going from the frying pan into the fire. Yes, we will close the book on the martial law chapter, but what comes next is daunting,” said Victor Cha, Korea chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“There has been a quiet crisis brewing in the alliance, which has been masked by the political crisis in Korea and the Trump focus on everything but Korea,” Cha added.

Lee supporters in Seoul on Monday. (Jintak Han/The Washington Post)

Lee has promised to establish an emergency task force on the economic and trade crisis as his first order as president.

Trump is set to double the tariff on steel and aluminum imports to 50 percent starting Wednesday, the same day Lee would be inaugurated. That comes on top of 25 percent levies on cars and a 10 percent blanket duty on all other products while trade talks take place.

South Korea’s overall exports to its two largest markets, the United States and China, each fell by about 8 percent last month compared with a year earlier because of the trade war and supply chain realignments. South Korea’s car exports to the United States fell by more than 30 percent from the previous year, trade data showed.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has taken an increasingly hawkish approach toward China and has been pushing allies to do the same, a move that could put Lee in a bind as he seeks balance between the two superpowers.

Lee has repeatedly said on the campaign trail that he supports the U.S.-South Korea security alliance, calling it the foundation of South Korea’s diplomacy, and cooperation with Tokyo.

Lee has not been specific about his strategy to deal with Trump. But he said he is willing to make compromises and wants to get started on negotiations right away.

“I would even crawl under [Trump’s] legs if necessary,” to strike the best deal for South Koreans, Lee said in a radio interview Monday.

Seoul does not, however, need to rush to reach a conclusion on the tariff talks, he said, adding that he first wants to know what leverage Seoul has. “Before we talk about our cards, we need to see what President Trump’s real cards are,” he said in a YouTube interview last month.

Compared to predecessors from his Democratic Party, Lee is considered far less ideological on foreign policy priorities. For example, previous presidents from his party advocated for the reunification of the Koreas and had singularly pursued pro-North policies at the expense of Seoul’s relations with Washington.

But Lee is not of that ilk. He calls himself a foreign policy “pragmatist” who is driven by South Korea’s national interest, and experts say that means he is less predictable — and may be more willing to engage with Washington and less skeptical of relying too much on the United States.

Balancing act

Lee also wants to improve relations with China, Seoul’s largest trading partner by far, and engage with Beijing’s leaders in diplomatic talks. He has said Seoul’s relations with Beijing suffered under Yoon, who walked more in lockstep with Washington.

“The Yoon Suk Yeol government failed to properly resolve diplomatic issues,” Lee wrote in a self-published book this spring. At a televised debate last month, he also described Seoul’s current approach to Beijing as “neglected” and “unnecessarily antagonizing.”

Lee has deflected on whether South Korea would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese invasion, telling Time last month: “I will think about that answer when aliens are about to invade the earth.”

Yet South Koreans have grown more wary of China, polls have shown, and striking a balance at a time of intensifying U.S.-China competition has become increasingly difficult, said Sungmin Cho, Korea-China expert at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul.

“South Korea’s position is becoming more difficult, to stand on this tightrope,” Cho said. “So he will be more serious about hedging.”

The regional environment has changed markedly even since Lee last ran for president in 2022, said Miyeon Oh, Korea chair at the Rand Corporation think tank.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue to improve, and it has forged a military alliance with Russia, even sending thousands of troops to fight in Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

Plus, China and Russia have been growing closer — a development that Lee has mentioned on the campaign trail, suggesting that Seoul should be paying closer attention to its near neighbors.

Together, this has made the broader region surrounding the Korean Peninsula far more challenging, Oh said.

“North Korea has become a global threat, not a regional threat,” she said.

Troops guard the South Korean side of the buildings that straddle the line between North and South Korea, as North Korean soldiers watch from Phanmun Pavilion behind them last year. (Jintak Han/The Washington Post)

Lee has said he supports restarting dialogue with North Korea. In a February interview with The Washington Post, he said he would like to see a significant breakthrough in talks to limit Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile ambitions.

Whether Pyongyang is interested in talking with Seoul again anytime soon, however, is a question mark. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un has become more emboldened by his newfound relationship with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and he has abandoned his country’s long-standing goal to unify with South Korea.

When it comes to North Korea, South Korea is a bit stuck, said Mason Richey, international politics professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul.

“I mean, how do you talk to North Korea when North Korea doesn’t want to talk to you? What policy do you support?” Richey said.

Promise to restore stability

Lee has had plenty of time to think about these questions: This is his second tilt at South Korea’s presidency.

A former mayor of Seongnam and governor of Gyeonggi province, both located just outside Seoul, Lee rose up the ranks of the Democratic Party promoting left-wing ideas like a universal basic income.

He was selected as the party’s candidate in the 2022 presidential election but lost to Yoon by a margin of less than 1 percent.

As leader of the opposition party, he became a thorn in Yoon’s side, launching an unprecedented number of impeachments against the president’s top officials.

But during this campaign season, Lee has been pitching more centrist policies in an effort to appeal to moderate swing voters, calling his campaign “centrist-conservative,” to differentiate from what he called far-right sentiments in the conservative People Power Party.

Lee grew up in poverty, working in sweatshops as a teen to help support his family instead of attending middle school. An accident at a glove factory left one arm permanently deformed.

He jokes that compared to the wealthy who are born with silver spoons in their mouths, he grew up so poor that there wasn’t even a spoon in sight.

Last year, Lee survived an assassination attempt after a man stabbed him in the neck during an event. On the campaign trail this year, he has worn a protective vest and spoke behind bulletproof glass, which is highly unusual in South Korea’s hands-on retail politics.

He has promised to restore stability, rejecting Yoon’s martial law as an aberration in South Korea’s nearly four-decade democratic history. But it’s a tall task, given the nation’s deep polarization, experts say.

While Yoon’s impeachment and removal demonstrated checks and balances on executive overreach, “that does not mean the next president can automatically solve deep political divides,” said Darcie Draudt-Véjares, an expert in South Korean politics at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

0 Comments

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

Michelle Ye Hee Lee is The Washington Post's Tokyo bureau chief, covering Japan and the Korean peninsula. follow on X@myhlee

10. Korea's new president

​Excerpts:

The tasks ahead for Korea are wide-ranging, from the deepening U.S.-China rivalry, growing ties among autocrats in North Korea and Russia, general uncertainty surrounding the Korean economy and the effects of an aging society with a low birthrate. Firstly, the new president should talk with U.S. President Donald Trump. Direct communication and the ability to negotiate with logic, rapport and composure have proven effective — even amid the on-and-off tariffs — as witnessed by summits with other world leaders. The new president must also reconnect through multilateral international stages such as the NATO Summit and the G-7 meeting to convey that a democratic Korea is back at work and ready to lean in with its exports and technological abilities.

There is the continuing pressure through multiple senior U.S. defense officials to take on more cost-sharing for the United States military in Korea as they publicly talk up "strategic flexibility" to better deter China and emphasize flexibility in the Northeast Asia region.

The domestic landscape does not promise easier terrain. With the central Bank of Korea forecasting Korea's economic growth for 2025 at 0.8 percent, work has to begin immediately on the business front for Korea and its export-fueled economy. More important may be the work of toning down the political divisions and hostility all along the political scale, from left to right, and achieving unity. With various social reforms pledged, creating unity is one of the hardest tasks for any leader. He must achieve this through example, open discussion and transparent public communications. This is what the new administration owes the Korean public.

1. Opinion
2. Editorial

ED Korea's new president

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20250603/ed-koreas-new-president

Published Jun 3, 2025 9:32 pm KST

Updated Jun 3, 2025 10:05 pm KST

New president braces for multiple challenges at critical juncture

Voters used their mandate to the full on Tuesday to choose to put an end to and seek closure on six months of crisis following former President Yoon Suk Yeol's Dec. 3 martial law declaration. Voter turnout stood at 79.4 percent as of 8 p.m.

Exit polls jointly conducted by three networks projected 51.7 percent support for the Democratic Party of Korea's candidate Lee Jae-myung, giving him a lead b more than 10 percentage points over the conservative People Power Party's Kim Moon-soo, who garnered 39.3 percent. The minor Reform Party's Lee Jun-seok obtained 7.7 percent, but nevertheless set a precedent by refusing to unify his candidacy with Kim for tactical reasons.

This election, arriving two years ahead of schedule due to Yoon's impeachment, means that the new administration must hit the ground running. The new leader should soon name his prime minister, chief of staff and Cabinet members to address the quickly mounting tasks. Korea's once-exemplary democracy needs fixing, the economy must grow with investment in innovative technology and the sharpness of political divisions must be dulled. To that end, all aspects of the election outcome should be accepted, analyzed and then embodied by the parties. For one, the winner should humbly accept the votes cast his way in this winner-take-all election, and wisely see just how many constituents went the other way. The parties that have lost should also be mindful of what the votes mean numerically and contextually.

It is time to wash away the mud slung by the candidates, who framed the election around calling each other responsible for "insurrection" vs. "tyranny." The past six months have left almost every citizen eager to get the country's democracy and economy functioning again within democratic government structure — not under political crisis mode — and change what needs fixing. This in itself should provide a mandate for the new leader as he swiftly forms his Cabinet and draws a detailed blueprint for the nation to become an AI powerhouse, one in which there is growth with fair distribution and pragmatic diplomacy, along with the vital Korea-U.S. alliance. Most of all, the public surely will not want the new leader dealing with differences, opposition, disputes and controversies in an idiosyncratic manner. If the past six months teach a lesson, it is that the new president must show that he is a democratic leader able to exercise restraint and tolerance in even the most difficult conditions.

The tasks ahead for Korea are wide-ranging, from the deepening U.S.-China rivalry, growing ties among autocrats in North Korea and Russia, general uncertainty surrounding the Korean economy and the effects of an aging society with a low birthrate. Firstly, the new president should talk with U.S. President Donald Trump. Direct communication and the ability to negotiate with logic, rapport and composure have proven effective — even amid the on-and-off tariffs — as witnessed by summits with other world leaders. The new president must also reconnect through multilateral international stages such as the NATO Summit and the G-7 meeting to convey that a democratic Korea is back at work and ready to lean in with its exports and technological abilities.

There is the continuing pressure through multiple senior U.S. defense officials to take on more cost-sharing for the United States military in Korea as they publicly talk up "strategic flexibility" to better deter China and emphasize flexibility in the Northeast Asia region.

The domestic landscape does not promise easier terrain. With the central Bank of Korea forecasting Korea's economic growth for 2025 at 0.8 percent, work has to begin immediately on the business front for Korea and its export-fueled economy. More important may be the work of toning down the political divisions and hostility all along the political scale, from left to right, and achieving unity. With various social reforms pledged, creating unity is one of the hardest tasks for any leader. He must achieve this through example, open discussion and transparent public communications. This is what the new administration owes the Korean public.

11. The Meaning of U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Korea

​You can watch Victor's 7 minute presentation here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Su70WpoZg8c

He provides useful background on the history of US troop reductions on the Korean peninsula. (there is nothing new under the sun and he reminds of Nixon's Guam Doctrine which is always an interesting parallel for the current times))

However, like most analysts, pundits, policy makers, and politicians, he is trapped in the numbers game. He does try to minimize the focus on numbers but unfortunately numbers are the only easily quantifiable and explainable metric.

Most importantly we never discuss what we believe deters Kim Jong Un nor do we describe our assumptions about nature, objectives, and strategy of Kim Jong Un. It is difficult to discuss these issues without understanding these basics when engaging with policy makers and politicians (as well as pundits and the public) who have little to no experience in Korea. I am not criticizing Victor for this because there is only so much we can fit into these short essays.

T​here is no discussion of the actual capabilities of the USFK forces and their relationship to the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. Everyone treats USFK as if it is a warfighting command. But it is not. It is a subunified command of INODPACOM and a force provider to the command that is responsible for deterrence and defense of the ROK, the bilateral ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC). There is no explanation here (or by any analyst or pundit) that the majority of USFK forces are intelligence, communications, and logistics that are designed to optimize US contributions to the ROK/US CFC as well as the all important mission of RSO&I of follow-on US combat forces to contribute to the defense after north Korea attacks. And of course the crux of the entire challenge here and in the Indo/Asia-Pacific is that most of these follow-on forces are dual apportioned for multiple contingencies. This is why we have to ensure we have our forces postured in the right locations (in CONUS, in the Indo/Asia-Pacific region, and in specific countries (e.g., Korea, Japan, Philippines, Australia) so that we have the right forces with the right capabilities to be able to respond at the right time, decisively.

No one is calling out the absurd supposed proposal of sending the rotational Brigade Combat Team (that is the only US ground combat maneuver force in Korea - the other ground combat force being the critically important Fires Brigade that is permanently stationed in Korea) to Guam. I emphasize supposed (and absurd) because I have not heard any military official discuss this. it was only mentioned in the Wall Street Journal report last week. I know that no professional military official would propose rotating an Army Brigade Combat Team to Guam. What would be its mission? Where would it deploy to fight? And how would it train and sustain any minimum level of readiness while on Guam? But the weather will be better on Guam than Korea in the winter. But as I have long mentioned, what we should do is to once again contribute to combat patrolling on the DMZ with our infantry, but this time integrate US forces with ROK units across the DMZ. But I doubt anyone has the stomach for that.

​Lastly our narrative should not be that we are withdrawing troops from Korea. It should be that we are always working to optimize our force posture throughout the Indo/Asia Pacific and in conjunction with our allies to ensure deterrence and defense from Korea to Australia.

Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/

Graphic at the link.

​I concur with the response to Q6 (except again we should refrain from describing changes as toops reductions but instead working to optimize our force posture for multiple contingencies.)

Q6: What should the policy be going forward?

A6: The Trump administration needs to stay in close coordination with its allies as it enacts changes to the military footprint in the Indo-Pacific. Withdrawing troops from one longstanding location, though it may make sense to the Pentagon, does not happen in a policy vacuum and could lead to unintended consequences detrimental to U.S. interests. Drawdowns need to be coordinated at the operational level with adjustments that enhance the South Korean military’s capabilities to bear a greater share of the defense burden. Close consultations also need to be had with Japan, which sees any reduction of defense and deterrence capabilities on the Korean peninsula as directly undermining Japan’s security.

Barreling ahead with a U.S. plan for reorienting force posture without such consultations creates unneeded alliance friction. For example, if Seoul believes the United States is operating without any regard for allies, then it might also take a self-help view for its defense. Japan, at least currently, has at best tempered confidence that South Korea can maintain the burden of defense and deterrence on its own, and may take its own actions to secure itself.

The Trump administration also needs to precede any further troop reductions with a comprehensive intelligence assessment of whether Kim is emboldened or deterred by U.S. moves. Trump has shown a tendency to forge ahead with policies on the Korean peninsula (e.g., the so-called “bloody nose” strike, summit diplomacy, and cancellation of military exercises) without the necessary due diligence in terms of consultations within the interagency process, with allies, and intelligence assessments vis-à-vis the adversary. If such force posture adjustments lead to opportunistic aggression or strategic miscalculation by North Korea or other actors, then the goal of being laser-focused on preparing for a Taiwan fight will be undermined. 

The Meaning of U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Korea

https://www.csis.org/analysis/meaning-us-troop-withdrawals-korea

Photo: Kim Min-Hee - Pool/Getty Images

Critical Questions by Victor Cha

Published June 2, 2025

A May 23 Wall Street Journal article stated that the United States has decided to withdraw 4,500 troops from South Korea and relocate them to Guam and other bases. Department of Defense spokesperson Sean Parnell responded with a statement that the report is “not true.” Others have noted that, although a decision on troop withdrawals has not been made, the issue is under serious consideration at the Pentagon, U.S. Forces Korea, and Indo-Pacific Command.

Q1: Why is the United States considering this measure?

A1: This measure derives from a stated objective of the Trump administration to reposition and augment its forces in the Indo-Pacific to focus on prevailing in a conflict with China over Taiwan and within the first island chain (defined as the chain of islands extending from the Kuril Islands in Japan through to Taiwan, the Philippines, and to Borneo). At the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 31, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth emphasized that the United States is committed to deterring aggression in the “priority theater” of the Indo-Pacific and is “reorienting toward deterring aggression by Communist China,” including any attempt by China to “conquer Taiwan by force” or to “change the status quo in the South China Sea and the First Island Chain by force or coercion.” He warned such action is “unacceptable” and that the United States will “fight and win—decisively” in return.

This means that force deployments throughout the region—whether in Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and other locations—should be capable of flowing to, and supporting, the U.S. effort in such military contingencies. In addition, the Trump administration expects that allies and partners in the region will carry more of the burden of self-defense. In particular, these tenets apply to South Korea, where the United States traditionally has had ground forces on the peninsula dedicated specifically to one contingency (a second North Korean attack). The burden of South Korea’s defense, according to Trump officials, should be shifted to Seoul, which has a more than capable military suited to the task. 

Q2: Has the United States altered troop levels in South Korea before?

A2: Yes. As far back as 1960, the Eisenhower administration reduced troop levels in South Korea to 55,000. The next major alteration came in 1971 when the Nixon administration pulled out the 7th Infantry Division as part of the Guam (Nixon) Doctrine, calling on allies to bear a larger burden of defense. In 1977, then-presidential candidate Jimmy Carter called for the pullout of all U.S. troops from Korea, a position he later stepped back from as president. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration in 2004 transferred one brigade (2nd Brigade Combat Team) to the war in Iraq, fighting in Al Anbar Province. The current withdrawal plan, if carried out, could reduce U.S. troops in Korea to below 20,000, which would be the lowest number since the United States’ complete withdrawal of post–World War II military occupation forces prior to the Korean War.

Image

Victor Cha

President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair

Remote Visualization

Total Number of Active-Duty U.S. Military Personnel in South Korea Since 1955

Eisenhower ordered troop reduction to 55,000 by 1960

Nixon withdrew the 7th Infantry Division from Korea

Bush ordered redeployment of troops to Iraq

Active-duty personnel number drops below 30,000 for the first time

1953: 326,863

Lowest active-duty personnel number since the Korean War

1954: 225,590

Military personnel figures for 2006 and 2007 are sourced from the Department of Defense Base Structure Report, as data from the Defense Manpower Data Center were unavailable for those years.

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.Chart: CSIS Korea Chair

Q3: Will the troop withdrawals undermine the security of South Korea?

A3: The 4,500 troops in question approximate the size of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, an expeditionary, combined mobile force designed to respond to a range of potential contingencies. The Stryker Brigade was introduced to Korea in 2022 during the Biden administration to replace the Armored Brigade Combat Team. The Stryker Brigade operates on a nine-month rotational deployment and would likely rotate off the peninsula permanently. This would leave one artillery brigade on the peninsula with existing combat units.

The impact of the removal of one brigade from Korea on peninsular security should be assessed in terms of defense and deterrence. The withdrawal of one brigade should not undermine the alliance’s defense capabilities. South Korea’s military plays the primary role in terms of conventional forces to contend with a North Korean attack in conjunction with U.S. air, naval, and intelligence and reconnaissance assets. The South Korean military is better equipped and trained than its North Korean opponents in a conventional fight. 

The impact of a troop drawdown on deterrence is less clear. While U.S. troops will still remain on the peninsula, providing the tripwire to ensure U.S. defense commitments, the trendlines clearly are moving toward a reduction, if not total removal, of the U.S. ground troop footprint as Washington’s focus shifts singularly to Beijing. This will raise questions in the minds of both South Koreans and North Koreans about the long-term credibility of the U.S. defense commitment. Indeed, the removal of all troops—the traditional “tripwire” that assures the U.S. security commitment—would raise core questions about the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence despite the Washington Declaration and Nuclear Consultative Group established by the previous U.S. administration. Moreover, the U.S. drawdown would take place in a heightened threat environment that is not conducive to allied confidence. A confluence of forces—China’s assertiveness and nuclear buildup, North Korea’s confidence, buoyed by the new relationship with Russia as a result of its arms trade with Putin for his war in Ukraine, and the unpredictable nature of President Trump—could lead adversaries like Kim Jong-un to miscalculate. 

Q4: Will there be more troop withdrawals from South Korea?

A4: We could see further changes in U.S. force structure on the peninsula that include reduced ground troops and enhanced air and naval capabilities (for a Taiwan contingency). While the pace of these changes will follow a military rationale, it could be accelerated by President Trump, who has made no secret of his desire to remove ground troops from Korea. CSIS data-scraping of Trump’s statements about this topic dates back over 35 years, long before he entered politics. Trump has consistently maintained the position that South Korea is a “rich country” that is “cheating” the United States on trade (because of the bilateral trade surpluses in South Korea’s direction), and that Seoul should be managing its own defense rather than “free-riding” off the U.S. security commitment. This belief has translated into policies by Trump calling for exponentially large increases in South Korean annual payments for the non-personnel costs of stationing U.S. troops in Korea (Special Measures Agreement), as well as the bevy of tariffs, including the 25 percent reciprocal tariff levied against South Korea. 

Q5: What are the implications of troop withdrawals for the new South Korean government?

A5: While the United States will have informed South Korea that the withdrawal of the brigade is under study, the absence of a fully functioning, non-interim government for the past six months certainly disadvantaged Seoul in terms of being able to shape the conversation in Washington. The new government will immediately face some difficult decisions. On the one hand, resisting strategic flexibility (i.e., the concept that U.S. forces in Korea will be used for off-peninsula contingencies) will likely be interpreted by U.S. military planners not only as out of step with the administration’s policies, but also seen by Trump as “free-riding” by the Korean ally, which might cause him to take vindictive actions to express his displeasure. This could even include pulling all troops out of South Korea. 

On the other hand, embracing strategic flexibility may appeal to Washington, but will be perceived negatively by Beijing as South Korea’s joining the U.S. side in a Taiwan contingency. For the progressive base in South Korea and in the Democratic Party of Korea, such a decision would also be seen as controversial and detrimental to the core objective of inter-Korean reconciliation by tightening the U.S.-Korea-Japan configuration against China and North Korea. These impending military and strategic decisions for the new government only exacerbate a policy environment complicated by the reciprocal tariffs, auto tariffs, auto parts tariffs, and steel and aluminum tariffs.

Q6: What should the policy be going forward?

A6: The Trump administration needs to stay in close coordination with its allies as it enacts changes to the military footprint in the Indo-Pacific. Withdrawing troops from one longstanding location, though it may make sense to the Pentagon, does not happen in a policy vacuum and could lead to unintended consequences detrimental to U.S. interests. Drawdowns need to be coordinated at the operational level with adjustments that enhance the South Korean military’s capabilities to bear a greater share of the defense burden. Close consultations also need to be had with Japan, which sees any reduction of defense and deterrence capabilities on the Korean peninsula as directly undermining Japan’s security.

Barreling ahead with a U.S. plan for reorienting force posture without such consultations creates unneeded alliance friction. For example, if Seoul believes the United States is operating without any regard for allies, then it might also take a self-help view for its defense. Japan, at least currently, has at best tempered confidence that South Korea can maintain the burden of defense and deterrence on its own, and may take its own actions to secure itself.

The Trump administration also needs to precede any further troop reductions with a comprehensive intelligence assessment of whether Kim is emboldened or deterred by U.S. moves. Trump has shown a tendency to forge ahead with policies on the Korean peninsula (e.g., the so-called “bloody nose” strike, summit diplomacy, and cancellation of military exercises) without the necessary due diligence in terms of consultations within the interagency process, with allies, and intelligence assessments vis-à-vis the adversary. If such force posture adjustments lead to opportunistic aggression or strategic miscalculation by North Korea or other actors, then the goal of being laser-focused on preparing for a Taiwan fight will be undermined. 

Victor Cha is president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

12. Korea Chair at CSIS warns of likely U.S. ground troop withdrawal from South Korea

Korea Chair at CSIS warns of likely U.S. ground troop withdrawal from South Korea

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/06/03/54TTOCEWSVFO3DWMCVSWFTXOC4/

"Stryker Brigade likely to be pulled permanently from S. Korea"

By Kim Eun-joong (Washington),

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2025.06.03. 12:05

Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). /Jang Ryun-sung

Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said on Jun. 2 that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team—comprising approximately 4,500 troops and currently rotating into South Korea every nine months—faces a high likelihood of permanent withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. “The pace of the change will be determined by military logic,” Cha said, “but U.S. President Donald Trump, who has publicly voiced his intention to withdraw ground forces from South Korea, could accelerate the process.”

Amid Washington’s broader strategy to counter China through increased “strategic flexibility” in the Indo-Pacific, Cha warned that the new South Korean administration will be forced to make difficult decisions without delay. “If it refuses, Trump may retaliate with actions including a full withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula,” he said.

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), which Cha mentioned in a Q&A-format commentary, forms a core component of U.S. ground forces stationed in South Korea. According to U.S. congressional reports, Army combat brigades in maneuver units typically consist of around 5,000 troops.

Cha said the impact of a troop reduction on deterrence against North Korea remains uncertain, and emphasized that U.S. forces would continue to play a role in honoring America’s defense commitments. Nevertheless, he added, “The trend toward reducing or fully withdrawing U.S. ground troops is unmistakable. This will inevitably raise doubts among both Koreas about the long-term reliability of U.S. security guarantees.”

He further noted that mechanisms tied to extended deterrence—such as the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), both established during former South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration—could be substantially weakened.

Cha also addressed the dilemma facing the new South Korean government. He warned that rejecting the concept of strategic flexibility—under which U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) could be deployed to contingencies outside the peninsula—could reinforce Trump’s perception that U.S. allies are “free-riding” on American military capabilities. In such a case, Trump could pursue “vindictive actions,” including a complete troop withdrawal, Cha said.

At the same time, he cautioned that embracing strategic flexibility, while potentially welcomed in Washington, could be interpreted by Beijing as a signal that South Korea would side with the United States in the event of a Taiwan contingency. “For South Korea’s progressive bloc, such a move could be seen as obstructing the goal of strengthening ties with China and as deepening trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan in opposition to North Korea and China,” he said.

Cha emphasized that any unilateral U.S. decision to restructure troop deployments without prior consultation would risk generating unnecessary friction between allies. He argued that any reduction in military presence should be accompanied by a realignment of responsibilities that strengthens South Korea’s capacity to bear a greater share of its own defense.

He also raised concerns about Trump’s previous approach to Korean Peninsula policy, noting that the president has at times bypassed essential preparatory measures, including intelligence assessments of adversaries. “If military posture adjustments lead to opportunistic provocations or strategic miscalculations by actors such as North Korea, they could trigger unintended consequences that undermine U.S. interests,” he said.

13. Lee Jae-myung projected to win South Korean presidency in landslide: Exit poll

News

Lee Jae-myung projected to win South Korean presidency in landslide: Exit poll

KBS-MBC-SBS poll finds Lee won 52% of vote, setting up end to turmoil that has stymied response to North Korea and Trump

https://www.nknews.org/2025/06/lee-jae-myung-projected-to-win-south-korean-presidency-in-landslide-exit-poll/

Jeongmin Kim | Joon Ha Park June 3, 2025

Lee Jae-myung at a rally in Yeouido on June 2, 2025 | Image: Democratic Party

This is a developing news story. Please check back for updates. (Last updated at 8:19 p.m. KST with additional background and at 9:27 p.m. with more photos)

Opposition candidate Lee Jae-myung is on the cusp of a landslide victory in South Korea’s snap presidential election, a joint exit poll showed late Tuesday, promising to end an extended leadership vacuum that has stymied Seoul’s response to evolving North Korean military threats and the disruptive return of alliance-skeptic Donald Trump.

The poll by South Korean broadcasters KBS, MBC and SBS projects that Lee of the Democratic Party (DP) captured 51.7% of all votes, well ahead of the ruling People Power Party’s (PPP) Kim Moon-soo at 39.3%. The projected gap is outside the margin of error.

Lawmakers and campaign staff at the Democratic Party situation room cheered as the results were shown on screen, chanting Lee’s name and hugging each other 

Other broadcasters such as Channel A, MBN and JTBC also all predicted a Lee victory, though they projected 0.5 to 2.5 percentage points less support than the KBS-MBC-SBS exit poll.

The DP’s expected return to power follows a half year of political turmoil since former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s short-lived declaration of emergency martial law on Dec. 3, which he justified by citing threats from “anti-state” and “pro-North Korea forces” — claims that experts widely dismissed as without merit.

His actions, batted down by lawmakers within hours despite Yoon’s deployment of troops to the National Assembly, triggered a fierce public backlash and mass protests, leading to his rapid impeachment and subsequent removal from office in April. 

In the meantime, South Korea has cycled through three different acting presidents amid political infighting between the ruling and opposition parties, leaving Seoul all but rudderless even as it has faced mounting economic and geopolitical challenges.

Democratic Party members celebrate exit polls projecting a Lee Jae-myung election victory at the party’s situation room in Seoul on June 3, 2025. | Image: NK News

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Lee, 61, quickly emerged as the top contender to replace the impeached president, after he lost in an extremely close race to Yoon in 2022.

But despite his reputation as a progressive firebrand who once championed engagement with North Korea, Lee rebranded himself as a “centrist conservative” ahead of the snap election and has even embraced Yoon policies that he once disparaged. These include strong support for the U.S.-ROK alliance, trilateral military cooperation with Japan and the Three-axis System for defending against DPRK threats with preemptive strikes and other capabilities.

At the same time, Lee has promised to take measures to reduce inter-Korean tensions, such as by restoring an abandoned military pact with Pyongyang and ending propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts along the border.

However, the new president’s biggest challenge could be navigating relations with the U.S. under the Trump administration, which has pursued a highly transactional foreign policy toward friends and foes alike on issues ranging from tariffs to defense cost-sharing. 

U.S. officials have increasingly signaled a desire to refocus the mission of American troops in South Korea toward countering China, which Washington views as its preeminent adversary, while relegating the task of deterring North Korean aggression to the ROK military.

The Democratic Party situation room on election night | Image: NK News (June 3, 2025)

THE SELF-PROCLAIMED ‘PRAGMATIST’

A lawyer by training, Lee first entered politics in the city of Seongnam, south of Seoul, but lost in mayoral and parliamentary elections. He then served as the DP spokesperson before being elected Seongnam mayor and then governor of Gyeonggi Province, a role in which he led multiple projects on inter-Korean economic cooperation and engagement.

For much of his career, Lee grounded his political identity in a personal story of poverty, relating how he began working at a factory at the age of 12 and went on to become a lawyer handling human rights cases.

However, he has gradually shifted to a more establishment, technocratic message focused on national themes, with less emphasis on his class-based roots.

Lee first ran for the presidency in 2017, losing to Moon Jae-in in the DP primary. He ran for a second time against Yoon in 2022, and after his narrow loss, he was elected the party leader later that year and re-elected in 2024 with record-high support, consolidating his grip on the party after its dominant performance in last year’s general election.

Lee faced essentially no viable opposition within the party during this year’s primary, and while gearing up for his third presidential bid, he publicly pivoted from his past progressive positions and presented himself as a “pragmatist” and “centrist-conservative,” in what appeared to be a strategic move to appeal to moderates disillusioned with Yoon and the PPP in the wake of the martial law fiasco.

This shift saw him distance himself from his previous support for inter-Korean economic projects and the withdrawal of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile interceptor, as well as more generally from DP orthodoxy on North Korea.

For instance, Lee adopted the U.S.-aligned terminology “North Korea denuclearization,” moving away from the DP-favored “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” while stating his support for the phased denuclearization of the DPRK.

Lee also emphasized the goal of “peaceful coexistence” with North Korea, criticizing Yoon for allegedly pursuing confrontation and describing his approach as a continuation of previous progressive administrations’ Sunshine Policy.

The DP candidate strongly voiced opposition to South Korean nuclear armament throughout his campaign and criticized his conservative rival Kim Moon-soo’s preference for nuclear deterrence options, which he claimed risked nuclear proliferation in the region and looking “suspicious” to Washington.

In his campaign, Kim pledged to explore the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula, stationing of U.S. nukes in Guam to protect South Korea and nuclear latency, which would aim to establish the ability to develop indigenous weapons in the future if needed.

Lee referred to the U.S.-ROK alliance as a “fundamental” pillar of South Korean defense in his pledge and debates, although he occasionally appeared to prioritize autonomous defense against DPRK missiles where possible.

The DP candidate said he will pursue reopening long-halted inter-Korean communication hotlines and restore the now-defunct Comprehensive Military Agreement that sets up buffer zones in air, land and sea near the border. He described North-South summits as something that “should naturally be done” but caveated that it will be “very difficult” in the current environment.

Despite his emphasis on the U.S. alliance, Lee emphasized the need for South Korea to maintain a flexible foreign policy toward China and Russia, even as Washington increasingly focuses its efforts on countering Beijing.

Likely in response to his rivals’ efforts to paint him as pro-Pyongyang, Lee embraced traditionally conservative positions on North Korea, such as improving DPRK human rights and bolstering the Three-axis Defense System, which were core to Yoon’s inter-Korean and defense policies.

But overall, North Korea issues received relatively little attention during a race defined by domestic political concerns stemming from Yoon’s martial law and economic troubles due to Trump’s tariff policies, with voters appearing largely indifferent to inter-Korean affairs amid little progress on denuclearization or detente in recent years and Kim Jong Un abandoning unification.

South Korean voters at a polling station on June 3, 2025 | Image: NK News

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Edited by Bryan Betts

14. UK labels North Korea a ‘regional disruptor,’ warns of nuclear modernization

​Disruptor is a good term though we sometimes use disruptor in a positive way as well.

News

UK labels North Korea a ‘regional disruptor,’ warns of nuclear modernization

Defense review lumps DPRK with Iran in hierarchy of global threats, highlighting its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine

https://www.nknews.org/2025/06/uk-labels-north-korea-a-regional-disruptor-warns-of-nuclear-modernization/

Jooheon Kim June 3, 2025

A North Korean missile test from a transporter erector launcher | Image: KCTV (March 28, 2023)

The U.K.’s defense ministry has warned that North Korea is poised to continue modernizing its nuclear arsenal to ensure regime survival and pressure its neighbors, while highlighting Pyongyang support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Strategic Defense Review, released by the U.K. on Monday, classifies the DPRK a “regional disruptor” alongside Iran.

“The DPRK will likely pursue further nuclear modernisation to guarantee regime survival and coerce its neighbours,” the document states. “Both countries are developing missile programmes with growing reach, and they continue to pose a direct threat to the U.K. in cyberspace.”

The review draws special attention to North Korea’s unprecedented deployment of troops to Europe in support of Russia’s war, while raising concerns that the DPRK threat to the U.K. could grow.

“China and Russia have deepened their relationship and there will continue to be grounds for both strategic and opportunistic alignment with Iran and the DPRK,” according to the document.

While noting that these relationships are “conditioned by differing interests and longstanding mistrust,” the U.K. report emphasizes the importance of staying vigilant for new threats from “middle powers” that may be hostile to London’s interests.

Overall, however, the report places much greater emphasis on Russia and China, defining Moscow as “an immediate and pressing threat” and Beijing as a “sophisticated and persistent challenge.”

According to the inaugural report by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), Russia has supplied North Korea with advanced air defense and electronic warfare systems in exchange for military support in its war against Ukraine. In April, a ROK think tank estimated that DPRK had earned around $20 billion from this support.

Earlier this year, the U.K. imposed sanctions on North Korea’s defense minister and other senior officials involved in deploying DPRK troops and weapons to Russia, following coordinated actions by other Commonwealth countries and the EU.

Meanwhile, the defense ministry’s report announced what it called the largest investment in the U.K.’s defense industry since the Cold War, signaling a response to growing threats from Russia and broader geopolitical instability. The country is committing an additional 15 billion pounds (US$20 billion) to strengthen domestic arms production and long-range strike capabilities. Plans include building at least six new munitions factories and procuring 7,000 domestically produced long-range weapons.

Although North Korea and the U.K. established diplomatic ties in 2000, the British Embassy in Pyongyang has remained closed since May 2020.

Edited by Bryan Betts

15. “I didn’t want to pass on the 4th generation inheritance”… North Korean defector testifies at Oslo Forum

​This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

We must never forget what is happening to the 25 million Koreans in the north.

“I didn’t want to pass on the 4th generation inheritance”… North Korean defector testifies at Oslo Forum

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/06/02/north-korea-oslo-freedom-forum-kim-jong-un/

RFA Staff

2025.06.02

Kim Yu-mi giving a speech at the Oslo Freedom Forum. (Oslo Freedom Forum)

At the 2025 Oslo Freedom Forum held last month, North Korean defector Kim Yu-mi vividly testified about her life in North Korea and her dramatic escape.

In May 2023, Kim Yu-mi risked her life to escape North Korea by sea with eight family members and enter South Korea.

“It is very meaningful to stand here and share memories of pain, but at the same time, my heart is heavy,” Kim said in his speech.

The trigger for the Kim family's decision to defect was the scene in November 2022 when Chairman Kim Jong-un made his daughter Kim Ju-ae appear in public for the first time.

He said, “Seeing the leader’s daughter enjoying privileges, I did not want to pass on the four-generation hereditary system to my children,” and “The feeling of despair after losing hope was the decisive factor in my decision to defect.”

At the time, Ms. Kim's husband ran a fishing boat and had a close relationship with the Coast Guard, and based on this, he made plans to defect.

After three attempts, the family was able to reach South Korea on a small fishing boat, sailing south through minefields in the dark of night and avoiding North Korean naval patrol boats.

At the end of her speech, Ms. Kim's eyes turned red as she revealed that her husband, Mr. Kim Lee-hyuk, had passed away in an accident a few months ago.

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North Korean resident defects to West Sea on wooden boat last month... 3rd time in 2 months

As the route to China is blocked, North Korean defection routes diversify, with boats and on foot

Mr. Kim Lee-hyuk died in a diving accident in December 2024 after settling in Korea.

“After a long journey towards freedom, I was finally able to achieve it, and it was all thanks to my husband,” she said. “I hope that the people of North Korea will also walk this path with me one day.”

He also said, “If North Korea had not had access to outside information, they would still be in a state of mental and physical slavery,” and asked for the international community’s continued interest and efforts to improve human rights in North Korea.

Meanwhile, the Human Rights Foundation, which hosted the forum, said that Kim Yu-mi's testimony once again highlighted the reality faced by North Korean residents and the importance of access to outside information.

Editor Park Jae-woo

​16. North Korea censors phones, alters language automatically

North Korea censors phones, alters language automatically

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250603/5640067/1

Posted June. 03, 2025 07:01,   

Updated June. 03, 2025 07:01

North Korea is using smartphones to indoctrinate and monitor its citizens in what the BBC described as “Orwellian tactics,” highlighting features that censor South Korean expressions and secretly capture user activity. British author George Orwell famously depicted a totalitarian surveillance state in his novel 1984.

According to the BBC and the New York Post on June 1, North Korean smartphones are programmed to automatically replace South Korean phrases with state-approved alternatives and issue warning messages. In one example shown using a phone obtained by a South Korea-based defector media outlet, typing “oppa,” a common South Korean term of endearment for male partners, was automatically replaced with “comrade,” followed by a pop-up warning that said, “Warning! This can only be used between actual siblings.” Typing “South Korea” was changed to “puppet region.” The BBC described these features as a form of “Orwellian programming” and said smartphones are a critical tool in North Korea’s indoctrination strategy.

The report also revealed that these phones secretly take screenshots every five minutes and store them in a hidden folder inaccessible to users. The New York Post noted, “North Korean authorities likely have access to these secret folders,” calling it a “bizarre 21st-century version of Orwellian surveillance.” The report added that this underscores how “the Kim Jong Un dictatorship may be winning the battle in the tech domain.”

The BBC noted that North Korea is the only country in the world without a public internet. However, some foreign broadcasters and nonprofit organizations transmit signals at night that allow North Koreans to listen to outside media secretly. It added that thousands of USB drives and microSD cards containing South Korean films, dramas, music, and news are smuggled into North Korea each month. “South Korean TV dramas may appear harmless,” the BBC said, “but scenes of high-rise apartments, fast cars, and upscale restaurants shock North Korean viewers by revealing South Korea’s everyday reality.”

Since 2023, North Korea has criminalized the use of South Korean words and accents. Authorities reportedly check confiscated smartphones for South Korean expressions in text messages. The BBC also noted that much of the content dissemination into North Korea had been supported by the U.S. government, but these efforts have suffered after funding cuts following the second Donald Trump administration.

Woo-Sun Lim imsun@donga.com

17. Lee’s comment on top court stirs controversy

​These issues will plague Lee's presidency, both his alleged criminal activity as well as allegations that he will abuse his power to manipulate he courts.

Lee’s comment on top court stirs controversy

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250603/5640031/1

Posted June. 03, 2025 07:00,   

Updated June. 03, 2025 07:00

Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung is under fire for saying he heard that the Supreme Court intended to quickly dismiss his appeal in an election law violation case. On June 2, Lee said on a YouTube program, “From what I’ve heard, people in the Supreme Court said, ‘Let’s wrap this up quickly, dismiss it cleanly.’” He added, “They didn’t contact me directly, but some communication was going on.” Lee also criticized the court’s decision, saying, “It was absurd to see the Supreme Court overturn and remand the case just two days after the ruling date was announced.”

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) accused Lee of implying that someone in the Supreme Court leaked the verdict in advance. PPP presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo wrote on social media, “This is shocking. Is he admitting there’s a mole in the Supreme Court?” and added, “If true, it would be a serious breakdown of constitutional order and a judicial scandal.” Interim party chair Kim Yong-tae also asked, “Who gave him internal court information? When and through what channel? Does the Democratic Party make deals with the judiciary every time the party or its members are on trial?” With just one day left until the election, Lee’s remarks have become a hot-button issue in the final stretch of the campaign.

There can be no disagreement that deliberations by a court panel must remain strictly confidential before a verdict is delivered. If the content of a ruling is leaked in advance, it opens the door to outside influence and casts doubt on the fairness of the verdict. For this reason, the Court Organization Act explicitly states that “deliberations on judgments shall not be disclosed.” If someone within the Supreme Court did pass information to Lee’s camp before the ruling in a high-profile case involving a major presidential candidate, it would constitute a grave breach of judicial neutrality.

In response to the PPP’s criticism, Lee said, “It’s better to stick to facts. Fabrication and distortion are wrong,” suggesting that the party is exaggerating his comments for political gain. The Democratic Party also defended him, stating, “Lee clearly said he did not hear anything directly from the Supreme Court.” But even if a court official did not contact Lee personally, any interaction with someone close to him would still be a serious matter. Both Lee and the Democratic Party must thoroughly explain how the information was obtained, and the Supreme Court must also clarify the facts.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com