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Quotes of the Day:
“A man is not great because he has not failed. A man is great because failure hasn’t stopped him.”
- Confucius
“We are like books. Most people only see our cover, the minority read only the introduction, many people believe the critics. Few will know our content.”
- Emile Zola
“The most dangerous person on earth is the arrogant intellectual who lacks the humility necessary to see that society needs no masters and cannot be planned from the top down.”
- Friedrich von Hayek
1. Unification minister nominee vows not to compromise on human rights in dealing with N. Korea
2. A Pessimist’s View of Korea-Japan Détente
3. Unification minister nominee calls for 'selective' review of inter-Korean agreements
4. Unmasking suspected North Korean hackers’ tricks
5. S. Korea asks Pyongyang to give prior notice on border dam discharge
6. China's Waning Leverage Over SKorea Lessens Chances of Retaliation Against THAAD, Experts Say
7. Yonhap forum sheds lights on decadeslong S. Korea-U.S. alliance amid security challenges
8. US And Its Allies Building A Wall Around North Korea – Analysis
9. U.S. flies nuclear-capable bombers in a fresh show of force against North Korea
10. [Special Report] Red flag raised over foreign interference in Korean elections
11. The Little Emergency that was the Korean War
12. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Progress Continues Toward Kim’s Modernization and Expansion Plans
13. Hyundai chairwoman requests permission to visit North Korea's Kumgangsan
14. S. Korea, US hold annual defense ICT talks
15. S. Korea to launch upgraded missile defense operations center
16. US remains committed to working with S. Korea to secure peace in Indo-Pacific: Pentagon
1. Unification minister nominee vows not to compromise on human rights in dealing with N. Korea
I am confident the Minister is going to adopt a human rights upfront approach supported by a comprehensive information program to support pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
Unification minister nominee vows not to compromise on human rights in dealing with N. Korea
The Korea Times · June 30, 2023
Kim Yung-ho, nominee for next unification minister, speaks to reporters in front of the Office of the Inter-Korean Dialogue in Seoul, Friday. Korea Times photo by Choi Joo-yeon
His 'uncompromising' principles set to collide with very nature of Pyongyang regime
By Jung Min-ho
Kim Yung-ho, the nominee for next unification minister, vowed on Friday not to compromise on any of his principles in the ministry's efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, saying that human rights are among the unnegotiable values.
Speaking to reporters at the Office of the Inter-Korean Dialogue in Seoul, Kim said the rights violations of ordinary North Koreans are "very serious" and South Korea has so far shown a lack of willingness to resolve the issue.
"Freedom, human rights and the rule of law are among the uncompromising things," said Kim, who is a political diplomacy professor. "From a scholar's perspective, the international community has paid extensive attention to addressing the issue, while South Korea has relatively been less so … As stakeholders in the unification matter, we should pay more attention to the suffering of North Koreans."
His remarks offer a glimpse into how the policy on North Korea will shift after the administration under President Yoon Suk Yeol replaced three key posts in charge of handling inter-Korean relations ― unification minister, vice minister and a presidential secretary for unification ― in Thursday's shake-up.
Ambassador to Thailand Moon Seoung-hyun, who was tapped as a vice minister, is the first official from the foreign ministry to be called for the post since the establishment of the Ministry of Unification in 1998.
Analysts told The Korea Times that all this is an obvious sign of a human rights upfront policy toward the North in close cooperation with other countries, with the aim of creating joint pressure ― possibly to an unprecedented level ― as a means of changing its abhorrent behavior.
Some say the policy could be successful to a certain degree, with the regime appearing to be conscious of international criticism on rights issues. But others worry that it would put Seoul on a collision course with the very nature of the authoritarian leadership in Pyongyang.
"There have been signs that such international pressure pushed the regime to change some awful practices. For example, the number of North Korean escapees who say they have seen public executions decreased in recent years," said Joung Eun-lee, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a think tank. "It has also passed many laws regarding, say, crimes, possibly because of international criticism on its justice system without laws."
People visit Mansu Hill to pay homage to the statues of their late leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il ahead of the 27th anniversary of the death of Kim Il-sung, in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this July 7, 2021, file photo. AP-Yonhap
The minister nominee, who studied the Korean War as a scholar, demonstrated his hardline stance on the North Korea's ruling Kim family and suggested in past media columns and on his personal YouTube channel that unification would not be attainable without regime change.
Asked whether this belief would affect his policymaking as minister, Kim avoided providing a direct answer, saying he would factor practical challenges into account while serving in the government.
But given his reputation in academic circles, one scholar, who refused to be named, said Kim would likely put forward human rights issues far more aggressively than the incumbent minister, Kwon Young-se, did and might well refrain from engaging in any inter-Korean talks held simply for the sake of holding talks. This could become a bone of contention at the forthcoming confirmation hearing at the National Assembly where liberal opposition lawmakers will likely question him on the very purpose of why the government department should exist.
"Given that a drastic improvement in human rights is not possible until North Korea, or any other country, reaches a certain level of economic development, I believe there should be a balanced, gradual policy approach. Under his leadership, the focus would likely be placed on increasing pressure, which concerns me," she said.
Cheong Seong-chang, an expert on North Korea a the Sejong Institute, a think tank, reckons a human rights upfront policy would inevitably worsen inter-Korean relations, which are already in their worst state in many years, with Pyongyang stepping up efforts to develop ever more destructive weapons.
"North Korea could respond with aggression, as it did with the inter-Korean liaison office," he said, referring to the North's blowing up of the office in June 2020 in protest of South Korean civic groups' sending of anti-regime leaflets over the border with balloons. "I'm worried about the possibility of its provocations in border areas."
The Korea Times · June 30, 2023
2. A Pessimist’s View of Korea-Japan Détente
"Pessimist" is right. Quite a critique.
Excerpts:
It is ironic that the South Korean government is the main driver of the new Cold War, or at least more than a mere assistant on the Korean Peninsula, the most vulnerable region to changes in the international situation in Northeast Asia. The role of South Korean diplomacy, surrounded by great powers and at a geopolitical disadvantage, has completely changed from a bridge of peace to an advance toward confrontation.
The view of the South Korean version of neoconservatism is consistent with an obsession with managing South Korea-Japan relations in order to maintain the South Korea-US alliance. Relations between Seoul and Tokyo should always remain friendly, and conflicts should be resolved even at the expense of South Korea. Even when the South Korean government or the people are unilaterally disadvantaged or severely harmed, the Yoon government does not hesitate to represent Japan's arguments and logic. It intends to maintain a cooperative state through voluntary concessions. It is volunteering to imprison itself in a contradictory and unreasonable diplomatic track.
POLITICS
A Pessimist’s View of Korea-Japan Détente
Is Yoon giving away too much?
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/pessimist-view-korea-japan-detente?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
JUN 30, 2023
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By: Keeho Yang
While the Yoon Suk Yeol government’s diplomacy has succeeded in improving South Korea-Japan relations and security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, while making great concessions in the ongoing issue of forced labor, it has many limitations.
What steps has Japan taken in the process and is the South Korean government's approach desirable? Can the two countries’ shared history and victim problems be resolved in this way, and will a relationship based on this be sustainable? Will bilateral relations contribute to South Korea's national interests and its pursuit of peace? Is the policy-making method within the government desirable?
After the shift from the Moon Jae-in government to that of Yoon Suk Yeol, a rapid change in South Korea-Japan relations has occurred, and domestic conflicts and confrontations have intensified. The biggest factor in supporting or opposing the Yoon government is foreign policy, including conflicting views of the same "diplomatic" behavior. According to a poll conducted in May by Gallup Korea to mark the first anniversary of Yoon’s inauguration, 37 percent rated the president’s performance as positive and 32 percent negative, all citing diplomacy as a reason for their views.
On forced labor, the biggest issue, the Yoon government has taken an indulgent approach that removed the judicial and moral responsibilities of the Japanese companies involved and the Japanese government. In response, the US and Japan have welcomed this "big concession.” In Japan, the evaluation of President Yoon was very positive, and it contributed to raising the approval rating of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida from 33 percent in January to 46 percent after the Korea-Japan summits in Tokyo and Seoul.
Because many past issues were resolved, export regulations and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between South Korea and Japan were restored. Mutual exchanges and investments between businesses in South Korea and Japan are also picking up.
The ostensible temporary improvement, however, came at the expense of progress in negotiations between the governments and the judiciary's relief for victims. Distorted solutions such as third-party debt repayments for forced labor, abandonment of the right to indemnity for Japanese companies, and secondary harm to victims contradicted previous and ongoing efforts.
The two countries’ governments and citizens have consolidated decades of historical reconciliation, gradual sharing of historical awareness, long-time victims' legal struggles and Supreme Court rulings in order to overcome the limitations of the 1951 San Francisco system, which failed to properly hold colonial rule responsible. These efforts were ignored in recent decisions. The historical trauma of Japan's invasion of the Korean Peninsula and insufficient attention paid to the victims' voices have spurred opposition and criticism.
Under Yoon, the South Korean government is firmly on the US side in its conflict with China and is sending a strong message to neighboring countries. Intervention in Taiwanese affairs or mentioning military aid to Ukraine is worsening Seoul’s relations with China and Russia. The temporary stitching up of South Korea-Japan relations was aimed at removing the historical issues between the two countries, the biggest obstacle to promoting security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan on the basis of the South Korea-US alliance and the US-Japan alliance. A values-based alliance built on freedom and anti-communism appears as blind solidarity among the three countries, and encourages closer ties among North Korea, China, and Russia.
It is ironic that the South Korean government is the main driver of the new Cold War, or at least more than a mere assistant on the Korean Peninsula, the most vulnerable region to changes in the international situation in Northeast Asia. The role of South Korean diplomacy, surrounded by great powers and at a geopolitical disadvantage, has completely changed from a bridge of peace to an advance toward confrontation.
The view of the South Korean version of neoconservatism is consistent with an obsession with managing South Korea-Japan relations in order to maintain the South Korea-US alliance. Relations between Seoul and Tokyo should always remain friendly, and conflicts should be resolved even at the expense of South Korea. Even when the South Korean government or the people are unilaterally disadvantaged or severely harmed, the Yoon government does not hesitate to represent Japan's arguments and logic. It intends to maintain a cooperative state through voluntary concessions. It is volunteering to imprison itself in a contradictory and unreasonable diplomatic track.
Action and Reaction
The Yoon government gave up balanced diplomacy in the US-China conflict, created unprecedented pressure and tension on North Korea, and made remarks on the Taiwan issue and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which significantly worsened relations with China and Russia. It voluntarily established a new confrontational Cold War structure in Northeast Asia, with South Korea, the US, and Japan on one side, and North Korea, China, and Russia on the other.
This is pushing South Korean diplomacy to the forefront of the new Cold War. The Yoon government's establishment of the South Korea-US-Japan security alliance is reminiscent of the US-led Cold War anti-communist network. Washington and Tokyo are strongly promoting security cooperation among the three countries, welcoming the Yoon government, which is cooperating with them against North Korea and turning a blind eye to the past. Notable actions by the Yoon government include strengthening the US-Japan alliance; establishing a network of military cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan; establishing a network of values-based alliances; participating in the anti-China economic security network; participating in the QUAD and the Indo-Pacific strategy; promoting an Asian version of NATO; and solidifying South Korea's inclusion in the Western camp through transitioning from G7 to G8.
The US-China conflict is sharply defined by the Taiwan crisis and competition over technological hegemony, and South Korea, caught in the middle, is facing a crisis in both diplomacy and trade.
Japanese Prime Minister Kishida has prioritized revision of the country’s constitution, following in the footsteps of former Prime Minister Abe. Public support for the revision exceeds 60 percent. In December 2022, Japan revised three security strategy documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Improvement Plan, with the aim of developing enemy base counterattack capabilities and doubling defense spending over five years. Against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the possibility of a Taiwan conflict, and the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, Japanese preemptive strikes against North Korean missile bases and command-and-control stations, ignoring the spirit of the peace treaty, have become plausible. Japan is rushing to purchase large numbers of Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of more than 1,250 kilometers to target North Korea and China, and to develop hypersonic missiles with a speed exceeding Mach 5. South Korea, the US and Japan are considering preemptive strikes in the event of North Korean nuclear and missile launches, so the possibility of an accidental conflict on the Korean Peninsula cannot be ruled out.
Tensions could escalate further if real-time sharing of missile information and Japan's participation in the NCG, a South Korea-US nuclear consultative body, continue.
In South Korean diplomacy, relations between North Korea, China, and Russia have deteriorated significantly, and South Korea, as a result, has lost control of Northeast Asian diplomacy. Japan said it would push for a South Korea-China-Japan summit within the year and is leading Northeast Asian international politics by "managing the situation" instead of South Korea, which has greatly reduced South Korea’s flexibility, such as the feasibility of proposing high-level talks with North Korea.
The US has also started to create an atmosphere of dialogue with China, and French President Emmanuel Macron is opposed to NATO's establishment of a Tokyo office for fear of worsening relations with China. In March, China announced it would reopen group tours to more than 40 countries, including France, Italy, and Vietnam, but excluded South Korea. The trade surplus with China, which reached US$55.8 billion in 2018, is in a deficit of more than US$5 billion this year.
Last year, South Korea posted a record $47.2 billion trade deficit, largely due to the complete disappearance of its routine trade surplus with China. Relations between South Korea and China have deteriorated to the extent that the two governments have summoned each other’s ambassadors in protest.
Amid the US-China conflict, South Korea's major industries, the semiconductor and automobile industries, are forced to seek new production and market alternatives. The US is restricting new facility investment in semiconductor plants in China over the next 10 years, which puts a heavy burden on South Korean conglomerates. European countries are also seeking self-rescue measures as the security crisis in Northeast Asia continues.
Germany's largest semiconductor company, Infineon, is investing about 5 billion euros to build a new plant in Dresden. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attended the groundbreaking ceremony, and she made the notable remark that European countries that experienced the Russian invasion of Ukraine could not continue to rely only on South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductors, where geopolitical risks are high.
Remaining Challenges
Blind and unilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, sanctions against North Korea, participation in the anti-China siege network, and the Indo-Pacific strategy are increasing South Korea's diplomatic burden. Variables such as pressure and sanctions on North Korea without dialogue, instability over historical issues between South Korea and Japan, and the potential discharge of Fukushima’s contaminated water are likely to pose risks for South Korean diplomacy in the near future. At the forefront of the new Cold War, confrontation with China and Russia has been established, inter-Korean dialogue has disappeared, and economic and trade performance is worsening. Unlike the strengthening of the South Korea-US-Japan alliance, the consensus between government and citizens on diplomacy with Japan is continuing to weaken.
The South Korea-Japan relationship could lose even more domestic support in South Korea due to Japan's unilateral release of Fukushima’s contaminated water and its push to register the Sado Mine as a UNESCO world heritage site. The schematic of South Korean diplomacy, which is passive and consistent with a positive response to the Japanese government's decisions, is becoming entrenched. South Korea's diplomacy is in a self-contradicting posture, where it has to support the Japanese government's decisions to ensure the South Korea-US alliance and security cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the US. It’s doubtful that the government is unaware of this situation.
The safety of contaminated water from Fukushima is not guaranteed despite the IAEA report and the Japanese government's announcement. The South Korean government should immediately demand Japan cease discharging contaminated water in deference to the health of current and future generations. The Pacific Islands are considering filing a lawsuit against Japan in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The South Korean government should demand that Japan stop discharging the contaminated water until it secures "safety" and "relief" at the same time. In addition to an inspection of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, which is a mere formality, South Korea and Japan should conduct joint investigations and research on the status of contaminated water.
Stable South Korea-Japan and South Korea-US-Japan relations should be pursued, and balanced diplomacy with China, Russia, and North Korea should be promoted, both based on domestic support for these efforts. Amid the turbulence of US-China relations, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the shifting international diplomatic landscape, South Korea should seek to be a global pivotal state with its national interests as the top priority. It is time to explore the direction of sustainable diplomacy with Japan in the complex and multi-layered field of international politics. Instead of being overly reliant on values-based alliances, it is necessary to expand diplomatic flexibility from the perspective of national interests and peace.
Keeho Yang is a professor, Dept. of Japanese Studies at Sungkonghoe University. This is a condensed version of an analysis produced for the East Asia Foundation, a Seoul-based think tank. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect any official position of the East Asia Foundation
3. Unification minister nominee calls for 'selective' review of inter-Korean agreements
This has been my fundamental criticism of MOU. It puts priority on seeking exchanges and reconciliation with the north rather than prioritizing the deep and detailed planning that is required to achieve unification. I believe Minister Kim is going to change the focus (for the better).
Excerpts:
Critics said his appointment could weaken the role of the unification ministry, which puts priority on seeking exchanges and reconciliation with the North.
"There should be a change in the role of the unification ministry. It needs to pursue policy in a principled and values-based way," he said.
(LEAD) Unification minister nominee calls for 'selective' review of inter-Korean agreements | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 30, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with details in paras 3,8,9)
SEOUL, June 30 (Yonhap) -- Kim Yung-ho, the nominee for South Korea's unification minister, said Friday the government needs to "selectively" review whether to honor existing inter-Korean agreements, depending on North Korea's behavior.
Kim, a professor known for his hard-line stance toward the North, said the government may need to reconsider the inter-Korean military accord signed on Sept. 19, 2018, if the North continues to violate it with high-intensity provocations.
"Policy continuity is important. But amid changes in the situation (on the Korean Peninsula), there is a need to selectively consider inter-Korean agreements," Kim told reporters.
Kim Yung-ho, the nominee for South Korea's unification minister, speaks to reporters on June 30, 2023, as he prepares for a parliamentary confirmation hearing. (Yonhap)
President Yoon Suk Yeol on Thursday named Kim, a professor at Sungshin Women's University, to lead Seoul's unification ministry. His appointment is subject to parliamentary confirmation hearings.
Kim, a conservative scholar, has raised the need to press Pyongyang to change its course by raising the issue of human rights violations in the secretive regime.
He stressed North Korea's human rights issue should be prioritized in terms of the government's inter-Korean policy.
"As the Yoon administration pushes for the vision of 'a global pivotal state,' we need to deal with the human rights issue from the perspective of universal value," he said.
Critics said his appointment could weaken the role of the unification ministry, which puts priority on seeking exchanges and reconciliation with the North.
"There should be a change in the role of the unification ministry. It needs to pursue policy in a principled and values-based way," he said.
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 30, 2023
4. Unmasking suspected North Korean hackers’ tricks
Unmasking suspected North Korean hackers’ tricks
By impersonating journalists, they tried to gain information from experts through phishing attacks
By Park Jaewoo for RFA Korean
2023.06.29
rfa.org
Suspected North Korean hackers are impersonating journalists in emails to target experts on North Korea issues in phishing attacks, a collection of emails obtained by Radio Free Asia showed.
The 12 suspicious emails were forwarded to RFA’s Korean Service by the experts who received them. RFA was not able to confirm the identity of any of the senders of the emails, nor their connection with the North Korean government.
However, they all exhibit signs that strongly suggest that they were phishing attempts by agents working for Pyongyang in order to gain access to intelligence or to install malware on an expert’s device.
In March, RFA reported that Google Cloud’s cybersecurity subsidiary firm Mandiant classified a group of hackers using the same or similar methods as a “moderately-sophisticated cyber operator that supports the interests of the North Korean regime,” and named that group, which it had been monitoring since 2018, as APT43.
In most of the cases RFA compiled, the email comes from an address on a free email platform like gmail or aol, but the sender does enough research into the journalist so as to plausibly pass themselves off as that person.
The apparent hackers attempted to pass themselves off as actual reporters for organizations like Kyodo News, Radio Free Asia, Voice of America (VOA) and others. They asked experts to answer a series of questions or attempted to entice them into clicking malicious links or downloading malicious files.
Information gathering
In one of the 12 emails, the attacker impersonated Shin Jin-woo, a reporter at South Korea's Dong-A Ilbo newspaper. “Shin” sent a list of specific North Korea policy questions to an expert at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, but used the expert's email address from a university. The impersonator sent the email from niceshinn@aol.com, which is similar to the real Shin's niceshin@donga.com address.
In addition, “Shin” offered the expert US$200 for his comments. It’s not normal practice for reporters to offer sources payment for information.
From: 신 진우 <niceshinn@aol.com>
To: [email redacted]
Sent: Fri, Mar 4, 2022 at 2:57 AM
Subject: Re: [urgent] Interview request form reporter of Dong-A Ilbo, the largest newspaper in Korea
Greetings,
I am Shin Jin-woo, a reporter working for Dong-A Ilbo, the largest newspaper in Korea.
I am the head of the foreign affairs team in the political department. Dong-A Ilbo has the most subscribers in Korea. It is also the oldest media company in Korea in 100 years.
I am sure that this interview is a good opportunity to inform Korean readers of your idea. I know that you are very busy. However, I would appreciate it if you could take a moment to answer. If you answer even some of the questions below, I expect it to be a good opportunity to convey your thoughts to the Korean people. If you do not want to be released your name, we could publish your paper anonymously. We’ll be pleased to offer an honorarium of $200 for your participation.
The questionnaire is as follows. Please reply. thank you.
Best regards.
Jin-woo
The goal of the email was to get the expert to answer specific North Korea policy questions as a means to gather intelligence on how the United States might respond to developments in the region.
The expert initially responded to “Shin,” saying he could answer a few of the questions, and asked him to communicate through his Brookings Institution email address. “Shin” replied with another email saying that he had a new list of questions that could be accessed if the expert clicked a link.
The link contained malware that could have compromised the expert’s device, allowing “Shin” to gain access to sensitive information.
Malicious attachment
In another example, an apparent hacker impersonated the friend of a RFA Korean Service reporter, even sending the phishing email to the reporter’s personal email address.
The imposter asked the reporter to download a .zip file containing the malware, claiming it was video of a lecture featuring North Korean escapees.
Translated from Korean:
From: [name redacted] <zak@naver.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 6, 2023, 4:17 AM
Subject: Sir~ it’s [name redacted]^^
To: <[redacted]@gmail.com>
Sir~ How are you doing?
A friend of mine was in this lecture given by North Korean defectors
It would be great if you could take a look at the lecture agenda and give me some good opinions.
Thanks a bunch^^
Attachment: North Korean defectors lecture.zip
The apparent hacker impersonated a real person that the reporter knew, and sent the email from a free email address, from South Korean online service provider Naver, to the reporter’s personal Gmail address.
The email had a very casual tone, complete with the ^^ text emoticon commonly used in Korean text messages to indicate a smiling face.
Falling for it
In one of the earliest examples, RFA Korean Service reporter Han Dukin received an email from a former senior state department official, asking him if he had received the answers to a list of questions that Han had sent to him about a week earlier.
But Han had never sent any questions.
The expert had actually answered the questions asked by Han’s imposter. After no RFA report used his answers, he contacted the real Han to make sure he had received the answers. It was only then that he realized he had been tricked.
Gaining trust
The strategies used in RFA's collection of suspicious emails is consistent with the typical method used by North Korean hackers as described by Asheer Malhotra, a threat researcher at cybersecurity firm Cisco Talos.
“Once the target starts engaging with them, … they will slowly and slowly begin conversations with you in an effort to establish trust,” said Malhotra.
“And once you've spoken to somebody for a few weeks you've exchanged more than a few emails with them, there is an inherent trust that starts building up and they will exploit or leverage that trust to eventually send you a malware sample,” he said.
“And they'll be like, hey, this is a report. I took your findings, and I compiled it into a document. Can you please open this up and review it for me?”
The emails contain techniques that are similar to those employed by APT43, Michael Barnhart, a senior analyst at Mandiant, told RFA.
Barnhart said that the goal of the North Korean hackers is not to compromise an entire organization.
“They don't want to attack RFA or a crypto exchange; they would rather go for the personal accounts because when you do the personal accounts, it [lowers] the level of suspicion,” he said. “If they come for an organization, law enforcement might get involved, whereas if they go for individual people, a lot of times they don't report that to law enforcement.”
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Eugene Whong. Written in English by Eugene Whong and Amanda Weisbrod. Edited by Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
5. S. Korea asks Pyongyang to give prior notice on border dam discharge
I think the ROK government makes this request every year.
Excerpts:
Under the agreement signed in October 2009, the North agreed to notify the South in advance of its plan to release dam water, following an accident that killed six South Koreans after the North discharged water from Hwanggang Dam without notice.
But North Korea pushed ahead with water release last year, without notifying the South.
S. Korea asks Pyongyang to give prior notice on border dam discharge | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · June 30, 2023
SEOUL, June 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea requested North Korea on Friday to give prior notice should it release water from dams near their border to minimize damage from heavy rains.
Seoul's unification ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, made the official request in a statement released to reporters as downpours have pounded the Korean Peninsula this week.
"We urge the North to take all sincere measures so that damage will not occur due to a failure in notification," the ministry said, noting how North Korea has given prior notice on three occasions under an inter-Korean agreement on the matter.
The request was made through the press, as Pyongyang has remained unresponsive to daily routine calls via an inter-Korean liaison communication channel since April.
This Aug. 8, 2022, file photo shows water being released from a dam in the border town of Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi Province. (Yonhap)
Under the agreement signed in October 2009, the North agreed to notify the South in advance of its plan to release dam water, following an accident that killed six South Koreans after the North discharged water from Hwanggang Dam without notice.
But North Korea pushed ahead with water release last year, without notifying the South.
Earlier this week, the North's main newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, said this year's monsoon season has begun, calling for precautionary measures against possible damage.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · June 30, 2023
6. China's Waning Leverage Over SKorea Lessens Chances of Retaliation Against THAAD, Experts Say
China's Waning Leverage Over SKorea Lessens Chances of Retaliation Against THAAD, Experts Say
June 29, 2023 9:23 PM
voanews.com · June 29, 2023
WASHINGTON - China's waning economic leverage over South Korea is making Beijing less likely to retaliate significantly against Seoul's normalization of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense system, experts say.
South Korea "will take follow-up measures to normalize the [THAAD] base" and "to resolve the inconvenient situation" for American soldiers, South Korean Defense Ministry spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyu said at a news briefing Tuesday in Seoul.
Normalization is the process of turning an ad hoc installation at a golf course into a military base that has operational, support and living facilities for the American soldiers operating the system. They are now living in temporary quarters without permanent buildings for support activities.
Jeon said the Defense Ministry seeks to accomplish this through "close consultations with the Ministry of Environment and the U.S."
The announcement reaffirming the normalization of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), designed to intercept North Korea's incoming missiles, came after the ministry declared on June 21 that the permanent installation of the system would not pose health and environmental hazards.
The ministry said an environmental impact assessment of the system showed the electromagnetic radiation emitted from the THAAD radar falls below 0.2% of the safety standards.
The radiation peaked at approximately 0.018 watts per square meter, according to the Defense Ministry, based on the assessment conducted with the Ministry of Environment and Korea Radio Promotion Association (RAPA). The International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection set a limit of 10 watts per square meter. Exceeding the limit is considered harmful to health.
Martin Meiners, a Pentagon spokesperson, referred VOA's Korean Service on Thursday to a statement made by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in March that says, "Normalization of the THAAD operations and capabilities provides USFK greater readiness to ensure continued resourcing of the unit, as well as providing greater opportunity to modify the defense design by exercising remote launch options."
The THAAD system has been stationed on its base in Seongju, a county 220 kilometers south of Seoul, since its deployment in April 2016. Formerly Lotte Skyhill golf course, the base lacks proper operational, support and living facilities for American soldiers in charge of operating the system.
The environmental approval allows the construction of facilities that are necessary to station THAAD permanently at the Seongju base, a location that David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, said via phone to VOA Korean, is "critical" for the missile defense system to fully protect all of South Korea.
On hold
The construction has been on hold since mid-2017 during the tenure of former President Moon Jae-in, who delayed the THAAD normalization to accommodate local protesters and China's opposition to the deployment while trying to push for a peace process with North Korea.
Seongju county residents and civic groups have been rallying against what they believe is harmful radiation from the THAAD radar since the announcement was made in July 2016 to deploy the system.
That year, Beijing claimed that THAAD's radar system could pierce into its territory and, in opposition, ordered more than 100 South Korean Lotte Group supermarkets be closed in China citing safety issues.
Lotte had owned the golf course before the South Korean Defense Ministry secured a deal to obtain the lot where the THAAD has been deployed.
After the 2016 announcement to deploy the THAAD, China banned South Korean music groups and other pop culture content and suspended visits to South Korea by Chinese tourists. China partially lifted the bans on tourism and South Korean culture content, but South Korean artists are still prohibited from performing in China.
De-risking under way
As Seoul is gearing up for the permanent installation of the THAAD system, experts say Beijing is less likely to exercise economic retaliation over its opposition.
"China has less leverage now, and like-minded democracies in the free and open Indo-Pacific and throughout the world are in a much different position towards China than they were in 2017," said Maxwell.
"South Korea now has really started de-risking, and, in some ways, decoupling from China," Maxwell continued. He added, "Any economic warfare conducted by China will be met with [economic] defense by South Korea and full support by the United States and other allies."
Growing numbers of Asian, European and American companies have been shifting their production lines and investments out of China.
The G7 countries gathered at their summit in Hiroshima in May said they are concerned about China's "malign" and "coercive" economic practices. They announced they will form the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to respond to such practices.
In an effort to guard against China's economic pressure, major South Korean electronics companies such as Samsung and LG have been moving their Chinese production lines to India and Vietnam.
Auto giants Hyundai and Kia have been doing the same.
Economic leverage
Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, said in a phone interview that although China may not have "easy leverage" that it could exercise, it will not completely forego economic pressure on South Korea.
"China is really very clever about establishing influence," Bennett told VOA Korean. With weaker economies engaged in its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing "applied pressure very rapidly after money that was [lent] to them didn't get [repaid]" by enacting "severe ramifications," he said.
Bennett added, however, that with a strong economy like South Korea, Beijing is likely to "do it gradually over time to avoid retaliation from South Korea."
The Chinese Embassy in Washington told VOA Korean on Tuesday that "we don't have specific comments" on Seoul's plans to normalize the THAAD base. The Korean Service also tried to contact the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, which did not respond.
In August 2022, Seoul said the THAAD was necessary for South Korea's self-defense and was not up for negotiation. Beijing had demanded that the newly elected government of President Yoon Suk Yeol uphold the previous Moon government's promises known as the "Three Nos policy."
To assuage Beijing, Moon had agreed to no additional deployment of the U.S. THAAD, no participation in a U.S.-led missile defense network, and no involvement in trilateral military alliances with the U.S. and Japan.
Military aggression
Even with its reduced economic leverage, experts said China would likely continue its military aggression to exert leverage over South Korea.
China will continue its aircraft incursions into South Korea's air defense zone as it did earlier in the month "regardless of what South Korea does" in its "effort to establish itself as a regional hegemon," said Bennett.
South Korea should think about purchasing an additional THAAD from the U.S. as a long-term defense not only against North Korea but from China, he continued.
Although North Korea is seen as posing the greatest threat to South Korea now, Bennett said China is more likely to be "the principal opponent" of South Korea in 10 years.
Riki Ellison, founder and chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, said in an email to VOA Korean, "China will always be upset with anything missile defense related no matter if it's the THAAD or other systems deployed near its borders that would be seen to be an offset to China's superiority in capacity of its rocket and missile forces no matter how small the numbers are."
He continued, "If China wants to get rid of the THAAD in Korea, then China has to [persuade Pyongyang] to get rid of or significantly reduce North Korea's rocket and missile forces facing South Korea."
North Korea launched a record number of missiles last year that continued every month until its failed satellite launch in May.
voanews.com · June 29, 2023
7. Yonhap forum sheds lights on decadeslong S. Korea-U.S. alliance amid security challenges
(2nd LD) Yonhap forum sheds lights on decadeslong S. Korea-U.S. alliance amid security challenges | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 29, 2023
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES with more details, photos throughout)
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, June 29 (Yonhap) -- Top government officials and experts gathered at a forum in Seoul on Thursday to explore ways to cope with security challenges on the Korean Peninsula, as South Korea and the United States mark the 70th anniversary of their alliance this year.
The symposium, co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul's unification ministry, was held at Lotte Hotel under the main theme of "70 Years of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: the Present and Future of the Korean Peninsula." ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's formal name.
The forum, now in its ninth year, came amid a complex security environment, highlighted by North Korea's push to expand its nuclear arsenal, the intensified rivalry between Washington and Beijing, and Russia's protracted war with Ukraine.
Seoul and Washington signed their mutual defense treaty, a bedrock alliance document, in October 1953, after the Korean War ended in a truce three months earlier. The alliance has served as a linchpin for promoting peace and security in the region.
Seong Ghi-hong, CEO and president of Yonhap News Agency speaks in an opening speech at a forum co-hosted by Yonhap and the Ministry of Unification at Lotte Hotel on June 29, 2023. (Yonhap)
In his message to the forum, President Yoon Suk Yeol vowed to create bigger opportunities for future generations by further supporting the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which he said has developed into a global comprehensive strategic alliance.
"In that regard, we must teach our future generations the value and meaning of the South Korea-U.S. alliance so that they are properly aware," Yoon said in the message read by Unification Minister Kwon Young-se, noting the important role of both the government and the press.
In a special session, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg highlighted the strengthening of the alliance, stressing that the decadeslong values-based alliance is "truly a force for good around the world."
The forum also came as South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have been bolstering their trilateral cooperation in the face of North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats.
After firing a record number of ballistic missiles last year, the North has intensified weapons tests this year as well, including the launch of a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile.
In a video message, Kurt Campbell, U.S. National Security Council coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, said U.S. President Joe Biden has invited President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Washington for a trilateral summit this summer.
This photo, captured from a video provided by the White House, shows National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell speaking in a prerecorded speech for a peace forum hosted by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul's unification ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"(In the envisioned summit), we will celebrate the remarkable progress that's been made in the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea, and to see what steps we can take to make sure we lock that progress in and to see what's possible to trilateralize areas of cooperation going forward," he added.
In a keynote speech, Foreign Minister Park Jin voiced expectations that the upcoming summit among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo will serve as further momentum for bolstering trilateral cooperation.
"Seoul and Washington will preserve genuine peace and peace through power, based on their alliance," Park said.
In the first comprehensive session of the forum, titled "The reshaping of international order and South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy," panelists discussed President Yoon's strategy and explored ways to preserve peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.
In the second session, participants explored ways to improve inter-Korean relations amid a protracted stalemate in denuclearization talks. Last year, Yoon proposed to the North an "audacious initiative" aimed at supporting its economic development in return for its commitment to denuclearization.
Seong Ghi-hong, CEO and president of Yonhap News Agency, said the symposium will serve as a "productive" venue of discussions to shed light on the present and future of the alliance.
"As South Korea's key newswire, Yonhap News Agency will support the ROK's endeavor to become a 'global pivotal state' contributing to freedom, peace and prosperity," he said.
Foreign Minister Park Jin delivers a keynote speech at a forum co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul's unification ministry at Lotte Hotel in Seoul on June 29, 2023. (Yonhap)
This photo, taken on June 29, 2023, shows panelists speaking in the first session of a forum, co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and South Korea's unification ministry, at Lotte Hotel in Seoul. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 29, 2023
8. US And Its Allies Building A Wall Around North Korea – Analysis
But let's not use the "C word: containment.
This is one of the rare authors who describe the ROK/US CFC this way: "the two countries’ Combined Forces Command." It is important to note that the ROK/US CFC belongs equally to both countries. It is not a US command. It is a bilateral command.
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, in the overall military sphere, the Washington Declaration also calls for closely connecting the capabilities and planning activities of Seoul’s new strategic command and the two countries’ Combined Forces Command. As South Korea’s conventional deterrence capabilities grow ever more advanced and capable, ensuring intra-alliance integration will be key.
The thinking is to take this model and apply the same template to other pro-US allies in the Pacific Ocean region, while recognizing the sensitivities of this topic to local parties and interest groups in Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan. But the road is long and negotiations will be necessary, but not impossible. The long-term outlook is to create a network of allies that are as unified as possible using high-tech, interoperable measures for both nuclear and conventional warfare scenarios.
Overall, the security situation in Northeast Asia is evolving into an escalating standoff in a changing geostrategic environment. What happens next in Russia matters globally and North Korea fully supports Moscow. China-Russia relations are also stable and likely to grow stronger in the coming months as various theaters heat up. While the Gulf region itself may be de-escalating, there is no doubt that the Western Pacific could become as hot as the Ukrainian-Russian battlefield.
US And Its Allies Building A Wall Around North Korea – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · by Dr. Theodore Karasik · June 29, 2023
North Korea is continuing to escalate its confrontation with the growing alliance of countries around it. Backed by China and Russia, Pyongyang is once again building its nuclear and space capacity, as well as its rhetoric. But the threat environment is changing and a new wall to contain North Korean military activity is rising.
This wall is metaphorical of course, as it is made up of sensors, rockets and other technologies rather than bricks. The barrier is made up of various layers of defense armaments and sensor systems that aim to protect countries such as South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and even Taiwan. These are not all interoperable but the fact that the alignment is occurring is significant to Western Pacific Ocean security. To be sure, the escalation ladder in the Northeast Asia sector is rising and, likely regardless of what happens in Russia, will continue.
China does not like these technological linkages and advances and is implementing strategies to fracture or complicate the US/Western-backed relationships. Beijing is taking advantage of a political rift in South Korea, attempting to throw a wrench in its relationships with the US and Japan. It has aligned with South Korea’s opposition in an effort to sway public sentiment and prevent those three countries from moving closer together.
Relations between Japan and South Korea and security cooperation among Japan, South Korea and the US have greatly improved under Yoon Suk-yeol’s presidency in Seoul, but the progress could be reversed just as quickly. Importantly, South Korea’s new national security strategy highlights what it sees as the danger posed by Beijing’s diplomatic maneuvers. In a balancing act because of the nature of Northeast Asian politics, South Korea’s new national security strategy, which was released this month, said it would maintain relations with China “in a consistent and resolute manner, based on national interests and principles.”
But South Korea’s population mix and the sentiment toward North Korea among various Seoul-based interest groups complicates the social media environment. This fact gives Beijing leverage and the phenomenon is not static but growing. China knows that South Korea’s foreign policy, especially its stance toward China and North Korea, often shifts dramatically when a new president takes office, which happens every five years.
Much of what is driving North Korea’s foreign policy today is the aftermath of last month’s failed launch of the Malligyong-1 military intelligence rocket. Pieces of debris, believed to be the Chollima-1 rocket used for the mission, were recovered by South Korea’s navy this week — a huge embarrassment for the North Korean regime. Pyongyang said this event was the worst failure ever for the North Korean state and immediately began to escalate rhetoric about “nuclear war.” Much of this talk is just rhetoric, but Pyongyang needs to be taken very seriously because of the technological developments that keep it as a perennial global threat. Hence, closer US cooperation with Western Pacific states is important and evolutionary, while attempting to box in any potential threat.
In response, South Korea-US relations are becoming closer and more integrated than ever before. North Korea’s anger at the rocket failure is based on the fact that Seoul and Washington in April signed the Washington Declaration, in which the two countries committed to engaging in deeper dialogue and information-sharing efforts via a new nuclear consultative group aimed at strengthening nuclear deterrence efforts on the Korean Peninsula.
The Washington Declaration focuses on expanding intra-alliance consultations on nuclear weapon matters and further integrates the forces of the US and South Korea in ways that can limit unintended escalation and buttress deterrence, as part of the larger conceptual aspect of building a wall against nuclear use. The integration of South Korean military capabilities into US nuclear strategy is part of the current security milieu. This activity mirrors NATO’s nuclear planning.
Meanwhile, in the overall military sphere, the Washington Declaration also calls for closely connecting the capabilities and planning activities of Seoul’s new strategic command and the two countries’ Combined Forces Command. As South Korea’s conventional deterrence capabilities grow ever more advanced and capable, ensuring intra-alliance integration will be key.
The thinking is to take this model and apply the same template to other pro-US allies in the Pacific Ocean region, while recognizing the sensitivities of this topic to local parties and interest groups in Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan. But the road is long and negotiations will be necessary, but not impossible. The long-term outlook is to create a network of allies that are as unified as possible using high-tech, interoperable measures for both nuclear and conventional warfare scenarios.
Overall, the security situation in Northeast Asia is evolving into an escalating standoff in a changing geostrategic environment. What happens next in Russia matters globally and North Korea fully supports Moscow. China-Russia relations are also stable and likely to grow stronger in the coming months as various theaters heat up. While the Gulf region itself may be de-escalating, there is no doubt that the Western Pacific could become as hot as the Ukrainian-Russian battlefield.
Dr. Theodore Karasik
Dr. Theodore Karasik is a senior advisor to Gulf State Analytics and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Lexington Institute in Washington, D.C. He is a former Advisor and Director of Research for a number of UAE institutions. Dr. Karasik was a Lecturer at the Dubai School of Government, Middlesex University Dubai, and the University of Wollongong Dubai where he taught “Labor and Migration” and “Global Political Economy” at the graduate level. Dr. Karasik was a Senior Political Scientist in the International Policy and Security Group at RAND Corporation. From 2002-2003, he served as Director of Research for the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy. Throughout Dr. Karasik’s career, he has worked for numerous U.S. agencies involved in researching and analyzing defense acquisition, the use of military power, and religio-political issues across the Middle East, North Africa, and Eurasia, including the evolution of violent extremism. Dr. Karasik lived in the UAE for 10 years and is currently based in Washington, D.C. Dr. Karasik received his PhD in History from the University of California, Los Angeles.
eurasiareview.com · by Dr. Theodore Karasik · June 29, 2023
9. U.S. flies nuclear-capable bombers in a fresh show of force against North Korea
U.S. flies nuclear-capable bombers in a fresh show of force against North Korea
washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com
By Hyung-jin Kim - Associated Press - Friday, June 30, 2023
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — The United States flew nuclear-capable bombers to the Korean Peninsula on Friday in its latest show of force against North Korea, days after the North staged massive anti-U.S. rallies in its capital.
The long-range B-52 bombers took part in joint aerial drills with other U.S. and South Korean fighter jets over the peninsula, South Korea’s Defense Ministry said in a statement. The bombers’ flyover is the latest in a series of temporary U.S. deployments of strategic assets in South Korea in response to North Korea’s push to expand its nuclear arsenal.
Two weeks ago, the U.S. deployed a nuclear-powered submarine capable of carrying about 150 Tomahawk missiles to South Korean waters for the first time in six years. The USS Michigan’s arrival came a day after North Korea resumed missile tests to protest previous U.S.-South Korean drills that it views as an invasion rehearsal.
The South Korean Defense Ministry said the B-52 bombers’ deployment boosted the visibility of U.S. strategic assets to the peninsula. It said the allies have been demonstrating their firm resolve to strengthen combined defense postures and will continue joint drills involving U.S. strategic bombers.
On Sunday, more than 120,000 North Koreans participated in mass rallies in Pyongyang to mark the 73rd anniversary of the start of the Korean War. During the rallies, officials and residents delivered speeches vowing “merciless revenge” against the United States over the war while accusing the U.S. of plotting an invasion on North Korea.
The Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty, leaving the peninsula in a technical state of war. The U.S. stations about 28,000 troops in South Korea as deterrence against potential aggression by North Korea.
Since its June 15 launches of two short-range ballistic missiles, North Korea hasn’t performed any further public weapons tests. But the U.S. bombers’ deployment could prompt it to launch weapons again in protest.
Enhancing “regular visibility of U.S. strategic assets” to the Korean Peninsula was part of agreements reached between U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol during their summit in Washington in April. Biden stated at the time that any North Korean nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies would “result in the end of whatever regime” took such action.
Since the start of 2022, North Korea has carried out more than 100 missile tests in a bid to enlarge its arsenal of nuclear-capable missiles targeting the U.S. mainland and South Korea. The allies have responded by expanding their military exercises.
In late May, a North Korean launch of a rocket carrying its first spy satellite ended in failure, with the rocket plunging into waters soon after liftoff. North Korea has since repeatedly said it would attempt a second launch, saying it’s crucial to build space-based surveillance system to cope with what it calls U.S. hostility.
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washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com
10. [Special Report] Red flag raised over foreign interference in Korean elections
[Special Report] Red flag raised over foreign interference in Korean elections
The Korea Times · June 30, 2023
gettyimagesbank
US, France, Taiwan and Canada reel from foreign intervention in their elections, and what makes you think Korea will be an exception? Experts ask
This is the first in a two-part series highlighting election and cyberattacks as the nation will hold National Assembly elections in April next year―ED.
By Kang Hyun-kyung
It all began with an anonymous whistleblower who uploaded a statement titled, "A Korean Chinese Tells the Truth," in an online chatroom on March 1, 2020, six weeks before the 2020 National Assembly elections.
Identifying himself as a Korean Chinese living in South Korea, the author claimed that like fellow Chinese keyboard warriors also known as "daetgeul budae" in Korean, he uploaded misinformation and fake news on several different internet websites in return for payment to influence public opinion in favor of China.
He accused China of having interfered in Korean elections held both at the national and local levels for many years through an internet opinion manipulation group consisting mostly of Han Chinese students studying in South Korea. He also claimed that China aims to put South Korea under its control to fulfill its ultimate goal of surpassing the United States as the world's No. 1 economy.
His testimony went viral on the internet, infuriating South Koreans.
In response, South Korean bloggers, social media users and other internet users teamed up on a fact-finding mission in an effort to verify what he had said was true. If it turned out to be true, they vowed to hunt down the Chinese.
As part of their cyber operations, some South Koreans shared comments containing hate speech about Chinese in several different online communities. The comments included a link, explaining it would usher them to a presidential petition calling for an end to hate speech and discrimination against Chinese and urging them to sign up to make their voices heard.
The link was fake. Instead, it led to an anti-China website, not the presidential petition site as was claimed.
Hours later, several online comments written in broken Korean were uploaded onto the websites. One of them read, "Na-neun gae-in-iyo," or "I'm an individual" in English.
South Korean internet users claimed those comments in broken Korean were concrete evidence proving that the authors were Chinese posing as South Koreans and had uploaded misinformation and fake news on social media and internet communities to manipulate public opinion in favor of a pro-China political party and their candidates, ahead of the April 15 National Assembly elections.
The online comment, "I'm an individual," topped the most searched phrase list on the nation's largest internet portal, Naver, at the time. Young internet-savvy South Koreans launched another operation to raise awareness of China's alleged interference in South Korean elections.
gettyimagesbank
Lee Ji-yong, a professor of Chinese Literature at Keimyung University in the southeastern city of Daegu, said China has approximately 30 million "paid online commentators" responsible for spreading propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the internet.
About half of them depend on the job for a living, according to Lee.
The Chinese online workers are called "Wumao" or the "50 Cent Army" as they get 0.50 Chinese renminbi for every post.
In South Korea, Lee claimed that Korean Chinese were mobilized to do that work.
About 700,000 Korean Chinese currently reside in South Korea mostly for work. The actual number will be much higher if undocumented Korean Chinese are included.
Lee warned of China's and other state actors' meddling in South Korean elections, stressing that the National Assembly elections to be held in April next year could be their target.
"China and North Korea are the two almost certain countries that will interfere in next year's elections," he said with confidence during a recent phone interview with The Korea Times. "I have no doubt that they will interfere in the elections to influence vote outcomes in their favor."
He said the Yoon Suk Yeol government would have already become a target as the South Korean president, who took office on May 10, 2022, has reiterated a stalwart position to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance amid an intensified U.S.-China rivalry.
The ruling People Power Party and the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea on June 8 agreed to launch an inquiry into North Korea's recent cyberattacks on the National Election Commission and nepotism allegations that rocked the election board. But the two parties have yet to reach an agreement on when to start the investigation.
Chinese foreign interference in elections poses a grave threat to several different countries, particularly in the West.
Canada is the latest country reeling from the fallout of allegations that China meddled in Canadian federal elections held in 2019 and 2021 following a flurry of related media reports based on intelligence documents.
In February, The Globe and Mail detailed how China interfered in those elections based on "secret and top-secret reports" produced by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and shared by senior government officials.
Appearing on a podcast on Feb. 27, Robert Fife, one of the two journalists who broke the exclusive story, said the CSIS documents that he viewed raised concerns about China's election interference and the targeting of Canadians through "hacking, bribery and sexual seduction."
He said the CSIS documents are secret briefs about Chinese interference operations in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections held in Canada, which Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's Liberals won.
Fife added that the documents have been shared with the Five Eyes intelligence allies. The five allies of the intelligence alliance he referred to are the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada.
The Canadian journalist said the CSIS also shared the intelligence reports with France and Germany.
"I think this is largely because they are having similar problems with the Chinese interference operations in their countries and also in the electoral process," he said.
A Russian military hacker group launched a complex cyberattack on Emmanuel Macron's presidential campaign in 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice said in October 2020.
Trudeau said China attempted to meddle in the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections, but its operations were unsuccessful and did not affect the election outcomes.
China denied the allegation.
Election workers count votes cast to elect lawmakers during the April 15 National Assembly elections in the tabulation center in Seoul's western district of Yeongdeungpo on April 15, 2020. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
Cybersecurity expert Choi Sang-myung, also known as Simon Choi, said South Korea is exposed to increasing risks of cyberattacks, particularly from North Korea, as the totalitarian country ratcheted up efforts for various malware and phishing attacks this year. ?
"We've experienced a lot of cyberattacks from North Korea this year alone. We were told that the North operates a phishing site, which looks like Naver, to steal the personal data of people who visit the site. Media outlets, government agencies and other institutions have been under attack from the North," he told The Korea Times.
"Their malware and phishing attacks are indiscriminate and deliberate. In the past, they targeted a limited number of people, mostly those who are in government. But these days they hack almost every Korean and Korean institution, so it's fair to say almost every South Korean is subject to cyberattacks from North Korea."
Choi, the founder of IssueMakersLab, an online group consisting of malware experts that successfully tracked the entire 7.7 DDoS attack by North Korea in 2009, explained the damaging consequences South Korea could face in the event North Korea deliberately uses the stolen information.
"The North Korean hackers can use that information to log on to South Koreans' email accounts and leave comments in internet communities, pretending to be South Koreans. With that information, they can also launch more active operations to influence South Korean voters in choosing candidates. They can run their own blogs and upload writings," he said. ?
With the stolen data, he said the North could manipulate public opinion in its favor to affect the elections.
State actors launch covert operations to influence the election outcomes of other countries in their favor. Considering this, Choi said Russia is another country that may attempt to meddle in the 2024 National Assembly elections.
South Korea's relations with Russia have deteriorated since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. South Korea sided with U.S. and its allies to support Ukraine.
Russia intervened in the 2016 U.S. presidential election by disrupting public opinion and spreading misinformation about then-Democratic Party candidate Hillary Clinton. It also hacked election boards and companies that provided election-related machines and their software to tamper with election outcomes.
The Russian military hacker group also hacked hundreds of computers used during the Opening Ceremony of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. The international intelligence community said the Russian hacking operation was in retaliation against the International Olympic Committee, which banned Team Russia from competing in the Winter Olympics due to doping violations.
Russia used a "false-flag" tactic to make it look like North Korea was behind the hacking attack.
Russia denied the allegation.
People protest against US President Donald J. Trump giving Acting Attorney General Matt Whitaker oversight of the Special Counsel investigation into Russia's meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, at Lafayette Park in Washington, DC, in this November 2018 file photo. EPA-Yonhap
The Korea Times · June 30, 2023
11. The Little Emergency that was the Korean War
Some interesting and little known history.
Interesting perspective on Syngman Rhee. In reading about his life, he did learn how to influence American leaders and used his skills well.
The Little Emergency that was the Korean War
June 24, 2013
A Moment in U.S. Diplomatic HistoryCold WarEast Asia and PacificMilitary
adst.org · June 24, 2013
There was a lot of unfinished business on the Korean peninsula in the 1940’s. It had been ruled by the Empire of Japan from 1910 until the end of World War II, when it was divided by American administrators along the 38th parallel, with U.S. military forces occupying the southern half and Soviet military forces occupying the northern half. The failure to hold free elections throughout the Korean Peninsula in 1948 deepened the division between the two sides; the North established a communist government, while the South established a right-wing government under Syngman Rhee. Cross-border skirmishes and raids at the 38th Parallel persisted until North Korean forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. The USSR boycotted the United Nations Security Council because the Republic of China, now operating from Taiwan, was chosen to represent China in the UN. Without the Soviet veto, the Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in Korea. The vast majority of “international” troops were American.
When the war broke out, Donald MacDonald, who was stationed in Korea at the time and discusses, in an interview with Stu Kennedy in 1990, what it was like coming into Korea in June 1948, the relationship between the United States and the Rhee government and the phone call early in the morning of June 25th that informed MacDonald of the unfolding “little” emergency.
“We Have a Little Emergency”
Q: When you returned to Korea in June, 1948, what was the situation?
MACDONALD: It was still very confused. It was marginally better than when I had left. Politically it was complicated by the split between the right and left. There were many demonstrations. There had been a couple of major assassinations before I got there. But the situation was not one that put in me in fear for my life and limb. We moved around freely. The bulk of the population were friendly.
A lot of people were complaining about what they thought we were failing to do…. One problem at the time was that the North Koreans on May 15, had pulled the switch on the electric power; the north was the primary source of power for the whole peninsula. In terms of creature comforts, that created some difficulties. Living was poor particularly for the Koreans…
By the time Rhee took over, he had made most of the Americans mad at him. He had a propensity for making all who had worked with him, mad at him. It was extraordinary. He had a single minded conviction of his own unique attributes and qualifications to be able to do anything. This was by no means un-Korean, but he exceeded most Koreans. It was he actually who had insisted on a separate government for South Korea when the Koreans were still hoping for a unified government of the peninsula.
Rhee knew how to manipulate Americans and did so. He was stubborn and mule-headed; he had an aura as the leading nationalist patriot fighter for Korea’s independence. He made Americans quite miserable. None of us liked him although we had some respect for his ability. Furthermore he became increasingly dictatorial. This turned off the junior members of the staff, particularly. I remember vividly trying to include all the criticisms I had heard in my dispatches, which Drumright took out, saying: “Young man, it is your business to report what happened, but not to pontificate”.
The outbreak was a complete surprise. It was not that we thought that there would be no war. There had been elaborate emergency plans drawn up, which were actually followed when war broke out. But for one thing, we were encouraged by the military advisory group to over-estimate South Korean military capabilities. We also underestimated the capacity of the North Koreans. Although the threat was obviously there, it was discounted. Also President Rhee had been crying wolf for so long that when in May, 1950 he and his defense minister began to cite movement of tanks and troops, we dismissed it as an effort to get more military assistance. We were concerned that he would move North; after all, he wasalways talking about it. Even though we recognized the threat and were planning for the eventuality of a war, when it actually happened it was a total surprise….
Once I started doing political reporting, I was in touch with government people, but I tended to work through the Embassy’s Korean political assistants more than by direct contact. For one thing, my Korean was still inadequate for conducting business. We all tended to distrust the government anyway. We preferred to go to newsmen, opposition politicians and others to try to get information on what was going on in the country, leaving government official contacts to our seniors….
The first word that I received about the War was a telephone call on Sunday morning, June 25, from Everett Drumright. I was in bed asleep. He said: “MacDonald, we have a little emergency. You’d better get to the office”. I went and never did get home very much thereafter.
The first matter to attend to was to determine whether the invasion was for real. There had been many skirmishes at division level at the front since 1949; it was never completely clear which side started these incidents. Therefore we had to establish the veracity of the reports of the North Korean attacks. It wasn’t until Monday that we actually heard gunfire. Events progressed more or less according to plan for the first day.
We started to segregate classified documents for destruction. We organized people in civil defense ways by designating air raid shelters, appointed wardens, arranged communications and so on. As it became increasingly clear that the South Korean Army was not going to hold, then matters got increasingly frantic. We were burning classified documents on the roof of the Embassy steadily for two or three days. Some of the Marine guards and junior officers were assigned to that detail.
“The North Koreans Are Coming”
Meanwhile, we of course still had to write reports. Ambassador Muccio personally had to hold the hand of the Korean government. The first group to be evacuated consisted of dependents–women and children. They left Sunday night and were put on board a fertilizer boat which had just been ordered to dump its cargo overboard to make room for them. That group left for Japan. The next group consisted of non-essential employees and finally everybody left except a group of volunteers that the Ambassador had requested. I was one of those.
I wasn’t a personal witness, but there seems to be no doubt that there was a disgraceful episode at plane-side Tuesday morning when some of our senior officials were elbowing each other out of the way to get on the plane first with their hunting rifles, their electronic gear and whatever other things that they had taken fancy to and had therefore had to go along with them. It was a mess.
I got home long enough to help my wife pack up one trunk locker and got her off. After that I returned home once before I left with Ambassador Muccio. My last act was to go back to the Embassy on Tuesday afternoon to check it out to make sure that everybody had left…
By Tuesday afternoon, the gunfire was clearly audible. That afternoon, around 4 PM, I drove out of Seoul in the Ambassador’s car. He was driving it because he didn’t want to leave it for the Communists. We drove to Suwon, where a temporary headquarters had been set up, both for the small Embassy team and the military group that was being assembled for assessment purposes.
In Suwon, we were essentially supporting the military and trying to report the situation to Washington using “one time pads”–a coded tear-off pad. These were the days before sophisticated electronics… We set up our headquarters in a former agriculture school that had been built by the Japanese. I can vividly remember General Church, who was the leader of the first reconnaissance party from Tokyo, after looking at maps and listening to reports for several hours, saying: “No one knows where anybody is!” It was in that climate then that on Thursday or Friday someone yelled that the North Koreans were coming.
One of the communication technicians threw a thermite grenade at the communications gear to destroy it and thereby set fire to the entire building, which had been built with well seasoned wood. It burned immediately.
We then set off in the middle of the night for Taejon, where the next temporary headquarters was established. In Taejon, there was little need for normal Embassy work. So I typed intelligence reports for the 24th Division G-2 until I was asked to make a trip through the rest of South Korea to make sure that all the missionaries were evacuated… I did a “Paul Revere ride” around the various missionary headquarters and told them to leave. I wound up finally in Pusan. I never returned to Taejon because in the meantime the 24th Division was defeated and had to fall back to Taegu.
Eventually, I found myself in Taegu where Drumright was in charge of a forward Embassy echelon. Muccio was in Pusan in charge of a rear echelon. Drumright spent most of his time checking up and reporting on the military situation. Muccio was spending his time calming President Rhee and doing what he could to stabilize the situation there… Muccio managed somehow or other to instill enough confidence into the Korean government so that when American assistance arrived in the form of air cover and eventually ground troops, what could be saved was saved. It was very difficult, but had Muccio not taken that firm positive reassuring stance, based on very little evidence, the situation would have been much worse.
A Close Call
Q: What happened after Taegu?
MACDONALD: Harold Noble has published a book, called “Embassy at War” which chronicles day-to-day what happened, and he cites one hilarious staff meeting in which I announced that I wasn’t doing enough in this perilous hour and if the Embassy couldn’t give me something to do, I would volunteer for active military duty–I was a reserve officer at the time. Partly because of that, they sent me on a mission to North Korea just after word of the Chinese intervention had reached us.
They wanted me to stand on the railroad track running down into Sinanju which was then close to the fighting. I was to interview refugees to see whether they were really refugees or “fifth column” troops being sent to the rear of the UN command. I spent a few very cold days doing that.
Somewhat later, just before the fall of Pyongyang, a team from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, headed by Richard Scammon, arrived to go to Pyongyang for interviews and examination of captured documents. This was an effort to understand how the Soviet Union had operated in North Korea. This led to a Departmental report called “A Case Study in Communist Take-over”. I was sent along as a hat-holder and logistics officer.
When the team left, I decided to stay for a while because there wasn’t much else to do, and the commander of the American military government team in Pyongyang was an officer for whom I had worked before, during my military government training. I joined him until orders to evacuate were received.
The colonel told me to leave first because he didn’t want to take responsibility for me. Actually, we spent a night in a school house on the way out. An ammunition dump, which was right next door, exploded and dumped the wall of the school right on us. That is the closest I came to being a war casualty.
adst.org · June 24, 2013
12. Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Progress Continues Toward Kim’s Modernization and Expansion Plans
Images at the link: https://www.38north.org/2023/06/sohae-satellite-launching-station-progress-continues-toward-kims-modernization-and-expansion-plans/
Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Progress Continues Toward Kim’s Modernization and Expansion Plans
Since Kim Jong Un’s March 2022 visit to the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, several changes have occurred to achieve the goals he set forth to expand and modernize the site. The May 31 satellite launch attempt, while ending in failure, showcased some of the modifications that have been made to facilitate the launch of more and larger satellite launch vehicles (SLVs).
Kim’s plans for the site included a series of tasks, most of which are still underway in different areas at Sohae. The most significant additions to the site have been a Horizontal Engine Test Stand and a coastal launch pad. Long-term projects have included refurbishment of the main satellite launch pad, a tunnel system that leads from the secure facility to the new roadway system, a seaport to the south that enables sea transport to the site, and an expanded roadway system to and from Sohae down to the seaport.
Figure 1. Overview of Sohae Satellite Launching Station. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
The Engine Test Stand Area
The engine testing area showed the most rapid changes since Kim’s visit in March of 2022. On commercial satellite imagery from November 13, 2022, activity was observed around the Vertical Engine Test Stand (VETS), including multiple construction vehicles and dirt piles. Construction of a new road routed toward the coast had begun, and the foundations for a new Horizontal Engine Test Stand (HETS), which will facilitate the testing of solid-fuel rocket motors, had been laid. By December 15, 2022, the HETS had been completed, built and used to test a solid rocket engine.
A possible test silo was rapidly constructed and completed by March 1, 2023 and was likely the location of a March 19 KN-23 short-range ballistic missile test.
Since the May 31 satellite launch attempt, construction activity has picked up at the VETS, where large, liquid-fuel engines are tested. Between June 5 and June 9, 2023, the environmental shelter had been moved onto the ramp connecting the apron to the test stand, and the dirt piles had been removed. Several vehicles were present starting June 9, but by June 16, all had left. While this appeared to be possible test preparation activity, there has been no visible evidence or reports of an engine test having been conducted as of yet.
Imagery from June 18 revealed that a dark sealant was being applied to the apron, a process not seen since late fall of 2016.
Imagery from June 23 revealed further application of the dark sealant extending beyond the VETS. The stretch of road from the main launch pad to the VETS has been sealed (paved), and from there, the sealant extends out in two directions.
First, the road to the HETS and the HETS pad has been sealed, and the road leading up the hill to the silo is having sealant applied as well.
Second, the road which extends from the test stand area to the new coastal road has had about half of the roadway sealed (paved). This practice of improving the road and pad surfaces highlights the importance of these areas within the launching station, where we can expect significant activity in the future.
In addition to the sealing (paving) process, imagery from June 23 also revealed the partial dismantlement of the retractable shelter at the VETS. The shelter has been moved back onto the apron, and all panels have been removed, leaving the base framework exposed. Whether this is just routine maintenance or the shelter will be modified is unknown. While the environmental shelter is under construction, further liquid-fuel engine testing is unlikely, but the VETS itself is likely operational.
These June events highlight the ongoing efforts to upgrade engine testing capabilities. Given the officially reported second-stage failure of the May 31 SLV launch, additional testing of those motors and their fuel should be anticipated.
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Figure 2d. Sealing (paving) around VETS apron and surrounding roads visible on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2a. Overview of activity at engine test stand area on November 13, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2b. Overview of engine test stand area and completed Horizontal Engine Test Stand on imagery from December 19, 2022. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2c. Possible test silo at engine test stand area on March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2d. Sealing (paving) around VETS apron and surrounding roads visible on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2a. Overview of activity at engine test stand area on November 13, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2b. Overview of engine test stand area and completed Horizontal Engine Test Stand on imagery from December 19, 2022. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2c. Possible test silo at engine test stand area on March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 2d. Sealing (paving) around VETS apron and surrounding roads visible on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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The Coastal Launch Pad
In just over one month, a new coastal satellite launch pad was constructed, significantly increasing Sohae’s capacity to launch more and different types of rockets. The initial excavation started around April 19, 2023, and the pad was used for the May 31, 2023 satellite launch.
The features of the new launch pad include a rail-mounted covered structure and rocket body lift mechanism. The shelter provides a protected area for rocket assembly and loading onto the lift mechanism and has two doors on the southwest side to receive components and one door on the northeast side. Prior to raising the rocket into an upright position for launch, the shelter is retracted to allow a launch.
Under the north end of the pad, a flame bucket was constructed directed toward the sea to allow exhaust fumes and other particles to be released away from the launch pad and keep the temperature around the rocket low enough to prevent heat-related damage. Near the pad, lightning arrestors and light towers were erected to protect the launch vehicle and its payload prior to launch and allow for low-light and night-time launches. The lighting towers are likely fitted with cameras and other equipment to monitor launches.
The speed at which the new launch pad was constructed indicated the high priority placed on an alternative to the main satellite launch pad, previously used for SLV launches. The pace was also a clear distinction from the slow modifications that occurred at the older pad, which began in March 2022. However, given the speed of construction, there are questions regarding the quality and integrity of the new launch pad. Further, unlike the main launch pad, there does not appear to be fuel and oxidizer storage at this location. These features may be installed over time, or it is possible that SLVs launched from this location will adopt other fueling procedures or arrive at the launch site pre-fueled.
Imagery throughout early June initially revealed only modest post-launch site maintenance activity. However, the dark sealant seen previously at the VETS has also been applied to the coastal launch pad and was completed by June 23. On June 24, low-resolution imagery revealed the presence of unidentified, light-toned materials covering the west portion of the southern half of the pad.
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Figure 3e. Possible sealing (paving) on coastal launch pad seen on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3a. Initial excavation for new coastal launch pad began around April 19, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3b. Overview of activity at new coastal launch pad on imagery from May 23, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3c. Overview of new coastal launch pad activity on May 30, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3d. Post-launch activity, including exhaust residue, vehicle tracks, and movement of the rail-mounted structure, observed on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3e. Possible sealing (paving) on coastal launch pad seen on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3a. Initial excavation for new coastal launch pad began around April 19, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3b. Overview of activity at new coastal launch pad on imagery from May 23, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3c. Overview of new coastal launch pad activity on May 30, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3d. Post-launch activity, including exhaust residue, vehicle tracks, and movement of the rail-mounted structure, observed on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3e. Possible sealing (paving) on coastal launch pad seen on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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In addition, imagery from May 16 showed a new administrative/operations building under construction approximately 0.5 km south of the coastal launch pad. On May 30, roofing rafters had been installed. By June 18, the roofing appeared to be nearing completion. Whether additional support facilities will be added to the area is unknown.
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Figure 4c. Roofing of new administrative/operations buildingnearing completion on imagery from June 18, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 4a. Close up of construction of new administrative/operations building located approximately 0.5 km south of the coastal launch pad on May 16, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 4b. Roofing rafters installed at new administrative/operations building by May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 4c. Roofing of new administrative/operations buildingnearing completion on imagery from June 18, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 4a. Close up of construction of new administrative/operations building located approximately 0.5 km south of the coastal launch pad on May 16, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 4b. Roofing rafters installed at new administrative/operations building by May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 4c. Roofing of new administrative/operations buildingnearing completion on imagery from June 18, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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The Main Satellite Launch Pad
Since September 6, 2022, until more recently, the refurbishment and modernization of the main launch pad had progressed slowly. Modifications were well underway by September 2022, with the arrival of building materials on the pad and the razing of the oxidizer and fuel storage bunkers. But work on the key components of the launch pad—the launch tower and mobile transfer structure—saw little activity in the following months.
By mid-December, the side panels and roof had been removed from the mobile transfer shelter, and new components for the tower had arrived, but then few observable changes were seen until May 12. From that date on, efforts to reassemble and complete those on-pad components, redesigned to accommodate larger rockets, progressed rapidly, seemingly to be ready for the announced SLV launch closure period from May 30 to June 9.
The modifications included the dismantlement of the rail-mounted transfer structure down to its frame by December 19, 2022, although it remained seemingly untouched with construction materials stacked on the launch pad for several months. In early May 2023, new paneling was placed on the modified transfer structure to change how it accommodates rockets. The previous transfer structure had a small, square opening where the rocket would be vertically placed for the gantry tower arm to lower and lift up the rocket. The modified transfer structure now likely opens in a clamshell-like way to provide the crane atop the gantry tower with more ways to raise the rocket to the tower.
Additional sections were added to the gantry tower to accommodate larger rockets, and a larger crane arm was installed to lift rockets from the transfer structure and maneuver them directly into the gantry arms. The construction was completed by May 23, 2023.
Between May 12 and May 23, 2023, the fuel and oxidizer line that feeds to the gantry tower from the razed fuel/oxidizer bunkers was possibly refurbished. By May 23, the line was painted bright orange, and at the end of the line by the former bunkers, possible trenching or other construction work was visible. By May 30, the ground was leveled, and trees were replanted.
Although the pace of construction and modification varied over the past year, the launch pad was likely at an operational status for the May 31 launch, and a flurry of vehicles on the launch pad in the hours after the launch gave the impression that the pad had been used. However, the lack of vegetation burn around the exhaust bucket, and then eventual photos and videos of the launch published in North Korean media, confirmed the launch had originated from the new coastal launch pad.
Modifications may continue, but the improvements already made can accommodate larger rockets than before. The modification of the feed line for fuel and oxidizer strongly suggests that fuel and oxidizer storage bunkers still need to be rebuilt.
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Figure 5h. Overview of activity at main launch pad on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5a. Early modernization efforts to main launch pad observed on imagery from September 6, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5b. Side panels and roof removed from mobile transfer shelter and new tower components arrived at main launch pad by mid-December. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5c. Overview of main launch pad activity on imagery from March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5d. Observable activity at main launch pad begins to progress more quickly. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5e. Fuel/oxidizer line possible refurbished and painted bright orange, and additional construction observed on imagery from May 23, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5f. Overview of main launch pad activity on May 30, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5g. No vegetation burn around exhaust bucket observed post-launch in combination with North Korean state media confirm the launch took place from the new coastal launch pad. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5h. Overview of activity at main launch pad on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5a. Early modernization efforts to main launch pad observed on imagery from September 6, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5b. Side panels and roof removed from mobile transfer shelter and new tower components arrived at main launch pad by mid-December. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5c. Overview of main launch pad activity on imagery from March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5d. Observable activity at main launch pad begins to progress more quickly. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5e. Fuel/oxidizer line possible refurbished and painted bright orange, and additional construction observed on imagery from May 23, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5f. Overview of main launch pad activity on May 30, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5g. No vegetation burn around exhaust bucket observed post-launch in combination with North Korean state media confirm the launch took place from the new coastal launch pad. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 5h. Overview of activity at main launch pad on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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Tunnel System
By September 2022, excavation work had started on a tunnel that, when completed, will connect the VIP housing area located within the secure launch facility to the future coastal launching area and seaport. Little to the exterior of the tunnel entrances has changed since May 16, 2023, as backfilling and road work continues. This tunnel will be critical for road access to and from the east, although its incomplete status made it unavailable for transporting the SLV to the coastal launch pad for the May 31 launch.
Nonetheless, the road distance from the rail station to the launch pad is significant without the tunnel’s use, highlighting the importance of this new tunnel which will provide an enhanced ability to transport heavy and large rockets around the expanded launching station. The slow progress of the tunnel in recent months indicates that while inconvenient, road transport of large rockets is possible, and operationalizing the tunnel is a lower priority than other construction, such as the new coastal launch pad and engine test area, both needed more immediately.
The large amount of soil and rock debris removed from the tunnel during its construction calls into question what other functions the tunnel will provide beyond a passage through the mountain, such as large vehicle storage as well.
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Figure 6d. West Tunnel entrance remains incomplete on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6a. Initial excavation work seen on West Tunnel entrance on imagery from September 6, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6b. Activity at West Tunnel entrance on March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6c. Activity at West Tunnel entrance observed on imagery from May 16, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6d. West Tunnel entrance remains incomplete on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6a. Initial excavation work seen on West Tunnel entrance on imagery from September 6, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6b. Activity at West Tunnel entrance on March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6c. Activity at West Tunnel entrance observed on imagery from May 16, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 6d. West Tunnel entrance remains incomplete on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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Figure 7d. East Tunnel entrance remains incomplete on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7a. Initial excavation work seen on East Tunnel entrance on imagery from September 6, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7b. Activity at East Tunnel entrance on January 18, 2023.Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7c. Activity at East Tunnel entrance observed on March 20, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7d. East Tunnel entrance remains incomplete on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7a. Initial excavation work seen on East Tunnel entrance on imagery from September 6, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7b. Activity at East Tunnel entrance on January 18, 2023.Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7c. Activity at East Tunnel entrance observed on March 20, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7d. East Tunnel entrance remains incomplete on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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Seaport
By October 2022, work had begun on the southern coast of the Sohae Peninsula to build a jetty that extends south into the sea, providing the first evidence of intent to build a seaport. The jetty extends far enough that larger vessels could potentially transport rocket components by sea to the site in the future.
Large concrete blocks have been placed along the waterfront in similar patterns as seen at other seaside locations in the country, such as the construction project located at the south end of the Yuktaeso-ri (Sinpho) Peninsula . It is unclear how the work will be finished, but ultimately, they will provide a solid quay wall for the berthing of vessels.
Imagery from June 23 revealed that more concrete blocks continue to arrive. While not yet positioned, their presence indicates the surface area of the new quay will be enlarged. In addition, approximately a dozen small vessels are anchored offshore. While a few may be fishing vessels, there appears to be a mix of harbor craft and three coastal bulk carriers with identified cargo.
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Figure 8d. Additional concrete blocks and offshore boat activity observed on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8a. Jetty construction seen on imagery from January 18, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8b. Further construction work on jetty observed on imagery from March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8c. Construction materials, new dredging, and jetty construction visible on imagery from March 20, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8d. Additional concrete blocks and offshore boat activity observed on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8a. Jetty construction seen on imagery from January 18, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8b. Further construction work on jetty observed on imagery from March 1, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8c. Construction materials, new dredging, and jetty construction visible on imagery from March 20, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 8d. Additional concrete blocks and offshore boat activity observed on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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Roadway System
Construction on the new coastal road began in the summer of 2022. It paralleled another older road that wound its way down the coast to a small village near the future site of the new seaport.
However, the older road to the seaport is unsuitable for carrying heavy loads and would be difficult for large trucks to navigate. To address this issue, a new road has been under construction that is wider with fewer curves and appears to change gradually in elevation.
While road construction continues, the northern portion, which connects the seaside village and workers’ construction area of Changya-dong to the coastal launch pad, was made serviceable prior to May 30, in time to transport the recently launched rocket to the pad by road. Construction continues throughout the road network; while currently a dirt road, the sealant application may extend to this roadway to improve transport conditions of heavy yet sensitive equipment.
Figure 9a. Overview of initial work on new coastal road on June 1, 2022. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com; Figure 9b. Overview of new coastal road construction progress on May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
New VIP Observation Area
The new observation area was seen being prepared as early as April 30, 2023, and by May 23, beautifying efforts were underway. While no physical structure has yet been constructed in the open field, by June 18, work resumed in this area.
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Figure 10c. Additional barriers added to VIP observation area by June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 10a. Initial clearing for new VIP observation area visible on imagery from April 19, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 10b. Beautification efforts to new VIP observation area seen on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 10c. Additional barriers added to VIP observation area by June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 10a. Initial clearing for new VIP observation area visible on imagery from April 19, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 10b. Beautification efforts to new VIP observation area seen on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 10c. Additional barriers added to VIP observation area by June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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Possible New Assembly and Storage Facility
To date, no visible changes have occurred at the existing Horizontal Assembly Building, which is located along the rail line servicing the complex. However, construction began in the summer of 2022 on a large structure near the VIP housing area on the site of the former launch control facility. Since then, the size and layout of the facility suggest it may serve as a new receiving and assembly facility.
The pace of construction at the new facility has been slow but methodical. The foundation and walls that have been erected provide insight into future smaller rooms, open bays, and pass-through corridors. On imagery from June 18, the smaller rooms have had ceilings built, and construction of more rooms is underway. Since May 23, at least eight yellow lattice sections have been placed on the ground to the east side of the complex. These are similar to those seen on the main launch pad on that date, suggesting they are crane components, possibly of the same crane previously seen next to the launch tower.
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Figure 11d. Overview of construction activity of possible new assembly and storage facility on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11a. VIP housing area prior to construction. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11b. Control center razed and building foundation construction underway on imagery from October 25, 2022. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11c. Yellow lattice sections arrived at construction site near VIP housing area observed on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11d. Overview of construction activity of possible new assembly and storage facility on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11a. VIP housing area prior to construction. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11b. Control center razed and building foundation construction underway on imagery from October 25, 2022. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11c. Yellow lattice sections arrived at construction site near VIP housing area observed on imagery from May 31, 2023. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2023. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 11d. Overview of construction activity of possible new assembly and storage facility on imagery from June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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Rail Transport
Rail connection between Sohae and the Pyongyang region, where rockets and their components are manufactured, has been a critical transport path. Without it, the size and weight of these items would make movement slow and precarious on North Korea’s substandard roads. Despite this, only one single track runs the distance.
Having only a single track leaves rail transport extremely susceptible to the condition of that single track. For instance, sometime between June 2 and 4, a rail bridge just north of the secure facility collapsed, likely from increased rail traffic to Sohae over the aging rail infrastructure. The bridge was repaired by June 15, but rail traffic would have stopped during that period, potentially causing delays in further construction around the Sohae area. Although the outage was brief, this vulnerability is likely part of the rationale for building the new seaport.
Construction on a new railroad depot located immediately north of the station’s security perimeter began in June 2022 and was quickly completed by September. The depot was likely added to facilitate the movement of construction materials to Sohae in support of the expansion project. The primary feature is a long, narrow receiving building surrounded by a few smaller structures and an open storage area. Materials received here are temporarily stored either inside or in open storage while waiting for truck transport to move them to their final destination. Materials may bypass the depot and continue to the covered rail transfer station located within the secure launching station complex.
In early September 2022, 50 meters of track had been removed from the entrance of the underground rocket component reception area beneath the pad, and a new access road was prepared to allow entry into the reception area (see Figure 5a). Going forward, whether the tracks will eventually be replaced or road transporters will be used to move components to the pad is unknown.
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Figure 12b. Activity at new railroad depot on June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 12a. Collapsed railroad bridge north of the secure facility observed on imagery from June 5, 2023. The bridge collapsed sometime between June 2 and 4, and was repaired by June 15. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 12b. Activity at new railroad depot on June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 12a. Collapsed railroad bridge north of the secure facility observed on imagery from June 5, 2023. The bridge collapsed sometime between June 2 and 4, and was repaired by June 15. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 12b. Activity at new railroad depot on June 23, 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
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13. Hyundai chairwoman requests permission to visit North Korea's Kumgangsan
To assess the damage and destruction?
Hyundai chairwoman requests permission to visit North Korea's Kumgangsan
koreaherald.com · by Lee Jung-joo · June 30, 2023
Published : Jun 30, 2023 - 15:42 Updated : Jun 30, 2023 - 15:42
Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun (Korea Herald DB)
Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun is planning a trip to Kumgangsan in North Korea to attend a private service on Aug. 4 commemorating her late husband, Chung Mong-hun, said officials on Friday. The event will commemorate the 20th anniversary of the death of Chung Mong-hun.
The Ministry of Unification said that Hyun has asked for Seoul's permission to be in contact with North Korea to visit the country in August on Tuesday. By law, all South Koreans must file a report to the Ministry of Unification prior to meeting or being in contact with a North Korean national, which will be processed within seven days.
Chairwoman Hyun reportedly stated in her report that she plans to contact North Korea’s Asia-Pacific Peace Committee to visit Kumgangsan. Once North Korea allows her to visit, they will send her a letter of invitation, which will be passed to the Ministry of Unification for final approval.
Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun and Hyundai Group's executive members leave Chung Mong-hun's memorial service in Hanam, Gyeonggi Province in 2013. (Park Hae-mook/The Korea Herald)
This isn’t the first time Hyun has requested to attend a private service for her late husband’s passing. In 2018, Hyun visited North Korea for the 15th anniversary of Chung’s death. However, critics say that Hyun’s visit will not be as easy this year, as tensions are higher between North and South Korea.
Chung took his own life in 2003 amid allegations that he had secretly transferred millions of dollars to the North before the 2000 inter-Korean summit. Since then, Chairwoman Hyun attended memorial services in Kumgangsan in 2009, 2013 and 2014.
By Lee Jung-joo (lee.jungjoo@heraldcorp.com)
koreaherald.com · by Lee Jung-joo · June 30, 2023
14. S. Korea, US hold annual defense ICT talks
S. Korea, US hold annual defense ICT talks
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · June 30, 2023
By Yonhap
Published : Jun 30, 2023 - 11:40 Updated : Jun 30, 2023 - 11:40
This photo shows South Korean and US officials posing for a photo during the second session of the South Korea-US ICT Cooperation Committee in Seoul on August 12, 2022. (Defense ministry)
Defense officials of South Korea and the United States held their annual meeting on bilateral security cooperation in the area of information and communication technologies in Hawaii earlier this week, Seoul's defense ministry said Friday.
The third session of the South Korea-US ICT Cooperation Committee took place Thursday. Kang Wan-gu, chief of planning and coordination at the ministry, and John Sherman, the Pentagon's chief information officer, led the session.
The two sides exchanged assessments on trends regarding 5G wireless networks and other latest ICT technologies and agreed to strengthen cooperation in the application of those technologies to the defense sector, according to the ministry.
They also recognized the importance of mutual cooperation regarding cybersecurity, interoperability and defense ICT policies. (Yonhap)
15. S. Korea to launch upgraded missile defense operations center
S. Korea to launch upgraded missile defense operations center
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · June 30, 2023
By Yonhap
Published : Jun 30, 2023 - 10:36 Updated : Jun 30, 2023 - 10:36
This image shows a conceptual image of a missile defense operations system. (Defense Acquisition Program Administration)
South Korea's Air Force is set Friday to open an upgraded missile defense operations center in a city just south of Seoul, officials said, in yet another move to strengthen the nation's anti-missile shield against growing North Korean threats.
The KAMD Operations Center will open in Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul, following a capability upgrade designed to respond "more swiftly and effectively" to ballistic missile threats, according to the Air Force.
KAMD, short for the Korea Air and Missile Defense, is a key pillar of South Korea's three-pronged defense system, which also includes the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, an operational plan to incapacitate the North Korean leadership in a major conflict and the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform.
The KAMD Operations Center is an upgrade from the previous Korea Theater Missile Operations Cell. Its opening came after two months of system stabilization and operational preparations following the delivery of the upgraded system to the Air Force in April.
The upgrade focuses on "significantly" reducing the amount of the time required to process ballistic missile data and enabling linkages with more detection and interception assets, according to the armed service. (Yonhap)
16. US remains committed to working with S. Korea to secure peace in Indo-Pacific: Pentagon
US remains committed to working with S. Korea to secure peace in Indo-Pacific: Pentagon
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · June 30, 2023
The United States has and will continue to work with South Korea to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, a Pentagon spokesperson said Thursday.
The spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, also reaffirmed US commitment to engaging with North Korea.
"From a DoD (Department of Defense) standpoint, certainly we remain committed to working with the Republic of Korea and our partners in the region to ensure peace, stability and security in the region," Ryder said when asked about the South Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty, which was signed 70 years earlier in October 1953.
His remark also comes amid escalating tension with North Korea, which unsuccessfully launched a space launch vehicle carrying a claimed military reconnaissance satellite late last month.
The allies strongly condemned the failed launch, calling it a violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions that prohibit the North from acquiring or using any long-range missile technologies, including space rockets.
Pyongyang has dismissed the condemnation, saying it will continue to launch space launch vehicles until it succeeds.
Ryder said the US keeps an "open door when it comes to being willing to talk with North Korea."
"But certainly from a DoD standpoint, we will continue to work alongside our partners and allies in the region to prevent potential future conflict," he told a press briefing.
When asked about the proposed visit by a US nuclear submarine to South Korea, the Pentagon spokesperson reaffirmed that a nuclear-capable "Ohio-class" submarine will visit South Korea "at some point in the future."
The US agreed to dispatch a nuclear ballistic missile submarine to South Korea under an agreement signed by President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, dubbed the Washington Declaration, that is designed to bolster US extended deterrence commitment to South Korea.
Ryder declined to comment on specific armament of specific systems when asked if the SSBN will be carrying nuclear weapons, reiterating that it will be a "nuclear-capable submarine." (Yonhap)
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · June 30, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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