Quotes of the Day:

“A man is not great because he has not failed. A man is great because failure hasn’t stopped him.” 

- Confucius

“We are like books. Most people only see our cover, the minority read only the introduction, many people believe the critics. Few will know our content.” 

- Emile Zola

“The most dangerous person on earth is the arrogant intellectual who lacks the humility necessary to see that society needs no masters and cannot be planned from the top down.” 

-  Friedrich ​von ​Hayek

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2023

2. China’s Imperialist Foreign Policy

3. Senators pushing for annual briefings on Chinese political influence ops

4. Personnel Is Power: Why China Is Winning at the United Nations

5. Paris police shooting: why are there riots in France?

6. U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era - Responding to a More Assertive China

7. How a reckless report could increase the chance of a crisis with China

8. Geography, Bureaucracy, and National Security: The Legacies of the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods

9. ‘Nothing Has Happened’ – 'General Armageddon's' Daughter as He Remains Out-of-Sight

10. The Wagner 'Coup' Was Staged by Putin—and the West Fell for It

11.  Xi’s Schadenfreude Over Moscow’s Mutiny

12. New Chinese Law Raises Risks for American Firms in China, U.S. Officials Say

13. The Military Recruiting Crisis: Even Veterans Don’t Want Their Children to Join

14. Putin's FSB and the Russian Army are 'at war': Chaos deepens as it emerges arrested General Surovikin was a secret member of Wagner after Prigozhin's failed mutiny

15. An Army Couple Had Their Daughter at a Military Hospital. Then the Collections Calls Started for $600,000.

16. Rise of the Machines or Just a Routine Test?

17. How a record-setting 'Ugly Baby' mission allowed US special operators to outmaneuver Iraqi forces

18. We salute the USS Chung-Hoon for flying its battle flag on the way back to port

19. Operation Paperclip: The Nazis Recruited To Win the Cold War

20. The High Price of Dollar Dominance

21. Russia’s Biowarfare Lies Can’t Go Unanswered

22. Biden administration could soon approve sending controversial cluster munitions to Ukraine

23. Extreme Pride in Being American Remains Near Record Low

24. CIA officer Ric Prado’s stellar career still inspires agents today

25. Confusion, infighting plague Russian military in mutiny’s wake

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2023

Key Takeaways

• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces seized the “strategic initiative” in the Bakhmut direction and are currently conducting a broad offensive in the area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two other sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 29.
• The Kremlin may intend to assume formal control over the Wagner Group following its armed rebellion and turn it into a state-owned enterprise, although it is not clear if the Kremlin has committed itself to such a course of action.
• Recent satellite imagery may have detected active construction of a speculated new Wagner Group base in Asipovichy, Belarus.
• Kremlin-affiliated businessmen may be acquiring Prigozhin’s domestic media empire, likely as part of ongoing effort to destroy his reputation in Russia.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to address Army General Sergei Surovikin’s whereabouts on June 29, prompting more speculations in the Russian information space.
• Western observers continue to speculate about the whereabouts of Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov following Wagner’s rebellion, although his lack of public appearance is not necessarily indicative of his current official standing within the Russian military leadership
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces intensified counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly made advances.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
• Russian forces in early May constructed a dam on the outskirts of Tokmak in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• A Russian BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed that Russian forces are moving military equipment to unspecified areas on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
• The Crimea-based Atesh partisan group stated that Russian forces are increasing their presence in Armyansk to defend key infrastructure in northern Crimea.
• Russian Cossack armed formations are reportedly signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of a larger formalization effort to integrate irregular forces into MoD structures.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 29, 2023

Jun 29, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2023

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 29, 2023, 7:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on June 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces seized the “strategic initiative" in the Bakhmut direction and are currently conducting a broad offensive in the area.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar similarly stated that Ukrainian forces seized the “operational initiative” in the area and reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200m in the direction of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and 1,500m in the direction of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi also stated that Ukrainian forces have the “strategic initiative" in a phone conversation with Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley on June 29.[3]ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces had gained the initiative at every level of war across almost the entire front following the Russian capture of Bakhmut on May 21.[4] Ukrainian officials are likely now acknowledging that Ukrainian forces possess the initiative in order to signal that Ukrainian forces intend to leverage it to a greater degree.

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two other sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.[5]The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success along the Rivnopil-Volodyne line (up to 16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[6]

The Kremlin may intend to assume formal control over the Wagner Group following its armed rebellion and turn it into a state-owned enterprise, although it is not clear if the Kremlin has committed itself to such a course of action. The Wall Street Journal reported that Russian authorities decided to assume control over Wagner’s activities abroad.[7] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin reportedly flew to Damascus to tell Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that Wagner will no longer operate as an independent organization in Syria and that Wagner personnel reported to the Russian military base in Latakia. Russian Foreign Ministry representatives also reportedly told Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera and Malian leadership that Wagner will continue operations in their respective countries.[8] Putin claimed on June 27 that the Kremlin “fully funds” and “fully supplies” Wagner, and Russian officials may use Wagner’s existing status as a state-financed and -supplied organization to complete its formal nationalization.[9]The nationalization of Wagner would likely aid in the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to subsume existing Wagner personnel into the regular Russian Armed Forces through contracts. The nationalization of Wagner would not likely dramatically disrupt its foreign activities, and the Kremlin may be interested in assuming de jure responsibility for Wagner's operations abroad to deprive the group of a remaining source of influence and independent cash flow. ISW has previously assessed that the agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will very likely eliminate Wagner as the independent actor that it is in its current form but could allow elements of the organization to endure.[10] The Kremlin has not indicated that it intends to nationalize Wagner, and it is possible that Putin has yet to determine what course of action to take in subordinating the group more firmly under the Kremlin’s control.

Recent satellite imagery may have detected active construction of a speculated new Wagner Group base in Asipovichy, Belarus. Mid-resolution imagery collected between June 15 and 27 shows new activity at an abandoned Belarusian military base (formerly used by the Belarusian 465th Missile Brigade) 15km northwest of Asipovichy.[11] This activity could be construction for a rumored new Wagner Group base. This site is within 15km of a large Belarusian combined arms training ground — a facility that Wagner Group personnel would need to access to service the Belarusian military in a training and advisory role that Belarusian officials have suggested Wagner will fulfill.[12] Russian opposition outlet Verstka previously reported on June 26 that Belarusian authorities are constructing a base for 8,000 Wagner Group fighters near Asipovichy.[13]Polish Deputy PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski stated that Poland anticipates that around 8,000 Wagner Group fighters will deploy to Belarus.[14] Further study of this area of interest with higher resolution collection instruments may provide additional clarity on the nature of the activity in the area and the size of the force that may be based there.

Wagner Group personnel may deploy elsewhere in Belarus, however. There is nothing particularly unique or interesting about a potential Wagner Group base in Asipovichy. Verstka’s original report indicated that the Wagner Group would have multiple camps in Belarus. Belarus hosts many training grounds and field camps that accommodated 30,000 Russian soldiers in early 2022 — many of which were on the border with Ukraine in Gomel and Brest oblasts.[15] The Wagner Group in Belarus could use some of these facilities as bases as well as or instead of the rumored base in Asipovichy.

Kremlin-affiliated businessmen may be acquiring Prigozhin’s domestic media empire, likely as part of an ongoing effort to destroy his reputation in Russia. Russian independent outlet The Bell, citing sources who cooperate with Prigozhin’s companies, reported that the Russian presidential administration will likely have direct control over Prigozhin’s media assets.[16] Sources noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “personal banker” Yuriy Kovalchuk may acquire assets of Prigozhin’s “Patriot” media holding group and the RIA FAN news outlet for his “National Media Group.”[17] The Bell also noted that some Russian Telegram channels claimed that the president of the “Herst Shkulev Media” holding group Viktor Shkulev may purchase Prigozhin’s media assets for one ruble with a commitment to retain the media editorial teams for three months and to pay salary arrears to staff. Sources expressed confidence that the Russian Presidential Administration will likely directly control Prigozhin’s media assets regardless of the identity of the future owner of these companies.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to address Army General Sergei Surovikin’s whereabouts on June 29, prompting more speculations in the Russian information space. Peskov could have denied ongoing speculations about Surovikin if there were no investigation of him. Peskov’s refusal suggests that Russian officials may be investigating Surovikin since Russian officials usually refuse to comment on ongoing investigations.[18] Russian news aggregator Baza reported that Surovikin’s daughter, Veronika Surovikina, claimed that Russian authorities did not arrest Surovikin and that he continues to work.[19] Russian sources claimed that Surovikin’s deputy, Colonel General Andrey Yudin, denied claims that Russian officials were holding him and Surovikin at the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center in Moscow.[20] A Russian milblogger denied Surovikin’s detention but claimed that the Kremlin is continuing to investigate members of the military leadership with close ties to Prigozhin.[21] Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that two of their sources close to the Russian General Staff and Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that Russian authorities questioned Surovikin and released him.[22] It would be logical for Russian officials to question Surovikin or any other military officials with ties to Prigozhin after Wagner’s armed rebellion.

Western observers continue to speculate about the whereabouts of Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov following Wagner’s rebellion, although his lack of public appearance is not necessarily indicative of his current official standing within the Russian military leadership.[23] Gerasimov has previously not appeared in public for long periods of time, particularly between the summer of 2022 and his reemergence in the winter of 2023 in the weeks leading up to his appointment to overall theater commander.[24] These stretches of absence prompted speculations that the Kremlin either had replaced him or intended to replace him as Chief of the General Staff.[25] The Kremlin and the Russian MoD carefully responded to these previous bouts of speculation by routinely affirming Gerasimov’s role as Chief of the General Staff, although they have yet to respond to the most recent round of speculation fueled by Wagner’s armed rebellion.[26] ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin will likely attempt to balance a desire to mitigate widespread disdain for MoD establishment figures like Gerasimov that fueled Wagner’s rebellion with trying to disempower those who may have sympathized with the rebellion.[27] Russian speculations that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky recently assumed Gerasimov’s responsibilities for Russian operations in Ukraine would be in line with this effort, although there continues to be no confirmation that such a transfer of responsibilities has occurred.[28] It is possible that Putin has yet to decide how to fully respond to Wagner’s rebellion, including decisions on a potential overhaul of the Russian military’s command cadre or changes in whom among the military leadership Putin favors. Until the Kremlin’s response to the rebellion becomes clearer Gerasimov’s public absence alone is not an indicator of his position within the Russian military leadership. ISW has previously observed that Gerasimov’s involvement, or lack thereof, in public meetings with Putin indicated the likely degree of favor that Gerasimov has enjoyed with Putin during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine but not his retention or loss of his formal position.[29]

Russian sources claimed that the Kremlin replaced the head of the Kaliningrad Oblast Rosgvardia (National Guard) on June 28. Russian sources reported that Murmansk Oblast Rosgvardia Head Viktor Galiy assumed the position of the Kaliningrad Oblast Rosgvardia head.[30]

Key Takeaways

• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces seized the “strategic initiative” in the Bakhmut direction and are currently conducting a broad offensive in the area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two other sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 29.
• The Kremlin may intend to assume formal control over the Wagner Group following its armed rebellion and turn it into a state-owned enterprise, although it is not clear if the Kremlin has committed itself to such a course of action.
• Recent satellite imagery may have detected active construction of a speculated new Wagner Group base in Asipovichy, Belarus.
• Kremlin-affiliated businessmen may be acquiring Prigozhin’s domestic media empire, likely as part of ongoing effort to destroy his reputation in Russia.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to address Army General Sergei Surovikin’s whereabouts on June 29, prompting more speculations in the Russian information space.
• Western observers continue to speculate about the whereabouts of Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov following Wagner’s rebellion, although his lack of public appearance is not necessarily indicative of his current official standing within the Russian military leadership
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces intensified counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly made advances.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
• Russian forces in early May constructed a dam on the outskirts of Tokmak in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• A Russian BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed that Russian forces are moving military equipment to unspecified areas on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
• The Crimea-based Atesh partisan group stated that Russian forces are increasing their presence in Armyansk to defend key infrastructure in northern Crimea.
• Russian Cossack armed formations are reportedly signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of a larger formalization effort to integrate irregular forces into MoD structures.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on June 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rozdolivka (32km southwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[31] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces made unspecified gains near the Serebryanske forest area (5–10km southwest of Kreminna).[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that unspecified elements of the Southern Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Bilohorivka and that Russian forces stopped a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions near Kreminna and that Russian forces stopped a Ukrainian assault near the Serebryanske forest area.[34] The milblogger also claimed that Russian special forces destroyed a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near the Serebryanske forest area.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces intensified counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly made advances on June 29. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces seized the “strategic initiative” in the Bakhmut direction and are currently conducting a broad offensive in the area.[36] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200m in the direction of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and 1,500m in the direction of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] Malyar added that Russian forces in the area are conducting counterattacks but have retreated in some areas after suffering losses.[38] Ukrainian Commander of the 57th Motorized Brigade Denys Yaroslavsky stated that Ukrainian forces are in the process of liberating Klishchiivka and that there is intense fighting in the area.[39] Yaroslavsky also stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of positions on the western outskirts of Bakhmut and that fighting is ongoing near Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut).[40] Yaroslavsky added that the liberation of dominant elevated positions in Berkhivka and Klishchiivka will allow Ukrainian forces to operationally encircle Russian forces in Bakhmut.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced along the E-40 (Bakhmut-Slovyansk) highway near Zaliznyanske (12km north of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces repelled several Ukrainian mechanized assaults near Kurdyumivka.[42] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the direction of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut) and Paraskoviivka (7km northeast of Bakhmut).[43] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that the Russians transferred an unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment from the Kreminna area to the Bakhmut direction to reinforce Russian forces in the area.[44] ISW has previously observed elements of the 237th Air Assault Regiment (76th VDV Division) and the 331st Airborne Regiment (98th VDV Division) operating in the Kreminna area, although ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of elements of either formation near Bakhmut recently.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bakhmut itself and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), and Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[46]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City front on June 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka).[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblast and made limited gains on June 29. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,300 meters in the western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia oblast border area and have established new positions in the Rivnopil-Volodyne (10–16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) direction.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entrenched themselves in new positions near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), while another milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Pryyutne.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Starmaiorske (7km south of Velyka Novosilka), while a milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked positions from Staromaiorske in the Rivnopil direction.[51] Footage published on June 28 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating near the Vremivka salient.[52]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 29. Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Tavirisk (Zaporizhia) direction.[53] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv), while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced on the northern outskirts of Robotyne.[54] Footage published on June 28 and 29 purportedly shows elements of the “Sudoplatov" volunteer battalion, 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[55]

Russian forces constructed a dam on the outskirts of Tokmak in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Open-source intelligence group Bellingcat shared satellite imagery on June 29 showing that Russian forces established a dam and moat around Tokmak (35km southwest of Orikhiv) in early May in an effort to prepare to defend the city against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[56]

Continued Russian endangerment of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has forced Ukraine to change the operational regime for four reactors at the ZNPP. The Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate put reactor No. 3 into “stop for repair” mode and put reactors Nos. 4, 5 and 6 into cold shutdown.[57] The Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate reported that these conditions are optimal for security and cited an increased risk due to continued Russian occupation of the facility and decreasing water levels in the Kakhovka reservoir. ISW has previously reported on the ZNPP personnel transferring reactors from normal operations to hot, then later cold shutdowns in response to Russian forces endangering the ZNPP.[58]

A Russian BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed that Russian forces are moving military equipment to unspecified areas on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[59] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces control the entire east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge and repelled all Ukrainian advances and attempts to transfer equipment to the area.[60] Other Russian sources claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing and that Ukrainian forces have established positions near the bridge.[61] Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that the volunteer Kherson “Vasily Margelov” battalion is conducting combat missions in Kherson Oblast.[62]

The Crimea-based Atesh partisan group stated that Russian forces are increasing their presence in Armyansk to defend key infrastructure in northern Crimea. Atesh stated that Russian forces are intensifying their presence in Armyansk and that a large number of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers are in the area.[63] Atesh stated that Russian forces have placed the Crimean “Titan” chemical plant under a special control regime.[64] Atesh also stated that the Russian “Convoy” PMC is protecting Kherson Oblast occupation officials who visit the ongoing repair work on the Chonhar bridge.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Cossack armed formations are reportedly signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of a larger formalization effort to integrate irregular forces into MoD structures. Russian Presidential Aide Dmitry Mironov stated that Cossack volunteer formations are “consistently” signing contracts with the Russian MoD to participate in the Russian invasion of Ukraine during a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Cossack Affairs on June 27.[66] Mironov noted that Russia needs to create legal and organizational foundations to form the Cossacks as the basis of the mobilization reserve and promote the development of Cossack volunteer formations as part of the Russian Armed Forces. Atman (head) of the All-Russian Cossack Society and State Duma Deputy Nikolai Doluda and other leaders of the Cossack communities attended the meeting to discuss support measures for Cossacks fighting in the war and their families. Atman of the “Terek” Cossack armed formation Vitaliy Kuznetsov stated on June 22 that

“Terek” signed a contract with the Russian MoD and is now legally recognized as a professional armed force.[67] The Kremlin’s meeting with Cossack organizations on June 27 was likely intended to incentivize more Cossack units to sign military contracts with the Russian MoD, despite the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin previously supported Cossack proposals to integrate Cossacks into the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) in 2021.[68] Ponars Eurasia reported that 15,500 Cossacks fought in Ukraine as of February 2023 and that there are 750,000 Cossacks listed on the state register.[69]

Families of a Russian airborne regiment that operated on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River complained that the Russian military command committed their relatives to fierce battles in an unspecified direction following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6.[70] Wives and mothers of the servicemen belonging to the 247th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) appealed to the Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov, stating that elements of the regiment deployed to fight on an unspecified frontline without ammunition and military equipment after their positions were flooded on the east bank Kherson Oblast. Wives and mothers reported that the regiment suffered heavy casualties and that its soldiers need medical assistance. Vladimirov accused the families of lying and claimed that the situation is under control in his response to the appeal.[71]

Head of the Russian State Duma Committee Andrey Kartapolov submitted a bill that if passed, would exempt Russian special services and the Russian MoD from standard Russian public procurement regulations. Russian opposition outlet Sota reported that this bill would allow the Russian MoD to make unregulated purchases from a single supplier.[72]

The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved the development strategy for the production of aerial drones through 2030 on June 28.[73] The Cabinet of Ministers defined five goals in areas of drone development including preparing drone operators, building infrastructure - such as airfields - for drones, and conducting further research in unmanned aerial drones. Putin tasked Russian officials on April 28 with developing Russia’s domestic drone industry likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base.[74]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian sources continue to report on societal restrictions in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials are prohibiting residents in Russian-occupied Ukraine from communicating with people living in Ukrainian-held territories and monitoring the residents’ phones for communications with people living in Ukrainian-held territory.[75] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that occupation authorities are further cracking down on residents after Russian occupation authorities killed two pro-Ukrainian 16-year-olds on June 24 in Berdyansk.[76] Fedorov reported that occupation authorities in Melitopol are checking teenagers’ phones for subscriptions to pro-Ukraine Telegram channels and are threatening their parents.[77]

Russian and occupation authorities continue to announce infrastructure projects aimed at further integrating occupied territories into Russia. Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin claimed that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administrations are participating in the national “Housing and Urban Environment” program, which will fund and construct 46 public space improvement projects in the three occupied regions.[78] DNR Head Denis Pushilin, LNR Head Leonid Pasechnik, and Russian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that participation in this program is the next step in integration with Russia.[79]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. China’s Imperialist Foreign Policy

Excerpts:

Now, I doubt we can deter China for all time given the importance it attaches to its claim to indisputable sovereignty over regional waters and landmasses, and the fervor with which it chases the Chinese Dream. But we may be able to deter it day by day. That may be the best we can do. And who knows, good things may happen if we can do it long enough.

As far as what kinds of forces we should stage in the region to compete to good effect, this is a law-enforcement challenge as much as a military challenge. It’s about sovereignty, which again boils down to who makes the rules, where on the map. So in a sense we should take a page from China’s playbook and make coast guards—law-enforcement services—and light naval forces our implements of choice, backing them up with heavier naval forces and shore fire support should things go sideways.

That’s why recent news of our return to the Philippines is so welcome, as are reports that multinational coast-guard patrols may soon take to the sea. Let’s experiment with how to harness joint and combined maritime forces along with geography for strategic and political effect—emboldening our hypothetical fisherman.

Do all of this, and we might blunt the worst excesses of China’s imperial foreign policy—and spoil the Chinese Dream.

China’s Imperialist Foreign Policy

Do all of this, and we might blunt the worst excesses of China’s imperial foreign policy—and spoil the Chinese Dream. 

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · June 29, 2023

Editor’s Note: These remarks were delivered at Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups Maritime Symposium, Middletown, RI, June 28, 2023.

The Chinese Communist Party wants big things in the Indo-Pacific, yet on a daily basis it is expending a minute amount of force, largely in irregular fashion, in order to get them. That seems to cut against strategic logic. Intuitively it makes sense to pour resources into a venture that seeks major results. To go big or go home! And so Chinese strategy and operational methods warrant our attention.

Clausewitz sketches the classic formula for how to devise ways to achieve political ends using available means, telling us that the value a combatant places on its “political object,” or goal, should determine the “magnitude” of the effort, meaning the rate at which it expends militarily relevant resources to acquire that goal, and the “duration” of time it keeps making the investment. Multiply the rate by the time and you have the total price tag you must pay to wrest your political object from an unwilling foe.

In other words: how much you want something dictates how much you spend on it, and for how long. It’s like buying your goal on the installment plan.

So, far from insisting that you go big or go home, the Clausewitzian formula suggests that a competitor has a range of options if it wants its political goal a whole lot. It can go big, doing its utmost in terms of magnitude in hopes of succeeding while keeping the endeavor short. It could mount an effort of medium effort while accepting that the duration will be longer. Or, at the far extreme, it could stage an effort of minor magnitude that consumes a very long time. A lot depends on the degree of resistance the enemy puts forth. The victor does have to outmuscle the vanquished, and that sets the minimum threshold of military might for an enterprise. And a lot depends on how patient the government, society, and armed forces are about attaining their goals.

To date China has pursued a strategy of patience, especially in Southeast Asia, deploying coercion against outmatched neighbors short of armed conflict while building up the military means to do something more bold, decisive, and conventional should party leaders so choose.

So in my judgment China’s leadership has opted for a low-magnitude, long-duration effort to achieve goals party chieftains ardently covet and have promised—time and again, and in the strongest, most unequivocal terms—to deliver to the Chinese people. Beijing calls its goals the “Chinese Dream.” That’s General Secretary Xi Jinping’s banner phrase for his policy of a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts,” to borrow his words from the 20th Party Congress last October. On all fronts covers an enormous amount of ground, from constructing a prosperous socialist society to gaining control of Taiwan to overthrowing the regional order in the Western Pacific and perhaps beyond.

The Chinese Dream is to Make China Great Again.

These are grand aims warranting the utmost effort by the Clausewitzian metrics of magnitude and duration. They’re also imperial aims. That’s a term I use advisedly. Imperialism is one of those words that—as George Orwell wrote of the word fascism—have been used so sloppily for so long that they have come to mean little more than “something not desirable.” It’s a loaded term. But back in the 1940s Professor Hans Morgenthau, in his classic “realist” text Politics Among Nations, defined an imperialist foreign policy as “a policy which aims at the overthrow of the status quo, at a reversal of the power relations between two or more nations.” That’s a precise and more neutral definition.

By Morgenthau’s definition China is a quintessential imperialist competitor.

And it’s worth noting that aspiring to an imperial foreign policy is nothing new for Communist China, even if the party had to put its aspirations on hold for many decades. In fact, on page one of her book on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, my friend and colleague Sally Paine writes that the Japanese victory over China’s Qing Dynasty turned the world upside down in Asia, enthroning imperial Japan atop the regional order while ousting China from its accustomed place. China has been trying to overturn the result of the Sino-Japanese War ever since. Chinese leaders might go along with the status quo while the country was too weak to amend it, but they always envisioned doing away with the status quo once strong and replacing it with another under Chinese predominance. Beijing might bide its time, to borrow former party chieftain Deng Xiaoping’s words, but that was an expedient—an interim phase to be put behind the nation once a favorable balance of power made that possible.

That says something about China as a strategic competitor. Continuing to struggle over a limited regional war’s outcome 128 years later takes the Clausewitzian maxim that “in war the result is never final” to extremes! And it’s not just China against Japan. Fulfilling China’s dream necessarily has baneful implications for the United States, a resident power in the Western Pacific since 1945 and the world hegemon since 1991. Resuming its place at the apex of the Asian order means dislodging America from its strategic position in the region, which means loosening or breaking the U.S.-Japan alliance that Chinese leaders see as containing their rightful aspirations and national clout.

In short, China’s imperial foreign policy aims at restoring the nation to the top of the Asian pecking order after China’s long “century of humiliation” at the hands of European and Japanese empires. That means demoting others. In Morgenthau’s parlance it aspires to reverse power relations with Japan and evict U.S. forces from the region, clearing the way for China to resume its historic station as the region’s central power.

Making China’s dream come true is a pretty ambitious program

And yet to date Beijing has not done anything dramatic to bring about its aspirations. Instead, creeping encroachment on its neighbors’ territory, the law of the sea, and the regional order presided over by the United States is the leadership’s method of choice. The Chinese Communist Party is waging revolutionary warfare, by increments, over time, preferably without resort to violent force. That’s kind of a mindbender, which is undoubtedly part of its appeal for the party. It’s tough to combat a mindbending strategy.

Six years ago, over at Orbis, I and Toshi Yoshihara ran an article likening China’s “gray-zone” strategy in the South China Sea to the French counterinsurgent theorist David Galula’s notion of a “cold revolutionary war,” a murky phase before the fighting when an insurgent group starts working to topple the incumbent regime but refrains from violence until it’s ready. The government hesitates to crack down preemptively on what could be legitimate political opposition. Its restraint opens maneuver space for an incipient insurgency.

That analogy casts the United States, the guardian of the rules-based order at sea, as the incumbent regime, and China as the revolutionary challenger that is actively working toward its ends but has not yet taken up arms. No one wants to crack down on China unless forced to it. That hesitance grants Beijing freedom of action so long as it exercises self-discipline, keeping its challenge just beneath the threshold of violent force.

Such are the quandaries of the gray zone.

This approach comes naturally to the Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army, which bring an insurgent mindset to everything they do. It also fits with the Maoist doctrine of “active defense,” which the party’s 2015 Military Strategy touts as the “essence” of how it sees the strategic environment and envisions using military power to shape it in China’s favor.

In effect active defense instructs the weaker contender to remain on the strategic defensive while it remains weaker, but to work actively to make itself strong while doing things to cut a superior opponent down to size. During that early phase in the struggle it should wage irregular warfare against the foe while raising manpower and militarily relevant resources to help it field regular forces. If successful Mao’s Red Army would achieve strategic parity over time. Ultimately it would achieve strategic superiority, letting it go on the strategic offensive and win a conventional battlefield triumph that would make Clausewitz proud.

Chinese Communists would have flipped the script.

And so China’s gray-zone strategy—using irregular means by increments to achieve sweeping political ends—makes sense after all. China’s strategic leadership believes a bold move against the U.S.-Japan alliance would be premature and dangerous. But it also realizes that gray-zone methods and forces are adequate to make gains against lesser opponents such as the Philippines or Vietnam. That means deploying the fishing fleet, the embedded maritime militia, and the China Coast Guard, all backed up by People’s Liberation Army forces over the horizon, to stake its claims to maritime real estate and defy others to reverse them.

It’s an approach that has paid off thus far. China claims “indisputable sovereignty” over most of the South China Sea, meaning it claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in that body of water along with the right to make the rules governing what goes on there. The Chinese Communist Party decides, others obey. And using law enforcement to uphold its political claims represents sound strategy. If you assert sovereignty over geographic space, you are claiming the right to enforce the law there. And if your law-enforcement services outmatch rival claimants’ coast guards and navies by a wide margin, why not start using them to police that geographic space as though the question of sovereignty were already decided in your favor?

You keep the big stick of military force over the horizon and use the small stick of law enforcement as the primary implement to pursue your aims.

If China acts like the regional sovereign for long enough, meeting no effective pushback within or from outside the region, then acquiescing in its claims, however lawless, might become the default stance in Southeast Asian capitals. Over time China’s control of South China Sea waters and islands would come to look like international custom—and the practice of states, meaning what they do, is a viable source of international law.

Acquiescence looks like consent. A local heavyweight can proclaim an extralegal policy, put superior power behind it, and remain hardheaded about it for so long that its rivals eventually give up opposing it out of exasperation. The policy takes on a sort of quasi-legal status because no one sees a vital stake in investing national resources for a long time to contest it. Just ask the United States during the age of the Monroe Doctrine. China would love to replicate that precedent in its drive for indisputable sovereignty.

So irregular warfare at sea constitutes a major strand in China’s imperial foreign policy. How do you combat it?

Well, we’ve postulated what Chinese want and how they intend to go about getting it. Let’s do the same for ourselves and our regional allies and partners. What should be our goal in the gray zone? Simple: if China wants to dishearten its neighbors, we should design our strategy and force deployments to give them heart, helping them stand up for the rights and privileges guaranteed them under the law of the sea and reaffirmed by authoritative international tribunals.

Here’s how this works. I want everyone to undertake an act of imagination this morning: imagine how the situation in the South China Sea looks through the eyes of a Philippine or Vietnamese fisherman, coastguardsman, or sailor. It looks grim; to succeed we, the U.S. sea services and potentially our allies, need to make things look less grim. Our goal should be to give Southeast Asian mariners heart in the face of Communist Chinese coercion. We should strive to give that fisherman the confidence to go out and make a living for himself and his family without undue fear of abuse at the hands of a domineering coastal state that’s asserting itself unlawfully—but effectively—in regional waters.

Now imagine what that fisherman sees around him on a daily basis: the Chinese fishing fleet, the militia embedded in it, and the world’s largest coast guard, all backed up by the PLA Navy, also the world’s largest force of its kind, along with shore-based aircraft and missiles. This force utterly outclasses his coast guard and navy, his ostensible protectors. A U.S. Navy task force puts in an appearance once in awhile and looks impressive, only to soon steam away—leaving Chinese maritime forces in possession of disputed waters and free to bully China’s neighbors. Our mariner is once again subject to that abuse we want to guard against. He could well be disheartened. And our strategy will have fallen short of its goal.

So my basic insight today is very basic: you have to step onto the field of competition and stay there for the duration of the contest if you hope to prevail. It’s the same principle as in sports. I doubt my Georgia Bulldogs would have won two straight national championships had they only shown up on the gridiron once in awhile to display their awesomeness. Lesser contenders like Alabama and Tennessee would have had their way the rest of the time.

Similarly, come-and-go operations such as FONOPs and occasional military exercises are helpful in many ways, but they apply a feeble deterrent at best in the gray zone. They provide a kind of virtual presence, but as the old joke goes, virtual presence is actual absence. To embolden that fisherman to ply his trade, and to empower his nation to exercise its sovereign rights at sea, we and our partners need to stage a constant presence in force. Coming and going is not enough. We have to go and stay.

That’s what Admiral J. C. Wylie meant in his book Military Strategy when he proclaimed that the “man on the scene with a gun”—the soldier, marine, or sailor toting superior firepower—is the final arbiter of who controls something. Controlling something is the goal of military strategy, in wartime and peacetime alike. Control is how you win. And you have to be on the scene to exercise control.

We might add that it’s only prudent to try to control that something, in this case maritime geographic space, with the least violence necessary—preferably none at all. Our Chinese friends get this. They are always talking about “winning without fighting.” But make no mistake: they are not talking about peaceful diplomatic compromise. They do not ride around Beijing or Shanghai with COEXIST stickers on their bumpers. Aggressors love peace, as Clausewitz teaches and as Chinese strategists confirm. They would love for the aggrieved to give in without a fight, and save China all of the costs, dangers, and hardships warfare entails.

Never forget that winning takes precedence over without fighting in that simple formula, or that peace is war without bloodshed for China.

Now, we can win without fighting if we convince our antagonist, our allies and partners, and third parties able to influence the outcome of the competition that we would win with fighting if it came to that. If we make that absolutely clear to all parties, making believers out of them, our opponent should scale back its provocations as a losing effort, letting the region deescalate to beneath the gray zone. Allies and partners would gain the confidence to stand up for themselves.

Now, I doubt we can deter China for all time given the importance it attaches to its claim to indisputable sovereignty over regional waters and landmasses, and the fervor with which it chases the Chinese Dream. But we may be able to deter it day by day. That may be the best we can do. And who knows, good things may happen if we can do it long enough.

As far as what kinds of forces we should stage in the region to compete to good effect, this is a law-enforcement challenge as much as a military challenge. It’s about sovereignty, which again boils down to who makes the rules, where on the map. So in a sense we should take a page from China’s playbook and make coast guards—law-enforcement services—and light naval forces our implements of choice, backing them up with heavier naval forces and shore fire support should things go sideways.

That’s why recent news of our return to the Philippines is so welcome, as are reports that multinational coast-guard patrols may soon take to the sea. Let’s experiment with how to harness joint and combined maritime forces along with geography for strategic and political effect—emboldening our hypothetical fisherman.

Do all of this, and we might blunt the worst excesses of China’s imperial foreign policy—and spoil the Chinese Dream.

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · June 29, 2023

3. Senators pushing for annual briefings on Chinese political influence ops

And Russia? Iran? north Korea?

Excerpts:

The briefings on China’s political influence ops and information warfare should focus on all elements of China’s government focused on coordinated and concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption and academic censorship, intended to coerce and corrupt U.S interests, values, institutions, or individuals as well as foster attitudes, behavior, decisions or outcomes in the U.S. that support the interests of the China’s communist party, according to the bill’s text.

The annual updates should include the Chinese tactics, tools and entities that conduct such malign influence; the actions of the U.S. Foreign Malign Influence Center related to early-warning, information sharing and proactive risk mitigation systems to detect, expose and deter such political influence operations; and the actions of the U.S. Foreign Malign Influence Center to do outreach to identify and counter tactics and tools of entities conducing political operations.

Senators pushing for annual briefings on Chinese political influence ops

A provision in the Senate Intelligence Committee's annual authorization bill would require the yearly updates.

BY

MARK POMERLEAU

JUNE 28, 2023

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · June 28, 2023

The Senate Intelligence Committee wants yearly briefings on China’s influence operations aimed at the American public.

A provision in the panel’s annual authorization bill, which passed the committee last week, requires an annual classified briefing by the intelligence community on how it is working to coordinate across the agencies to “identify and mitigate the actions of Chinese entities engaged in political influence operations and information warfare against the United States, including against United States persons.”

In recent years, China has stepped up its global influence campaign, to include in the U.S., as a means of sowing discord and making itself look more favorable relative to Western nations.

The briefings on China’s political influence ops and information warfare should focus on all elements of China’s government focused on coordinated and concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption and academic censorship, intended to coerce and corrupt U.S interests, values, institutions, or individuals as well as foster attitudes, behavior, decisions or outcomes in the U.S. that support the interests of the China’s communist party, according to the bill’s text.

The annual updates should include the Chinese tactics, tools and entities that conduct such malign influence; the actions of the U.S. Foreign Malign Influence Center related to early-warning, information sharing and proactive risk mitigation systems to detect, expose and deter such political influence operations; and the actions of the U.S. Foreign Malign Influence Center to do outreach to identify and counter tactics and tools of entities conducing political operations.

The bill must still pass the full Senate, be reconciled with the House version of the intelligence bill, and be signed by the president for the provision to become law.

Additionally, when it comes to U.S. military information efforts, the House Armed Services Committee in its annual defense policy bill that passed the committee last week, sought to include their intel committee colleagues in quarterly briefings on military information ops.

The provision adds the House Intelligence Committee to be briefed along with the HASC on “significant military operations, including all clandestine operations in the information environment, carried out by the Department of Defense during the immediately preceding quarter,” per the bill.

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · June 28, 2023

4. Personnel Is Power: Why China Is Winning at the United Nations

This is a major line of effort in China's "strategic competition"

Again, my thesis on China: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

Personnel Is Power: Why China Is Winning at the United Nations

The Biden administration has made progress in winning some key elections at international organizations, including at International Telecommunication Union. But the State Department needs to show the same level of commitment to boost American representation among the professional class at the United Nations.

19fortyfive.com · by Morgan Lorraine Vina and Brett D. Schaefer · June 29, 2023

In the new era of strategic competition, international organizations have become a battleground for amassing influence and establishing international norms. Countries compete against one another not only by asserting power through the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, or other UN organizations but also through employment of their nationals in the UN system.

While American citizens have historically enjoyed relatively high levels of employment at the United Nations, they have fallen short of expected levels of employment. Many UN organizations link staff recruitment to geographical distribution, membership status, financial contributions, and share of the global population. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted when it examined the issue more than a decade ago, “In 2009, the United States was underrepresented, based on formal and informal targets, at all five of the UN organizations GAO reviewed…. This follows general U.S. underrepresentation at most of these organizations from 2006 to 2009.”

The GAO is conducting an updated assessment, but UN statistics suggest that report will conclude, once again, that the UN system should employ more American nationals than it does.

In contrast, China has had remarkable success in increasing employment of its nationals in the UN system. In 2009, the UN employed 794 Chinese nationals. In 2021, it employed 1,471, an 85 percent increase. This increase coincides with Beijing’s increasing contributions, but also follows a concerted effort by Beijing to boost employment of Chinese nationals through regular means and by taking advantage of the UN’s Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program to subsidize access to UN employment.

Additionally, when Chinese nationals have been elected to lead UN organizations, Beijing has used these opportunities both to increase hiring of Chinese nationals and to use these organizations to promote their national interests. For example, in 2019, Secretary-General Fang Liu of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) advanced policies dictated by Beijing, including new air routes instituted in violation of ICAO procedures. Liu also concealed cyber security breaches linked to China that threatened the security of ICAO, its member states, and the aviation industry.

Seeking to address America’s shortfall, Congress and the previous and current administrations have sought to increase awareness and support for UN employment of Americans in the U.S. Department of State. The Trump administration sought to counter China’s influence by establishing an Office of Multilateral Competitiveness in the State Department’s Bureau of International Organizations and tasking it with tracking and supporting U.S. employment in UN system. With funding from Congress, the Biden State Department reconfigured and renamed the unit as the Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel (MSP) and charged it with similar responsibilities along with coordinating U.S. efforts in UN elections.

The effort to increase U.S. employment in the UN system is more than simple national pride or getting America’s share. Unlike nationals from China and other authoritarian countries, who can face grave threats and pressure to act in the interests of their governments even when it violates the purposes and mission of their organizations, U.S. citizens and those from many other democratic countries tend to respect the missions and responsibilities of the organizations and honor their oaths to serve as independent international civil servants. Hiring independent employees benefits the UN and, through the neutral, fair application of their missions, the member states.

On the positive side, the United States has expanded its support for JPOs. These entry-level UN positions are subsidized by governments and often lead to formal employment as participants’ familiarity with the organization gives them a head start on other applicants. But JPOS are expensive, approximately $400,000 for each officer. The expense limits this avenue.

Overall, the United States needs to be more effective at alerting U.S. citizens of UN employment opportunities, guiding their applications, and supporting them after they apply.

However, MSP has gotten off to a slow start. Modestly staffed, the Office’s personnel team created a website and database to encourage Americans interested in UN employment to submit their information. While well-intentioned, the website is anything but user-friendly. Buried deep within the State Department’s website, the database known as “Advocacy+” includes an intake form for candidates interested in receiving State Department advocacy for a UN position. Progress is slow-going. Despite the website being live for a year, it only started accepting data last December.

So far, only a few hundred candidates have submitted information. The candidates that the Department has advocated for have been, largely, brought to their attention through ad hoc State Department channels. Additionally, no data exist on the success rate for those candidates who have shared their data with Advocacy+. Given the Administration’s emphasis on this effort, the lack of data, follow-through, and impact is inexcusable.

Moving forward, the State Department should hone and expand its recruiting, focusing on those individuals whose experience or skills might make them attractive candidates. For instance, Foreign Service Officers who leave service or candidates who don’t make it through to FSO selection process, should also be considered as a potential recruiting pool. They often have language skills and backgrounds that lend themselves to work in international organizations. Similarly, congressional staff focused on foreign policy, former U.S. military, USAID professionals, and Peace Corps volunteers leaving service are potential candidates that should be made aware of UN employment opportunities.

Congress should also explore opportunities to expand the Department’s authority to consult and advocate for U.S. candidates seeking employment at the United Nations and scale up existing efforts through representational events. In a welcome step, the U.S. State Department and senior-level administration officials have stepped up advocacy for U.S. candidates in recent elections. Members of Congress should similarly consider campaigning on behalf of Americans seeking leadership positions in UN organizations.

The Biden administration has made progress in winning some key elections at international organizations, including at International Telecommunication Union. But the State Department needs to show the same level of commitment to boost American representation among the professional class at the United Nations.

Morgan Lorraine Viña is the former chief of staff to U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Nikki R. Haley. Brett Schaefer is the Jay Kingham Fellow in International Affairs at The Heritage Foundation.

19fortyfive.com · by Morgan Lorraine Vina and Brett D. Schaefer · June 29, 2023

5. Paris police shooting: why are there riots in France?

Is Macron and the government at significant risk in France?

Paris police shooting: why are there riots in France?

Reuters · by Reuters

PARIS, June 29 (Reuters) - Riots have convulsed France after police shot dead a teenager of North African descent at a traffic stop in a Paris suburb.

Here are some of the factors behind the unrest:

WHO IS THE VICTIM?

The 17-year-old who died on Tuesday has been identified only as Nahel. His mother is Algerian and father Moroccan, according to an acquaintance of the family. He was known to police for previous incidents in which he failed to comply with traffic stops, the local prosecutor Pascal Prache said.

Nahel died from a single shot through his left arm and chest. Police and paramedics tried to resuscitate him but he was declared dead at 9:15 a.m., Prache added.

An officer has acknowledged firing a lethal shot, the prosecutor said, telling investigators he wanted to prevent another chase, fearing he or another person would be hurt.

WHAT HAPPENED AT THE TRAFFIC STOP?

Prache said police spotted a Mercedes driving in a bus lane at 7:55 a.m. in the district of Nanterre on the western outskirts of Paris. Police attempted to pull him over at a red light using sirens and lights, the prosecutor added, but Nahel disobeyed and committed several traffic offences, endangering the lives of a pedestrian and a cyclist.

The officers caught up with the Mercedes in a traffic jam. Both officers at one point used guns to deter him from starting off again and asked him to turn off the ignition, the prosecutor said. When the car made to get away, one officer fired at close range through the driver's window.

WHY DID RIOTS UNFOLD?

Nahel's death has fed longstanding complaints of police violence and systemic racism inside law enforcement agencies from rights groups and within the low-income, racially mixed suburbs that ring major cities in France. Authorities deny that.

Even though the police officer involved is under investigation for voluntary homicide and President Emmanuel Macron has condemned the shooting, public anger has spilled onto streets across France. Police made 180 arrests during a second night of unrest into Thursday. Some 40,000 officers were deployed to curb the trouble, 5,000 in the Paris region.

Tuesday's killing was the third fatal shooting during traffic stops in France so far in 2023, down from a record 13 last year. The majority of victims of such shootings since 2017 were Black or of Arab origin.

WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF SUCH UNREST?

Like the United States and some other European nations, France has experienced previous waves of protests over police conduct, particularly against minorities.

In 2005, violence erupted in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois and spread across France after two teenagers of African descent were electrocuted in a power substation as they hid from police. That unrest convulsed France for three weeks and forced then President Jacques Chirac to declare a state of emergency.

Writing by Richard Lough; Editing by Andrew Cawthorne

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

6. U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era:  Responding to a More Assertive China

The 147 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.cfr.org/node/41/download/pdf/2023-06/TFR81_U.S.-TaiwanRelationsNewEra_SinglePages_2023-06-05_Online.pdf

A distinguished group of scholars and practitioners contributed to this report. (See below)

Independent Task Force Report No. 81

U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era

Responding to a More Assertive China

Susan M. Gordon and Michael G. Mullen , Co-chairs

David Sacks, Project Director

Updated June 2023

https://www.cfr.org/task-force-report/us-taiwan-relations-in-a-new-era

U.S. policy toward Taiwan needs to evolve to contend with a more capable, assertive, and risk-acceptant China that is increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo.

Executive Summary

A conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) over Taiwan is becoming increasingly imaginable, a result of China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness, the emergence and coalescence of a separate Taiwanese identity, and evolving U.S. calculations about its interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait. If deterrence fails and a war erupts, the result would be calamitous for Taiwan, China, the United States, and the world, resulting in thousands of casualties on all sides and a profound global economic depression. 

The United States has critical strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait. If China were to successfully annex Taiwan against the will of the Taiwanese people, doing so on the heels of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it would severely undermine international order by again demonstrating that countries can use coercion or force to unilaterally redraw borders. If China were to station its military on the island, the United States would find it far more difficult to project power, defend its treaty allies, and operate in international waters in the Western Pacific. U.S. influence would wane because its allies would question U.S. commitment to their defense and either accommodate China or pursue strategic autonomy. A war in the Taiwan Strait would also halt the production and shipment of the majority of the world’s semiconductors, paralyzing global supply chains and ushering in a severe economic crisis. Finally, if China were to take control of Taiwan, it would spell the end of a liberal democracy and have chilling effects on democracies around the world. The Task Force thus finds that it is vital for the United States to deter China from using force or coercion to achieve unification with Taiwan. 

The Task Force assesses that although China is developing the military capabilities it would need to annex Taiwan and is determined to subjugate the island, it has not yet decided to pursue a nonpeaceful resolution and deterrence remains possible. Although war is not inevitable, unless the United States moves with urgency to bolster deterrence and shape Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s decision-making calculus to raise the costs of aggressive action against Taiwan, the odds of a conflict will increase. 

Reinforcing deterrence without provoking the conflict that it seeks to avoid is no small task. Indeed, some argue that, given the risk, the United States should lessen its support for Taiwan. Such a course, however, fails to adequately reckon with what the world would look like the day after a successful Chinese assault: markedly less safe, less free, and less prosperous. Beyond deterring Chinese aggression, the United States also has an interest in enhancing its unofficial relationship with a top-ten trading partner, a fellow democracy, and a like-minded force on global issues. 

The Task Force finds that the political framework established more than four decades ago, whereby Taiwan, China, and the United States all embrace different conceptions of Taiwan’s relationship to China but do not explicitly challenge one another’s position, is becoming more and more brittle. This reality, paired with Xi’s unease with the status quo and his determination to make progress toward unification, increases the risk of a conflict. In particular, the Task Force finds that  

• the prevailing political framework has allowed for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait while enabling rapid economic growth in both Taiwan and China; 
• the status quo is under increasing strain as China, Taiwan, and the United States reevaluate whether the long-standing political formulation continues to serve their respective interests; 
• the likelihood of resolving cross-strait differences peacefully is steadily decreasing;  
• as the prospect of achieving peaceful unification grows more remote, China will increasingly employ coercive tools against Taiwan; and  
• the chance of a conflict will rise as Xi Jinping approaches the end of his tenure and the basis of his legitimacy shifts from delivering economic growth to satisfying Chinese nationalism. 

The Task Force analyzed how Taiwan’s role as the primary producer of the world’s semiconductors, including nearly all of the most advanced chips, would affect deterrence and China’s calculus. The Task Force concludes that although China’s reliance on chips manufactured in Taiwan would raise the costs of a conflict, it does not act as a “silicon shield” that can protect Taiwan from an attack. The greater danger is that China will be able to leverage economic interdependence to deter countries from coming to Taiwan’s direct or indirect defense. The Task Force finds that  

• Taiwan’s critical role in global supply chains—above all, semiconductor production—acts as a brake to hostilities but does not diminish China’s desire to gain control over Taiwan;  
• in addition to the devastation for the people of Taiwan, a conflict would also trigger a global economic depression and open-ended era of hostility between the world’s two leading powers;  
• Taiwan’s dependence on trade with China provides Beijing with leverage over Taipei that could reduce the latter’s options during a crisis; 
• U.S. and allied reliance on semiconductors produced in Taiwan raises the stakes for the United States and the West in a conflict; and  
• U.S. and allied economic interdependence with China would complicate efforts to resist Chinese aggression against Taiwan and impose costs on Beijing.  

The Task Force asserts that the United States has not only legal but also vital strategic reasons for maintaining the capacity to come to Taiwan’s direct defense. At the same time, however, China’s rapid military modernization, Taiwan’s underinvestment in its military, and U.S. military gaps mean that the United States cannot assume that it would be able to decisively intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. The Task Force finds that 

• deterrence is steadily eroding in the Taiwan Strait and is at risk of failing, increasing the likelihood of Chinese aggression;  
• China does not yet have the ability to invade and seize Taiwan in the face of U.S. intervention, but, barring a significant transformation of Taiwan’s military and sustained focus from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), it will likely gain the capability to do so by the end of the decade;  
• despite some progress, Taiwan is still not doing enough to address critical shortfalls in its defense and civil resilience;  
• the United States has major military gaps that it is addressing but that would nonetheless make coming to Taiwan’s defense difficult and costly; and 
• support from allies and partners will be imperative for a U.S. defense of Taiwan, but the level of assistance the United States can expect is largely unknown. 

The Task Force recommends that U.S. diplomacy focus on preserving the political foundation that has worked for decades but has become increasingly challenged by all sides. U.S. diplomacy should aim to deter Chinese aggression, signal to China and Taiwan that it opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, and ensure that any future arrangement between China and Taiwan be arrived at peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people. In support of these objectives, the United States should 

• maintain its One China policy, recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China and eschewing formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan while fulfilling its unique legal commitments to the island, and emphasize that such a policy is predicated on China pursuing a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues; 
• avoid symbolic political and diplomatic gestures that provoke a Chinese response but do not meaningfully improve Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, resilience, or economic competitiveness; 
• explain to the American people why Taiwan matters and why they should care about its fate;  
• create additional international and multilateral forums that allow Taiwan to have its voice heard and contribute to resolving global issues, in a way that does not suggest Taiwanese independence; and 
• promote people-to-people ties between the United States and Taiwan. 

The United States should assist Taiwan in reducing its economic dependence on the PRC and bolstering its integration into the global economy, which would improve Taiwan’s ability to withstand China’s economic coercion. In addition, given its heavy reliance on Taiwan for semiconductor manufacturing, the United States needs to ensure that Taiwan remains a trusted economic and trading partner. In particular, the Task Force recommends that the United States  

• negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan;  
• diversify supply chains in critical sectors to reduce the risk from potential Chinese economic retaliation; 
• build resiliency in global semiconductor manufacturing;
• raise awareness of the economic consequences of a Chinese blockade or attack on Taiwan with allies and partners and coordinate with them to prepare sanctions on China; and 
• work with Taiwan to reduce the PRC’s economic leverage and respond to its economic coercion. 

The Task Force maintains that deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan should be the United States’ top priority in the Indo-Pacific. As a core objective, the United States should ensure that every time Chinese leaders look across the Taiwan Strait, they conclude that a blockade or invasion would fail and that pursuing such a course would make it impossible for them to accomplish China’s modernization objectives. Achieving this goal will be difficult but doable with the correct mix of policies. To accomplish it, the Task Force recommends that the United States  

• prioritize Taiwan contingencies as the DOD pacing scenario and ensure DOD spending supports capabilities and initiatives critical to success, securing the United States’ ability to effectively come to Taiwan’s defense; 
• fundamentally shift U.S.-Taiwan security relations to build Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities;  
• seek greater clarity from allies on the assistance they would provide during Taiwan contingencies and work to improve their capabilities and define their roles and responsibilities; 
• place the U.S. defense industrial base on a wartime footing now to ensure that the U.S. military has the capabilities it needs to deter Chinese aggression and prioritize arms deliveries to Taiwan; and  
• conduct a joint study with Taiwan of its war reserve munitions, ability to produce weapons during wartime, and stockpile of essential goods. 

U.S. policy toward Taiwan needs to evolve to contend with a more capable, assertive, and risk-acceptant China that is increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. Making long overdue adjustments will be difficult, but a failure to adapt is far more dangerous. The future of the world’s most economically critical region could very well hinge on whether the United States succeeds in deterring China and maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. 

About the Task Force

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of critical importance to U.S. foreign policy. Task Force members endorse the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation. They participate in the Task Force in their individual, not institutional, capacities. Observers participate in Task Force discussions but are not asked to join the consensus.

Chairs

Susan M. Gordon

GordonVentures LLC

Michael G. Mullen

MGM Consulting LLC

Directors

David Sacks

Fellow, CFR

Anya Schmemann

Managing Director, Independent Task Force Program, CFR

Task Force Members

• Kevin M. Brown
• Dell Technologies
• Michèle A. Flournoy
• WestExec Advisors
• Susan M. Gordon (co-chair)
• GordonVentures LLC
• Harry Harris
• U.S. Navy, Ret.
• Paul Heer
• Chicago Council on Global Affairs 
• Charles Hooper
• U.S. Army, Ret.
• Ivan Kanapathy
• Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
• Patricia M. Kim
• The Brookings Institution
• Margaret K. Lewis
• Seton Hall University School of Law
• Chris Miller
• The Fletcher School, Tufts University
• Michael G. Mullen (co-chair)
• MGM Consulting LLC
• Meghan L. O’Sullivan
• Harvard Kennedy School
• Douglas H. Paal
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Minxin Pei
• Claremont McKenna College
• Matt Pottinger
• Hoover Institution, Stanford University
• Daniel R. Russel
• Asia Society
• David Sacks (project director)
• Council on Foreign Relations

Observers

• Christa N. Almonte
• Council on Foreign Relations
• Robert D. Blackwill
• Council on Foreign Relations
• Ian Johnson
• Council on Foreign Relations
• Manjari Chatterjee Miller
• Council on Foreign Relations
• Carl F. Minzner
• Council on Foreign Relations
• Nargiza Salidjanova
• Rhodium Group
• Anya Schmemann
• Council on Foreign Relations
• Sheila A. Smith
• Council on Foreign Relations
• Erin M. Staine-Pyne
• Council on Foreign Relations

7. How a reckless report could increase the chance of a crisis with China

Okay, I have not read the entire 147 page Council on Foreign Relations report. But I suppose where you stand depends on where you sit. The difference is that Dr. Swaine and those at the Quincy Institute believe that concessions without reciprocity and appeasement works and that every foreign policy problem is the fault of the US. We are the ones in the wrong and it is the US that must make concessions to reassure China. The fundamental difference I believe, perhaps Ironically, is that it is the US that is trying to maintain the status quo and that it is China that continues to threaten the sovereignty of Taiwan (and of course my use of sovereignty is very controversial).

That said, there are some useful criticisms here that are worthy of discussion. Is Taiwan a vital strategic location? Should we abandon the One China Policy? Should we shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity? 

How a reckless report could increase the chance of a crisis with China - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Michael D. Swaine, Jake Werner, James Park · June 29, 2023

How a reckless report could increase the chance of a crisis with China

A new study from the Council on Foreign Relations on US Taiwan policy is both dangerous and misleading.

June 29, 2023

Written by

Michael D. Swaine, Jake Werner and James Park

Print

How a reckless report could increase the chance of a crisis with China

Given its broad membership and prestigious leadership, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is generally considered to be the flagship foreign policy think tank in the United States, reflecting the judicious, mainstream views of America’s foreign policy establishment.

It is thus noteworthy and potentially dangerous that CFR has just published an assessment of U.S. Taiwan policy that largely reflects the viewpoint of hawks in Washington on a range of issues, including the strategic value of Taiwan to the United States and the goals of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). If this highly contested view is misunderstood by the larger policymaking community as an expert consensus, the United States risks further escalation with China toward serious conflict.

The report supposedly drew on the views of a task force composed of a wide range of experts on U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations. However, the bulk of the study ignores or downplays many of the more balanced stances held by those currently taking part in the Taiwan policy debate. As a result, five of the 17 task force members issued dissents to the report citing foundational problems with the nature of its arguments and recommendations (two other task force members dissented in a more hawkish direction).

The report begins on a promising note, displaying keen insight into the escalatory dynamic that has emerged from a collapsing U.S.-China relationship:

“Objecting to steps the United States has taken regarding relations with Taiwan, China has accused the United States of having a ‘fake’ One China policy. The United States asserts that its actions are consistent with its One China policy and are a necessary response to heightened Chinese coercion of Taiwan. This discord has created an action-reaction dynamic whereby China puts pressure on Taiwan, prompting the United States to take steps to demonstrate its support for Taiwan, in turn leading to more Chinese pressure on the island.”

From this point, one might expect an exploration of the destabilizing actions on all sides. When it comes to policy recommendations, one would be interested in proposed methods of mutual reassurance that each actor should pursue as well as red lines that each should avoid. Most significantly, one would hope for a discussion of how the United States and China could return their larger relationship to a solid footing — the precondition for each side trusting the other’s assurances that they respect the status quo that has kept Taiwan safe for over four decades.

Instead, Chinese pressure tactics are explored in detail while those of the United States and Taiwan are left aside, leaving an impression of one-sided aggression rather than mutually driven insecurity. Although the report rhetorically supports the One China policy and sensibly calls for the United States to avoid symbolic gestures toward Taiwanese sovereignty, all other suggestions involve strengthening the ability of Taiwan and the United States to resist Chinese influence. Many of these ideas are well-advised, but they can only successfully deter Chinese aggression if they are accompanied by robust positive initiatives. In the current climate, an imbalanced “deterrence” agenda pushes the escalatory spiral further toward conflict.

Perhaps the deepest problem with the report, which influences all its other assessments, is its depiction of Taiwan as a vital strategic location that must be kept free of Chinese influence in order to preserve U.S. military power in the Asia-Pacific region.

Repeatedly citing the congressional testimony of a single U.S. defense official (whose remarks have not been subsequently repeated by the Biden administration), the report asserts that Taiwan is vital to the United States due to its “geographic position at the center of the first island chain…its role as the global hub of semiconductor manufacturing… [and] its willingness to work with the United States as a trusted partner on transnational issues.” Taiwan’s fate, the authors argue, “will in large part determine the U.S. military’s ability to operate in the region.”

Yet the strategic value of Taiwan to the overall U.S. military posture in Asia is a point debated by many analysts and scholars, often without decisive conclusions. While China’s control of Taiwan would doubtless have some considerable constraining effects on U.S. operational ability in Asia, it is highly questionable whether it would have such consequential, determining effects on U.S. regional power projection as the report claims.

More significantly, by defining Taiwan as an essential U.S. strategic asset, the report repudiates the One China policy, which states that the United States will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) if it is arrived at peacefully and without coercion.

Despite framing the Taiwan question as an issue of U.S.-China strategic competition and making numerous policy suggestions for Washington to maintain a position of advantage over Beijing, the report ironically recommends that the United States should still uphold the One China policy and reassure Beijing that Washington does not seek to permanently separate Taiwan from China.

This is apparently to be done by simply repeating the mantra that Washington upholds its One China policy while avoiding “symbolic gestures (such as the 2022 trip to Taiwan by former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi) which are apt to prompt a harsh PRC response and raise concerns in Beijing that Washington is moving away from its One China policy.” In other words, China should just take our word for it. Left unexplained is how such meager actions will convince Beijing that Washington remains open to peaceful unification as the United States implements policies based primarily on a strategic argument for keeping Taiwan out of Chinese hands.

A second highly problematic assertion made in the report is the notion that Xi Jinping will likely become steadily more aggressive toward Taiwan, and possibly employ force, in order “to rally support for the CCP and his personal rule,” especially if China’s economy continues to slow.

Although the report offers no concrete evidence and correctly admits that this depiction of Xi’s mindset is purely speculative, it nonetheless employs the claim as an important part of its argument for doubling down on all forms of deterrence while neglecting credible reassurance. Given its one-sided, militarized analysis, the report recommends that the United States place its defense industrial base “on a wartime footing.”

The logical accompaniment to the report’s heavy reliance on deterrence over credible reassurance is the notion that the United States should replace its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity toward U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict with a policy of strategic clarity guaranteeing such intervention. The task force considered the choice between ambiguity and clarity but failed to reach a consensus. Yet the report nonetheless endorses strategic clarity in substance by recommending that President Biden’s repeated assertions that the United States would intervene militarily in any conflict should become “the new baseline for U.S. declaratory policy.”

Overall, instead of providing a steadying hand in support of a more credible, balanced approach to dealing with the Taiwan issue, the CFR report will simply reinforce the military deterrence-centered, reassurance-slighted approach of many defense analysts in Washington. In doing so, it ignores or downplays the counter arguments of others, some of whom were on the task force. Its recommendations would commit the United States to an open-ended, unlimited, and increasingly intense arms race with China over Taiwan. Such a one-sided approach would deepen the level of Chinese suspicion and distrust over U.S. motives, thereby increasing the likelihood of a severe crisis or conflict with Beijing and placing the people of Taiwan in great danger.

Written by

Michael D. Swaine, Jake Werner and James Park

8. Geography, Bureaucracy, and National Security: The Legacies of the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods

An important read.

A key excerpt that resonates with me:

By the early 2000s, a pattern had emerged for US national security. The United States positioned itself as a problem solver for different regions of the world, each with its own distinct issues and logic. The objective was to prevent smaller, localized threats from metastasizing into major challenges for the United States—a lesson seemingly reinforced by the shock of the 9/11 attacks. Whether combating extremism in Central Asia, fighting an outbreak of the Ebola virus in Western Africa, or finding solutions to narco-trafficking in the Western Hemisphere, US power would be deployed to cope with a set of separate, disconnected regional challenges. Most critically, other major powers were viewed primarily through an exclusive regional lens and focus: terrorism was a Middle East problem, Russia was a European problem, China was an Asia-Pacific one, etc.

At the same time, Washington presided over a process of economic globalization largely set on autopilot, under the assumption that growing interconnections and the mutually-beneficial profits that would be generated would mediate any security dilemmas. However, the problem, as Kennan, observing the post-Cold War emergence at the end of his life, was that the US national security establishment was forced to grapple with a world with “no such great and all-absorbing focal points for American policy” which could then provide to the bureaucracy an overarching narrative for US global engagement.

But the prevailing ethos of the day was that globalization would solve the security dilemmas of the twentieth century. As Sujai Shivakumar, Gregory Arcuri, and Charles Wessner described it:

To many, the end of the Cold War heralded the triumph of open societies and democratic institutions, allowing for efficiencies that could be realized from the globalization of production and the adoption of just-in-time supply chains. The potential for this globalization was secured through a commitment to common international governance structures and a shared recognition among policymakers in the United States, Europe, East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere on the value of a general liberalization of global trade and the relaxation of state control over national economies. The so-called Washington Consensus emerged as the byword for a new age where economic efficiency and specialization were paramount and supply chains that spanned previously intractable geopolitical fault lines were now searching for lower costs in wage and other inputs across the globe. It also assumed that knitting together different countries into an extended value chain would diminish the possibility for conflict.

Geography, Bureaucracy, and National Security: The Legacies of the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods - Foreign Policy Research Institute

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Nikolas Gvosdev is the Editor of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs and a Senior Fellow in FPRI's Eurasia Program.

Derek S. Reveron

Derek Reveron is the Chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and a Lecturer in Extension and Faculty Affiliate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.

fpri.org · by Nikolas K. Gvosdev​ and Derek S. Reveron​

Bottom Line

• Since 1945, US foreign policy has been defined by precluding the emergence of adversaries and hostile coalitions by creating an Americanized international system through alliances, extended deterrence, and favorable trade terms.
• The Cold War national security system has not adapted well to global issues of trade, transnational threats, and China’s expansive foreign policy.
• Today’s world is defined by China’s return to global importance. The United States is not only the largest destination for Chinese exports, but almost every country in the world is one of its major trading partners. China has used this revenue to modernize its military, fund a global development program, and position itself as a competitor to US power.

Editor’s Note: This first article in a series considers whether or not the legacy national security system of the United States organized around geographic regions is well-suited for strategic competition.

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in significant global upheaval, particularly in the form of fragmented supply chains. This was followed by the Taliban’s success in Afghanistan in August 2021, Russia’s intensification of its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and China’s announcement in 2023 that the world is experiencing a geopolitical transformation. These events suggest that US foreign policy will face significant challenges in the future. The post-Cold War period, once defined by expectations of American leadership promoting international integration under a liberal framework, is strained. A new era is emerging, in which the emergence of other major powers, combined with technologies that promote fragmentation and disintegration, will result in a more competitive international landscape.

The Cold War had forced the United States to move from its traditional approach to national security—formulating episodic, expeditionary responses to specific challenges—in favor of a steady-state, forward-deployed model. Faced with the challenge of the Soviet Union and the risk that a Eurasian hegemon would be able to dominate the industrial centers of Western Europe and East Asia and control the resource endowments of the Middle East and Africa, the US government, after World War II, was forced to address the question as to the extent to which the United States would need to extend its geographic zone of activity and responsibility in order to ensure American security. What scholar Robert Jervis termed the “globalization” of US security commitments meant that the US government had to develop the bureaucracies to carry out what then policymaker Paul Nitze outlined as the “effective organization, direction and leadership” of the “actual and potential capabilities of the United States and of allied and friendly states.”

The global challenge of the USSR provided a central organizing principle that allowed for the coordination of US regional strategies. Beyond the defense of Western Europe and East Asia, the United States had to be able to act in Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia, and in Africa to safeguard strategic resources, secure key lines of communication, and prevent geographic vulnerabilities from being exploited by the Soviet Union. It was not enough, as Glenn Snyder argued, for the United States to rely on its nuclear arsenal to deter the USSR to secure its position, for threatening a nuclear response to “minor ventures” on the part of the Soviet Union would not be credible. Instead, the United States had to show it could operate effectively in every region of the world. In turn, the so-called “stability-instability paradox”—where Moscow and Washington had to avoid head-on clashes that might lead to nuclear war— meant, as Michael Krepon articulated, that the Cold War would be characterized by superpowers “jockeying for advantage in a myriad of ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became surrogates for direct conflict.” George Kennan described these “myriad of ways” under the rubric of “political warfare”—including alliances, economic aid, security cooperation, and information operations.

In order to engage in everything from security cooperation to economic development, the United States, after World War II, began to subdivide the world into geographic and functional commands and bureaus. As Kennan described it, the Soviet challenge meant that the United States had “assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history.” With the passage of legislation like the 1947 National Security Act and the 1948 Economic Recovery Act, and the momentous decision to negotiate binding alliances with other states around the world, starting with the Rio Pact of 1947 (for the Western Hemisphere) and the 1949 Washington Treaty (which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO), the United States needed to create the bureaucratic infrastructure to mobilize and project all types of power around the world—what Kennan called “the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” These legislative and bureaucratic acts signaled that the United States would “have a world-wide, continuous global military presence” and that the United States would seek to establish unified commands in “strategic areas” around the world.

First issued by President Harry Truman in 1946, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), re-examined every two years, has been the overall blueprint for the US defense security architecture. The UCP requires the US Department of Defense to think in terms of geographic areas of responsibility—and then to consider substantive areas of focus. [Today, as of 2023, there are seven geographic commands (European, Africa, Indo-Pacific, Northern, Southern, Central, and Space) and four functional commands (transportation, special operations, strategic, and cyber).]

Like Defense, State also adopted a geographic lens through regional bureaus (consisting today, as of 2023, of African, East Asian and Pacific, European and Eurasian, Near Eastern, South and Central Asian, and Western Hemisphere), as well as multiple functional bureaus (arms control, political-military affairs, counterterrorism, conflict and stabilization operations, etc.) New agencies—including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the now defunct US Information Agency, and the expansion of the national security and foreign policy roles of other Cabinet departments—Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, etc.—involved ever larger parts of the federal government in discrete pieces of the national security mission.

There were some bureaucratic problems—over time, different parts of the US government–the CIA, Department of Defense, Department of State and the National Security Council itself–drew different geographic lines on the map, meaning that areas of responsibility did not always align increasing the number of people and agencies involved in policy coordination. But because, during the Cold War, all US regional and functional strategies were part of a strategic pyramid whose capstone was containing the Soviet Union, problems that might be generated as a result of those geographic “seams” could be managed. In turn, regional policy during the Cold War was understood to be the local manifestation of the overall global Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the end goal of shaping a global balance of power that favored America and its allies.

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union itself collapsed, the United States found itself in possession of a robust geographic and functional national security bureaucracy. Rather than dismantling its foreign policy apparatus and returning the United States to its pre-World War II expeditionary nature, the United States pursued what Josef Joffe has described as a “hub and spokes” approach, where each region of the world connected to the American center and where the United States would play the principal role in creating a regional security architecture. The United States emerged as the leading provider of international security—especially in dealing with the challenges of terrorism, weak and failing states, and rogue regimes—and other states would defer to US leadership for setting the overall global agenda. US security guarantees to traditional power centers in Europe and Asia would usher in a new era of globalization that would produce economic growth, which in turn would strengthen the processes of democratization.

Democratization, in turn, would create alignment in foreign policy interests. As summed up by the German tagline “wandel durch handel”—change through trade—other rising or resurgent powers would be incentivized to align with the US instead of against it. This approach worked in Europe both after World War II and the Cold War and in Asia where Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries overcame authoritarianism as a remedy for social stability. This approach of “deep engagement”—as Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth put it—would tap down regional conflict and also prevent the emergence of a global challenger to the US system.

From these assumptions, post-Cold War US grand strategy proceeded along the following lines:

First, the United States should act as a regional protector, by providing security to those potential rivals—Japan, China, Western Europe—who would otherwise have to produce security on their own by converting economic strength into military assets. Historically, the accumulation of such assets has fed conflicts and ambitions, and the latter would surely be turned against the reigning primary power, the United States. In short, US foreign policy was defined by precluding the emergence of adversaries and hostile coalitions by building on the US strategy from the Cold War: through alliances, extended deterrence, and favorable trade terms.

Second, in so doing, the United States acted as a regional pacifier. In each region of the world, the United States would seek to guarantee regional security, not only from external threats, but, whether explicitly or implicitly, the security of key players vis-a-vis each other. Geographically oriented bureaucracies and forward-deployed military forces and development agencies enabled this. By extending security guarantees, it was expected conflict would be inhibited and, instead, cooperation among them would be enhanced. The ideal outcome for this model was the transformation of the post-World War II European Coal and Steel Cooperative and other such measures into the European Union, where former great power rivals learned to work together in common cause. In so doing, countries like France, the United Kingdom, or Germany did not have to worry about relative balances of power and security in Europe, and so invested fewer resources in guns and more in butter, and indeed, in communal ventures. As a result, global sub-systems like Western Europe have tended to remain stable, sparing the United States the unpleasant necessity of choice among partners by allaying with all, let alone of fighting on one side or the other. In short, act in order to minimize intervention became the watchword.

The “hub and spokes” approach assumed that after 1991 only the United States had the capacity for truly global reach, while other powers, such as China or Russia, were largely defined as regional in terms of scope and challenge. This approach was buttressed by the post-Cold War reality that the United States was the leading trade and financial partner for every region of the world, and that the sinews of the global system ran through the American hub. It therefore encouraged a trend towards the regionalization of US foreign and security policy where a US global approach was seen as the sum of its regional parts, because the expected “threats will be dispersed rather than concentrated, unpredictable and often unexpected, and significantly derived from regional and state-centered contingencies.” By the early 2000s, there were concerns about the “rigidly regional organization” of US national security policy.

The problem was one of focus. The collapse of the USSR removed the golden thread for US regional strategies. After 1991, subsequent efforts to reframe US grand strategy sought to replace the Soviet threat with “democratic enlargement” or the “war on terror.” But the first lacked specificity in terms of being able to provide a strategic rationale for prioritization and resources. The second focused primarily on functional capacities to deal with violence. Neither could completely overcome the centrifugal forces of regionalism. In the absence of a single, overarching, and existential threat, US approaches to different regions could become less susceptible to prioritization and coordination, more defined by a grab bag of miscellaneous tasks.

But because the United States enjoyed, at least on paper, economic and military supremacy in each region, there was little concern that this might pose a threat to US interests. Thanks to the revolution in military affairs, it was the only country with the logistical and technological capability to deliver overwhelming force to any part of the globe. As the calendar ticked into the new millennium, America was the leading trade partner of choice for more than 80 percent of the world’s nations. The very formulation of the concept of the “rogue state” was that countries that did not want to adhere to the standards and rules of the Americanized international order that the US was taking the lead in formulating could be isolated and cut out of the “hub and spoke” system.

By the early 2000s, a pattern had emerged for US national security. The United States positioned itself as a problem solver for different regions of the world, each with its own distinct issues and logic. The objective was to prevent smaller, localized threats from metastasizing into major challenges for the United States—a lesson seemingly reinforced by the shock of the 9/11 attacks. Whether combating extremism in Central Asia, fighting an outbreak of the Ebola virus in Western Africa, or finding solutions to narco-trafficking in the Western Hemisphere, US power would be deployed to cope with a set of separate, disconnected regional challenges. Most critically, other major powers were viewed primarily through an exclusive regional lens and focus: terrorism was a Middle East problem, Russia was a European problem, China was an Asia-Pacific one, etc.

At the same time, Washington presided over a process of economic globalization largely set on autopilot, under the assumption that growing interconnections and the mutually-beneficial profits that would be generated would mediate any security dilemmas. However, the problem, as Kennan, observing the post-Cold War emergence at the end of his life, was that the US national security establishment was forced to grapple with a world with “no such great and all-absorbing focal points for American policy” which could then provide to the bureaucracy an overarching narrative for US global engagement.

But the prevailing ethos of the day was that globalization would solve the security dilemmas of the twentieth century. As Sujai Shivakumar, Gregory Arcuri, and Charles Wessner described it:

To many, the end of the Cold War heralded the triumph of open societies and democratic institutions, allowing for efficiencies that could be realized from the globalization of production and the adoption of just-in-time supply chains. The potential for this globalization was secured through a commitment to common international governance structures and a shared recognition among policymakers in the United States, Europe, East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere on the value of a general liberalization of global trade and the relaxation of state control over national economies. The so-called Washington Consensus emerged as the byword for a new age where economic efficiency and specialization were paramount and supply chains that spanned previously intractable geopolitical fault lines were now searching for lower costs in wage and other inputs across the globe. It also assumed that knitting together different countries into an extended value chain would diminish the possibility for conflict.

In business and economic terms, what has this new era of globalization wrought? As Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Arjen van Witteloostuijn concluded:

Just-in-time delivery is or, more accurately perhaps, was one of the features of modern-day globalization. Spurred by technological changes such automation and robotization, the just-in-time production of intermediate products on the assembly lines across the globe has enabled businesses to manage, or rather minimize, stocks optimally. Also, advances in multi-mode transportation have made it possible to manage production processes in such a way that the need to keep large and expensive stockpiles was substantially reduced … As a consequence, global supply chains have become “mean and lean”, as well as reliable in ways that allowed production processes to become highly efficient: By and large, only bones were left, with all flesh cut out.

In political and national security terms, however, this has led to unbalanced co-dependencies among countries where economic linkages are not necessarily guaranteed by shared political or security relationships. In particular, these developments proceeded from an assumption that these business ties would constrain Russian or Chinese leaders from seeking to revise or rewrite the rules of the regional or global political orders in ways that might provoke a clash with the United States and its allies.

This new era of globalization also rested on fragile and vulnerable architectures—especially in terms of cyber and digital infrastructure—that depended on the willingness of no actor to risk damaging or destroying it. At the same time, long, involved supply chains rested both on the perceived security of various lines of communication—especially the maritime zones—from disruption—and the ongoing dismantling of borders and barriers that impeded the movement not only of capital and ideas but goods and skills. In other words, as some of the critics of the overly regional focus of post-Cold War US national security policy were pointing out, some of the most critical challenges facing the United States were precisely outgrowths from globalization and global trends, not discrete regional issues.

After 2007, Russia under Vladimir Putin, particularly after his Munich Security Conference speech where he decried the Soviet collapse, the country began to embark on a more confrontational approach to the United States—but did so beyond the bureaucratic “box” of Europe. Whether joint military drills with China and Iran, recultivating closer relationships in Africa and Latin America, and then engaging in active military interventions—in Georgia, Ukraine, and then in Syria—Moscow demonstrated its capacity, even if limited, to act beyond the permutations of a single region. Yet in looking at the disjointed US response to Russian activities along its southern peripheries, geostrategic analyst George Friedman zeroed in on the US “conceptual division of the region into distinct theaters” as a major cause.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been another wake-up call, in this case, about the fragility of global supply chains and calling into question the assumption that global economic integration would produce stability. Instead, as the Economist warned, the “underlying anarchy of global governance is being exposed” by the pandemic, and with it, the confidence in globalization’s ability to promote stability at the global level. Instead, returning to Brakman, Garretsen, and van Witteloostuijn:

The virus has exposed vulnerabilities in the global economic system that were hidden to many, until recently. For instance, essential medical supplies were insufficiently available locally, which reveals that many countries have become dependent on long international supply chains, with a small disruption somewhere along a supply chain being felt everywhere. The Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that China, as one of the main suppliers of medical supplies, has redirected Chinese-made supplies from exports to domestic usage. As a consequence, global prices for medical supplies increased substantially, as did global shortages. Experiences like these might change future international relations. Governments are confronted with unpleasant international dependencies and vulnerabilities. Becoming too dependent on global supply chains might lead to a re-evaluation of global trade and risk assessments.

And this brings us to the most pressing security concern of the mid-twenty-first century: the China challenge.

Today’s world is defined by China’s return to global importance with almost every country in the world as one of its major trading partners. As Mark Green put it:

China is the largest trading partner to Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Given their proximity, those countries are hardly a surprise. But it is also the top trader with Russia—and Ukraine. In Africa, China is the top partner for countries like South Africa and Kenya. In South America, for places like Brazil; in the Middle East, places like Saudi Arabia. And China is the largest external trading partner of the European Union.

In other words, countries that during the Cold War were key political-economic allies of the United States against the Soviet Union now must balance their relationship with the United States against their economic interdependence with Beijing.

Even the United States is not isolated. America is China’s largest export market, importing over $500 billion worth of goods in 2022. China and its partners such as Russia and Iran with major global south countries like India, Indonesia, and Brazil are looking to create alternatives to the US-led international system where the yuan is a global currency alongside the dollar—offering countries an alternative to having to depend on the US economic and financial hub. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde captured this: “We are witnessing a fragmentation of the global economy into competing blocs, with each bloc trying to pull as much of the rest of the world closer to its respective strategic interests and shared values.” The yuan is a long way away from supplanting the dollar, if it ever occurs, but China certainly promotes a goal to splinter trade with some countries away from the dollarized trade system.

The economic impact of China’s foreign policy is still developing, but its military impact is clear. Using record trade surpluses, China has invested in its military, modernizing its command structure, created the world’s largest Navy, and planned to quadruple its nuclear arsenal. The Joffe assumption—that rising states would continue to depend on the US to secure their economic and trading linkages—has not been borne out.

The China challenge cannot be addressed fully by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the US Indo-Pacific Command. Remembering the Soviet Union was not addressed solely by US European Command, a new lens is needed. The challenge created by China (and its partners) is global in nature. It is not restricted to a particular region of the world—China is no longer “just” an Asian or Western Pacific issue. Yet the United States struggles to articulate how exactly it will engage in strategic competition that requires an integrated approach across different parts of the world. As this becomes clearer, so too will the inflexibility of the national security system, where the challenges do not neatly segment into pre-existing US geographically defined bureaucratic boxes.

Speaking at the Brookings Institution in May 2023, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger observed that “the current structure of the combatant commands is based solely on geography, which “made absolute sense when most of the conflicts were regional.” But “not anymore”—and this approach leaves a “framework that has lines on maps that don’t really correspond” to where and how the challenges are located, especially the cross-cutting challenges like cyber as well as other states that don’t confine their activity to a single region. Instead, “they create seams.” The changing nature of national security, therefore, requires an overhaul of how the US organizes its efforts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

Image: Department of Defense

fpri.org · by Nikolas K. Gvosdev

9. ‘Nothing Has Happened’ – 'General Armageddon's' Daughter as He Remains Out-of-Sight

‘Nothing Has Happened’ – 'General Armageddon's' Daughter as He Remains Out-of-Sight

kyivpost.com

• The mystery surrounding General Sergei Surovikin’s absence continues to be fed by contradictory statements, on and off the record briefings and apparently well-informed rumor.

by Steve Brown | June 30, 2023, 11:02 am

Russian General Sergei Surovikin, commander of Russia's military operation in Ukraine is seen during a visit of Russian President to the joint staff of troops involved in Russia's military operation in Ukraine in an undisclosed place on December 17, 2022. Gavriil GRIGOROV / Sputnik / AFP

Surovikin, is a highly decorated officer and became nicknamed “General Armageddon” for his ruthless tactics while conducting operations in Chechnya and Syria. He is currently the head of Russian aerospace forces and deputy commander of their forces in Ukraine. He has not been seen in public since Wagner’s failed uprising on Saturday, June 24.

The New York Times had cited US intelligence sources earlier to report that Surovikin had prior knowledge of the June 23-24 rebellion led by the Wagner chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with whom he had well publicized links.

It was then reported on June 27 on the Ukraine Telegram channel, quoting the Russian “rosZMI” media outlet that Surovikin had been arrested and was being detained in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center along with his deputy, Colonel-General Andriy Yudin.

Yudin was then quoted by the “Ura.ru” website as saying that this was false information and he was at home “on leave,” although it was confirmed on June 29 that he had in fact been fired. It was unclear why or whether it was connected to the Prigozhin debacle; but the timing seems more than just coincidence.

The Financial Times said on June 29 that they had been informed that “three people familiar with the matter” had reported that Surovikin was being detained at an unknown location. It was not clear whether he had been charged as part of the plot that led to Prigozhin’s “march for justice,” or was simply detained for interrogation on what he may or may not have known.

The Bloomberg news site said on Thursday that although it was not clear whether Surovikin’s detention was part of a formal investigation it cited sources saying he was being questioned by military prosecutors over his links to Wagner and, while he is not in prison, he is being “kept in one place.”

Several Russian independent media platforms, citing Moscow security sources, said Surovikin was not currently under arrest but was cooperating in the investigation.

Sergei Markov, a former member of parliament and a Kremlin-linked political scientist said the authorities should “show Surovikin to everyone” or Russians “might think of large-scale, secret arrests.”

Markov also said the general was being questioned not as a suspect but “as a very informed” source, adding: “Surovikin was the main go-between for the defense ministry and Wagner, so he knows more than anyone else.”

On the same day, the Russian media aggregator Baza, which has close links to Russia’s FSB security service, spoke to Surovikin’s daughter Veronika who said “Nothing happened to him, he is at his workplace as usual.”

She also said that, anyway, him not being seen wasn’t unusual, as the general “never appeared every day in the media and did not make [public] statements.” The wife of Surovikin, who almost never appears or speaks in public, refused to comment on the rumors about his arrest.

A further complication to the mystery was revealed by CNN later on June 29 when it revealed it had seen documents provided by the investigative platform Dossier Center. These showed that Surovikin, along with at least 30 other senior Russian military and intelligence officials, was a “secret VIP member” of the Wagner private military company and held a personal registration number issued by the group.

It was not made clear what this VIP membership involves and whether Surovikin derived any financial benefit from the more than $1 billion income Wagner received from the Kremlin in the past year.

It was already known that Surovikin had links to Prigozhin and the mercenary group. The two worked closely during Russia’s military intervention in Syria and Prigozhin has previously described the general as a “legendary figure.”

CNN says that the documents raise questions not only about Surovikin but also which other senior members of the Russian military and security establishment have links to Wagner and what would be the implications.

The Dossier Center was created and is supported by Mikhail Khodorkovsky the exiled Russian oligarch and long-time opponent of Putin. It lists its mission as being to: “track the criminal activity of… [the] de facto criminal organization that operates from within the Kremlin.

“The Dossier Center maps out this network, compiling extensive case files against corrupt individuals and the institutions they may control.”

The Kremlin has refused to clarify the fate of Surovikin. Asked by reporters, during one of his regular press briefing sessions on June 29, if he could clarify the situation with the general, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said: “No, unfortunately not.”

“So, I recommend that you contact the defense ministry; this is its prerogative.”

When a reporter asked if Russian president Vladimir Putin still had trust in Surovikin, Peskov replied:

“He is the supreme commander-in-chief, and he works with the defense minister and with the chief of the General Staff.”

Asked about Prigozhin’s whereabouts, Peskov said he did not have information about his location at the present time.

This came as satellite imagery appeared to show rapid building activity at military bases in Asipovichy and Tesl in southern Belarus, prompting speculation that Wagner troops would soon relocate to the country in line with an agreement said to have been negotiated by Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko.

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Steve Brown

After a career as a British Army Ammunition Specialist and Bomb Disposal Officer, Steve later worked in the fields of ammunition destruction, demining and explosive ordnance disposal with the UN and NATO. In 2017, after taking early retirement, he moved to Ukraine with his Ukrainian wife and two sons where he became a full-time writer. He now works as an English language editor with the Kyiv Post.

kyivpost.com

10. The Wagner 'Coup' Was Staged by Putin—and the West Fell for It

Excerpts:

None seemed to realize the obvious truth: The coup was staged, and completely faked false flag operation.

Think about it: An army invades Russia, race right up to Moscow, and no one gets hurt? With just a few thousand men, it achieved what Hitler with almost a million men wasn't able to? And Putin holds his military back? And then, with Moscow supposedly within his grasp, Prigozhin decides, "Oh well, never mind" and heads to Belarus?

​...

Of course, what Russians view as strength—Putin was able to squash a major armed mutiny—Western media and Biden's "experts" interpreted as weakness. And this, too, is as Putin wants it. The perception in the West that he is weak and his military is incompetent suggests that the West need not provide so much assistance to Ukraine, a key goal of Putin's.

Putin is also reminding the world that the longer the Ukraine war continues, the greater the chance for unpredictable consequences, like, say, nuclear Armageddon. As Prigozhin's troops rolled up the M4 highway to Moscow, commentators fretted about the chaos and who was in control of Russia's nukes.

There's an entire doctrine in the Russian military science called Reflexive Control, which is designed to trick the enemy by serving him information he is likely to believe because of his pre-existing bias. Team Biden is already there.

Meanwhile, the Wagner Group has used its trip to Moscow to land itself in Belarus, which just received a gift of tactical nuclear weapons from Putin. This points to yet another potential goal of the false flag operation: opening a second front to Ukraine's north while directly threatening NATO's eastern flank with the weapons of Armageddon. This time, Putin is doing it with Russia's most effective fighting force.

The Wagner 'Coup' Was Staged by Putin—and the West Fell for It

REBEKAH KOFFLER , PRESIDENT OF DOCTRINE & STRATEGY CONSULTING, FORMER DIA INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

ON 6/29/23 AT 5:23 PM EDT

Newsweek · June 29, 2023

By now, everyone has heard about the narrowly avoided coup in Russia: Last Friday night, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, one of Putin's most trusted allies and the commander of the notorious Russian mercinary Wagner Group, marched on Moscow in an apparent coup d'etat, only to come to a swift agreement with Vladimir Putin and decamp for Belarus. While most commentators acknowledged that things didn't quite add up, the "expert" class happily concluded that at least it had weakened Putin in his war against Ukraine.

None seemed to realize the obvious truth: The coup was staged, and completely faked false flag operation.

Think about it: An army invades Russia, race right up to Moscow, and no one gets hurt? With just a few thousand men, it achieved what Hitler with almost a million men wasn't able to? And Putin holds his military back? And then, with Moscow supposedly within his grasp, Prigozhin decides, "Oh well, never mind" and heads to Belarus?

Russian President Vladimir Putin reacts during The Strong Ideas For The New Times Forum, on June 29, 2023 in Moscow, Russia. President Putin visited the annual forum, hosted by the Agency for Strategic Initiatives. Contributor/Getty Images

Prigozhin would have had to be an idiot or suicidal to think that with 8,000 men he could invade Moscow. Yet Prigozhin is very smart man, a juvenile delinquent turned convict, then hot dog salesman, then CEO of a multi-million dollar catering business serving the Kremlin, to finally commander of the world's most formidable mercenary force. It is utterly implausible that Prigozhin thought that he could take on Rosgvardia, Russia's National Guard, a 340,000-strong domestic security force reporting directly Putin.

And then there was the footage of Prigozhin sitting a bench in Rostov-on-Don, bantering amiably with Russia's deputy minister of defense, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and deputy head of the Russian military intelligence, the GRU, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Alekseyev. It was just too chummy for a true rebellion.

Just wow. A video has surfaced showing Prigozhin at the Southern Military District HQ in Rostov-on-Don talking to (and HUMILIATING) Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov. He threatens to blockade Rostov and head for Moscow!

I have extreme trouble understanding Yevkurov and… pic.twitter.com/jGr9gaLB1i

— Kevin Rothrock (@KevinRothrock) June 24, 2023

That Prigozhin is still alive, having supposedly betrayed the Russian motherland, is inconceivable under the rule of Putin, who famously said in 2019 that "treason is the biggest crime on earth" and who hunts down traitors anywhere on the globe, including in the United States.

The "coup" was staged. The only question is, why would Putin stage such an elaborate deception?

And the answer is politics. The Russian strongman is up for re-election on March 17, 2024. With no end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine war, Putin has to convince the Russians of the need to bear even more sacrifices in order to maintain popular support for the war in Ukraine. Putin achieved this by appealing to two primordial fears of the Russian people: invasion from the West and chaos.

In his address on Saturday, the capstone of this whole charade, Putin asserted that the West was behind Prigozhin mutiny, which he likened to the 1917 revolution. As Putin knows, if you want to scare a Russian, tell them they are going to go through the horror and disorder of the Bolshevik revolution again. These claims became the pretext for Putin to gain more power, not less. He declared a "counter-terrorism operation," effectively marshal law, requiring extreme security measures, including constant monitoring of citizens communications. And he reversed the rule that prohibited people with a criminal record from joining the military, which will enable additional military mobilization.

And the Russian media predictably cheered the dear leader for saving Mother Russia and "chasing away" the traitors.

Of course, what Russians view as strength—Putin was able to squash a major armed mutiny—Western media and Biden's "experts" interpreted as weakness. And this, too, is as Putin wants it. The perception in the West that he is weak and his military is incompetent suggests that the West need not provide so much assistance to Ukraine, a key goal of Putin's.

Putin is also reminding the world that the longer the Ukraine war continues, the greater the chance for unpredictable consequences, like, say, nuclear Armageddon. As Prigozhin's troops rolled up the M4 highway to Moscow, commentators fretted about the chaos and who was in control of Russia's nukes.

There's an entire doctrine in the Russian military science called Reflexive Control, which is designed to trick the enemy by serving him information he is likely to believe because of his pre-existing bias. Team Biden is already there.

Meanwhile, the Wagner Group has used its trip to Moscow to land itself in Belarus, which just received a gift of tactical nuclear weapons from Putin. This points to yet another potential goal of the false flag operation: opening a second front to Ukraine's north while directly threatening NATO's eastern flank with the weapons of Armageddon. This time, Putin is doing it with Russia's most effective fighting force.

Rebekah Koffler is the president of Doctrine & Strategy Consulting, a former DIA intelligence officer, and the author of "Putin's Playbook: Russia's Secret Plan to Defeat America." She also wrote the foreword for "Zelensky: The Unlikely Ukrainian Hero Who Defied Putin and United the World."

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Newsweek · June 29, 2023

11. Xi’s Schadenfreude Over Moscow’s Mutiny

Excerpts:

Yet however vindicated Xi may feel today about Putin’s style of governance, his schadenfreude may not see too many tomorrows. Sure, Xi’s years-long anti-corruption campaign, one that targeted both prominent “tigers” and small-time “flies,” rooted out political disloyalty within the party and sidelined potential rivals. Xi similarly enhanced his direct control over China’s armed forces, for instance by reforming China’s military reserve command structure to reduce the number of bureaucratic layers between himself and the individual soldier. Xi, too, maintains a very watchful eye on paramilitaries, which are prohibited from using force.

But Xi’s geopolitical and economic mismanagement has contributed to a genuine crisis of confidence about the party’s legitimacy, including its ability to achieve economic growth, social stability, and national unity. Xi’s myriad challenges are set to worsen on account of China’s rapidly deteriorating external environment and precipitous economic slowdown, not to mention the ongoing onslaught of Western export controls aimed at thwarting the country’s technological ambitions. Put differently, Xi appears on the cusp of confronting the very misfortunes that befell Putin. What remains unclear is whether Xi’s unique brand of party-centric nationalism and state-directed ideology, both so clearly missing from Moscow’s milieu, will be enough to salvage the China dream—or lead to its demise.

No doubt, Xi’s Marxist-Leninist mindset, combined with a consolidation of power, makes China’s regime more resilient today than Russia’s. But in rejecting collective leadership and installing himself as the country’s sole arbiter of ideology and policy, Xi has tied China’s great rejuvenation to his personal performance and judgment, with the latter taking a massive hit following last weekend’s events in Russia. For if Xi’s bad bet on Putin is any indication, China’s success remains anything but assured.

Xi’s Schadenfreude Over Moscow’s Mutiny

Xi feels vindicated over Putin’s style of governance—but has made a bad bet on the Russian leader.

By Craig Singleton, a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Foreign Policy · by Craig Singleton · June 29, 2023

In war, more things often go wrong than right. If that inconvenient truth was somehow lost on Chinese leader Xi Jinping more than 16 months into Russia’s planned two-day takeover of Ukraine, then last weekend’s rebellion and march toward Moscow by the Wagner Group surely set him straight. Indeed, while Xi often champions the ostensible novelty of the Chinese system, deep down he fears that China is afflicted by the very same ideological ills that once plagued the Soviet Union—and continue to curse its Russian remnants.

In war, more things often go wrong than right. If that inconvenient truth was somehow lost on Chinese leader Xi Jinping more than 16 months into Russia’s planned two-day takeover of Ukraine, then last weekend’s rebellion and march toward Moscow by the Wagner Group surely set him straight. Indeed, while Xi often champions the ostensible novelty of the Chinese system, deep down he fears that China is afflicted by the very same ideological ills that once plagued the Soviet Union—and continue to curse its Russian remnants.

Chief among these ills, according to Xi himself, are “political corruption, ideological heresy, and military disloyalty,” all of which were on full display during last weekend’s Russian rumble.

Moscow’s short-lived mutiny, led by a wealthy, well-armed former member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s innermost circle, represents the sum of Xi’s greatest fears about China’s post-Deng Xiaoping political framework. No doubt, Putin is Xi’s “best, most intimate friend.” But Xi has hardly been shy about criticizing Putin’s perverse preference for power sharing, whereby the Russian leader lets competing factions vie to keep each other in check. If nothing else, last weekend’s dramatic events re-affirmed Xi’s intense distrust of any form of pluralism—even within a country’s power elite—and will likely lead him to pursue ever more radical policies aimed at making the world less safe for democracy.

Generally speaking, Xi and Putin agree on most everything, with one major exception: the reason for the Soviet Union’s demise. In Xi’s estimation, the Soviet Communist Party’s rule did not collapse as a result of any specific external pressure, nor because of the structural fragility inherent in the Soviet Union’s state-directed economy. Instead, Xi asserts the “great Soviet socialist nation fell to pieces,” seemingly overnight, because its “ideals and beliefs [were] shaken.” Putin, meanwhile, has long argued economics, not ideology, led to a collapse in the Soviet Union’s social sphere. The elite infighting that followed, Putin posits, gave rise to long-term consequences in the political sphere and, eventually, the Soviet Union’s self-destruction.

Based on these differing diagnoses, Xi and Putin have pursued wildly divergent strongman strategies—the former relying on purges and purposeful political discipline, the latter on graft and growing his coterie of cronies, a group that until recently included Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin. If the failed rebellion is any indication, Xi’s initial ideological instincts were right all along.

No doubt, the seeds of Prigozhin’s short-lived mutiny were sown the moment Putin foolishly embraced paramilitaries as foreign-policy force multipliers. But the veneer of competence and control long synonymous with Putin’s 20-plus years in power truly began to crumble last month, when explosive-laden drones penetrated Russian air defenses and struck several apartment buildings in Moscow. In that moment, the Kremlin’s misadventures in Ukraine became too serious for the Russian power elite—the siloviki, such as Prigozhin—to ignore.

Now, Putin’s problems are Xi’s, too. For if the Soviet Union could implode so suddenly and unexpectedly, Xi surely realizes the same fate could befall Beijing’s junior partner.

Beijing’s near-term challenge is compounded by its limited, almost myopic, insight into Russian decision-making. That extends to accurately assessing whether long-simmering resentment and recriminations over Putin’s failed attempts to subjugate Ukraine might lead other disgruntled elites to exploit Russia’s current power vacuum. Even worse for Beijing is the begrudging realization that it is merely a bystander in Putin’s Ukraine power play—incapable of either helping Moscow win the war outright or effecting a diplomatic solution that ensures Putin, and by extension Xi, can save some much-needed face. Indeed, with prominent Chinese theorists speculating that time may no longer be on Putin’s side, Xi must now grapple with losing the very great-power clash he set in motion against the West.

If history and Xi’s previous actions are any guide, he will channel Putin’s predicament into doubling down on his preference for rigid top-down policymaking at the expense of the entrepreneurial, collaborative hallmarks that embodied the Deng era. Abroad, China will lead like-minded authoritarian partners in deepening their interference in both developing and developed countries. Their collective goal: to destabilize democracies and make the world less dangerous for dictators.

Yet however vindicated Xi may feel today about Putin’s style of governance, his schadenfreude may not see too many tomorrows. Sure, Xi’s years-long anti-corruption campaign, one that targeted both prominent “tigers” and small-time “flies,” rooted out political disloyalty within the party and sidelined potential rivals. Xi similarly enhanced his direct control over China’s armed forces, for instance by reforming China’s military reserve command structure to reduce the number of bureaucratic layers between himself and the individual soldier. Xi, too, maintains a very watchful eye on paramilitaries, which are prohibited from using force.

But Xi’s geopolitical and economic mismanagement has contributed to a genuine crisis of confidence about the party’s legitimacy, including its ability to achieve economic growth, social stability, and national unity. Xi’s myriad challenges are set to worsen on account of China’s rapidly deteriorating external environment and precipitous economic slowdown, not to mention the ongoing onslaught of Western export controls aimed at thwarting the country’s technological ambitions. Put differently, Xi appears on the cusp of confronting the very misfortunes that befell Putin. What remains unclear is whether Xi’s unique brand of party-centric nationalism and state-directed ideology, both so clearly missing from Moscow’s milieu, will be enough to salvage the China dream—or lead to its demise.

No doubt, Xi’s Marxist-Leninist mindset, combined with a consolidation of power, makes China’s regime more resilient today than Russia’s. But in rejecting collective leadership and installing himself as the country’s sole arbiter of ideology and policy, Xi has tied China’s great rejuvenation to his personal performance and judgment, with the latter taking a massive hit following last weekend’s events in Russia. For if Xi’s bad bet on Putin is any indication, China’s success remains anything but assured.

Foreign Policy · by Craig Singleton · June 29, 2023

12. New Chinese Law Raises Risks for American Firms in China, U.S. Officials Say

New Chinese Law Raises Risks for American Firms in China, U.S. Officials Say

U.S. counterintelligence officials say revised Chinese law potentially turns normal business activities into espionage

By Kate O’Keeffe

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https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-chinese-law-raises-risks-for-american-firms-in-china-u-s-officials-say-cf62c1a0?mod=hp_lead_pos10

WASHINGTON—U.S. counterintelligence officials are amping up warnings to American executives about fresh dangers to doing business in China under an amended Chinese law to combat espionage. 

A bulletin being issued Friday by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and viewed by The Wall Street Journal warns that the revised law is vague about what constitutes espionage and gives the government greater access to and control over companies’ data, potentially turning what would be considered normal business activities into criminal acts. 

The amended counterespionage law, which takes effect Saturday, has unsettled foreign businesses in China. The publication of those revisions this spring came amid a wave of raids, inspections and other acts by Chinese authorities against foreign, chiefly American businesses, as tense U.S.-China relations deteriorated further.

The revised law expands the definition of espionage without defining terms in a way that is “deeply problematic for private sector companies,” said Mirriam-Grace MacIntyre, who leads the counterintelligence center. 

Teams from the center have been stepping up briefings for U.S. business leaders since April, she said.

MacIntyre declined to name the businesses being advised. China’s recent actions appeared to focus on due diligence and consulting firms and other businesses collecting information about China’s economy and business climate.  

China’s government has said that the rights of foreign businesses are protected under Chinese law. “As long as one abides by laws and regulations, there is no need to worry,” a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said this week in response to a question about whether the updated counterespionage law would affect foreign journalists and researchers. 

The revised law expands the definition of espionage from state secrets and intelligence to any “other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security,” center officials said. The law also imposes new exit and entry restrictions for people deemed to present national security threats, they said, and raises legal risks for U.S. companies, journalists, academics and researchers.

The revised Chinese counterespionage law is among a raft of national, cybersecurity and data privacy laws and regulations that collectively expand Beijing’s oversight of foreign companies operating in China, the counterintelligence center’s bulletin said.

The awareness campaign by the counterintelligence center follows similar efforts, including one last year that warned state and local government leaders and business executives about efforts by China to lobby and otherwise influence them as tensions with Washington rose.

Write to Kate O’Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com

13. The Military Recruiting Crisis: Even Veterans Don’t Want Their Children to Join

Long read. This depresses and worries me.

The Military Recruiting Crisis: Even Veterans Don’t Want Their Children to Join

Pentagon scrambles to retain the main pipeline for new service members as disillusioned families steer young people away

https://www.wsj.com/articles/military-recruiting-crisis-veterans-dont-want-their-children-to-join-510e1a25?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Ben KeslingFollow

June 30, 2023 12:01 am ET

Sky Nisperos’s grandfather came to the U.S. from Mexico, and became an American citizen by serving in the U.S. Navy. Her father, Ernest Nisperos, is an active-duty officer in the Air Force with two decades of service. For years, Sky planned to follow a similar path.

“I wanted to be a fighter pilot,” the 22-year-old said. “It was stuck in my head.”

Now, one of the most influential people in her life—her father—is telling her that a military career may not be the right thing. 

The children of military families make up the majority of new recruits in the U.S. military. That pipeline is now under threat, which is bad news for the Pentagon’s already acute recruitment problems, as well as America’s military readiness.  

“Influencers are not telling them to go into the military,” said Adm. Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview. “Moms and dads, uncles, coaches and pastors don’t see it as a good choice.”

After the patriotic boost to recruiting that followed 9/11, the U.S. military has endured 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan with no decisive victories, scandals over shoddy military housing and healthcare, poor pay for lower ranks that forces many military families to turn to food stamps, and rising rates of post-traumatic stress disorder and suicide. 

At the same time, the labor market is the tightest it has been in decades, meaning plenty of other options exist for young people right out of school.

U.S. recruiting shortfalls represent a long-term problem that, if not resolved, would compel the military to reduce its force size. With America embarking on a new era of great-power competition with China and Russia, that problem has become more serious. 

Sky Nisperos at her home Norman, Okla., in April. She showed a photo of her father, Ernest Nisperos, an officer in the Air Force.

NICK OXFORD FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (2)

China, which has around two million serving personnel, versus a little under 1.4 million in the U.S., has steadily expanded its military capabilities in recent decades, especially in the South China Sea. The most immediate threat is a possible conflict with China over Taiwan, which would require a rapid and sustained response from all parts of the U.S. armed forces.

“I’ve been studying the recruiting market for about 15 years, and we’ve never seen a condition quite like this,” said a senior Defense Department official. 

Toughest year

The U.S. Army in 2022 had its toughest recruiting year since the advent of the all-volunteer military in 1973 and missed its goal by 25%. This year, it expects to end up about 15,000 short of its target of 65,000 recruits.

The Navy expects to fall short by as many as 10,000 of its goal of nearly 38,000 recruits this year, and the Air Force has said it is anticipating coming in at 3,000 below its goal of nearly 27,000. The Marine Corps met its target last year of sending 33,000 to boot camp, and expects to meet its goals this year, but its leaders described recruitment as challenging.

Only 9% of young people ages 16-21 said last year they would consider military service, down from 13% before the pandemic, according to Pentagon data.  

Pentagon officials see recruitment shortfalls as a crisis and pledge to hit their targets in the future to stave off making changes to the force structure.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said she expects within weeks to begin drafting a proposal for a recruiting overhaul so sweeping that Congress might need to pass legislation to enact all of it. 

She declined to provide details but said a key element will be to coordinate with veterans’ groups. “Right now we are not in a comprehensive, structured way leveraging our relationships with veterans organizations,” Wormuth said.

The Army has stepped up and modernized its marketing, launched remedial courses to bring unqualified young people to a level where they can join and revised some benefits.

Army recruiters spoke with members of the National FFA Organization, formerly called Future Farmers of America, at an FFA convention in Indianapolis, Ind., in October. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Defense officials said they aren’t doing a good job of battling what they call misperceptions. They said many families want their children to go on to higher education after high school, considering the military a stumbling block instead of a steppingstone. Once a young person is on a path to a career, they aren’t as likely to put on a uniform, they said. 

When the draft ended at the close of the Vietnam War, the military fostered recruitment with the promise of a good career with retirement benefits and healthcare, as well as education benefits to prepare soldiers for life after the military. That strategy worked, and the Army typically met its overall needs. 

It did so by relying heavily on veterans and military families to develop the next generation of recruits, especially in the region known in the military as the “Southern Smile,” a curving region from the mid-Atlantic and down across the southern U.S.

Today, nearly 80% of all new Army recruits have a family member who has served in uniform, according to the service. That can be a good thing, said Col. Mark Crow, director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis at West Point, because “people who know the most about it stick around.” 

Depending too much on military families could create a “warrior caste,” Wormuth said. Her plans seek to draw in people who have no real connection to the military and to broaden the appeal of service.

Sky Nisperos, who moved around the world as a military brat, said that as a teen she began to see the effect of her father’s nearly dozen deployments and tours away from his family. Ernest Nisperos said he remembers being asleep when one of his kids jabbed him in the ribs to wake him. He put Sky’s sister in a wrestling ankle lock before he realized he was back home. 

“My sister and I would say, ‘It’s just drill sergeant-dad mode,’ especially for the month he came back,” Sky said.

Ernest Nisperos realized his deployments, which involved battle planning and top secret intelligence, were taking a toll. In 2019, after he returned from Afghanistan, he took the family to Disneyland. During the nightly fireworks extravaganza, he cowered in the fetal position while his family and “Toy Story” characters looked on.

Sky worried her father would end up like her grandfather, the military patriarch, who in the years since he retired from the Navy started to have what the family describes as flashbacks to his time in Ramadi, Iraq, in 2005, sometimes yelling that he needed to take cover from a nonexistent attack.

Her father decided he didn’t want that life for Sky and her two siblings.‘What was it all for?’

Some on the left see the military as a redoubt of fringe conservatism. Oath Keepers, the militia group involved in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol whose leaders were found guilty of seditious conspiracy, and other extremists have touted their veteran credentials. Those on the right have expressed concerns about the military focusing on progressive issues, or in the terms of some Republican lawmakers, being too “woke.”

The sudden and unpopular conclusion to the war in Afghanistan in 2021 added to the disenchantment of some veterans, including Catalina Gasper, who served in the Navy. Gasper said she and her husband, who spent more than two decades in the Army, used to talk to their boys, now 7 and 10, about their future service, asking them if they wanted to be Navy SEALs. 

In July 2019, on her last combat deployment to Afghanistan, she was stationed at a base in Kabul when the Taliban launched an attack. The blast battered Gasper’s body and she was transported back to the U.S. for treatment and recovery. 

She was left with lingering damage from a traumatic brain injury. She is sensitive to loud sounds and bright lights. She has recurrent dizziness and forgets words. She also has bad knees and herniated discs in her back. 

The U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan in the summer of 2021, precipitating Kabul’s fall to the Taliban. “We’re left with the gut-wrenching feeling of, ‘What was it all for?’ ” she said.

She said she was a patriot but decided she would do everything she could to make sure her kids never enter the military. “I just don’t see how it’s sustainable if the machine keeps chewing up and spitting out” our young people, she said.

Katherine Kuzminski, head of the Military, Veterans and Society Program at Center for a New American Security, a bipartisan security think tank, said the pandemic exacerbated the military’s long-term recruiting problems. “You can’t underestimate the fact we didn’t have recruiters on college and high school campuses for two years,” she said. “Recruiters are the only military access point for many people” without family or friends in the military. 

Potential Army recruits at the FFA convention used virtual reality headsets. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Wormuth, the Army secretary, said she is working with the Department of Education to streamline access to schools. Even with federal laws in place that guarantee military recruiters access to high school and college students, school administrators can limit the scope of visits and restrict recruiters’ movements and activities in schools. 

Recruiters are competing with some of the lowest unemployment numbers in decades, and entry-level jobs in the service industry that can promise quick paychecks, no commitments and no wait times to start.

“To be honest with you it’s Wendy’s, it’s Carl’s Jr., it’s every single job that a young person can go up against because now they are offering the same incentives that we are offering, so that’s our competition right now,” said Sgt. Maj. Marco Irenze, of the Nevada Army National Guard.

Defense officials said the military pay scale was designed for single teenage men content to live in barracks and who joined to seek adventure, among other reasons. But the military has seen a shift from teens to people in their 20s, who come in later in life with greater expectations for benefits, pay and marketable skills and who pay more attention to the job market​.

The lowest-ranking troops make less than $2,000 a month, although pay is bolstered by benefits including healthcare, food and housing, leaving them few out-of-pocket expenses. 

Families or those who live off base can find expenses outstrip income. More than 20,000 active-duty troops are on SNAP benefits, otherwise known as food stamps, according to federal data.  

When service members move to a new base they often have to spend money out of pocket—even though the Army is supposed to cover all costs, according to Kathy Roth-Douquet, CEO of Blue Star Families, a military-family advocacy group that is currently asking Congress to mandate more funding for troops’ housing. 

“If it’s too expensive to serve in the military, families won’t recommend service,” she said. “This hurts the main pipeline of recruitment.”

The promise of a pension down the line isn’t as attractive as it once was, said West Point’s Crow. Only 19% of active-duty troops stayed until retirement age in 2017, according to the Pentagon. To tackle that problem, the military started a system in 2018 that allows troops to invest in what is essentially a 401(k) program, so if they leave the military before full retirement they can still benefit.Prep courses

The Department of Defense said 77% of American youth are disqualified from military service due to a lack of physical fitness, low test scores, criminal records including drug use or other problems. In 2013, about 71% of youth were ineligible. 

The Army estimates that pandemic pressures on education including remote learning, illness, lack of internet access and social isolation lowered scores on the ASVAB, the military’s standardized test for potential recruits, by as much as 9%. Those who score below a certain level on the test and on physical readiness tests can’t join without improving their scores. 

Lt. Col. Dan Hayes, a Green Beret who once taught Special Forces captains, some of the highest-performing soldiers in the Army, took charge of the Future Soldier Prep Course in Fort Jackson, S.C. The course takes Army recruits who can’t perform academically or physically and gets them up to standards that allow them to join the service. Other programs help new soldiers raise scores. 

“We’re looking at the problems in society and recruiting and realizing we have to meet people half way,” said Hayes.

The Army is adapting marketing techniques from the private sector. One early lesson: The Cold War-era slogan, “Be All You Can Be,” performed better than a recent one, “Army of One,” which didn’t reflect the teamwork the service thinks appeals to current teenagers. The slogan also emphasizes that the military offers career development and a broader sense of purpose, some of its strongest selling points. 

Maj. Gen. Deborah Kotulich, the director of the Army’s recruiting and retention task force, a unit convened to address recent shortfalls, said potential recruits should know the Army has more than 150 different job fields available.  

Catalina Gasper at home in Garden Ridge, Texas, in April. She looked at photos of herself in her Navy uniform with her father, Mark Phippen.

KAYLEE GREENLEE BEAL FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (2)

Maj. General Alex Fink is just as likely to wear a business suit as camouflage fatigues at the Army Enterprise Marketing Office based in Chicago. The Army put Fink, a reservist with a marketing background, in Chicago so he can be in the heart of one of the nation’s advertising and marketing hubs. 

“It hadn’t evolved for the last 15 or 20 years,” he said in an interview. “We really couldn’t measure the effectiveness of marketing.”

Fink’s office is now gathering data on every potential recruit. If an Army ad runs on Facebook and a link gets clicked, the service can follow that anonymous user digitally. 

“We don’t know your name, but we can start serving you ads,” he said. 

And if that user eventually fills out an Army questionnaire, the service has a name to go with that data and can know what kinds of ads work best. “Literally we can track this all the way until a kid signs a contract,” he said.Restructuring units

Deeper problems soldiers report include moldy barracks, harassment, lack of adequate child care and not enough support for mental health issues such as suicide. 

“Parents have concerns about, hey, if my kid joins the military are they going to have good places to live?” Wormuth said. “If my kid joins the military are they going to be sexually harassed, or are they going to be more prone to suicidal ideations?”

She said the Army has encouraged recruiters to be forthright about addressing what might have once been taboo issues in order to dispel those concerns. The service says it has worked to encourage troops to report abuse and harassment and cracked down on such behavior, and has also expanded parental-leave benefits.

Department of Defense officials have said they will have to address the total combat power of the military if the recruiting crisis continues, but that they aren’t ready to yet talk about whether strength will ultimately be affected.

Readiness shortfalls can be masked when units aren’t headed into war, but a full-scale response, such as what would be needed in the Pacific, could expose undermanned units that can’t be deployed or aren’t effective, and ships and aircraft that aren’t combat ready due to a lack of personnel to maintain them. 

The military faces decisions on either cutting the size of units or reconfiguring them, or making choices that could hurt the quality of the current forces.

Working to retain existing soldiers is an option. But retention can mean low performers aren’t let go, said Gil Barndollar, a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship at Catholic University of America. “If you’re not cutting your bottom 10% after their initial contracts it’s going to have a long-term effect on high performers,” he said.

Last year, the Army’s top officer, Gen. James McConville, told reporters the service was prepared to eliminate redundancies in the Army’s key fighting units, which are called brigade combat teams. The Army would maintain the number of the units by reducing the personnel in each of them, a restructuring that was prompted by the recruiting crunch, according to one defense official.

Potential recruits at the FFA convention tried a fitness challenge. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonpartisan think tank, said the Army might end up making cuts that leave too few soldiers in platoons and other units. During peacetime and training this may go unnoticed, but if those units have to deploy, the Army would have to take troops from other units to fill in gaps.

Undermanned units aren’t ready to respond quickly, Cancian said, and units with fill-in soldiers don’t have the same effectiveness as a unit whose members trained together for months or years. “What you’re going to see in the Army are hollow units,” he said.

Wormuth, the Army secretary, has said units will get cuts but hasn’t made public her plan. She has for months hinted at broader force reductions.

“If you look at us over the course of the last 50 years of history, the Army is a little bit like an accordion. We tend to expand in times of war,” Wormuth said. “Frankly that’s how the Founding Fathers thought about the military, they didn’t want a large standing militia.”

Still, she said, the Army is “very, very focused” on turning around the recruiting numbers.

Changes may come too late for those about to graduate from high school or college. Sky Nisperos, who once dreamed of becoming an Air Force pilot, graduated from the University of Oklahoma in May. Her plan now, she said, is to become a graphic designer. 

Michael R. Gordon contributed to this article.

Design by Andrew Levinson.

Write to Ben Kesling at ben.kesling@wsj.com

14. Putin's FSB and the Russian Army are 'at war': Chaos deepens as it emerges arrested General Surovikin was a secret member of Wagner after Prigozhin's failed mutiny

Is this exploitable? Or do we keep in mind Bonaprte's dictum? "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

Putin's FSB and the Russian Army are 'at war': Chaos deepens as it emerges arrested General Surovikin was a secret member of Wagner after Prigozhin's failed mutiny

• Ukrainian officials claim an internal war is raging in Russia's defence structures
• They say some Russian defence and intelligence officials are facing 'liquidation' 
• Gen. Sergei Surovikin has been missing since Saturday and is believed detained 

By DAVID AVERRE and CHRIS JEWERS

PUBLISHED: 04:58 EDT, 30 June 2023 | UPDATED: 06:16 EDT, 30 June 2023

Daily Mail · by David Averre · June 30, 2023

A war has broken out between Vladimir Putin's Federal Security Service (FSB) and Russia's Defence Ministry after the Wagner group's mutiny, Kyiv has said.

Andrii Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, said mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's short-lived revolt over the weekend revealed the weaknesses of the Russian president.

This, he said, has sparked an 'open war' between the so-called 'towers' of the Kremlin - headed by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov - and that 'liquidation' of each other's officials was likely.

The Defence Ministry and the FSB headquarters are located just 3 miles away from each other in Moscow's city centre.

Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine's intelligence directorate, added that Prigozhin is also in the FSB's crosshairs.

'We are aware that the FSB was charged with a task to assassinate him. Will they be successful in doing that? We'll see with time.'

It appears there has already been one high-profile casualty of the failed rebellion in the form of Russia's 'General Armageddon' Sergei Surovikin, who is believed to have been detained days after mercenaries staged their revolt.

He has not been heard from since Saturday when he appeared in a video calling for an end to the mutiny.

It is thought that the deputy commander of the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine is being held in Moscow's notorious Lefortovo prison after US officials claimed he had supported Prigozhin's march on the capital, and is being interrogated.

Reports that Surovikin had ties to Wagner appeared to be confirmed overnight when a Russian investigative group Dossier Centre claimed it had found documents showing that he was a secret VIP member of the Wagner group.

An intelligence official from Ukraine's Ministry of Defence said mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's short-lived revolt has sparked an 'open war' between the so-called 'towers' of the Kremlin - headed by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) and FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov (R)

A Prigozhin ally, General Sergei Surovikin is believed to have been detained days after mercenaries staged their revolt. He has not been heard from since Saturday

The Russian Defence Ministry building in Moscow, Russia, 26 June 2023

Cars drive past the headquarters of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in central Moscow, Russia

The Defence Ministry and the FSB headquarters are located just 3 miles away from each other in Moscow's city centre

Alexei Venediktov, former head of the Ekho Moskvy, a prominent independent radio station that was shut down by authorities after Moscow invaded Ukraine, said Surovikin and his close lieutenants have not been in contact with their families for three days, but stopped short of saying that he was detained.

Another prominent military messaging channel, Rybar, which is run by a former defence ministry press officer, reported a purge in the ranks was underway as authorities looked into allegations that some could have sided with Prigozhin.

Surovikin has been linked to Prigozhin since both were active in Syria, where Russia has waged a military action since 2015 to shore up Syrian President Bashar Assad's government and to help him reclaim territory after a devastating civil war.

Earlier this week, the New York Times reported that US officials believed that Surovikin had advance knowledge about the mutiny. Asked about that report, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov shrugged it off as part of 'speculation and gossip'.

On Thursday, Peskov refused to comment on whether Surovikin had been arrested.

Asked by the Associated Press if the president still trusts Surovikin, he replied that Putin works with the defence minister and the chief of the general staff and referred questions about officers to the Defence Ministry. He also referred all other questions about Surovikin and his status to the ministry.

Surovikin, who was nicknamed 'General Armageddon' by Western media for his brutal tactics in Syria and Ukraine, was credited with shoring up Russian defences after Moscow's retreat from broad areas of Ukrainian territory last autumn amid a swift counter-offensive by Kyiv.

But in January, Putin replaced him with General Valery Gerasimov, putting the general staff chief in charge of the Russian battle in Ukraine. Surovikin was demoted to the position of Gerasimov's deputy.

Gerasimov's own fate also is unclear after the abortive mutiny. While Shoigu showed up at several events attended by Putin, Gerasimov was absent.

Former US Vice President Mike Pence declared that it was an 'open question' whether the Russian president has full command of his military amid reports of internal war in Russia's defence structures following Wagner's rebellion.

If a purge is indeed under way, it could destabilise the military chain of command and erode troop morale even further - something the Russian army cannot afford as further incidents of mutiny and desertion on the frontlines continue to emerge.

A new video shows disgruntled soldiers - convicts freed from jail to fight - who now fear being shot by Putin's counterintelligence officers for vowing not to go back to the 'meat grinder' frontline.

Andrii Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, said mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's short-lived revolt over the weekend revealed the weaknesses of the Russian president. This, he said, has sparked an 'open war' between the so-called 'towers' of the Kremlin - headed by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov - and that 'liquidation' of each other's officials was likely.

The ex-convicts - seen in Priyutny, Zaporizhzhia region - went public amid reports that Putin's forces are using the Stalinist tactic of shooting those who refuse to fight

The men say their comrades were decimated by Ukraine's forces, losing 128 out of around 150 in a Storm brigade, according to one report.

One of the mutinying Russian fighters said in a video sent to their wives: 'They came to us and said: 'Boys, you have to go back to the front line'.

'Again into the meat grinder, where we have already been. We will not return from there.

'We refuse to go further, to carry out combat missions. We surrender to the war police.

'If one of us dies, it means that we did not die on the front line, we were simply killed [for refusing to fight].

'If any one of us now dies… he was simply shot dead by his own side.'

The ex-convicts - seen in Priyutny, Zaporizhzhia region - went public amid reports that Putin's forces are using the Stalinist tactic of shooting those who refuse to fight.

They were part of an estimated 70,000 prisoners - including rapists and murderers - released by Putin in his effort to invade Ukraine.

'We are the remnants of a Storm brigade,' said the man chosen as their spokesman on the video. 'There were once 150 of us… Now there appear to be fewer than 30.

'These are the only men remaining after fierce battles,' he said.

'Today we were brought back from the front line to these apartments. This is where an FSB colonel threatens the mobilised, who refuse [to fight]… We were not supplied with ammunition, nor water or food.

'The wounded were not taken out. The war dead are rotting there, no-one removes them. Terrible orders are issued [by commanders]…

'We believe that we are simply being killed…'

As Russian army units refuse to fight in Ukraine, it appears that volunteer fighters are continuing to sign up with the Wagner group, in spite of Shoigu's recent decree that all volunteers must sign contracts with the Russian military.

Reports from BBC News Russia and Meduza suggested that Wagner group recruitment hotlines remained open as of today, with Russians continuing to sign private contracts with the group in defiance of Shoigu and the Russian defence ministry.

Meanwhile in Moscow, Russian secret services feared there were plans to blow up Vladimir Putin as his motorcade crossed a major bridge, it was reported.

Vladimir Putin on 29 June 2023 during visit to the World Trade Centre in Moscow, Russia

Putin visited Russia's World Trade Center in Moscow yesterday

This screenshot from a security video shows vessels combing the river close to Novoarbatsky Bridge amid rumours of a planned assassination attempt on Putin

The Federal Protection Service [FSO] was tipped off about a barge suspected to be planting explosives on the floor of the Moscow River, according to VChK-OGPU Telegram channel.

The bridge was not named but is on a route used by Putin's motorcade moving to and from the Kremlin from his out-of-city official residence. It came as Putin visited Russia's World Trade Center yesterday.

Video shows security service vessels evidently combing the river close to Novoarbatsky Bridge. Divers were reported to have been in the murky waters.

'The FSO was checking information about the preparation of an assassination attempt on Putin with the help of explosives at the bottom of the Moskva River, laid down from a barge,' said the report by VChK-OGPU, seen as having law enforcement contacts.

'A duty officer of the Federal Security Service reported a suspicious barge under the bridge.'

The barge was ordered to move 'due to the movement of motorcades over the bridge'.

Immediately afterwards 'divers began to examine the bottom of the river.'

There was no information on whether explosives were found, nor any suggestion as to who might have planned any assassination bid on the Russian president.

Daily Mail · by David Averre · June 30, 2023

15. An Army Couple Had Their Daughter at a Military Hospital. Then the Collections Calls Started for $600,000.

Unbelievable. Thank you Sergeant Major of the Army for taking action.

An Army Couple Had Their Daughter at a Military Hospital. Then the Collections Calls Started for $600,000.

military.com · by Patricia Kime · June 29, 2023

Army Spc. Daysha Cartagena and her husband, Staff Sgt. Isaiah Cortez, were looking forward to the birth of their daughter in October 2021. The pregnancy hadn't been easy; Cartagena's legs and ankles were swollen, and her blood pressure had been erratic.

When she began feeling contractions, Cartagena went to Womack Army Medical Center at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, where she was examined and sent home, told she wasn't ready yet to have her baby. She repeated the process two more times before finally returning to Womack, her contractions coming in painful waves seconds apart, the baby's heartbeat plummeting with each squeeze. Again, she was told she wasn't dilated enough to give birth, but by then, she was leaking brown, bloody fluid, and she was allowed to stay at the hospital.

It was the middle of the night, and Cartagena was given medication to move the process along. By 6 a.m., the doctors on call decided she needed an emergency Cesarean section. Three hours later, she had the surgery, but by then, her daughter's heartbeat was faint, she was pale and barely breathing.

"She was blue. She didn't scream. And there was this sudden shift inside the room as [the staff] looked at each other. It's like panic inside that room," Cartagena said during a recent interview with Military.com.

Cartagena's daughter's Apgar score -- a health assessment of a baby at birth on a 10-point scale, with 10 being the goal -- was 2.

The baby, Mya, was flown by civilian helicopter to WakeMed in Raleigh, North Carolina, where she was placed on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, or ECMO, a process in which a person's blood is removed from their body, scrubbed free of carbon dioxide and then oxygenated and circulated back through.

It had been determined that Mya had inhaled and swallowed meconium -- a baby's first bowel movement -- during labor, which can cause constriction of the airways, respiratory distress, pneumonia, brain damage resulting from an oxygen deficiency and death.

Mya's parents believe the problem was tied to the long labor and delayed C-section.

The baby was transferred to Duke Medical Center, where she spent two weeks on ECMO and six weeks total, hospitalized.

Then the bills came: $12,166.40 for the air ambulance; $61,634.80 from WakeMed; $594,564.88 from DukeHealth.

The dual military couple uses sick call or military health facilities for their own health care and never had seen a medical bill for themselves. They contacted the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System and the Defense Department's health program, Tricare, to ensure that Mya was enrolled. They sought help from customer service at Womack and legal experts.

Nothing worked. When the collections letters and calls started coming -- at home, at work, on the couples' cell phones -- Cartagena asked other Army moms on social media about medical debt, but no one seemed to be facing such enormous bills.

In frustration, Cortez turned to Reddit, posting a snapshot of the latest balance he owed Duke: $633,455.81.

"We've been dealing with tricare [sic] for over a year trying to get them to pay the medical bills and they keep giving us the run around saying that it's been resolved but a month later we'd get calls from billing telling me the authorizations have been denied," Cortez posted. "Has anyone dealt with this before or know which avenues I can take?"

He received a slew of responses and upvotes, offering suggestions, advice and empathy.

And then one response, from Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Grinston's public affairs shop, wrote "Dm me."

Cortez sent a direct message. And within hours, he said, "Magically everybody wants to help." While Grinston's office does not respond to every plea for assistance or complaint from soldiers on the internet, the enormity of the bill and Cortez's own admission that he had contacted Tricare and was being told he needed to complete a malpractice claims form with Womack before the civilian bills were paid drew Army leadership's attention, according to a service member familiar with the proceedings who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal Army deliberations.

More than 100 million American adults -- roughly four in 10 -- have outstanding medical bills, debt worth more than $195 billion. Not only is carrying excessive medical debt stressful on family members and household budgets, it can prevent patients from receiving health services in the civilian sector and ruin credit ratings, making it difficult for those who carry it to qualify for a home or car loan or prevent them from getting an advanced degree, according to a 2022 survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation, a nonprofit that focuses on health issues.

Service members in theory face less of a risk of medical debt, given the health care promised them by the military branches, but the fact that many use some combination of base and civilian care can lead them down a path toward debt as well.

Officials contacted leadership at Fort Liberty and learned that baby Mya's case had fallen through the cracks. She had not been assigned a case manager to help the family with the complexities of medical billing, and her mother's records were incomplete, missing information as a result of a changeover to the Defense Department's new electronic health records system, MHS Genesis.

Now, Womack and Tricare are working with the couple and the private hospitals to solve the claims and to clear the couple's credit reports of any red flags generated by the long-standing billing issues.

"We have the best Soldiers in the world and I'm happy to advocate wherever I can," Grinston said in an email to Military.com. "Anytime a Soldier has an issue, I'd ask they keep their leaders engaged and give them the opportunity to counsel and mentor. Those leaders should escalate to the appropriate level on behalf of their Soldiers."

Military.com contacted the WAMC press office on Friday to ask about the billing. A public affairs officer on Monday said the commander was being briefed that afternoon on the case, and they would respond to a request for information following the briefing.

On Tuesday, Shannon Lynch, a public affairs specialist with WAMC, provided the hospital's response: "Womack Army Medical Center is working with the family and TRICARE to help resolve the issue," Lynch wrote.

When pressed to answer specific questions about the case, Lynch cited the law that protects a patient's right to privacy regarding their health information, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

She did not answer generic questions about WAMC's policies regarding case manager assignments or assisting patients with Tricare billing -- questions that do not involve patient privacy concerns.

"Womack Army Medical Center honors every patient's privacy by following Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) laws and associated regulations," Lynch wrote in a followup email to Military.com.

A spokeswoman for Humana, the contractor that manages the Tricare East Region, described the case as a "complicated situation" and requested more time to respond, but did not by publication.

Cartagena believes that her delivery delays were linked to staff shortages in Womack's labor and delivery department. When changing duty stations to Fort Liberty, she faced difficulties getting an appointment and went six weeks without a prenatal checkup.

Across the Defense Health Agency, numerous obstetrics and gynecology units have faced shortages. In April 2022, providers at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, reported that staffing shortages were delaying appointments and pushing patients to civilian medical facilities more than an hour away, and in one case reported by Military.com, a Marine wife went 12 weeks without a prenatal appointment after moving to Camp Lejeune from Quantico, Virginia.

At Naval Hospital Bremerton in Washington, closure of labor and delivery negatively affected patients, including a service member who miscarried after spending eight hours in a waiting room at a civilian facility.

Sailors at the Pacific Northwest base reported challenges getting appointments, even those required prior to a deployment or permanent change of station move.

And earlier this month, pregnant mothers at Kadena Air Base in Japan were told to plan for delivering their babies at a civilian Japanese hospital or return to the continental United States for their deliveries.

While the Defense Health Agency said that hospital diversions were unnecessary, the announcement highlighted the severe, acute staffing shortages at Naval Hospital Okinawa, which provides the bulk of medical care to U.S. service members and their families on the island in the Japanese archipelago.

In 2017, Congress gave the Pentagon broad authority to reevaluate and potentially scale back military medical facilities and outsource more care to the communities surrounding bases.

In some areas, such as Bremerton and Okinawa, military leaders have had to rethink the reform efforts. In March, Lester Martinez-Lopez -- assistant secretary of defense for health affairs -- said the Defense Health Agency is working to "increase the efficiency" of clinics in Japan so that more appointments are available.

Also in March, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said the service would review downsizing at Naval Hospital Bremerton to ensure that all health services can continue.

"I want to assure you that I personally have discussed this with the Office of Secretary of Defense, with the deputy, with the secretary of defense himself," Del Toro said during a hearing before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee.

Cortez and Cartagena say they are considering filing a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act for malpractice they believe resulted in Mya requiring a feeding tube for the first four months of her life and treatment that damaged her vocal cords.

Cartagena wants some accountability at the hospital, which she said has lost many of her medical records during a changeover to a new electronic medical records system, MHS Genesis.

"Womack [at one point] was saying that my daughter was never born in the hospital. How do you mess that up? I literally had [a] C-section there," Cartagena said. "And now they said I had my C-section on Oct. 6, 2021, which is false because my daughter was born Oct. 24."

Nonetheless, the parents said, they are grateful for their Army units, which provided assistance they described as "great" and "so supportive," and feel blessed that the Sergeant Major of the Army's office helped them.

Still, they said, it shouldn't have taken a "powerful man" intervening to get their problem fixed.

"No one [at Womack or base legal] ever said, 'Hey, there's an office that you can go to that will help submit a claim for your daughter,'" Cartagena said. "It's really sad."

Nearly 2, Mya is a healthy toddler who continues to have issues swallowing but otherwise appears to be on track developmentally and physically.

Grinston, who is expected to retire from the Army in August, said he was glad to help.

"I'm glad to hear Mya is doing much better and I wish all the best to Daysha and Isaiah throughout their careers," Grinston wrote in a statement to Military.com.

-- Patricia Kime can be reached at Patricia.Kime@Military.com. Follow her on Twitter @patriciakime.

military.com · by Patricia Kime · June 29, 2023

16. Rise of the Machines or Just a Routine Test?

Conclusion:

Accepting that there will be problems, and indeed embracing these as learning opportunities, is central to progressing with design. A culture of fearmongering in the face of setbacks is not going to make setbacks less likely or ensure that design teams get it right on the first try. Instead, it will only ensure that companies are disincentivized from doing responsible and thorough testing and evaluation, and it will result in mistakes being hidden rather than explored. Such a situation is certain to create dangers of its own and will undermine much of the trust necessary for soldiers to be willing to use the autonomous systems designed to help them. This is not to say that criticism should be quieted, or that arms developers should be spared harsh critiques when merited. Some failures cannot and should not be tolerated, especially when these are allowed to persist in systems being deployed. However, we should ensure that our critiques are aimed at genuine problems and not at necessary steps in the design process (or indeed, at mere hypotheticals). Developers have a responsibility to both combatants and civilians around the world to ensure that the systems they design are reliable, discriminate, and subject to meaningful human control. All of this demands that weapon developers look for problems as hard as they can and then find solutions. Anything less is likely to produce weapons that are not trustworthy and that should not be deployed.

Rise of the Machines or Just a Routine Test? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Nathan G. Wood · June 30, 2023

On June 1, the Guardian reported that during a simulation conducted by the U.S. Air Force, an AI drone “killed” its operator. According to Col. Tucker Hamilton, chief of the Air Force’s AI Test and Operations, the drone had been ordered to eliminate enemy radar installations, and when it noticed that human operators could override its decision to fire, it decided to eliminate them so that it could continue with its mission unopposed. Even though it was only a simulation, and no one was harmed, as could be expected with a headline so good, the story was picked up by news outlets around the world. The initial story was retracted only a day later, but the damage had already been done — critics of autonomous weapons used the article to point out the many dangers of such systems. Yet, in the rapid flurry of critiques, one key point was lost: Events like those reported in the original article, that an AI-enabled system might exhibit novel and dangerous unwanted behaviors, are not science fiction horror stories. They are real and important elements of the testing and evaluation of new weapon systems in development.

By virtually all accounts, the original story was in error — such a simulation never took place. But for the sake of argument, what if it had? What if the Air Force had performed simulations with an AI drone and found that it tried to kill its operator? Would this mean that such systems could never be trusted, or that machines would inevitably turn on their creators? Would it mean that the military should scrap the development of all autonomous or AI-enabled systems?

Of course not. AI is critical to a number of existing combat systems and will be critical for many more in the future. If Hamilton’s story had happened, it would simply imply that increasingly autonomous systems may develop novel behaviors, some of them unwanted, and that the military and arms suppliers must be cautious as they move forward in developing these weapons. This is not to say that AI-enabled or autonomous weapons pose no ethical or legal challenges but to highlight that testing and evaluation of new weapons is carried out specifically to find such problems. And if problems are found, the response should be to address these, not to succumb to fear and abandon the project altogether. More importantly, thorough and transparent testing and evaluation are necessary for developing new weapon systems that are as safe and reliable as possible, but these practices are likely to be greatly undermined if openness about issues encountered leads to calls that all development be halted. When developing weapons there will be setbacks, but such setbacks are a critical element of moving forward in design.

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By taking seriously the realities of weapons development, along with the importance of intermediate failures and shortcomings, it becomes clear that militaries and governments need to pay close attention to when systems fail and why. However, such attention must be dedicated to removing problems. If some cannot be removed, it is then the responsibility of these agencies to determine if subsequent risks can be adequately mitigated or if the projects should be scrapped altogether. But, either way, in order to reach these conclusions, it is critical that development continues to move forward and not be derailed by every setback and every wave of critiques following a good headline.

“Killer” Robots

Autonomous weapon systems, often referred to as “killer robots” by critics, are the center of much public debate and international efforts to regulate their development and use have been ongoing for years. It is important to remember, however, that autonomous weapons have been a mainstay of modern militaries for decades. Both the U.S. Department of Defense and the International Committee of the Red Cross define autonomous weapon systems as systems that can select and engage targets without human intervention. While this includes any number of futuristic platforms that one might imagine, it also includes such things as loitering munitions, anti-radiation missiles, and anti-missile systems like the Phalanx used by many navies around the world. What critics of autonomous weapons commonly object to are not these tested platforms, but autonomous systems that might sometimes act unpredictably or would be incapable of adequately distinguishing between legitimate targets and those protected from attack.

When Hamilton stated that an AI-powered drone “killed the operator because that person was keeping it from accomplishing its objective,” this played straight into the narrative that critics had been fostering: These weapons will be unpredictable, uncontrollable, and inherently dangerous things.

Air Force spokesperson Ann Stefanek responded that “[t]he Department of the Air Force has not conducted any such AI-drone simulations and remains committed to ethical and responsible use of AI technology”. Hamilton also amended his earlier words, saying that he was referring to a mere thought experiment and not an actual simulation that occurred, adding that “[w]e’ve never run that experiment, nor would we need to in order to realize that this is a plausible outcome.” Yet, even after news circulated that the original report was in error, critics remained stalwart that the case “nevertheless shows the urgent need for international law on autonomy in weapons systems to ensure meaningful human control over the use of force.”

It is worth noting that this critique is somewhat beside the point, as Hamilton’s story focused on an AI-powered drone that was under human control, in that it could identify threats but could have its attacks prevented by a human operator. However, the terrible twist in this thought experiment was that the drone “got its points by killing that threat,” and so in order to maximize its points, it “killed” the operator who might prevent it from accomplishing its objective. When it was instructed not to kill the operator, it then “destroyed” the control tower allowing the operator to override its functions.

Though the case at hand was hypothetical, and though the critics’ objection misses the mark (slightly), there is clearly something amiss when a drone turns on its handlers in order to “get more points.” The underlying problem is what is referred to as an alignment problem — how do you get an AI system to not just do what you explicitly say, but to do so in a way that aligns with the military’s underlying goals and values? The drone in Hamilton’s thought experiment was doing what operators asked of it — eliminating enemy air defense systems — but it was going about this in a manner totally out of sync with their overall goals and intentions, and directly acting against the operators’ immediate orders to boot. But do all of these things together imply that such a system would necessarily be a failure? More importantly, would finding such issues in a weapon platform under development really give us grounds to halt development or scratch that project? To answer that, we should ask ourselves what we want in our weapons and how engineering and design move forward in practice.

What Do We Want in a Weapon?

Obviously, any weapon system will be expected to meet a number of requirements: It must be effective for some particular warfighting role(s), safe for soldiers to use, discriminate enough that it will not subject civilians to disproportionate risks, and ideally cost-effective. Autonomous weapons have further requirements as well, a central point in the U.S. Department of Defense’s Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems. Among other things, such systems must “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force,” be subject to temporal, geographic, and operational constraints in order to minimize chances of mistakes, be sufficiently robust, be protected against enemy tampering and interference, and be designed so as to be understandable by operators, provide feedback on operations, and delineate clear procedures for activation and deactivation. Altogether, the Department of Defense sums up the requirements for autonomous weapons under five broad principles: responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability.

In addition to these concrete and general requirements for autonomous weapons, Dr. Andrew Hill and Col. Gregg Thompson of the U.S. Army War College explore “five giant leaps” they believe serve as benchmarks in the development of autonomous weapons. Two of these leaps, the spontaneous doctrine test and the disciplined initiative test, hold relevance for the hypothetical case Hamilton described.

The spontaneous doctrine test involves deliberately placing a robotic system in a situation for which it is suboptimally organized or equipped for an objective, and then allowing it to explore different ways of fighting.

Now, while having an operator who can override targeting decisions should not necessarily be seen as a “suboptimal” organizational structure, there is a sense in which, at least from the autonomous system’s perspective, it is — the AI drone is instructed to destroy enemy air defenses, it identifies such defenses, but for some reason, it can then be prevented from doing what it was instructed to do. If the drone were to then find creative ways to get around this final hurdle, that would represent a possible leap forward, a formation of spontaneous doctrine allowing it to more completely fulfill its mission goals. When these “creative ways” involve the targeting of friendly personnel, designers obviously need to address this, but the fact remains that the drone still found a way to get around limitations on its ability to achieve mission success.

The disciplined initiative test relates to justified acts of disobedience, when a soldier (or autonomous system) alters its orders or objectives in order to achieve even greater aims. Again, as above, the drone that targets its own operator to achieve these aims is clearly a failure, but it is also reaching toward this “leap” demanded of autonomous weapons — it is given a mission, and it does what is needed to complete that mission. Finding novel methods for completing tasks (or going beyond them) is a good thing, and it is the job of designers, engineers, and testers to ensure that none of these novel methods are in breach of legal or ethical principles governing warfare and that the system is otherwise functioning as intended.

The Importance of Testing

This brings us to a critical aspect of the development of new weapons in war: testing and evaluation. In the current version of Directive 3000.09, one of the areas that saw significant additions from the last version was the required review process for autonomous weapons and the methods for “testing and evaluation” and “verification and validation.” Specifically, the directive stipulates that there must be an “establishment of minimum thresholds of risk and reliability for the performance of autonomy in weapon systems,” as well as “concrete, testable requirements for implementing the DoD AI Ethical Principles.” To achieve this, the directive places heavy emphasis on the development of administrative, human, and technical systems for supporting the testing and evaluation and verification and validation of (semi-) autonomous weapon systems.

If a drone were to fire on its operator to “gain more points” in testing, it would certainly not pass the review process laid out in the directive. Moreover, one of the core reasons for doing testing in the first place is to see if such things are possible. If they are, then the system is not ready for deployment and requires more work. To demand that a system or platform behave and perform well in every single test is to expect that there will be no problems or unforeseen wrinkles in development, and this, perversely, is apt to make problems more likely.

Transparency, Survivor Bias, and Responsible Innovation

In February 2007, a flight of six F-22 Raptors were flying eastward across the Pacific Ocean, when, suddenly, their computer systems crashed, taking down nearly everything else with them. In an interview with CNN, Maj. Gen. Don Sheppard (ret.) described the situation as follows:

At the international date line, whoops, all systems dumped and when I say all systems, I mean all systems, their navigation, part of their communications, their fuel systems.

It seems that some part of the computer code in the aircraft could not handle the sudden jump backwards in time that occurred when the aircraft hit the dateline, and this caused a rapid shutdown across the whole system. Luckily, the aircraft were able to limp home and were fixed in short order, but things could have been much worse.

But what if every time there was a setback or error found there came public pressure to abandon the project? Worse still, what if there was such pressure and Lockheed Martin knew there was this potential error hiding in the wings? (Pun unintended, but welcome.) Together, these would create significant pressure to not make mistakes, or at the very least, not show anyone that you have made them. In this case, Lockheed Martin could simply try to keep their aircraft from crossing the international dateline. Problem solved. Until, that is, such craft might be deployed to a combat environment in that area.

By penalizing failure and putting pressure on those with setbacks, we are not likely to suddenly have better engineers, smarter scientists, or more diligent operators. We will, however, have teams that show fewer errors. And this is a problem. As computer scientist Harold Thimbleby aptly notes, “[p]eople, however well trained, will always eventually make a slip,” and sometimes these slips might have disastrous consequences. But by being transparent about mistakes, we can develop systems that make mistakes less likely or have enough safeguards in place to ensure that some mistake here or there does not result in catastrophic failure.

With regards to the development of autonomous weapons, the story Hamilton gave (without any evidence) alone created a wave of hysteria concerning such systems and, even after the initial report was amended, critics remained staunch in their objections. But autonomous weapons are a part of modern militaries already, have been for decades, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Public outcry can still affect development efforts, though, putting pressure on developers to “not make mistakes” or, simply, not show anyone that they’re making them. This pressure could be harmful — making mistakes and learning from them is, as noted by mathematician Matt Parker, “how engineering progresses.” Developers build something, try it, look for faults, and, when they find them, learn what went wrong so that they can do better. By demanding that no mistakes occur in the first place, it becomes more likely that the mistakes that inevitably do occur will be swept under the rug rather than treated as the important lessons they are.

Conclusion

The case recounted by Hamilton never happened. There was no AI drone either in simulation or real life trying to kill its operator or destroy its communications tower. But even if there had been, the response to such an event should not be immediate, fearful demands to halt the development of autonomous systems in the military. Engineering failures are opportunities for learning what went wrong and why, and indeed are key to improving not only design for specific systems but also understanding larger scientific realities. One must also remember that testing is never really complete, especially for military systems, as adversaries will continually search for ways to undermine them, sometimes in ways that may make weapons unpredictable. This is an unfortunate reality, and one must bear in mind that for any engineering enterprise, mistakes and accidents will happen. Testing and evaluation help to keep such failures to an acceptable minimum, but these will never go away entirely.

Accepting that there will be problems, and indeed embracing these as learning opportunities, is central to progressing with design. A culture of fearmongering in the face of setbacks is not going to make setbacks less likely or ensure that design teams get it right on the first try. Instead, it will only ensure that companies are disincentivized from doing responsible and thorough testing and evaluation, and it will result in mistakes being hidden rather than explored. Such a situation is certain to create dangers of its own and will undermine much of the trust necessary for soldiers to be willing to use the autonomous systems designed to help them. This is not to say that criticism should be quieted, or that arms developers should be spared harsh critiques when merited. Some failures cannot and should not be tolerated, especially when these are allowed to persist in systems being deployed. However, we should ensure that our critiques are aimed at genuine problems and not at necessary steps in the design process (or indeed, at mere hypotheticals). Developers have a responsibility to both combatants and civilians around the world to ensure that the systems they design are reliable, discriminate, and subject to meaningful human control. All of this demands that weapon developers look for problems as hard as they can and then find solutions. Anything less is likely to produce weapons that are not trustworthy and that should not be deployed.

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Dr. Nathan G. Wood is a postdoctoral fellow at Ghent University and an external fellow of the Ethics and Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. His research focuses on the ethics and laws of war, especially as they relate to emerging technologies, autonomous weapon systems, and aspects of future conflict.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Nathan G. Wood · June 30, 2023

17. How a record-setting 'Ugly Baby' mission allowed US special operators to outmaneuver Iraqi forces

How a record-setting 'Ugly Baby' mission allowed US special operators to outmaneuver Iraqi forces

Stavros Atlamazoglou Jun 29, 2023, 7:11 AM EDT

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

An Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighter looks at Iraqi army positions near the Green Line in northern Iraq on March 20, 2003.

BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP via Getty Images

• In March 2003, US and allied forces invaded Iraq.
• US special-operations forces wanted to infiltrate northern Iraq to tied down Iraqi forces there.
• But doing that required a risky low-level nighttime flight through enemy-held territory.

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Special-operations forces often rely on surprise and violence of action to defeat larger forces. During the opening hours of the invasion of Iraq 20 years ago, the US special operators gambled that those traits could pave the way for the fall of Saddam Hussein.

As part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, US military planners decided to invade Iraq from the south and push north toward Baghdad. But US commanders also wanted to open a second front, and Iraq's vast northwestern border presented an enticing opportunity to US special operators.

US commandos decided to feint a strike in the north to keep Iraqi military units in the area from reorienting to meet the invasion force in the south.

In an ambitious effort reminiscent of the Allies' long-range commando raids during World War II, US special-operations troops launched Operation Ugly Baby, a daring attempt to outmaneuver Iraqi forces and pave the way to a US victory.

Operation Ugly Baby

A map of the Ugly Baby mission route along Iraq's western border on March 22, 2003.

US Army

As the US military was getting ready for Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was a question of whether Turkey would allow US forces to cross its territory to reach northern Iraq.

US special-operations forces intended to work with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to keep 13 Iraqi divisions in the north. Although a NATO member, Turkey was wary of anything that could strengthen or embolden Kurdish forces. The Turkish military ultimately refused to allow US forces to fly through Turkish airspace for the invasion, which was launched on March 20, 2002.

"It was about three days of us trying to get into northern Iraq by flying over Turkish airspace, and each time they would deny our flight," Army Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer 5 Jefferey Elwell said of the initial operations on the 20th anniversary of the invasion.

During those operations, Turkish fighter jets even intercepted the MC-130 Combat Talon special-operations aircraft carrying US troops and forced them to fly back to base.

US Green Berets in an MC-130H heading to Iraq during Operation Ugly Baby on March 22, 2003.

US Army

In the end, US special operators took off from Romania and flew through Jordan to reach Iraq, which forced them to cross over heavily defended Iraqi territory to reach their destination.

On the night of March 21, six MC-130s from the Air Force's 352nd Special Operations Squadron took off with about 300 Green Berets. Over Iraq, the MC-130 pilots flew 250 feet above the ground at speeds of almost 350 mph, relying on night-vision goggles and terrain-following radar to guide them. In conditions where a small mistake could be fatal, the pilots expertly flew the planes through Syria and Iraq.

The low altitude allowed the aircraft to evade air-defense radars and anti-aircraft missiles, but it increased the risk they faced from small-arms fire, which could be just as deadly.

When they finally encountered Iraqi troops, the aircraft were flying so low that the surprised Iraqis initially overshot their targets, but the staggered formation of the US aircraft gave the Iraqis time to adjust their fire. As the fire intensified, the pilots maneuvered their aircraft, which carried dozens of troops, sharply to evade.

A US special-operations aircraft that was forced land by enemy fire during Operation Ugly Baby in March 2003.

US Army

"We passed over a small convoy, and they started firing everything from shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile systems to pistols and everything in between," Elwell, then an Operational Detachment Alpha team sergeant, recalled.

One of the MC-130 took so many hits from Iraqi ground fire that it had to abort, declaring an emergency and landing in Turkey. "As the ramp came down, everyone started running as they realized aviation fluid was spilling over the tarmac," Elwell said.

The rest of the aircraft continued and landed safely in the desert, completing the infiltration and allowing the Green Berets to link up with their Peshmerga partners. The detour extended the infiltration route to more than 1,000 miles, making it what the Air Force said was the longest low-level infiltration since World War II.

Task Force Viking

A US Army 173rd Airborne Brigade convoy in Kurdish-controlled territory north of Erbil on March 29, 2003.

JOSEPH BARRAK/AFP via Getty Images

Two years after leading the US invasion of Afghanistan, US commandos had successfully returned to Iraq, but Operation Ugly Baby was only the beginning of the US special-operations campaign in northern Iraq.

In all, Task Force Viking numbered about 400 special operators, including elite Delta Force commandos, Green Berets from the 10th Special Forces Group, and frogmen from the UK's Special Boat Service. CIA officers also provided intelligence and specialized support to the commandos.

But what it lacked in numbers, it made up in partners. Task Force Viking led some 50,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, conducting raids and other operations, including close-air-support coordination, that tied down about 150,000 Iraqi soldiers and elite Republication Guard troops, preventing them from putting up more resistance to the US-led invasion force in the south.

In Iraq, US special operators proved again that they were a reliable tool for US policymakers. The invasion lasted only a few weeks, but the insurgency that soon emerged dominated the Pentagon's attention for seven years.

US special operators led the years-long counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaign that followed and played a key role in destroying Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

18. We salute the USS Chung-Hoon for flying its battle flag on the way back to port

Bravo Zulu.

We salute the USS Chung-Hoon for flying its battle flag on the way back to port

‘Go Forward Sea Warriors.’

BY JARED KELLER | PUBLISHED JUN 29, 2023 11:49 AM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · June 29, 2023

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Less than a month after running afoul of a Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Chung-Hoon pulled into port with its battle flag flying high.

The Chung-Hoon — named for the legendary late Rear Adm. Gordon Paiʻea Chung-Hoon, a Navy Cross and Silver Star recipient and the Navy’s first Asian-American flag officer — arrived at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on June 21 with its distinctive bright blue battle flag flapping from its mast.

USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93) Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer returning to her home port Pearl Harbor, Hawaii following her deployment – June 21, 2023. #usschunghoon pic.twitter.com/VDrGjWbE3y

— Eric Coffman (@eric_coffman_) June 22, 2023

The USS Chung-Hoon’s crest. (U.S. Navy)

While the details of the battle flag are hard to make out in photos of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, it consists of the ship’s crest of Hawaiian warrior helmet and anchor wrapped in palm wreaths against a light blue background, the details of which are available on the Navy’s informational page on the ship.

The helmet is meant as a reference to Chung-Hoon’s birthplace of Hawaii and “emphasizes the fighting spirit” of the ship, according to the Navy, while the anchor is meant to commemorate Chung-Hoon’s distinguished Navy career.

Meanwhile, the palm wreaths “symbolize victory and the triumph of the human spirit,” and emblazoned under the ship’s crest is the ship’s motto of ‘Imua e na Koa Kai,’ which translates from Hawaiian to ‘Go Forward Sea Warriors.’

The guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) conducts a Mk 45 five-inch gun live fire during Rim of the Pacific 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Devin M. Langer)

The battle flag’s emphasis on the Chung-Hoon’s namesake is deeply appropriate given the late rear admiral’s legacy. As commander of the destroyer USS Sigsbee in the Pacific during World War II, Chung-Hoon received the Navy Cross and Silver Star for “conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary heroism” during a kamikaze attack on his vessel, during which Chung-Hoon maintained “prolonged and effective fire” on incoming Japanese aircraft to provide a screen to a U.S. aircraft carrier strike force despite extensive damage to his own vessel.

The Chung-Hoon’s battle flag has been featured in many past photos of the destroyer in action over the last several years. Indeed, the flag was flying proudly during the destroyer’s most recent travels in the South China Sea alongside the Canadian frigate HMCS Montreal which precipitated its run-in with a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel in early June.

 Video: A Chinese warship came within 150 yards of hitting American destroyer USS Chung-Hoon.

Embarked journalists captured the moment on video & witnessed the near collision.

"The fact this was announced over the radio prior to doing it clearly indicated it was intentional." pic.twitter.com/cuksOabO15

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) June 3, 2023

While the incident with China didn’t result in anything more than some heightened heart rates on both sides of the Pacific, it’s certainly a testament to that “fighting spirit” embodied in the Chung-Hoon’s battle flag.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• The Navy is offering up to $75,000 in enlistment bonuses to get more sailors
• No, military helicopters are not invading California
• No ‘golden hour’? How Army medicine is changing for the next war
• Army fires former 5th SFAB commander following investigation
• Russia’s antique tanks are finding a second life as VBIEDs

Jared Keller

Jared Keller is the managing editor of Task & Purpose. His writing has appeared in Aeon, the Los Angeles Review of Books, the New Republic, Pacific Standard, Smithsonian, and The Washington Post, among other publications. Contact the author here.

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Navy

battle flag

Battle Flags

taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · June 29, 2023

19. Operation Paperclip: The Nazis Recruited To Win the Cold War

This could never happen again.

Operation Paperclip: The Nazis Recruited To Win the Cold War

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June 28, 2023Randall Stevens

In 1949, the “Bumper-WAC” became the first human-made object to enter space as it climbed to an altitude of 393 kilometers (244 miles). The rocket consisted of a JPL WAC Corporal missile sitting atop a German-made V-2 rocket. The V-2 was developed by Wernher von Braun’s team of German researchers, who surrendered to the United States at the end of World War II. Photo courtesy of NASA/JPL-Caltech.

When the existence of Operation Paperclip was first revealed to the American public in 1946, the general consensus in the country was that it was a bad idea. Prominent figures, including former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, were vociferous in their disapproval. The United States had, after all, just fought a world war against the Nazis. They were the bad guys. 

For the architects of Operation Paperclip, it wasn’t so cut-and-dried. In the larger terms of US national defense, the criteria for who could be classified as “the enemy” was quickly changing. Even before the fall of Berlin, American intelligence agents had begun quietly tracking down and recruiting Nazi scientists and engineers with expertise in electronics, medicine, aerospace, rocketry, chemistry, and other wartime technologies — expertise that could give the Western powers a greater edge in the burgeoning Cold War. In all, more than 1,600 Nazis were given safe haven in the United States so their skills and knowledge could be exploited to maintain American military superiority. 

After The New York Times and Newsweek broke the news about Paperclip in 1946, government officials assured the American public that the individuals recruited in the operation were the “good Nazis,” insisting that none of them had been complicit in the atrocities committed by Hitler’s regime. In reality, however, there were a number of known war criminals among them, including some who had conducted human experiments, used slave labor, and even overseen the systematic murder of thousands.

German rocket scientist Wernher von Braun (arm in cast) surrenders to US Army counterintelligence personnel of the 44th Infantry Division in Reutte, Bavaria, in May 1945. Von Braun later played an integral role in the US space and rocket programs. Photo courtesy of NASA.

It was Moscow’s own version of Operation Paperclip that had sent the US scrambling to enlist as many Nazi scientists and engineers as it could. Washington was willing to overlook their egregious crimes because the battle lines were shifting. With the defeat of Hitler, America’s World War II ally, the Soviet Union, had instantly replaced the Third Reich as its primary enemy, and the two sides were now locked in a technological arms race that would ultimately bring the world to the brink of nuclear annihilation. 

Origins of Operation Paperclip

Operation Paperclip began in the summer of 1945. However, Washington’s plans to exploit technologies developed by the Nazis had been underway since before the Allies fully liberated Europe. 

According to Annie Jacobsen, author of Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America, the British and Americans created the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS), an intelligence organization of more than 3,000 technical experts, in 1945. CIOS was tasked with collecting Nazi military research and materials in liberated territories. Initially, its chief objective was to gather information on special weapons — especially nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The US knew Nazi scientists had begun a nuclear program, and had already discovered stocks of chemical and biological munitions. CIOS agents worked with special reconnaissance teams to locate and secure these weapons and their delivery systems (and/or their blueprints), as well as the men who had developed them. 

A 46-foot, 14-ton captured German V-2 rocket is launched during a test firing at White Sands Proving Grounds, near Las Cruces, New Mexico, in May 1946. The long-range liquid-fuel rocket was developed by German engineer Wernher von Braun, who in September 1945 came to the US as a technical adviser to the United States Army’s missile program. AP photo.

By March 1945, the end of the war in Europe was finally in sight. The last German offensive had been thwarted, the Allies had crossed the Rhine in the west, and the Red Army had crossed the Oder River in the east. With Berlin now encircled, British, American, and Soviet troops closed in to deliver the final death blow to the Third Reich.

Then, suddenly and unexpectedly, the Americans halted their advance. Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower told Soviet leader Joseph Stalin that Berlin would be his for the taking. The British were incensed, but Eisenhower was already looking beyond the end of the war in Europe. 

By that point, CIOS operations had revealed Germany’s military industrial complex to be staggering in scale and innovation. Nazi scientists and weapons engineers were much further along in their research than their American counterparts. While logistical and resource constraints prevented the Nazis from completing many of their most ambitious projects, they had pioneered a number of significant technologies, including the first combat jet, air-to-air missiles, and the impenetrable Tiger tank armor. 

From left: Dr. William H. Pickering, director of the Cal Tech jet propulsion lab; Dr. James Van Allen, chairman of the physics department at the State University of Iowa; and Dr. Wernher von Braun, director of the development operations division of the Army, are seen at a news conference at the IGY headquarters in Washington, Jan. 31, 1958. AP photo by Bill Allen.

Having ceased major combat operations, the Allies made acquiring those technologies a top priority. While the Red Army was busy fighting for Berlin, Allied operatives got to work tracking down and arresting Hitler’s scientists, determined to beat the Soviets to the punch. The Americans formed the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) to gather and review dossiers on hundreds of Nazi scientists and engineers, then recruit the ones deemed useful, move them to the United States, and, at least initially, put them to work in the war against Japan.

What Was Operation Paperclip?

Paperclip was originally called Operation Overcast. Under that name, the mission was to capture and interrogate 100 prominent Nazi scientists and leverage their expertise to expedite the defeat of the Japanese Empire. 

In March 1945, CIOS agents made an accidental discovery that quickly changed and expanded the mission of Overcast. It began when a lab technician at Bonn University (in the German town of Bonn) found a crumpled document floating in one of the school’s toilets. The document turned out to be the so-called “Osenberg List,” a register of prominent Nazi scientists and engineers who, in 1942, had been moved from the war’s front lines to begin developing new weapons for the German Reich.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower gets a warm handshake from Alabama Gov. John Patterson, left, after arrival in Huntsville on Sept. 8, 1960, for the dedication of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. Wernher von Braun, director of the center, stands center. AP photo/BHR.

Created by German scientist Werner Osenberg, the list included only the names of scientists and engineers who had been thoroughly vetted to ensure their political ideology aligned with the Nazi regime. After being plucked from the toilet in Bonn, the list eventually found its way to US Army Maj. Robert B. Staver, an intelligence officer assigned to Operation Overcast. 

The Osenberg List proved an invaluable resource for Staver and his team as they raced to capture Nazi scientists and engineers before they could be recruited by the Soviets. It also provided Staver with the intelligence he needed to expand the scope of the mission. Because the CIOS had uncovered enough evidence to show that the US was lagging far behind the Germans in many fields of research, Staver implored the War Department to recruit hundreds of the men named in the Osenberg List and relocate them to the US as soon as possible. 

In July 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released a top secret memo titled “Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States.” The memo was never shown to President Harry S. Truman. In it, the Joint Chiefs described “desired” Nazi scientists as “chosen, rare minds whose continuing intellectual productivity we wish to use.”

German rocket expert Wernher Von Braun is shown Aug. 5, 1955, at the Pentagon in Washington. Von Braun had been working on a smaller model of the US Army’s “Corporal” guided missile. AP photo.

It was no secret that most of those “rare minds” were war criminals, but that didn’t stop the War Department. Overcast was soon renamed Operation Paperclip, for the paper clips attached to the dossiers on the Nazis with “troublesome” records. Despite their records, most were still offered employment by the American government and approved for relocation to the United States as “War Department Special Employees,” according to Jacobsen.

President Truman approved the operation in August 1946, “provided they were not known or alleged war criminals,” according to Jacobsen. The Army and the OSS (forerunner agency to the CIA) circumvented this provision by simply ignoring their recruits’ deep ties to the Nazi regime. To that end, it was helpful that most of the Nazis themselves spent the rest of their lives whitewashing their own history.

The Soviet Union’s Operation Paperclip

Though the Soviet Union was an ally during World War II, the British and Americans saw the writing on the wall. They wanted to prevent the latest in supersonic rockets, nerve gasses, and jet engines from ending up in Stalin’s arsenal, but doing so would prove to be no small task, as the Red Army was just as hell-bent on scooping up Nazi tech.

Kurt H. Debus, a former V-2 rocket scientist who became a NASA director, sits between US President John F. Kennedy and US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1962 at a briefing at Blockhouse 34, Cape Canaveral Missile Test Annex. Photo courtesy of NASA.

The Soviet version of Operation Paperclip was called Operation Osoaviakhim. Its objective was to move Nazi scientists and engineers to the USSR, along with their families, laboratory equipment, and other work materials. In some cases, the Soviets moved entire research facilities — including the Mittelwerk V2 rocket factory and the Luftwaffe’s aviation test center — from occupied areas into Soviet territory. Similar to the Americans, they euphemistically referred to the recruits as “Foreign Experts in the USSR.” 

Unlike with Operation Paperclip, however, the Nazi scientists captured by the Red Army were treated like criminals. They weren’t given the option of staying in Germany, let alone employment contracts. Instead, Moscow considered their work on behalf of the Soviet Union to be war reparations. 

On Oct. 22, 1946, the Red Army, under the direction of the Soviet Union’s Interior Ministry, began implementing a carefully orchestrated plan to move Nazi experts in the fields of optics, aviation, chemical engineering, and other technology sectors eastward into the Soviet Occupation Zone. Upwards of 6,000 Germans were whisked out of their homeland on freight trains in a single day.

Operation Paperclip officials and participants: Hermann Oberth (foreground), Ernst Stuhlinger (seated left), US Army Maj. Gen. H.N. Toftoy (standing left), Robert Lusser (standing right), and Wernher von Braun (seated right). Photo courtesy of NASA.

Many of the forcibly relocated Germans were accomplished scientists or engineers who had been prominent members of the Nazi Party. As vassals of the Soviet Union, they would be crucial in the development of advanced turboprop engines, the Soviet Space Program, and even (some believe) the Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle. 

The Success of Operation Paperclip

At the top of the Osenberg List was Wernher von Braun, who had served as the technical director of the Peenemünde Army Research Center in Nazi Germany. In that role, von Braun had overseen the development of the V2 rocket. After the war, he and his team — along with hundreds of other Paperclip recruits — were offered contracts to resume their work in the US as “War Department Special Employees.” 

Von Braun and his team of Nazi rocket scientists arrived at White Sands Proving Grounds, New Mexico, in 1946, long after the war in the Pacific had ended. The rest of the Paperclip recruits were dispersed to various other facilities across the country, including Fort Bliss in Texas and Wright Field in Ohio. They were contracted to work in the US for just a short period — between six months and a year — but the resettlements turned out to be permanent. 

Members of the German rocket team who worked on rockets for Army Ordnance under Paperclip are shown at White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico, in 1946. Photo courtesy of NASA.

As the Cold War threatened to escalate into World War III, the recruits’ Nazi backgrounds became less important. What was more important was that the United States military needed their skills and knowledge more than ever — and, most importantly, so did the Soviet Union. In other words, were they to become free agents, they’d find plenty of job opportunities on the other side of the Iron Curtain. 

Von Braun eventually became the director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center. He helped design the Saturn V rocket, which would take American astronauts to the moon and win the Space Race. And he wasn’t the only former Nazi with a very questionable past to play a central role in America’s Cold War strategy.

Operation Paperclip Declassified

Many of the scientists and engineers who came to the US via Operation Paperclip had worked directly with high-ranking Nazi officials, including Heinrich Himmler (head of the Nazi SS), Hermann Göring (head of the German Luftwaffe), and even Hitler. Some were themselves members of the SS, and a few were even tried for war crimes at Nuremberg.

Dr. Wernher von Braun, left, briefs President John Kennedy, center, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson at the assembly plant of the huge Saturn rocket on Sept. 11, 1962, at Huntsville, Alabama. AP photo.

For example, Arthur Rudolph, another Nazi scientist who helped develop NASA’s Saturn V rocket, had been director of Mittelwerk, an underground, high-tech German weapons factory and subcamp of the Buchenwald concentration camp. Some 20,000 inmates died at Mittelwerk. After a former camp inmate wrote a book condemning Rudolph in 1979, the US government finally launched an investigation. In 1984, he returned to Germany and renounced his American citizenship to avoid a trial.

There was also Hubertus Strughold, who as the Luftwaffe’s medical chief conducted human experiments on inmates at the Dachau concentration camp. After being relocated to the US, he helped design the pressurized suits and onboard life support systems for the Gemini and Apollo programs. 

Georg Rickhey, the former head of the Mittelwerk camp, was the only Paperclip recruit who ever faced a formal trial. In 1947, he was extradited from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to Germany for the Dachau Trials, where he was indicted for working with the SS and the Gestapo. It was alleged that he witnessed extrajudicial executions at Mittelwerk, but he was ultimately acquitted. 

Although a lot of information about Operation Paperclip is now viewable to the general public at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., much of the paper trail remains classified. The full scope of the program — and the true histories of all the men it brought to the US — may never be known.

20. The High Price of Dollar Dominance

Hmmmm.... not a good thing? I do not think we could have a military capable of defending our interests if the dollar does not remain as the world's reserve currency.

Note the author is a professor at Peking University. Just saying.

Excerpts;

But an indispensable dollar is not a good thing, either for the United States or for the rest of the world. The global economy would be better off if the United States stopped accommodating global savings imbalances that allowed surplus economies to dampen global demand. The U.S. economy in particular would benefit because it would no longer be forced to absorb, through higher unemployment or more debt, the effects of the mercantilist policies of surplus countries. Washington and Wall Street would see their powers curtailed, but American businesses would grow faster, and American workers would earn more.

Getting to a post-dollar world will not be easy, however. What much of the debate about the eventual demise of the dollar misses is how economically disruptive the change will be for persistent surplus countries, which will have to dramatically downsize entire industries that are currently geared to exports. The transition will entail more than just selecting a new currency in which to denominate trade. It will involve building radically different structures for trade and capital flows. And while these may be more sustainable and beneficial to the U.S. economy in the long run, their adoption will be messy and painful for the world’s surplus economies.

The answer to Lula’s question of who designated the U.S. dollar the global reserve currency is ironic: it was surplus countries such as Brazil and China. And despite what their leaders might say, none of them are in a hurry to upend the current system. Until these countries fundamentally transform their domestic economies—or until the United States decides it will no longer pay the steep economic cost of performing its accommodating role—they and the rest of the world will have no choice but to accept the continued dominance of the U.S. dollar.

The High Price of Dollar Dominance

The Dollar Is the Worst Reserve Currency—Except for All the Rest

By Michael Pettis

June 30, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Michael Pettis · June 30, 2023

At an April summit of the so-called BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva demanded to know why the world continues to base nearly all its trade on the U.S. dollar. To thunderous applause, he asked, “Why can’t we do trade based on our own currencies? Who was it that decided that the dollar was the currency after the disappearance of the gold standard?”

Lula’s speech echoed one side of a debate that has heated up in recent years about the future of the U.S. dollar as the dominant global currency. Those who claim that the dollar is in decline often argue that for the last 600 years, reserve currencies have risen and fallen in tandem with their home economies. As the United States’ share of the global economy diminishes, they claim, the dollar’s role will also diminish. But the truth is that there were no dominant global reserve currencies before the U.S. dollar. It is the only currency ever to have played such a pivotal role in international commerce.

There is a downside to a dominant U.S. dollar, however. To play the role of linchpin of the global economy, the United States must let capital flow freely across its borders and absorb the savings and demand imbalances of other countries—that is, it must run deficits to offset the others’ surpluses and allow them to convert their excess production and savings into U.S. assets by purchasing real estate, factories, stocks, or bonds. This pushes down global demand, forcing the United States to compensate, often with higher unemployment or debt. Both the United States and the world at large would benefit from a less dominant U.S. dollar, in other words. But contrary to Lula’s expectations, adopting an alternative global reserve currency will not necessarily benefit surplus countries such as Brazil. Rather, it will force them to confront the reasons for their surpluses—persistently weak domestic demand based on a very unequal distribution of domestic income—and address them by cutting back on production and redistributing income.

GOLD AND SILVER, DOLLARS AND DEFICITS

Before the dollar’s ascent in the first half of the twentieth century, currencies and reserves that funded trade consisted mainly of specie—gold and silver coins. To the extent that central banks began to hold foreign currencies as part of their reserves in the nineteenth century, they mainly did so in the form of gold coins or currencies that they believed were convertible into specie. When historians say that British sterling was the dominant reserve currency before the U.S. dollar, they mean that the United Kingdom’s commitment to maintaining convertibility was seen as more credible than that of other central banks, which might therefore hold sterling in addition to gold.

In the pre-dollar era, moreover, a currency’s usefulness in global trade was largely unrelated to the strength of its home economy. The United States, for example, was the world’s largest and richest economy by the 1860s, but because its commitment to gold convertibility was seen as questionable, the U.S. dollar remained a minor currency until the 1920s. In large parts of Latin America and Asia, meanwhile, the dominant currency for trade was not that of a major economic power at all. Because of their purity and consistency, Mexican silver pesos ruled over even the sterling in international trade for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

These are not just technical differences. Global trade and capital flows were structured very differently in the old specie-standard world than they are in today’s dollar-dominated one. In the former, trade imbalances were limited by the ability of each country to manage specie transfers. No matter how large a country’s economy or how powerful its central bank, its currency could be used to settle trade only to the extent that it was seen as fully exchangeable with specie. As foreign holdings of the country’s currency rose relative to the specie holdings of its central bank, the promise of convertibility would become less and less credible, thereby discouraging the currency’s use.

These limits had important consequences. One was that under a specie standard, trade in each country broadly balanced (with the exception of small imbalances driven by capital flows that funded productive investment). Another, more important consequence was that the process through which trade flows equilibrated—described by the Scottish philosopher and economist David Hume’s model of the price-specie flow mechanism—acted symmetrically on both surplus countries and deficit countries, so that demand contraction in the latter was matched by demand expansion in the former.

Both the United States and the world at large would benefit from a less dominant U.S. dollar.

The current dollar-based system is very different. In this system, imbalances are limited mainly by the willingness and ability of the United States to import or export claims on its domestic assets—that is, to allow holders of foreign capital to be net sellers or net buyers of American real estate and securities. The result is that countries can run large, persistent surpluses or deficits only because these imbalances are accommodated by opposite imbalances in the United States.

Even worse, the contractionary effect of deficits on the global economy is not offset by expansion in the surplus countries, as it was in pre-dollar systems. At the Bretton Woods conference, in 1944, the British economist John Maynard Keynes strenuously opposed a global trading system in which surpluses or deficits were allowed to persist, but he was overruled by the senior American official at the conference, Harry Dexter White. As a result, deficit countries must absorb the deficient domestic demand of surplus countries while surplus countries avoid adjusting—which would entail either paring back production or redistributing wealth to workers—by accumulating foreign assets and putting permanent downward pressure on global demand.

This adjustment process is not well understood, even among mainstream economists. Surplus countries run surpluses not because they are especially efficient at manufacturing but because their manufacturers enjoy implicit and explicit subsidies that are ultimately paid for by workers and households and so come at the expense of domestic demand. This, as Keynes explained, is how mercantilist policies work—improving international competitiveness by suppressing domestic demand—and is why they are referred to as “beggar thy neighbor” tactics. Rather than converting rising exports into rising imports, they result in persistent trade surpluses.

But surpluses in one country must be accommodated by deficits in another. Since the 1980s, the United States has accommodated the surpluses of other countries by allowing them to be easily converted into claims on U.S. assets. As a result, the U.S. dollar reigns supreme in international trade, but the U.S. economy is forced to absorb weak demand from abroad, either by pushing up domestic unemployment or, more likely, by encouraging the rise of U.S. government and household debt.

THE INDISPENSABLE DOLLAR

This does not mean that the United States must always run deficits to anchor the global trading system to the dollar, as many have argued. But it does mean that when the world needs savings, the United States exports savings and runs trade surpluses, and when the world has excess savings, the United States imports savings and runs trade deficits.

The United States did the former from the 1920s through the 1970s, a five-decade period during which many countries urgently needed to rebuild manufacturing capacity and infrastructure destroyed in the two world wars. With European and Asian incomes devastated by conflict, countries in these regions needed foreign savings to help reconstruct their economies. Because the United States was the world’s leading trade surplus nation in this period, it quickly moved to meet the need by exporting excess savings, establishing the dollar as the dominant global currency in the process.

By the early 1970s, however, most of the world’s leading economies had rebuilt themselves from the ravages of war. Now, they had savings of their own that they needed to export to propel their economies even higher. Once again, the United States obliged: its openness to foreign capital, its flexible financial markets, and its high-quality governance meant that it absorbed much of the excess savings of the rest of the world. It is no coincidence that the 1970s is when the United States’ large, persistent surpluses began to dwindle, giving way by the 1980s to large, persistent deficits that have continued to this day.

No other currency can replace the U.S. dollar.

This willingness to let capital flow freely and to absorb the savings and demand imbalances of the rest of the world is what underpins the dominant role of the U.S. dollar. No other country before the United States has played this role to nearly the same extent, which is why no other currency has dominated international trade and capital flows the way the dollar does today. What is more, no other country or group of countries—not China, Japan, the BRICS, or the European Union—is willing to play this role or would be able to without dramatically overhauling its financial system, redistributing domestic income, eliminating capital controls, and undermining exports—all of which would likely be highly disruptive.

For all these reasons, no other currency can replace the U.S. dollar. When the dollar’s reign eventually ends, so will the current global trade and capital regime. Once the United States (and the other Anglophone economies that play similar roles) stops absorbing up to 80 percent of the excess production and excess savings of surplus countries such as Brazil, China, Germany, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, these countries will no longer be able to run surpluses. And without surpluses, they will be forced to cut domestic production so that it no longer exceeds weak domestic demand. In other words, only the dollar’s widespread use has permitted the huge imbalances that have characterized the global economy of the past 50 years.

A POST-DOLLAR WORLD?

But an indispensable dollar is not a good thing, either for the United States or for the rest of the world. The global economy would be better off if the United States stopped accommodating global savings imbalances that allowed surplus economies to dampen global demand. The U.S. economy in particular would benefit because it would no longer be forced to absorb, through higher unemployment or more debt, the effects of the mercantilist policies of surplus countries. Washington and Wall Street would see their powers curtailed, but American businesses would grow faster, and American workers would earn more.

Getting to a post-dollar world will not be easy, however. What much of the debate about the eventual demise of the dollar misses is how economically disruptive the change will be for persistent surplus countries, which will have to dramatically downsize entire industries that are currently geared to exports. The transition will entail more than just selecting a new currency in which to denominate trade. It will involve building radically different structures for trade and capital flows. And while these may be more sustainable and beneficial to the U.S. economy in the long run, their adoption will be messy and painful for the world’s surplus economies.

The answer to Lula’s question of who designated the U.S. dollar the global reserve currency is ironic: it was surplus countries such as Brazil and China. And despite what their leaders might say, none of them are in a hurry to upend the current system. Until these countries fundamentally transform their domestic economies—or until the United States decides it will no longer pay the steep economic cost of performing its accommodating role—they and the rest of the world will have no choice but to accept the continued dominance of the U.S. dollar.

• MICHAEL PETTIS is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie China Center and Professor of Finance at Peking University. He is the co-author, with Matthew Klein, of Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace.

Foreign Affairs · by Michael Pettis · June 30, 2023

21. Russia’s Biowarfare Lies Can’t Go Unanswered

​Bring back the Active Measures Working Group.​

Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic

Communications: How One Interagency Group

Made a Major Difference

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/documents/stratperspective/inss/strategic-perspectives-11.pdf

Russia’s Biowarfare Lies Can’t Go Unanswered

Published 06/29/23 07:00 AM ET

Ivana Stradner and Anthony Ruggiero

themessenger.com · June 29, 2023

The Russian disinformation machine has spun its latest web of lies. Last week, the Russian Defense Ministry accused the U.S. of preparing to target Russian troops with drones carrying malaria-bearing mosquitoes. Russia is setting informational conditions to hold the U.S. accountable for expected Russian casualties from Ukraine’s counteroffensive. While the West may laugh at an absurd claim about biowarfare mosquitoes, many in the Global South may find them credible. Therefore, it is crucial for the U.S. to counteract and flip the narrative on Russia’s disinformation strategy.

On June 6, the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station’s dam in Ukraine collapsed. As a result, water from the dam’s reservoir flooded into the surrounding Kherson Oblast. Igor Kirillov, the chief of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Force, claimed “the flooding of the territories of the Kherson region, planned by the Kyiv regime, can complicate the situation, including with regard to arbovirus infections. After a drop in the water level, the formation of foci of diseases transmitted by mosquitoes, primarily West Nile fever, is possible.” Kirillov emphasized how the U.S. has worked with Ukraine to infect Russians with these viruses.

The threat of infectious disease outbreaks from the dam collapse is real. The World Health Organization has warned about the potential for cholera outbreaks in Kherson. The head of Ukraine’s State Environmental Inspectorate explained that inspectors have detected both cholera and E.coli in the water. There are unconfirmed reports from a Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar-led partisan group that Russian soldiers have been seeking help at hospitals, and some of them subsequently have died.

Russia has been bolstering its biowarfare disinformation bona fides. Russia recently hosted biological security consultations with China. Beijing’s wild theories about the origin of COVID-19, including that it came from a U.S. lab in Maryland, were probably welcomed in Moscow.

This is not the first time that Russia has accused the U.S. and Ukraine of plotting a bioweapons attack. At a late October meeting of the United Nations Security Council, Russia accused Ukraine and the United States of a plot to use migratory birds, bats and mosquitoes to spread pathogens. Moscow’s representative asserted that, in March 2022, Russian troops discovered containers that could be used to spray bioagents and that the U.S. would use a drone to distribute infected mosquitoes. The U.S. representative soundly rejected Moscow’s claims.

Russia also previously claimed the Pentagon was collecting blood samples from COVID-19 patients in Ukraine to develop “ethnic weapons” against “the Slavic ethnicity,” as part of a larger accusation that the U.S. manufactured COVID-19 to retain its international power.

Kirillov’s pattern of absurd claims is a favored Kremlin tactic: accusing the U.S. of bioweapons plots to deflect blame during times of increased scrutiny of Vladimir Putin’s leadership. The Kremlin’s information-warfare ghouls run a sophisticated operation, weaving together unrelated events to craft misleading narratives.

Take the monkeypox outbreak as an example. In 2021, at the Munich Security Conference, a panel of experts — including government officials from the U.S. and China — participated in a monkeypox crisis simulation to understand how to reduce high-consequence biological threats. The simulated outbreak began in May 2022, which coincides with the actual monkeypox outbreak. Kremlin actors such as Kirillov misconstrued the goals of the simulation to claim the U.S. started the outbreak.

Furthermore, during the Cold War, the KGB conducted Operation “Denver,” a disinformation campaign geared toward blaming the U.S. government for creating and releasing the HIV virus that causes AIDS. This campaign successfully spread globally, especially in Pakistan and India. While these claims may seem far-fetched and harmless, they all contribute to Moscow’s agenda to paint the U.S. as a nefarious actor driven by a secret agenda to subjugate and even exterminate populations.

Last year, Russia used a Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) meeting to accuse the U.S. of conducting “military and biological research” in Ukrainian labs. While the U.S. and Ukraine vehemently denied these allegations, the Kremlin still managed to sow disinformation about U.S. bioweapons activities in Ukraine.

Washington should augment the information shared at the BWC meeting, which revealed that Russia is the real threat for hiding an active biological weapons program and preserving old Soviet bioweapon programs.

To counteract Russian disinformation, the U.S. should utilize social media and entertainment channels. Examples include humorous internet memes that reveal Russia’s bioweapons activities, and thought-provoking media programs, such as HBO’s “Chernobyl,” that draw attention to the actions of Russian authorities.

The U.S. often has been hesitant to wield information against adversaries such as Russia, allowing the Kremlin to discredit the West freely in the information space. However, silence only begets proliferation of the Kremlin narrative, and the U.S. must actively challenge Russian disinformation and put the Kremlin on the defensive.

Ivana Stradner (@ivanastradner) is a research fellow at the Barish Center for Media Integrity at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Anthony Ruggiero (@NatSecAnthony) is senior director of FDD’s nonproliferation and biodefense program, and a former senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the National Security Council during the Trump administration.

themessenger.com · June 29, 2023

22. Biden administration could soon approve sending controversial cluster munitions to Ukraine

DPICM.

A dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) is an artillery or surface-to-surface missile warhead designed to burst into submunitions at an optimum altitude and distance from the desired target for dense area coverage. The submunitions use both shaped charges for the anti-armor role, and fragmentation for the antipersonnel role, hence the nomenclature "dual-purpose". Some submunitions may be designed for delayed reaction or mobility denial (mines). The air-to-surface variety of this kind of munition is better known as a cluster bomb. They are banned by more than 100 countries under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

...

DPICMs were developed for several reasons:

• They can give a heavy, indirect-fire cannon the ability to engage area targets, with the spread compensating for their inherent inaccuracy;
• DPICM has a potential destructive effect on armored vehicles due to the shaped charge bomblet, but it may require a very large number of shells to have an effect against targets like tank formations to the point of futility;^[2]
• Due to their combined spread and airburst, they are more capable against dug-in troops than conventional HE rounds.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual-purpose_improved_conventional_munition

Useful graphics and explanation here:

Here’s What You Need to Know About the US Military’s New Cluster Munition Policy

It’s been hard to find a middle ground between legitimate military requirements and real humanitarian concerns.

BYJOSEPH TREVITHICK

UPDATED JUN 29, 2019 11:58 PM EDT

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/16603/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-us-militarys-new-cluster-munition-policy

Excerpts:

The first sign that momentum was building for the US to provide the munitions came last week, when a senior Pentagon official said during a public House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing that the department believes the munitions would be “useful” on the battlefield.

“Our military analysts have confirmed that DPICMs would be useful, especially against dug-in Russian positions on the battlefield,” Laura Cooper, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, told lawmakers. DPICMs stands for dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, the official name for the type of cluster munitions that the US has in its stockpile.

The Ukrainians have been asking the administration for cluster munitions compatible with both the US-provided HIMARS rocket launchers and the 155 mm howitzers, and have argued that the munitions would allow Ukrainian troops to more effectively attack larger, more dispersed targets like concentrations of Russian soldiers and vehicles.

Cooper said last week that the US has not yet provided the munitions both because of “existing congressional restrictions on the provision of DPICMs and concerns about allied unity.”

Biden administration could soon approve sending controversial cluster munitions to Ukraine

https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/29/politics/cluster-munitions-biden-administration-ukraine/

By Natasha Bertrand, CNN

Updated 3:10 AM EDT, Fri June 30, 2023

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Video shows Ukrainian soldiers firing at holed up Russian fighters

02:25 - Source: CNN

WashingtonCNN — 

The Biden administration is strongly considering approving the transfer of controversial cluster munition warheads to Ukraine, multiple people familiar with the matter told CNN, as the Ukrainians struggle to make major gains in their weeks’ old counteroffensive.

Officials told CNN that a final decision is expected soon from the White House, and that if approved, the weapons could be included in a new military aid package to Ukraine as soon as next month.

“These would undoubtedly have a significant battlefield impact,” a US official told CNN.

Changing battlefield conditions inside Ukraine over the last two weeks have prompted US officials to give the cluster munitions renewed and serious consideration, officials told CNN.

Ukrainian officials have been pushing the US to provide the munitions since last year, arguing that they would provide more ammunition for Western-provided artillery and rocket systems, and help narrow Russia’s numerical superiority in artillery.

But the US had been reluctant to provide them because of the risk they could pose to civilians, and because some key US allies, including the UK, France and Germany, are signatories to a ban on cluster munitions – weapons that scatter “bomblets” across large areas that can fail to explode on impact and can pose a long-term risk to anyone who encounters them, similar to landmines.

Exclusive: Biden administration weighs Ukrainian requests for access to US stockpile of controversial cluster munitions

The Ukrainian counteroffensive launched earlier this month, however, has not made as much progress as US officials hoped it would by this point, with Russian lines of defense proving more well-fortified than anticipated.

And it is not clear whether the heavy amount of artillery ammunition the Ukrainians have been expending day-to-day is sustainable if the counteroffensive drags on, officials and military analysts said.

Cluster munitions, which the US has stockpiled in large numbers since phasing them out in 2016, could help fill that gap, officials said.

Administration officials also believe they have managed to alleviate some allies’ concerns about the US transferring the munitions, officials said.

The US official noted that the weapon would not be a new capability for Ukraine. Both the Ukrainians and the Russians have used cluster bombs since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, and more recently, Ukrainian forces have begun using Turkish-provided cluster munitions on the battlefield.

A Ukrainian military serviceman holds a defused cluster bomb from an MSLR missile, among a display of pieces of rockets used by the Russian army, October 21, 2022.

Clodagh Kilcoyne/Reuters

The Russians – who also used the munitions to devastating effect on civilians in Syria – have used them more often and against civilian targets, including parks, clinics and a cultural center, according to an investigation by Human Rights Watch.

The first sign that momentum was building for the US to provide the munitions came last week, when a senior Pentagon official said during a public House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing that the department believes the munitions would be “useful” on the battlefield.

“Our military analysts have confirmed that DPICMs would be useful, especially against dug-in Russian positions on the battlefield,” Laura Cooper, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, told lawmakers. DPICMs stands for dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, the official name for the type of cluster munitions that the US has in its stockpile.

The Ukrainians have been asking the administration for cluster munitions compatible with both the US-provided HIMARS rocket launchers and the 155 mm howitzers, and have argued that the munitions would allow Ukrainian troops to more effectively attack larger, more dispersed targets like concentrations of Russian soldiers and vehicles.

Cooper said last week that the US has not yet provided the munitions both because of “existing congressional restrictions on the provision of DPICMs and concerns about allied unity.”

The US and Ukraine are not signatories to the cluster munition ban. But the US began phasing out its use of the DPICMs in 2016 because they “contained hundreds of smaller ‘cluster bomb’ explosives that were often left unexploded across the battlefield, posing a danger to civilians,” according to a 2017 statement from Central Command.

One Ukrainian lawmaker told CNN that 30% of their territory is mined, and that Ukraine de-mines it when they go in. The US State Department announced last August that they intended to provide $89 million in support of de-mining efforts in Ukraine, with a State Department official noting that “this is a challenge that Ukraine will face for decades.”

Still, the Ukrainians have told US officials that they could make good use of the cluster munitions currently gathering dust in storage as western ammunition supplies dwindle.

Congress has also placed statutory restrictions on the US’ ability to transfer cluster munitions that have a greater than one percent unexploded ordnance rate, which raises the prospect that they will pose a risk to civilians.

But President Joe Biden could override that restriction, officials told CNN. Bipartisan members of Congress have also expressed support in recent months for sending the munitions.

Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksiy Goncharenko is among the officials who has been pushing the US to provide the munitions. He previously told CNN that with the cluster munitions, “Ukraine will finish this war much faster, to the benefit of everybody.”

“Russia is extensively using the old styles, the most barbaric styles, of cluster munitions against Ukraine,” Goncharenko told CNN in December. “Personally, I was a victim of this. I was under this shelling. So we have all the right to use it against them.”

CNN’s Jennifer Hansler contributed to this report.

23. Extreme Pride in Being American Remains Near Record Low

​More depressing news. I guess I am an outlier who remains proud to be an American.

If I were an adversary I would be factoring this into my influence campaign against the US.

Extreme Pride in Being American Remains Near Record Low

news.gallup.com · by Gallup, Inc. · June 29, 2023

Politics

June 29, 2023

Story Highlights

• 39% extremely proud to be American essentially unchanged from low of 38%
• 67% of U.S. adults extremely or very proud to be American
• 60% of Republicans, 33% of independents, 29% of Democrats extremely proud

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- At 39%, the share of U.S. adults who are “extremely proud” to be American is essentially unchanged from last year’s 38% record low. The combined 67% of Americans who are now extremely or “very proud” (28%) also aligns with the historically subdued 65% reading one year ago.

Another 22% of U.S. adults currently say they are “moderately proud,” while 7% are “only a little” and 4% “not at all.”

###Embeddable###

When Gallup first asked this question in January 2001, 55% of U.S. adults were extremely proud to be American. However, pride soon intensified after 9/11, with extreme pride ranging from 65% to 70% between 2002 and 2004. The percentage of Americans expressing extreme pride declined in 2005 and in subsequent years, but it remained at the majority level through 2017. Since 2018, extreme pride has consistently been below that, averaging 42%.

In terms of the combined percentages saying they are extremely or very proud, roughly nine in 10 Americans expressed high levels of pride in the earliest years of the trend, through 2004. In 2005, that figure began falling into the 80% range, before dropping to 75% in 2017 and staying below 70% since 2020.

Demographic Differences in Americans’ National Pride Driven by Partisanship

Party identification remains the greatest demographic differentiator in expressions of national pride, and Republicans have been consistently more likely than Democrats and independents to express pride in being American throughout the trend. That gap has been particularly pronounced since 2018, with more than twice as many Republicans as Democrats saying they are extremely proud. Republicans are also nearly twice as likely as independents to express the highest degree of pride.

The latest findings, from a June 1-22 Gallup poll, show 60% of Republicans and 29% of Democrats expressing extreme pride in being American. Both figures are statistically similar to last year’s readings. Independents’ current 33% extreme pride is also essentially unchanged, but it is their lowest on record by one percentage point.

###Embeddable###

In addition to party identification, age appears to significantly affect Americans’ national pride. Whereas 50% of U.S. adults aged 55 and older say they are extremely proud to be American, 40% of those aged 35 to 54 and 18% of 18- to 34-year-olds say the same.

Aggregated data from 2020 to 2023 provide a sufficient sample for analysis and show that younger adults in all party groups are significantly less proud than older adults of the same political persuasion.

###Embeddable###

Bottom Line

Although the percentage of U.S. adults who say they are extremely proud to be American remains near the record low, together with the share who are very proud, about two-thirds express national pride. Pride in one’s national identity continues to differ most sharply among partisans, with more Republicans than Democrats saying they are proud. However, age is nearly as important a factor, with younger adults in all party groups significantly less proud than older adults in each party. While Republican party identification may be associated with greater national pride, the fact that Republicans tend to be older than Democrats and independents also contributes to the party differences.

To stay up to date with the latest Gallup News insights and updates, follow us on Twitter.

Learn more about how the Gallup Poll Social Series works.

View complete question responses and trends (PDF download).

###Embeddable###

Results for this Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-22, 2023, with a random sample of 1,013 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is ±4 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.

Each sample of national adults includes a minimum quota of 80% cellphone respondents and 20% landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using random-digit-dial methods.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

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news.gallup.com · by Gallup, Inc. · June 29, 2023​

24. CIA officer Ric Prado’s stellar career still inspires agents today

CIA officer Ric Prado’s stellar career still inspires agents today

washingtontimes.com · by Daniel N. Hoffman

By - - Thursday, June 29, 2023

OPINION:

One of the great regrets of my decadeslong CIA career is that I never had the honor of serving under the legendary CIA senior clandestine services officer Ric Prado.

I made my way into the agency’s counterterrorism mission — where Mr. Prado made his mark as a creative and courageous paramilitary officer — a few years after he rang down the curtain on his stellar career.

Having grown up in Cuba and escaped with his family to the U.S. following Fidel Castro’s Communist revolution, Mr. Prado dedicated his life to defending the principles of freedom, liberty and democracy enshrined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

As he recounted in his 2022 autobiography, “Black Ops: The Life of a CIA Shadow Warrior,” the Castro regime confiscated his family’s business and designated Mr. Prado, then just 10 years old, for indoctrination in the Soviet Union. Instead, Mr. Prado’s father, who never took a welfare check, settled his family in Miami to embrace the freedom of opportunity denied them in Castro’s Cuba.

Mr. Prado’s life story is about serving his country, often at great personal risk.

After serving in the Air Force as a Special Forces pararescue jumper, in the Miami-Dade Fire Department and in the National Guard, he embarked on a remarkable career at the CIA. In his first tour of duty in the early 1980s, he had the distinction of being the only CIA officer allowed into the camps where the agency was training Contra insurgents to fight the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

“Embracing the suck” of living in the jungle where the enemies were “communists and communism,” Mr. Prado spent some 14 months teaching the fledgling rebel fighting force to use mortars and conduct hit-and-run raids.

Even at this early stage in his career, Mr. Prado embodied what today’s CIA leaders seek in new recruits: “We look for commonsense problem-solvers,” CIA Deputy Director of Operations Dave Marlowe noted in a recent fireside chat at Vanderbilt University, candidates “who can take your thinking and apply it in real-world situations, often on their own, and make significant decisions of great importance.”

Although it was the clash with a communist regime in Latin America that kicked off his CIA career, Mr. Prado went on to serve in the Philippines as a senior manager on North Korean operations and at the agency’s Counterterrorism Center.

Then came a particularly dangerous overseas deployment in Africa to a contested space where every major Islamic terrorist group, including Hezbollah and al Qaeda, had fielded operatives.

On Sept. 11, 2001, when the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil turbocharged the CIA’s mission, Mr. Prado was serving as chief of operations in the Counterterrorism Center.

CTC officials would work around the clock tracking and disrupting global terrorist threats, while partnering with the U.S. military to launch Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Mr. Prado retired in 2002 after a 25-year CIA career, a career in which he said that he “helped crush the ideology that took everything” from his family.

Mr. Prado’s legacy continues to resonate decades later. He was present at the creation, as they say, taking the lead in the battle against al Qaeda and other transnational actors who had shattered the American homeland’s long record of invulnerability to threats from hostile forces abroad.

Mr. Prado also conveyed to the multitude of CIA officers in his command that intelligence is key to an effective counterterrorism strategy, that it’s all about interpreting signs, picking up on warnings, and preempting threats before they can be visited on our shores.

We must, in Mr. Prado’s words, “take the fight to the enemy on their turf, wherever that turf may be.”

In the decades after 9/11, CIA counterterrorism officers have followed in Mr. Prado’s footsteps, serving on the front lines, recruiting spies and stealing secrets. The best excel in the same sort of crucible that formed Mr. Prado, making him one of the agency’s finest leaders of his generation.

While we celebrate this Fourth of July with fireworks, parades and family barbecues, it’s worth remembering President Ronald Reagan’s eloquent words, which reflect Mr. Prado’s commitment to service above self:

“Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn’t pass it on to our children in the bloodstream. The only way they can inherit the freedom we have known is if we fight for it, protect it, defend it, and then hand it to them with the well-fought lessons of how they in their lifetime must do the same.”

• Daniel N. Hoffman is a retired clandestine services officer and former chief of station with the Central Intelligence Agency. His combined 30 years of government service included high-level overseas and domestic positions at the CIA. He has been a Fox News contributor since May 2018. Follow him on Twitter @DanielHoffmanDC.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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25. Confusion, infighting plague Russian military in mutiny’s wake

Confusion, infighting plague Russian military in mutiny’s wake

washingtontimes.com · by David R. Sands

By - The Washington Times - Thursday, June 29, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have survived — for now — the mutiny launched by onetime ally Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group mercenaries last weekend.

Mr. Putin’s top generals may not be so lucky.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and top commanders were already on shaky ground given the poor performance of Russian forces in the now 16-month-old campaign in Ukraine. The invasion has been characterized by confusing lines of command, logistical failings, equipment shortages and deep morale problems in the ranks.

Mr. Prigozhin may have been banished to Belarus with his fighters, but his criticisms of Russia’s military leadership seem likely to resonate for months.

“The Russian armed forces are not monolithic, but consist of a multitude of rival groups competing for position and sources of income,” Mikhail Komin, a Russia analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said in an analysis of the tepid response Mr. Prigozhin’s revolt generated among many in the Russian military. “Prigozhin’s mutiny revealed the scale of the crisis within the Russian Armed Forces, which are disillusioned by constant failures and tired of war, and within the military and security elites more broadly.”

The disappearance from public view of two key Russian commanders — Gen. Sergei Surovikin, a former commander of the Ukraine campaign seen as close to Mr. Prigozhin, and General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, the current head of Ukrainian operations and a frequent target of Mr. Prigozhin’s fury — in the six days since the uprising has sparked speculation in Moscow and the West that one or both have been purged.

The opposition Moscow Times and others have unconfirmed reports that Gen. Surovikin, still nominally the deputy commander of Russian troops in Ukraine, had advanced knowledge of the Wagner Group uprising and has been jailed for failing to head it off.

Mr. Surovikin was last seen in a video Saturday appealing to Mr. Prigozhin — with whom he had worked when both were fighting in Syria — to stand down.

Asked directly about the status of Mr. Putin’s top generals, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov pointedly declined to comment Thursday on the speculation about Gen. Surovikin and other top officials who had worked with Mr. Prigozhin.

“The issue isn’t my prerogative, and I have nothing to say on that,” Mr. Peskov said.

Russian military blogs, many of them supportive of the Ukraine war but bluntly critical of the military leadership, have been rife with speculation on the soap opera surrounding Russia’s top commanders.

A former Russian Defense Ministry spokesman who blogs on the Telegram messaging network as “Rybar” said the Prigozhin uprising has sparked wholesale changes among the embattled Russian brass. The fact that many Russian military units did little or nothing to stop the Wagner Group force as it captured a major military outpost in Rostov-on-Don and got within 125 miles of Moscow before being called off has only fueled the infighting, Rybar reported.

“The armed insurgency by the Wagner private military company has become a pretext for a massive purge in the ranks of the Russian armed forces,” the blogger wrote.

Mr. Putin has appeared at public events with Mr. Shoigu during the week, suggesting he was not about to replace a longtime aide despite the criticisms from Mr. Prigozhin and others.

Analysts said the fallout from the Wagner Group mutiny has left the Russian president with two unpalatable choices: Stick with the current commanders who are widely seen as having failed so far in the Ukraine fighting or appear to bow to Mr. Prigozhin’s pressure and make major changes in personnel.

Complicating the decision is the widespread feeling in Russia and the West that the bald, imposing Gen. Surovikin, who earned the nickname “General Armageddon” for his scorched-earth approach to fighting in Syria, was the most effective of the many commanders Mr. Putin has put in charge of the Ukraine fighting. He was credited with improving Russia’s defensive lines after a successful Ukrainian offensive last fall and directed the damaging bombing campaign that targeted Ukraine’s key infrastructure before his demotion in January.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, which has followed the internal politics of the Russian military establishment closely, said in a report this week that the Kremlin was unlikely to remove Gen. Gerasimov entirely from the chain of command because it would reflect badly on Mr. Putin. Still, with his authority suddenly in question in the days after the revolt, Mr. Putin will have to walk a delicate line.

“The Kremlin will likely attempt to balance a desire to mitigate the widespread disdain for [the Ministry of Defense] establishment figures that fueled Wagner’s rebellion while also trying to disempower those who may have sympathized with the rebellion,” the ISW analysis said.

Questions of loyalty have been raised about those below the command level as well: Russian military bloggers, the ISW reported, have “claimed that Russian pilots who refused to strike the Wagner convoys and Russian border guards who refused to open fire on Wagner are now facing unspecified criminal prosecution. The Kremlin may punish lower-ranking Russian servicemen to create additional scapegoats for their response to the rebellion.”

On the battlefield

Yet another unknown is how many of Mr. Prigozhin’s estimated 25,000 mercenary fighters will take up the Kremlin’s offer to renounce their rebellion and agree to fight under the command of the regular Russian army in Ukraine.

Ukrainian military officials have reported slow but steady progress in their much-touted spring counteroffensive designed to drive back Russian occupying forces in the south and east, but the stunning events in Russia since June 24 have not translated into a major shift on the battlefield.

Kyiv has tried to portray the offensive as going largely according to plan, noting that thousands of Ukrainian troops who were trained for the assault have yet to enter the fighting.

Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar told a national television broadcast that the country’s forces had made advances in sectors in the south designated by two occupied towns: Berdiansk and Mariupol.

“Every day, there is an advance,” Ms. Maliar said. “Yes, the advances are slow, but they are sure.”

Former Vice President Mike Pence made a surprise trip Thursday to Ukraine in a show of support for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Mr. Pence is the first of the 2024 Republican presidential contenders to make the trip to Ukraine at a time when support for the war has become a divisive issue in the battle for the party’s nomination next year.

“Beyond the human loss and the heartbreak that we have seen from this unprovoked Russian invasion, my message to the American people is simply that it is vitally important that America continue to lead on the world stage — that we stand up to the kind of naked aggression we have seen here,” Mr. Pence said in an interview with NBC News in Kyiv.

“I truly do believe that by giving the Ukrainian military the resources that we have over the last year and a half to push back on this Russian invasion that the West has really shown its strength — that the American people have shown our commitment to freedom,” he said. “The war here in Ukraine is not our war, but freedom is our fight.”

Former President Donald Trump and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, the two front-runners in the 2024 Republican presidential race, have expressed skepticism of bottomless U.S. support for Ukraine.

Mr. Trump, in a CNN town hall in May, refused to say whether he wants Ukraine or Russia to prevail in the war. “I want everybody to stop dying. They’re dying. Russians and Ukrainians. I want them to stop dying,” he said. “And I’ll have that done in 24 hours.”

Mr. Pence and two fellow 2024 Republican hopefuls, former Ambassador Nikki Haley and Sen. Tim Scott of South Carolina, have rallied behind Ukraine.

Mr. Pence, while in Kyiv, received a briefing from Ukrainian officials on the war’s progress and on Russia’s human rights violations, according to his adviser. The former vice president also participated in events commemorating some of the war dead.

Mr. Pence said a Ukrainian victory over Russia would force the rest of the world to rethink “unprovoked aggressive war” and send “a very clear message to countries like China as they contemplate their own military ambitions across the Asia Pacific.”

• Seth McLaughlin contributed to this report.

• David R. Sands can be reached at dsands@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by David R. Sands

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com