Quotes of the Day:
"The Chinese leadership hoped that the world would soon forget the Tiananmen Square massacre. Our job in Congress is to ensure that we never forget those who lost their lives in Tiananmen Square that day or the pro-democracy cause for which they fought."
- Tom Lantos
“Our own generation is unique, but sadly so, in producing a school of thinkers who are allegedly experts in military strategy and who are certainly specialists in military studies but who know virtually
nothing of military history”
- Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of On War" in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 53-54.
“Until you learn to teach yourself you will never be taught by others.”
- J .F.C. Fuller
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 3 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Hong Kong Lawyer Uses Her Trials to Keep Memories Alive of China’s Tiananmen Massacre
3. Facebook Made This 29-Year-Old Rich; War Made Him A Billionaire
4. We’re Doing it Wrong: Returning the Study of War to the Center of Professional Military Education
5. Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Forces Biden to Rewrite US Security Plan
6. A Fault Line in the Pacific
7. Deadly secret: Electronic warfare shapes Russia-Ukraine war
8. Why Are We Still Governed by Baby Boomers and the Remarkably Old?
9. Putin thinks West will blink first in war of attrition, Russian elites say
10. Zelensky shares defiant video after 100 days of war in Ukraine
11. Explained: Why You Can't Stop the U.S. Navy SEALs
12. How Western heavy weaponry can make a difference in the war in Ukraine
13. MQ-1C Gray Eagle Drones Likely Headed to Ukraine: A Game Changer?
14. What the West Has Given Is Not Enough to Win, Ukraine Says
15. U.S. general calls on West to send fighter jets to Ukraine ‘as soon as possible'
16. How the War Against ISIS Was Won
17. As Ukraine loses troops, how long can it keep up the fight?
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 3 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 3
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3
Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, and George Barros
June 3, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces will “accelerate” the “special military operation” in Ukraine in a meeting with Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov on June 3, though Russian forces are unlikely to be able to do so. Kadyrov said that Shoigu has “identified new tasks” that will improve the effectiveness of Russian offensive maneuvers and improve Russian tactics.[1] Kadyrov did not specify which tasks Russian forces will undertake to speed up their pace. Shoigu previously claimed on May 24 that Russian forces were making slow progress in eastern Ukraine to avoid civilian casualties.[2] In a retrospective on the 100th day of the war, the UK Defense Ministry stated that Russian forces will likely establish control over Luhansk Oblast in the next two weeks, though only at significant further cost.[3] The UK Defense Ministry further noted that Russian forces on all other axes have gone over to defensive operations to concentrate all available forces in Severodonetsk, and stated Russia will need to commit sizable investment of manpower and equipment—that it will be unable to generate quickly, if at all—to advance beyond Luhansk Oblast.
A Russian milblogger published a lengthy message on June 3 claiming that nearly the entire 35th Combined Arms Army has been destroyed in Izyum due to incompetent Russian commanders. A Russian milblogger under the pseudonym Boytsovyi Kot Murz said that Russian commanders did not account for combat challenges in the Izyum woods, leading to significant losses in the 64th and 38th Separate Guard Motor Rifle Brigades, which he reported now have less than 100 servicemen in total.[4] Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that Russian commanders failed to provide necessary equipment to units fighting in wooded terrain and did not repair Russian heavy artillery in a timely manner. Russian forces also reportedly lacked effective communication with command centers and relied on messengers due to the shortage of encrypted phones. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted that the lack of communications between Russian units and commanders allowed Ukrainian forces to strike Russian advanced positions with drones. Russian private military company servicemen from Wagner also refused to participate in combat, leading to a significant lack of advances on the Izyum axis. While ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, they are consistent with previous reports of Russian operations and high casualties on the Izyum axis.
Russian and proxy forces reportedly have not sufficiently prepared frontline units with medical supplies, leading to abysmal medical care. Boytsovyi Kot Murz criticized the Russian Defense Ministry for failing to prepare medical equipment and field hospitals for wounded servicemen.[5] Russian commanders reportedly failed to learn lessons from the lack of medical equipment during the Battle of Debaltseve in 2015 and are repeating similar mistakes. Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that Russian forces do not provide frontline troops with high pressure bandages and other supplies necessary to address limb injuries in time. Boytsovyi Kot Murz compared expired and underprepared Russian first aid kits to higher quality Ukrainian supplies and claimed that Russian forces do not have volunteer support that could address the shortages in military equipment. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted that only Russian infantry, that he claimed has been defeated, had necessary medical training—while newly recruited reservists are incapable of providing first aid. Boytsovyi Kot Murz said that Russian medics are conducting an unnecessary number of limb amputations due to the lack medical equipment provided by the Russian Defense Ministry. These claims are consistent with past reports of poor Russian medical care in frontline units, and these conditions are likely a major contributing factor to Russian demoralization and the growing refusal of servicemen to return to frontline units.
Ukrainian forces report that Russian electronic warfare (EW) units are increasingly threatening Ukrainian air reconnaissance in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are increasingly jamming all possible signals and hindering Ukrainian drone operations.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff has previously reported that Russian forces intensified EW operations in Donbas, likely in an effort to obstruct Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance and drone strikes on Russian units.[7]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults southeast and southwest of Izyum and west of Lyman but remain unlikely to secure major advances towards Slovyansk.
- Russian forces made minor gains in the eastern part of Severodonetsk, but Ukrainian forces continues to launch localized counterattacks in Severodonetsk and its outskirts.
- Russian forces did not attempt to launch assaults on Avdiivka.
- Russian forces failed to regain lost positions in northeastern Kherson Oblast and continued to defend previously occupied positions.
- Russian occupation authorities began issuing Russian passports in Kherson City and Melitopol, though they continue to face challenges establishing societal control over occupied territories and ending Ukrainian partisan actions.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces attempted a series of unsuccessful assaults on Barvinkove (southwest of Izyum) and several settlements southeast of Izyum on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to resume an offensive operation towards Barvinkove but did not secure any gains.[8] A Russian attack against Sviatohirsk, approximately 27km southeast of Izyum along the major road to Slovyansk, also failed.[9] Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Bohorodychne and Dolyna, both located along the Izyum-Slovyansk highway, and Studenok, approximately 18km southeast of Izyum.[10] Russian forces likely attempted to assault Sviatohirsk from both the northwest from Izyum and east from Lyman, as the forward positions of Russian forces on the Lyman front in Bohorodychne are only 5km west of the settlement. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are accumulating up to 20 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the Izyum area, but these units are highly unlikely to be fully staffed or equipped.[11] Russian forces may be generating forces and renewing attacks towards Barvinkove, as opposed to continued stalled attacks directly towards Slovyansk from Izyum, in an attempt to bypass Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces are unlikely to make major gains on the Izyum front in the coming days, however.
Russian forces continued to carry out ground assaults in Severodonetsk with partial success on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted assaults on the eastern part of the city and achieved some unspecified successes.[12] Russian forces attacking in Metolkine, just southeast of Severodonetsk, did not make any territorial gains and retreated to previously controlled positions.[13] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian defenders are conducting local counterattacks and retook several blocks in an unspecified location, though ISW cannot confirm the exact control of terrain within Severodonetsk and Russian forces likely control much of the city.[14] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed that Russian and LNR forces are conducting assaults on the outskirts of Severodonetsk and are advancing towards the Azot Chemical Plant to suppress any Ukrainian resistance, intentionally comparing it to the past Ukrainian defense of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol.[15] A social media video also depicted Russian forces transporting pontoon bridge equipment to the Severodonetsk area to support future attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donetsk River and begin an assault on Lysychansk.[16] Russian forces also failed to take control of the eastern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in continued assaults.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the armed forces of the DNR and LNR), the Russian 8th, 58th, and 5th Combined Arms Armies, the 90th Tank Division, and unspecified airborne troops area all committed to ongoing operations to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[18] These units are likely heavily degraded from earlier operations and operating without repalcements or rotations to rest frontline units after over three months of fighting.
Russian forces conducted several offensive operations towards Bakhmut, Soledar, and Lysychansk from Popasna, but did not secure any new territory.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that unspecified elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division of the Combined Arms Army suffered up to 50% losses of personnel and equipment in Popasna, though this statement is unlikely to refer to the division as a whole.[20] Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations west or east of Avdiivka.[21] A Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander claimed on Russian state television that Russian and DNR forces are slowly advancing near Avdiivka due to strong “Right Sector” resistance (a common Kremlin talking point claiming that any Ukrainian successes are due to actions by nationalist units) in the area.[22]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces continued to launch air strikes and fire artillery at Kharkiv City and northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 3.[23] Russian military Telegram channel Swodki claimed that Russians forces are conducting an offensive operation against Fedorivka and Shestakove, approximately 30km east of Kharkiv City, but Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces focused on defending their previously occupied positions.[24] Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk reported that Ukrainian defenders continued to confront Russian units of the 6th Combined Arms Army, Baltic Fleet, and the Donetsk People’s Republic’s 1st Army Corps.[25]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions in northeastern Kherson Oblast, but largely focused on defending occupied positions throughout southern Ukraine. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council Chairman Mykola Lukashuk said that Ukrainian defenders repelled Russian assaults on settlements near the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border on June 3.[26] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully engaged in a skirmish in Lozove, a liberated settlement on the eastern Inhulets Riverbank and near the eastern Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are moving reserves to advanced positions and are intensifying air reconnaissance to prevent further Ukrainian counteroffensives in northeastern Kherson Oblast.[28] Ukrainian counteroffensives in northeastern Kherson Oblast began in late May and have likely pushed Russian forces back to defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River.[29]
Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities began distributing Russian passports in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts on June 3. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian occupation forces opened passport offices in Kherson City and Melitpol and a plan to open more centers throughout Zaporizhia Oblast.[30] Russian-appointed Crimean leader Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Crimea will assist in organizing passport centers in the newly occupied territories.[31] Russian passportization efforts are prompting an increase in partisan activity in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian partisans called on Kherson citizens to burn down a passport center.[32] Russian Telegram channels additionally reported that partisans are threatening civilians that have received Russian passports.[33]
The Kremlin is reportedly sending officials to administer Ukrainian agribusiness. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian representatives from the Caucasus are relocating to Kherson Oblast to manage agricultural production in southern Ukraine.[34] The Ukrainian Embassy in Beirut said that Russia has already exported about 100,000 tons of Ukrainian wheat to Syria.[35] The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that Ukrainians used agricultural products to purchase Western military equipment, likely in an effort to justify Russian forces seizing Ukrainian businesses.[36] Russian occupation authorities continue to face challenges in establishing bureaucratic control over southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation authorities are forced to bring “Russian specialists” to Zaporizhia Oblast because Ukrainians overwhelmingly refuse to cooperate with Russian forces. The Ukrainian Resistance Center added that these ”Russian specialists” will undergo regular rotations from their jobs in Russia to occupied territories.[37]
The Kremlin carried out measures to further assert permanent control over occupied Luhansk Oblast and economically link occupied Ukrainian territory to Russia itself at the local level. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin signed an agreement on trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between Moscow and Luhansk City with the Head of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), Leonid Pasechnik, on June 3.[38] ISW previously reported that officials in occupied Mariupol and St. Petersburg signed a similar pact on June 1.[39] The Kremlin also opened a United Russia Party “humanitarian headquarters” in Popasna and sent representatives of the Russian Investigative Committee to Rubizhne.[40]
[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/06/03/okupanty-pereselyayut-na-hersonshhynu-predstavnykiv-kavkazkogo-regionu/
2. Hong Kong Lawyer Uses Her Trials to Keep Memories Alive of China’s Tiananmen Massacre
Keep up the fire. Keep up the fight.
33 years ago today.
Hong Kong Lawyer Uses Her Trials to Keep Memories Alive of China’s Tiananmen Massacre
Courtrooms are the main venue left for Hong Kong lawyer Chow Hang-tung, as the city erases statues and other memorials
May 25, 2022 5:30 am ET
HONG KONG—Each year on June 4, Chow Hang-tung lighted a candle on stage in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park, leading tens of thousands of people demanding justice for the victims of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.
In recent months, the lawyer has been repeating the same message—this time from the dock of a Hong Kong courtroom.
It is the main venue left for her to speak out as authorities detain political opponents, outlaw street protests and wipe the city of memories of Tiananmen as part of a sweeping campaign to eliminate dissent.
The 37-year-old has stood defiant through multiple trials for her activism, propelling her to the forefront of Hong Kong’s hollowed-out opposition movement. She has compared her stand to that of the iconic “Tank Man” protester in Tiananmen, wept while reading testimonies by mothers of the citizens gunned down and defended her right to free speech. Her remarks have led to arguments with judges, while winning applause from dozens of loyal followers in the public gallery and a wave of support online.
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National-security police recently arrested several of her courtroom backers, charging two of them with sedition for their public displays of support for Ms. Chow.
Ms. Chow is using her court appearances to keep alive resistance to China’s continuing efforts to scrub memories of Tiananmen in Hong Kong, she has said from jail. Until recently the only city on Chinese soil that allowed mass commemorations, it has in recent months cleared statues and memorial walls to victims of the 1989 massacre from university campuses and closed a museum.
“She wants to leave a testament in history of not bowing down,” said Cheung Yiu-leung, who has acted as a defense lawyer for Ms. Chow. “For that, she’s paying a high price.”
Ms. Chow is serving two prison terms, totaling 22 months, for attending and inciting others to go to Tiananmen memorial vigils in 2020 and 2021, after city authorities banned the memorials citing pandemic restrictions. She is awaiting trial on a national-security charge, for which she faces up to 10 years in jail, related to her work with the group that organized the annual commemoration.
More than 150 people have been arrested under the national-security law imposed by Beijing in June 2020. While many contest the charges against them, some of them have chosen to plead guilty, a move that could help them gain shorter prison sentences. Others have accepted gag orders banning them from talking to journalists or using social media as a condition of being released on bail before trial.
Hong Kong lawyer Chow Hang-tung while being detained by national-security police in 2021.
PHOTO: TYRONE SIU/REUTERS
As the window for speaking out on the Tiananmen massacre is closing in Hong Kong, Ms. Chow has said that her will wouldn’t be broken by punishment. “You can even force me to shut up, but you can’t force me to utter what I do not believe,” she wrote from detention.
Ms. Chow’s supporters, who describe her as “the Daughter of Hong Kong,” have flocked to her Facebook page in recent months, saying they drew strength and solace from her speeches and also her writings from prison.
In October, four United Nations human-rights experts cited Ms. Chow’s case as they raised concerns over the fairness of Hong Kong’s national-security trials. In January, a group of prominent China-focused academics nominated her and four other Hong Kong activists for the Nobel Peace Prize.
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“She’s an exemplar for the resistance of Hong Kong. People look to a moral exemplar and maintain hope because of it,” said Perry Link, a professor at the University of California, Riverside, who organized the Nobel nomination letter.
Her fiancé is Wu Yangwei, a veteran human-rights activist in the mainland who was a friend of China’s now-deceased Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Liu Xiaobo. He and Ms. Chow worked together supporting families of those killed in Tiananmen and both are admirers of the late Czech president and dissident, Václav Havel, who argued that symbolic moral acts can have political significance.
“Who would have known that I overtook you and ended up in jail first,” Ms. Chow wrote to Mr. Wu after she was first detained.
Local activists credit Ms. Chow for tying the struggle for democracy in Hong Kong to the decadeslong activist movement in mainland China. Many young activists in Hong Kong over the past decade viewed their democratic struggles as separate from those of mainland China. Feeling an affinity for Chinese culture, Ms. Chow eschewed identity politics and believed the fates of the two places have always been intertwined.
Related Video
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'I'm Still Angry,' A Tiananmen Survivor Confronts Painful Memories
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Rose Tang, an activist and artist in Brooklyn, was among pro-democracy protesters in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. On the 30th anniversary of the military crackdown, she talked with WSJ about what sparked the demonstrations and why they’re important to remember. Photo: Dorothy Hong for The Wall Street Journal (Video from May 30, 2019)
“She made me understand that many human-rights advocates in the mainland are still toiling,” Owen Chow, a young activist who is currently in prison awaiting trial on an unrelated subversion charge, said in January.
The two met while assisting the relatives of a dozen Hong Kong activists captured by China’s coast guard while trying to flee the city by boat in August 2020. Ms. Chow helped enlist mainland human-rights lawyers to help the detained activists on the mainland, though several of the lawyers have since had their licenses stripped following their efforts.
Growing up in Hong Kong, Ms. Chow read martial-arts novels and loved orienteering. She first attended the Tiananmen candlelight vigil as a young student, accompanying her mother. She was saddened by the scenes of mourning, an experience that shaped her life as an activist. In 2009, while studying geophysics at Cambridge University in the U.K., she participated in a protest during a visit by a Chinese leader, to demand recognition of the Tiananmen victims.
For a while, she collected seismic data in the earthquake-prone Tibet region of China, but mainland officials stopped researchers from going there after anti-Beijing protests broke out among the local population. Ms. Chow quit pursuing a doctoral degree in science, deciding that it would be more meaningful to work protecting people’s rights.
Back in Hong Kong in 2010, she worked at an NGO, helping jewelry workers in China suffering with occupational lung diseases win compensation from their Hong Kong boss. The job later led her to study law and take up human-rights cases.
In 2015, Ms. Chow took a leadership role with the group that organized the June 4 vigil and qualified as a barrister the next year.
Last June 4, however, Ms. Chow was arrested hours before the traditional evening commemoration. Authorities had banned the event citing Covid-19 restrictions, but she said publicly she would go anyway.
A 2021 vigil in Hong Kong to mourn the victims of China's Tiananmen Square crackdown.
PHOTO: ANTHONY KWAN/GETTY IMAGES
“Her weakness is that she doesn’t know how to compromise,” said Mr. Cheung, her former defense lawyer.
While out on bail, Ms. Chow and the vigil organizers, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, were ordered by police to turn over the group’s staff information and meeting minutes.
Ms. Chow, who was the group’s vice chairwoman, refused to comply, delivering a letter of rejection to the police on Sept. 7, before returning to her office to prepare a legal defense for a pro-democracy legislative candidate arrested by national-security police earlier last year.
Around midnight, she called her fiancé, Mr. Wu, who warned her she faced being arrested again.
“She shouldered greater risks than she had realized,” Mr. Wu said.
National-security police arrested Ms. Chow the next morning and charged her and other Hong Kong Alliance leaders with inciting subversion, based on allegations that they conspired with unidentified foreign forces to undermine China’s national security.
Since then, she has regularly ridden a prison van to court to apply for bail. Her applications, challenging the national-security law’s stringent conditions that make it hard for suspects to get bail, have been rejected by judges.
In the dock, she often represents herself, holding bundles of papers and making legal arguments. Her friends say she has a goofy sense of humor that sometimes surfaces when she breaks into soft laughter while addressing the judge. When she and another activist were being sentenced to jail, they swayed in sync in the dock as if moving to a song.
Courtroom drama is never far away.
After being found guilty of unlawful assembly charges at her second trial on Jan. 4, the judge, Amy Chan, gave Ms. Chow a chance to plead for leniency.
Wearing a black jacket, Ms. Chow instead challenged the conviction, saying it had effectively criminalized the June 4 vigil and freedom of expression.
Tears in her eyes, she started to read an eight-part testimony by the parents of Tiananmen victims, describing tanks, blood and dead bodies.
The judge interrupted her, saying that the court wouldn’t allow her to make a political statement. Supporters of the lawyer in the audience protested, saying she was only reading facts.
Ms. Chow, now weeping, said the words from the victims deserved more space in the court than her own.
Clapping and cheering erupted in the gallery.
“The court is a holy place, not a stage for performance,” the judge responded.
The judge later turned to the public gallery, threatening to order the court marshal to take action if they didn’t stop.
In response, several supporters stood up and—one by one—told the judge they had been clapping, then walked out of the room.
Ms. Chow continued reading another eulogy over objections from the judge.
“Even if the court doesn’t want to listen, I still have a way to speak,” Ms. Chow said. She asked the public to continue to light a candle on future Tiananmen anniversaries.
As the window for speaking out on the Tiananmen massacre is closing in Hong Kong, lawyer Chow Hang-tung has said that her will wouldn’t be broken by punishment.
PHOTO: ROY LIU/BLOOMBERG NEWS
3. Facebook Made This 29-Year-Old Rich; War Made Him A Billionaire
A lot to consider in this article; most notably is the "inverted" R&D concept.
Facebook Made This 29-Year-Old Rich; War Made Him A Billionaire
Forbes · by Jeremy Bogaisky · June 3, 2022
After being drummed out of Silicon Valley as a Trump-supporting hawk, the onetime VR wunderkind Palmer Luckey is feeling vindicated. His $8 billion defense tech startup, Anduril, is arming Ukraine and building the weapons of the future—before the Pentagon even knows it wants them.
It’s an overcast 60-degree spring day at Anduril Industries’ test range in the drought-parched hills of Southern California, but while the weather is a tad chilly for humans, it’s perfect for surveillance. “The seeing” is good, explains Palmer Luckey, Anduril’s billionaire founder, who made his first fortune selling his virtual reality startup, Oculus VR, to Facebook for $2 billion in 2014. Cool temperatures mean little thermal distortion, which makes it easier for Anduril’s sentry towers to spot immigrants on the U.S.-Mexico border.
The self-taught tech prodigy—who will turn 30 in September and transition from whiz kid to “whiz man,” he jokes—cues his engineers to demonstrate why investors are set to pour another $1 billion into Anduril, for a total of $1.8 billion raised since 2017. (Luckey owns at least 11% of the company, which, when added to his Facebook windfall, brings his current net worth to an estimated $1.4 billion. That will rise after the latest round closes in June, which is expected to swell Anduril’s valuation by 70%, to $8 billion.)
A ground-based infrared sensor spots a pickup truck on a road in the test area, triggering a camera on a mast to focus on it. An AI program called Lattice, which Anduril considers its core technology, highlights the truck and identifies it as a vehicle. With the truck set to disappear behind a hill, a stealthy black helicopter drone called Ghost shoots out to keep it in view. Onscreen, the truck stops—a man exits and launches a drone. A radio-frequency sensor picks up a signal from the drone, revealing it’s a Chinese-made DJI P4. Lattice instantly labels the man and the drone as “suspicious.” To neutralize the drone, a metal box pops open and a burly quadcopter called Anvil takes off at startling speed. It has one job: to crash into intruding drones, knocking them out of the sky.
“We can torch the batteries, torch the airframe and just go ridiculously fast,” says Luckey, who despite the weather is wearing his trademark uniform of flip-flops, cargo shorts and a Hawaiian shirt. “There’s definitely a homefield advantage when it comes to drone-versus-drone combat.”
It’s a brute, direct approach, in keeping with Luckey’s current incarnation. Eight years ago he won reams of adoring press (including a Forbes cover story) as a puppy-like teen wunderkind pioneering virtual reality. But three years after he sold out to Mark Zuckerberg, he was fired by Facebook amid furor over his support for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election.
His swift move to found a defense startup—partnering with libertarian billionaire Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund and executives drawn from Thiel’s spooky spy software maker Palantir—completed Luckey’s spiritual exit from left-leaning Silicon Valley. He departed physically, too. Anduril is headquartered in Costa Mesa, closer to San Diego’s military bases than the center of the metaverse in Menlo Park.
Anvil, seen here exiting its launch box, autonomously stalks intruding drones and bludgeons them out of the sky. Luckey doubts the high-tech approaches competitors are taking to drone interdiction: Copper foil can protect sensitive electronics from microwave weapons; comm links can be protected by encryption; spinning a drone fast can prevent a laser from torching it. “You can't really make a drone survive getting hit by another drone going 200 mph."
Courtesy of Anduril
After losing friends who criticized him as a warmonger, Luckey is suddenly feeling vindicated. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where Anduril has systems on the ground (he won’t say what precisely), some people are reaching out to apologize. They now realize “it is actually really important for the U.S. to have better weapons,” he says.
How he goes about building those weapons is key to understanding what sets his company apart. Anduril, which generated an estimated $150 million in revenue last year, develops much of its technology on its own dime, a high-stakes wager that inverts how military contractors normally operate. Rather than waiting for the Department of Defense to launch a multiyear process of defining tech requirements and inviting bids to develop prototypes, Anduril plows ahead and makes weapon and surveillance systems that it believes the government will want—as long as they work.
“We want to be the company that when the DoD needs something, we're the first people they think of,” says Luckey.
Two previously undisclosed projects: a fast armed drone that Luckey says is intended, in some cases, to replace manned fighters in the job of scrambling to intercept air-zone violators. Then there’s a large surveillance drone—shown on the condition that it not be described in detail—designed to launch and land vertically (making it runway-independent) and to fly long distances autonomously, making it seemingly suited for the vast reaches of the Pacific. There’s no formal Pentagon request for either.
Marrying Luckey’s past and present, there’s also a complex simulation tool that melds Lattice with a video game engine from Carbon Games, a studio Anduril acquired in 2019. It’s intended to let DoD run thousands of rapid “what if” scenarios on how conflicts could play out, viewable both with VR goggles and on regular screens. It also helps Anduril decide what hardware to build next.
Luckey is confident his tech is superior to that of the defense giants, but Anduril isn’t taking any chances. According to federal disclosures, 39 lobbyists worked to push the scales in Washington for Anduril in 2021. It hired a strong team of D.C. and DoD veterans from the start, headlined by Christian Brose, a former chief staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee. They see their cause as virtuous, pushing to speed up the sclerotic acquisitions process and to do away with proposal-based competitions in favor of more trials and bake-offs.
Luckey personally spends a lot of time in Washington. “People want to believe that if you build the best thing, then you’ll win. That’s not the way that the real world works,” he says.
Home-schooled by his mother in Long Beach, California, Luckey got his first lessons in engineering working on cars with his dad. Eventually, he took over half the garage, advancing to building things like high-powered lasers and coil guns, which fire high-speed projectiles using electromagnets. In his mid-teens he took to upgrading old game consoles with miniaturized electronics to make them portable. Games led to virtual reality: He started collecting bulky old VR headsets (the underlying technology dates to the 1960s) and tinkering with them. His breakthrough was realizing that he could replace their expensive, heavy optics with cheap, light ones if he used software to manipulate the images. Thus was born Oculus Rift, the VR headset Luckey created when he was just 16—and the one that attracted the attention of Mark Zuckerberg.
Luckey sits in a building in a complex that used to house the Los Angeles Times’ Orange County offices and printing plant that’s being renovated to serve as Anduril’s headquarters at a total cost of $180 million. The new HQ will accommodate around 2,400 employees; Anduril has just under 1,000 now, up sharply from 230 two years ago.
Tim Tadder for Forbes
While Luckey was at Facebook, he tinkered with even wilder things—building a ramjet engine in his swimming pool, (unsuccessfully) trying to make rocket boots—and he started talking to Trae Stephens, a partner at Founders Fund, about ideas for defense startups.
Peter Thiel had tasked Stephens with finding the next Palantir or SpaceX to tap the government’s deep coffers. Drawing a blank, Stephens, a Palantir veteran, was encouraged to build the type of company he thought would work from scratch. Stephens and Luckey agreed that DoD’s greatest weakness was software—the brass still treated it as just an add-on to big weapons systems. But Luckey wasn’t interested in doing anything about it himself—until Facebook dumped him.
Stephens recruited his best friends from Palantir: Brian Schimpf to helm software and serve as CEO, and Matt Grimm to run operations. But after rocky experiences selling software to the Pentagon while at Palantir, they made a plan to slip AI into DoD in a hardware pill: futuristic weapons based on cutting-edge software. Luckey, Stephens hoped, would command respect in D.C.—and be their hardware guy too.
“Smart people, especially engineers, want to be around Palmer because he’s electric,” says Stephens, who’s chairman of the company. Luckey’s creativity is chaotic, he adds, but his fellow founders are there as bumper guards. “He is, when channeled appropriately, unstoppable.”
“Smart people, especially engineers, want to be around Palmer because he’s electric."
Trae Stephens
In 2017, the newly formed Anduril sold Customs & Border Patrol on trying out its first proof of concept: sentry towers that automatically detect people and vehicles illegally crossing the border, freeing agents from many routine patrols. In 2020, the agency gave Anduril a contract worth up to $250 million; by February, CBP had 176 towers deployed on the Mexican border.
In January, Anduril scored its biggest validation yet: a contract to take charge of U.S. Special Operations Command’s drone defenses that could be worth almost $1 billion over 10 years. An even bigger opportunity is on the horizon. The Pentagon is eager to knit together all its surveillance and weapons systems to create a unified view of the battlefield and orchestrate them from afar, all the while resisting hacking and jamming. The program is called Joint All Domain Command and Control, or JADC2, and Anduril and others—including Palantir and Redwood City, California–based C3 AI—are jockeying for tens of billions of dollars in potential spending.
Anduril is hopeful that its Lattice software system can pull it off. At a 2020 Air Force trial, Anduril fused radar with its sensor towers to detect incoming cruise missiles and automatically route targeting data to multiple weapons systems, including an F-16 and a Paladin howitzer, to take them out. Remarkably, the system required the oversight of just a single airman.
“They’re definitely at the top,” says Nicolas Chaillan, who until last September was the Air Force’s chief software officer. Chaillan, who questioned the Joint Chiefs’ commitment to JADC2 in a public resignation letter, warns that the project could be doomed by siloed development efforts that might not ultimately mesh.
If it collapses like other failed modernization efforts, Luckey professes to be unconcerned. After all, in addition to its ongoing government contracts, Anduril now has a war chest fat with VC funds. The Pentagon doesn’t need to fret over Palmer Luckey, he says; it needs to fret over finding the next Palmer Luckey. “They need to be worried about how to make people like I was when I was 19—with good tech and good ideas—into successful vendors. Because right now there’s just no path at all.”
MORE FROM FORBES
Forbes · by Jeremy Bogaisky · June 3, 2022
4. We’re Doing it Wrong: Returning the Study of War to the Center of Professional Military Education
A very provocative article from the always provocative Jim Lacey.
We’re Doing it Wrong: Returning the Study of War to the Center of Professional Military Education - Modern War Institute
After what was effectively a bloody, three-year master’s course on operational level warfare, the Red Army, in June 1944, unleashed an offensive—Operation Bagration—that in mere weeks tore apart three of the four armies comprising Germany’s Army Group Center. In a stunning display of its recently acquired competence, the Red Army proved it had fully absorbed the intricacies of operational warfare. Fortunately, for the fate of Ukraine, at some point in the decades since Bagration, the Russians appear to have forgotten all they had learned.
Just as Operation Bagration forced the world to take notice of the Red Army’s operational skills, the level of Russia’s military incompetence put on display for the past several months has equally stunned the world. What has gone wrong? Undoubtedly, there are many answers to this question. But please allow me to offer one essential item that likely lies at the root of Russian military ineptitude—Russia’s professional military education ceased taking the study of war seriously. The supposed experts of the new forms of war—hybrid warfare, conducted in the gray zone by little green men, with heavy doses of cyber and information operations—have forgotten how to execute more traditional forms of war.
Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Army’s senior-level professional military education focused almost entirely on the conduct of war, primarily at the operational level. To help in this task the Soviet General Staff commissioned a series of after-action reports purposely designed as teaching tools for a new generation of senior officers to underpin these studies. Included in these studies was one on Operation Bagration, which, along with the analysis of the post-Kursk assault on Ukraine and the final march to Berlin, became the models for deep-attack operations the Soviets planned to employ in overwhelming NATO.
Somewhere along the way, Russian professional military education lost its way. Today, the Military University in Moscow offers over two thousand subjects in thirteen areas, including arts and humanities, command, modern languages, economics, and law. The Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which has its roots in the famous Frunze Military Academy, does little better. Together with the Military Academy of the General Staff, it awards master’s degrees from eight different academic councils. Interestingly, the academy’s textbook for comprehending geopolitics is written by Alexander Dugin, Putin’s favorite global thinker. What is sorely missing from Russian professional military education is the serious study of operational warfare, the results of which are clearly on display in Ukraine.
This leads to a big question: Is US professional military education (PME) preparing the United States military to do better than the Russians? In many areas, the answer is an undoubted yes. At the lower levels, American battlefield tactical capability is assuredly far above what the Russians are demonstrating. Moreover, at the level where detailed planning for a complex, multiple-brigade attack would take place, American staff officers are indeed masters of the process. Told to move Force A from Point X to Point Y, professional US military staffs will rapidly decide on a preferred course of action, conduct planning, and then execute better and faster than any other military force.
The problem is, at the operational level of war, how do these planners know that going to Point Y is the correct answer? Here, at the higher levels of warfare, PME is failing—specifically at the war college level, but also in other PME schools that have some responsibility for teaching how to think about war. Except for scattered small pockets of specialized classes, the war colleges have deemphasized teaching the art and science of war in favor of delving deep into the realms of policy, grand strategy, sociocultural studies, and a host of other topics that are irrelevant to the actual conduct of war at the theater or multi-theater level. For example, in early March, the Joint Staff collected replies for an information paper titled “Joint Professional Military Education Transformation” detailing how much of their curriculums senior-level schools devoted to warfighting. One school boasted that it had removed its coursework on military history and theory in favor of a new core course focused on statecraft. Another school did not have a single learning objective focused on warfighting and was resistant to adding one.
This misalignment continues despite, in 2018, the National Defense Strategy declaring that PME had “stagnated.” Although PME institutions mostly ignored this plea for change, others did not. In May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognizing where the problem lay, issued guidance to fix it. In no uncertain terms, the Joint Chiefs told the war colleges to focus on “the art and science of warfighting” to produce “strategically minded, critically thinking, and creative joint warfighters skilled in the art of war and the practical and ethical application of lethal military power.” The Joint Chiefs clearly told the war colleges to give up on their overwhelming dedication to educating future policymakers and grand strategists. Instead, they were instructed to focus on educating “strategic-minded” joint warfighters and “applied strategists.” In short, the Joint Chiefs want operational maneuverists, well-versed in military strategy and who can comprehend the strategic context in which wars are fought. In their guidance, the Joint Chiefs also told PME schools how to accomplish their task:
PME schools must incorporate active and experiential learning to develop the practical and critical thinking skills our warfighters require. These methodologies include use of case studies grounded in history to help students develop judgment, analysis, and problem-solving skills, which can then be applied to contemporary challenges, including war, deterrence, and measures short of armed conflict. Curricula should leverage live, virtual, constructive, and gaming methodologies with wargames and exercises involving multiple sets and repetitions to develop deeper insight and ingenuity. We must resource and develop a library of case studies, colloquia, games, and exercises for use across the PME enterprise and incentivize collaboration and synergy between schools. To achieve deeper education on critical thinking, strategy, and warfighting, PME programs will have to ruthlessly reduce coverage of less important topics. (Emphasis added.)
Almost amazingly, these straightforward instructions have been largely ignored. Why?
First, change is hard—particularly when the institutions have no desire to change course. The pushback from PME professors to the Joint Chiefs’ vision was fast and furious. Some professors claimed the focus on historical case studies is the wrong approach. Others declared that PME did not need more wargaming while extolling the benefits of increasing regional immersion. Another thought that the war college student would profit by spending a semester reading great books. I would agree with this last assessment if the books selected were General Grant’s or Field Marshal Slim’s brilliant autobiographies, Thucydides’s masterwork on the Peloponnesian War, or David Chandler’s Campaigns of Napoleon. Instead, the list of required books includes Plato’s The Republic, Toni Morrison’s Sula, William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, and Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead. These are worthwhile reads, but they should not be part of any war college program tasked to produce operational level warfighters and military strategists.
There are two fallback arguments employed by almost every scholar who advocates teaching a course or class that has no business in a war college curriculum. The first is that it enhances the students’ ability to think creatively. This is the rationale for absurdities such as teaching English literature courses at a war college and for classes where the students spend hours painting and creating other art works to enhance their creative thinking. I do not consider myself a cultural philistine, and I stand second to none in my appreciation of the power of great art and literature to challenge the mind. But the war colleges have less than a year to educate students in war’s higher operational echelons and military strategy, a study that could easily take a lifetime. Thus, many would think it proper to enhance student creativity and critical thinking through a deep study of the classics of military history and of historical campaigns.
This, in fact, is what the Joint Chiefs ordered. But despite these clear instructions, a recent article by a professor associated with the Army War College advises “moving beyond its principal focus on ‘historical mindedness’—using history as a means of preparing officers for the complex security environment they face—and hiring highly qualified faculty from a range of academic disciplines including economics, political science, mathematical modeling, human geography, and psychology.”
Amazingly, despite contrary instructions from the Joint Chiefs, some PME institutions are resetting their course to do precisely this. For instance, the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), a school whose foundation had until recently been based on the deep study of history and operational level warfare, has announced a reorganization that is sending it in another direction. Despite clear instructions for all PME schools to increase their focus on military history and the employment of historical case studies, SAMS recently fired three historians of national reputation. In the same week, the school announced it was hiring: “Calling all social scientists! Cognitive or political science, complexity theory, #anthropology #economics #geography #IR #psychology #sociology & related fields.” This is the exact opposite of what the Joint Chiefs ordered when they told PME leadership to “ruthlessly” remove courses that did not enhance warfighting skills from their curriculums.
The war colleges have long been teaching a wide variety of things far removed from the art and science of war. As one war college professor told me, “My colleagues think war is icky.” For decades they have been following the lead of a former Army War College commandant, Major General Eugene Salet, who in 1967 declared, “Today’s military professional, while first and always a soldier, must also be a diplomat, an economist, a scientist, a historian, and a lawyer. The complexity of the military arts and sciences has expanded into many other disciplines and professions.” Ever since, the war colleges have been on a broadening campaign that has resulted in the hiring of dozens of professors specializing in international relations, political science, sociocultural studies, and more—anything, it seems, but the deep study of war. Instead, the war colleges were and remain driven to create strategists capable of comprehending and influencing issues at the policy level—despite the fact that an active military officer’s role in the policy arena is limited to offering his or her best military advice.
This hiring of professors with expertise other than war accelerated over the past twenty years, as PME schools turned into counterinsurgency academies, emphasizing all-of-government studies over the study of war. This hiring of so much expertise in topics other than war accounts for the second line of resistance. Since few of these professors have much to offer in a curriculum focused on military strategy and the conduct of operational warfare for strategic impact, their future employment rests upon maintaining the status quo.
But what has this status quo resulted in? The United States just lost two wars. How is it possible that the war colleges have educated more than twenty thousand “strategists” over the last two decades and have nothing to show for it but two strategic defeats at the hands of military forces we outclassed in every possible way? One would think this fact alone would engender some severe soul-searching, possibly leading to the trashing of entire curriculums and starting from scratch. Instead, the response from most US PME institutions—there are some exceptions—has been to double down on what is clearly not working.
Moreover, these are curriculums established before the United States had to contend with two great military superpowers and a raft of more minor regional powers who are continuously enhancing their military capabilities. Given the substantially changed strategic environment, clearly highlighted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and China’s increasing belligerence, it is professional malpractice for the war colleges and other PME institutions to refuse to return their primary focus to the study of warfare.
That does not mean every class that is not clearly focused on military strategy and the conduct of operations must go. PME, as the Joint Chiefs ordered, still has a duty to ensure America’s warriors are “strategic-minded.”
But these needs are narrow. Take, for instance, economics. Students need to understand how economics works in the real world, such as how markets, debt, or rapid currency moves influence strategic decisions. But all of this can be presented in a block of five or six classes before moving on to other topics. The same is true for political science topics, which can all be covered in a half dozen classes.
Room must also be made for educating students on the new domains of warfare. But, that does not mean giving over vast resources and class time to create new tracks for each new domain or dimension of warfare. Take cyber, for instance. Senior leaders do not have to know how to code or set up networks. This is the work of trained specialists. Instead, they have to understand how to integrate cyber into an overall scheme of maneuver. This high-level focus ensures war college students learn what they have to know while requiring only a fraction of the time and resources needed to create specialized senior-level cyber warriors.
One last argument for the status quo that arises frequently is that students must understand the political dimensions of a conflict before they can even begin to formulate a military strategy. In fact, in a recent operational decision exercise I conducted at the Marine Corps War College, students were told to stop and, if possible, destroy an enemy force. Most of the participants claimed they needed to have a briefing on the political dimensions of the conflict before deciding on a scheme of maneuver. Why? General Dwight D. Eisenhower executed the invasion of Normandy and operations across northern Europe based upon the following order: “You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” He was not briefed on the the political dimensions of the conflict, nor were they crucial to his campaign plans. Following in the path laid out by Carl von Clausewitz, wartime policy objectives are still set by politicians, but how they are achieved on the battlefield is determined by military professionals well versed in the art and science of war.
In our new geopolitical environment, PME, and particularly the war colleges, cannot continue to ignore the clearly stated instructions of the Joint Chiefs. It is time to get back to first principles and and refocus PME on the study and conduct of war.
James Lacey, PhD, is the Horner Chair of War Studies at Marine Corps University. He is the author of The Washington War, Gods of War, and the forthcoming Rome: A Strategy for Empire.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Lindsay Church, US Naval War College
5. Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Forces Biden to Rewrite US Security Plan
We are a global power. We have to protect our interests throughout the world.
Excerpts:
The document’s publication, originally slated for this past January, was delayed after US officials came to believe that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was likely. It is now being substantially rewritten to reflect the ways the world has changed since the war began, the people said. It’s not yet clear when it will be published, and one of the people emphasized it may still undergo changes.
The new draft emphasizes the importance of both Europe and Asia to US national security interests, a shift from an earlier version that focused more squarely on China and Asia. Rather than downplaying the importance of China, the document argues that events in Europe and Asia are intricately connected, according to the people.
Produced by every administration since Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the National Security Strategy provides one of the most important windows into the White House’s thinking on foreign policy issues.
The document, mandated by Congress, is designed to help lawmakers evaluate the administration’s budget priorities for national security; to clarify US relationships with allies, partners, and adversaries; and to ensure that representatives from across the US national security apparatus speak to foreign counterparts with one voice.
Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Forces Biden to Rewrite US Security Plan
- US policy makers say China is watching reaction to Ukraine war
- Latest draft emphasizes importance of Europe and Asia
June 3, 2022, 12:01 PM EDT
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted a major rewrite of the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, according to people familiar with the matter.
Early versions of the text, which is still being finalized, show how the administration’s priorities are shifting in response to Putin’s war in Ukraine and the burgeoning partnership between Beijing and Moscow.
The document’s publication, originally slated for this past January, was delayed after US officials came to believe that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was likely. It is now being substantially rewritten to reflect the ways the world has changed since the war began, the people said. It’s not yet clear when it will be published, and one of the people emphasized it may still undergo changes.
The new draft emphasizes the importance of both Europe and Asia to US national security interests, a shift from an earlier version that focused more squarely on China and Asia. Rather than downplaying the importance of China, the document argues that events in Europe and Asia are intricately connected, according to the people.
Produced by every administration since Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the National Security Strategy provides one of the most important windows into the White House’s thinking on foreign policy issues.
The document, mandated by Congress, is designed to help lawmakers evaluate the administration’s budget priorities for national security; to clarify US relationships with allies, partners, and adversaries; and to ensure that representatives from across the US national security apparatus speak to foreign counterparts with one voice.
Spokespersons at the National Security Council didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent speech on US policy toward China suggests one potential formulation for the way the document will weigh threats from Beijing and Moscow. Russia, Blinken said, is a “clear and present threat,” whereas China is “the most serious long-term challenge to the international order.”
More fundamentally, the strategy is likely to argue that neither Russia’s challenge in Europe nor China’s in Asia can be dealt with in isolation.
“For us, there is a certain level of integration and a symbiosis in the strategy we are pursuing in Europe and the strategy we’re pursuing in the Indo-Pacific,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters on May 18. “President Biden’s unique capacity to actually stitch those two together is, I think, going to be a hallmark of his foreign policy presidency.”
In particular, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has brought China’s ambitions toward the democratically-governed island of Taiwan into sharp focus for US policy makers. Even before the war began, Biden officials argued that China would likely view America’s response to the Ukraine crisis as a proxy for how it would deal with more aggressive action by Beijing against Taiwan.
Since the war began, American officials have viewed several developments as sending a powerful message to Beijing, including the rapid deployment of sanctions against Russia in partnership with European allies, the bolstering of European defense budgets and the willingness of NATO allies to abandon decades of more cautious policies to aid Ukraine with financial and military support.
“The Chinese are going to watch this very, very carefully,” Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said last month of Putin’s war in Ukraine. “It’s going to take some time for them to sort out.”
Officials in President Xi Jinping’s government have repeatedly rejected accusations that they seek to attack Taiwan, which China views as part of its territory despite never controlling it. At the same time, Xi’s government has warned that the US is taking a “Cold War” approach toward Asia. Beijing has sought to counter that by bolstering ties with Pacific Island nations while reiterating its claims to disputed areas of the South China Sea.
The Biden administration’s focus on the interconnected nature of Europe and Asia has also been driven by a growing recognition of the partnership between Beijing and Moscow, as well as the willingness of Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea to sanction Moscow over the invasion, the people said.
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The result has been a burgeoning US dialog with Asian nations about events in Europe and with European countries about events in Asia, officials say. Whereas discussions with European nations about the Indo-Pacific during the Obama administration were “difficult, challenging, often suspicious,” they are now “deeply productive,” White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell told the Center for Strategic and International Studies on May 9.
The revised security document is also expected to feature a clearer articulation of the link between emerging transnational threats such as climate change and traditional geopolitical competition, one of the people said. Outer-space, for example, is both a transnational issue as well as a venue where geopolitics plays out, the person said.
The Trump administration published its National Security Strategy, which focused on “American sovereignty,” in December 2017. The Biden administration published its “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” in March 2021, but is yet to publish its full-fledged National Security Strategy.
— With assistance by Nick Wadhams
6. A Fault Line in the Pacific
Conclusion:
What happens in the Solomon Islands has broader security implications for the region and should be seen as part of a systematic effort by Beijing to extend its presence in the Pacific, advance the tools of authoritarian control, undercut U.S. access to the region, and constrict the freedom of movement of U.S. allies. The ongoing developments in the Pacific should underscore the critical importance for the United States of engaging the many oft-neglected countries of the Pacific Islands. They should also serve as an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and allied policy toward this vital region, and encourage Washington to be more creative, more proactive, and more committed to the Pacific.
A Fault Line in the Pacific
The Danger of China’s Growing Sway Over Island Nations
June 3, 2022
The last time most Americans paid attention to the Solomon Islands was in the middle of World War II, when the United States and Japan waged a prolonged naval battle in the waters and skies surrounding Guadalcanal. That grinding fight had outsized strategic effects—halting the Japanese advance into the South Pacific, ensuring that allied nations such as Australia and New Zealand were neither surrounded nor cut off from supply by hostile forces, reversing the war’s momentum in the Pacific, and providing a base to launch a counteroffensive against a totalitarian enemy. Pointing to the hundreds of small islands spread across the Pacific, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt explained to the American public that while they might “appear only as small dots on most maps . . . they cover a large strategic area.”
That large strategic area, key to fighting and winning World War II, suffered from considerable neglect over the last several decades as U.S. strategy and policy focused elsewhere. That now must change. In April, the government of the Solomon Islands announced that it had signed a tentative security pact with China, and in late May, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to the region in an effort to secure more agreements from Pacific Island countries. The Solomon Islands security pact contained vague and expansive language that appears to open the door for China to play a role in quelling internal unrest in the Solomon Islands by allowing Beijing to deploy Chinese police and military forces at the Solomon Islands’ request to “maintain social order.” The pact, and potential future deals with other Pacific Island states, could undermine regional security by extending the reach of the Chinese military, giving it access to a critical maritime chokepoint, and thrusting the Pacific Islands into the middle of a globe-spanning geopolitical competition.
China’s deal with the Solomon Islands and its efforts to obtain similar agreements with other Pacific nations have set off alarm bells both inside and outside the region. China certainly has the ability to provide much needed investment in infrastructure in the region, but local populations are wary due to their well-founded view that Chinese investments are as much about advancing Beijing’s interests and corrupting local politics as they are about meeting local needs. Nowhere is this truer than in the Solomon Islands, where more than 90 percent of people said that they preferred their country aligning with liberal democracies instead of China, and nearly 80 percent said they did not want their country receiving financial aid from China.
And yet, in Manasseh Sogavare, the prime minister of the Solomon Islands, Beijing found a willing partner. Sogavare’s decision to sign this deal not only put him at cross-purposes with many of his own citizens, but also the broader Pacific Island community, which is not favorably disposed to an authoritarian power setting up military bases in their midst. New Zealand’s foreign minister condemned the agreement as both “unwelcome and unnecessary,” while Micronesia’s president wrote to Sogavare that he feared such a deal would make the Pacific Islands “the epicenter of a future confrontation.” The reaction has been most anguished in Australia, with some likening the deal to the Cuban missile crisis and others claiming it as the worst failure in Australian foreign policy since World War II.
The announcement of the security agreement between Honiara and Beijing, and China’s diplomatic push, should serve as a wake-up call to the United States and its allies. Their engagement with the countries of the region has fallen short. Washington must expand its diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands, support multilateralism in the region, back development initiatives, and take seriously the existential concerns many of these countries harbor about climate change. An urgent change in approach is needed to prevent Beijing from further undermining democracy and expanding its military footprint across the Pacific.
BEIJING’S PACIFIC STRATEGY
The security deal between China and the Solomon Islands did not materialize out of thin air. China has ramped up its presence and extended its influence across the Pacific over the past decade by courting the region’s elite, building bonds with regional institutions, and increasing both its aid and its investments across the region. As it has done so, Beijing has been on the hunt for strategically located real estate that would allow it to project power outward and further influence the politics of the broader Indo-Pacific region. Reports have emerged of Chinese-owned companies seeking to develop deep-water ports and airfields in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and other locations across the Pacific.
Washington must expand its diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.
Despite repeated claims from China that it has no intention of establishing a military base in the Solomon Islands or elsewhere in the region, its track record and its ambitions suggest otherwise. In Cambodia, Djibouti, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, China has initiated major infrastructure projects that have resulted in China obtaining access to strategically significant port facilities. And as Beijing has demonstrated in the South China Sea when it claimed and subsequently militarized unoccupied islands, the Chinese government has a track record of publicly denying its true intentions while taking steps to enlarge its global military footprint.
Beijing’s search for a military foothold in the Pacific represents an expansion of what it has already done elsewhere. Establishing a presence in this region could accomplish several strategic goals at once—securing Chinese sea lines of communication, increasing intelligence collection on allied forces, keeping Australia and New Zealand boxed in, and complicating any U.S. plans to move forces into the region. With this deal, the Solomon Islands has now opened the door for a Chinese military presence in the Pacific. The question for the United States and its allies now is how to respond.
A NEW FOCUS ON THE ISLANDS
There has been intense debate—especially inside of Australia— about how exactly the Solomon Islands deal occurred, and whether Australia, the United States, or any other country could have done more to forestall such a deal. This has hit a particularly raw nerve in Australia, where every government in the postwar era has worked to prevent a hostile power from gaining a military presence in the South Pacific. Although it may be worthwhile to conduct an inquiry into why this happened, a blame game is less productive than using this moment to focus on how the United States and its allies can work together to mitigate further fallout and prevent China from signing similar deals elsewhere.
For the past several decades, the Pacific has not been an area of focus for U.S. foreign policy. That seems to be changing, but unless the new attention is directed on genuinely trying to meet the region’s needs, it is unlikely to be greeted with much enthusiasm. The Pacific Islands governments are concerned about the nature of Chinese activities in the Pacific states, but it is not their primary concern. Rather, regional leaders emphasize the importance of finding ways to drive development, build needed infrastructure, and address the existential risks of climate change to which low-lying Pacific Island states are especially vulnerable. The easiest way to earn trust and become a better regional partner will be to work with the Pacific Island states—individually, collectively, and regularly—to address these concerns, which were laid out by Pacific Island leaders in the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security that embraced an “expanded concept of security” to deal with the range of challenges facing the Pacific.
What happens in the Solomon Islands has security implications for the region.
Doing so will require pursuing more robust commitments to offsetting climate change, closely monitoring the Pacific Islands’ coastal waters to curb illegal fishing, and preventing resource exploitation by Chinese fisherman. In addition, the United States and its partners should promote more open labor markets to allow for residents of the Pacific Islands to work elsewhere in the region based on employment needs and support educational initiatives to offer more opportunities for Pacific Island youth to pursue an education overseas. The United States and its partners should invest in projects that improve basic infrastructure and expand access to health care and Internet connectivity in the Pacific Islands. Legislatures in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and elsewhere can also find ways to collaborate with their democratically elected counterparts across the Pacific Islands to discuss ways to improve governmental accountability. All of these commitments will require greater resources from the United States and its partners, changes in domestic legislation in multiple countries to allow for expanded work permits, and more sustained engagement with the region.
The United States can also demonstrate a renewed commitment to the Pacific Islands by making some key bureaucratic changes. Washington may be planning to reopen the U.S. embassy in the Solomon Islands that it closed in 1993, but the Biden administration has not yet appointed ambassadors to either Fiji or Papua New Guinea. It does not have resident ambassadors in Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, or Vanuatu (they are currently represented by U.S. regional ambassadors). It is hard to make an argument for serious and sustained engagement with the Pacific community without an active U.S. presence. Beyond those posts, Washington should consider naming an ambassador to the Pacific Islands Forum, modeled on the position of the U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Additionally, Washington needs to renew its compacts of free association with the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. For decades, these deals have allowed the United States to limit other states’ military access to compact countries in exchange for U.S. political, development, and defense guarantees.
The United States should also support multilateralism in the region. Washington should commit to more consistent and high-level attendance as a dialogue partner at the Pacific Islands Forum’s annual summit. It should express interest in associate membership in the forum for two U.S. Pacific Island territories—American Samoa and Guam—and establish a regular meeting with the Pacific Islands Forum akin to Japan’s biennial meeting with leaders of Pacific Island countries.
COMMITTING TO THE PACIFIC
Of course, neither long-term policy adjustments nor near-term bureaucratic adjustments answer the more immediate challenge posed by the influx of Chinese investment and the potential establishment of a Chinese military presence in the region. In tackling the former, democratic partners should support anticorruption and transparency initiatives and fund independent media in the Pacific Islands. On dealing with the latter, diplomatic efforts should prioritize circumscribing Beijing and Honiara’s secret agreement, to ensure that it remains an agreement in theory but not in practice. And because Beijing’s denials are so often precursors to further activity, Washington should begin the work of warning regional leaders about what the Chinese militarization of the Pacific would look like and what responses such militarization would necessitate from the United States. Chinese militarization in the region would result in environmental damage, the Pacific Island countries ceding sovereignty, and an inevitable response by the United States and its allies, which could draw the Pacific Islands into a future conflict.
What happens in the Solomon Islands has broader security implications for the region and should be seen as part of a systematic effort by Beijing to extend its presence in the Pacific, advance the tools of authoritarian control, undercut U.S. access to the region, and constrict the freedom of movement of U.S. allies. The ongoing developments in the Pacific should underscore the critical importance for the United States of engaging the many oft-neglected countries of the Pacific Islands. They should also serve as an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and allied policy toward this vital region, and encourage Washington to be more creative, more proactive, and more committed to the Pacific.
7. Deadly secret: Electronic warfare shapes Russia-Ukraine war
Excerpts:
Yet in the war's early days, Russia's use of electronic warfare was less effective and extensive than anticipated. That may have contributed to its failure to destroy enough radar and anti-aircraft units to gain air superiority.
Russia's defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment for this article.
Some analysts believe Russian commanders held back units fearing the units would be captured. At least two were seized. One was a Krasukha-4, which a U.S. Army database says is designed to jam satellite signals as well as surveillance radar and radar-guided weapons from more than 100 miles (160 kilometers) away. The other: the more advanced Borisoglebsk-2, which can jam drone guidance systems and radio-controlled land mines.
Russia may have also limited the use of electronic warfare early in the conflict because of concerns that ill-trained or poorly motivated technicians might not operate it properly.
Deadly secret: Electronic warfare shapes Russia-Ukraine war
The Palantin-K EW systems are parked during a rehearsal in Voronezh region, Russia, on Sept. 19, 2021, (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)
KYIV, Ukraine — On Ukraine's battlefields, the simple act of powering up a cellphone can beckon a rain of deathly skyfall. Artillery radar and remote controls for unmanned aerial vehicles may also invite fiery shrapnel showers.
This is electronic warfare, a critical but largely invisible aspect of Russia's war against Ukraine. Military commanders largely shun discussing it, fearing they'll jeopardize operations by revealing secrets.
Electronic warfare technology targets communications, navigation and guidance systems to locate, blind and deceive the enemy and direct lethal blows. It is used against artillery, fighter jets, cruise missiles, drones and more. Militaries also use it to protect their forces.
It's an area where Russia was thought to have a clear advantage going into the war. Yet, for reasons not entirely clear, its much-touted electronic warfare prowess was barely seen in the war's early stages in the chaotic failure to seize the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv.
It has become far more of a factor in fierce fighting in eastern Ukraine, where shorter, easier-to-defend supply lines let Russia move electronic warfare gear closer to the battlefield.
"They are jamming everything their systems can reach," said an official of Aerorozvidka, a reconnaissance team of Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle tinkerers, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of safety concerns. "We can't say they dominate, but they hinder us greatly."
A Ukrainian intelligence official called the Russian threat "pretty severe" when it comes to disrupting reconnaissance efforts and commanders' communications with troops. Russian jamming of GPS receivers on drones that Ukraine uses to locate the enemy and direct artillery fire is particularly intense "on the line of contact," he said.
Ukraine has scored some successes in countering Russia's electronic warfare efforts. It has captured important pieces of hardware — a significant intelligence coup — and destroyed at least two multi-vehicle mobile electronic warfare units.
Its own electronic warfare capability is hard to assess. Analysts say it has markedly improved since 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and instigated a separatist revolt in eastern Ukraine. But there are setbacks. Last week, Russia claimed it destroyed a Ukrainian electronic intelligence center in the southeastern town of Dniprovske. The claim could not be independently confirmed, and Ukrainian officials did not respond to a request for comment.
Ukraine has also made effective use of technology and intelligence from the United States and other NATO members. Such information helped Ukraine sink the battle cruiser Moskva. Allied satellites and surveillance aircraft help from nearby skies, as does billionaire Elon Musk's Starlink satellite communications network.
Electronic war has three basic elements: probe, attack and protect. First, intelligence is gathered by locating enemy electronic signals. On attack, "white noise" jamming disables and degrades enemy systems, including radio and cellphone communications, air defense and artillery radars. Then there is spoofing, which confuses and deceives. When it works, munitions miss their targets.
"Operating on a modern battlefield without data is really hard," said retired Col. Laurie Buckhout, a former U.S. Army electronic warfare chief. Jamming "can blind and deafen an aircraft very quickly and very dangerously, especially if you lose GPS and radar and you're a jet flying at 600 miles an hour."
All of which explains the secrecy around electronic warfare.
"It is an incredibly classified field because it is highly dependent on evolving, bleeding-edge technologies where gains can be copied and erased very quickly," said James Stidham, a communications security expert who has consulted for the U.S. State and Homeland Security departments.
Ukraine learned hard lessons about electronic warfare in 2014 and 2015, when Russia overwhelmed its forces with it. The Russians knocked drones out of the sky and disabled warheads, penetrated cellphone networks for psychological ops and zeroed in on Ukrainian armor.
One Ukrainian officer told Christian Brose, an aide to the late U.S. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., how Russian info warriors tricked a commander into returning a wireless call from his mother. When he did, they geolocated him in mid-call and killed him with precision rockets, Brose wrote in the book "The Kill Chain."
The U.S. also experienced Russia's electronic warfare in action in Syria, where the adversaries have backed opposing sides in the civil war. In 2018, U.S. Special Operations chief Gen. Raymond Thomas described how U.S. pilots' communications were regularly "knocked down" in Syria in the "most aggressive" electronic warfare environment on the planet. Russia's advanced systems are designed to blind U.S. Airborne Warning and Control Systems, or AWACS, aircraft — the eyes and ears of battlefield commanders — as well as cruise missiles and spy satellites.
In the current war, electronic warfare has become a furious theater of contention.
Aerorozvidka has modified camera-equipped drones to pinpoint enemy positions and drop mortars and grenades. Hacking is also used to poison or disable enemy electronics and collect intelligence.
Ukrainian officials say their electronic warfare capabilities have improved radically since 2015. They include the use of encrypted U.S and Turkish communications gear for a tactical edge. Ukraine has advanced so much it exports some of its technology.
Russia has engaged in GPS jamming in areas from Finland to the Black Sea, said Lt. Col. Tyson Wetzel, an Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council. One regional Finnish carrier, Transaviabaltica, had to cancel flights on one route for a week as a result. Russian jamming has also disrupted Ukrainian television broadcasting, said Frank Backes, an executive with California-based Kratos Defense, which has satellite ground stations in the region.
Yet in the war's early days, Russia's use of electronic warfare was less effective and extensive than anticipated. That may have contributed to its failure to destroy enough radar and anti-aircraft units to gain air superiority.
Russia's defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment for this article.
Some analysts believe Russian commanders held back units fearing the units would be captured. At least two were seized. One was a Krasukha-4, which a U.S. Army database says is designed to jam satellite signals as well as surveillance radar and radar-guided weapons from more than 100 miles (160 kilometers) away. The other: the more advanced Borisoglebsk-2, which can jam drone guidance systems and radio-controlled land mines.
Russia may have also limited the use of electronic warfare early in the conflict because of concerns that ill-trained or poorly motivated technicians might not operate it properly.
"What we're learning now is that the Russians eventually turned it off because it was interfering with their own communications so much," said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former U.S. Army commander for Europe.
The communications problems were evident with many Russian troops talking on insecure open radio channels, easily monitored by outsiders.
It's unclear how much of an edge Russia's electronic assets may now offer. Ukraine's forces are now more concentrated than early in the war, which could make them easier to target.
Much depends on whether Russia's battalion tactical groups "are configured in reality as they are on paper," said James Rands, of the Jane's military intelligence think tank. Each group, comprised of roughly 1,000 troops, is supposed to have an electronic warfare unit. The Pentagon says 110 such groups are in Ukraine.
The Kremlin also claims to have more than 1,000 small, versatile Orlan-10 unmanned aerial vehicles it uses for reconnaissance, targeting, jamming and cellphone interception.
Russia has lost about 50 of its Orlan-10s in the war, but "whatever they lost could be a small portion of what's flying," said researcher Samuel Bendett, of the Center for Naval Analyses think tank.
Ukraine's relative UAV strength is unclear, but Ukrainians have adapted such technologies as software-defined radio and 3D printing to stay nimble.
The U.S. and Britain also supply jamming gear, but how much it helps is unclear. Neither country has offered details. The ability of both sides to disable the other's drones is crucial with the artillery they scout now so decisive in battles.
Musk's Starlink is a proven asset. Its more than 2,200 low-orbiting satellites provide broadband internet to more than 150,000 Ukrainian ground stations. Severing those connections is a challenge for Russia. It is far more difficult to jam low-earth orbiting satellites than geostationary ones.
Musk has won plaudits from the Pentagon for at least temporarily defeating Russian jamming of Ukrainian satellite uplinks with a quick software fix. But he has warned Ukrainians to keep those terminals powered down when possible — they are vulnerable to geolocation — and recently worried on Twitter about redoubled Russian interference efforts.
"I'm sure that the Russians are getting smarter about that now," said Wetzel, the Air Force lieutenant colonel.
___
Bajak reported from Boston. AP correspondent Lolita C. Baldor contributed from Washington.
8. Why Are We Still Governed by Baby Boomers and the Remarkably Old?
A great question. We baby bombers and other older people are holding onto power for too long. Everyone needs to just retire and let the coming generations take over.
Opinion | Why Are We Still Governed by Baby Boomers and the Remarkably Old?
Guest Essay
June 3, 2022, 5:00 a.m. ET
Credit...Igor Bastidas
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Mr. Levin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is a contributing Opinion writer.
America’s top political leaders are remarkably old. Our president will turn 80 this year. His predecessor, who is contemplating running again, is about to turn 76. The speaker of the House is 82. The Republican leader in the Senate is 80, and his Democratic counterpart is a comparatively sprightly 71.
This is very unusual. And it’s not because this cohort has just gotten its turn at the wheel, but because it has held power for an exceptionally long time. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Donald Trump, whose presidencies spanned more than a quarter-century, were all born roughly within two months of one another in the summer of 1946. Nancy Pelosi has been the Democratic leader in the House for almost 20 years. Mitch McConnell has led Senate Republicans for about 15 years. Our politics has been largely in the hands of people born in the 1940s or early ’50s for a generation.
We should wish them all many more healthy years and be grateful for their long service. But we should also recognize the costs of their grip not only on American self-government but even on the country’s self-conception.
It’s often said that Americans now lack a unifying narrative. But maybe we actually have such a narrative, only it’s organized around the life arc of the older baby boomers, and it just isn’t serving us well anymore.
Consider what the country’s modern history looks like from the vantage point of an American born near the beginning of the postwar baby boom. Say you were born the same year as Mr. Clinton, Mr. Bush and Mr. Trump, in 1946. Your earliest memories begin around 1950, and you recall the ’50s through the eyes of a child as a simple time of stability and wholesome values. You were a teenager in the early ’60s, and view that time through a lens of youthful idealism, rebellion and growing cultural self-confidence.
By the late 1960s and into the ’70s, as a 20-something entering the adult world, you found that confidence shaken. Idealism gave way to some cynicism about the potential for change, everything felt unsettled and the future seemed ominous and ambiguous. But by the 1980s, when you were in your 30s and early 40s, things had started settling down. Your work had some direction, you were building a family and concerns about mortgage payments largely replaced an ambition to transform the world.
By the 1990s, in your 40s and early 50s, you were comfortable and confident. It was finally your generation’s chance to take charge, and it looked to be working out.
Opinion Debate Will the Democrats face a midterm wipeout?
As the 21st century dawned, you were still near the peak of your powers and earnings, but gradually peering over the hill toward old age. You soon found the 2000s filled with unexpected dangers and unfamiliar forces. The world was becoming less and less your own.
You reached retirement age in the 2010s amid growing uncertainty and instability. The culture was increasingly bewildering, and the economy seemed awfully insecure. The extraordinary blend of circumstances that defined the world of your youth seemed likely to be denied to your grandchildren. By now, it all feels that it’s spinning out of control. Is the chaotic, transformed country around you still the glittering land of your youth?
This portrait of changing attitudes is, of course, stylized for effect. But it offers the broad contours of how people often look at their world in different stages of life, yet also of how many Americans (and, crucially, not just the boomers) tend to understand our country’s postwar evolution. We see our history, and so ourselves, through the eyes of Americans now reaching their 80s.
As history, this narrative leaves a lot to be desired. But as a kind of pocket sociology of our time, it is utterly dominant. Almost every story we now tell ourselves about our country fits into some portion of the early-boomer life arc. And our politics is implicitly directed toward recapturing some part of the magic of the mid-20th-century America of boomer youth.
That moment — when many Americans trusted their leaders and went to church, when idealistic protests seemed to drive significant social change, when you didn’t need a college degree to get a union factory job that would let you support a family in the suburbs on one income — exerts an inexorable pull on our political imagination now. The parties blame each other for how far America has fallen from that standard, and politicians (old and young, left and right) implicitly promise a return to some facet of it.
That time was not imaginary. But it was not so simple either, particularly for people at the margins of the powerful mainstream consensus of the age. And it was a singular period made possible by an unrepeatable set of circumstances in the wake of the Second World War. We do ourselves no favors when we treat it as the American norm, when we ignore its costs and challenges, or when we cling to its glamour by keeping the people who lived that story in power as they age.
Our model of social change is still rooted in midcentury clichés. Younger Americans imagine that starting a family and owning a home was much easier for previous generations than it really was. They buy the broad outlines of the boomers’ nostalgia and take it to mean they are inheriting a desiccated society.
Confronting injustice, they almost unthinkingly re-enact the outward forms and symbols of college protests of the 1960s, generally to no effect. Our implicit definition of social cohesion takes for granted that midcentury moment, when America had not only been through a long stretch of intense mobilization in war and depression but was also less culturally diverse than at pretty much any time before or since.
Above all, though, our boomer sense of ourselves keeps us from orienting our society toward the future, and contributes to a broadly shared sense of despair about our country that is neither justified nor constructive. Our politics should prioritize planning for greater national strength in the medium term, but we can hardly expect quarreling octogenarians to have that future clearly in mind.
And yet, the solution is not youth politics either. In a new book on leadership, the former presidential adviser David Gergen is admirably frank in acknowledging that those born in the 1940s, like himself, should make room for new leaders. But he looks for them among the youngest Americans. “Millions of baby boomers and alumni of the Silent Generation are starting to leave the stage, to be replaced by millennials and Gen Zers,” he writes.
Maybe I take this personally, having just turned 45, but Mr. Gergen blithely skips over Americans born in the 1960s and ’70s. Maybe he can’t quite fathom middle-aged leadership. Yet middle-aged leadership may be exactly what we now require.
Many American institutions seem locked in battles between well-meaning but increasingly uncomprehending leaders in their 70s and a rising generation, in their 20s and early 30s, bent on culture war and politicization and seemingly unconcerned with institutional responsibilities. Our politics has the same problem — simultaneously overflowing with the vices of the young and the old, and so often falling into debates between people who behave as though the world will end tomorrow and those who think it started yesterday. The vacuum of middle-aged leadership is palpable.
There are some politicians of that middle generation — some members of Congress and governors, even our vice president. Yet they have not broken through as defining cultural figures and political forces. They have not made this moment their own, or found a way to loosen the grip of the postwar generation on the nation’s political imagination.
A middle-aged mentality traditionally has its own vices. It can lack urgency, and at its worst it can be maddeningly immune to both hope and fear, which are essential spurs to action. But if our lot is always to choose among vices, wouldn’t the temperate sins of midlife serve us well just now?
Generational analyses are unavoidably sweeping and crude, and no one is simply a product of a birth cohort. But in our frenzied era, it’s worth looking for potential sources of stability and considering not only what we have too much of in America and should want to demolish and be rid of but also what we do not have enough of and should want to build up.
We plainly lack grounded, levelheaded, future-oriented leaders. And like it or not, that means we need a more middle-aged politics and culture.
Yuval Levin, a contributing Opinion writer, is the editor of National Affairs and the director of social, cultural and constitutional studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of “A Time to Build: From Family and Community to Congress and the Campus, How Recommitting to Our Institutions Can Revive the American Dream.”
9. Putin thinks West will blink first in war of attrition, Russian elites say
How can we convince him otherwise?
Putin thinks West will blink first in war of attrition, Russian elites say
The Kremlin is seeking to ramp up economic pressure to erode foreign support for Ukraine
By Catherine Belton
June 3, 2022 at 3:00 a.m. EDT
Russian President Vladimir Putin is digging in for a long war of attrition over Ukraine and will be relentless in trying to use economic weapons, such as a blockade of Ukrainian grain exports, to whittle away Western support for Kyiv, according to members of Russia’s economic elite.
The Kremlin has seized on recent signs of hesitancy by some European governments as an indication the West could lose focus in seeking to counter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, especially as global energy costs surge following the imposition of sanctions on Moscow.
Putin “believes the West will become exhausted,” said one well-connected Russian billionaire, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. Putin had not expected the West’s initially strong and united response, “but now he is trying to reshape the situation and he believes that in the longer term he will win,” the billionaire said. Western leaders are vulnerable to election cycles, and “he believes public opinion can flip in one day.”
The embargo on Russia’s seaborne oil exports announced by the European Union this week — hailed by Charles Michel, president of the European Council, as putting maximum “pressure on Russia to end the war” — would “have little influence over the short term,” said one Russian official close to Moscow diplomatic circles, also speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. “The Kremlin mood is that we can’t lose — no matter what the price.”
The Kremlin has pointed out that the E.U.’s move has only provoked a further surge in global energy prices and says it will seek to divert supplies to other markets in Asia, despite a ban on insuring Russian shipments that was also imposed by the E.U. and Britain.
The populations of E.U. countries “are feeling the impact of these sanctions more than we are,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in an interview with The Washington Post. “The West has made mistake after mistake, which has led to growing crises, and to say that this is all because of what is going on in Ukraine and what Putin is doing is incorrect.”
This posture suggests that the Kremlin believes it can outlast the West in weathering the impact of economic sanctions. Putin has little choice but to continue the war in hopes the Ukraine grain blockade will “lead to instability in the Middle East and provoke a new flood of refugees,” said Sergei Guriev, former chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The Kremlin’s aggressive stance seems to reflect the thinking of Nikolai Patrushev, the hawkish head of Russia’s Security Council, who served with Putin in the Leningrad KGB and is increasingly seen as a hard-line ideologue driving Russia’s war in Ukraine. He is one of a handful of close security advisers believed by Moscow insiders to have access to Putin. In three vehemently anti-Western interviews given to Russian newspapers since the invasion, the previously publicity-shy Patrushev has declared Europe is on the brink of “a deep economic and political crisis” in which rising inflation and falling living standards were already impacting the mood of Europeans, while a fresh migrant crisis would create new security threats.
“The world is gradually falling into an unprecedented food crisis. Tens of millions of people in Africa or in the Middle East will turn out to be on the brink of starvation — because of the West. In order to survive, they will flee to Europe. I’m not sure Europe will survive the crisis,” Patrushev told Russian state newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in one of the interviews.
In another interview last week to the popular Argumenty and Fakty tabloid, Patrushev said Russia is “not rushing to meet deadlines” in its military campaign in Ukraine.
The Russian military has been gradually making gains in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, and rather than seeking an immediate and decisive battle, Putin believes time is on his side, the Russian billionaire said. Putin “is a very patient guy. He can afford to wait six to nine months,” the billionaire said. “He can control Russian society much more tightly than the West can control its society.”
The weeks-long diplomatic haggling over the terms of the E.U. oil embargo was seen by the Kremlin as a sign of faltering western resolve, economists and the Russian official said. Phones calls over the weekend by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s to Putin about ways to lift the blockade on Ukraine’s ports will have further bolstered that view. When Western leaders call Putin and seek to do a deal, “it means he thinks he has leverage,” a former U.S. government official said.
The Kremlin has insisted the blockade on Ukrainian grain exports is because of Ukrainian mining of the Black Sea — a claim denied by Kyiv — while Peskov said Western sanctions were also preventing grain shipments from being dispatched.
Russia’s potential losses due to the E.U. ban on its seaborne oil exports could be minimal, said Sergei Aleksashenko, a former deputy chairman of the Russian central bank, who now lives in exile in the United States. If Russia is able to divert the entire seaborne volume to India and China, Russian losses as a result of the ban could total only $10 billion, he said.
Putin’s economic advisers will “tell him what the estimated loss is from the embargo, and he will laugh quietly,” Aleksashenko said. “He is not changing his course.”
The E.U. embargo should be seen as “only a first step” in efforts to cut off the Kremlin’s hard currency earnings, said Edward Fishman, adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University and a former official with the U.S. State Department.
Several current and former senior Western officials have been discussing proposals for the United States and E.U. to form a cartel and impose a price cap on Russian oil, possibly at $30 or $40 per barrel. This step could be more effective than the E.U. ban and help drive down global prices, Guriev and Fishman said. Under the proposal, the United States could impose secondary sanctions on anyone buying Russian oil at a price over the cap, they said.
Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi first floated the idea of creating a cartel of oil consumers at a meeting with President Biden, while the European Commission is now examining Draghi’s proposal for a potential gas price cap.
Putin has declared that “the economic blitzkrieg” against Russia has failed, and on the surface, the economy has been cushioned against the initial shock of Western sanctions by the inflow of nearly $1 billion in revenue per day from oil and gas exports to Europe before the E.U. embargo on seaborne oil. Thanks to capital controls and orders that Russian exporters sell half their hard currency earnings to the state, the ruble has strengthened to prewar highs.
But Russia’s Central Bank chief, Elvira Nabiullina, has warned that the full impact of Western sanctions is yet to be felt. A ban on high-tech imports is only just beginning to bite, while shortages of some goods are only now beginning to be seen. Inflation is set to exceed 20 percent, and Russia is facing its deepest recession in 30 years. Putin’s attempt to protect the population against inflation, estimated at 18 percent, by ordering a 10 percent hike in pensions and the minimum wage falls far short.
With risks growing for all sides, “it is going to be a war of attrition from the economic, political and moral point of view,” the Russian official said. “Everyone is waiting for autumn,” when the impact of sanctions will hit the hardest, he said.
So far, however, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky estimating Kyiv needs $7 billion in aid a month just to keep the country running, Putin appears to be betting on the West blinking first, the former U.S. government official said. Putin’s “goal of subjugating Ukraine and eventually placing a Russian flag in Kyiv has not changed.”
10. Zelensky shares defiant video after 100 days of war in Ukraine
Zelensky shares defiant video after 100 days of war in Ukraine
Victoria Bisset
June 3, 2022 at 12:00 p.m. EDT
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky shared a video on social media Friday offering a message of resilience 100 days into the Russian invasion and proclaiming that “victory” will belong to Ukraine.
The video directly echoes a clip released by the Ukrainian leader on the second day of the war, in which Zelensky appears alongside his prime minister and other members of his core team, walking the streets of Kyiv, in defiance of rumors that the city was about to fall or that he might flee the country.
Back then, the aim of his message was clear: to show beyond all fear or doubt that he was committed to stay and fight. This time, Zelensky’s video serves as a reminder that Russia’s early objectives have failed and that, even with Russia occupying as much as a third of the country, Ukrainians will continue to fight.
Standing again on the streets of Kyiv outside the presidential building, Zelensky reintroduces his top officials.
“The leader of [our parliamentary] faction is here, the head of the president’s office is here, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Shmyhal is here, [presidential adviser] Podolyak is here, the president is here,” he says, with his team standing behind him in the same position as in the Feb. 25 video. “Ukraine’s armed forces are here. The most important thing is our people; the people of our state are here.”
“We have been defending Ukraine for 100 days already,” he says. “Victory will be ours.”
Although the new video mirrors the old one, notable differences show how the war has progressed. The first was recorded in the twilight hours on the deserted Kyiv streets, with the president and his staff bathed in the soft yellow glow of street lamps, and wearing the military-style outfits that befitted a wartime leader.
In the new video, Zelensky and his top officials are dressed more casually on a bright, early summer day. The Ukrainian president looks less tired than he did on Feb. 24, though perhaps older than the gap of 98 days would allow.
Russia’s early advances on Kyiv in late February and early March stalled quickly. Some experts believe that Moscow had calculated that the capital city would fall with little fight, and was that they were surprised that Zelensky stayed in Kyiv and that his forces remained loyal in the face of overwhelming odds.
A former actor and comedian, Zelensky has kept in daily communication with his country through social media and other direct addresses, winning over many that had doubted him earlier in his presidency.
Russian forces have shifted focus to the east of the country. On Thursday, Zelensky said that 20 percent of Ukrainian territory had fallen to Russia, with fierce fighting around the eastern city of Severodonetsk.
One view among the Russian elite is that President Vladimir Putin is hoping a lengthy war of attrition will wear down not only Ukrainian forces but also allies in North America and Europe, which have provided arms and supplies to Kyiv while tightening economic pressure on Russia.
At the end of the video released on Friday, Zelensky repeats a patriotic rallying cry.
"Glory to Ukraine!” he says.
“Glory to heroes!” his team behind him responds in unison.
11. Explained: Why You Can't Stop the U.S. Navy SEALs
Explained: Why You Can't Stop the U.S. Navy SEALs
Of all the units in the U.S. Special Operations community, you probably know the most about the U.S. Navy SEALs. There are countless books, documentaries, and several movies about SEALs. There is something about these operators that has seized the general public’s imagination. It must be the allure and mystery of the sea and the tremendously difficult training that stirs up so much interest.
Let’s take a look at the SEALs and see if we can shine a light on these maritime and land warfare operators:
Short History of the SEALs
The Navy SEALs were hatched from the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) or “frogmen” from World War Two who operated secretly for the Office of Strategic Services. UDTs mainly prepped beaches for amphibious missions during the war in the Pacific and on D-Day. They conducted reconnaissance and blew up hazards and obstacles. This kept the enemy from stopping landings from the main element of troops attacking from landing craft. Other types of “frogmen” in World War Two units were “Scouts and Raiders” and “Naval Combat Demolition Units.” In 1962, President John F. Kennedy specially acknowledged the existence of SEALs – an acronym that stands for Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams.
What Are the Missions?
The main aspect of SEAL warfare is unique infiltration and exfiltration in and out of combat zones. The Navy can insert SEALs by many different means – whether it’s a free-fall HALO jump out of an airplane or being deployed by boat or submarine – the SEALs can get to the battlefield in a number of ways.
The maritime mission is the main effort for SEALs. They can swim underwater to blow up ships or board them to rescue hostages and eliminate terrorists. SEAL snipers have killed pirates who threatened shipping lanes. Sometimes the mission is to collect intelligence or kick doors down in direct-action raids. They still have the UDT mission of working to prep for amphibious landings. It’s not just maritime environments – the SEALs can operate in deserts, mountains, and extreme Arctic weather.
How Do You Become a SEAL?
The usual route to becoming a SEAL is to directly enlist in the Navy and complete boot camp in Great Lakes, Illinois. At that point, trainees can attend BUD/S or Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL School. It used to be that trainees would first acquire a rating and be required to serve in the regular Navy to gain experience and then later apply to BUD/S. Now the path is more direct for new enlistees, but fleet sailors can still attend BUD/S.
What Is BUD/S?
BUD/S is probably what you are most familiar with when it comes to SEAL training. Trainees start with an 11-week indoctrination phase consisting of Naval Special Warfare Preparatory School and Basic Orientation. The next stage of BUD/S lasts six months. Trainees first show their physical skills with endless calisthenics, timed runs, “log PT,” and obstacle courses. Teamwork is sharpened with small boat seamanship. They also spend a substantial amount of time in the cold Pacific waters off Coronado, California. It’s best to master the combat side stroke before BUD/S.
Long Training Pipeline
This first phase is seven weeks of basic conditioning that includes the infamous “Hell Week” when trainees are pushed to their physical and mental limits. Trainees can quit the course by ringing a bell – about 75-percent of each class does this. Then the SEALs get to the bread and butter training of combat diving. This lasts seven weeks.
Once trainees make it past this period, they progress to land warfare training for seven weeks of instruction on weapons and tactics. After these three phases, SEAL trainees attend basic parachute school for three weeks. Training does not stop there. It’s on to SEAL qualification training for 26-weeks before trainees receive their Trident, nicknamed the “Budweiser.” This is time to celebrate, however training seems to never end. Next is “18 months of pre-deployment training and intensive specialized training,” according to the Navy.
Global Service
There are eight SEAL teams one can be assigned to. SEALs served in Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, and Afghanistan, and those are just the known missions. You can bet a SEAL will have served all over the world during his career.
There are constant debates and arguments over which branch of the special operations community trains the hardest and attracts the most elite operators. You can’t escape that the SEALs have so many different missions, so they may require the most extensive and diverse amount of training that attracts an individual who is what psychologists call a “high sensation seeker.” They definitely seek the most dangerous jobs.
12. How Western heavy weaponry can make a difference in the war in Ukraine
How Western heavy weaponry can make a difference in the war in Ukraine
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A Ukrainian section fires a round from an M777 howitzer in Donbas.
“Artillery sweat saves infantry blood.”
The Ukrainian military has this saying for a reason.
It has been weeks since Ukraine began to ask desperately for heavy western weaponry, particularly advanced tubed and rocket artillery, as part of an effort to turn the tide of Russia’s invasion, which is not going too well for Kyiv.
Despite much deliberation in the West, there seemed to be a drastic shift after the U.S. approved the transfer of a number of M142 HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems to Ukraine in late May.
The HIMARS and their munitions are expected to be part of a new $700 million aid package that also includes a lot more hardware, such as counter-fire radars, new FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank weapons, artillery rounds, vehicles, and spare parts.
Moreover, as it became known on June 1, the United Kingdom also requested the U.S. give the green light to provide Ukraine with M270, an even heavier and more advanced rocket system produced in the U.S.
The U.S. supply follows a series of advanced tubed artillery transfers, particularly 155-millimeter M777 howitzers, a new holy grail to Ukraine’s military community that has already been deployed to war zones.
Ukraine is hoping for a break.
New towed and rocket pieces, if delivered quickly and in large quantities, are expected to become the war’s key game-changer.
As the military says, massive supplies will not only help suppress dominating Russian field artillery, the key factor behind its battlefield gains, but also pave the way for an ambitious Ukrainian counteroffensive.
US M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers fire salvoes during the “African Lion” military exercise in the Grier Labouihi region in southeastern Morocco on June 9, 2021. (FADEL SENNA/AFP)
New caliber
Gone are the days when field artillery did its job by way of the overwhelming might of massive and wide barrages as it did during World War II.
The era of drones and advanced target-marking and reconnaissance have made it a much smarter, more precise, and pinpoint tool.
Its role in modern combined arms warfare has increased a lot as well. According to Ukrainian specialists polled by the Kyiv Independent, tactical artillery may constitute up to 70% of a large unit’s firepower in all-out combat.
In this regard, the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022 is a peak moment of Soviet-made artillery, both tubed and rocket.
The ongoing Battle of Donbas, as a large-scale combined arms action, clearly shows that, quite predictably, Russia enjoys a tangible advantage in terms of the number of artillery pieces deployed.
Ukraine and Russia both rely on old Soviet-standard artillery rounds, mostly 122- and 152-millimeter calibers, but numerical superiority is crucial. Russia, the main successor of old Soviet depots, enjoys a nearly unlimited stockpile of rounds.
This upper hand is largely the reason behind Russia’s many dangerous territorial gains, particularly in Donbas.
At the core of its battlefield tactics, Russian artillery devastates everything in front of its advancing groupings, be it Ukrainian lines or populated cities. Then it lets the infantry advance through smoldering ruins.
Russian forces used this tactic in the Ukrainian cities like Mariupol, Volnovakha, and Popasna, which have ceased to exist as human settlements, being heavily ruined or even razed to the ground.
Russia’s artillery losses, however, are huge as well.
French-provided CEASAR howitzers operated by the Ukrainian military move in a convoy in the war zone of Donbas (ArmyInform)
According to Oryx, an online investigations project, as of June 1, Russia has lost at least 13 heavy 120-millimeter mortars, at least 61 towed pieces (including 152-millimeter 2A65 Msta-B howitzers), 121 self-propelled pieces (including heavy 152-millimeter 2S19 Msta-S) and at least 69 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).
A large percentage of lost units were captured by Ukraine.
But Ukraine’s military falls far behind in terms of quantities of artillery and rocket pieces in the field, as well as in terms of munitions available. According to multiple reports from the war zone of Donbas, Russia’s expenditure on munitions in combat is several times bigger than that of Ukraine’s.
Now that Russia’s all-out war has entered its fourth month, Ukraine is struggling with munitions shortage. Especially when it comes to Soviet-made multiple launch rocket systems like 220-millimeter BM-27 Uragan and 300-millimeter BM-30 Smerch.
Supplies of old Soviet-standard 122- and 152-millimeter rounds from former Warsaw Pact nations in Europe do not fully compensate for the widening shortage.
According to the Ukrainian command, the solution is to acquire large quantities of heavy Western artillery — more advanced, effective, and smarter than Russia’s Soviet-made pieces. This inevitably means that Ukraine needs to adopt NATO’s 155-millimeter caliber along with the dwindling Soviet 152-millimeter.
Ukraine’s long-lasting project of switching to NATO rounds as part of its defense reform to gain full compatibility with the Alliance has accelerated by the needs of war.
Western howitzers generally outstrip older Soviet 152-millimeter pieces in terms of effective range, depending on the sort of rounds used.
A U.S. 1st Marine Division serviceman walks past 155-millimeter howitzers lined up near the Iraqi border in Kuwait on February 20, 2003 (Joe Raedle)
The 155-millimeter M777, over 100 pieces of which Ukraine has already received from Canada, Australia, and the U.S., has an effective range of 22.5 kilometers (with M795 rounds), or more than 30 kilometers (with M549A1 rounds). Ukraine was also provided with a number of M982 Excalibur guided shells for the M777A2 version, with an effective range of 40 kilometers.
At the same time, merely comparable Soviet-made 152-millimeter towed 2А65 Msta-B has a maximum range of 24.7 kilometers (with a usual HE projectile) and the maximum range of 28.5 kilometers with an enhanced round.
The French-provided CAESAR has an effective range of up to 41 kilometers with an ERFB round and almost 50 kilometers with an Excalibur. A close Soviet counterpart 2S5 Giatsint-S has an estimated maximum of only 33 kilometers.
Ukraine’s munitions shortage should be satisfied with extensive Western supplies: Canada and the U.S. alone have pledged to send a total of 220,000 rounds so far. The latest U.S. aid package alone includes 15,000 rounds.
Ukraine, at the same time, still does not have a facility to manufacture large quantities of artillery rounds of neither Soviet nor NATO caliber.
Ukraine’s military has, however, proved to be effective in operating what it has in the field, despite shortages.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has decided to provide Ukraine with M777A2s featuring no digitalized network fire control systems, probably due to fears of such complex technology potentially being seized by Russians in combat.
But the Battle of Donbas has continuously demonstrated Ukraine’s superiority in terms of reconnaissance drones on the battlefield and the use of counter-artillery radars, particularly U.S.-made AN/TPQ systems. The new U.S. aid package also includes five new radars.
Older Soviet pieces like Msta-B are still operated via far less effective mechanical fire control systems, although Russia is also using surveillance drone data for target indication.
When it comes to heavy self-propelled pieces, even Russians admit the obsoleteness of the Soviet 152-millimeter 2S19 Msta-S howitzer compared to modernized U.S.-made M109s or German PzH 2000.
A Russian attempt to keep up with the West, 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV weapons, which have been demonstrated by the Kremlin at World War II Victory Day parades for years, has not yet started replacing older pieces in combat.
All the advantages of the Western weapons combined together are expected to effectively suppress the Russian artillery and push it back beyond the distance from which it can deliver massive fire upon Ukrainian lines.
By June, Ukraine had acquired a number of 155-millimeter pieces, many of which have already been confirmed to be in use in Donbas. Norway has already donated a reported 20 M109A3GN pieces, while Germany and the Netherlands have sent 12 PhZ 2000s.
France, against expectations, has already sent CAESARs, 12 pieces, according to media reports, which have already seen combat. France is expected to send more. Nearly 30 Dana/Dana M2s are coming from the Czech Republic, and a number of FH.70s have been provided by Italy and Estonia.
On June 2, Ukraine also signed a contract to get eight modernized howitzers Zuzana 2s, while Poland has committed to manufacturing a total of 60 AHS Krab howitzers in the coming months.
All of them will be united under the use of the universal NATO caliber of 155 millimeters.
As Austria-based warfare expert Tom Cooper said on June 1 that “by July or August the Ukrainian army is going to have one of most potent artillery corps in Europe, at least by standards from before Feb. 24, 2022.”
Israeli soldiers walk next to an M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System during drills on March 16, 2016 (Lior Mizrahi)
Limited supply
When it comes to rocket systems from the West, namely M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS, their technical advantage over the Soviet/Russian systems gives Ukraine hope to give a fight to dominating Russian systems Smerch and Uragan.
The White House is believed to have approved the first trial batch of four M142 systems and a number of M30/31 rockets with an effective range of 70 kilometers. The U.S. gave in to Russian threats of “escalation” and assured, with Ukrainian consent, that it will not provide Kyiv with rockets able “to target Russian territory.”
This means that the U.S. has refused, at least publicly, to provide Ukraine with an MGM-140 ATACMS surface-to-surface missile with a maximum range of 300 kilometers — which turns an M142 into a tactical ballistic missile system like the notorious Russian systems Iskander-M that have been devastating Ukraine.
However, according to the Ukrainian authorities, even at 70 kilometers, HIMARSs are capable of making a difference in combat. Even with M30/31 rockets, they exceed Russian BM-27 Uragan (28.5 kilometers), although are still exceeded by BM-30 Smerch and Tornado-S (up to 70-120 kilometers).
But even in this case, Ukraine has big plans on using HIMARS to combat Russian rocket systems and also target Russian command and control units and communications deep in its rear.
For instance, if deployed to eastern Kharkiv Oblast, HIMARS will be capable of compromising vital Russian ground lines of communication coming from Russia’s Belgorod Oblast south via Ukraine’s Kupyansk and further to Izium, the key Russian axis against Donbas.
They could also provide serious support to Ukraine’s offensive in southern Kherson Oblast, where the Ukrainian military recently crossed the Inhulets River and gained a steady foothold.
As for 227-millimeter M270 systems expected from the U.K., it remains to be seen how many systems and what kind of rockets Britain will be ready to provide, be it M30/31 rockets (up to 70 kilometers) or ATACMS versions with a range of over 160 to 300 kilometers.
Germany is also reportedly ready to send at least four MARS II pieces, which is a modified German M270 version, but nothing else is known so far.
Either way, according to the Ukrainian military, the key behind successful assistance is the swift and massive supply of both artillery and rocket systems — otherwise, sending little quantities over a prolonged period of time will simply not have the necessary effect of repelling Russian advancements.
Author: Illia PonomarenkoIllia Ponomarenko is the defense and security reporter at the Kyiv Independent. He has reported about the war in eastern Ukraine since the conflict’s earliest days. He covers national security issues, as well as military technologies, production, and defense reforms in Ukraine. Besides, he gets deployed to the war zone of Donbas with Ukrainian combat formations. He has also had deployments to Palestine and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an embedded reporter with UN peacekeeping forces. Illia won the Alfred Friendly Press Partners fellowship and was selected to work as USA Today's guest reporter at the U.S. Department of Defense.
13. MQ-1C Gray Eagle Drones Likely Headed to Ukraine: A Game Changer?
MQ-1C Gray Eagle Drones Likely Headed to Ukraine: A Game Changer?
The Biden administration, in ongoing efforts to aid Ukrainian forces, intends to sell Ukraine four MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones. The sale is not final. Congress can still intervene – or the Pentagon could reverse course – but as of now, the deal has forward momentum. The Biden administration is expected to notify Congress, and also make a public announcement of the deal, in the coming days.
MQ-1C – Breaking Down the Sale
A portion of the $40 billion Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which Congress passed last month, has been earmarked to fund the drone sale and the training Ukrainian forces will require to operate the new drones. The USAI passed through the House of Representatives with a vote of 368-57. Notably, the only ‘nay’ votes came from the GOP; Each and every DNC Rep voted in favor of the bill. Similarly, the bill enjoyed unanimous DNC support in the Senate, where it passed on a vote of 86 to 11. The specifics of what would be included in the massive $40 billion aid package were, and are, murky. But now, the potential Gray Eagle sale sheds light on a small portion of how the USAI funds will be allocated.
To date, the Ukrainians have used only smaller, shorter-range drone systems – the AeroVironment RQ-20 Puma AE and the Bayraktar-TB2. Procuring the Gray Eagle would offer Ukraine a significant boost in war fighting capabilities; the Gray Eagle is simply a better weapons system than anything currently in the Ukrainian drone inventory.
Developing the MQ-1C Gray Eagle
Developed by General Atomics, the Gray Eagle is a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aircraft system. The drone was introduced in 2009 as an upgrade over the more widely recognized MQ-1 Predator. The Gray Eagle has an increased wingspan (56 feet) and relies upon a Thielert Centurion 1.7 Heavy Fuel Engine (HFE). The HFE is a diesel engine that burns jet fuel – which results in improved performance at high altitudes. The Gray Eagle can sustain operations for up to 36 hours, at 25,000 foot altitudes, within a range of 200 nautical miles. When needed, external fuel tanks can be added, boosting the Gray Eagle’s endurance to 50 hours.
The Gray Eagle can handle a payload of 800 pounds, including AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or the GBU-44/B Viper Strike guided bombs. The Hellfire is a vaunted air-to-ground missile, costing $150,000 per unit. The Gray Eagle can carry eight Hellfires at once. Initially developed as an anti-armor weapon, the Hellfire has been modified to suit various purposes – including the destruction of “high-value targets.” Today, the Hellfire is the U.S. military’s primary air-to-ground weapon, and can be launched from air, sea, and ground platforms.
In addition to Hellfires and GBUs, the Gray Eagle can also be outfitted with electronic weapons; In 2013 Raytheon introduced NERO electronic payloads for the Gray Eagle, which included the ability to jam enemy communications. Outfitting the Gray Eagle with NERO is understood to reduce risk and operating costs.
To track targets, the Gray Eagle relies on a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI) and an AN/AAS-52 Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS). The drone has proven itself reliable at engaging targets and gathering intelligence.
The U.S. Army has enjoyed a successful operational history with the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, deploying the drone over Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. If the Gray Eagle sale earns Congressional approval, the Ukrainians will be receiving a proven drone, capable of confronting the Russians with impressive firepower.
Harrison Kass is a Senior Defense Editor at 19FortyFive. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison has degrees from Lake Forest College, the University of Oregon, and New York University. He lives in Oregon and regularly listens to Dokken.
14. What the West Has Given Is Not Enough to Win, Ukraine Says
Excerpts:
“I am convinced of one thing: that if we want long-term peace and security in Europe, there is only one way to attain that, and that is through a Russian loss in this war and Ukrainian victory,” Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš said on Thursday. “Anything other than a clear loss for Russia…would simply mean Russia licking its war wounds, retooling and building its army, and sooner or later—in one year, in two years, who knows—advancing once again in Ukraine or elsewhere.”
“Putin is still thinking as an imperialistic power, that it’s important and necessary to eat up neighbors. He did it in Georgia in 2008, he did it in Ukraine in 2014, and we did not respond in kind,” Kariņš said. “If we want peace, Ukraine clearly has to win and Russia clearly has to lose. We have to break the cycle of imperialistic expansion. Otherwise, we all pay the price.”
“Of course I agree,” said Slovakian Prime Minister Eduard Heger, also on Thursday. “It’s our duty to help Ukraine win.”
What the West Has Given Is Not Enough to Win, Ukraine Says
Central and Eastern European defense ministers say limited arms packages will not defeat Russia in the Donbas or deter invasion elsewhere.
BRATISLAVA, Slovakia – The amounts and types of weapons the United States and other NATO members are sending to Ukraine are not enough to eject Russian armed forces and win the war, Ukraine’s defense minister said.
“We need more,” Oleksii Reznikov said Friday, to mount a “sufficient counterattack and kick them outside of our country to liberate all occupied territory.”
Reznikov’s grim assessment comes just three days after President Joe Biden announced a new $700 million arms package for Ukraine that includes long-requested High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, although with only limited-range rockets and a promise from Kyiv to not strike targets inside of Russia.
His call for more advanced Western arms was echoed this week at a key international security conference by several Central and Eastern European leaders who rejected hopes for a near-term end to the war.
Reznikov said recent donations of artillery, radar, and electronic warfare gear are helping Ukraine to defend its territory west of the Donbas region, slowing Russia’s advances. But they are not enough to expel Russian forces or to deter future strikes on Europe.
“We need to liberate our land as soon as possible. To do that, we need heavy weapons, primarily MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket Systems]. We also need artillery tanks, aviation, anti-ship complexes, new UAVs, anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems. We need them fast. We need them in the numbers matching the scope of the challenge we face,” said Reznikov, appearing via video link from Ukraine at the GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum.
American HIMARS have not yet reached Ukraine, Reznikov said. “At this moment, we are starting training courses in Europe,” he said; the Ukrainian artillery teams are expected to return home with those systems. The UK and other countries have pledged to send MLRS, also requiring training outside of Ukraine before bringing them into the fight. “It’s a first step,” he said.
Reznikov said that Ukraine has been inadequately armed or supported since the beginning of the war; Western donations have come too “slowly.” He asked Western ministers of donor states to speed their intergovernmental efforts.
“Deliberations take days and weeks, literally measured in Ukrainian lives...we need simplified and expedited procedures” to forward new and different weapons for the evolving battlefield,” he said. “We need more heavy weapons. The stocks of Soviet-era weapons and ammo are almost depleted. Thus we need weapons and munitions and military equipment of the NATO standard to replace the Soviet ones.”
He said the Ukrainian military also needs training, spare parts, and maintenance capabilities or agreements.
For weeks, U.S. and other Western arms packages have introduced increasingly more advanced weapons into Ukraine, each one carefully selected as much for Ukraine’s defensive needs as to avoid provoking Russian attacks on NATO members. At the same time, U.S., British, French, and other Western leaders have said that these weapons are meant to give Ukraine the best possible defense and negotiating position–not for expelling Russian forces from Ukrainian territory.
Derek Chollet, State Department counselor, in an interview for the Defense One Radio podcast last week in Washington, said, "The Ukrainians have been very clear to us. They're seeking to defend their country, defend their territory, defend their sovereignty. They're not seeking offensive capability to go after Russia."
But the Central and Eastern Europe prime ministers gathered here, much closer to the fight, spoke with starkly different tones about how the war should end.
“I am convinced of one thing: that if we want long-term peace and security in Europe, there is only one way to attain that, and that is through a Russian loss in this war and Ukrainian victory,” Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš said on Thursday. “Anything other than a clear loss for Russia…would simply mean Russia licking its war wounds, retooling and building its army, and sooner or later—in one year, in two years, who knows—advancing once again in Ukraine or elsewhere.”
“Putin is still thinking as an imperialistic power, that it’s important and necessary to eat up neighbors. He did it in Georgia in 2008, he did it in Ukraine in 2014, and we did not respond in kind,” Kariņš said. “If we want peace, Ukraine clearly has to win and Russia clearly has to lose. We have to break the cycle of imperialistic expansion. Otherwise, we all pay the price.”
“Of course I agree,” said Slovakian Prime Minister Eduard Heger, also on Thursday. “It’s our duty to help Ukraine win.”
On the same panel, Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov said, “The reality is there is no other choice: clear win, full territorial integrity, there is no room for compromise.” Petkov said if Russia is allowed to occupy any Ukrainian territories it has taken that “this is not peace, this is a frozen conflict…the only way to have peace is to get Russia out of the country.”
Heger said it was their “duty” to provide Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelenskyy the weapons he needs to win.
15. U.S. general calls on West to send fighter jets to Ukraine ‘as soon as possible'
I wonder how the Administration feels about the Adjutant General's comments.
U.S. general calls on West to send fighter jets to Ukraine ‘as soon as possible'
He added that sending Soviet-era MiG fighters to Ukraine in the near term is the best “immediate solution.”
Maj. Gen. David Baldwin (right), adjutant general of the California National Guard, testifies before the House Armed Services Committee Dec. 7, 2016 in Washington, DC. | Getty Images
06/03/2022 03:51 PM EDT
The commanding general of the California National Guard is calling on U.S. and other Western officials to explore sending fighter jets to Ukraine “as soon as possible,” rekindling a longstanding request by Kyiv.
In a statement to POLITICO on Friday, Maj. Gen. David Baldwin, California National Guard adjutant general, also said sending Soviet-era MiG fighters in the near term is the best “immediate solution.”
“MiGs are the best immediate solution to support the Ukrainians, but U.S. or western fighters are options that should be explored as soon as possible,” Baldwin said.
The comments come a day after Baldwin told reporters that U.S. military officials are working with Ukrainian counterparts on Kyiv’s request to Western nations for fighter aircraft to help repel the Russian invasion.
Although a three-way deal to send U.S. F-16s to Poland if Warsaw provided MiGs to Ukraine fell apart in March, Guard officials are still “steering them” toward the Soviet-era planes in the near term.
“There is a lot of goodness in them going to MiGs because they are already trained in that, but if they are going to use Western-type aircraft, it’s a discussion about numbers and types and capabilities of aircraft that may be available,” Baldwin said.
Members of the California National Guard have a longstanding relationship with the Ukrainian military. Guardsmen have been training with their Ukrainian counterparts in Eastern Europe under a state partnership since the 1990s. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, Guard members have also been helping to craft Kyiv’s requests to the Pentagon for weapons to use against Russian forces, Baldwin said.
In response to questions from POLITICO after the Thursday news conference, Lt. Col. Brandon Hill, a spokesperson for the California National Guard, stressed that a final decision about providing U.S.-made fighters to Kyiv would be up to the White House and the Pentagon. But he noted that, even before the conflict started, the intent was always for Ukraine to become “NATO-interoperable,” including giving them the opportunity to operate Western fighters.
California Guard members, particularly the pilots, are communicating with Ukrainian soldiers and airmen on a daily basis to share tactics and ideas, Baldwin noted.
“At our one-star generals, down to our colonels and some of our senior NCOs, they engage with Ukrainian leaders, the Ukrainian defense attaché and others, to help them refine their requests in terms of types of weapons systems are asking for and providing them information of things that might be available at the more tactical level,” Baldwin said Thursday. “The current one that we are working through is, ‘what’s the right fighter aircraft for them?’”
While “we are steering them toward those MiGs first,” there is also an “over-the-horizon” discussion of what aircraft will be needed in the future, Baldwin said.
“In the midterm, over the course of the next six months to the year and then the long term: What’s in the realm of possibility for systems that would be effective, available and affordable for them?” he said.
NATO members Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia all operate the MiG-29, but their limited inventories are on the way out. Slovakia will replace its Soviet-era jets with U.S. F-16s in 2024, and the U.S. approved the sale of several F-16s to Bulgaria in April. Poland meanwhile signed a deal in 2020 for 32 F-35s, and Polish leaders have recently said they’re interested in adding to that number as soon as possible.
“We do not support the transfer of the fighters to the Ukrainian air force at this time and have no desire to see them in our custody either,” John Kirby told reporters at the time, after Poland offered to hand over the MiGs to the U.S. for eventual transfer to Ukraine. The Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence community had assessed the warplanes wouldn’t materially improve Ukraine’s ability to fend off Russia, but instead could draw NATO directly into the conflict, Kirby added.
There were also logistical issues involved in getting fighter jets over the border into Ukraine, and with flying the planes from a NATO country into a war zone.
Officials debated sending the HIMARS for weeks over concerns that sending advanced, longer-range rockets could provoke Vladimir Putin into escalating the conflict. Ultimately, they decided to send shorter-range munitions, and said they had received assurances that Kyiv would not use them to strike targets in Russia.
“America’s goal is straightforward: We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression,” Biden wrote in a New York Times oped announcing the move. “We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia.”
Paul McLeary contributed to this report.
16. How the War Against ISIS Was Won
Just to ensure proper credit, the concept of "through, with, and by" was most thoroughly described by COL (RET) Mark Boyatt as the foundational concept for Special Forces operations. But as we can now see it can be employed by a broad range of forces, and effective if done right, in the right conditions.
But the bottomline of this article is use the right forces for the right missions at the right time.
How the War Against ISIS Was Won
Fighting ‘by, with and through’ local allies may be the U.S. military strategy of the future. In Mosul, it survived its toughest test.
June 3, 2022 11:46 am ET
In mid-April 2017, I was a fly on the wall for a top-level meeting that helped cement the defeat of Islamic State. Nearly three years earlier, Islamic State militants had taken the city of Mosul, rocking the Middle East and spurring the U.S. to send its military forces back to Iraq.
The American mission this time wasn’t to do the fighting on the ground but to back up Iraqi forces with U.S. firepower and advise them as they battled their way forward. The name of the military campaign was “Operation Inherent Resolve,” and in the spring of 2017, that resolve was being put to the test.
The campaign against Islamic State militants defeated an enemy, thrust local partners to the lead and held U.S. casualties to a minimum.
Die-hards from Islamic State, also known as ISIS, were determined to make a last stand in Mosul. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were trapped in the city, which is bisected by the Tigris River, and Iraqi advances had been stalled on its western side.
I had traveled with Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend to an Iraqi base south of the city when word came that Iraq’s then-Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, was gathering his commanders there for an impromptu council of war.
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Wearing the black fatigues of Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service, Mr. Abadi sought to rally his generals in an enormous tent whose walls were lined with photos of Iraqi Federal Police officers who had died in the war. But the meeting devolved into finger pointing as frustrated Iraqi officers complained that not all of Iraq’s units were pulling their weight. Worse, one option to help turn the battle around—sending Iraq’s battle-scarred armored division into west Mosul—appeared to have been shelved.
“We tried and did not succeed,” Mr. Abadi said. “I don’t want to do it again.”
Lt. Gen. Townsend, who was leading the American and allied effort, knew better than to cajole the Iraqi leader in front of his officers. But afterward he sketched out a plan with Col. Pat Work, a U.S. adviser to the Iraqi commander for the Mosul fight, that the American officers would lobby for in private.
Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend led the counter-ISIS campaign in its final months.
PHOTO: CAROLINE BREHMAN/GETTY IMAGES
To turn the tables on ISIS and force the militants to fight in two directions, the Iraqis needed to open a second front from the north, and their armored division needed to be part of it. The U.S. would help the Iraqis troubleshoot their logistics and provide them with armored bulldozers to bust through Islamic State defenses. Small teams of U.S. advisers would continue to call in airstrikes, rocket fire and artillery.
To give the Iraqis an extra boost, Lt. Gen. Townsend went a step further by allowing 82nd Airborne paratroopers to fire TOW and Javelin antitank missiles in support of the Iraqi advance. For years, officials in Washington had insisted that conventional U.S. military troops stay clear of ground combat, but the American commander was concerned that the Iraqis’ tank fire wasn’t accurate at several hundred meters and wanted to help them with the Mosul endgame, even if it meant firing antitank rounds from a distance. In early May, the northern front was launched and the final battle for Mosul was under way.
Key Moves in the Battle of Mosul
Iraqi and US advances
2
4
1
1
Mosul
University
of Mosul
IRAQ
Bagdad
3
Al-Jamhuri Hospital
Old City
EAST
MOSUL
EAST
MOSUL
WEST MOSUL
WEST MOSUL
2
2
2 miles
80
1
Mosul International Airport
2 km
The attack from the north began in early May, including Iraq’s only armored division, which had moved west of the city. In June, Iraqi forces pushed from multiple directions toward ISIS's last bastion, in the Old City. On July 10, Iraq's prime minister declared that the battle was won.
In October 2016, an array of Iraqi forces advanced on Mosul from the east in an effort to retake the city from ISIS. By January 2017, the east side of the city was under the Iraqis' control.
The battle for West Mosul began in February 2017. Iraqi forces attacked from the south, making some headway, but by April the offensive was largely stalled. U.S. commanders urged the Iraqis to open a second front by attacking from the north.
1
2
3
Source: Michael Gordon report
Camille Bressange / THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The war against Islamic State militants offers lessons for the U.S. that are only growing in relevance. Two decades of war in Afghanistan ended in retreat, but the counter-Islamic State campaign in Iraq and Syria was a success—one that saw an enemy defeated, foreign partners thrust into the lead, U.S. casualties held to a minimum and the U.S. free of the burdens of occupation, though at a considerable cost to local troops and civilians.
The counter-Islamic State campaign accomplished all this without a major U.S. troop commitment—a model that will be all the more useful as the Pentagon turns its attention to “great power competition” with Russia and China, and the American public grows weary of overseas conflicts. Large-scale troop deployments are no longer a plausible option for confronting militants in the Middle East or other ungoverned spaces. Fighting through foreign partners may be the only available option.
The U.S. learned in fighting ISIS that sending advisers into the field alongside their partners was critically important.
Scaled-back versions of the strategy may also prove useful when the U.S. bumps up against its principal military peers. The U.S. military has stayed clear of Ukraine since Russia’s February invasion to avoid escalating tensions with a nuclear-armed adversary and has refrained from providing the Ukrainians with weapons that can be used to strike into Russian territory.
Still, Ukrainian forces have benefited from flows of Western artillery, antitank missiles and short-range air defense, as well as U.S. intelligence on targets inside Ukraine. U.S. advisers mentored Ukrainian forces for nearly eight years before the February invasion, and continue to do so at European bases outside the country. That help has enabled the Ukrainians to stop a Russian thrust toward Kyiv, though Russia has seized much of Ukraine’s southern coast, imposed a naval blockade on the country and is trying to consolidate control of the eastern Donbas region.
“The assistance can be intelligence. It can be fire support. It can be equipping. It can be a variety of things with the appropriate budgets and authorities,” said Joseph Votel, a retired Army general who previously led U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command. “It doesn’t necessarily need to equate to troops to be useful in dealing with a Great Power adversary.”
The idea of coupling a modest number of U.S. troops with a larger local force emerged decades ago in the special operations community and has been dubbed “by, with and through.” The concept was that operations could be carried out against a common foe by local allies, with support from American forces and their coalition partners and through a legal framework. I saw a variation of this strategy at Tora Bora in 2001, when small teams of CIA operatives and special operations troops aligned themselves with Afghan warlords to coordinate airstrikes against their Taliban and al Qaeda foes.
U.S. forces help Kurdish allies assemble a drone as they prepare to retake Mosul from ISIS, Oct. 2016.
PHOTO: EMRAH YORULMAZ/ANADOLU AGENCY/GETTY IMAGES
The counter-Islamic State campaign applied the practice on a particularly vast scale and marked a sharp break with earlier U.S. military strategy in Iraq. From its inception, this was no mere drone campaign, in which targeted killings were directed by pilots a hemisphere away. But neither was it like 1991’s Desert Storm, in which an overwhelming U.S. force pursued Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards after weeks of day-and-night bombardment. Rather, the U.S. fought Islamic State through proxies on the ground, supported not just by small U.S. teams but by the concentrated use of American intelligence, artillery and air power.
Though the Pentagon has yet to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the conflict, the mission has already yielded important lessons. The U.S. learned that sending advisers to accompany their partners into the field was critically important. The allies the U.S. chose to work with also made a difference: identifying local political and military figures with some degree of public credibility created important advantages. Finally, the U.S. made a crucial decision to deny its adversary a sanctuary in Syria by carrying out strikes in 2014 and then sending Special Operations forces to work with Syrian fighters the following year.
In Afghanistan, by contrast, the conditions were less propitious. Many Afghans viewed their government as corrupt, and the Taliban enjoyed a refuge in neighboring Pakistan. As the U.S. looked to exit that conflict, it also backed away from its own “by, with and through” strategy by sharply curtailing its airstrikes, ending its practice of joining Afghan commandos on missions and removing contractors who had provided logistical support for Afghan forces.
For all the problems with working with foreign partners, however, it is better to be present with them in the theater than not when confronting militant groups. “I took the Marines into Afghanistan from over the horizon just after 9-11, and believe me, you can’t do squat until you get your agents on the ground, and you get your people working with their people,” said Jim Mattis, the retired Marine general and former secretary of defense.
U.S. commanders couldn’t dictate battlefield decisions to the Iraqis. But as a conduit for American firepower and other military support, they could make themselves indispensable, which deepened their influence.
The proximity of that involvement was a crucial point in turning around the battle for Mosul. In line with policy decisions made in Washington, the military began by mentoring Iraqi troops almost entirely from within the confines of Iraqi bases, which reduced the risk to U.S. troops but hampered them building momentum on the battlefield. After repeated importuning from U.S. commanders, however, in the summer of 2016 a small team of U.S. advisers was finally allowed to accompany an Iraqi battalion that was seeking to bridge the Tigris on its way to Mosul. Lt. Gen. Townsend later authorized small U.S. teams to advise Iraqi units closer to the front lines and directly call in airstrikes instead of passing targeting data to command centers in the rear.
The U.S. commanders couldn't dictate battlefield decisions to the Iraqis. But as a conduit for American firepower and other military support, they could make themselves indispensable, which deepened their influence.
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After the April meeting with Mr. Abadi, the Americans sought to use this influence to redirect Iraqi strategy. That required persuading Iraqi commanders to take their lone armored division, which had suffered a brutal setback during its thrust into Eastern Mosul in December, and using it among other forces to open a northern front in the western part of the city.
To bring the Iraqis around, Maj. Kevin Ryan, an intelligence officer from the 82nd Airborne Division, briefed the Iraqi commander for the Mosul operation that opening up a northern front would divert one out of every four Islamic State fighters away from the group’s southern defenses and reduce Iraqi casualties by 25 percent.
Once Iraqi leaders accepted the U.S. recommendations, 82nd Airborne paratroopers were ordered to back up Iraqi forces with TOW and Javelin antitank missiles and Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifles as they took on an Islamic State stronghold in West Mosul.
In the field, Lt. Col. James Browning, the U.S. adviser with Iraq’s armored division, made an effort to build trust with its commander, including by joining the division’s soldiers in their Ramadan fast, abstaining from food and water during daylight. Like other advisers, he addressed the Iraqi commander of the unit, Maj. Gen. Jassem Qassem, as sa’eedi, the Arabic equivalent of “sir.”
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“This was about understanding the physical demands and showing respect so that when those challenging moments came, I could look at him and say, ‘I am in this moment with you in every respect, but we must move forward,’” he said.
There were plenty of such moments. As the troops moved south, a half dozen of the division’s soldiers leapt to the roof of a building militants had abandoned so that they could survey the defenses below. Islamic State fighters reoccupied the first floor of the building, turning a routine tactical maneuver into a battlefield drama. Baking in the sun and taking fire from inside the building, most of the trapped men were soon wounded.
Lt. Col. Browning huddled with Maj. Gen. Qassem to discuss the dwindling options. Lt. Col. Browning’s plan was to have a drone shoot a Hellfire missile at Islamic State fighters on the lower floor—and hope that the battered structure was stable enough that it wouldn’t completely collapse. It was a risk Maj. Gen. Qassem was prepared to take.
With a giant whoosh, the Hellfire smashed into the first floor of the building, which pancaked on top of itself. Walid Khalifa, the one-star deputy commander of the division, ran to the semi-collapsed structure, thrust a ladder against the wall and began retrieving the soldiers, who were hauled to safety across the street. One was dead, but the rest were still alive. It was, Lt. Col. Browning recalled, a “Medal of Honor moment,” though not one that would be officially recognized.
Islamic State fighters parade in an armored vehicle they commandeered from Iraqi security forces, Mosul, Iraq, June 23, 2014
PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS
With their backs against the Tigris, Islamic State fighters arranged for a cluster of men, women and children to march in circles in its shrunken bastion—a tactic to fend off the American airstrikes that were already becoming hard to execute with the fighting at such close quarters.
The battle’s final days turned on a mission to seize a small stretch of territory in Mosul’s old quarter. A special Iraqi ranger unit moved across the rubbled terrain tossing grenades. Iraqi soldiers in the armored bulldozers that the Americans had supplied rolled over Islamic State die-hards, some of whom blew up their suicide vests under the bulldozers’ tracks. I was in Mosul in July as the fighting crested, famished civilians trudged out of the city and female suicide bombers prowled the streets.
After flying to the city, Mr. Abadi called Lt. Gen. Townsend to say that he wanted to make his victory announcement but needed to be sure the U.S.-led coalition would not contradict it. The American commander assured him that for all intents and purposes, the city had been liberated, and what work remained could be described as mopping up.
Mr. Abadi formally declared the end of “the terrorist state” in a July 10 address broadcast on Iraqi state television.
It would take another 20 months before the last of the militants made a final stand in Syria’s Middle Euphrates River Valley. U.S. Special Operations forces carried out that operation together with Syrian allies. But it was in Mosul that the joint U.S. and Iraqi campaign against ISIS had reached its turning point, and the U.S. military’s “by, with and through” doctrine survived its toughest test.
Politicians have talked boldly about turning the page on an era of “forever wars.” But we may not have seen the last of messy counterterrorism campaigns. The campaign against ISIS offers lessons and suggests others still to learn, including how better to measure and reduce civilian casualties. The risk to civilians was considerable in Iraq and Syria because of the militants’ practice of using human shields and the U.S. firepower used to keep its partners moving forward. Still, the counter-ISIS campaign provides a template for the future.
“Small teams can now call in an enormous amount of firepower, platforms and logistics,” said Michael Nagata, a retired three-star Army general who has spent much of his career in special operations in the Middle East. “Unless we want to go fight all the wars ourselves and suffer the casualties, there is no alternative.”
Mr. Gordon is a national security correspondent for the Journal. This essay is adapted from his book, “Degrade and Destroy: The Inside Story of the War Against the Islamic State, from Barack Obama to Donald Trump,” to be published this month by Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Appeared in the June 4, 2022, print edition as 'How the War Against ISIS Was Won U.S. Military Advisers Helped Turn the Tide Against ISIS'.
17. As Ukraine loses troops, how long can it keep up the fight?
It is a huge math problem, except that we are talking about human lives being lost in the equation.
As Ukraine loses troops, how long can it keep up the fight?
AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · June 4, 2022
ZHYTOMYR, Ukraine (AP) — As soon as they had finished burying a veteran colonel killed by Russian shelling, the cemetery workers readied the next hole. Inevitably, given how quickly death is felling Ukrainian troops on the front lines, the empty grave won’t stay that way for long.
Col. Oleksandr Makhachek left behind a widow, Elena, and their daughters Olena and Myroslava-Oleksandra. In the first 100 days of war, his grave was the 40th dug in the military cemetery in Zhytomyr, 90 miles (140 kilometers) west of the capital, Kyiv.
He was killed May 30 in the Luhansk region of eastern Ukraine where the fighting is raging. Nearby, the burial notice on the also freshly dug grave of Viacheslav Dvornitskyi says he died May 27. Other graves also showed soldiers killed within days of each other — on May 10, 9th, 7th and 5th. And this is just one cemetery, in just one of Ukraine’s cities, towns and villages laying soldiers to rest.
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Among the comrades-in-arms who paid respects to the 49-year-old Makhachek at his funeral on Friday was Gen. Viktor Muzhenko, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ chief of general staff until 2019. He warned that losses could worsen.
“This is one of the critical moments in the war, but it is not the peak,” Muzhenko told The Associated Press. “This is the most significant conflict in Europe since World War II. That explains why the losses are so great. In order to reduce losses, Ukraine now needs powerful weapons that match or even surpass Russian weaponry. This would enable Ukraine to respond in kind.”
Concentrations of Russian artillery are causing many of the casualties in the eastern regions that Moscow has focused on since its initial invasion launched Feb. 24 failed to take Kyiv.
Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army forces in Europe, described the Russian strategy as a “medieval attrition approach” and said that until Ukraine gets promised deliveries of U.S., British and other weapons to destroy and disrupt Russian batteries, “these kinds of casualties are going to continue.”
“This battlefield is so much more lethal than what we all became accustomed to over the 20 years of Iraq and Afghanistan, where we didn’t have numbers like this,” he said in an AP phone interview.
“That level of attrition would include leaders, sergeants,” he added. “They are a lot of the brunt of casualties because they are the more exposed, constantly moving around trying to do things.”
Makhachek, a military engineer, led a detachment that laid minefields and other defenses, said Col. Ruslan Shutov, who attended the funeral of his friend of more than 30 years.
“Once the shelling began, he and a group hid in a shelter. There were four people in his group, and he told them to hide in the dugout. He hid in another. Unfortunately, an artillery shell hit the dugout where he was hiding.”
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Ukraine had about 250,000 men and women in uniform before the war and was in the process of adding another 100,000. The government hasn’t said how many have died in more than 14 weeks of fighting.
Nobody really knows the number of Ukrainian civilians who have been killed or how many combatants have died on either side. Claims of casualties by government officials — who may sometimes exaggerate or lowball their figures for public relations reasons — are all but impossible to verify.
Western analysts estimate far higher Russian military casualties, in the many thousands. Still, as Ukraine’s losses mount, the grim mathematics of war require that it find replacements. With a population of 43 million, it has manpower.
“The problem is recruiting, training and getting them on the front line,” said retired U.S. Marine Col. Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
“If the war is now moving into a long-term attrition struggle, then you have to build systems to get replacements,” he said. “This has been a difficult moment for every army in combat.”
Muzhenko, the Ukrainian general, said Zelenskyy’s admission of high casualties would further galvanize Ukrainian morale and that more Western weaponry would help turn the tide.
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“The more Ukrainians know about what is happening at the front, the more the will to resist will grow,” he said. “Yes, the losses are significant. But with the help of our allies, we can minimize and reduce them and move on to successful offensives. This will require powerful weapons.”
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Yuras Karmanau contributed to this report from Lviv.
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AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · June 4, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
