Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"I have come to believe that a great teacher is a great artist and that there are as few as there are any other great artists. Teaching might even be the greatest of the arts since the medium is the human mind and spirit."

- John Steinbeck “On Teaching”

“A prudent man imbued with the scientific spirit will not claim that his present beliefs are wholly true, though he may console himself with the thought that his earlier beliefs were perhaps not wholly false. I should regard an unchanging system of philosophical doctrines as proof of intellectual stagnation. Philosophical progress seems to me analogous to the gradually increasing clarity of outline of a mountain approached through mist, which is vaguely visible at first, but even at last remains in some degree indistinct.“

- Bertrand Russell, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (1961), Preface, xiv

“If there's one American belief I hold above all others, it's that those who would set themselves up in judgment on matters of what is "right" and what is "best" should be given no rest; that they should have to defend their behavior most stringently. ... As a nation, we've been through too many fights to preserve our rights of free thought to let them go just because some prude with a highlighter doesn't approve of them."

- Stephen King, Bangor Daily News, Guest Column of March 20, 1992”

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2023

2. New psychology research reveals the “bullshit blind spot”

3. More than just a name change: Military, community embrace Fort Liberty, move beyond Fort Bragg

4. U.S. Defense Chief Rebukes China as Warships Transit Taiwan Strait

5. China defends buzzing American warship and accuses the U.S. of provocation

6. The Downside of the Debt Deal Is a Weaker Military

7. 'A Shared Vision for the Indo-Pacific': Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the Shangri-La Dialogue (As Delivered)

8. Top American, Chinese defense officials vie for influence in Asia-Pacific

9. Li Shangfu: China’s defence minister at Shangri-La Dialogue warns of ‘cold war mentality’ in digs at US

10. China accuses US of 'provocation' after near collision of warships

11. China accuses US of 'provocation' after near collision of warships

12. Opinion | The U.S. is not trusted globally. Here’s how that can change.

13. Old-Fashioned Weapons Are a Key to Taiwan’s Defense

14. Three Cheers for the New U.S. Marine Corps, None for the Old

15. Use of NATO arms for attack in Russia raises doubts about Kyiv’s controls

16. US protectionism is a flawed strategy

17. Chinese Hackers’ Attack on Key US Bases on Guam Is Part of Unrestricted Warfare: Military Expert

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2023

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukrainian forces are prepared to start counteroffensive operations.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin escalated his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely hoping to draw criticism back to the Russian military leadership and downplay his ongoing conflict with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. Prigozhin’s flamboyant allegations are also likely an attempt to retain his heightened initiative within the Russian information space following the capture of Bakhmut.
Prigozhin seized on general Russian discontent with security on the Belgorod Oblast border to threaten that Wagner Group forces may operate in Russian territory without approval from the Russian military command.
A Russian Duma Deputy stated during a public forum on June 1 that Russia has failed to accomplish any of its articulated goals for the “special military operation” in Ukraine.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and northwest and south of Kreminna.
Regular Russian forces have likely largely relieved Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut amid a low offensive tempo in the area as of June 3.
Russian forces focused offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line near Marinka.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued efforts to establish defensive positions in Kherson Oblast.
The Russian military leadership is attempting to create and staff new military formations.
Likely Ukrainian partisans assassinated a Russian collaborator in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 3, 2023

Jun 3, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Fredrick W. Kagan

June 3, 2023, 4:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1 pm ET on June 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukrainian forces are prepared to start counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in a June 3 interview with the Wall Street Journal that Ukraine is ready to launch a counteroffensive.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine “would like to have certain things, but … can’t wait for months” to start counteroffensive operations.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 3 that “military plans love silence” and that she will “discuss something else” in the meantime, likely acknowledging that Ukrainian officials have started to more strictly enforce a regime of informational silence about operations in preparation for upcoming counteroffensives.[3] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated on June 3 that Ukraine has formed all nine brigades of the “Offensive Guard” and that these formations are ready to take part in hostilities at Zelensky’s and Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi’s orders.[4]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin escalated his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely hoping to draw criticism back to the Russian military leadership and downplay his ongoing conflict with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. Prigozhin alleged on June 2 that representatives of the MoD placed anti-tank mines and other explosive devices along routes that Wagner forces were using to withdraw from Bakhmut.[5] Prigozhin asserted that these charges were placed in rear areas with no Ukrainian activity and that the MoD likely meant for Wagner forces to detonate the explosives in order to give Wagner a “public flogging.”[6] Prigozhin also further responded to a concerted attack that Chechen commanders launched against him on June 1 and stated on June 3 that he and Kadyrov settled the conflict.[7] Prigozhin claimed that he called Kadyrov on June 1 and the two agreed to let the “whole story” about the conflict dissipate.[8] Prigozhin suggested that a group in the Kremlin may have started the conflict between Kadyrov’s forces and Wagner and insinuated that the Kremlin often plays ”dangerous games” that could destabilize interethnic relations within Russia.[9] Kadyrov has yet to publicly address the conflict between Chechen forces and Wagner.

Prigozhin has not yet responded to Kadyrov or the Chechen commanders who started the attack in an antagonistic manner typical of his usual approach to responding to critiques.[10] The claimed private phone call between Prigozhin and Kadyrov would suggest that Prigozhin is concerned that this typical public response might further antagonize Kadyrov and Chechen commanders and that Prigozhin is concerned about having another prominent silovik figure like Kadyrov aligned against him. Prigozhin likely accused the MoD of trying to kill Wagner forces and the Kremlin of creating the conflict with the Chechen commanders to quickly reorient Russian discussion back to his usual targets of ire, the Russian military and political leadership. Prigozhin is also likely aiming to rally pro-war ultranationalist groups, specifically Kadyrov and Chechen commanders, to join him in criticizing those targets as he has done before.

Prigozhin’s flamboyant allegations are also likely an attempt to retain his heightened initiative within the Russian information space following the capture of Bakhmut. Prigozhin has consistently shaped discussions within the Russian information space leading up to the capture of Bakhmut and following the end of Wagner’s effort in the city by engaging in a near-daily series of public outbursts and demonstrative actions.[11] Prigozhin has used his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites and bolster his attempt to solidify himself as the central figure of the Russian ultranationalist community.[12] The concerted attack from Chechen commanders represents the first instance since the capture of Bakhmut that Prigozhin has not been the one to initiate larger conversations about himself and the Wagner Group within the Russian information space. Prigozhin’s desire to retain Kadyrov as a potential ally has likely constrained Prigozhin’s regular approach to shaping the Russian information space. Prigozhin has routinely used Wagner’s claimed responsibility for tactical gains to legitimize his pursuit of influence and his criticism of others, and he is likely also concerned that he may soon lose his current ability to dominate discussions about himself and Wagner as Wagner Group forces withdraw to rear areas to replenish and reconstitute.[13] Prigozhin’s dramatic accusation against the MoD aims to remove any constraints resulting from his conflict with Kadyrov, shift the conversation back to criticizing his opponents in the MoD, and allow Prigozhin to continue determining how he and Wagner are portrayed.

Prigozhin seized on general Russian discontent with security on the Belgorod Oblast border to threaten that Wagner Group forces may operate in Russian territory without approval from the Russian military command.[14] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner will not wait for an invitation or permission from the MoD to defend Belgorod Oblast if the MoD does not curb security threats to the region. Prigozhin justified his threat of insubordination by claiming that Wagner aims to protect the Russian people, implying that Wagner will assume the role of border defender that the MoD should already occupy. Prigozhin's threats capitalize on complaints from other prominent information space voices that Russian authorities have not done enough to protect border areas from the impacts of the war and reflect Prigozhin‘s current loss of informational initiative.[15]

Prigozhin’s threats also indicate that he may aim for Wagner forces to assume primary or sole responsibility for an axis in the Ukrainian theater now that Wagner forces have withdrawn from that role in the Bakhmut area. Prigozhin may see the Belgorod-Ukraine border as an easy enough front line to defend as the raids into Russia have thus far occurred on an extremely limited scale. Deploying Wagner forces to the Belgorod border would allow Prigozhin to maintain his position as a commander of frontline forces without the grueling demands of conducting human wave-style frontal assaults against a heavily fortified Ukrainian city. Prigozhin’s apparent threat to undertake military operations, even defensive ones, on Russian territory without the permission of the Russian MoD is astonishing if it is anything other than flamboyant rhetoric. It implies that Prigozhin regards himself as able to use large military forces loyal to him at his own discretion and beyond the control of the actual Russian military. Russian President Vladimir Putin would have to have tremendous confidence in Prigozhin’s personal loyalty to himself to be at all comfortable with such a situation.

A Russian Duma Deputy stated during a public forum on June 1 that Russia has failed to accomplish any of its articulated goals for the “special military operation” in Ukraine. First Duma Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Affairs Konstantin Zatulin emphasized that of Russia’s officially declared goals at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine — “denazification, demilitarization, the neutrality of Ukraine, and the protection of the inhabitants of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”—none have actually been met.[16] Zatulin further noted that as the war has worn on, these goals have ceased to hold actual meaning and suggested that Russian forces should have been more aggressive in efforts to push Ukrainian forces back from the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Zatulin’s critical observations are noteworthy considering that he is a contributor to the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club, which famously upholds views complementary to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the official Kremlin propaganda line.[17] Zatulin’s apparent views of the war represent an absolute minority within the Russian domestic political environment, as self-censorship and general information space repressions are commonplace. However, such statements coming from a relatively mainstream and well-platformed official suggest that a small subset of the predominant pro-war Russian political faction may feel somewhat empowered to voice discontent and advocate for escalated goals as the war continues.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukrainian forces are prepared to start counteroffensive operations.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin escalated his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely hoping to draw criticism back to the Russian military leadership and downplay his ongoing conflict with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. Prigozhin’s flamboyant allegations are also likely an attempt to retain his heightened initiative within the Russian information space following the capture of Bakhmut.
Prigozhin seized on general Russian discontent with security on the Belgorod Oblast border to threaten that Wagner Group forces may operate in Russian territory without approval from the Russian military command.
A Russian Duma Deputy stated during a public forum on June 1 that Russia has failed to accomplish any of its articulated goals for the “special military operation” in Ukraine.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and northwest and south of Kreminna.
Regular Russian forces have likely largely relieved Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut amid a low offensive tempo in the area as of June 3.
Russian forces focused offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line near Marinka.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued efforts to establish defensive positions in Kherson Oblast.
The Russian military leadership is attempting to create and staff new military formations.
Likely Ukrainian partisans assassinated a Russian collaborator in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (16km northwest of Svatove).[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian reinforcements arrived during Russian ground attacks near Novoselivske and forced Russian forces to retreat towards Kuzemivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[19] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Kuzemivka but that Russian forces repelled the assaults.[20] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Dvorichna (16km northeast of Kupyansk), Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), and Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[21]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northwest and south of Kreminna on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting in the Makiivka area is ongoing near the R-66 (Kreminna to Svatove) highway and that Russian forces advanced in forests west of Kreminna.[23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis of the Battle for Bakhmut.

Regular Russian forces have likely largely relieved Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut amid a low offensive tempo in the area as of June 3. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 2 that 99 percent of Wagner units have left Bakhmut.[24] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that degraded Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) elements, including those of the 76th VDV Division, 106th VDV Division, and two unspecified brigades have deployed to the Bakhmut area and are increasing their role in the area.[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces lost 100,000 personnel killed and wounded in the 10-month Bakhmut effort.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions 6km west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are conducting positional engagements on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut.[28] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are strengthening defensive lines in this area because Russian forces aim to restart their offensive effort on June 5, the claimed completion date of the Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut.[29]

Russian forces on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line continued to focus their offensive efforts on Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 14 Russian ground attacks in Marinka and near Oleksandrivka (immediately south of Donetsk City).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces did not conduct ground attacks near Avdiivka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces gained some territory in northwestern Marinka and that Russian forces will likely attempt to encircle the settlement in June.[31] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces made limited gains north of Avdiivka and complained that Ukrainian forces successfully constrained Russian offensive efforts west of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka.[32]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on June 3. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to seize the initiative in the Vuhledar direction but there are currently no reports that Ukrainian troops have broken through Russian lines.[33] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are probing Russian defenses for future attacks near Pavlivka (2km southwest of Vuhledar) and Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[34] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions near Russian-controlled Pavlivka, which is consistent with other Russian claims of activity in the area.[35] None of these claims are particularly anomalous or unusual, and ISW has no independent confirmation of any of them.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued to target rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine on June 3. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian aviation units struck Russian concentration areas in Skadovsk Raion, Kherson Oblast.[36] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched missile strikes against Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, and that Russian air defenses intercepted six unspecified Ukrainian missiles.[37] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov also claimed that Russian air defenses were active near Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, and that residents heard several explosions in the area.[38]

Russian forces continue to expand fortifications in rear areas of Kherson Oblast as of June 3. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows newly erected dragon’s teeth defensive structures northeast of Stavky (87km southeast of Kherson City).[39] The fortifications are located on the north side of the E97 highway, a key ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting occupied Crimea to Skadovsk (60km south of Kherson City) and Oleshky (8km southwest of Kherson City). These new structures are consistent with an ongoing pattern in limited Russian fortifications in southern Ukraine that prioritize the defense of main GLOCs.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military leadership is attempting to create and staff new military formations. Russian state media outlet TASS began reporting in mid-May that authorities of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic are offering to pay 20,000 rubles (approximately $247) to residents who join the newly formed 40th Army Corps.[40] Rostov Oblast news agency DON24 similarly reported on May 12 that Rostov Oblast governor Vasily Golubev instructed military enlistment offices to pay bonuses to volunteers who sign up for contract service with the Rostov St. George Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 40th Army Corps of the Southern Military District.[41] Russian media noted that these are the first instances of the 40th Army Corps in the public press, and ISW has not observed mentions of this formation pre-dating reports from mid-May.[42] ISW previously reported on the ad hoc formation of the volunteer-based 3rd Army Corps, which formed over the summer of 2022 and reportedly had an end-strength of around 20,000 personnel.[43] It is unclear how Russian military authorities intend to staff an army corps-level formation considering pervasive and continued issues with force generation.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Likely Ukrainian partisans assassinated at least one Russian collaborator in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on June 2. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian actors blew up the car of local businessman Sergey Didovodyuk in Myhailivka with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing Didovodyuk and injuring two others.[44] Rogov claimed that Didovodyuk was active in the occupation political sphere and participated in preliminary voting for the ruling “United Russia” party. Ukrainian sources reported that Didovodyuk is the deputy chairperson of the “We are Together with Russia” collaborator movement, of which Rogov is the chair.[45] Ukrainian sources also reported that the attack killed Didovodyuk’s daughter, Mykhailivka occupation Civil-Military Administration Deputy Head Yana Didovodyuk, and injured the Mykhailivka occupation Civil-Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Bidnyak.

Russian authorities established a system to simplify the adoption of Ukrainian children to Russian families and prevent returning Ukrainian children to Ukraine. Russian independent investigative outlet Vazhne Istorii reported that the Russian government established a state information bank on Ukrainian orphans and other children without parental care and advertises their profiles to Russian families for guardianship and adoption.[46] Vazhne Istorii reported that the Russian system aims to keep Ukrainian children from returning to Russia and that there are 4,400 Ukrainian orphans left without any care or adult supervision in Russia as of March 2023. Vazhne Istorii found that the number of Ukrainian children in Russia significantly increased in 2022, including 573 Ukrainian children in the Rostov Oblast database, 460 in the Moscow Oblast database, and 388 in the Nizhny Novgorod database.

Russia established a permanent occupation government in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on June 2 that established the Government of the LNR, consisting of 18 ministers and headed by a prime minister.[47] Pasechnik announced that Sergey Kozlov serves as the Chairperson of the LNR Government and that the new government strengthens integration with Russian state bodies.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. New psychology research reveals the “bullshit blind spot”

Some very useful information to reflect upon as you read all the news and comments I forward every day. Let's eliminate our "BS blind spots" through intellectual humility and critical thinking.

I admit I have forwarded information that has resided in my "BS blind spot." I know I need more work on this.

New psychology research reveals the “bullshit blind spot”

https://www.psypost.org/2023/05/new-psychology-research-reveals-the-bullshit-blind-spot-163943?utm_campaign=mb&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_source=morning_brew

by Mane Kara-Yakoubian

May 31, 2023

Is there a bullshit blind spot? A series of two studies recently found that people who were the worst at detecting bullshit not only grossly overestimated their detection ability, but also overestimated their ability compared to other people. In other words, they not only believe that they are better at detecting BS than they actually are, they also believe that they are better at it than the average person.

At the same time, those who were best at detecting BS not only underestimated their own performance but also believed that they were slightly worse at detecting BS than the average person. This research was published in Thinking & Reasoning.

“Broadly, I’m interested in figuring out why relatively smart people believe dumb things (and I include myself sometimes in that category!). So, this includes trying to understand what characteristics are common among people who fall for misinformation as well as what characteristics are common in the misleading messages that make them appealing and persuasive to some people (such as the features of the message itself, how it is delivered, etc.),” said Shane Littrell, PhD (@MetacogniShane), a postdoctoral research associate at the University of Miami.

“My co-authors and I recently published a study examining whether people who spread misinformation are also more likely to fall for it – that is, whether one can ‘bullshit a bullshitter’ (open-access version) – and one of the main implications of that work suggests that people who intentionally spread misinformation in some situations can also unintentionally spread it without realizing it in other situations. To me, this seemed to suggest that some people who knowingly spread bullshit are unaware of the fact that they often fall for it themselves, possibly because they think they’re better at detecting it than everyone else.”

“And, on a certain level, that makes intuitive sense. A con man might not think he can be conned because he ‘knows all the tricks,’ so to speak. So, our next set of studies set out to test that idea by examining how confident people who fall for bullshit are in their own bullshit detection skills, and what cognitive processes they use when they evaluate misleading information.”

Across two studies, the researchers recruited 412 participants to examine the link between bullshit detection, overconfidence in one’s abilities, and the perceived thinking processes people engage in when they encounter and evaluate potentially misleading information. In Study 1, the bullshit detection task involved rating 20 statements as profound or not profound.

Half of the statements were real quotes from famous public figures that are typically judged to be profound (e.g., “A river cuts through a rock, not because of its power but its persistence”). The other half were randomly generated by an algorithm to have proper grammatical structure but also be nonsensical and inherently meaningless (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”).

A bullshit detection score was derived for each person based on the number of real (profound) and fake (not profound) statements that they were able to correctly classify. Participants also estimated their own performance as well as others’ performance on this task, which provided confidence metrics. They also provided a confidence rating for their bullshit detection ability in general.

Past research has suggested that some people fall for bullshit because they are more likely to rely on fast, intuitive thinking rather than slower, reflective thinking. Thus, to test whether this is true, Study 2 examined individual differences in the types of thinking processes people perceive that they engage in when trying to detect bullshit. In other words, did participants feel that they were able to spot bullshit immediately or did they need to reflect on it before making a determination?

To find out, the researchers had participants complete measures that assessed their perceptions of the thinking processes they used when evaluating potentially misleading information (i.e., intuitive versus reflective thinking). To ensure that the perceived speed of their thinking process (faster intuition vs slower reflection) aligned with the actual speed of their evaluations, participants’ subjective ratings of their thinking process were compared with objective measures of their evaluation speed (i.e., time spent evaluating statements), revealing that the two were positively correlated.

Overall, Study 2 found that both intuitive and reflective thinking processes are involved in detecting – and falling for – bullshit, rather than one particular thinking process being dominant.

“Our main finding was that the people who are the most susceptible to falling for bullshit are not only very overconfident in their ability to detect it, but they also think that they’re better at detecting it than the average person. This applied whether they evaluated the BS quickly/intuitively or spent more time reflecting on it,” said Littrell.

“This is kind of a double-whammy in terms of bullshit susceptibility that we call the ‘bullshit blind spot.’ The other interesting finding was that the people who are best at detecting BS are actually underconfident in their detection skills and think they’re worse at it than the average person (i.e., they have a bullshit ‘blindsight’),” he added.

“It’s objectively worse to be a person who is not only bad at spotting BS but thinks they’re awesome at it than it is to be a person who is good at spotting BS but underconfident at it. So, I think the most important thing to take away from our findings is that everyone would be better off practicing more intellectual humility and skepticism. This is tough for most people, because we all like to believe that we’re smart, and in control of what we think and believe, and that we aren’t easily fooled. Unfortunately, many people who believe this are quite wrong.”

With regard to study limitations, the researcher explained that the type of pseudo-profound bullshit stimuli that was used in this work was what might be encountered in conversation, on social media, or from the self-help/inspiration guru industries.

“It could be that people evaluate or otherwise react to bullshit in other types of contexts (e.g., organizational, consumer marketing) differently or that the effect sizes would be different. Past research suggests that our findings would probably generalize to other types of BS and misinformation, but that needs to be empirically tested for us to be sure. Also, we used a Western, English-speaking sample of participants, so we can’t draw any firm conclusions on whether these results would replicate in other types of cultures and languages.”

Are there other lessons we can take from this work? According to Dr. Littrell, “I think our findings underscore the simple truth that all of us not only can be fooled (some more than others), but all of us likely have been fooled at some point in our lives, either by misinformation on social media, biased media coverage, flashy consumer marketing, or even/especially by someone we know bullshitting us.”

“By being more intellectually humble in our day-to-day lives, we’ll be better prepared to resist bullshit and other misinformation by being more mindful of our own cognitive vulnerabilities which will hopefully encourage us to be more attentive to and skeptical of the information we’re exposed to. The phrase, ‘what if I’m wrong?’ can be an incredibly liberating and protective mantra to live by.”

The research, “Bullshit blind spots: the roles of miscalibration and information processing in bullshit detection”, was authored by Shane Littrell and Jonathan A. Fugelsang.

https://www.psypost.org/2023/05/new-psychology-research-reveals-the-bullshit-blind-spot-163943?utm_campaign=mb&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_source=morning_brew

3. More than just a name change: Military, community embrace Fort Liberty, move beyond Fort Bragg

More than just a name change: Military, community embrace Fort Liberty, move beyond Fort Bragg

By Ben Wolfgang - The Washington Times - Friday, June 2, 2023

washingtontimes.com · by Ben Wolfgang

By - The Washington Times - Friday, June 2, 2023

FAYETTEVILLE, N.C. — It was a daunting task and one that proved emotional for the men and women who served at the historic Army installation.

But the redesignation of Fort Bragg to Fort Liberty, which became official at a ceremony Friday morning, was a mission that pulled together soldiers, civilians, business leaders and other stakeholders in and around this city.

“I’m an old-school soldier. I believe that once the orders are given, you execute and you move forward,” Grilley Mitchell, president of North Carolina’s Cumberland County Veterans Council, told reporters this week.

“Those of us who served on Fort Bragg, we’re going to miss the name Fort Bragg,” Mr. Mitchell said. “But at the same time, as with anything else, when orders are given, we adapt and overcome and we execute.”

Fort Bragg was the latest in a string of Army installations to undergo a name change. Swept up in the uproar over the killing of George Floyd, a Black man, while in police custody in Minneapolis in May 2020, the Pentagon announced a plan to scrub forts, bases, ships and other sites of names honoring the Confederacy and its military leaders.

Opened in 1918 and named for Gen. Braxton Bragg, a North Carolinian and former U.S. Army artillery commander who fought for the South in the Civil War, the sprawling Fort Bragg was at the top of the list for redesignation.

Few bases carry the historic weight of Bragg/Liberty, home to the iconic 18th Airborne Corps and its most famous division, the 82nd Airborne. By population, it’s the largest military installation in the country, with over 53,000 active-duty troops stationed there and another 14,000 civilians working on site.

The new name won’t affect the day-to-day functioning of the base, officials say. But there have been a number of physical changes accompanying the new name.

Most noteworthy is the new 0.6 mile Sunset Liberty March that runs through the heart of the base. The path includes historical markers paying tribute to the men and women of past generations who served at the base and its major military achievements and innovations.

Each day, an individual will march along the path to honor a veteran who gave his or her life for the country. Anyone can sign up for the march. Officials said the first three months’ worth of daily marches have already been claimed.

Lt. Gen. Chris Donahue, commanding general of 18th Airborne Corps, said he intends to march on Christmas Eve.

“I hope it’s snowing. I hope it’s about 28 degrees. I hope the winds are about 100 miles per hour,” he told reporters this week. “I want everyone to know that we will come out here anytime, do whatever it takes to honor and make sure we’re living up to what everyone needs us to do on this base.”

Turning the page

The name change has met resistance from some veterans who say it’s a shining example of the Pentagon’s runaway woke agenda, which they say prioritizes political correctness above the effectiveness of America’s armed forces. Defense Department officials vehemently reject those charges.

But it’s clear that the base initiative stretches beyond simply changing names. At each base, crews have worked to scrub all references to Confederate figures. In the case of Fort Liberty, that meant finding every plaque, picture, road sign or other reference to the rebel general.

“I’ve never done anything at this scale,” said Col. John Wilcox, garrison commander at the base.

“It’s a lot of attention to detail, a lot of hidden gems. As you start to peel back one thing, you realize there are three or four things I’ve got to go fix,” he said in an interview. “I’ve been on Fort Bragg for 15 years, so I’m sure I’ll still catch myself in conversations saying ‘Fort Bragg.’ But that’s OK. Change is good. The way we’re moving across the completion line, if you will, it’s exciting. It’s exciting to turn the page and be able to put your stamp on something this significant.”

Similar changes have taken place at other Army installations across the country. Texas’ famous Fort Hood is now Fort Cavazos, named after the Army‘s first four-star Latino general. Georgia’s renowned Fort Benning was renamed Fort Moore in honor of Lt. Gen. Hal Moore, a Vietnam War hero famously portrayed by Mel Gibson in the film “We Were Soldiers.”

Louisiana’s Fort Polk later this month will be renamed Fort Johnson in honor of Sgt. William Henry Johnson, a World War I Medal of Honor recipient.

In the case of Fort Liberty, the new name has sparked changes far beyond the base itself. Across Fayetteville, a host of local businesses, from pawn shops to banks to motorcycle dealerships, include Bragg in their name. Most are expected to rebrand themselves over the next year, evidence of just how deeply the redesignation has affected the entire community. And most of those businesses are embracing the Liberty theme, said Gary Rogers, chairman of the Greater Fayetteville Chamber of Commerce.

“I think our community is one of the most patriotic communities. … We’re excited about this opportunity,” he said in an interview. “I have not heard any individual businesses say they will not change their name. Will it probably happen? Sure. And it may be based on the owner, or the belief that they’ve had this name for so long. And in all honesty, they’ll probably be just fine. The fact of the matter is if you’ve been in business for 30-plus years, you may not feel the need to. And that’s OK.”

• Ben Wolfgang can be reached at bwolfgang@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Ben Wolfgang

4. U.S. Defense Chief Rebukes China as Warships Transit Taiwan Strait

Excerpts:

Relations between Beijing and Washington have deteriorated further recently, after the U.S. shot down a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon, warned Beijing against arming Russia in the war in Ukraine and allowed Taiwan’s president to stop off in the U.S. China’s decision to rebuff the U.S. invitation comes after a weekslong effort by the U.S. to secure a meeting, including a letter from Austin to Li.

During his keynote speech this year, Austin focused on what he described as cooperation between U.S. allies, contrasting that with what the U.S. has described as Chinese coercion. He cited Japan’s decision to spend 2% of its GDP on military spending. He also highlighted a deal between the U.S. and Philippines for U.S. forces to operate out of four Filipino military bases. He said the U.S. would increase its rotation of forces in Australia and he noted that Japan and South Korea are holding more regular military exercises and improving their sharing of information.

“We are doubling down on our alliances and partnerships,” Austin said. “Our shared goals are clear: to deter aggression and to deepen the rules and norms that promote prosperity and prevent conflict.”

While speaking at the same event last year, Austin warned about China’s military activity including the “steady increase in provocative and destabilizing military activity near Taiwan.”

This year, Austin stressed the impact of a potential conflict in Taiwan on the world’s economy and security in the region. He also said that successive U.S. administrations have opposed “unilateral changes to the status quo.”

“The whole world has a stake in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The security of commercial shipping lanes and global supply chains depends on it,” Austin said. “And so does freedom of navigation worldwide.”

Beijing regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has vowed to take control of the self-governed island by force if necessary. Austin’s remarks on Taiwan “completely disregard the facts, confuse right and wrong, and are totally incorrect,” Jing said.

Keith Zhai and Chun Han Wong contributed to this article.

U.S. Defense Chief Rebukes China as Warships Transit Taiwan Strait

Secretary Lloyd Austin says he is ‘deeply concerned’ about the two rivals’ ability to manage a crisis

By Nancy A. YoussefFollow

Updated June 3, 2023 8:34 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-defense-chief-austin-rebukes-china-for-being-unwilling-to-engage-28cabd8c

SINGAPORE—American and Canadian warships sailed through the Taiwan Strait as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin delivered a rebuke to China for not communicating better with U.S. military leaders, sending a dual message to Beijing.

The transit was aimed at demonstrating the U.S. and its partners would continue operating in what they consider to be international waters, despite rising tensions between the two rival powers. It came at the same time that Austin delivered a blunt warning to Beijing about the risk of not communicating.

“I am deeply concerned that the [People’s Republic of China] has been unwilling to engage more seriously on better mechanisms for crisis management between our two militaries,” Austin said Saturday while delivering a keynote address at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. “But I hope that will change, and soon.”

U.S., China Trade Blame Over Military Communication Issues

China defends buzzing American warship and accuses the U.S. of provocation

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, said Washington would not “flinch in the face of bullying or coercion” from China.

NBC News · by The Associated Press

SINGAPORE — China’s defense minister defended sailing a warship across the path of an American destroyer and Canadian frigate transiting the Taiwan Strait, telling a gathering of some of the world’s top defense officials in Singapore on Sunday that such so-called “freedom of navigation” patrols are a provocation to China.

In his first international public address since becoming defense minister in March, Gen. Li Shangfu told the Shangri-La Dialogue that China doesn’t have any problems with “innocent passage” but that “we must prevent attempts that try to use those freedom of navigation (patrols), that innocent passage, to exercise hegemony of navigation.”

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told the same forum Saturday that Washington would not “flinch in the face of bullying or coercion” from China and would continue regularly sailing through and flying over the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea to emphasize they are international waters, countering Beijing’s sweeping territorial claims.

That same day, as a U.S. guided-missile destroyer and a Canadian frigate were intercepted by a Chinese warship as they transited the strait between the self-governed island of Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, and mainland China. The Chinese vessel overtook the American ship and then veered across its bow at a distance of 150 yards in an “unsafe manner,” according to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Additionally, the U.S. has said a Chinese J-16 fighter late last month “performed an unnecessarily aggressive maneuver” while intercepting a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea, flying directly in front of the plane’s nose.

Those and previous incidents have raised concerns of a possible accident occurring that could lead to an escalation between the two nations at a time when tensions are already high.

Li suggested the U.S. and its allies had created the danger, and should instead should focus on taking “good care of your own territorial airspace and waters.”

“The best way is for the countries, especially the naval vessels and fighter jets of countries, not to do closing actions around other countries’ territories,” he said through an interpreter. “What’s the point of going there? In China we always say, ‘Mind your own business.’”

NBC News · by The Associated Press

6. The Downside of the Debt Deal Is a Weaker Military

Is the alternative a blank check for the military?

How do we convince the American people we must continually increase military spending in the face of all other challenges we have?

The Downside of the Debt Deal Is a Weaker Military

The already stretched armed forces will absorb a real cut after inflation.

By The Editorial BoardFollow

June 2, 2023 7:07 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/debt-ceiling-bill-budget-military-spending-biden-kevin-mccarthy-senate-pentagon-45db6323?mod=opinion_lead_pos1

The debt-ceiling bill passed the Senate on Thursday evening with 63 votes, though not before several Senators warned about its cuts to military spending. They have a point that will have to be addressed.

Republicans succeeded in reducing domestic discretionary spending, but the political price was agreeing to President Biden’s defense budget request of $886 billion for 2024 and $895 billion in 2025. That’s a 3% nominal increase in 2024, and it at least breaks the Democratic Party’s long-time demand that every defense dollar be matched with one for social welfare.

But Mr. Biden’s number is a real cut in defense after inflation. The deal means U.S. spending on the military could fall below 3% of the economy for the first time since the height of the post-Cold War peace dividend in the late 1990s.

No one thinks the world is more tranquil today than in 1999, as Vladimir Putin prosecutes the first European land war in 80 years. The Biden budget shrinks the U.S. Navy to 286 ships by 2025—as China ramps up to a 400-strong fleet designed to subdue Taiwan.

Sen. Dan Sullivan of Alaska noted that U.S. intelligence officials recently estimated China’s true defense budget in the ballpark of $700 billion, much larger than the sham statistics put out by the Communist Party. This means the U.S. is no longer the world’s singular financier of military power.

Sen. Roger Wicker (Miss.) argued that the U.S. may have 36 to 48 months—not decades—to prepare for when Xi Jinping “says he wants to be ready for a war against the United States—a war to take over the island of Taiwan.” Beijing could strike U.S. forces in Guam or Japan lest they intervene to stop an island assault.

Republicans can only expect so much in divided government, but Congress added tens of billions to Mr. Biden’s defense requests over the past two years. Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas noted that the difference between the budget deal and the 5% real annual growth the Pentagon needs is the rough equivalent of four Ford-class aircraft carriers or 90,000 of the Stinger missiles that have helped Ukraine against Russia.

The debt bill includes an automatic cut in spending if Congress fails to pass its 12 spending bills. This is supposed to force Congress to do its job and preclude an omnibus mega-bill. But Mr. Cotton is right to warn that Democrats may still take the Pentagon hostage “to extort even higher levels of welfare spending.” The risk is a return to the sequester politics of 2011 that ravaged military readiness.

Congress can improve this at the margins—for example, by fixing such bad Biden budget priorities as retiring hundreds of aircraft without replacements. Another option is a supplemental appropriation for Ukraine that rebuilds U.S. stocks of ammunition and missiles in multiyear contracts.

Congress could also pass a special appropriation for Taiwan, where war is still preventable. The island is waiting for weapons it has already purchased, such as Harpoon antiship missiles. That could include money for U.S. Navy submarines or a surge in antiship weapons.

A fair criticism is that the Pentagon could spend its money better. GOP Rep. Ken Calvert has been working on civil-service reform that could save billions, and another hero’s call is rationalizing inefficient military healthcare. Congress can break the culture that Defense Department grocery stores or subsidized canoe rentals on bases are inviolable.

But these projects save money only over time, and reform can’t overcome a Navy roughly half the size of the Cold War fleet. Much of the Pentagon’s spending goes for pay and benefits, and the only way to scrape up billions in a pinch is to raid accounts such as maintenance or flight hours. That’s why General Jim Mattis said “no enemy in the field” had hurt military readiness more than the 2011 sequester.

The worst part of the debt deal may be the message it sends to investors. Americans have recently learned that a brittle defense-industrial base isn’t prepared to surge weapons for contingencies like the war in Ukraine. Companies won’t pour investment into, say, expanding shipyards when Washington is announcing that defense spending is falling.

The moment is ripe for a Republican presidential candidate to explain these realities to voters. Speaker Kevin McCarthy drove the best bargain he could with Mr. Biden, and the deal is better than default. But the Speaker’s line that the deal “fully” funds national defense is wrong and makes it harder to tell Americans the truth, which is that the U.S. is drifting into a dangerous period with a vulnerable military.

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Wonder Land: The country is drifting right and opposition conservatives better not miss the turn. Images: AP/AFP/Getty Images/Zuma Press Composite: Mark Kelly

Appeared in the June 3, 2023, print edition as 'The Downside of the Debt Deal'.

7. 'A Shared Vision for the Indo-Pacific': Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the Shangri-La Dialogue (As Delivered)

These are the key substantive talking points that we need to make more than talking points.

We should compare these to the Chinese MINDEF's comments. My assessment is that our SECDEF offered a much more positive message than did the Chinese MINDEF (or is my "BS blind spot" blinging me? or am I just biased toward our SECDEF?)

Excerpts:

More and more, the countries of the Indo-Pacific have come together around a compelling vision of the future. And they’re advancing it in unprecedented ways.

It’s a vision of a region in which all countries are free to thrive on their own terms—without coercion, or intimidation, or bullying.

It’s a vision of a free, and open, and secure Indo-Pacific within a world of rules and rights.

And that vision is anchored in some key principles.

Respect for sovereignty.

Adherence to international law.

Transparency and openness.

The free flow of commerce and ideas.

Human rights and human dignity.

Equal rights for all states, large and small.

And resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue, and not coercion or conquest.

...

Now clearly, we have much more to do. But our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific is truly shared—and truly achievable.

You know, this vision isn’t the vision of a single country, or the initiative of a single country. It is a common and compelling aspiration.

It’s about building the basic conditions that let people live their lives without fear and pursue their dreams without limit.

And that matters to citizens across the region.

You know, some 60 percent of the world’s young people live in this region, and they rightly demand the free flow of ideas.

Fishing communities in the Philippines, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands depend on open waterways for their livelihoods.

And innovators here in Singapore depend on the rule of law to keep propelling the global economy forward.

So these shared principles matter for men, women, and children all around this region.

And they can’t be taken for granted.

And neither can this region’s security or prosperity be taken for granted.

Just look at the crisis caused by Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

'A Shared Vision for the Indo-Pacific': Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the Shangri-La Dialogue (As Delivered)

defense.gov

Well, good morning, everyone.

It is indeed great to be back here for another Shangri-La Dialogue.

Let me thank John and everyone at IISS for their efforts to deepen our dialogue on the Indo-Pacific. You know, this is my third time speaking in Singapore at an IISS event. And so this is starting to be—it’s becoming a habit there, John.

I also want to thank our national host, Singapore, for your tremendous hospitality.

And it’s great to see Senior Minister Teo, and Minister Ng, and other distinguished guests from our host here today.

And I’m glad that we’re joined by so many defense ministers and leaders from around the Indo-Pacific and around the world.

One minister of defense made a special effort to be here today: my good friend Oleksii Reznikov of Ukraine. Oleksii’s seat is currently empty. I’m sure he’s working the room somewhere around here, but Oleskii, if you can hear me, I’d remind you that, I’d just tell you that your presence here reminds us that we can never take our peace and security for granted.

I’m also delighted to be here with Director Haines and many of our U.S. military leaders.

So thanks to everyone for being here today.

This dialogue is always a great opportunity to exchange views. And the only thing more wide-ranging than the conference agenda is the breakfast buffet.

[Laughter]

You know, this forum began two decades ago, in a very difficult geopolitical climate. And today, we’re meeting at another moment of significant consequence.

More and more, the countries of the Indo-Pacific have come together around a compelling vision of the future. And they’re advancing it in unprecedented ways.

It’s a vision of a region in which all countries are free to thrive on their own terms—without coercion, or intimidation, or bullying.

It’s a vision of a free, and open, and secure Indo-Pacific within a world of rules and rights.

And that vision is anchored in some key principles.

Respect for sovereignty.

Adherence to international law.

Transparency and openness.

The free flow of commerce and ideas.

Human rights and human dignity.

Equal rights for all states, large and small.

And resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue, and not coercion or conquest.

You know, since the last time that I was in Singapore, we have made some tremendous progress toward our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

This is actually my seventh trip to the region as Secretary of Defense, and my fourth trip to Southeast Asia. And each time, I’ve had the privilege to listen to leaders expressing their hopes for their countries and their people.

And those conversations reinforce a simple truth. And that truth is that no one country can reach this future alone. As we all heard from Prime Minister Albanese last night, each country has a role to play. And the choices made by countries across the region reflect a deepening commitment to these shared principles.

Throughout the Biden administration, we’ve demonstrated what my first speech in Singapore called “the power of partnership.”

We have forged new friendships and deepened old alliances. We have reinforced deterrence to prevent conflict. We have defended the rules and norms that protect us all. And we have moved closer to the bright future that the people of this region want—and the one that they deserve.

So today, I’d like to talk about the historic progress that we’ve made together over the past year.

I’ll talk about what the countries of the region are doing to fulfill that vision, what the United States is doing, and—most importantly—what we’re doing together.

Now clearly, we have much more to do. But our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific is truly shared—and truly achievable.

You know, this vision isn’t the vision of a single country, or the initiative of a single country. It is a common and compelling aspiration.

It’s about building the basic conditions that let people live their lives without fear and pursue their dreams without limit.

And that matters to citizens across the region.

You know, some 60 percent of the world’s young people live in this region, and they rightly demand the free flow of ideas.

Fishing communities in the Philippines, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands depend on open waterways for their livelihoods.

And innovators here in Singapore depend on the rule of law to keep propelling the global economy forward.

So these shared principles matter for men, women, and children all around this region.

And they can’t be taken for granted.

And neither can this region’s security or prosperity be taken for granted.

Just look at the crisis caused by Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s indefensible war of choice stands as the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the end of World War II.

And Russia’s shocking aggression has brought home to people everywhere how dangerous our world would become if big countries could just invade their neighbors with impunity.

Russia’s invasion shows us all the dangers of disorder and the cost of chaos.

That’s why so many countries represented here have supported Ukraine’s brave defenders against Russia’s war of imperial aggression.

And that’s why the countries of the Indo-Pacific have cast their vote time and again for a future of peace, prosperity, and progress.

This year, as president of the G-7, Japan has focused on connectivity and on bridging the gap with developing countries. That includes pledging to invest $75 billion in public and private funds for regional infrastructure that can weather the storms of climate change.

India took the helm of the G-20 and called on its members to work together to lift up the most vulnerable. And for the first time, India and ASEAN completed a new maritime exercise together.

Last year, the Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy declared that international norms and international order were keys to our shared security and prosperity.

Indonesia and Vietnam took bold steps toward resolving their maritime-boundary dispute. And this is after 12 hard years of negotiations.

And so around the region, countries are matching their words with their actions, insisting on resolving differences through dialogue, and calling for even closer cooperation.

And so are we.

As you may know, I had a brief, 41-year career in the U.S. Army.

[Laughter]

And I learned over and over again that alliances and partnerships make us all stronger.

The United States is working together with our friends more closely every day.

We’re doubling down on our alliances and our partnerships.

And our National Defense Strategy calls for us to work more closely with our allies and partners at every stage of defense planning.

And so that spirit of partnership drove our work together to help the region recover from the worst days of the pandemic—including providing more than 360 million safe and effective vaccine doses.

And that same spirit will help us tackle other shared threats, from climate change to nuclear proliferation.

And so our shared goals are clear: to deter aggression and to deepen the rules and norms that promote prosperity and prevent conflict.

So we’re stepping up planning, and coordination, and training with our friends from the East China Sea to the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.

That includes staunch allies such as Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. And it includes as well such valued partners as India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and clearly our hosts here today in Singapore.

Consider the historic strides forward in the U.S.-Philippine alliance.

As you’ve heard, the United States and the Philippines recently designated four new locations under our Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. And so this will let our forces work together to strengthen Philippine security, continue to modernize the Philippine military, and deliver humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

We also recently completed the largest and most complex Exercise Balikatan ever. More than 17,000 troops participated—and that’s nearly twice as many as last year. And for the first time, the exercise featured cyber elements, HIMARS rocket systems, and Patriot surface-to-air missiles.

We’re also standing with our Japanese allies as they make historic changes to their National Security Strategy. This will mean major new investments in Japan’s defense, including moves to develop a counterstrike capability. And we’re upgrading our joint exercises like Keen Sword and Resolute Dragon to include more complex and realistic scenarios.

We also salute the bold steps taken by Japan and the Republic of Korea to work more closely together. Strong ties between Tokyo and Seoul are good for both countries—and for the region. We’ve made tremendous progress in our own trilateral cooperation with Japan and the ROK, including more regular military exercises and greater information sharing.

As North Korea continues its nuclear threats, and missile tests, and other dangerous provocations, we’re deepening our extended deterrence with our allies in the Republic of Korea. That includes increased deployments of our most advanced assets and the historic Washington Declaration issued by President Biden and President Yoon. And we’re cooperating more deeply than ever with the ROK on joint planning exercises, and information-sharing, and more.

At the same time, we’re working closely with our allies to upgrade our force posture in the region. We’re making our presence more distributed, more agile, and more resilient. And that will bring greater stability and security to the region.

So we’re committed to ensuring that every country can fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. And every country, large and small, must remain free to conduct lawful maritime activities.

So we’re modernizing our presence so that we can all continue to exercise these rights each and every day.

We will forward-station our 12th Marine Littoral Regiment—which is the most advanced formation in the U.S. Marine Corps—in Japan by 2025 to deepen stability in the First Island Chain.

We have committed to increase the rotational presence of U.S. forces in Australia, including rotations of fighters and bomber task forces, as well as future rotations of ground and maritime capabilities.

We’re also deeply committed to ensuring that our allies and partners have the capabilities that they need to deter aggression and to increase stability.

You see, more capable allies and partners magnify all of our security.

So we’re making extraordinary investments in our capabilities, alongside our allies and partners, to reinforce peace and prosperity in this region.

President Biden’s Fiscal Year 2024 budget request includes the largest procurement request in the history of the Department of Defense—and the largest investment ever in research and development. His budget also includes a 40 percent increase over last year’s request for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative—and that’s an all-time high of $9.1 billion.

We’re making bold investments in airpower, including an additional $61 billion for our F-35s, F-22s, and uncrewed aircraft, and not to mention the B-21 Raider. And we’re investing in an expanded fleet of subs, carriers, and destroyers—as well as in space, and cyberspace , and long-range fires, including hypersonics.

And at every point, we are committed to sharing the advances that we’ve made to help our partners.

For example, our Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology with India lets us explore new ways to co-develop key defense platforms.

With Japan, we’re working closely together on uncrewed combat air systems, and counter-hypersonics, and air-defense and missile-defense technologies.

With the Philippines, we’re negotiating a new security sector assistance roadmap that will bring our alliance into a new era.

And through the historic AUKUS partnership, we’re cooperating with Australia and the U.K. on a range of path-breaking capabilities. And of course, earlier this year, we announced how AUKUS will deliver conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, all with the purpose of upholding peace and security.

And just since 2020, we’ve invested nearly $1.2 billion in security cooperation funding to ensure that Indo-Pacific countries can detect malign actors and deter coercion.

And so America’s partnerships are bringing the region closer together to help keep it free, and open, and secure.

And you can see that in new forms of trilateral cooperation.

The United States, Australia, and Japan are operating together more closely than ever and finding new ways to enhance our science and technology cooperation.

The United States, Japan, and the ROK are strengthening our interoperability and exploring ways to better share information about missile threats from North Korea.

Later today, I’ll talk with my Australian, Japanese, and Philippine counterparts about stronger cooperation, especially in the maritime domain.

We’ve also made some important strides forward with Australia, India, and Japan through the Quad. The Quad is strengthening its maritime cooperation and its work on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And all four Quad partners will participate in Exercise Malabar, which will take place off the coast of Australia for the first time this summer.

Many of the region’s other top exercises are expanding as more countries come together around our shared principles—our shared principles.

Last year, our annual Garuda Shield expanded from a bilateral exercise with Indonesia to include 14 countries with more than 4,000 troops. And this year, more than 19 flags will fly over Super Garuda Shield.

Next month, Exercise Talisman Saber with Australia will bring 14 countries together. It will be the largest iteration ever, with more than 30,000 people participating, including a significant contingent from Japan. And it is yet another way that European countries like France, and Germany, and the U.K. are standing up for our shared values in the Indo-Pacific.

And so building nimble coalitions to advance our shared vision makes the Indo-Pacific more stable and more resilient.

The United States is absolutely proud to expand our cooperation with ASEAN. We remain staunch supporters of ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. And we stepped up our work through the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus, including new programs to support the next generation of Southeast Asian defense leaders.

We’re also continuing to expand our marquee maritime initiative with the Quad. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness will help our partners across the region better monitor the waters near their shores. And that will help them combat illegal fishing and better respond to natural disasters.

And finally, we are building important new ties in the Pacific Islands.

We’re working with our Pacific partners to combat illegal, and unregulated, and unreported fishing through more training and cooperation, such as the U.S. Coast Guard’s Shiprider program. We’re working together to strengthen maritime domain awareness and expand the capacity of our Pacific Island partners. And we recently signed a historic Defense Cooperation Agreement with Papua New Guinea. It will modernize our security cooperation and help us provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region.

And so ladies and gentlemen, our work together has made this region stronger and safer.

Now, we understand the headwinds that we face. But we won’t let those headwinds blow us off course.

We’ll continue to stand by our allies and partners as they uphold their rights. We will maintain our vigorous and responsible presence across the Indo-Pacific. And we’ll continue to work to ensure that no one country can assert control over shared waterways.

In the South China Sea, we will continue to work with our allies and partners to uphold the freedom of navigation and overflight. And let me again underscore the importance of the 2016 ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal. It is legally binding, and it is final.

We won’t be deterred by dangerous operational behavior at sea or in international airspace.

The People’s Republic of China continues to conduct an alarming number of risky intercepts of U.S. and allied aircraft flying lawfully in international airspace. And we’ve all just seen another troubling case of aggressive and unprofessional flying by the PRC.

So we will support our allies and partners as they defend themselves against coercion and bullying.

To be clear, we do not seek conflict or confrontation. But we will not flinch in the face of bullying or coercion.

Now, all of this is especially important in the Taiwan Strait.

I’d also like to be clear about another point. The United States remains deeply committed to preserving the status quo in the strait, consistent with our longstanding one-China policy, and with fulfilling our well-established obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.

Our policy is constant and firm. It has held true across U.S. administrations. And we will continue to categorically oppose unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.

I’d also highlight that conflict is neither imminent or inevitable. Deterrence is strong today—and it’s our job to keep it that way.

You know, the whole world has a stake in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait—the whole world. The security of commercial shipping lanes and global supply chains depends on it. And so does freedom of navigation world-wide.

But make no mistake: conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be devastating.

So we are determined to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. And so are a number of other countries around the world—and that number continues to grow.

President Biden has been clear. The United States does not seek a new Cold War. And competition must not spill over into conflict. And the region should never be split into hostile blocs.

Instead, we’re working to strengthen the guardrails against conflict, and to redouble our diplomacy, and to bolster peace, and security, and stability in the region.

The United States believes that open lines of communication with the People’s Republic of China are essential—especially between our defense and military leaders.

For responsible defense leaders, the right time to talk is anytime.

The right time to talk is everytime.

And the right time to talk is now.

Dialogue is not a reward. It is a necessity.

And a cordial handshake over dinner is no substitute for a substantive engagement.

And the more that we talk, the more that we can avoid the misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to crisis or conflict.

You know, I am deeply concerned that the PRC has been unwilling to engage more seriously on better mechanisms for crisis management between our two militaries. But I hope that will change, and soon.

I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again: Great powers must be beacons of transparency and responsibility. And the United States is deeply committed to doing our part.

And we are determined to keep this region open, peaceful, and prosperous.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Indo-Pacific has become an extraordinary example of human progress and peaceful cooperation.

I’m proud to be here with you. And the United States is proud to be your partner.

As I said before, conflict and strife are not inevitable. But peace and security are not automatic.

The region’s growing openness and prosperity show the importance of working together—and not allowing ourselves to be split apart.

The people of the Indo-Pacific have a wider view and a wider vision.

So together, we can deepen the region’s security.

Together, we can expand the circle of opportunity.

And together, we can ensure that every citizen of this region has the chance to thrive.

So let’s continue to draw on the power of partnership.

Let’s continue to come together in common purpose.

And let’s continue to build a region of prosperity, and openness, and freedom.

It’s a real pleasure to stand in your ranks. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[Applause]

JOHN CHIPMAN: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for that extremely compelling presentation and I think everyone will have marked down your note that the right time for talk is anytime. I was also struck by your phrase earlier in your remarks that the United States is seeking to modernize our presence so that we can exercise our rights, and it invited me to ask you if I can the first question we've seen in the conflict in Ukraine how quickly and automatically the forces of Ukraine have been able to incorporate a genuinely diverse range of technologies and systems. Including some that are very modern, can you say a few words about how you think emerging technologies, AI, quantum, cyber, uncrewed vehicles and the like have a particular role in the mission of deterrence in defense in this theater?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III: Well thanks John. This is really important to us. You know, if you look at our National Defense Strategy we talk about the importance of leveraging capability and capacity in all of the warfighting domains, land, air, sea, space, cyberspace. And so our task is to go after those -- those capabilities that support our warfighting concepts that -- that enable us to be not only successful in the -- in the-- in deterring a conflict but also enable us to be dominant in any future contest. So as we go after those capabilities to support our warfighting concepts, we're looking to bring things together and synchronize them and network them in ways that we've not done before. So we're going after capabilities like you mentioned quantum computing, edge computing, AI and -- and a number of other things. It's one thing to say that but I think you have to make an effort to invest in the right kinds of things and align your budget to -- to match what your strategy is. So we -- we through great pains to link our budget request to our strategy line by line almost and it's a -- it's probably the best I've ever seen.

I applaud my -- the staff, they really did a tremendous job there. So, it's one thing to even when you get the capabilities, you have to make sure that you've organized your organization to be able to manage those things, and then you have to drive yourself -- drive the organization to success. I made a change to our -- to our staff, I created a position that -- that oversees the -- the integration of our digital -- digital work and also AI, so I have a chief digital and AI officer that is really a phenomenal job of aligning the organization across -- across the board. So getting the capabilities are one thing, but then you've got to organize and you've got to drive to -- to create the capabilities that we're all looking for and then you have to work with industry and I know there's a number of industry leaders in this crowd and we make an effort.

I make an effort to talk to industry leadership to tell them where we want to go, what our needs are and, you know, how we intend to employ the capabilities that we're asking for and I would say that the United States, you know, our industrial base is really one of our strategic advantages. But, you know, unless we're communicating the right things to industry, we won't be where we need in the long term. So that remains a work in progress, but the kinds of things that you're talking about in terms of technology are the kinds of things that will help us maintain a competitive edge going forward. It is very important to us. It is fundamental to our -- our National Defense Strategy and again this is something we remain sighted on each and every day.

DR. CHIPMAN: Well thank you very much. I'll take with your permission about three or four from the floor. Don't worry about joining late. I don't necessarily respect an order of precedence so I'll call on four or five people first. First you mentioned SecDef the Philippines, so Jeffery Ordaniel from the Philippines first.

Q: Hi thank you. So according to the 2022 report to Congress released by your department Sir, if China continues the face of its nuclear expansion. If you'll likely a stockpile about 1,500 warheads and that's significant given that the limit -- the legal limit of the U.S. operation deployed nuclear warheads under the New START agreement is about 1,500. And so that means China will achieve nuclear parody with the United States in about 15 years, my question is are there any updates on U.S. efforts to push for some sort of an arms control with China and are your Asian allies involved in -- in that kind of discussion? Thank you.

SEC. AUSTIN: Let me begin this by saying we are serious about our commitment to extended deterrence and I have spoken with our allies and partners in the room a number of times on this particular issue. And you should know that the president of the United States and all of us are very serious about this commitment, but in terms of specific updates on engagements with -- with the PRC on arms control, I don't have any updates there. You have to talk to them first. So as soon as they answer the phone, maybe we'll -- we'll get some work done here.

DR. CHIPMAN: From the United States, Bonnie Glaser.

Q: Thank you, John. Secretary Austin, senior Chinese officials are communicating to their foreign counterparts that the United States is seeking to goad China into using force against Taiwan. This is reminiscent to the October surprise in 2020 when China seemed convinced that the United States was trying to participate a crisis in the South China Sea. So I agree, dialogue especially purposeful dialogue is essential. If you had the opportunity to meet with General Li, what would you tell him about U.S. objectives in the Taiwan Strait beyond the fact that the United States supports maintenance of the status quo and opposes use of force?

SEC. AUSTIN: Well thanks for the question. Let me say up front that I respectfully disagree with the premise of the question and that we're trying to goad China into a conflict. It's in fact just the opposite. We are doing everything in our power to make sure that we maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, because as I said earlier in my remarks this is important to all of us in this region. In -- in terms of, you know, what I would say to -- to my counterpart, well, you know, I -- again with respect to Taiwan it's the same thing that I said to them the last time and that is our policy has not changed and we do not seek, do not desire to see a change, a unilateral change by any party. And so, you know, any kind of disagreements ought to be resolved through diplomacy and again it's important to maintain peace and stability in this region as I mentioned earlier. Conflict in the straits would affect the global economy in ways that we cannot imagine but thanks for the question

DR. CHIPMAN: Then from China, Chi Zhang.

Q: Thank you Dr. Chipman. Good morning Mr. Secretary. The theme of our plenary session here is U.S. leadership but how to play the role of leadership. On one hand you claim to support the centrality of ASEAN in the region, on the other hand the U.S. established multi-lateral institutions such as Quad and AUKUS. Is there any contradiction between U.S. led institutions and the centrality of ASEAN in the region? How to guarantee ASEAN centrality? Thank you.

SEC. AUSTIN: Don't think I got the entire jist of the question but it -- I think your question was centered on AUKUS and -- and whether or not that either-- that promotes security and stability in the region or -- or drives us to -- to conflict. It absolutely promotes greater stability and security. It provides a valued and highly capable ally with additional capability that I think will be a generational capability. And so I am confident that this will add greater stability and security for this region, I am proud of the work that we're doing with AUKUS and I know my good friends, my colleagues from Australia and the UK are here and I look forward to having additional discussions with them about AUKUS and updating our progress. But I think that this will add significantly to our efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region.

MR. CHIPMAN: And from Vietnam, Bich Tran.

Q: Thank you Dr. Chipman. Secretary, so you mentioned Vietnam is one of important partners of the United States in this region. So I wonder where does, you know, I think says a lot about the United States respects the different political system of Vietnam. So I wonder whether you agree that being a communist is not a problem but being a revisionist may be another issue? Thanks. So differtiate between a communist state and a revisionist state.

SEC. AUSTIN: I heard you say being a communist is not a problem, but being a revolutionary is an issue but, hey listen we are focused on what you heard me talk about earlier and that is making sure that we maintain peace, security and stability in this region, and we remain access to international airways and waterways. We don't -- in our partnerships and our alliances, we don't ask people to choose or countries to choose between us and another country. We don't ask country, impose our will on countries, you know, again we want to work on those things that are common interest to all of us, the both of us. So I'll leave it at that.

DR. CHIPMAN: From France, Francois Heisbourg.

Q: Thank you very much for your statements and for recalling the role with some of your European partners are playing in the region. You emphasized that you were in favor of the status quo on Taiwan and that conflict was neither imminent nor inevitable. Those are obviously very welcome statements, yet we have been hearing over the last couple of years a number of active duty, high ranking American officers actually talk about imminence 2025 and 2027 being the most frequently sighted dates. Are we going to continue to hear active duty, high ranking American officers take that line or will there be as we would put it in French, (in French), silence in the ranks?

SEC. AUSTIN: Well first of all I believe what they are pointing to in some cases is the fact that President Xi challenged his military to develop the capabilities to conduct military operations by 2027. It doesn't mean that he's made a decision to do that. In terms of whether or not our officers, what they will say in the future, they have the ability to say what they're thinking and, you know, we always welcome that. But my opinion is that a conflict is neither imminent or is it inevitable and so we're going to do everything we can to make sure that we're doing the right things to maintain the status quo. But, you know, the way that you deter any misguided decision is by having a combat credible military and we have one and we will continue to have one, and our officers are in charge of maintaining that combat credible force. I have to remain focused on making sure that they are ready to address any situation or circumstance. I know my INDOPACOM Commander is in the room somewhere and he'd be the first to stand up and tell you, boss you've charged me to do that and by golly I am going to be ready no matter what happens and that's what I want him to do. But again I don't think that a conflict is inevitable, nor do I think at this point that it's imminent.

DR. CHIPMAN: And from the Netherlands and the IISS, Verle Noouwens.

Q: Secretary of Defense, you made mention to the UK, Germany and France in the Indo-Pacific. I wanted to ask how important is it for the United States for European countries to be engaged militarily in the Indo-Pacific?

DR. CHIPMAN: How important is it for European militaries to be engaged militarily in the Indo-Pacific? How does it add value to the effort I think is the --

SEC. AUSTIN: Well, the first thing I'd tell you is we're not trying to create a NATO in the Indo-Pacific and we have a number of colleagues today from Europe and I'm really glad to see them here because they all have interest in this region. And those interests are not just military, they cover whole of government and so they would tell you that they have an interest in the region because all the great things that happened here. And Prime Minister Albanese talked about some of those things yesterday. The rate at which this region is growing, you know, the capability, the capacity that this region has. It is rightful that European countries would remain interested in making sure that we have good relationships with the countries here in the region and I'm confident that that's why they're here. But they'll probably tell you themselves because you'll see -- you'll interact with them later on in the day.

DR. CHIPMAN: Absolutely right. From Indonesia, Dewi Fortuna Anwar.

Q: Thank you John. I'd like to ask about the -- the relations between the Quad and ASEAN. As-- as the secretary, as you know, there's been a lot of initial skepticism and concerns that the Quad may undermine ASEAN's centrality. But I'm very happy to hear again, you know, you have stressed again the ASEAN centrality. And recently, President Widodo actually said that, you know, Quad and ASEAN are not competitors. They could be partners. Now I'd like to tease out more a Quad as an ASEAN corporation or is it the Quad and individual given the fact that all Quad countries are also a member of (inaudible). So what will be the format for such cooperation? Thank you.

DR. CHIPMAN: I think it's a question about the complex Rubik's Cube or the regional architecture in this region and how of these different mini-lateral and established multi-lateral arrangements interconnect?

SEC. AUSTIN: Well, I think we should take what we have in which is what we've done and what we've continue to do in terms of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral alliances and partnerships and build on those incrementally. Again, I don't think we should drive things to go in one direction or another. We're not trying to create a NATO in the Indo-Pacific. We value our relationships with our allies and partners and each of our allies and partners has a -- I mean they have their own self interests and we understand that and we want to make sure that we're helping them protect their self-interest. And that, when possible, are working with us and with other countries to provide for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

DR. CHIPMAN: Great. I'm going to take two questions in succession and let the Secretary answer those and we'll conclude the session with that. My first of this duet is Sharon Nanau.

Q: Yes sir, my question is on USA cooperation is pushing United States agenda into smaller island states. Example in the Solomon Islands, the U.S. was absent for over 20 plus years and only because of it's diplomatic switch to China. They've reopened the embassy last year. So to this corporation you've mentioned allies and partners but is it another form of pushing -- pushing USA agendas especially for smaller island states who don't have a leverage when coming to interacting with the developed bigger countries?

DR. CHIPMAN: Thank you very much. He's got that on small island states and their place in U.S. engagement in the region and from Ireland but also the Finanial Times, Demetri Sevastopulo.

Q: Thank you, a very small island state. Secretary Austin, good morning. You've made a lot of progress creating a more joint security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, but one thing that's missing is joint operational war plans with allies, particularly to pattern Australia for Taiwan contingency. So my question is how urgent is the need for joint operational war plans and how hard is proving to develop them?

SEC. AUSTIN: On the issue of the importance of small island states, really they are important I think you know that for many of the small island states we've had relationships that go back for decades. We value and treasure those relationships and as you look at the number of people in some of those states that serve in the United States military, it really is impressive. So we want to make sure that we continue to build on those relationships and continue to account for your needs and your concerns. Most recently you saw that the President held a summit where he had Pacific Islander leadership into the White House and it was a great event. And this -- and I can tell you first hand that this is really important to him. On the issue of joint operational war plans, you probably know that I'm not going to discuss any kind of war plan in a forum like this and what we're doing and not doing. But what I will tell you is that it's important to work hard to increase our interoperability.

Now, it's, you know, it's important to have where possible compatible platforms. It's really important to make sure that you have, you know, policies and procedures that serve you well and that, you know, your allies or partners understand and are familiar with. But what happens when you work together as a joint or combined force is that you continue to build trust among your forces and the forces that you're working with and at the end of the day, you can't surge trust. You know, it's got to be there up front. And so I'm proud of the work that we're doing to increase interoperability in the region, that interoperability will serve us well no matter what challenge presents itself.

We have come along way but we are by no means where any of us want be eventually. So we'll continue to work on that and for all of you that have, you provided the opportunities for my troops to work with your troops. Let me say thanks again. I cannot tell you how important that is. In terms of specific plans, again, we don't discuss plans in public forums but I will assure you that will continue to work with our allies to make sure that we think about and account for future contingencies. John, thanks so much for allowing me to be here and I guess we'll leave it at that.

[APPLAUSE]

1:01:01

defense.gov

8. Top American, Chinese defense officials vie for influence in Asia-Pacific

Who won the influence campaign?

Top American, Chinese defense officials vie for influence in Asia-Pacific

myjournalcourier.com · by DAVID RISING · June 2, 2023

Albanese, whose country has angered Beijing with its agreement with Britain and the U.S., known as AUKUS, to obtain nuclear-powered submarines to address the perceived rising threat from China, said he would focus on Australia's deepening engagement, as well as “shared opportunities and challenges” in the region.

“We want a region that is stable, peaceful, resilient and prosperous,” he said when his speech was announced.

Ahead of his speech, Albanese met with Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and told reporters that the strong ties between the two countries was important because “security isn't just about defense.”

“It's also about our capacity to be less vulnerable to shocks, whether that's a future pandemic, a trade or cyber security shock, or international conflict,” he said.

Wong stressed that none of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations wanted to have to choose between Washington or Beijing.

“No one wants to be in a position where we have to either contain China's rise or limit America's presence,” he said. “Any move in either direction will have few takers in the region because no one in ASEAN wants to see a new Cold War.”

This year's dialogue comes amid a wide range of issues, including the war in Ukraine and its regional implications, including China's support for Russia, the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, and growing tensions between China and the U.S. and its allies over Beijing's claim to the self-governing island of Taiwan.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will open the day Saturday with an address on American “leadership in the Indo-Pacific,” according to the Pentagon, while China's new defense minister, Li Shangfu, leads off the day Sunday with a speech on his country's new security initiatives.

Austin began his trip to the region in Japan, whose prime minister, Fumio Kishida, has been one of the most outspoken leaders in Asia against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Kishida has ramped up Japan's defense spending, and cautioned others at the Shangri-La forum last year that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”

China has refused to criticize Russia's invasion of Ukraine and has blamed the U.S. and NATO for provoking Moscow. During a trip in April to Moscow, Li pledged to expand military cooperation, military-technical ties and the arms trade with Russia.

“We will certainly take them to a new level,” he said at the time.

On the sidelines of the conference in Singapore, Austin plans to meet with “key leaders to advance U.S. defense partnerships across the region in support of our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific anchored in ASEAN centrality," the Defense Department said.

Following the conference, Austin travels to New Delhi to meet with his Indian counterpart for talks on issues including expanding “operational cooperation between the U.S. and Indian militaries.”

Like the U.S., many of its allies have been increasing their focus on the Indo-Pacific, and the conference brings together many other top officials, including defense ministers from Britain, Germany, Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Ukraine's defense minister is also expected to attend.

Austin asked Li to meet with him in Singapore, but China turned down the request, Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters in Washington.

“The department believes strongly in the importance of maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication between Washington and Beijing to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict,” he said.

Li, a general who was named defense minister in March, is under American sanctions that are part of a broad package of measures against Russia — but predate its invasion of Ukraine — which were imposed in 2018 over Li’s involvement in China’s purchase of combat aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles from Moscow.

The sanctions, which broadly prevent Li from doing business in the United States, do not prevent him from holding official talks, Ryder said.

Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei said Austin’s offer of talks in Singapore was rejected because the U.S. “disregards China’s concerns and creates artificial obstacles.”

“The U.S. side should take practical actions to show sincerity and correct mistakes, so as to create the necessary conditions and proper atmosphere for communication and exchange between the two sides,” he said, while not mentioning the sanctions or other issues directly.

Even before Li’s appointment, multiple Defense Department requests for talks involving key leaders were rejected, with more than a dozen requests having gone unanswered or declined since 2021, according to a senior American defense official who spoke on condition of anonymity to provide information on private discussions.

In Japan on Thursday, Austin stressed the need for regular communications and open channels, noting a recent incident in which a Chinese fighter jet flew aggressively close to an American reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea.

“I’m concerned about at some point having an incident that could very, very quickly spiral out of control,” Austin said. “I would welcome any opportunity to engage with leadership."

Despite Li's refusal of the invitation, China might not want to be seen as the non-communicative party in regional eyes so some sort of bilateral talks could still take place over the course of the weekend, said Euan Graham, senior fellow for Indo-Pacific Defense and Strategy with IISS.

“I wouldn't rule out a U.S.-China meeting yet,” he said.

___

Associated Press writer Lolita C. Baldor in Washington, D.C., contributed to this story.

myjournalcourier.com · by DAVID RISING · June 2, 2023

9. Li Shangfu: China’s defence minister at Shangri-La Dialogue warns of ‘cold war mentality’ in digs at US

I could not find a transcript of the Chinese MINDEF remakes. Of all the articles I scanned this seemed to have the most relevant key points from his speech.

Excerpts:

“A cold war mentality is now resurgent, greatly increasing security risks,” he said. “Mutual respect should prevail over bullying and hegemony.”

...

“China and the US have different systems and are different in many other ways,” Li said.

“However, this should not keep the two sides from seeking common ground and common interests to grow bilateral ties and deepen cooperation. It is undeniable that a severe conflict or confrontation between China and the US will be an unbearable disaster for the world.”

...

Li suggested the US and its allies had created the danger, and should instead focus on taking “good care of your own territorial airspace and waters”.

“The best way is for the countries, especially the naval vessels and fighter jets of countries, not to do closing actions around other countries’ territories,” he said.

“What’s the point of going there? In China we always say, ‘Mind your own business.’”

...

Li told the Singapore summit: “In essence, attempts to push for Nato-like [alliances] in the Asia-Pacific is a way of kidnapping regional countries and exaggerating conflicts and confrontations, which will only plunge the Asia-Pacific into a whirlpool of disputes and conflicts.

“Today’s Asia-Pacific needs open and inclusive cooperation, not buddying up into small cliques. We must not forget the severe disasters brought by the two world wars to peoples of all countries, and we must not allow such tragic history to repeat itself.”

Li Shangfu: China’s defence minister at Shangri-La Dialogue warns of ‘cold war mentality’ in digs at US

After refusing to meet with his US counterpart, general says ‘some countries’ interfering in others’ business but Beijing does not seek confrontation

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/04/li-shangfu-chinas-defence-minister-at-shangri-la-dialogue-warns-of-cold-war-mentality-in-digs-at-us

The Guardian · June 4, 2023

China’s defence minister, Li Shangfu, has said a cold war mentality is resurgent in the Asia-Pacific region, but Beijing seeks dialogue over confrontation. The remarks came after Li refused to formally meet the US defence secretary, Lloyd Austin, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

Speaking at the dialogue, Asia’s top security summit, on Sunday, Li took thinly veiled digs at the US, repeating familiar grievances and accusing “some countries” of intensifying an arms race and interfering in the internal affairs of others.

“A cold war mentality is now resurgent, greatly increasing security risks,” he said. “Mutual respect should prevail over bullying and hegemony.”

Li, a general of the People’s Liberation Army, has been under US sanctions since 2018 over the purchase of combat aircraft and equipment from Russia’s main arms exporter, Rosoboronexport. The Singapore speech marked his first significant international address since he was made defence minister in March.

The general told the dialogue audience that China would not tolerate attempts by Taiwan independence forces or external forces to separate Taiwan from China.

Taiwan is a self-governed island that considers itself independent and has never been ruled by China’s Communist party regime. China’s president, Xi Jinping, has made it a goal to see Taiwan reunited with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary.

Austin rebuked China in his own speech on Saturday for refusing to hold military talks, leaving the superpowers deadlocked over democratically ruled Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Ties between Washington and Beijing are strained over a range of issues, including Taiwan, the South China Sea and President Joe Biden’s restrictions on semiconductor chip exports.

“China and the US have different systems and are different in many other ways,” Li said.

“However, this should not keep the two sides from seeking common ground and common interests to grow bilateral ties and deepen cooperation. It is undeniable that a severe conflict or confrontation between China and the US will be an unbearable disaster for the world.”

A senior US state department delegation arrived in Beijing on Sunday as Washington seeks to boost communication with China. Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of state for east Asia and the Pacific, would discuss “key issues in the bilateral relationship” during his visit, the state department said. Kritenbrink was being accompanied by Sarah Beran, the White House national security council’s senior director on China and Taiwan.

On Sunday, China’s military rebuked the US and Canada for “deliberately provoking risk” after the allies’ navies staged a rare joint sailing through the Taiwan Strait. The US Navy’s 7th Fleet said the guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and Canada’s HMCS Montreal conducted a “routine” transit of the strait on Saturday “through waters where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in accordance with international law”.

The US military said that during the transit, a Chinese navy ship cut across the bow of the Chung-Hoon twice, forcing it to slow down to avoid collision. It was the second close encounter between the American and Chinese militaries in less than 10 days after one of Beijing’s fighter planes swerved in front of one of Washington’s surveillance planes.

Li on Sunday questioned why vessels of the US and allies were there in the first place. China did not have any problems with “innocent passage” but “we must prevent attempts that try to use those freedom of navigation [patrols], that innocent passage, to exercise hegemony of navigation”.

Li suggested the US and its allies had created the danger, and should instead focus on taking “good care of your own territorial airspace and waters”.

“The best way is for the countries, especially the naval vessels and fighter jets of countries, not to do closing actions around other countries’ territories,” he said.

“What’s the point of going there? In China we always say, ‘Mind your own business.’”

Li told the Singapore summit: “In essence, attempts to push for Nato-like [alliances] in the Asia-Pacific is a way of kidnapping regional countries and exaggerating conflicts and confrontations, which will only plunge the Asia-Pacific into a whirlpool of disputes and conflicts.

“Today’s Asia-Pacific needs open and inclusive cooperation, not buddying up into small cliques. We must not forget the severe disasters brought by the two world wars to peoples of all countries, and we must not allow such tragic history to repeat itself.”

Li did not explicitly name any country but appeared to be referring to the US, which has been shoring up alliances and partnerships in the region. The US is a member of the Aukus alliance, which groups it with Australia and Britain. Washington is also a member of the Quad with Australia, India and Japan.

Li shook hands with Austin at a dinner on Friday but the two have not had a deeper discussion, despite repeated US demands for more military exchanges.

Speaking privately the sidelines of the conference, two Chinese military officers said Beijing wanted clear signs from Washington of a less confrontational approach in Asia – including the dropping of sanctions against Li – before military-to-military talks could resume.

With Reuters and Associated Press

The Guardian · June 4, 2023

10. NATO-trained units will serve as tip-of-spear in Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Does Ukraine have enough of these trained units?

Do they employ these in the initial assault where they could be ground up? Or should they be used as follow on forces for deep attacks where they could devastate the Russian forces who have been "softened up" and attritted in the initial assault?

NATO-trained units will serve as tip-of-spear in Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila Hrabchuk

June 4, 2023 at 1:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · June 4, 2023

When Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive finally begins, the fight will be led by brigades armed not only with Western weapons but also Western know-how, gleaned from months of training aimed at transforming Ukraine’s military into a modern force skilled in NATO’s most advanced warfare tactics.

As other Ukrainian units were fighting to expel the Russian occupiers from the country’s east and south, the brand-new 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade was preparing for the next phase of war from a classroom at a NATO base in Germany.

The brigade’s leadership trained with computers that simulated situations they might face in real life. Deputy commander Maj. Ivan Shalamaha and others planned their assaults and then let the program show them the results — how their Russian enemies might respond, where they could make a breakthrough and where they would suffer losses.

“You understand the overall picture, how it works,” Shalamaha said. “You understand where and what your shortcomings were. And we pay attention to what we failed to do during this simulation.”

Now the war games are over. The 47th brigade and other assault units have been armed with Western weapons, including Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and relocated to a secret location closer to the front line. During a recent visit by Washington Post journalists, the soldiers were waiting for the order to charge ahead to retake a large swath of Ukrainian territory and tip the war back in Kyiv’s favor.

The counteroffensive will be the biggest test yet of the U.S.-led strategy of giving the Ukrainians weapons and training to fight like an American army might — but on their own.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov called it the “next level” of security assistance, something he and other officials requested from their Western partners. The United Kingdom has been providing basic training to thousands of Ukrainian recruits since last summer. But more recently, whole Ukrainian units have been sent to Germany and other countries to learn “how to operate simultaneously together, like interoperability among the different units,” Reznikov said.

“We need company-level, platoon-level, battalion-level training courses with techniques, with their infantry fighting vehicles, with a commander who will understand how to conduct his forces, support artillery, support reconnaissance operations,” Reznikov said.

Critics of the West’s new emphasis on training the Ukrainians in combined-arms warfare, in which tanks, artillery, combat vehicles and other weapons are layered to maximize the violence they inflict, have pointed out that Kyiv is still missing key elements to fully implement that attack, mainly modern fighter jets. Ukraine is expected to receive U.S.-made F-16s after Washington agreed not to stop allied nations from providing them, but they won’t reach the battlefield in time for the counteroffensive.

One goal of the training is to teach Ukraine’s soldiers how to go on offense. For years, the Ukrainian military focused mainly on defensive tactics — how to protect its territory from attack. Even soldiers who fought Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine for eight years before Moscow’s full-scale invasion had little experience with planned assaults.

The quick, sweeping counteroffensive last fall to liberate nearly all of Ukraine’s northeast Kharkiv region in less than a week was the military’s first planned large-scale offensive in the country’s more than 30 years of independence.

The success in Kharkiv, and last year’s successful defense of Kyiv, were credited in part to previous NATO training for Ukraine’s military, which began after Russia invaded Crimea and fomented war in the eastern Donbas region in 2014. Many Ukrainian commanders, now in senior leadership, took part in such training.

At the training in Germany earlier this year, “the main tasks that were played there were offensive — only going on the offensive,” said a 29-year-old company commander whom The Washington Post is identifying only by his call sign, Tovarish, out of security concerns.

“We were in constant contact with their sergeants, officers, soldiers, as they trained us,” Tovarish said. “We had translators with us, so we could ask any questions. There was never a time when we asked a question, and they didn’t respond. Everything was really at a high level. We saw this other level, and we need to get there.”

Shalamaha said the first tasks working with KORA, a war-game simulator designed for NATO forces, were to plan make-believe operations on foreign soil against a pretend enemy. The instruction progressed to focus on what lies ahead for Ukraine’s military this summer. By the end, Shalamaha was working alongside commanders of other brigades expected to fight in the counteroffensive, coordinating their actions to test how they’d work together on the battlefield.

Others in the 47th brigade received training specific to the weapons or vehicles they’d be receiving, first learning the basics of how to operate them, then how to incorporate them as a single battle unit and then alongside other units.

A 32-year-old private whose call sign is Luke said he remained in touch with some of the American instructors he met. Sometimes he asks for advice or to review some of the things they taught him.

“In Germany, they really gave us a good chance to feel how it’s going to be,” Luke said. “As a team leader, I can command like five to seven people. But when it gets to be more than that, you really do need more practice. And then you’re trying to organize a whole battalion to move at the same time and everybody has to know what they’re doing. It’s really, really difficult.”

The 47th brigade started as a battalion that Shalamaha and Valerii Markus, a famous veteran and author with more than 450,000 Instagram followers, were charged with creating. It eventually grew to a full-fledged brigade intended to break through enemy lines.

“I realized that there was indeed an opportunity to create something — something interesting, something important, which could then grow into something much bigger,” Markus said.

“When I joined the army 12 years ago, I encountered a lot of things that disappointed me very much, that made me hate the army,” he added. “When I received this offer, I saw it as an opportunity to build a unit in which I would have liked to serve 12 years ago.”

Though still unproven on the battlefield, the 47th brigade is armed almost entirely with Western weapons and, in a first, nearly every one of the unit’s soldiers has undergone a weeks-long course with foreign instructors. The 47th’s leadership is also especially young — all born after the fall of the Soviet Union. Alongside Shalamaha, who is 25, Lt. Col. Oleksandr Sak, the brigade’s top commander, is 28. Markus, the chief master sergeant, is 29.

“We are the young generation,” Shalamaha said. “We still have our whole lives ahead of us, and we are now fighting for this state which we want to see for ourselves, for our children, grandchildren, and so on.”

But the biggest change? They didn’t just accept anyone, interviewing every soldier who wanted to join the brigade. Commanders questioned each person’s motivation and readiness. Every candidate had to pass a physical fitness test.

Alyona, a 27-year-old teacher who goes by the call sign Airy, was so angry after the atrocities committed last year by Russian soldiers in Bucha, her hometown, that she applied to join multiple assault brigades. Each time, she was turned away because she’s a woman — told to go home and cook borscht, she said.

Then earlier this year, Alyona reached out to a commander in the 47th brigade. He asked if her mother knew she wanted to fight. She lied and said yes.

“I told him why I’m here, that it’s not to take some photos to post on Instagram,” she said. “This isn’t a joke.”

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · June 4, 2023

11. China accuses US of 'provocation' after near collision of warships

Sigh...Admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter accusations.

China accuses US of 'provocation' after near collision of warships | CNN

CNN · by Brad Lendon,Eric Cheung · June 4, 2023

Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Li Shangfu delivers his speech on the last day of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 4.

Vincent Thian/AP

Singapore CNN —

China’s defense minister on Sunday accused the United States and its allies of trying to destabilize the Indo-Pacific – just hours after warships from the two countries were involved in a near collision.

In a combative speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore, Li Shangfu accused the US of “provoking bloc confrontation for self-interest” and said Washington and its allies were making up rules to assert dominance over the region.

He also warned that any “severe confrontation” between the US and China would be “an unbearable disaster for the world.”

Li’s warning came a day after US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told the same forum a war over Taiwan would be “devastating” and affect the global economy “in ways we cannot imagine.”

And it came just hours after the US accused a Chinese warship of cutting in front of an American vessel that was taking part in a joint exercise with the Canadian navy in the Taiwan Strait, forcing the American vessel to slow down to avoid a collision.

A screengrab of the encounter between the US and Chinese ships, as captured by Canada's Global News.

Global News

Questioned after his speech on the incident, Li said the US naval presence in the strait was an example of Washington creating chaos in the region.

“They are not here for innocent passage, they are here for provocation,” Li said of US warships.

Li said if the US and other foreign powers did not want confrontation, they should not send their military assets near China.

“Mind your own business,” Li said, adding, “Why did all these incidents happen in areas near China, not in areas near other countries?”

Near collision

Hours earlier, the US Indo-Pacific Command said, a Chinese destroyer had cut across the bow of the USS Chung-Hoon during a joint exercise between American and Canadian navy vessels in the Taiwan Strait.

According to the US, the Chinese ship came within 150 yards of the USS Chung-Hoon – less than the length of the Arleigh Burke-class ship itself.

“Chung-Hoon maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision,” the US statement said.

The Chinese ship acted in an “unsafe manner” and “violated the maritime ‘rules of the road’ of safe passage in international waters,” it said.

The incident was captured on video by a crew from Canada’s Global News, which was aboard the frigate HMCS Montreal traveling with the Chung-Hoon.

Montreal’s commander, Capt. Paul Mountford, called the action of the Chinese ship “not professional,” while a senior US defense official said, “Actions speak louder than words, and the dangerous behavior we’ve seen from the PLA around the strait, in the South and East China Seas, and beyond really says it all.”

In a statement later Sunday, a spokesperson for the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command said Chinese forces “handled the situation based on laws and regulations.”

“Relevant countries are deliberately stirring up trouble and risks in the Taiwan Strait, maliciously undermining regional peace and stability and sending wrong signals to the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces,” PLA Senior Colonel Shi Yi said.

The incident is the second time in two weeks that Chinese military personnel have engaged in aggressive maneuvers in the vicinity of US military personnel near China’s border. A Chinese fighter jet conducted an “unnecessarily aggressive maneuver” during an intercept of a US spy plane in international airspace over the South China Sea last week, the US military said in a statement released on Tuesday.

Austin on Sunday called on Beijing to “do the right things to rein in conduct” of its forces after the recent incidents.

Saturday’s incident between the US and Chinese destroyers was “extremely dangerous,” he said, adding, “I think accidents can happen that could cause things to spiral out of control.”

Later Taiwan said it was Beijing, not Washington, that was the provocateur in the strait, with Taipei’s Defense Ministry calling on “the Chinese Communist Party to respect the freedom of navigation and avoid overly provocative behavior, so as to jointly preserve regional peace, stability and safety.”

‘Completely wrong’

Shortly after Austin spoke on Saturday, People’s Liberation Army Lieutenant General Jing Jianfeng told Chinese state broadcaster CCTV that the US defense chief’s comments on Taiwan were “completely wrong.”

China’s ruling Communist Party claims Taiwan as part of its territory, despite never having controlled it, and its increasingly frequent military exercises near to and around the island have raised concerns about how far it will go to realize that claim. China’s leader Xi Jinping has pointedly not ruled out the use of force.

Jing accused Washington of trying to “consolidate hegemony and provoke confrontation,” adding that US actions were damaging regional peace and stability.

The comments from the Chinese and US defense chiefs come at a tense time for relations between the two countries, as China recently rejected an offer from Austin to meet at the summit in Singapore, citing US sanctions on Chinese officials and companies.

Austin noted in his speech on Saturday that he and Li greeted each other with a smile at a banquet Friday night, but called on Beijing to do more, saying “a cordial handshake over dinner is no substitute” for actual talks.

US and Chinese defense chiefs are not expected to meet this year – a mark of the depth of the fracture in relations between the two countries.

Austin on Thursday said it was “unfortunate” China declined a US offer to meet at the conference and warned the ongoing lack of communication could result in “an incident that could very, very quickly spiral out of control.”

In his Saturday morning speech, Austin criticized China for for its “alarming number of risky intercepts of US and allied aircraft” in international airspace, adding that the US would support allies and partners against “coercion and bullying.”

CNN · by Brad Lendon,Eric Cheung · June 4, 2023

12. Opinion | The U.S. is not trusted globally. Here’s how that can change.

Does our "BS blind spot" prevent us from seeing this growing anti-western and anti-American sentiment?

Fiona Hill offers a brutal critique. Are we only paying lip service to the rules based international order?

Excerpts:

Reflecting on this phenomenon in the context of the Ukraine war, Russia expert Fiona Hill notes that the other factor in this distrust is that these countries don’t believe the United States when they hear it speak in favor of a rules-based international order. They see Washington, says Hill, as full of “hubris and hypocrisy.” America applies rules to others but breaks them itself in its many military interventions and unilateral sanctions. It urges countries to open up to trade and commerce yet violates those principles when it chooses.

This is the new world. It is not characterized by the decline of America “but rather the rise of everyone else” (as I wrote in 2008). Vast parts of the globe that were once pawns on the chessboard are now players and intend to choose their own, often proudly self-interested, moves. They will not be easily cowed or cajoled. They have to be persuaded — with policies that are practiced at home and not just preached abroad. Navigating this international arena is the great challenge of U.S. diplomacy. Is Washington up to the task?

Reflecting on this phenomenon in the context of the Ukraine war, Russia expert Fiona Hill notes that the other factor in this distrust is that these countries don’t believe the United States when they hear it speak in favor of a rules-based international order. They see Washington, says Hill, as full of “hubris and hypocrisy.” America applies rules to others but breaks them itself in its many military interventions and unilateral sanctions. It urges countries to open up to trade and commerce yet violates those principles when it chooses.

This is the new world. It is not characterized by the decline of America “but rather the rise of everyone else” (as I wrote in 2008). Vast parts of the globe that were once pawns on the chessboard are now players and intend to choose their own, often proudly self-interested, moves. They will not be easily cowed or cajoled. They have to be persuaded — with policies that are practiced at home and not just preached abroad. Navigating this international arena is the great challenge of U.S. diplomacy. Is Washington up to the task?

Opinion | The U.S. is not trusted globally. Here’s how that can change.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · June 2, 2023

As I was following Turkey’s recent general election, I was stunned to hear one of the country’s top officials, Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, speaking to a crowd from a balcony. Jubilant, he promised that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would “wipe away whoever causes trouble” for Turkey “and that includes the American military.” Earlier, Soylu declared that those who “pursue a pro-American approach will be considered traitors.” Keep in mind that Turkey has been a member of NATO (with U.S. bases in the country) for about 70 years.

Erdogan often uses stridently anti-Western rhetoric himself. About a week before the election’s first round, he tweeted that his opponent “won’t say what he promised to the baby-killing terrorists or to the Western countries.”

Erdogan might be one of the most extreme representatives of this attitude, but he is not alone. As many commentators have noted, most of the world’s population is not aligned with the West in its struggle against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. And the war itself has only highlighted a broader phenomenon: Many of the largest and most powerful countries in the developing world are growing increasingly anti-Western and anti-American.

When Brazil elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the presidency last October, many heaved a sigh of relief that the mercurial populist Jair Bolsonaro had been replaced by a traditional and familiar left-of-center figure. Yet in his few months in office, Lula has chosen to pointedly criticize the West, rage against the hegemony of the dollar, and claim that Russia and Ukraine are equally to blame for the war. This week, he hosted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, whose brutal reign has led millions to flee his country. Lula lavished praise on the dictator and criticized Washington for denying Maduro’s legitimacy and imposing sanctions on his regime.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa had a reputation as a practical, business-friendly moderate who had strong ties with the West. But South Africa under him has veered closer to the Russian and Chinese orbit. The country has refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has hosted the Russian and Chinese navies for joint exercises, and now stands accused by the United States of supplying arms to Russia, allegations that South Africa has denied.

And then there is India, which has made clear from the start of the Ukraine war that it had no intention of siding against Russia, which remains the chief supplier of advanced weaponry for the Indian military. India’s statements about its desire to maintain a balance in its relations between the West and Russia (and even China) have been so numerous that Ashley J. Tellis, one of the most respected scholars on U.S.-India relations, wrote an essay warning Washington not to assume that New Delhi would side with it in any future crisis with Beijing.

What is going on? Why is the United States having so much trouble with so many of the world’s largest developing nations? These attitudes are rooted in a phenomenon that I described in 2008 as the “rise of the rest.” Over the past two decades, a huge shift in the international system has taken place. Countries that were once populous but poor have moved from the margins to center stage. Once representing a negligible share of the global economy, the “emerging markets” now make up fully half of it. It would be fair to say they have emerged.

As these countries have become economically strong, politically stable and culturally proud, they have also become more nationalist, and their nationalism is often defined in opposition to the countries that dominate the international system — meaning the West. Many of these nations were once colonized by Western nations, and so they retain an instinctive aversion to Western efforts to corral them into an alliance or grouping.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · June 2, 2023

13. Old-Fashioned Weapons Are a Key to Taiwan’s Defense

Excerpts:

This likely PLA strategy has two implications for force structure and one for strategy.

First, the U.S. should transfer—or help Taiwan develop—a variety of missiles and decoy systems to penetrate air-defense networks on the Chinese mainland. Several of these missiles should be hypersonic, and others should possess submunitions to destroy military and civilian runways.

Second, the U.S. ought to place key Chinese ports and airfields on a target list and gather enough cruise and ballistic missiles to destroy them at the outset of a conflict. The only way to break the Chinese reconnaissance network and allow U.S. forces to push the PLA back would be to destroy the infrastructure that supports the network.

Third, and most critically, the U.S. must rehearse the rapid deployment of American forces to Taiwan. This would skirt the Sino-American understanding of the island, but the U.S. must assure that Taiwan can endure the weeks of combat between a Chinese first strike and an American and allied counter.

The Ukraine war has upended the conventional wisdom that legacy systems no longer matter, especially as Ukraine begins targeting sites within Russia. That lesson also would apply in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Old-Fashioned Weapons Are a Key to Taiwan’s Defense

Destroying Beijing’s surveillance capabilities would take long-range missiles, which Washington should send to Taipei now.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/weapon-munition-taiwan-china-defense-drone-land-air-missile-hypersonic-ballistic-cruise-fe3a9984?mod=MorningEditorialReport&mod=djemMER_h

By Seth Cropsey

June 2, 2023 6:13 pm ET

Listen

(5 min)

Soldiers deploy an unmanned aerial vehicle during a drill simulating a military intrusion by Beijing in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan, Jan 11. PHOTO: DANIEL CENG/ASSOCIATED PRESS

A confrontation in the Indo-Pacific between China and Taiwan would have a ground component. Taiwanese forces—ideally aided by American counterparts—would have to resist an amphibious-airborne assault by the People’s Liberation Army. Prevailing in such an engagement would require the ability to hit targets on mainland China to shatter the country’s logistics system and perforate its reconnaissance ability.

Since the Vietnam War, munitions have become increasingly precise, allowing an attacker to destroy specific targets with fewer weapons. Yet modern militaries still suffer from a reconnaissance problem. As Russia’s air force learned in 2022, if you don’t know where the enemy is, precise weapons aren’t that useful.

An array of small helicopter drones and large fixed-wing drones have begun to bridge the gap between reconnaissance and precision targeting in that conflict. Ukraine has used these to great effect to identify and engage specific targets rapidly and to correct fire.

Russia and Ukraine are employing thousands of drones along the front line, constantly eyeing each other within a 20-mile diameter bubble. Piercing that bubble requires an attacker to destroy electronic and air defenses near the front line and launch longer-range reconnaissance drones into the gap to identify and hit deep targets.

Yet both forces have also relied on so-called legacy systems. Drones and antitank weapons haven’t rendered tanks obsolete, and neither have antiship missiles done so for warships. Any weapon is useful in the right context. The Ukraine war has shown the interplay between the deep fight—using missile strikes to starve the enemy’s front line of supplies and stall reserve movement—and the close fight—the traditional combat phase between tanks and infantry.

A war over Taiwan would have the same dynamic. The PLA has little incentive to conduct a lengthy blockade, given the naval power of the U.S. and other allied combatants. More likely are early strikes on fixed targets, such as American and allied bases throughout the First Island Chain, Guam and the U.S. West Coast. The more the PLA can disrupt America’s logistics and decimate its forces as the conflict opens, the longer it could isolate Taiwan.

To do that, PLA ground forces would have to create a beachhead on the island, capture a major port, land forces on that beachhead, and then break into the country’s interior. But amphibious operations are logistically intense. Transporting men and materiel over water is hard, even across a relatively small body of water like the Taiwan Strait. The PLA has only a limited number of amphibious ships for an assault—six combined arms brigades theoretically capable of amphibious operations, but with limited experience. China’s likely plan, then, is to use civilian ferries to make up the difference. Yet these ships are exceptionally vulnerable, and so with enough missiles, Taiwan and its allies could likely disrupt an invasion.

Even with such a setback, China could create a robust drone-based reconnaissance system. China is the world leader in consumer drone production, with companies like DJI that have direct ties to the Communist Party. The PLA also has a variety of fixed-wing drones. The U.S. may have an advantage in space-based satellites, which could help target PLA ships, air defenses and logistics sites, but the PLA has developed a series of antisatellite weapons and jammers that could disrupt the American satellite surveillance and communications network for several critical days. During this breach, the PLA could flood Taiwanese airspace with drones to identify and target virtually anything that moves on the island.

This likely PLA strategy has two implications for force structure and one for strategy.

First, the U.S. should transfer—or help Taiwan develop—a variety of missiles and decoy systems to penetrate air-defense networks on the Chinese mainland. Several of these missiles should be hypersonic, and others should possess submunitions to destroy military and civilian runways.

Second, the U.S. ought to place key Chinese ports and airfields on a target list and gather enough cruise and ballistic missiles to destroy them at the outset of a conflict. The only way to break the Chinese reconnaissance network and allow U.S. forces to push the PLA back would be to destroy the infrastructure that supports the network.

Third, and most critically, the U.S. must rehearse the rapid deployment of American forces to Taiwan. This would skirt the Sino-American understanding of the island, but the U.S. must assure that Taiwan can endure the weeks of combat between a Chinese first strike and an American and allied counter.

The Ukraine war has upended the conventional wisdom that legacy systems no longer matter, especially as Ukraine begins targeting sites within Russia. That lesson also would apply in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Mr. Cropsey is founder and president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of “Mayday” and “Seablindness.”

14. Three Cheers for the New U.S. Marine Corps, None for the Old

Excerpts:

Plus, warfare is intrinsically unpredictable. Nature operates by fixed, immutable laws grounded in mathematics that scientists set out to discover. Researchers can hold most conditions constant to reveal how a single phenomenon works. By contrast armed forces have to contend with living, breathing, often ornery foes intent on shaping tactical, operational, or strategic conditions in their favor. Antagonists abide by no fixed or predictable laws of martial strife. In fact, savvy combatants have every incentive to change battlefield conditions—to change the conditions of the military experiment. The greats, from the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu to the U.S. Air Force colonel John Boyd, urge them to do just that. That being the case, military interactions display a protean, unpredictable quality not found in the natural sciences. They morph with time and technology, and as contenders fashion new ways to outdo one another for strategic and political gain.

Because of the nature of warfare, in other words, no one can say with scientific near-certainty that the foes of Force Design 2030 are wrong. Unlike adherents to a discredited scientific paradigm, marine retirees can cling stubbornly to an old military paradigm—and vehemently oppose a new one—without losing all credibility. They can argue from authority.

Sounds like politics, doesn’t it? While Thomas Kuhn posits that science achieves fitful progress through politics, military affairs is literally a subset of political life, with the same hurly-burly among strong opinions. But stasis is not an option amid drastic, constant change. Political leaders and their military advisers must make their best guess as to the character of the future strategic environment and appoint leaders who appear fittest for that environment. They have made their best guess. By all indications lawmakers, the Pentagon, and the administration concur with Berger’s appraisal of the situation. Short of persuading the powers-that-be to anoint a Gorshkov, Rickover, or Liu, elevating a likeminded successor as commandant is the best substitute. Eight years of top-level advocacy on behalf of reinventing the Marine Corps is better than Berger’s four.

General Smith is one of the chief architects and executors of Force Design 2030 and associated concepts. He formerly commanded the III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, which will act as the marines’ Pacific stand-in force in a scrap with China. And he seems fervently committed to seeing the force-redesign project through. Robert Work applauds the administration’s choice for commandant. So do I.

Approve Smith’s candidacy, senators. Out with the old paradigm of sea combat—and in with the new.

Three Cheers for the New U.S. Marine Corps, None for the Old

Fighting jointly is how you prevail in an age when not just fleets of warships, and not just navies, but air forces, strategic rocket forces, and armies boast sensors and armaments able to mold events far out across the main.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · June 4, 2023

Let the paradigm shift continue! This week the Biden administration nominated General Eric Smith, the deputy U.S. Marine Corps commandant for combat development and integration, to ascend to the post of commandant, or top uniformed marine. This comes as glad tidings to those of us who favor “naval integration,” meaning the effort to alloy the American sea services—the Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard—into a single keen-edged implement for denying, winning, and exploiting command of the sea in concert with our fellow armed services and allies.

If approved by the Senate, General Smith will replace retiring General David Berger, who made naval integration his signature initiative as commandant. General Berger released “planning guidance” to the service almost instantly after taking up his post in 2019. Marine Corps headquarters soon codified these initial rough rudder orders in a family of documents that go by such titles as “Force Design 2030” and “A Concept for Stand-In Forces.” In turn these directives built on associated concepts such as “Distributed Maritime Operations” and “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.”

Taken together these concepts put aggressors such as China on notice that the U.S. sea services refuse to be driven out of important combat theaters despite the proliferation of access-denial weaponry and sensors; that marines will fan out at sea and along strategically important archipelagoes, eluding assault while working with the fleet on such crucial functions as scouting and putting weapons on target; and thus that marines intend to help the fleet deny aggressors control of the sea, wrest away control for themselves, and make use of control once they rule the sea.

This is the classic pattern in naval warfare: deny, win, exploit.

If they demonstrate in peacetime that they can do all of that, the chances of their having to prove it in wartime diminish. Hostile leaders will desist from misadventures that look impossible—and deterrence will prevail. Meanwhile friendly leaders and peoples will take heart that America has their back. And deterrence and reassurance are what it’s all about in statecraft during tense eras such as this.

Smith represents continuity with Berger’s vision, and continuity is at a premium for the Marine Corps around now. I have never been a fan of stringent term limits for senior officers. It takes more than four years, the normal tenure for a military chief of staff, to change the course of a big institution that’s set in its ways. The Soviet Navy benefited immensely from the prolonged labors of Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who oversaw the navy’s rise for almost three decades. The U.S. Navy submarine force profited from the exceptional case of Admiral Hyman Rickover, who served in uniform for 63 years and earned the title “father of the nuclear navy.” China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy has elevated its stature thanks in no small part to Admiral Liu Huaqing, who commanded the navy during the 1980s and rose to be China’s top-ranking military officer.

People are policy. But people need time to institute policy change. The more sweeping the change, the more forceful the leadership needs to be, and the longer change may take. And if necessary change is so convulsive as to amount to a “paradigm shift,” the demands on leadership are that much more intense.

The phrase paradigm shift goes back to MIT professor and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, who noticed during the 1960s that science advances through a messy, often vitriolic political process rather than through an orderly process of proposing, testing, falsifying, and amending hypotheses about natural phenomena. Professor Kuhn disputed the common notion that science is a dispassionate enterprise grounded purely in facts and logic.

In effect Kuhn defines a scientific paradigm as the best model going for explaining some facet of the world around us. For example, the geocentric paradigm satisfied humanity’s need to explain the workings of the cosmos for centuries until the Copernican revolution displaced it with the now-standard heliocentric paradigm. But as Kuhn observes, no scientific theory is ever proved beyond doubt. A theory can only be falsified, or disproved. It stands—provisionally—unless and until something better comes along. It’s doubtful anyone will ever improve on Copernicus’ model of the solar system considering all the direct observations made during the space age. What evidence could possibly falsify the claim that the planets in their courses revolve around the Sun?

But you never know.

So much for the theory of scientific progress. Here’s the rub: scientists are not Vulcans. They are human beings with human motives and frailties, and human beings do not accept something new just because it comports with fresh data and reasoning. Some defend the old with utmost vigor. That’s where politics comes in. People respond to incentives. Kuhn points out that upwardly mobile professionals tend to become invested in the reigning paradigm. Supporting and expanding on it helps them garner tenure, grant money, plaudits from peers, the sorts of career benefits all of us crave. Opposing the orthodoxy appears zany, and it certainly carries professional risk. That being the case, a paradigm’s adherents tend to become its gatekeepers, seeking to perpetuate their standing in the profession. If “anomalies” crop up between the model and observed reality, its defenders try to explain them away. Failing that, they adjust the model around the margins to accommodate anomalies.

Ultimately, however, the disparities between theory and reality may become so glaring that tinkering with the paradigm can no longer account for them. The paradigm collapses more or less at once. Gatecrashers who brought in the new paradigm become the new gatekeepers, and the cycle of progress through politics starts anew. No paradigm is exempt from challenge.

So it is with the natural sciences, so it is with maritime and military strategy (and, presumably, with other fields of human endeavor). Over the past year a clutch of retired marine generals and senior officials, joined most recently by the noted military strategist Newt Gingrich, have appointed themselves the defenders of the ancien paradigm of Marine Corps force design and strategy, a vision founded on hardware like tanks and tube artillery and on sloganeering about marines’ being the nation’s “9-1-1” force. They portray General Berger as a rogue commandant remaking the Marine Corps without congressional consent; they demand that Congress halt or slowroll the effort.

In Thomas Kuhn’s parlance, these gatekeepers refuse to accept that anomalies separate their boosterism from new martial realities, and to let go of their outworn paradigm. Retired marine colonel and deputy defense secretary Robert Work, who wrote in these pixels last year about the ruckus surrounding Force Design 2030, observed last month that the gatekeepers have lost in Congress and the administration. Smith’s nomination attests to it. But as Work notes, they refuse to move on.

One imagines Kuhn shaking his head in wonderment.

But why do they refuse to move on, and how do they get away with it? Part of it goes to the nature of warfare. Scientists have an advantage of serious moment over military practitioners. Namely, they can experiment more or less at will. They can adjust their theories, rejigger the parameters for laboratory or field trials, and on and on. They enjoy a considerable measure of control over the conditions under which an experiment unspools. By contrast there’s only one true field trial for strategy, operations, and doctrine, and that’s on the battlefield. Combat is the arbiter of what does and does not work in the military realm. But wars seldom come along, and no one in his senses would start one to test a theory of martial affairs (even though we do our best to learn from ongoing conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war). Still less can officialdom run controlled experiments.

So opportunities for “experimentation” under real-world conditions are rare and uncontrolled. This is not field research per se. Peacetime maneuvers and wargames are the best substitute for combat, but they’re at best a pale copy of the real thing.

Plus, warfare is intrinsically unpredictable. Nature operates by fixed, immutable laws grounded in mathematics that scientists set out to discover. Researchers can hold most conditions constant to reveal how a single phenomenon works. By contrast armed forces have to contend with living, breathing, often ornery foes intent on shaping tactical, operational, or strategic conditions in their favor. Antagonists abide by no fixed or predictable laws of martial strife. In fact, savvy combatants have every incentive to change battlefield conditions—to change the conditions of the military experiment. The greats, from the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu to the U.S. Air Force colonel John Boyd, urge them to do just that. That being the case, military interactions display a protean, unpredictable quality not found in the natural sciences. They morph with time and technology, and as contenders fashion new ways to outdo one another for strategic and political gain.

Because of the nature of warfare, in other words, no one can say with scientific near-certainty that the foes of Force Design 2030 are wrong. Unlike adherents to a discredited scientific paradigm, marine retirees can cling stubbornly to an old military paradigm—and vehemently oppose a new one—without losing all credibility. They can argue from authority.

Sounds like politics, doesn’t it? While Thomas Kuhn posits that science achieves fitful progress through politics, military affairs is literally a subset of political life, with the same hurly-burly among strong opinions. But stasis is not an option amid drastic, constant change. Political leaders and their military advisers must make their best guess as to the character of the future strategic environment and appoint leaders who appear fittest for that environment. They have made their best guess. By all indications lawmakers, the Pentagon, and the administration concur with Berger’s appraisal of the situation. Short of persuading the powers-that-be to anoint a Gorshkov, Rickover, or Liu, elevating a likeminded successor as commandant is the best substitute. Eight years of top-level advocacy on behalf of reinventing the Marine Corps is better than Berger’s four.

General Smith is one of the chief architects and executors of Force Design 2030 and associated concepts. He formerly commanded the III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, which will act as the marines’ Pacific stand-in force in a scrap with China. And he seems fervently committed to seeing the force-redesign project through. Robert Work applauds the administration’s choice for commandant. So do I.

Approve Smith’s candidacy, senators. Out with the old paradigm of sea combat—and in with the new.

About the Author

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

From 19FortyFive

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19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · June 4, 2023

15. Use of NATO arms for attack in Russia raises doubts about Kyiv’s controls

Excerpts:

There have been no previous public indications of weapons agreement violations, but the episode raises questions about accountability going forward, and what the United States is willing to tolerate, said Mark Cancian, a retired Marine Corps officer and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Ukrainians “are clearly complicit here,” he said, and the United States “has indicated in [its] statements that this is contrary to policy.”

Starting May 22, photographs and footage from the incursion began to circulate, and were promoted on the social media channels of both groups. The Post independently verified a video and photograph posted by the Russian Volunteer Corps, which, along with another video, showed at least four MRAPs and an armored Humvee mounted with a .50-caliber machine gun gathered along a road in Ukraine about five miles from the Russian border. Based on the visuals alone, The Post was not able to identify where the MRAPs and Humvee were from, or if they included the vehicles analyzed by U.S. intelligence.

Soldiers can be seen with yellow armbands commonly worn by Ukrainian forces. The MRAPs and Humvee are marked with white plus signs, which Ukrainian forces have painted onto vehicles during the war. One MRAP also appears with a distinct upward arrow on its left front door.

Photographs and videos later posted on Russian social media showed at least two of the same MRAPs, both with plus signs and one with what appeared to be the same arrow on the door. One of the MRAPs later appeared in a video published by the Russian news outlet Izvestia, which reported it would now be used by the Russian military.

Use of NATO arms for attack in Russia raises doubts about Kyiv’s controls

By Alex Horton, John Hudson, Samuel Oakford and Isobel Koshiw

June 3, 2023 at 12:59 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · June 3, 2023

The Russian fighters aligned against Moscow who launched a cross-border raid from Ukraine into the Belgorod region of Russia last week used at least four tactical vehicles originally given to Ukraine by the United States and Poland, U.S. officials said, raising questions about the unintended use of NATO-provided equipment and Kyiv’s commitments to secure materiel supplied by its supporters.

Three of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, also known as MRAPs, taken into Russia by the fighters were provided by the United States and the fourth was from Poland, according to people familiar with the U.S. intelligence finding, which has not previously been reported. Those people spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive issue.

The fighters also carried rifles made by Belgium and the Czech Republic and at least one AT-4 antitank weapon in common use among U.S. and Western troops, according to photos verified by The Washington Post.

U.S. and Western officials have insisted that Ukraine carefully track the billions of dollars’ worth of weapons that have flowed into the country. Kyiv’s backers have also largely barred Ukrainian forces from using Western weapons and equipment for attacks on Russian soil. Yet the recent raid into Russia underscores how materiel can change hands in unpredictable ways, creating oversight challenges that few in Washington and Kyiv appear willing to acknowledge. At least two MRAPs appear to have been captured by Russian forces after the operation, according to imagery examined by The Post.

The Legion of Free Russia and a second militia called the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) led the raid. The groups are composed of ethnic Russian fighters, including Russian citizens, who oppose Russian President Vladimir Putin and say they are working to “liberate” their homeland. Some members of the groups are known to be Russian neo-Nazis or to harbor other extremist views.

Ilya Ponomarev, political coordinator for the Legion of Free Russia, said the group was part of the International Legion, a coalition of volunteer fighters overseen and armed by the Ukrainian military. The RDK is an independent group that has said some members are in the International Legion, though the legion denied a connection to RDK, Reuters reported. The International Legion did not respond to The Post’s request for comment.

Last week’s operation took place amid widespread expectations of an imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive. The incursion was followed by an increase in other attacks on Russian territory, including drone attacks targeting Moscow and heavy shelling in the Belgorod region.

On Thursday, the RDK claimed responsibility for attacks that struck deeper into Belgorod. In a video message posted to the group’s Telegram account, fighters announced what they described as “a second phase” of operations inside Russia.

The Legion of Free Russia group also released video Thursday showing what it described as attacks on Russian forces, which The Post confirmed was taken about a mile from the border in the Belgorod town of Novaya Tavolzhanka. On Friday, the group posted an image showing a tank operating in the town, and claimed to be involved in fighting there.

Border areas in Belgorod remained under attack from intense shelling, local officials said Friday, reporting at least two deaths. The wave of strikes in the region has been described by local Russian officials and journalists as the largest bombing of Russian territory since the start of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Two apartment buildings caught fire in Shebekino, the Belgorod governor, Vyacheslav Gladkov, wrote on Telegram, adding that at least 850 mortar shells had hit the region since Thursday. Thousands of residents were evacuated, according to local media, and some reacted furiously at what they described as inaction by officials.

“We were forced to abandon our house, we fled from the shelling, took shelter with friends, yesterday we wanted to return to pick up dogs, they don’t let us,” one resident of Shebekino wrote in reply to a social media posting by the governor. “What should we pensioners do?”

In Moscow, senior officials continued to project a sense of calm. The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, did not address the situation during his daily briefing with reporters.

When asked about the use of U.S. equipment for cross-border attacks, a State Department spokesperson said: “The United States does not encourage or enable attacks inside of Russia. We have been clear about how we don’t support the use of U.S.-made equipment being used for attacks inside of Russia, including with the Ukrainians over the past week.

“Our focus is on providing Ukraine with the equipment and training they need to retake their own sovereign territory, and we have done just that,” the official said.

A U.S. official said that “each country makes their own sovereign decisions about what assistance they provide Ukraine and what conditions they place on them.” The official noted that “many have made the same requests we have of the Ukrainians.”

A spokesperson for Ukraine’s armed forces referred questions to Kyiv’s defense intelligence agency, which did not respond to a request for comment.

Ponomarev acknowledged there are restrictions against using Western equipment in Russia, but claimed the vehicles used had a long chain of custody that made it acceptable in this instance. He said they used “trophies” that the Russians captured from Ukrainians and were subsequently recaptured and kept by the legion. Ponomarev did not provide any evidence to support his claim that the legion had recaptured Western equipment from Russian forces.

RDK told The Post in a statement that it had used no foreign equipment in the operation. Yet photographs posted on RDK’s Instagram page and videos sent to The Post by the group show fighters in Belgorod holding various rifles, including the Czech-made CZ Bren and Belgium’s FN SCAR, according to Jonathan Ferguson, the keeper of firearms and artillery at Britain’s Royal Armouries who reviewed the images for The Post.

Belgium and the Czech Republic have provided arms to Ukraine, and it’s probable that is where these rifles came from, said Andrew Galer, a small-arms expert at the Janes defense intelligence firm who also reviewed the images, though he said it is possible they could have come from an intermediary country.

Bren and SCAR rifles are commonly distributed to Ukraine’s soldiers and its international volunteer fighters, according to two American volunteers serving in Ukraine.

A spokesperson for the Belgian defense ministry declined to say how many rifles it has sent to Ukraine or identify one from a photo provided by The Post. “The weapons supplied have always been passed on to the official authorities and the regular army, which is responsible for them,” a ministry spokesperson said.

The Polish and Czech Republic defense ministries declined to comment.

There have been no previous public indications of weapons agreement violations, but the episode raises questions about accountability going forward, and what the United States is willing to tolerate, said Mark Cancian, a retired Marine Corps officer and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Ukrainians “are clearly complicit here,” he said, and the United States “has indicated in [its] statements that this is contrary to policy.”

Starting May 22, photographs and footage from the incursion began to circulate, and were promoted on the social media channels of both groups. The Post independently verified a video and photograph posted by the Russian Volunteer Corps, which, along with another video, showed at least four MRAPs and an armored Humvee mounted with a .50-caliber machine gun gathered along a road in Ukraine about five miles from the Russian border. Based on the visuals alone, The Post was not able to identify where the MRAPs and Humvee were from, or if they included the vehicles analyzed by U.S. intelligence.

Soldiers can be seen with yellow armbands commonly worn by Ukrainian forces. The MRAPs and Humvee are marked with white plus signs, which Ukrainian forces have painted onto vehicles during the war. One MRAP also appears with a distinct upward arrow on its left front door.

Photographs and videos later posted on Russian social media showed at least two of the same MRAPs, both with plus signs and one with what appeared to be the same arrow on the door. One of the MRAPs later appeared in a video published by the Russian news outlet Izvestia, which reported it would now be used by the Russian military.

Francesca Ebel in London; Serhiy Morgunov in Kyiv, Ukraine; and Loveday Morris in Bratislava, Slovakia, contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · June 3, 2023

16. US protectionism is a flawed strategy

Compare this with Fiona Hill's comments in Fareed Zakaia's OpEd.

And as an aside with a name like the author's, he could not be anything but an economist.

Excerpts:

A further issue is how these protectionist measures are viewed by US allies. Biden has done a great job of rebuilding security alliances with partners in Asia and Europe, which is a key part of the US strategy. The United States has been a leading force in building the coalition to support Ukraine in its resistance to Russian invasion and has rallied its partners to counter China’s economic coercion. But many partners are unhappy with the US turn inward, as reflected by its decision to drop out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and by its recent protectionist measures.

US partners generally liked Sullivan’s language about the small yard with a high fence, since they do not favour decoupling from China. But there is some scepticism from allies, and even more so from China, that the United States is sincere in keeping the yard small. The United States will be rolling out additional export and investment controls aimed at China, and even if each step seems small, the general trend is towards decoupling.

The unwillingness of the United States to engage in new trade and investment liberalisation is a serious flaw in its strategy. It leaves the field open to China to strengthen its economic ties with countries all around the world.

As a result, the US international economic strategy is likely to achieve mixed results at best. Hopefully the United States will eventually respond by returning to promoting an open global economy and leading by example.

US protectionism is a flawed strategy | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by David Dollar · June 4, 2023

Author: David Dollar, Brookings Institution

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently came to the Brookings Institution to deliver a speech presenting the Biden administration’s international economic strategy. There are several things in Sullivan’s speech that have been well received by many economists, but also some areas of concern.

What is positive about the strategy is the recognition that economic strength is the foundation of national security. That US partnership with its allies, especially in Asia and Europe, is a foundation of economic security and that concerns about China’s trade practices should not lead to complete decoupling of the West from China.

Sullivan used the image of a small yard with a high fence — that is, there are technologies with security importance where we want China out of the supply chain (the high fence), but this will affect only a minor part of the economy (the small yard). Other economic exchange with China can proceed, as can cooperation on global public goods such as carbon reduction and development assistance.

What is worrisome about the strategy is the heavy focus on industrial policy measures that involve both subsidies and protection of the domestic market through ‘Buy American’ provisions. Subsidies are well justified for issues with large externalities, but protectionism will prove to be a mistake. The US administration is using one instrument, industrial policy, to hit two targets — to protect national security and to bring back manufacturing jobs. By trying to hit two targets, each one is to some extent undermined.

In the domain of national security, the ‘Buy American’ provisions make it more expensive to achieve US goals. Take, for example, the energy transition. The Joe Biden administration believes, correctly, that a transition to electric vehicles and renewable generation of power is key to the nation’s long-term prosperity and security. But the ‘Buy American’ provisions will make electric cars, batteries and renewable technologies more expensive in the United States than elsewhere, slowing down the transition.

Concerning the second target, generating manufacturing jobs in the United States, the administration’s approach is incredibly indirect. It consists of subsidising the build-up of capital stock, both through direct subsidies and indirectly through import protection, with the hope that more capital stock will generate more jobs.

Assuming that the proposed infrastructure construction and investments in semiconductors and electric vehicles actually proceed, there will be apparent job creation. But some, perhaps all, of the workers involved will be pulled from elsewhere in the economy, including from other manufacturing employment. After all, the United States currently has a 3.7 per cent unemployment rate, so there are not a lot of under-utilised workers. There is no guarantee that there will be net manufacturing job creation.

In addition, the world has changed so that average manufacturing wages in the United States are now lower than average wages in the rest of the private sector. The idea that manufacturing jobs in the United States are particularly well-paying is outdated.

If we are concerned about good jobs, as we should be, a more direct approach would be to focus on labour issues, including building a better environment for union organising, shoring up social security, providing public support for childcare and preschool education and investing in mid-career retraining. These are all likely to have broader effects on workers than subsidising a small amount of manufacturing production.

To be fair to US President Joe Biden, these social measures are all part of his broader agenda. But the administration’s focus has been on its industrial policy measures and now there seems to be little chance of advancing its social agenda given a divided US Congress. The risk is that over the next few years there will be little or no progress in the manufacturing renaissance and that this failure will be evident and politically salient.

A further issue is how these protectionist measures are viewed by US allies. Biden has done a great job of rebuilding security alliances with partners in Asia and Europe, which is a key part of the US strategy. The United States has been a leading force in building the coalition to support Ukraine in its resistance to Russian invasion and has rallied its partners to counter China’s economic coercion. But many partners are unhappy with the US turn inward, as reflected by its decision to drop out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and by its recent protectionist measures.

US partners generally liked Sullivan’s language about the small yard with a high fence, since they do not favour decoupling from China. But there is some scepticism from allies, and even more so from China, that the United States is sincere in keeping the yard small. The United States will be rolling out additional export and investment controls aimed at China, and even if each step seems small, the general trend is towards decoupling.

The unwillingness of the United States to engage in new trade and investment liberalisation is a serious flaw in its strategy. It leaves the field open to China to strengthen its economic ties with countries all around the world.

As a result, the US international economic strategy is likely to achieve mixed results at best. Hopefully the United States will eventually respond by returning to promoting an open global economy and leading by example.

David Dollar is Senior Fellow in the John L Thornton China Centre at the Brookings Institution.

eastasiaforum.org · by David Dollar · June 4, 2023

17. Chinese Hackers’ Attack on Key US Bases on Guam Is Part of Unrestricted Warfare: Military Expert

From the Epoch Times.

Excerpts:

“For years, China has conducted aggressive cyber operations to steal intellectual property and sensitive data from organizations around the globe. Today’s advisory highlights China’s continued use of sophisticated means to target our nation’s critical infrastructure,” said Jen Easterly, director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, in a news release on May 24.

...

CCP Is Conducting ‘A Form of Warfare’

Carl Schuster, a retired Navy captain and former director of operations at U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, told The Epoch Times that the CCP has been conducting cyber operations against the United States for years, but the hacking against Guam has him particularly concerned.

“My concern is that I believe at least some part of the Chinese leadership is conducting a form of warfare. We’re not at war per se, but any form of attack that depresses your capacity to function as a country should be considered an act of war. China is either practicing for the moment when war occurs or, they are already actively pursuing the degradation, if you will, of America’s financial infrastructure and its digital infrastructure,” Schuster said.

He speculated that the hacking was carried out by the strategic support force of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Chinese Hackers’ Attack on Key US Bases on Guam Is Part of Unrestricted Warfare: Military Expert

ntd.com · June 2, 2023

In response to the Five Eyes Coalition’s discovery of a Chinese hacker attack on American military bases in Guam, a U.S. military expert told The Epoch Times that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is either rehearsing for an impending war or has already launched some form of war against the United States.

Together with various cybersecurity agencies under the Five Eye alliance, Microsoft released details of the covert malware attack on May 24.

The attack was carried out by Beijing-sponsored hacker group codenamed “Volt Typhoon” and relied on “living-off-the-land techniques,” according to the Microsoft report.

“Volt Typhoon has been active since mid-2021 and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations in Guam and elsewhere in the United States,” it said.

Microsoft believes that the hackers are “pursuing development of capabilities that could disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the United States and Asia region during future crises.”

The organizations affected include communications, manufacturing, utility, transportation, construction, maritime, government, information technology, and education sectors, as identified by the report.

Security experts observed that the hackers intended to perform spying activities and maintain access for as long as possible without being detected.

“For years, China has conducted aggressive cyber operations to steal intellectual property and sensitive data from organizations around the globe. Today’s advisory highlights China’s continued use of sophisticated means to target our nation’s critical infrastructure,” said Jen Easterly, director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, in a news release on May 24.

CCP Is Conducting ‘A Form of Warfare’

Carl Schuster, a retired Navy captain and former director of operations at U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, told The Epoch Times that the CCP has been conducting cyber operations against the United States for years, but the hacking against Guam has him particularly concerned.

“My concern is that I believe at least some part of the Chinese leadership is conducting a form of warfare. We’re not at war per se, but any form of attack that depresses your capacity to function as a country should be considered an act of war. China is either practicing for the moment when war occurs or, they are already actively pursuing the degradation, if you will, of America’s financial infrastructure and its digital infrastructure,” Schuster said.

He speculated that the hacking was carried out by the strategic support force of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Guam’s Strategic Importance

Located in the Western Pacific, Guam is one of the four unincorporated organized territories of the United States. It is home to three military bases, including Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam, and Apra Harbor Naval Base. These bases have played significant roles in major conflicts, such as World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

Schuster said Guam is a major strategic hub for the United States.

“If China were to attack [Japan], Guam is the closest U.S. military facility through which we would send our military assistance or military forces going to help Japan. It’s also the island on which we would stage most of the support if we had to come to the Philippines defense or even Taiwan,” he explained.

Similarity to Balloon Incident

Schuster believes that the hacking operation has similarities with the spy balloon incident, and both are treading in the gray area.

He said he believes they are testing the United States.

“I think they’re both looking at what they can depress and damage via cyber attack, and I think they are, in many ways, testing our willingness to respond,” he said.

“First of all, it’s like the balloon case. They look at something that they think will not draw notice. Gather what they can. And then, when they see a reaction, withdraw or modify to try a different avenue,” Schuster said. “The balloon was a classic case of operating in near space to get a close picture of the environmental data over our key facilities. … And we didn’t respond.

“So in fact it was a covert operation in plain sight. I think these hacking attacks on Guam are similar in that they provide plausible deniability,” he said.

On Feb. 4 of this year, the U.S. military shot down a Chinese high-altitude surveillance balloon off the Carolina coast, but the Chinese Defense Ministry claimed it was a “civilian airship” intended for meteorological research that had blown off course by winds.

This time, facing the accusation of hacking by the Five Eyes Alliance, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning again denied it, claiming that it was a collective disinformation campaign launched by the United States through the Five Eyes Alliance.

CCP’s Unrestricted Warfare Against US

It is quite possible that flying spy balloons over the U.S. airspace and hacking key military infrastructure are both part of the CCP’s Unrestricted Warfare strategy, a concept developed by former Chinese Air Force Majors General Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangshui in their 1999 book “Unrestricted Warfare.” They claim unrestricted warfare employs all means, including economic warfare, cyber attacks, and terrorism.

In August 2016, Qiao Liang released a revised version of the book, which expands the scope of unrestricted warfare to include cyber warfare, resource warfare, media warfare, financial warfare, and cultural warfare. The book says that today’s battles have gone far beyond uniformed soldiers and aircraft and artillery and that the CCP must militarize all areas and must actively engage in all areas of invisible warfare as soon as possible.

In the book, Qiao said that unrestricted warfare is “a war that transcends all boundaries and limits … by all means … and beyond all political, historical, cultural, and moral constraints.”

Schuster said that in the CCP’s military thinking on unrestricted warfare, cyber warfare is an important part.

“Our finances travel over the web. Much of our business and logistics is coordinated through cyber systems. So it [cyber warfare] attacks our variability to operate as a country, it attacks our economy, it attacks our culture,” he said.

He also said that those in power in the CCP really believe in the concept of unrestricted warfare.

Political Warfare: Affecting US Elections and Public Opinion

In addition to the quasi-military actions fought in the gray zone, the CCP’s efforts to manipulate public opinion and suspected interference with U.S. elections are also part of unrestricted warfare.

In August 2022, two Reps. Jim Banks (R-Ind.) and Michael Waltz (R-Fla.) sent a letter to Jeffrey Wichman, the head of the U.S. intelligence community responsible for foreign political interference, to express concerns about TikTok launching a feature called “Election Center” during the U.S. midterm elections.

This in-app program allows users to access election information in each state, including how to register to vote, how to vote by mail, how to find polling stations in the user’s area, and more.

“TikTok, an overseas subsidiary of Chinese company ByteDance, which has members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on its board, will be policing American political discourse and owning the data of potentially millions of voters. This new Elections Center could provide an unprecedented political surveillance and election interference tool for the Chinese Communist Party, our foremost foreign adversary,” Banks and Waltz said in the letter.

Schuster believes that China is trying to reshape public opinion in the West, through media warfare, law warfare, and opinion warfare. He refers to it as psychological warfare in general.

“China is conducting it on almost a daily basis against not just the United States, but the West in general. You will see, for example, some of the things they do to affect elections. You saw that in Canada. We believe we saw it in the United States. The Europeans believe they’ve seen some elements of it. All of these things are intended to shape the geopolitical environment in China’s favor,” he said.

He observed that the CCP is aiming to create the perception that Beijing’s actions are legitimate while undermining the legitimacy of its opponents’ military, diplomatic, and political efforts. The regime also seeks to manipulate public opinion in the West by controlling media narratives. Additionally, the CCP and its cronies employ a strategy known as “law warfare” in which they attempt to alter the interpretation of laws.

“If you divide your enemy politically, then you weaken your enemy without firing a shot. So in their view, the perfect military campaign is one that does not involve any fighting. If you can make them believe they cannot be defeated or they cannot win, or that they should not fight, then you can achieve your objectives without fighting,” he explained.

From The Epoch Times

ntd.com · June 2, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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