Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


And now that you don't have to be perfect, you can be good.
- John Steinbeck “East of Eden”



"... We believe in free speech and free press. In fact, we are in thorough accord with the principle of democracy, equal opportunity, sound economic policies, free intercourse with the nations of the world, making conditions of life of the entire people most favorable for unlimited development.  
We believe in liberty of action in all matters, provided such actions or utterances do not interfere with the rights of other people or conflict with the laws and interests of the nation.  
Let us pledge our solemn word to carry out these cardinal points to the best of our ability, as long as there is life remaining within us."
AIMS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE KOREANS [CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THE FIRST KOREAN CONGRESS] 
- Drafted by Yu Il-han (柳一韓; 유일한), April 14, 15,16 (Philadelphia, 1919)

"There are no traffic jams along the extra mile." 
- Roger Staubach


1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2023

2. No survivors found after plane that flew over DC and led to fighter jet scramble crashes in Virginia

3. Sonic boom heard across D.C. region caused by military flight, Md. officials say

4. Florida Businessman Says ‘Entire Family’ Was on Crashed Plane Behind D.C. Chaos

5. Navy SEAL training commander speaks out after scathing report on ‘shattering’ candidate death

6. Marines release specs for high-tech next-gen combat utility uniform

7. Exclusive: Ukraine has cultivated sabotage agents inside Russia and is giving them drones to stage attacks, sources say

8. Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare

9. Fleet’s material condition keeps getting worse, new INSURV report says

10. Marines Will Restructure Infantry Battalions by September

11. Special Operations News Update - June 5, 2023 | SOF News

12. Army Seeks Bomb-Carrying Drones Like Ukraine’s

13. We Argued About Admitting Ukraine to NATO in 2008. Now We Agree on It.

14. Taiwan’s Imported Wolf Warriors – OpEd

15. Blinken says no Ukraine cease-fire without Russia’s withdrawal

16. World's spy chiefs meet in secret conclave in Singapore

17. US defense secretary discusses upgrading ties with India to counter China

18. United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) 2023 Joint Statement

19. Secretary Austin Concludes India Visit

20.  Pentagon draws ire of lawmakers over war crimes evidence sharing

21.  An Unwinnable War: Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine

22. EXPLAINED: Russia Claims to Have Repelled ‘Large-Scale Ukrainian Offensive’, Rumors of Counteroffensive Swirl

23. Ditching USD is an escape from sanctions and aggression

24. BRICS Raging Against the Dollar Is an Exercise in Futility

25. Did Shangri-La give birth to a new Quad?

26. US in an ill-conceived turn to neo-mercantilism

27.  A Strait Too Far: How a Deliberate Campaigning Approach in the Pacific Can Make Beijing Think Twice

28. Li Shangfu: War with US would be unbearable disaster, says China defence minister




1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2023


Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2023


Key Takeaways

  • Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted another limited raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 4 and are reportedly continuing to operate in a Russian border settlement.
  • Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov responded to a RDK and LSR demand to negotiate for the exchange of captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs).
  • The dissonant Russian responses to and reporting about the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast continue to suggest that the Russian leadership has not yet decided how to react to these limited cross-border raids.
  • The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast are increasingly becoming the current focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership.
  • Russian forces again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles on June 4 making it the fourth consecutive day of strikes across Ukraine.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in southwestern Bakhmut, supporting repeated Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city.
  • Ukrainian and Russian forces both claimed to have made limited territorial gains on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and Marinka.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft government decree that will no longer require an individual’s presence at an enlistment office for military registration.
  • Russian officials continue to use rest and rehabilitation schemes to deport Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia.


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 4, 2023

Jun 4, 2023 - Press ISW


Download the PDF


Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2023


Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros,

and Fredrick W. Kagan


June 4, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted another limited raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 4 and are reportedly continuing to operate in a Russian border settlement. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows LSR and RDK personnel advancing towards Novaya Tavolzhanka (3.5km from the Ukrainian border).[1] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov confirmed that there was fighting within Novaya Tavolzhanka, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Western Military District and the Russian Border Guard Service struck a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near the settlement, forcing them to withdraw.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that a sabotage and reconnaissance group of 20 personnel entered Novaya Tavolzhanka without armored vehicles.[3] Wall Street Journal Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Yarsoslav Trofimov reported that the pro-Ukrainian Russian fighters remain in Novaya Tavolzhanka as of 1700 (Moscow Standard Time).[4]

Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov responded to a RDK and LSR demand to negotiate for the exchange of captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs). The LSR and RDK addressed a video to Gladkov purporting to show RDK and LSR fighters with two Russian POWs whom they said they captured near Novaya Tavolzhanka. The RDK and LSR demanded that Gladkov arrive at the temple in Novaya Tavolzhanka by 1700 (Moscow Standard Time) to negotiate for the release of the POWs.[5] Gladkov stated that he was ready to meet with the RDK and LSR fighters at the Shebekino checkpoint to negotiate the exchange of the POWs.[6] Gladkov later reportedly refused to meet with the RDK and LSR fighters because he believed that the Russian POWs were already dead.[7] The RDK and LSR released a subsequent video showing themselves with 12 Russian POWs, criticizing Gladkov for lacking courage, and stating that they would send the POWs to Ukraine.[8]

The dissonant Russian responses to and reporting about the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast continue to suggest that the Russian leadership has not yet decided how to react to these limited cross-border raids. The contradictory reporting from official Russian sources about the situation in Belgorod Oblast and Gladkov’s apparent personal decision to respond to the RDK and LSR suggests that the MoD and Gladkov are not coordinating their responses to the raids. ISW has previously reported that Russian officials have disproportionately responded to the limited raids into Russian territory in an effort to assuage growing Russian anxiety about the war in Ukraine while also supporting ongoing information operations that aim to present the war as existential to Russia.[9] Russian responses have primarily centered on informational effects, and there is no indication that the Russian leadership has set a wider policy for preventing further limited raids into Russian border oblasts. It is also not clear if Russian authorities are orchestrating the evacuation response to this activity. An RDK fighter claimed on June 4 that Belgorod Oblast authorities have not organized the announced evacuation measures in the Shebekino area and that Russian citizens have largely fled of their own accord, leaving many settlements in a semi-abandoned state.[10] Gladkov claimed that 4,000 residents from the area are currently staying at temporary accommodation centers in connection with evacuation efforts, however.[11] Ukrainian Advisor to the Internal Affairs Minister Anton Herashchenko stated on June 4 that the RDK and LSR activity has prompted Russian leaders to divert significant forces to stop border incursions, although ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have done so.

The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast are increasingly becoming the current focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize the MoD on June 3 and 4, specifically calling out the lack of response from Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Colonel General Alexander Lapin, and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valeriy Gerasimov.[12] Prigozhin offered to negotiate the release of POWs held by the RDK and LSR if Russian authorities failed to do so, and responded to criticism of his offer by sarcastically stating that Russia has a problem with people who have “balls.”[13] Other ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the latest raid by criticizing Gladkov for being willing to negotiate with the RDK and LSR, and Russian authorities for failing to consistently inform the public about the situation in Belgorod Oblast.[14] A prominent milblogger used the raid in Belgorod Oblast to criticize the MoD for not funding Belgorod territorial defense volunteer formations and for not considering the volunteers as actual combatants.[15] Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin argued that the Kremlin cannot do anything about the situation in Belgorod Oblast without engaging in a costly diversion of resources that would likely end in an attritional operation reminiscent of Bakhmut.[16]

Russian forces again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles on June 4, marking the fourth consecutive day of strikes across Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched five Shahed-136/131 drones from Bryansk Oblast and six Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from six strategic Tu-95 bombers in the Caspian Sea in the early morning of June 4.[17] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down three Shahed drones and four cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that two Russian missiles struck an active Ukrainian airfield near Kropyvnytskyi in Kirovohrad Oblast.[18] Ihnat added that two Shahed drones struck unspecified infrastructure in Sumy Oblast.[19] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all drones and missiles that targeted Kyiv.[20]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in southwestern Bakhmut, supporting repeated Ukrainian reports that the Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city. Prigozhin claimed that some unspecified reports suggest that Ukrainian forces established observation posts in the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.[21] Prigozhin recommended that the Russian forces in Bakhmut take action if these reports are true. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar and other Ukrainian officials have continuously reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut since May 20, when Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces seized the entirety of the city.[22]

Key Takeaways

  • Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted another limited raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 4 and are reportedly continuing to operate in a Russian border settlement.
  • Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov responded to a RDK and LSR demand to negotiate for the exchange of captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs).
  • The dissonant Russian responses to and reporting about the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast continue to suggest that the Russian leadership has not yet decided how to react to these limited cross-border raids.
  • The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast are increasingly becoming the current focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership.
  • Russian forces again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles on June 4 making it the fourth consecutive day of strikes across Ukraine.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in southwestern Bakhmut, supporting repeated Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city.
  • Ukrainian and Russian forces both claimed to have made limited territorial gains on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and Marinka.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft government decree that will no longer require an individual’s presence at an enlistment office for military registration.
  • Russian officials continue to use rest and rehabilitation schemes to deport Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force northeast of Kharkiv City on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group conducted an unsuccessful attempt to penetrate through Ukrainian defenses near Zelene (34km northeast of Kharkiv City.[23]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are attempting to regain the initiative on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and are reinforcing their troops along the Luhansk-Kharkiv frontline.[24] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces are attempting to restart their offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske and Kuzemivka (16km northwest of Svatove), Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (27km south of Kreminna).[25] Syrskyi added that Russian forces are reinforcing their positions with “Storm Z” assault units that are staffed with convicts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed a group of 500 convicts to reinforce an unspecified element operating in Kharkiv Oblast, and that the Ukrainian forces injured almost 100 of these convicts with artillery fire.[26]

Ukrainian and Russian forces both claimed to have made limited territorial gains on the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 4. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces successfully advanced 400 meters in an unspecified area in the Svatove direction and liberated a significant area of the Ivanivskyi forest.[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces crossed the Oskil River and seized Novomlynsk (21km northeast of Kupyansk) but noted the absence of photo or video evidence for this claimed advance.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Novoselivske, while the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), Andriivka (14km west of Svatove), and Novoselivske.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Kreminna on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Bilohorivka and Spirne.[30] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in combat along the R-66 highway near Kreminna.[31]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Ivanivske and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Ivanivske direction and that Ukrainian forces conducted assault operations near Zaliznyanske (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[33] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Wagner forces continue to withdraw from Bakhmut and that regular Russian airborne (VDV) forces are replacing them.[34] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported that the loss ratios of losses of Russian forces to Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut was 7.5 : 1.[35]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka on June 4. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Vodyane, while some Russian milbloggers refuted this claim.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations near Avdiivka.[38]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Marinka on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian ground attacks near Marinka.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” Special Forces (Spetsnaz) continue offensive operations in the Marinka direction.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Akhmat units and elements of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps) with artillery support from the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) conducted assault operations in Marinka while Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack in Marinka.[41]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in southern Donetsk Oblast on June 4. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Pavlivka (2km southwest of Vuhledar) and Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[42] Another milblogger characterized the Ukrainian attacks near Pavlivka and Mykilske as unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations.[43]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4.[44] Geolocated footage posted on June 4 shows that mechanized Ukrainian forces made limited advances northeast of Rivnopil.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the direction of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Makariivka (within 4km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and captured Novodarivka (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Neskuchne (2km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through the first line of Russian defenses and advanced 500 meters to three kilometers in this area.[47] There is no visual evidence for these reports as of this writing. The language of these reports suggests that Russian forces also lost their positions in Levadne (18km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although it is unclear if this is a recent development or occurred on an earlier date. Footage posted on June 2 shows artillery elements of a Ukrainian artillery brigade conducting fire missions against Russian positions near Staromaiorske, about 7km south and 7km southeast of Neskuchne and Rivnopil, respectively.[48] Some milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted limited counterattacks near Mala Tokmachka (28km southeast of Hulyaipole), and that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against attacking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian “Vostok” volunteer battalion and elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) successfully defended against further Ukrainian advances.[50] Russian sources largely claimed that the Ukrainian localized counterattacks were reconnaissance-in-force operations.[51]

Ukrainian forces continued to target frontline and rear areas in southern Ukraine. Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted Ukrainian missiles targeting Berdyansk and Melitopol on June 3.[52] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck additional areas in Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4: near Melitopol, northeast of Melitopol near Chernihivka, and near the frontline near Verbove and Polohy.[53] Crimean Occupation Head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare systems destroyed or disabled nine Ukrainian UAVs targeting Dzhankoi, Crimea on June 3.[54]



Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD submitted a draft government decree that will no longer require an individual’s presence at an enlistment office for military registration. The draft decree states that Russian officials will be able to register citizens for military service “without the personal appearance of citizens in the military [recruitment office] on the basis of information contained in the state information resource, other state information systems and information resources.”[55] Russian citizens will reportedly receive notifications of registration and deregistration in their personal accounts on the Russian State Services Portal.[56] The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on Aprill 11 approving the creation of a digital unified register of Russian citizens eligible for military service.[57] ISW assessed that the Kremlin advocated for the digital register in order to use tools of digital authoritarianism to improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and crack down on Russian draft dodgers, and this new draft government decree is likely a part of this effort.[58]

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian servicemembers continue to desert their positions in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 4 that roughly 40 Russian servicemembers near Svatove, Luhansk Oblast left their combat positions and deserted.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces dispatched two helicopters and a Rosgvardia unit to look for the deserters.[60]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue to use rest and rehabilitation schemes to deport Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia. Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik stated on June 4 that the “Helping Ours” volunteer organization has sent 103 people, 67 children and 36 mothers, from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts to the Klyazma sanatorium in Moscow Oblast.[61] Miroshnik stated that “Helping Ours” reached a new agreement with the Russian Federal Medical and Biological Agency to send another 162 people, primarily children ages five to 13, to the Klyazma sanatorium by the end of 2023.[62] A Russian news aggregator reported on June 3 that children’s health camps in Bryansk Oblast will receive 750 children from Bryanka, Luhansk Oblast and that 90 children from the settlement will arrive in Bryansk Oblast in June.[63]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


2. No survivors found after plane that flew over DC and led to fighter jet scramble crashes in Virginia


What a strange incident. We heard the sonic boom yesterday.


No survivors found after plane that flew over DC and led to fighter jet scramble crashes in Virginia

AP · by MICHAEL BALSAMO and ASHLEY THOMAS · June 4, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — A wayward and unresponsive business plane that flew over the nation’s capital Sunday afternoon caused the military to scramble a fighter jet before the plane crashed in Virginia, officials said. The fighter jet caused a loud sonic boom that was heard across the capital region.

Hours later, police said rescuers had reached the site of the plane crash in a rural part of the Shenandoah Valley and that no survivors were found.

The Federal Aviation Administration says the Cessna Citation took off from Elizabethtown, Tennessee, on Sunday and was headed for Long Island’s MacArthur Airport. Inexplicably, the plane turned around over New York’s Long Island and flew a straight path down over D.C. before it crashed over mountainous terrain near Montebello, Virginia, around 3:30 p.m.

It was not immediately clear why the plane was nonresponsive, why it crashed or how many people were on board. The plane flew directly over the nation’s capital, though it was technically flying above some of the most heavily restricted airspace in the nation.

A U.S. official confirmed to The Associated Press that the military jet had scrambled to respond to the small plane, which wasn’t responding to radio transmissions and later crashed. The official was not authorized to publicly discuss details of the military operation and spoke on condition of anonymity.

Flight tracking sites showed the jet suffered a rapid spiraling descent, dropping at one point at a rate of more than 30,000 feet per minute before crashing in the St. Mary’s Wilderness.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command later said in a statement that the F-16 was authorized to travel at supersonic speeds, which caused a sonic boom that was heard in Washington and parts of Virginia and Maryland.

“During this event, the NORAD aircraft also used flares – which may have been visible to the public – in an attempt to draw attention from the pilot,” the statement said. “Flares are employed with highest regard for safety of the intercepted aircraft and people on the ground. Flares burn out quickly and completely and there is no danger to the people on the ground when dispensed.”

Virginia State Police said officers were notified of the potential crash shortly before 4 p.m. and rescuers reached the crash site by foot around four hours later. No survivors were found, police said.

The plane that crashed was registered to Encore Motors of Melbourne Inc, which is based in Florida. John Rumpel, who runs the company, told The New York Times that his daughter, 2-year-old granddaughter, her nanny and the pilot were aboard the plane. They were returning to their home in East Hampton, on Long Island, after visiting his house in North Carolina, he said.

Rumpel, a pilot, told the newspaper he didn’t have much information from authorities but hoped his family didn’t suffer and suggested the plane could’ve lost pressurization.

“I don’t think they’ve found the wreckage yet,” Rumpel told the newspaper. “It descended at 20,000 feet a minute, and nobody could survive a crash from that speed.”

A woman who identified herself as Barbara Rumpel, listed as the president of the company, said she had no comment Sunday when reached by The Associated Press.

The episode brought back memories of the 1999 crash of a Learjet that lost cabin pressure and flew aimlessly across the country with professional golfer Payne Stewart aboard. The jet crashed in a South Dakota pasture and six people died.

President Joe Biden was playing golf at Joint Base Andrews around the time the fighter jet took off. Anthony Guglielmi, spokesperson for the U.S. Secret Service, said the incident had no impact on the president’s movements Sunday. Biden was playing golf at the Maryland military base with his brother in the afternoon.

A White House official said the president had been briefed on the crash and that the sound of the scrambling aircraft was faint at Joint Base Andrews.

___

Associated Press writers Chris Megerian and Zeke Miller in Washington and Christopher Weber in Los Angeles contributed to this report.

AP · by MICHAEL BALSAMO and ASHLEY THOMAS · June 4, 2023



3. Sonic boom heard across D.C. region caused by military flight, Md. officials say



Again, strange:

Data from flight tracking service Flightradar24 shows a plane matching the Citation’s description and flight path reaching Long Island before turning around. The plane flew directly over Washington before the data ends near Staunton, Va.

Sonic boom heard across D.C. region caused by military flight, Md. officials say

The Washington Post · by Katie Shepherd · June 4, 2023

An authorized Defense Department plane caused a sonic boom heard across the D.C. region Sunday afternoon, officials in Maryland said.

The sonic boom was related to an incident involving a Cessna that crashed in Virginia, three people with knowledge of the situation said. Two of them said the Cessna was unresponsive when hailed by authorities.

The loud, explosive sound startled residents across the District, Maryland and Virginia around 3:10 p.m. For nearly an hour, it was unclear what had made the noise. On social media, people from areas as far-flung as Springfield, Va., and Bowie, Md., reported hearing the boom and feeling the accompanying vibrations that shook houses and left people searching for the source of the sound.

Officials from Annapolis and Bowie both said on Twitter that it was caused by a Defense Department flight.

“The loud boom that was heard across the DMV area was caused by an authorized DOD flight. This flight caused a sonic boom. That is all the information available at this time,” according to a statement by the Annapolis Office of Emergency Management.

Officials in Bowie said they “confirmed that the loud boom heard in Bowie was a sonic boom from a plane out of Joint Base Andrews.”

A media representative for Joint Base Andrews could not say what caused the boom but suggested the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) would know. NORAD did not immediately respond to calls and an email.

The Federal Aviation Administration said in a statement that a Cessna Citation jet crashed near Montebello, Va., around 3:30 p.m. Sunday.

The aircraft had taken off from Elizabethton Municipal Airport in Elizabethton, Tenn., and was bound for Long Island MacArthur Airport in New York, the FAA said.

The FAA said the National Transportation Safety Board would lead the investigation into the crash. The board did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Data from flight tracking service Flightradar24 shows a plane matching the Citation’s description and flight path reaching Long Island before turning around. The plane flew directly over Washington before the data ends near Staunton, Va.

The Washington Post · by Katie Shepherd · June 4, 2023


4. Florida Businessman Says ‘Entire Family’ Was on Crashed Plane Behind D.C. Chaos


Seems like a strange comment. His wife was not on the plane, only his daughter and grandchild (plus a nanny). Do they have no other family members? What about their son-in-law (assuming they have one). 


I can hear the conspiracy theories taking shape already based on this information:

Both Barbara and her husband, prominent business people in Florida, have donated to a medley of Republican candidates for federal office over the past few years, including hundreds of thousands of dollars in donations to former President Donald Trump and his political organization, according to Federal Election Commission records viewed by The Daily Beast.
The couple donated a combined $250,000 to the Trump Victory PAC in 2020 alone. Then, just two years later, Barbara made a number of donations to controversial candidates, including $2,900 to Georgia Senate hopeful Herschel Walker and $500 to Florida congressional candidate Laura Loomer, a far-right influencer known for making anti-Muslim statements.
Barbara also has direct ties to the Trump Administration. She was listed as a co-chair for a firearm-rights campaign organization supporting the former president’s 2016 run, called the “Second Amendment Coalition for Trump-Pence.”
A longtime National Rifle Committee member, Barbara has also been on the NRA’s Women’s Leadership Council since 2002 and spent more than six years as an executive committee member, according to her LinkedIn profile.
The couple committed their commercial real estate portfolio to a trust benefitting the organization, according to a statement they published on the NRA website.
“We want to leave a legacy that will help preserve this country as we know it and as it is meant to be,” Barbara wrote at the time.




Florida Businessman Says ‘Entire Family’ Was on Crashed Plane Behind D.C. Chaos


TRAGEDY AT 10,000 FEET

John Rumpel, a prominent Florida businessman, told The Washington Post his “entire family” was on the plane when it crashed—including his daughter, a grandchild and her nanny.


Erik Uebelacker

Breaking News Intern

Updated Jun. 05, 2023 3:26AM ET / Published Jun. 04, 2023 9:52PM ET 

The Daily Beast · June 5, 2023

Photo Illustration by Thomas Levinson/The Daily Beast/Getty

A Florida businessman and prominent political donor identified himself as the owner of a Cessna passenger aircraft that sparked panic as it flew into restricted U.S. airspace over Washington, D.C. Sunday—before crashing into the Virginia wilderness, according to a report.

The aircraft, which authorities said was piloted by a person who lost consciousness, prompted an aerial chase with Pentagon jets, which caused a sonic boom heard across the D.C. area, officials said.

According to federal aviation records, the plane was registered to Encore Motors of Melbourne, a Florida-based company owned by John and Barbara Rumpel, though neither were on board at the time of the crash.

In a brief interview with The Washington Post, John Rumpel confirmed he was the owner of Encore and said his “entire family” was on the plane at the time, including his daughter, a grandchild and her nanny.

“We know nothing about the crash,” he said. “We are talking to the FAA now. … I’ve got to keep the line clear.”

When reached by The Daily Beast, Barbara Rumpel, who is listed as the president of Encore Motors in Melbourne, declined to comment.

Both Barbara and her husband, prominent business people in Florida, have donated to a medley of Republican candidates for federal office over the past few years, including hundreds of thousands of dollars in donations to former President Donald Trump and his political organization, according to Federal Election Commission records viewed by The Daily Beast.

The couple donated a combined $250,000 to the Trump Victory PAC in 2020 alone. Then, just two years later, Barbara made a number of donations to controversial candidates, including $2,900 to Georgia Senate hopeful Herschel Walker and $500 to Florida congressional candidate Laura Loomer, a far-right influencer known for making anti-Muslim statements.

Barbara also has direct ties to the Trump Administration. She was listed as a co-chair for a firearm-rights campaign organization supporting the former president’s 2016 run, called the “Second Amendment Coalition for Trump-Pence.”

A longtime National Rifle Committee member, Barbara has also been on the NRA’s Women’s Leadership Council since 2002 and spent more than six years as an executive committee member, according to her LinkedIn profile.

The couple committed their commercial real estate portfolio to a trust benefitting the organization, according to a statement they published on the NRA website.

“We want to leave a legacy that will help preserve this country as we know it and as it is meant to be,” Barbara wrote at the time.

The Sunday flight began when the aircraft, a Cessna Citation, took off on a flight from Tennessee to Long Island, New York, the FAA said in a statement to The Daily Beast.

The flight failed to attract attention until it entered into restricted airspace near the U.S. Capitol, prompting a rapid response from the Pentagon. At least one F-16 was scrambled and quickly went supersonic, causing the boom that shocked residents across the region.

“The civilian aircraft was intercepted at approximately 3:20 p.m.,” the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) said shortly after the incident.

One of the Pentagon pilots saw the operator of the Cessna had “passed out,” a U.S. official told ABC News—a narrative which was later confirmed by both the U.S. Capitol Police and NORAD.

Shortly after being intercepted, the plane crashed in the Virginia wilderness.

It remains unclear what caused the pilot’s unconsciousness, though both the FAA and NTSB are investigating the crash.

It was unclear if there were any survivors.

The Daily Beast · June 5, 2023



5.  Navy SEAL training commander speaks out after scathing report on ‘shattering’ candidate death



A tragic event that hopefully we will learn from. But I think the Captain makes a very important point about leadership and the next generation.


[but] I’ve reinforced this throughout my entire time as as commanding officer: It’s on us as leaders to adjust to the next generation,” Geary said. “It’s not enough to say ‘You have to be like us and we expect you to perform like we did.’


This important comment goes way beyond this tragic incident and SEAL training. I think it can be traced to many of the issues in the military today, from recruiting to diversity, etc. We need to adapt to the upcoming generations. Those who pine for the good old days or blame the young generation for our ills should take a hard look in the mirror and ask if they are still suited for leadership in today's military. I think the young generation(s) are just as tough as we thought we were in our younger days. But they have different world views that are not necessarily in synch with the fantasy of our good old days.


Excerpts:


Now, in the wake of a highly critical Navy investigation into Mullen’s death, the SEAL officer faces scrutiny from the Navy, Congress and the press, and plans to retire from the service without adding a star to his uniform.
“You’re grieving the death of a dream every day,” said Geary, who is speaking out for the first time since Mullen’s tragic death. “I know by coming forward with the press on this one, I’m committing a cultural faux pas that will put me out of graces with my community, but I have to … I am laying down my career for my cadre of candidates to be their voice and defend them because no one else is.”
....
“Capt. Geary maintained a view that the high attrition was caused, among other reasons, by the current generation having less mental resilience, or being less tough,” said the report, which was unsealed last week.
The career SEAL officer vehemently denied the allegation to The Post, stating on multiple occasions that he would never say such a thing and that such an opinion would be the antithesis of his personal leadership philosophy.
“One of the things that was misstated in that report was this notion that I somehow blamed the next generation for being mentally weak, which is what resulted in the attrition,” Geary said. “Those were not my words. I never said that. Those closest to me in my command would say I never said that.”
“That’s flippant and irresponsible and just not true.”
To the contrary, Geary said he knew the next generation of SEALs were tough, giving multiple anecdotes throughout his two-hour interview with The Post and criticizing those who say young people are weak.
“It’s very easy to say, ‘Well, damn the next generation’ and make fun of them … [but] I’ve reinforced this throughout my entire time as as commanding officer: It’s on us as leaders to adjust to the next generation,” Geary said. “It’s not enough to say ‘You have to be like us and we expect you to perform like we did.’


Navy SEAL training commander speaks out after scathing report on ‘shattering’ candidate death

New York Post · by Caitlin Doornbos · June 4, 2023

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Decorated Navy SEAL killed in free-fall parachute training accident

WASHINGTON – Navy Capt. Brad Geary was on the path to becoming an admiral on Feb. 4, 2022, when he got “earth-shattering” news: one of his Navy SEAL candidates was found unresponsive hours after completing the training program’s “Hell Week.”

Seaman Kyle Mullen, 24, had just pushed himself through the most physically intense period in the SEALs’ famously arduous boot camp when fellow candidates discovered him in his room, blue in the face.

Medics would later pronounce him dead at a hospital.

“I’ll never be able to take that weight off my shoulders,” Geary said in an exclusive interview with The Post this week. “I’ve lost many teammates in my career, unfortunately. Too many. But this was the first one under my command.”

Three months before Mullen’s death, Geary had traveled to Washington, DC to accept the Navy’s top honor for “inspirational leadership,” the Vice Adm. James Bond Stockdale Award.

Now, in the wake of a highly critical Navy investigation into Mullen’s death, the SEAL officer faces scrutiny from the Navy, Congress and the press, and plans to retire from the service without adding a star to his uniform.

“You’re grieving the death of a dream every day,” said Geary, who is speaking out for the first time since Mullen’s tragic death. “I know by coming forward with the press on this one, I’m committing a cultural faux pas that will put me out of graces with my community, but I have to … I am laying down my career for my cadre of candidates to be their voice and defend them because no one else is.”

Tough enough

An autopsy report revealed Mullen died of a combination of pneumonia and swimming-induced pulmonary edema – a condition common in SEAL candidates, who experience fluid buildup in the lungs after prolonged exposure to frigid waters.

But Mullen had powered through in the middle of winter, enduring a five-and-a-half day stretch in which SEAL candidates are allowed just four hours of sleep each night, run a total of more than 200 miles, swim in the frigid ocean and complete other physical training for more than 20 hours per day.

Navy investigators swarmed Geary’s command following Mullen’s death.

The captain says he laid his concerns about a rising number of SEAL candidates dropping out of the training program he took over in 2020 and his efforts to conduct a study to identify the cause.

Kyle Mullen, 24, was found unresponsive after completing Navy SEAL’s “Hell Week.”

Facebook/Regina Knaup Mullen

Consulting with experts and academics, Geary found a multitude of reasons for rising dropout rates – including the coronavirus pandemic and “generational shifts” – but he said his concerns were ignored when brought to Navy leadership.

“Nobody really wanted to hear our message until after Kyle Mullen died,” he told The Post. “We beat that drum incessantly and it really did not resonate.”

Geary also made a number of changes to the program to prevent attrition, such as mandating six hours of sleep before Hell Week and eliminating heavy rucksacks from runs in early training phases.

see also


Cause of Navy SEAL candidate Seaman Kyle Mullen’s death during ‘Hell Week’ revealed

But when the report came out, Geary found himself depicted as a barbarian, out-of-touch leader whose cadre of trainers pushed SEAL candidates too hard.

“Capt. Geary maintained a view that the high attrition was caused, among other reasons, by the current generation having less mental resilience, or being less tough,” said the report, which was unsealed last week.

The career SEAL officer vehemently denied the allegation to The Post, stating on multiple occasions that he would never say such a thing and that such an opinion would be the antithesis of his personal leadership philosophy.

“One of the things that was misstated in that report was this notion that I somehow blamed the next generation for being mentally weak, which is what resulted in the attrition,” Geary said. “Those were not my words. I never said that. Those closest to me in my command would say I never said that.”

“That’s flippant and irresponsible and just not true.”

To the contrary, Geary said he knew the next generation of SEALs were tough, giving multiple anecdotes throughout his two-hour interview with The Post and criticizing those who say young people are weak.

“It’s very easy to say, ‘Well, damn the next generation’ and make fun of them … [but] I’ve reinforced this throughout my entire time as as commanding officer: It’s on us as leaders to adjust to the next generation,” Geary said. “It’s not enough to say ‘You have to be like us and we expect you to perform like we did.’

“No, no, we need to look for their strengths and look for their weaknesses. Be objectively critical of those and then help them develop what we need them to have for the SEAL teams and the missions that will ask them to do,” he added.

Navy SEAL candidates participate in “surf immersion” during training.

MC1 Anthony Walker/US Navy via AP

Ironically, it was Mullen’s fierce, never-quit mentality that contributed to his death.

He’d turned down offers of medical treatment as he coughed up blood and fluids that week, and even called himself “such a p—y” because he was struggling to breathe the day he died, the report said.

“[Mullen], intent on doing everything possible to complete the pipeline, was at increased risk of serious injury during Hell Week conditions of extreme fatigue and environmental exposure, with decreased ability to compensate and recover from such injuries,” the report said.

Fall from grace

But the investigation placed the heaviest blame on Geary and his staff, alleging the latter abused the Special Forces hopefuls while the captain looked the other way.

It also claimed that his leadership fostered an environment where seeking medical attention was discouraged, young SEAL trainers grew extreme in their practices and the voices of retired SEALs brought in as advisers were silenced.

Geary denied the allegations, saying he was “disappointed” with the results of the investigation, defending his team against accusations of wrongdoing.

After Mullen’s death, Navy Capt. Brad Geary was depicted as a barbarian, out-of-touch leader whose cadre of trainers pushed SEAL candidates too hard.

Chief of Naval Operations

“Our cadre deserved to be trusted and the American people deserve to know that they can trust the SEAL community, and it’s frustrating to me that [the report] unjustly undermines that trust,” he said.

His attorney, Jason Wareham, criticized the Navy investigation, alleging it was mishandled from the start and “perpetuates the Navy’s narrative to wrongfully discredit my client through twisted quotes, misconstructions and mishandling of evidence that has existed since the start.”

For example, the Army coroner failed to test Mullen for certain performance-enhancing drugs, despite knowing some, including human growth hormone and testosterone, were found with syringes in his car after he died, according to the report.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday presents Cmdr. Bradley Geary the USO Special Salute Award during the USO’s 38th Annual Awards Dinner on March 10, 2020.

Chief of Naval Operations

Geary received an official letter of reprimand after the Navy investigation, but was allowed to continue his service in the military.

However, the letter is likely a career-killer, as his name has been sullied throughout the course of the investigation.

“I genuinely love everyone that is entrusted to my care as a leader, and as the commanding officer of [the SEAL training program,] I loved my candidates,” Geary told The Post. “I loved Kyle Mullen; I grieved his loss and still do. I will carry that weight with me forever.”

A mother’s pain

But Geary’s fate is just fine with the late sailor’s mother, Regina Mullen.

If anything, she told The Post she’d like to see Geary, who still serves in the Navy but no longer leads the training program, fired for what she claimed was his role in her son’s death.

“I said, ‘You are a murderer. You murdered him,'” she said of her conversation with Geary in the wake of her son’s death, she told The Post. “I think he feels bad, but everybody feels bad when you’re caught.”

Regina Mullen went on to suggest that no one should go through the elite special forces training course.

“You are a murderer. You murdered him,” Kyle Mullen’s mother Regina told Geary.

Rachel Wisniewski

A registered nurse, she said her son would not have died if he had been given proper medical care when showing signs of respiratory distress.

“If you’re sick, you’re weak – that’s what they were like promoting and cultivating,” she said. “I don’t even know that you need the SEALs [in the military.]”

From the beginning, Regina wanted accountability for the command and worried the Navy would float the drugs found in Kyle’s car as the cause of his death.

She said this week that she told the service to write that there was no evidence that PEDs caused her son’s death in a press release, a request that was honored.

A photo of Kyle Mullen as a baby in his mother’s photo album.

Rachel Wisniewski

At the very least, Regina Mullen said, the command’s medics who conducted the mandatory post-Hell Week medical check on her son should have caught his debilitating condition and been ordered to monitor him.

“They should have never let that medical team go home,” she told The Post. “They saw my son swallowing, spitting up blood – it was visible by the eye … That’s disgusting. It was abuse of power.”

After her son’s death, Regina Mullen worked with Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ), who wrote legislation aimed at improving medical care and oversight of high-stress military training programs.

“When I first met Regina, she made it clear that no other parent should ever have to endure her pain,” Smith said in a statement last week after he and Regina met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.). “She has made incredible strides in her goal to ensure these young men are as healthy as possible and have access to a world-class medical monitoring capability.”

Regina Mullen wears her son’s fatigues.

Rachel Wisniewski

Independent investigation

The bereaved mother is now pushing Congress to direct the Pentagon’s internal watchdog to investigate the case after advocating for the command investigation that alleged Geary and his team were at fault in Kyle’s death.

She’s also spoken to media outlets calling for accountability for the officers.

“The safety of the men, that’s their primary responsibility,” she told The Post on Friday.

see also


Mom of Navy SEAL trainee Kyle Mullen wants reform after his Hell Week death

Geary’s attorney said he is confident that further investigation would clear his client of the scrutiny that has surrounded him since the initial report was completed last fall.

“If the Navy regrettably acts against my client, administratively or punitively, the resulting process will undoubtedly bring the needed antiseptic of sunshine to this issue,” Wareham said.

Former Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller told The Post those most deserving of accountability are likely Geary’s superiors, claiming the Pentagon’s bureaucracy regularly pushes blame and punishment onto those in charge of individual commands after tragedies.

“The services are extremely reluctant to ever investigate themselves, and when they have to because they realize there’s pressure, the initial investigation is always flawed [with] cursory bias,” he said Friday. “And in this one, clearly, the mother was not accepting the results of it.”

Kash Patel, Miller’s former chief of staff and longtime friend of Geary’s, agreed, saying he believes the Navy is cracking down on the captain to avoid taking responsibility for ignoring Geary’s early warnings about attrition.

“It was a tragic death, there needs to be a justification for it and someone needs to be punished,” Patel said. “And rather than punish the people who are actually responsible for it – the secretary of the Navy and the admirals – they reach down and create a scapegoat and unfortunately … we have a tragic way of attacking our actual heroes.”

Regina Mullen has called for accountability for the officers involved in her son’s death.

Rachel Wisniewski

The hope is that the new IG investigation will bring more clarity about what actually happened, make sense of conflicting narratives and offer suggestions about how it can be prevented in the future.

“I am extremely skeptical of any investigation conducted by the United States military,” Miller said. “That’s why you have Inspector Generals [who] are typically more unbiased based on their charter and more forthright and more revealing.

“But here’s the thing,” he added, “until Congress gets involved and forces an independent investigation, that’s the only way you get any anything meaningful out of the military.”

New York Post · by Caitlin Doornbos · June 4, 2023


6. Marines release specs for high-tech next-gen combat utility uniform



​Let's check the abbreviation/acronym for this new uniform: : HTNGCUU - try pronouncing that.

Marines release specs for high-tech next-gen combat utility uniform

marinecorpstimes.com · by Hope Hodge Seck · June 2, 2023

The Marines took a major step forward in acquiring a combat utility uniform that builds in fire resistance, minimizes visibility and adds comfort, releasing a highly anticipated solicitation in May that lists the must-have features and requirements for the new garments.

The solicitation for the next-gen Marine Corps combat utility uniform, or MCCUU, was published May 12, giving interested companies a month to submit a proposal and fabric sample for a uniform that will keep the Corps’ distinctive Marine camouflage pattern, but incorporate new tech and better fabric.

The Corps’ interest in a new utility uniform was first made public in 2021, when it signaled interest in garments that would incorporate the durability of the standard uniform with the fire protection of the flame-resistant organizational gear, or FROG, uniform.

The move would create substantial cost savings, Military.com reported at the time. The service currently pays $89 for the regular utility uniform and $184 for the flame-resistant organizational gear.

RELATED


Camouflage combat utility uniforms OK’d for Pentagon Marines

Marines already have been milling around the food court and strolling the hallways of the Pentagon in their cammies.

At the time, Marine Corps Systems Command officials said it wanted to pay no more than $105.60 per next-gen Marine combat utility uniform. The newly released solicitation limits uniform costs to $22 per yard, or about $110 apiece.

According to the solicitation, the flame-resistant properties of the next-gen uniform will include either no-melt, no-drip technology ― which protect the wearer from injury when the fabric is exposed to flame ― or self-extinguishing capabilities, which mean the fabric will stop burning once a fire source is removed.

The original flame-resistant organizational gear uniform, procured following a 2006 urgent need statement amid a preponderance of combat-related burn injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan, includes a shirt, trousers and balaclava face guard. The current version features no-melt, no-drip fabric and can withstand temperatures of up to 230 degrees Fahrenheit.

Separately, the new uniform will build in an increasingly valuable tactical feature: signature management. The Marines’ patented MARPAT camouflage, highly effective for concealment under the naked eye, emits a glow under short-wave infrared optics.

The U.S. military has been working since at least 2012 to develop materials, from special fabrics to dyes, that neutralize this compromising effect.

Today, multispectral camouflage technology, like the “camoshield” developed by SSZ Camouflage and Schoeller Textil AG, aims to reduce or eliminate the glow effect by bringing down the worn uniform’s surface temperature.

The Marine Corps remains secretive about its specifications and requirements for signature reduction. The solicitation states that interested contractors must complete a nondisclosure agreement even to receive the spec list.

However, it’s clear this does represent an all-new feature for Marine cammies.

“The current MCCUU offers no [flame-resistant] capability or signature management beyond the visual spectrum,” Marine Corps Systems Command spokeswoman Morgan Blackstock told Marine Corps Times in an email.

Beyond the added technology features, the uniform will feature improvements in “breathability, comfort and durability,” according to solicitation documents.

It will remain lightweight at no more than 7.5 ounces per yard, and be required to air-dry in 85 minutes or less. It must pass high air permeability thresholds to ensure the fabric breathes, and have built in moisture management or water-repellent fabric technologies that will make it like cutting-edge athletic gear.

In light of past Marine complaints about uniform trousers that ripped along the seams, the next-gen uniforms must also pass a stringent battery of requirements ensuring they can withstand tearing under pressure. Manufacturers also must prove that the fabric won’t pill or degrade after repeated wash cycles.

Like the current utility uniform, the next-gen combat utility uniform also will be treated with insect repellent, offering bite protection of up to 96%.

Marine Corps Systems Command officials declined to provide information about when Marines would have the chance to evaluate new uniform items or the timeline for fielding, saying these things were predecisional. The solicitation provides some answers, however.

Up to six purchase orders will be awarded to buy fabric featuring various flame-resistant qualities, documents state. Systems Command will then down-select, buying up to 700 yards apiece from selected vendors to assemble uniforms for test and evaluation.

“The experimental MCCUUs shall be tested for several months in a Field User Evaluation (FUE) in a hot/humid/wet environment in early 2024 to establish suitability and acceptability in the operational environment with concurrent lab testing,” documents state.

A final decision about which uniform to acquire will be made sometime in fiscal year 2025. No information has been released yet about fielding dates.

Ultimately, according to the solicitation, the Marine Corps plans to buy via the Defense Logistics Agency, about 270,000 next-gen blouses and trousers ― roughly 1,350,000 yards of fabric.

About Hope Hodge Seck

Hope Hodge Seck is an award-winning investigative and enterprise reporter covering the U.S. military and national defense. The former managing editor of Military.com, her work has also appeared in the Washington Post, Politico Magazine, USA Today and Popular Mechanics.


7. Exclusive: Ukraine has cultivated sabotage agents inside Russia and is giving them drones to stage attacks, sources say


Unconventional warfare: "activities to enable an insurgency or resistance to coerce,disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power..."


Not to claim "whataboutism" but the Russians have been doing this in Ukraine and other former Soviet states for some time.


Exclusive: Ukraine has cultivated sabotage agents inside Russia and is giving them drones to stage attacks, sources say | CNN Politics

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Zachary Cohen,Kylie Atwood · June 5, 2023

Washington CNN —

Ukraine has cultivated a network of agents and sympathizers inside Russia working to carry out acts of sabotage against Russian targets and has begun providing them with drones to stage attacks, multiple people familiar with US intelligence on the matter told CNN.

US officials believe these pro-Ukrainian agents inside Russia carried out a drone attack that targeted the Kremlin in early May by launching drones from within Russia rather than flying them from Ukraine into Moscow.

It is not clear whether other drone attacks carried out in recent days – including one targeting a residential neighborhood near Moscow and another strike on oil refineries in southern Russia – were also launched from inside Russia or conducted by this network of pro-Ukrainian operatives.

But US officials believe that Ukraine has developed sabotage cells inside Russia made up of a mix of pro-Ukrainian sympathizers and operatives well-trained in this kind of warfare. Ukraine is believed to have provided them with Ukrainian-made drones, and two US officials told CNN there is no evidence that any of the drone strikes have been conducted using US-provided drones.

Officials could not say conclusively how Ukraine has managed to get the drones behind enemy lines, but two of the sources told CNN that it has established well-practiced smuggling routes that could be used to send drones or drone components into Russia where they could then be assembled.

‘Cash works wonders’

A European intelligence official noted that the Russian-Ukrainian border is vast and very difficult to control, making it ripe for smuggling – something the official said the Ukrainians have been doing for the better part of the decade that they’ve been at war with pro-Russian forces.

“You also have to consider that this is a peripheral area of Russia,” the official said. “Survival is everyone’s problem, so cash works wonders.”


A drone explodes in an intense burst of light near the dome of the Kremlin in Moscow, in this image taken from video obtained by Reuters May 3, 2023.

Ostorozhno Novosti/Reuters

Who exactly is controlling these assets is also murky, the sources told CNN, though US officials believe that elements within Ukraine’s intelligence community are involved. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has set general parameters for what his intelligence and security services are allowed to do, two of the sources said, but not every operation requires his sign-off.

Asked for comment, a spokesperson for the head of the Ukrainian Security Service suggested to CNN that the mysterious explosions and drone strikes inside Russia would continue.

“We will comment on instances of ‘cotton’ only after our victory,” he said. Quoting the head of the Security Service, Vasyl Malyuk, the spokesperson added that regardless, “‘cotton’ has been burning, is burning, and will continue burning.”

“Cotton” is a slang-word that Ukrainians use to mean explosions, usually in Russia or Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. Its origins date back to the early weeks of the war and stem from the fact that the Russian word for a “pop” is very similar to the Ukrainian word for cotton.

‘A culmination of months of effort’

There has been a steady drumbeat of mysterious fires and explosions inside Russia over the last year, targeting oil and fuel depots, railways, military enlistment offices, warehouses and pipelines. But officials have noticed an uptick in these attacks on Russian soil in recent weeks, beginning with the attack on the Kremlin building. It appears to be “a culmination of months of effort” by the Ukrainians to set up the infrastructure for such sabotage, said one of the sources familiar with the intelligence.

“There has been for months now a pretty consistent push by some in Ukraine to be more aggressive,” this person said, speaking anonymously because of the sensitivity of US intelligence. “And there has certainly been some willingness at senior levels. The challenge has always been their ability to do it.”


A specialist inspects the damaged facade of an apartment building after a reported drone attack in Moscow on May 30, 2023.

Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, has consistently proposed some of the most brazen plans for operations against Russia and values symbolic acts, US officials told CNN.

Classified Pentagon documents leaked online earlier this year revealed that the CIA urged Budanov to “postpone” attacks on Russia on the anniversary of its invasion of Ukraine, according to the Washington Post. Budanov agreed to the CIA’s request, the classified documents reportedly said. But drones were spotted near Moscow on February 28, just days after the one-year anniversary of the war.

Another leaked US intelligence report obtained by CNN, which is sourced to signals intelligence, says that Zelensky in late February “suggested striking Russian deployment locations in Russia’s Rostov Oblast” using drones, since Ukraine does not have long-range weapons capable of reaching that far.

It is not clear whether that plan moved forward, but oil facilities in Rostov Oblast have caught on fire after being hit by suspected drones several times over the last year – attacks Russia is now investigating and has blamed on “criminal actions by the Armed formations of Ukraine.”

“All I will comment on is that we’ve been killing Russians,” Budanov told Yahoo News last month when asked about the car bomb attack that killed the daughter of a prominent Russian political figure in Moscow’s suburbs last year. The US intelligence community assessed that that operation was authorized by elements within the Ukrainian government.

“And we will keep killing Russians anywhere on the face of this world until the complete victory of Ukraine,” Budanov added.

A savvy military strategy

Publicly, senior US officials have condemned the strikes inside Russia, warning of the potential for an escalation of the war. But speaking privately to CNN, US and western officials said that they believe the cross-border attacks are a smart military strategy that could divert Russian resources to protecting its own territory, as Ukraine gears up for a major counteroffensive.

On Tuesday, the UK’s Foreign Secretary told reporters that Ukraine has “the right to project force beyond its borders to undermine Russia’s ability to project force into Ukraine itself. Legitimate military targets beyond its own borders are internationally recognized as being part of a nation’s self-defense…We should recognize that.”

French Vice Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, chief of operations of the Joint Staff, told CNN on Friday that the attacks inside Russia are merely “part of war” and offer an opportunity to send a message to Russia’s population.

“There is a war there and it could concern you [the Russian public] in the future,” Vaujour said of the attacks. “And so it’s a good way for Ukrainians to address a message not only to Vladimir Putin, but to the Russian population,” he added.

Regarding the attacks, he said that it wasn’t “forbidden” for Ukraine to think about that.

Ukrainian officials, moreover, have said privately that they plan to continue the attacks inside Russia because it is a good distraction tactic that is forcing Russia to be concerned with its own security at home, according to a US source who has spoken to Ukrainian officials in recent days.

In an intelligence update, the UK Ministry of Defense said that attacks by pro-Ukrainian partisan groups and drone strikes in the border region of Belgorod have forced Russia to deploy “the full range of military firepower on its own territory.”

“Russian commanders now face an acute dilemma,” the update said, “of whether to strength defences in Russia’s border regions or reinforce their lines in occupied Ukraine.”

CNN’s Jennifer Hansler, Alex Marquardt and Oren Liebermann contributed to this report.

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Zachary Cohen,Kylie Atwood · June 5, 2023



8. Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare



The 224 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA800/RRA853-1/RAND_RRA853-1.pdf



Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare

The Military Applications of Emerging Technologies and Implications for the United States

by Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA853-1.html



China views psychological warfare, centered on the manipulation of information to influence adversary decisionmaking and behavior, as one of several key components of modern warfare. The U.S. military's increased focus on China and preparations for a potential U.S.-China conflict mean that it is important to understand how Chinese psychological warfare capabilities may evolve and what they would mean for Chinese strategic behavior in a crisis or conflict. The author explores Chinese military thinking about next-generation psychological warfare. China is interested in both advanced computing, such as big data, and brain science for their potential military applications to improve future psychological warfare capabilities.

Leveraging a wide array of Chinese-language primary-source materials, the author provides an overview of Chinese thinking on psychological warfare, key capabilities, and related operational concepts that the Chinese military is pursuing and presents a hypothetical case study to illustrate how these capabilities, if realized, may be applied to a future U.S.-China contingency. One high-risk future scenario is if the Chinese military and broader leadership believes that these emerging technologies enable Beijing to predict or otherwise influence adversary decisionmaking. This could lead Beijing to have misplaced confidence in its ability to deter adversaries from fighting or coerce them to not fight at all.


Research Questions

  1. How does China think about future psychological warfare and the cognitive domain? What are some emerging operational concepts?
  2. What emerging technologies are the Chinese military interested in leveraging for next-generation psychological warfare? Is there any evidence of tangible Chinse efforts to actually develop these capabilities?
  3. What shortcomings do Chinese military psychological warfare researchers identify that might hinder desired progress?
  4. How might Chinese psychological warfare capabilities evolve, and what would they mean for Chinese strategic behavior in a crisis or conflict?
  5. How could Chinese capabilities affect U.S.-China dynamics over peacetime competition, crisis, and conflict?

Key Findings

Chinese military thinking on psychological warfare is much more diverse than previously understood

  • Although there are areas of general agreement (the objectives of psychological warfare), there is clearly debate over various operational concepts.

The People's Liberation Army psychological warfare community has discussed a variety of technologies that it envisions leveraging for future operations

  • These include advanced computing, especially big data and information processing; brain science, especially brain imaging; and legacy proposals that remain of interest, including sonic weapons, laser weapons, subliminal messaging, and holograms.
  • There is strong evidence the Chinese military has developed and employed information manipulation capabilities and laser weapons already, although it is unclear whether these have been specifically intended as psychological warfare.

There are three alternative futures that illustrate potential trends and the long-term outlook for Chinese psychological warfare

  • The first is an embrace of information manipulation as a leading edge of national power.
  • The second is a bold new direction for warfare, centered on a Chinese military embrace of emerging technology for predicting or otherwise shaping adversary decisionmaking.
  • The third is a failure of imagination, causing a continuation of the status quo for Chinese military capabilities.

The real-world impact of next-generation psychological warfare capabilities may be even less important than Beijing's assumption about whether they will work as intended, or, once employment begins, even its perception that they are working as intended

  • This raises the risk that once China realizes that its psychological warfare efforts are not having the intended effect, such as the adversary taking a different course of action, Beijing might respond in unpredictable ways.

Recommendations

  • The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) should pay special attention to indications that the Chinese military is becoming more interested in predicting or influencing adversary decisionmaking.
  • DoD should continue to improve its understanding of Chinese psychological warfare theory (doctrine) and development of new capabilities across the research and development process.
  • DoD should better understand China's psychological warfare workforce.
  • DoD should better understand Chinese psychological warfare operations and training.
  • DoD should pay special attention to how Beijing is applying military-civil fusion toward psychological warfare.
  • DoD should better understand Chinese concerns about adversary psychological warfare for defense.
  • DoD should consider how to protect its troops from Chinese psychological warfare (nonlethal) weapons.
  • DoD should consider how to protect its troops from Chinese information collection and information manipulation.
  • DoD should consider dialogue with China, specifically the Chinese military, on the implications of new technology for warfare and the acceptable scope of conflict.
  • The U.S. intelligence community should pay special attention to an increase in intelligence deception from China.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One
  • Introduction
  • Chapter Two
  • Overview of Chinese Psychological Warfare
  • Chapter Three
  • People's Liberation Army Views of the Cognitive Domain
  • Chapter Four
  • Chinese Military Research on Next-Generation Psychological Warfare
  • Chapter Five
  • Gauging People's Liberation Army Interest and Potential Challenges
  • Chapter Six
  • Applied Case Study
  • Chapter Seven
  • Implications for the United States


9. Fleet’s material condition keeps getting worse, new INSURV report says


And what if we have to fight tonight?


Fleet’s material condition keeps getting worse, new INSURV report says

navytimes.com · by Geoff Ziezulewicz · June 2, 2023

The Navy fleet’s overall material condition declined slightly in fiscal 2022, “resuming a slight but steady negative trend” that has occurred since fiscal 2017, according to the Navy’s annual Board of Inspection and Survey, or INSURV, report released by the Navy on Friday.

The report notes that the negative trend “is more notable” due to changes in INSURV calculations that adhere more closely to Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual metrics.

INSURV also removed major system demonstration and administrative program scores from the INSURV Figure of Merit, or IFOM, calculations.

“The updated IFOM calculation generates a more focused measure of overall material condition,” the report states.

Go here to read the full INSURV report that was sent to Congress.

The board changed its ship inspection waiver policy in FY20, requiring vessels to be inspected every three years or be considered overdue.

At the end of FY22, roughly 44 percent of vessels were overdue for inspection, according to the report.

The report also warns that INSURV does not have enough people to inspect every ship every three years, and notes that it had to lean on Regional Maintenance Center technicians to serve as inspectors.

RELATED


Surface ship readiness continues to struggle, US Navy inspections show

Surface ship maintenance continued its slide in 2020, according to a new annual report from the Board of Inspection and Survey.

By David B. Larter

“INSURV does not possess sufficient funded billets to perform all inspection elements, especially the most specialized, specific technical requirements,” the report states.

The report found that the material condition of surface ships, submarines and aircraft carriers “all declined slightly from FY 2021,” but that the largest year-to-year drop occurred in the Military Sealift Command Fleet.

“Overall, several functional areas and subsystems remain degraded or show declining trends, indicative of areas where material readiness is stressed,” the report states.

INSURV conducted 80 material inspections of in-service vessels in FY22, a 72 percent increase in total inspections compared to the six-year average, the report states.

Inspectors also conducted 23 trials of new-construction ships, along with eight surveys.

Of those, the Virginia-class submarine, Independence-class littoral combat ship, Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport, ship-to-shore connector, yard tug and barracks barge programs performed well on trials.

“The remaining programs experienced significant deviations from OPNAV trial requirements, missed key program milestones, or had declining trial performance during the fiscal year,” according to the report.

INSURV conducts a range of inspections of ships already in the fleet and those being introduced to the fleet in order to ensure they will be able to meet their mission, the report states. The office also conducts surveys on ships at the end of their service lives when required.

INSURV scores ships based on the “weighted average of the material condition of equipment in functional areas” that are generally aligned along roughly 156 systems and about 551 sub-systems.


A chart from the Navy's annual Board of Inspection and Survey report shows the six-year trend for surface functional area scores and the total number of ships inspected each year. (Navy)

The surface fleet showed “a slightly decreasing trend” in the average IFOM score, and the scores for FY22 were below the six-year average.

All told, INSURV evaluated 14 functional areas as degraded in the surface fleet ships it assessed.

The submarine community “showed a slight decline from FY 2021 and was just below the 6-year average,” according to the report. Two functional areas were evaluated as degraded in the FY22 assessment.


A chart from the Navy's annual Board of Inspection and Survey report shows the six-year trend for submarine functional area scores and the total number of boats inspected each year. (Navy)

INSURV notes that carrier data “has been difficult to trend due to the small samples sizes that result when a population of ten to eleven CVNs was historically inspected an average of once every five to six years.”

To increase the sample size and make the trends more relevant, INSURV expanded the overall trend time period to 12 years and grouped the carriers into multi-year periods, according to the report.

The carrier scores “remained consistent with FY 2021 result and equaled the 6-year average,” the report states.

Eleven functional areas were evaluated as degraded.


A chart from the Navy's annual Board of Inspection and Survey report details the condition of carriers. INSURV expanded the overall time period of the trend (12 years) and grouped the CVNs into multi-year periods. (Navy)

The scoring averages for the Military Sealift Command fleet were lower in FY22 than the six-year average, according to the report.

“FY 2022 scores and trends indicate nearly all functional areas experience a decline over previous years,” the report states, noting a “precipitous drop” in IFOM scores for that fleet.


A chart from the Navy's annual Board of Inspection and Survey report shows the five-year trend for Military Sealift Command functional area scores and the total number of ships inspected each year. (Navy)

About Geoff Ziezulewicz

Geoff is a senior staff reporter for Military Times, focusing on the Navy. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was most recently a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.



10. Marines Will Restructure Infantry Battalions by September




Marines Will Restructure Infantry Battalions by September

The changes are informed by the service’s Infantry Battalion Experiment, part of Force Design 2030.


BY CAITLIN M. KENNEY

STAFF REPORTER, DEFENSE ONE

JUNE 5, 2023 05:18 AM ET


defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney

The Marine Corps will reconfigure all of its infantry battalions and shrink them from roughly 900 to just over 800 Marines by this fall as part of the service’s ongoing Force Design modernization effort.

The units will also have more medical and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as loitering munitions—changes that came out of the service’s Infantry Battalion Experiment as it prepares for future conflicts. The changes were announced Monday as part of the service's Force Design Annual Update.

The Marines in 2020 began the Infantry Battalion Experiment, or IBX, to see if they could rework infantry battalions to be smaller while at the same time having Marines trained to use a variety of weapons in a distributed environment. Commandant Gen. David Berger has said Force Design 2030 was necessary to get the force ready for potential operations in the Pacific and elsewhere.

The service used three existing battalions to test a variety of configurations, including one with just 735 Marines. During Phase I of the experimentation, which included 13 “live-force experiments” in different locations—they realized that was too small.

“We essentially broke the battalion. I mean, those are my words,” Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for Combat Development and Integration, told reporters Friday ahead of the update’s release. “But that's what we wanted, right? So we found our far left, left lateral limit, right? And then we came back. So we—the commandant made the decision to bring the infantry battalion number back up to 811.”

The Force Design update released Monday directs the deputy commandant for manpower and reserve affairs to “implement the 811 Marine battalion structure across all active and reserve component infantry units” by September 1.

This is the third and final update to the plan under Berger, who is retiring this summer. Berger has faced criticism from retired Marine leaders for some of the modernization effort’s major changes, but has also received support in Congress for the overhaul.

Despite critics saying that “we don’t listen,” Heckl said Berger “didn’t even balk” at the recommendation given by senior commanders to increase the size of the battalions from the proposed 735 level.

“This is what Marines do better than anybody,” he said. “We're small enough that we can be agile, and quick, and make changes quickly and efficiently. And that’s exactly what is happening here.”

The 811 number means battalions will be able to keep an entire 81-mm mortar section, instead of cutting it in half as would have been required with the 735 number, said Brig. Gen Kyle Ellison, the commander of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.

“The 81-mm mortar is an all-weather capable fire support asset for the battalion,” Ellison said. “Based on experimentation, what we determined was … some of our autonomous systems and loitering munitions that we're going to bring to bear here in the future aren’t all-weather. And so how do you create that complement of systems that enable us to maintain a combined-arms capable force at the battalion level?”

The redesigned battalions will also have a scout platoon that does “multidomain reconnaissance at the battalion level, being able to sense and make sense forward on a distributed battlefield,” a capability commanders currently do not have, Ellison said. Battalions will also have electronic warfare capabilities and loitering munitions at the company level, and more medical capabilities at the company and battalion level.

“We're going to be encountering a level—if we go to combat—a level of combat casualty care requirements that we haven't seen since World War II,” he said. “How are we going to keep faith with our people and be able to take care of them and evacuate them in a contested environment?”

The Marines settled on an 811-Marine battalion size last year, but also decided to keep experimenting and do a second phase of IBX, which Ellison calls the “decisive phase.” This phase is currently underway, focused on just 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, based at Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms in California.

The second phase “will be characterized by further refinements following a series of experiments at the company and battalion levels. These experiments will primarily focus on C5ISRT, sustainment, sensing, and lethality,” according to the new Force Design update. C5ISRT is command, control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting.

Third Battalion, 4th Marines returned from deployment in April, and over 18 months, as it prepares for the next one, the unit will be manned, trained, and equipped based on how the Marine Corps envisions future infantry battalions, “so we can assess it and build that body of evidence to make sure we found the sweet spot with our experimentation and our equipment,” Ellison said. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, which is leading the experimentation effort, will work with the unit through their training and deployment, he said.

“So we’re going to experiment with them in every clime and place, to include the jungles of Okinawa, Japan, and in the Pacific,” he said. “So it's about an 18 month experimentation timeline, but we'll recommend decisions as we learn. We're not going to wait to make decisions, there’s second- and third-order effects to every decision we make. And part of our responsibility is to inform Lt. Gen. Heckl of decisions that can be made early that help us anticipate later decisions or enable alternatives across the rest of the force.”

defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney




11. Special Operations News Update - June 5, 2023 | SOF News



Special Operations News Update - June 5, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · June 5, 2023


Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: Marines jump from a KC-130J Super Hercules during parachute drills over Okinawa, Japan, May 16, 2023. Photo by Marine Corps Cpl. Michael Taggart.

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

MG Bargewell Dedication. On May 20, 2023, a park dedication ceremony was held on Armed Forces Day dedicating Delta Park in Hoquiam, Washington to Major General Eldon Bargewell, a retired Special Forces officer now deceased. https://eldonbargewell.org/

Fallen ARSOF Remembered. The names of 1,242 fallen Army Special Operations warriors are etched on the Memorial Wall at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command headquaters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. USASOC honored their legacy during a Gold Star Memorial Ceremony held on May 25, 2023. “Fallen warriors of Army Special Operations honored, remembered”, U.S. Army, March 26, 2023.

Former SOF Intel Officer Jailed. A retired lieutenant colonel, Robert Birchum, who worked in various intelligence positions with the Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and other intel organizations has been sentenced to three years imprisonment for removing more than 300 classified files or documents from authorized locations and storing them in his home. “Retired Air Force officer gets 3 years for having classified documents”, Air Force Times, June 2, 2023.

Army to Cut SOF by 10%? Lawmakers and Army officials have discussed cuts through the decade’s end, including cutting force strength of Green Berets and PSYOP. “Army Mulls 10-20% Cut to Special Operations Forces”, Defense One, May 22, 2023.

CA Officer Assignment. Brig. Gen. Andree G. Carter, deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, will be assigned as the commander, 350th Civil Affairs Command, Pensacola, Florida.

SF Officer Assignment. Brig. Gen. Lawrence G. Ferguson, deputy commanding general (Operations), 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is assigned as commanding general, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

193rd SOW and ACE. Agile Combat Employment or ACE is a concept that the 193rd Special Operations Wing is incorporating into its training program. The wing is exploring expansion of its course offerings at Fort Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania. Read more in “Wing eyes Regional Training Site as location for national Agile Combat Employment instruction”, 193rd SOW, June 2, 2023.

1952 Society. The Green Beret Foundation has established the 1952 Society; a mechanism that provides an opportunity for people to take part in a tiered donation system that provides vital support and assistance to U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers, their families, caregivers, and survivors. https://greenberetfoundation.org/society/

SFA Caribbean Cruise. The Special Forces Association is planning on holding their 2024 SFA Annual Convention aboard a cruise ship for five days in October 2024. The ship sails from Tampa, Florida and will visit a few ports before returning. Events are planned before and after the cruise voyage in Tampa – golf, motorcycle ride, etc. Registration Site – https://sfali.org/cruise-pre-registration-page/

MARSOC and Global Health Engagement. One key mission of the Marine Forces Special Operations Command is Foreign Internal Defense (FID). The basic concept is to place a Marine Special Operations Company (MSOC) in a country, work with local partner forces to exchange ideas and practices, and help increase their ability to working independently to increase national security. A piece of that concept is the improvement of the public health of both the local populous and the partner nation’s military – implementing something called Global Health Engagement or GHE. “MARSOC, SOCOM and the influence of Global Health Engagement”, DVIDS, March 21, 2023.

Emerald Warrior and Video Gaming. All five U.S. Special Operations Command components took part in a video game component of a special operations exercise in May 2023. The USSOCOM initiative allowed the SOF components to exercise a problem set using a distributed mission operation (DMO) network. “AFSOC used video game – – like simulation training, adds realistic, world-wide value”, AFSOC, May 24, 2023.

Sky Warden Delivery Announced. USSOCOM will begin accepting delivery of a modified crop-duster as the platform selected for its Armed Overwatch mission. “Get Ready for Sky Warden: First Delivery Set for October”, Air and Space Forces, May 22, 2023.

AFSOC Air Advisor Conference. Key members from across the Security Force Assistance and Air Advisor enterprise gathered for a summit on 23-25 May, 2023 at Hurlburt Field. “AFSOC hosts Security Forces Assistance Air Advisor Summit”, AFSOC, May 31, 2023.

USASOAC Tests ‘Air-Launched Effects”. The US Army Special Operations Aviation Command took part in a the third iteration of the Experimental Demonstration Gateway Exercise (EDGE 23) in Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona testing ways it could best deploy ‘launched effects’. Essentially . . . small drones shot out of something else . . . mid-flight from a Gray Eagle UAW or MH-60M Black Hawk. “Army special ops put “launched effects” prototype through its paces at EDGE 23″, Breaking Defense, May 25, 2023.

Death of SEAL Candidate. A 198-page report dated March 24, 2023, by the U.S. Navy’s Naval Education and Training Command points to systemic failures in the medical staff at BUD/S as contributing to the death of a SEAL candidate in February 2022. “Report Finds Inadequate Medical Oversight Led to 2022 SEAL Candidate’s Death”, SANDBOXX, May 30, 2023. See also “Navy SEAL training plagued by problems, investigation finds after death of sailor”, Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2023.

Fallen Warriors Remembered by Project 33. Members of the armed services are honored by a foundation established to pay tribute to those who lost their lives in America’s wars. “Project 33 leads effort to teach Americans about lives of the fallen”, Military Families Magazine, May 21, 2023.

GB Foundation VP / COO Announcement. Francis Arias has been promoted to the role of Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the Green Beret Foundation. She recently served as Director of Operations for the Foundation. The Foundation provides U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers and their families with emergency, immediate and ongoing support. (PR Newswire, May 24, 2023).

26th MEU and NSW Conduct Exercise TRIDENT 23-4. The Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) of the 26tyh Marine Expeditionary Unit integrated with East Coast-based Naval Special Warfare operators to exercise direct-action SOF raid training and advanced training focused on Military Assisted Departure (MAD) and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) during May 2023. (DVIDS, May 31, 2023)

SLIC Lectures at NAVSCIATTS. The Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School, a security cooperation schoolhouse operating under the U.S. Special Operations Command, is holding a 4-week long Stratetic Leaders International Course (SLIC) at its headquarters in at Stennis Space Center in South Mississippi. “NAVSCIATTS holds opening SLIC lectures for Semester 23-4 iteration”, DVIDS, June 1, 2023.

FBNC Now Fort Liberty. A big chunk of Airborne and Special Forces heritage has gone away as the long-time name of Fort Bragg has now been struck from the history books. (Military.com, June 2, 2023).


International SOF

Turkish SF to Kosovo. Turkish SOF will be part of a peacekeeping mission. A commando battalion from the 65th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will deploy to be part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) to help address the ongoing unrest in the northern region of the Balkan country. “Turkish Defense Ministry sending special forces to Kosovo at NATO’s request”, Turkish Minute, June 3, 2023.

Italian SOF Mini-Sub Revealed. A previously unreported Italian special operations mini-submarine has been seen for the first time. The remarkable thing about the AE-90 Submarine, believed to have been designed and employed as early as the 1990s, is that it has been retired from use. “Previously Unreported Italian Special Forces AE-90 Submarine Seen For First Time”, Covert Shores, June 2, 2023.

UK SF Busy Around the World. According to a report by a research group called the Action On Armed Violence (AVAO) UK special forces have conducted secret operations in 19 countries over the past twelve years. These operations include hostage rescues, exfiltration, training, and protection. The AOAV has historically highlighted the need for more public oversight on UK special forces operations. (AOAV, May 22, 2023).

Somali SF Complete Uganda Training. A group of Special Forces attached to the Somali National Army (SNA) has completed special training at Uganda’s 206 Commando Brigade Training Centre. “Somali Special Forces Complete Commando Training in Uganda”, All Africa, May 22, 2023.

Australia SOF and War Crimes. Three Australian newspapers were sued by Australia’s most-decorated living soldier over a series of articles in 2018 which he says defamed him. At the center of the trial was the personal life of Ben Roberts-Smith, a former member of the Special Air Service (SAS), and allegations of war crimes committed by Australian forces. “Ben Roberts-Smith: How decorated soldier’s defamation case has rocked Australia”, BBC News, June 1, 2023. See also “US warned it might suspend ties with Australian special forces oveer war crime allegations”, The Guardian, May 31, 2023.


SOF History

USAJFKSWCS. On June 1, 1983, the US Army Institute for Military Assistance (USAIMA) was renamed the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Jedburghs. On June 4, 1944, Jedburgh teams parachuted into France to link up with French resistance. One member of these teams was Lucien Stervinou, a French man who joined up with the French resistance forces based in England while France was occupied by the Germans.

June 6, 1944. D-day; the Allies stormed the beaches of Normandy, France to establish beachheads and then drive into the interior of France during World War II.


Sudan Conflict and Evac of Foreign Nationals

Irish Evac Effort. Operation Piccolo was a rescue mission to evacuate Irish citizens from Sudan as hostilities broke out between warring factions in April 2023. An Emergency Civil Assistance Team (ECAT) was formed up that would remove more than 250 Irish people from Sudan. Some members of the ECAT were from the Army Ranger Wing; a SOF organization that also assisted in the Kabul non-combatant evacuation operation of August 2021. Read more on this topic in “Inside the military and diplomatic mission to evacuate Irish citizens from Sudan”, The Journal, May 28, 2023.

Update on the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), ceasefire, humanitarian crisis, and evacuation of foreign nationals. (archived)

https://www.national-security.info/country/sudan/sudan-neo.html


Commentary

NSW and Fleet Tactics. Lieutenent Commander Kenneth Walls, an active-duty naval officer, argues that naval special warfare can contribute much to the fight at sea. However, he believes that the tactical integration of NSW into the functions and counterfunctions of scouting, command and control, and firepower is underdeveloped. He believes that the NSW community and the Navy need to improve their understanding of each other to ensure that NSW can effectively contribute to fleet-level operations against peer threats in the maritime environment. “Fleet Tactics & Special Warfare”, Proceedings, June 2023.

Europe and Irregular Warfare. The term irregular warfare means many things to different people. It is an elusive concept across the United States government as well as among US allies and partners. This is especially true of our European partners. The Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) recently completed a study of how European institutions conceptionalize irregular warfare. Read more on this in “Divided by a Common Language: How Europe Views Irregular Warfare”, IW Initiative, May 31, 2023.


National Security

Border Crisis. Several states are sending troops to the southern border to assist in providing security due to the massive amounts of migrants attempting to cross into the United States. Arkansas, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Florida, and West Virginia are among those states sending troops.

Congressional Testimony on GPC. Dr. Jonathan Schroden of CNA testitied before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 17, 2023 on how special operations forces can contribute to strategic competion with Russia and China. His testimony highlighted a variety of areas where SOF can contribute – to include intelligence operations, information sharing, foreign internal defense, and information operations.

Preparing for War in the Arctic. Climate change and geopolitics are reshaping the High North’s strategic landscape – from the military balance of power to the quest for oil, gas, and mineral resources. SOF and the 11th Airborne Division are ramping up their cold weather training. “Hiding an Army at the Top of the World”, Bloomberg, June 4, 2023.

Chinese PSYOP. A report by RAND Corporation provides information on the psychological warfare capabilities of the Chinese military and some of its emerging operational concepts. China views the manipulation of information to influence adversary decisionmaking and behavior as a key component of modern warfare. Chinese Next–Generation Psychological Warfare, RAND, June 2023, PDF, 224 pages. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA853-1.html


Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/

Afghanistan

Controlling the Skies Over Kabul – August 2021. On August 13, 2021, four Marines from the Marine Air Control Group -28 Detachment of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) flew to Kabul to help manage the chaotic situation at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). With little sleep, the Marines were handling more numerous flights per day – and providing updated information to several U.S. agencies as well as many foreign militaries. “How Marines brought order to the skies during the Kabul airlift”, Military Times, May 30, 2023.

Movie Review – Kandahar. Gerard Butler is cast in an action-thriller set in Afghanistan at the time of the U.S. withdrawal from that country in August 2021. Butler plays an undercover special ops CIA operative stationed in Afghanistan when his identity is leaked by a Pentagon informant. Journal & Topics, June 2, 2023. https://www.journal-topics.com/articles/movie-review-kandahar/


Africa

EU in Niger. The European Union has established a diplomatic and military presence in Niger to assist that country and other regional countries in the containment of violent jihadism. In February 2022 the European Union Military Partnership Mission or EUMPM was established with the ami to strengthen the military capacities of the Nigerien Armed Forces. Read more in “EU operations in Niger”, Grey Dynamics, June 1, 2023.

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December 8, 2023

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SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.


Books, Pubs, and Reports

Proceedings. The June 2023 issue by the U.S. Naval Institute has been posted online. This issue is focused on Information Warfare (IW) and artificial intelligence (AI). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/june

Sentinel. The June 2023 issue is now available online. Some great articles about Special Forces in Indochina. https://www.specialforces78.com/chapter-78-newsletter-for-june-2023/

CRS Report – Defense Primer: Naval Forces. The Congressional Research Service has updated its brief on U.S. Naval Forces; providing a description of the strategy, ship types, size of Navy, force-level goals, and more. Updated May 25, 2023, CRS IF10486, PDF, 3 pages.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10486

CRS Report – Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces. The Congressional Research Service has updated its brief on U.S. nuclear forces; describing the triad: ICBMs, heavy bombers, and SLBMs. Updated May 19, 2023, CRS IF10519, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10519


Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Video – Counterintelligence and SOF in the Gray Zone. Colonel (Ret) Christopher Costa is interviewed about how the new eara of counterintelligence must shift focus from the counterrorism era to strategic competion and for greater SOF participation in developing aggressive, innovative, and proactive counterintelligence responses to China, Russia, Iran and other foreign intelligence entities. Think JSOU, Joint Special Operations University, April 28, 2023, YouTube, 1 1/2 hour.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZkhxtv8ZME

Video – Emerald Warrior. This exercise is the largest joint special operations event involving U.S. Special Operations Command forces training to respond to various threats across the spectrum of conflict. DVIDS, May 31, 2023, 2 minutes. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/885051/emerald-warrior-final-video

Podcast – The Team Sergeant. The wealth of knowledge and experience of the Special Forces NCOs seemed to have declined as the Vietnam era veterans retired. Tom Kelly discusses his new book about leadership and how to be a team sergeant (18Z) in today’s Special Forces Regiment. https://pinelander.podbean.com/e/episode-073-team-sergeant-handbook-may-19-2023/

Movie Trailer – Mission Impossible 7 Dead Reakoning. Another American action spy film starring Tom Cruise will soon be in the theaters. Looks to be a good one, check out the trailer. (YouTube, May 2023)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cIusD7uLX90

Movie Trailer – Hidden Strike. Two ex-special forces soldiers, John Cena and Jackie Chan, must escort a group of civilians along Baghdad’s “highway of death” to the safety of the Green Zone. (YouTube, May 30, 2023). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_jEicE6KyQ

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385


SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · June 5, 2023



12. Army Seeks Bomb-Carrying Drones Like Ukraine’s



Excerpts:

According to the new solicitation, the drones would be used by soldiers in mechanized units—from the squad to “potentially” the brigade level—and would need at least a 500-gram payload. The possible targets include enemy soldiers and vehicles.
Ukrainians and Russians have frequently used commercial drones to attack each other.
At one drone-training center Defense One toured in Ukraine, volunteers rigged a photography drone to drop bombs by using the drone’s camera flash to activate a light-sensitive switch.
Both sides also pack explosives onto first-person-view drones—originally designed for racing and designed to go very fast—turning them into suicide drones. K-2, commander of a battalion within Ukraine’s 54th brigade, told Defense One he has special units in charge of operating those drones.


Army Seeks Bomb-Carrying Drones Like Ukraine’s

Average U.S. soldiers could pilot lethal quadcopters—if they are ever fielded.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

The U.S. Army wants to develop bomb-carrying drones similar to the jury-rigged commercial drones widely used in Ukraine, according to a service solicitation to industry.

The proposal-submission solicitation notes the drones’ utility to infantry, suggesting that lethal drones may one day be a common tool in the average infantry platoon’s kit.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command already operates a variety of smaller drones, most prominently the Switchblade suicide drone.

The wider Army, however, only operates the Skydio X2D unarmed reconnaissance drone at the small-unit level, according to the early-May posting by the Army Applications Laboratory. Skydio won a five-year fixed-price contract from the Army in early 2022, valued at $20 million per year.

Developing small, lethal drones is “vital for Army future combat operations,” the lab wrote in its call for submissions. Created in 2018 under Army Futures Command, the lab identifies commercial tools of potential use to soldiers.

The solicitation says drones must come from the Defense Department’s vetted list. Known as the Blue UAS list, it includes a mix of quad-copters—similar to the DJI Mavic 3 that is widely used in Ukraine—and winged drones. The proposal specifically disallows WingtraOne, a 4-foot winged drone, but does not say why.

The solicitation also says soldiers must be able to drop munitions using the drones’ controller—and that suppliers should eventually integrate this feature into “ATEK.”

The Army Applications Laboratory did not respond to questions about “ATEK” by publication time, but it may be a reference to ATAK, an Air Force-designed Android app used for live video feeds and geospatial mapping, among other things.

The solicitation says the drone’s munitions must also be more deadly than a M67 fragmentation grenade. The Army’s Combat Capabilities Development Command is already working on dropping M67 grenades from the Skydio X2D, according to the request, mimicking widely used tactics in Ukraine.

Such drones could be useful for harassing an adversary, with particularly deadly results if the enemy is caught unawares. “Whenever you can get a cheap kill, you should go for the cheap kill,” said Scott Boston, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation.

The unmanned systems could also be armed with an anti-tank warhead, potentially replacing costlier systems like the Javelin missile, Boston added.

Fielding such cheap drones would also help Army units get in more hands-on training and mean that soldiers wouldn’t run out of them in a firefight, Boston said.

The solicitation follows a December request by the Army Application Laboratory that drone companies explain how their systems could be used as loitering munitions. That posting said the Army was researching the effort because of drones’ use in the war in Ukraine.

According to the new solicitation, the drones would be used by soldiers in mechanized units—from the squad to “potentially” the brigade level—and would need at least a 500-gram payload. The possible targets include enemy soldiers and vehicles.

Ukrainians and Russians have frequently used commercial drones to attack each other.

At one drone-training center Defense One toured in Ukraine, volunteers rigged a photography drone to drop bombs by using the drone’s camera flash to activate a light-sensitive switch.

Both sides also pack explosives onto first-person-view drones—originally designed for racing and designed to go very fast—turning them into suicide drones. K-2, commander of a battalion within Ukraine’s 54th brigade, told Defense One he has special units in charge of operating those drones.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove



13. We Argued About Admitting Ukraine to NATO in 2008. Now We Agree on It.


Excerpts:


In that case, Europe, the United States, and other friends of Ukraine should commit to supplying Ukraine with defense training, intelligence, and equipment — and to building its domestic defense industry — so that Ukraine can both deter any resumed Russian attack and defend itself against such an attack should deterrence fail. The model here is the U.S. commitment to Israel—a “qualitative military edge” and “the ability to defend itself by itself.” This, as in the case of Israel, would fall short of any commitment to put troops on the ground to help defend Ukraine.


In parallel, NATO must enhance its own defense capabilities to deter further Russian adventurism in Ukraine or elsewhere — and the Europeans in particular need not just to expand their defense budgets -for Germany this means that it should finally implement its commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense—but create real military capability that will deter Russia and defeat it if deterrence fails. This is crucial to maintaining peace in Europe. Freedom has to be better equipped than tyranny!


While refraining from offering a NATO membership track to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008, NATO offered Putin’s Russia a path for cooperation with NATO on the basis of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. Putin rejected this opportunity and chose the path of aggression.. Vladimir Putin bears personal responsibility for this war and for the death of thousands of Ukrainians, for the suffering of millions more, and for the economic hardship and uncertainty that has affected the whole world. His vision of empire must be stopped in Ukraine. 


We Argued About Admitting Ukraine to NATO in 2008. Now We Agree on It.

By STEPHEN HADLEY and CHRISTOPH HEUSGEN

JUNE 3, 2023

defenseone.com · by Stephen Hadley


Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg (L) and President Volodymyr Zelenskyi (R) during a meeting on April 20, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. Andriy Zhyhaylo / Obozrevatel / Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

The authors—longtime senior U.S. and German national-security figures—describe how they concluded that alliance membership is a necessary step.

|

June 3, 2023 08:00 AM ET

We were at opposing ends at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 when we disagreed on whether Ukraine was ready for membership. As a result, Ukraine was not offered a so-called Membership Action Plan. After 2008, and until President Putin’s 2014 attack on Ukraine, NATO never reverted to seriously discussing the vaguely expressed perspective at Bucharest that Ukraine would one day become a NATO member. The upcoming NATO summit at Vilnius is the right moment to make this perspective concrete. We agree now that NATO should establish a path that will help bring Ukraine closer to membership and pave the way for Ukraine to join NATO once Russia’s war against Ukraine has been successfully repelled.

Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, we had some sympathy for the idea that Ukraine could be a bridge between Russia and the West—with economic relations with both the EU and Russia’s Eurasian Union, and a military posture that threatened no one, along the line of the former Finnish model. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 destroyed that idea, especially for Ukrainians. With its aggression, Russia brought about the very things that it later saw as compromising its security interests. It put NATO enlargement back on the agenda. And only then did NATO infrastructure start to move closer to Russia as a means of deterrence against further Russian military adventurism in Europe.

The last hope for Ukraine to become a bridge between East and West was reflected in the Minsk agreements but implementation foundered over Russian recalcitrance. It is wrong to claim that both sides were equally responsible for not implementing Minsk. It was Moscow that didn’t adhere to the ceasefire in the first place. It was Russia that didn’t withdraw its heavy weapons and its mercenaries from the occupied regions. It was Russia that did not allow the free movement of the OSCE observers. No wonder that the Rada in Kyiv—Ukraine’s parliament—was reluctant to adopt changes to the Ukrainian Constitution.

With its re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it became clear that Putin’s real agenda was to extinguish Ukrainian sovereignty and end its existence as an independent nation, incorporating it into a restored Russian empire that would include what Putin calls “historical Russian lands” embracing Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic States, parts of Poland—and much more.

Putin’s imperialist vision threatens peace in Europe. And Ukraine is central to this vision — without Ukraine, there can be no restored Russian empire. For Russia and Russians themselves, a positive future is more likely if Putin’s imperialist ambitions fail.

The success of the projected Ukrainian counteroffensive is critical in thwarting this vision and forcing Putin to stand down from his invasion of Ukraine. If this leads to a peace negotiation, it could present Ukraine with the prospect of painful concession of Ukrainian territory to Russia. This would reward Putin’s invasion. And a Russian breach of the agreement and a resumption of its aggression at some future date cannot be ruled out given its poor record of respecting agreements.

To impose a strategic cost on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and to help deter any future resumption of the war, Ukrainian membership in NATO (as well as membership in the EU) should clearly be pursued in parallel with any negotiated agreement. Before its actual accession, Ukraine will have work to do to ready itself for membership including by further improving its governance and fighting corruption. The security guarantees of NATO membership will be crucial to attract investment and finance Ukraine recovery after the war. Vilnius will be the right moment to demonstrate transatlantic unity in this respect.

If the war ends without an agreement and in a stalemate—a “frozen” conflict with a “hot” line of control—NATO membership for Ukraine would have to remain on hold to prevent involving NATO in a direct conflict with Russia, risking a nuclear war.

In that case, Europe, the United States, and other friends of Ukraine should commit to supplying Ukraine with defense training, intelligence, and equipment — and to building its domestic defense industry — so that Ukraine can both deter any resumed Russian attack and defend itself against such an attack should deterrence fail. The model here is the U.S. commitment to Israel—a “qualitative military edge” and “the ability to defend itself by itself.” This, as in the case of Israel, would fall short of any commitment to put troops on the ground to help defend Ukraine.

In parallel, NATO must enhance its own defense capabilities to deter further Russian adventurism in Ukraine or elsewhere — and the Europeans in particular need not just to expand their defense budgets -for Germany this means that it should finally implement its commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense—but create real military capability that will deter Russia and defeat it if deterrence fails. This is crucial to maintaining peace in Europe. Freedom has to be better equipped than tyranny!

While refraining from offering a NATO membership track to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008, NATO offered Putin’s Russia a path for cooperation with NATO on the basis of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. Putin rejected this opportunity and chose the path of aggression.. Vladimir Putin bears personal responsibility for this war and for the death of thousands of Ukrainians, for the suffering of millions more, and for the economic hardship and uncertainty that has affected the whole world. His vision of empire must be stopped in Ukraine.




14. Taiwan’s Imported Wolf Warriors – OpEd



Excerpts:


Lee revealed that the foundation has spent millions in taxpayers’ money to have high-profile anti-China politicians visit Taiwan. To him, this has threatened the stability of the Taiwan Straits, and ordinary Taiwanese are very unhappy about it (https://vt.tiktok.com/ZSLNYDjLx/).
Liz Truss is not the only highly paid “wolf warrior” visiting Taipei.
An entire pack of wolves has appeared especially from the West to ‘protect’ Taiwanese from the new Yellow Peril associated with the rise of China and its challenge to western hegemony and dominance of the world order.
Taiwan’s imported wolf warriors – genus canis lupus occidentalis and canis lupus lupus primarily – have 4 distinct characteristics. They favour China as their prey, are seen as discredited politicians, and require large sums of money and other perks to leave their home territories to hunt elsewhere. Unlike their canine counterparts, these ‘political animals’ prefer to work alone so as to maximise the returns.
The importing paymaster, Prospect Foundation, is a think tank based in Taiwan. Established in 1997, its mission according to a wikipedia post, is to analyse the Cross-Taiwan-Strait relations and international politics and economy and provide suggestions of policies for Taiwan government.



Taiwan’s Imported Wolf Warriors – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · by Lim Teck Ghee · June 5, 2023

China’s State Councilor and Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu shared with a world audience what can be considered as the country’s definitive Taiwan policy position going forward. Speaking at the 20th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 5 June he emphasised that the “one-China principle has become the consensus of the international community and the basic norm governing international relations” and that “any attempt to fudge and hollow out the one-China principle is absurd and dangerous.”


He also reiterated that China is willing to strive for peaceful reunification “with utmost sincerity” but will not renounce the use of force to “safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity”.

Further he identified the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities’ attempts to seek independence and external forces’ interference in China’s internal affairs as the root cause of tensions across the Taiwan Straits.

A recent social media expose by Taiwanese journalist Andy Lee helps to identify some of the external forces. According to his Tik Tok presentation, “Taipeh journalist reveals truth about Liz Truss’s Taiwan trip”, Taiwan’s “Prospect Foundation” can be seen as the godfather behind the trip of UK’s shortest-serving and discredited prime minister, Liz Truss, to Taiwan.

Lee revealed that the foundation has spent millions in taxpayers’ money to have high-profile anti-China politicians visit Taiwan. To him, this has threatened the stability of the Taiwan Straits, and ordinary Taiwanese are very unhappy about it (https://vt.tiktok.com/ZSLNYDjLx/).

Liz Truss is not the only highly paid “wolf warrior” visiting Taipei.


An entire pack of wolves has appeared especially from the West to ‘protect’ Taiwanese from the new Yellow Peril associated with the rise of China and its challenge to western hegemony and dominance of the world order.

Taiwan’s imported wolf warriors – genus canis lupus occidentalis and canis lupus lupus primarily – have 4 distinct characteristics. They favour China as their prey, are seen as discredited politicians, and require large sums of money and other perks to leave their home territories to hunt elsewhere. Unlike their canine counterparts, these ‘political animals’ prefer to work alone so as to maximise the returns.

The importing paymaster, Prospect Foundation, is a think tank based in Taiwan. Established in 1997, its mission according to a wikipedia post, is to analyse the Cross-Taiwan-Strait relations and international politics and economy and provide suggestions of policies for Taiwan government.

Although some of the foundation’s financial resources are spent on collaborative activities with other regional think tanks, a considerable portion is used to bring prominent anti-China politicians to enjoy photo opportunities with the Taiwanese president and to deliver speeches and participate in events aimed at condemning China and furthering the case for the West to confront and bring down China.

How much money and perks is paid by the foundation to import foreign wolves to support the current Taiwanese government in its bid to seek independence from China and retain power in the country by villifying China is not public knowledge.

What is a fact is that these imported wolf warriors do not come cheap.

How much was Truss paid

Liz Truss has not provided information on how much she was paid for her private trip to Taiwan. According to the British newspaper Mirror, the former prime minister was paid £65,751.62 to attend a conference in India for just four hours on top of paid hotel, flights and expenses ( https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/liz-truss-earns-16500-per-29784243) This figure is twice the annual average salary in Britain! That engagement is one of the many speaking gigs Truss has been taking.

It is very likely that she was paid a much higher fee for her Taiwan trip – perhaps tens of million Taiwanese dollars. This is because the more fierce the attacks against China, the higher the fees that will be paid to the wolf warrior.

In Liz Truss case, she has called on ‘free’ nations to commit themselves to a ‘free’ Taiwan and to back it up with concrete measures. Specifically she called for an “economic Nato” to tackle Beijing. As a prominent war wolf, Truss has no scruples in advocating both military and non military policies with the latter aimed at damaging or destroying the economic livelihoods of ordinary people to ‘defend’ her version of ‘democracy and the world order’.

Described by Li Guanjie, a research fellow at the Shanghai International Studies University, as a “washed-out, second-rate politician”, Liz Truss, unfortunately for Prospect Foundation, has little credibility even in Britain’s anti China media.

She was most recently headlined as trying to avoid paying for US $15,000 worth of personal expenses incurred when she was foreign secretary in 2021. These expenses include bath robes which went missing and for which she has been criticised for being an accessory to grubbiness and greed.

An op-ed in the Global Times following her visit said the “provocative plan against China” was “somewhat ‘fashionable’ in the circles of obsolete politicians in the US and the West”. The opinion article submitted that Ms Truss has a “bad personal image in the UK” and described her visit to Taiwan as “egregious”. “It is not only a brutal interference in China’s internal affairs, but also digging holes for the UK. She can be called London’s ‘bad teammate’.”

Other Prominent Western Wolf Warriors

Other prominent wolf warriors have included former Australian prime minister, Tony Abbott, and a relative newcomer to the anti China wolf pack, and US House speaker Nancy Pelosi. Their fees paid to them by Prospect Foundation and other Taiwanese sources is unknown.

Pelosi’s trip was an official one and is estimated to have cost the US taxpayer over US90 million in security costs alone.

In return for what has been described by critics as an opportunistic, unhelpful and war mongering visit, Pelosi was given Taiwan’s highest honour, The Order of Propitious Clouds with Special Grand Cordon.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen who presented Pelosi with the award described her as “one of Taiwan’s most devoted friends” and treated her to lunch at the presidential palace with top Taiwanese tech executives. According to a Facebook post by the Taiwanese leader, they had “Pelosi’s favourite dark chocolate ice cream” for dessert. Tsai is probably expecting no less than the US Presidential Medal of Freedom for buttering up Pelosi and hitching Taiwan to the US wagon.

Tsai and Pelosi also shared a meal with Morris Chang, the founder and chairman of Taiwan’s biggest semiconductor manufacturer, TSMC, and “exchanged views on deepening Taiwan-U.S. relations,” Tsai said.

Perhaps Pelosi may have shared her apertif opinion during that conversation about plans that the US may have to destroy TSMC should reunification of China and Taiwan take place.

Prospect Foundation’s More Constructive Mission

Rather than spending Taiwanese taxpayers money on imported wolf warriors from the US, Britain, Australia and other US allies, Prospect Foundation should deploy its considerable resources in helping bring about the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China. This more worthwhile objective to be explored with think tanks, and other key stakeholders from China and Southeast Asian nations, would also be much less expensive.

eurasiareview.com · by Lim Teck Ghee · June 5, 2023



15. Blinken says no Ukraine cease-fire without Russia’s withdrawal



Blinken says no Ukraine cease-fire without Russia’s withdrawal

militarytimes.com · by Susie Blann and Matthew Lee, Associated Press · June 2, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says there can be no cease-fire in the war in Ukraine unless it is part of a “just and lasting” peace deal that includes Russia’s military withdrawal. Blinken said Friday that “a ceasefire that simply freezes current lines in place” and enabled Russian President Vladimir Putin to “rest, rearm, and re-attack” would not be “a just and lasting peace.” In a speech during a visit to Finland, Blinken said that Russia must also pay for part of Ukraine’s reconstruction and be held accountable for its full-scale invasion of its neighbor in February last year.

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Friday that a cease-fire in the war in Ukraine could not be declared unless it was part of a “just and lasting” peace deal that included Russia’s military withdrawal.

Blinken said that “a cease-fire that simply freezes current lines in place” and allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin “to consolidate control over the territory he has seized, and rest, rearm, and reattack — that is not a just and lasting peace.”

Russia must also pay a share of Ukraine’s reconstruction and be held accountable for launching its full-scale invasion of its neighbor in February 2022, Blinken said in a speech during a visit to Finland, which recently joined NATO and shares a long border with Russia.

Allowing Moscow to keep the one-fifth of Ukrainian territory it had occupied would send the wrong message to Russia and to “other would-be aggressors around the world,” according to Blinken.

Russia, however, wants any talks to address Ukraine’s request to join NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has pushed for the country’s membership in the Western military alliance that the Kremlin sees as a threat.

“Naturally, this (issue) will be one of the main irritants and potential problems for many, many years to come,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Friday.

Blinken said Washington was ready to support peace efforts by other countries, including recent overtures from China and Brazil. But any peace agreement must uphold the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

The United States is a leading Western ally and supplier of arms to Kyiv to help it push back against the Kremlin’s forces.

China, which says it is neutral and wants to serve as a mediator but has supported Moscow politically, on Friday urged countries to stop sending weapons to Ukraine.

In Kyiv, air defenses shot down more than 30 Russian cruise missiles and drones Friday in Moscow’s sixth air attack in six days, local officials said.

The Ukrainian capital was simultaneously attacked from different directions by Iranian-made Shahed drones and cruise missiles from the Caspian region, senior Kyiv official Serhii Popko wrote on Telegram.

A 68-year-old man and an 11-year-old child were wounded in the attack, with private houses, outbuildings and cars sustaining damage from falling debris, according to Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office.

A recent spate of attacks on the capital has put strain on residents and tested the strength of Ukraine’s air defenses while Kyiv officials plot what they say is an upcoming counteroffensive to push back the Kremlin’s forces 15 months after their full-scale invasion. Kyiv was the target of drone and missile attacks on 17 days last month, including daylight attacks.

Moscow’s strategy could backfire, however, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank.

The air campaign aims to “degrade Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities, but ... the Russian prioritization of Kyiv is likely further limiting the campaign’s ability to meaningfully constrain potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions,” it said in an assessment late Thursday.

Ukrainian air defenses intercepted all 15 cruise missiles and 21 attack drones targeted at Kyiv on Thursday night, Ukraine’s chief of staff, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said.

Ukraine’s presidential office said Friday that at least four civilians were killed and 42 wounded over the previous 24 hours.

The Moscow-appointed governor of Ukraine’s occupied Donetsk province, Denis Pushilin, claimed Friday that three people had been killed and four wounded, including a 3-year-old-girl, by Ukrainian strikes on the region.

The previous day, Ukraine said a 9-year-old and her mother were killed in Kyiv by a Russian pre-dawn missile barrage.

Meanwhile, border regions of Russia once again came under fire from Ukraine. Recent cross-border raids have also rattled those regions of Russia and put the Kremlin on guard.

That could be a Ukrainian strategy to disperse Russian forces before a counteroffensive begins.

“Russian commanders now face an acute dilemma of whether to (strengthen) defenses in Russia’s border regions or reinforce their lines in occupied Ukraine,” the U.K. Ministry of Defense said Friday.

Air defense systems shot down “several Ukrainian drones” overnight Thursday in Russia’s southern Kursk region, which borders Ukraine, regional Gov. Roman Starovoit wrote on Telegram.

In the neighboring Bryansk region, which also borders Ukraine, regional Gov. Alexander Bogomaz said that Ukrainian forces shelled two villages on Friday morning. No casualties were reported.

Two drones also attacked energy facilities in Russia’s western Smolensk region, which borders Belarus, in the early hours of Friday, officials said.

___

Matthew Lee reported from Oslo, Norway. Karl Ritter contributed to this report from Stockholm.

militarytimes.com · by Susie Blann and Matthew Lee, Associated Press · June 2, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says there can be no cease-fire in the war in Ukraine unless it is part of a “just and lasting” peace deal that includes Russia’s military withdrawal. Blinken said Friday that “a ceasefire that simply freezes current lines in place” and enabled Russian President Vladimir Putin to “rest, rearm, and re-attack” would not be “a just and lasting peace.” In a speech during a visit to Finland, Blinken said that Russia must also pay for part of Ukraine’s reconstruction and be held accountable for its full-scale invasion of its neighbor in February last year.

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Friday that a cease-fire in the war in Ukraine could not be declared unless it was part of a “just and lasting” peace deal that included Russia’s military withdrawal.

Blinken said that “a cease-fire that simply freezes current lines in place” and allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin “to consolidate control over the territory he has seized, and rest, rearm, and reattack — that is not a just and lasting peace.”

Russia must also pay a share of Ukraine’s reconstruction and be held accountable for launching its full-scale invasion of its neighbor in February 2022, Blinken said in a speech during a visit to Finland, which recently joined NATO and shares a long border with Russia.

Allowing Moscow to keep the one-fifth of Ukrainian territory it had occupied would send the wrong message to Russia and to “other would-be aggressors around the world,” according to Blinken.

Russia, however, wants any talks to address Ukraine’s request to join NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has pushed for the country’s membership in the Western military alliance that the Kremlin sees as a threat.

“Naturally, this (issue) will be one of the main irritants and potential problems for many, many years to come,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Friday.

Blinken said Washington was ready to support peace efforts by other countries, including recent overtures from China and Brazil. But any peace agreement must uphold the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

The United States is a leading Western ally and supplier of arms to Kyiv to help it push back against the Kremlin’s forces.

China, which says it is neutral and wants to serve as a mediator but has supported Moscow politically, on Friday urged countries to stop sending weapons to Ukraine.

In Kyiv, air defenses shot down more than 30 Russian cruise missiles and drones Friday in Moscow’s sixth air attack in six days, local officials said.

The Ukrainian capital was simultaneously attacked from different directions by Iranian-made Shahed drones and cruise missiles from the Caspian region, senior Kyiv official Serhii Popko wrote on Telegram.

A 68-year-old man and an 11-year-old child were wounded in the attack, with private houses, outbuildings and cars sustaining damage from falling debris, according to Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office.

A recent spate of attacks on the capital has put strain on residents and tested the strength of Ukraine’s air defenses while Kyiv officials plot what they say is an upcoming counteroffensive to push back the Kremlin’s forces 15 months after their full-scale invasion. Kyiv was the target of drone and missile attacks on 17 days last month, including daylight attacks.

Moscow’s strategy could backfire, however, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank.

The air campaign aims to “degrade Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities, but ... the Russian prioritization of Kyiv is likely further limiting the campaign’s ability to meaningfully constrain potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions,” it said in an assessment late Thursday.

Ukrainian air defenses intercepted all 15 cruise missiles and 21 attack drones targeted at Kyiv on Thursday night, Ukraine’s chief of staff, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said.

Ukraine’s presidential office said Friday that at least four civilians were killed and 42 wounded over the previous 24 hours.

The Moscow-appointed governor of Ukraine’s occupied Donetsk province, Denis Pushilin, claimed Friday that three people had been killed and four wounded, including a 3-year-old-girl, by Ukrainian strikes on the region.

The previous day, Ukraine said a 9-year-old and her mother were killed in Kyiv by a Russian pre-dawn missile barrage.

Meanwhile, border regions of Russia once again came under fire from Ukraine. Recent cross-border raids have also rattled those regions of Russia and put the Kremlin on guard.

That could be a Ukrainian strategy to disperse Russian forces before a counteroffensive begins.

“Russian commanders now face an acute dilemma of whether to (strengthen) defenses in Russia’s border regions or reinforce their lines in occupied Ukraine,” the U.K. Ministry of Defense said Friday.

Air defense systems shot down “several Ukrainian drones” overnight Thursday in Russia’s southern Kursk region, which borders Ukraine, regional Gov. Roman Starovoit wrote on Telegram.

In the neighboring Bryansk region, which also borders Ukraine, regional Gov. Alexander Bogomaz said that Ukrainian forces shelled two villages on Friday morning. No casualties were reported.

Two drones also attacked energy facilities in Russia’s western Smolensk region, which borders Belarus, in the early hours of Friday, officials said.

___

Matthew Lee reported from Oslo, Norway. Karl Ritter contributed to this report from Stockholm.



16. World's spy chiefs meet in secret conclave in Singapore




World's spy chiefs meet in secret conclave in Singapore


KEY POINTS

  • The meetings are organized by the Singapore government and have been discreetly held at a separate venue alongside the security summit for several years, sources said.

  • The U.S. was represented by Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, the head of her country’s intelligence community.

CNBC · June 4, 2023

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines.

Anna Moneymaker | Getty Images News | Getty Images

Senior officials from about two dozen of the world's major intelligence agencies held a secret meeting on the fringes of the Shangri-La Dialogue security meeting in Singapore this weekend, five people told Reuters.

Such meetings are organised by the Singapore government and have been discreetly held at a separate venue alongside the security summit for several years, they said. The meetings have not been previously reported.

The U.S. was represented by Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, the head of her country's intelligence community, while China was among the other countries present, despite the tensions between the two superpowers.

Samant Goel, the head of India's overseas intelligence gathering agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, also attended, an Indian source said.

"The meeting is an important fixture on the international shadow agenda," said one person with knowledge of the discussions. "Given the range of countries involved, it is not a festival of tradecraft, but rather a way of promoting a deeper understanding of intentions and bottom lines.

"There is an unspoken code among intelligence services that they can talk when more formal and open diplomacy is harder - it is a very important factor during times of tension, and the Singapore event helps promote that."

All five sources who discussed the meetings declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter.

A spokesperson for the Singapore Ministry of Defence said that while attending the Shangri-La Dialogue, "participants including senior officials from intelligence agencies also take the opportunity to meet their counterparts."

"The Singapore Ministry of Defence may facilitate some of these bilateral or multilateral meetings," the spokesperson said. "Participants have found such meetings held on the sidelines of the (dialogue) beneficial."

The U.S. Embassy in Singapore said it had no information on the meeting. The Chinese and Indian governments did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand operate what is called the Five Eyes network to gather and share a broad range of intelligence, and their intelligence officials meet frequently.

Larger meetings of the intelligence community are rarer, and almost never publicised.

Although few details were available on the specific discussions in Singapore, Russia's war in Ukraine and transnational crime figured in the talks on Friday, the person with knowledge of the discussions added. On Thursday evening, the intelligence chiefs held an informal gathering.

No Russian representative was present, one of the sources said. Ukraine's deputy defence minister, Volodymr V. Havrylov, was at the Shangri-La Dialogue but said he did not attend the intelligence meeting.

Another of the sources said the tone at the meeting was collaborative and cooperative, and not confrontational.

At the main security dialogue, more than 600 delegates from 49 countries held three days of plenary sessions, as well as closed-door bilateral and multilateral meetings at the sprawling Shangri-La Hotel.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese gave the keynote address while U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu and counterparts from Britain,

Japan, Canada, Indonesia and South Korea also spoke.

Haines was among the official U.S. delegates to the Shangri-La Dialogue. At a discussion on cybersecurity in the main meeting, she said in response to a question from a Chinese military officer that cooperation between countries was essential.

"It is absolutely critical, even when there is distrust, and even when you are facing in effect adversaries, that you still try to work through and cooperate on issues of mutual interest and also try to manage the potential for escalation," she said.

U.S. officials said on Friday that CIA Director William Burns visited China last month for talks with Chinese counterparts as the Biden administration seeks to boost communications with Beijing.

CNBC · June 4, 2023





​17. US defense secretary discusses upgrading ties with India to counter China



But how does India feel.. note we just a meeting with the Quad "Minus" – US, Japan, and Australia (or is this the Tirad?)



US defense secretary discusses upgrading ties with India to counter China

AP · by ASHOK SHARMA · June 5, 2023

NEW DELHI (AP) — U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Monday discussed upgrading partnership with India, a major arms buyer, and set a roadmap for cooperation for the next five years as both countries grapple with China’s economic rise and increased belligerence, officials said.

Austin’s visit comes as India strengthens its domestic defense industry by acquiring new technologies and reducing reliance on imports, particularly from Russia, its largest supplier of military hardware despite the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Austin and his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, explored ways of building resilient supply chains, a statement from India’s Defense Ministry said. They decided “to identify opportunities for the co-development of new technologies and co-production of existing and new systems and facilitate increased collaboration between defense startup ecosystems of the two countries.”

They also discussed regional security issues and committed to strengthening operational collaboration across all military services, with an eye to supporting India’s leading role as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific, the statement said.

The new roadmap for U.S.-India defense industrial cooperation will fast track technology cooperation and co-production in areas such as air combat and land mobility systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, munitions and the undersea domain, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi said.

“This initiative aims to change the paradigm for cooperation between U.S. and Indian defense sectors, including a set of specific proposals that could provide India access to cutting-edge technologies and support India’s defense modernization plans,” it said.

The discussions also included cooperation in space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence. Austin also met with India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.

“I’m returning to India to meet with key leaders for discussions about strengthening our Major Defense Partnership. Together, we’re advancing a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” Austin tweeted after his arrival in New Delhi on Sunday.

Austin, who is on his second visit to India, was expected to lay the groundwork for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington on June 22, which has fuelled speculation about a possible announcement of defense contracts.

India is looking to buy 18 armed high-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. for an estimated $1.5 billion to $2 billion, said Rahul Bedi, a defense analyst. The UAVs would likely be deployed along its restive borders with China and Pakistan and in the strategic Indian Ocean region, Bedi said.

Indian media reports said a joint production and manufacture of combat aircraft engines, infantry combat vehicles, howitzers and their precision ordnance were discussed last month in Washington at a meeting of the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group.

Austin arrived in New Delhi from Singapore, where he attended the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual forum bringing together top defense officials, diplomats and leaders. Austin lobbied for support for Washington’s vision of a “free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific within a world of rules and rights” as the best course to counter increasing Chinese assertiveness in the region.

China’s Defense Minister Gen. Li Shangfu said at the conference that the U.S. has been “deceiving and exploiting” Asia-Pacific nations to advance its own self-interests to preserve “its dominant position.”

Li suggested that Washington has been holding on to alliances that are “remnants of the Cold War” and establishing new pacts, like the AUKUS agreement with Britain and Australia and the Quad grouping with Australia, India and Japan, “to divide the world into ideologically-driven camps and provoke confrontation.”

India is trying a balancing act in its ties with Washington and Moscow, and has been reducing its dependence on Russian arms by also buying from the U.S., France, Germany and other countries.

The U.S. defense trade with India has risen from near zero in 2008 to over $20 billion in 2020. Major Indian purchases from the United States included long-range maritime patrol aircraft, C-130 transport aircraft, missiles and drones.

Experts say up to 60% of Indian defense equipment comes from Russia, and New Delhi finds itself in a bind at a time when it is facing a 3-year-old border standoff with China in eastern Ladakh, where tens of thousands of soldiers are stationed within shooting distance. Twenty Indian soldiers and four Chinese troops died in a clash in 2020.

AP · by ASHOK SHARMA · June 5, 2023



18. United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) 2023 Joint Statement


No mention of Quad but AUKUS and ASEAN are mentioned.


United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) 2023 Joint Statement

defense.gov

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence the Hon. Richard Marles MP, Japanese Minister of Defense Hamada Yasukazu, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III, convened a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on June 3, 2023 during the 20th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (2023 Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore. This was the twelfth meeting among the defense leaders of the three nations and highlighted the significant progress made in implementing activities and practical areas of cooperation set forth in the 2022 Joint Statement.

The Ministers welcomed and acknowledged the significance of each country’s strategic documents issued this past year, confirming the alignment of their strategies and the important role that the trilateral partnership plays in realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Ministers highlighted that trilateral defense cooperation has never been stronger, and noted advances in the complexity of our trilateral cooperation and growing trilateral coordination at all levels.

The Ministers expressed serious concern about the increasingly severe security environment in the East China Sea. They strongly opposed any destabilizing and coercive unilateral actions that may escalate tensions in the East China Sea.

The Ministers expressed concern about the situation in the South China Sea. They strongly opposed any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion and actions that could increase tensions in the area, including the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, and efforts to disrupt other States’ offshore resource exploitation activities. They strongly object to China’s claims and actions that are inconsistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and which undermine international rules, standards, and norms. The Ministers emphasized the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, particularly UNCLOS, and reaffirmed the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal decision as final and legally binding on the parties. They resolved to work together to support states being able to exercise their rights and freedoms in the South China Sea, consistent with UNCLOS, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight.

The Ministers emphasized the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

The Ministers emphasized the importance of a secure and prosperous Southeast Asia, where sovereignty is respected and in furtherance of broader regional stability. They reiterated continued support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led regional architecture, including ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). They also emphasized their strong support for the practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The Ministers committed to work closely with regional countries, bilaterally and through ASEAN mechanisms, to support regional security and stability including to promote maritime, cyber, border, and health security cooperation. The Ministers recognized the importance of strengthening cooperation with the Philippines and welcomed the meeting of Australia, Japan, Philippines, and United States’ defense ministers taking place while at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

The Ministers committed to deepening cooperation with Pacific island countries, including by working with Pacific partners to support maritime security, respond to increased pressure from natural disasters, and address the impacts of climate change. The three countries will continue expanding regional engagement and strengthening cooperation with Pacific counterparts, particularly through the Pacific Islands Forum and other inclusive Pacific architecture.

The Ministers are deeply concerned about North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. They strongly condemn North Korea's repeated launches of missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles at an unprecedented frequency, and the most recent claimed space launch using ballistic missile technology, which is a serious violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Ministers remain committed to working with the international community to address North Korea’s serious threat to the region. They reiterate their call on North Korea to immediately resolve the abduction issue and cease its human rights violations.

Recognizing the important role the trilateral partnership plays in boosting regional stability, the Ministers committed to continue to take concrete and practical measures to improve interoperability and deepen defense cooperation across the spectrum. They reinforced the importance of consulting with each other and developing coordinated responses to regional disasters and crises.

The Ministers noted the significance of the introduction of counterstrike capabilities by Japan and investment in long-range strike capabilities by Australia. They confirmed that Australia and Japan would work closely together, and with the United States, as these capabilities are introduced.

The Ministers welcomed the progress being made toward the entry into force of the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). They acknowledged the important role of the RAA in enabling deeper trilateral cooperation and enhancing interoperability. The Ministers agreed to leverage the RAA for this purpose as soon as it enters into force and committed to working on a roadmap for conducting trilateral cooperation activities in Australia over the coming year.

The Ministers welcomed the recent announcement of Australia’s pathway to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. Japan reiterated its consistent support for AUKUS.

The Ministers welcomed the progress being made and highlighted achievements including the first coordinated Asset Protection Mission (APM) during a trilateral activity in November 2022, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation at Iwakuni Air Base in March 2023.

The Ministers exchanged views on the regional security environment and concurred to resist unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in all parts of the world and to work closely to deter and counter actions that undermine international peace and stability and the international system based on the rule of law. They strongly condemned Russia's unprovoked, unjust, and unlawful aggression against Ukraine. They shared the view that Russia should immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and cease hostilities in line with the Charter of the United Nations as called for in the resolution A/ES-11/L.7 adopted by the UN General Assembly on February 23.

The Ministers committed to continue enhancing defense cooperation among the three countries across the following areas:

Trilateral Activities and Exercises:

  • Conduct trilateral F-35 Joint Strike Fighter training in Australia.
  • Increase complex and high-end trilateral exercises in northern Australia such as Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO to enhance readiness.
  • Regularize Asset Protection Missions for the U.S. Forces and the Australian Defence Force by Japan Self-Defense Forces.
  • Accelerate and deepen trilateral information-sharing cooperation.
  • Continue trilateral policy and strategy dialogues on regional issues.

Expanded Cooperation:

  • Seek to conclude a trilateral Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) framework at the earliest possible opportunity.
  • Boost strategic capabilities cooperation across multiple domains, including in integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and undersea warfare.

Inclusive Partnerships:

  • Further deepen engagement with ASEAN Member States (including through the ADMM-Plus framework), Pacific island countries, European countries and like-minded partners and allies to uphold and reinforce free and open international norms in every region in the world.
  • Coordinate capacity building engagements with regional partners.
  • Work in complement with Pacific partners in addressing the challenge of unexploded ordnance.

The Ministers affirm that trilateral cooperation is essential to maintain democratic values, transparency and respect for international norms, and expressed their firm determination to keep the Indo-Pacific region as a free, open, secure, and prosperous region while continuing to expand the scope of defense cooperation.

defense.gov


19. Secretary Austin Concludes India Visit



Excerpt:


In all of his engagements, the Secretary underscored the centrality of the U.S.-India partnership to maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.



Secretary Austin Concludes India Visit

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

June 5, 2023 |×

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Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III traveled to India, June 4-5, to reinforce the major defense partnership, and advance cooperation in critical domains ahead of Prime Minister Modi's official state visit to Washington. The Secretary met with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh. During his meetings, the Secretary and his counterparts exchanged perspectives on a range of regional security issues and committed to collaborating closely with India in support of our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The Secretary and Minister Singh welcomed the conclusion of a new Roadmap for U.S.-India Defense Industrial Cooperation, which will fast-track technology cooperation and co-production in areas such as air combat and land mobility systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; munitions; and the undersea domain. This initiative aims to change the paradigm for cooperation between U.S. and Indian defense sectors, including a set of specific proposals that could provide India access to cutting-edge technologies and support India's defense modernization plans. The Secretary and Minister Singh also pledged to review regulatory hurdles impeding closer industry-to-industry cooperation and to initiate negotiations on a Security of Supply Arrangement and a Reciprocal Defense Procurement agreement, which will promote long-term supply chain stability.

The Secretary and his counterparts also discussed the growing importance of defense innovation and cooperation in emerging domains such as space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence. They praised the recent launch of a new Advanced Domains Defense Dialogue and committed to expanding the scope of bilateral defense cooperation to encompass all domains. They also welcomed the establishment of the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X), a new initiative to advance cutting-edge technology cooperation. The initiative, which will be launched by the U.S.-India Business Council on June 21, is designed to complement existing government-to-government collaboration by promoting innovative partnerships between U.S. and Indian companies, investors, start-up accelerators, and academic research institutions.

The Secretary and Minister Singh also committed to strengthen operational collaboration across all military services, with an eye to supporting India's leading role as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific. They discussed new opportunities to strengthen information sharing and increase cooperation in the maritime domain. On this note, Secretary Austin welcomed India's leadership role in the Quad Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative (IPMDA), which will provide cutting-edge domain awareness capability to countries across the Indo-Pacific region.

In his meeting with National Security Advisor Doval, the Secretary exchanged views about regional and global security issues of concern, including maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region. The Secretary welcomed Mr. Doval's perspective about shared security interests and objectives, including his ideas for greater maritime collaboration.

In all of his engagements, the Secretary underscored the centrality of the U.S.-India partnership to maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.


defense.gov



20. Pentagon draws ire of lawmakers over war crimes evidence sharing




​The US does not recognize the ICC which of course undermines our legitimacy when we call l for upholding the rules based international order.


Excerpts:


The Pentagon did not respond to Military Times’ request for comment as of publication. The minority office of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also did not respond to a question from Military Times about what actions are being considered by lawmakers to force the Pentagon to provide evidence of war crimes to the ICC.
Pentagon officials reportedly fear doing so would create precedent for the court to charge U.S. citizens, which has stood as a redline for policymakers since the court’s inception.
When the ICC was founded in 1998, the U.S. fought to prevent the prosecution of any citizens in countries that were not party to the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the international court. The U.S. government lost that debate.
Since then, any person, regardless of citizenship, who is charged with a war crime in a country that has signed onto the ICC can be investigated and prosecuted by the court.
In 2001, Congress passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which restricted support for the ICC and prevented U.S. forces from taking part in peacekeeping missions.




Pentagon draws ire of lawmakers over war crimes evidence sharing

militarytimes.com · by Zamone Perez · June 2, 2023


The Department of Defense drew the ire of lawmakers on Wednesday when a senior State Department official confirmed the Pentagon has acted as a roadblock in the United States government’s cooperation with an international organization that prosecutes war crimes.

Beth Van Schaack, who serves as the U.S. Global Criminal Justice ambassador-at-large, testified Wednesday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on possible war crimes perpetrated by Russia during its invasion of Ukraine.

Van Schaack spent much of the session answering lawmakers’ questions about the Pentagon’s resistance to cooperating with the International Criminal Court.

Questioned by Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) about whether the Pentagon was the agency keeping the rest of the federal government from reaching a consensus on ICC cooperation, Van Schaack referenced previous congressional testimony from Defense Sec. Lloyd Austin. Van Hollen countered, asserting that the query was “a yes or no answer.”

Van Schaack answered “yes,” acknowledging that the Pentagon has kept the rest of the federal government from reaching consensus over war crimes evidence sharing.

The ranking member of the committee, Sen. James Risch (R-Idaho), took aim at the Pentagon’s position against evidence sharing, saying no one from the Pentagon contacted lawmakers as they were writing the legislation to allow increased cooperation with the ICC.

“We’re not going to tolerate an agency saying, ‘Well, we don’t like that law, so we’re not going to enforce it,’” Risch said during the hearing. “When you’re dealing with the ICC, you’re always cognizant of the fact that there could be pitfalls, there could be a problem putting U.S. servicemen in jeopardy.

“We scrupulously avoided that and had specific language to see that didn’t happen,” he added.

The Pentagon did not respond to Military Times’ request for comment as of publication. The minority office of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also did not respond to a question from Military Times about what actions are being considered by lawmakers to force the Pentagon to provide evidence of war crimes to the ICC.

Pentagon officials reportedly fear doing so would create precedent for the court to charge U.S. citizens, which has stood as a redline for policymakers since the court’s inception.

When the ICC was founded in 1998, the U.S. fought to prevent the prosecution of any citizens in countries that were not party to the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the international court. The U.S. government lost that debate.

Since then, any person, regardless of citizenship, who is charged with a war crime in a country that has signed onto the ICC can be investigated and prosecuted by the court.

In 2001, Congress passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which restricted support for the ICC and prevented U.S. forces from taking part in peacekeeping missions.

Congress later amended the law, however, and eased restrictions in the fiscal year 2023 appropriations bill, which passed in December. Under the law, the U.S. government can aid the ICC with investigations and prosecutions “of foreign persons for crimes ... related to the [s]ituation in Ukraine,” the legislation read.

“The legislation is very carefully crafted — it’s surgical in fact,” Van Schaack told lawmakers. “All the other protections of the American Servicemembers’ Act remain in place. ... There are ways we can provide assistance without jeopardizing U.S. personnel.”

Adam Keith, the director of accountability at Human Rights First, supported lawmakers’ desire to help the ICC as it prosecutes Russian war crimes in the Ukraine conflict.

“It’s good that Congress is pressing the administration to support the ICC’s investigation of war crimes in Ukraine,” Keith told Military Times in an email. “It’s time for President Biden to finally push through the embarrassing impasse on this issue and put the U.S. government’s weight behind one of the main institutions providing justice for Russian war crimes.”

About Zamone Perez

Zamone “Z” Perez is a rapid response reporter and podcast producer at Defense News and Military Times. He previously worked at Foreign Policy and Ufahamu Africa. He is a graduate of Northwestern University, where he researched international ethics and atrocity prevention in his thesis. He can be found on Twitter @zamoneperez.



21. An Unwinnable War: Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine



Excerpts:

In parallel, the United States should consider establishing a regular channel of communication regarding the war that includes Ukraine, U.S. allies, and Russia. This channel would not initially be aimed at achieving a cease-fire. Instead, it would allow participants to interact continually, instead of in one-off encounters, akin to the contact group model used during the Balkan wars, when an informal grouping of representatives from key states and international institutions met regularly. Such discussions should begin out of the public eye, as did initial U.S. contacts with Iran on the nuclear deal, signed in 2015.
These efforts might well fail to lead to an agreement. The odds of success are slim—and even if negotiations did produce a deal, no one would leave fully satisfied. The Korean armistice was certainly not seen as a triumph of U.S. foreign policy at the time it was signed: after all, the American public had grown accustomed to absolute victories, not bloody wars without clear resolution. But in the nearly 70 years since, there has not been another outbreak of war on the peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korea emerged from the devastation of the 1950s to become an economic powerhouse and eventually a thriving democracy. A postwar Ukraine that is similarly prosperous and democratic with a strong Western commitment to its security would represent a genuine strategic victory.
An endgame premised on an armistice would leave Ukraine—at least temporarily—without all its territory. But the country would have the opportunity to recover economically, and the death and destruction would end. It would remain locked in a conflict with Russia over the areas occupied by Moscow, but that conflict would play out in the political, cultural, and economic domains, where, with Western support, Ukraine would have advantages. The successful reunification of Germany, in 1990, another country divided by terms of peace, demonstrates that focusing on nonmilitary elements of the contestation can produce results. Meanwhile, a Russian-Ukrainian armistice would also not end the West’s confrontation with Russia, but the risks of a direct military clash would decrease dramatically, and the global consequences of the war would be mitigated.
Many commentators will continue to insist that this war must be decided only on the battlefield. But that view discounts how the war’s structural realities are unlikely to change even if the frontline shifts, an outcome that itself is far from guaranteed. The United States and its allies should be capable of helping Ukraine simultaneously on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Now is the time to start.



An Unwinnable War

Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine

By Samuel Charap

June 5, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Samuel Charap · June 5, 2023

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a moment of clarity for the United States and its allies. An urgent mission was before them: to assist Ukraine as it countered Russian aggression and to punish Moscow for its transgressions. While the Western response was clear from the start, the objective—the endgame of this war—has been nebulous.

This ambiguity has been more a feature than a bug of U.S. policy. As National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan put it in June 2022, “We have in fact refrained from laying out what we see as an endgame. . . . We have been focused on what we can do today, tomorrow, next week to strengthen the Ukrainians’ hand to the maximum extent possible, first on the battlefield and then ultimately at the negotiating table.” This approach made sense in the initial months of the conflict. The trajectory of the war was far from clear at that point. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was still talking about his readiness to meet his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and the West had yet to supply Kyiv with sophisticated ground-based rocket systems, let alone tanks and long-range missiles as it does today. Plus, it will always be difficult for the United States to speak about its view on the objective of a war that its forces are not fighting. The Ukrainians are the ones dying for their country, so they ultimately get to decide when to stop—regardless of what Washington might want.

But it is now time that the United States develop a vision for how the war ends. Fifteen months of fighting has made clear that neither side has the capacity—even with external help—to achieve a decisive military victory over the other. Regardless of how much territory Ukrainian forces can liberate, Russia will maintain the capability to pose a permanent threat to Ukraine. The Ukrainian military will also have the capacity to hold at risk any areas of the country occupied by Russian forces—and to impose costs on military and civilian targets within Russia itself.

These factors could lead to a devastating, years-long conflict that does not produce a definitive outcome. The United States and its allies thus face a choice about their future strategy. They could begin to try to steer the war toward a negotiated end in the coming months. Or they could do so years from now. If they decide to wait, the fundamentals of the conflict will likely be the same, but the costs of the war—human, financial, and otherwise—will have multiplied. An effective strategy for what has become the most consequential international crisis in at least a generation therefore requires the United States and its allies to shift their focus and start facilitating an endgame.

WHAT WINNING DOESN’T LOOK LIKE

As of the end of May, the Ukrainian military was on the verge of conducting a significant counteroffensive. After Kyiv’s successes in two earlier operations in the fall of 2022, and given the generally unpredictable nature of this conflict, it is certainly possible that the counteroffensive will produce meaningful gains.

Western policymakers’ attention is primarily devoted to delivering the military hardware, intelligence, and training necessary to make that happen. With so much seemingly in flux on the battlefield, some might argue that now is not the time for the West to start discussions on the endgame. After all, the task of giving the Ukrainians a chance at a successful offensive campaign is already straining the resources of Western governments. But even if it goes well, a counteroffensive will not produce a militarily decisive outcome. Indeed, even major movement of the frontline will not necessarily end the conflict.

More broadly, interstate wars generally do not end when one side’s forces are pushed beyond a certain point on the map. In other words, territorial conquest—or reconquest—is not in itself a form of war termination. The same will likely be true in Ukraine: even if Kyiv were successful beyond all expectations and forced Russian troops to retreat across the international border, Moscow would not necessarily stop fighting. But few in the West expect that outcome at any point, let alone in the near term. Instead, the optimistic expectation for the coming months is that the Ukrainians will make some gains in the south, perhaps retaking parts of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, or push back the Russian assault in the east.

Those potential gains would be important, and they are certainly desirable. Fewer Ukrainians would be subjected to the unspeakable horrors of Russian occupation. Kyiv might retake control of major economic assets, such as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. And Russia would have suffered another blow to its military capabilities and global prestige, further raising the costs of what has been a strategic catastrophe for Moscow.

The hope in Western capitals is that Kyiv’s gains on the battlefield will then force Putin to the negotiating table. And it is possible that another tactical setback would diminish Moscow’s optimism about continued fighting. But just as losing territorial control does not equate to losing a war, neither does it necessarily induce political concessions. Putin could announce another round of mobilization, intensify his bombing campaign on Ukraine’s cities, or merely hold the line, convinced that time will work for him and against Ukraine. He might well continue fighting even if he thinks he will lose. Other states have chosen to keep fighting despite recognizing the inevitability of defeat: think, for example, of Germany in World War I. In short, gains on the battlefield will not in themselves necessarily bring about an end to the war.

MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE?

After over a year of fighting, the likely direction of this war is coming into focus. The location of the frontline is an important piece of that puzzle, but it is far from the most important one. Instead, the key aspects of this conflict are twofold: the persistent threat that both sides will pose to each other, and the unsettled dispute over the areas of Ukraine that Russia has claimed to annex. These are likely to remain fixed for many years to come.

Ukraine has built an impressive fighting force with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of aid, extensive training, and intelligence support from the West. The Ukrainian armed forces will be able to hold at risk any areas under Russian occupation. Further, Kyiv will maintain the capability to strike Russia itself, as it has demonstrated consistently over the past year.

Of course, the Russian military will also have the capacity to threaten Ukrainian security. Although its armed forces have suffered significant casualties and equipment losses that will take years to recover from, they are still formidable. And as they demonstrate daily, even in their current sorry state, they can cause significant death and destruction for Ukrainian military forces and civilians alike. The campaign to destroy Ukraine’s power grid might have fizzled, but Moscow will maintain the ability to hit Ukraine’s cities at any time using airpower, land-based assets, and sea-launched weapons.


Ukrainians firing toward Russian troops in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, May 2023

Viacheslav Ratynskyi / Reuters

In other words, no matter where the frontline is, Russia and Ukraine will have the capabilities to pose a permanent threat to each other. But the evidence of the past year suggests that neither has or will have the capacity to achieve a decisive victory—assuming, of course, that Russia does not resort to weapons of mass destruction (and even that might not secure victory). In early 2022, when its forces were in far better shape, Russia could not take control of Kyiv or oust the democratically elected Ukrainian government. At this stage, the Russian military even appears unable to take all the areas of Ukraine that Moscow claims as its own. Last November, the Ukrainians forced the Russians to retreat to the east bank of the Dnieper River in the Kherson region. Today, the Russian military is in no state to push back across the river to seize the rest of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Its attempt in January to push north on the plains of the Donetsk region near Vuhledar—a far less taxing offensive than a river crossing—ended in a bloodbath for the Russians.

The Ukrainian military, meanwhile, has defied expectations and may well continue to do so. But there are significant impediments to achieving further progress on the ground. Russian forces are heavily dug in on the most likely axis of advance in the south. Open-source satellite images show they have created multilayered physical defenses—new trenches, antivehicle barriers, obstacles and revetments for equipment and materiel—across the frontline that will prove challenging to breach. The mobilization Putin announced last fall has ameliorated the manpower problems that had earlier allowed Ukraine to advance in the Kharkiv region, where Russia’s thinly defended lines were vulnerable to a surprise attack. And the Ukrainian military is largely untested in offensive campaigns that require integrating various capabilities. It has also suffered significant losses during the war, most recently in the battle for Bakhmut, a small city in the Donetsk region. Kyiv is also facing shortages of critical munitions, including for artillery and air defenses, and the hodgepodge of Western equipment it received has strained maintenance and training resources.

These limitations on both sides strongly suggest that neither one will achieve its stated territorial objectives by military means in the coming months or even years. For Ukraine, the objective is extremely clear: Kyiv wants control over all its internationally recognized territory, which includes Crimea and the parts of the Donbas that Russia has occupied since 2014. Russia’s position is not quite as categorical since Moscow has maintained ambiguity about the location of the borders of two of the five Ukrainian regions it claims to have annexed: Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Regardless of this ambiguity, the bottom line is that neither Ukraine nor Russia will likely establish control over what they consider their own territory. (This is not to suggest that both parties’ claims should be accorded equal legitimacy. But the manifest illegitimacy of the Russian position does not appear to deter Moscow from holding it.) Put differently, the war will end without a resolution to the territorial dispute. Either Russia or Ukraine, or, more likely, both, will have to settle for a de facto line of control that neither recognizes as an international border.

A FOREVER WAR BEGINS

These largely immutable factors could well produce a drawn-out hot war between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, history suggests that is the most likely outcome. A study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, using data from 1946 to 2021 compiled by Uppsala University, found that 26 percent of interstate wars end in less than a month and another 25 percent within a year. But the study also found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.” Even those that last fewer than ten years can be exceptionally destructive. The Iran-Iraq war, for example, lasted for nearly eight years, from 1980 to 1988, and resulted in almost half a million combat fatalities and roughly as many wounded. After all its sacrifices, Ukraine deserves to avoid such a fate.

A long war between Russia and Ukraine will also be highly problematic for the United States and its allies, as a recent RAND study I co-authored with the political scientist Miranda Priebe shows. A protracted conflict would keep the risk of possible escalation—either to Russian nuclear use or to a Russian-NATO war—at its current elevated level. Ukraine would be on near-total economic and military life support from the West, which will eventually cause budgetary challenges for Western countries and readiness problems for their militaries. The global economic fallout of the war, including the volatility in grain and energy prices, would persist. The United States would be unable to focus its resources on other priorities, and Russian dependence on China would deepen. Although a long war would also further weaken Russia, that benefit does not outweigh these costs.

While Western governments should continue to do all they can to help Ukraine prepare for the counteroffensive, they also need to adopt a strategy for war termination—a vision for an endgame that is plausible under these far-from-ideal circumstances. Because a decisive military victory is highly unlikely, certain endgames are no longer plausible. Given the persistence of fundamental differences between Moscow and Kyiv on core issues such as borders, as well as intense grievances after so many casualties and civilian deaths, a peace treaty or comprehensive political settlement that normalizes relations between Russia and Ukraine seems impossible, too. The two countries will be enemies long after the hot war ends.



For Western governments and Kyiv, ending the war without any negotiations might seem preferable to talking to the representatives of a government that committed an unprovoked act of aggression and horrific war crimes. But interstate wars that have reached this level of intensity do not tend to simply peter out without negotiations. If the war persists, it will also be extremely difficult to transform it back into a low-intensity localized conflict like the one that took place in the Donbas from 2014 to 2022. During that period, the war had a relatively minimal impact on life outside the conflict zone in Ukraine. The sheer length of the current frontline (over 600 miles), the strikes on cities and other targets far beyond the line, and the mobilization underway in both countries (partial in Russia, total in Ukraine) will have systemic—perhaps even near-existential—effects on the two belligerents. For example, it is difficult to imagine how the Ukrainian economy can recover if its airspace remains closed, its ports remain largely blockaded, its cities under fire, its men of working age fighting at the front, and millions of refugees unwilling to return to the country. We are past the point when the impact of this war can be confined to a particular geography.

Since talks will be needed but a settlement is out of the question, the most plausible ending is an armistice agreement. An armistice—essentially a durable cease-fire agreement that does not bridge political divides—would end the hot war between Russia and Ukraine but not their broader conflict. The archetypal case is the 1953 Korean armistice, which dealt exclusively with the mechanics of maintaining a cease-fire and left all political issues off the table. Although North and South Korea are still technically at war, and both claim the entirety of the peninsula as their sovereign territory, the armistice has largely held. Such an unsatisfactory outcome is the most likely way this war will end.

In contrast with the Korean case, the United States and its allies are not doing the fighting in Ukraine. Decisions in Kyiv and Moscow will ultimately be far more determinative than those made in Berlin, Brussels, or Washington. Even if they wanted to do so, Western governments could not dictate terms to Ukraine—or to Russia. Yet even while acknowledging that Kyiv will ultimately make its own decisions, the United States and its allies, in close consultation with Ukraine, can begin to discuss and put forward their vision for the endgame. To some extent, they have already been doing so for months: U.S. President Joe Biden’s May 2022 op-ed in The New York Times made clear that his administration sees this war ending at the negotiating table. His senior officials have regularly repeated this view ever since, although the language of helping Ukraine for “as long as it takes” often garners more attention. But Washington has steadfastly avoided providing any further details. Moreover, there do not appear to be any ongoing efforts either within the U.S. government or among Washington, its allies, and Kyiv to think through the practicalities and substance of eventual negotiations. Compared with the efforts to provide resources for the counteroffensive, practically nothing is being done to shape what comes next. The Biden administration should begin to fill that gap.

THE COSTS OF WAITING

Taking steps to get diplomacy off the ground need not affect efforts to assist Ukraine militarily or to impose costs on Russia. Historically, fighting and talking at the same time has been a common practice in wars. During the Korean War, some of the most intense fighting took place during the two years of armistice talks, when 45 percent of U.S. casualties were incurred. Beginning to plan for the inevitable diplomacy can and should occur in parallel with the other existing elements of U.S. policy—as well as with the ongoing war.

In the short term, that means both continuing to help Kyiv with the counteroffensive and beginning parallel discussions with allies and Ukraine about the endgame. In principle, opening a negotiation track with Russia should complement, not contradict, the push on the battlefield. If Ukraine’s gains make the Kremlin more willing to compromise, the only way to know that would be through a functioning diplomatic channel. Setting up such a channel should not cause either Ukraine or its Western partners to let up the pressure on Russia. An effective strategy will require both coercion and diplomacy. One cannot come at the expense of the other.

And waiting to set the stage for negotiations has its costs. The longer the allies and Ukraine go without developing a diplomatic strategy, the harder it will be to do so. As the months go by, the political price of taking the first step will go up. Already, any move that the United States and its allies make to open the diplomatic track—even with Ukraine’s support—would have to be delicately managed lest it be portrayed as a policy reversal or an abandonment of Western support for Kyiv.

Fighting and talking at the same time has been a common practice in wars.

Starting preparations now makes sense also because conflict diplomacy will not yield results overnight. Indeed, it will take weeks or perhaps months to get the allies and Ukraine on the same page about a negotiating strategy—and even longer to come to an agreement with Russia when the talks begin. In the case of the Korean armistice, 575 meetings were required over two years to finalize the nearly 40 pages of the agreement. In other words, even if a negotiation platform were set up tomorrow, months would elapse before the guns fell silent (if the talks were to succeed, which is far from a given).

Devising measures to make the cease-fire stick will be a thorny but critical task, and Washington should ensure that it is ready to assist Kyiv in that effort. Serious work should begin now on how to avoid what Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, describe derisively as “Minsk 3,” a reference to the two failed cease-fire deals that were brokered with Russia in the Belarusian capital in 2014 and 2015, after its earlier invasions. These agreements failed to durably end the violence and included no effective mechanisms for ensuring the parties’ compliance.

Using data from conflicts between 1946 and 1997, the political scientist Virginia Page Fortna has shown that strong agreements that arrange for demilitarized zones, third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, or joint commissions for dispute resolution and contain specific (versus vague) language produced more lasting cease-fires. These mechanisms reinforce the principles of reciprocity and deterrence that allow sworn enemies to achieve peace without resolving their fundamental differences. Because these mechanisms will be challenging to adapt to the Ukraine war, governments need to work on developing them now.

Although an armistice to end this war would be a bilateral agreement, the United States and its allies can and should assist Ukraine in its negotiating strategy. In addition, they should consider what measures they can take in parallel to provide incentives for the parties to get to the table and minimize the chances that any cease-fire collapses. As Fortna’s research suggests, security commitments to Ukraine—some assurance that Kyiv will not face Russia alone if Moscow attacks again—should be part of this equation. Too often, the discussion of security commitments is reduced to the question of NATO membership for Ukraine. As a member, Ukraine would benefit from Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty, which requires members to consider an armed attack against one of them as an attack against them all. But NATO membership is more than just Article 5. From Moscow’s perspective, membership in the alliance would transform Ukraine into a staging ground for the United States to deploy its own forces and capabilities. So even if there were consensus among allies to offer Kyiv membership (and there is not), granting Ukraine a security guarantee through NATO membership might well make peace so unattractive to Russia that Putin would decide to keep fighting.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with Western leaders in Hiroshima, Japan, May 2023

Kyodo / Reuters

Squaring this circle will be challenging and politically fraught. One potential model is the U.S.-Israel 1975 memorandum of understanding, which was one of the key preconditions for Israel to agree to peace with Egypt. The document states that in light of the “long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel’s security or sovereignty by a world power.” It goes on to say that in the event of such a threat, the U.S. government will consult with Israel “with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.” The document also explicitly promises “remedial action by the United States” if Egypt violates the cease-fire. This is not an explicit commitment to treat an attack on Israel as an attack on the United States, but it comes close.

A similar assurance to Ukraine would give Kyiv an enhanced sense of security, encourage private-sector investment in Ukraine’s economy, and enhance deterrence of future Russian aggression. Whereas today Moscow knows for sure that the United States will not intervene militarily if it attacks Ukraine, this kind of statement would make the Kremlin think more than twice—but it would not raise the prospect of new U.S. bases on Russia’s borders. Of course, Washington would need confidence in the durability of the cease-fire so that the probability of the commitment being tested would remain low. Avoiding war with Russia should remain a priority.

When the time comes, Ukraine will need other incentives such as reconstruction aid, measures of accountability for Russia, and sustained military assistance in peacetime to help Kyiv create a credible deterrent. In addition, the United States and its allies should supplement the coercive pressure being applied to Russia with efforts to make peace a more attractive option, such as conditional sanctions relief—with snapback clauses for noncompliance—that could prompt compromise. The West should also be open to a dialogue on broader European security issues so as to minimize the chance of a similar crisis with Russia breaking out in the future.

START TALKING

The first step toward making this vision a reality over the coming months is to stand up an effort in the U.S. government to develop the diplomatic track. An entire new U.S. military command element, the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine, has been devoted to the aid and training mission, which is led by a three-star general with a staff of 300. Yet there is not a single official in the U.S. government whose full-time job is conflict diplomacy. Biden should appoint one, perhaps a special presidential envoy who can engage beyond ministries of foreign affairs, which have been sidelined in this crisis in nearly all relevant capitals. Next, the United States should begin informal discussions with Ukraine and among allies in the G-7 and NATO about the endgame.

In parallel, the United States should consider establishing a regular channel of communication regarding the war that includes Ukraine, U.S. allies, and Russia. This channel would not initially be aimed at achieving a cease-fire. Instead, it would allow participants to interact continually, instead of in one-off encounters, akin to the contact group model used during the Balkan wars, when an informal grouping of representatives from key states and international institutions met regularly. Such discussions should begin out of the public eye, as did initial U.S. contacts with Iran on the nuclear deal, signed in 2015.

These efforts might well fail to lead to an agreement. The odds of success are slim—and even if negotiations did produce a deal, no one would leave fully satisfied. The Korean armistice was certainly not seen as a triumph of U.S. foreign policy at the time it was signed: after all, the American public had grown accustomed to absolute victories, not bloody wars without clear resolution. But in the nearly 70 years since, there has not been another outbreak of war on the peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korea emerged from the devastation of the 1950s to become an economic powerhouse and eventually a thriving democracy. A postwar Ukraine that is similarly prosperous and democratic with a strong Western commitment to its security would represent a genuine strategic victory.

An endgame premised on an armistice would leave Ukraine—at least temporarily—without all its territory. But the country would have the opportunity to recover economically, and the death and destruction would end. It would remain locked in a conflict with Russia over the areas occupied by Moscow, but that conflict would play out in the political, cultural, and economic domains, where, with Western support, Ukraine would have advantages. The successful reunification of Germany, in 1990, another country divided by terms of peace, demonstrates that focusing on nonmilitary elements of the contestation can produce results. Meanwhile, a Russian-Ukrainian armistice would also not end the West’s confrontation with Russia, but the risks of a direct military clash would decrease dramatically, and the global consequences of the war would be mitigated.

Many commentators will continue to insist that this war must be decided only on the battlefield. But that view discounts how the war’s structural realities are unlikely to change even if the frontline shifts, an outcome that itself is far from guaranteed. The United States and its allies should be capable of helping Ukraine simultaneously on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Now is the time to start.

Foreign Affairs · by Samuel Charap · June 5, 2023



​22. EXPLAINED: Russia Claims to Have Repelled ‘Large-Scale Ukrainian Offensive’, Rumors of Counteroffensive Swirl






EXPLAINED: Russia Claims to Have Repelled ‘Large-Scale Ukrainian Offensive’, Rumors of Counteroffensive Swirl


The Kremlin has claimed to have destroyed 16 tanks and to have killed ‘more than 250’ Ukrainian troops, though the claims are unverified and Kyiv has yet to comment.


by Chris York | June 5, 2023, 10:24 am | Comments (10)

kyivpost.com

Russia has claimed it repelled a "large-scale offensive" by Ukrainian forces in Moscow-annexed Donetsk on Sunday, June 4, saying “the enemy… had no success.”

What exactly is Russia claiming happened?

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), “a total of six mechanized and two tank battalions of the enemy” launched an attack along “five sectors of the front in the South-Donetsk direction.”

It added in a Telegram post in the early hours of Monday morning: “As a result of the skillful and competent actions of the Eastern Group of Forces, the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine amounted to more than 250 personnel, 16 tanks, three infantry fighting vehicles, 21 armored fighting vehicles.”

“In total, six mechanized and two tank battalions of the enemy were involved.

“The goal of the enemy was to break through our defenses on the most vulnerable, in its opinion, sector of the front. The enemy did not achieve his tasks, he had no success.”

The ministry posted what it said was a video of the battle, showing Ukrainian armored vehicles coming under heavy fire.

President Putin's top commander in Ukraine, Valery Gerasimov, "was at one of the advanced command posts," its statement added.

How reliable are these claims?

At the time of writing, the main source for these specific claims is the Russian MoD and as such, should be treated with a liberal pinch of salt.

In its latest daily assessment, The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), said: “Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4.

“Geolocated footage posted on June 4 shows that mechanized Ukrainian forces made limited advances northeast of Rivnopil [a village in Donetsk],” it added.

The ISW stressed that there was “no visual evidence” for some of the claims which were made by Russian milibloggers, some of which appear to contradict the Kremlin’s version of events.

The ISW wrote: “Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through the first line of Russian defenses and advanced 500 meters to three kilometers in [one area of Donetsk].”

It added: “Russian sources largely claimed that the Ukrainian localized counterattacks were reconnaissance-in-force operations.”

A high-profile Russian war correspondent, Alexander Kots, said that "battles have been going on" in the area of Ugledar, in the south of the Donetsk region, and also further north in Soledar and Bakhmut, which were occupied by Moscow's forces after months of fighting.

Kots said Ukrainian forces were "conducting offensive operations" in and around the frontline hotspot of Bakhmut which Russian mercenary group Wagner claimed last month had fallen to Moscow.

He suggested that Kyiv had not yet "introduced the main forces into battle."

Has Kyiv commented?

There has been no comment on the specific claims made by Russia, but Ukraine’s StratCom of the Armed Forces in a Monday morning post on Telegram said: “Russian occupying forces are intensifying their informational and psychological operations.”

They added: “Russian propagandists will spread false information about the counteroffensive, its directions, and the losses of the Ukrainian army. Even if there is no counterattack.

“For this, old videos and photos have been prepared, which show damaged vehicles, dead and captured. And also other fake materials.”

Is this the long-waited Ukrainian counteroffensive?

That’s currently unclear. There has been no comment from officials in Kyiv about the attack referred to by the Russian MoD and the details have not been independently verified.

The Ukrainian army has previously said there would be no big announcement of the start of the counteroffensive and officials in Kyiv have been vague when referring to any specific start date.

Over the weekend, a PR campaign from Kyiv that centered on a video of Ukrainian soldiers raising a finger to their lips to ask for silence made clear that details of the counteroffensive would not be forthcoming.

"Words are very unnecessary
They can only do harm"

(c) Depeche Mode pic.twitter.com/0Ul78wSv9q
— Oleksii Reznikov (@oleksiireznikov) June 4, 2023

On social media, speculation is already rife.

Russian Defense Ministry says Ukrainian counter offensive has begun.

Judging from the panic I'm seeing on Russian military channels, they are right.

This will be an absolute massacre.
— Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv) June 5, 2023

What has Kyiv been waiting for?

In an interview with The Wall Street Journal published on Saturday, June 3, President Zelensky said Kyiv is “ready” for the long-awaited counteroffensive but that “we would like to have certain things” in order to protect both Ukraine’s soldiers and its civilians.

Zelensky was referring to air defense systems, in particular the US-made Patriot systems which have been exceptionally busy in Ukraine in recent weeks, intercepting missiles and drones launched in almost nightly Russian attacks on the capital Kyiv.

Despite very little damage being done, at huge financial cost to Moscow, some analysts believe the Kremlin’s tactic is to force Ukraine to choose between defending its cities or defending its troops when they launch the counteroffensive.

It’s not known exactly how many Patriot systems are currently in Ukraine or where they are all stationed, but Zelensky implied that with current supplies, it is not possible to do both.

“The reality is 50 Patriots will, for the most part, prevent people from dying,” he said.

“Everyone knows perfectly well that any counteroffensive without air superiority is very dangerous."

"A large number of soldiers will die" if Kyiv is not given the weapons to counter Russian air power, he added.

kyivpost.com



23. Ditching USD is an escape from sanctions and aggression



A view from Cuba. :-) 



Ditching USD is an escape from sanctions and aggression

Jai Hamid - June 3, 2023

cryptopolitan.com

TL;DR Breakdown

  • Diaz-Canel critiques USD dominance in global trade, citing repressive effects.
  • BRICS nations push for de-dollarization, considering a shared currency.
  • Countries globally seek to reduce USD reliance, pointing towards a shift in world economic order.

The quiet murmurs of the world’s economic machinery have become increasingly resonant as nations grapple with the domineering influence of the United States dollar (USD).

In an exclusive interview aired by RT, Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuba’s President, made a bold statement emphasizing the repressive power of the USD, and what nations are doing to break free.


The quiet murmurs of the world’s economic machinery have become increasingly resonant as nations grapple with the domineering influence of the United States dollar (USD).

In an exclusive interview aired by RT, Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuba’s President, made a bold statement emphasizing the repressive power of the USD, and what nations are doing to break free.

The USD’s global reach and its repercussions

Cuba’s top authority detailed how the ubiquity of the USD as a global reserve currency permits the United States to exert influence, which some interpret as a form of monetary hegemony.

According to Diaz-Canel, such a position enables the US to engage in activities that include implementing stringent sanctions, blackmailing, and fostering aggression.

The President didn’t shy away from expressing his views on the matter, highlighting how these actions often affect developing economies that struggle to fight back.

This isn’t the first instance where a leader has critiqued the USD’s dominating role in global trade. The call for de-dollarization has been a recurring theme among various nations that’ve been on the receiving end of US sanctions.

The rise of BRICS and the de-dollarization wave

An alternative to this situation may well be in the making. Diaz-Canel’s gaze turns towards the BRICS bloc, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

The group represents an encouraging prospect for economic integration, primarily for developing economies looking to sidestep the looming shadow of the USD.

These countries are actively striving to reduce their reliance on the USD, proposing the use of their own currencies for settling trades. The move, which is expected to be a significant discussion point at their August summit, indicates a clear and conscious shift away from USD dependency.

The potential introduction of a shared BRICS currency could diminish the USD’s influence, and a successfully executed plan would inevitably reshape the world economic order.

Cuba, though not a BRICS member, enjoys a sturdy alliance with Russia, a relationship that traces back to the Soviet era. Trade interactions between the two nations have shown a substantial increase, reaching a staggering $452 million last year, a significant leap from its preceding value.

The effects of US sanctions and the road ahead

Cuba’s economic landscape has been largely shaped by US sanctions, initially enacted in the 1960s. The US justification for these sanctions ranges from human rights violations to the assertion of communist ideologies and regional instability.

In this context, Diaz-Canel lauded Russia’s role in promoting a multipolar world, which fosters more equitable trade relations and benefits nations that resist the “unfulfilled promises” of the United States.

Russian President Vladimir Putin echoed a similar sentiment, emphasizing that resistance to multipolarity would be detrimental.

The call to abandon the USD isn’t restricted to BRICS nations or their allies. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have agreed to foster the use of their national currencies.

Similarly, representatives from nine Asian countries convened in Iran to explore potential de-dollarization strategies.

The rising tide of de-dollarization implies a significant shift in the global financial landscape. While the full impact remains to be seen, nations are no longer willing to remain passive under the influence of the USD.

They’re actively seeking alternatives, a clear indication that a transformative epoch in international trade is on the horizon.

Jai Hamid

Jai Hamid is an enthusiastic writer whose current area of interest is the blockchain sector. Whenever she is not reading or writing, you can find her tending to her plants in the garden. She strongly believes that crypto is going to transform the world for the better.

Disclaimer: The information provided is not trading advice. Cryptopolitan.com holds no liability for any investments made based on the information provided on this page. We strongly recommend independent research and/or consultation with a qualified professional before making any investment decision.

cryptopolitan.com



24. BRICS Raging Against the Dollar Is an Exercise in Futility



I am always happy to see these analyses.  But I still remain concerned about the attacks on the dollar or our own foolish moves (e.g., our own congressmen advocating for default on our debt).


Graphics at the link.




BRICS Raging Against the Dollar Is an Exercise in Futility

Talk of a common currency displacing the greenback is wishful at best.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-06-05/brics-raging-against-the-dollar-is-an-exercise-in-futility?sref=hhjZtX76


ByMarcus Ashworth


June 5, 2023 at 12:00 AM EDTCorrectedJune 5, 2023 at 3:26 AM EDT



The exorbitant privilege the US enjoys from the dollar being unambiguously the world's reserve currency is under attack again. The emerging market BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are trying to attract hangers-on by whipping up talk of a rival to dethrone King Dollar. It's going to fail for all the usual reasons. As the King himself, Elvis Presley, sang: A little less conversation, a little more action, please.

One Constant

The dollar has maintained its international value pretty consistently

Source: Bloomberg

Last week, BRICS foreign ministers gathered in Cape Town, South Africa along with representatives from other countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kazakhstan. It was the warm-up act for the main event, with heads of state scheduled to meet in late August in Johannesburg, though the location may be switched to allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend without risking arrest under a warrant from the International Criminal Court. There’s not much moral high ground in sight, which defines the nature of the gatherings — an ill-disguised attempt to overthrow the post-World War II rules-based world order.

Following its invasion of Ukraine, $300 billion worth of Russian foreign exchange and gold reserves were frozen by the US and Europe, raising the possibility that the overseas assets of countries acting contrary to western interests could similarly be withheld. There is a point here about potential overreach, as western sanctions on bad state actors have mushroomed in recent years. The US government cannot ignore the fallout from its retaliatory action against Putin, and enlightened self interest suggests it should deliver more clarity on what it will and won't do in the future. The irony is that de-dollarization is rearing its head just as the US settles its debt-ceiling fracas. 

The influence of the BRICS coalition could be substantial, given the group has 42% of the world's population. But economically, it delivers just 23% of total global output and only 18% of trade. According to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transactions, the dollar is used for 42% of currency transactions. The euro’s share is 32% but it doesn't have anything like the same influence outside Europe and parts of North Africa. The Chinese yuan contributes about 2%, as its non-domestic usage does not extend significantly even within Asia, or outside of trade-linked finance.

Reality Check

The dollar's usage extends far and wide beyond US territory

Source: SWIFT, Bloomberg

The defining element for a reserve currency is where it is the second-most used currency for domestic transactions. The dollar is pretty much the most-utilized method of exchange across the world after each nation's own currency — sometimes even surpassing domestic currencies. Almost every commodity, including oil and gold, trades in dollars. Even crypto-currencies are paired almost exclusively with the greenback. What is also vital for a reserve currency is its use as a store of value. The International Monetary Fund estimates 59% of global central bank reserves are in dollars, with euros at 20%, and the yuan just 5%.  

As many as 19 other countries are interested in joining the federation, Bloomberg News reported, with 13 nations already formally invited. But an ever bigger set of contradictory interests will only make the concept even less manageable. A common currency is on the agenda. One Russian idea is to make it part-backed by gold — although moving gold bars around is no simple matter. Despite a mutual dislike of the extended reach of the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, the grouping's fundamental differences are too wide for it to make headway. Cheap Russian oil may currently be highly attractive for hydrocarbon-importing nations but it is not a long-term foundation for world trade.  


South African Reserve Bank Governor Lesetja Kganyago highlighted last month that any legal BRICS-backed tender would require a single central bank. As with its belt-and-road initiative across Asia into Europe, it is impossible to imagine that China would not dominate any wider BRICS forum, making Shanghai the most likely location for a BRICS central bank. That is unlikely to sit easily with India, which frequently has border skirmishes with China. Replacing a liberal democracy-backed currency with a concept dominated by a totalitarian state with capital controls won’t float.

If the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries cannot come up with a petro-currency, what chance does a random bunch of geographically disparate nations have? A South American trade currency concept called the "sur" is struggling because smaller countries’ interests will just be smothered by the much larger economy of Brazil.

Some BRICS countries are resource-rich, most resource-poor. None, either alone or combined, can magic up an alternative currency. Substantive progress on nuts-and-bolts commerce among the group has to come first. The dollar's dominance might be irksome but there is no alternative that is anywhere near critical mass. Rage against the dollar machine all you want — but it isn’t listening.

Marcus Ashworth is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering European markets. Previously, he was chief markets strategist for Haitong Securities in London. @marcusashworth

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(Corrects date of BRICS meeting in second paragraph.)

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

Marcus Ashworth at mashworth4@bloomberg.net



25. Did Shangri-La give birth to a new Quad?


The Philippines is really stepping up. And it may have geostrategic importance just as it did after the Spanish American War.Will we have Quad 1 and Quad 2?





Did Shangri-La give birth to a new Quad?

US, Japan, Philippines and Australia’s first-ever quadrilateral meeting held on forum’s sidelines raised joint South China Sea patrols

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · June 5, 2023

The recently-concluded Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore was among the most high-stakes confabs in recent years, as multiple powers explored ways to avoid a full-blown New Cold War and armed confrontation between the US and China.

But with no sign of any immediate thaw between the two superpowers, new, inchoate security groupings are emerging on the margins.

After months of intense anticipation, defense chiefs from the US, the Philippines, Australia and Japan held their first-ever quadrilateral talks on the sidelines of the Shangri-La forum, with Beijing’s maritime assertiveness in mind.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Japan’s Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles and Philippine Acting Defense Secretary Carlito Galvez held an unprecedented meeting with huge symbolic and big operational implications.

Atop their agenda was proposed quadrilateral joint patrols in the South China Sea for later this year, which if held would mark a major milestone for America’s evolving “integrated deterrence” strategy to contain China’s rise in the region.

Although playing down the idea earlier this year, Washington seems increasingly open to new quadrilateral mechanisms beyond its existing “Quad” partnership with India, Australia and Japan, which by accounts has been beset by internal divisions over confronting Russia in the wake of the Ukraine conflict.

Over the weekend, yet another incident served as a stark reminder of rising geopolitical volatility in the Indo-Pacific. Following a rare joint sail by US and Canadian naval forces through the Taiwan Straits, Beijing responded with aggressive counter-maneuvers and strident diplomatic protests.

During a “routine” transit through the area, the US Navy’s 7th Fleet said the guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and Canada’s HMCS Montreal reportedly came close to blows with a Chinese navy ship, which cut across the bow of the American destroyer on two occasions.

Just days earlier, the Pentagon released footage that showed a Chinese fighter jet performing a similar maneuver, albeit in the skies, against an American surveillance aircraft.

The Chinese J-16 fighter cutting directly in front of the nose of the US RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft on May 26, 2023. Image: CNN / Screengrab

Rising tensions in the seas and the skies were mirrored by tough diplomatic exchanges between US and Chinese defense chiefs at the Singapore forum. For his part, China’s defense chief Li Shangfu warned against a “Cold War mentality” in a not-so thinly-veiled jab at the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) alliance and Quad.

“In essence, attempts to push for NATO-like [alliances] in the Asia-Pacific is a way of kidnapping regional countries and exaggerating conflicts and confrontations, which will only plunge the Asia-Pacific into a whirlpool of disputes and conflicts,” the Chinese official warned while reiterating an uncompromising position on Beijing’s plans to “reunify” self-ruling Taiwan.

For his part, US defense chief Austin warned against any aggressive maneuvers against Taiwan while underscoring his vocal concerns over the virtual breakdown of military-to-military communication channels with China.

“I am deeply concerned that the PRC (People’s Republic of China) has been unwilling to engage more seriously on better mechanisms for crisis management between our two militaries,” Austin said during his speech in Singapore.

“The more that we talk, the more that we can avoid the misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to crisis or conflict,” he added.

The deadlock in Sino-American relations has likely forced Washington to reconsider its earlier apprehensions with new Quad groupings in the region.

Earlier this year, US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink, during a regional tour in Asia, played down suggestions of a new Quad grouping, including by Philippine Senator Francis Tolentino, who has pushed for “own version of Quad” to check China’s ambitions in adjacent waters.

“I guess regarding what you called, a new Quad, I would say, ‘no.’ We’re not looking to establish a new quad,” Kritenbrink said in an online press briefing during his Manila visit last month.

“We’re not looking to establish any new formal mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific at this point,” the senior US diplomat said, adding how his country is “happy to assist with the ongoing modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including in the maritime domain.”

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force at the Malabar 21 – an inter-nation exercise with the Indian Navy, US Navy and Royal Australian Navy – to improve tactical skills and further strengthen the Quad navies. Photo: AFP / EyePress News

Nevertheless, Kritenbrink left the door open for “opportunities in the future for such close allies as the United States, Philippines and Japan to look at ways that maybe we could expand our cooperation” amid growing discussions over a trilateral Japan-Philippine-US (JAPHUS) security grouping.

Following Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s consequential visit to the White House and the Pentagon last month, which saw the two treaty allies sign new bilateral defense guidelines, moves to forge de facto alternative quadrilateral groupings are accelerating.

Historically, Manila served as a venue for the two key moments in the birth of the original Quad. The first US, Australia, India, and Japan inaugural meeting took place on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) gathering in Manila in 2007. Exactly a decade later, the leaders of the four powers, wearing traditional Filipino barongs, held their first formal official-level discussions also in Manila.

Now, the US is overseeing the emergence of a new quadrilateral grouping, especially with the Philippines’ emergence as a new star ally in Asia under a more Western-friendly regime.

During the Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippine Defense Chief Carlito Galvez took an uncompromising position on the South China Sea disputes, signaling Manila’s hardening line against China’s assertiveness over its claimed features and islands.

“We view the 2016 arbitration award as not only setting the reason and right in the South China Sea, but also as an inspiration for how matters should be considered by states facing similar challenging circumstances,” Galvez said before his Indo-Pacific counterparts.

“President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has strongly emphasized his directive to safeguard every square inch of our territory from any foreign power… The UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the 2016 arbitration are and will continue to be the twin anchors of our policies and actions in the West Philippine Sea and the broader South China Sea,” he added while emphasizing his country’s commitment to enhance maritime security cooperation with like-minded powers.

Last week, the Philippines, Japan and US held their first-ever joint coast guard drills in Manila Bay. Later this year, the US and its regional allies including the Philippines are expected to conduct potentially unprecedented quadrilateral joint patrols in the South China Sea.

This photo taken by the Philippine Coast Guard shows Chinese vessels anchored at the Whitsun Reef 175 nautical miles west of Bataraza in Palawan in the South China Sea. Photo: AFP

Closer intelligence-sharing, expanded joint drills and arms transfers among the four allies are likely to follow, with Tokyo exploring its own visiting forces agreement with Manila, which has already hosted large-scale US and Australian military presences in the past decade.

In an official statement following the inaugural Philippine, US, Japan and Australia quadrilateral meeting in Singapore, Japan’s Ministry of Defense said that the four allies “discussed regional issues of common interest and opportunities to expand cooperation,” while vowing to double down on new and pre-existing cooperative agreements.

“It was an honor to meet with Secretary Galvez, Minister Hamada, and DPM Marles to discuss opportunities to expand cooperation across our four nations, including in the South China Sea,” Austin said in a tweet after the meeting. “We are united in our shared vision for advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific,” he added.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · June 5, 2023



26. US in an ill-conceived turn to neo-mercantilism



Excepts:

From Adam Smith in 1776 to the present, free traders accept the primacy of national security. But the eternal question is about the proper domain of restrictions. US decisions as to whether a country, company, product or technology threatens US national security are shielded both from public and judicial scrutiny and deliberately ignore economic costs.
As long as Sullivan is National Security Advisor, the yard may remain small, but his successor could have expansive views — especially if former US president Donald Trump is elected to a second term.
US President Joe Biden has successfully enacted his domestic agenda and further legislative action on the trade front and now awaits the president elected in November 2024. This should be a moment for Biden to use his presidential powers to promote an ambitious World Trade Organization agenda.
For the next 18 months, Biden should thereby add the world economy to his justified focus on Ukrainian defenses.
Yet Sullivan gave only a weak nod to the World Trade Organization. Sullivan’s words conveyed no call for US leadership in building a rules-based trading system respecting market principles. But Sullivan’s remarks should not be the last we hear from President Biden on US policy towards the global economy.



US in an ill-conceived turn to neo-mercantilism

Neoliberalism is out and neo-mercantilism in as US decoupling from China abandons adherence to rules-based, free market trade


asiatimes.com · by Gary Clyde Hufbauer · June 5, 2023

Speaking at the Brookings Institution in April 2023, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared national security and industrial policy as the guiding lights for US trade. Sullivan couched his prescriptions in soft tones and catchy phrases. “Decoupling” is out, “de-risking” is in.

The goal is to “forge a new consensus” — something different to the market-oriented Washington Consensus of yesteryear. National security restrictions have their limits set in a “small yard, high fence.”

US security is not trying to engage in a “technology blockade” against China but rather on a “level playing field.” The phrasing recalls Napoleon’s remark of an “iron fist in a velvet glove.”

Embedded in Sullivan’s remarks were familiar neo-mercantilist themes. These include that post-Second World War trade agreements did little to improve US life and, at most, only enriched wealthy Americans instead of working people. Neo-mercantilist themes also suggest that industrial policy is essential to spark innovation in neglected sectors.

They emphasize that allies should accept heavy US subsidies even when they attract private investment to US shores and that national security, broadly defined, must take precedence over market forces.

Not surprisingly, Sullivan’s speech brought cheers from the deacons of neo-mercantilism. Clyde Prestowitz, an independent columnist, applauded Sullivan for turning his back on free trade and globalist policies. Todd Tucker of the Roosevelt Institute warmly endorsed Sullivan for embracing industrial policy and “moving away from a moribund neoliberalism.”

Oren Cass of American Progress quibbled that “decoupling is essential” and admonished Sullivan for not carrying the ascendancy of national security and industrial policy far enough.

Sullivan and his supporters dismiss fundamental facts. Post-war liberalization, accompanied by revolutions in transportation and communications, raised living standards for billions of people. Gains to the United States alone now amount to more than US$2 trillion annually, some 10% of GDP.

Despite its declining popularity, trade still commands majority support among Americans. Massive industrial subsidies that are awarded to select firms may fail to accelerate growth in the United States. Intense competition between leading firms — whether domestic or foreign — seems the better formula.

If the United States cares about its global leadership role, neoliberalism is far superior to neo-mercantilism.

Echoing US Trade Ambassador Katherine Tai, Sullivan proposed “modern trade agreements” — as opposed to old-fashioned free trade agreements — to achieve “21st-century goals.” Those goals are to foster green energy, ensure safety and openness in digital infrastructure, avoid a race to the bottom in corporate taxation, protect labor and the environment and tackle corruption.

US Trade Representative Katherine Tai is implementing only ‘modern’ trade agreements, not necessarily ‘free’ ones. Photo: AFP / Bill O’Leary

The avatar of “modern trade agreements” is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, an agreement that contemplates neither economic incentives nor enforcement mechanisms to achieve the goals commended by Sullivan and Tai.

Tariff cuts are not on the table. By implication, market access provisions such as Buy America waivers and exceptions to the Jones Act — which requires goods shipped between US ports to be transported solely on US ships — have also been ruled out.

As if to emphasize the economic vacuum, Taiwan characterized its parallel agreement with the United States as a “building block” to an eventual free trade agreement. But nothing in the draft agreement lowers barriers to farm trade, reduces tariffs on manufactured goods, or relaxes Buy America regulations. Such market access provisions are high on Taiwan’s wish list.

From Adam Smith in 1776 to the present, free traders accept the primacy of national security. But the eternal question is about the proper domain of restrictions. US decisions as to whether a country, company, product or technology threatens US national security are shielded both from public and judicial scrutiny and deliberately ignore economic costs.

As long as Sullivan is National Security Advisor, the yard may remain small, but his successor could have expansive views — especially if former US president Donald Trump is elected to a second term.

US President Joe Biden has successfully enacted his domestic agenda and further legislative action on the trade front and now awaits the president elected in November 2024. This should be a moment for Biden to use his presidential powers to promote an ambitious World Trade Organization agenda.

For the next 18 months, Biden should thereby add the world economy to his justified focus on Ukrainian defenses.

Yet Sullivan gave only a weak nod to the World Trade Organization. Sullivan’s words conveyed no call for US leadership in building a rules-based trading system respecting market principles. But Sullivan’s remarks should not be the last we hear from President Biden on US policy towards the global economy.

Gary Clyde Hufbauer is Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

asiatimes.com · by Gary Clyde Hufbauer · June 5, 2023



27. A Strait Too Far: How a Deliberate Campaigning Approach in the Pacific Can Make Beijing Think Twice


Conclusion:


While the most recent fall and spring campaigning efforts involved many noteworthy successes, the joint force needs to do more and in short order. As Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. John C. Aquillino recently stated, when it comes to deterring Beijing, “everything needs to go faster.” Doing so requires the joint force to first focus on the inherent natural obstacles, both from the sky and the sea, standing between China and Taiwan. Next, the joint force should double down on the historic, nascent, and proposed efforts describe above. Washington cannot afford to keep planning and executing these exercises in isolation. Rather they should be one seamless and collective joint and allied campaign ruthlessly conveying the message to Beijing: not today, not tomorrow, not ever.



A Strait Too Far: How a Deliberate Campaigning Approach in the Pacific Can Make Beijing Think Twice - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Benjamin Van Horrick · June 5, 2023

On March 1, Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Kathleen Hicks tweeted a clear message to the People’s Republic of China — don’t press your luck and attempt to cross the Taiwan Strait. The tweet’s timing was likely no accident. Leading Northeast Asia security analyst Ian Easton argues that March through May is one of two ideal windows of meteorological opportunity for cross-strait amphibious operations, with the other occurring in September and October. For the U.S. joint force, the spring campaigning season in the Indo-Pacific is thus essential for strengthening regional partnerships, increasing multinational lethality, and instilling doubt in Chinese leaders’ minds about whether they could successfully invade Taiwan.

The joint force’s current campaigning actions along the first island chain and just beyond are already deterring Beijing from attempting such an invasion. But these actions have yet to fully exploit the timing challenges that Beijing faces. U.S. planners have conducted an ever-increasing number of cross-strait invasion wargames. Inevitably, though, these focus predominately on capability scorecard comparisons, and incorporate the misleading assumption that China is “playing a home game” while the United States is “playing an away game.” As Easton explains, historic weather patterns in the Taiwan Strait change the equation. From June through August, and then again between November and February, the weather in the Taiwan Strait, specifically frequent monsoons, typhoons, and prohibitive sea-states, make amphibious operations extremely difficult. For Chinese Communist Party leaders, the result is that if they were to attempt an invasion over the summer or winter months, they would consistently encounter unforgiving seas, high winds, and frequent rain, if not torrential downpours.

All of this means that with the right preparations, Washington does not have to be playing an away game. Through increasing interoperability and testing new concepts in and around the first island chain, U.S. forces can secure and exploit their seven-thousand-mile head start in any future Taiwan scenario. Understanding the current scope of U.S. spring campaigning in the region helps convey why timing, weather, alliances, and locations matter more than just inventory scorecards. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has made clear, “campaigning is not business as usual — it is the deliberate effort to synchronize the Department’s activities and investments to aggregate focus and resources to shift conditions in our favor.” Rethinking the joint force’s posture during the most favorable months for a cross-strait invasion can shift conditions in America’s favor even further.

Become a Member

I read the Deputy Secretary’s tweet while supporting the Balikatan 2023 exercise as one of the lead planners on Task Force 76/3. Balikatan is one of numerous critically timed spring campaigning activities in the Indo-Pacific. Others include Iron Fist in Japan, Cobra Gold in Thailand, Ssang Yong in South Korea, and Salaknib, which, like Balikatan, occurs in the Philippines. These exercises include marines like myself, as well as other branches of the joint force and a number of U.S. allies and partners. Among the key lessons from Balikatan 2023 is that by developing, reinforcing, and strengthening a distributed joint force campaigning approach across the Indo-Pacific, Washington can better leverage pre-existing regional partnerships to deter a cross-strait invasion. During the spring and fall, the joint force demonstrates its ability to deploy in China’s primary, ground-launched conventional long-range weapons-engagement zone, while regional allies demonstrate their willingness to partner and train with U.S. forces.

By placing the force in a crucial stretch of geography during these crucial seasons, Washington makes good on commitments in the region and imposes diplomatic and military costs on Beijing. Moving forward, U.S. planners can enhance these efforts with a few key steps. These include making the experimental Task Force 76/3 permanent, improving coordination between Marine expeditionary forces and naval fleets, and maturing stand-in forces in the Pacific.

Key Places at Key Times

In late February and early March, as I was working with colleagues from the Philippines to finish preparations for Balikatan 2023, we were just a small component of a much wider endeavor. At that time, U.S. forces were already operating alongside the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Luzon as part of Salaknib. American military personnel were simultaneously arrayed alongside additional allied and partnered forces in key locations such as Japan’s southwest islands and Thailand, as well as operating along the western approaches to the Strait of Malacca.


Figure 1: Joint force, allied, and partner campaigning activities during the spring in 2023.
Source: Littoral East Asia from China’s Perspective (Image credit: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments).

As the map above shows, America and its allies were active in considerable numbers along the entire first island chain. Approximately 5,500 sailors and marines from the USS America Amphibious Ready Group / 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit operated alongside Japanese Self-Defense Forces during Iron Fist. This exercise focused on enhanced maritime domain awareness, seizing key terrain, and employing a variety of aviation- and surface-delivered fire support capabilities. From 2006 to 2022, Iron Fist was executed in California, or around 7,000 miles further east. Holding Iron Fist 2023 less than 100 miles northeast of Taiwan during one of the two ideal time windows for a cross-strait invasion provides tangible evidence of a new defense strategy and sends a much stronger message to Beijing.


At the same time as Iron Fist, 6,000 additional American military personnel joined approximately 1,400 allied and partner forces for the 42nd iteration of Cobra Gold, taking place in Thailand and the waters surrounding the Strait of Malacca. Most of the U.S. forces participating in Cobra Gold were sailors and marines from the USS Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group / 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. As the “crown jewel” of the U.S.-Thai alliance, this exercise demonstrates far more utility than just crisis response. Throughout Cobra Gold, these forces executed a variety of missions, such as command-and-control exercises, humanitarian and disaster relief projects, and field training evolutions, all focused on enhancing interoperability and strengthening relationships. In doing so, they employed new anti-armor systems, deep insertion techniques, and the only expeditionary fifth-generation strike fighters operating in the entire Southeast Asia region. The exercise also incorporated South Korea’s amphibious capabilities, including the ROKS II Chul Bong landing ship tank. On the diplomatic front, American naval forces also welcomed liaison officers from Thailand and South Korea on board the USS Makin Island.


U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs operating off the USS Makin Island in the Gulf of Thailand during Cobra Gold 2023.

Upon Cobra Gold’s conclusion, the USS Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group’s three amphibious ships embarked with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and, along with multiple South Korean warships, sailed through the Strait of Malacca. While proceeding through the East China Sea, the ships linked up with the USS America, which had recently completed its participation in Iron Fist. The combined forces’ embarked sailors and marines executed multiple integrated skills proficiency operations, including employing F-35Bs that were initially embarked on the USS Makin Island from the USS America. After this demonstration, the majority of the ships proceeded to Busan, South Korea, to begin Ssang Yong, a multi-week allied exercise focused on enhancing interoperability and further strengthening relationships. This year’s exercise was much more comprehensive than in years past. For example, the United Kingdom’s 40 Commando Marines, joined by two Royal Navy patrol ships, operated alongside and fully integrated with their U.S. and South Korean marine counterparts. Together, these combined forces executed a series of complex and distributed amphibious operations from and between ships located off South Korea’s southeastern coast.

Immediately following Ssang Yong’s conclusion, approximately 5,400 Filipino personnel and 12,200 U.S. personnel proceeded to carry out the largest iteration of Balikatan in the exercise’s 38-year history. Exercise activities occurred throughout the majority of April. As with Ssang Yong, Cobra Gold, and Iron Fist, they focused on enhancing interoperability, improving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and strengthening allied relationships.


U.S. 3rd Littoral Combat Team marines secure a landing zone on the Philippines’ Basco Island during Balikatan 2023.

Coastal defense, perhaps more than any other mission set, figured prominently in Balikatan 2023. U.S. and Filipino infantry marines, including those from the new 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, executed live-fire attacks focused on ensuring that they could seize and defend key terrain. From this terrain, these and other U.S. and Filipino troops, including those from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, employed a variety of intelligence-collection assets, all focused on enhancing maritime domain awareness to inform combined force intelligence-fires fusion cells.

Finally, a variety of U.S. and Filipino units, including the U.S. Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force and a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 detachment, participated in a culminating “SINKEX,” something that had not been part of Balikatan before. This involved destroying a vessel at sea that had violated the Philippines’ sovereignty, observed by President Ferdinand Marcos, the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, and numerous other senior U.S. and Filipino government officials. Notably, shortly after observing the exercise, Marcos flew to the United States, where he met at the White House with President Joe Biden, and at the Department of Defense with Austin. During these meetings, the leaders discussed the importance of the nations’ strategic alliance, including Marcos’ recent decision to increase from five to nine the number of approved Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement locations in the Philippines that American forces can access.

As the spring campaigning season comes to its conclusion, the joint force is already well into preparing for this fall, during the other key meteorological window. While the details of these campaigning actions have not been released publicly yet, they are sure to build on relatively new activities across the Indo-Pacific region’s key maritime terrain executed in the fall of 2022, such as Kamandang in the Philippines and Resolute Dragon in Japan. Last September and October, marines and sailors from the 3rd Marine Division and the USS Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group / 31st Marine Executionary Unit, alongside Japanese and Filipino troops, operated throughout Japan’s southwest islands and across the Philippines, including in key maritime terrain located in the middle of the Luzon Strait. These campaigning activities also incorporated for the first time a new U.S. Marine Corps formation, Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia. This formation was designed specifically to meet the National Defense Strategy’s campaigning intent and demonstrated its ability to do so during a critical time window in key locations astride the Strait of Malacca, such as Singapore and Indonesia.

Room to Improve

To capitalize on the success of this spring and last fall’s initial campaigning achievements, future exercises need more than just a task and purpose conceptualized during a planning conference, which is still too often how they begin. Instead, Department of Defense officials should develop careful and deliberate linkages to an overall joint force campaign approach. Each exercise should build upon its earlier iterations to increase lethality and build diplomatic pressure. Several specific changes could enhance the deterrent value generated by U.S. forces during key periods in the year. With the seven-thousand-mile head start in mind, a deliberate and carefully coordinated campaign of exercises and operations planning will send a message to Beijing: not today, not ever.

The first recommendation focuses on the force that I’m grateful to serve as a planner for, Task Force 76/3, which was originally designed as an experimental concept sourced out of III Marine Expeditionary Force and Expeditionary Strike Group 7 / Commander Task Force 76. The naval services should now codify a permanent naval-integrated command to guide, direct, and coordinate maritime campaigning in the Indo-Pacific — the priority theater. This would be similar to the maturation of Task Force 51/5 over the last decade as a combined Navy-Marine Corps staff that is subordinated to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and executes command and control of Amphibious Ready Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units when operating in U.S. Central Command.

Task Force 76/3 should become a permanent integrated blue-green staff subordinated to the Seventh Fleet and responsible for orchestrating the campaigning of the USS America Amphibious Ready Group / 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit based out of Japan, as well as all California-based Amphibious Ready Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units sourced by Third Fleet and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. Given the theater and the presence of allies and partners, Task Force 76/3 should also become joint, combined, and partnered, with liaison officers integrated from the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Second, the three-star-led Marine expeditionary forces and naval fleets should better synchronize their efforts through deliberate collaboration. Much of the success of the 2023 spring exercises resulted from efforts of formations such as 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. But while these forces participated in some of the same exercises with the same goals, they were not coordinated to meet Austin’s intent for synchronization.

For the Marine Corps to achieve its campaigning potential in the Indo-Pacific, the service will have to do everything possible to enhance close coordination, including between its two three-star formations whose headquarters are located thousands of miles apart. These formations should draw closer together, embedding liaisons within staffs and preparing combined planning objectives and operations centers — while simultaneously forging ever-closer relationships with the Third and Seventh Fleets. Consider as just one example what this recommendation could look like for the California-based Amphibious Ready Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units. These are currently manned, trained, equipped, and certified by Third Fleet and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force respectively, and then consistently deploy to the Western Pacific, where they fall under the operational control of Seventh Fleet. If the first recommendation is implemented, they would fall under a permanently naval-integrated Task Force 76/3 and have their entire force generation and deployment model informed from the outset by campaigning plans developed more than a year beforehand.

Third, the Marine Corps should seek to capitalize on recent U.S. diplomatic gains in the Pacific by codifying and maturing stand-in forces, or what some colloquially refer to as rotational forces. Marine Rotational Force-Darwin is a known model, deploying marine units to Darwin, Australia to partner with a critical ally and build robust operational capabilities. Initiated during the late 2000s as part of the “Pivot to the Pacific,” Marine Rotational Force-Darwin subsequently took a decade to mature. In the past year, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force’s initial employment of Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia builds on a similar model and shows its promise as an evolving program. This could include increasing deliberately timed deployments to the Philippines, where it could help to enable the recently announced Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites. These would not need to be heel-to-toe, year-round deployments, but rather linked to the specific cross-strait vulnerability windows.

To implement this recommendation, the Defense Department would need considerable assistance from other branches of the U.S. government to secure certain key prerequisites. These include multi-option mobility platforms, diplomatic permissions to transport and share munitions, and partner agreements to welcome stand-in forces in ports across the Indo-Pacific. Rather than leave things to chance and personal initiative, the Navy and Marine Corps should codify the establishment of formations such as Task Force 76/3 to conceive, direct, and execute campaigning in the Pacific.

Maximizing Momentum and Opportunities to Deter

While the most recent fall and spring campaigning efforts involved many noteworthy successes, the joint force needs to do more and in short order. As Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. John C. Aquillino recently stated, when it comes to deterring Beijing, “everything needs to go faster.” Doing so requires the joint force to first focus on the inherent natural obstacles, both from the sky and the sea, standing between China and Taiwan. Next, the joint force should double down on the historic, nascent, and proposed efforts describe above. Washington cannot afford to keep planning and executing these exercises in isolation. Rather they should be one seamless and collective joint and allied campaign ruthlessly conveying the message to Beijing: not today, not tomorrow, not ever.

Become a Member

Benjamin Van Horrick is a Marine Corps logistics officer. He is the current logistics operations officer for Task Force 76/3. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Benjamin Van Horrick · June 5, 2023



28.  Li Shangfu: War with US would be unbearable disaster, says China defence minister


Well perhaps we can find some common ground.




Li Shangfu: War with US would be unbearable disaster, says China defence minister

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Image caption,

Li Shangfu became defence minister in March

China's defence minister has said war with the US would be an "unbearable disaster" for the world in his first major speech since taking on the role.

At a security summit, General Li Shangfu said "some countries" were intensifying an arms race in Asia.

But he said the world was big enough for both China and the US, and the two superpowers should seek common ground.

Earlier the US alleged "unsafe" manoeuvres by a Chinese destroyer near a US warship in the Taiwan strait.

On Saturday the US navy said a Chinese destroyer sailed "in an unsafe manner" near an American warship as it transited the Taiwan Strait with Canadian vessels.

China criticised both countries for "deliberately provoking risk". The US and Canada said they were sailing where international law allows.

Gen Li, who became defence minister in March, accused the US of a "Cold War mentality" and said this was "greatly increasing security risks".

In his speech he said China would not allow naval patrols by the US and its allies to be "a pretext to exercise hegemony of navigation".

Asked about the incident in the Taiwan Strait, he said only that countries from outside the region were raising tensions.

He was speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Asia-Pacific region's only annual security meeting.

Beijing has rejected a US request for direct military talks in protest at sanctions placed on Gen Li by the US in 2018 over weapons purchases from Russia.

At the Singapore summit, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin rebuked China for refusing to hold military discussions.

Gen Austin and Gen Li shook hands and briefly spoke at the event's opening dinner on Friday, but there was no substantive exchange, reports say.

One of China's delegates told AFP that the removal of US sanctions on Gen Li was a precondition for talks.

Senior intelligence officials attended a meeting of spy chiefs at the Singapore summit, according to Reuters.

Despite the diplomatic spat, a top US state department official has arrived in Beijing for a week of wide-ranging talks.

Relations between Washington and Beijing have been strained in recent years over several issues, including China's claim over Taiwan, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Media caption,

Chinese fighter jet flies close to US military plane


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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:


"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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