Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force!

You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you...

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory.

Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking."

– General Eisenhower ,D-Day Order, June 6, 1944

“Our sons, pride of our nation, this day have set upon a mighty endeavor, a struggle to preserve our Republic, our religion, and our civilization, and to set free a suffering humanity.”

— President Franklin D. Roosevelt

"These are the boys of Pointe du Hoc. These are the men who took the cliffs. These are the champions who helped free a continent. These are the heroes who helped end a war."

– President Ronald Reagan

I recommend this film. Please take 15 minutes to watch it on this anniversary of D-Day.

The OSS Society

9,845 followers

On this 81st anniversary of D-Day, we are honored to share our award-winning short documentary, “Operation Overlord: OSS and the Battle for France.” Our film tells the story of Allied special forces whose daring exploits changed the course of World War II. It was shown by USSOCOM in Normandy, and by CIA to its personnel worldwide, to commemorate last year’s 80th anniversary of D-Day.

https://vimeo.com/1017308385/4a5209382f?share=copy

1. Why We Will Continue to Fight

2. Russia Launches Massive Aerial Assault on Ukraine

3. Ukraine’s Drone Attack Exposes Achilles’ Heel of Military Superpowers

4. Donald Trump’s New Friend in Germany

5. Trump Says He Discussed Trade, Rare Earths in Call With China’s Xi

6. A Crisis of American Power: Competing for Legitimacy, Influence, and Capacity in the 21st Century

7. It’s a Really Bad Time to Be an Expert in Washington

8. Ukraine’s dirty war is just getting started

9. Stanford is a case study in how Beijing infiltrates U.S. universities

10. The ‘New Warfare’ Comes of Age: Are We Ready?

11. Private Military Companies (PMCs) Subject Bibliography No. 1: Wagner Group (Africa Corps)

12. US must harden Indo-Pacific bases against drone attacks, think tank says

13. Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe

14. Vets hope thousands will rally against VA cuts in nationwide protests

15. 'No human hands': NGA circulates AI-generated intel, director says16.

16. Embrace Poland and the Baltic States for Embracing Anti-Personnel Mines

17. DoD 3.0: Rebooting the Pentagon for the Next War

18. America's Allies Must Save Themselves

19. How Japan—and Other U.S. Allies—Can Work Around America: A Plan to Survive Trump’s Trade War

20. As Rutte formally unveils NATO 5% spending proposal, Hegseth says some allies 'not quite there'

21. Iran Orders Material From China for Hundreds of Ballistic Missiles

22. Could US and Israel Destroy Iran’s Nuke Program? Yep, Here’s How

23. The President’s Path to the Right Side of History

24. Drop NATO’s Pacific Illusion

25. Inside the US Army's Pacific war prep, from unfamiliar aircraft landings to drone warfare

26. Trump’s pivot to Asia is a turn away from Europe

27. Fusion Energy Is The Key To World Hegemony

28. Brain control warfare: China’s bleeding-edge strategy for winning without firing a shot

1. Why We Will Continue to Fight

Conclusion:

We should never forget that, as much as we might wish otherwise, there will always be causes that require war to achieve justice and stability. There will always be forces of oppression and evil that must be countered through force. And this, as unpleasant as it is, is why humans fight. American leaders should eschew populist wishful thinking and rhetoric that pretends these realities do not endure and, instead, communicate to the American people that some things are worth fighting for, that we will back our friends and allies as they fight for these virtuous causes, and that America will stand against the forces of evil and disruption. Anything less is a betrayal of those who have gone before, who sacrificed to keep the barbarians beyond the gates—like those young men 81 years ago.

Why We Will Continue to Fight

War is horrible, but sometimes it is necessary.

thedispatch.com · by Mike Nelson · June 6, 2025

Eighty-one years ago today the combined forces of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, the Free French, and several other countries of the Allied coalition parachuted onto drop zones and landed on beaches across Normandy, starting the offensive to liberate Europe from Nazi occupation. The largest amphibious operation in military history and, at the time, the largest airborne infiltration, Operation Overlord represented an audacious step to defeat the German war machine.

The United States had at that point been at war for two and a half years since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some of that time had been marked by slow build-up and industrial refocus, some had been marked by initial failures, such as the Battle of Kasserine Pass and the fall of the Philippines, and some had been marked by hard fought victories such as the Battle of Guadalcanal. But all of it had required rallying the American public for the sacrifices that would be borne, both by those in uniform and on the homefront, for the ultimate victory in a righteous cause. To assist in this effort, acclaimed filmmaker Frank Capra made a seven-part documentary series, Why We Fight. These films, drawing on Capra’s masterful storytelling and ability to strike a resonant emotional chord with the American public, were meant to address the specific question as to why America was fighting the joint evil of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.

But in the intervening years, we’ve seen a shift from many Americans: Some don’t want an answer to the question of why countries might fight specific conflicts, and instead raise more fundamental questions: Why fight at all? Is anything worth fighting for?

There has always been a portion of humanity that held the naive but well-intentioned belief that mankind could evolve past the need for armed conflict and live in peace, but this rejection of the utility of and need for force—or at a minimum the recognition that others will continue to use force against us—took hold among the American left during the Vietnam War and has festered. More recently, many on the American right have been engaged in rhetoric—right down to accusing anyone who sees the need for a strong defense as being bloodthirsty or war profiteers—that sounds like it could have been borrowed from the Port Huron statement.

War is inherently horrible and should be avoided if at all possible. War releases the destructive force of state and non-state actors, brings out the worst in man, and, even in the most virtuous of causes, results in the deaths and mutilation of countless innocents. Nobody, not even the victor, walks away from a war unscathed. Even the war which we mark today, the war to defeat Nazi imperialism and to end the Holocaust—arguably the most noble cause for which men have fought—still resulted in the deaths of millions of civilians on both sides.

But despite its horrible nature, war remains an enduring reality of human existence, as we are reminded in a quote largely attributed to Trotsky: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Over two millennia ago, Thucydides wrote that nations go to war for “fear, honor, or interest,” and, as much as we might like to think differently, we have not evolved biologically from the humans who went to war in his day—for all of the technological advances that give us greater access to information, the brains that process and decide how to act on it remain the same. Despite the enduring idea that each generation might be the one to advance past war and achieve some sort of global communion, the stark and ugly truth is that there will always be conditions and competition between humans that are so unacceptable, resolving them through force becomes necessary.

Ultimately, wars are entered into to achieve an end state, a preferred outcome to the underlying tension that resulted in the conflict. Usually, these wars do not end until one side has compelled the other to accept their desired end state, as the United States did versus the Nazis, Japanese, or Confederates, or until one side is unwilling to continue the conflict and agrees to a cessation, as with the British in the American Revolution and as we ourselves did in Vietnam. In some cases, these conflicts are purely practical—a competition for resources or access. In some cases, the decision to engage in warfare is entered into hastily, either through misunderstanding of what is at stake or through miscalculation of the difficulty and cost. But neither of these realities change the fact that many conflicts are fought for the most fundamental of reasons—for freedom, sovereignty, or to defend the lives and property of citizens.

This misunderstanding as to the necessity for conflict, and why nations fight, creates advocacy for bad policy. In the aftermath of October 7, there were many—primarily on the left—who demanded Israel engage in immediate ceasefire, regardless of the facts that hundreds of hostages remained in captivity and that the terror organization masquerading as a semi-autonomous government that had just slaughtered more than 1,000 Jews remained in power in Gaza. On the right, there are many, including inside the current administration, who cannot comprehend why Ukraine fights for its sovereignty and independence and advocate for a concession to Russian demands. Both of these calls for a cessation of conflict discount the conditions that rendered the conflict necessary. Regarding Gaza, after two decades of trying to live with Hamas in an official governing status, Israel would be foolish to allow its citizens to remain in captivity or to allow Hamas, who has not changed its stated purpose to eradicate Israel and Israelis, to regroup until the next October 7. In Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky’s forces are fighting for the very existence of their country. Those who criticize Ukraine for fighting wave away the fact that without that fierce resistance Ukraine would cease to exist—absorbed yet again by the malign neighbor who has oppressed it in the past—to say nothing of the fact that Russia has kidnapped thousands of Ukrainian children and continues to oppress Ukrainian citizens under military occupation.

So as we mark the anniversary of so many young American, British, and Canadian boys landing to defeat the forces trying to eradicate the Jewish people, and of the Free French, Polish, Dutch, Czechs and others charging forth to fight for the sovereignty of their homelands, we should remember that today there are militaries fighting to defeat those who would murder Jews and for the sovereignty of their homeland, and that these causes, as they were 81 years ago, remain worthy and right.

We should never forget that, as much as we might wish otherwise, there will always be causes that require war to achieve justice and stability. There will always be forces of oppression and evil that must be countered through force. And this, as unpleasant as it is, is why humans fight. American leaders should eschew populist wishful thinking and rhetoric that pretends these realities do not endure and, instead, communicate to the American people that some things are worth fighting for, that we will back our friends and allies as they fight for these virtuous causes, and that America will stand against the forces of evil and disruption. Anything less is a betrayal of those who have gone before, who sacrificed to keep the barbarians beyond the gates—like those young men 81 years ago.

Mike Nelson

Mike Nelson is a retired Army Special Forces officer and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project. He is formerly of the Institute for the Study of War and the National Security Institute. You can find him on x.com at @mikenelson586.

thedispatch.com · by Mike Nelson · June 6, 2025

2. Russia Launches Massive Aerial Assault on Ukraine

Russia Launches Massive Aerial Assault on Ukraine

At least three were killed and 49 injured in missile and drone strikes, days after Kyiv’s daring attack deep inside Russia

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-launches-massive-aerial-assault-on-ukraine-b5fbbebb

By Ian Lovett

Follow and Jane Lytvynenko

June 6, 2025 3:59 am ET

A building in Kyiv was damaged in Russian strikes. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

KYIV, Ukraine—Russia launched a huge missile and drone attack on Ukraine overnight, killing at least three people in Kyiv, igniting fires across the capital and partially shutting down its metro system days after Ukraine embarrassed the Kremlin with a surprise strike on its bomber fleet.

The overnight assault included 407 strike drones and 44 missiles, according to Ukraine’s air force. Sites across the country were hit, including the city of Ternopil in the far west of Ukraine. Kyiv bore the brunt of the attack. Some 200 drones and 30 missiles were shot down, according to Ukrainian officials.

In addition to three deaths, at least 49 people across the country were injured, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The attack came after Ukraine’s daring covert drone operation on Sunday, which damaged and destroyed strategic bombers at sites deep inside Russia. In a phone call with President Trump earlier this week, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow would have to respond to the attack, Trump said on social media.

In a central Kyiv shelter early Friday morning, dozens of Ukrainians listened as the walls vibrated with the sound of explosions into the early hours of the morning. Kyiv residents came with their families and pets, making makeshift beds of blankets and yoga mats, and reading out updates about bombing from their phones to their neighbors.

Updates to follow as news develops.

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

3. Ukraine’s Drone Attack Exposes Achilles’ Heel of Military Superpowers

Excerpts:

Now, a combination of technological advances and innovation-spawning armed conflicts has flipped the equation, leaving Washington and its allies behind on developments. For military commanders, the pace of change has meant an upheaval on a scale unseen since World War II.

“We’re going to have to be more agile. Drones are going to constantly change,” U.S. Army chief of staff Gen. Randy George told a conference on Monday. Ukraine’s attack was “a really good example of just how quickly technology is changing the battlefield,” he said.

Thanks to cheap commercial drones and other digital devices, rebels, terrorist organizations and threadbare militaries like Ukraine’s can achieve returns on military investments of a scale almost unimaginable a few years ago.

Ukraine said it launched 117 small drones in Sunday’s attacks on four Russian bases. The drones it employed sell for about $2,000 apiece. Even including the operation’s other expenses, Kyiv still probably spent well under $1 million to destroy aircraft that would cost well over $1 billion to replace—something Russia has little ability to do in the near future.

Kyiv amplified the impact through propaganda, releasing video images of the attack hours after it was carried out. The ease with which information spreads online now gives covert operations a potentially destabilizing element of psychological warfare previously impossible on a global scale.

Ukraine’s Drone Attack Exposes Achilles’ Heel of Military Superpowers

Technological advances give threadbare militaries and rebel fighters the ability to strike stunning blows against stronger forces

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraines-drone-attack-exposes-achilles-heel-of-military-superpowers-75d1d79c

Destroyed Russian warplanes at an airbase. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

By Daniel Michaels

June 5, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Key Points

What's This?

Ukraine’s drone attack on Russia highlights the growing threat of low-cost, high-tech strikes in modern warfare.
Cheap commercial drones enable smaller militaries to achieve significant returns, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s successful attacks.
The conflict underscores the need for rapid innovation and adaptation in military technology and tactics among Western powers.

Ukraine’s audacious drone attack wounded and embarrassed Moscow, but it also exposed a threat to Kyiv’s Western allies: Low-cost, high-tech strikes can deliver an increasingly potent punch to even the most heavily defended world powers.

Inexpensive drones such as those Kyiv used to attack dozens of Russian warplanes parked at airfields far from Ukraine on Sunday have become a cornerstone of what strategists call asymmetric warfare, where two sides square off with mismatched military power, resources or approaches. For years, the U.S. and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization prevailed in that imbalance thanks to their wealth and advanced technologies.

Now, a combination of technological advances and innovation-spawning armed conflicts has flipped the equation, leaving Washington and its allies behind on developments. For military commanders, the pace of change has meant an upheaval on a scale unseen since World War II.

“We’re going to have to be more agile. Drones are going to constantly change,” U.S. Army chief of staff Gen. Randy George told a conference on Monday. Ukraine’s attack was “a really good example of just how quickly technology is changing the battlefield,” he said.

U.S. Army chief of staff Gen. Randy George Photo: Tom Williams/Zuma Press

Thanks to cheap commercial drones and other digital devices, rebels, terrorist organizations and threadbare militaries like Ukraine’s can achieve returns on military investments of a scale almost unimaginable a few years ago.

Ukraine said it launched 117 small drones in Sunday’s attacks on four Russian bases. The drones it employed sell for about $2,000 apiece. Even including the operation’s other expenses, Kyiv still probably spent well under $1 million to destroy aircraft that would cost well over $1 billion to replace—something Russia has little ability to do in the near future.

Kyiv amplified the impact through propaganda, releasing video images of the attack hours after it was carried out. The ease with which information spreads online now gives covert operations a potentially destabilizing element of psychological warfare previously impossible on a global scale.

Widespread deployment of dual-use technologies—including commercial drones and networking software similar to that used by ride-sharing services—has played a big role in allowing Ukraine to thwart Russia’s initial large-scale invasion in 2022 and hold on against a much larger military power.

Donald Trump’s New Friend in Germany

Friedrich Merz and the President repair JD Vance’s election damage.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trumps-new-friend-in-germany-e365199c

By The Editorial Board

June 5, 2025 5:42 pm ET

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz Photo: Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images

Whew. President Trump’s Oval Office meetings with foreign leaders are nerve-wracking affairs, so it was a relief to see Thursday’s session with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz go well. The President and the Chancellor appear to have repaired some of the damage Vice President JD Vance needlessly inflicted on one of America’s most important alliances.

On the substance, Mr. Merz’s visit was mercifully short of surprises. Mr. Trump praised Mr. Merz’s rearmament drive and suggested that more European imports of American natural gas should be part of a U.S.-European Union trade deal. The two bonded over their disagreements with former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s immigration and Russia policies. Mr. Merz wisely ignored Mr. Trump’s more provocative statements about the Ukraine war.

The vibe was more important. Germany is Europe’s largest economy, a linchpin of the North Atlantic alliance, and a major economic partner of the U.S. Yet in February Mr. Vance used a speech in Munich to try to drive a wedge between the two sides. In the heat of a German election campaign, the Vice President all but endorsed Mr. Merz’s rivals on the far right, the Alternative for Germany (AfD).

It was a clumsy attempt to export MAGA-style culture wars to Europe. Mr. Vance apparently didn’t realize, or didn’t care, that the AfD counts among its leaders people credibly accused of neo-Nazi sympathies—and that this implicit endorsement would alienate the mainstream politicians who would govern Germany, and the nearly 80% of Germans who didn’t vote for the AfD.

The Trump Administration has an opportunity to build a strong working relationship with Berlin. Mr. Merz instinctively understands the importance of U.S.-German ties and leads a traditionally pro-American Christian Democratic party. Mr. Trump was able to undo some of that damage on Thursday.

Disagreements are inevitable, but this is too important a relationship, at too important a time, to founder on one-upmanship. Mr. Trump seems to recognize this, and so does Mr. Merz. Perhaps it’s the beginning of a productive, if not always beautiful, friendship.

Friedrich Merz,

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00:0006:58

Free Expression: Alternative for Germany more than doubled its 2021 vote share to 20% in the 2025 election, but the winning Christian Democratic Union, which sees the AfD as a pariah, has said it won’t work with them—despite a U.S. intervention. (02/21/25) Photo: Julian Stratenschulte/Sven Hoppe/Zuma Press/Krisztian Bocsi/Bloomberg News

5. Trump Says He Discussed Trade, Rare Earths in Call With China’s Xi

Excerpts:

Details were unclear, however, and Beijing struck a less conciliatory note in its account of the call, with an official Xinhua News Agency account saying that Xi urged Trump to remove “negative” measures that have disrupted bilateral trade. It made no mention of rare earths.

The two heads of state agreed that their teams would hold a new round of talks as soon as possible. The Chinese team is led by Vice Premier He Lifeng, who has a clear mandate from Xi of not catering to America’s demands without getting concessions in return. The U.S. would be represented by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Trump said.

The addition of Lutnick to the U.S. negotiating team, in addition to Bessent and Greer, suggests that Beijing is getting a desired channel of communication with the cabinet member overseeing export controls.

The partly conflicting accounts of the conversation raised questions of whether Trump had extracted a firm commitment from Xi to loosen controls over rare earths and other critical minerals.

Trump Says He Discussed Trade, Rare Earths in Call With China’s Xi

President calls conversation productive; Beijing’s account is less conciliatory

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-xi-speak-amid-trade-tensions-7e637978

By Alex Leary

Follow, Lingling Wei

Follow and Alexander Ward

Updated June 5, 2025 4:50 pm ET

that trade talks, trade relations are back on track

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After speaking with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, President Trump said the trade deal between the two countries is “in very good shape.” The call came about a week after the U.S. accused China of violating the 90-day trade truce. Photo: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

Trump and Xi spoke, aiming to stabilize trade negotiations after recent breakdowns.
Rare-earth mineral exports, a sticking point, were addressed, though details remained unclear.
Upcoming talks will include Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer

WASHINGTON—President Trump spoke Thursday with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and suggested after the call that one point leading to a breakdown in trade talks—the export of rare-earth minerals, which are critical to the U.S. auto industry—had been addressed.

Trump called the conversation productive and said both sides agreed to meet soon. He also said Xi invited him to visit China and that he reciprocated the offer. “The call lasted approximately one and a half hours, and resulted in a very positive conclusion for both Countries,” Trump wrote on social media.

“There should no longer be any questions respecting the complexity of Rare Earth products,” Trump wrote.

“We had a very good talk and we’ve straightened out any complexity,” Trump told reporters later Thursday, without elaborating. “I think we’re in very good shape with China and the trade deal.”

Details were unclear, however, and Beijing struck a less conciliatory note in its account of the call, with an official Xinhua News Agency account saying that Xi urged Trump to remove “negative” measures that have disrupted bilateral trade. It made no mention of rare earths.

The two heads of state agreed that their teams would hold a new round of talks as soon as possible. The Chinese team is led by Vice Premier He Lifeng, who has a clear mandate from Xi of not catering to America’s demands without getting concessions in return. The U.S. would be represented by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Trump said.

The addition of Lutnick to the U.S. negotiating team, in addition to Bessent and Greer, suggests that Beijing is getting a desired channel of communication with the cabinet member overseeing export controls.

The partly conflicting accounts of the conversation raised questions of whether Trump had extracted a firm commitment from Xi to loosen controls over rare earths and other critical minerals.

or in this case, non-compliance with the agreement,

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00:0201:02

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer recently told CNBC that China slowed on approving exports of key rare-earth materials, which broke the trade agreement with the U.S. Photo: Kim Hong-Ji/Reuters

“The asymmetry in Beijing’s and Washington’s reporting of the call suggests that Xi held to a tough line and Trump did not get much acquiescence to his demands,” said Eswar Prasad, a former senior International Monetary Fund official in China and now an economics professor at Cornell University.

The White House didn’t respond to questions about the rare-earth discussion.

The conversation was focused almost entirely on trade, Trump said, and they didn’t discuss the war in Ukraine and other global hot spots. However, the Chinese readout indicated that Xi had cautioned Trump on Taiwan, following reports of increased U.S. arms shipments to the island. Xi emphasized that the U.S. should handle the Taiwan issue cautiously, Xinhua said.

According to Xinhua, the call took place at Trump’s request. It was the first time the two leaders spoke since Trump took office in January.

Washington and Beijing agreed in mid-May to temporarily lower tit-for-tat tariffs after talks in Geneva. But the Trump administration accused China of violating the 90-day truce, citing a slow-walking of exports of rare-earth minerals, which are critical for the automobile and other industries.

China, in turn, alleged that Washington introduced multiple “discriminatory and restrictive measures,” such as issuing export-control guidelines for artificial-intelligence chips and announcing a plan to revoke visas for Chinese students.

After the call, Trump told reporters, “Chinese students are coming—no problem. It’s our honor to have them, frankly.” He added, “We want to have foreign students, but we want them to be checked.”

When both sides resume trade negotiations, Beijing will likely try to get the U.S. to reverse some of the recent restrictions on the sale of high-tech products to China, which include jet engines China needs to make its own commercial aircraft and software-design chips.

“The Chinese want to use the talks to walk back legitimate U.S. national-security actions supported on a bipartisan basis in the strategic export-control and technology space,” said Jimmy Goodrich, a China and technology expert and senior adviser to Rand. “That would be a trap the U.S. side seems keenly aware of.”

Trump administration officials have consistently labeled a trade deal with China as the key prize in Trump’s attempt to reshape global economic relations through tariffs.

But some analysts believe Trump has a misplaced faith in a grand bargain with China. “If Trump makes this about a trade deal, Xi will just violate it down the road,” said Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute think tank in Washington.

The phone call took place just hours before German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited the White House, hoping to persuade Trump to drop tariffs on Europe.

Until now, Xi had resisted getting on the phone with Trump as the Chinese leader wanted the White House to first dial down its pressure on Beijing, according to people close to China’s decision-making.

However, faced with mounting economic pressure, Xi also has to prevent the Chinese economy from falling into an abyss. Managing relations with Washington is key to that.

In an initial sign that Beijing was engaged with Washington in arranging the call, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with David Perdue, the U.S. ambassador to Beijing, on Tuesday. Wang urged the U.S. to “create the necessary conditions” for bilateral relations to get back on the right track.

Then on Thursday, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng also met a U.S. delegation for a “Track II” dialogue, or discussions among nongovernmental groups on both sides, saying that bilateral relations are now at “a crucial juncture.”

Trump and Xi last spoke on Jan. 17, days before Trump was sworn in for a second term.

Write to Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com, Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

6. A Crisis of American Power: Competing for Legitimacy, Influence, and Capacity in the 21st Century

Conclusion:

American power is at an inflection point, challenged simultaneously by diverse global threats, accelerating great power competition, and domestic political volatility and calls for retrenchment. The US must rapidly reconceptualize its vital national interest, and develop a grand strategy rooted in pragmatic Rooseveltian realism—clearly defined, achievable objectives, burden-sharing, and continuity of purpose—to guide its actions, while concurrently rebalancing its resources to better facilitate security, prosperity, and unity at home. Central must be the judicious application of American hard and soft power to facilitate positive global perceptions US legitimacy, influence, and capacity to lead. Therefore, selective, subtle, proactive humanitarian intervention and capacity building must remain at the core of realist national security policy. The implications of continued strategic mismanagement for American power, and the broader geopolitical system are unclear. What is certain is the status quo is unlikely to continue, and we are engaged in a period in which traditional conceptualizations and employment of national power is in transition.

Essay

A Crisis of American Power: Competing for Legitimacy, Influence, and Capacity in the 21st Century

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/06/a-crisis-of-american-power-competing-for-legitimacy-influence-and-capacity-in-the-21st-century/

by Kyle Ramsay

06.06.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

American power is in crisis, and with it, America’s role in the global system. More than thirty years after the end of the Cold War and nearly twenty-four after 9/11, is America still leader of the free world; the self-appointed “indispensable nation”? More importantly, does it want to be?

The security challenges facing the US and the broader global community are increasingly transnational, interconnected, and disruptive, and America continues to be viewed, and act, as the primary security guarantor. In reacting to these “compound security threats” (CSTs) to global stability and US geopolitical primacy, America has too often conflated military force with national power, “contributing to errors in strategic judgement and actions”. This crucial misinterpretation of Newton’s definition of power—force displaced over time—has resulted in two decades of sustained global conflict with inconclusive or failed end states, the progressive alienation of once staunch Western and regional allies, and the rapid erosion of American legitimacy, influence, and perceived capacity and desire to effect positive, sustained change within the global system. Consequently, the US is overextended politically, economically, and militarily, the international security environment is markedly more unstable, and American society, socio-politically polarized and war-weary, is demanding the administration refocus national attention and resources on domestic “nation building” rather than foreign interventionism.

Thus, US power is at an inflection point, where the choices made in the near term will determine America’s geopolitical role, influence, and manner of engagement within the international system in the 21st Century. This paper will present a prescription for a more adaptive, nuanced, and restrained application of American national power in support of strategic policy through discussion of three “American crises” arenas—grand strategy, humanitarianism, and identity.

Crisis in American Grand Strategy

America has radically diverted from the deliberate, pragmatic, realist-based foreign and domestic policies which enabled the US to achieve and maintain great power status throughout most of the twentieth century, and in doing so, lost sight of its core national interest—the continued security and prosperity of the American people. Critically, contemporary discourse often conflates grand strategy with foreign policy, effectively subordinating essential domestic economic and sociopolitical elements of national power, to the detriment of strategic success.

The effectiveness of American ‘strategy’ during thirty-plus years of unparalleled geopolitical freedom of maneuver is evident in the CSTs of today: a revanchist Russia threatens European stability, political cohesion, and the effectiveness of the NATO alliance; China is exploiting its significant economic, industrial, and military potential to expand its regional and global influence and directly challenge the Western-centric liberal international order; transnational and domestic terrorism appears omnipresent; and merging human security and health issues continue to drive humanitarian crises with global consequences. Contemporary American foreign policy has oscillated wildly between liberal interventionism and reactionary, unilateral militarism, resulting in increasingly negative domestic and global perceptions of US power, while subordination of domestic concerns in pursuit of economic globalization has relentlessly eroded America’s manufacturing capacity, and with it the middle class. The persistent inability of American strategy to effectively attain stated foreign or domestic policy objectives, in conjunction with increasingly constrained fiscal and material resources and societal division, has led to renewed debate within US political, military, academic, and social discourse concerning retrenchment, leaving the future role and application of American ‘power’ in a state of transition. However, in entertaining this absolutist debate, the US is again repeating the mistakes of the past.

Moving forward, America must first recognize grand strategy implies a long-term course of action in which all elements of national power—economic, political, military, and societal[1] force—are developed and harnessed in pursuit of clearly defined, achievable strategic objectives which serve the national interest. Continuity and unity of purpose is critical, and cannot vacillate with each election cycle, to include conceptualization of threats. For example, from 1945-1992 America successfully executed a policy of strategic containment targeting the Soviet Union, investing significant political and financial capital in scientific and technological innovation and infrastructure, in close partnership with the private sector, military, and academia, to achieve global dominance across scientific, economic, and military domains. Concurrently, America exploited common security interests, in conjunction with the ideological and cultural appeal of US democracy, to establish strategic partnerships and collective security alliances with key states, and a normative system of behavior through which to regulate the geopolitical environment. Thus, policy continuity over time, and the reasoned application of, and investment in, critical elements of national power, enabled a positive strategic outcome. In contrast, American policies since 1992 have been reactionary, superficial, and militant, focusing on short-term operational successes in the absence of definable or achievable strategic conditions, while over-simplified narratives and methods progressively subverted America’s value-centric legitimacy.

In a period of dynamic CSTs and global connectivity, legitimate national power will be both executed and judged by the effective and balanced application of political, economic, and military force. Therefore, measurements of national power in the 21st Century will simultaneously align with, and transcend, traditional realist metrics, and incorporate a state’s perceived legitimacy and influence in the eyes of the global community, specifically its capacity and desire to effect change which benefits the greater international system, and the means through which it promotes domestic security and prosperity. The US must relearn how to differentiate “force” from “power”, identify and acknowledge the failings of existing strategic guidance, and appreciate how “legitimate power” is globally evaluated.

Thus, the US must not pursue a singular policy of full retrenchment, nor status-quo interventionism, nor execute a “pivot” to the Indo-pacific at the expense of counterterrorism and human security capacity building operations (CBOs)[2]. Too often US national security policy demonstrates the inability to concurrently manage and adaptively prioritize multiple threat actors, instead myopically fixating on a single issue or actor to the detriment of other security interests. For example, the fixation on international terrorism in the opening decades of the 21st Century enabled adversarial powers—China, Russia, and Iran—to significantly improve their military, economic, and political power projection capabilities to the degree where each now challenges, or at the very least subverts, American’s ability to effectively achieve regional and global policy objectives. Instead, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Nagata asserts America must learn how to “walk and chew bubble gum at the same time”. America must develop a blended model predicated upon limited direct intervention in only those instances of the utmost concern to the national interest, and instead act through, and enable, regional actors to address regional threats. This blend of Rooseveltian realism, collective security, and burden-sharing will enable the global community to address globalized security threats, while an increased regional division of labor will reduce the security burden on the US, and force regional powers to assume majority ownership in the provision of their national security. Further, return to a modernized form of burden-sharing will enable the US to devote greater attention and resources to addressing the contributory sociopolitical trends fueling division within American democracy, and reinvest in the scientific and technological innovation and infrastructure necessary to remain competitive across multiple strategic domains with rising powers.

American grand strategy in the post-Cold War era has been haphazardly conceived and executed and directly contributed to the decline of US national power. The US must return to a more deliberate and restrained strategy based upon collective security, burden-sharing, the selective application of national power, and the rational pursuit of domestic security and prosperity, while resisting the impetus to become decisively engaged in conflicts not of vital concern to core national interests.

Crisis in Humanitarianism

In this period of ‘power in transition’, America must rapidly reconceptualize humanitarian intervention from a derided policy of liberal interventionism to an essential, dual-purpose element of realist grand strategy and power projection. Capacity building operations, specifically, represent a strategic opportunity for the US, in conjunction with Western and regional allies, to proactively address the roots of emerging CSTs through the persistent development of host nation (HN) governance, security, infrastructure, and societal capabilities, and concurrently win the battle for influence, legitimacy, and capacity in an era of renewed great power competition (GPC).

The intent of CBOs is to empower local governance and non-state entities to better understand and “manage uncertainty and risk” and develop the necessary integral capacity to pre-emptively address the drivers of instability and moderate unrest in times of acute crisis. CBOs must be understood as a mechanism of proactive, collective burden-sharing, in which improved HN capacity will enable the state to increasingly act as a regional balancer, greatly reducing strain on the US as global security guarantor. Central to this effort will be the collective provision of material and fiscal resources, subject matter experts (SMEs), and the subtle, synergized application of political, economic, and military force in support of HN efforts. CBOs can be executed cooperatively within one state—NATO’s mission in Afghanistan—or delineated by national areas of responsibility (AORs) as part of a broader regional approach, thereby avoiding the frictions of national “caveats” under multinational command structures.

Warfighting and CBOs are often viewed as diametrically opposing campaigns, when in fact they are threat-specific elements of a broader strategy pursuing stability. The CBO approach is equally applicable to failed states as it is in instances of overt GPC, such as the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Petraeus asserts the policy threat to humanitarian assistance, and the irregular warfare methodologies involved, is the tendency of policy-makers and politicians to “pivot” to the Indo-pacific, [and now potentially Europe], instead of a “rebalancing” objectives and resources. Thomas Barnett, acknowledging the complexity of the contemporary security environment and corresponding resource requirements, expertly argues America requires two militaries: a “Leviathan” force, whose primary role is conventional, high-intensity, peer-on-peer conflict; and a “System Administrator” force, tasked with proactive CBO intervention to address the diverse drivers of human security crises. The focused and selective employment of special operations forces (SOF) to execute CBO tasks permits sustained, low-visibility, small-footprint operations within permissive and non-permissive environments, enabling “Leviathan” formations to focus on core mission sets within assigned AORs. The composition of each SOF CBO is task specific, supplemented with essential whole-of-government enablers—governance, law enforcement, engineering, humanitarian, economic, educational actors—for the developing world, and military-centric assets for conventional conflict theatres. In each application, the reduced visibility and scale permits the HN to save face and allows the US to avoid the perils of great power “overextension” which come with sustained, conventional military deployment in pursuit of haphazardly conceived political objectives in which America’s exit strategy is inexorably tied to the effectiveness of HN governance and security actors, aptly demonstrated by America’s experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

This approach, akin to a blend of Kilcullen’s concept of “permanent containment” and Rooseveltian selective interventionism, reflects operational realities and challenges the traditional pillars of peace operations—humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence (Wilson III, Dueling Regimes 32). Therefore, traditional definitions and concepts must be modernized and adapted to more accurately reflect the emerging complexities of the strategic environment, and the unique operational methodologies necessary to mitigate and avert destabilizing and protracted compound security dilemmas.

The national security impetus driving collective, proactive humanitarian intervention is clear, and great care must be taken not to denigrate the strategic necessity of CBO initiatives with simplistic, ideological-based, partisan rhetoric. National power is increasingly a battle for influence, legitimacy, and capacity. Persistent CBO operations, selectively identified and expertly executed, represent an essential, low-cost, high-yield element of realist strategy and power projection, and demonstrate America’s continuing commitment to the stability and prosperity of the collective global system.

Crisis in American Identity

The crisis in American ‘identity’ is inseparable from three issues: the inability of American “grand strategy” and national power to achieve its stated objectives within acceptable costs and timeframes; failure to translate American national power into sustained domestic security and prosperity across all socioeconomic classes; and the propensity to devote American political, fiscal, and material resources to resolving human security issues abroad while subordinating domestic resolution of those same trends. The pervasive sociopolitical division plaguing American democracy, as well as increasingly fervent domestic calls for retrenchment, are in part driven by the prioritization of foreign policy at the expense of domestic affairs. Accordingly, elements of this crisis can be found interwoven into the sections above.

America’s global role will look much different in the years ahead. Though deeply divided, the American electorate has collectively made it clear mitigation of domestic sociopolitical issues is their primary concern, and that the practice of elected officials ignoring the voice of the people is over. The inherent dichotomy is both unremarkable and unsurprising: Americans want to be seen as an integral part of the global community, though they do not want to feel exploited, nor have their role come at the expense of their quality of life. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has happened. NATO member states consistently fail to meet their alliance commitments and routinely rely upon the US to assume the leading role—politically, economically, and militarily—in maintaining stability throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. This parasitical behavior, akin to “buck-passing”, has resulted in growing resentment and calls for retrenchment amongst Americans, exacerbated by the frequency in which states who benefit from US geopolitical primacy critique its methodology. This resentment formed the foundation of President Trump’s rhetoric towards NATO, in which he derided the utility and longevity of the alliance if member states continued to exploit the benefits of US power.

The harsh reality is no other democracy has sufficient capacity or will to assume the role of global leader, increasing the potential for a return to a multipolar international system. Complete retrenchment will likely result in significant and far-reaching perturbations within global systems, along with an unknown impact on perceptions of American power, giving weight to Wilson’s contention that the US “is not merely part of the system, it is the system”. However, a pragmatic “refocusing” of efforts, in accordance with Rooseveltian realism discussed above, may enable the US to devote greater resources at home, while forcing security partners to assume leading regional roles, albeit with American support.

The crisis of American ‘identity’ is a product of the prolonged misapplication of American economic, political, and military force after the Cold War, and the persistent subordination of domestic affairs. Domestic “nation building” is critical to resolving this crisis, the results of which will have significant implications for US power in the 21st Century.

Conclusion

American power is at an inflection point, challenged simultaneously by diverse global threats, accelerating great power competition, and domestic political volatility and calls for retrenchment. The US must rapidly reconceptualize its vital national interest, and develop a grand strategy rooted in pragmatic Rooseveltian realism—clearly defined, achievable objectives, burden-sharing, and continuity of purpose—to guide its actions, while concurrently rebalancing its resources to better facilitate security, prosperity, and unity at home. Central must be the judicious application of American hard and soft power to facilitate positive global perceptions US legitimacy, influence, and capacity to lead. Therefore, selective, subtle, proactive humanitarian intervention and capacity building must remain at the core of realist national security policy. The implications of continued strategic mismanagement for American power, and the broader geopolitical system are unclear. What is certain is the status quo is unlikely to continue, and we are engaged in a period in which traditional conceptualizations and employment of national power is in transition.

Footnotes

[1] Societal refers to a combination of a national value-based ideological, cultural, and social appeal, often linked with conceptualizations of “national identity”.

[2] The term CBOs will used to represent military-centric mission sets—Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Defense, Diplomacy, and Military Assistance (DDMA)—as well as civilian-led economic, governance, and civil infrastructure and development initiatives to improve Host-Nation capacity across all domains.

Tags: American Foreign Policy, Capacity Building Operations (CBOs), Compound Security Threats, Crisis Arenas, Great Power Competition, Influence, Infrastructure, Legitimacy, National Security Strategy, Power, Proactive Intervention, Societal Resilience

About The Author

Kyle Ramsay
Kyle Ramsay is a Future Security Initiative Professor of Practice in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. He is a retired Canadian Infantry soldier, officer, and national security professional specializing in irregular warfare, the environmental and sociopolitical drivers of instability and conflict, the utility of persistent multi-domain capacity building operations (CBOs) as an instrument of national security policy; complex humanitarian emergencies; and societal resilience.

7. It’s a Really Bad Time to Be an Expert in Washington

Excerpts:

“Groupthink and a blinkered mind-set are dangers for any administration,” said Richard Fontaine, the chief executive of the Center for a New American Security, which, in the days of bipartisanship, described itself as a bipartisan think tank. “Pulling from multiple sources in and outside of government to develop solid options for foreign policy decision makers is the way to go.”

Well, maybe in the Washington of a previous era.

Within a 200-yard radius of U.S.A.I.D., DOGE teams moved into the Wilson Center, a nonpartisan foreign policy think tank that had significant private funding and money from Congress. They shuttered it, from its Cold War archives to the Kennan Institute, one of the country’s leading collections of scholars about Russia. At a moment when superpower conflict is back, it was the kind of place that presented alternative views.

DOGE was unimpressed. Like their U.S.A.I.D. colleagues in another part of the Ronald Reagan Building, they were soon stuffing their notes into cartons and discovering their computer access had been shut down. (The Wilson Center also sponsored book writers, including some from The New York Times.)

The war on expertise has raised some fundamental questions that may not be answerable until after the Trump administration is over. Will the experts stick around — after hiding out in the private sector or changing professions — only to reoccupy the Swamp? And more immediately, what damage is being done in what may be the country’s defining challenge: the competition with China over artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, electric vehicles, quantum computing?

That is what many in the intelligence agencies worry about, not least because Europe is already openly recruiting disillusioned American scientists, and China’s intelligence services are looking for the angry and abandoned.

It’s a Really Bad Time to Be an Expert in Washington

The Trump administration has eviscerated the expert class that generated alternative views in its best moments, and engaged in groupthink at its worst.

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The old structure of the National Security Council did not fit the “top-down approach” of President Trump, according to Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

By David E. Sanger

David E. Sanger has covered six presidencies over more than four decades as a Times foreign correspondent and White House correspondent.

June 6, 2025,

5:01 a.m. ET

The most dangerous occupation in Washington these days is being an expert.

Across West Executive Avenue from the White House, the offices that once buzzed with specialists at the National Security Council are now half vacant. Their dismissal reflects an administration not especially interested in the policy options developed by the specialists — many drawn from the State Department or the C.I.A. — who stayed deep into the night pressure-testing alternatives to immediate and long-simmering crises.

As Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, told reporters this week, the old structure did not fit the “top-down approach” of President Trump, who views the institution’s proper role as carrying out his decisions.

At the Pentagon, 14 advisory boards have been dismantled, with curt, thank-you-for-your-service notes sent to Democrats and Republicans alike. Some of the boards dealt with obscure matters. But others focused on vital issues, like rethinking the American nuclear arsenal as China’s nuclear buildup, Vladimir V. Putin’s episodic nuclear threats and Mr. Trump’s ambitious demand for a “Golden Dome” missile defense system have changed the nature of nuclear strategy.

Also gone: The board of experts who were trying to learn lessons from China’s astoundingly successful hack into the country’s telecommunications networks — where, by all accounts, they remain to this day. Then came historians at the State Department and the climate specialists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which employed experts in weather, oceans, climate and biodiversity.

The National Weather Service lost so many people that the agency had to hire them back. No such luck for researchers relying on the National Science Foundation, where projects are disappearing every month.

Image

The Eisenhower Executive Office Building, where many of the dismissed members of the National Security Council worked. Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

No one killed off the expert advisory board at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as it deliberated whether healthy children should receive the Covid vaccine. They did not have to. While it weighed the pros and cons, Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and his colleagues announced that they had already made their decision.

When the history of these tumultuous past four months is written, it will doubtless focus on the moments when teams from the Department of Government Efficiency shut down the U.S. Agency for International Development, when the president issued tariff threats to much of the world and when he went to war with Harvard. Less noticed, perhaps, may be the devastation of the expert class, which once dominated the city, moving between think tanks and government offices, generating alternative views in its best moments, engaging in groupthink at its worst.

Today, the experts are swelling the ranks of Washington’s suddenly unemployed.

To the MAGA faithful, each one of these disbanded groups is a victory for a trimmer government that follows the president’s wishes. To them, the National Security Council was the heart of the so-called deep state, whose members testified against Mr. Trump during his first impeachment inquiry. The raft of advisory committees mostly slowed down decision making, they argued, when they were not undercutting policies they did not like. Worse yet, they were the source of leaks.

So if an advisory committee of experts was not needed to help James K. Polk, the 11th president, figure out how to spread the United States to the West Coast, why do we need them to figure out the strategy for adding Greenland and Canada? (The expansionist Mr. Polk has been restored to a place of pride in the Oval Office — his portrait now hangs just below and to the right of Thomas Jefferson’s.)

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Part of Mr. Trump’s problem with experts is their portrayal as neutral arbiters, more interested in the data than presidential spin. That is what has led to the White House this week trying to to discredit the Congressional Budget Office, which concluded that, yes, the new tax bill could really add $2.4 trillion to the national debt, no matter the spin. Lacking the authority to fire the budget experts there, the White House turned to casting them as politically biased.

Image

Rather than being informed by experts, Mr. Trump’s demand for a “Golden Dome” defense project has changed the nature of nuclear strategy. Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

And while every new president replaces board members and demands some fealty to the new leader’s ideology, what has happened in the past four months seems to some in the federal government more like China’s cultural revolution, where the only good ideas are the ones that flow from the leader, and both research reports and intelligence findings should support the president’s desires.

And when they are not, trouble follows. Just ask the National Intelligence Council, a small subset of intelligence experts — many drawn from academia — what happened when they came to the conclusion that the Venezuelan government was not controlling a criminal gang, an argument that Mr. Trump had used to justify deportations.

They were told to “do some rewriting” so the material could not be used against the president and Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence. After the intelligence findings were left unchanged, the board’s leadership resisted and was removed. The whole institution is being moved into Ms. Gabbard’s organization, where its independent judgments can be better controlled.

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At the Environmental Protection Agency, self-protective action has replaced scientific inquiry. “We’ve taken the words ‘climate’ and ‘green energy’ off every project document,” one scientist still in the government’s employ said recently, refusing to speak on the record for obvious reasons.

Veterans of Mr. Trump’s first term say these changes are a manifestation of the president’s bitter memories. “I think somebody convinced President Trump, based on his experience in his first administration, that his own staff would be the biggest obstructionists,” H.R. McMaster, Mr. Trump’s second national security adviser, said at a conference on artificial intelligence and national security on Wednesday. (Mr. Trump’s current national security adviser, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, is one of around a half dozen across both terms.)

While General McMaster, now at Stanford, said he did not object to shrinking the National Security Council staff, he worried that also lost would be the capacity to run “a deliberative process, which I think would be kind of nice on some of these issues, like tariffs, to clarify what you are trying to achieve.”

“Deliberative process” appears to be exactly what Mr. Trump is trying to avoid. And if that means eviscerating the expert class, so be it.

Image

H.R. McMaster, then the national security adviser to Mr. Trump, during a meeting in 2017. Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

It helps explain why the Department of Government Efficiency was given license to wipe out the Agency for International Development. General McMaster is hardly alone in concluding that some of the aid agency’s programs had “drifted.” Many Democrats say they agree, though almost never on the record.

But General McMaster gave voice to the question raised all over Washington when he asked, “Should you just crush the entire organization or recognize there is a mission for that organization to advance American interests?”

It was crushed, with foreign service officers, child health experts and others locked out of the offices. And that has led to both professional and personal angst.

“If you work in the field of maternal and child health, you are in trouble,” said Jessica Harrison Fullerton, a managing director at the Global Development Incubator, a nonprofit that is trying to fill some of the gaps U.S.A.I.D.’s dismantlement left. “Not only are you devastated by the impacts on the people you have been serving, but your expertise is now being questioned and your ability to use that expertise is limited because the jobs are gone.”

In fact, what many of Washington’s experts discovered was that crushing the organizations — and putting their experts out on the street — was the point of the exercise. It helped create a frisson of fear, and reinforced the message of who was in control. It has also led to warnings from more traditional Republicans that Mr. Trump’s demand for loyalty over analysis is creating a trap for himself.

“Groupthink and a blinkered mind-set are dangers for any administration,” said Richard Fontaine, the chief executive of the Center for a New American Security, which, in the days of bipartisanship, described itself as a bipartisan think tank. “Pulling from multiple sources in and outside of government to develop solid options for foreign policy decision makers is the way to go.”

Well, maybe in the Washington of a previous era.

Within a 200-yard radius of U.S.A.I.D., DOGE teams moved into the Wilson Center, a nonpartisan foreign policy think tank that had significant private funding and money from Congress. They shuttered it, from its Cold War archives to the Kennan Institute, one of the country’s leading collections of scholars about Russia. At a moment when superpower conflict is back, it was the kind of place that presented alternative views.

DOGE was unimpressed. Like their U.S.A.I.D. colleagues in another part of the Ronald Reagan Building, they were soon stuffing their notes into cartons and discovering their computer access had been shut down. (The Wilson Center also sponsored book writers, including some from The New York Times.)

The war on expertise has raised some fundamental questions that may not be answerable until after the Trump administration is over. Will the experts stick around — after hiding out in the private sector or changing professions — only to reoccupy the Swamp? And more immediately, what damage is being done in what may be the country’s defining challenge: the competition with China over artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, electric vehicles, quantum computing?

That is what many in the intelligence agencies worry about, not least because Europe is already openly recruiting disillusioned American scientists, and China’s intelligence services are looking for the angry and abandoned.

Graham Allison, the Harvard professor who writes often on the U.S.-China technological and military competitions, told an audience at the A.I. Summit on Wednesday that America is not acting like it understands that “China has emerged as a full-spectrum competitor.”

“Our secret sauce,” he said, has been the American ability to “recruit the most talented people in the world. Einstein didn’t come from America.”

“The idea that we would be taking action that would undermine that makes no sense to any strategic thinker,” he said.

Of course, those strategic thinkers rank among the suspect class of Washington experts.

David E. Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four books on foreign policy and national security challenges.

8. Ukraine’s dirty war is just getting started

Opinion

David Ignatius

Ukraine’s dirty war is just getting started

Covert strikes across Russia and beyond are reshaping a conflict that shows no signs of letting up.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/06/05/ukraine-covert-war-russia-espionage/?utm

June 5, 2025 at 7:42 p.m. EDTYesterday at 7:42 p.m. EDT

7 min

237

Drone construction equipment is seen at a production facility in eastern Ukraine in April. (Ed Ram/For The Washington Post)

Ukraine’s daring drone attack against Russian air bases last weekend delivered “a serious slap in the face of the power … of the Russian Federation,” as Lt. Gen. Vasyl Malyuk, the head of SBU, Ukraine’s security service, boasted after the operation. Some Ukraine supporters hoped the strikes might mark a breakthrough in the war.

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But what’s ahead appears to be a bloody continuation of this terrible conflict. President Donald Trump, who came into office promising to settle the war, on Thursday glibly compared it to “two young children fighting like crazy in a park. … Sometimes, you’re better off letting them fight for a while and then pulling them apart.”

With Trump stepping back as a peacemaker, at least for now, Ukraine will depend more than ever on its intelligence services, which have shown an ability to strike Russian forces deep inside their home country and around the world. The front line inside Ukraine will remain a hellscape of drones and artillery. But covert operations could expand into a “dirty war” beyond the front, with more targeted killings, sabotage, and strikes on countries that supply arms to Ukraine and Russia, respectively.

Both sides have long wanted to break out of the stalemated war of attrition, and Sunday’s “Operation Spiderweb” was a bold Ukrainian attempt to reset the table. Malyuk said preparation for the coordinated attacks across Russia’s vast territory began 18 months ago. Other sophisticated operations are in the works, intelligence sources tell me.

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The SBU and the GUR, Ukraine’s two spy agencies, have been working for more than three years to deliver on the motto of Ukraine’s special forces: “I’m coming for you.” They have run operations to take the battle into Russia — and abroad against its forces and partners around the world. The goal has been to strike in unexpected locations through devious means and make Russia bleed far beyond the front lines in Ukraine.

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The SBU and GUR have an intense rivalry, much like the decades-old competition between the FBI and the CIA. The SBU, responsible for internal security but also active outside the country, was plagued for years by claims that it was penetrated by Russia. That’s why Sunday’s complex operation was such a coup: It didn’t get leaked. Intelligence sources told me that Malyuk had informed President Volodymyr Zelensky, but not some other top members of his administration. Malyuk didn’t even tell a key deputy, the sources said.

A sign of the SBU-GUR rivalry is that on May 30, just two days before the SBU drone attack on air bases, GUR operatives launched an attack on an army base at Desantnaya Bay, near Vladivostok in the Russian Far East — the most distant target yet in the war.

The Vladivostok attack involved a combination of truck bombs and drones, intelligence sources told me, with the drones mostly used for diversion. The target was the 155th Marine Brigade, which has fought at Mariupol and in other Ukraine battles, according to the Kyiv Independent, to which GUR sources confirmed the attack.

The SBU, beyond trucking the ingenious containers carrying small quadcopters into Russia, has also taken the lead on naval drones that forced the Russian navy to retreat in the Black Sea. European intelligence officers have helped with the design of these sea drones, sources told me.

Ukraine has considered a naval version of the sneak-attack tactic it used so effectively on Sunday. The sources said the SBU weighed sending sea drones hidden in cargo containers to attack ships of Russia and its allies in the North Pacific. But, so far, they apparently have yet to launch these operations.

A big target for the SBU has been the bridge spanning the Kerch Strait and connecting Russia to occupied Crimea. SBU operatives have struck the bridge three times since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, most recently in a big underwater blast on Tuesday. The heavily protected bridge is a prime symbolic target for Ukraine — another way of delivering a “slap.”

The GUR, headed by the charismatic Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, has run extensive operations into Russia and against Russian forces around the world. He told me in an interview last year: “We’ve offered a plan aimed at reduction of Russian potential. It encompasses a lot of aspects, like the military industry … critical military targets, their airfields, their command-and-control posts.”

One GUR tactic has been to strike Russian mercenary forces from the Wagner Group in Africa. A GUR-organized strike last July killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers, according to the BBC. Budanov had told me: “We conduct such operations aimed at reducing Russian military potential, anywhere where it’s possible. Why should Africa be an exception?”

Intelligence sources described several GUR operations in South Africa to disrupt weapons shipments to Russia. In December 2022, GUR agents discovered that a Russian cargo ship, the Lady R, had docked at the Simon’s Town naval base to receive what the sources said was a shipment of weapons. The GUR passed the information to the United States, and the U.S. ambassador in Pretoria made a public protest in May 2023. GUR agents also disrupted a weapons transfer to a Russian cargo plane that visited South Africa in 2022, the sources said.

When the Smolnyy, a Russian naval training ship, docked at Cape Town in August, Ukrainians sharply protested. Sources told me that some GUR officers considered attacking the ship but held back.

Ukraine’s readiness to launch risky spy operations has produced recurring tension between Washington and Kyiv, U.S. and Ukrainian sources told me. One example was the August 2022 assassination of Daria Dugina, the daughter of a Russian writer who has been a prominent advocate of the war with Ukraine (and was the likely target). U.S. intelligence learned that Ukrainian spies had organized the plot and told them Washington strongly opposed such actions, according to the New York Times.

The countries bordering Ukraine might become new battlegrounds as the war continues. An example is Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova on Ukraine’s western border that is aligned with Moscow and hosts a Russian “peacekeeping” force. Using Russian defectors and other local forces, Ukraine considered an operation to attack the Russian troops there but decided against opening this new front.

Now, Russia is considering sending 10,000 additional troops to Transnistria and seeks to destabilize pro-Western Moldova, the Moldovan prime minister claimed in an interview with the Financial Times this week.

The spillover danger affects all the other countries bordering Ukraine: Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania — as well as Germany, the Baltic states, and Norway and Finland beyond. Most of these countries support Ukraine, and the Ukrainian intelligence services use Eastern European capitals as hubs for their operations. It’s all too easy to imagine a widening campaign of Russian sabotage and assassination threats such as those that began last year.

When Trump took office, he appeared to think it would be easy to end this war. He got his answer this week when Ukrainian and Russian negotiators met in Istanbul. Russia’s terms amounted to demanding Ukraine’s capitulation. According to a Tass report, Russia’s negotiating memorandum seeks “Ukraine’s neutrality, which means its pledge not to join military alliances and coalitions, a ban on any military activity … and on the deployment of foreign military forces.”

Ukraine won’t be “forced to be neutral,” it said in its own sheet of terms. “It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move toward E.U. membership.” That, in essence, is what this war is about.

Trump spoke on Thursday about the terrible carnage of this war, describing gruesome intelligence photos he had seen of severed limbs and shattered bodies. Those aren’t children “fighting in a park.” As the president steps back, the body count continues to climb.

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By David Ignatius

David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column for The Washington Post. His latest novel is “Phantom Orbit.” follow on X@ignatiuspost

9. Stanford is a case study in how Beijing infiltrates U.S. universities

Excerpt:

To understand how China uses its students as spies, read the stunning investigative report published last month by Stanford Review reporters Garret Molloy and Elsa Johnson in which they documented the infiltration of Stanford University by the Chinese Communist Party. “The CCP is orchestrating a widespread academic espionage campaign at Stanford,” Johnson told me and my co-host, Danielle Pletka, in a recent podcast interview. “Stanford is in the heart of Silicon Valley,” she added, “and that’s a huge incentive for China.”

Opinion

Marc A. Thiessen

Stanford is a case study in how Beijing infiltrates U.S. universities

Student reporters at Stanford University revealed China’s spying methods using Chinese nationals.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/06/05/chinese-espionage-stanford-university/?utm

June 5, 2025 at 6:00 a.m. EDTYesterday at 6:00 a.m. EDT

5 min

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People walk and ride along the campus of Stanford University in Stanford, California, on May 30. (John G Mabanglo/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

The Trump administration is revoking visas for Chinese students “with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields” and revising its “visa criteria to enhance scrutiny of all future visa applications” for students from China and Hong Kong.

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This is both necessary and long overdue. For years, China has been engaged in a systematic effort to target U.S. universities, using Chinese students to conduct extensive espionage and intellectual property theft on elite campuses across the United States — which has helped fuel China’s technological and military growth.

To understand how China uses its students as spies, read the stunning investigative report published last month by Stanford Review reporters Garret Molloy and Elsa Johnson in which they documented the infiltration of Stanford University by the Chinese Communist Party. “The CCP is orchestrating a widespread academic espionage campaign at Stanford,” Johnson told me and my co-host, Danielle Pletka, in a recent podcast interview. “Stanford is in the heart of Silicon Valley,” she added, “and that’s a huge incentive for China.”

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Johnson and Molloy interviewed Chinese nationals on campus who told them how the espionage works. “In conversations, Chinese students would report, ‘Every single week I’m asked to meet a handler where I’ll be asked to talk about the research I’m doing, the directions that research is going in, how that research is progressing and how we could reimplement that research back in China,’” Molloy said. If their handlers “have interest in, let’s say, [artificial intelligence] or quantum computing,” he said, “they will then reach out to that student and ask them to provide documents, internal memos, methodologies, future directions of the research.”

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Some conduct espionage for Beijing willingly. “There are some students who want to work with the Chinese government and they’re happy to do this, they want to advance their careers,” Johnson said. Others are victims of what the reporters call “transnational repression,” in which the long arm of Chinese state security reaches across the Pacific into the United States. In 2017, China passed a National Intelligence Law mandating that Chinese citizens must “support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work,” whether at home or abroad.

“At Stanford, students who refused to hand over certain documents had their family taken to police stations in China,” Molloy told me, adding, “if you do not comply with the national intelligence law, your family back in China is under threat. Therefore, students have a very strong incentive to do exactly what the party says.” What this means is, whether enthusiastically or reluctantly, countless Chinese nationals at U.S. universities must inform on their schools to the Chinese Communist Party.

Stanford is not alone. There are approximately 277,398 Chinese students in the United States, according to the Institute of International Education, second only to India in terms of U.S. enrollment. The majority are studying science, technology, engineering and mathematics — areas of high priority for CCP espionage.

Nearly half of Chinese students are pursuing advanced degrees. Many graduate students are sponsored by state-backed vehicles, such as the China Scholarship Council, which the Chinese regime uses to recruit and pay tuition for Chinese students chosen to attend, and almost certainly spy on, U.S. universities. CSC-funded students are must pass party loyalty tests, Molloy said, and are “required to go to the Chinese consulate and provide information” on research taking place at the university as well as conduct “peer surveillance” of other Chinese nationals.

Stanford and other universities appear more than happy to look the other way and take Beijing’s money, which has become a major source of revenue for U.S. universities. Indeed, an investigation by the Free Press found that China has become the second-largest source of foreign funding for U.S. universities, behind only Qatar.

Rep. John Moolenaar (R-Michigan), chairman of the House select committee on China, recently wrote to the presidents of Stanford, Carnegie Mellon, Purdue, the University of Illinois, the University of Maryland and the University of Southern California warning that “America’s student visa system has become a Trojan horse for Beijing, providing unrestricted access to our top research institutions and posing a direct threat to our national security.”

He asked them to provide Congress with detailed information on Chinese national undergraduate, graduate and PhD students attending their institutions, including: the sources of tuition funding for Chinese nationals at their schools; the type of research Chinese national students are conducting; and what policies are in place to prevent Chinese nationals from working on projects tied to U.S. government grants and export-controlled coursework, such as advanced semiconductor engineering, quantum computing, AI and aerospace engineering.

Molloy, an economics major, visited China last summer and was shocked to meet with many members of the CCP who were educated at Stanford. “We’re educating the head of the Chinese [securities and exchange commission], we’re educating the head of Beijing’s tariff negotiators. I’m meeting all these people and they all say ‘I work for the Chinese Communist Party in a really high role. I hope that China beats the U.S. And I also went to Stanford for my undergraduate and master’s degree.’ And I’m putting this together and I’m saying it’s shocking that we are educating such high-level Communist Party officials. … What’s going wrong here?”

It’s a fair question — one of many for which the Trump administration plans to get answers.

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By Marc A. Thiessen

Marc Thiessen writes a column for The Post on foreign and domestic policy. He is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and the former chief speechwriter for President George W. Bush.follow on X@marcthiessen

10. The ‘New Warfare’ Comes of Age: Are We Ready?

Excerpts:

Bombing easily rebuilt bridges, wooden bridges on the Ho Chi Minh trail, required resources all out of proportion to the results. So, too, bombing caves in Tora Bora. A modern, highly-integrated, highly electrified, and computerized society such as our own, however, offers the most target-rich of target-rich environments. An open society where military assets exist cheek-by-jowl with interstate highways makes the Ukrainian achievement look like child’s play.

It’s not drones, then, or any other clever device that should arrest our attention, but rather the degree of our interdependency and the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure to even the simplest of attacks. The “new warfare” answers the general’s plaintive quest for targets with a richness of which he could never have dreamed, targets accessible by the simplest of weapons. By all means, let’s see if we can build a “Golden Dome” to protect ourselves against nuclear-tipped missiles, but let’s also reckon with drone attacks on our own air force bases, or any of a hundred and one other simple scenarios.

Witnessing what the Ukrainians just did to the Russians, we’d best start thinking hard about what we’re going to do to protect ourselves — before it’s too late.

The ‘New Warfare’ Comes of Age: Are We Ready?

spectator.org · by James H. McGee · June 2, 2025

I’m filled with admiration for Ukraine’s daring and imaginative strike this weekend at high-value targets across the length and breadth of Russia. I don’t for a moment believe that, by itself, this one strategic blow will change the outcome of the war, but if the Ukrainians can continue to find fresh ways to extend the scope of the conflict, to inflict damage deep inside Russia, and to force the Russian armed forces to defend as well as attack, then the entire conflict might well take on a new and entirely different dimension. (RELATED: Russia’s Aerial Assault on Ukraine)

It’s much too early to judge the larger impact of the Ukrainian attack on the outcome of the war, or even, more narrowly, on the currently planned Istanbul negotiations. But it’s not too early to step back and consider what it signifies in terms of an emerging “new warfare,” one capable of challenging the Russians, to be sure, but also one that will surely challenge us as well.

I’m not talking about swarms of weaponized drones, although that’s been the focus of so much of this morning’s commentary. Every day they prove their worth, and the Ukrainians have leapt to the forefront in finding tactical — and now strategic uses — for what were once dismissed as mere toys. But instead of focusing our attention on the tools, no matter how cleverly developed and deployed, we should focus on the concept of attacking critical facilities, not just military facilities, but also crippling, well-orchestrated strikes at critical civilian infrastructure. (RELATED: Drones: We Aren’t Ready for the Next War)

The Guerrilla Warfare Myth

We once called it “guerrilla warfare,” and, while it exerted a powerful fascination, serious military professionals always dismissed it as merely a “sideshow,” a useful distraction for enemy forces, but never decisive. My childhood hero, Lawrence of Arabia, certainly did much to undermine the Ottoman Turks on the Arabian peninsula, but World War I in the Middle East was won by General Allenby’s regular forces, not Lawrence’s colorful band of Arab irregulars.

Winston Churchill delighted in notions of “setting Europe ablaze,” and, at a time when, after Dunkirk, Britain lacked the wherewithal to do anything other than pinprick attacks against Nazi-conquered Europe, commando raids and resistance movements commanded his attention — but he never mistook them as decisive. At war’s end, General Eisenhower fulsomely praised such outfits as the SAS and the OSS and the resistance fighters they enabled, but he also understood full well that the war was won by fleets of tanks and bombers and, in the end, the pounding of artillery and the grinding sacrifice of infantry.

Since World War II, a fiction has emerged to the effect that the guerrillas are undefeatable, be they Mao’s forces in late 1940s China, the Viet Minh/Viet Cong through two Vietnam Wars, or in any array of other conflicts across the globe. But Mao conquered China, not with guerrillas, but with divisions of regular soldiers armed with captured Japanese weapons — captured by the Russians when they swept into Manchuria in 1945. General Giap crushed the French at Dien Bien Phu with regular troops and, above all, a massive concentration of artillery, including modern U.S. 105mm howitzers captured by Mao from the Chinese Nationalists.

And contrary to carefully cultivated myth, the Viet Cong guerrillas didn’t win the Second Vietnam War. Instead, they were largely broken during and after the Tet Offensive, ceasing to be a significant military factor. The ultimate defeat of South Vietnam came at the hands of North Vietnamese regulars in a conventional invasion led by hundreds of modern Russian-supplied tanks, an assault invited by the withdrawal of U.S. support for our South Vietnamese allies. You can’t fight tanks when your anti-tank weapons lack ammunition and your attack aircraft lack spare parts.

The guerrillas, or insurgents, or whatever one wishes to call them, have triumphed in Third World countries largely because the battles were being fought in Third World countries, countries in which, in the end, no one but the locals cared deeply enough about the outcome to go on fighting. Walking away from Afghanistan was unfortunate, and the manner of the Biden-orchestrated final departure was a profound national embarrassment. But two decades after 9/11, we’d long passed the point where the American people cared deeply enough to make a difference.

The ‘New Warfare’

The “new warfare,” however, is very different, and not just because it’s sometimes pursued with drone attacks or exploding pagers. The real difference lies in the changing nature of modern society and the availability of truly crippling targets for irregular warfare. Consider, for example, the recent attacks on electrical infrastructure in southern France. Just over a week ago, saboteurs destroyed two electricity substations, one in Nice, one in Cannes, the latter blacking out the final day of the Cannes Film Festival, and, overall, depriving nearly 200,000 homes and businesses of power. The leftist saboteurs proclaimed adherence to a grab-bag of causes, starting with support for Hamas, but ranging across the usual progressive preoccupations.

These attacks were the work of amateurs, albeit well-organized amateurs. They shouldn’t be dismissed for this reason. As we’ve witnessed recently in this country, from the murders of Israeli embassy staff in D.C. to this weekend’s firebomb attacks in Boulder, Colorado, there is a rising tide of lethal violence being perpetrated by such amateurs. Moreover, at the next level, the various permutations of Antifa can no longer simply be viewed as amateurs — within their ranks, there’s a growing cadre of genuine terrorists.

Arguably, the larger concern must be the potential for multi-level organized attacks akin to what the Ukrainians have just carried out in Russia. While they had to smuggle their attack drones into and across Russia to put them into position, what about the swathes of agricultural land and other properties purchased in this country by Chinese government front organizations, some of them within easy striking distance of some of our most vital military facilities? It’s not hard to conceive of these as the bases for similar drone attacks.

China and ‘New Warfare’ Strategies

I’ve written before in these pages about the need to think about a potential Pacific war in broader terms than a simple naval gunfight around the Taiwan Straits. That’s scary enough, and, as Xi Jinping’s 2027 deadline for “resolution” of the Taiwan issue looms, the U.S. Navy is scrambling to prepare for such an eventuality.

But what if the prelude to such an attack takes place, not in and around Taiwan, but through a wave of deniable attacks across the U.S. homeland?

Data centers blown up by truck bombs, substations set on fire, wildfires started, all perhaps attributed to some made-up — but highly plausible — domestic radicals, but orchestrated by Chinese intelligence agents. We know that there are plenty of those currently operating in this country.

The Ukrainian intelligence service, we are told, spent some 18 months preparing this weekend’s attack. The Israelis devoted a significant amount of time and they’re much-vaunted intelligence capabilities in putting together the pager attack. We kid ourselves if we assume that the Chinese Ministry of State Security is incapable of such things, and potentially on a much grander scale.

We also kid ourselves if we assume that they wouldn’t try, or, at the very least, that they’re not in the business of crafting a novel kind of deterrence. A current American Spectator essay, Kevin Cohen’s “Cuba Now Represents a Major Threat,” makes this very point. Writing of the expanding Chinese, Russian, and Iranian presence in Cuba, Cohen observes: “They are constructing real-time capabilities within reach of the U.S. mainland. Their combined presence suggests a new doctrine of proximity-based deterrence and hybrid warfare emerging just offshore.” Cohen further notes that Cuba now offers “a frontline concern” and “an active platform for adversaries.” (RELATED: Cuba Now Represents a Major Threat)

We would do well to heed Cohen’s warning, and we would do better still to view it in the context of steadily expanding Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence operations across Africa and in Latin America. Even Antarctica now seems to be a target of expanded Chinese interest.

In other words, we’re a long way — a very long way — from a localized conflict on the far side of the Pacific Ocean. Xi Jinping has made no secret of his desire to reorder China’s place in the world, sweeping the U.S. aside, a prospect that assumes a greater military dimension even as China’s economy runs increasingly into trouble. If you can’t supplant the U.S. through economic competition, then recourse to “other means” becomes more urgent.

But whether we think in terms of suffering an actual attack or simply having our hands tied via Cohen’s “novel kind of deterrence,” we should think very clearly about the challenge demonstrated by Ukraine’s action this weekend. In his book, Hue: 1968, journalist Mark Bowden (of Blackhawk Down fame) quotes an arresting exchange between a congressman and an air force general. The congressman asks the general what he needs to whip the North Vietnamese, and the general simply answers, “Targets — we need targets!”

Bombing easily rebuilt bridges, wooden bridges on the Ho Chi Minh trail, required resources all out of proportion to the results. So, too, bombing caves in Tora Bora. A modern, highly-integrated, highly electrified, and computerized society such as our own, however, offers the most target-rich of target-rich environments. An open society where military assets exist cheek-by-jowl with interstate highways makes the Ukrainian achievement look like child’s play.

It’s not drones, then, or any other clever device that should arrest our attention, but rather the degree of our interdependency and the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure to even the simplest of attacks. The “new warfare” answers the general’s plaintive quest for targets with a richness of which he could never have dreamed, targets accessible by the simplest of weapons. By all means, let’s see if we can build a “Golden Dome” to protect ourselves against nuclear-tipped missiles, but let’s also reckon with drone attacks on our own air force bases, or any of a hundred and one other simple scenarios.

Witnessing what the Ukrainians just did to the Russians, we’d best start thinking hard about what we’re going to do to protect ourselves — before it’s too late.

Private Military Companies (PMCs) Subject Bibliography No. 1: Wagner Group (Africa Corps)

by Pamela Ligouri Bunker, by Lisa Campbell, by Robert Bunker

06.06.2025 at 06:00am

Editor’s note: This annotated bibliography is the product of a contract between the authors and the Department of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Center (IWC).

Authors’ note: This subject bibliography is a selection of top resources on Wagner Group, and includes journal articles, books, and online discussion groups. The dates of the material range from 2019 to 2025, encompassing Wagner’s origins to its breakup and Russian state replacement strategies. The purpose is to provide ready-access resources for the study of Wagner Group and its successor organization Africa Corps.

The Wagner Group is a recent iteration of Russia’s historical use of proxy forces abroad. In 2013, the Syrian government contracted Slavonic Corps, a front organization and sub-contractor for the Russian private security company Moran Security Group to secure selected oilfields in eastern Syria. Although its first and only mission was considered both a test and a failure, the concept of Slavonic Corps gave rise to the Wagner Group, which emerged soon after. The leadership of Wagner Group included Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dimitry Utkin; Prigozhin was a successful convict-turned-businessman with close ties to President Putin while Utkin was a former member of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and commander of a Spetsnaz unit. The unique and timely characteristics of these leaders, as well as Wagner’s direct ties to the Russian state, were key to the organization’s success. Operating mostly in the grey zone, the Wagner Group fulfilled Russian strategic objectives and sought to secure funding by both licit and illicit means. Russian offerings to state leaders via Wagner Group ranged from single issue solutions to “regime survival packages” in exchange for resource extraction, business enterprise contracts, and other forms of payment.

The Wagner Group gained notoriety worldwide with its use of extreme tactics, its enhanced military and economic capabilities, and the locations where it operated. Wagner’s engagements in Africa included providing services to weak authoritarian governments, often post-coup juntas or nations in conflict. Such clients required hybrid warfare support for self-preservation, wealth acquisition, land recapture, counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorism operations. These governments tended to accept Wagner’s operational methods, which fell well below Western and international legal and moral thresholds. Wagner conducted attacks on civilian populations that ranged from hit-and-run style to orchestrated mass atrocities utilizing air support. Furthermore, Wagner set itself apart from other PMCs and Western and UN forces by willingly engaging in combat operations abroad, often fighting alongside indigenous military troops. To ensure strategic success for the Russian state, Wagner prioritized disinformation campaigns, influence operations and other soft power plays. Robust efforts with these campaigns have contributed to recent geopolitical shifts towards anti-West, pro-Russian sentiment and cooperation.

In the post-Prigozhin era, the organization was reconfigured. Following the attempted mutiny, the Russian government pressed forward with splitting up the Wagner Group. Russia openly acknowledges Wagner’s replacement, ‘Africa Corps,’ now under tight control of the Ministry of Defense, while it retains nominal vestiges of the original group. Africa Corps is still being established, thus its success in comparison with Wagner is speculative, but the proven value of such PMCs to Russia likely far outweighs any perceived drawbacks. The potential threat that these groups pose to the United States—creating an arena for great power competition in Africa and potential path there to proxy warfare with Russia—is of particular concern. The recent US withdrawal from Niger, a former strategic partner in the Sahel is likely the result of Russia-Wagner influence. Additional at-risk US partnerships in West Africa and elsewhere on the continent may depend on the success or failure of Post-Prigozhin Russian PMCs.

Allesandro Arduino, Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of War. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2023, pp. 1-302.

Annotation: While the work has about forty pages dedicated to the Wagner Group (and allied groups), its true value lies in placing that private military company (PMC) within the context of contemporary mercenary use proliferation, specifically regarding the Chinese state and their utilization of weaponized drones and cyberspace operations. Given that the author is a Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese private security specialist, the treatment of Wagner in the work can be considered a basic primer on the topic and is well researched. For additional context, refer to Sean McFate’s previous book The Modern Mercenary (OUP, 2015).

Olivia Allison et. al, Wagner’s Business Model in Syria and Africa Profit and Patronage. Occasional Paper. London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), February 2025, pp. 1-39.

Annotation: This unique paper delves into the underlying economics—the cost and profitability—of the Wagner Group’s activities in Syria, Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali, with the financial data tabled out. Prigozhin’s Russian state capital (via domestic contract plus ups) and the key vulnerabilities of Wagner’s business model are also discussed. It draws upon the extensive use of primary source interviews and secondary documents. The revenue streams generated by Wagner appear much lower than previously projected. The paper is written by a RUSI team with intelligence and financial investigative backgrounds, with a PhD researcher providing methodological oversight.

Anna Arutunyan and Mark Galeotti, Downfall: Putin, Prigozhin, and the fight for the future of Russia. London: Ebury Press, 2024, pp. 1-272.

Annotation: The work represents a popular press biography of the gangster-entrepreneur Yevgeny Prigozhin by two of the top contemporary Russian politico-military and organized crime experts in the field. It thematically chronicles his adult life as he takes on different personas (thug, entrepreneur, chef, et. al) and proves his usefulness to Vladimir Putin and the Russian state before engaging in a munity against his benefactor by marching on Moscow with his Wagner mercenary group. The book is an easy read and extensively utilizes primary Russian sources and insider cultural knowledge.

Jessica Berlin et. al, The Blood Gold Report: How the Kremlin is using Wagner to launder billions in African gold. Washington, DC: 21 Democracy, December 2023, pp. 1-62.

Annotation: The report focuses on the use of the Wagner group by the Russian state. It promotes a narrative which exposes the “Kremlin’s ‘blood gold’” activities of gold extraction from African countries to support its war against Ukraine and fund other global hybrid warfare activities. The work emphasizes Wagner’s African playbook, investigates Wagner’s blood-gold trail in Africa, and then provides information on how the Wagner blood-gold activities have been countered. The latter is done after providing an explanation of how global gold supply chains work. Six policy recommendations are then offered to further mitigate Wagner extractive activities taking place in Africa. Imagery and diagrams are included in the report.

János Besenyő, András István Türke, and Endre Szénási, Wagner Group Private Military Company: Volume 1: Establishment, Purpose, Profile and Historic Relevance 2013-2023. No. 42. Warwick: Helion & Company, 2024, pp. 1-54.

Annotation: The work provides information on historical mercenary antecedents, Wagner’s ties Slavonic Corps, a limited Wagner chronology, and an overview of the group’s activities in Syria and Africa along with a brief mention of its deployment to Venezuela. Imagery of its logos (patches), personnel, and vehicles (& aircraft) is provided along with a few maps of its deployments and an organizational chart of the group in Syria in 2017. This is a well-researched work useful for operational level analysis. A second larger follow-on volume is planned to be released in May 2025.

Jason Blazakis et. al, Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army. Special Report. Washington, DC: The Soufan Group, June 2023, pp. 1-44.

Annotation: The Soufan Group—primarily known for its terrorism research—has, in this special report, produced a basic primer on the Wagner Group covering its emergence through its mutiny against the Putin regime in June 2023. About a third of the work provides a generalized overview concerning the organization and addresses questions such as who its key figures are, its activities, and where deployed. The report contains a listing of bulleted (•) key findings, three implications related to international peace and security concerning accountability, conflict prevention and resolution, and radicalization and mobilization, and eight recommendations to counter Wagner activities.

The legacy and future of the Wagner Group. Washington, DC: Brookings, 21 September 2023, 1:35 Minute Video.

Annotation: The Brookings Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors and the Center on the United States and Europe convened top experts to discuss Wagner’s military, political, economic, and misinformation operations, what restructuring of the group was being implemented by the Russian Ministry of Defense, and what the future of Russia’s proxy activities may look like. Participants were Vanda Felbab-Brown, Kimberly Marten, Candace Rondeaux, Jessica Brandt, and Wassim Nasr with Constanze Stelzenmüller acting as moderator of the event.

Filip Bryjka and Jędrzej Czerep, Africa Corps—A New Iteration of Russia’s Old Military Presence in Africa. PISM Report. Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, May 2024, pp. 1-46.

Annotation: The report provides a post-Prigozhin rebellion assessment of the Wagner Group, reorganized by the end of 2023 by the Russian Ministry of Defense, and now operationally subordinated to the GRU, under the rebranded name Africa Corps. With this reorganization came the Kremlin’s willingness to both institutionalize and expand its political, military, and resource-extractive activities in Africa to include new countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger with a particular emphasis on the Sahel. The establishment of Africa Corps, its activities, and futures are analyzed along with response recommendations provided.

Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta, “After Prigozhin: The Future of the Wagner Model in Africa.” CTC Sentinel. Vol. 16, Iss. 9, September 2023, pp. 13-21.

Annotation: Through open-source information and interviews with analysts, this article evaluates what the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s mutiny and subsequent death likely meant for Wagner operations in Africa. While taking the position that Wagner had more autonomy from Russia than others have implied, e.g. citing use of UAE aviation firms, it nonetheless recognizes that Russian use of this “mercenary diplomacy” model (now with less autonomy) will not fade away and will even nominally remain ‘Wagner’ where expedient. It postures that the U.S. and other Western nations should be proactive in response to the Russian drive for dominance in Africa but outlines how this may be problematic for a number of reasons.

Decoding the Wagner Group Shadow Network: An Inside Look at Russia’s Irregular Warfare Strategy. Washington, DC: Future Frontlines (New America), 2025, Website.

Annotation: This research and investigative program (based on a public intelligence approach) focuses on the Wagner Group and is managed by New America—a DC based think tank. It fuses OSINT and leverages qualitative and quantitative analysis to uncover obscured information related to this private army and the networks associated with it. Key components of the Wagner Ecosystem are accessible through this website and are illuminated by data visualizations, leadership dossiers, country insights, analysis (short reports), datasets, archived Wagner-linked VKontakte and Telegram channels, and a Wagner Group Personnel Dataset (with information on 13,000+ irregular fighters linked to the group which requires access vetting). The comprehensive program is directed by Wagner authority Candace Rondeaux.

Marat Gabidullin, et. al, Moi, Marat, ex-commandant de l’armée Wagner (I Marat, ex-Commander in the Wagner Army). Neuilly-sur-Seine: Michel Lafon, 2022, pp. 1-363.

Annotation: The author, Marat Gabidullin, is a former Wagner Group commander who was deployed to the Donbass, Ukraine in 2015 and to Syria as an ‘ISIS Hunter’ in 2016-2017. The work is a primary account of his experiences with the organization during its early years. He is the first member of the PMC to speak publicly about the group and is currently living in France where he has asked for asylum. His memoir has been published in French and earlier in Russian (under a different title) but has not yet been translated into English.

Antonio Giustozzi, Joana de Deus Pereira, and David Lewis, Did Wagner Succeed in the Eyes of its African and Middle Eastern Clients? Whitehall Report 4-24. London: Royal United Services Institute, January 2025, pp. 1-41.

Annotation: The main areas of the report focus on Wagner’s services provided, supporting local regime military forces and contracting as a combat force for hire, and its contracts in Syria, Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), and Mozambique. Wagner’s extensive use of disinformation (to promote itself, Russian interests, and the regimes it contracted) is also touched upon. The report engages in the novel question whether the regimes that contracted with it were satisfied with its performance. The score card is hit and miss in this regard, however, this was balanced out with governments realizing they could become overly dependent on Wagner services. In one situation with CAR, however, regime survival took precedence.

After the Fall: Russian influence on Africa’s illicit economies post-Wagner. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), February 2025, pp. 1-50.

Annotation: This research report lays out Russia’s strategy in those African countries in which the Wagner group was operational prior to the 2023 death of Yevgeny Prigozhin. This strategy includes rebranding (as Africa Corps), maintaining (as Wagner where prudent), expanding (with overt Russian positioning, particularly where there is a Western vacuum), and diversifying (with new PMC groups). Challenges are said to include backlash against prior PMC atrocities and/or outside nation influence as well as the increasing presence of China in the region.

All Eyes On Wagner (AEOW). Virtual: INPACT (Open Collective), 2025, Website.

Annotation: The INPACT website supports ‘an OSINT accountability project’ focusing on the Wagner Group with the intent to research, investigate, and disrupt it. The project is staffed by volunteers who represent a European investigative collective and produces short reports in English and French on Wagner’s activities. Other components of Russian hybrid warfare, its partners, and strategic arms and disruptive technologies are also covered by the project. The project formed in 2021 is ongoing with regard to Wagner follow-ons, and represents a virtual collaboration focused on the Wagner Group’s activities and wrongdoing.

Matthew A. Lauder, State, non-state, or chimera? The rise and fall of the Wagner Group and recommendations for countering Russia’s employment of complex proxy networks. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 33. Helsinki: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, June 2024, pp. 1-28.

Annotation: One of the newer and more comprehensive investigative books on the Wagner Groups, chronicling its inception, evolution, deployments, eventual downfall (post-Prigozhin mutiny), and eventual rebranding as Africa Corps directly under Russian state control. The work uses archetypes (soldiers, oil men, et. al) for its chapter themes tying into geographic activities (Ukraine, Syria, et. al). The author is a polyglot (including being fluent in Russian) who has interviewed many former Wagner mercenaries and engaged in field research in many of the conflict zones where the group operated including Ukraine, Mali, Libya, and Central African Republic (CAR). The work contains a color photo gallery of twenty-four Wagner related images and is considered one of the authoritative works on the subject.

Jack Margolin, The Wagner Group: Inside Russia’s Mercenary Army. London: Reaktion Books, 2024, pp. 1-328.

Annotation: This investigative journalism work focuses on the rise and fall of the Wagner Group, drawing upon primarily English and Russian language resources. It provides a solid overview of the group and its chronology of deployments and operational activities in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. Both the ‘face’ of Wagner (its propaganda fueled mythos) and the actual enterprise (the hundreds of companies and their activities supporting it) are discussed and analyzed. The author is the director of the Conflict Affected States Program at C4ADS, a Washington, DC non-profit policy institute and has been studying the Wagner Group since its inception in 2014, providing an excellent depth of expertise.

Candace Rondeaux and Ben Dalton, “The Wagner Group’s Little Black Book: Decoding Command and Control of Russia’s Irregular Forces.” New America. 17 October 2024, pp. 1-36.

Annotation: Analyzing leaked records by means of document review and metadata and network analysis—including Prigozhin’s digital ‘phone book’ and 2012-2022 personal calendar—this article breaks open the tightly held ‘back office’ operations of the Wagner Group. Through statistical regression on key variables and with the help of AI, the authors uncover previously concealed relationships between core players in Wagner (esp. Prigozhin, Troshev, and Utkin) to reveal a structure which, while seemingly decentralized, can be unraveled through shell companies to reveal tight networking with central nodes of the Russian state. While preliminary in nature, the research offers further direction in holding accountable individuals in the PMC and the Russian government for atrocities committed over the course of Wagner’s tenure.

Candace Rondeaux, Putin’s Sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Collapse into Mercenary Chaos. New York: PublicAffairs, 2025, pp, 1-464.

Annotation: This forthcoming and much anticipated work by a recognized subject matter expert (SME) on the Wagner Group is derived from the multiyear study—Decoding the Wagner Group Shadow Network—undertaken by Future Frontlines, New America’s public intelligence service which the author directs. The work chronicles the history and activities of this Russian PMC, the interactions between the major personalities involved—Yevgeny Prigozhin (the leader of the Wagner Group) and Vladimir Putin (the autocratic ruler of Russia and Prigozhin’s patron), explains why the group (and similar PMCs) have developed, and assesses their likely future relationship to and utilization by the Russian state.

Architects of Terror: The Wagner Group’s Blueprint for State Capture in the Central African Republic. Washington, DC: The Sentry, June 2023, pp. 1-75.

Annotation: This detailed independent investigative report relates how the Russian-backed PMC Wagner Group was, over a 5-year period, able to infiltrate all levels of the state system in the CAR, expanding Russia’s sphere of influence while enriching Wagner through exploitation of the country’s gold and diamond mining operations. It offers evidence that, under the pretense of supporting President Touadera against a mounting insurgency, the group along with CAR forces systematically engaged in campaigns of terror and ethnic cleansing against civilian populations. It concludes with policy recommendations for countering Wagner’s regional aspirations.

Ladd Serwart, Héni Nsaibia, and Nichita Gurcov, TMoving Out of the Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations Around the World. Grafton: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 2023, pp. 1-46.

Joseph Siegle, “Russia’s Use of Private Military Contractors.” Washington, DC: Hearing on “Russia’s Use of Private Military Contractors, US House of Representatives, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, 15 September 2022, pp. 1-10.

Annotation: This congressional testimony documents the positioning of the Wagner Group PMC in African states as of September 2022—encompassing CAR, Mali, and Chad with 6-10 other regimes in process—as a deliberate part of Russian strategic objectives in the region. These objectives included influence along the S. Mediterranean and Red Sea maritime transport corridors, displacement of Western influence, and undermining a rules-based international order. Their entry to these nations, as in Syria, was propping up autocratic rulers, in turn creating long-term instability and a need for ongoing involvement by Wagner (Russia). Rather than facing off with Wagner directly, Siegle suggests the US might best mitigate these outcomes by strengthening its own broader security and economic engagement in the region, supporting democratic leadership, sanctioning Russia, and working toward international prohibitions on mercenary groups.

Julia Smirnova and Francesca Visser, “Content glorifying the Wagner Group circulating on Meta platforms.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). 16 August 2023, pp. 1-22.

Annotation: A study was conducted by the ISD out of London which identified one-hundred and fourteen Facebook and Instagram accounts posting in thirteen languages which glorified the Wagner Group on these Meta platforms. The data—much of which contained Wagner Group recruitment content such as videos and recruitment posters—was analyzed using the Method52 social media analysis tool. Numerous screen shots of website content and imagery are provided in these research findings. Large numbers of followers—over 136K for three Facebook pages alone—were noted along with many posts and one video having over 712K views. Concerns over Meta not mitigating these Wagner accounts were voiced in this research.

Julia Stanyard, Thierry Vircoulon, and Julian Rademeyer, The Grey Zone: Russia’s military, mercenary and criminal engagement in Africa. Research Report. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), February 2023, pp. 1-92.

Annotation: This pre-Prigozhin mutiny report focuses on the Wagner Groups’ activities in Africa produced by a counter-transnational organized crime (C-TOC) think tank situated in Geneva. The major component of the report discusses Wagner’s strategy, Wagner and Russian organized crime, Russian business and political interests, and Wagner operations (as case studies) in Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Mozambique, Libya, Mali, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Kenya, and Cameroon. Report conclusions and seven bulleted (•) recommendations to mitigate Wagner and Russian criminal activities are also provided. Useful information on the evolution of Russian organized crime and sanctioned businesses and individuals in Africa as well as a number of maps and figures are provided in the report.

Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond.” Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 18 December 2019, pp. 1-34.

Annotation: This early article focuses on the Russian private military company (PMC) experience in Syria, beginning with the Slavonic Corps which predated the Wagner Group by a couple of years yet later formed its nucleus as it emerged in Russia and was initially deployed to Ukraine. The piece goes on to discuss the Wagner Group’s redeployment to Syria in support of the al Asad regime with key personnel, training techniques, C2, payment policies, recruitment, logistics, and ownership information provided. Syria is viewed as a training ground for Russian PMCs and portrays the iron triangle that has developed between the military, government, and oligarchs which has allowed the state to both engage in power politics and extract resources in its overseas military-economic contracts.

Russia in Africa: The Wagner Group, Russia-Africa Summit and Beyond. Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 19 July 2023, 1:15 Minute Video.

Annotation: This United States Institute of Peace event focused on the growing expansion of Russian influence in Africa. In addition to a focus on Wagner Group activities in Africa, the gathering also highlighted the political context surrounding them and what may transpire from the then upcoming Russia-Africa Summit held 27-28 July 2023 in St. Petersburg, Russia. The speakers at the USIP event were Joseph Siegle, Amaka Anku, and Catrina Doxsee with Thomas Sheehy serving as the moderator. One very useful component of the activity was being provided with an African perspective related to the subject.

Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022–24. RUSI Special Report. London: Royal United Services Institute, February 2024, pp. 1-38.

Annotation: The report focuses on three components of Russian unconventional warfare taking place during 2022-2024 outside of the Ukrainian theater of operations. These are GRU special forces training and recruitment restructuring and its ability to better infiltrate them into Europe, the use of Russia’s Muslim minority in Europe and the Middle East—spearheaded by the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov—for the subversion of Western interests, and the activities related to the Wagner Corps. The latter’s evolution, reorganization into the Expeditionary (Africa) Corps, and its relationship to the Kremlin’s strategy of expanding a network of relationships in Africa is discussed and analyzed.

Owen Wilson, The Wagner Group: Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Mercenaries and Their Ties to Vladimir Putin. London: Gibson Square, 2024, pp. 1-256.

Annotation: This journalistic work sets out to elaborate Yevgeny Prigozhin’s role as leader of the Wagner group and, more pointedly, as the non-acknowledged ‘business partner’ of Russian President Putin. It offers a readable overview of the Wagner Group’s origins in 2014, its support of Russian designs on oil and mineral resources in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, and its subsequent operations until Prigozhin’s death in 2023. It portrays the brutality of a group—and its leader—increasingly losing respectability in Russia as its losses in Ukraine forced it to turn to mass unvetted recruiting of civilians and prisoners, to be primarily cannon fodder in an undersupplied war against an underestimated opponent.

About The Authors

Pamela Ligouri Bunker
Pamela Ligouri Bunker is a managing partner, senior analyst, and majority shareholder of C/O Futures, LLC. She is a researcher and analyst specializing in international security and terrorism with an emphasis on narrative analysis. She is a former senior officer of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation with professional experience in research and program coordination in university, non-governmental organization (NGO), and local government settings. She holds undergraduate degrees in anthropology-geography and social sciences from California State Polytechnic University Pomona, an M.A. in public policy from the Claremont Graduate University, and an M.Litt. in terrorism studies from the University of Saint Andrews, Scotland. She is co-author/co-editor of five books, including Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies: Dark Renaissance (Routledge, 2015), and has many other refereed and professional publications. She can be reached at pligouribunker@cofutures.net.
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Lisa Campbell
Lisa J. Campbell is a California Air National Guard Officer (Retired) with past positions including Senior Intelligence Officer, Red Team Analyst (AFRICOM), and Intelligence Operations Specialist. Subject matter expertise includes all-source intelligence analysis with a focus on threat identification and mitigation for domestic and overseas military operations as well as the development & implementation of war-gaming scenarios. She holds an MBA from the University of La Verne, BS in Geology from Cornell College, and attended the Air Command and Staff College (Distance Program). Publications include professional and academic works related to threat groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, the Wagner Group, and the Mexican cartels.
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Robert Bunker
Dr. Robert J. Bunker is Director of Research and Analysis, C/O Futures, LLC, a Research Fellow with the Future Security Initiative (FSI), Arizona State University, and an Instructor at the Safe Communities Institute (SCI) at the University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy. He holds university degrees in political science, government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history and has undertaken hundreds of hours of counterterrorism training. Past professional associations include Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College and Futurist in Residence, Training and Development Division, Behavioral Science Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico. Dr. Bunker has well over 700 publications—including about 50 books as co-author, editor, and co-editor.

12. US must harden Indo-Pacific bases against drone attacks, think tank says

Harden, yes. But also - Air (drone) and missile defense, yes. Mobility (multiple dispersed locations), yes. Cyber defense, yes. Deception, yes.

US must harden Indo-Pacific bases against drone attacks, think tank says

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · June 6, 2025

U.S. and Japanese service members work together to repair airfield damage during a Keen Sword drill at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, on Oct. 24, 2024. (Jessi Stegall/U.S. Marine Corps)

The U.S. Air Force needs to do more to protect its Indo-Pacific bases, including from evolving threats such as drones, according to a California-based think tank.

The Rand Corp. report — Assessing Progress on Air Base Defense — was released Tuesday and highlights the growing vulnerability of U.S. military installations to low-cost, remote-controlled and autonomous drones, a tactic that has gained prominence in the war in Ukraine.

“It is at the lower end of the capability spectrum that threats may be evolving the most quickly,” the report warns. “Recent experiences in the Russia-Ukraine war are highlighting the threat of small remote control and autonomous drones to air bases, particularly to soft buildings and aircraft parked in the open.”

The report follows a recent Ukrainian drone strike that reportedly damaged or destroyed a portion of Russia’s long-range bomber fleet, raising alarms about the susceptibility of U.S. air assets to similar attacks.

“Russian air base defenders do not appear ready to protect their air bases against the small drones that are destroying their aircraft,” Rand’s report states without referencing the June 1 strike. “To avoid a similar fate on a much larger scale, the U.S. Air Force should conduct a serious cost benefit analysis of fielding its own active defense capabilities, ones that are tailored for air base defense in Pacific and European threat environments.”

While major adversaries like China pose a high-end threat with ballistic and hypersonic weapons, Rand warns that even less capable adversaries could deploy large numbers of drones to autonomously seek and destroy soft targets such as aircraft, fuel depots and control towers.

“China has also demonstrated the use of drone swarms,” the report states. “Its industrial capacity, experience in mass production of drones, and wide-ranging use of machine learning could quickly make it the preeminent producer and user of such systems.”

The report outlines a spectrum of potential threats to U.S. air bases, from hobbyist quadcopters to hypersonic boost-glide missiles.

While the Army leads efforts to counter unmanned aerial systems and has fielded some short-range air-defense systems, Rand emphasized that gaps remain, particularly against smaller drones.

Ongoing projects include the development of directed energy weapons such as lasers to target drones, but the report concludes that passive defense measures remain the most cost-effective option for improving air base resilience.

These measures include hardened shelters, camouflage, decoys, asset dispersal, redundant fuel supplies, runway repair capabilities and blast-resistant construction.

“A combination of both active and passive defense measures is understood to be critical for defending air bases during conflict,” the report states. However, “passive defenses, such as fuel bladders, runway repair, and aircraft shelters have generally been seen as the most cost-effective investment.”

The report recommends increased investment in both active and passive air base defense systems and urges the Defense Department to prioritize passive infrastructure improvements.

It also encourages Pacific Air Forces to work with regional partners and allies to boost installation resilience.

“The potential air base resources in northern Australia could prove critical to resiliency efforts in a potential U.S. war with China,” the report states.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · June 6, 2025

13. Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe

Excerpts:

But the implications of Operation Spider Web go far beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict by undermining the old idea that rear areas are safe. Comparatively inexpensive drones, launched from inside Russia’s own territory, wiped out aircraft that cost billions and underpin Moscow’s long-range strike and nuclear signaling. That’s a strategy than can be easily replicated by other attackers against other countries.

Anyone who can smuggle, hide and pilot small drones can sabotage an adversary’s ability to generate air attacks.

Air forces that rely on large, fixed bases must either harden, disperse or accept that their runway is a new front line.

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web destroyed more than aircraft – it tore apart the old idea that bases far behind the front lines are safe

theconversation.com · by Benjamin Jensen

A series of blasts at airbases deep inside Russia on June 1, 2025, came as a rude awakening to Moscow’s military strategists. The Ukrainian strike at the heart Russia’s strategic bombing capability could also upend the traditional rules of war: It provides smaller military a blueprint for countering a larger nation’s ability to launch airstrikes from deep behind the front lines.

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web involved 117 remote-controlled drones that were smuggled into Russia over an 18-month period and launched toward parked aircraft by operators miles away.

The raid destroyed or degraded more than 40 Tu-95, Tu-160 and Tu-22 M3 strategic bombers, as well as an A-50 airborne-early-warning jet, according to officials in Kyiv. That would represent roughly one-third of Russia’s long-range strike fleet and about US$7 billion in hardware. Even if satellite imagery ultimately pares back those numbers, the scale of the damage is hard to miss.

The logic behind the strike is even harder to ignore.

Traditional modern military campaigns revolve around depth. Warring nations try to build combat power in relatively safe “rear areas” — logistics hubs that are often hundreds if not thousands of miles from the front line. These are the places where new military units form and long-range bombers, like those destroyed in Ukraine’s June 1 operation, reside.

Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has leaned heavily on its deep-rear bomber bases — some over 2,000 miles from the front in Ukraine. It has paired this tactic with launching waves of Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones to keep Ukrainian cities under nightly threat.

The Russian theory of victory is brutally simple: coercive airpower. If missiles and one-way drones fall on Kyiv often enough, civilian morale in Ukraine will crack, even as the advance of Russian ground forces get bogged down on the front line.

For Kyiv’s military planners, destroying launch platforms undercuts that theory far more cheaply than the only other alternative: intercepting every cruise missile in flight, which to date has achieved an 80% success rate but relies heavily on Western-donated equipment coming increasingly in short supply.

Airfield vulnerability

Airfields have always been critical targets in modern warfare, the logic being that grounded bombers and fighters are more vulnerable and easier to hit.

In the North African desert during World War II, the United Kingdom’s Special Air Service used jeep raids and delayed-action explosives to knock out an estimated 367 enemy aircraft spread across North Africa — firepower the Luftwaffe never regenerated. That same year, German paratroopers seized the airstrips on Crete, denying the British Royal Air Force a forward base and tipping an entire island campaign.

A generation later in Vietnam, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army assault teams armed with satchel charges and mortars repeatedly penetrated U.S. perimeters at Phan Rang, Da Nang and Bien Hoa, burning fighters on the ramp and forcing the diversion of thousands of American soldiers to base security.

The underlying playbook of hitting aircraft on the ground remains effective because it imposes cascading costs. Every runway cratered and every bomber torched obliges the military hit to pour money into ways to frustrate such attacks, be it hardened shelters or the dispersal of squadrons across multiple bases. Such air attacks also divert fighters from the front lines to serve as guards.

U.S. soldiers look at wreckage of an Air Force B-57 Canberra bomber after Viet Cong mortars destroyed 21 planes at Bien Hoa airbase in 1964. AP Photo

A new age of drone warfare

In Operation Spider Web, Ukraine has sought to repeat that strategy while also leveraging surprise to achieve psychological shock and dislocation.

But the Ukraine operation taps into a uniquely 21st-century aspect of warfare.

The advent of unmanned drone warfare has increasingly seen military practitioners talk of “air littorals” — military speak for the slice of atmosphere that sits above ground forces yet below the altitude where high-performance fighters and bombers traditionally roam.

Drones thrive in this region, where they bypass most infantry weapons and fly too low for traditional radar-guided defenses to track reliably, despite being able to incapacitate targets like fuel trucks or strategic bombers.

By smuggling small launch teams of drones within a few miles of each runway, Kyiv created pop-up launchpads deep into Russia and were able to catch the enemy off guard and unprepared.

The economic benefits of Ukraine’s approach are stark. Whereas a drone, a lithium-battery and a warhead cost well under $3,000, a Russian Tu-160 bomber costs in the region of $250 million.

The impact on Russia

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web will have immediate and costly consequences for Russia, even if the strikes end up being less destructive than Kyiv currently claims.

Surviving bombers will need to be relocated. Protecting bases from repeat attacks will mean erecting earthen revetments, installing radar-guided 30 mm cannons and electronic-warfare jammers to cover possible attack vectors. This all costs money. Even more importantly, the operation will divert trained soldiers and technicians who might otherwise rotate to the front line in support of the coming summer offensive.

Russian MiG-31bm fighter jets, a Tu-160 strategic bomber and an Il-78 aerial refueling tanker fly over Moscow during a rehearsal for the WWII Victory Parade on May 4, 2022. Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty Images

The raid also punches a hole in Russia’s nuclear weapons capabilities.

Losing as many as a dozen Tu-95 and Tu-160 aircraft, which double as nuclear-capable bombers, would be strategically embarrassing and may prod the Kremlin to rethink the frequency of long-range air patrols.

Beyond the physical and financial damage to Russia’s fleet, Ukraine’s operation also comes with a potent psychological effect. It signals that Ukraine, more than three years into a war aimed at grinding down morale, is able to launch sophisticated operations deep into Russian territory.

Ukraine’s security service operation unfolded in patient, granular steps: 18 months of smuggling disassembled drones and batteries across borders inside innocuous cargo, weeks of quietly reassembling kits, and meticulous scouting of camera angles to ensure that launch trucks would be indistinguishable from normal warehouse traffic on commercial satellite imagery.

Operators drove those trucks to presurveyed firing points and then deployed the drones at treetop height.

Because each of the drones was a one-way weapon, a dozen pilots could work in parallel either close to the launch site or remotely, steering live-video feeds toward parked bombers. Videos of the strike suggest multiple near-simultaneous impacts across wide swaths of runway — enough to swamp any ad hoc small-arms response from perimeter guards.

A new front line?

For Ukraine, the episode demonstrates a repeatable method for striking deep, well-defended assets. The same playbook can, in principle, be adapted to missile storage depots and, more importantly, factories across Russia mass-producing Shahed attack drones.

Kyiv has needed to find a way to counter the waves of drones and ballistic missile strikes that in recent months have produced more damage than Russian cruise missiles. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Firepower Strike Tracker has shown that Shaheds are now the most frequent and most cost-effective air weapon in Russia’s campaign.

But the implications of Operation Spider Web go far beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict by undermining the old idea that rear areas are safe. Comparatively inexpensive drones, launched from inside Russia’s own territory, wiped out aircraft that cost billions and underpin Moscow’s long-range strike and nuclear signaling. That’s a strategy than can be easily replicated by other attackers against other countries.

Anyone who can smuggle, hide and pilot small drones can sabotage an adversary’s ability to generate air attacks.

Air forces that rely on large, fixed bases must either harden, disperse or accept that their runway is a new front line.

Author

Benjamin Jensen

Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting; Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International Service

theconversation.com · by Benjamin Jensen

14. Vets hope thousands will rally against VA cuts in nationwide protests

A Time For Prayer

"In times of war and not before,

God and the soldier we adore.

But in times of peace and all things righted,

God is forgotten and the soldier slighted."

-Rudyard Kipling”

― Rudyard Kipling

Vets hope thousands will rally against VA cuts in nationwide protests

Punk rockers and activist band Dropkick Murphys will play at a Washington D.C. rally amid dozens, and perhap hundreds, of gatherings nationally to protest cuts to VA staffing.

Nicholas Slayton

Published Jun 5, 2025 6:16 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton

Veterans organizations will hold a day of protests in various cities and at Department of Veterans Affairs facilities around the country on Friday, June 6, headlined by a rally in Washington, D.C. that will feature the punk and activist band Dropkick Murphys.

The protests, say organizers of the D.C. event, are aimed at speaking out against expected staffing cuts to the VA, which they say will greatly impact care for veterans.

“We want to have a big tent for this. Veterans Affairs affects more than 14 million American veterans, of every political stripe and from every socio-economic background,” Joe Plenzler, a Marine veteran, told Task & Purpose. Plenzler has previously written opinion essays for Task & Purpose about veteran issues.

Along with the Washington, D.C. rally, online organizers have plans for over 200 other events at VA facilities in nearly every state, coinciding with the 81st anniversary of D-Day and the invasion of Normandy.

Organizers of the D.C. event, dubbed the Unite for Veterans rally, say they expect several thousand people to turn out on the National Mall for the 2 p.m. event. Plenzler, one of the event’s organizers, told Task & Purpose the rally will feature several prominent veterans as speakers, including Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), former Congressman Adam Kinzinger, Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America CEO Kyleanne Hunter, and Shawn Vandiver, founder of AfghanEvac, a non-profit that works to resettle Afghans in the United States.

The organizers acknowledged that the millions of veterans in the United States can have disparate political views, but one unifying aspect behind the rally is a demand that VA care and services not be diminished.

“We want to have a big tent for this. Veterans Affairs affects more than 14 million American veterans, of every political stripe and from every socio-economic background,” Plenzler said.

Plenzler said that the prospect of severe staffing cuts could both reduce care and also cost many vets their jobs, since a third of all federal employees are veterans.

“If you go into the VA, upwards of 25% of their employees are veterans. It’s veterans caring for veterans,” he said.

For its part, the VA has repeatedly claimed that personnel cuts won’t impact care.

In a statement to Task & Purpose, VA Press Secretary Peter Kasperowicz said that “anyone who says VA is cutting health care and benefits is not being honest. In fact, VA is expanding health care and benefits.”

The proposed cuts, first reported by the Associated Press, would amount to a 15% reduction of the department’s workforce. VA Secretary Douglas Collins described the number as a “goal” rather than a fixed plan last month.

Kasperowicz also accused rally organizers of opposing necessary reforms on political grounds.

“Imagine how much better off veterans would be if this union-led group cared as much about fixing the department as it does about protecting VA’s broken bureaucracy,” Kasperowicz said.

Sen. Duckworth, in a statement to Task & Purpose, said that she was outraged at the administration’s policies towards veterans.

“Donald Trump has fired more veterans than any president in modern history, and by gutting the VA he is hurting our veterans’ access to the quality health care and other benefits they’ve earned through their service,” she said.

Dusty Gannon, an Army officer who served in Afghanistan as a platoon leader, said he was planning on going to the rally because he sees a disconnect between how veterans in the U.S. are venerated and how they’re cared for.

“We have this whole [generation] of veterans who fought in all of these conflicts who are all coming home, and the government is failing us,” he said. “They’ve just left us high and dry.”

Gannon said he hopes the rally will be a chance to meet and spend time with fellow veterans who understand the “gravity of the experience,” he said.

Nationally, organizers are tracking the times and locations of rallies on a central online spreadsheet.

The latest on Task & Purpose

Navy SEAL Team 6 operator will be the military’s new top enlisted leader
Veterans receiving disability payments might have been underpaid, IG finds
Guam barracks conditions are ‘baffling,’ Navy admiral says in email
Navy fires admiral in charge of unmanned systems office after investigation
The Pentagon wants troops to change duty stations less often

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Nicholas Slayton

Contributing Editor

Nicholas Slayton is a Contributing Editor for Task & Purpose. In addition to covering breaking news, he writes about history, shipwrecks, and the military’s hunt for unidentified anomalous phenomenon (formerly known as UFOs).

History

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton

15. 'No human hands': NGA circulates AI-generated intel, director says

We know AI makes up sources. (Just ask RFK, Jr).

'No human hands': NGA circulates AI-generated intel, director says - Breaking Defense

NGA puts a "template" on the products that "literally acknowledges … what you are looking at has not been touched by human hands,” said Director Frank Whitworth. “It's important [for] combat commanders and the Secretary and the President that they have that knowledge.”

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · June 5, 2025

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Director Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth spoke at the DoDIIS Worldwide Conference, Dec. 13, 2022, at the Henry B. Gonzales Convention Center in Texas.

WASHINGTON — The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is using artificial intelligence so routinely that it’s now created a standardized disclosure to go on AI-generated intel products, according to the agency’s director.

“We actually have now adopted a living, breathing template, a real piece of art, that goes around every [AI-generated intelligence] product, and it says these words, ‘machine-generated GEOINT,’” Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth, a career naval intelligence officer, told the third annual Ash Carter Exchange and AI+ Expo hosted by the nonpartisan Strategic Competitive Studies Project on Tuesday. (GEOINT refers to geospatial intelligence.)

“No human hands actually participate in that particular template and that particular dissemination,” he said. “That’s new, that’s new and different.”

Whitworth suggested that NGA was the first agency among the 18 official members of US Intelligence Community to apply such a warning label on a routine basis — and that such AI-generated intelligence products are now being circulated at the highest levels of the US government.

“I think it’s significant that you now have an entity within the IC that is putting out a template that literally acknowledges, for the purposes of our readership, what you are looking at has not been touched by human hands, okay, that this is 100 percent machine-generated,” he said. “It’s important [for] those combat commanders and the secretary [of defense] and the president that they have that knowledge, so that they can assess and possibly ask additional questions, and that they know also the risk continuum that we’re all operating under.”

While an NGA spokesperson told Breaking Defense they were not able to make public an image of the template or the full text of the disclosures, Whitworth did offer some details. Significantly, NGA isn’t using a single generic stamp on all AI-generated products, but rather a system that tells the reader the type and level of AI involvement. (In everyday terms, it sounds less like an FDA warning label and more like the detailed nutritional information on the side of a package).

“It actually has a matrix as to whether it was the dissemination that was machine generated or it was the exploitation of the image itself,” Whitworth said.

This detailed disclosure is itself machine-generated based on the specifics of the product, the NGA spokesperson told Breaking Defense. “They’re auto-generated based on included information,” the official explained. “This unique product annotation allows consumers to quickly understand the role machines play in intelligence products.”

As striking as this development is, it is an evolutionary moment rather than a revolutionary one, with almost a decade of backstory. As the Global War on Terror ground on and surveillance technology grew ubiquitous, military intelligence began to drown in data, in the form of drone videos, satellite photos, recordings of intercepted communications, and other sources that it had too few humans to look at or listen to. And NGA, with its vast archives of geo-located data covering most of the surface of the planet, has more data than any other agency, Whitworth said.

“That’s a lot of data, more data than any other agency, certainly in the IC and possibly within DoD or even larger,” he said. “So we need some help.”

So the Pentagon pushed to harness then-novel machine-learning technologies to do a first pass and help the humans prioritize. In 2017, then-Deputy Secretary Bob Work created an Algorithmic Warfare Task Force, whose Project Maven AI saw operational use by early the following year. Maven, in turn, was so successful that it gave rise to two different AI toolkits, both in high demand across the military: one for a secure sharing of all kinds of military data, called Maven Smart System — which is run by the Pentagon Chief Data & AI Office —and one specifically for AI analysis of imagery and video — which is run by NGA and known as NGA Maven.

Keeping up with demand for Maven has been a major challenge for NGA, Whitworth said last year. Meanwhile, the agency continues to add new capabilities to Maven and explore other AI tools, some provided by commercial vendors and others uniquely military.

It’s still a step further to allow AI to generate a final product that gets shared outside the agency.

“We’re not fearful about whether it replaces people’s jobs,” Whitworth said. “We’re willing to take the help that AI/ML provides.”

But the AI itself needs human help, he emphasized, not only to double-check its final output but to help train it for what to look for in the first place.

“Humans are going to be so important as coaches and mentors to these models,” Whitworth said. “I sign letters of appreciation for people, in some cases, who have served more than 40 years, who have, I’m just going to say, wisdom. They have a certain intuitive approach to what they do. … Who better than those people, with all that experience, to continually refine these models?”

What’s crucial, the admiral argued, is “humility” about the limitations of both humans and machines.

“I’ve been really thinking about the word humility in two ways,” Whitworth said. “One is the humility as humans to accept that it’s getting so big, that the data is getting so enormous, that we do need to accept some help when it comes to AI. And then there’s also a little bit of AI humility, where when you have a situation like targeting, like warning, like the safety of navigation, you may actually need the model to be humble enough to accept that a human needs to double check.”

16. Embrace Poland and the Baltic States for Embracing Anti-Personnel Mines

Excerpts:

A Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland would create immense suffering and present catastrophic risks of escalation. Anything that reduces the likelihood of such an attack thus presents a clear and present benefit, in humanitarian terms. Moreover, if one wishes to take an “all things considered” approach to (dis)armament, the Baltic states and Poland signaling their readiness to develop, acquire, and deploy anti-personnel mines may actually be a good thing.

By making clear to Moscow that further aggression will meet stiff and persistent resistance and making effective resistance a credible scenario, Russian aggression may be deterred (at least partially). Moreover, the more the Baltic states and Poland can offset their defensive efforts to minefields and rapidly deployable mining systems, the less they may need to fall back on military buildup in other areas. This means that mines may actually allow for lowering armament efforts in other areas. To be sure, none of this is guaranteed — but adding another option to the Baltic states’ and Poland’s security efforts lowers the likelihood of war, which is certainly a good thing.

Embrace Poland and the Baltic States for Embracing Anti-Personnel Mines – War on the Rocks

Nathan Wood

warontherocks.com · June 6, 2025

Anti-personnel mines are widely reviled, especially in the humanitarian community, but there are certain places in which they could be used to prevent war in the first place. The eastern edge of Europe is one of those places.

On March 18, the defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland recommended the withdrawal of their states from the Ottawa Convention, which bans anti-personnel landmines. It is unclear whether there are plans to immediately begin stockpiling mines or if the statement is intended only to showcase that these states will retain all possible options for deterring and, if necessary, defending against Russian aggression. In any case, Latvia has been the first-mover, with its parliament voting to follow through on the recommendation.

The types of systems the Baltic states and Poland would be likely to acquire and deploy would also align with international humanitarian law and strategically offset manpower deficiencies, ultimately lowering the risk of a regional and general war, as well as the pressures for a larger arms race. To be sure, some will lament that states are pulling back from arms control treaties. Worries surrounding the potential harm to civilians, the degradation of arms treaties globally, or the proliferation of previously limited weapons are all sure to be raised in the coming months. However, pulling back from the Ottawa Convention and opening the possibility for stockpiling (and potentially deploying) anti-personnel mines are actions driven by a legitimate need to provide security and reduce the risk of war.

BECOME A MEMBER

Plausible Anti-Personnel Mine Systems and Deployments

If we wish to speculate on the types of anti-personnel mines the Baltic states and Poland may acquire, it is worthwhile to state at the outset and clearly that this is speculation. That being said, speculation may be grounded in common sense as well as an understanding of the tactical, operational, and strategic realities for these countries. For the Baltics and Poland, anti-personnel mines would fill a manpower gap in a future war with Russia (especially in the case of the greatly outnumbered Baltic states) and serve as area denial weapons.

The Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish ministers of defense also clearly stated that they “will remain committed to international humanitarian law, including the protections of civilians during an armed conflict,” which provides further information on what sorts of systems might be used and how. In particular, all of these states are signatories to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. These treaties set clear bounds on how wars may be fought and what weapons may be used. Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons deals explicitly with mines and booby traps, clearly stating what precautions must be taken when laying minefields or deploying remotely-delivered mines.

If one pays heed to the defense realities of the Baltic states and Poland and takes the defense ministers’ words seriously, one can deduce that anti-personnel mines would be deployed in two distinct manners and locations. In aiming to maximize security gains while doing all that is possible to protect civilians, these states would opt for a mixture of minefields laid inside their own territories in border areas they cannot as effectively monitor or defend, and retain a stock of rapidly deployable mines for tactical use in the event of a Russian invasion. For the former deployment context, those mines would be laid in clearly marked minefields in areas controlled by these states. It would therefore be these states’ responsibility to maintain and safeguard such minefields. Given that mines laid in open terrain are also apt to degrade and to create grave risks to civilians, then these minefields would not be left for long durations, but rather deployed in response to a perceived imminent threat. This would present the lowest risk of minefields becoming compromised by weather and wear, and minimize potential risks to civilians in the vicinity. Moreover, as such minefields would be laid in their own territory, states utilizing anti-personnel mines for this purpose would be maximally compliant and conscientious in how these weapons are used.

Of greater worry are rapidly deployable mines to be used during potential combat operations which might be employed in enemy territory. However, the systems the Baltic states or Poland are most likely to acquire or develop would be those akin to the American-made Area Denial Artillery Munition. The Area Denial Artillery Munition is a 155mm artillery projectile which can carry 36 mines of type M67 or M72. In keeping with international law, both mine variants are self-destructing, with self-destruction of activated mines occurring 4 or 48 hours after activation. With such short activation windows, these mines would allow the Baltic states or Poland to quickly close gaps in their lines, interdict Russian advances, or otherwise control their border, while also not imposing any long-term or significant added risk to civilians; because said mines would only be fired into or ahead of advancing Russian forces, any civilians present would already be at extremely grave risk due to their proximity to the enemy. It is also worth clearly stating that the laying of mines in clearly marked and maintained minefields and the use of self-destructing/self-deactivating mines in the event of remote deployment are both governed by tenets of international law, laws to which the Baltic states and Poland are signatories. The Amended Protocol II of The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – a treaty governing the potential use of incendiary weapons, mines, and other conventional weapons – sets clear guidelines and restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines, and all states in question have signed and ratified this agreement.

Humanitarian Risks and Effective Deterrence

If the Baltic states and Poland proceed to develop, acquire, and deploy anti-personnel mines under the restrictions of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, it would not present a significant or grave increase in risk to civilians either in these states or in Russia/Belarus. More than this, anti-personnel mines allow these states to bolster their defensive capacity and offset one of their most significant military shortfalls: manpower. By utilizing fixed minefields and rapidly deployable mining systems like the Area Denial Artillery Munition, the Baltic states and Poland would credibly undermine the prospect of a successful Russian incursion which would not be also massively casualty-intensive for Russia. This itself presents a serious humanitarian upside.

A Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland would create immense suffering and present catastrophic risks of escalation. Anything that reduces the likelihood of such an attack thus presents a clear and present benefit, in humanitarian terms. Moreover, if one wishes to take an “all things considered” approach to (dis)armament, the Baltic states and Poland signaling their readiness to develop, acquire, and deploy anti-personnel mines may actually be a good thing.

By making clear to Moscow that further aggression will meet stiff and persistent resistance and making effective resistance a credible scenario, Russian aggression may be deterred (at least partially). Moreover, the more the Baltic states and Poland can offset their defensive efforts to minefields and rapidly deployable mining systems, the less they may need to fall back on military buildup in other areas. This means that mines may actually allow for lowering armament efforts in other areas. To be sure, none of this is guaranteed — but adding another option to the Baltic states’ and Poland’s security efforts lowers the likelihood of war, which is certainly a good thing.

BECOME A MEMBER

Nathan Wood is currently leading the project “Military Defense Technologies and Ethics,” supported by the German Aerospace Center and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. He is also an external fellow of the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo, and an associate member of the Centre for Environmental and Technology Ethics – Prague. He has published in numerous scientific and popular journals.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of his institutions or funding agencies.

Image: Saeima via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · June 6, 2025

17. DoD 3.0: Rebooting the Pentagon for the Next War

"Kill the map."

Excerpts:

Our five suggested reforms are not radical—they are overdue and must be enacted by Congress.

1. Kill the Map: Rewriting the Unified Command Plan

2. Weaponize the Economy: Expand DoD’s Gray Zone Arsenal

3. Fix Arms Sales: Move Fast or Lose Allies

4. Underwrite Jointness: Operationalize the Budget

5. Service Roles Reimagined: Adapt or Fade

DoD 3.0: Rebooting the Pentagon for the Next War - Modern War Institute

Jahara Matisek and James Micciche | 06.06.25

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jahara Matisek · June 6, 2025

Twice in the last century, Congress has rewritten the rules for how America organizes its military. Each overhaul unlocked leaps in US combat power. In 1947, the National Security Act dissolved the War and Navy Departments to create the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, and National Security Council. It was the first time America intentionally organized itself to manage a large, globally deployed peacetime military. That was DoD 1.0. (Later, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 addressed deficiencies of the previous plan and growing interservice rivalries by empowering the secretary of defense, setting a DoD 1.5.)

American military struggles in Iran and Grenada led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. This ushered in DoD 2.0, with modernized military commands that empowered the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, codified jointness, and established the combatant command structure that still shapes how the US military operates today. This reorganization improved unity of effort across services, making global postures more coherent.

Four decades later, the seams in that system are showing. Global threats no longer fit neatly within geographic boundaries. Adversaries move faster, coordinate better, and exploit exposed institutional gaps. At the same time, more global taskings with less forces and increasingly outdated bureaucratic models are straining force readiness and regional postures. More risk is carried, and yet, the Pentagon is using last century’s tools and policies to compete.

Congress must intervene to enable a third transformation: DoD 3.0. This reform would revolutionize how the legislature equips, organizes, authorizes, and funds the US military to better manage strategic competition, improve deterrence, and fight and win.

Why Change Is Needed

Governments and their militaries are struggling with the information revolution, as they try to break away from industrial age systems and institutions. The digital age is producing significant changes in societies, as well as the ways and means in which warfare is waged. Yet the Pentagon’s structure, authorities, and conceptual tool kit remain frozen in a Cold War mold—built for regional conflicts, linear escalation, conventional force-on-force fights, and prolonged procurement and modernization time horizons. Industrial age warfighting is three decades removed from relevance, and trying to organize, train, and equip a military for that era is like charging horse cavalry against an Abrams tank.

The global operating environment in 2025 is unlike anything the United States has faced, characterized by transregional adversaries, hybrid threats, and a convergence of nuclear, cyber, space, and conventional capabilities that threaten core interests. Digital technologies have “weaponized everything,” as every citizen can become a combatant due to the internet and connectivity. Adversaries of the US-led order do not respect geographic boundaries, nor do they sequence operations into isolated phases, which still influences joint and service planning concepts. Adversaries move and coordinate across domains, often below the threshold of war, aiming to destabilize societies and sway neutral countries.

At the core of this fraying order is an informal axis of authoritarianism. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea increasingly coordinate logistically, diplomatically, economically, and technologically. Their cooperation challenges what remains of the post–Cold War order. Chinese satellites enable Russian targeting in Ukraine; Iranian drones are used by Russia against Ukrainian cities; and North Korean troops deployed alongside Russian forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast. Moreover, Russia militarizes the Arctic and deploys private military contractors across Africa for access to resources; China pursues debt-trap diplomacy in developing countries while signaling desires to retake Taiwan; and Iran trains and equips proxy forces all over the Middle East, especially the Houthis in Yemen. The United States has been unable to deter or punish these actions accordingly.

Meanwhile, US strategic means and domestic political will are contracting. America no longer enjoys unilateral freedom or generous peacetime defense budgets due to a national debt approaching $40 trillion in the next two years. Sustaining deterrence requires deep integration with allies and partners—but the American system for deterrence appears to be fraying.

Other trends amplify the need for reform. Antiaccess and area-denial weapon systems are growing more sophisticated, threatening the ability of US forces to operate. This problem is most glaring in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has weapons capable of striking targets out to three thousand kilometers, with sophisticated, space-enabled kill chains equally capable of jamming American satellites and military systems.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning are transforming warfare, yet, even with initiatives like joint all-domain command and control and AI task forces, institutional adoption remains uneven, and many decision cycles continue to prioritize traditional, human-in-the-loop processes. Nuclear modernization will stretch already strained budgets. Worse, gray zone tactics continue blurring lines between war and peace, exploiting gaps in US doctrine, titles and authorities, and political willpower.

Finally, the core challenge inside the Pentagon is not head count—it is output. Cutting billets without changing how the system works just means fewer people doing the same slow, redundant tasks. DoD 3.0 must go beyond shifting organizational charts; it needs to provide agile structures, proactive authorities, and resourced processes that foster a culture of execution. Incrementalism will not suffice when adversaries move faster, experiment more, and learn in real time.

Five Fixes that Congress Should Make

To meet this moment, the Pentagon cannot rely on cosmetic tweaks—it needs structural reform. Congress must usher in the DoD 3.0 era by reimagining how it authorizes and funds a force organized for global competition, empowered for innovation, and with clearly defined roles across services and partners.

The Unified Command Plan needs reform, eliminating geographic fiefdoms and aligning forces against global threat networks. It means giving DoD authorities and tools to compete in the economic and information domains where adversaries too often advance unchecked, to include closer interagency alignment. It means speeding up arms sales and training pipelines for allies and partners to be effective and interoperable. It means tying service budgets to joint interoperability—not parochial, stovepiped priorities. It also means rethinking service roles so that each branch plays to its strengths rather than duplicating others in search of relevance and more money.

Our five suggested reforms are not radical—they are overdue and must be enacted by Congress.

1. Kill the Map: Rewriting the Unified Command Plan

The current Unified Command Plan (UCP) divides the world like it is still 1995—into neat, geographic blocks that, due to a lack of great power threats, reward regional stovepipes and punish global integration. But modern threats play outside those boundaries. Chinese influence operations, Russian paramilitary forces, Iranian militias, North Korean weapons, and cartels all transverse various areas of responsibility in ways the bureaucratic military system is not built to track, let alone counter. Additionally, the seams created by artificially drawn boundaries become exploitable vulnerabilities and command-and-control dilemmas. For instance, three different combatant commands are responsible for the Arctic.

Addressing these deficiencies does not require scrapping the combatant command system altogether, but it means reimagining how global coordination occurs. Rather than anchoring operations in rigid geographic silos, the Pentagon should create cross-functional, transregional cells or task forces aligned to strategic problem sets—working alongside, not replacing, existing geographic combatant commands. For example, a globally scoped China Threat Integration Cell could synchronize actions across all geographic combatant commands, ensuring unified messaging, resourcing, and campaign design. These cells would augment geographic combatant command authorities by providing a dedicated layer of coordination without diminishing each commander’s core responsibilities.

An updated version of the UCP must improve how the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense can enforce or rapidly adapt global priorities, force management, and funding for specific threats in a more responsive manner than yearly guidance and mostly static budgeting processes. This would solve zero-sum funding games created by limiting oversight of transregional threats to coordinating authorities assigned to geographic organizations inherent to the current UCP while still avoiding the creation of a general staff, which is forbidden by US Code.

Congress has no say in the UCP, but must be brought in to force accountability, improve oversight, break regional fiefdoms that dilute strategic clarity, and encourage ruthless prioritization. Some may counter that Congress should not be involved in military command functions, but given its power of the purse, the UCP must justify its spending-to-threat prioritization to ensure the Pentagon is globally focused rather than perpetuating myopic regional interests. Already, the current administration of President Donald Trump is reexamining components of the UCP, meaning Congress has top cover to orchestrate reforms. We must abolish the idea that a single geographic combatant commander can own a threat that spans continents and domains.

2. Weaponize the Economy: Expand DoD’s Gray Zone Arsenal

Chinese state-owned enterprises, Belt and Road Initiative funding, and cyber-enabled coercion are reshaping regions in favor of China faster than American diplomacy can react. Worse, when pro-American countries in Africa or Southeast Asia ask for development investment, the United States usually offers workshops, symbolic funding, and token visits—while China offers a deal. If the Trump administration can follow through on funding the Lobito Corridor, in pursuit of extracting critical minerals and rare earths out of central Africa, then that might finally be a step in the right direction.

The Pentagon can fill this vacuum, especially as the State Department and other US aid agencies are defunded and dismantled. At the tactical level, US Army civil affairs personnel and theater special operations commands can be equipped and authorized for low-level economic and information warfare, augmenting interagency approaches to promote national interests. In fact, Army civil affairs has a historical track record of success in politically sensitive regions—and it can contribute again, especially when synchronized to enhance non-DoD activities and investments. Additionally, unlike the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where counterinsurgency doctrine often reduced the visibility of US forces’ role, having uniformed Americans, wearing the flag, aiding neutral or unaligned nations is useful for achieving influence.

This is not about militarizing development. Economic coercion has become a key instrument of authoritarian regimes in spaces where US agencies struggle to respond swiftly or lack sufficient mandate and resources. If the United States is serious about countering adversarial economic warfare, then the US military must play a role, given its reach and logistical staying power. DoD must have limited, targeted authorities to conduct low-level economic and information operations in contested regions through civil affairs, special operations forces, and military commands. Such use of American power via a joint, interagency approach can promote US national interests and achieve key objectives, aligning with proposals from the chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee.

3. Fix Arms Sales: Move Fast or Lose Allies

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a Cold War relic that moves glacially. Allies and partners sometimes choose to buy elsewhere because of slow processing speeds at the Embassy, in Congress, or at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). This problem is so pervasive, the commander of Africa Command testified to Congress that “African partners consistently prefer U.S. defense assistance, but they often have to turn toward Beijing when U.S. timelines do not meet their urgent needs.” Direct commercial sales (DCS) can help bypass the slowness of FMS, but again, Congress would have to authorize the types of weapons and systems that could be sold via DCS.

Partner enablement must be a strategic priority, not a logistics problem. FMS must be streamlined by empowering DSCA, US embassies, and military commands with flexible funding by cutting bureaucratic red tape, minimizing contracting delays, applying common sense Leahy vetting, updating outdated notification thresholds, enforcing accountability for stalled or high-value cases, safeguarding exportability in defense contracts, improving interagency coordination, and making it easier for partners to acquire what they need in a crisis. Modernized FMS and DCS supports US industry, strengthens alliances through interoperability, promotes burden sharing, and ensures America does not fight alone in the next war. Given the Trump administration’s executive actions on FMS reform, Congress can further codify needed solutions.

4. Underwrite Jointness: Operationalize the Budget

Every military branch loves bragging about its jointness—until the budget hits. Then it’s every platform and data management system for itself.

Congress should enforce interoperability through the only language the services listen to: funding. From the concepts driving force design to the platforms and formations Congress funds and authorizes, they must all be more than a sum of their parts and work to solve the nation’s problems, not promote service specific interests. Joint processes must tie procurement and platform development to enforceable digital and operational standards—not more PowerPoint promises and buckets of money for the consultant de jour and DC think tanks filled with retired senior leaders that lost Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Pentagon’s productivity challenge isn’t cutting personnel—it’s unlocking output. Slashing billets without changing workflows hollows capacity. Eliminating redundancy, streamlining decisions, and scaling effective practices drive progress. Break stovepipes, accelerate cross-domain integration, and enforce measurable joint outcomes. Platforms must be interoperable by design, not as an afterthought. Every dollar should advance convergence, not perpetuate legacy divides between services, domains, and allies.

5. Service Roles Reimagined: Adapt or Fade

With growing convergence of threats, services must specialize—not compete. Congress must fix the strategic cultures of each service, stopping their rent-seeking approaches for bigger budgets.

To meet the demands of the future operational environment, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, a shrinking US Army should transfer maneuver forces to reserve components to ensure more fires, protection, sustainment, and deep intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—the real backbone of joint large-scale combat operations, are on active duty. The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 is a model of tough, necessary change: smaller, smarter, more survivable. The Navy must reduce its dependence on carriers and invest in distributed lethality: more submarines, frigates, and unmanned assets. The Air Force must embrace effects over prestige: investing more in disaggregated airbases, autonomous systems, and cheaper fighters and bombers, not just the next generation of a more expensive, stealthy aircraft. Most importantly, the space and cyber communities must define how they support and coexist with the rest of the force, because they are not (yet) managers of violence.

DoD 3.0 doesn’t flatten service identity but ensures each branch maximizes its value rather than fighting for budget share in a zero-sum system, while mastering Title 10 roles. Services must divest from legacy systems or shift them to reserves. Congress must make tough decisions, like cutting massive shipbuilding projects (carriers) for smaller less expensive platforms or deactivating brigade combat teams, removing thousands of consumers from their districts. DoD 3.0 requires balancing oversight, resources, and service recommendations.

Innovate the Pentagon Now, or Lose Ground to Adversaries

In 1947 and again in 1986, Congress stepped in to reframe how America organizes for war. Both times, the Department of Defense wasn’t restructured because it was failing—but because it was falling behind. Each reform effort was painful, complex, and disruptive and came from outside DoD. But both left the American military better prepared to meet the threats of its time.

Now, forty years after Goldwater-Nichols, the United States is falling behind once again. Today’s threat landscape necessitates a DoD 3.0—a deliberate rethinking of how we plan, organize, equip, and integrate with allies and partners to prevail in competition and conflict. This isn’t about tearing down institutions. It’s about upgrading them to operate at the speed, scale, and complexity of warfare in the digital age.

This also isn’t reform for reform’s sake, but about making sure the next war, if it comes, is fought with the right structures, tools, and strategic mindset. America doesn’t need another commission. It needs bold, bipartisan action in Congress that reflects the reality of a world where China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are not just watching—they are coordinating.

A DoD 3.0 is no longer optional. It’s a strategic and operational imperative and America is already late.

Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “Franky” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the US Naval War College and a fellow at the European Resilience Initiative Center, Payne Institute for Public Policy, and Defense Analyses and Research Corporation. He has published two books and over one hundred articles on strategy, warfare, and national security.

James P. Micciche is a soon to retire US Army Strategist most recently assigned to XVIII Airborne Corps. He holds degrees from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and Troy University. He can be found on LinkedIn and X/Twitter.

The authors would like to thank the legendary Dr. Francis Park (US Army colonel, retired) for providing extensive feedback on this article.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jahara Matisek · June 6, 2025

18. America's Allies Must Save Themselves

Excerpts:

China stands to gain immensely from the vagaries of Trump’s foreign policy. It has always bristled at how the United States and its dollar dominate the global system of trade and finance. That preeminence is being shaken not by anything China has done but by Trump’s actions. The chaos in the bond markets after Trump’s tariff announcements in April showed that there is waning confidence in U.S. stability and power.

Consider the folly of Trump’s treatment of Australia. The United States enjoys a large trade surplus with Australia; in Trump’s terms, the United States is already winning this bilateral relationship. It has no better ally or trade partner. And yet he chose to impose an across-the-board ten percent tariff on Australian goods and a 25 (now 50) percent tariff on Australian steel and aluminum at the same time as Washington is trying to line up allies against China. A third of Australia’s exports go to China. In these circumstances, Canberra will be reluctant to hew more closely to Washington’s line. Slowing the growth of China’s economy (and its demand for Australian resources) is hardly in Australia’s interest.

Trump does not pretend he is trying to bring about truly fair trade or a level playing field. His goal is to reindustrialize the United States, to bring factories back from China, Europe, and Southeast Asia. And he wants to assert American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere even as he unwinds U.S. involvement in the rest of the world. Voters in the United States will have to decide eventually whether these are plausible or worthwhile goals, but U.S. allies should already have made up their minds.

U.S. allies often trusted in the United States and in American values more in hope than in expectation. But that trust was real, and now it is fraying. Trump invites a different sort of trust in the United States: the certainty that Washington will seek to act ruthlessly in its own self-interest and use its might to extract the best deal for itself. Future U.S. leaders may try to restore the country’s moral leadership, but trust once lost is hard to win back. Trade deals come and go, but if the light on the hill shines only for Americans, Trump will have ushered in a darker world for everybody else.

America's Allies Must Save Themselves

Foreign Affairs · by More by Malcolm Turnbull · June 6, 2025

America’s Allies Must Save Themselves

How to Pick Up the Pieces of the World Order Trump Is Breaking

Malcolm Turnbull

June 6, 2025

At a European Union meeting in Berlin, November 2023 Fabrizio Bensch / Reuters

MALCOLM TURNBULL was Prime Minister of Australia from 2015 to 2018.

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Since returning to office, U.S. President Donald Trump has assailed the world order created by the United States after World War II. He has challenged the sovereignty of allies and partners by threatening to acquire Greenland, annex Canada, and seize the Panama Canal. His global trade war is designed to benefit the United States at the expense of all its trading partners. He has withdrawn from the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization. In dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Trump administration has abandoned long-standing bipartisan commitments to international development. And his treatment of Ukraine—his attempt to hound the Ukrainians toward a peace deal rather than use American might to compel Russia to the table—humiliated the weaker and wronged party and courted the aggressor.

Trump believes that might makes right. As he posted in April on Truth Social, “THE GOLDEN RULE OF NEGOTIATING AND SUCCESS: HE WHO HAS THE GOLD MAKES THE RULES.”

The world order and the institutions the United States created after World War II were all designed to resist that logic, and to ensure that the strong could not simply do what they can and force the weak to suffer as they must. But Trump has no time for such high-mindedness. Instead, he has vindicated the cynical view that the United States was never the altruistic and idealistic power it claimed to be.

For those who still believe in a principled and generous United States, this is a traumatic moment of cognitive dissonance. The reality of Trump’s administration—the contempt for law both at home and abroad, the bullying, the abrogation of agreements and treaties, the threats against allies, and the cuddling up to tyrants—is plain to see. But it still seems incredible. Some observers search for a benign explanation. Perhaps, they imagine, Trump is playing four-dimensional chess and his outrageous actions are just part of a shrewd master plan. Others cling to the hope that something will change the course of events, a plot twist to keep things on track before the show goes off the rails.

But hope is a dangerous comforter in times like these. Trump is the new normal in Washington. At least until the next presidential election, there does not appear to be a reversal in sight.

This does not mean that U.S. allies should surrender to Trump’s intimidation. Together, they can exert considerable influence and contend with the havoc unleashed by Washington. Those countries that share the values for which the United States once stood, but currently does not, should band together to preserve what worked best in the order Trump is intent on burying. As French President Emmanuel Macron said last week, U.S. allies should build a coalition of countries that “will not be bullied.”

ON THEIR OWN FEET

In the era of “America first,” the United States is not, and does not purport to be, the reliable security partner it once was. Allies around the world have recognized they have to do more to defend themselves. They must acquire more advanced weapons systems, deeper stocks of ammunition and equipment, and recruit more personnel. At the same time, they have to increase their “sovereign autonomy,” notably their ability to operate without the concurrence or cooperation of the United States. They also must develop and strengthen alliances with like-minded partners other than the United States.

Such moves would not constitute a rejection of the United States but rather follow from precisely what the Trump administration is inviting allies to do. In an interview in April, Vice President JD Vance praised the French leader Charles de Gaulle who, despite protests from Washington in the 1960s, ensured that France, unlike the United Kingdom, retained complete sovereignty over all its military capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal. As Vance put it, de Gaulle understood “that it’s not in Europe’s interest, nor America’s interest, for Europe to be a permanent security vassal of the United States.”

The message from Washington has shifted markedly. Trump is not the first president to say allies should make a larger contribution to mutual defense. But to many allies, he seems to be saying they should spend more because they may well be on their own.

Consider Trump’s treatment of Ukraine. In the early months of his second term, Trump appeared to have effectively changed sides in the war in Ukraine, favoring Russia and bullying Ukraine into accepting a peace on the terms preferred by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Unfortunately for Trump, three months of appeasement have not ended the war. He may eventually stand up to Putin, or he could simply leave Ukraine to its fate.

The United States is not the reliable security partner it once was.

Apart from Ukraine, European countries face the most urgent threat from Russia. The European members of NATO have the economic capacity to match and outmatch Russia if they choose to do so. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently asked, “Why do 500 million Europeans need 330 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians?”

NATO and all U.S. allies, including Australia, recognize the need to spend more. But Washington and allied capitals differ on how that extra cash should be spent. The United States naturally wants additional purchases of American weapons. But allies fear that although buying more U.S. equipment and munitions may please Trump, it will not deliver greater independence. Indeed, a buying spree of U.S. weapons systems may result only in the purchaser becoming even more reliant on the United States.

The long-term solution for U.S. allies is to be able to deter aggressors with capabilities that are sovereign, ideally in the sense that they have been produced domestically but certainly in the sense that they can be deployed and operated without the concurrence of the United States. At the moment, that is not possible. U.S.-supplied F-35s, for instance, are so functionally dependent on American software and spare parts that it is difficult to see how they could be used, or used for long, without Washington’s consent.

This kind of dependence, common in most modern weapons systems, was often irksome for U.S. allies but not regarded as a big problem. NATO allies could trust that they would never fight alone, so dependence on an indifferent United States was merely a theoretical concern. But today, with the White House demanding that the United States’ allies be able to fend for themselves, the circumstances are very different. It is no surprise that the EU’s recently unveiled 150 billion euro defense procurement plan largely excludes U.S. companies. At the same time, Portugal has announced it is no longer planning to acquire F-35s, and Canada is reassessing its plans to purchase 88 F-35s. Europe’s challenge is not just to find the money to fund rearmament but also to overcome national rivalries to agree on several standard-bearers for the defense industry, much in the same way that France and Germany came together to create Airbus in 1970. Another inspiring example for Europe (and other U.S. allies) can be found in Ukraine, where the local defense industry has produced one disruptive, innovative, and much less costly capability after another—as demonstrated by the stunning drone attacks that Ukrainian forces launched earlier this week on Russian air bases.

THE QUEST FOR SOVEREIGN AUTONOMY

In Europe, U.S. allies are geographically close to one another and have strong strategic and economic ties. The situation is very different in the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, China is far stronger relative to its Asian neighbors than Russia is to its European ones. On the other hand, although Trump has given the Europeans cause for concern that they could be on their own, he has not yet suggested that the United States would abandon its allies in Asia.

The obvious flash point is Taiwan, where the signals from the Trump administration are decidedly mixed. Trump himself has said that Taiwan is difficult to defend and has complained about its semiconductor manufacturing industry, claiming the island “stole the chip business” from the United States and should pay for U.S. protection. But speaking recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said Trump has made it clear that “Communist China will not invade Taiwan on his watch” and that the United States would work to make the costs of an invasion too high for China, ensuring that peace in the Taiwan Strait was the only option.

That confidence is belied by events on the ground. Chinese exercises around Taiwan look more and more like rehearsals for an invasion. Hegseth himself acknowledged in his speech that an attack could be imminent. Taiwanese politics are unstable, with no consensus on the need to increase defense spending, and there are a range of coercive measures short of kinetic conflict that could enable Chinese leader Xi Jinping to win Taiwan without firing a shot.

Notwithstanding Hegseth’s fighting words in Singapore, Taiwan is both closer and far more important to Beijing than it is to Washington. If Ukraine is not Trump’s war (as he so often insists), he would likely not risk war with China over Taiwan—a war that even if it remained conventional would result in the destruction of much of the U.S. and Chinese navies. With more than 200 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, China could replace its losses long before the United States was able to do so. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan will cause U.S. allies in the region to lose confidence in the notion of an American security umbrella and the effectiveness of U.S. deterrence, which is measured not just in firepower but also in willpower.

China could win Taiwan without firing a shot.

Although they would be immediately threatened, Japan and South Korea each have the economic power to considerably increase their own defense capabilities. South Korea is already a major defense exporter. And both countries host U.S. military bases with significant capabilities. But if they lose confidence in Washington’s will to fight in Asia, those bases could become liabilities, making it harder for each country to manage its own defense and diplomacy without the concurrence of the United States. The same logic that Vance used to praise de Gaulle’s France would be applied to Japan and South Korea. There is no substitute for establishing sovereign autonomy. Both countries could conclude that it would be best to possess a nuclear deterrent of their own.

Elsewhere in Asia, Southeast Asian countries are too diverse in their geopolitical orientations to collaborate on defense. Several, such as Laos and Myanmar, are already closely aligned with China. Others benefit from having to hedge between China and the United States. But all would likely fall within China’s sphere of influence if the United States were to abandon the region.

Consider the case of the Philippines, a formal treaty ally of the United States. The Philippines has been subjected to increasing incursions from China as Beijing asserts its claims in the South China Sea. But even though the United States has a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, it has done little more than protest as China builds and militarizes artificial islands and even spars directly with Philippine vessels. In the absence of firm U.S. support, the Philippines will inevitably feel compelled to accommodate China’s demands.

In recent years, Australia has become more dependent on the United States even as the United States has become less dependable. This dynamic is most glaring when it comes to the formation of AUKUS, a 2021 security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Australia canceled a program to build 12 diesel electric submarines with France in favor of eight nuclear-powered but conventionally armed attack submarines to be built with the United Kingdom. These vessels will not be ready, however, until the 2040s. To bridge the gap between the retirement of Australia’s aging submarine fleet and its future acquisitions, officials agreed that the United States would sell Australia three to five Virginia-class submarines by around 2032. But U.S. legislation pertaining to AUKUS specifically states that the submarines cannot be sold unless the president certifies that their sale will not degrade U.S. underwater capabilities. Given the U.S. Navy is about 20 attack submarines short of what it says it requires and U.S. shipbuilders are constructing only about half as many submarines as the U.S. Navy needs to replace old ones, it seems unlikely that Australia will ever get any Virginias of its own in the era of “America first.”

When the AUKUS submarine deal was agreed to in 2021, an understandably angry French foreign minister said, “Australia has sacrificed sovereignty for the sake of security. It is likely to lose both.” AUKUS may be a cautionary tale for other allies. Sovereignty and autonomy are more important than ever. Compromise them at your peril.

“Trade Wars Are Good and Easy to Win”

In trade, too, Trump has sought to upend existing partnerships and alliances. His bullying tariff policy is intended to assert American power and extract significant concessions from others, all at the expense of the trading system the United States helped build. “These countries,” Trump said in April, “are calling us up, kissing my ass. . . . They are dying to make a deal.”

My view, based on experience with Trump, is that pandering to him is precisely the wrong way to go. Trump’s agenda is to use tariffs to force importers to move their production to the United States. Of course, this approach defies basic principles of economics. Take Canada, from which the United States imports about 40 percent of its aluminum. The production of aluminum requires prodigious quantities of cheap energy. Canada has vast hydropower resources, and as a result, the energy costs of its large aluminum industry are a third of those of the U.S. aluminum industry. Canada has a natural comparative advantage. The 50 percent (up from 25 percent) tariff Trump has imposed on aluminum will increase the price of aluminum within the United States, benefiting only U.S. aluminum producers at the expense of consumers and manufacturers.

Trump does not believe in comparative advantage. Rather, if a country has a trade deficit, it’s a loser. If it has a trade surplus, it’s a winner. I remember meeting him in Manila in November 2017 when I was prime minister of Australia. He was complaining bitterly about the size of the U.S. trade deficit with China. He asked me what would happen if he banned all Chinese imports. I quietly replied, “A global depression.” That might be a price he is willing to pay, but the rest of the world should not let U.S. policy send the global economy into a tailspin.

Those countries that still believe in free trade need to work together to promote new free-trade arrangements (and extend existing ones) that do not involve the United States. Consider, for instance, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the successor to the TPP. Trump withdrew from the TPP after reaching the White House in 2017. Most believed the deal was dead. Several TPP members, including Japan, were very skeptical about the possibility of concluding an agreement without the United States. Some were anxious that such a move would offend Trump. I was able to persuade Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that he should not be concerned on that score. Moreover, the United States could one day change its mind; by keeping the deal alive we would, effectively, preserve the possibility of an American return.

Trump asked me what would happen if he banned Chinese imports. I quietly replied, “A global depression.”

By early 2018, the Trans-Pacific Partnership had lost one member and gained two adjectives; the now 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership was born. The United Kingdom has acceded to the trade pact and several other major economies, including China, South Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan, have expressed interest in joining. The CPTPP was the most significant international trade agreement ever negotiated since the completion of the Uruguay round of talks in 1994 that resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization. It was agreed even as a protectionist tide was rising in countries around the world. Unlike traditional trade deals, the CPTPP doesn’t simply reduce tariffs on goods but sets binding rules on digital trade, e-commerce, data flows, and the protection of intellectual property. It enforces core labor rights, including the right to form independent trade unions, and prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of characteristics such as race, religion, and gender. And it obliges parties to avoid favoring their state-owned enterprises in a way that disadvantages foreign competitors. The CPTPP stands as a bold reply to Trump’s rejection of multilateral trade leadership. Its members showed that they could reduce their exposure to U.S. political instability and trade unilateralism and at the same demonstrate that global rule-setting can proceed without American participation or consent.

U.S. allies need to find alternatives to the power of the U.S. market. The Europeans already have their own vast free-trade zone, but they are seeking to establish more free-trade relationships with others. EU-Australian trade negotiations, begun in 2017 but suspended in 2023 over agricultural exports, have been revived. And as Macron said in Singapore in May, the EU is seeking to forge new trade agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and perhaps even join or associate with the CPTPP.

Two staunch U.S. allies in East Asia—Japan and South Korea—are seeking closer relationships with China. As speculation about Trump’s tariffs swirled in March, the three countries’ foreign ministers agreed to “comprehensive and high-level” negotiations toward a free-trade deal. Such an agreement would help build “a predictable trade and investment environment” in the midst of the volatility unleashed by Washington. Trump can take credit for bringing these three countries closer together; given their historical enmities, that would be a considerable (if unintended) achievement.

A DARKENING WORLD

China stands to gain immensely from the vagaries of Trump’s foreign policy. It has always bristled at how the United States and its dollar dominate the global system of trade and finance. That preeminence is being shaken not by anything China has done but by Trump’s actions. The chaos in the bond markets after Trump’s tariff announcements in April showed that there is waning confidence in U.S. stability and power.

Consider the folly of Trump’s treatment of Australia. The United States enjoys a large trade surplus with Australia; in Trump’s terms, the United States is already winning this bilateral relationship. It has no better ally or trade partner. And yet he chose to impose an across-the-board ten percent tariff on Australian goods and a 25 (now 50) percent tariff on Australian steel and aluminum at the same time as Washington is trying to line up allies against China. A third of Australia’s exports go to China. In these circumstances, Canberra will be reluctant to hew more closely to Washington’s line. Slowing the growth of China’s economy (and its demand for Australian resources) is hardly in Australia’s interest.

Trump does not pretend he is trying to bring about truly fair trade or a level playing field. His goal is to reindustrialize the United States, to bring factories back from China, Europe, and Southeast Asia. And he wants to assert American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere even as he unwinds U.S. involvement in the rest of the world. Voters in the United States will have to decide eventually whether these are plausible or worthwhile goals, but U.S. allies should already have made up their minds.

U.S. allies often trusted in the United States and in American values more in hope than in expectation. But that trust was real, and now it is fraying. Trump invites a different sort of trust in the United States: the certainty that Washington will seek to act ruthlessly in its own self-interest and use its might to extract the best deal for itself. Future U.S. leaders may try to restore the country’s moral leadership, but trust once lost is hard to win back. Trade deals come and go, but if the light on the hill shines only for Americans, Trump will have ushered in a darker world for everybody else.

MALCOLM TURNBULL was Prime Minister of Australia from 2015 to 2018.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Malcolm Turnbull · June 6, 2025

19. How Japan—and Other U.S. Allies—Can Work Around America: A Plan to Survive Trump’s Trade War

Excerpts:

Bold but pragmatic measures are necessary to strengthen the multilateral trading system amid the latest U.S. efforts to undermine it. No country can achieve economic security alone, not even the United States; resilient supply chains depend on having reliable partners to trade with. Trade is the best way to avoid overdependence on any one country, whether that is dependence on exports to a United States that may impose steep tariffs at any time or dependence on China for supplies of critical minerals and clean energy products.

Trump’s tariffs complicate international efforts to reduce this dependence on China. In recent years, the United States had been leading multilateral efforts to develop alternative supply chains for critical minerals and clean energy technologies. But tariffs will erect walls that break those links. If Washington will not be a reliable partner, other countries will need to build these supply chains among themselves. Japan has already been working with Australia and India to source rare earths. But Tokyo should be doing more. Japan’s friends in Asia, as well as Canada and countries across Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, could all play a role in developing critical mineral and clean energy supply chains.

All of these measures to strengthen global trade rules and shore up critical supply chains would have a much greater effect if the United States were to join. That door should remain wide open, but merely hoping for the United States to change its thinking is not a strategy. Japan and like-minded countries need to mitigate the damage of U.S. tariffs—current and potential—and in the process find ways to expand trade and boost their economic security while augmenting the international trade system. If the rest of the world demonstrates that it can cooperate and prosper without the United States, future American leaders and the American people may come to see the benefits of participating in global initiatives once again. That outcome would be good for Japan, good for the world, and even good for the United States.

How Japan—and Other U.S. Allies—Can Work Around America

Foreign Affairs · by More by Tatsuya Terazawa · June 6, 2025

A Plan to Survive Trump’s Trade War

Tatsuya Terazawa

June 6, 2025

At a container terminal in Tokyo, Japan, February 2025 Kim Kyung-Hoon / Reuters

TATSUYA TERAZAWA served as Vice Minister for International Affairs at Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry from 2018 to 2019.

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President Donald Trump’s tariffs have forced a global reckoning. For Japan and many other countries, the vulnerability that comes with relying on U.S. markets has become startlingly clear. First came tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico. Then, in February, the administration introduced a 25 percent tariff on steel and aluminum (this week, it raised those tariffs to 50 percent). In March, it imposed a 25 percent tariff on automobiles and auto parts. And in April, Trump announced so-called reciprocal tariffs that imposed a base tariff of ten percent on imports from all countries plus additional duties on a country-by-country basis. The country-specific tariffs were paused for 90 days, until July. Along with various tariffs targeting Canada, China, and Mexico, they are now in legal limbo after a U.S. federal court ruled last week that the president had overstepped his authority in imposing them.

For the countries affected by U.S. tariffs, the potential economic harms are far too great to simply hope that an American court will make the problem go away or that the president will change his mind.Japan, in particular, is dangerously exposed to the U.S. market—but as the fourth-largest economy in the world, with relationships across the globe, Japan also has the resources and opportunity to craft an effective multilateral strategy for coping with Washington’s obstructionist approach to trade.

If all of Trump’s proposed measures enter force, Japan faces a 25 percent tariff on automobiles and auto parts, a 50 percent tariff on steel and aluminum, and a 24 percent tariff on all other goods it exports to the United States. Japan’s economy depends on exports. The United States is its second-largest market, after China (including Hong Kong), accounting for roughly 20 percent of all exports, and steep tariffs would make many Japanese goods too expensive for American consumers. Tariffs on automobiles and auto parts are especially damaging, as these goods represent more than a third of Japan’s exports to the United States. Japan’s top 1,000 companies expect a seven percent drop in their total profits between April 2025 and March 2026, after making continuous gains since 2020.

Even if Tokyo can negotiate with Trump to secure tariff exemptions, significant harm has already been done. Many countries, including Japan, have lost confidence in the long-term openness of the U.S. market. It has become too risky to rely too much on trade with the United States. The erosion of multilateral institutions under both Trump administrations has slowed the expansion of trade and weakened the enforcement of trade rules for all. And the effort to build secure supply chains for critical minerals and clean energy products—reducing dependence on China for these vital goods and inputs—has grown more challenging as the United States puts up barriers to trade.

Japan and other countries in a similar position now need to take action that does not depend on working with the United States. Trump may be hostile to trade, but that does not change the fundamental economic reality that trade fuels growth. Nor has the need to reduce critical dependencies disappeared. To offset the damage of Trump’s tariffs, Japan will have to expand its own trade relationships and collaborate with other countries to strengthen the global trade system with or without the United States—at least for now.

FILLING THE GAP

A key part of Japan’s strategy must be to make up for a potentially substantial loss of exports to the U.S. market by increasing trade elsewhere. Outreach efforts can lay the groundwork. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Japan External Trade Organization must organize more business networking events, trade shows, and other trade promotion activities to help build new connections in non-U.S. markets. Sending cabinet ministers can demonstrate Japan’s commitment to develop economic relationships with countries where Japanese companies have previously had fewer ties. India, for example, and many countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East represent opportunities for trade expansion, once official visits smooth the way. China must be included on the travel agenda, too. In the past few years, political disagreements have strained economic relations between Japan and China; foreign direct investment from Japan to China has been shrinking since 2021. Hosting senior Chinese leaders in Tokyo and sending senior Japanese leaders to Beijing can help rebuild warmer relations and encourage businesses in both countries to expand their ties. There are already signs of such improvement: at a high-level meeting in Beijing last week, China agreed to resume imports of Japanese marine products, which China had banned in 2023, citing concerns about the release of treated wastewater from Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The next step is formalizing new and deepened trade relationships with free trade agreements. A good place to start would be to build on an existing regional deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), which includes all ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. The signatories to RCEP represent around 30 percent of global GDP and 30 percent of the global population. Trade liberalization under RCEP is modest compared with other free trade agreements, but multiple bilateral arrangements within it have reduced tariffs on a broad range of products, and it is the only existing framework for reducing tariffs among China, Japan, and South Korea.

It has become too risky to rely too much on trade with the United States.

The sense of alarm that the first Trump administration’s trade restrictions generated across Asia played a key role in building support for the RCEP in 2020. Today’s concerns are far greater and could drive a renewed effort to strengthen the trade agreement. The question is, how? Endless product-by-product negotiations to reduce tariffs among RCEP members will not help countries now facing severe economic harm from U.S. tariffs. To speed up the process, the signatories should start with negotiations to establish a formula for tariff reduction. RCEP already divides goods into four categories. Tariffs on some products, often those member countries do not produce in meaningful quantities, are eliminated right away because no special interests block their removal. In another category, political considerations make it difficult to reduce tariffs—Japan’s farm lobby strongly opposes tariff reductions on rice, for instance. In the final two groups of products, tariffs will be either reduced or eliminated over an agreed timeframe.

Using this structure, RCEP countries can negotiate a formula to set more ambitious goals. They can pledge to shorten the timeframes for reducing or eliminating tariffs by a certain percentage, lower tariff reduction levels further by a certain percentage, and shift a certain percentage of products from the tariff reduction category to the tariff elimination category. These commitments would be accepted by all members and applied to them equally. If a country cannot satisfy these conditions for tariffs on a particular product, it could request an exception in exchange for concessions on other goods. Recognizing that not all RCEP signatories are starting with the same degree of openness to trade, this approach—unlike an attempt to apply a single tariff rate cut across the board—would accommodate the different political sensitivities and stages of development of member countries. Ultimately, lowering tariffs on a broad range of products will help RCEP members quickly diversify their markets and expand their trade.

Japan should also look beyond RCEP. Previously, Japan has not had highly developed trade ties in Latin America or the Middle East because of geographical distance and the lack of strong historical ties. But Trump’s tariffs could push Japan to explore these markets as it seeks opportunities to expand and diversify its trade. In particular, Tokyo should pursue trade agreements with the South American trade bloc Mercosur (composed of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), both of which boast vibrant economic activity, population growth, and rising living standards, making them attractive trade partners.

PLAYING BY THE RULES

Another part of Japan’s strategy must be to strengthen international trade rules and institutions that have been weakened by Trump. In Trump’s first term, his administration blocked the appointment of new members to the World Trade Organization’s appellate body, which is the core of its dispute settlement process. Those seats remain unfilled. The first Trump administration also imposed tariffs on China in the name of national security, but in doing so grossly overstretched the exceptions allowed for national security under WTO rules. When the world’s biggest economy disregards the norms of the international trade system in this way, other countries will find easy excuses for not following the same rules.

Today’s tariffs further undermine the WTO-based system. But the WTO, although imperfect, is still important. A foundational principle of the agreements undergirding the WTO is “most favored nation” status, which requires all WTO members to apply the same trade terms to all their trading partners, with some limited exceptions. Before Trump unveiled his “reciprocal tariffs” in April, according to the WTO, 80 percent of global trade was conducted under “most favored nation” terms. That figure dropped to 74 percent with Trump’s announcement—still the vast majority of global trade.

The countries that operate under WTO rules should now try to make those rules work better, even if that means working without the United States for now. The first step is to address the nonfunctional dispute settlement mechanism. Because Washington will not lift its block on appellate body appointments, other WTO members will have to agree to be bound by the decisions made through an alternative process. A new appeals system for trade disputes known as the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement already has 56 members on board, including Canada, China, Japan, and the European Union. The more large economies—such as India, Indonesia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—that participate, the stronger this alternative process will become.

Simply hoping for the United States to change its thinking is not a strategy.

Member countries can also create new rules within the WTO, as they have done in agreements on e-commerce and facilitating investment for development. Further discussions should explore additional rules to balance climate, development, and trade priorities, such as a code of conduct for carbon border adjustment mechanisms. The problem, however, is that these processes are time-consuming and incremental—and that, in the end, formalizing WTO rules requires consensus. Dozens of WTO members have signed on to the e-commerce and investment facilitation agreements, and in both cases, a few countries, including India and South Africa, have blocked that process. It may not be possible to convince these countries to accept new agreements, even if accepting them does not require that they participate in them.

Nor is it possible to develop an alternative system to the WTO from scratch within any reasonable timeframe. But an existing trade pact can complement its functions: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) can provide a framework for ambitious trade liberalization and rigorous rules, covering a broad swath of the world. The CPTPP is the successor agreement to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement signed in 2016 by 12 countries—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. The United States never ratified the agreement, and Trump formally withdrew the country in 2017. In 2018, the 11 remaining members, led by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, revived the deal as CPTPP. Even without the United States, CPTPP members represent a combined 14 percent of global GDP. The pact significantly reduces barriers to trade, including tariffs, and enforces rules governing intellectual property, government procurement, investment, and more. It also has a process for settling trade disputes among its members. In a sense, CPTPP is an alternate WTO, or a “super WTO”—a much smaller club, but with deeper trade liberalization and higher regulatory standards.

CPTPP is already expanding beyond the Pacific region, adding the United Kingdom in 2024. Countries in Asia such as Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand are natural candidates and should be encouraged to participate. They will have to satisfy entry criteria and be accepted by the current members, which should be achievable. To serve as a global trade framework, however, CPTPP will need to expand farther—particularly to EU and non-EU countries in Europe, such as Norway and Switzerland, all of which should be able to qualify for entry. The EU itself is a rule-making institution, which may make its members wary of joining CPTPP. But the benefits of participating in a much larger trade bloc that supplements the weakened WTO system should outweigh any downside for Europe of negotiating trade rules with CPTPP members.

KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN

Bold but pragmatic measures are necessary to strengthen the multilateral trading system amid the latest U.S. efforts to undermine it. No country can achieve economic security alone, not even the United States; resilient supply chains depend on having reliable partners to trade with. Trade is the best way to avoid overdependence on any one country, whether that is dependence on exports to a United States that may impose steep tariffs at any time or dependence on China for supplies of critical minerals and clean energy products.

Trump’s tariffs complicate international efforts to reduce this dependence on China. In recent years, the United States had been leading multilateral efforts to develop alternative supply chains for critical minerals and clean energy technologies. But tariffs will erect walls that break those links. If Washington will not be a reliable partner, other countries will need to build these supply chains among themselves. Japan has already been working with Australia and India to source rare earths. But Tokyo should be doing more. Japan’s friends in Asia, as well as Canada and countries across Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, could all play a role in developing critical mineral and clean energy supply chains.

All of these measures to strengthen global trade rules and shore up critical supply chains would have a much greater effect if the United States were to join. That door should remain wide open, but merely hoping for the United States to change its thinking is not a strategy. Japan and like-minded countries need to mitigate the damage of U.S. tariffs—current and potential—and in the process find ways to expand trade and boost their economic security while augmenting the international trade system. If the rest of the world demonstrates that it can cooperate and prosper without the United States, future American leaders and the American people may come to see the benefits of participating in global initiatives once again. That outcome would be good for Japan, good for the world, and even good for the United States.

TATSUYA TERAZAWA served as Vice Minister for International Affairs at Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry from 2018 to 2019.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Tatsuya Terazawa · June 6, 2025

20. As Rutte formally unveils NATO 5% spending proposal, Hegseth says some allies 'not quite there'

Excerpts:

One potential point of complication is America’s closest ally, the UK, which only plans on reaching 3 percent GDP by 2034, falling someway short of the new spending target. Today Hegseth dismissed the issue. “Our friends in the UK … they’re gonna get there,” he said, without elaborating.

As for what that funding will go toward, at today’s meeting, the ministers agreed to new capability targets, with “top priorities” including air and missile defense, long range weapons, logistics, and “large land maneuver formations.”

As Rutte formally unveils NATO 5% spending proposal, Hegseth says some allies 'not quite there' - Breaking Defense

We will decide, at the NATO summit, [on] the spending, and we already know we need to spend much, much more if we want to fulfill all these [capability] targets,” Rutte said on the sidelines of the defense ministerial.

breakingdefense.com · by Tim Martin · June 5, 2025

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Pete Hegseth, Defense Secretary, meet at the NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels (NATO)

BELFAST — NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte formally unveiled an already controversial two-tiered plan to boost allied spending to 5 percent of GDP, though a top US official acknowledged there’s work to do to get some treaty members on board ahead of the alliance’s upcoming summit.

Rutte’s plan involves a commitment that allies spend 3.5 percent on defense capabilities and an additional 1.5 percent on broader security-related investments. Though the plan had been previously reported — and is already the subject of some skepticism for analysts and some European officials — Rutte’s official unveiling today at a defense ministerial conference came with noted optimism about its chances at the summit.

“We will decide, at the NATO summit, [on] the spending; and we already know we need to spend much, much more if we want to fulfill all these [capability] targets,” he said, according to a DoD statement.

But speaking alongside Rutte, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth acknowledged that not everyone is in agreement.

“There are a few countries that are not quite there yet,” he said. “I won’t name any names. … We will get them there.”

Hegseth said that “5 percent [GDP] is our message, and we will deliver that. President [Donald] Trump [plans on it] at The Hague, at the Summit, it’s been his commitment, and I believe our allies will step up.”

European NATO nations have come under intense pressure from Trump to increase defense spending and protect the continent, without overreliance on the US. And though the 5 percent GDP agreement will be a political coup for Washington, it sets a high bar for alliance spenders, some of whom are still grappling with reaching the existing 2 percent mark. The US has also prioritized withdrawing troops from Europe, with reports that talks on the matter with the alliance will be held after the Summit.

One potential point of complication is America’s closest ally, the UK, which only plans on reaching 3 percent GDP by 2034, falling someway short of the new spending target. Today Hegseth dismissed the issue. “Our friends in the UK … they’re gonna get there,” he said, without elaborating.

As for what that funding will go toward, at today’s meeting, the ministers agreed to new capability targets, with “top priorities” including air and missile defense, long range weapons, logistics, and “large land maneuver formations.”

Separately today, Trump also nominated Air Force Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich for the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), according to the DoD. SACEUR is responsible for leading European military strategy and operations with the role dating back to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Grynkewich is to succeed the retiring Gen. Chistopher Cavoli. NATO has agreed to the new appointment, which will require Grynkewich to receive the grade of general. He currently serves as director of operations, J-3, joint staff at the Pentagon, noted the DoD. Carrying out a dual post, in parallel with his SACEUR duties, Grynkewich will also take on the post of commander US European Command.

That news will likely come with a sigh of relief for NATO members as well as American lawmakers, as prior reports had suggested the Pentagon was considering relinquishing the SACEUR role. In April, Katherine Thompson, the DoD official performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, had attempted to assure lawmakers at a House Armed Services Committee hearing, that no change was on the cards.

21. Iran Orders Material From China for Hundreds of Ballistic Missiles

The CRInK.

"Adversarial cooperation". From the Annual Threat Assessment:

ADVERSARIAL COOPERATION

Cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has been growing more rapidly in recent years, reinforcing threats from each of them individually while also posing new challenges to U.S. strength and power globally. These primarily bilateral relationships, largely in security and defense fields, have strengthened their individual and collective capabilities to threaten and harm the United States, as well as improved their resilience against U.S. and Western efforts to constrain or deter their activities. Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated these ties, but the trend is likely to continue regardless of the war’s outcome. This alignment increases the chances of U.S. tensions or conflict with any one of these adversaries drawing in another. China is critical to this alignment and its global significance, given the PRC’s particularly ambitious goals, and powerful capabilities and influence in the world.

U.S. adversaries’ cooperation has nevertheless been uneven and driven mostly by a shared interest in circumventing or undermining U.S. power, whether it be economic, diplomatic, or military. Concerns over escalation control and directly confronting the United States, as well as some divergent political interests, have tempered the pace and scope of these relationships. The leaders, though, are likely to continue to look for opportunities to collaborate, especially in areas in which there are mutual advantages and they lack other ways of achieving their aims toward or resisting the United States alone.

Russia has been a catalyst for the evolving ties, especially as it grows more reliant on other countries for its objectives and requirements including in but not limited to Ukraine. Moscow has strengthened its military cooperation with other states, especially Pyongyang and Tehran. Russia also has expanded its trade and financial ties, particularly with China and Iran, to mitigate the impact of sanctions and export controls.

The PRC is providing economic and security assistance to Russia’s war in Ukraine through support to Moscow’s defense industrial base, including by providing dual-use material and components for weapons. China’s support has improved Russia’s ability to overcome material losses in the war and launch strikes into Ukraine. Trade between China and Russia has been increasing since the start of the war in Ukraine, helping Moscow to withstand U.S. sanctions.
Iran has become a key military supplier to Russia, especially of UAVs, and in exchange, Moscow has offered Tehran military and technical support to advance Iranian weapons, intelligence, and cyber capabilities.
North Korea has sent munitions, missiles, and thousands of combat troops to Russia to support the latter’s war against Ukraine, justified as fulfilling commitments made in the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that Pyongyang and Moscow announced in June 2024.

Cooperation between China and Russia has the greatest potential to pose enduring risks to U.S. interests. Their leaders probably believe they are more capable of countering perceived U.S. aggression together than alone, given a shared belief that the United States is seeking to constrain each adversary.

For at least a decade, Beijing and Moscow have used high-profile, combined military activities primarily to signal the strength of the China–Russia defense ties. This relationship has deepened during the Russia-Ukraine war, with China providing Russia dual-use equipment and weapons components to sustain combat operations.
Russia has increased its oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to China in an effort to maintain revenues in the face of sanctions by Western states.
China is using its increased cooperation with Russia to attain a stronger presence in the Arctic and legitimize its influence there. One area of cooperation is China’s production of icebreaker ships that enable safe passage through Arctic waters.
The two countries probably will expand combined bomber patrols and naval operations in the Arctic theater to signal their cooperation and make it more concrete. In November, they also agreed to expand their cooperation on developing the NSR for its economic potential and as an alternative to Western dominated routes.

https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Iran Orders Material From China for Hundreds of Ballistic Missiles

Tehran wants to bolster military capacity amid contentious nuclear talks with U.S.

https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701

By Laurence Norman

June 5, 2025 7:00 pm ET

Missiles on display in Tehran last year. Photo: majid asgaripour/Reuters

Key Points

What's This?

Iran ordered thousands of tons of ballistic-missile ingredients from China, people familiar with the transaction said, as it seeks to rebuild its military prowess after conflict with Israel.
Shipments of ammonium perchlorate could fuel hundreds of ballistic missiles. Some material could be sent to Iran-aligned militias, one of the people said.
Iran seeks to bolster regional allies and its arsenal amid nuclear talks with the U.S.; its missile program suffered setbacks in October after an Israeli attack.

Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ballistic-missile ingredients from China, people familiar with the transaction said, seeking to rebuild its military prowess as it discusses the future of its nuclear program with the U.S.

Shipments of ammonium perchlorate are expected to reach Iran in coming months and could fuel hundreds of ballistic missiles, the people said. Some of the material would likely be sent to militias in the region aligned with Iran, including Houthis in Yemen, one of the people said.

Iran wants to bolster regional allies and rebuild its arsenal while it pushes deeper into contentious talks with the Trump administration over its nuclear program. Iran has continued to expand its stockpiles of uranium enriched to just below weapons grade and ruled out negotiating limits on its missile program.

President Trump said he discussed the negotiations in a call with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. “Time is running out on Iran’s decision pertaining to nuclear weapons,” Trump wrote Wednesday in a social-media post.

An Iranian entity called Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Co. ordered the missile ingredients in the past few months from Hong Kong-based Lion Commodities Holdings Ltd., people familiar with the order said.

Lion Commodities director Nelson Barba didn’t respond to a request for comment. Pishgaman couldn’t be reached for comment.

A military parade in Tehran last year. Photo: abedin taherkenareh/Shutterstock

Iran’s mission to the United Nations didn’t respond to a request for comment. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said China wasn’t aware of the contract.

“The Chinese side has always exercised strict control over dual-use items in accordance with China’s export control laws and regulations and its international obligations,” the spokesperson said.

Iran has been looking for ways to rebuild its so-called Axis of Resistance network of militias after Israel pummeled Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and the Assad regime fell in Syria. U.S. and Israeli strikes on the Houthis damaged the group’s capabilities, though they still threaten Israel.

Iran recently transferred ballistic missiles to Shia militia groups in Iraq, who could target Israel and U.S. forces in the region they have previously attacked, the people confirmed. The missile transfers were previously reported by the Times of London.

After the U.S. in 2020 killed Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Iraqi Shia groups fired at least a dozen ballistic missiles at the U.S. Al Asad air base in the country.

Iran has one of the biggest ballistic missile programs in the region, U.S. officials have said. Ammonium perchlorate, an oxidizer used in fireworks, is essential to the solid propellant used in Iran’s most effective ballistic missiles.

Earlier this year, two Iranian ships docked in China were loaded with more than 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a precursor for producing ammonium perchlorate. The material was delivered to Iranian ports in mid-February and late March, according to shipping trackers. The sodium perchlorate was enough to fuel around 260 short-range missiles, officials said.

American soldiers inspecting damage at the Al Asad air base in Iraq in 2020. Photo: Ali Abdul Hassan/Associated Press

The new, larger contract for ammonium perchlorate could be enough for Iran to produce 800 missiles, one official said. The contract was signed months ago, likely before Trump said he had proposed nuclear talks to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in early March.

The U.S. Treasury on April 29 sanctioned six people and six entities based in Iran and China for their role in “procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients,” including sodium perchlorate, for Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Two weeks later, it added sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong entities and people for aiding Iran’s ballistic missile industry.

Treasury in May added sodium perchlorate to the list of materials it says are being used for Iran’s military, nuclear or ballistic missile programs. “Chinese entities and individuals have provided support to Iran’s ballistic missile program, as well as to the Houthis’ missile and UAV production efforts, which is why we continue to identify and sanction them,” a State Department official said.

In November 2022, U.S. naval forces said they intercepted a vessel in the Gulf of Oman carrying over 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate on a route commonly used by Iran to send weapons to the Houthis in Yemen.

Firefighters at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee port after an explosion in April. Photo: meysam mirsadeh/AFP/Getty Images

An injured person being carried after April’s explosion at the port. Photo: MOHAMMAD RASOLE MORADI/IRNA/AFP/Getty Images

Israel severely damaged Iran’s ability to produce new solid propellant missiles in October by taking out around a dozen so-called planetary mixers, used to blend components for the missiles.

Iran has started to repair the mixers, one official said. That means much of the material imported from China could remain in Iran but some is expected to be sent to militia including the Houthis, the official said.

Iran likely needs material from abroad to avoid bottlenecks in its domestic production capabilities, said Fabian Hinz, a military analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Storing the combustible material creates risks. An April explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port, which handles most of Iran’s container trade, killed dozens of people, state media said. The explosion was the result of mishandling of explosive material by a unit of the IRGC’s Quds Force. At least some of the sodium perchlorate imported from China earlier this year was lost in the explosion, one official said.

“These substances are a major fire and explosive hazard,” Hinz said. “Iran’s defense industrial complex does not have a strong track record in ensuring safety standards.”

Last month, Iran’s customs authorities issued an order to accelerate the clearing of “hazardous materials” through customs.

Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com

Appeared in the June 6, 2025, print edition as 'Iran Taps China for Fuel for Ballistic Missiles'.

22. Could US and Israel Destroy Iran’s Nuke Program? Yep, Here’s How

Could US and Israel Destroy Iran’s Nuke Program? Yep, Here’s How

Israel wants to strike while Tehran’s defenses are at their weakest, but Trump is offering one last chance for peace.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-06-06/us-israel-could-destroy-iran-s-nuclear-sites-if-it-rejects-trump-deal?srnd=phx-opinion-politics-and-policy&sref=hhjZtX76

June 6, 2025 at 12:00 AM EDT

By James Stavridis

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group.

A B-2 stealth bomber drops a laser-guided bomb. Source: US Air Force via Getty Images

Despite hopeful signals from President Donald Trump’s administration about a potential nuclear deal with Iran, the fundamentals don’t look good. Trump said this week, rightly, that the US would not allow Tehran any form of uranium enrichment capability (although top aides have sent mixed signals). Iran, conversely, makes the unconvincing claim that it would use enrichment capacity not to build an atomic weapon, but to feed nuclear power plants.

Israel, meanwhile, is sending blatant signals that it is ready and enthusiastic to launch strikes at Tehran’s nuclear facilities now, while Iranian air defenses are still weakened after two years of sporadic conflict. Trump is telling the Israelis to cool their jets (literally) while he tries to forge a peaceful arrangement. But he is equally clear that if talks collapse, the next step may well be joint US-Israeli strikes.

You can bet that serious planning for strikes is in progress at the Pentagon, US Central Command in Tampa, Florida, and Israeli Defense Forces HQ. General plans for such an assault, of course, have been in existence for decades and are frequently updated — most recently after the significant Israeli airstrikes months ago.

What would joint Israeli-US assaults on Iran’s nuclear facilities look like? How effective would they be? In other words, what is the risk-benefit calculus for such an audacious and aggressive move?

The most obvious and necessary element of such an operation would come from the air: a combination of cruise missiles, drones and manned aircraft. But before any bombs are dropped over Iranian nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow, there would be significant military preparation.

First would be a comprehensive offensive cyberwar campaign, probably coinciding with an onslaught of cruise missiles and drones attacking Tehran’s remaining Russian-supplied S-300 and S-200 air-defense stations, and Iranian surface-to-air systems like the Bavar 373 or Khordad 15. The cyber-offensive would best be set off inside Tehran’s military electric grid: The Israelis probably have that ability — essentially cyber-boots on the ground.

The Israelis would probably also use some level of special forces. The strike they conducted on Iranian missile production facilities in Syria in 2024, Operation Many Ways, is instructive in that they used Shaldag Unit commandos dropped in by helicopters. For the IDF and Mossad (Israel’s intelligence agency) to get real ground power in place would require transporting commandos significant distances. One option would be to use an Israeli naval flotilla to get the special forces close enough for helicopter movements.

The combination of cruise missiles and drone attacks would be where US combat power would come into play — particularly with long range Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile volleys from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers. US submarines could also contribute, although their missile inventories are far below those of the surface ships. The cruise missiles would be focused on destroying Iran’s air-defense batteries, electric grid, early warning radars and strategic communications nodes.

Simultaneously, a wave of drones would be sent to take out the Iranian air force before it could get into the skies. Tehran’s planes are mostly old by modern combat standards, including ancient US-made F4 and F14 fighters (think Tom Cruise in Top Gun in the 1980s), and have significant maintenance problems.

They would be easy prey in the air, but knocking them out while they are still parked on the ground — much like the Ukrainians did to Russia’s strategic bombers last week — would further de-risk the battlefield.

This phase would use a combination of Israeli and American aircraft. The most sophisticated planes flown by both air forces are the fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, which could operate from land bases in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and be refueled in the air by KC-135 and KC-46 super tankers. The American aircraft could also come from the sea — it would be best to have at least two aircraft carriers, with 80 combat aircraft each. (Currently there is only one carrier strike group in the region, but another could be there in less than two weeks.) Israel’s older F-18s and F-16s, alongside carrier-based US F/A-18 Hornets, could be used to mop up any remaining Iranian aircraft after the air defenses were thoroughly denuded.

Then would come the main event: heavy air strikes, probably led by US B-2 Spirit strategic bombers carrying 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrators, aka “bunker busters.” The US recently positioned up to eight of the stealth bombers at striking positions on the island of Diego Garcia, southeast of Iran in the Indian Ocean. They were replaced last month by a fleet of venerable B-52s, but could return within a matter of hours.

Iran’s best defense isn’t missiles or planes, however — it is that much of the uranium-enrichment program is buried deep underground and hardened against bombing. Still, I wouldn’t want to be in the central centrifuge rooms when the B-2s arrive. Conservative estimates of battle damage indicate the program would be knocked back by at least a year.

Unfortunately, the Iranians likely have important sites we don’t know about — the “known unknowns” my old boss Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld talked about. Iran is a huge country, almost two and a half times the size of Texas, much of it mountainous and difficult to fully surveil from space. This would be a challenging mission indeed.

Iran would respond vigorously to a massive strike. Counterattacks would be both direct and asymmetrical, and would almost certainly include another volley of ballistic missiles at Israel (far larger than the ineffective attack last year), alongside strikes from what’s left of Hezbollah’s inventory in Syria. Bombings at US and Israeli embassies and commercial facilities worldwide would be likely, and cyberattacks a certainty.

Tehran might close the Strait of Hormuz with mines, small craft and short-range surface-to-surface missiles. This would shut down 35% of the world’s oil and gas shipments, and it would take perhaps months for the US and allies to reopen it. Tehran might also strike at Saudi or UAE offshore oil and gas facilities, or even attack the Saudis’ main energy facilities on land.

If Tehran goes this far, it would widen the war to potentially include strikes on Iranian naval facilities in the Indian Ocean, major military bases inland, or other command-and-control sites. Re-opening the Strait of Hormuz would likely pull in America’s European and Gulf allies.

But having lost control of its decimated proxies — Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis — Iran has few moves left on the chessboard. It’s said that Iran’s progenitor, the Persian Empire, was one of the first societies to play the game of chess. If Tehran blows this chance to negotiate with the US, it is headed to a very dark endgame indeed.

Stavridis is dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is on the boards of Aon, Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the cybersecurity sector.

The President’s Path to the Right Side of History

By Rob Dannenberg

Former Head of Security, Goldman Sachs

thecipherbrief.com · June 5, 2025

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE/OPINION -- “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” The powerful statement by then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan delivered on June 12, 1987, in West Berlin was a clear demand by the leader of the free world directed at the leader of the Soviet Union. A year and a half later, the Berlin Wall fell, setting off a chain of events that ultimately resulted in German reunification, the end of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the liberation of eastern Europe.

Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union collapsed. Reagan’s demand had proven to the world the power of the West and the determination of its leader to bring an end to the evil political system represented by the Soviet Union—the 20th Century’s most imperialistic power.

The world of the 21st Century is now faced with a challenge represented by another imperialist and dictator, Vladimir Putin, the leader of the Russian Federation, who in February 2022, launched an invasion of Ukraine and plunged Europe into its largest conflict since the end of the Second World War in 1945.

At the time Reagan delivered his speech, there were already indications that the Soviet system was weakening. The Soviet economy was under strain from the costs of defense spending among other challenges. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, had begun a cautious program of trying to reform the socialist economy, recognizing that the Soviet-style command economy could not compete with the capitalist economies of the Free World.

The Chernobyl nuclear disaster had occurred 14 months earlier, shaking confidence in Soviet science and crisis management capabilities. There were increasing efforts by citizens of Soviet satellite countries to flee those countries and move West. The Soviet system was wobbling and it’s likely that Reagan’s dramatic remarks in Berlin increased the pace of the weakening of the Soviet system.

Similarly, the argument can be made that Mr. Putin’s system may now be wobbling.

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Last weekend’s stunningly successful drone attacks by Ukrainian forces against Russia’s strategic bomber bases located deep in the territory of the Russian Federation are an important sign of weakness in the Russian system and Putin’s incompetence in managing the invasion of Ukraine has long been evident.

Examples abound, starting with the bad Russian intelligence that Ukraine was weak that marked the initial weeks of the war, to the reliance by Russia on tactics reminiscent of the bloodiest battles in the First World War, to the astonishing advance toward Moscow by Prigozhin’s rebellious Wagner militia forces, to Ukraine’s Kursk invasion of the territory of the Russian Federation, to the ability of Ukrainian naval forces to drive the Russian Black Sea fleet out of the eastern Black Sea, and now the successful attack by Ukraine on an important element in Russia’s nuclear arsenal — an attack that was followed almost immediately by one on the heavily defended bridge over the Kerch Strait.

And today, after three years of war, Ukraine has the ability to infiltrate special forces and position attack drones undetected deep in Russian territory and detonate charges placed against the pylons of a strategically important bridge.

This is equal parts brilliant operational planning and execution by Ukraine and incompetence by the Russian military and Security Services for which there needs to be an accounting.

Vladimir Putin is an autocrat and autocracies are brittle. Eventually their leaders face a reckoning, and it usually comes from within. This war is Putin’s war. He started it for a couple of reasons. One was to fulfill his ambition to rebuild parts of the claimed territory of Imperial Russia which in his mind, includes Ukraine.

Another likely reason Putin started the war is to try and divert the attention of the Russian population from the massive corruption his regime represents.

Some estimates of Putin’s wealth now make him the richest man on the planet. The acolytes, siloviki and oligarchs that make up his regime have similarly enriched themselves — all at the expense of the Russian people. There is clearly nothing like using the propaganda power of state-controlled media to present the false narrative of a threat to Russia from external powers—in this case NATO—and to paint a picture of a “Nazi” regime ruling neighboring Ukraine and persecuting its ethnic Russian population. This is the propaganda that Putin used to justify his unjustifiable war. It—and he—lack both credibility and staying power. There will be a reckoning and that reckoning can be advanced through the strength and vision of Western leaders.

Ukraine’s successful drone attacks exposed the clearly flawed operating assumption by President Trump that Ukraine is losing the war. They are not.

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In some ways, Ukraine has already won. Despite the slow-rolling of support for Ukraine under the Biden Administration and the badgering and bullying by Trump of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainian resolve to resist remains unshaken and their ability to inflict pain on Putin’s Russia continues to be convincingly demonstrated.

According to any number of sources, Russia is approaching a million casualties (forces killed, wounded, captured, or missing) since the start of the war. The loss in military materiel is equally devastating and Russia’s economy—even at full wartime mobilization—cannot build replacement equipment fast enough and must rely on aid from allies like Iran, North Korea, and China. Despite the seeming Russian advantage in the horrible mathematics of war, Ukrainian skill, daring and competence may, in the end, overcome Russia’s advantage in both size and population.

Russia’s response to the Ukrainian strike still remains to be seen, but the impact of the strike will certainly reverberate in the halls of power in the Kremlin and may present a threat to Putin’s regime.

This is why it is critical for the U.S. and the West to provide even more vocal and material support for Ukraine. President Trump and the Republican majorities in both the U.S. House and Senate should immediately advance the sanctions legislation currently under consideration and encourage Europe to expand their sanctions on Russian energy production and revenues. Russia’s economy is already reeling, but revenues from energy keep it from collapsing.

Ukraine’s attacks may also present a unique opportunity for President Trump to get on the right side of history and, in a statement as bold as President Reagan’s, call on Putin to end the war.

Let there be no mistake: this is Putin’s war and only he has the power to end it. Ukraine will not surrender or accept a bad truce or peace deal, nor should they. Ukraine will continue to fight, and one should not be surprised if Ukraine has more ability to take the war to the territory of the Russian Federation as they have demonstrated any number of times since February of 2022.

President Trump’s approach to Putin and the war he started has been flawed from the beginning. He must now realize that Putin is dragging him along with his continued talk of negotiations which is nothing more than “peace theater.” Mr. Putin does not want peace except on terms that would represent complete capitulation by Ukraine and the West.

Mr. Trump should take a lesson from Ukraine and use the current situation to demonstrate firmly to both Putin and the world that Putin’s aggression will not stand, and the United States and the West will stay united and support Ukraine. Mr. Trump has the opportunity to correct the record and get on the right side of history. It could happen in a speech in which he demands: “Mr. Putin, End this War!” Trump could add, “Before it is too late.”

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

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thecipherbrief.com · June 5, 2025

24. Drop NATO’s Pacific Illusion

Excerpts:

Washington should set out its objective, European self-defense, and means, phased U.S. force withdrawal. European governments then would have to assess the perceived threat and develop their response. Future administrations could work with the Europeans while withdrawing American forces. The Europeans could spend as much or little as they wished, without interference from Washington. However, the latter must not abandon its departure plans, irrespective of the whining and wailing that would inevitably result.

The U.S. should still seek European support against China or involvement in other Asian contingencies as a matter of mutual interest. However, attempting to purchase European aid by treating the allies as helpless dependents in Europe is a losing game. For instance, a number of NATO governments offered limited backing for nonessential U.S. operations in Afghanistan (an official alliance mission) and Iraq (an unofficial multilateral project) in return for Americans’ willingness to risk nuclear war with Moscow on their behalf. That was a bad deal for the U.S. It would have been better for Washington if the Europeans deterred Russia, even if they didn’t participate in regime change operations elsewhere. Similarly, Americans remaining in Europe to defend the continent in the hope that next time Berlin might send two frigates to the Pacific would be a bad bargain.

Yes, it would be great if the Europeans took “a big role” in the Asia-Pacific. But only if the Europeans first take over the defense of Europe. To that end, Washington should stop telling them what to do and instead start telling them what the U.S. intends to do, which is to shift responsibility for the continent’s defense to them.

Drop NATO’s Pacific Illusion

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · June 5, 2025

Foreign Affairs

Europeans should focus on defending themselves, not on pretending to counter China.

Credit: Drop of Light

Doug Bandow

Jun 5, 2025 12:01 AM

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The Trump administration may be following its predecessor’s policy in looking to NATO for assistance against China. Alas, expecting European military aid in the Pacific is a fool’s errand. The best way for America’s NATO allies to assist Washington would be to take over their own defense in Europe.

On his recent trip to Asia, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth provided a textbook example of mixed signals. When asked what kind of military role Europe should play in the Indo-Pacific, he responded a “big one.” The People’s Republic of China, Hegseth said, “does not appreciate the presence of other countries” there and it would be “useful” if the PRC had to consider their role when developing policy. At the same time, he allowed, “We would much prefer that the overwhelming balance of European investment be on that continent,” meaning Europe. Elbridge Colby, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, has taken a more forthright position that Europeans should worry about their region first.

Nevertheless, some European governments, reluctant to protect their own homelands, succumb to the “Weltmacht temptation” to exercise power on the world stage. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron, ever busy creating security castles in the air, recently visited Asia and insisted that “France is an Indo-Pacific player.” Last month he issued “a call for action for Europe and Asia to work together on a coalition of independents.” This is “the basis of our Indo-Pacific strategy, which is how to preserve an open environment, rule-based order, in the region. And we want to be a reliable partner for that. This is the core of the bilateral commitment we have with Singapore, but with a lot of countries of the region.” Exactly what he had in mind was unclear, but he apparently envisioned a military role. He added, menacingly: “If China does not want NATO being involved in Southeast Asia or in Asia, they should prevent, clearly, the DPRK to be engaged on the European soil.” (He left unexplained how Beijing could prevent North Korea from cooperating with Russia.)

At least France, like the United Kingdom, has experience in deploying its navy to the Pacific. Most European states can only playact beyond their continent. For instance, Germany has a formal “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and four years ago sent the lone frigate Bayern on a Pacific cruise apparently intended to intimidate China—which contemptuously rejected Berlin’s request for a naval visit to Shanghai. Most European NATO members possess minimal navies. Even France and the UK have, respectively, only 22 and 16 principal surface combatants and 9 and 10 submarines. As for the others? The most numerous are Italy with 18 and eight, Turkey with 17 and 13, Greece with 13 and 10, Germany with 11 and six, and Spain with 11 and two. Moreover, Turkey’s and Greece’s fleets are directed at each other, and the quality of other nations’ ships and subs vary widely. Yet two years ago the European Union’s then-de facto foreign minister, Josep Borrell, issued a “call on European navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to show Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area.”

(The issue works the other way as well. Ousted South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol regularly attended NATO summits and cooperated with the transatlantic alliance, despite the far more pressing threat posed by North Korea and sporadic tensions with China. Newly elected President Lee Jae-myung indicated that he is likely to skip the upcoming alliance meeting, and seems less likely to make Europe’s defense a South Korean priority.)

Of course, the ideal would be European security partners able and willing to provide meaningful assistance to America in the event of a confrontation with China. Most important, however, would be a European coalition that possessed sufficient conventional and nuclear assets to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russia and any other unfriendly states in or near Europe. That is, to not insist on the U.S. maintaining tens of thousands of troops and massive amounts of materiel on the continent, backed by a formal security guarantee—seemingly forever.

If the continent took over its own defense, it also could prepare to cooperate economically with America and others in response to Chinese aggression against Taiwan or other regional states. This would be a major improvement over the current system, in which the U.S. is expected to patrol the Asia-Pacific and be prepared to rescue Europe from Russia.

Another serious problem is Washington’s continued insistence on telling others what they should do. No government, even an ally, likes being ordered about as if it was equivalent to the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Indeed, Macron told the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue: “we want to cooperate, but we do not want to depend. We want to cooperate, but we do not want to be instructed on a daily basis what is allowed, what is not allowed, and how our life will change because of the decision of a single person.”

Instead of attempting to dictate to the Europeans, the U.S. should explain what it plans to do, while working with them as they craft a response. Although Europe’s decades of anemic military effort reflect calculated cheap-riding, continental governments and peoples also assess threats differently. Even during the Cold War most European NATO members feared a Soviet invasion less than did Washington. European governments insisted on building a natural gas pipeline to the USSR even as U.S. administrations deployed armored divisions, air wings, and tactical nuclear weapons to defend against the presumed Soviet threat.

No surprise, then, European politicians were not inclined to spend more money on their militaries to defend against a danger they believed to be overblown or even nonexistent. Their peoples understandably preferred to construct generous welfare states rather than deploy expansive militaries. These attitudes prevailed until Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Even now, many Europeans perceive little threat from Moscow. The latter has demonstrated neither the desire nor ability to march to the Atlantic, instead singling out Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO. If Russia continues to struggle to make small gains against Ukraine while suffering drone and missile attacks deep within its territory, who imagines that it could conquer the rest of Europe? Even major countries such as Spain and Italy continue to do as little as possible while seeking to avoid widespread censure. Some nominal allies probably would dismantle their militaries entirely if they thought doing so was feasible.

Washington should set out its objective, European self-defense, and means, phased U.S. force withdrawal. European governments then would have to assess the perceived threat and develop their response. Future administrations could work with the Europeans while withdrawing American forces. The Europeans could spend as much or little as they wished, without interference from Washington. However, the latter must not abandon its departure plans, irrespective of the whining and wailing that would inevitably result.

The U.S. should still seek European support against China or involvement in other Asian contingencies as a matter of mutual interest. However, attempting to purchase European aid by treating the allies as helpless dependents in Europe is a losing game. For instance, a number of NATO governments offered limited backing for nonessential U.S. operations in Afghanistan (an official alliance mission) and Iraq (an unofficial multilateral project) in return for Americans’ willingness to risk nuclear war with Moscow on their behalf. That was a bad deal for the U.S. It would have been better for Washington if the Europeans deterred Russia, even if they didn’t participate in regime change operations elsewhere. Similarly, Americans remaining in Europe to defend the continent in the hope that next time Berlin might send two frigates to the Pacific would be a bad bargain.

Yes, it would be great if the Europeans took “a big role” in the Asia-Pacific. But only if the Europeans first take over the defense of Europe. To that end, Washington should stop telling them what to do and instead start telling them what the U.S. intends to do, which is to shift responsibility for the continent’s defense to them.

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · June 5, 2025

25. Inside the US Army's Pacific war prep, from unfamiliar aircraft landings to drone warfare

Inside the US Army's Pacific war prep, from unfamiliar aircraft landings to drone warfare

Business Insider · by Chris Panella

The exercise is the latest between the US and the Philippines, as both allies beef up their cooperation amid rising tensions in the region. US Army Photo by Spc. Matthew Keegan

2025-06-05T10:17:02Z

The US Army is training with the Philippines on new tech, weapons, and tactics.
That includes flying and landing aircraft in unfamiliar locations in varying western Pacific weather.
Keeping troops alive in the environment and giving them the latest drones is also key.

Out in the islands of the western Pacific, the US Army and a strategic ally are landing aircraft in places they don't know, testing new drones and sensors, and trying to keep soldiers hidden in the electromagnetic spectrum.

The training is focused on adapting to the quickening pace of innovation on the battlefield, a general told Business Insider.

In the Philippines, soldiers from Hawaii's 25th Infantry Division are conducting their annual Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center- Exportable exercise. The division and its Philippine counterparts, about 2,000 personnel, are preparing for the possibility of a conflict in the Pacific.

The threat of a war with China is at the forefront of US military thinking about the region.

The environment poses the biggest challenge. This area is largely tropical, mostly water with islands scattered about. Maj. Gen. Marcus Evans, commander of the division, said temperatures are high and soldiers are grappling with the rain, wind, and humidity from monsoon season. These environmental factors are impacting how drones operate and how troops sustain themselves.

New technologies and weapons, including drones, counter-UAS systems, reconnaissance capabilities, and more, are on display at JPMRC-X. US Army Photo by Spc. Matthew Keegan

The exercise stretches across land, air, and sea, among other combat domains, and the operations are testing soldiers. "Each and every day, they are having to fly in varying terrain to different helicopter landing zones working around the different weather patterns," Evans said of the air operations. Some pilots are flying in temperatures and landing on terrain with which they are unfamiliar.

On the ground, troops are learning to drive infantry squad vehicles that can move over sand and through jungles. The vehicles carry everything soldiers will need when they're alone in the environment — more water, food, and power are priorities. At an exercise last year, troops were given bottled water. Now, they're working with a purification system that allows them to draw water from rivers and streams.

Among the weapons they're working with are emerging technologies like drones, which come with challenges. They're flying shorter distances and for less time due to the temperature and weather.

Soldiers are also working with counter-uncrewed aerial systems, reconnaissance and electronic warfare capabilities, and technology to help obscure or hide signatures from enemies. Much of it is a glimpse at what soldiers would need in the future war.

The exercise is a sort of stress-test, not just not on the vehicles, aircraft, weapons, and systems, but also the individual soldier. They're operating the drones across formations, using counter-UAS systems to defeat enemy drones, and looking at the electromagnetic spectrum to keep hidden.

Troops on the ground have to change tactics and strategies quickly. US Army Photo by Spc. Aiden O'Marra

It's also an opportunity for troops to innovate from the bottom up. Warfare technology is moving at breakneck speeds — urging, as Evans said, the need to be more agile in employing them but also knowing the threats and how to defend against them.

He told BI about one soldier who was flying a first-person view drone. They used a medium-range reconnaissance drone to "serve as a pathfinder," effectively navigating the FPV drone behind the reconnaissance one to have a better sense of the battlefield and get in a position to strike enemy targets.

"No one had talked to him about [that], trained him on [it], but he was innovating with the equipment that he was given," Evans said.

In Evans' view, having the soldiers out there working with and learning from the Philippine Army is crucial. "The longer we stay in the field, the more things that we can stress, the more things we test out and understand the true limitations in this kind of harsh environment," he said.

26. Trump’s pivot to Asia is a turn away from Europe

Trump’s pivot to Asia is a turn away from Europe

By Ned Temko Columnist

June 05, 2025, 2:23 p.m. ET

London

The Christian Science Monitor · by The Christian Science Monitor · June 5, 2025

The full scale of Donald Trump’s ambition to remake U.S. foreign policy – and redefine America’s approach to the world – has become clearer in the past few days, with the rollout of his version of an Obama-era initiative dubbed the “pivot to Asia.”

It builds on one of the few remaining areas of bipartisan consensus in Washington – countering the rising economic clout, military strength, and geopolitical ambitions of China.

But Mr. Trump’s approach could hardly be more different than the shift begun under Mr. Obama and expanded by President Joe Biden.

Why We Wrote This

Donald Trump’s “pivot to Asia” is not a new concept, but it differs in key ways from President Barack Obama’s strategy. As he wages a tariff war in Asia, will Mr. Trump find the regional allies he needs?

President Trump’s bet is that it will also be more effective: a show of power that will ultimately allow for creative dealmaking with Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is designed to ensure, as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told a major Asian security conference last Saturday, that “China will not invade Taiwan on his [Mr. Trump’s] watch.”

But he will have to reckon with two imponderables.

How will Mr. Xi respond? At least initially, China’s pushback on Mr. Hegseth’s address has been scalding.

And what of America’s Asian allies, described by Mr. Hegseth as key “force multipliers”?

They are feeling conflicted, confused, and unsettled about Mr. Trump’s America these days, and not only because of his sudden announcement in April of sweeping tariffs on their exports to the United States.

They are front-row spectators in Mr. Trump’s on-and-off tariff war with China, a key trading partner for many of them, and they are worried by the prospect of being caught in the middle of a major superpower showdown.

They have also been watching Mr. Trump loosen his commitment to the countries that had been America’s closest allies since World War II: the NATO member states of Europe.

It is from Europe that the contrast between Mr. Trump’s “pivot” and the Obama-era vision appears most stark.

When then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first set out the policy in a 2011 essay, she presented the pivot as building on, not downgrading, the transatlantic alliance.

But under Mr. Trump, it has begun to look like a pivot away from the European allies. The president has suggested that America’s security commitment to them could depend on whether he thinks that they have been spending enough on defense.

He has also prioritized ending the Ukraine war over heeding European allies’ warning that a peace deal should not reward Russian President Vladimir Putin for his 2022 invasion.

Sgt. Ezekieljay Correa/U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Marines take part in a training exercise with Australian troops in Australia, designed to improve force interoperability in the Indo-Pacific.

That view is shared by America’s major allies in Asia. They are concerned that such an outcome could embolden Mr. Xi to make good on his pledge to make the island democracy of Taiwan part of China, by force if necessary.

The encouraging news for the Trump administration is that Washington already has strong, and expanding, security partnerships with key Asian countries, including Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines and Taiwan.

The Biden administration also increased security cooperation with other major players, including India, and encouraged closer ties among regional partners.

They share America’s concerns about China’s growing power, and Beijing’s increasing readiness to brandish it, especially in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

And they view U.S. support as vital to their security.

So they will have welcomed Mr. Hegseth’s overall message – that the Indo-Pacific was now the American military’s “priority theater.”

Ditto his insistence that Mr. Trump did not seek conflict with China, but a “peace through strength” that would make the “costs too high” for Beijing to “dominate us – or our allies and partners.”

But they were left in no doubt that their terms of engagement with Washington, and of any new “peace” arrangement with Beijing, would be set by Mr. Trump.

“President Trump was elected to apply America First on the world stage,” Mr. Hegseth declared.

“We ask – and indeed insist – that our allies and partners do their part,” he added, telling them that they “can, and should, quickly upgrade their own defenses.”

Echoing what he called the administration’s “tough love” approach to NATO, he called on Asian allies to ratchet up their defense spending to 5% of GDP. That is clearly out of early realistic reach, even in those countries already increasing their military outlays.

South Korea, for example, facing a nuclear-armed North Korea, spends less than 3% of its GDP on defense.

Mr. Hegseth’s message had particular force because Mr. Trump has in the past openly questioned the cost of American military support for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. He has also suggested Taiwan had “stolen” the role of preeminent producer of advanced microchips from U.S. companies.

Still, Washington’s Asian allies can hope that strongly shared security interests, and Mr. Trump’s determination to achieve “peace through strength” with China, will shield them from the kind of tensions shaking the transatlantic partnership.

On the other hand, amid Mr. Hegseth’s praise for his boss’s guiding worldview – that “America does not have or seek permanent enemies” – NATO’s experience has left some of them wondering whether, under Mr. Trump, America can be relied on as a permanent friend.

The Christian Science Monitor · by The Christian Science Monitor · June 5, 2025

27. Fusion Energy Is The Key To World Hegemony

Fusion: A game changer?

Fusion Energy Is The Key To World Hegemony

Forbes · by Wal van Lierop · June 5, 2025

What would it take for the United States to lose its hegemony to a rising power like China?

Right now, America appears to be ahead economically and militarily. However, there is a stark difference between America’s national strategy (insofar as one exists) and China’s.

The US under President Trump calls for regression. It seeks to restore a manufacturing economy that peaked in the 1950s—like an elderly man trying to restore hair where it hasn’t grown for decades. It is doubling down on domestic oil, gas and coal. Through tariffs, disparagement of NATO and aggression towards allies like Canada and Denmark, the administration has alienated partners that long supported a US-led world order.

Fusion will be a key element to become an energy superpower. (Wal van Lierop)

getty

China, meanwhile, has a tremendous lead in developing the economy of the future. It has a near monopoly on rare earth minerals, which are needed for electronics, renewable energy systems, defense technologies and more. China leads in solar, wind and batteries, the energy systems growing at the fastest rate. It is ahead in electric vehicles, industrial robotics and drones as well. It probably has achieved parity in artificial intelligence and may surpass the US soon. If China were to take Taiwan, it would control the global market for advanced chip manufacturing.

In the background, but probably most importantly, China may be on track to commercialize fusion energy before the US or its disgruntled allies. Unlike the US, China has no domestic energy industry with vocal lobbyists (and purchasable politicians) to slow progress. It is funding fusion as a national strategy while private fusion companies in the West are at the mercy of investors that, for the most part, chase low risk and quick returns.

Fusion promises cheap, plentiful, baseload energy without carbon emissions. AI, data centers and industrial robotics powered by fusion would produce goods and services at much lower costs than value chains dependent on fossil-fired electricity. Militaries built on swarms of small, cheap, electronic drones and robots—powered by small, distributed fusion facilities deep underground, safe from attack—would have an edge over competitors using large, expensive, petroleum-powered vehicles with vulnerable supply chains.

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I cannot overstate the ramifications of China developing fusion first. As an analogy, imagine if Japan and Germany had uncovered vast reserves of oil at home in the 1920s. American and Soviet oil gave the Allies a strategic advantage over the Axis powers. Had the situation been reversed, World War II could have ended differently.

While private fusion companies in the West have raised about $8 billion total, China is investing at least $1.5 annually into fusion projects—double what the US government spends. Japanese and German investments in fusion don’t even come close. Canada, for the record, has no fusion funding strategy. Moreover, the government of British Columbia, home of industry leader General Fusion, seems not to understand the value of this crown asset.*

On all fronts nuclear, China is leaping ahead. In April, its scientists added fresh fuel to an operational thorium molten salt reactor—a first. The thorium reserves found in Inner Mongolia, an autonomous region of China, could theoretically meet Chinese energy demand for thousands of years. The kicker: this reactor design originated in the US. As project lead Xu Hongjie put it, “The US left its research publicly available, waiting for the right successor. We were that successor."

Moreover, in January, China’s Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST) sustained a fusion reaction for 1,066 seconds, setting a new record. Its Burning Plasma Experimental Superconducting Tokamak (BEST) fusion reactor could come online by 2027 and is expected to produce five times the amount of energy it consumes. When BEST announces this milestone, Western fusion companies may be announcing that they’ve run out of funding.

To China, fusion is not a startup project—it’s a matter of national interest and security. Its scientists are patenting more fusion-related technologies than any other single country and graduating more doctorates in fusion-related fields. And because China is the top refiner and exporter of the critical minerals needed in fusion reactors (e.g., for magnets), no external force is going to slow their progress. In the meantime, China has a cheap gas station next door—Russia—supplying all the fossil fuels China could need in exchange for support in its war with Ukraine. That support includes critical minerals needed by Russian arms manufacturers.

Is fusion energy, along with other Chinese-dominated technologies, enough to end US hegemony?

In 1988, historian Paul Kennedy published The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, a book that tried to explain the relative success (and failure) of powerful states. According to Kennedy, their rise and fall “…shows a very significant correlation over the longer term between productive and revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the other.”

Essentially, states must balance economic prosperity with strategy. Technological breakthroughs are vital to both. Innovation creates wealth, which enables the state to invest in defense and win wars. While underinvestment in defense leaves the state vulnerable to other powers, overextension and overspending on defense can run an economy into the ground, leaving it unable to sustain a strong military.

Now, picture a great power—China—with a military to rival the US and fusion reactors that provide virtually unlimited energy. Imagine the clout China would have in establishing ports, military bases and consumer markets around the world if it could license that fusion technology.

A China that exceeds the US in energy, industry, intelligence, mobility and defense is positioned to usurp it. Of course, China could bungle its advantage. Authoritarian regimes have a habit of mismanaging internal dissent, falsifying reality and making preventable mistakes.

The rise of China is inevitable, but the self-inflicted decline of the US and its allies isn’t. Rather, it’s a choice reflecting how societies invest their resources and envision their future.

*Disclosure: The author is an investor in General Fusion and sits on its board of directors.

Forbes · by Wal van Lierop · June 5, 2025

28. Brain control warfare: China’s bleeding-edge strategy for winning without firing a shot

Brain control warfare: China’s bleeding-edge strategy for winning without firing a shot

washingtontimes.com

Brain control warfare: China's bleeding-edge strategy for winning without firing a shot - Washington Times

U.S. and allied militaries are ill-prepared to counter growing PLA cognitive warfare threats

Chinese military personnel in a high-tech government hacking room work on stealing state secrets from rival countries in hybrid war. File photo credit: DC Studio via Shutterstock. Chinese military personnel in a high-tech … more >

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Thursday, June 5, 2025

The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu once declared that subduing your enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. For China today, that goal is closer to being realized through new weaponry and capabilities that Beijing calls cognitive warfare.

China’s most recent experience with large-scale war took place over 70 years ago in Korea. Human waves of troops were sent into battle against better-armed U.S. and allied forces. The result was a slaughter — the People’s Liberation Army lost between 400,000 and 1 million soldiers.

Today, the PLA is no longer planning human wave military attacks. Instead, many of its researchers are working on advanced warfare capabilities that combine high-technology hardware with biotechnology research focused on the human brain.

The goal, driven by the ideology of Chinese-style Marxism-Leninism, is nothing less than world domination and a global populace under the control of China’s communist regime, according to the analysts and specialists who have studied Beijing’s leaders.

Cognitive warfare experts interviewed for this report say there is evidence China has embraced the development and eventual use of weapons designed to affect the mind — with the troops and commanders of adversarial militaries to entire civilian populations serving as potential targets.

Most details of the work on Chinese cognitive warfare remain closely guarded U.S. government secrets, but clues first surfaced officially in December 2021. That’s when the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security announced sanctions against the PLA’s Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences and 11 related research institutes.

Commerce banned U.S. firms from doing business with the labs, which were working on biotechnology, including “purported brain-control weaponry,” on behalf of the Chinese military.

That unspecified effort was enough to trigger national security sanctions. But all details of the research remain under wraps.

In December, the Pentagon for the first time disclosed in its annual report on China that Beijing in 2016 launched something called the China Brain Project, a multi-year program designed to unlock human cognitive functions and neural pathways in support of civilian and military applications.

According to the Pentagon, the research has included brain-computer interface activities that enable humans and computers to interact and exchange information through implants in the brain or on the skull.

There have also been experiments with mind control of remote machines — technology that could give PLA commanders and troops optimized command-and-control networks, and the ability to maximize the use of advanced weapons systems and other military equipment for more rapid and precise attacks.

Other work includes what the report said is “emotion detection,” a technology useful for cognitive warfare in influencing enemy troop morale in war, as well as in establishing control over civilian populations.

PLA scientists are also working on military applications for brain research that will produce more mentally agile combat troops equipped with greater mobility and increased situational awareness.

“The PLA is exploring a range of ’neurocognitive warfare’ capabilities that exploit adversaries using neuroscience and psychology,” the report said without elaborating.

Other than the brief Commerce notice in 2021 and the Pentagon report in December, no other official details on Chinese cognitive warfare have been made public.

But recently published science articles and interviews with cognitive warfare experts indicate the Chinese military is moving forward with major strategic investments in what the PLA calls a new domain of warfare to complement its massive buildup of military hardware.

“The emergence of cognitive warfare — which manipulates cognition to destabilize sociocultural, economic, political and military systems — poses a unique threat to America and its allies,” said Josh Baughman, an analyst at the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute.

“This type of warfare differs from information warfare in that it aims to influence how, not what, people think, feel, and act, altering the cognitive space from individual to population levels,” he said in an interview.

Mr. Baughman recently revealed in a new book that cognitive warfare is now a pivotal component of the People’s Liberation Army strategy for achieving victory in war.

Writing in the U.S. military edited book “Human, Machine War: How the Mind-Tech Nexus Will Win Future Wars,” the defense analyst wrote that the PLA believes its ultimate victory will come from destroying an adversary’s will to fight.

The United States, he said, urgently needs to understand how the PLA’s focus on cognitive warfare has shifted the battleground of a potential conflict with China from physical territory to the minds of Americans.

Failure to understand this new concept of war, he said, could lead to China conquering America’s allies — or even the United States itself — without firing a shot.

For the PLA, the nexus of mind and technology is fundamental to winning the cognitive war, and the tools of the trade include social media, the metaverse, smartphone apps such as TikTok, wearable technology, virtual reality, artificial intelligence and especially generative AI.

Chinese-controlled apps like TikTok offer China the means to wage warfare on the battlefield of the mind, according to researchers.

Ian Oxnevad, senior fellow in national security at the National Association of Scholars, said TikTok is “one of [China’s] foremost cognitive weapons.”

The popular video-sharing app was banned in the U.S. but given a temporary reprieve by President Trump.

TikTok has been blamed for popularizing dangerous fads, criticized for promoting discredited diversity, equity and inclusion programs on college campuses and accused of fueling anti-Israel protests. All while collecting reams of personal data on Americans.

China’s strategy of cognitive warfare is “to make America angry and stupid with an app has proven remarkably successful,” Mr. Oxnevad said.

Roots in Soviet science

China was not the first to conduct research on cognitive warfare.

The Soviet Union and later Russia studied a cognitive warfighting concept called “reflexive control” for more than 40 years. Reflexive control seeks to convey to a partner or adversary specially prepared information that will lead to a target voluntarily making a predetermined decision — one preselected by the Russians.

Reflexive control includes disinformation, camouflage and other strategic tools used against either the minds of enemy leaders and troops or through computer-based decision-making processors, such as those now emerging through artificial intelligence.

The term reflexive control has become “intellectual information warfare” in today’s Russian military.

According to Russian military writings, the tactic works by distracting the enemy, overloading information systems, creating exhaustion by tricking adversaries into useless operations and using the power of suggestion to introduce disinformation that will affect an enemy legally, morally or ideologically.

Timothy L. Thomas, a China warfare expert with the Mitre Corp. predicts mind-centered conflict will become the major battle domain that will revolutionize warfare in the not too distant future.

“Human fighters will fade away and intelligent equipment will be brought onto the battlefield,” he said. “Cross-domain unconventional and asymmetrical fighting will be the new normal, and intelligence control will replace territorial control as the center of gravity in war.”

This new form of war that Beijing called “intelligentized warfare” will reshape the rules of engagement and lead to a major restructuring of combat forces so that machine-on-human or machine-on-machine war will become a new standard.

China prioritizes mind warfare

China’s work on brain warfare has been on the radar of U.S. intelligence since at least 2019. Three reports produced that year by the PLA highlight the emphasis being placed on brain warfare.

One report obtained by The Washington Times cited the military uses of advances in science and technology.

“War has started to shift from the pursuit of destroying bodies to paralyzing and controlling the opponent,” states the report headlined, “The Future of the Concept of Military Supremacy.”

“The focus is to attack the enemy’s will to resist, not physical destruction,” the report said.

The PLA now is extending warfare to human consciousness in ways that are “causing the brain to become the main target of offense and defense of new concept weapons,” the report added.

The merger of humans and machines will set off a new contest for controlling the brain, according to the PLA.

“The two combatant sides will use various kinds of brain control technologies and effective designs to focus on taking over the enemy’s way of thinking and his awareness, and even directly intervene in the thinking of the enemy leaders and staff, and with that produce war to control awareness and thinking,” the report said.

A second PLA report disclosed that brain-machine interface is part of Beijing’s plan for the development of intelligentized warfare. Interactive combat will include “direct control of machines using thoughts through mature brain-machine interface,” this report said.

A third PLA report stated that the China Electronic Technology Group was working on “brain confrontation” technology for warfare.

This process calls for measuring neuronal activity in the brain and translating neuro-signals into computer signals that can be used to control weapons with the brain.

PLA researchers also are working on “neuro-defense” technology that will leverage electromagnetic, biophysical and material technologies to enhance the brain’s defenses against control attacks.

PLA political warfare engaged in long-standing attacks

Kerry K. Gershaneck, a China expert, said China has been waging political warfare and cognitive warfare, a related form, against the United States for almost 100 years.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is preparing to annex Taiwan and has stepped up political warfare to extraordinary degrees, Mr. Gershaneck said.

The Chinese leader is willing to go to war but would prefer to win by subverting U.S. willingness and ability to fight back, he said.

“Accordingly, Xi’s goal for his vastly expanded political war is to achieve mind superiority by attacking us in the cognitive domain to weaken us physically and mentally, to destroy our will to fight, and to create fatal doubt in our leaders and in our decisions,” said Mr. Gershaneck, a professor at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.

Mr. Gershaneck, a retired Marine Corps officer with extensive intelligence experience, said the Trump administration is finally tackling Chinese economic warfare against the United States. But so far it is less clear whether the president is devoting needed resources to defeating ongoing Chinese political warfare.

Books like “Human, Machine, War” provide important policy leads for the president and his national security team. The book “lays a solid foundation for understanding the insidious nature of the existential threat we face from Communist China,” Mr. Gershaneck said.

“Ideally, it will help propel Trump 47 to do what America has failed to do for more than three decades: devise a counter-political warfare strategy for our Second Cold War, rapidly resource it, and execute it.”

Sound, thought, electronic weapons target the brain

Other tools in this new form of warfare include the use of sound weapons capable of incapacitating enemy forces by disrupting neurological functions without causing visible injury.

This PLA method was disclosed recently in a report by CCP BioThreats Initiative, a think tank made up of former intelligence and military experts.

“Infrasound and cognitive weapons represent a significant leap in the evolution of modern warfare, introducing a new set of capabilities designed to target the mind and body in ways that are difficult to detect and defend against,” the report said.

PLA sound weapons can induce confusion, emotional distress and a loss of consciousness, according to Chinese military researchers who wrote about them in a 2024 report. They also are designed to directly impair cognitive abilities vital in warfare.

“As the CCP and PLA and other military forces continue to incorporate these technologies into their arsenals, the U.S. and its allies must remain vigilant and proactive in developing countermeasures.”

Electronic brain warfare tools also include the broadcasting of radio waves designed to disrupt thinking and decision-making.

Other weapons use electromagnetic energy for nonlethal attacks that produce drowsiness or cognitive impairment in adversaries, the report said.

The brain weapons likely would be used in what the U.S. military calls gray zone operations around Taiwan, in the South China Sea and East China Sea and along the disputed Sino-Indian border.

“Any breakthrough in this research would provide unprecedented tools for the [Chinese Communist Party] to forcibly establish a new world order, which has been Xi Jinping’s lifelong goal,” the Biothreats Initiative report said.

One indication of the major shift toward cognitive warfare was the Chinese military’s dismantling of the Strategic Support Force last year. In its place the PLA set up a new Information Support Force that reports directly to the CCP Central Military Commission. Both forces were regarded as powerful units equal to services like the army and navy.

Edward Haugland, a retired military intelligence officer and specialist in cognitive warfare, said focusing on the PLA is important. But he believes a wider cognitive war is being waged on multiple fronts — with ongoing Chinese operations deep inside Western countries, including the United States.

Tactics in this underground war include covert Chinese “police stations” in numerous countries, collaboration with drug cartels and shipments of fentanyl, Confucius Institutes on U.S. and foreign college campuses, elite capture of officials and other leaders and up to 300,000 Chinese students who can be used for technology theft and intelligence and propaganda activities.

Mr. Haugland said he is concerned that an overemphasis by the U.S. military on PLA cognitive warfare could result in a misplaced focus on solutions that are military, kinetic and technical, and not informational and political.

Still, the cognitive warfare threat is real.

“This to me is our greatest mistake, as the primary battlefield — the cognitive domain — is being attacked concurrently on so many parallel fronts it is likely China will never need to use its military,” said Mr. Haugland, author of the 2023 book “The Cognitive War: Why We Are Losing and How We can Win.”

“Besides, I believe Xi Jinping cannot trust his military and a large percentage of it is used to control his people, so he must win the cognitive war without a shot. And he is doing so.”

American national security leaders, he said, remain unaware, unprepared and unarmed to wage U.S.-style cognitive warfare, he said.

As a result, “we will lose to the CCP and radical left both domestically and globally,” Mr. Haugland said.

Cmdr. Robert Bebber, a Navy intelligence officer, said in a recent report for the Hudson Institute, that war is evolving from precision strike and stealth warfare used in the Cold War era to operations and technologies that target an opponent’s decision-making.

“This shift has taken many forms, such as gray zone operations, hybrid warfare, [Russian] little green men [in Crimea], and [geopolitical] salami-slicing operations and tactics,” he said in a report published by the Hudson Institute.

Cmdr. Bebber believes cognitive warfare is highly disruptive, threatening democratic institutions and sovereignty and likely changing the basic character of war.

Advances in brain sciences, data and computational technologies, and artificial intelligence are fundamentally altering the global strategic environment, he said, by “expanding the attack surface that foreign adversaries can exploit using cognitive manipulation.”

“The emergence of cognitive warfare — which manipulates cognition to destabilize sociocultural, economic, political, and military systems — poses a unique threat to America and its allies,” Cmdr. Bebber said.

“This type of warfare differs from information warfare in that it aims to influence how, not what, people think, feel, and act, altering the cognitive space from individual to population levels.”

U.S. policymakers have been slow to recognize and react to the threat because it is new, and also “perhaps because the American public has remained under a persistent state of cognitive manipulation, which has debilitated the people,” he said.

The danger, according to Cmdr. Bebber, is that cognitive warfare by China or Russia will result in advanced military operations used by the United States or NATO becoming fractured, disjointed and ultimately ineffective as enemies disrupt or destroy linkages and network connections.

“Perhaps most insidiously, the military may find itself irrelevant to adversary operations as cognitive warfare capabilities emerge and mature to the point where adversaries can coerce societies through so-called information confrontation,” he said.

This could result in the U.S. military and its allies unable to respond as adversaries control entire domestic populations.

Despite this danger, U.S. and allied military forces and national security policymakers have not yet organized their institutions and infrastructure to detect, track and combat cognitive warfare campaigns that adversaries are waging against the American public,” he said.

Washington and Western allies need to develop their own cognitive warfare capabilities to support security needs, he said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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