Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“An intellectual is a person who has discovered something more interesting than sex.”

– Aldous Huxley

“If you want to reach a large audience, appeal to idiots.”

– Schopenhauer

“The more intelligent a man is, the more he begins to notice suffering.”

– Fyodor Dostoevsky

1. Chinese propaganda surges as the U.S. defunds Radio Free Asia

2. The Pentagon Disinformation That Fueled America’s UFO Mythology

3. Chinese Student Trolled Over ‘Humanity’ Speech at Harvard

4. NATO ally reveals mass act of unexplained sabotage

5. China may own the ‘narrative’ of future conflict if the US crushes the satellite imagery biz: experts

6. China’s Gray-Zone Infrastructure Strategy on the Tibetan Plateau: Roads, Dams, and Digital Domination

7. What We’ve Lost: Firsthand Accounts from the Field (USAID)

8. Renewing Shipbuilding Will Require a Culture Change

9. Brian Jenkins: The Man Who Decoded Terror Before the World Knew Its Name

10. The China Challenge in Critical Minerals: The Case for Asymmetric Resilience

11. The kings of the drone age – Battlefields have a new ruler

12. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre: A Reflection on America’s China Policy

13. The great poaching: America's brain drain begins

14. Trump's Golden Dome will make US – and world – less safe

15. Army plans to close more than 20 base museums in major reduction

16. Ukraine’s drone attack offers fearful lesson for a Chinese invasion force

17. Marco Rubio declares war on the global censors

18. Learning the Right Lessons from Afghanistan

19. How the Proposed State Department Reorganization Guts U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy

20. Sometimes a Parade Is Just a Parade

1. Chinese propaganda surges as the U.S. defunds Radio Free Asia

First rule of patrolling: never give up the high ground.

First rule of diplomacy, competitive statecraft, and political warfare: never cede the information domain.

Excerpts:

“USAGM once broadcast a huge amount of content globally in so many different languages,” said Steve Palmer, a decades-long veteran of international radio broadcasting who has never worked at a USAGM entity. “With those disappearing, there is evidence to suggest that other countries are stepping in to fill the void.”

Kari Lake, the Trump ally who is serving as a senior adviser to the USAGM, which oversees RFA, did not respond to questions for this story. An agency spokesperson and the White House also did not respond to requests for comment.

The U.S.-backed news outlets under USAGM were often the only outside voice in countries that limit — and sometimes criminalize — independent reporting.

In a sign of how verboten RFA is across Asia, in late 2020, RFA reported that authorities in North Korea executed the owner of a fishing fleet in front of 100 boat captains and fishery executives for secretly listening to broadcasts by Radio Free Asia and other unauthorized media outlets.

The media analysis centers on the use of shortwave radio in and around China. Shortwave signals can travel for thousands of miles. In countries with strict internet censorship, shortwave can circumvent restrictions and deliver information to audiences while maintaining listeners’ anonymity and protecting them from reprisals.

In China, the government strictly controls access to independent media, especially in regions like Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, where it has continued its efforts to suppress ethnic minority communities.

Chinese media filling the void:

The channels that have a growing presence as RFA withdraws are subsidiaries of China Media Group, a state-run conglomerate overseen by the CCP’s propaganda department. Since 2018, CMG outlets — including China National Radio and the internationally focused China Radio International (CRI) — have undergone a polished overhaul, expanding their reach at home and pushing aggressively into new regions abroad, airing content in more than 65 languages.

Officials overseeing CMG units have unanimously described them as a “mouthpiece” for the Communist Party. In 2017, then-CRI chief Wang Gengnian said the broadcaster’s role was also to recruit “foreign mouths and brains” to amplify Chinese policies overseas — particularly Beijing’s sweeping Belt and Road infrastructure push. Popular programming includes state news bulletins and culture-focused segments that consistently cast China in a positive light.

In Xinjiang and Tibetan regions, native-language state radio broadcasts include programs focused on reinforcing national laws and promoting ethnic unity. One such recent Xinjiang tourism segment was titled “How Can We Not Love Xinjiang,” while a Tibetan-language broadcast featured extended readings from President Xi Jinping’s political ideology.

Democracy in America

Chinese propaganda surges as the U.S. defunds Radio Free Asia

Beijing expanded its state propaganda, including to the persecuted Tibetan and Uyghur minorities, as RFA pulled back.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/06/06/trump-radio-free-asia-cuts-china-propaganda/

June 6, 2025 at 5:00 a.m. EDTToday at 5:00 a.m. EDT

8 min

A Tibetan man walks by a display showing a photo of President Xi Jinping standing in front of the Potala Palace, during a government-organized visit in Lhasa in 2023. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

By Sarah Ellison and Cate Cadell

Two months after the Trump administration all but shut down its foreign news services in Asia, China is gaining significant ground in the information war, building toward a regional propaganda monopoly, including in areas where U.S.-backed outlets once reported on Beijing’s harsh treatment of ethnic minorities.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

Cutbacks at Radio Free Asia and other news outlets funded by the U.S. Agency for Global Media have allowed China to fill a programming void and expand the reach of its talking points, according to an analysis prepared for a USAGM grantee that, though based on publicly available data, was not authorized to be shared publicly.

RFA distributed its broadcast on 60 shortwave radio frequencies as recently as late March, when President Donald Trump issued an executive order demanding drastic cuts to U.S.-backed media. The news service is not using any of those frequencies anymore, the analysis found. China’s state radio added 80 new frequencies during the same period, jamming frequencies previously used by RFA and increasing its own broadcasting on more frequencies and for longer hours, according to the analysis.

The U.S. decision to shut down much of RFA’s shortwave broadcasting in Asia is one of several cases where the Trump administration — which views China as America’s biggest rival — has yielded the adversary a strategic advantage. The administration gutted the United States Agency for International Development, which once served as a counterweight to Chinese influence in many developing countries. And China has expanded its trading relationships with countries affected by Trump’s tariffs.

Follow Trump’s second term

“USAGM once broadcast a huge amount of content globally in so many different languages,” said Steve Palmer, a decades-long veteran of international radio broadcasting who has never worked at a USAGM entity. “With those disappearing, there is evidence to suggest that other countries are stepping in to fill the void.”

Kari Lake, the Trump ally who is serving as a senior adviser to the USAGM, which oversees RFA, did not respond to questions for this story. An agency spokesperson and the White House also did not respond to requests for comment.

The U.S.-backed news outlets under USAGM were often the only outside voice in countries that limit — and sometimes criminalize — independent reporting.

In a sign of how verboten RFA is across Asia, in late 2020, RFA reported that authorities in North Korea executed the owner of a fishing fleet in front of 100 boat captains and fishery executives for secretly listening to broadcasts by Radio Free Asia and other unauthorized media outlets.

The media analysis centers on the use of shortwave radio in and around China. Shortwave signals can travel for thousands of miles. In countries with strict internet censorship, shortwave can circumvent restrictions and deliver information to audiences while maintaining listeners’ anonymity and protecting them from reprisals.

In China, the government strictly controls access to independent media, especially in regions like Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, where it has continued its efforts to suppress ethnic minority communities.

Tibetan Buddhist monks listen to Radio Free Asia broadcast outside of Dharamshala, India, in 2008. (Ashwini Bhatia/AP)

Because shortwave radio does not track listeners, it is unclear how many people are affected. But even small inroads can make an impact in areas that are otherwise sealed off. RFA played a significant role in drawing attention to Beijing’s mass internment drive in Xinjiang that detained more than a million ethnic Uyghurs in “reeducation” centers.

For example, RFA is no longer broadcasting to Tibetan or Uyghur audiences. Beijing has added 26 new Tibetan language frequencies and 16 new Uyghur language frequencies since the end of March, the same period when RFA began pulling back. The additions expand the reach of China’s propaganda.

RFA’s retreat closes one of the last sources of media in China that broadcasts beyond the state’s control. Beijing deploys the world’s most sophisticated censorship system, blocking virtually all foreign news and social media, and is investing heavily in expanding the reach of its own radio stations abroad, which are run under the authority of a CCP propaganda bureau.

“It’s a moral imperative that America takes the lead on helping these ethnic groups where their human rights are being trampled, especially by China,” said Rep. Carlos A. Gimenez (R-Florida), who sits on the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. He acknowledged that the United States has limited resources, but asked: “If the Chinese think these channels are worthwhile, then why don’t we?”

Beijing has long sought to reverse what it perceives as a losing global battle with the West in what it calls “discourse power,” said Maria Repnikova, a professor at Georgia State University specializing in Chinese propaganda and soft power.

“China’s propaganda efforts are extensive and multifaceted and have been increasing in sophistication over the past several decades,” Repnikova said.

Radio Free Asia is one of the news outlets that, until recently, was operating under the umbrella of the U.S. Agency for Global Media. Voice of America, the oldest of the outlets, was created in 1942 to combat Nazi propaganda. RFA followed in 1996, spurred by the Chinese government’s censorship of the bloody Tiananmen crackdown seven years earlier.

RFA’s mission is to deliver uncensored domestic news and information to China, Tibet, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, among other places in Asia with little access to independent media outlets and few, if any, free speech protections. All broadcasts were presented in local languages and dialects, including Mandarin, Tibetan, Cantonese, Uyghur, Vietnamese, Lao, Khmer, Myanmar and Korean.

But RFA has had to place almost its entire staff on unpaid leave as Lake carried out the executive order. Employees and their unions sued the administration in April, trying to restore funding for the news services. A judge has granted that funding be restored on a monthly basis, but the future of the news organization is still in peril.

The receptionist desk sits empty at the Radio Free Asia office in Washington on April 1. (Rod Lamkey/AP)

Chinese officials have lauded the closure of RFA, which raised particular ire for its comprehensive coverage of Uyghur camps. A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington said that RFA has a “long list of bad records” reporting on China, and that Beijing’s growing number of state radio services improve media literacy.

“In the digital age, misinformation often spreads faster than verified facts … media cooperation between China and relevant countries is conducive to promoting mutual understanding and trust between the people of these countries,” said spokesman Liu Pengyu.

China initially denied the existence of the Uyghur internment facilities, and later described them as “vocational centers.”

The first Trump administration declared in 2021 that China’s treatment of Uyghurs was a genocide, a designation that the Biden administration extended.

The Chinese government essentially eliminated Uyghur broadcasting by imprisoning Uyghur journalists, Uyghur writers and Uyghur editors in internment camps, said Alim Seytoff, director of RFA’s Uyghur service, leaving the region with only Chinese government propaganda. And while China controls all of its residents’ access to media, the Uyghur region is “the most closed, most surveilled, and the most armed region of China,” Seytoff said.

China spent vast sums to try to jam RFA’s Uyghur service, Seytoff added. The broadcasts, available to the more than 11 million Uyghurs living in Xinjiang, brought global attention to China’s repression of Uyghurs. Beijing’s heavy spending supported not only jamming the RFA broadcasts, Seytoff said, but also persecuting the family members of RFA’s Uyghur journalists, surveilling, intimidating and placing roughly 50 of them in detention camps.

The channels that have a growing presence as RFA withdraws are subsidiaries of China Media Group, a state-run conglomerate overseen by the CCP’s propaganda department. Since 2018, CMG outlets — including China National Radio and the internationally focused China Radio International (CRI) — have undergone a polished overhaul, expanding their reach at home and pushing aggressively into new regions abroad, airing content in more than 65 languages.

Officials overseeing CMG units have unanimously described them as a “mouthpiece” for the Communist Party. In 2017, then-CRI chief Wang Gengnian said the broadcaster’s role was also to recruit “foreign mouths and brains” to amplify Chinese policies overseas — particularly Beijing’s sweeping Belt and Road infrastructure push. Popular programming includes state news bulletins and culture-focused segments that consistently cast China in a positive light.

In Xinjiang and Tibetan regions, native-language state radio broadcasts include programs focused on reinforcing national laws and promoting ethnic unity. One such recent Xinjiang tourism segment was titled “How Can We Not Love Xinjiang,” while a Tibetan-language broadcast featured extended readings from President Xi Jinping’s political ideology.

At an event celebrating the anniversary of the Chinese state-run Tibetan radio network last month, a senior official from Beijing’s propaganda department said its ethnic language services should allow the “leader’s thoughts to penetrate the hearts of ethnic people like honey rain.”

What readers are saying

The comments predominantly criticize President Trump's decision to defund Radio Free Asia, suggesting it weakens U.S. influence and strengthens China's position in the information landscape. Many commenters express concern that this move cedes ground to China, allowing it to... Show more

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By Sarah Ellison

Sarah Ellison is a national enterprise reporter for The Washington Post. Previously, she wrote for Vanity Fair, the Wall Street Journal and Newsweek, where she started as a news assistant in Paris.follow on X@sarahellison

By Cate Cadell

Cate Cadell is a Washington Post national security reporter covering the U.S.-China relationship. She previously reported for Reuters News, where she was a politics correspondent based in Beijing.follow on X@catecadell

2. The Pentagon Disinformation That Fueled America’s UFO Mythology

Excerpts:

In fact, a Wall Street Journal investigation reveals, the report itself amounted to a coverup—but not in the way the UFO conspiracy industry would have people believe. The public disclosure left out the truth behind some of the foundational myths about UFOs: The Pentagon itself sometimes deliberately fanned the flames, in what amounted to the U.S. government targeting its own citizens with disinformation.

At the same time, the very nature of Pentagon operations—an opaque bureaucracy that kept secret programs embedded within secret programs, cloaked in cover stories—created fertile ground for the myths to spread.

These findings represent a stunning new twist in the story of America’s cultural obsession with UFOs. In the decades after a 1938 radio broadcast of H.G. Wells’ “The War of the Worlds” spread panic throughout the country, speculation about alien visitors remained largely the province of supermarket tabloids, Hollywood blockbusters and costumed conferences in Las Vegas.

More recently, things took an ominous turn when a handful of former Pentagon officials went public with allegations of a government program to exploit extraterrestrial technology and hide it from Americans. Those claims led to the Pentagon’s investigation.

Now, evidence is emerging that government efforts to propagate UFO mythology date back all the way to the 1950s.

The Pentagon Disinformation That Fueled America’s UFO Mythology

U.S. military fabricated evidence of alien technology and allowed rumors to fester to cover up real secret-weapons programs

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/ufo-us-disinformation-45376f7e?st=7qaqvY&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Illustration by Chase Gaewski/WSJ

By Joel Schectman

Follow and Aruna Viswanatha

June 6, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Atiny Pentagon office had spent months investigating conspiracy theories about secret Washington UFO programs when it uncovered a shocking truth: At least one of those theories had been fueled by the Pentagon itself.

The congressionally ordered probe took investigators back to the 1980s, when an Air Force colonel visited a bar near Area 51, a top-secret site in the Nevada desert. He gave the owner photos of what might be flying saucers. The photos went up on the walls, and into the local lore went the idea that the U.S. military was secretly testing recovered alien technology.

But the colonel was on a mission—of disinformation. The photos were doctored, the now-retired officer confessed to the Pentagon investigators in 2023. The whole exercise was a ruse to protect what was really going on at Area 51: The Air Force was using the site to develop top-secret stealth fighters, viewed as a critical edge against the Soviet Union. Military leaders were worried that the programs might get exposed if locals somehow glimpsed a test flight of, say, the F-117 stealth fighter, an aircraft that truly did look out of this world. Better that they believe it came from Andromeda.

This episode, reported now for the first time, was just one of a series of discoveries the Pentagon team made as it investigated decades of claims that Washington was hiding what it knew about extraterrestrial life. That effort culminated in a report, released last year by the Defense Department, that found allegations of a government coverup to be baseless.

In fact, a Wall Street Journal investigation reveals, the report itself amounted to a coverup—but not in the way the UFO conspiracy industry would have people believe. The public disclosure left out the truth behind some of the foundational myths about UFOs: The Pentagon itself sometimes deliberately fanned the flames, in what amounted to the U.S. government targeting its own citizens with disinformation.

At the same time, the very nature of Pentagon operations—an opaque bureaucracy that kept secret programs embedded within secret programs, cloaked in cover stories—created fertile ground for the myths to spread.

These findings represent a stunning new twist in the story of America’s cultural obsession with UFOs. In the decades after a 1938 radio broadcast of H.G. Wells’ “The War of the Worlds” spread panic throughout the country, speculation about alien visitors remained largely the province of supermarket tabloids, Hollywood blockbusters and costumed conferences in Las Vegas.

More recently, things took an ominous turn when a handful of former Pentagon officials went public with allegations of a government program to exploit extraterrestrial technology and hide it from Americans. Those claims led to the Pentagon’s investigation.

Now, evidence is emerging that government efforts to propagate UFO mythology date back all the way to the 1950s.

A night view of the 'Extraterrestrial Highway' near Area 51.

Mikayla Whitmore for WSJ

This account is based on interviews with two dozen current and former U.S. officials, scientists and military contractors involved in the inquiry, as well as thousands of pages of documents, recordings, emails and text messages.

At times, as with the deception around Area 51, military officers spread false documents to create a smokescreen for real secret-weapons programs. In other cases, officials allowed UFO myths to take root in the interest of national security—for instance, to prevent the Soviet Union from detecting vulnerabilities in the systems protecting nuclear installations. Stories tended to take on a life of their own, such as the three-decade journey of a purported piece of space metal that turned out to be nothing of the sort. And one long-running practice was more like a fraternity hazing ritual that spun wildly out of control.

Investigators are still trying to determine whether the spread of disinformation was the act of local commanders and officers or a more centralized, institutional program.

The Pentagon omitted key facts in the public version of the 2024 report that could have helped put some UFO rumors to rest, both to protect classified secrets and to avoid embarrassment, the Journal investigation found. The Air Force in particular pushed to omit some details it believed could jeopardize secret programs and damage careers.

The lack of full transparency has only given more fuel to conspiracy theories. Members of Congress have formed a caucus, composed mainly of Republicans, to examine unidentified anomalous phenomena, or UAP, in bureaucratic speak. The caucus has demanded the intelligence community disclose which agencies “are involved with UAP crash retrieval programs.”

MAGA skepticism about the “deep state” further feeds the notion that government bureaucrats have been keeping those secrets from the American public. At a November hearing of two House Oversight subcommittees, Rep. Nancy Mace, a Republican from South Carolina, cast doubt on the Pentagon’s report. “I’m not a mathematician, but I can tell you that doesn’t add up,” she said.

A guard stands at an entrance to the Nevada Test and Training Range near Area 51 in 2019.

John Locher/Associated Press

‘Stupid enough’

Sean Kirkpatrick, a precise, bespectacled scientist who once spent years studying vibrations in laser crystals, was nearing retirement from government service when he received the call that would change his life.

By 2022 he had ascended to chief scientist at the Missile and Space Intelligence Center at the Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, Ala. As he sat at his desk at 6:30 one morning, drinking coffee and skimming through intelligence reports that had come in overnight, his Tandberg desk phone—essentially a classified version of FaceTime—rang.

It was a deputy undersecretary from the Pentagon, who was putting on a tie as he told Kirkpatrick about a new office Congress ordered the department to set up to examine unidentified anomalous phenomena. “The undersecretary and I put together a shortlist of who could do it, and you’re at the top,” the official relayed, adding that they had settled on Kirkpatrick because he both had a scientific background and had built a half-dozen organizations within the intelligence community.

Is that the real reason, Kirkpatrick countered, “or am I the only one stupid enough to say, ‘yes?’”

In short order, Kirkpatrick had the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office up and running. Just the latest in an alphabet soup of special government projects set up to study UFOs stretching back more than half a century, AARO, as it is known, operated out of an unmarked office near the Pentagon, with a few dozen staffers and a classified budget.

The mission fell into two buckets. One was to collect data on sightings, particularly around military installations, and assess whether they could be explained by earthly technology. Amid growing public attention, the number of such reports has skyrocketed in recent years, to 757 in the 12 months after May 2023 from 144 between 2004 to 2021. AARO linked most of the incidents to balloons, birds and the proliferation of drones cluttering the skies.

Many pilot accounts of floating orbs were actually reflections of the sun from Starlink satellites, investigators found. They are still examining whether some unexplained events could be foreign technology, such as Chinese aircraft using next-generation cloaking methods that distort their appearance.

Sean Kirkpatrick, the first director of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office, has retired to a mountaintop retreat.

Angela Owens/WSJ

The office found that some seemingly inexplicable events weren’t so strange after all. In one, a 2015 video appeared to show a spherical object buzzing past a jet fighter at an almost impossible speed. “Oh, my gosh dude,” the pilot can be heard saying in the video, laughing. But later, investigators determined there was nothing much to see—whatever the object was, the camera angle and relative speed of the jet had made it appear to be going much faster than it was.

The office’s second mission proved to be more peculiar: to review the historical record going back to 1945 to assess the claims made by dozens of former military employees that Washington operated a secret program to harvest alien technology. Congress granted the office unprecedented access to America’s most highly classified programs to allow Kirkpatrick’s team to run the stories to ground.

As Kirkpatrick pursued his investigation, he started to uncover a hall of mirrors within the Pentagon, cloaked in official and nonofficial cover. On one level, the secrecy was understandable. The U.S., after all, had been locked in an existential battle with the Soviet Union for decades, each side determined to win the upper hand in the race for ever-more-exotic weapons.

But Kirkpatrick soon discovered that some of the obsession with secrecy verged on the farcical. A former Air Force officer was visibly terrified when he told Kirkpatrick’s investigators that he had been briefed on a secret alien project decades earlier, and was warned that if he ever repeated the secret he could be jailed or executed. The claim would be repeated to investigators by other men who had never spoken of the matter, even with their spouses.

It turned out the witnesses had been victims of a bizarre hazing ritual.

For decades, certain new commanders of the Air Force’s most classified programs, as part of their induction briefings, would be handed a piece of paper with a photo of what looked like a flying saucer. The craft was described as an antigravity maneuvering vehicle.

An F-117 Nighthawk flies over the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range in 2002 near Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.

Thomas J. Pitsor/USAF/Getty Images

The officers were told that the program they were joining, dubbed Yankee Blue, was part of an effort to reverse-engineer the technology on the craft. They were told never to mention it again. Many never learned it was fake. Kirkpatrick found the practice had begun decades before, and appeared to continue still. The defense secretary’s office sent a memo out across the service in the spring of 2023 ordering the practice to stop immediately, but the damage was done.

Investigators are still trying to determine why officers had misled subordinates, whether as some type of loyalty test, a more deliberate attempt to deceive or something else.

After that 2023 discovery, Kirkpatrick’s deputy briefed President Joe Biden’s director of national intelligence, Avril Haines, who was stunned.

Could this be the basis for the persistent belief that the U.S. has an alien program that we’ve concealed from the American people? Haines wanted to know, according to people familiar with the matter. How extensive was it? she asked.

The official responded: “Ma’am, we know it went on for decades. We are talking about hundreds and hundreds of people. These men signed NDAs. They thought it was real.“

The finding could have been devastating to the Air Force. The service was particularly sensitive to the allegations of hazing and asked that AARO hold off on including the finding in the public report, even after Kirkpatrick had briefed lawmakers on the episode. Kirkpatrick retired before that report was finished and released.

In a statement, a Defense Department spokeswoman acknowledged that AARO had uncovered evidence of fake classified program materials relating to extraterrestrials, and had briefed lawmakers and intelligence officials. The spokeswoman, Sue Gough, said the department didn’t include that information in its report last year because the investigation wasn’t completed, but expects to provide it in another report scheduled for later this year.

“The department is committed to releasing a second volume of its Historical Record Report, to include AARO’s findings on reports of potential pranks and inauthentic materials,” Gough said.

UFO kitsch abounds near Hiko, Nev., outside Area 51.

Mikayla Whitmore for WSJ

A bunker in Montana

Kirkpatrick investigated another mystery that stretched back 60 years.

In 1967, Robert Salas, now 84, was an Air Force captain sitting in a walk-in closet-sized bunker, manning the controls of 10 nuclear missiles in Montana.

He was prepared to launch apocalyptic strikes should Soviet Russia ever attack first, and got a call around 8 p.m. one night from the guard station above. A glowing reddish-orange oval was hovering over the front gate, Salas told Kirkpatrick’s investigators. The guards had their rifles drawn, pointed at the oval object appearing to float above the gate. A horn sounded in the bunker, signaling a problem with the control system: All 10 missiles were disabled.

Salas soon learned a similar event occurred at other silos nearby. Were they under attack? Salas never got an answer. The next morning a helicopter was waiting to take Salas back to base. Once there he was ordered: Never discuss the incident.

Robert Salas, shown at home in Ojai, Calif. believes to this day that he witnessed an intervention from outer space while working at a nuclear launch site.

Maggie Shannon for WSJ

Salas was one of five men interviewed by Kirkpatrick’s team who witnessed such events in the 1960s and ’70s. While sworn to secrecy, the men began sharing their stories in the ’90s in books and documentaries.

Kirkpatrick’s team dug into the story and discovered a terrestrial explanation. The barriers of concrete and steel surrounding America’s nuclear missiles were thick enough to give them a chance if hit first by a Soviet strike. But scientists at the time feared the intense storm of electromagnetic waves generated by a nuclear detonation might render the hardware needed to launch a counterstrike unusable.

A model of an electromagnetic pulse testing site, shown in a 1978 Pentagon document.

To test this vulnerability, the Air Force developed an exotic electromagnetic generator that simulated this pulse of disruptive energy without the need to detonate a nuclear weapon.

When activated, this device, placed on a portable platform 60 feet above the facility, would gather power until it glowed, sometimes with a blinding orange light. It would then fire a burst of energy that could resemble lightning.

A 1973 Pentagon document diagrams a close-up of the part of the equipment that fires an electromagnetic wave that can appear like a bolt of lightning during the test.

The electromagnetic pulses snaked down cables connected to the bunker where launch commanders like Salas sat, disrupting the guidance systems, disabling the weapons and haunting the men to this day.

But any public leak of the tests at the time would have allowed Russia to know that America’s nuclear arsenal could be disabled in a first strike. The witnesses were kept in the dark.

To this day Salas believes he was party to an intergalactic intervention to stop nuclear war which the government has tried to hide. He is half right. The experience left the octogenarian deeply skeptical of the U.S. military and its ability to tell the truth. “There is a gigantic coverup, not only by the Air Force, but every other federal agency that has cognizance of this subject,” he said in an interview with the Journal. “We were never briefed on the activities that were going on, the Air Force shut us out of any information.”

Concealing the truth from men like Salas and deliberate efforts to target the public with disinformation unleashed within the halls of the Pentagon itself a dangerous force, which would become almost unstoppable as decades passed. The paranoid mythology the U.S. military helped spread now has a hold over a growing number of its own senior officials who count themselves as believers.

The crisis grew to a boil over a piece of metal mailed to a late-night radio host in 1996, which the sender said they had been told was part of a crashed spaceship.

Write to Joel Schectman at joel.schectman@wsj.com and Aruna Viswanatha at aruna.viswanatha@wsj.com

This article is the first of two parts. Stay tuned for part 2.

Appeared in the June 7, 2025, print edition as 'Pentagon Fueled UFO Mythology, Then Tried Coverup'.

3. Chinese Student Trolled Over ‘Humanity’ Speech at Harvard

The video is at this link. It is worth the 7 minutes to watch. She is an impressive person.

https://youtu.be/GpR_xk-DWsQ

It is really interesting how she is being criticized and attacked online by Americans and Chinese - is she "pro-CCP?" Or is she an "American spy?" Did she grow up in privilege or poverty?

Is this Chinese propaganda?

Or is this just a heartfelt graduation speech?

Chinese Student Trolled Over ‘Humanity’ Speech at Harvard

Her remarks drew applause, then her allegiances came under question inside and outside China

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinese-student-trolled-over-humanity-speech-at-harvard-00d205c5?st=WMr1VC&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Shen Lu

June 6, 2025 3:54 pm ET

Yurong Luanna Jiang speaking during Harvard’s commencement ceremonies last month. Photo: Charles Krupa/AP

Key Points

What's This?

Yurong Luanna Jiang’s Harvard commencement speech drew praise but also criticism from Chinese nationalists and Beijing critics.
Jiang’s speech, referencing a ‘shared humanity,’ was interpreted by some as in alignment with American thinking, by others as spouting Chinese rhetoric.
Online scrutiny led to accusations around Jiang’s perceived privilege, prompting her to defend herself.

A Chinese graduate student drew wide applause with a speech at Harvard’s commencement ceremonies in late May. Online, it was a different story.

In her address, Yurong Luanna Jiang, who studied international development at the Harvard Kennedy School, spoke about her program’s diverse student body, recounting how on an internship in Mongolia last year she helped Indian and Thai classmates in Tanzania translate writing on a made-in-China washing machine over the phone.

Wearing an embroidered and beaded Chinese collar over her graduation robe, Jiang used the anecdote to extol the idea that “humanity rises and falls as one.”

The speech, as Harvard grapples with the federal government’s attempt to stop it from enrolling international students, was delivered in an often trembling voice. Jiang seemed close to tears as she said, “If there’s a woman anywhere in the world who can’t afford a period pad, it makes me poorer.” Faculty and students clapped at the line and at the speech’s conclusion: “We are bound by something deeper than belief: our shared humanity.”

Then came the online attacks, from both Chinese nationalists and Beijing critics. At a time when Harvard’s links to China and Chinese students in the U.S. have come under the Trump administration’s microscope, it illustrated the no-win situation for a group of students often viewed with suspicion over their allegiances both at home and in their host country.

On China’s social media, initial pride that a Chinese woman had delivered such a high-profile speech quickly gave way to mockery and scathing criticism. Jiang’s remarks were described by some as hollow and aligned with American thinking. “The speech epitomizes the ideological template that Harvard and the American elite have championed globally for decades,” wrote a commentator for the nationalist platform Guancha.

placing travel restrictions on countries, including Yemen,

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President Trump signed a sweeping travel ban on 12 countries late Wednesday and suspended Harvard from the student-visa program, effectively prohibiting foreign nationals from attending the university. Photo: Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images, Roberto Schmidt/AFP/Getty Images

Political commentator Ren Yi, known by his alias Chairman Rabbit, called Jiang a “pawn in America’s political infighting.”

Outside China, critics said her speech had echoes of rhetoric often used by Chinese leader Xi Jinping and in Communist Party propaganda. A version of the speech published by Jiang’s account on a Chinese video-streaming site translated its English title, “Our Humanity,” into “A Community With a Shared Future for Humankind”—the precise terminology used in Xi’s foreign-policy vision.

Jiang said the video was subtitled and uploaded by friends who picked up the translation as a familiar expression that is “quite common in everyday language.”

Exiled Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Nathan Law said in a tweet criticizing Harvard’s choice of Jiang as a speaker that her use of phrases such as “shared future” and “shared humanity” mirrored a “worldview designed to allow Beijing to bypass democratic norms and scrutiny.”

“In some ways, my own experience has become a living illustration of my speech that we are living in a divided world in a hard time,” Jiang said in a statement to The Wall Street Journal. “It’s surreal to find myself accused simultaneously of being a U.S. spy and a Chinese spy.”

Graduates walking past a statue of John Harvard. Photo: CJ Gunther/EPA/Shutterstock

In China, online sleuths unearthed details of Jiang’s background, which led to more condemnation of her alleged privilege and ties to the West, including her education at a U.K. high school and Duke University undergraduate studies. Critics seized on her father’s alleged affiliation with a state-backed environmental organization, suggesting it had helped her get accepted at Harvard.

A few days after her speech, Jiang took to Chinese social media to defend herself. She said she grew up in an unstable family and had been bullied in middle school. She said her father had an unpaid position at the state-backed environment organization and hadn’t pulled strings to get her accepted at Harvard.

Other commentators drew attention to a video from a 2024 speech by Chinese Ambassador Xie Feng at the Harvard Kennedy School that showed Jiang standing behind the stage, watching as a protester was being removed from the audience by another student, an incident widely criticized by Republican lawmakers. Rep. John Moolenaar (R., Mich.), chairman of a House select committee on the Chinese Communist Party, called the removal of the student the work of a “pro-CCP agitator” who faced no blowback from the university.

Jiang declined to comment on the event. A person close to her said Jiang wasn’t involved in either the organization of the event or the removal of the student.

Harvard declined to comment, citing student privacy but referred to a website detailing how the university selects graduate ceremony speakers.

For decades, Harvard has trained scholars, entrepreneurs, doctors and executives from humble backgrounds in China. The Ivy League university has also provided training to many Chinese bureaucrats and education to the children of some top Communist Party officials. Harvard’s alleged ties with the Communist Party have emerged as a leading line of attack in President Trump’s pressure campaign against Harvard.

It wasn’t the first time a Chinese student in the U.S. has faced online vitriol.

In 2017, Yang Shuping, a Chinese graduate of the University of Maryland, faced criticism after she called American air quality “fresh and sweet, and oddly luxurious” in a commencement speech and said that in China she wore a face mask against the pollution. Critics said she was pandering to her U.S. audience by implicitly criticizing China.

On her Chinese social-media account, Yang apologized, saying she loved her homeland and was proud of its prosperity and development.

Write to Shen Lu at shen.lu@wsj.com

4. NATO ally reveals mass act of unexplained sabotage

NATO ally reveals mass act of unexplained sabotage

Newsweek · by Shane Croucher · June 6, 2025

Published Jun 06, 2025 at 2:51 AM EDT

There were around 30 as yet unexplained sabotage attacks on telecommunications infrastructure in Sweden, mostly along the same major road, authorities in the country have revealed.

Nothing is stolen in the attacks on masts, but cables are cut and fuses and other technical equipment destroyed, Sweden's national public broadcaster SVT Nyheter reported, citing investigators.

Swedish investigators have not publicly identified a suspect so far. The attacks are part of a broader trend of sabotage against Swedish telecoms infrastructure, and come amid reports from NATO allies of a significant increase in Russian espionage.

The attacks began over Easter weekend, but have not led to major disruptions. However, it "stands out and is more than usual," Roger Gustafsson, head of security at the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS), told SVT.

Investigators are working on the theory that a single actor is behind the attacks, which mostly targeted infrastructure along the E22 in Sweden.

The E22 is also known as the European Road, and is part of a road transport network that stretches for more than 3,300 miles, connecting the U.K. in the west to Russia in the east.

Swedish security services are monitoring the investigation, and Detective Superintendent Håkan Wessung, head of serious crime in Sweden's Kalmar, told SVT that "we don't rule anything out".

This is a developing article. Updates to follow.

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About the writer

Shane Croucher is a Breaking News Editor based in London, UK. He has previously overseen the My Turn, Fact Check and News teams, and was a Senior Reporter before that, mostly covering U.S. news and politics. Shane joined Newsweek in February 2018 from IBT UK where he held various editorial roles covering different beats, including general news, politics, economics, business, and property. He is a graduate of the University of Lincoln, England. Languages: English. You can reach Shane by emailing s.croucher@newsweek.com

Newsweek · by Shane Croucher · June 6, 2025

5. China may own the ‘narrative’ of future conflict if the US crushes the satellite imagery biz: experts

China may own the ‘narrative’ of future conflict if the US crushes the satellite imagery biz: experts

Experts say NRO cuts would hurt public understanding of what adversaries are doing.

By Patrick Tucker and Audrey Decker

June 4, 2025

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Congress is weighing reductions to the National Reconnaissance Office's budget for acquiring commercial satellite imagery, a move that could ultimately give China an edge in the influence domain and on the battlefield.

The cut could slow growth and innovation at U.S. remote-sensing companies, at a time when China's own burgeoning satellite-imagery industry is aggressively seeking clients. Though European countries are unlikely to become reliant on Chinese imagery, the same cannot be said for governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. If Chinese companies can offer comparable imagery at lower cost, the profits could fuel innovation at a pace that U.S. firms struggle to match.

That could leave U.S. adversaries in control of how the world perceives developing conflicts, warned Kari Bingen, director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former deputy defense undersecretary for intelligence.

“If Chinese companies end up leading in this area, they would be positioned to become the partner of choice, to undercut our companies in the global marketplace, and ultimately could control the narrative of what happens on Earth,” Bingen said. “On February 23, 2022, instead of Western companies publicly releasing imagery of the buildup of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border—and marrying that with intelligence on what we anticipated—imagine if those images and that narrative had come from China?”

The Trump administration is weighing a proposal to reduce funding for NRO’s Electro-Optical Commercial Layer program from $300 million a year to $200 million, SpaceNews first reported. And NRO requested no funding for its commercial radar program in 2026, despite expectations that it would ask for about $30 million, according to industry and congressional sources.

NRO usually doesn’t prioritize requests for commercial because officials know Congress will add money there through the appropriations process, according to one congressional staffer.

So it’s likely—but not certain—that lawmakers will add back the funding this year. But the staffer warned that this year’s budget will be “really, really tough,” and likely involve major cuts, since the administration is banking on the passage of the reconciliation bill to fund the Defense Department.

The EOCL contract is a 10-year program worth almost $4 billion, with Maxar holding the largest share, and BlackSky and Planet Labs holding smaller pieces. If the proposed 30 percent cut is spread equally between all vendors, it could be “catastrophic” for Maxar, because the company heavily relies on NRO for revenue, the staffer said. But if NRO opts to fully fund Maxar, BlackSky and Planet would bear the brunt of the reduction.

The proposed EOCL cut was first brought up publicly by Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass., during a May 14 hearing at which he cited a “rumor” that NRO had slashed commercial imagery funding lines in the 2026 budget, at the direction of OMB.

NRO director Chris Scolese didn’t confirm or deny the rumor during the hearing, but said, “We very much value the commercial capabilities, and intend to keep on using those.” Asked about Scolese’s remarks, a spokesperson for NRO declined to comment and said the specifics of the NRO budget are protected.

One industry executive described the proposed cuts as not only “reprehensible,” but also unexpected, since President Trump released an executive order directing the Defense Department to use commercial solutions wherever possible.

Other executives argued that the move further proves the government isn’t a reliable partner to industry—especially since companies have been scaling up their offerings in response to previous government encouragement to expand commercial.

The cut likely wouldn’t be fatal, the executive said, but companies are relying on Congress to “do the right thing” and add the money back to the budget.

The narrative of conflict

For a glimpse into how vital commercial satellite imagery has become, look no further than the war in Ukraine, where companies like Maxar and Planet have provided critical satellite images and data to Ukraine that have helped them defend against Russian aggression.

The fact that Ukraine remains a sovereign nation is due in part to the release of commercial satellite images showing Russian forces massing on its borders in February 2022. The decision to share those images helped the United States persuade allies—and much of the world—to disregard Moscow’s claims that it had no intention of invading, and contributed to a coordinated response from allied governments, which quickly mobilized military aid and imposed economic sanctions against Russia, said David Gauthier, who led commercial operations at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency at the time.

The NGA worked alongside the NRO to ensure that imagery and related data were available: The NRO procured the images, while Gauthier oversaw the acquisition of analysis and other data.

“We actually worked pretty well together to instill long-term vision in industry that the government would be a good customer in this effort,” Gauthier said.

Newer space-based capabilities—like synthetic aperture radar, or SAR—also helped Ukraine monitor Russian forces, providing intelligence despite cloud cover and concealment, such as what Russia used during 2021 military exercises.

“The Ukrainians could use that radar imagery to understand convoy movements at night and track Russian tanks under clouds,” Gauthier said. “They could use that to defend themselves better and maybe pre-position their forces to be better at defending their homeland from this invasion.”

U.S. military leaders, along with partner militaries, are asking for such capabilities more and more frequently, said Dan Smoot, CEO of Maxar, during a panel at the Special Competitive Studies Project’s AI forum on Tuesday.

“There is an increased demand. Unfortunately, the world has got geopolitical challenges right now,” Smoot said.

Asked about potential budget changes, Smoot pointed to rising demand from European governments that could help fill the gap.

“We've seen a lot more countries lean in—really driving their own capabilities,” he said. “We’re seeing the [European Union] really step into wanting to have their own intel and defense capabilities at this point.”

That push is driving new partnerships, such as one announced Wednesday between Maxar and Saab aimed at enabling satellite imagery collection even under conditions where GPS is jammed or denied.

Still, Gauthier cautioned that European enthusiasm won’t immediately replace the U.S. government’s central role. “The U.S. government is the single largest customer for this data in the world,” he said. “So you can never discount the fact that the biggest customer plays the biggest role in the fate of these companies.”

And while NATO member states are eager to build sovereign satellite imagery capabilities, their budgets remain limited, said Tomáš Hrozensky, a senior researcher at the European Space Policy Institute.

“Europe is investing 0.07% of its GDP—or about €14 billion per year—in space activities, almost exclusively in the civil domain,” Hrozensky told Defense One. “The U.S. is investing 0.24% of its GDP, via NASA and the defense sector on comparable levels.”

Bingen said U.S. export controls—especially International Traffic in Arms Regulations—make American companies less competitive globally.

“While international markets are a growth area—providing commercial space capabilities to allies and partners—our companies are hampered by restrictions, especially SAR and [radio frequency] providers, that reduce their competitiveness,” Bingen said. “So it’s a double whammy to our commercial companies.”

A European defense official speaking on background said NATO member nations are urgently discussing how to build a more autonomous commercial imagery sector. That discussion is expected to feature prominently at the upcoming NATO summit later this month. But for now, Europe remains reliant on U.S.-based commercial satellite imagery providers.

And a March decision by the White House to temporarily pause intelligence sharing with Ukraine—and prevent NATO allies from redistributing data purchased from U.S. commercial firms—has eroded trust, the official said.

“All of these relationships between all these nations are built on trust, and we cannot deny that there has been a breach of that trust,” they said.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

6. China’s Gray-Zone Infrastructure Strategy on the Tibetan Plateau: Roads, Dams, and Digital Domination

Access the entire report on line here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-gray-zone-infrastructure-strategy-tibetan-plateau-roads-dams-and-digital-domination

Access the 19 page PDF here: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-06/250604_Hader_GrayZone_Strategy.pdf?VersionId=rczL0u7FF5fIuIUntMUoPlkYcTQUKwuC

China’s Gray-Zone Infrastructure Strategy on the Tibetan Plateau: Roads, Dams, and Digital Domination

Photo: iLab/CSIS

Report by Thomas Hader, Benjamin Jensen, Divya Ramjee, and Jose M. Macias III

Published June 4, 2025

Available Downloads

In the future . . .

China’s use of critical infrastructure to control downstream water supply will threaten vital economic activities and life.
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will leverage rail and road networks to strengthen its positions near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. China’s military-civilian dual-use infrastructure will continue to encroach on disputed lands while posturing the country’s forces to project coercive power and gain an advantage in the next border clash.
Regional states will no longer harbor Tibetan refugee camps, while also adopting increasingly authoritarian practices made possible by surveillance systems exported by China.

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is actively using diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic tools to influence, deter, and compel countries to act in the PRC’s interest. These tools are derived from a combination of the hybrid strategy and gray-zone tactics that have defined Xi Jinping’s China. The tactics cover operations ranging from corporate cyber theft to international development infrastructure projects.1 But while U.S. policymakers’ attention is fixed on great power competition, the PRC is also active in periphery zones and even within their own territory. In fact, the infrastructure the PRC seeks to export through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) development projects emerged from efforts within China’s frontier.2

China is fundamentally redefining infrastructure as a tool of coercion. Under the guise of economic development and increasing connectivity, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is constructing a coercive architecture across the Tibetan Plateau. This includes dams that can choke water flow to downstream states, railways that enable rapid military mobilization, and digital networks that are already exporting surveillance and repressing dissent. These projects are not neutral investments. They are latent instruments of state power—dual-use nodes that allow Beijing to pressure neighbors without triggering open conflict. As infrastructure becomes a strategic enabler of compellence and deterrence, the United States and its partners must reframe how they assess and respond to China’s actions. Failing to do so will leave the region vulnerable to incremental gains that add up to irreversible strategic shifts.

This report identifies four key sectors where PRC infrastructure development is creating coercive leverage. First—and most alarming—is water. China’s upstream control of Asia’s major rivers—accomplished through the construction of dams—allows it to manipulate downstream economies and ecosystems, giving it a potent geopolitical bargaining chip. Second, the CCP is using land development and gray-zone tactics to de facto annex disputed territory and deploy military assets under the pretext of civilian activity. Third, transportation and rail projects are enabling rapid troop movements, especially near the LAC with India, shifting the military balance in Beijing’s favor. Finally, digital infrastructure projects—particularly through firms like Huawei—are extending China’s surveillance state into neighboring countries, particularly targeting refugee populations and dissidents in Nepal.

This edition of the On Future War series examines the CCP’s strategy for coercing and suppressing its own people on the Tibetan Plateau and neighbors under the auspices of economic development.

To build resilience against the PRC’s coercive infrastructure, this report recommends a three-pronged approach centered on capacity-building with regional partners, increased digital sovereignty, and expanded intelligence cooperation. First, the United States should strengthen India-Nepal cooperation through economic and infrastructure partnerships that reduce both countries’ dependency on Chinese projects. This includes leveraging institutions like the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to offer alternatives to BRI investments. Second, the United States must support the creation of secure digital ecosystems by promoting cybersecurity standards and countering digital authoritarianism, particularly in regions where Chinese firms like Huawei have entrenched themselves. Finally, expanding intelligence-sharing agreements modeled on the U.S.-India Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) pact can enhance early warning systems and regional deterrence against PLA activity. Together, these efforts aim to push back against Beijing’s coercive strategy by reinforcing the sovereignty, security, and resilience of states along the Tibetan Plateau.

Continued at the link: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-gray-zone-infrastructure-strategy-tibetan-plateau-roads-dams-and-digital-domination

7. What We’ve Lost: Firsthand Accounts from the Field (USAID)

There is no substitute for a wide range of US boots on the ground - much more than military boots are needed for our situational understanding of (and taking action in) the world around us.

What We’ve Lost: Firsthand Accounts from the Field

The Foreign Service Journal > June 2025 > What We’ve Lost: Firsthand Accounts from the Field

https://afsa.org/what-weve-lost-firsthand-accounts-field

afsa.org

In the April-May 2025 FSJ, we published stories from our colleagues at USAID whose lives were turned upside down by the dismantling of their agency. We received so much feedback that AFSA decided to launch a new public awareness campaign—“Service Disrupted”—to help Americans understand what our country loses when our diplomats are pulled from the field.

We asked AFSA members to share the important work they were doing when the assault on the Foreign Service began, specifically: What is important about the work you do, and what will be (or has been) lost without you in the field? What are the impacts (losses) to America as the result of your program and/or position being shuttered? What do you want Americans to better understand about your specific work and why it matters?

Member stories quickly inundated our inbox—too many to print. Below we share a few, which have been lightly edited for clarity. Many are printed anonymously; the authors are known to us and come from member agencies and from posts across the globe.

We will continue to share your stories in the Journal and on our social media channels as we receive them. If you have one to share, please send it to humans-of-fs@afsa.org.

—The Editors

Saving Lives

I was part of the team in the Bureau for Global Health that delivered life-saving medicine all over the world, demonstrating the goodwill of the American people and creating partnerships abroad to counter foreign malign influence. To ensure this medicine, paid for by U.S. taxpayers, actually reached patients in need, my work focused on supply chain security and countering corruption.

We used USAID donations to prevent corruption and catalyze accountability of public institutions and foreign governments—accountability that would ultimately phase out the need for donated support. Our focus on supply chain security mitigated falsified medicines being put into circulation. Falsified medication can lead to antimicrobial resistance, allowing new superbugs that do not have a cure to find their way to American shores.

Now, not only are the most underserved and destitute communities in the world dying of preventable diseases, but governments are being supported by adversaries to the United States and are not being held to USAID’s standards. The trade of falsified medicines will likely increase, posing a threat to U.S. national security.

USAID’s important work created goodwill and gave the United States an advantage in foreign policy negotiations. We no longer have a seat at the table.

Feeding the Future

I was taught from a young age to love land and people. As a child in 4-H, I pledged to use my head, heart, hands, and health in service to my club, community, country, and world. As a Future Farmers of America (FFA) member, I found in the FFA creed a belief in the future of agriculture. Throughout my childhood, I was supported by my hometown businesses, churches, and individuals who taught me to give back to others, to believe in agriculture and service, and to be a leader.

These values led me to my work in international development and U.S. foreign assistance, first as a Peace Corps volunteer and staff member, and later as a USAID Foreign Service officer focused on humanitarian assistance, agricultural development, and resilience building. For the past 14 years, I represented my country in some of the most remote areas of the world. As part of the U.S. government’s Feed the Future initiative, I have carried the values instilled in me by my small community in northeastern Kentucky, working hand in hand with other proud Americans.

Launched in 2011 and codified into law by the Global Food Security Act in 2016, Feed the Future invested in food security and agricultural development in developing countries. Through this initiative, America worked to break the cycle of poverty and hunger by improving food systems, nutrition, and livelihoods. In just its first 10 years, Feed the Future lifted 23.4 million people out of poverty, prevented 3.4 million children from stunting, and reduced hunger in 5.2 million families.

Though most of the initiative’s results have been erased from today’s internet, our work made a difference to the individuals in the countries where I have lived and worked. We provided food assistance—sorghum and split peas grown by American farmers—during times of drought and war. We taught good agricultural practices and introduced drought-tolerant seeds, small-scale irrigation, and agribusiness principles to help poor farmers harvest enough to feed their families. We injected extra capital into village savings and lending groups so that women could borrow money to start small businesses. We constructed dip tanks and provided veterinary training for extension workers, reducing animal diseases.

I have represented the United States in multiple countries, in meetings where my voice—the voice of the American people—is respected, where we set the priorities. In support of those priorities, we helped to open markets for U.S. businesses and offered families a path to economic success, reducing their chances of being recruited into violent extremist organizations. We supported youth seeking opportunities in agriculture, helping them build lives at home instead of turning to migration.

Agriculture can be a path out of poverty, and I am proud to have supported my country in making this happen. For decades, the U.S. led the global fight to eradicate world hunger. From the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after World War II to the Feed the Future initiative that appears to be canceled by this administration, we have provided support and guidance to those in need, sharing our knowledge and excellence across the globe.

I remain hopeful that there is a future where we continue these efforts—serving our world, believing in agriculture, and maintaining our status as the leader of the free world.

VOA in Transylvania

The narrow road high in Transylvania cut across a wide upland valley, mountains far in the distance. No fences, no houses, no people except for a lone figure up ahead. A peasant in a sheepskin cloak slogging along the deserted road under an endless gray sky. Hearing us approach, he turned and held up his hand. In mid-1980s Romania, public transportation was scarce, gasoline rationed if available at all. Horses pulled wagons, and people walked. If you had a car, you gave people rides.

So we stopped. Gratefully, the man got in and greeted us.

“You’re foreigners,” he said, on hearing us reply. Then he froze a second before turning to me, smiling widely.

“I know who you are! I hear you on Vocea Americii!”

One Federal Employee Giving Back

For a few years as a child in Florida, I received reduced-price school lunch. Without that money from the Department of Education, I would have gone to school hungry. My parents were both working full time—as a nurse and construction/factory worker—but it wasn’t enough to feed and house our family of four. Yet there are calls to dismantle the Department of Education and cut benefits to hungry kids.

My parents divorced when I was in middle school, and my mom moved in with a succession of boyfriends. I’ll never forget the time we left one of those boyfriend’s houses late at night after he threatened my mom and sister, and we sat at a picnic table in a public park while mom tried to figure out what to do. I watched my younger sister cry in fear and promise she’d be good as she held on tightly to her dog. We found somewhere to stay that night, but I don’t remember us having a dog after that. We moved into Section 8 housing—voucher housing subsidized by Housing and Urban Development—as we worked to get our lives back together.

In high school, I waited tables and saved my tips. I studied hard and received a full scholarship to a local university through the Florida Bright Futures program, given to the top 10 percent of graduating seniors in the state. Many of my friends planned to study abroad, but that wasn’t an option for me financially—until my professors found out why I wasn’t going and helped me apply for a study abroad scholarship. That scholarship, the Critical Needs Language scholarship from the federal government, paid for me to spend a year overseas learning a language the U.S. government deemed essential. In return, I promised to work for the U.S. government once I graduated.

Thanks to the U.S. government, I had been fed. I had been safely housed. I had been educated. I did not come from privilege, but the government and my own hard work had helped me reach for better opportunities, and you can bet I was going to take them.

After graduation, I moved to D.C. and looked for a government job to repay the debt I owed—not out of obligation, but out of gratitude. I found a position with a nonprofit organization where the projects were largely funded by USAID. The pay wasn’t great—barely above poverty—but I believed in the mission, and now I was on the giving end of U.S. government money.

I understood that by helping people improve their lives, we help the United States: People overseas who receive food, shelter, medicine, and improved government services from the United States are more likely to have a positive view of our country, buy U.S. products, and support U.S. policies. They want to work with us and be our partners because we were there for them in a time of need, just like the social safety net was there for my family when we needed it.

Some people claim USAID projects are a waste of money, that the organization is full of fraud. As someone who has spent hours reviewing receipts for $3 taxi expenses, and discussing $2 differences between the receipts presented and the bank statement of the local organization running the program, I can assure you that every penny is carefully accounted for.

In just its first 10 years, Feed the Future lifted 23.4 million people out of poverty, prevented 3.4 million children from stunting, and reduced hunger in 5.2 million families.

After three years at the nonprofit, I got my dream job with the U.S. government. I can still remember the feeling of awe that came over me as I recited the oath of office, which is framed on my desk: I solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully execute the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

Over the past 12 years, I have issued passports to U.S. citizen babies born overseas; prevented people with suspected terrorist ties from receiving a visa to the United States; sat with an elderly woman who lost her husband on what was supposed to be the trip of a lifetime to celebrate their retirement, and then called their children to inform them of their father’s death. I have helped arrange emergency travel for a refugee to join his American citizen children in the United States when their mother was placed in hospice, to ensure they did not enter foster care and become wards of the state. I have explained the “Muslim ban” and “extreme vetting” to foreign governments.

I have explained the U.S. electoral system and the system of checks and balances in countries with monarchies and authoritarian democracies. I have implemented and advocated for policies I personally deeply disagreed with under both Democratic and Republican leaders. I have evacuated U.S. citizens in emergency situations in Burundi, Sudan, Afghanistan, Guinea, Lebanon, and so many other places that honestly I can’t even remember anymore.

I do not have a gun, but I am the person who goes into the crisis to make sure you can get out. On a slow week, I work 40 hours; most weeks, I work 50. I do not get paid overtime.

I have missed my only sister’s wedding and the births of her two children. My dad is terminally ill, and I am not there. I haven’t seen my mom in several years because whatever vacation time and money I scrape together goes to helping my dad. I have given up my right to express my opinion on U.S. government policy, even as I am required to implement it.

This is just the story of one federal employee. But it is not unusual. We come from all over the United States. From families who had nothing other than a strong work ethic, and who instilled in us the value of service. No one will argue that government is perfect: We live it every day and see its flaws. But we also know that the work we do is essential to our nation.

I work hard every day to keep you safe regardless of who you are or what your political beliefs are. I have not received any special treatment to get where I am: I have benefited from programs open to any citizen of the United States in need, and I have more than paid back that debt.

Supporting Press Freedom

My portfolio covers USAID’s support for journalists and press freedom in Eastern Europe. USAID’s media strengthening programs enhance the integrity, resilience, and plurality of the news and information space across the region. We help citizens to be more informed about their health care and education decisions; members of the private sector to make data-driven decisions on running their businesses and contributing to the economy; communities to hold their leaders and policymakers to account; and countries to be more stable, better governed, less corrupt, more open to business, and better aligned with American interests and values. This, in turn, makes America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.

One example is our support of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which was the lead partner in Eastern Europe on the Panama Papers investigation. The largest collaboration of journalists to date, the project involved more than 350 reporters from 80 countries who analyzed and verified the data from more than 11 million leaked records, including emails, financial spreadsheets, passports, and corporate records. Journalists were able to cross-check it with other public databases and politically exposed persons records to then follow the money trail.

The findings were published in 2016, exposing how hundreds of political and financial elites and celebrities moved their licit and illicit wealth through hard-to-trace companies and tax havens. Reporting by OCCRP and its partners revealed how associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin shuffled more than $2 billion in stolen public funds through banks and shadow companies.

This is just one example of OCCRP’s work, which has earned nearly 300 local, national, and international reporting awards, contributing to the seizure or freezing of at least $10 billion in assets and nearly 500 arrests, indictments, and sentences since 2009. That year, USAID was OCCRP’s first public donor, and OCCRP estimates that for every $1 in U.S. government funding, it has returned $100 to the U.S. taxpayer in fines levied by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Treasury against banks and companies for wrongdoing exposed by OCCRP reporting.

The positive impact of USAID assistance to independent media is also shown in Ukraine, where USAID supported the delivery of nearly 1,000 flak jackets and helmets for journalists reporting on the war (including the first set of military-grade vests to get across the border after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022), thousands of first aid kits, and training on first aid and conflict reporting. USAID also obligated $20 million in January 2025, before the current administration’s stop work order, to help replenish such equipment and training, which was needed after three years of war.

The funding also would have gone to help reporters continue to track tens of thousands of kidnapped children taken from Ukraine to Russia, cover war crimes and atrocities, and provide lifesaving information to communities on the line of contact. That support was terminated as part of the review process on foreign assistance.

Finally, USAID provided support to newsrooms in the Western Balkans to improve their financial, digital, and legal security, including to the storied outlet in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Oslobodjenje, which published every day during the siege of Sarajevo from 1992 to 1996. On a visit in 2022 by then–USAID Administrator Samantha Power, who had covered the war as a journalist in the 1990s, staff at Oslobodjenje told her that it was harder to be a journalist now than during the war, not only because of the economic, political, and technological headwinds they face, but because of vexatious lawsuits meant to drive them out of business. Power’s visit came as USAID announced its creation of a global mutual defense fund, Reporters Shield, to help reporters facing the rising threat of strategic litigation against public participation lawsuits, or SLAPP suits.

USAID’s support of independent media in Eastern Europe and around the world has provided a powerful, cost-effective way for the United States to support those on the front lines of freedom. Such efforts have strengthened democracies and allies of the U.S., ensured a more level playing field and stronger economies for American businesses to invest in, and made the world safer and more secure.

Helping Americans Abroad

In 1995 I was a first-tour consular officer at the U.S. consulate general in Krakow, when we received a call from Jagiellonian University about an elderly U.S. gentleman who was residing in their dormitories. Retired and single, he had come to study Polish in a language course for foreigners. The course had ended, the dorms were closing for the summer, but no matter what they told him, “the gentleman will not leave and just sits all day watching TV.” As the American Citizen Services (ACS) officer, I went to see him.

He was a gentle, old man, quiet and reserved, who could answer simple questions, but that was all. He did not understand that it was time for him to leave and return home. When we asked for his passport, he took us to his room and pointed at his dresser. In one drawer we found countless pieces of paper covered with scribblings and notes that made no real sense, but no passport or plane ticket. We had virtually no information about the man save his name. He did not know his address, names of relatives, telephone number, and so on. In the drawer, however, we found a large key, and the Polish staffer said it looked like a bank lockbox key. The gentleman had no idea what the key was for or where he got it.

After visiting numerous banks, one of them said it was theirs, but the lockbox could only be accessed by the key owner, or a court order to open it. Fortunately, the bank accepted the gentleman’s student ID card, and there we found his passport, traveler’s checks, a plane ticket, and an envelope with a return address.

After tracking the address, we were able to contact his son. The gentleman had had a series of small strokes while in Poland, befuddling him. Once contacted, the family needed our help to get him back to the U.S. Unable to travel alone, he needed an escort to fly, which none of the family could do. A consulate spouse agreed to accompany him to London and put him on a plane to New York. Afterward, I received a personal letter from his son, thanking us profusely for our help retrieving their father.

Our consulate had only eight FSOs at that time, handling 300 nonimmigrant visa (NIV) requests daily while covering many other responsibilities. This was a rare case but not unusual, and certainly not an exercise that could have been handled remotely or by AI. It’s just one example of how U.S. diplomats are always willing, able, and needed to help U.S. citizens in distress overseas.

Don Sheehan

State Department FSO, retired

Arlington, Virginia

Foreign Assistance Helps U.S. Businesses

Over the past two years, I led USAID efforts to support countries facing debt distress and macroeconomic crises. We advised more than 25 governments on strengthening tax systems, cutting costs, and improving oversight in sectors like banking.

In 2024 in Bangladesh, where $17-30 billion was looted from banks by former political leaders, USAID became the first bilateral agency to deploy an adviser focused on banking sector reform—introducing oversight mechanisms common in the U.S. to help recover assets and prevent future losses. Now that USAID has been shut down, Bangladesh is forced to turn to other partners.

This work isn’t new. USAID has supported economic governance for decades, with bipartisan backing. During the first Trump administration, for instance, USAID helped Burma’s civilian leaders avoid $6 billion in port project costs, saving the country money and denying the People’s Republic of China (PRC) leverage.

Why should the U.S. care? First, fiscally sound countries are better investment environments for U.S. businesses—offering stable exchange rates, low inflation, and reliable infrastructure. Second, sound economic management is foundational to poverty reduction and a principle behind the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Scorecard, yet a place where USAID has led due to our on-the-ground presence. Third, addressing issues that matter to foreign leaders strengthens partnerships—and counters PRC influence, enhancing U.S. global standing.

Family Members Serve Too

Let us honor the sacrifices that are mutually shared by our patriotic USAID families. My wife gave up her career so she could support us at hardship and danger posts. In service to our great nation, my family has endured three evacuations, including once when we had to reassure our toddlers that Santa would still deliver their presents despite the need to flee across the Congo River. Elsewhere, our kids remember the sounds of explosions while sheltering in bomb shelters and the heavy doors of the armored vehicles that frequently took them to school.

Our USAID family members have proudly served our country alongside us. They are the real heroes and deserve better.

Anchored in Hope

The dreaded news has finally been confirmed—I have been placed on administrative leave. Despite the frustration, the sting of betrayal, and the uncertainty that looms over me, I remain, against all odds, hopeful.

The past few weeks have thrown more at me than I could have imagined. I have endured betrayal by my own government and the very institution I swore to serve. I have had my allegiance questioned, my integrity scrutinized—as if my commitment to this country and its values were conditional, as if my identity disqualified me from belonging. I have been told, to my face and behind my back, that my mixed-race heritage makes me an abomination. I have watched with anguish as the world spirals deeper into crisis after crisis—war, injustice, climate catastrophe, humanitarian disasters—each one a reminder of how much is at stake.

Through it all, my hope has been tested like never before.

To say my soul has been crushed over the past few weeks would be an understatement. The weight of everything—past and present—has pressed down on me with unrelenting force. And yet, here I stand.

Three years ago, I achieved what felt like a lifelong dream: I became a Foreign Service officer with USAID. It was more than just a job—it was a calling. The mission, the purpose, the commitment to something greater than myself—it all resonated deeply. But what made it even more meaningful was my first post: the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Returning to my birthplace, the country that shaped so much of my cultural and social identity, felt like fate. It was a dream come true, tinged with the inevitable fear of the unknown, but grounded in an overwhelming sense of pride. I had made it. I had stepped into a new chapter, one filled with purpose, responsibility, and the opportunity to have a real impact.

That first year at post was one of the best years of my life. Sure, I had my fair share of complaints about the traffic in Kinshasa. But even that, in hindsight, is something I miss. What I wouldn’t give now to be stuck on that shuttle at the end of a long day, sitting in gridlocked streets with my friends and colleagues, trading stories and laughter. What I wouldn’t give to walk into the office and see the warm smiles of my Congolese colleagues, people who exemplify the best of humanity, working tirelessly to tackle some of the country’s most pressing health challenges.

But in the blink of an eye, it was all ripped away.

In January, I was evacuated under harrowing circumstances due to civil unrest. I was forced to leave behind the life I was building, the work that gave me purpose, and the people who had become my second family. The trauma of that moment still lingers, not just because of the chaos and fear, but because it stirred something even deeper: memories of another evacuation, one that uprooted me from what was then Zaire in 1991. I was just a child then, unable to fully comprehend what was happening. But now, as an adult, experiencing it again in eerily similar ways, the wounds have reopened in ways I never anticipated.

Returning to the United States under this veil of suspicion, under the shadow of my own government questioning my intentions, has shaken me to my core. This is not just a personal struggle; it is part of a broader, insidious pattern of psychological warfare being waged against those of us who have dedicated our lives to public service. It is an attack not just on me but on my colleagues, on marginalized communities, on anyone who dares to challenge the status quo and push for a better world. The consequences of this assault will be lasting, far beyond my own experience.

And yet, despite my rage, my hurt, and my profound sense of disillusionment—I remain hopeful.

Some may call it naivete. Others may attribute it to my Catholic upbringing, the ingrained belief in resilience, in faith, in the notion that light can still break through the darkest of nights. But I know it is more than that.

We have a moral obligation—not just as public servants, but as human beings—to stand up for what is right, to protect those who cannot protect themselves, to build a world that is just and equitable.

I have seen resilience in action, lived it, breathed it. I saw it in my parents, in the way they endured unimaginable hardships yet never wavered in their resolve. I see it in the communities I have chosen and the ones that have chosen me—people who stand firm in their convictions, who fight for justice, who embody the very best that humanity has to offer. These are the people who give me strength, who remind me that hope is not just a sentiment but an act of defiance, a conscious choice in the face of despair.

I do not know what will happen next. The path ahead is uncertain, filled with more questions than answers. But I do know this: I will not go down without a fight. I refuse to let this moment define me, to let it strip me of my purpose, my voice, or my determination. I will not be silenced, and I will not turn away from the work that matters. Because that work—the fight for justice, for dignity, for humanity—is bigger than me. It always has been.

From the ashes of what remains, we will rise again. Stronger. Wiser. More aware of all that is at stake.

We have a moral obligation—not just as public servants, but as human beings—to stand up for what is right, to protect those who cannot protect themselves, to build a world that is just and equitable. And I refuse to do anything less than that.

Hope is not just an emotion. It is a force. It is a choice. And today, as I stand on uncertain ground, I choose it once again.

Erin Aseli Fleming

Foreign Service Officer

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8. Renewing Shipbuilding Will Require a Culture Change

Renewing Shipbuilding Will Require a Culture Change

There are pockets of brilliance in U.S. shipbuilding. Collective will is needed to solve the systemic issues that hold back the broader enterprise.

By Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard Charles W. Bowen (Retired)

June 2025 Proceedings Vol. 151/6/1,468

usni.org · June 1, 2025

The U.S. naval shipbuilding crisis imperils national security and undercuts economic vitality. But it is not a new problem—Mike Petters wrote a Proceedings article almost 20 years ago titled “American Shipbuilding: An Industry in Crisis.” The problem persists, and confronting it is more important than ever.

I have witnessed the evolution of the U.S. shipbuilding industry throughout my career, first as the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard, and now as an employee of Bollinger Shipyards. I have seen the factors that play into the industry’s current slump, and I have also seen success stories that could help model its recovery. Solutions to renew U.S. shipbuilding will rely on the combined dedication of lawmakers and industry partners.

A Historical Perspective

With 67 fast response cutters now on contract, the program continues to receive robust congressional support. The Coast Guard has used the platform for purposes far beyond its original mission requirements. (U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area)

History shows what is possible when a nation unites behind a common goal. During World War II, U.S. shipbuilders delivered more naval combatants than British, Japanese, and German builders combined. The effort started from a minimal industrial base; production had slowed to a trickle following World War I and during the Great Depression. The United States’ transformation into the “arsenal of democracy” proved that collective will can overcome substantial obstacles.1

It is not certain that the United States now could replicate the feat, but the need for immediate action is clear. The multifaceted challenges facing U.S. shipbuilding include workforce shortages, overly bureaucratic procurement processes, inconsistent funding, design instability, and a limited industrial base. These issues are interconnected, and addressing them requires a new collaborative approach.

Personal Reflections on Shipbuilding

During my Coast Guard career, I spent extensive time at Bollinger Shipyards in Lockport, Louisiana. I remember being amazed at the manufacturing lines for Island-class and Marine Protector-class vessels. Ships were fabricated through a system of workstations. To a young boatswain’s mate, seeing large sections of hulls being worked on upside down to improve worker accessibility seemed like the height of innovation.

After retiring from the Coast Guard, I joined the Bollinger team working on the fast response cutter program. This experience reinforced my belief that pockets of excellence exist in the industry, despite its broader struggles. The fast response cutter met or exceeded all contract requirements. Coast Guard leaders often refer to it as a “game changer.” Over the life of the program, the cutters have been delivered on time and under projected budget. The original program of record was 58 ships. With 67 cutters now on contract, the program continues to receive robust congressional support, resulting in additional vessels. The Coast Guard has used the platform for purposes far beyond its original mission requirements.

Unfortunately, the fast response cutter’s success is the exception. Systemic issues continue to hinder the industry.

U.S. shipbuilding relies on the combined dedication of lawmakers and industry partners. Here, an uncompleted U.S. Coast Guard cutter sits in a hangar bay. (Cheyenne Basurto)

Proposed Solutions

Overcoming the challenges to U.S. shipbuilding requires government and industry to collaborate on a comprehensive approach to streamline processes and reinvigorate the workforce. The approach should center on the following touchstones.

Expanding and Developing the Workforce

The shipbuilding industry must attract the next generation of skilled workers through public-private partnerships. Programs such as the Bollinger Mississippi Shipfitter Bootcamp, launched in 2024 in collaboration with the Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College and the State of Mississippi, provide hands-on training and clear pathways to employment. The 14-week program includes 12 weeks in the classroom and another two in the shipyard working with trade supervisors. The inaugural program received an enthusiastic response from shipyard supervisors, educators at the school, and students—applications more than doubled for a second term and continue to grow. The program has expanded to additional shipyard trades.2

Another shipbuilder, Eastern Shipbuilding Group, partnered with the Bay County Artificial Reef Association and the University of Florida to launch the Coastline Initiative. The program encourages students from local schools to design artificial reefs, while promoting welding and engineering skills.3

These initiatives are more than just training programs; they are community investments that create a pipeline of skilled labor tailored to industry needs. Promoting vocational careers requires a cultural shift. The Department of Education and the Department of Labor should amplify efforts to integrate technical education into public schools. If young people know about the rewarding opportunities in shipbuilding, more of them may choose this vital field. This could have far-reaching economic benefits. According to the National Association of Manufacturers, for every $1.00 spent in manufacturing, another $2.64 is added to the economy—one of the greatest multiplier effects of any economic sector.4

Community support is essential. Shipyards should engage with local schools, community colleges, and vocational programs to create apprenticeships and internships. Integrating shipyards with local communities can aid recruitment and retention.

Streamlining Procurement and Contracting Processes

The federal procurement system must become more agile. A 2023 National Academies consensus study report stated:

Historically federal acquisition systems and the federal budgeting process were set up to field technologies and capabilities identified four or more years in advance, which can be too slow to keep pace with the state of the market in technological and industrial innovation and indeed the speed with which adversaries deploy new, commercially available technological capabilities.5

The Navy and Coast Guard can use existing authorities that allow for rapid prototyping, adapting commercial technologies, and strengthening pilot programs.

Decision-makers also should consider commercial best practices when building a new class of ship. Not every vessel is a major combatant with an operational demand for all the redundancies warships require. Adopting efficient design standards could save significant costs and speed delivery. The Maritime Administration’s (MarAd’s) National Security Multi-Mission Vessel (NSMV) program is a prime example. Using commercial best practices instead of following the normal government procurement process saved MarAd $428 million per ship and accelerated construction.6 From the outset, Congress specified the vessel would be built to commercial design standards and use commercial construction practices, and the results speak for themselves. The NSMV is now a mature program delivering high-quality, state-of-the-art ships.

By applying common-sense standards when appropriate, costs can be reduced, and timelines shortened, without compromising essential capabilities.

Making Funding Stable and Predictable

Stable funding is the lifeblood of shipbuilding. Implementing multiyear contracts provides the consistency that shipyards need to plan effectively, invest in infrastructure, and maintain skilled labor forces.7 Unpredictable funding patterns, on the other hand, prompt workforce layoffs and hinder investment in new technologies. At a time when shipyards face challenges related to supply chains, labor, access to capital, and inflation, unpredictable funding could push them past the breaking point.

Former Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro called for multiyear contracts and advance procurement funding to ensure consistency and predictability in shipbuilding. Only Congress can make that happen, by committing to reliable budgets, passed on time, that support year-over-year, uninterrupted shipbuilding programs.

Minimizing Design Changes

The Government Accountability Office has repeatedly emphasized that starting construction before a design is final leads to delays and cost increases. A significant example is the Constellation-class frigate. A parent design originally was chosen for the frigate, to reduce risk and shorten the path to design maturity, but later design changes have delayed delivery by years.8

Conversely, the fast response cutter stands out for its success in this area. Strong program management and production quality, coupled with expert oversight from the on-site government project office and contracting officials, resulted in a superior on-time product.

Balancing innovation with practicality is essential. Rapid technological changes tempt decision-makers to continually update designs. This leads to delays and cost overruns, and almost every current government shipbuilding effort has fallen behind because of constant changes parachuted into the process. Focusing on proven technologies while allowing for future upgrades can keep projects on schedule and under budget.

Protecting the Industrial Base

The Merchant Marine Act of 1920—also known as the Jones Act—mandates that goods transported between U.S. ports be carried on ships that are U.S.-built, -owned, and -crewed. Proponents of scrapping the legislation must understand that repealing the Jones Act could devastate the remaining industrial base, leading to job losses and compromising national security by outsourcing shipbuilding capabilities.9

Avoiding overreliance on foreign manufacturing is crucial. The Covid-19 pandemic revealed significant vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Outsourcing naval shipbuilding to foreign shipyards would exacerbate these problems.

The U.S. shipbuilding industry already carries a heavy regulatory burden. U.S. environmental laws, safety regulations, and fair labor practices increase costs relative to some foreign competitors. While these standards are essential and reflect national values, acknowledging the burden they create could inform new policies that support domestic industries without compromising principles.

A worker cuts the first prototype unit for the Coast Guard’s polar security cutter at Bollinger Shipyard in 2023. (Ronald Hodges)

A Collective Effort for National Security

In February, President Donald Trump called for revitalizing U.S. shipbuilding. The challenges are complex but not insurmountable.

Investment in workforce development, infrastructure, and technology is crucial. This includes not only financial investment, but also a commitment to creating a culture that values manufacturing and trade skills. Policies that ensure stable funding and protect domestic capabilities will be the foundation for success. A strategic focus on efficiency, practicality, and long-term sustainability in ship design and procurement will make for effective and enduring future fleets.

The spirit of innovation and determination that built the fleets of the past still exists. It is embodied in the skilled workers who craft our vessels, the engineers who design them, and the leaders who cut through complex policy and funding realities. They are what will propel U.S. shipbuilding beyond its crisis and ensure the United States remains the foremost maritime power, capable of defending its interests and upholding its defining principles.

usni.org · June 1, 2025

9. Brian Jenkins: The Man Who Decoded Terror Before the World Knew Its Name

"A soldier-scholar, strategist, and visionary"

Terrorism

Brian Jenkins: The Man Who Decoded Terror Before the World Knew Its Name

A soldier-scholar, strategist, and visionary at the RAND Corporation, Jenkins has spent over five decades quietly mapping the terrain of terror, long before the rest of the world even knew it was a battlefield.

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/06/04/brian-jenkins-the-man-who-decoded-terror-before-the-world-knew-its-name/

Amal Chandra

June 4, 2025

Image credit: rand.org

Authors: Amal Chandra and Prashanto Bagchi*

Before 9/11 made terrorism the defining geopolitical issue of the 21st century, before ISIS filled headlines and infiltrated social media, and before policymakers scrambled to harden national security doctrines, there was Brian Michael Jenkins. A soldier-scholar, strategist, and visionary at the RAND Corporation, Jenkins has spent over five decades quietly mapping the terrain of terror, long before the rest of the world even knew it was a battlefield.

A Career Forged in Unconventional Conflict

Born in 1942, Jenkins’ life and work mirror the evolving story of modern terrorism itself. His early career with the U.S. Army’s Special Forces during the Vietnam War gave him more than just combat experience; it offered insight into asymmetrical warfare and the psychological dimensions of conflict. Returning from Vietnam, he joined the RAND Corporation in 1972, a think tank known for marrying military expertise with intellectual rigor.

What set Jenkins apart from the outset was his refusal to view terrorism solely as military or criminal. He recognized it as theater, a tool of psychological warfare designed not necessarily to kill, but to terrify. His now-famous observation that “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” reframed the public and policy discourse on terrorism. At a time when hijackings and political kidnappings were dismissed as isolated acts of fanaticism, Jenkins saw the beginnings of a coherent, global strategy of fear.

In his seminal 1974 RAND paper, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, Jenkins challenged Cold War orthodoxy. He argued that terrorism was not merely a tool of the weak but a deliberate, systematic form of political communication. Through symbolic violence, terrorists could broadcast their message across borders and into living rooms, turning fear itself into a weapon.

This conceptual leap was decades ahead of its time. Today, in the era of live-streamed shootings, viral extremist manifestos, and algorithmic radicalization, Jenkins’s early insights ring prophetic. He understood that in modern conflict, narrative is as potent as ammunition.

What Jenkins highlighted was that terrorism feeds not only on ideology but also on spectacle. It seeks to provoke overreaction, manipulate public perception, and polarize societies. In doing so, it reshapes political agendas, social trust, and civil liberties.

Intelligence Over Intensity: A New Doctrine

While Jenkins’ intellectual contributions laid the groundwork for modern counter-terrorism thinking, his influence extended well beyond the page. Over the years, he became a trusted advisor to U.S. presidents, a key witness before congressional committees, and a strategic consultant to military and intelligence agencies.

Yet Jenkins never advocated blind escalation. One of his most consistent messages has been the danger of overreaction. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, when America reeled from shock and rage, Jenkins urged caution. His 2008 book, ‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?’ aimed at the hysteria surrounding weapons of mass destruction. Jenkins did not dismiss the threat, but he stressed evidence over emotion. He dissected the technical and logistical hurdles involved in nuclear terrorism and concluded that, while vigilance was necessary, fear should not dictate policy.

This ability to balance urgency with restraint and vigilance with perspective defined Jenkins’s approach. He was never swayed by sensationalism. Instead, he insisted on granular analysis and long-term thinking, attributes often lost in the chaos of political posturing.

Counterterrorism as Cultural and Strategic Literacy

One of Jenkins’ most significant contributions came in his 2006 book Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves, which synthesized decades of insight into a clear doctrine: terrorism cannot be defeated by military means alone.

Jenkins advocated for a layered, multi-dimensional response—one that combined hard power with soft power, intelligence with empathy, and resilience with reform. He emphasized the importance of understanding terrorists not merely as criminals, but as political actors operating within specific historical, ideological, and social contexts.

Instead of seeing counter-terrorism as a war to be won, Jenkins framed it as a condition to be managed—a chronic threat that demanded patience, flexibility, and strategic depth. His views clashed with the dominant paradigms of “shock and awe” and military surges. Yet history has vindicated his caution. The prolonged quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of ISIS from the ashes of state failure, and the continuing spread of extremism have all demonstrated that tactical victories mean little without strategic foresight.

Architect of Homeland Security

In the wake of 9/11, Brian Michael Jenkins emerged as a quiet yet pivotal figure in shaping America’s homeland security architecture. Unlike the immediate emphasis on military retaliation, Jenkins advocated a security doctrine grounded in foresight, coordination, and resilience. He argued that terrorism was not just a threat to lives but a stress test for democratic societies—a challenge that demanded more than reactive force.

As a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and a senior advisor at the Mineta Transportation Institute, Jenkins helped reimagine public transportation security. His influence can be seen in today’s layered defenses in airports and rail networks, which prioritize not only physical barriers but also behavioral analysis, inter-agency intelligence sharing, and real-time threat assessment. He emphasized that visible security alone was insufficient; understanding intent and motive was key to prevention.

Jenkins was also an early voice warning against the rise of homegrown radicalization and “lone wolf” actors. Long before social media became a vehicle for extremist grooming, he foresaw how digital echo chambers could incubate violent ideologies. His research consistently highlighted the shift from hierarchically organized terror cells to ideologically driven individuals acting without central command—a model that now dominates the threat landscape.

Importantly, Jenkins warned of the double-edged nature of overreaction. He cautioned that excessive surveillance, racial profiling, and erosion of civil liberties could inadvertently serve terrorist objectives by fostering division and mistrust. Security, in his view, had to be as much about upholding societal cohesion and rights as about hardening targets.

Jenkins’ contributions reshaped how the U.S. approached domestic security, not as a fortress to be sealed but as a system to be intelligently managed. His insistence on combining vigilance with restraint and infrastructure with insight laid the groundwork for a security strategy that aspires not only to keep people safe but also to keep societies open, democratic, and psychologically resilient.

A Living Legacy That Matters

Unlike many strategists whose work gathers dust in academic archives, Jenkins’ legacy is tangible and ongoing. His ideas shape how journalists frame attacks, how policymakers weigh responses, and how intelligence agencies track emerging threats. He remains a senior advisor at RAND and a sought-after voice on security matters, frequently writing, testifying, and commenting on the shifting contours of global conflict.

But perhaps Jenkins’ most enduring contribution is philosophical. At a time when fear is a currency and polarization a weapon, Jenkins has modeled what it means to approach terrorism with clarity rather than panic and intellect rather than impulse.

He offers a reminder that security is not merely the absence of violence but the presence of resilience—psychological, political, and institutional. In his words and work, he urges societies not only to resist terrorists but also to resist becoming terrorized.

As we move deeper into an era defined by AI-enhanced propaganda, decentralized insurgencies, and ideological fragmentation, Jenkins’ framework for understanding terrorism feels more relevant than ever. His recognition that terrorism is, at its core, a narrative act—one that seeks to rewrite the story of who we are and how we live—offers a critical lens for today’s challenges.

Where many see terrorism as a tactical threat, Jenkins sees it as a test of our democratic character. Will we uphold the values we claim to defend, or will we let fear erode them from within?

For a world increasingly defined by uncertainty and fear, Brian Michael Jenkins stands as a sentinel—not just of strategy, but of sanity. In decoding terror, he has offered more than tools to combat it; he has given us a moral compass with which to navigate the storms of the 21st century.

* Prashanto Bagchi is an International Relations scholar at the JNU, New Delhi.

Tagsfront Security Terrorism

Amal Chandra

Amal Chandra is the author of The Essential, a policy analyst, political commentator and columnist (Follow him on ‘X’ at @ens_socialis)

10. The China Challenge in Critical Minerals: The Case for Asymmetric Resilience

Excerpts:

Finally, a positive vision for an end game must be developed. Critical minerals have become securitized in a way that resembles an economic security dilemma, where both sides’ pursuit of security in the context of mistrust leads to a decreased sense of security everywhere. Drawing on Thomas Schelling’s influential 1966 work “Arms and Influence” – and as elaborated on more recently by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen in the context of U.S. policy on Taiwan – it is important to conceive of the relationship between China’s perception of resource security, its behavior, and Western perceptions of resource security in an interactive way.

While increasing one’s own resource security is a worthy goal, beyond recalibration, it cannot feed the current escalatory dynamic and encourage the further weaponization of critical minerals, as this will have deleterious effects on everyone’s security. The creation of strength and leverage should be paired with the creation of credible reassurances, for instance regarding a commitment to stability, transparency, and continued open access for most metals and minerals.

Asymmetric resilience is thus at once a more systemic and a more targeted approach to fulfilling critical mineral security objectives, exploring the possibility of mitigating rather than eliminating vulnerabilities and developing targeted areas of dominance. Built on defensive, assertive, plurilateral, and stability pillars, it takes into account feasibility, the variegated nature of different critical mineral supply chains, a networked understanding of global critical minerals security, and the need to act in concert with others, aiming for a recalibrated global equilibrium in the pursuit of the shared end goal of security, resilience, and stability.

The China Challenge in Critical Minerals: The Case for Asymmetric Resilience

De-risking is unlikely to truly alter China’s dominance over global critical mineral supply chains. There’s a better approach.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/the-china-challenge-in-critical-minerals-the-case-for-asymmetric-resilience/

By Pascale Massot

June 06, 2025

Credit: Depositphotos

China is the dominant player in global critical minerals supply chains, especially in the midstream segments. The country controls, on average, two-thirds of the production or refining of major critical minerals such as lithium, graphite, cobalt, nickel, copper, and rare earth elements and above 90 percent for the latter. In 2022, the United States was more than 50 percent import dependent on 51 mineral commodities. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), China was the leading supplier for 17 of these and ranked among the top three sources for 24.

The U.S. was caught “sleeping at the wheel” – and it was not alone. Western governments have found themselves staring at the China challenge from the vantage point of decades of open-market-driven minerals procurement policy. Since the last quarter of the 20th century and until very recently, the neoliberal globalization paradigm in the West left to market forces the task of fulfilling critical mineral security objectives. This led to decades of internationalization, financialization, and global supply chain reconfiguration to align with profit motive and shareholder value maximization. In parallel, labor, environmental, civil society, and indigenous rights considerations continued to improve, a positive development that has also compounded the delocalization incentives of mining and refining industries.

As geopolitical strategic competition with China heats up, the realization that this paradigm is ill adapted to the pursuit of economic security has set Western governments scrambling to put together a set of responses building on the de-risking agenda popularized by Ursula von der Leyen in 2023 (coined months prior by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz). In North America, this agenda has tended to focus on three legs: onshoring/friend-shoring, diversification, and reindustrialization.

Yet current policy discussions suffer from growing pains resulting from an incomplete paradigm shift away from a market-led approach, insufficient appreciation of the scale and nature of China’s dominance, overly ambitious and underfunded targets, underspecified end goals, and too narrow an understanding of what ultimately constitutes resource security.

To help chart a way forward, I propose an approach of “asymmetric resilience,” which seeks to recalibrate the balance of strength and vulnerability between China and the West by modulating each side’s exposure to risk and developing targeted areas of dominance along global supply chains, while recognizing that China is also pursuing resource security. Asymmetric resilience seeks a recalibrated equilibrium that both sides can feel secure in.

China’s Crushing Level of Dominance in Critical Minerals Supply Chains

China has a few decades’ head start in thinking about commodities from a resource security perspective and implementing a multipronged strategy with domestic and international components. China has invested in all aspects of critical minerals development, all along the value chain, including on the technology front.

To take the global nickel industry as an example, the share of China’s refined nickel exports, while high at over 20 percent, does not capture China’s multifaceted dominance. Chinese investment in the accelerated high-pressure acid leach (HPAL) process has transformed the industry, and made the vast Indonesian nickel deposits economically viable. Chinese investors worked assiduously to develop a long-term presence in the Indonesian nickel processing and refining industry after Jakarta announced a national ban on raw nickel exports.

This led to a situation today where Ford Motors has chosen to partner with Vale Indonesia and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co. – a Chinese firm – to develop its nickel processing facility in Indonesia. This illustrates the predicament facing Western firms looking to build critical mineral resilience: it’s impractical for Western firms to back a nickel project without the involvement of a Chinese firm bringing the technology, know-how, and project delivery capacity. In this case, the actualization of U.S. nickel supply chain resilience runs through an ASEAN country, the Canadian subsidiary of a Brazilian iron ore giant, and a private Chinese firm.

To give a sense of the level of U.S. exposure here, under the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) thresholds (whose future is in flux), about 8-9 percent of global raw nickel supply and about 12 percent of refined supply is compliant. These figures would only rise to 10 percent and 13 percent respectively by 2034 taking current projections into account. A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out that the IRA fails to incentivize critical mineral production in key partner countries that do not have a free trade agreement with the United States, including Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, and Namibia.

The U.S. is not in a unique situation in this regard. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act puts the target at 10 percent domestic capacity for annual consumption by 2030. The act also aims to ensure that no more than 65 percent of annual consumption comes from a single third country. We all know who the third country is. Many observers have called even those objectives – which would leave the EU reliant on imports for up to 90 percent of annual consumption, 65 percent of which could come from China – overly ambitious.

The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency continues to turn up the heat on this issue. It was during his first administration that intense attention was brought to the issue of critical minerals in the first place. Trump has already issued at least three executive orders that speak directly to the topic and seek to speed up development of mining (including critical minerals, oil and gas, and even coal), including by dismantling regulatory hurdles for the domestic mining industry. But the administration’s disregard for climate change considerations, the lack of an integrated industrial strategy, the broad tariff-based logic and aversion to multilateral, collaborative approaches are likely to lead to decreased critical mineral resilience overall.

China’s Vulnerability Paradox

Given the level of dominance, it is easy to gloss over the fact that China’s current dominance in global critical minerals supply chains stems from a deep historical sentiment of vulnerability and continued reliance on imports of raw commodities (and, as it turns out, the continued export of finished products at the other end of the supply chain as well).

This is still true for the supplies of most raw minerals, something I cover in my book, “China’s Vulnerability Paradox.” China’s large share of global rare earths production is an outlier. A 2018 study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) estimated that China is more than 50 percent import dependent for 19 out of 42 nonfuel minerals, including iron ore and copper, but also cobalt, lithium, beryllium, niobium, chromite ore, platinum group metals (platinum, palladium, and rhodium), tantalum and others. And in some cases, China’s production capacity is plateauing (see potash, for instance).

This reality shows in the content of critical minerals export controls China has enacted over the past few years (in December 2023, December 2024, and February and April 2025). These have targeted relatively unique minerals (such as gallium and germanium), some niche metals (such as tungsten and bismuth), and rare earths that have strategic value, relatively low substitution potential, and where China has strong domestic production, not more broadly used base metals or minerals (such as copper or iron ore).

But China has other layers of vulnerability and exposure as well. Given the level of entwinement with global markets, there are second order effects and unintended consequences of using export controls as a tool to increase economic security, as the United States is discovering in the case of its own export control measures against China.

The Chinese government knows that export controls can raise global prices and incentivize production outside of the country. Rising global prices in minerals where China does not dominate raw production (say cobalt, nickel or lithium) would impact Chinese importers, in a context where low prices have served Chinese interests.

Here, it is always key to keep in mind the domestic political economy roots of China’s international behavior. China’s antimony production has actually been rapidly declining over the past few years, and antimony prices have risen sharply (by 250 percent in 2024 alone). This is hurting Chinese importers. Some analysts have argued that China’s antimony export restrictions were not so much aimed at a global audience, but rather at ensuring enough supplies stay at home to supply the domestic manufacturing industry.

Importantly, China has structured its export controls so that the extent of the control and its coverage can be adjusted over time.

A Path Forward: Asymmetric Resilience

The de-risking paradigm does not reckon with the fact that China’s dominance will continue to be a reality for the foreseeable future. It also fails to take good measure of the interconnectedness of global critical minerals supply chains as both a structural feature and an important component of supply chain resilience. We know, for instance, that a largely onshored supply chain would not necessarily be the most resilient, given the possibility of domestic supply shocks, quite apart from the fact that it remains uneconomical and unrealistic in most cases.

The asymmetric resilience approach I propose seeks to recalibrate rather than eliminate areas of vulnerability, building on defensive, assertive, plurilateral, and stability pillars.

To start, there is indeed a need for defensive resilience strategies. Certain defense considerations mandate a bolstering of supply security for niche minerals that can involve onshoring, but quantities needed are limited. Strategic stockpiling can also be a powerful ballast. In a productive example, the Australian government committed to investing AU$1.2 billion toward establishing a critical minerals reserve flexible enough to include offtake agreements and selective stockpiling, with the option to make this available to select partners. Urban mining (recycling) is another option for boosting domestic production.

Trade diversification as a general objective is valid. No country wants to overly depend on one source of supply. The difficulty here is to formulate comfort zones – the EU has formulated a ceiling of 65 percent dependence on one source.

The de-risking paradigm tends to lean on such defensive understandings of resource security. Yet, to thrive, an assertive posture is needed. This includes both investing at home to develop strong leadership in the face of the rapid changes required by the current tech/green fourth industrial revolution, and also targeting areas where positions of strength can be enhanced or created, given China’s deep enmeshment in global markets and remaining import and export vulnerabilities. In other words, instead of trying to duplicate Chinese positions of strength – for instance by seeking to match China’s refining prowess pound for pound in every mineral – efforts can be devoted to building targeted areas of dominance.

To more effectively drive critical minerals security, a more multifaceted understanding of supply chains is needed, close to Henry Farell and Abraham Newman’s “networked” understanding of market power. There are many nodes, players, and layers in global commodity markets, geographic and structural. Resource security does not stop at the border; investment flows and ownership structures, the technology frontier, industrial ecosystems, market power, pricing and the role of commodity exchanges, transport infrastructure, and even the role of the U.S. dollar deserve consideration. A strong industrial strategy should include upstream components – some critical minerals mining and refining, as well as magnet manufacturing, perhaps facilitated via some negotiated technology transfers and investments from China. But it must also include leaning on existing strengths, pushing hard on R&D and technology development, financing and pricing strategies, and third country relations.

There can be no one-size-fits-all strategy. Some commodities can be stockpiled, others less easily so. Some commodities are needed in such small quantities that many countries developing stockpiling strategies would overshoot collective resource security goals. In some cases, it may make sense to build more capacity at home, especially in the refining and processing segments. In others, it won’t make sense. Community engagement and consent as well as regulatory considerations make the opening of refining and processing plants in North America or Europe a more complex undertaking – and there are good reasons for this. This means other paths to resilience must be pursued, paths that will remain international in nature.

The third pillar must then be plurilateral. The U.S. or the EU cannot achieve critical mineral security on their own. A networked understanding of global commodity markets makes clear the need to forge plurilateral solutions. Close exchange and cooperation with multiple partners clearly yield benefits, and to some extent this was the approach taken with the Mineral Security Partnership. A significant change in how producers in the Global South are approached is also needed, if strong development pathways are to be supported.

Finally, a positive vision for an end game must be developed. Critical minerals have become securitized in a way that resembles an economic security dilemma, where both sides’ pursuit of security in the context of mistrust leads to a decreased sense of security everywhere. Drawing on Thomas Schelling’s influential 1966 work “Arms and Influence” – and as elaborated on more recently by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen in the context of U.S. policy on Taiwan – it is important to conceive of the relationship between China’s perception of resource security, its behavior, and Western perceptions of resource security in an interactive way.

While increasing one’s own resource security is a worthy goal, beyond recalibration, it cannot feed the current escalatory dynamic and encourage the further weaponization of critical minerals, as this will have deleterious effects on everyone’s security. The creation of strength and leverage should be paired with the creation of credible reassurances, for instance regarding a commitment to stability, transparency, and continued open access for most metals and minerals.

Asymmetric resilience is thus at once a more systemic and a more targeted approach to fulfilling critical mineral security objectives, exploring the possibility of mitigating rather than eliminating vulnerabilities and developing targeted areas of dominance. Built on defensive, assertive, plurilateral, and stability pillars, it takes into account feasibility, the variegated nature of different critical mineral supply chains, a networked understanding of global critical minerals security, and the need to act in concert with others, aiming for a recalibrated global equilibrium in the pursuit of the shared end goal of security, resilience, and stability.

Authors

Guest Author

Pascale Massot

Pascale Massot is an associate professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. She is also a nonresident honorary fellow for Political Economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, a senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and a nonresident fellow with the Centre for China Studies, National Taiwan University. Dr. Massot is the author of “China's Vulnerability Paradox: How the World's Largest Consumer Transformed Global Commodity Markets” (Oxford University Press, 2024), winner of the 2024 Best Book Award in International Political Economy from the International Studies Association (ISA) and the 2024 Peter Katzenstein Book Prize.

11. The kings of the drone age – Battlefields have a new ruler

Excerpts:

To be sure, and as Russia’s summer offensive so luridly proves, many of war’s fundamentals remain: manpower and an industrial base are both crucial to victory. But morale of course matters too, and on that point Spider Web surely inflicted a deep psychological blow on Russia, one set to linger long after those smashed aircraft have been replaced. Indeed, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to end with a single battlefield defeat, but rather when one side’s morale fractures, finally leading to serious negotiations, regime change, or a collapse.

For the moment, both sides still fight with determination, and this psychological tipping point has yet to arrive. How we reach that point is the question. Thirty or even 20 years ago, it wouldn’t have even been in play. The Ukrainians might have been able to wage a guerrilla war against an occupying Russia — but holding off the enemy in the field would have been practically impossible.

Now, though, for all Russia’s resources, it’s not difficult to imagine its morale imploding if a particularly devastating drone assault obliterates a Russian target of monumental importance — or indeed Putin himself, who would once have been almost entirely safe over 1,000 kilometres from the frontline. In the end, Goliath remains Goliath and David remains David. But today David has a drone. And that does change things, even if not as much as David might have hoped.

The kings of the drone age

Battlefields have a new ruler

unherd.com · by David Patrikarakos · June 6, 2025

It took Ukraine 18 months to plan Operation Spider Web, but just minutes for its swarm of cheap drones to send a $7 billion message to Russia and the world: war is entering a new epoch. An age of asymmetric power has arrived, and it is disordering traditional power dynamics everywhere, from how armies fight to how citizens relate to their rulers.

Last weekend, over 100 first-person view Ukrainian drones whacked four air bases across Russia — the furthest in Siberia — severely diminishing Russia’s offensive air capabilities. Zelensky’s message was clear: we can hit you wherever you are, with technology you can buy for thousands of dollars or less on the internet.

Yet if operation Spider Web was part MacGyver, it was also part le Carré. The Ukrainians had their drones smuggled on lorries well in advance of the strikes. The weapons were hidden in containers disguised as sheds, before being transported into Russia by lorry. These were then parked near the air bases, before Ukraine remotely opened their retractable roofs and launched their cargo to devastating effect.

Drones evoke a simple truth: hoard technology, especially military technology, and you centralise power. Disperse it and watch that power dissipate alongside it.

Historically, war was an intimate affair. For millennia, the only way to kill someone was if you could see them. That remained true even with the invention of gunpowder. Machine guns and howitzers can certainly fire further, but still require proximity. The basic dynamics were always the same: men and machines clashed on the ground. Success depended on outlasting or overpowering the enemy through force, numbers, or strategic positioning.

In practice, that made logistics and supply lines crucial to war machines. And, as late as the 20th century, conflicts were won by states that could deploy the greatest amount of resources against the enemy. The key here was effectiveness (total output), not efficiency (the ratio of output to input). And this is partly why two behemoths dominated the Cold War world so absolutely. Notwithstanding their vast differences, the US and USSR enjoyed almost unimpeded control of their respective nation’s resources — and because they had more resources than their rivals, they became hegemonic.

But drones are different: representing are a step towards detaching humanity from the kinetic fight. War is no longer only about mobilising soldiers, but rather about sending autonomous machines to survey, target and even strike the enemy. This transforms war for would-be attackers: even if Spider Web’s drones had all been discovered or destroyed, the pilots operating them remotely from inside Ukraine would still have been safe.

There are broader implications here, especially given the way organised violence shapes society. Whoever deploys violence most effectively is best positioned to secure territories and resources, the foundation of political authority. The Gunpowder Revolution helped drag the West into civic modernity: by increasing the scale and scope of war, it increased the money needed to fund it. That, in turn, sparked the need for more sophisticated revenue-gathering systems, requiring greater centralisation, a trend that persisted until the end of the last century.

Drones, then, have reversed this dynamic, decentralising power and putting it into the hands of groups and individuals — or indeed war weary states facing a continent-sized enemy. Only governments have access to fighter jets and similar: an F-16 costs around $30 million and requires years of training to fly. Spider Web used drones that cost just thousands dollars, and which you can learn to pilot in days, even as they eliminated $7 billion of sophisticated military hardware in mere minutes. How’s that for power dispersal?

The result is inevitable: greater independence for smaller, poorer, or less militarily capable states. The Ukrainians remain reliant on US hardware, especially for air defence systems. As Russia daily pounds Ukrainian cities, they represent a lifeline for Kyiv. But the Americans are refusing to supply any more. So Ukraine flipped the script: rather than beg for more systems to ward off Russian attacks at the last moment, Zelensky’s generals used drones to disable them at source. This sends a clear message to Washington: while we need your support, we can execute high-level operations on our own.

“The result is inevitable: greater independence for smaller, poorer, or less militarily capable states.”

Once again, this technological shift matters politically. That inevitably empowers Kyiv at the negotiating table, while putting pressure on Moscow to update its own air defence systems, designed to counter incoming missiles or aircraft.

Certainly, Spider Web’s timing suggests Zelensky and his generals understand the political ramifications of the drone revolution. The operation hit the day before Ukraine met with Russia in Istanbul for only their second face-to-face negotiations since 2022. This is no coincidence. As well as inflicting serious damage on Russia’s offensive capabilities, Spider Web shifted the power dynamic, given that throughout the negotiations Moscow has maintained its maximalist position.

We must, of course, be careful here: with Russia embarrassed by the fiasco, it will be less likely to make concessions in the short term. Russian officials and commentators in the state media have compared the attack to Pearl Harbour and called for retaliation. State media now call for a nuclear response. Meanwhile, Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that, following the strike, he spoke to Putin who has promised, “very strongly, that he will have to respond to the recent attack on the airfields”. So for Ukraine, it has yielded nothing tangible in negotiations. But, in truth, nothing was ever going to emerge. Putin has no interest in ending the war without first crushing Ukraine. Once again, that was clear at the Istanbul talks, when Russian negotiators announced that they would only agree to peace if Kyiv ceded large amounts of territory and accepted limits on the size of its military. A laughable, unserious proposal. So you may as well hit him as hard as you can.

Spider Web may have put a spring in the step of the Ukrainian negotiators, they may feel they can look their Russian interlocutors in the eye more easily. But, alone, it will do little to end the war. As Tim Ripley, editor at Defence Eye tells me, the conflict will likely be decided on the ground, with drones merely supporting a more traditional campaign of attrition. Certainly, the Russians seem to understand this. Their summer offensive is already underway: in the northeast, they’ve smashed Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region and continue their push into neighbouring Sumy. Now, they’re swarming the Ukrainian lines across the Donbas with heavy assaults, backed by weekly missile and drone attacks — sometimes up to 300 at a time.

The tempo of the Russian offensive is only intensifying as the weather improves. Ground forces are mobilising for a major push. All told, this is a major strategic moment for the Kremlin. By attacking on multiple fronts, Russia hopes to stretch Ukrainian resources and morale to breaking point. Yes, the Ukrainian air attack has damaged Russian bombers, but the Russian war machine is vast, and it keeps on coming.

And, of course, Putin could also order his own Spider Web. After all, if drones empower Davids, they’re also available to Goliaths: who, let’s face it, have far more cash, infrastructure and human capital behind them. What emerges is a situation where everyone is empowered by the new technology, from great powers, to small ones, to non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah.

How are the Israelis likely to respond to a mass Hezbollah drone attack that overwhelms their Iron Dome defences and causes destruction and casualties to a degree previously impossible? And what might the Chinese Goliath do to the American one?

In short, drones may auger yet more chaos, more bloodshed, more war.

And, all the while, the drones buzz on. China, for its part, is developing swarming machines that can operate in coordinated groups to overwhelm adversaries. The Chinese military has also integrated AI-powered drones that can autonomously identify and strike targets with surgical precision — harbingers of intelligent and totally autonomous warfare.

Other countries are rushing ahead too. Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 drones have long helped Ukraine annihilate Russian forces. Israel’s Harop and Heron drones were among the first to showcase the technology’s versatility in intelligence gathering and strike capabilities. As all these nations advance drone technology, they shift the calculus of modern conflict by removing human risk from the battlefield and increasing the scale and precision of military operations.

We in the UK are yet to fully embrace the technology’s potential. Yes, Defence Secretary John Healey recently wrote in the Strategic Defence Review that “technology is changing how war is fought”. But what the Army needs now is action not words. Clever governments understand the need to balance expensive weapons systems with cheap, flexible drone technologies. States that refuse to learn waste billions on aircraft carriers.

To be sure, and as Russia’s summer offensive so luridly proves, many of war’s fundamentals remain: manpower and an industrial base are both crucial to victory. But morale of course matters too, and on that point Spider Web surely inflicted a deep psychological blow on Russia, one set to linger long after those smashed aircraft have been replaced. Indeed, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to end with a single battlefield defeat, but rather when one side’s morale fractures, finally leading to serious negotiations, regime change, or a collapse.

For the moment, both sides still fight with determination, and this psychological tipping point has yet to arrive. How we reach that point is the question. Thirty or even 20 years ago, it wouldn’t have even been in play. The Ukrainians might have been able to wage a guerrilla war against an occupying Russia — but holding off the enemy in the field would have been practically impossible.

Now, though, for all Russia’s resources, it’s not difficult to imagine its morale imploding if a particularly devastating drone assault obliterates a Russian target of monumental importance — or indeed Putin himself, who would once have been almost entirely safe over 1,000 kilometres from the frontline. In the end, Goliath remains Goliath and David remains David. But today David has a drone. And that does change things, even if not as much as David might have hoped.

David Patrikarakos is UnHerd‘s foreign correspondent. His latest book is War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. (Hachette)

12. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre: A Reflection on America’s China Policy

It might have been different if Tianannmen had occurred when President Raegan was still in office.

To Gorbachev he said: "Tear down this wall."

To Deng he would have said, "Get the tanks off the square."

Excerpts:

There are two reasons why the United States’ China policy returned to the track of engagement. First, the U.S. needed to unite with China to confront the Soviet Union before its collapse in December 1991. Second, after the end of the Cold War, China’s enormous population and market – a source of potentially huge profits – became a primary driver of U.S. engagement. Simply put, decoupling with China was not pragmatic, and national security and economic interests profit have always ranked higher than human rights in the priorities of U.S. foreign policy.

Still, there were consequences to the dramatic return to the original U.S. China policy after the Tiananmen Massacre. The about-face not only showed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime the reality and flexibility of U.S. policy but also forced human rights advocates in China to re-evaluate the role of the U.S. government in advancing Chinese human rights and democracy. It became clear that the U.S. government wanted to maintain a permanent pragmatic engagement with China instead of sanctioning or even decoupling from the Chinese government over human right abuses. Both the CCP and China’s pro-human rights community recognized that the U.S. advocates for human rights but does not always treat them as a priority.

As the famous Bible verse goes, “There is nothing new under the sun.” After revisiting Bush’s choices 36 years ago, Trump’s China policy today should not surprise us. It’s just another incarnation of the long-standing focus on realism and engagement policies. However, there is one major differences: Bush and other presidents still mentioned human rights and democracy as a goal. Trump refuses to mention human rights and democracy in his China policy, while wiping out U.S. values and soft power from global diplomacy. Trump’s second term thus marks the worst iteration of the United States’ realist and pragmatic approach to China.

On the 36th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, the Chinese who are promoting China’s democratization should internalize the lessons learned not only in 1989, but also in 1992. They should not only depend on the U.S. but should make an effort to receive aid from Europe, Japan, and Taiwan. Within the United States, they should not rely solely on the executive branch of government; instead, they should focus on American society, including Congress, NGOs, think tanks, and universities.

One lasting truth is this: the people promoting China’s democratization must fight to the end, regardless of external assistance, until we finally prevail.

After the Tiananmen Square Massacre: A Reflection on America’s China Policy

After June 4, 1989, the U.S. government downgraded concerns over China’s human rights record to pursue realist interests. That Trump is doing the same today should be no surprise.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/after-the-tiananmen-square-massacre-a-reflection-on-americas-china-policy/

By Baosheng Guo

June 04, 2025

Then-U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, February 1989.

Credit: George Bush Presidential Library and Museum

Today marks the 36th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre on June 4, 1989, yet in recent months the international community has paid little attention to this historical moment and the question of democratization in China. One of the reasons is that after U.S. President Donald Trump took office, he implemented a foreign policy under his “America First” principle that prioritizes transactionalism and ignores values.

Trump not only discontinued the Summit for Democracy held in the Biden era but also withdrew funding from the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID. He gutted the U.S. Agency for Global Media, and suspended or restrained broadcasting regarding China, including Voice of America (VOA) Chinese, VOA Tibetan, and Radio Free Asia (which broadcast in Mandarin, Uyghur, and Tibetan). These platforms have long been the most critical overseas media to promote China’s democratization and to criticize the Chinese government for trampling on human rights. Meanwhile, the funding of many human rights organizations and NGOs related to China was also interrupted.

All of these moves caused significant losses to the Chinese democratic movement, at least overseas, sending it tumbling to new lows.

Many were astonished by Trump’s policies and could not understand why his approach to China disregarded the country’s human rights and democracy. But in fact, such a China policy is not unusual in U.S. history. By examining how the U.S. government addressed the Tiananmen Square Massacre 36 years ago, we find that the George H.W. Bush administration actually put American interests above the values of democracy and human rights. Through this look back at history, we can see that realism and a policy of pragmatic engagement have been consistent features of the U.S. government’s China policy.

On June 4, 1989, the Chinese government brutally and bloodily suppressed the peaceful pro-democracy protest movement in Beijing and all around China, resulting in the slaughter of thousands of students and citizens. This incident, known as the Tiananmen Massacre, provoked a short-lived turning point in U.S. China policy. Before the Massacre, the United States had pursued a policy of engagement with China; after, the U.S. started to prioritize human rights above U.S. interests – but only for a moment. Before long, Washington had once again put national security and economic interests above human rights and democracy.

This short-lived turning point demonstrates the basic logic of the United States’ China policy in an era long predating Trump.

Since 1979, when the United States established a diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Washington has implemented a policy of pragmatic engagement with China, believing that “deepening engagement would spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder, with a more open society.”

Presidents Carter and Reagan promoted engagement with China to coordinate against the Soviet Union, encouraged China’s economic reform, and advocated for human rights. When President George H. W. Bush took office in 1989, he strengthened the pragmatic Sino-American engagement policies. He had been the chief of the Liaison Office to the PRC in 1974, and he had deep and human relationships with both Chinese top leaders and a broad cross-section of average citizens. Bush was so keen on a friendly relationship with China that he even expressed his dissatisfaction to the ambassador to China, Winston Lord, who was passionate about the Chinese human rights movement before June 4, 1989.

However, the crackdown on protesters swiftly forced a change in Bush’s China policy. One day after the Tiananmen Massacre, under pressure from Congress and international society, Bush announced a a series of sanctions on the Chinese government, such as a suspension of arms sales and military visits between the two countries, a re-examination of applications for an extension of stay by Chinese students in the United States, and reviews of other issues in bilateral relations.On June 8, the U.S. State Department called on American citizens to leave China. On the 20th, Bush instructed the U.S. government to impose new sanctions against China, including the cessation of all high-level contacts with Chinese government officials, and announced that the United States would seek to have international financial institutions postpone new loans to China.

The significant turn in Bush’s China policy won the praise and support of the U.S. Congress, society, and the international community. In a press conference on June 5, Bush said, “The demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were advocating basic human rights… Throughout the world, we stand with those who seek greater freedom and democracy. This is the strongly felt view of my administration, of our Congress, and most importantly, of the American people.”

In the immediate aftermath of the killings, the Bush administration started to treat human rights as the primary determinant of the Sino-U.S. relationship. Bush paused the long-standing engagement policy and the strategy of unity with China confronting the Soviet Union. That shocked the Chinese government, which could not believe that the U.S. would emphasize human rights to such an extent.

However, Bush still quietly maintained a positive view of the engagement policy. Even in the June 5 press conference, he said that “the budding of democracy which we have seen in recent weeks owes much to the relationship we have developed since 1972. And it’s important at this time to act in a way that will encourage the further development and deepening of the positive elements of that relationship and the process of democratization.”

His words set the tone and legitimacy for his renewal of the engagement policy with China soon after. Meanwhile, he implied that the United States should maintain engaged with China to promote the democratization of the country. “It would be a tragedy for all if China were to pull back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and repression,” Bush declared. “The process of democratization of Communist societies will not be a smooth one, and we must react to setbacks in a way which stimulates rather than stifles progress toward open and representative systems.”

As Professor Stephen Knott later wrote, “Although Bush abhorred the Chinese government’s violent crackdown in Tiananmen Square, he did not want to jettison improved U.S.-Sino relations… Many in Congress cried out for a harsh, punitive response to the Chinese government’s killing of peaceful protestors, but the Bush administration imposed only limited sanctions.”

James R. Lilley was the U.S. ambassador to China from 1989 to 1991. He said in an interview that “some Members of Congress from the Democratic Party were using this issue to bash President Bush with. The phrase commonly used was: ‘Send them [the Chinese leadership] a signal’ by withdrawing our ambassador. President Bush made it clear that he wasn’t going to do that.”

In addition, Bush sent his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and the deputy secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, on secret missions to Beijing in July and December 1989. As Scowcroft wrote in 1998, “The purpose of my trip … was not negotiations – there was nothing yet to negotiate – but an effort to keep open the lines of communication.”

Nevertheless, the two secret visits to Beijing were symbolically significant and heralded a further change in the direction of U.S. China policy yet again. As Professor David Shambaugh commented, “Scowcroft had gone to Beijing in the hopes of establishing a pathway through which the Chinese leadership could climb out of the traps they had laid and were in.” And Professor Evan Medeiros has argued that in 1989, the U.S. government “wanted a return to stable and positive relations more than Beijing. The White House made numerous efforts: a secret trip, multiple letters, and the briefing after Bush’s summit with Gorbachev.”

Along with two secret visits, Bush wrote two letters to Deng Xiaoping, China’s top leader at the time. In the first letter, Bush attempted to justify his choices: “the actions I took as president could not be avoided… the clamor for stronger action remains intense… I have resisted that clamor, making clear that I do not want to see destroyed this relationship that you and I have worked so hard to build.”

In the second letter, he wrote that he saw “many areas of importance today where China and the U.S. have similar interests… On the broader subject that is a constant concern to me, how to normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find some answers. With respect, I hope China will try to do the same.”

Like many Americans and Chinese overseas, political scholar Ted Galen Carpenter critiqued the letters. “The United States needs to preserve a decent relationship with Beijing. But no one should have any illusions about the profoundly evil nature of China’s communist regime,” Galen wrote. “Bush preserved the China tie, but he did so at the cost of his personal dignity and American values. That mistake must not be repeated.”

But the die was cast. Bush started to return to the engagement policy after an all-too-short period of prioritizing human rights in U.S. China policy. Except for keeping some sanctions, the Bush administration began to restore a comprehensive relationship with China. In particular, Bush separated Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment from sanctions and human rights, and he vetoed any bills of Congress that linked the two together. Bush vetoed such bills in both 1991 and 1992, allowing China to receive annual MFN treatment.

Just three years after the Tiananmen Massacre, the Bush administration ultimately returned its China policy to one of pragmatic engagement. Bush’s weakened emphasis on human rights became a target of criticisms from Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton in the 1992 election. However, when Clinton took office, he also decoupled human rights from China’s MFN status.

There are two reasons why the United States’ China policy returned to the track of engagement. First, the U.S. needed to unite with China to confront the Soviet Union before its collapse in December 1991. Second, after the end of the Cold War, China’s enormous population and market – a source of potentially huge profits – became a primary driver of U.S. engagement. Simply put, decoupling with China was not pragmatic, and national security and economic interests profit have always ranked higher than human rights in the priorities of U.S. foreign policy.

Still, there were consequences to the dramatic return to the original U.S. China policy after the Tiananmen Massacre. The about-face not only showed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime the reality and flexibility of U.S. policy but also forced human rights advocates in China to re-evaluate the role of the U.S. government in advancing Chinese human rights and democracy. It became clear that the U.S. government wanted to maintain a permanent pragmatic engagement with China instead of sanctioning or even decoupling from the Chinese government over human right abuses. Both the CCP and China’s pro-human rights community recognized that the U.S. advocates for human rights but does not always treat them as a priority.

As the famous Bible verse goes, “There is nothing new under the sun.” After revisiting Bush’s choices 36 years ago, Trump’s China policy today should not surprise us. It’s just another incarnation of the long-standing focus on realism and engagement policies. However, there is one major differences: Bush and other presidents still mentioned human rights and democracy as a goal. Trump refuses to mention human rights and democracy in his China policy, while wiping out U.S. values and soft power from global diplomacy. Trump’s second term thus marks the worst iteration of the United States’ realist and pragmatic approach to China.

On the 36th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, the Chinese who are promoting China’s democratization should internalize the lessons learned not only in 1989, but also in 1992. They should not only depend on the U.S. but should make an effort to receive aid from Europe, Japan, and Taiwan. Within the United States, they should not rely solely on the executive branch of government; instead, they should focus on American society, including Congress, NGOs, think tanks, and universities.

One lasting truth is this: the people promoting China’s democratization must fight to the end, regardless of external assistance, until we finally prevail.

Authors

Guest Author

Baosheng Guo

Baosheng Guo is an M.A. student in Asian Studies at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs and a well-known Chinese dissident. He was a major participant and organizer of the student movement in Beijing universities after the June 4th Incident in 1989.

13. The great poaching: America's brain drain begins

A national security issue.

2 hours ago -Science

The great poaching: America's brain drain begins

https://www.axios.com/2025/06/07/us-science-brain-drain

Erica Pandey

Illustration: Brendan Lynch/Axios

The Trump administration’s spending cuts and restrictions on foreign students are triggering a brain drain — and American scientists are panicking.

Why it matters: U.S. researchers' fears are coming true. America’s science pipeline is drying up, and countries like China are seizing the opportunity to surge ahead.

“This is such a race for being the science powerhouse that you never fully recover,” says Marcia McNutt, president of the National Academy of Sciences. “You might accelerate back up to 60, but you can’t make up for those years when you were at a standstill while the competition was racing ahead.”

Driving the news: The National Science Foundation, which funds much of America's fundamental science research, is already doling out grants at its slowest pace in 35 years, The New York Times reports.

More cuts to science could come with the "big, beautiful bill."

Universities are also watching with bated breath as the administration tries to limit the number of foreign students studying in the U.S..

Harvard is pushing back, but could face a total ban on recruiting internationally. The Trump administration says it will "aggressively revoke" visas for Chinese students studying in "critical fields."

By the numbers: While American universities are rescinding offers to incoming PhD students, other countries are recruiting heavily from U.S. labs.

The journal Nature analyzed data from its jobs platform to track where scientists are looking for work. In the first few months of the Trump administration, there were jumps in the the number of U.S. applicants looking for jobs in Canada (+41%), Europe (+32%), China (+20%) and other Asian countries (+39%), compared to the same period in 2024.
U.S. jobs saw fewer applications from candidates in Canada (–13%) and Europe (–41%).

Case in point: France's Aix-Marseille University, which made headlines for earmarking millions of dollars for U.S. scientists, closed its application window after receiving a flood of apps.

After American Nobel laureate Ardem Patapoutian's federal grant was frozen, he got an email from China offering 20 years of funding if he relocates his lab, The New York Times' Kate Zernike writes. He declined.
“This is a once-in-a-century brain gain opportunity,” the Australian Strategic Policy Institute wrote in a brief.

The other side: The White House argues that its changes to the system will usher in a golden age of science and rebuild public trust. President Trump has also suggested that spots freed up by rejecting international students could be filled by American applicants.

But professors say this isn't entirely realistic.
"In hard sciences, in astronomy and physics and computer science, for example, there’s no way you would fill that hole with local applicants of comparable quality," says Chris Impey, an astronomer at the University of Arizona.

What to watch: “The optimistic part of all of us thinks science is strong enough to outlast one administration, and for a while I thought that, but the hit to young people is at the center of the whole enterprise,” Impey says. “It’s like pulling the rug out from under the whole thing."

It's not just brain drain of existing talent, he says. Students who are in high school and college now and thinking about a career in research might reconsider. "There’s plenty of things smart kids can do. They don’t have to go into science."
At the same time, McNutt says she tells students: "If you went into graduate school in the fall of this year, by the time you get your PhD, this madness may be over. You come out with your new PhD ready to fill the gap."

14. Trump's Golden Dome will make US – and world – less safe

Perhaps in theory. But I think it is the morally right thing to do to search for solutions and capabilities to defend ourselves. I do not want to bank on these theories by academics and pundits.

And I do not think a missile defense will provoke arms buildups. They are already occurring which is why we need missile defense. Chicken meet egg.

Trump's Golden Dome will make US – and world – less safe - Asia Times

Missile defense shield will provoke arms buildups, derail prospects for new nuke control treaty and boost chances of nuclear war

asiatimes.com · by Matthew Bunn · June 7, 2025

President Donald Trump’s idea of a “Golden Dome” missile defense system carries a range of potential strategic dangers for the United States.

Golden Dome is meant to protect the US from ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, and missiles launched from space. Trump has called for the missile defense to be fully operational before the end of his term in three years.

Trump’s goals for Golden Dome are likely beyond reach. A wide range of studies makes clear that even defenses far more limited than what Trump envisions would be far more expensive and less effective than Trump expects, especially against enemy missiles equipped with modern countermeasures.

Countermeasures include multiple warheads per missile, decoy warheads and warheads that can maneuver or are difficult to track, among others.

Regardless of Golden Dome’s feasibility, there is a long history of scholarship about strategic missile defenses, and the weight of evidence points to the defenses making their host country less safe from nuclear attack.

I’m a national security and foreign policy professor at Harvard University, where I lead “Managing the Atom,” the university’s main research group on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. For decades, I’ve been participating in dialogues with Russian and Chinese nuclear experts – and their fears about US missile defenses have been a consistent theme throughout.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have already warned that Golden Dome is destabilizing. Along with US offensive capabilities, Golden Dome poses a threat of “directly undermining global strategic stability, spurring an arms race and increasing conflict potential both among nuclear-weapon states and in the international arena as a whole,” a joint statement from China and Russia said.

While that is a propaganda statement, it reflects real concerns broadly held in both countries.

Golden Dome explained.

History lessons

Experience going back half a century makes clear that if the administration pursues Golden Dome, it is likely to provoke even larger arms buildups, derail already-dim prospects for any negotiated nuclear arms restraint, and perhaps even increase the chances of nuclear war.

My first book, 35 years ago, made the case that it would be in the US national security interest to remain within the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which strictly limited US and Soviet – and later Russian – missile defenses. The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of SALT I, the first agreements limiting the nuclear arms race. It was approved in the Senate 98-2.

The ABM Treaty experience is instructive for the implications of Golden Dome today.

Why did the two countries agree to limit defenses? First and foremost, because they understood that unless each side’s defenses were limited, they would not be able to stop an offensive nuclear arms race.

If each side wants to maintain the ability to retaliate if the other attacks – “don’t nuke me, or I’ll nuke you” – then an obvious answer to one side building up more defenses is for the other to build up more nuclear warheads.

For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets installed 100 interceptors to defend Moscow – so the United States targeted still more warheads on Moscow to overwhelm the defense. Had it ever come to a nuclear war, Moscow would have been even more thoroughly obliterated than if there had been no defense at all.

Both sides came to realize that unlimited missile defenses would just mean more offense on both sides, leaving both less secure than before.

In addition, nations viewed an adversary’s shield as going hand in hand with a nuclear sword. A nuclear first strike might destroy a major part of a country’s nuclear forces. Missile defenses would inevitably be more effective against the reduced, disorganized retaliation that they knew would be coming than they would be against a massive, well-planned surprise attack.

That potential advantage to whoever struck first could make nuclear crises even more dangerous.

Post-ABM Treaty world

Unfortunately, President George W Bush pulled the United States out of the ABM Treaty in 2002, seeking to free US development of defenses against potential missile attacks from small states such as North Korea. But even now, decades later, the US has fewer missile interceptors deployed (44) than the treaty permitted (100).

The US pullout did not lead to an immediate arms buildup or the end of nuclear arms control. But Putin has complained bitterly about US missile defenses and the US refusal to accept any limitation at all on them. He views the US stance as an effort to achieve military superiority by negating Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Russia is investing heavily in new types of strategic nuclear weapons intended to avoid US missile defenses, from an intercontinental nuclear torpedo to a missile that can go around the world and attack from the south, while US defenses are mainly pointed north toward Russia.

Russia maintains a large force of nuclear weapons like this mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via APPEAR / The Conversation

Similarly, much of China’s nuclear buildup appears to be driven by wanting a reliable nuclear deterrent in the face of the United States’ capability to strike its nuclear forces and use missile defenses to mop up the remainder.

Indeed, China was so angered by South Korea’s deployment of US-provided regional defenses – which they saw as aiding the US ability to intercept their missiles – that they imposed stiff sanctions on South Korea.

Fuel to the fire

Now, Trump wants to go much further, with a defense “forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland,” with a success rate “very close to 100%.” I believe that this effort is highly likely to lead to still larger nuclear buildups in Russia and China. The Putin-Xi joint statement pledges to “counter” defenses “aimed at achieving military superiority.”

Given the ease of developing countermeasures that are extraordinarily difficult for defenses to overcome, odds are the resulting offense-defense competition will leave the United States worse off than before – and a good bit poorer.

Putin and Xi made clear that they are particularly concerned about the thousands of space-based interceptors Trump envisions. These interceptors are designed to hit missiles while their rockets are still burning during launch.

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Most countries are likely to oppose the idea of deploying huge numbers of weapons in space – and these interceptors would be both expensive and vulnerable. China and Russia could focus on further developing anti-satellite weapons to blow a hole in the defense, increasing the risk of space war.

Already, there is a real danger that the whole effort of negotiated limits to temper nuclear arms racing may be coming to an end. The last remaining treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear forces, the New START Treaty, expires in February 2026. China’s rapid nuclear buildup is making many defense officials and experts in Washington call for a US buildup in response.

Intense hostility all around means that for now, neither Russia nor China is even willing to sit down to discuss nuclear restraints, in treaty form or otherwise.

A way forward

In my view, adding Golden Dome to this combustible mix would likely end any prospect of avoiding a future of unrestrained and unpredictable nuclear arms competition. But paths away from these dangers are available.

It would be quite plausible to design defenses that would provide some protection against attacks from a handful of missiles from North Korea or others that would not seriously threaten Russian or Chinese deterrent forces – and design restraints that would allow all parties to plan their offensive forces knowing what missile defenses they would be facing in the years to come.

I believe that Trump should temper his Golden Dome ambitions to achieve his other dream – of negotiating a deal to reduce nuclear dangers.

Matthew Bunn is professor of the practice of energy, national security and foreign policy, Harvard Kennedy School

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Thanks

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asiatimes.com · by Matthew Bunn · June 7, 2025

15. Army plans to close more than 20 base museums in major reduction

Is this a DOGE action? It pains me to read anything about us not remembering our history. I get that there is a strong fiscal rationale but "those who fail to remember history....

Next on the chopping block? – professional military education????

I am reminded about the recent information about Operation Spiderweb. The Ukrainians used the Soviet era bombers in a Ukraine military museum to help with the targeting.

“A generation which ignores history has no past and no future.”

– Robert Heinlein

“Those who don’t know history are doomed to repeat it.”

– Edmund Burke

“Study the past if you would define the future.”

– Confucius

“The only thing new in the world is the history you do not know.”

– Harry S. Truman

“There is no better teacher than history in determining the future. There are answers worth billions of dollars in a $30 history book.”

– Charlie Munger

As an aside, have you ever seen the building the Army Center Military History works in at Fort McNair? The leadership there certainly prioritized its limited funding on the museums and the mission over the building it works in. I think it is one of the oldest buildings on Fort McNair. Any other organization would have ensured its HQ building was the best, but not CMH. Theirs is a non-descript old building that looks more like a warehouse (which it probably was at one time) rather than the center for all military history.

Excerpts:

In all, the Army plans to reduce its current roster of 41 museums — 38 of which are on or near bases inside the U.S. with three overseas — to 12. The decision comes as the Army’s body for overseeing the museums deals with aging buildings and growing maintenance costs.

“We have more museum footprint than we can support and that is the bottom line,” said James Vizzard, the deputy executive director of the Army Center for Military History at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. “We can keep the museums open, but we cannot present a museum experience our visitors deserve and, frankly, our workforce deserves.”

Army museums are overseen by the Center of Military History, under its Army Museum Enterprise directorate, Vizzard said. The museums own and care for about 540,000 artifacts, which might be weapons, uniforms, vehicles or any other notable objects with historic or educational value, across its museums, warehouses and other facilities. The museums also oversee a collection of 60,000 archived documents.

Army plans to close more than 20 base museums in major reduction

Citing maintenance costs and aging buildings, the Army will close or consolidate many of its 41 museums, leaving only 12 at major bases.

Matt White

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White

More than 20 U.S. Army museums that showcase the legacies of major historic units or bases will close in the next three years in a major overhaul of the museum system, Army officials said Wednesday.

A list of museums slated to be closed by 2028, obtained by Task & Purpose, includes ones at Fort Drum, New York, which is dedicated to the 10th Mountain Division, and museums at major bases like Fort Stewart, Georgia, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Fort Bliss, Texas.

In all, the Army plans to reduce its current roster of 41 museums — 38 of which are on or near bases inside the U.S. with three overseas — to 12. The decision comes as the Army’s body for overseeing the museums deals with aging buildings and growing maintenance costs.

“We have more museum footprint than we can support and that is the bottom line,” said James Vizzard, the deputy executive director of the Army Center for Military History at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. “We can keep the museums open, but we cannot present a museum experience our visitors deserve and, frankly, our workforce deserves.”

Army museums are overseen by the Center of Military History, under its Army Museum Enterprise directorate, Vizzard said. The museums own and care for about 540,000 artifacts, which might be weapons, uniforms, vehicles or any other notable objects with historic or educational value, across its museums, warehouses and other facilities. The museums also oversee a collection of 60,000 archived documents.

Only about 1% of the artifact collection is on display at any time in the museums, Vizzard said. Historians and curators regularly create exhibits from the vast pool of stored artifacts for showcasing in the museums.

“Part of the problem is that [each museum] can afford to hire a couple of curators, but every museum should also have education specialists. That’s what museums are for,” Vizzard said. “You need to have exhibit technicians and educators and those are where we tend to skimp, frankly, and that gets back to that museum experience. You’re not getting the right museum experience if you just have curators.”

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The National Museum of the United States Army at Fort Belvoir, Virginia is also overseen by the center, but its budget, staffing and exhibit spaces will not be affected by the round of closures.

One of the driving factors is the state of the aging facilities. Many Army museums, said Vizzard, occupy older buildings on a base, leading to high maintenance costs.

“The museum enterprise was created because lots of individual entities, whether that was posts or units or schools, created their own little museums,” Vizzard said. “So you had a post commander who was all excited about it and put a lot of money into it and built it up. And then the next commander was like, ‘I don’t really care about the museum. I got to train people to go to war.’”

As a result, museums at smaller bases without outside funding often find their way to ever smaller and older buildings.

“They’ll say ‘we have this really old building, let’s put the museum in it,” Vizzard said. “And as someone who lives in a 90-year-old house, my word for it is ‘money pit.’”

If the Army was to repair and update the over 100 buildings that Army museums now occupy, Vizzard said, the cost could run to $65 million. By comparison, the total annual operating budget for all 41 museums, he said, is $35 million. Leaky roofs and bad HVAC, he said, make for bad experiences for visitors and also can damage exhibits.

The restructuring, said Vizzard, was due to dwindling resources and rising costs across the museums, which often occupy old, poorly maintained buildings on the bases they

Missiles on display at the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range Museum in New Mexico. U.S. Army photo

The move was not, Vizzard said, a reaction to the flurry of federal budget cuts under President Donald Trump, either via the Elon Musk-run Department of Government Efficient, or DOGE, or under the major cuts to the Pentagon budget mandated by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.

“One question we’ve gotten a lot is, you know, ‘was this from DOGE? Was this the new administration?’ It absolutely was not. We were working on drafts of the information paper, frankly, before the inauguration, and we did not change them significantly in response to anything that happened after. This has been a long time coming.”

The bases where museum will be kept open, according to the list obtained by Task & Purpose are:

The U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York

U.S. Army Museum of Hawaii in Honolulu

Fort Gregg Adams, Virginia

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Fort Cavazos, Texas

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Fort Jackson, South Carolina

Fort Benning, Georgia

Fort Novosel, Alabama

Fort Sam Houston, Texas

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Those set to be closed include museums on the following bases:

Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Fort Lewis, Washington

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico

Fort Carson, Colorado

Fort Riley, Kansas

Fort Bliss, Texas

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Fort Knox, Kentucky

Fort Stewart, Georgia

Fort Drum, New York,

Fort Hamilton, New York

Rock Island, Illinois

Fort Eustis, Virginia

Camp Humphreys, South Korea

Vilseck, Germany

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History

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16. Ukraine’s drone attack offers fearful lesson for a Chinese invasion force

Excerpts:

If resources permit, the drones can engage larger combatants and ro-ros. Heavier drones with more powerful munitions can hide in a swarm of smaller vehicles and are hard to distinguish from them.

Red does not have many good counter-moves. Defensive directed-energy weapons or guns on large ships are far from where the drones are hitting the landing force. Jamming a communications network that has dozens or hundreds of nodes within a few kilometers of one another is next to impossible. ACVs or other craft assigned to carry counter-drone weapons risk being identified as such and swarmed.

And can this drone force be hit on the ground before launch, even with total air supremacy? Not much. As the Ukraine attack showed, drone arsenals are mobile and easily camouflaged: the drones that hit airbases were driven thousands of kilometres into Russian territory without being detected.

At the defender’s discretion, the operation can be livestreamed on social media, stressing the most disciplined nation’s will to fight.

Can we doubt that China is rewriting its wargames this week?

Ukraine’s drone attack offers fearful lesson for a Chinese invasion force | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Bill Sweetman · June 6, 2025

Ukraine’s massive drone strike against Russian air bases on 1 June should reverberate across all theaters of conflict. But there is one Western Pacific scenario where it could be very relevant indeed: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

There was a micro-panic among invasion watchers in March when a brief video appeared, and then vanished, showing an impressively large and unique Chinese device, a series of barges with telescoping vertical pylons in their hulls and built-in bridges at each end. Towed into place in line astern, the barges would extend their pylons to the sea bottom and lift themselves out of the water, connect themselves with bridges and extend a long cable-stayed ramp to the shore.

The system is designed to bypass Taiwan’s ports and allow commercial ro-ro ships to directly and rapidly discharge vehicles ashore. That’s important because an invasion of Taiwan would be so massive—300,000 troops is the baseline estimate in a comprehensive recent study by the US Naval War College—that for a navy to provide enough sealift is almost inconceivable.

But the mobile pier, ingenious as it is, acknowledges a basic fact: there is no alternative in Taiwan to an amphibious assault through the surf line, with the goal of then seizing nearby port or using the beach as a landing point for the pier. Attractive alternatives such as directly seizing a major port or using airborne force to grab centers of gravity (Hostomel was another Ukraine lesson) don’t exist.

Completed in October 2022, the War College study is the product of a conference held in 2021, before Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The study doesn’t mention the kind of drones used in Ukraine—but they could make an enormous difference.

China’s amphibious forces, a joint army-navy responsibility, are built on a blend of the assets and technologies used by the US Marine Corps and others, technologies based on experience in World War II and Korea, where the last major amphibious landing took place.

The technology hasn’t changed much: a combination of seagoing ships designed to approach the beach, and larger ships that carry and launch landing craft to deliver troops and vehicles to the beach, along with amphibious combat vehicles (ACVs) that can swim to the beach and fight beyond it. Helicopters and hovercraft have been added to the mix since Korea, but can only handle part of the load. And some of the landing craft are now hovercraft, which are faster and may be able to move a little inland.

Like the Marines, China’s amphibious doctrine calls for a focused landing on a front of 2 to 4 km, with boats, hovercraft and ACVs approaching the beach in columns from the motherships close to the horizon. Except for a few hovercraft, they’d be generally moving at less than 15 knots.

Such a force is a fat target. The landing craft and ACVs are neither fast, nor hard, nor can they carry effective defenses. Surprise is next to impossible, particularly in Taiwan, with a rugged coast where most beaches are backed by steep cliffs or equally impassable rice fields.

China’s plan, tested in its own exercises and countless Western wargames, is based on massive use of force to prevent attacks on the landing force, through control of the three domains—land, water, and air.

But small drones do not live in any of those domains.

Sure, they fly, and travel faster than anything on the surface, but their small size and proximity to the surface protect them from air threats and most surface-to-air weapons. Sometimes called the ‘air littoral’, it’s a different domain.

The Ukrainian strike on 1 June highlighted other aspects of drones. Slower than conventional aeroplanes and missiles, surviving with swarm tactics and small size, they can be very precise, picking the exact point where to land or deliver a weapon. ‘Zero miss distance’ means that a small warhead can be destructive, using the target’s fuel or weapons—or its very marginal buoyancy—to destroy it. A laden landing craft or an ACV will sink rapidly if holed.

Small drones don’t have long range, but if the target is headed your way from 20 km out, that’s not necessary.

Being sure that an object is the enemy, not a friend, is not hard in an amphibious invasion. If it has a wake and it’s heading for the beach, it’s Red—the other side.

But let’s throw in a self-forming 5G network of autonomous drones, all with cameras. The Ukraine attack was against non-moving targets, so the invasion force might be harder to hit. But as the drone swarm overflies the incoming force, the video from each camera is continuously stitched into a high-resolution target map, updated as targets are hit.

Drones that still have energy but are out of munitions continue to build the target map, diving on a target as their batteries drain. Drones joining the fight do not have to search for targets; they are directed to them, so the attack becomes more efficient. None of this takes sophisticated hardware or artificial intelligence—just simple rules that ensure drones with unused munitions don’t run out of energy and fall uselessly into the sea.

If resources permit, the drones can engage larger combatants and ro-ros. Heavier drones with more powerful munitions can hide in a swarm of smaller vehicles and are hard to distinguish from them.

Red does not have many good counter-moves. Defensive directed-energy weapons or guns on large ships are far from where the drones are hitting the landing force. Jamming a communications network that has dozens or hundreds of nodes within a few kilometers of one another is next to impossible. ACVs or other craft assigned to carry counter-drone weapons risk being identified as such and swarmed.

And can this drone force be hit on the ground before launch, even with total air supremacy? Not much. As the Ukraine attack showed, drone arsenals are mobile and easily camouflaged: the drones that hit airbases were driven thousands of kilometres into Russian territory without being detected.

At the defender’s discretion, the operation can be livestreamed on social media, stressing the most disciplined nation’s will to fight.

Can we doubt that China is rewriting its wargames this week?

aspistrategist.org.au · by Bill Sweetman · June 6, 2025

17. Marco Rubio declares war on the global censors

We should not forget that in the information space, actions speak louder than words (for better or worse).

When it comes to censorship action needs to be applied to censorship of all forms of free speech regardless of political or national leaning.

Any government that engages in censorship is ultimately bound to fail.

"The more a government seeks to control information, the more it reveals its fear of the truth—and in the end, truth always finds a way to be heard."

– Anonymous dissident proverb, often cited in discussions of authoritarian regimes and information warfare

"The further a society drifts from the truth, the more it will hate those that speak it."

– George Orwell

"The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth—persistent, persuasive and unrealistic."

– John F. Kennedy

“No government has ever succeeded in keeping its people in ignorance indefinitely.”

– Vaclav Havel (paraphrased from speeches)

“Censorship is the tool of those who have the need to hide actualities from themselves and others.”

– Charles Bukowski

“The only valid censorship of ideas is the right of people not to listen.”

– Tom Smothers

“A society that silences its dissidents cannot survive. Truth is the oxygen of liberty.”

–Unknown (attributed in various dissident circles)

Marco Rubio declares war on the global censors

by Jonathan Turley, Opinion Contributor - 05/31/25 10:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/5326891-rubio-visa-policy-censorship/

Winston Churchill once warned that “appeasement is feeding the crocodile, hoping he will eat you last.” When it comes to the crocodile of censorship, history is strewn with defenders who later became digestives. Censorship produces an insatiable appetite for greater and greater speech limits, and today’s censorship supporters often become tomorrow’s censored subjects.

This week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stopped feeding the crocodile.

On May 28, 2025, Rubio shocked many of our allies by issuing a new visa restriction policy that bars foreign nationals deemed “responsible for censorship of protected expression” in the U.S.

The new policy follows a major address by Vice President J.D. Vance in Munich challenging our European allies to end their systematic attacks on free speech. Vance declared, “If you are running in fear of your own voters, there is nothing America can do for you. Nor, for that matter, is there anything that you can do for the American people that elected me and elected President Trump.”

At the time, I called the speech “Churchillian” in drawing a bright line for the free world. Rubio’s action is no less impressive and even more impactful.

Europe has faced no consequences for its aggressive efforts at transnational censorship. Indeed, this should not be a fight for the administration alone. Congress should explore reciprocal penalties for foreign governments targeting American companies or citizens for engaging in protected speech.

After Vance spoke in Munich, I spoke in Berlin at the World Forum, where European leaders gathered in one of the most strikingly anti-free speech conferences I have attended. This year’s forum embraced the slogan “A New World Order with European Values.”

That “new world order” is based on an aggressive anti-free speech platform that has been enforced for years by the European Union. At the heart of this effort is the Digital Services Act, a draconian law that allows for sweeping censorship and speech prosecutions. Most importantly, it has been used by the EU to threaten American corporations for their failure to censor Americans and others on social media sites.

After the World Forum, I returned home to warn that this is now an existential war over a right that defines us as a people —the very “Indispensable Right” identified by Justice Louis Brandeis, which is essential for every other right in the Constitution.

The irony was crushing. I wrote about how this nation has fought to protect our rights in world wars, yet many in Congress simply shrug or even support the effort as other countries move to make Americans censor other Americans.

What was most unnerving about Berlin was how Americans have encouraged Europeans to target their fellow citizens. At the forum was Hillary Clinton who, after Elon Musk purchased Twitter on a pledge to dismantle its massive censorship system, called upon the EU to use the Digital Services Act to force him to resume censorship.

Other Americans have appeared before the EU to call upon it to oppose the U.S. Nina Jankowicz, the former head of President Joe Biden’s infamous Disinformation Governance Board, has recently returned to the EU to rally other nations to oppose what she described as “the autocracy, the United States of America.”

She warned that the Digital Services Act was under attack, and that the EU had to fight and beat the U.S.: “Do not capitulate. Hold the line.”

Former European Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services Thierry Breton even threatened Musk for interviewing Trump before our last presidential election. He told Musk that he was being “monitored” in conducting any interview with now-President Trump.

The EU is doubling down on these efforts, including threatening Musk with prosecution and massive confiscatory fines if he does not resume censoring users of X. The penalties are expected to exceed $1 billion.

Other countries are following suit. Brazilian Supreme Court Judge Alexandre de Moraes shut down X in his entire country over Musk’s refusal to remove political posts. These countries could remotely control speech within the U.S., forcing companies like X to meet the lowest common denominator set by the EU and anti-free speech groups.

There are free speech concerns even in such measures designed to protect free speech. This policy should be confined to government officials, particularly EU officials, who are actively seeking to export European censorship systems worldwide. It should not extend to academics or individuals who are part of the growing anti-free speech movement. Free speech itself can counter those voices. These are the same voices that we have heard throughout history, often using the very same terms and claims to silence others.

However, Rubio showed Europe that the U.S. would not simply stand by as European censors determined what Americans could say, read, or watch. As the EU threatens companies like X with billion-dollar fines, it is time for the U.S. to treat this as an attack on our citizens from abroad.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt put it simply during World War II: “No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it.”

It is time to get serious about the European threat to free speech. And Rubio is doing just that — finally imposing real consequences for censorship. We are not going to defeat censors by yelling at them. Speech alone clearly does not impress them.

Jonathan Turley is the Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University and the author of “The Indispensable Right: Free Speech in an Age of Rage.”

18. Learning the Right Lessons from Afghanistan

Conclusion:

No doubt there are other important lessons to be learned from Afghanistan. To profit from them, academics, as well as policymakers, need to go beyond catchphrases. They will need to consider that repeated failures reflect deeper, structural problems in our approach. If we cannot solve the problems of local leadership quality or the need for realistic time horizons, we must at least begin by acknowledging that these problems exist and recur. Only then will we be able to formulate better approaches for the future.

Learning the Right Lessons from Afghanistan

The National Interest · by Ronald Neumann · June 6, 2025

Topic: Security

Blog Brand: Silk Road Rivalries

Region: Asia

Tags: Afghanistan, Democracy, Military, Policing, Taliban, and Vietnam War

June 6, 2025

The conventional explanations for America’s failure to stabilize Afghanistan provide little help for future policymaking.

The American memory of Afghanistan is receding in the rearview mirror. Increasingly, the potential to learn lessons from the twenty-year campaign is being wasted, replaced instead by bumper stickers and slogans that pass for knowledge but are either incorrect or largely useless without a great deal of further reflection.

Three of the most common bumper sticker lessons are “don’t do democracy,” “don’t build an army in our own image,” and “don’t do nation-building.” The problems with each of these suggest the need for deeper reflection if we are to profit from the past and get beyond slogans for future policy decisions.

Democracy in Afghanistan

The debate over how actively the United States should promote democracy abroad is nearly as old as the Republic itself. It first emerged in the early 1800s during debates over whether or how actively the United States should support liberation movements in Latin America. It is likely to continue.

The problem with using the case of Afghanistan to argue against democracy promotion as a policy goal is that it rests on the false premise that spreading democracy to Afghanistan was the principal goal of the US campaign there. In fact, the real aim throughout the Bush, Obama, and first Trump administrations was how to withdraw from Afghanistan militarily while leaving a more or less stable country behind where terrorism could not return. To do so required a basis of legitimacy on which the government could be organized. Short of returning to civil war, which had previously characterized the country, some form of peaceful allocation of power was necessary. Hence, democracy was a practical, rather than an ideological, necessity if the country was to be governed by consensus rather than bullets.

There were numerous problems in building Afghan democracy, including the time needed to establish a supporting culture and institutions, the incorrect choice of electoral system, and the difficulty of holding elections in insecure conditions. However, the problem with Afghanistan was not that democracy promotion was an unrealistic goal but rather that there were few alternatives to it.

In any case, policymakers did not frame the problem in these terms; leaving soon was a goal, but democracy was a sort of default reaction on how to achieve this. Whether that was the right choice is debatable—if one has an alternative governance model. But to conclude that the case of Afghanistan proves that the United States should refrain from democracy-building is to refuse to think about the options that were, or were not, available at the time.

No Model Army

The problems of constructing a foreign army in our own image have bedeviled US policy since the Vietnam War. Scholars have long documented how US-trained armies were not well suited to their purposes. In Vietnam, the South Vietnamese force was designed for a conventional war with the North rather than a demanding counterinsurgency.

In Afghanistan, the United States constructed a force so dependent on foreign support that it could not function without it. To take only one example, the supply system we built in Afghanistan was sophisticated, digitized, and heavily dependent on foreign expatriates, all of whom we removed at the end. However, the problem is not the truth of the slogan but rather the need for an alternative.

One cannot send large numbers of US military personnel to train the army of another country without having an organizing doctrine for training. We have no such doctrine for training a force radically different from our own, with large limitations on literacy and education. Building an army in a different model will require extensive thought and development. Without undertaking such thinking, we will be left either unable to assist in building a foreign army when one is needed or to repeat past mistakes. Thus, the phrase by itself is no help for future decisions.

State-Building, Not Nation-Building

“Don’t do nation-building” is arguably the most problematic “lesson” to emerge from recent American history. Firstly, the phrase “state-building” would be more accurate, as Afghanistan has existed as a defined state since 1747. The first Bush administration, and particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, had drawn the lesson from the Balkans that nation-building was a mistake.

The result was a resistance to any commitment to institutional strengthening in Afghanistan immediately after the 2001 war when the Taliban was essentially defeated and security problems less acute. This opportune period, when foreign influence was at its peak, was largely wasted. No attention was given to building institutions. American assistance was limited to humanitarian aid only, and the first, very inadequate, developmental assistance did not begin until 2004.

In Iraq, there was an assumption that when the Saddam Hussein government was removed, Iraq would simply evolve into a democracy with very little help. The disaster of this belief has been amply documented. But the notion of not doing nation-building continued to bedevil the United States. The long-lasting second Afghanistan policy review in the Obama administration concluded that the United States would limit its goals to destroying the Taliban and not do nation-building (or state strengthening).

The problem with this formulation was that the Taliban was a regenerative movement. To keep it suppressed would require an army. But armies are part of a state, and a state needs a functioning economy and infrastructure. All of these considerations led to an enormous increase in the development budget, deployment of districts and provincial reconstruction teams, and a massive effort to increase the civilian advisory presence. The logic of these steps was unmistakable, and they unquestionably amounted to state-building, even as the administration declared it would not do so. The contradiction was not helpful to policy, to say the least.

The Real Lessons

Twenty years of warfare leave an almost endless number of decisions for debate. Tactical issues, basic governance concerns, strategies for defeating the Taliban, and shifting policies of different administrations all provide food for thought. However, there is also room to reflect on whether there are more fundamental lessons worth considering. Three recurring problems in American policymaking arise: building a learning organization, creating reasonable timelines, and identifying local partners.

Building a Learning Organization.

One important problem that is rarely, if ever, addressed is the need to build a “learning organization.” An interesting book by Georgetown professor Lise Moraj Howard compares relatively successful United Nations peacekeeping operations to search for common lessons. One lesson she drew from the successful UN missions is the need to build an institution that develops enough knowledge of the local culture and politics to implement its policies effectively.

Building a learning organization requires certain key components. The first is long-term leadership. An organization needs enough time and leadership continuity to make mistakes and climb the learning curve. In Afghanistan, the rapid turnover of ambassadors and generals, along with the deployment of a new division every year or two, was the antithesis of building a learning organization. Similarly, short tours, generally limited to one year, were also common among most military and civilian personnel.

The result was frequent changes in operational policy on the ground, in addition to the broad policy changes that came from Washington. Afghan officials grew cautious about investing too much effort in new approaches, as it was likely that, within a few months or a year, a new US official would alter the approach. When this problem is repeated over and over, it becomes increasingly difficult to get full support for any policy from the locals.

US policymakers should reconsider the length of service, particularly for generals and ambassadors, as well as the frequency of rotations for major troop units and subordinate units. Rapid rotations tend to emphasize short-term goals. Structuring organizations around the attainment of long-term goals should have been the first step in US Afghan policy.

Expedient vs. Realistic Timelines

It is essential to consider the time required for policy success. This is particularly true when establishing a new form of government or rebuilding a society after a civil war. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with US policy, which tends to be driven by “politically feasible” timelines rather than ones designed to solve the problems at hand. The gap between these timelines needs to be examined and policy modified accordingly. Timelines considered politically inexpedient should not be rejected outright.

There are examples of successful change from corrupt autocracies into functioning democracies with strong armies. South Korea is an example of a country that moved from a corrupt, kleptocratic government to the democratic, economically successful one it is today. Taiwan is another such example. These cases suggest that decades are necessary for such change. While the United States spent 20 years in Afghanistan, it never had policy thresholds that extended beyond one administration. The result was, as John Paul Vann famously said in Vietnam, “We don’t have 12 years’ experience. We have one year’s experience 12 times.” In Afghanistan’s case, the US presence had one year’s experience 20 times.

A realistic understanding of the time needed for social change, anti-corruption measures, and democracy to take root could have led to commitments over a much longer period, perhaps with expenditures more drawn out and less concentrated in a year or two. Such a policy would have required very different public policies to explain the timelines and to build appropriate expectations for the pace of progress. Instead, the constant demand for rapid progress and the pretense that it was happening had the result of undercutting policy support over time.

Alternatively, if such commitment was not possible, a realistic understanding of essential timelines might have led to a variety of different ways to leave earlier, even if what we left behind was unsatisfactory. In any event, the refusal to look realistically at the time requirement meant that we were trapped in unrealistic policies over and over. This lesson is worth learning because a realistic appraisal of the time required for operational success will be necessary in the future.

The Importance of Local Leadership

In Afghanistan, as in Iraq and Vietnam, the United States found itself with local partners who were not up to the requirements of the situation. They could neither address the seeping corruption nor control infighting among their supporters. Consequently, the field was wide open to insurgents. Two potential lessons can be drawn from this problem.

One is that we will need to be realistic in judging whether we have local partners who are up to the broad requirements of whatever policy we are engaged in. They may exist—President Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines was such a leader, and the result was a successful counterinsurgency and nation-building. In the absence of such leadership, the United States has a long record of trying to compensate by either making policy in Washington or deposing the leader. We attempted both in Vietnam and Afghanistan but failed in both places.

Many examples of the problem with local partners not meeting the needs of the situation are found in the book Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency. Over and over again, American officials identified problems and devised policies to address them but were unable to obtain lasting local buy-in. Whenever American officials rotated, funding ran out, or a particular local partner was killed or transferred, the situation returned to square one.

The same pattern repeated itself in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Obama surge in Afghanistan produced not only Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) but also District Support Teams (DSTs) and a significant effort to increase the number of civilian advisors. This was intended to produce a significant change in governance within a very short time. As observers noted at the time, the Afghan government lacked the institutional capacity to capitalize on the progress achieved.

The underlying problem was not only the lack of time but also the willingness of the political leadership in Afghanistan or Vietnam to make necessary changes on their own. The problem was aptly captured in the famous, leaked “NODIS” telegram from then-US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, who observed that the basic problem with the proposed strategy was that we had no local partner.

Without adequate partners on the ground, policy frequently fails. Equally consistent has been our reaction to the lack of local partners. Either we try to build our own policies, as described above, or we change the leadership. In South Vietnam, the United States supported a coup that resulted in President Ngo Dinh Diem’s murder in 1963. In Afghanistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke tried to remove President Hamid Karzai, an effort that failed and further alienated the Afghan president. The US approach is not only arrogant and mechanistic but also completely unsuccessful. After 70 years of consistent failure, it is time for policymakers and academics to understand that foreign policy cannot be made without regard to foreigners.

There will not be a single solution to this problem in the future. It may not even be clear that the problem exists until the United States is deeply immersed in a country and its choices are limited. However, addressing the issue will require acknowledging that the problem exists and debating solutions in both academic and policy forums. Discussing policy failure without examining the underlying attitudes and approaches of local leaders has been a repeated phenomenon in many different administrations and countries, yielding the same poor results. There are underlying problems like these that extend beyond individual policy choices. Recognizing the importance of local leadership would be a starting point for making better choices in the future.

Policing: Paramilitary or Civil?

Building an effective police force has been a key issue in the insurgencies America has confronted. Professor Howard’s book also noted that police training is among the most challenging problems across various UN missions. When a problem recurs repeatedly, it is time to consider whether there is a deeper issue beyond the operational or organizational decisions in a particular country.

Several key points must be understood to develop a new approach to police training. One is that the United States is particularly badly placed for police training. We have no national police force. We have no national doctrine for police training. We have no established source of recruitment for police trainers, except for a limited number of retired police officers. Most active police forces do not want to give up their personnel to foreign missions.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the debilities were exacerbated by the argument over whether the police force should be more along paramilitary or civilian lines. Of course, the answer was that both were necessary. Without proper law enforcement training, the police force could not act as a source of justice or public safety. However, the Afghan police still had to face large, heavily armed insurgent groups.

Mixed civil and paramilitary forces do exist in France, Italy, and Spain, but not in the United States. But these examples never made it into police training in Afghanistan. The international training mission drew Italy and France into training the Afghan border police, but not for regular police training.

The time given for police training was also too brief. In the United States, the average time for police training is 21 weeks, and this training is typically provided to at least high school graduates in established police forces who are not involved in counterinsurgency operations. In Afghanistan, training rarely exceeded several months, with recruits who were frequently illiterate and unable to perform basic reporting or record-keeping tasks.

There are some examples of comparatively successful police training. Robert Perito’s book The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations notes the necessity of an adequate ratio of police trainers to police recruits. Nothing in the length of time US and international forces devoted to police training in Afghanistan (or Iraq, for that matter) suggests that we learned this lesson.

The need to strengthen a local police force may arise in many cases that do not involve counterinsurgency or state-building efforts. Hence, Afghanistan’s lessons still matter. The resort to an outmatched Kenyan police force in Haiti, a country overrun by armed gangs, does not suggest we have even tried to take this history to heart.

No doubt there are other important lessons to be learned from Afghanistan. To profit from them, academics, as well as policymakers, need to go beyond catchphrases. They will need to consider that repeated failures reflect deeper, structural problems in our approach. If we cannot solve the problems of local leadership quality or the need for realistic time horizons, we must at least begin by acknowledging that these problems exist and recur. Only then will we be able to formulate better approaches for the future.

About the Author: Ronald Neumann

Ronald E Neumann was the US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007, as well as Ambassador to Algeria and Bahrain. He served as an infantry officer in Vietnam and a senior officer in Iraq (2004–2005).

Image: Ryanzo W. Perez / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Ronald Neumann · June 6, 2025

19. How the Proposed State Department Reorganization Guts U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy

Excerpts:

Conclusion and Recommendations

Secretary Rubio’s current reorganization plan represents a grave diminution of the role of human rights in American diplomacy, and the risk of unintended consequences for embassies and regional bureaus. Congress should encourage Secretary Rubio to modify the plan laid out in the congressional notification, including by:

Retaining as many regional and functional experts in DRL as possible, or at a minimum, transferring them to regional bureaus. This would sustain the critical capacity and expertise on human rights issues that Congress intended when it mandated the establishment of an Assistant Secretary devoted to human rights in the late 1970s and that it has strongly supported in bipartisan fashion ever since. While the Assistant Secretary title survives, the near-elimination of supporting infrastructure subverts the mandate Congress established when it created the position in statute.
Maintaining foreign assistance funding administered by DRL, among other things, to promote core freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of association and public assembly; support human rights activists and their families in the world’s most repressive countries; and sustain independent civil society organizations that provide a bulwark against authoritarian governments.
Continuing to anchor U.S. human rights diplomacy firmly on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights instead of supposed “American” or “Western” values, and focusing efforts on addressing the worst violations of human rights worldwide.
Retaining the Department’s Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance process and providing it additional resources, pursuant to a recent GAO recommendation.

How the Proposed State Department Reorganization Guts U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy

justsecurity.org · by Scott Busby, Charles O. (Cob) Blaha · June 6, 2025

Some of the most dramatic and troubling elements of Secretary Marco Rubio’s reorganization proposal for the Department of State are the specific plans for the Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). Together, we have worked in the State Department for over half a century, including decades in DRL. We believe these proposed changes would gut the Department’s capacity to ensure that U.S. foreign policy and programs are consistent with universal values and our national interests, and would thwart some of the Trump administration’s own priorities. Congress should urge Secretary Rubio to modify the proposed plan in ways that would sustain bipartisan U.S. efforts to advance democracy and human rights across the globe.

Proposed Reorganization of DRL

In presenting his reorganization proposal, Secretary Rubio contends that the State Department has become too bureaucratic and fragmented in the ways it goes about trying to make and implement policy. He then claims his proposal will streamline the decision-making process by eliminating what he views as extraneous offices and largely integrating all work on “functional” or thematic issues under the aegis of the Department’s six regional bureaus and the embassies that report to them.

As for DRL, the reorganization proposal includes the following:

Eliminates all but one of DRL’s offices, including DRL’s regional offices (which mirror the larger regional bureaus in the Department) along with the Office of Multilateral and Global Affairs and Office of Global Programming (two of the bureau’s largest offices);
Creates a new Office of Natural Rights (which will incorporate some of the staff from the two regional offices dedicated to Europe and East Asia and the Pacific);
Renames the current Office of International Labor Affairs the “Office of Free Markets and Fair (sic) Labor,” which will “refocus” on “the promotion of free market principles” along with ensuring that “American work[er]s (sic) compete in a fair and open playing field;”
Divvies up the current Office of Security and Human Rights (which has been responsible for vetting of security assistance for human rights compliance as well as making recommendations on human rights-based sanctions) among a new Office of Sanctions and Reports and a compliance office under the newly created Undersecretariat for Foreign Assistance and Humanitarian Affairs (F); and
Envisions that the DRL’s “remaining functions will be focused on advancing the Administration’s affirmative vision of American and Western values” under the supervision of a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for “Democracy and Western Values”

Some have estimated that these changes would result in an 80% reduction in DRL staff.

The plan also calls for the incorporation into DRL of the statutorily mandated Office of International Religious Freedom (IRF), Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP), and Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism (SEAS). These offices do not appear to be slated for the same reductions as DRL offices. The result will be that the staff devoted to these specific human rights issues, while very important, will outstrip those devoted to the broader human rights issues covered by DRL.

The Regionalization of Human Rights Diplomacy

Consistent with his overarching vision, Secretary Rubio’s proposal aims to incorporate most human rights diplomacy under the regional bureaus and their corresponding embassies. As justification for eliminating DRL regional offices, Secretary Rubio has repeatedly argued that since embassies and State Department regional country desks also have human rights officers, DRL regional offices are redundant.

This ignores how the State Department really and effectively works. Regional country desks are responsible for contacts with their respective foreign embassies in Washington; embassies are responsible for contacts with the governments in those countries. This often results in desks and embassies seeking to accommodate the views of those governments, which generally resent criticism of their human rights records. This is an especially acute problem in cases where the United States has security relationships with foreign governments. The overriding imperative for those regional country desks and embassies is to smooth relations with those governments and militaries, and human rights concerns are often seen simply as bilateral irritants.

Moreover, embassy human rights officers are often relatively junior Foreign Service Officers who rotate through political sections every two or three years and often have relatively little experience in either the country in question or in human rights. Their concerns have much less influence within embassy country teams, especially compared to the U.S. colonels or generals responsible for promoting contact and relations with foreign militaries who commit human rights violations. DRL regional offices provide a valuable counterweight to the propensity of regional bureaus and embassies to avoid raising human rights concerns. Indeed, DRL helps those counterparts by taking on the burden of raising sensitive human rights issues.

What’s more, these DRL offices, which typically include civil servants, often have years of experience in the human rights issues of the countries they cover. Major missteps can be made even by professionals without that background. Among other duties, DRL personnel are responsible for maintaining contacts with non-governmental human rights organizations that are generally outside the country of concern and are experts on that country and region. In his congressional notification, Secretary Rubio accused DRL of being “prone to ideological capture and radicalism.” The truth is exactly the opposite — because of their experience, DRL officers know which of these non-governmental organizations are responsible and reliable, and which are not. These groups often play a key role in prompting congressional action. Losing knowledge of and relationships with these groups is likely to hamper the Department’s action on any number of other priorities.

DRL regional officers also play a central role in coordinating and sometimes drafting sections of the Department’s annual Human Rights Reports, which are among the most widely-read documents the U.S. government produces. Secretary Rubio’s plan envisions an Office of Sanctions and Reports responsible for “coordination” of “high-profile statutory reports,” but it would be very difficult to maintain adequate quality control of these reports without Department experts who know the human rights issues in countries being written about.

Elimination of Offices of Multilateral and Global Issues and Programming

Another radical element in Rubio’s reorganization proposal is the complete elimination of DRL’s Office of Multilateral and Global Affairs (DRL/MLGA) and Office of Global Programming (DRL/GP) – two of its largest offices. DRL/MLGA historically has had the lead in developing U.S. policy on human rights in multilateral fora such as the United Nations and a wide range of cross-cutting global issues such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of peaceful assembly; Internet freedom; transnational repression; business and human rights; protection of human rights defenders; corruption; and the human rights of marginalized persons including women, ethnic and racial minorities, persons with disabilities, and indigenous and LGBTQI+ persons. Given the Trump administration’s aversion to multilateral engagement and to addressing discrimination against disfavored groups, it is no surprise that this office is on the chopping block.

But DRL/MLGA’s whole-scale elimination undermines policy objectives Secretary Rubio himself has long espoused. For instance, in announcing a new visa restriction policy directed at those allegedly involved in curtailing Americans’ speech overseas, Secretary Rubio recently said, [f]ree speech is among the most cherished rights we enjoy as Americans. This right, legally enshrined in our constitution, has set us apart as a beacon of freedom around the world.” Yet elimination of DRL/MLGA would rob the Department of the very experts devoted to promoting that freedom globally. Similarly, officers devoted to long-standing bipartisan priorities such as transnational repression, the human rights risks of emerging technologies, and promoting access to and communication on the Internet for people in closed societies like China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea would also be lost.

The Trump administration has also been unequivocal in its commitment to promoting American business abroad. In recent years, American companies have come to recognize the importance of promoting respect for human rights in their operations for both their reputations and effectiveness through initiatives such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (which most of the largest U.S. extractives companies have endorsed) and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (which private security contractors have been required to join if they wish to contract with the Department of State). MLGA also produces guidance for companies on hot button issues like artificial intelligence and surveillance products as well as business advisories on some of the countries with the worst human rights records. The abolition of the business and human rights team in DRL/MLGA would remove the very people who American companies have come to rely on to carry out these transnational efforts.

Abolition of DRL/GP and termination of the vast majority of the foreign assistance that supports human rights organizers and reformers in other countries is also highly counterproductive. Such assistance has supported, for instance, political prisoners and their families in a wide range of countries, journalists reporting on corruption, and the development of technologies to circumvent Internet restrictions in repressive countries like China, Iran, and Russia. In one emblematic case of which we are aware, the termination of assistance has meant that a young Yemeni activist, who is the sole supporter of her family and under threat from the Houthis —a group that Secretary Rubio himself designated as terrorist in March — is not receiving the emergency relief that was planned for her.

DRL/GP has also supported the rule of law globally, which is critical to ensuring the sanctity of contracts for American business abroad. Secretary Rubio’s plan calls for any such assistance to be managed by DRL’s Assistant Secretary and “front office” – but, simply put, senior leaders have neither the time nor expertise to implement such programs.

The “Office of Natural Rights”: A Gift to Rights Violators Worldwide

Secretary Rubio’s plan proposes creation of a new DRL “Office of Natural Rights” (DRL/NR) which, inter alia, “will ground the Department’s values-based diplomacy in traditional western conceptions of core freedoms” under the supervision of a Deputy Assistant Secretary for “Democracy and Western Values.”

This would represent a major break in how the U.S. government has traditionally framed human rights, which is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and deliberately not ‘’ “Western” or “American” values. A “Western” or “American” values approach to diplomacy is a complete gift to governments that commit human rights violations worldwide, who often resist U.S human rights efforts on the very basis that the U.S. is foisting foreign values on them. This would be especially damaging to our attempts to advance human rights in China, which frequently cites so-called “Asian values” as justification for its human rights violations. Ironically, the Department’s recent statement on the 36th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre suggests it may understand the problems with promoting self-described “American” values. The statement acknowledges that “the principles of freedom, democracy, and self-rule are not just American principles. They are human principles the CCP cannot erase.”

Secretary Rubio’s proposed reorganization also contains a puzzling emphasis on countering “free speech backsliding in Europe and other developed nations” as a DRL priority. U.S. human rights diplomacy already opposes restrictions on free speech, including in Europe. Surely, extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and other gross violations of human rights, most of which occur in areas outside Europe, deserve the Department’s highest attention.

Security and Human Rights

Under the proposal, personnel from DRL’s current Office of Security and Human Rights (DRL/SHR) would be divided up between a new Office of Sanctions and Reporting (DRL/REP) and the Under Secretary for Foreign Assistance and Humanitarian Affairs’ new Office of Foreign Assistance Oversight Policy Group. However, it is unclear which of those offices will take on DRL/SHR’s high-profile Leahy law vetting operation, which annually vets tens of thousands of requests for U.S. assistance to foreign militaries and police worldwide and prohibits assistance to foreign security force units credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights. Here again, the elimination of DRL’s regional offices will have a negative impact, since they are most attuned to reports of human rights violations by foreign security forces, while embassies and country desks are, in many cases, reluctant to monitor and follow up on such reports in part because of the sensitivities in their direct relationships.

Furthermore, the reorganization plan makes no mention of which DRL office will assume the statutory responsibility to prevent atrocities under the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, or which office – if any – will assume SHR’s role in the Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance (CHIRG) process, responsible for monitoring and responding to reports of civilian harm caused by U.S. weapons supplied to foreign militaries. Indeed, it is entirely possible that Secretary Rubio’s reorganization would eliminate the CHIRG process.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Secretary Rubio’s current reorganization plan represents a grave diminution of the role of human rights in American diplomacy, and the risk of unintended consequences for embassies and regional bureaus. Congress should encourage Secretary Rubio to modify the plan laid out in the congressional notification, including by:

Retaining as many regional and functional experts in DRL as possible, or at a minimum, transferring them to regional bureaus. This would sustain the critical capacity and expertise on human rights issues that Congress intended when it mandated the establishment of an Assistant Secretary devoted to human rights in the late 1970s and that it has strongly supported in bipartisan fashion ever since. While the Assistant Secretary title survives, the near-elimination of supporting infrastructure subverts the mandate Congress established when it created the position in statute.
Maintaining foreign assistance funding administered by DRL, among other things, to promote core freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of association and public assembly; support human rights activists and their families in the world’s most repressive countries; and sustain independent civil society organizations that provide a bulwark against authoritarian governments.
Continuing to anchor U.S. human rights diplomacy firmly on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights instead of supposed “American” or “Western” values, and focusing efforts on addressing the worst violations of human rights worldwide.
Retaining the Department’s Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance process and providing it additional resources, pursuant to a recent GAO recommendation.

These should be the minimum requirements for any State Department reorganization. They reflect long-standing bipartisan consensus on U.S. human rights diplomacy, and they serve American national interests.

FEATURED IMAGE: Secretary of State Marco Rubio testifies before the House Committee on Appropriations | Subcommittee on National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs at the Rayburn House Office Building on May 21, 2025 in Washington, DC. Rubio testified on the proposed budget estimates for fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State. (Photo by John McDonnell/Getty Images)

justsecurity.org · by Scott Busby, Charles O. (Cob) Blaha · June 6, 2025

20. Sometimes a Parade Is Just a Parade

Conclusion:

Being from a military family or living near a military base has been shown to predispose people toward military service. This suggests that the more exposure people have to the military, the likelier they are to serve in it. A big celebration of the country’s armed forces—with static displays on the National Mall afterward, and opportunities for soldiers to mix with civilians—could familiarize civilians with their armed forces and, in doing so, draw talented young Americans to serve.

Sometimes a Parade Is Just a Parade

Not everything the Trump administration does is a threat to democracy.

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2025/06/trump-military-parade-ok/683050/

By Kori Schake

Scott Olson / Getty

June 7, 2025, 7 AM ETShare as Gift

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President Donald Trump has gotten his way and will oversee a military parade in Washington, D.C., this summer on the Army’s birthday, which also happens to be his own. Plans call for nearly 7,000 troops to march through the streets as 50 helicopters buzz overhead and tanks chew up the pavement. One option has the president presiding from a viewing stand on Constitution Avenue as the Army’s parachute team lands to present him with an American flag.

The prospect of all this martial pomp, scheduled for June 14, has elicited criticism from many quarters. Some of it is fair—this president does not shy away from celebrating himself or flexing executive power, and the parade could be seen as an example of both—but some of it is misguided. Trump has a genius for showmanship, and showcasing the American military can be, and should be, a patriotic celebration.

The president wanted just such a tribute during his first term, after seeing France’s impressive Bastille Day celebrations. Then–Secretary of Defense James Mattis reportedly refused, effectively threatening to resign by telling the president to ask his next secretary of defense. Three secretaries of defense later, Trump has gotten enthusiastic agreement from current Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Criticism of the display begins with its price tag, estimated as high as $45 million. The projected outlay comes at a time of draconian budget cuts elsewhere: “Cutting cancer research while wasting money on this? Shameful,” Republicans Against Trump posted on X. “Peanuts compared to the value of doing it,” Trump replied when asked about the expense. “We have the greatest missiles in the world. We have the greatest submarines in the world. We have the greatest army tanks in the world. We have the greatest weapons in the world. And we’re going to celebrate it.”

Read: The case for a big, beautiful military parade

Other prominent critics of the Trump administration have expressed concern that the parade’s real purpose is to use the military to intimidate the president’s critics. The historian Heather Cox Richardson wrote on her Substack, “Trump’s aspirations to authoritarianism are showing today in the announcement that there will be a military parade on Trump’s 79th birthday.” Ron Filipkowski, the editor in chief of the progressive media company MeidasTouch, posted, “The Fuhrer wants a Nuremberg style parade on his birthday.” Experts on civil-military relations in the United States also expressed consternation. “Having tanks rolling down streets of the capital doesn’t look like something consistent with the tradition of a professional, highly capable military,” the scholar Risa Brooks told The New York Times. “It looks instead like a military that is politicized and turning inwardly, focusing on domestic-oriented adversaries instead of external ones.” Even the military leadership has been chary. During Trump’s first term, then–Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Paul Selva reflected that military parades are “what dictators do.”

But these critics may well be projecting more general concerns about Trump onto a parade. Not everything the Trump administration does is destructive to democracy—and the French example suggests that dictatorships are not the only governments to hold military displays. The U.S. itself has been known to mount victory parades after successful military campaigns. In today’s climate, a military parade could offer an opportunity to counter misperceptions about the armed forces. It could bring Americans closer to service members and juice military recruitment—all of which is sorely needed.

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Table of Contents

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Introduction

What We’ve Lost: Firsthand Accounts from the Field

Saving Lives

Feeding the Future

VOA in Transylvania

One Federal Employee Giving Back

Supporting Press Freedom

Helping Americans Abroad

Foreign Assistance Helps U.S. Businesses

Family Members Serve Too

Anchored in Hope

Renewing Shipbuilding Will Require a Culture Change

The China Challenge in Critical Minerals: The Case for Asymmetric Resilience

The kings of the drone age

After the Tiananmen Square Massacre: A Reflection on America’s China Policy

The great poaching: America's brain drain begins

Trump's Golden Dome will make US – and world – less safe - Asia Times

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Democracy in Afghanistan

No Model Army

State-Building, Not Nation-Building

The Real Lessons

Building a Learning Organization.

Expedient vs. Realistic Timelines

The Importance of Local Leadership

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Conclusion and Recommendations

How the Proposed State Department Reorganization Guts U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy

Proposed Reorganization of DRL

The Regionalization of Human Rights Diplomacy

Elimination of Offices of Multilateral and Global Issues and Programming

The “Office of Natural Rights”: A Gift to Rights Violators Worldwide

Security and Human Rights

Conclusion and Recommendations

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