Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Our lives on this planet are too short and the work to be done too great to let this spirit flourish any longer in our land. Of course we cannot vanquish it with a program, nor with a resolution... But we can perhaps remember, if only for a time, that those who live with us are our brothers, that they share with us the same short moment of life; that they seek, as do we, nothing but the chance to live out their lives in purpose and in happiness, winning what satisfaction and fulfillment they can. ”
- Robert F. Kennedy

"Have patience with the quarrelsomeness of the stupid. It is not easy to comprehend that one does not comprehend."
- Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach

"Ideas are more powerful than guns. We would not let our enemies have guns, why should we let them have ideas."
- Joseph Stalin




1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 7 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. CNN evaluating partisan talent as part of push to make coverage more neutral
3. Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Maria Ressa on Digital Diplomacy and Human Rights Online
4. Leverage the Joint Intellectual Capacity of Senior PME
5. Elite unit of Russian army destroyed in 14-hour battle, Ukraine says
6.  The Pacific Strategy in World War II: Lessons for China’s Antiaccess/Area Denial Perimeter
7. Sweden’s NATO Bid Is in Trouble
8. Raytheon moving corporate headquarters to DC area, joining other defense primes
9. Tell Everyone How to Measure Cyber Risk, DOD Begs NIST
10. Russian menace brings abrupt end to the west’s ‘peace dividend’
11. Ukraine and the start of a second cold war
12. Portrait of the invader: Understanding the Russian soldier
13. What happens in Ukraine doesn’t stay in Ukraine: Austin adds clarity on Taiwan
14. FBI seizes retired general's data related to Qatar lobbying
15. Russia draws closer to capture of Ukraine's Donbas region
16. World Bank slashes global growth forecast to 2.9%, warns of 1970s-style stagflation
17. US sees heightened extremist threat heading into midterms
18. America Is Waging a Technology War on Russia
19. House lawmakers eye 4.6% pay raise for troops in 2023
20. Inside the Taliban’s secret war in the Panjshir Valley
21. Foreign Service applicants sit for updated exam amid subjectivity concerns
22. Russia’s War in Ukraine and Implications for Its Influence Operations in the West
23. The SOF Truths: A Different Perspective on Security Force Assistance
24. Analysis: Understanding the Militant Groups Behind the Violence in the West Bank
25. Opinion | The Ukraine War Still Holds Surprises. The Biggest May Be for Putin.



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 7 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 7
Jun 7, 2022 - Press ISW

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros
June 7, 6:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in several locations in eastern Ukraine but did not secure any confirmed gains in ground assaults on June 7. Russian forces have likely captured most of Severodonetsk, but ISW cannot confirm the exact control of terrain within the city.[1] Russian forces additionally redeployed troops east of Bakhmut to renew offensives to secure access to highways northeast of Bakhmut and threaten Ukrainian lines of communication.[2] Russian troops north of Slovyansk will likely seek to advance toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from positions north of the city.[3] Russian forces on the Southern Axis are reportedly redeploying away from Zaporizhia Oblast toward Kherson Oblast, likely in order to support Russian defensive positions that have been threatened by Ukrainian counterattacks along the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border south of Davydiv Brid.[4]
Members of the Russian military community are accusing Ukrainian forces of escalating artillery attacks on Russian rear areas in a likely attempt to dissuade further Western support to the Ukrainian military. Former FSB agent Igor Girkin (also known as Strelkov) accused Ukrainian troops of perpetrating “terrorist attacks” against residential areas of Donetsk City, Horlivka, and Makiivka.[5] A Russian source additionally accused Ukrainian forces of firing on Shyroka Balka, Kherson Oblast.[6] Ukrainian social media users denied the claims and stated that they are likely false-flag attempts to spoil Western opinion of the Ukrainian military and halt military aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[7]
The Kremlin’s efforts to censor information about deceased military personnel and ongoing forced mobilization within the DNR and LNR are reportedly exacerbating domestic tensions and opposition to the war in Russia. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin assigned lawyers and psychologists to convince families of personnel of the sunken cruiser Moskva to refrain from disclosing any information regarding the deaths of their relatives in an effort to crush rising social tensions in Russia.[8] The GUR stated that the Kremlin is threatening to nullify financial compensation to the families of Moskva crew members if they publicly discuss the sinking of the cruiser, resulting in some relatives refusing to meet with Black Sesa Fleet commanders in Sevastopol in protest. Ukrainian media sources separately reported that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) altered mobilization protocols and is now promising compensation for wounded and deceased personnel due to DNR servicemen rioting at the frontlines.[9]
Domestic Russian complaints about the maltreatment and lack of preparation among Russian combat forces are likely prompting the Kremlin to take rhetorical steps to curb discontent. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated that new conscripts during the summer training period will be trained with specific attention to lessons learned so far in Ukraine during a meeting with the National Defense Management Center (NDCC) (the supreme command center of the Russian Armed Forces and Defense Ministry) on June 7. Shoigu added that summer conscripts will learn battlefield first aid, likely responding to criticisms by members of the Russian military community of poor tactics and lack of first aid acumen among Russian soldiers.[10] However, the Russian military is unlikely to properly train and equip Russian conscripts rushed to the front as replacements and likely primarily seeks to mollify public discontent. Former DNR Security Minister and milblogger Alexander Khodakovsky claimed that he asked the DNR military command to move exhausted and demoralized proxy conscripts to auxiliary tasks away from the line of contact but to no avail.[11]
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces have likely established control over the majority of the residential sector of Severodonetsk and conducted assaults against Ukrainian positions in the industrial zone in the past 24 hours. The operational environment within the city remains fluid.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to advance on Slovyansk southeast from the Izyum area and west from Lyman, attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses that have halted most direct frontal assaults from Izyum.
  • Russian forces are likely attempting to reinforce their operations in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area from both the Toshkivka-Ustynivka area in the south and Kupyansk from the northwest.
  • Russian forces began withdrawing troops from positions in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely either to rotate damaged units into rear areas or to reinforce Russian defenses in northwestern Kherson Oblast, though ISW cannot currently confirm the destination of these forces.
  • Russian forces failed to regain advanced positions on the western (now Ukrainian-occupied) bank of the Ihulets River on June 7.
  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russian forces restored transit connections between newly occupied cities and Crimea.
  • Russian occupation authorities continue to face challenges suppressing Ukrainian resistance and finding partisan supporters despite increasingly draconian occupation measures and attempts to bribe Ukrainian civilians.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
  • Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate Main Effort–Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued efforts to advance southeast of Izyum toward Slovyansk on June 7. Russian forces are attempting to advance toward the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border and around Dovhenke, Dolyna, Krasnopillya, and Bohorodychne.[12] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces captured several settlements in the area southeast of Izyum and north of Slovyansk, including Svyatohirsk, Studenok, Yarova, and Drobysheve.[13] Russian forces seek to advance on Slovyansk from both positions around Izyum as well as Lyman in the west after the failure of efforts to advance solely from Izyum.[14]

Russian forces have likely established control over the majority of the residential sector of Severodonetsk and conducted assaults against Ukrainian positions in the industrial zone on June 7.[15] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed during a meeting with the National Defense Management Center (NDCC) that Russian forces have captured 97% of Luhansk Oblast, including the entirety of the residential part of Severodonetsk.[16] Russian forces reportedly also control Metolkine and Borivske, two southeastern suburbs of Severodonetsk.[17] Maxar satellite imagery (see images in-line with text) from June 6 showed Russian MLRS and towed artillery deployments oriented toward Severodonetsk, indicating that Russian forces continue to rely heavily on artillery fire to support their operations around Severodonetsk.[18] Russian forces are likely using mass bombardment to clear sectors of the city before occupying the rubble—similar to Russian operations in Mariupol. The operational environment within Severodonetsk remains fluid and challenging and ISW cannot confirm specific control of terrain within the city. As with our previous coverage of Russian operations in Mariupol, our assessed control of terrain represents our best estimate of control of key areas of the city.


Maxar satellite imagery of MLRS (Location: 49.054, 38.515, approximately 11 km northeast of Severodonetsk) and towed artillery deployments (Location: 49.035, 38.521, approximately 9 km northeast of Severodonetsk) oriented toward Severodonetsk on June 6. Satellite images ©2022 Maxar Technologies.
Russian forces are likely attempting to reinforce their operations in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area from both the Toshkivka-Ustynivka area in the south and Kupyansk from the northwest. Russian troops will likely continue attempts to drive northward to Lysychansk from the Toshkivka-Ustynivka area. Russian forces likely seek to assault Lysychansk without having to cross the Siverskyi Donets River from within Severodonetsk in the face of likely heavy Ukrainian defenses. However, Ukrainian forces still control Toshkivka, and Russia forces will need to establish control over this settlement in order to support northward pushes on Lysychansk from along the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets. Geolocated satellite imagery additionally showed Russian forces constructing a pontoon bridge in Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, on June 6.[19] Kupyansk lies along the P07 highway that runs southeast from Kharkiv Oblast directly to Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, and the construction of the pontoon bridge may indicate that Russian troops are strengthening lines of communication around Kupyansk to better support operations in Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces focused on strengthening their grouping east of Bakhmut on June 7. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops deployed unspecified units to Popasna and Mykolaivka and conducted unsuccessful assaults on Nahirne, Berestov, Krynychne, and Roty, all to the east of Bakhmut.[20] The UK Ministry of Defense notably stated that Russian efforts south of Popasna toward Bakhmut have stalled over the past few weeks, and recent deployments to this area suggest that Russian forces seek to renew efforts to gain access to highways to the northeast of Bakhmut, specifically the T1302, that would allow them to reinforce operations in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[21]
Russian forces reportedly made incremental progress to the north of Avdiivka and reached Krasnohorivka and Kamyanka but did not fully capture either town.[22]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces focused on holding their defensive lines in northern Kharkiv Oblast and shelled Ukrainian positions around Kharkiv City.[23] Head of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration Oleg Synegubov stated that Russian forces fired on the Kyivskyi district of Kharkiv City, Derhachi, Udy, Slobozhanske, and Chornohlazivka.[24]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces began withdrawing troops from positions in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely either to rotate damaged units into rear areas or to reinforce Russian defenses in northwestern Kherson Oblast, though ISW cannot currently confirm the destination of these forces. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Starukh reported that Russian forces are relocating from Melitopol and parts of Vasylivka, approximately 45 km south of Zaporizhia City, in the direction of Kherson City.[25] Starukh noted that Russian forces are possibly conducting a force rotation. ISW previously reported that Russian forces have been accumulating personnel and outdated T-62 tanks in Vasylivka and Melitopol since late May.[26] Russian forces could commit these troops to defend occupied positions against Ukrainian counterattacks in Kherson Oblast. Russian forces also engaged in clashes in three frontline settlements but did not launch offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on June 7.[27]
Russian forces attempted to regain advanced positions on the western (now Ukrainian-occupied) bank of the Ihulets River on June 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted counterattacks against Lozove and Bila Krynytsia on the eastern Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border but did not secure any territorial gains.[28] Russian Telegram channels claimed the Russian forces recaptured the strategic settlement of Davydiv Brid, situated on the eastern Inhulets Riverbank and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), on June 6, though ISW cannot confirm this report.[29] Ukrainian aviation reportedly conducted airstrikes against areas of Russian troops concentrated in Kherson Oblast and against ammunition depots in Mykolaiv Oblast.[30]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russian forces restored transportation connections between newly occupied cities and Crimea on June 7.[31] Shoigu announced that the Russian Railways joint-stock company and Russian forces set conditions for “full-fledged traffic” between Donbas, Crimea, and Ukraine on six railway sections during a meeting with the National Defense Management Center (NDCC), the supreme command center of the Russian Armed Forces and Defense Ministry.[32] Shoigu also announced that Russian forces opened road connections from Rostov-on-Don to Crimea that pass near the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, through Berdyansk, and Melitopol.[33] Shoigu stated that the restoration of transit infrastructure and water supplies creates favorable conditions for the development of an agro-industrial complex in southern Ukraine and noted that Russian forces began exporting captured Ukrainian grain via the Berdyansk Port in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order.[34] ISW previously reported that the Kremlin may seek to exploit agribusiness in southern Ukraine to reap some economic benefit from capturing southern Ukraine after the wholesale destruction of major urban terrain and industrial plants by Russian forces.[35]
Russian occupation authorities continue to face challenges suppressing Ukrainian resistance and finding partisan supporters. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation authorities are confiscating the Russian passports of railway workers in Melitopol who have refused to cooperate with Russian forces and left the city.[36] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces authorized troops to shoot civilians and indiscriminately destroy any vehicles at checkpoints in Kherson Oblast, likely indicating the growing fear of Ukrainian resistance in the region and increasingly draconian measures to restrict Ukrainian movements.[37]
[8] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rodyny-moriakiv-z-kreisera-moskva-prymushuiut-zamovchuvaty-informatsiiu-pro-svoikh-zahyblykh-rodychiv.html
[9] https://t.me/stranaua/45965http://ctrana dot online/news/394284-zarplata-po-kontaktu-v-dnr-privezli-bronezhilety-nachali-vypuskat-v-rossiju-poslednie-novosti.html
[31] https://t.me/mariupolnow/12853; https://t.me/mod_russia/16561; https://t.me/swodki/111828https://rtvi dot com/news/shojgu-mezhdu-rossiej-i-krymom-otkryt-nazemnyj-transportnyj-koridor/
[33] https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/5393026
[36] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/06/07/v-melitopoli-zaliznychnyky-vidmovlyayutsya-spivpraczyuvaty-z-okupantamy/



2. CNN evaluating partisan talent as part of push to make coverage more neutral


CNN evaluating partisan talent as part of push to make coverage more neutral
Axios · by Sara Fischer · June 7, 2022
CNN's new boss, Chris Licht, is evaluating whether personalities and programming that grew polarizing during the Trump era can adapt to the network's new priority to be less partisan.
Why it matters: If talent cannot adjust to a less partisan tone and strategy, they could be ousted, three sources familiar with the matter tell Axios.
Details: Licht wants to give personalities that may appear polarizing a chance to prove they're willing to uphold the network's values so that they don't tarnish CNN's journalism brand.
  • For on-air talent, that includes engaging in respectful interviews that don't feel like PR stunts. For producers and bookers, that includes making programming decisions that are focused on nuance, not noise.
Between the lines: CNN's tone became more partisan and combative during the Trump era and under the leadership of former CNN president Jeff Zucker.
  • To conservative critics, some on-air personalities, like Jim Acosta and Brian Stelter, have become the face of the network's liberal shift.
Be smart: Licht doesn't want to necessarily shy away from personality programming, especially in prime time, but he wants to ensure that partisan voices don't dominate in a way that harms CNN, a source notes.
  • Licht took the helm at CNN last month, shortly after longtime CNN president Jeff Zucker exited the network in scandal.
  • His priorities are widely seen as aligned with the leadership of CNN parent Warner Bros. Discovery.
  • CNN did not comment.
Catch up quick: Licht and Warner Bros. Discovery CEO David Zaslav haven't been shy about their goal of dialing back on partisan and alarmist programming in favor of traditional journalism.
  • Last week, Licht told employees in a memo that the network has added a "Breaking News” guideline to its stylebook, to address overuse of the breaking news banner across its network and cable news writ large.
  • Licht said he agrees with complaints from "people both inside and outside the organization" that the network overuses the "Breaking News" banner.
  • “We are truth-tellers, focused on informing, not alarming our viewers,” he said in the note obtained by Axios.
The big picture: Zaslav and mentor and investor John Malone have been public about their wish to pull CNN away from progressive commentary.
  • "I would like to see CNN evolve back to the kind of journalism that it started with, and actually have journalists, which would be unique and refreshing,” Malone told CNBC last year.
Axios · by Sara Fischer · June 7, 2022



3. Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Maria Ressa on Digital Diplomacy and Human Rights Online

Excellent discussion between the Secretary of State and our good friend (and Nobel Peace Prize winner) Maria Ressa.

Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Maria Ressa on Digital Diplomacy and Human Rights Online - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
QUESTION: Hello, everybody. Thank you so much for joining us. I’m Maria Ressa from the Philippines. What an honor to have U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken with us today at a crucial moment for all of us working for a better digital rights world. Secretary Blinken, thank you for joining us.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Maria, great to be with you and great to be with everyone. This is really a pleasure for me. I’m thrilled to be hosted by RightsCon to be talking to you. I want to say greetings to everyone from the 360/Open Summit and from around the world who is in one way or another logged on, tuned in, and joining this conversation.
It’s so important from our perspective that the United States, likeminded governments, but especially with civil society, with NGOs, with think tanks, with the private sector, work to protect human rights online, work to demonstrate that our democracies can deliver for people as we navigate this extraordinary digital transformation that is having an impact on the lives of virtually everyone on this planet.
One thing I wanted to say at the outset before we get into a conversation is I am very pleased to announce that for the first time the United States will become chair of the Freedom Online Coalition in 2023. We want to strengthen the coalition. We want to bring more members onboard. We want to make it a center of action for ensuring a free and open digital future.
And this, in part, is going to be building on Canada’s terrific work as the current chair and really trying to carry it forward. So I’m really pleased to do that, to be able to announce that. And Maria, it’s great to be with you. You have been – you are – an extraordinarily courageous champion of freedom of speech, freedom of press and media, and freedom for a digital future that we all want and we hope to build together. So thank you for being willing to have this conversation today.
QUESTION: Well, that’s really great to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, exactly at this moment in time when it seems at times hopeless, and you never want to be hopeless, right? So let me ask you. You’ve been very outspoken about the way digital authoritarians have used tech to abuse human rights, a growing trend that people like us on the front lines increasingly defenseless. I mean, what have you seen globally, and what can you do about it?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: So you’re right. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what we’re seeing. Look, I think as in so many ways when we saw the emergence of a lot of this technology, starting mostly in the 1990s, the early 2000s, I think there was great hope that it would be inexorably a force for openness, transparency, freedom. And of course, in many ways it is.
But we’re also seeing, of course, the abuse of this technology in various ways, including by repressive governments trying to control populations, to stifle dissent, to surveil and censor. We see that, of course, in the PRC with technology being used, for example, for mass surveillance, including of the Uyghurs and other minorities.
So the question is what is to be done. What do we do about it? And there are a number of things that we need to do and in fact that we are doing. One is to start by calling things out. That’s the – often the basis for everything. We have to call out the abusive technology, including digital authoritarianism.
Second, as I mentioned, we’re going to be taking on the chairmanship of the Freedom Online Coalition. We’re working to strengthen it. And this is an important vehicle to try to protect and advance internet freedom and to push back against digital authoritianism.
Very practically speaking, there are a number of things that we – countries, NGOs, and others – are doing to, for example, get anti-censorship technology into the hands of people who need it so that they have the tools to push back against the misuse of technology in an authoritarian way. We set up a multinational fund to do that at the Summit for Democracy that we hosted last year.
And then, for example, putting export controls on surveillance technology to make sure that technology that we and other countries are producing that could have a dual use and be misused for the surveillance of populations, that doesn’t get into the wrong hands. That takes working together. One country alone can’t do it. And in fact, governments alone can’t effectively do it. We need to build these coalitions to make sure that we identify where technology should not go because it’s being misused, and then work together to make sure that it doesn’t get there.
QUESTION: No, I agree with working together. Mr. Secretary, you know that early on I said that the tech platforms that took control of – became the gatekeepers from journalists abdicated responsibility for protecting the public sphere, and in some ways it’s taken so long to get government regulations that in a way governments have also abdicated responsibility. We’re just starting to see the beginning of these roll out in the spring from the EU, right?
And yet we know the impact of disinformation. In the Philippines, we have seen disinformation repeatedly change our history. It’s that Milan Kundera quote, the struggle of man against power. Well, we’ve forgotten really quickly, and disinformation is being used to manipulate our biology.
Where do you see, what can you do about this? And how do we fight back, given that there are more than 30 elections this year and you can’t have integrity of elections if you don’t have integrity of facts?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Couldn’t agree with you more. And this has been one of the other changes that we thought was going to be totally for the good, but of course, that hasn’t been the case.
In the United States a few decades ago, information that most people used on a – in their daily lives, there was a common foundation, because there were actually a fairly limited number of sources of the information that people got. We had three television networks back then, we didn’t have cable, we didn’t have an internet, we didn’t have talk radio, et cetera, et cetera.
And the hope, of course, was that the democratization of information would be a good thing overall. And fundamentally, I believe that’s still the case. But as a result of this, as a result of this disaggregation, you’ve lost exactly what you said, which are sort of the trusted mediators who can make sure that information, to the greatest extent possible, is actually backed up by the facts. And at the same time, that technology itself has allowed the abuse and the spreading of misinformation and disinformation in ways that we probably didn’t fully anticipate or imagine.
So we see authoritarian governments using this. We see it, for example, right now in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We saw it in 2014 when Russia initially went at Ukraine and was using information as a weapon of war. So in that particular instance and in this instance, we’ve actually reversed this on them precisely by using information, real information, to call out what we saw them preparing and working to do. And being able to do that and to bring to the world everything that we were seeing about the planned Russian aggression and to lay out exactly the steps they were likely to take, and which unfortunately they did, I think has done a profound service to making sure that credible information is what carries the day and disinformation is undermined.
But there are a number of things that we can – here again – and we are doing to combat the misuse of information. Again, we start by exposing it and we start by sharing the information that we have; working with others, again, in a coordinated way. We have at the State Department something called the Global Engagement Center, which is focused intensely on finding, exposing disinformation, the techniques that are used by those who are propagating it, and, in a coordinated way, working with other countries, pushing back on it and giving people the tools to do it.
It’s critical for us that we also build the capacity of partners around the world, both governments but also journalists, NGOs, civil society. There are a number of things that we’re doing. We have initiatives to help give people fact-checking tools to make sure that the information that they’re getting actually is backed up by the facts and to show when it’s not. Digital literacy training, which is so critical to understanding what people are consuming and being able to separate the wheat from the chaff, the true from the misinformation and disinformation. Bolstering independent media – this is so critical. The single best check and balance against misinformation and disinformation is an effective, independent media, and we have initiatives to do that, including as appropriate financing and other things.
We see that there’s a deliberate attack to take down independent media, to take down NGOs that are operating in this space, so we’re putting in place protections. For example, countries actually try to use legal means – or I should say “legal” in quotation marks – “legal” means through lawsuits, as you know very well, and through regulatory challenge. Well, we’re putting in place programs, funding to enable people, institutions, media organizations to actually push back on that.
All of these things together are part of what we need to do. And finally, it’s so critical that we and you, this entire community, work with the platforms to find ways to more effectively ensure that they’re not being abused and used as a means of propagating misinformation, disinformation. Of course, it’s primarily on the platforms themselves to take the steps necessary to push back against that. I hope very much that we can continue to do that in a collaborative fashion. And sharing the information – what we’re seeing, for example – with the platforms, we’ve found that when we’ve been able to point them to malicious actors using the platforms in abusive ways, they’ve been responsive in making sure those actors can’t do it.
But of course, it’s a moving target, and for every bad actor that you take off, maybe it comes back under another guise or something else pops up. So we have to be vigilant; we have to be relentlessly focused on this. And I hope that we can do this in a cooperative, collaborative way.
QUESTION: Well, that’s certainly what we’re trying to do. But what we’ve seen in the last – and you mentioned 2014 until now, right? The disinformation that splintered reality, that allowed Russia to invade, to annex Crimea, and then eight years later to invade Ukraine — those metanarratives were seeded, the platforms were told about it, not much was done. And the question, of course, is would we be at this place if more was done, right?
But I guess this is – this goes to the last – the crucial question, which is: We have had impunity in the virtual world, and that impunity – you have a thousand-page document from the Senate that outlines what Russian misinformation did in 2016 in the United States. That impunity has filtered into the real world and really severed the checks and balances that are there. I guess the – and here, to quote Shoshana Zuboff, where she just says we live in one world, and if you don’t have rule of law in the virtual world, how can you have rule of law in the real world.
And this goes back to what is your democratic vision. I think that’s what’s been missing is that we don’t have a democratic vision for the 21st century with this technology that we have. What is it that you have?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Yeah, Maria, you’re – I think you’re exactly right. And first let me say, look, we’ve been awoken to this challenge over the last years, and I think for me it certainly started particularly in 2014 with the initial Russian aggression against Ukraine and the use of misinformation and disinformation as a weapon of war as critical to their campaign. And then, of course, we saw the interference in our elections. And all of that has created a – I think an increasingly greater consciousness of the challenge and the need to do something about it.
But doing something about it starts with exactly what you said, which is advancing a positive vision, an affirmative vision of what this future should look like – a vision of an open, free, global, interoperable, secure, reliable internet. One of the ways we’ve done that is with this Declaration for the Future of the Internet that now some 60 countries have joined onto that actually lays out what this positive vision is. We’re working in concrete ways, though, not just to put out the vision but to realize it.
QUESTION: So what are the concrete steps that you’re taking?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: So much of the work that we’re doing is to make sure that we and other likeminded countries are at the table when so many of the rules and norms that are going to shape the future of the internet are being decided. And we’re doing that in a variety of ways. We’ve come together with the European Union, through something we’ve stood up called the Trade and Technology Council, to make sure that we’re working together to advance these different norms and standards. There’s growing convergence between the United States and the European Union on this vision for the future. Now we put that in practice by bringing our combined weight together everywhere these rules and norms are being shaped.
We’re making sure that we’re investing in our own capacity to do that. Here at the State Department, over just six months, we stood up a new Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy. We will soon have a senior envoy to deal with emerging technologies to make sure that, to the extent values are infused in technology, they’ll be liberal values, not illiberal ones, and making sure that technology is used for the good and to advance democracy, not to undermine it.
We’ve been working to make sure that after last year’s Summit for Democracy, we make this year a year for action in terms of implementing many of the concrete initiatives that were announced at the summit, including some that I mentioned a short while ago, in terms of supporting independent media, giving people the tools they need to combat censorship, making sure that journalists and other organizations under siege can fight back and have the tools and the means to do so.
We, as I mentioned, have initiated a Declaration for the Future of the Internet with 60 countries so far, making sure that we’re all aligned in a shared vision and trying to advance it.
And finally, the institutions that are actually doing this work, that are deciding how all of the technology that we share is being used – it’s usually important that people who share this vision, share these values, are running these institutions. There’s a hugely important election for the head of the International Telecommunications Union coming up, and the candidate we support, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, is someone of vision and of value who can help advance this shared perspective that we have.
So it’s one of those things where probably 99.999 percent of people have no idea what the ITU is or how important this election is, but we’re very focused on it and making sure that someone with a shared vision can drive this forward.
The last thing I’ll say, Maria, is this: I think everyone present today is at the heart of this effort – civil society, NGOs, the private sector, independent media working together, holding governments to account, and then ideally, all of us joining forces. When you put all that together, it’s a very powerful force, and it’s one that I am convinced can carry the day in making sure that the future of technology and the future of the internet is one that actually advances freedom, that advances democratic principles, and that makes sure that together, we can build a future that reflects the values that we share.
So the work that every single one of you is doing in ways big and small, that’s what really counts, and I’m just pleased for the opportunity to spend a few minutes talking about how we see it, how we think about it, especially, Maria, with you. So thank you.
QUESTION: No, thank you so much, Secretary Blinken. Can I quick – get to one quick question?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Of course.
QUESTION: Because you – so you mentioned leading in. Sheryl Sandberg just said that she would be leaving Meta this – at the end of this year. These are American companies that did have values that were infused into their design – and again, probably not by their design, but encouraged the death of democracies in many parts of the world. In Norway just last week, I kind of thought the next two years will be critical for the survival of democracy, and there were people from Kyiv, from Ukraine, who really said that they’d received the most help from ordinary people. You’ve just asked us all to work together. I guess is there a timetable even though – long-term, yes. Education, medium-term – yes, lost in the short term. How can we stop what Anne Applebaum called Autocracy Inc. from taking over in this period of chaos?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Maria, I think we all have to be seized with the fierce urgency of now. And yes, many of the things that we’re talking about will play out over time. Much of this is not flipping a light switch or turning on or off a computer. It does take time. But if we bring to it together a sense of urgency and a sense of determination, that’s usually important, and if this entire community is galvanized, I think we can make a real difference. But that requires day-in, day-out vigilance; it requires day-in, day-out action.
And I think what we’ll see if we do it right and do it in a sustained way is you take a step and you look, and it doesn’t look like you’ve traveled very far; but my hope and expectation is that over the next few years, we will take many steps together and we’ll actually recognize that we’ve traveled a great distance.
The hard reality that we face – and it’s a cliche, but it’s profoundly true – technology itself isn’t inherently good or bad. How it’s used determines whether it’s for the good or for the bad. And if we marshal all of our forces together, I think we carry a great weight into this fight to make sure, to the best of our ability, that technology is used for the good, that it’s used to advance a more open, more free, more democratic world, and that it’s not misused and abused to undermine those basic principles.
But I think we have to have exactly what you said: a real sense of urgency about that, a real sense of vigilance, a determination to call out misuse and abuse, the determination on the part of NGOs and civil society to hold governments and hold the private sector to account. And I’m – I remain optimistic that marshaling all of these forces together with that sense of urgency, we can make a difference and we can shape a future that is more open, more tolerant, and actually supports and defends freedom and democracy and doesn’t undermine it. That’s the objective.
But look, we have to show, all of us in different ways, that we can actually deliver on this. So I recognize declarations are good, calling things out are good, but what really counts is action that makes a change, action that deals with the problem. None of that is easy, but we’re determined to do it, and we’re determined to do it together.
QUESTION: Fantastic. Thank you so much for your time, Secretary Blinken. Good luck.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thanks, Maria. Great to see you.
QUESTION: Bye-bye.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thanks. Bye-bye.
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State


4. Leverage the Joint Intellectual Capacity of Senior PME

Surprisingly the author did not mention the National War College. It is the best mix of joint and international officers as well as civilian personnel from a broad range of the interagency (dominated by FSOs from State).

Leverage the Joint Intellectual Capacity of Senior PME
usni.org · June 7, 2022
In May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) called for updated leader development strategies, including professional military education, to better counter the rapidly changing security environment and help the services develop intellectual overmatch against adversaries. The vision statement defines overmatch as rooted in producing officers that are strategically minded, critical thinkers, and creative joint warfighters. The JCS paper also includes talent management and an outcomes-based model. The services continue to address these and other proposals for improving the military’s strategic capacity through human intellectual capital, but there is room for additional improvement in how the war colleges tackle senior professional military education. All requirements can be tailored into an interwar approach to leverage the intellectual capital already resident in the senior service colleges, with little or no additional financial cost.
In the interwar period, the Marine Corps revolutionized its small force to take ownership of amphibious landing operations. They wrote doctrine, developed an operationally focused headquarters and task-force organizational structure, and conducted training in conjunction with Navy exercises to counter the hard lessons learned at Gallipoli. Through a rigorous wargaming and war exercises program, the Marine Corps was able to modify and validate the organizational, equipment, logistics, and supply requirements to support their audacious new doctrine.
The creation of amphibious doctrine and planning was conducted simultaneously with two other significant planning initiatives—one focused on competing below the level of armed conflict, and the other on integrating air assets into ground combat. Critically, these innovations were achieved primarily by harnessing the intellectual capital of the Marine Corps schools, suspending the standard curriculum to leverage the officers in professional military education as writers, wargamers, and strategic planners. Thus, the Marine Corps was able to use the interwar period to tackle the most challenging elements of their contemporary environment and maintain a critical relevance on the global stage.
In that same interwar period, the Army War College linked student officers directly with the Army General Staff and War Plans Division, conducting much of the initial strategic design and planning that would become the basis for the Rainbow Plans used at the outset of World War II. These plans were then used during the extensive joint wargames at the Naval War College, the results of which were incorporated back into updated strategic plans. These creative, strategic iterations enabled the services to transition from post–World War I thoughts of limited wars and isolationism to how they would posture for a global conflict lasting multiple years duration, well before U.S. politicians and the American people were prepared for that potentiality. Each service demonstrated it was able to use the professional military education system at the senior level to prepare officers for war, as demonstrated by officer performance in World War II, while training officers to think creatively, develope strategic plans, and prepare detailed operational plans for potential conflicts.
The joint services face similar challenges in military planning today, with more requirements than they have planners to address environment of changing global technologies, circumstances, and relationships. But the services do not have to wait for a supportive grand strategy to ensure the joint military strategy is honed for war. Crafting an interwar-style enhancement of professional military education to meet the JCS request could be done in a few steps, some of which are already underway as service-specific initiatives, and others that are offered as specialty electives to small groups of students. To this end, the following initiatives could better leverage the intellectual capital in joint services professional military education and gain significant results in strategic growth across the Department of Defense:
  1. Maintain the strategic breadth of the core curriculum and specialty lectures, continuing to include the programs’ latest initiatives and specialty deep dives.
  2. Transform the “electives” periods to tackle Joint Staff and combatant command strategic planning requirements.
  3. Ensure an iterative briefing and assessment process between student/faculty groups and Joint Staff and combatant command operational planning team leads to ensure academic rigor and repetitive iterations.
  4. Establish self-selected planning teams based on follow-on assignments and mentor recommendations, nested with service talent management programs.
  5. Increase joint assignments at service war colleges to as balanced a ratio as possible (providing for true joint staff planning), while maintaining the Joint and Fellow Senior Service College programs.
These measures, as historically seen in the innovative strategic-development and war-plans creation in the interwar period, are just part of the emerging service strategies for talent management and intellectual overmatch. Importantly, they address JCS concerns for strategic intellectual overmatch as well as recent critiques of the academic rigor in war college curriculums. Creating a strategy and wargaming real-world scenarios requires creative thinking to overcome an evolving adversary. Similar opportunities exist at each senior service colleges already, and these measures would expand and link those opportunities to the larger student population and to existing strategic planning requirements.
The War College Students
Developing strategically minded officers involves two levels of education and practice—grand strategy and military strategy. The core curricula of the service war colleges—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—are similar and include courses in national strategy and policy, strategic leadership, and military strategy. Each also includes specialty lectures from faculty and invited guests to cover a wide range of skills and topics. Maintaining established curricula, which are evaluated and rewritten on a cyclical basis, will give students the foundation in strategic thinking they need to conduct planning and wargaming.
Using the war colleges for strategy development, for either the Joint Staff or the combatant commands, would serve two critical and complementary roles in establishing intellectual and strategic overmatch. From a strategic overmatch perspective, it would leverage the intellectual resources inherent in the war colleges’ student population, which numbers almost 1,000 senior officers, to tackle the challenging missions of warfighting, contingency planning, and day-to-day global campaigning.
In addition to supporting national security strategic objectives, the proposed methodologies would also promote strategic thinking in the war colleges, as teams move through multiple iterations with their supported commander or planning section. In a common criticism, Richard Hooker opines that the war colleges are missing the rigor inherent to academic assessments and are no longer the “laboratories for wars” they once were for previous conflicts. Even if core curricula do not provide the requested iterations, the joint strategy planning repetitions would certainly provide the opportunity to generate and test multiple strategic options. Using the service war colleges for joint planning would answer concerns about the education of the military’s future strategic leaders. Any strategy products, by necessity, must meet real-world evaluation and assessment criteria. The separation between contingency planning, operational plans, geographic combatant command (GCC) campaign plans and functional combatant command (FCC) plans requires different training and approaches to strategy for different groups of officers, thus forcing diversity in education. Operational planning groups may be focused more on military strategy, while GCC groups could focus more on different elements of national power integrated into their campaign plans.
Linking student working groups with combatant command or Joint Staff planning teams has a distinct benefit beyond the obvious relevance to the mission requirement. Each service, as evidenced in the Army’s Talent Management Task Force to the Marine Corps’ Talent Management 2030 initiative, is focusing on programs to ensure the talent is available and incentivized to perform at professional military education, and liaison with next assignment would only further incentivize. Currently the war colleges are struggling with how to assess student performance and reward top performers beyond a simple notation on their efficiency reports. Both challenges would be mitigated in using students as joint planners.
Services are already identifying ways to match senior service college students with follow-on assignments prior to attending their respective war college, and this match—even for those already selected for O-6 command—increases those officers’ reputation and knowledge when liaising with their next assignment. Nesting the planning team assignment with service talent management processes allows for short- and long-term officer development.
Increasing the joint mix of the branch courses takes advantage of the similar time frame and year-long change of duty location for most senior service college assignments. There would be little additional cost in assigning more Army students to the Naval War College or vice versa, and the advantage to a joint planning team would be significant. In the interwar period, naval officers might attend the Army War College only after spending a year at Norfolk, thus ensuring their familiarity with Navy plans. An expanded joint ratio would preclude requiring a two-year schooling requirement, while still ensuring appropriate representation replicating a joint staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for outcome-based measures that will develop officers into trained, innovative strategists that will win the next war. The services need to take innovative measures to meet the global challenges of today. Though the challenges themselves are different than those of the past, the U.S. military can nonetheless look to past solutions. Reinvigorating the senior service college warfighting and strategic planning capabilities and linking them with real-world planning requirements will build a depth of intellectual overmatch and leverage the opportunities emerging from global interactions in unprecedented ways.
usni.org · June 7, 2022



5. Elite unit of Russian army destroyed in 14-hour battle, Ukraine says



Elite unit of Russian army destroyed in 14-hour battle, Ukraine says
Newsweek · by Brendan Cole · June 7, 2022
Kyiv's forces destroyed an elite Russian army unit during a battle that raged for more than 14 hours, according to Ukraine's military.
The 80th assault brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said on its Facebook page that its troops had successfully stopped a Russian attempt to advance via a strategically important highway in eastern Ukraine.
The post said that the Ukrainian paratroop brigade, which is garrisoned in Lviv, used NLAW grenade launchers to attack a Russian BMD combat vehicle and troops. It said that 50 personnel were killed from the Pskov-based 76th Guards Air Assault Division, "which is considered elite in the Russian armed forces."
A senior lieutenant and senior soldier from the Ukrainian brigade refused evacuation despite suffering wounds and continued to lead fire until Russian troops retreated, leaving the bodies of the dead behind, the post said.

In this image, smoke rises above the Ukrainian city of Severodonetsk during fighting between Ukrainian and Russian troops on June 2, 2022. Ukraine's military has said that its 80th assault brigade had destroyed a unit of Russia's 76th Guards Air Assault Division. ARIS MESSINIS/Getty Images
"The coordinated actions of the artillery units of the 80th brigade, in the end, inflicted a mass artillery strike on the enemy," said the post in Ukrainian, according to a translation.
Russia has not commented on the alleged battle and Newsweek has contacted the Russian defense ministry for comment.
While Tuesday's post by the Ukrainian military did not name the town where the battle took place, it comes as Russia focuses its attacks on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk as it seeks to capture all of eastern Ukraine's Donbas region.
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Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Tuesday that his forces have "fully liberated" residential neighborhoods of Severodonetsk and are advancing in the town of Popasna.
"Its industrial zone and nearby settlements continue to be taken under control," he said in a defense ministry briefing, according to Russian state agency RIA Novosti.
Shoigu also said road traffic can travel from Russia to annexed Crimea via territories captured in southeastern Ukraine. He added that Russian forces have captured 6,489 Ukrainian troops.
However, the exact scope of Russian gains in Severodonetsk is still uncertain. The U.S. think tank the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said that the nature of urban combat is "obfuscating reports of control of terrain within" the city although it added it was "likely" that Moscow's forces control much of it.
"The exact situation in the city remains unclear," the ISW said Monday. "Control of terrain is likely changing hands frequently."
Serhiy Haidai, the governor of Luhansk, said last week that Ukrainian troops had recaptured around one fifth of Severodonetsk from Russian forces, amid warnings that should the city fall it could lead to Moscow's complete occupation of the Luhansk region.
Newsweek · by Brendan Cole · June 7, 2022



6. The Pacific Strategy in World War II: Lessons for China’s Antiaccess/Area Denial Perimeter

I do not think we study the Pacific War enough. I agree there are a lot of lessons. And the whole Nimitiz MacArthur relationship is fascinating and allocation and prioritization of resources among their two forces is probably unlike anything before or since.

Excerpt:

Second, as MacArthur witnessed in the Pacific, “Never before had a field of battle embraced land and water in such relative proportions.”50 This same observation holds true with China: to counter these distances Joint, interorganizational, and allies must be leveraged. Like the strategy against Japan, applying pressure from all sides to China will involve intense diplomatic efforts and support from regional allies. This same seamless effort will hold true in the South China Sea and must be recognized now by the Joint Force.



The Pacific Strategy in World War II: Lessons for China’s Antiaccess/Area Denial Perimeter
By understanding the evolution of the strategy in the Pacific, the Navy can forge a future approach if it finds itself executing large-scale combat operations against China.
By Major Patrick Naughton, U.S. Army Reserve
June 2022 Naval History Magazine
usni.org · June 2, 2022
The occupation and hardening of islands in the South China Sea by the People’s Republic of China looks remarkably similar to the actions of the Empire of Japan in World War II. In the event of large-scale combat operations, the United States will need to develop an effective strategy to address the antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) perimeter China is employing off its coast. This stand-off corridor will present immense challenges if the US intends to conduct any type of joint forcible entry operation from the sea into the Chinese mainland. As such, it is worth examining the Allied strategy against Japan for any concepts that can be emulated.
By understanding the evolution of the strategy in the Pacific and the results of the Allied efforts there, the Navy and the Joint Force can forge a future approach and learn important lessons in the event the United States finds itself executing large-scale combat operations against China. These include the creation of a coordinated strategy, the importance of the total Joint Force and U.S. allies, amphibious operations, and theater logistics.
The evolution of the war in the Pacific against Japan is generally considered to consist of four phases: defense, defense-offense, offense-defense, and offense.1 The operational and tactical realities in each of these phases resulted in the development of different strategies by senior civilian and military Allied leaders during a series of top-secret and code-named planning conferences from 1941 to 1945.
The Defensive Phase
The surprise and destruction wrought on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor caught the United States completely off guard. As such, the initial strategy adopted by the United States was defensive. It focused on defending its Pacific shores and its line of communications to U.S. holdings and allies in the region.2 This phase lasted from Pearl Harbor until the battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942—where the first major Japanese attack in the war was halted. The major Allied meetings that occurred during this phase to determine the strategy to counter Japan were codenamed Arcadia and Post-Arcadia.

The exact moment the USS Shaw (DD-373) blew up during Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
(U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive)
By January 1942, the Combined Joint and Allied Chiefs of Staff had realized it was crucial to halt the enemy’s advance across the Pacific region as soon as possible.3 “With the losses we have sustained, it is necessary to revise completely our strategy,” noted Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz to the senior leaders at Post-Arcadia. 4 Most present agreed with Nimitz and grudgingly recognized Japanese dominance and acknowledged that the situation was grave.5 They also noted that it would only be through great energy, skill, and determination could the United States halt Japan’s expansion before it attained a dominate position where it could not be ejected. 6
The attack on Pearl Harbor and the loss of several battleships left the United States strategically unable to immediately respond. As early as 10 December 1941 Nimitz accurately summarized the current strategic situation undertaken by the Unites States and its allies during this phase: “The loss of battleships commits us to the strategic defensive until our forces again can be built up.”7 Despite calling for a defensive posture, Nimitz also realized that the United States was not toothless; it still possessed carriers, cruisers, and destroyers that could be marshaled immediately “to retrieve our initial disaster.” 8 This purely defensive phase culminated in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, where the Japanese Navy was successful fought to a tactical standstill—a first for the war.
The Defensive–Offensive Phase
Shortly after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the United States embarked on an offensive operation that culminated in the Battle of Midway in June 1942. There, the United States blunted the Japanese advance into the Pacific by delivering a decisive blow that crippled the Imperial Japanese Navy Fleet, halted its expansion, and forced it on the defense for the rest of the war. By mid-1942, the Allies had generally agreed that the defeat of Germany would be the main effort; however, pressure (led by the United States) would be maintained against Japan to regain the initiative and prevent its further extension further the region.9 Despite this Germany first mindset, Midway gave the United States—though still on the defense itself—some space to plan and implement a more aggressive offensive strategy for the region.10

General Douglas MacArthur
(U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive)
“The whole course of the war in the Pacific may hinge on the developments of the next two or three days,” correctly predicted the daily action log for the U.S. Pacific Fleet just prior to Midway.11 With the outcome all but set, this same log soon correctly recorded that the victory virtually ended Japanese expansion into the Pacific.12 Nimitz himself proclaimed to the American public that Pearl Harbor was partially avenged but would not be complete until Japan had been reduced to impotence. Tongue in cheek, he concluded “perhaps we will be forgiven if we claim we are about midway to our objective."13
This newfound aggressiveness and optimism now also was observed in other American commanders. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, radioed the Army Chief of Staff to say that Midway had changed the strategic situation which must be exploited through offensive action.14 Midway ultimately signaled the transition from defense to a new and important phase in the US strategy to counter Japan.
The Offensive–Defensive Phase
With Midway, the United States seized the initiative and for the first time was able to aggressively plan offensive operations. Despite this, it had not achieved full freedom of maneuver and still had to use a large portion of its force to consolidate its gains and defend large-scale combat operations.15 This phase lasted from August 1942 to August 1943 and is most remembered for the offensive operations related to Guadalcanal. The major Allied meetings that occurred during this phase were codenamed Casablanca, Trident, and Quadrant.
By the Casablanca Conference in early 1943, the allies had concluded that the goal was to conclude the war as early as possible. It was determined that the Axis’ economic and military strength must be destroyed at a rate that exceeded their ability to replace.16 To achieve this in the Pacific, Joint and Allied planners realized it would require the enemy to be kept under a constant pressure powerful enough to absorb all Japan’s military efforts.17 As such, strategic objectives were defined: halt further expansion; prevent Japan from consolidating its remaining positions; protect existing and opening new large-scale combat operations to the Allies while menacing Japan’s; and, finally, intensify the attrition of the enemy by land, air, and sea.18
Accomplishing these objectives in the Pacific was no easy task. Allied large-scale combat operations extended more than 12,000 miles—from the Bering Sea, through the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, Fiji, New Guinea, and Northwest Australia, to Singapore. In contrast, the Japanese occupied strongly established interior lines, which permitted them to react quickly to Allied offensives with an economy of force.19 To counter this, it was decided to simultaneously strike at points deemed significant to Japan cause it to react, whereby it was hoped that the overwhelming firepower of the Joint Force would destroy its military forces. Presenting multiple dilemmas would prevent Japan from consolidating its gains and hardening its island holdings and preclude it from initiating any offensive operations.20 This technique would give birth to the most important and least understood strategy of the Pacific Theater.
As noted by MacArthur, once the Allies undertook the offensive, all ground, air, and sea operations became mutually supportive and “thoroughly coordinated.” He dubbed this a new type of campaign, calling it “three-dimensional warfare” and a “triphibious concept.”21 What soon became known as island-hopping or leapfrogging is sometimes misunderstood as frontal attacks on heavily fortified island positions; in fact, this was not the strategic concept. Rather, as MacArthur recognized, it was a unique system of warfare for the Pacific: avoid the frontal attack, bypass island strong points, and then isolate and cut off their lines of supply.22 Or, as Admiral William (Bull) Halsey described it, “Jump over the enemy’s strong points, blockade them, and leave them to starve.”23
In addition to bypassing and blockading enemy strong points, some islands in the Pacific were seized. The Joint Force would then use these locations to solidify its large-scale combat operations, create power projection platforms, and more importantly, build airfields to provide air cover for the next offensive. As MacArthur noted, “Every step forward had been governed by the basic concept of securing airfields no more than 200 to 300 miles apart from which to assure an ‘air umbrella’ over each progressive thrust into the enemy.”24 The end goal for these island air bases was to eventually work toward positions from which the Japanese homeland could be attacked by land-based air.25
Despite the effectiveness of this technique, at the Casablanca Conference, senior leaders quickly realized that leapfrogging alone would take too long and not be the winning strategy for the Pacific.26 As such, other methods of attrition needed to be determined. One way to accomplish this was to continue the intensified attacks on enemy shipping to disrupt the enemy’s large-scale combat operations between Japan and its territorial holdings.27]The second method was to put direct pressure on these same positions. It was during this phase that planning began for the Allied attack into Burma and support for Chinese forces under Chiang Kai-shek intensified.28 As Roosevelt declared at Casablanca, it was believed that with the inability to move freely along Pacific large-scale combat operations, combined with pressure on its territories, “Japan would be hard pressed to maintain her garrison in the chain of islands stretching all the way from Burma to New Guinea and would have to start pulling in her lines.”29
The strategic objectives during the offensive-defensive phase set the conditions for the United States and its allies to conduct the final phase of their strategy. “We must not allow the Japanese any pause,” declared General George Marshall at Casablanca; “the only way of stopping the Japanese was by complete exhaustion through attrition. It was very difficult to pause,” he continued, “the process of whittling away Japan had to be continuous.”30

Group photograph at the Casablanca conference from 14 January through 24 January 1943.
(U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive)
The Final Offensive Phase
By late 1943, the United States and the Allies found themselves in a position in which their advance bases and large-scale combat operations were no longer seriously threatened. They now attained the freedom of maneuver to conduct offensive operations at the times and locations of their choosing.31 This final phase would culminate with the dropping of the atomic bomb and Japan’s unconditional surrender. The major Allied meetings that occurred during this phase were codenamed Sexton, Eureka, Octagon, Argonaut, and Terminal (Potsdam).
US and Allied planners were unaware of the atomic bomb until late July 1945. As such, it was not initially considered in the strategy for this phase. By the end of 1943, a two-pronged assault was being executed, with Nimitz applying pressure in the central Pacific and MacArthur in the south. Strategic objectives were to maintain large-scale combat operations, force continued attrition, contain the Japanese fleet, keep Pacific Allies in the war, and, finally, attain positions for a full-scale offense against the Japanese homeland.32
These offensives in the Pacific, combined with actions in Burma and China, were successful in staging the Joint Force and its allies for this invasion. By late July 1945, the Japanese home islands were isolated via sea and air blockades. Intensive air bombardments had wreaked havoc on civilian and economic targets, and her military had been eroded to a skeleton force.33 Because of this posture, President Harry Truman issued an ultimatum to Japan that as long as its leaders continued to support the war, that country would be utterly destroyed.34 Truman professed that U.S. efforts would not cease “until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in unconditional surrender.”35
Despite its degraded condition, the final invasion of Japan still presented a challenge. It was estimated that some two million men of fighting stock were still available who would fanatically defend their homes.36 In a moment of premonition in 1941, Japanese antiwar protagonist Baron Wakatsuki Reijiro accurately predicted to the Emperor that by wars’ end the nation would face ultimate defeat and be reduced to ashes. 37 With the dropping of the atomic bombs in early August 1945, this portent would be realized as Japan unconditionally surrendered.
Results of the U.S. Strategy and the Atomic Bomb
In the final Allied planning conference of the war, it was recognized that the island-hopping campaign had provided the Allies with forward air bases that could strike enemy forces anywhere. In addition, it gave them advanced power projection platforms to invade the Japanese home islands if needed.38 Numerous strong points in the Pacific had been isolated and rendered ineffective; crucially, almost 300,000 Japanese troops were stranded.39
Allies and enemies alike commented on the brilliance of this U.S. strategy. In his diary, the Chairman of the British Chief of Staff noted the masterly manner in which the United States jumped from island to island, leaving masses of Japanese to decay behind them.40 After the war, a senior Japanese intelligence officer commented on the strategy’s effectiveness, praising it “for its brilliance because it gained the most while losing the least.”41 A Japanese fleet Ccommander declared after the war that what had pained them the most was the land-based air force stationed on forward islands.42 Halsey declared the island-hopping strategy to be what won the war in the South Pacific.43

Trinity Test, the first explosion of an atomic bomb
(U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive)
As later noted by Allied planners, the unrelenting joint all domain attacks on Japanese large-scale combat operations and the relentless attrition of their military destroyed Japanese naval and air forces and reduced them to desperate ploys like suicide attacks.44 “The stress laid upon rear areas is quite considerable,” noted an instructional circular distributed to Japanese forces that commented on the impact of attacks on large-scale combat operations, “this is to say, the enemy is constantly attacking our transport ships rather than our warships.”45 By early July 1945, Allied planners concluded that due to the blockade and relentless air campaigns, Japan was ripe for invasion. This final offensive was, of course, avoided by the events of 6 and 9 August 1945. 46
Many credit the bomb as ending the war in Japan. However, this was but one piece of the complete strategic puzzle in the Pacific. “It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb,” remarked British Prime Minister Winston Churchill after the war. In his memoirs, he accurately reminded the public that it was seizing ocean bases through conventional means that allowed the Allies to get close enough to launch the planes that delivered their atomic payloads.47 Halsey echoed this sentiment, arguing that the belief that the bomb ended the war was overvalued. In a testament to the successful drive across the Pacific, it was his hope history would remember that when hostilities ended, “the capital of the Japanese Empire had just been bombed, strafed, and rocketed by planes of the Third Fleet, and was about to be bombed, strafed and rocketed again.”48
Lessons for Large-Scale Combat Operations Against China in the Pacific
The Pacific theater strategy during World War II offers four major lessons for the Navy and the Joint Force. First, the conflict highlights the importance of establishing a coordinated joint strategy in the event of current large-scale combat operations with China. Interestingly, the Navy noted after the war that when planning for future contingencies you cannot separate naval, air, and ground strategies.49 Unlike that which occurred in 1941, the United States must avoid the purely defensive phase that surrenders the initiative to the enemy—the adopted strategy should be joint and one that can quickly pivot to the offense as soon as possible.
Second, as MacArthur witnessed in the Pacific, “Never before had a field of battle embraced land and water in such relative proportions.”50 This same observation holds true with China: to counter these distances Joint, interorganizational, and allies must be leveraged. Like the strategy against Japan, applying pressure from all sides to China will involve intense diplomatic efforts and support from regional allies. This same seamless effort will hold true in the South China Sea and must be recognized now by the Joint Force.
Third, actions in the South China Sea and a joint forcible entry from the ocean will be amphibious in nature. The Joint Force should avoid finding itself in the same situation as 1943, where it lacked any kind of robust amphibious capabilities.51 As was also noted, these operations must be organized into proper joint assault formations that possess a degree of coherence and permanence.52 They cannot be ad hoc organizations pieced together with little to no prior training experience with one another. This is a core mission for the U.S. Marine Corps, which it has taken to heart; however, the Army also must be able to execute this function.53
Finally, as Lieutenant General Jack Fuson, a past Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, noted in his memoirs after his time in the Pacific, one can have the worlds’ best trained and equipped force but if it cannot be transported into enemy territory it is useless.54 The Marine Corps’ focus is to establish beachheads; it will be the Army’s role to expand and consolidate that lodgment for follow-on operations. “After landing at the target area,” Fuson wrote of island-hopping, “the Army then had to move in and establish a line of communication to sustain combat operations as far inland as necessary.”55 It will be the Army that will expand lodgments, form base camps and logistics hubs, secure airfields, and establish large medical facilities.
Some may argue that current efforts in hypersonic missiles, nuclear weapons, cyber, and long-range precision fires as negating any need to conduct joint forced entry operations into China. However, the Pacific war (and numerous others) demonstrated that technology and deep strikes alone are not the single deciding factor in large-scale combat operations. As was achieved with Japan, breaking the military and civilian will of a peer competitor and forcing them into political discussions is accomplished through a combination of attrition and constant pressure executed by the Joint Force with support from international allies.
1. Ernest J. King, Our Navy at War: Official Report Covering Combat Operations up to 1 March 1944 (Washington, DC: Secretary of the Navy, 1944), 25.
2. King, Our Navy at War, 25.
3. World War II Inter-Allied Conferences, Post-Arcadia, January 1941 to May 1942, Papers and Minutes of Meetings (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2013), 31.
4. ADM Chester W. Nimitz, USN, “Gray Book”: War Plans and Files of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Vol. 1: 7 December 1941–1 September 1942, American Naval Records Society, 1.
5. Post-Arcadia, 79-80.
6. Post-Arcadia
7. Nimitz “Gray Book”,1.
9. World War II Inter-Allied Conferences, Casablanca Conference, January 1943, Papers and Minutes of Meetings (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2013), 84.
10. King, Our Navy at War, 25.
11. Nimitz, “Gray Book”, 574.
12. Nimitz, 575.
13. Chester Nimitz, June 6, 1942 Communique to the Press, World War II: The Allied Counteroffensive 1942–1945, The New York Times Living History, ed. Douglas Brinkley and David Rubel (New York, NY: Times Books, 2003), 4.
14. George Marshall Radio No. 204, June 10, 1942 to Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall Foundation.
15. King, Our Navy at War, 25.
16. Casablanca Conference, 4.
17. Casablanca Conference, 5.
18. Casablanca Conference, 95–96.
19. Casablanca Conference, 5.
20. Casablanca Conference, 5–6.
21. Douglas MacArthur, Reminisce.nces (Annapolis, MD: Bluejacket Books, 1964), 169.
22. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 169.
23. William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York, NY: Curtis Publishing Company, 1947), 170–71.
24. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 235.
25. Casablanca Conference, 95.
26. Casablanca Conference, 167.
27. Casablanca Conference, 95.
28. Casablanca Conference, 180.
29. Casablanca Conference, 167.
30. Casablanca Conference, 190.
31. King, Our Navy at War, 25.
32. World War II Inter-Allied Conferences, Trident Conference, May 1943, Papers and Minutes of Meetings (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2013), 28.
33. World War II Inter-Allied Conferences, Terminal (Potsdam) Conference, July-Aug 1945, Papers and Minutes of Meetings (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2013), 82-83.
34. Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1945 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), 50.
35. Truman, Public Papers of the President of the United States, 50.
36. Terminal (Potsdam) Conference, 15.
37. Recorded in Diary of Marquis Koichi Kido, entry for 29 November 1941, found in The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, ed. Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004), 133.
38. Terminal (Potsdam) Conference, 12.
39. Terminal (Potsdam) Conference, 40.
40. Field Marshall Viscount Alanbrooke Diary found in Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (Annapolis, MD: Bluejacket Books, 1964), 311.
41. Col Matsuichi Juio’s comments found in Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (Annapolis, MD: Bluejacket Books, 1964), 170.
42. Recorded in Some Opinions Concerning the War from Admiral Nobutake Kondo, found in The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, ed. Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004), 314.
43. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 172.
44. Terminal (Potsdam) Conference, 12.
45. A Japanese Analysis of American Combat Methods on Guadalcanal, found in John Miller, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 368.
46. Terminal (Potsdam) Conference, 19.
47. Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 646.
48. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story, 271.
49. Forrest P. Sherman, Lecture: The Navy in World War II, found in Nimitz “Gray Book”: War Plans and Files of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Vol. 7: 1 July 1945 - 31 August 1945, American Naval Records Society, 11.
50. MacArthur, Reminiscences, 169.
51. Jack C. Fuson, Transportation and Logistics: One Man’s Story (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1994), 18.
52. Casablanca Conference, 304.
53. Megan Eckstein, “New Marine Corps Cuts Will Slash All Tanks, Many Heavy Weapons As Focus Shifts to Lighter, Littoral Forces,” USNI News, 23 March 2020.
54. Jack C. Fuson, Transportation and Logistics: One Man’s Story (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1994), 5.
55. Fuson, Transportation and Logistics, 6.
usni.org · June 2, 2022



7. Sweden’s NATO Bid Is in Trouble

Excerpt:

Sweden, of course, remains an extremely attractive NATO applicant, and there’s no doubt that it will be a considerable asset to NATO when it joins. That, though, won’t be this summer, and it may not be at the same time as Finland. The culprit is clearly Turkey, but Andersson—a rookie prime minister without foreign or security policy experience—clearly mismanaged the no-confidence vote against Johansson. As a result, Swedish national security will suffer at an extremely sensitive moment. It doesn’t matter that the Pentagon sent the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge as well as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, to Stockholm earlier this month. It also doesn’t matter that the U.S. and the UK (and other NATO member states including Germany) have in the past few weeks given Sweden and Finland security guarantees. NATO membership is different—and now it sadly looks more distant. At least for Sweden.

Sweden’s NATO Bid Is in Trouble
Domestic politics have elevated a Kurdish parliamentarian, and that worsens Stockholm’s Turkey woes.
defenseone.com · by Elisabeth Braw
Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO bids seemed like a mere formality. Nothing, it seemed, could stop the two Nordic neighbors from joining the alliance–indeed, they were even promised a fast lane to membership. But then Turkey proceeded to block the countries’ applications over concerns for their support of Kurds—a dig primarily directed at Sweden. Then Sweden’s opposition parties organized a no-confidence vote against a bungling justice minister. In a remarkable turn of events, this caused Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson to make concessions to a Kurdish member of parliament. Sweden’s NATO application seems close to derailing—for the time being.
Before submitting their NATO applications, Sweden and Finland had surveyed alliance members and no one spoke up to object. Then they submitted their applications—and Turkey blocked them. “Unless Sweden and Finland clearly show that they will stand in solidarity with Turkey on fundamental issues, especially in the fight against terrorism, we will not approach these countries' NATO membership positively,” Recep Tayyip Erdogan told NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg last month. The Turkish president’s beef mostly seems to concern Sweden, which has long hosted Kurdish refugees (some of them of the militant variety). One former Peshmerga fighter, Amineh Kakabaveh, is even a member of Sweden’s parliament. Erdogan wants Sweden to curtail its links to Kurdish groups and end its suspension of arms exports to Turkey.
Enter Morgan Johansson. The veteran Social Democrat politician is minister of justice and the interior in Andersson’s minority government, and he has a dismal record. During his tenure, a wave of gun violence, mostly perpetrated by criminal gangs, has rapidly spread through the country. Already last year, Sweden was among the EU’s deadliest countries when it comes to gun violence, with four shooting deaths per million inhabitants compared to the EU average of 1.5, and since then the situation has further deteriorated. And on June 2, the parliamentary committee charged with scrutinizing government operations unanimously criticized Johansson for obfuscating. The opposition requested a parliamentary no-confidence vote in Johansson.
But instead of treating the parliamentary slap on the fingers as a welcome opportunity to sack a bungling minister, Andersson clung to Johansson—and as with all parliamentary decisions, her government needed every single one of the votes it had managed to sew together when it took office. The most decisive of those votes, the one that gives the government a one-vote majority of support in parliament, belongs to Kakabaveh—and she’d already accused Andersson of giving in to Turkey’s demands regarding NATO accession. She needed to be placated, which she apparently was. She voted with the government—and afterwards told Swedish media that the government had made promises to her regarding the Kurds. These promises, Swedish media report, clash with Erdogan’s demands. And just in case Andersson thought she could trick Kakabaveh, the latter declared after the vote that she’ll vote against the government’s budget in later this month if her demands are not met.
Andersson saved Johansson—even though it meant jeopardizing Sweden’s NATO bid. Erdogan is a difficult man, and Turkey has always been a tricky member of NATO, but as a member it has the right to reject applicants it doesn’t like. Had Andersson signaled willingness to compromise, it’s likely that Erdogan would have softened his opposition to Sweden. Now, with Andersson and her government at the mercy of Kakabaveh, he’s extremely unlikely to do so. Sweden’s NATO bid is close to derailing.
That puts Finland in in a difficult spot. The two countries have long remained outside NATO together and it was always clear that if they were going to join, they’d join together. In May, after a closely coordinated discernment process, they submitted their applications together. And now? It would hardly be surprising if Finland gets annoyed with the wait. But it doesn’t matter whether Finland is annoyed, because the only country that can cut the wait is Turkey—and Turkey might decide to let Finland in and keep Sweden out. There go the two perfect applicants’ perfectly managed NATO applications submitted at the perfect moment.
Sweden, of course, remains an extremely attractive NATO applicant, and there’s no doubt that it will be a considerable asset to NATO when it joins. That, though, won’t be this summer, and it may not be at the same time as Finland. The culprit is clearly Turkey, but Andersson—a rookie prime minister without foreign or security policy experience—clearly mismanaged the no-confidence vote against Johansson. As a result, Swedish national security will suffer at an extremely sensitive moment. It doesn’t matter that the Pentagon sent the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge as well as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, to Stockholm earlier this month. It also doesn’t matter that the U.S. and the UK (and other NATO member states including Germany) have in the past few weeks given Sweden and Finland security guarantees. NATO membership is different—and now it sadly looks more distant. At least for Sweden.
defenseone.com · by Elisabeth Braw



8. Raytheon moving corporate headquarters to DC area, joining other defense primes


​Location, location, location. Whatever is necessary to strengthen the MICC - military industrial congressional complex. (note sarcasm)

​​Raytheon moving corporate headquarters to DC area, joining other defense primes - Breaking Defense
The company hopes new HQ location will "increase agility" in doing government and commercial business.
breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · June 7, 2022
US Aerospace manufacturer Raytheon’s hospitality chalet at the Farnborough Airshow. (Photo by In Pictures Ltd./Corbis via Getty Images)
WASHINGTON: Raytheon Technologies announced today it will be relocating its global headquarters to the Washington, DC-area — a move the defense giant hopes will facilitate even more business with the government and commercial customers.
“The location increases agility in supporting U.S. government and commercial aerospace customers and serves to reinforce partnerships that will progress innovative technologies to advance the industry,” the firm said in a statement, noting the new HQ office will be in Arlington, Va., just outside DC. Raytheon is currently based outside Boston, Mass.
Raytheon’s move comes just a month after Boeing announced that it was moving its corporate headquarters from Chicago to Arlington. At the time, Boeing said the move “makes strategic sense for our global headquarters given its proximity to our customers and stakeholders, and its access to world-class engineering and technical talent.”
That means that soon the world headquarters of the five biggest defense primes — which also include Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics and Northrup Grumman — will share the same balmy DC-area weather.
Raytheon is the second largest defense contractor, behind Lockheed, according to a 2021 analysis by Bloomberg. In April, the company told investors it was projecting around $68 billion in sales for 2022, including defense and commercial aerospace contracts [PDF]. At the time, Raytheon Technologies Chairman and CEO Greg Hayes also hinted at an potential expansion of international business.
“We remain confident in the long-term outlook for our businesses, supported by the return to travel and growing global defense budgets,” he said. “Now more than ever, we are committed to investing in next-generation technologies and serving our customers to meet their mission-critical needs across aerospace and defense.”
The company, formed by the 2020 merger between Raytheon and United Technologies, is unique among the defense primes for its focus on components and weapons, as opposed to platforms. Its development efforts range from hypersonic tech, to satellites to naval radars, among many others. Recently, the Pentagon awarded a contract to a Raytheon partnership with Lockheed to produce Javelin anti-tank missile systems to backfill US stocks that had been sent to Ukraine.




9. Tell Everyone How to Measure Cyber Risk, DOD Begs NIST

Excerpt:

From DOD’s perspective, measurement is “NIST’s core competency” and the agency should be doing more to facilitate whole-of-government risk assessments which also consider the supply chain components of commercial information and communications technology.
“The current practice of departments and agencies developing their own overlays results in variability … The individual department or agency may be operating at low risk to their mission w/o realizing how others may be impacted by the residual risks that they manage,” read the Defense Department comments. “Whole-of-government activities (national security, national commerce, etc.) need a capstone resource to enable integrated risk assessments grounded in the broader/shared uncertainties associated with observation and measurement particularly for their common operating space of ICT, cyber and cyber-security.”

Tell Everyone How to Measure Cyber Risk, DOD Begs NIST
defenseone.com · by Mariam Baksh

D3Damon/Getty Images
Gaps in an 8-year-old standard are creating potentially dangerous mismatches between departments and agencies.


June 7, 2022 06:00 AM ET
It’s time the National Institute of Standards and Technology point to how organizations should be assessing the risk they’re associating with systems when deciding what security controls to implement for their protection, according to the Defense Department.
“Enhance Section 4.0 (Self-Assessing Cybersecurity Risk with the Framework) to integrate guidance on how [Special Publication 800-30, revision 1] can be leveraged to perform the risk measurement to assign a value,” wrote Michele Iversen, director of risk assessment and operational integration at DOD’s chief information office for cybersecurity. “It appears that [the Cybersecurity Framework] depends on measuring, or assessing risk, but [avoids] alignment to the NIST standard commonly used to assess cybersecurity risks.”
Iversen’s comment is in response to a request for information NIST issued toward a second update of the agency’s landmark cybersecurity framework. NIST on Friday released a summary of the comments it’s received—over 130, mostly from industry—since the request in February.
Originally issued in 2014, the Cybersecurity Framework, or CSF, points to various security controls organizations should consider implementing. But the document leaves it up to the user to determine which of those to prioritize, depending on how much risk they’re looking to address, or are willing to accept. And the question of how to measure whether use of the framework was successful was never really answered.
“Further guidance for measuring the performance of an entity in establishing and improving a cybersecurity program was a key need expressed in the RFI responses,” NIST wrote. “As with previous RFIs, comments on drafts, and discussions at NIST forums, metrics and measurement remain a lively topic among respondents. Many recognize that cybersecurity program implementation and improvement are not a pass/fail exercise, and that an effective program must be able to assess, coordinate and report measurable activities. Others stated that such detailed metrics, such as specific control objectives, ‘defeat the broad applicability and flexibility that make the CSF valuable.’”
That tension between the desire for broad applicability and specific guidance is another general challenge for the framework, with groups like BSA | The Software Alliance asking for examples of how federal agencies have used it, as required.
“The level of detail and specificity in the CSF reflects the scalability and flexibility necessary to meet the needs of a wide range of stakeholders—small and large organizations in various sectors,” NIST wrote. “There were more than 500 references in the comments supporting the need for more guidance to support CSF implementation, and many users expressed a desire for greater detail in the CSF while maintaining a non-prescriptive approach. Identifying the proper balance between simplicity and detail in updates to the CSF is a key takeaway that will need further discussion.”
From DOD’s perspective, measurement is “NIST’s core competency” and the agency should be doing more to facilitate whole-of-government risk assessments which also consider the supply chain components of commercial information and communications technology.
“The current practice of departments and agencies developing their own overlays results in variability … The individual department or agency may be operating at low risk to their mission w/o realizing how others may be impacted by the residual risks that they manage,” read the Defense Department comments. “Whole-of-government activities (national security, national commerce, etc.) need a capstone resource to enable integrated risk assessments grounded in the broader/shared uncertainties associated with observation and measurement particularly for their common operating space of ICT, cyber and cyber-security.”



10. Russian menace brings abrupt end to the west’s ‘peace dividend’


​Have "peace dividends" ever really paid out?

Russian menace brings abrupt end to the west’s ‘peace dividend’
What is the future of Europe?
Financial Times · by John Paul Rathbone · June 7, 2022
“The prospect of a Soviet invasion of Europe is no longer a realistic threat,” George HW Bush proclaimed in 1991 as he announced a 25 per cent cut in US defence expenditure and Russia’s menace dwindled at the end of the cold war.
The then president’s comments signalled the optimistic era of the “peace dividend”. Western governments looked forward to funding priorities other than security, such as health and education or lower taxes, in a period of expanding free markets, liberal democracy and economic globalisation.
Three decades on, Russia’s assault on Ukraine has thrust defence spending up the agenda again. The US is providing billions of dollars of military assistance to Kyiv. Long complacent about defence, European countries including Germany have pledged to spend more.
“Now, whoomph, we are suddenly in a new era that is the opposite of globalisation, where statecraft and security concerns trump free markets and economics,” said Nigel Gould-Davies, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank.
But it is a re-prioritisation that could hurt western living standards. As Kaja Kallas, prime minister of Estonia, which borders Russia, has said: “I would love to invest all this money that we invest in defence, in education, but . . . we don’t really have an option.”
Western military spending had already edged up by the mid-2010s, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for eastern Ukraine’s separatist movements in 2014, plus fears about China’s rise, gave impetus to the US, UK and EU to repair security budgets cut after the 2008 financial crisis.
Military spending continued to rise slightly through the coronavirus pandemic, said Diego Lopes da Silva, senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. But a complete reversal of the post-cold war peace dividend would be an expense on a totally different scale. It would also compete with other pressing needs, such as the transition to a green economy.

In the late 1980s, the US spent 6 per cent of gross domestic product on defence. Last year, it spent 3.5 per cent, a difference worth more than $520bn. EU countries cut back even further, in part because they relied on the US security umbrella and because rules limit their budget deficits and ability to raise debt.
Last year, among Nato’s 30 member states, only the US, UK, France, the Baltic states, Norway, Poland and Romania hit the alliance’s target of 2 per cent of GDP going on defence spending. Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, spent just 1.3 per cent.
The invasion of Ukraine has shifted the calculus. Although the west is now much stronger militarily than Russia, unlike in the cold war, Moscow’s unpredictability has prompted politicians to act.
Top of the list, analysts and defence officials say, are more combat-ready Nato forces positioned in states that border Russia, especially the Baltics, as well as increased force readiness and ammunition capacity.
A Ukrainian soldier carries a Javelin missile system. The US has sent an estimated one-third of its stock to Ukraine this year © Gleb Garanich/Reuters
Germany’s army recently revealed it was short of combat-ready equipment. Even the US, the world’s biggest defence spender, has been caught short: it has sent an estimated one-third of its Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, and replenishing that stock will take years.
“Just-in-time logistics are great — until you are in the middle of a battle,” said Andrew Graham, former head of the UK’s Defence Academy. “Peacetime accounting doesn’t allow you to have reserves but military doctrine requires it.”
European pledges to raise defence spending are now flowing thick and fast, although how they will be funded is another matter: governments are having to help voters cope with surging food and energy costs that have been exacerbated by the Ukraine conflict.

“Central to Putin’s thinking is that the west will not cope and will eventually grow tired of supporting Ukraine,” a senior European intelligence official said.
Even in energy-rich Norway, which is profiting from rising oil prices, there are worries that Nato’s 2 per cent spending target is getting out of reach in an expanding economy.
In the UK, which is Nato’s second-biggest military spender, leading politicians are calling for defence budgets to rise to 3 per cent of GDP. “I’ve always said that as the threat changes, so should funding,” said UK defence secretary Ben Wallace. “It’s up to me to present a case about those threats.”
Germany has committed to reaching and even exceeding Nato’s target. But the €100bn defence fund it is setting up will be enough to fund its spending gap for only two years, analysts estimate.

French president Emmanuel Macron has outlined plans to bolster military spending, but the country’s highest audit body has warned that, to do so, Paris will have to scrimp on other spending to hit budget deficit targets.
In Italy, Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s desire to increase defence spending has met public resistance, with teachers threatening protests and public transport workers announcing strikes.
And in Spain, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s goal of hitting the 2 per cent target by 2030 faces strong opposition from his government’s coalition partner. Yolanda Díaz, the communist deputy prime minister, has said the priority should be “research, education and health”.
The Netherlands is a rare example where the government seems to have grasped the nettle. Last week, it agreed to a series of spending increases to hit the 2 per cent target by 2024, paid for by tax rises, spending cuts elsewhere and public borrowing.
“2022 is the year when the importance of defence spending was recognised,” said John Llewellyn, former head of international forecasting at the OECD and partner at Llewelyn Consulting-Independent Economics. “But it is not necessarily the year that the tax burden also had to rise to fund it.”
Additional reporting by Andy Bounds in Brussels, Guy Chazan in Berlin, Amy Kazmin in Rome, Richard Milne in Oslo, Sarah White in Paris and Peter Wise in Lisbon
Financial Times · by John Paul Rathbone · June 7, 2022




11. Ukraine and the start of a second cold war

​Cold war good, hot war bad? Perhaps cold war is a better description of strategic competition between authoritarian and democratic powers. Perhaps it is both the old and new normal and was only split by the post cold war world period from 1990 through 2001....? It is after all political warfare, ideological warfare, proxy warfare, hybrid warfare, the gray zone, and all the other descriptors short of conventional (and nuclear) war.  

Ukraine and the start of a second cold war
Financial Times · by Gideon Rachman · June 6, 2022
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, there has been much talk of the echoes of the second world war and the dangers of a third one. But the current global moment is much more like a return of the cold war.
Once again, the US is assembling a coalition of democracies to face off against a Russia-China axis. Once again, the dangers of a nuclear war are central to international politics. And once again, there is a large bloc of non-aligned countries — now generally referred to as the “global south” — that is intensively courted by both sides.
Many in the global south insist that Ukraine is a regional conflict that must not be allowed to disrupt or change the whole world. But policymakers in the Biden administration already frame the war in global terms. They see Russia and China as partners in a challenge to the “rules-based order”, upheld by the US and its allies. The battles in Ukraine are currently the central theatre of that wider struggle.
Viewed from Washington, security threats in Europe and Asia are now so deeply connected that the two continents are seen by officials as a “single operating system”. That is a pattern of thinking that is very reminiscent of the cold war, when America was always mindful that what happened in Vietnam or Korea could have effects in the divided city of Berlin or in the north Atlantic.
One big difference from the last cold war is that this time the Americans see China, not Russia, as their most serious rival. That belief has not been changed by the fact that it is Russian president Vladimir Putin who has launched a war. In fact, the China focus of the Biden administration intensifies the tendency to see the Ukraine war as not just about the security of Europe, but about the wider global order.
While there is some glib talk in the west about attempting to “do a Kissinger” — and once again engineer a split between Russia and China, as happened in the 1970s — few in Washington believe that is a plausible near-term prospect. On the contrary, US officials see China as very firmly in Russia’s corner. Dissuading Beijing from translating its pro-Russian sentiments into direct military or economic support for Moscow remains a top American priority.
US allies in Asia — in particular Japan, South Korea and Australia — are also very alive to the implications of the Ukraine war for their own security. The worst-case scenarios for them would be that Russia’s aggression emboldens China and distracts America — leading to a region-transforming Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The best case is that the Ukraine war revitalises the western alliance and US global leadership and causes China to back off in Asia.
In reality, however, Biden’s people do not think that Russia’s troubles in Ukraine have changed Chinese minds about the wisdom of a possible invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese, they believe, are more interested in figuring out where Russia has gone wrong — and adjusting their own plans accordingly. The need for overwhelming force in any military action is one likely lesson. Another is the need to protect China’s economy from possible western sanctions.
In late May, Biden visited Japan and South Korea — and not for the first time suggested that the US would fight to defend Taiwan. (His administration was again forced to qualify the president’s comments.) At the end of June, Nato will hold a summit in Madrid. Significantly, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand have all been invited to attend.
Pulling together a coalition of democracies is meant to improve the west’s security position in both Europe and Asia. Countries such as Japan play an important symbolic and practical role in the struggle with Russia. They are vital to the sanctions effort — making it much harder for Moscow to find easy ways around sanctions. In return, the Asians are keen to see European countries play a bigger security role in Asia. Recent naval visits to the region, by the British, French, Germans and Dutch, have been welcomed.
But while the Americans are happy with the response of their most important north Asian allies to the Ukraine war, they are concerned by their failure to win the battle for opinion in south-east Asia. At a recent summit meeting with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Washington, some Asean leaders privately echoed Russian talking points about Nato’s responsibility for the war in Ukraine and alleged “false flag” operations.
India is seen as an even more important challenge. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been careful to avoid taking sides on Ukraine, abstaining on the key UN votes and increasing oil imports from Russia. The Americans think that hectoring New Delhi on this subject is likely to be counter-productive. Instead, they are intent on gradually drawing India closer to them by emphasising the two countries’ shared security interests in containing Chinese power.
Some historians now see the first and second world wars as two stages of the same conflict — separated by a generation of increasingly fragile peace. It may be that future historians will talk about the first and second cold wars — separated by a 30-year era of globalisation. The first cold war ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The second, it seems, began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Financial Times · by Gideon Rachman · June 6, 2022


12. Portrait of the invader: Understanding the Russian soldier

From the Kyiv Independent.



Portrait of the invader: Understanding the Russian soldier
June 7, 2022 11:53 am by Igor Kossov
A Russian soldier patrols a Mariupol street on April 12, 2022, photographed as part of a trip organized by the Russian military. (Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images)
One hundred days of all-out war has been plenty of time to get acquainted with the Russian troops.
Their lackluster combat performance, artillery barrages against cities, treatment of civilians, intercepted messages home, and interviews with dozens of civilians around Ukraine allow one to put together a mosaic portrait of the invaders. It’s not a flattering image.
Many of the soldiers are dirt-poor and badly educated, with many growing up without access to modern amenities. Many joined the armed forces because they have no future in their backwater towns. The majority have bad training, low morale and no faith in their poorly-maintained equipment and their callous or incompetent officers. 
When occupying areas, many drank heavily, turning their quarters into shambles, or went around looting anything barely valuable they could get their hands on. 
While some civilians acknowledged that they were treated adequately by Russian soldiers, others spoke of casual murder and cruelty inflicted either to feel safe, to satisfy base desires or just for the sake of being cruel.
This was enough to rack up more than 15,000 alleged war crimes as of June 1 by Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova’s reckoning. This ranged from random killings to deliberate murder, to torture and rape of civilians.
Where they’re from
Demographic patterns emerge when one looks at Russian soldiers who have been killed or captured in Ukraine. 
As of May 30, the BBC has identified over 3,000 Russian casualties, based on open source data. Of these, the biggest losses hit the regions of Buryatia, Dagestan, Volgograd, Bashkortostan, Orenburg, Krasnodar, Chelyabinsk and North Ossetia, many of which sit along Russia’s southern border, as well as its eastern reaches.
Similar findings appear in a report by iStories Media, a partner of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, as well as the Kyiv Independent’s review of death reports in Russia’s social and traditional media and Telegram channels that purport to list the dead. 
Some of these regions are predominantly homes of ethnic minorities. Close to a third of Buryatia’s population are Buryats, while about a third of Dagestan residents are Avars. In conversations with the Kyiv Independent, Ukrainians in several regions mentioned that significant parts of Russian forces were ethnic Buryats, with a sprinkling of other Siberians.
“Military status can be seen as an escape from the stigma suffered by ethnic minorities,” said Kirill Mykhailov, an expert with the Conflict Intelligence Team, a group of investigative journalists in Russia. “No one will question if you really are Russian if you are a soldier.”
Chechen forces accompanied the invasion force, but most of them did little fighting and were largely there for “TikTok PR,” Mikhailov said. On at least one occasion, Kadyrovites have reportedly been used as barrier units, whose job was to prevent retreat and desertion.
But ethnic minorities are far from the only ones who join the military to escape poverty — large numbers of ethnic Russians do the same. 
It’s also no coincidence that some of the regions with the most known casualties also have the lowest GDP in Russia, including Dagestan, Buryatia and North Ossetia. Bashkortostan and Chelyabinsk are in the middle of the pack of Russian regions sorted by wealth.
The poorer regions also have high unemployment rates. Chechnya, Dagestan and North Ossetia had unemployment rates above 15% while Buryatia’s was above 10% in 2020, according to Russia’s Statistical Bureau. The official national rate was just above 5% that year.
“The army is the sole stable employer in certain regions,” according to the iStories investigation.
“In regions like this, the army is often the only opportunity for career growth and moving out of their backwater,” Mikhailov added.
The average Russian soldier is poor. Many come from rural areas without modern amenities. According to iStories, less than half of village homes in regions leading by death are equipped with things like hot water or gas. 
Kamil Galeev, a Russia-based researcher with the Wilson Center, wrote that the rank and file are “young guys from small towns and usually underprivileged backgrounds.”
Ukrainian civilians who lived near or among Russian occupiers told the Kyiv Independent that many Russian soldiers reacted with surprise, envy and disappointment when they saw how even rural or suburban Ukrainians live. 
Multiple residents of a housing complex on the edge of Hostomel, as well as two couples living on a block in Irpin that Russians turned into a base, heard the same sentence from their occupiers: “You live better than we do. We don’t have this at home.”
The looting
The occupiers’ next thought was usually to help themselves to as much stuff as possible. 
“Naturally that explains much of the looting, especially in the affluent suburbs of Kyiv but also in places like the Donbas too,” Mikhailov said. 
When presented with the opportunity to take free stuff from Ukrainians, the Russians fell to it with gusto, sending over 58 tons of stuff from temporarily occupied areas into Russia, according to Russian investigative outlet Mediazona. 
Russian forces also swiped a great deal of historical heritage from Ukrainian museums, including historical coin collections and art in Mariupol, as well as Scythian gold and historical weapons from Melitopol.
Looting was widespread everywhere the Kyiv Independent interviewed civilians.
Several watches are seen on hand of a dead Russian soldier in Kharkiv on May 14, 2022. (Ivan Chernichkin/Zaborona/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)
Mykhailo and Viktor, two residents of the Hostomel complex, said the Russians looted more than 70% of apartments under the pretense of looking for weapons. They said Russians carried sacks of looted stuff, including nice clothes and even sneakers.
Throughout the country, many soldiers’ choice of loot showed that they hadn’t been exposed to expensive things before. They would take clothes and cheap electronics like printers but leave behind expensive paintings.
Melitopol resident Yevhen said that Russians in his area liked to target people who used to fight in Donbas — they would come to their home, seize their cars, houses and other stuff. These people were the lucky ones. In Kyiv Oblast, the Russians hunted down Donbas veterans and executed them. 
“The scariest in the region is murder and looting in the villages,” said Kostiantyn, a journalist in occupied Kherson, who isn’t identified by last name due to security reasons. “They just come to houses and chase people onto the street, then live there. They slaughter their livestock and take their stuff.” 
He added that the Russians emptied all supermarkets of their appliances and began working their way down to smaller stores. 
Volodymyr Marchuk, a Zaporizhzhia Oblast government spokesman, said that Russia had no unified plan for how to behave in occupied territories — these decisions were down to the unit. For example, he said Chechens in the region had a “purely mercantile gangster approach,” taking what valuables they could and being solely profit-driven.  
“Others have a different approach,” said Marchuk. This included “terror against the population, including kidnapping people to shake them down or exchange them for money.”
The looting sometimes led to inter-unit conflicts. Ukraine’s intelligence directorate (GUR) at the end of April alleged that there was a shootout between about 100 Buryats and Chechens fighting for Russia. GUR claimed the Buryats resented the Chechens for appropriating the loot they plundered from Ukrainians’ homes.
GUR also said the “inter-ethnic conflict” came from “the reluctance of the Buryats to go on the offensive and the inequality of their circumstances compared to the Chechens,” who rarely fight on the front line. There is also tension in both ethnic groups’ histories. As Aslan Doukaev points out in an article for the Jamestown Foundation, thousands of Buryats have taken part in armed conflicts in Chechnya, on Russia’s side. 
Competence
Those who do fight on the front lines have done a great deal to show the world that the Russian military is a lot less scary than it once seemed, as it let column after column get shot to pieces and failed to achieve objectives against the more lightly armed Ukrainians. 
Part of it comes down to training. Taras Chmut, a former Ukrainian marine and head of the Come Back Alive foundation, said about 50-60% of Russia’s armed forces have below-average training, with roughly 30% having average training and only about 5% having above average training.
“In general (the training) leaves much to be desired,” agreed Mikhailov. Much of training “is done halfheartedly, the army never prepared for the war it was about to embark on — remember, it came as a surprise for most of the lowest ranks.” 
Airborne troops and marines, who comprise the “constant readiness troops,” were better prepared but still not enough for a war like this, he added. Low pay, corruption and hazing continue to be problems for the Russian military, according to the OCCRP’s April report. Galeev wrote that good, competent officers, who have the trust and support of their men are antithetical to Putin’s desire to maintain absolute power. 
He went on to say that as a result, less intelligent officers, leading men with rock bottom morale is what the Russian military routinely selects for. Hence its need to rely so much on artillery. 
A Russian soldier patrols the Mariupol drama theatre on April 12, 2022 in Mariupol. The theater was destroyed by an airstrike, which reportedly killed 600 civilians that were hiding inside. (Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images)
Being a contracted soldier in Russia can be bad enough but conscripts arguably have it even worse. Significant numbers of raw conscripts have been deployed to Ukraine, even though the Kremlin initially denied this. 
Mikhailov said that theoretically, two thirds of troops are on contract and the rest are conscripts at any given time; in practice, not all contract slots are filled. The conscripts tend to be poor as “richer, more privileged ones would dodge the draft,” according to Galeev. He added that conscripts who don’t know their rights can be pressured into signing a contract. 
The system is so ramshackle and the invasion so bungled, many soldiers and officers have simply refused to follow orders. A senior U.S. defense official told reporters last month that “mid-grade officers at various levels, even up to the battalion level… have either refused to obey orders or are not obeying them with the same measure of alacrity that you would expect an officer to obey.”
This doesn’t mean that every unit is bad at its job. Illya Bohdanov, a Ukrainian volunteer fighter, told the Kyiv Independent how he was sent to reclaim the bodies of a Ukrainian column that was devastated by a Russian ambush, in the area of Bucha and Hostomel early on in the war. The ambushing troops were some of the Russian army’s elite.
“In terms of their offensive capability, I was surprised,” said Bohdanov. “It’s unfamiliar territory, you’re in a foreign country, you don’t even know where you are and to stage such a competent ambush, against regular forces? It impressed me. In general, the Russians fought well.”
Attitude
Still, given all of the above problems, and the shattered promises that Ukraine would fold in under a week, the average Russian soldier was either absolutely miserable or absolutely drunk, according to civilians who spoke to the Kyiv Independent.
The Russian soldiers’ alleged calls and messages home, which the Ukrainian forces said they intercepted, are full of doom, gloom and terror. Soldiers would describe how they were losing men left and right or how much of their unit was wiped out. 
Residents of the Hostomel housing complex said when the Russians arrived, they were proud and cocksure. Soon, that turned into confusion, frustration, then dread. Resident Mykhailo saw a soldier crying. Others jumped at loud noises. “I saw it in their eyes,” said resident Olena. “Fear and a lack of understanding of what they’re doing here.”
Civilians said that some Russians appeared to believe or at least parrot the notion that they were there as liberators and Ukrainians, by and large, would welcome them. Some did seem confused or crestfallen when that didn’t happen.
“One guy got drunk and told stories that he will never forgive himself that he came to Ukraine and did what he did and wants to kill himself every day,” said Victoria Lyashchenko, who lived on a block in Irpin that Russians made into a base. 
Her neighbor, a German national who declined to give his name, said the first rotation through the area was made up of very young guys who were “terrified, we could see it. One of them, 20 years old, even cried on my shoulder.”
The men who came to replace them were different — they were older and determined to enjoy themselves. They stuffed themselves with local food and looted every bottle of alcohol available from local homes, getting hammered and making a big mess on a nightly basis. When that ran out, they started taking their APCs somewhere to get more booze.      
“They smashed all the notebooks and tablets and phones, threw them into fires. They ate the food, threw out the scraps with the plates and cups outside. They tore everything apart,” said Lyashchenko. “We asked if we could give them water to flush the toilets. They said we have no time for that. They threw dirty socks and underwear in the toilets, clogging them.”
One of the many apartments that were torn apart by Russian occupiers in the town of Hostomel, photographed on April 8, 2022. (The Kyiv Independent)
This sort of behavior was widespread in Kyiv Oblast. Apartments were torn apart, enormous piles of stuff scattered everywhere. In some homes, the Russians defecated on the floor and left it there or threw it at walls. In one rich man’s manor home outside the village of Stoyanka-2, the Russians got into the extensive wine cellar, poured some of it into a small pool and attempted to bathe in it. They drank the rest and trashed the entire property. 
Aggression and dehumanization
Some of that energy came out as aggression. Bucha resident Tetiana Oleksandrova described a Chechen soldier that shot a burst of automatic fire into the school basement where she sheltered, killing another woman, as “furious,” with “the eyes of a jackal.”
Her husband, Andrii Fotchenko, said the young ethnically Russian “pawns” who anxiously followed him around reminded him of “baby ducklings.” But these were the same men who earlier threw four flashbangs into a basement they knew was filled with civilians. 
One question that tends to come up when discussing Russian troops is their “adequacy.” Unlike in English, where the word “adequate” usually means “sufficient,” in Russian and Ukrainian, the adjective is often used to describe a decent, normal person. 
Various civilians said that some of the Russians they ran into were “adequate” people, who just tried to do their jobs and didn’t inflict casual cruelty on the residents they captured. Tasia, a mother from a village in Zaporizhzhia, said that when one Russian soldier tried to get his commander to take out her 17-year-old son, the commander disgustedly dismissed the soldier, who was later beaten up by his comrades and transferred elsewhere.
As the world now knows, these were overshadowed by the other soldiers, who were a lot worse. Some of them gunned down individuals or groups of civilians, either because they were hunting them or for no reason at all. Potshots were taken at civilians for entertainment. And then there was all the rape.
In calls and messages between soldiers and their loved ones in Russia, one attitude came up a lot: that Ukrainians aren’t really people. Everyone recalls the infamous call where a soldier’s girlfriend gave him permission to rape Ukrainian women. In a more recent call, a Russian woman talked about how she would torture and kill Ukrainian children if she had her way. “I would inject them with drugs, look in their eyes and say die, suffer,” she said. 
This falls in line with the Kremlin’s message that Ukraine isn’t a thing — that its residents are uppity “Little Russians” that need to be put in their place. 
Mikhailov brought up the “poor work of political officers who never explained what a Nazi is, which is why, per sociologist Greg Yudin, many would assume anyone so much as expressing Ukrainian patriotism is a Nazi and should be treated accordingly.”
Yudin himself wrote that when Russia’s “de-nazification” campaign failed due to brave Ukrainian resistance, the Russians derived “a natural conclusion from that: Ukrainians turned out to be deeply infected by Nazism.”  
“And this is precisely how the message of official speakers has changed recently: We have underestimated how deep Nazism has permeated Ukrainian society. That affects the operational choices by the troops on the ground. Imagine you are a Russian soldier occupying a city in Ukraine… What are the classifications and distinctions you would use when dealing with the local population?   
“Your basic theory is that this is a land occupied by the Nazis, and you are here to liberate it. Obviously, Nazis will resist; and those resisting are Nazis.”   
“This is why I seriously doubt these atrocities are just excesses of war,” he concluded. 
Author: Igor Kossov
Igor is a reporter at the Kyiv Independent. He has previously covered conflict in the Middle East, investigated corruption in Ukraine and man-made environmental damage in Southeast Asia. He has a Master’s in Journalism from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism and was published in the Kyiv Post, USA Today, The Atlantic, Daily Beast and Foreign Policy.



13. What happens in Ukraine doesn’t stay in Ukraine: Austin adds clarity on Taiwan


Excerpts:

It remains to be seen whether the weapons the U.S. decides to send Taiwan will be the most advanced and whether their range and use will be as constrained as the arms going to Ukraine. Such limitations shrink the costs and risks of aggression and reduce deterrence.
Austin sought to remove some of this added ambiguity in U.S. policy when he told Nikkei the U.S. would send Taiwan weapons “commensurate with the Chinese threat,” which Blinken and other U.S. officials describe as “expanding.” He was asked whether U.S. reluctance to send forces to Ukraine would apply to Taiwan as well, and said, “They are indeed two highly different scenarios” — a distinction implicitly inching further toward strategic clarity.
Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Joseph Wu, noted last week, “The reaction to Ukraine here is very strong because it is a mirror image of what might happen to Taiwan in the future.” A Biden statement that America won’t let Taiwan be a reprise of Ukraine would go a long way toward strategic clarity and deterrence.
What happens in Ukraine doesn’t stay in Ukraine: Austin adds clarity on Taiwan
BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 06/07/22 10:00 AM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL
The Hill · June 7, 2022
In recent weeks, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has made some important policy statements — on the continuing war in Ukraine, on the threatening conflict over Taiwan, and on the possible linkage between the two.
After meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in late April, Austin said Washington’s long-range goal goes beyond helping Ukraine to defend its sovereignty and independence: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”
The remark was consistent with President Biden’s own stark description of Russian President Vladimir Putin as a genocidal war criminal who “cannot remain in power” — which administration officials quickly minimized as Biden’s moral outrage at Putin’s monstrous actions and not a call for “regime change” in Moscow.
U.S. weapons and intelligence have aided Ukraine’s heroic resistance substantially, but not enough to stop the killing or the ongoing loss of Ukrainian territory. Administration fears that Putin might accuse the U.S. of “escalation” have hampered the dual aims of protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and reducing Russia’s aggressive capabilities.
For three months, administration officials refused to meet Ukraine’s urgent requests for fighter aircraft, longer-range artillery and other weapons they considered too potent, too provocative. Last week, they finally approved four High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) capable of hitting targets 40 miles away. But approval was conditioned on Ukraine’s promise to use them, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “only for defensive purposes” and not “against targets on Russian territory.” Ukraine got only medium-range rounds.
Washington’s hesitancy has implications for its potential role in defending Taiwan against China. When Austin was asked about the connection at a congressional hearing in April, he responded, “I don’t want to speculate on whether an invasion [of Taiwan] is likely or less likely. I would say that we need to be careful about making direct comparisons between what’s going on in Ukraine and what could happen in Taiwan.”
When pressed on the matter, he said: “I think that it’s not advisable to make direct comparisons between Ukraine and Taiwan. These are two completely different scenarios, two different theaters.”
The two theaters do differ in obvious ways — Taiwan as an island invokes a different wartime scenario. But, at a geostrategic level, the similarities overwhelm the divergences. Threatened by powerful, aggressive neighbors, Ukraine and Taiwan are vibrant democracies whose value systems challenge the legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing. Both are on the frontlines of the global struggle between freedom and autocracy.
Washington seeks to thread the needle in both cases by doing the minimum needed to assist in their defense, without triggering a military confrontation with either Russia or China. During the House Armed Services Committee Hearing in April, Austin addressed the impact that Putin’s war might have on Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s likely actions toward Taiwan, saying, “I don’t want to speculate about what is in Mr. Xi’s head, but I think as the world looks at this, they’ve been impressed by the commitment, the resolve of many countries in the world to resist that kind of behavior.”
But deterring aggression is all about what is in the aggressor’s head, and the United States is the only country whose potential commitment to defend Taiwan matters to Beijing. When Chinese officials put that ultimate question directly to the Clinton administration in 1995, the response was, “We don’t know … it would depend on the circumstances.”
Every administration since then has applied the same policy of strategic ambiguity — except, for five minutes each, George W. Bush and Donald Trump — until Biden, who has declared emphatically three times that America will defend Taiwan. On all five occasions of presidential clarity, respective administration officials hastily cautioned that U.S. policy on the defense of Taiwan “has not changed.”
They ritualistically invoke the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as providing the declarative policy answer to the question Chinese officials asked in 1995, and journalists and experts still ask today: Will America defend Taiwan? Yet, the TRA — enacted in 1979 but not mentioned in the 1995 Sino-U.S. exchange — offers its own ambiguities. It obligates the United States to provide Taiwan “arms of a defensive character” but does not define defensive weapons as narrowly as Washington describes what it is sending Ukraine. The TRA also commits America to maintain its own “capacity to resist” aggression against Taiwan, but does not require or authorize the president to exercise that capacity.
Congress proposed the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act to fill that strategic policy lacuna by authorizing the president to use force to defend Taiwan, but both the Trump and Biden administrations opposed the legislation. Almost universally ignored is the implication contained in TRA’s declaration “that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”
Should China use force against Taiwan, Washington would have a basis in both domestic and international law to terminate relations with the People’s Republic of China or, at a minimum, to resume formal recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan. It already has ample grounds to declare a One China/One Taiwan policy, given China’s threatening military actions and its Anti-Secession Law, which formally mandates China’s use of force against Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Washington seems to be sending mixed signals regarding the weapons systems it is willing to sell Taiwan. It rejects requests for helicopters and anti-submarine systems, urging artillery and anti-ship missiles instead. But then it delays delivery of howitzers and anti-aircraft missiles because of either COVID-related supply line issues or demands of the war in Ukraine. (If the latter, it demonstrates how China and Russia — as “no-limits strategic partners” — can pressure America from two directions at once.)
It remains to be seen whether the weapons the U.S. decides to send Taiwan will be the most advanced and whether their range and use will be as constrained as the arms going to Ukraine. Such limitations shrink the costs and risks of aggression and reduce deterrence.
Austin sought to remove some of this added ambiguity in U.S. policy when he told Nikkei the U.S. would send Taiwan weapons “commensurate with the Chinese threat,” which Blinken and other U.S. officials describe as “expanding.” He was asked whether U.S. reluctance to send forces to Ukraine would apply to Taiwan as well, and said, “They are indeed two highly different scenarios” — a distinction implicitly inching further toward strategic clarity.
Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Joseph Wu, noted last week, “The reaction to Ukraine here is very strong because it is a mirror image of what might happen to Taiwan in the future.” A Biden statement that America won’t let Taiwan be a reprise of Ukraine would go a long way toward strategic clarity and deterrence.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.
The Hill · June 7, 2022

14. FBI seizes retired general's data related to Qatar lobbying

Oh no.

FBI seizes retired general's data related to Qatar lobbying
Federal court filings outlined a potential criminal case against former Marine Gen. John R. Allen.

Marine Gen. John Allen testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington. | J. Scott Applewhite/AP Photo
By Associated Press
06/07/2022 09:45 PM EDT
The FBI has seized the electronic data of a retired four-star general who authorities say made false statements and withheld “incriminating” documents about his role in an illegal foreign lobbying campaign on behalf of the wealthy Persian Gulf nation of Qatar.
New federal court filings obtained Tuesday outlined a potential criminal case against former Marine Gen. John R. Allen, who led U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan before being tapped in 2017 to lead the influential Brookings Institution.

It’s part of an expanding investigation that has ensnared Richard G. Olson, a former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan who pleaded guilty to federal charges last week, and Imaad Zuberi, a prolific political donor now serving a 12-year prison sentence on corruption charges.

The court filings detail Allen’s behind-the scenes efforts to help Qatar influence U.S. policy in 2017 when a diplomatic crisis erupted between the gas-rich Persian Gulf monarchy and its neighbors.
“There is substantial evidence that these FARA violations were willful,” FBI agent Babak Adib wrote in a search warrant application, referring to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
Allen also misrepresented his role in the lobbying campaign to U.S. officials, Adib wrote, and failed to disclose “that he was simultaneously pursuing multimillion-dollar business deals with the government of Qatar.”
The FBI says Allen gave a “false version of events” about his work for Qatar during a 2020 interview with law enforcement officials and failed to produce relevant email messages in response to an earlier grand jury subpoena, the affidavit says.
The 77-page application appears to have been filed in error and was removed from the docket Tuesday after The Associated Press reached out to federal authorities about its contents.
Allen declined to comment on the new filings. He has previously denied ever working as a Qatari agent and said his efforts on Qatar in 2017 were motivated to prevent a war from breaking out in the Gulf that would put U.S. troops at risk.
Allen spokesperson Beau Phillips told AP last week that Allen “voluntarily cooperated with the government’s investigation into this matter.”
The Brookings Institution, one of the most influential think tanks in the U.S., did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Qatar has long been one of Brookings’ biggest financial backers, though the institution says it has recently stopped taking Qatari funding.
Olson was working with Zuberi on another matter involving Qatar when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf countries announced a blockade of the gas-rich monarchy over Qatar’s alleged ties to terror groups and other issues in mid-2017.
Shortly after the blockade was announced, then-President Donald Trump appear to side against Qatar.
The court papers say Allen played an important role in shifting the U.S.’ response. Specifically, authorities say Allen lobbied then-National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster to have the Trump administration adopt more Qatar-friendly tone.
In a June 9 email to McMaster, Allen said the Qataris were “asking for some help” and wanted the White House or State Department to issue a statement with specific language calling on all sides of the Gulf diplomatic crisis to “act with restraint.”
Federal law enforcement officials say then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson did what Allen told McMaster the Qataris wanted done two days later, issuing a statement that “shifted away from earlier statements by the White House.” Tillerson’s statement called on other Gulf countries to “ease the blockade against Qatar” and asked “that there be no further escalation by the parties in the region.”






15. Russia draws closer to capture of Ukraine's Donbas region


Russia draws closer to capture of Ukraine's Donbas region
AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · June 8, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russia drew closer to its goal of fully capturing Ukraine’s eastern industrial heartland of coal mines and factories as the Kremlin claimed to have taken control of 97% of one of the two provinces that make up the Donbas region.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Tuesday that Moscow’s forces hold nearly all of Luhansk province. And it appears that Russia now occupies roughly half of Donetsk province, according to Ukrainian officials and military analysts.
After abandoning its bungled attempt to storm Kyiv two months ago, Russia declared that taking the entire Donbas is its main objective. Moscow-backed separatists have been battling Ukrainian government forces in the Donbas since 2014, and the region has borne the brunt of the Russian onslaught in recent weeks.
Early in the war, Russian troops also took control of the entire Kherson region and a large part of the Zaporizhzhia region, both in the south. Russian officials and their local appointees have talked about plans for those regions to either declare their independence or be folded into Russia.
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But in what may be the latest instance of anti-Russian sabotage inside Ukraine, Russian state media said Tuesday that an explosion at a cafe in the city of Kherson wounded four people. Tass called the apparent bombing in the Russian-occupied city a “terror act.”
Before the Feb. 24 invasion, Ukrainian officials said Russia controlled some 7% of the country, including the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia annexed in 2014, and areas held by the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russian forces hold 20% of the country.
While Russia has superior firepower, the Ukrainian defenders are entrenched and have shown the ability to counterattack.
Zelenskyy said Russian forces made no significant advances in the eastern Donbas region over the past day.
“The absolutely heroic defense of the Donbas continues,” he said late Tuesday in his nightly video address.
Zelenskyy said the Russians clearly did not expect to meet so much resistance and are now trying to bring in additional troops and equipment. He said the same was true in the Kherson region.


Speaking earlier to a Financial Times conference, Zelenskyy insisted on Ukraine’s need to defeat Russia on the battlefield but also said he is still open to peace talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
But a former senior U.S. intelligence officer said the time isn’t right.
“You’re not going to get to the negotiating table until neither side feels they have an advantage that they could push,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor of the Washington-based Center for a New American Security.
The Russians “think they will be able to take the whole of the Donbas and then might use that as the opportunity to call for negotiations,” Kendall-Taylor said at an online seminar organized by Columbia and New York universities.
Shoigu, the Russian defense minister, said Moscow’s forces have seized the residential quarters of Sievierodonetsk and are fighting to take control of an industrial zone on the city’s outskirts and nearby towns.
Sievierodonetsk and nearby Lysychansk have seen heavy fighting in recent weeks. They are among a few cities and towns in the Luhansk region still holding out against the Russian invasion, which is being helped by local pro-Kremlin forces.
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Shoigu added that Russian troops were pressing their offensive toward the town of Popasna and have taken control of Lyman and Sviatohirsk and 15 other towns in the region.
Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak urged his people not to be downhearted about the battlefield reverses.
“Don’t let the news that we’ve ceded something scare you,” he said in a video address. “It is clear that tactical maneuvers are ongoing. We cede something, we take something back.”
Luhansk Gov. Serhiy Haidai conceded that Russian forces control the industrial outskirts of Sievierodonetsk.
“The toughest street battles continue, with varying degrees of success,” Haidai said. “The situation constantly changes, but the Ukrainians are repelling attacks.”
Moscow’s forces also kept up their artillery barrage of Lysychansk. Haidai said Russian troops shelled a market, a school and a college building, destroying the latter. At least three people were wounded, he said.
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“A total destruction of the city is under way. Russian shelling has intensified significantly over the past 24 hours. Russians are using scorched-earth tactics,” Haidai said.
Meanwhile, the U.S. military has begun training Ukrainian forces on the sophisticated multiple rocket launchers that the Biden administration agreed last week to provide. The Pentagon said the training is going on at a base in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, is mounted on a truck and can carry a container with six rockets, which can travel about 45 miles (70 kilometers). Officials said it would take about three weeks of training before they could go to the battlefront.
In other developments, Zelenskyy said Ukraine planned to publish a special “Book of Executioners” next week with information about war crimes committed by the Russian army.
“These are specific facts about specific people who are guilty of specific cruel crimes against Ukrainians,” he said. Those named would include not only people who carried out the crimes but their commanders, he said.
___
Associated Press journalists David Keyton and Oleksandr Stashevskyi in Kyiv; Yuras Karmanau in Lviv; Andrew Katell in New York; and Lolita Baldor in Washington contributed to this story.
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Follow AP’s coverage of the Ukraine war at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · June 8, 2022


16. World Bank slashes global growth forecast to 2.9%, warns of 1970s-style stagflation

World Bank slashes global growth forecast to 2.9%, warns of 1970s-style stagflation
  • The World Bank slashed its global growth forecast on Tuesday to 2.9% for 2022.
  • The bank warned that the world economy could slip into a period of stagflation reminiscent of the 1970s.
  • “For many countries, recession will be hard to avoid,” World Bank President David Malpass said.
CNBC · by Karen Gilchrist · June 7, 2022
Global growth is expected to slip to 2.9% in 2022 from 5.7% in 2021 — 1.2 percentage points lower than previously predicted, according to the World Bank.
Bloomberg | Getty Images
The World Bank on Tuesday slashed its global growth forecast and warned that many countries could fall into recession as the economy slips into a period of stagflation reminiscent of the 1970s.
Global economic expansion is expected to drop to 2.9% this year from 5.7% in 2021 — 1.2 percentage points lower than the 4.1% predicted in January, the Washington-based bank said in its latest Global Economic Prospects report.
Growth is expected to then hover around that level through 2023 to 2024 while inflation remains above target in most economies, the report said, pointing to stagflation risks.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the resultant surge in commodity prices have compounded existing Covid pandemic-induced damage to the global economy, which the World Bank said is now entering what may be "a protracted period of feeble growth and elevated inflation."
"The war in Ukraine, lockdowns in China, supply-chain disruptions, and the risk of stagflation are hammering growth. For many countries, recession will be hard to avoid," World Bank President David Malpass said.
Growth in advanced economies is projected to decelerate sharply to 2.6% in 2022 from 5.1% in 2021 before further moderating to 2.2% in 2023, the report said.
Expansion in emerging market and developing economies, meanwhile, is projected to fall to 3.4% in 2022 from 6.6% in 2021, well below the annual average of 4.8% from 2011 to 2019.
That as inflation continues to climb in both advanced and developing economies, prompting central banks to tighten monetary policy and raise interest rates to curb soaring prices.
1970s-style stagflation
The present high-inflation, weak growth environment has drawn parallels with the 1970s, a period of intense stagflation which required steep increases in interest rates in advanced economies and triggered a string of financial crises in emerging market and developing economies.
The World Bank's June report offers what it calls the "first systematic" comparison between the situation now and that of 50 years ago.
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Here's how the Fed hopes to rein in inflation without harming the labor market
Clear parallels exist between then and now, it said. Those include supply side disturbances, prospects for weakening growth, and the vulnerabilities emerging economies face with respect to the monetary policy tightening that will be needed to rein in inflation.
However, there are now also a number of differences, such as the strength of the U.S. dollar, generally lower oil prices, and broadly strong balance sheets at major financial institutions, which present room for maneuver.
To reduce the risks of history repeating itself, the World Bank urged policymakers to coordinate aid for Ukraine, counter the spike in oil and food prices, and set up debt relief for developing economies.
CNBC · by Karen Gilchrist · June 7, 2022


 
17. US sees heightened extremist threat heading into midterms

Excerpts:

A senior DHS official, speaking to reporters ahead of the release of the bulletin, said it describes the situation as “dynamic” because authorities are seeing a wider variety of people motivated by a broader range of grievances and incidents than in the past.

The upcoming decision from the Supreme Court, which could overturn Roe v. Wade, could lead to violence from either extremist supporters or opponents of abortion rights depending on the outcome, said the official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss some factors that went into the preparation of the bulletin.

Racial extremists may be motivated by immigration enforcement or whether the government continues to rely on Title 42, the public health order that has been used since the start of the coronavirus pandemic to prevent people from seeking asylum at the southwest border, DHS said.

The agency and the FBI are working with state and local law enforcement to raise awareness of the threat, and DHS has increased grant funding to local governments and religious organizations to improve security, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas said in a statement released with the bulletin.

US sees heightened extremist threat heading into midterms
AP · by BEN FOX · June 7, 2022
WASHINGTON (AP) — A looming Supreme Court decision on abortion, an increase of migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border and the midterm elections are potential triggers for extremist violence over the next six months, the Department of Homeland Security said Tuesday.
The U.S. was in a “heightened threat environment” already, and these factors may worsen the situation, DHS said in the latest National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin.
“In the coming months, we expect the threat environment to become more dynamic as several high-profile events could be exploited to justify acts of violence against a range of possible targets,” DHS said.
It’s the latest attempt by Homeland Security to draw attention to the threat posed by domestic violent extremism, a shift from alerts about international terrorism that were a hallmark of the agency following its creation after the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
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Indeed, the threats from overseas rate only passing mentions in this bulletin. It notes that al-Qaida supporters celebrated the January standoff at a synagogue in Colleyville, Texas. And it mentions that the Islamic State group called on supporters to carry out attacks in the United States to avenge the killings of the group’s leader and spokesman.
DHS also warns that China, Russia, Iran and other nations seek to foment divisions within the U.S. to weaken the country and its standing in the world. In part, they do this by amplifying conspiracy theories and false reports that proliferate in American society.
Domestic violent extremists, however, present the most pressing and potentially violent threat, the agency said, citing, for example, the racist attack in which a white gunman killed 10 Black people at a Buffalo, New York, supermarket in May.
The bulletin, which is scheduled to expire Nov. 30, said calls for violence by domestic extremists directed at democratic institutions, candidates and election workers will likely increase through the fall. It said that people in online forums have praised the mass shooting at the elementary school in Uvalde, Texas, and encouraged copycat attacks.
“The alert highlights the fact that society is becoming more violent every single day,” said Brian Harrell, a former assistant secretary at DHS. “Would-be criminals and domestic terrorists will always use the path of least resistance, and often times soft targets and crowded places are picked for this violence.”
A senior DHS official, speaking to reporters ahead of the release of the bulletin, said it describes the situation as “dynamic” because authorities are seeing a wider variety of people motivated by a broader range of grievances and incidents than in the past.
The upcoming decision from the Supreme Court, which could overturn Roe v. Wade, could lead to violence from either extremist supporters or opponents of abortion rights depending on the outcome, said the official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss some factors that went into the preparation of the bulletin.
Racial extremists may be motivated by immigration enforcement or whether the government continues to rely on Title 42, the public health order that has been used since the start of the coronavirus pandemic to prevent people from seeking asylum at the southwest border, DHS said.
The agency and the FBI are working with state and local law enforcement to raise awareness of the threat, and DHS has increased grant funding to local governments and religious organizations to improve security, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas said in a statement released with the bulletin.
AP · by BEN FOX · June 7, 2022

18.  America Is Waging a Technology War on Russia

Conclusion:

In retrospect, it may seem that the three decades that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union represented a brief, bright, fleeting window in U.S.-Russia scientific and technology relations.

America Is Waging a Technology War on Russia
19fortyfive.com · by ByRobert Farley · June 7, 2022
The Biden administration has taken drastic measures to limit the transfer of technology to Russia in the months since that country invaded Ukraine. This is not the first time that the United States has waged a war of technology against Moscow. Beginning in 1945, the United States engaged in a decades-long effort to restrict the Soviet Union’s access to the most advanced military and civilian technologies.
It isn’t quite correct to say that export controls were invented to contain the Soviet Union, but it isn’t quite wrong, either. Before World War II, efforts to control the export of military equipment were haphazard, and they did not generally focus on technology. In United States vs. Curtiss Wright, the ruling that the Roosevelt administration had the inherent authority to prevent the export of military technology to Bolivia created the basic legal foundation for export management. Beginning in 1935, the Neutrality Acts restricted U.S. arms exports to combatants, out of the belief that these weapons could spark or extend wars.
Shifting the Focus of Battles Over Technology
Civilian equipment that contained technology with possible military applications was a different question entirely. For a time, it received little attention. The U.S. exported significant amounts of technology to the Soviet Union in the interwar period, and so did France and Britain. During World War II, the U.S. transferred huge amounts of military equipment to the Soviets, including tanks, trucks, and aircraft. One piece of equipment that the U.S. did not export was the B-29 Superfortress, an aircraft that the Americans had spent an enormous amount of money developing. They did not intend to just give it away. But it didn’t matter: The Russians got their hands on three aircraft that landed after bombing raids against Japan, took them apart, and eventually produced the bomber in bulk.
B-29 bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
After World War II, U.S. planners believed that they would require a significant technological advantage in order to offset the numerical superiority of the Soviet military, and thus instituted strict rules on the export of equipment with military applications. Much of this effort had its origins in the race to grab Nazi technology in the immediate wake of the war, when it became apparent that the Soviets very much wanted to catch up with the U.S. in military sophistication. New rules forced U.S. companies to seek approval from the U.S. government for the transfer of sensitive technologies. Essentially, the new regime made military and even non-military technology a matter of national security, and thus subject to the scrutiny of the state.
Recruiting Allies to the Cause
The U.S. strategy for technology management had an international aspect. Although the U.S. designed the system in order to prevent its own companies from transferring technology to the Soviet Union, in practice many friendly states found themselves the target of the export controls, due to concern that they would trade with the USSR or with its Eastern European satellites.
The international manifestation of export controls was the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, more commonly known as CoCom. Designed to coordinate high-technology export policies across the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan, CoCom came into effect in 1950. The U.S. leaned hard on allied states, mostly Japan and the members of the NATO alliance, to limit the transfer of military and dual-use technology to the Soviet bloc, and to customers sympathetic with the Soviet bloc. This included not just transfers from the U.S., but also technology developed in Europe and Japan.
The system of protection that concentrated on the movement of things in the 1940s and the 1950s soon turned its attention to people. Stopping the Soviets from acquiring technology was one problem, but stopping them from acquiring know-how was perhaps even more important. This manifested not only in visa regulations applied to foreign scholars and engineers, but also in schemes designed to prevent suspect individuals from accessing critical knowledge. Even the spread of unclassified information became problematic, if it might lead to the revelation of classified knowledge. Soviet efforts to collect vast reams of Western scientific knowledge undoubtedly heightened U.S. concerns.
A Return to the Technology Restrictions
All of this was costly to the United States, and to the scientific community as a whole. Efforts to limit Soviet access to knowledge necessarily reduced the scientific capacity of the United States and its allies, both by compartmentalizing information and by insulating Western scientific communities from foreign knowledge and expertise. However, U..S policymakers believed that controls designed to limit personal interaction with Soviet and Soviet-sympathizing scientists would hurt the Russians more than they would hurt America.
Later in the Cold War, the role of export controls in maintaining American technological supremacy came under debate. On one hand, scholars and policymakers associated with the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment emphasized the need for the United States to stay ahead of the USSR in technology in order to offset Soviet numerical superiority. On the other hand, détente provided the basis for a variety of social and scientific exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. When détente waned following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistanadvocates of tighter controls gained the upper hand. Even tighter restrictions on scientific cooperation and the export of dual-use equipment ensued.
In an important sense, the campaign worked. The USSR wasn’t completely cut off from technological developments, but Soviet science and engineering were undoubtedly held back because they could not collaborate with the best scholars and engineers from the West. Different norms of research and publication developed on either side of the Iron Curtain, and Western military and civilian technology steadily pulled ahead of their Soviet equivalents. After 1992 everything loosened up, and Russia gained access to the most advanced international technology.
In retrospect, it may seem that the three decades that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union represented a brief, bright, fleeting window in U.S.-Russia scientific and technology relations.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020).
19fortyfive.com · by ByRobert Farley · June 7, 2022


19. House lawmakers eye 4.6% pay raise for troops in 2023



​Of course military pay cannot keep up with inflation but with the raise the troops will be somewhat better off.

House lawmakers eye 4.6% pay raise for troops in 2023
militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · June 7, 2022
House lawmakers will propose a 4.6% pay raise for servicemembers next year as part of their initial draft of the annual defense authorization bill, but are also mandating a series of studies into the issue of military pay to ensure it’s keeping pace with civilian wages and families’ financial needs.
As part of the House Armed Services Committee’s personnel section of the annual military policy legislation, officials are backing the White House call for a 4.6% pay raise to go into effect Jan. 1 of next year.
That recommendation follows federal formulas calculating the yearly rise in civilian sector wages and would be the highest pay raise for troops in 20 years.
For junior enlisted troops, the 4.6% hike would mean about $1,300 more next year in take-home pay. For senior enlisted and junior officers, the hike equals about $2,500 more. For an O-4 with 12 years’ service, it’s more than $4,500 in extra pay.
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The White House has asked for a 4.6% raise in servicemember pay next year, but advocates question whether that will keep up with family financial needs.
But some critics have said those numbers may not be high enough to account for inflation spikes over the last several months and amid the rising cost of groceries, gas and other essentials. The Congressional Budget Office has predicted a 6.1% jump in the consumer price index this year.
Lawmakers plan to include in the bill a closer look at how military pay raises are calculated, with an eye towards future adjustments if Pentagon officials see growing gaps between troops’ paychecks and civilian salaries.
In recent months, committee ranking member Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., has voiced concerns that enlisted pay rates may be too low to ensure stable recruiting and retention levels for the services.
The new studies will also take into account how military housing allowances are calculated and awarded, and whether changes may be needed there.
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The pay raise would be the largest for service members since 2003.
Last fall, the Defense Department boosted housing allowances for troops living in 56 markets with soaring rent rates, to ensure those individuals weren’t being priced out of quality housing.
Lawmakers still could push for a higher pay raise during the committee’s full-day mark-up of the authorization bill, which is scheduled for June 22.
Meanwhile, officials on the Senate Armed Services Committee are expected to unveil their plays for the annual pay raise as part of their initial authorization drafts next week. Appropriations proposals from House lawmakers on the defense budget are expected to be released later this month.
About Leo Shane III
Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.




​20. Inside the Taliban’s secret war in the Panjshir Valley

Susannah George is helping us to assess the Afghan resistance potential.

Excerpts:
A commander of approximately 100 fighters in Panjshir said the opposition is mostly armed with weapons shipped into Afghanistan across its borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But the munitions, including heavy weapons such as rocket launchers, are not enough.
“We are supported by several countries, but we need more,” he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.
Taliban leaders have sought to contain news from Panjshir by limiting access to the valley and issuing sweeping denials when confronted with reports of fighting.

Inside the Taliban’s secret war in the Panjshir Valley
The Washington Post · by Susannah George · June 8, 2022
DARA, Afghanistan — Taliban forces have been locked for months in a shadowy on-again, off-again battle with opposition fighters based in the Panjshir Valley. Just a few hours’ drive north of Kabul, the province has long been an anti-Taliban stronghold and remains the only significant pocket of resistance to the group since the fall of Kabul last August.
The Washington Post secured a rare visit to the mountains and villages where the fight is playing out, getting a glimpse of a conflict that the Taliban has gone to great lengths to conceal.
Taliban officials flatly deny there is any violence in the area, even though thousands of the group’s forces are visible across the valley. “Everything here is fine,” insisted Nasrullah Malikzada, the Taliban’s local information director in Panjshir. “There is no fighting at all.”
Yet residents say assaults on Taliban positions are a regular occurrence, and dozens of people have been killed, with some civilians imprisoned in sweeping arrests. Those residents spoke on the condition of anonymity or used only one name for fear of reprisals.
The clashes in Panjshir are unlikely to pose an imminent threat to the Taliban’s control of the province or the country, but the violent resistance here punctures key narratives propping up the movement’s claim to legitimacy: that its rule has brought peace to Afghanistan and that its fighters are capable of maintaining security.
When the Taliban swept into Kabul in summer 2021 and the Afghan military melted away, a small band of fighters in the Panjshir held out for weeks. The Taliban claimed to have taken full control of the valley in September, but spokesmen for the National Resistance Front say they never surrendered.
Panjshir has a long history of resistance: It was the one province Taliban fighters were never able to pacify after taking Kabul for the first time in 1996. The current anti-Taliban movement is led by Ahmad Massoud — the son of legendary resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was assassinated by al-Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States — and former vice president Amrullah Saleh. Both men fled Afghanistan in late 2021, but they continue to direct operations from exile and are believed to command thousands of fighters.
A commander of approximately 100 fighters in Panjshir said the opposition is mostly armed with weapons shipped into Afghanistan across its borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But the munitions, including heavy weapons such as rocket launchers, are not enough.
“We are supported by several countries, but we need more,” he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.
Taliban leaders have sought to contain news from Panjshir by limiting access to the valley and issuing sweeping denials when confronted with reports of fighting.
“Of course no one knows what is happening here,” a 62-year-old shopkeeper named Gulzar told The Post on the recent visit to the valley. “No one is allowed to come here; I don’t even know how you got here,” he said, cautiously watching pickup trucks and armored vehicles packed with Taliban fighters race up and down the hillside.
The Post was officially granted access to the valley by Taliban leaders in Kabul and Panjshir, who said they wanted media coverage of security and stability in the area. After a guided tour of the province’s capital, The Post team was given permission to travel unaccompanied to villages and to interview civilians. Those interactions offered a small window into an opaque struggle.
Gulzar said the most recent wave of fighting spilled into his village. “I was here at my shop when I heard the gunfire begin,” he said, pointing to the orchards separating him from his family home on the opposite cliffside. He immediately gathered his relatives and fled to the mountains.
The clashes raged for over a day before anti-Taliban fighters ran out of ammunition and surrendered. Gulzar said he watched dozens of men hand over their weapons before being taken away. Two other men from the area confirmed his account.
Malikzada, the Taliban information minister, said the fighting Gulzar described was “propaganda from outside forces” and “entirely false.” He also denied restricting access to Panjshir, though he admitted to having recently blocked at least one international news outlet from visiting the valley because he thought the organization repeatedly published reports filled with “lies.”
Under Taliban rule, information that challenges the official line is increasingly difficult to verify. The country’s media landscape has shrunk, civil society faces constant intimidation, and human rights groups have either disbanded or operate under severe limitations.
In Panjshir, there are competing, one-sided narratives. As the Taliban maintains that all is calm, spokesmen for the resistance post near-daily social media updates on their armed struggle. Residents have learned to be skeptical.
“There is a lot of propaganda [on both sides] in the war in Panjshir,” said a farmer in Dara village who was once a member of the Afghan police force.
The farmer says he often sees the bodies of dead Taliban fighters driven away in the back of trucks after battle, though he thinks claims by the resistance to have killed more than 300 fighters over the past month are greatly exaggerated.
“It’s a big province. People in one village don’t necessarily know what’s going on in another every single day,” said Ali Maisam Nazary, the head of foreign relations for the resistance. Nazary said the group’s information comes from commanders on the ground and informants inside the Taliban.
The farmer believes both sides are playing down civilian casualties. After a recent clash, he said he attended back-to-back funerals for 10 people killed in the crossfire in his village alone. Talking to friends and family elsewhere in the valley, he estimated the total number could have been four times that in a single day.
Both the Taliban and the National Resistance Front claim that no civilians have been killed in the recent fighting.
“Maybe two or three people have died, [but] it was probably from the cold or from falling off a mountain,” said Malikzada, the Taliban’s information minister. “No one has been killed in clashes.”
Clashes have increased since the end of the holy month of Ramadan in May, according to residents interviewed by The Post. Spring has always marked the beginning of Afghanistan’s fighting season, as the weather in the north becomes milder and makes it easier for fighters to maneuver.
The attacks have become more brutal as casualties have mounted on both sides, according to a tribal elder, Tawhidi, who spoke on the condition that he be identified only by his last name for fear of reprisals. He said he has witnessed Taliban fighters carrying out summary executions after suffering losses in an assault and has heard similar reports from other parts of the valley.
Faramaraz, who works in a bazaar not far from Dara village, said Taliban fighters left the body of a dead opposition fighter on the side of a main road in late May.
“They wanted everyone to see,” he said. “And they wouldn’t allow the men to move him for burial; they made the women take the body to the cemetery.”
Malikzada conceded that thousands of Taliban fighters have been dispatched to the province, including some of the group’s most elite units. Their forces can be seen everywhere in the valley, and sophisticated military equipment is positioned along otherwise idyllic orchards and rivers.
DadMuhammad Battar, a former Taliban Red Unit commander in Laghman, is now one of the group’s top special forces leaders in the area. He said he coordinates with similar units attached to the Defense Ministry and a Taliban quick reaction force stationed in the provincial capital.
“The situation is completely fine here,” he said, seated beside a bouquet of plastic flowers and a dozen American-made M-16 rifles. “We go on patrol, but we haven’t conducted any operations. We are mainly here to focus on criminal cases.”
Along the road just outside Battar’s base, dozens of Taliban convoys could be seen weaving in and out of the valley as the sun began to fade. Further down, heavy armored vehicles — Humvees and MRAPs — formed checkpoints along the roads leading to and from villages that residents said had seen the most recent round of fighting.
“It’s important for the foreigners to trust us,” Malikzada said at the end of the guided tour. “We don’t lie to the foreign media. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan already proved to the people of Afghanistan that everything we say is the reality.”
Turning to The Post reporter, he added: “There is no reason for you not to trust us.”
Tassal reported from Houston.
The Washington Post · by Susannah George · June 8, 2022


21.  Foreign Service applicants sit for updated exam amid subjectivity concerns



Foreign Service applicants sit for updated exam amid subjectivity concerns
federaltimes.com · by Ryan White · June 6, 2022
Applicants are sitting for the Foreign Service’s notoriously difficult multiple choice entrance exam this week. They are the first cadre of future diplomats to be selected through the service’s updated hiring process.
Previously, the Foreign Service Officer Test served as the first gateway to the rest of the selection steps. If applicants failed to achieve or exceed a variable cutoff score, they were not invited to move forward in the process.
Those few that did progress had their personal narrative statements and an essay written during the exam evaluated by the Qualifications Evaluation Panel, which seeks to asses how well applicants demonstrate core service tenants known as the “13 Dimensions.” Once an applicant moved onto the QEP, their FSOT score no longer had any bearing on the rest of the hiring process.
In late April, the State Department announced that starting with the June testing period - the FSOT would no longer serve as a mechanism to cull the ranks of applicants. Instead all applicants would move forward onto the QEP and their FSOT score would be factored into the evaluation along with the other materials.
The updated process “will give the Department a more balanced view of candidates who will be selected for the next phase of the selection process, the Foreign Service Oral Assessment,” the department wrote in their announcement. “This is the most significant change to the Foreign Service Selection process since 1930. We anticipate that this change will result in identifying a more qualified pool of candidates.”
The announcement came as a surprise to many, including the American Foreign Service Association, the professional association for FSOs. The association said it was not informed of or consulted about the change prior to the announcement. The AFSA has expressed their concern about the lack of transparency from the State Department.
The association said it supports the undertaking of comprehensive review of how the Foreign Service selects members and that it’s not opposed to fundamental changes.
“We remain concerned that these unilateral changes risk being seen as excessively subjective and subject to partisan influence,” the AFSA wrote in their June addition of the Foreign Service Journal. “It is important to protect against potential future politicization of hiring through manipulation of a process that is now less easily explained.”
Despite the concerns from the AFSA and uproar from critics who have argued for the preservation of the status quo in opinion columns, the State Department has been relatively silent regarding the change beyond the initial announcements.
“We urge fuller transparency regarding hiring decisions made through this new system and further discussions with stakeholders on its implementation,” the AFSA said.
About Ryan White
Ryan White is a reporting intern at Sightline Media. He is currently a senior at The University of Maryland, College Park studying journalism.



22. Russia’s War in Ukraine and Implications for Its Influence Operations in the West

The 6 page paper on PDF can be downloaded here: https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/IS-524.pdf

Conclusion:
Russian influence operations appear to be hampered by the consequences of its war in Ukraine, but the United States and its allies should not take this situation for granted.[25] Russia’s influence operations online are slowly creeping back to their pre-war levels, which is why the United States and allies must continue to be vigilant in light of Russia’s continued activities.


Russia’s War in Ukraine and Implications for Its Influence Operations in the West




Michaela Dodge, Russia’s War in Ukraine and Implications for Its Influence Operations in the West, No. 524, June 7, 2022
Russia’s War in Ukraine and Implications for Its Influence Operations in the West
Dr. Michaela Dodge is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and its subsequent atrocities on Ukrainian territory have affected Moscow’s ability to successfully conduct influence operations in the West, but whether this will continue remains to be seen. Russia’s aggression made the execution of its influence operations more difficult, but the Kremlin will try to utilize the Ukrainian migration wave to other countries to stir discontent and plant divisive false narratives within western societies.
Russia’s War in Ukraine Makes Russia’s Influence Operations in the West More Difficult to Execute
Following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the European Union (EU) banned RT (formerly known as Russia Today) and Sputnik on the 27 countries’ territory. These so called news organizations, directly connected to the Russian government, were spreading “systematic information manipulation and disinformation” and their disinformation narratives were considered “a significant and direct threat to the [European] Union’s public order and security.”[1] Amid streaming platforms’ and technological companies’ efforts to comply with the EU’s ban by demonetizing and deplatforming[2] RT’s and Sputnik’s content, RT America laid off all of its staff and effectively shut down in the United States.[3] The Russian Federation used these channels to legitimize false narratives, disseminate fake news, and pollute the information environment in other countries.
On its own, shutting these outlets down will perhaps not make a significant difference in Russia’s ability to plant false narratives because there are too many others performing the same function. But countries have been taking additional steps to shut down comparable entities on their respective territories, such as websites involved in spreading Russia-linked disinformation. For example, the Czech Republic shut down more than 18 disinformation websites in the weeks following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[4] Other countries took similar measures. But banned websites can (and often do) migrate to hosts not subjected to a ban and may eventually reconstitute their readership, making the effect temporary unless further actions are taken. Such is the nature of the contemporary information environment.[5] It certainly does not mean democracies should completely cede the ground to Russia’s disinformation outlets. Delegitimizing disinformation content and exposing links to the Russian government is one of the best ways to counter Russia’s propaganda.
Russia’s war in Ukraine made disinformation relatively easier to spot—content related to denying Russia’s war crimes in places like Irpin or Bucha (or blaming them on Ukraine), claiming Russia’s false flag attacks and operations are Ukrainian operations, or spreading lies about the United States having a covert biological weapons program in Ukraine, are solid signs that Russia or pro-Russian elements are most likely behind it. Shutting down platforms spreading these narratives takes away one of the disinformation sources, even if temporarily.
Following Russia’s invasion, EU countries expelled more than 200 Russian accredited diplomats.[6] More than 400 diplomats were expelled from over 20 countries worldwide in what is reported to be one of the largest expulsion of diplomats in modern history.[7] What do diplomats have to do with Russia’s ability to spread false information and conduct influence operations? A relatively large number of Russia’s diplomats are intelligence officers pretending to be diplomats and enjoying diplomatic immunity. Their jobs in host countries can include identifying and making contacts with people who could be turned to work for the Russian Federation, generating compromising material on host countries’ political and business figures for a potential blackmail use later, and maintaining networks of willing collaborators. “Russia uses diplomacy not to remain in contact with partners, but to push false claims and false propaganda statements against the west,” according to Stanisław Żaryn, spokesperson of the Minister-Special Services Coordinator and head of the National Security Department in the Chancellery of Poland’s Prime Minister.[8]
Utilizing these resources contributes to the Russian Federation’s capacity to execute influence operations and, therefore, not having this resource available will inevitably hinder its ability to do so. Anecdotally, the Czech Republic saw a temporary decrease in pro-Russian internet trolling activities after it expelled 18 Russian intelligence officers posing as diplomats in April 2021.[9] The trolling resumed after about 6 weeks, presumably after the expelled Russians got their new assignments. The Czech Republic then established a strict parity rule, equalizing the number of Russian diplomats in Prague and Czech diplomats in Moscow and significantly limiting Moscow’s diplomatic presence in the country. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Czech Republic imposed further restrictions on Russia’s diplomatic presence.[10]
Domestic Implications for Russia
In retaliation for other countries’ steps to make Russia’s disinformation and influence operations more difficult, the Russian government blocked access to several foreign news organizations’ websites and then passed censorship laws effectively prohibiting independent journalism about Russia’s war in Ukraine.[11] These measures came on the heels of years of increasing restrictions on the operation and funding of foreign news outlets and non-profits in Russia. Several news organizations suspended their coverage for fear of exposing their employees to punishment under the new law; others like Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow) shut down altogether.[12] Russia completely banned Twitter and Facebook.[13]
These steps will make it yet harder for independent journalists to penetrate the Russian information sphere and provide Russians with information that is not censored and state-approved. Work-arounds are possible, but unlikely to be utilized by a majority of Russia’s population that still predominantly relies on the government-run media for its primary information source.[14] Even if Russians had diverse sources of information about the war at their disposal, they may still opt for government-sponsored disinformation.[15] The majority of Russians appear to support Putin’s war in Ukraine (which must be called a “special operation” in Russia), including in regions that bear a majority of casualties.[16] The Putin regime will continue to promulgate false narratives at home to solidify support and pre-empt questions related to the government’s poor handling of the war.
Potential for Russia to Exploit New Narratives
Despite some setbacks, Russia’s influence operations will continue in the future.[17] If anything, Russia may utilize them more than ever given that they are a tool of choice vis-à-vis stronger opponents and Russia’s war in Ukraine is weakening Russia in the short- and long-run. So far, Russia’s success has been limited to non-western audiences and those pre-disposed to believe Russia.[18]
Russia’s unprovoked war has caused over 6 million people to flee Ukraine, mainly to Poland but also to other countries.[19] To address the influx of refugees and prevent a large-scale humanitarian crisis, host governments have activated a set of measures making it easier for Ukrainians to obtain residence and work permits, utilize health and social security services, participate in language courses, and for children to attend schools. These measures have been funded from national and European Union budgets. Private entities contribute to these efforts, e.g., by providing free meals. These measures are causing resentment among a small part of the host population, which could be fertile ground for Russian influence operations and disinformation, particularly if solidarity with Ukraine diminishes over time. Narratives about the Ukrainians unjustly “taking advantage” and abusing other people’s generosity are already circulating within the information sphere, although they are not widely shared.
Next, Russia has reportedly been forcibly removing Ukrainians to Russia.[20] Ukrainians are forced through “filtration camps” and sometimes have their passports stolen.[21] With no documentation and means, this population could be vulnerable to exploitation by the Russians, including for example using these Ukrainians to generate propaganda videos on alleged Ukrainian soldiers’ atrocities or on how well the Ukrainians are treated in Russia, for either foreign or domestic consumption.[22]
Russia makes great efforts to deny its war crimes and portrays them as the actions of Ukrainians. These efforts have limited success in countries with open access to information; Russia’s culpability is undeniable.[23] Russia’s more successful narratives falsely involve allegations that the United States maintains biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine and that Russia was provoked to attack Ukraine because of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s enlargement into Russia’s Cold War sphere of influence.[24]
Conclusion
Russian influence operations appear to be hampered by the consequences of its war in Ukraine, but the United States and its allies should not take this situation for granted.[25] Russia’s influence operations online are slowly creeping back to their pre-war levels, which is why the United States and allies must continue to be vigilant in light of Russia’s continued activities.
Notes:
[1] Foo Yun Chee, “EU bans RT, Sputnik over Ukraine disinformation,” Reuters, March 2, 2022, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-bans-rt-sputnik-banned-over-ukraine-disinformation-2022-03-02/.
[2] Demonetizing means prohibiting financial gains from advertisement, deplatforming means removing and banning a registered user from a mass communication medium (such as a social networking or blogging website). See “Deplatform,” Merriam-Webster, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deplatform.
[3] Oliver Darcy, “RT America ceases productions and lays off most of its staff,” CNN News, March 4, 2022, available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/03/media/rt-america-layoffs/index.html.
[4] Lukáš Václavík, “Čeští dezinformátoři se opět nadechují. I přes zablokování se pomalu vracejí na původní návštěvnost (Czech propagators of desinformation are breathing again. Despite the blocks, they are getting back to the pre-invasion levels of exposure),” Zive, May 12, 2022, available at https://www.zive.cz/clanky/blokovani-ceskym-dezinformatorum-ublizilo-nekteri-vsak-paradoxne-posilili-ukazuje-analyza/sc-3-a-215992/default.aspx.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “EU allies expel more than 200 Russian diplomats and staff amid outrage over Bucha killings,” France24, May 4, 2022, available at https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220405-eu-allies-expel-more-russian-diplomats-amid-outrage-over-bucha-killings.
[7] Hiroshi Asahina, “400-plus Russian diplomats expelled worldwide over Ukraine,” Nikkei Asia, April 15, 2022, available at https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/400-plus-Russian-diplomats-expelled-worldwide-over-Ukraine; and Robbie Gramer and Mary Yang, “West Boots Out Hundreds of Russian Diplomats in Wake of Ukraine Invasion and War Crimes,” Foreign Policy, April 7, 2022, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/07/us-europe-russian-diplomats-ukraine/.
[8] Patrick Wintour, “Spy games: expulsion of diplomats shines light on Russian espionage,” The Guardian, April 15, 2022, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/15/spy-russian-diplomats-europe-espionage-ukraine.
[9] Jakub Štos and Radka Wallerová, “Trollí farma přímo na ruské ambasádě? Poznatky BIS po vyhoštění špionů (A Troll Farm on the Russian Embassy? What Does the Czech Security and Information Service Know after the Expulson of Russia’s Spies),” Seznam, June 28, 2021, available at https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/trolli-farma-primo-na-ruske-ambasade-poznatky-bis-po-vyhosteni-spionu-168360.
[10] “Ruští diplomaté v Evropě si balí kufry. Také Česko vyhostilo zástupce velvyslance (Russian Diplomats in Europe Are Sent Packing. The Czech Republic Expelled Ambassador’s Deputy too),” Hospodářské Noviny (Economic Newpaper), March 29, 2022, available at https://domaci.hn.cz/c1-67051110-rusti-diplomate-v-evrope-si-bali-kufry-take-cesko-vyhostilo-zastupce-velvyslance.
[11] “Russia blocks access to BBC and Voice of America websites,” Reuters, March 4, 2022, available at https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/russia-restricts-access-bbc-russian-service-radio-liberty-ria-2022-03-04/.
[12] Michael Grynbaum, John Koblin and Tiffany Hsu, “Several Western news organizations suspend operations in Russia,” The New York Times, March 4, 2022, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/business/western-media-operations-russia.html; and Sophia Sandurskaya, “Russian Liberal Radio Mainstay Ekho Moskvy Closes After Pulled Off Air,” The Moscow Times, March 3, 2022, available at https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/03/03/russian-liberal-radio-mainstay-ekho-moskvy-closes-after-pulled-off-the-air-a76730.
[13] Dan Milmo, “Russia blocks access to Facebook and Twitter,” The Guardian, March 4, 2022, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russia-completely-blocks-access-to-facebook-and-twitter.
[14] Yasmeen Serhan, “How Western News Is Getting Around Putin’s Digital Iron Curtain,” The Atlantic, March 22, 2022, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/international-news-russia-kremlin-media-censorship/627120/.
[15] Kseniya Kirillova, “Why Russians Swallow Propaganda,” Center for European Policy Analysis, April 21, 2022, available at https://cepa.org/why-russians-swallow-propaganda/.
[16] Mike Eckel, “Polls Show Russians Support Putin And The War On Ukraine. Really?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 7, 2022, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-support-ukraine-war-polls-putin/31791423.html; and Shura Burtin, “Feeling around for something human Why do Russians support the war against Ukraine?” Meduza, May 3, 2022, available at https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/05/03/feeling-around-for-something-human.
[17] Cindy Otis, “Russia is turning to its old disinformation playbook in Ukraine. Is the world able to stop it?” USA Today, March 7, 2022, available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnist/2022/03/07/russia-disinformation-ukraine-cyber-warfare/9402421002/.
[18] “Russia is swaying Twitter users outside the West to its side,” The Economist, May 14, 2022, available at https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/05/14/russia-is-swaying-twitter-users-outside-the-west-to-its-side.
[19] “UNHCR Says 6 Million Ukrainian Refugees So Far From Russian Invasion,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 13, 2022, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-6-million-refugees-unhcr/31847527.html.
[20] Laurence Peter, “Russia transfers thousands of Mariupol civilians to its territory,” BBC News, 27 March 2022, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60894142.
[21] Gleb Golod, “‘I’ve never been so scared’ Ukrainian refugees give firsthand accounts of ‘filtration camps’ run by Russian troops,” Meduza, May 12, 2022, available at https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/05/13/i-ve-never-been-so-scared.
[22] This would not be that different from the Russians extracting concessions from Ukrainian prisoners of war under duress.
[23] See for example “Ukraine: Russian forces extrajudicially executing civilians in apparent war crimes – new testimony,” Amnesty International, April 7, 2022, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/04/ukraine-russian-forces-extrajudicially-executing-civilians-in-apparent-war-crimes-new-testimony/; or Malachy Browne, David Botti and Haley Willis, “Satellite images show bodies lay in Bucha for weeks, despite Russian claims,” The New York Times, April 4, 2022, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/04/world/europe/bucha-ukraine-bodies.html.
[24] Jeff Seldin, “US Sees No Letup in Russian Influence Operations,” VOA News, March 18, 2022, available at https://www.voanews.com/a/us-sees-no-letup-in-russian-influence-operations/6490690.html.
[25] Jeff Seldin, “Russia’s Vaunted Influence Operations Bogged Down with Ukraine,” VOA News, March 7, 2022, available at https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-s-vaunted-influence-operations-bogged-down-with-ukraine/6473771.html.
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23. The SOF Truths: A Different Perspective on Security Force Assistance


The author does a good job of "operationalizing" the SOF truths for Security Force Assistance. And although now USSOCOM is the proponent for SFA there are a large number of non-SOF forces required to conduct that mission so hopefully they can adapt these to become the 5 SFA Truths.

But the SOF truths are not exclusively SOF (or at least they should not be - just like "through, with, and by" is the foundation of SF operations but can be employed by any force with a mission to do so). They can be adapted for any organization. They are the common sense brainchild of the late Colonel John Collins, aka the Warlord.

See his article on Special Operations that includes the history of the SOF truths here.  https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/148-collins.pdf

Excerpt from COL Collins' article:

Many true believers throughout USSOCOM have memorized SOF Truths, here are the first four of five bullets that I conceived and Congressman Earl Hutto signed in the Foreword to U.S. and Soviet Special Operations on 28 April 1987:
- Humans are more important than hardware
- Their quality is more important than quantities
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced
- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur
When General Stiner sent me on a Cook's tour of his subordinate commands in 1993 the first stop was Fort Bragg, where USASOC commander Lieutenant General Wayne Downing proudly concluded his formal presentation with a slide that displayed SOF Truths. He did a double take when I told him "they're wonderful," then said, "I wrote 'em."
If asked to start over from scratch, I would add one word to the fourth bullet so it would read "Competent SOF cannot be created RAPIDLY after emergencies occur." Otherwise, I believe they are still solid as bricks, but wish that whoever enshrined the first four had retained Number 5, which says "Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance." That oversight was a serious mistake in my opinion, because its omission encourages unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored employers and perpetuates a counterproductive "us versus everybody else" attitude by excessively gung ho members of the SOF community.


I wish those who tout the SOF truths would recognize Colonel Collins as he deserves great credit for coining these.


The SOF Truths: A Different Perspective on Security Force Assistance - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Marshall McGurk · June 7, 2022
US special operations forces train, advise, and assist in at least sixty countries every day, preparing allies and partners for conflict. The SOF Truths guide these special operations units; every special operator knows them by heart. The SOF Truths reside within a unique culture set by the SOF imperatives and SOF’s core activities.
Special operations forces play a critical role as part of the joint force’s forward presence and expeditionary capability within multidomain operations. Army special operations forces advance partnerships, influence adversarial behavior, execute special operations, and respond to crisis, often before conflict begins. Leaning forward requires nuanced and critical thinking to prioritize limited special operations forces across the combatant commands.
But while the SOF Truths guide individual units and special operators, they should play a much broader role in the policymaking process. Planners should use them to provide a creative framework for special operations employment. By considering the SOF Truths during planning decisions, SOF’s tailorable, scalable, and purpose-built units will lead more irregular warfare efforts across the Department of Defense’s integrated deterrence efforts.
SOF Truth #1: Humans are more important than hardware.
Policymakers should align US SOF with partners who invest in their people. The United States maintains its strategic advantage with the right personal, institutional, or programmatic relationships among partners and allies. Partner-nation special operations forces trained by the United States are adept at weathering crises, be they assaults from the Islamic State or invasions from great powers. US SOF partners succeed during crisis because they have internalized and sustain the rigors of special operations training and culture.
Ideally, willing and able countries align with the United States against mutual adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, or violent extremists. As documented by retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, former commander of US Army Europe, US Army Special Forces’ investment in Ukraine is paying strategic dividends. US special operators cannot create SOF everywhere; the key lies within a willing and able partner.
SOF Truth #2: Quality is better than quantity.
The employment of US special operations is improved when partnered forces have the right equipment at the right time with the right training. While special operators provide expertise in the human domain, foreign military sales provide the tools for partner-nation forces to deter or defeat their adversaries. Providing quality equipment requires synchronization of the security cooperation triad: SOF assistancedefense attachés, and Office of Defense Cooperation initiatives.
Foreign military sales cover a wide range of equipmentschooling, and training opportunities. Under the control of both the State Department and the Department of Defense, the best foreign military sales provide consistent delivery of what partnered nations want and need, while reinforcing that the United States is the preferred partner of choice.
Policymakers and engagement managers should compare the prioritized regions in the 2022 National Defense Strategy with current crises and adversary actions to determine multiyear investments in robust and capable partners.
SOF Truth #3: SOF cannot be mass produced.
SOF personnel are carefully selected—and then rigorously trained. The United States should apply the same scrutiny when selecting partners abroad.
Ukraine provides a perfect case of successful SOF investment. There, previous instruction from Green Berets in marksmanship and antitank gunnery is paying obvious dividends. The time for creating competent Ukrainian SOF passed when Russian invaded on February 24, 2022. Thankfully, soldiers from 1st Special Forces Command had been in Ukraine for nearly a decade, establishing training centers, initiating training cadres, and building a capability that is disrupting the much larger Russian army.
Just as SOF cannot be mass produced in the United States, policymakers should not expect SOF to be mass produced in partner nations, like the Philippines or Ukraine. Investment of security force assistance professionals and equipment, especially in a new partner, is a multiyear, possibly multidecade, effort. Policymakers should employ SOF with a long-term vision nested with the National Defense Strategy and with resources that are robust enough to weather changes in national priorities.
SOF Truth #4: Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.
Just as US special operations forces spend years honing their craft, partnered special operations forces cannot be created after an emergency.
Recent case studies show how employing SOF prior to conflict supports US national interests. For example, the Lebanese Armed Forces defeated ISIS in 2017, expelling the terrorist group from Lebanon. US security cooperation efforts, combining training, equipment, and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) since 2006, played a role in Lebanon’s victory. Likewise, decades-long US Army Special Forces engagement with El SalvadorColombia, and Thailand show the value of creating competent partner-nation SOF before emergencies occur.
However, special operations forces are not a panacea. To be effective, SOF should be deployed into a struggling country or training with that country’s armed forces well ahead of a crisis, not afterward. Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen highlight the risks of attempting to create competent SOF in theater after emergencies occur. While brave, courageous, and competent, Afghan National Army commandos could not overcome Afghan national policy, the inability to resupply their formations, or a determined enemy with mass and interior lines. Likewise, the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service suffered 40 percent casualties fighting the Islamic State. Effective and sustainable strategies will see special operations forces deployed ahead of crises with long-term plans supporting security cooperation and integrated country strategies.
Policymakers employing SOF should invest appropriately across potential conflict zones to set the theater for potential contingencies—before emergencies occur.
SOF Truth #5: Most special operations require non-SOF support.
Just as US special operations forces require administrative, logistics, and communications support, the same is true of our allies and partners. If US special operators aim to increase partner-nation SOF quality, the conventional forces in those militaries must be improved through comprehensive training and changes to US special operations policy.
Fortunately, conventional advisors and joint exercises can help the United States’ conventional military partners improve. Security force assistance brigades advise foreign militaries at the battalion level and above and bring dedicated sustainment advisors. Likewise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Exercise Program provides consistent episodic engagement for battle staff training at the brigade level and above.
Creating non-SOF support for partner-nation SOF also requires US policymakers to create flexibility in US Special Operations Command’s JCET program to deploy non–special operations specialties in support of US objectives. For example, North Korea maintains a credible chemical weapons capability but under the current construct US Army chemical specialists, even from within the Special Forces groups, are prohibited from deploying on a JCET to train alongside South Korean forces. If such niche specialties are deployed with SOF, then USSOCOM will meet one of its strategic efforts by deploying enablers to “integrate and synchronize into [SOF] operations non-lethal and other enabling capabilities.”
Call to Action: Use the SOF Truths as an Employment Framework
Special operations forces make necessary and unique contributions to national defense. Using the SOF Truths as a framework for special operations employment ensures special operators are “specially employed,” and maintains boundaries on what they should and should not do.
With the releases of the 2022 National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy, a new framework for special operations employment can ensure flexibility and resilience in complex environments across the conflict continuum. Policymakers and engagement planners must choose capable nations to receive special operations security force assistance prior to conflict. Capable partner forces, in need of SOF assistance, enable integrated deterrence alongside the US joint force. Rigor is required to ensure SOF support has a long-term vision capable of crossing administrations, as irregular warfare is a multiyear effort.
A return to the indirect approach requires patience on the part of both policymakers and practitioners. Thoughtful use of the SOF Truths as criteria for special operations employment would ensure the quality, competency, and robustness required of USSOCOM’s vision.
Major Marshall McGurk recently served as the lead Special Forces observer-coach/trainer at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. His previous assignments include 3rd Special Forces Group, Special Operations Command Central, and 1st Special Forces Group, with operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Republic of Korea.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek, US Army
mwi.usma.edu · by Marshall McGurk · June 7, 2022


24. Analysis: Understanding the Militant Groups Behind the Violence in the West Bank




Analysis: Understanding the Militant Groups Behind the Violence in the West Bank | FDD's Long War Journal
longwarjournal.org · by Joe Truzman · June 6, 2022
Jenin: Palestinian Islamic Jihad militant Emjed Walid al-Fayed, killed during an IDF raid on May 21.
After clashes with Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops in the West Bank village of Ya’bad last week, the Fatah-linked Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades issued a statement mourning the death of one of its militants, Bilal Kabaha. Kabaha’s killing signals an upward trend of militant activity in the West Bank since last year.
There are several reasons behind the onset of violence in the West Bank, particularly in Jenin.
The cancelling of Palestinian elections and the May conflict in Gaza last year were the initial catalyst for the violence. Adding to that was the escape of six militants (most of whom are members of PIJ) from a prison in northern Israel in September, just across the line from Jenin, which rallied fighters across the Palestinian territories. Lastly, IDF operations in the West Bank throughout 2021 resulted in an unusually high number of militant deaths exacerbating the already mounting tensions.
Ultimately, it was likely the killing of a significant number of militants last year that motivated terrorist organizations in the West Bank to reorganize and establish a joint operations room. Groups such as Katibat Jenin (Jenin Unit), Hizam al-Nar (Belt of Fire) and Katibat Nablus (Nablus Unit) were formed and resulted in a marked increase in clashes with IDF troops. Though, it is unclear if the initiative to form these umbrella groups was directed from a local level or abroad (Gaza, Lebanon, Turkey).
Of these groups, FDD’s Long War Journal has identified five Palestinian militant organizations who have issued statements identifying their affiliation with the newly established formations or have claimed responsibility for attacking IDF troops with these groups.
Katibat Jenin and Katibat Nablus are led by Palestinian Islamic Jihad while Hizam al-Nar is headed by Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
Hamas, The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine are active in these formations but play a smaller role. While all of these groups have their own political movements and so-called military wings, they operate under the Katibat and Hizam al-Nar organizations as a single unit to combat IDF operations.
A similar model has been employed in Gaza with the joint operations room of the Palestinian factions. Approximately a dozen militant organizations operate under the Hamas-led operations room umbrella during times of conflict against Israel.
Evidence of the new formations was highlighted in a recent VICE News segment in May. At the beginning of the video, four of the previously mentioned organizations can be seen conducting a training operation in Jenin. VICE News did not specifically mention the name of these groups, however, FDD’s Long War Journal identified them by the bandanas worn by the fighters.
While clashes in the West Bank with militant groups have clearly been on the rise for more than a year, the IDF has yet to publicly acknowledge the new and aggressive approach the nascent organizations have undertaken against them. It’s unclear if this is due to not wanting to publicly reveal the significant escalation in the West Bank by Palestinian factions or an unwillingness to credit the groups for organizing a somewhat effective method of so-called resistance operations against the Israeli military.
Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
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longwarjournal.org · by Joe Truzman · June 6, 2022


25. Opinion | The Ukraine War Still Holds Surprises. The Biggest May Be for Putin.

Excerpts:
In the short run, none of these can make up for the drop in Russian supplies. But if we have a year or two of astronomical gasoline and heating oil prices because of the Ukraine war, “you are going to see a massive shift in investment by mutual funds and industry into electric vehicles, grid enhancements, transmission lines and long-duration storage that could tip the whole market away from reliance on fossil fuels toward renewables,” said Tom Burke, director of E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism, the climate research group. “The Ukraine war is already forcing every country and company to dramatically advance their plans for decarbonization.”
Indeed, a report published last week by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, and Ember, a global energy think tank based in Britain, found that 19 out of the 27 E.U. states “have significantly stepped up their ambition in terms of renewable energy deployment since 2019, while decreasing planned 2030 fossil fuel generation to shield themselves from geopolitical threats.”
A recent article in McKinsey Quarterly noted: “The 19th century’s naval wars accelerated a shift from wind- to coal-powered vessels. World War I brought about a shift from coal to oil. World War II introduced nuclear energy as a major power source. In each of these cases, wartime innovations flowed directly to the civilian economy and ushered in a new era. The war in Ukraine is different in that it is not prompting the energy innovation itself but making the need for it clearer. Still, the potential impact could be equally transformative.”
Go figure: If this war doesn’t inadvertently blow up the planet, it might inadvertently help sustain it. And, over time, shrink Putin’s primary source of money and power.

Opinion | The Ukraine War Still Holds Surprises. The Biggest May Be for Putin.
The New York Times · by Thomas L. Friedman · June 7, 2022
Thomas L. Friedman
The Ukraine War Still Holds Surprises. The Biggest May Be for Putin.
June 7, 2022, 7:17 p.m. ET

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Opinion Columnist
LONDON — Here’s a surprising fact: At a time when Americans can’t agree on virtually anything, there’s been a consistent majority in favor of giving generous economic and military aid to Ukraine in its fight against Vladimir Putin’s effort to wipe it off the map. It’s doubly surprising when you consider that most Americans couldn’t find Ukraine on a map just a few months ago, as it’s a country with which we’ve never had a special relationship.
Sustaining that support through this summer, though, will be doubly important as the Ukraine war settles into a kind of “sumo” phase — two giant wrestlers, each trying to throw the other out of the ring, but neither willing to quit or able to win.
While I expect some erosion as people grasp how much this war is driving up global energy and food prices, I’m still hopeful that a majority of Americans will hang in there until Ukraine can recover its sovereignty militarily or strike a decent peace deal with Putin. My near-term optimism doesn’t derive from reading polls, but reading history — in particular, Michael Mandelbaum’s new book, “The Four Ages of American Foreign Policy: Weak Power, Great Power, Superpower, Hyperpower.
Mandelbaum, professor emeritus of U.S. foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (we co-wrote a book in 2011), argues that while U.S. attitudes toward Ukraine may seem utterly unexpected and novel, they are not. Looked at through the sweep of U.S. foreign policy — which his book compellingly chronicles through the lens of the four different power relationships America has had with the world — they’re actually quite familiar and foreseeable. Indeed, so much so that both Putin and China’s president, Xi Jinping, would both benefit from reading this book.
Throughout U.S. history, our nation has oscillated between two broad approaches to foreign policy, Mandelbaum explained in an interview, echoing a key theme in his book: “One emphasizes power, national interest and security and is associated with Theodore Roosevelt. The other stresses the promotion of American values and is identified with Woodrow Wilson.”
While these two world views were often in competition, that was not always the case. And when a foreign policy challenge came along that was in harmony with both our interests and our values, it hit the sweet spot and could command broad, deep and lasting public support.
“This happened in World War II and the Cold War,” Mandelbaum noted, “and it appears to be happening again with Ukraine.”
But the big, big question is: For how long? Nobody knows, because wars follow both predictable and unpredictable paths.
The predictable one regarding Ukraine is that as the costs rise there will be rising dissent — either in America or among our European allies — arguing that our interests and values have gotten out of balance in Ukraine. They will argue that we can neither economically afford to support Ukraine to the point of total victory — i.e., evicting Putin’s army from every inch of Ukraine — nor strategically afford to go for total victory, because faced with total defeat Putin could unleash a nuclear weapon.
One can already see signs of this in the statement by President Emmanuel Macron of France on Saturday that the Western alliance must “not humiliate Russia” — a statement that elicited howls of protest from Ukraine.
“Every war in American history has provoked dissent, including the Revolutionary War, when those who were opposed moved to Canada,” explained Mandelbaum. “What our three greatest commanders in chief — Washington, Lincoln and F.D.R. — all had in common as wartime presidents was their ability to keep the country committed to winning the war, despite the dissent.”
That will be President Biden’s challenge, too, especially when there is no consensus among the allies or with Ukraine on what “winning” there looks like: Is it the achievement of Kyiv’s currently stated goal of recovering every inch of its territory occupied by Russia? Is it enabling Ukraine, with the help of NATO, to deliver such a blow to the Russian Army that Putin is forced into a compromise deal that still leaves him holding some territory? And what if Putin decides he never wants any compromise — and instead wants Ukraine to endure a slow and painful death?
In two of the most important wars in our history, the Civil War and World War II, Mandelbaum said, “our goal was total victory over the enemy. The problem for Biden and our allies is that we cannot aim for total victory over Putin’s Russia, because that could trigger a nuclear war — yet something like total victory may be the only way to stop Putin from just bleeding Ukraine forever.”
Which brings us to the unpredictable: After more than 100 days of fighting, no one can tell you how this war ends. It was started in Putin’s head, and it will likely end only when Putin says he wants it to end. Putin probably feels that he’s calling all the shots and that time is on his side, because he can take more pain than Western democracies. But big wars are strange things. However they start, they can end in totally unpredicted ways.
Let me offer an example via one of Mandelbaum’s favorite quotes. It is from Winston Churchill’s biography of his great ancestor the Duke of Marlborough, published in the 1930s: “Great battles, won or lost, change the entire course of events, create new standards of values, new moods, new atmospheres, in armies and in nations, to which all must conform.”
Churchill’s point, Mandelbaum has argued, was that “wars can change the course of history and great battles often decide wars. The battle between Russia and Ukraine for control of the area in eastern Ukraine known as the Donbas has the potential to be such a battle.”
In more ways than one. The 27 nations of the European Union, our key ally, are actually the world’s largest trading bloc. They have already moved decisively to slash trade with and investments in Russia. On May 31, the E.U. agreed to cut off 90 percent of Russia’s crude imports by the end of 2022. This will not only hurt Russia but also cause real pain for E.U. consumers and manufacturers, already paying astronomical prices for gasoline and natural gas.
All of this is happening, though, at a time when renewable energy, such as solar and wind, have become competitive in price with fossil fuels, and when the auto industry worldwide is significantly scaling up production of electric vehicles and new batteries.
In the short run, none of these can make up for the drop in Russian supplies. But if we have a year or two of astronomical gasoline and heating oil prices because of the Ukraine war, “you are going to see a massive shift in investment by mutual funds and industry into electric vehicles, grid enhancements, transmission lines and long-duration storage that could tip the whole market away from reliance on fossil fuels toward renewables,” said Tom Burke, director of E3G, Third Generation Environmentalism, the climate research group. “The Ukraine war is already forcing every country and company to dramatically advance their plans for decarbonization.”
Indeed, a report published last week by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, and Ember, a global energy think tank based in Britain, found that 19 out of the 27 E.U. states “have significantly stepped up their ambition in terms of renewable energy deployment since 2019, while decreasing planned 2030 fossil fuel generation to shield themselves from geopolitical threats.”
A recent article in McKinsey Quarterly noted: “The 19th century’s naval wars accelerated a shift from wind- to coal-powered vessels. World War I brought about a shift from coal to oil. World War II introduced nuclear energy as a major power source. In each of these cases, wartime innovations flowed directly to the civilian economy and ushered in a new era. The war in Ukraine is different in that it is not prompting the energy innovation itself but making the need for it clearer. Still, the potential impact could be equally transformative.”
Go figure: If this war doesn’t inadvertently blow up the planet, it might inadvertently help sustain it. And, over time, shrink Putin’s primary source of money and power.
Now wouldn’t that be ironic.
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The New York Times · by Thomas L. Friedman · June 7, 2022








De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
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Phone: 202-573-8647

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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