Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and your the easiest person to fool."

- Richard Feynman

"The world suffers a lot. Not because the violence of bad people. But the silence of good people.

- Napoleon Bonaparte

"People do not seem to realize that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character."

- Ralph Waldo Emerson

1. National Security Office publishes 'National Security Strategy of the Yoon Seok-Yeol Administration'

2. KINU Unification Survey 2023: Executive Summary

3. North Korean leader 'terrorized' by South Korea's closer ties with US, Japan

4. N.K. hacking group monitored ex-ministers' emails for months: police

5. Financial Institutions in US, East Asia Spoofed by Suspected North Korean Hackers

6. A Hidden Player: The Significance Of Mongolia In Geopolitics – Analysis

7. S. Korean, U.S. special operations generals stage 'friendship' parachute jump

8. N. Korea says it 'never recognizes' IMO resolution condemning its missile launches

9. North Korean diplomat’s wife and son go missing in Russian far east

10. Public struggle session carried out against 10 people in Hyesan

11. U.S., South Korea seek to deepen ties as alliance marks 70 years

12. Former North Korean agent gives his first interview since defecting in 2014

13. First FA-50 for Poland rolls out as security ties deepen

14. Japanese sincerity and Korean forgiveness: beyond apology, compensation

15. north Korea Borders, Smuggling, Markets, and Suffering - John Batchelor Show

1. National Security Office publishes 'National Security Strategy of the Yoon Seok-Yeol Administration'

The 150 page English version can be downloaded here: https://www.president.go.kr/download/648037c2bf5e7 (note the Korean version is only 107 pages - it takes a lot more words to explain it to us Americans!)

Thank you to all my Korean and American friends who forwarded me copies and links through the day yesterday since I had not been able to locate this in time for my morning news distribution yesterday and only had the media reports about it.

So is this a grand strategy? It is certainly the most comprehensive Korean national security strategy I have seen in my nearly four decades dealing with Korean issues. It is compresehive and aggressive. Like most NSS' it is aspirational. But unlike many NSS' it does have a lot of substance.

I think it will be panned by Americans who are north Korean engagers. It will be assessed as threatening to the regime and even though it is offering an open hand (and Audacious Initiative) to the regime many publists will criticize the offers as not credible because of allt strong focus on military capabilities, defense (to include description of the Kill chain) , trilateral cooperation, and unification. These are all perceived as threatening to the regime.

It is kind of schizophrenic or Jekyll and Hyde like as it provide a lot of language that shows an open hand to the north (e.g., the Audacious Initiative) while having a tightly bound fist that illustrates the strength and resolve of the ROK to defend the nation.

My criteria for judging a good strategy is will it help me develop effective campaign plans to achieve the objectives outlined in the strategy? My initial assessment is yes it will but I need to study and reflect on it a little more.

The highpoints:

Major Security Challenges

north Korean WMD Threats

US-PRC Competition

Supply China Crisis

New Security Threats

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration has presented its national security and foreign policy vision of becoming a “Global Pivotal State Contributing to Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity” and aims to address current and future security challenges based on the following fundamental principles of its National Security Strategy.

Honoring the demands of the people and incorporating the calling of the times, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration has presented its national security and foreign policy vision of becoming a “Global Pivotal State Contributing to Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity” and established the following three national security objectives.

National Security Objectives

1. Defend national sovereignty and enhance the safety of citizens

2. Establish peace on the Korean peninsula and prepare for future unification

3, Lay the foundation for East Asia's prosperity and expand the nation's global roles.

And there is so much more. This covers a lot of ground and every major issue is addressed relatively substantially: from war to the economy to science and technology to improving the lives of military service members to cyber, to the threats to include the "intensifying dissatisfaction of destitute citizens" in north Korea, to trilateral cooperation (ROK/JAPAN/ US) to diplomacy in the region and throughout the world, to human rights, "objective" information into north Korea, to emerging security issues, diplomatic engagement with north Korea, to unification.

Although unification is not the main focus it notes the tentative new name for the unification plan: "New Vision for Future Unification." Along with a handful of Korean watchers I met with senior members of the Future Unification Planning Committee on Tuesday as they shared an outline of the initial draft plan to solicit our comments and recommendations. The new plan should be released either on August 15th (Liberation Day) or in September at the time of the UN General Assembly meeting. They met other think tank members this week and will engage in all the major countries and international organizations to include China, Russia, Japan, the EU and others to solicit input.

Establishing a new vision for future unification with a blueprint and action plan

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration will develop the “New Vision for Future Unification” (tentative name) as a mid-to-long-term initiative to raise public awareness on unification and realize universal values such as freedom, human rights, communication, and openness. This initiative aims to present a vision and direction to establish the foundation for peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy. To achieve this goal, the government has established the Future Unification Planning Committee, a public-private cooperation platform, to listen to diverse opinions from all levels of society and promote consensus among the public. Additionally, efforts will be made to secure support from the international community for our unification vision.

Moreover, we plan to further develop the Korean National Community Unification Formula20 as it approaches its 30th anniversary in 2024. Changes in the unification environment, including international situations and inter-Korean dynamics, will be taken into account during this process. To ensure comprehensive input for this task, we will proactively collect feedback from all levels of society using various methods such as social dialogue on unification.

National Security Office publishes 'National Security Strategy of the Yoon Seok-Yeol Administration'

https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/press/D26t9Wdf

- Aiming to become a “global pivotal state” based on the state administration philosophy of “freedom and solidarity” -

- Proactively respond to changes in the security environment, such as the US-China competition and the intensifying North Korean nuclear threat -

- Preparing for new security threats such as economic security, climate change, health and cyber threats -

The Office of National Security published 'National Security Strategy of the Yoon Seok-yeol Administration - A Global Backbone of Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity' (hereinafter 'National Security Strategy'), which introduces the foreign policy and security strategy of the Yoon Seok-yeol administration.

The 'National Security Strategy' is a guideline that presents policy directions in the fields of diplomacy, unification, and national defense, and is published incorporating the changed security environment and state affairs policy with each new administration.

The National Security Strategy, published this time, consists of a total of 8 chapters (107 pages). ·In-depth assessment of the rapidly changing security environment, such as the rise of cyber threats, etc. In response to such changes in the security environment, the 'National Security Strategy' presents specific national security goals, strategic principles, and tasks for each sector to realize the diplomatic and security vision of the Yoon Seok-yeol administration, 'a global pivotal nation that contributes to freedom, peace and prosperity'. I did.

The National Security Office plans to distribute 10,000 copies of the 'National Security Strategy' booklet (7,000 copies in Korean, 3,000 copies in English) to widely publicize the foreign and security strategies of the Yoon Seok-yeol administration at home and abroad.

230607_Press Release_Seokyeol Yoon_Government_National Security Strategy_Publication.pdf

National Security Strategy of the Yoon Seok-yeol Administration (Korean).pdf

National Security Strategy of the Yoon Seok-yeol Administration (English).pdf

2. KINU Unification Survey 2023: Executive Summary

While the focus in the coming days will be on the ROK's newly released National Security Strategy, we should also consider this just released survey because it does provide some insights in ROK public about a number of issues.

The 94 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.kinu.or.kr/main/module/report/view.do?nav_code=mai1674786536&category=51&idx=114285

The whole table of contents is pasted below after two key excerpts.

Note that even though this is from the Korean Institute of National Unification there are no specific questions to survey the ROK public about their view on unification, e.g., whether they support it or not. This really focuses on the threats, nuclear weapons,nad ROK/US relations both on the peninsula dn in the region. The only reference to unification are indict questions along the line of the need for USFK after unification

Note that the Biden Yoon Summit and the Washington declaration took place in the middle of the survey period.

But I really have to call out the very erroneous analysis on OPCON transition. This illustrates a fundamental problem in the OPCON transition process. if a ROK government organization cannot accurately describe the issues and provide the facts then it is no wonder there is so much misunderstanding about OPCON transition. The survey acknowledges that the ROK public's understanding of OPCON transition is low. The survey does not help to educate them and actually furthers the misunderstanding.

First is the accusation of US reluctance to transition OPCON. The US initiated this entire process in 2003-2004. Although plans have been adjusted a number of times over the past two decades, the US has acted in good faith and has maintained the position that the agreed upon conditions must be met before transition takes.

The survey makes OPCON transition about sovereignty and mis-explains the command relationships. OPCON transition must be about organizing the ROK/US Combined Forces Command in the optimal way to ensure deterrence of war and the ability to defend the ROK.

But it is this statement that is the real problem:

1) The following explanation was inserted before the question: “Wartime Operational Control is the authority to command and control the armed forces in times of war. Currently, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, whose commander is a US Army general, has Wartime Operational Control of the South Korean military.”

First is the fact that a decision by both Presidents is required to provide their forces to the ROK/US CFC. Since 1994 the ROK and US has had an equal partnership in the ROK/US CFC because both nations choose when and what forces will be placed OPCON to the ROK/US CFC. Until 1994 ROK forces were under the OPCON of ROK/US CFC in both armistice and wartime. Second, the statement above implies the continuing erroneous belief that in wartime the US will have wartime control of the South Korean military. That is not accurate. First of all even if the defense plans are executed as written, the ROK government only provides designated forces to the ROK/US CFC. The entire South Korean military is not OPCON to the ROK/US CFC. Third. the ROK/US CFC is not a US command. Yes it is currently commanded by a US Army General Officer but that does not mean the ROK forces are under US control. With ROK/US CFC both ROK and US forces are equally under control of both the ROK and US through the Military Committee which is made up of representatives of the ROK and US National Command and Military Authorities (e.g., MINDEF, SECDEF, ROK CJCS, US CJCS, INDOPACOM CDR, and senior US military officer in Korea). There Is no sovereignty issue because this is not 1950 when MacArthur assumed command of all forces in Korea and Syngman Rhee signed a memo authorizing his forces to be placed under the UN command. The ROK government does exactly what the US government does - when hostilities are assessed to be imminent both countries will make the decision to place their forces under the OPCON of CFC and CFC will answer to the Military Committee thus both countries share equal control of the ROK/US CFC. It is named the ROK/US CFC because both countries equally "own" it. The ROK government really needs to get is act together and problem inform and educate the ROK public which they should have been doing since 1978 when the ROK/US CFC was formed and again in 1994 with the signing of Strategic Directive #2 which returned control of ROK forces during armistice and equalized the relationship between ROK JCS and USFK making both "force providers" to the ROK/US CFC when each country's President issues the order to do so.

But perhaps this is no longer an issue because the Yoon administration certainly does not seem to be placing any priority on OPCON transition.

I will reiterate my position. I think the ROK/US CFC needs to be commanded by a ROK general for any operations conducted in north Korea. We need to continue to sustain nd improve the ROK/US CFC structure and capabilities and contributions by both nations but focus on a ROK general in command. Why is this important? Because the outcome of any operations in north Korea in either a war or collapse scenario is going to undifationand the establishment of a United Republic of Korea. The "Korea question" (unnatural division of the peninsula) must be solved by Koreans. If a US general is in command of the ROK/US CFC the perception will be that the US is an occupying force (for all the reasons of misconception I have outlined above not only the Korean public thinks the US "owns" the ROK/US CFC and that it is a US command, the international community does as well. Therefore when the ROK/US CFC goes into the territory north of the DMZ it will be perceived as the US occupying the former north Korea. The US cannot afford to have another Iraq and Afghanistan on its hands. Second, since unification is a political process a Korean general must lead the military effort in support of the political process. Third and most important, for the long term legitimacy of the United Republic of Korea, a Korean general must be in command of the ROK/US CFC to ensure that there is no doubt that it is Koreans solving the Korea question and achieving unification. But as I noted, this does not seem to be a priority for the Yoon administration at the current time.

KINU Unification Survey 2023: Executive Summary

published date

2023-06-05

author

Sang Sin LEE, Tae-eun MIN, Kwang-il YOON, Bon-sang KOO

https://www.kinu.or.kr/main/module/report/view.do?nav_code=mai1674786536&category=51&idx=114285

■ ROK-US Relations and South Korea’s Nuclear Armament

• Most South Koreans trust the nuclear umbrella policy and believe it protects them from the North Korean nuclear threat.

- 72.1% of all respondents and 85.3% of PPP supporters said they trust the US nuclear umbrella policy.

- 68.5% of all respondents and 75.6% of PPP supporters said the nuclear umbrella policy has prevented North Korea from attacking South Korea with a nuclear weapon.

• 90% of respondents believe that the US Forces Korea is needed now. However, 54.3% believe that the U.S. Forces Korea will be needed after unification, down from 60.0% in the 2022 survey.

- The escalation of the US-China conflict may have affected attitudes toward the long-term role of US forces in Korea.

• The need for the ROK-US alliance in the future has remained above 90%, peaking at 95.1% in 2022. This year, however, it dropped to 87.2%.

- This change may be due to polarization in South Korean domestic politics, meaning that the current administration's efforts to strengthen ROK-US relations may have lowered the perceived need for the alliance among opposition supporters who are critical of the government.

• Among all respondents, 27.7% believe that ROK-US relations have gotten better over the past year, the highest percentage since the survey began. In contrast, 10.4% said it had gotten worse, and 61.9% said it hadn't changed much.

• In the 2020 survey, 35% of all respondents said the US cares for South Korea's national interests, rising to 46.4% in 2023. The increase was especially large among PPP supporters (62.8%). Among Democrats, there was no significant change since 2020.

■ The Impact of the ROK-US summit on Public Opinion

• This year's KINU Unification Survey sample was split roughly in half before and after the Washington Declaration (504 before, 497 after). This creates a kind of natural experiment condition. If the change in public opinion before and after April 27 is statistically significant, it can be considered an impact of the Washington Declaration.

• Favorability toward the US, Japan, and Russia increased after the summit, while favorability toward China and North Korea did not change significantly. In particular, perceptions of the US improved overall after the summit.

• The large increase in favorability toward Japan is likely due to Prime Minister Kishida's visit (scheduled at the time of the survey), as well as the idea that the outcome of the ROK-US summit will have a positive impact on Japan's relationship with South Korea.

• Not only did perceptions of Japan as a current military threat decrease, but there was a clear improvement in perceptions of Japan as a future military threat before and after the summit.

• Support for South Korea's nuclear arsenal increased from 59.9% to 60.6% after the summit, although this difference is not statistically significant. This suggests that the Washington Declaration, which called for expanded deterrence in exchange for South Korea's giving up of its own nuclear armament, did not change South Korean public opinion in favor of nuclear armament.

- On the other hand, trust in the US nuclear umbrella policy increased from 68.7% to 75.6% after the summit.

- Positive evaluations of the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella policy increased slightly after the summit.

1. OPCON Transfer

<Figure Ⅲ - 12> OPCON Transfer: by Party Affiliation

■ Survey Questions

• “Do you favor or oppose South Korea transferring wartime operational control (OPCON)5) from the US Command to the ROK Armed Forces?”

- 1= disagree strongly; 2= disagree somewhat; 3= agree somewhat; 4= agree strongly.

- 1+2= ”disagree“; 3+4= ”agree“

■ Broad consensus on the need for OPCON transfer

• Despite the US' reluctance to transition of OPCON, 70.8% of all respondents recognize the need to do so.

• Attitudes on the issue vary by political party, with 65.3% of PPP supporters and 78.3%

of Democratic Party supporters in favor, but even among conservatives, nearly two-thirds support OPCON transfer.

• Regardless of the need for a ROK-US alliance or positive attitudes for the US, there is a public consensus that the ROK government should retain wartime operational control, which is an important part of sovereignty.

• However, the level of public's understanding of the concept of wartime operational control and the role of US Forces Korea (USFK) is not considered to be very high. Public opinion on this issue is likely to change in response to changes in the ROK-US relations and the political climate in Northeast Asia.

I. KINU Unity Consciousness Survey 9

1. Purpose of Study 10

2. Cohort Analysis 11

3. Survey Overview 11

4. Summary of Survey Results 12

II. South Korea's Nuclear Possession and Public Opinion 17

1. The Necessity of South Korea's Nuclear Possession 18

2. The Necessity of US Nuclear Redeployment 21

3. Pros of Nuclear Possession After Unification 22

4. US Forces Korea and South Korea's Nuclear Possession 23

5. Possibility of Crisis Accompanying Nuclear Possession Attitudes toward nuclear weapons 25

6. Conditions for possessing nuclear weapons 28

7. Domestic politics and nuclear possession in South Korea 30

8. Attitudes toward the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime 32

III. US-ROK Relations and South Korea's Nuclear Possession 33

1. Trust in US Policy on the Korean Peninsula 34

2. Trust in US Extended Deterrence 36

3. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence 37

4. Extended Deterrence and the Need for South Korea's Nuclear Development 38

5. Korea Possible Withdrawal of US Forces 39

6. Necessity of US Forces Korea 40

7. Necessity of the ROK-US Alliance 41

8. Evaluation of ROK-US Relations over the Past Year 42

9. US Consideration of Korean National Interests 43

10. Possibility of US Support in the Event of Korea-China Conflict 44

11. Opinion on transfer of wartime operational control 45

IV. North Korea's Nuclear Threat and South Korea's Nuclear Possession 47

1. Comparison of Conventional Military Power between the South and North Korea 48

2. Economic Sanctions on North Korea and North Korea's Denuclearization 50

3. Inter-Korean Dialogue and North Korea's Denuclearization 52

4. Permission to View North Korean Newspapers and Broadcasting 54

5. Information on North Korea's Nuclear Threat Concern 55

6. Interest in the North Korean Nuclear Threat 56

7. Possibility of a Nuclear War with North Korea 58

V. Public Opinion on Changes in the International Situation in Northeast Asia 59

1. Evaluation of Korea-China Relations 60

2. Attitude toward the US-China Competition for Hegemony 62

3. China Overtaking the US Possibility 64

4. Prospects for China's Attack on Taiwan 66

5. Cross-Strait Relations: Necessity for South Korean Intervention in Sino-Taiwan Conflict 67

6. Military Alliance between Korea and Japan 69

7. Justification for Japan's Nuclear Development 72

8. Prospects for Japan's Nuclear Development 74

VI. The Impact of the Korea-US Summit on Public Opinion 75

1. Neighboring Countries' Favorability 76

2. Neighboring Countries' Perception of Military Threats: Current Threats 77

3. Neighboring Countries' Perceptions of Military Threats: Future Threats 78

4. Attitude toward South Korea's Nuclear Weapons 79

5. United States' Changing Confidence in Extended Inhibition 80

6. Changes in the evaluation of the effectiveness of extended inhibition 81

3. North Korean leader 'terrorized' by South Korea's closer ties with US, Japan

Interesting analysis. But I still support Dr. Jung Pak's assessment that Kim Jong Un is more afraid of his own people than the combined ROK/US military forces.

I think the trilateral cooperation is a contributing factor to Kim being "terrorized." But what is really "terrorizing" him is that his strategy is failing across the board.

Excerpts:

The NIS said the North Korean leader’s “psychological instability” — made worse by the launch’s failure — may manifest as “more venturous military provocations” and resort to “rule by terror” and “rights abuses” domestically.

From the ROK NSS the regime is in "triple distress."

Deepening isolation due to its provocations.

Economic hardship due to strengthened sanctions.

Intensifying dissatisfaction of destitute citizens.

We must see how this intensifying dissatisfaction manifests itself? Will the people sink into deeper despair or will some take action?

North Korean leader 'terrorized' by South Korea's closer ties with US, Japan

americanmilitarynews.com · by Asia News Network · June 7, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is unstable and intimidated by deepening trilateral security ties between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, a South Korean National Intelligence Service analysis found.

The NIS attributed Kim’s feelings of anxiety and terror to Yoon push to beef up the alliance with key security partners, the US and Japan, according to sources with knowledge of the analysis.

The NIS has intelligence from multiple sources that the three countries bolstering their security relationship to counter North Korea is “stoking anxiety” and “having an adverse effect” on Kim’s health. Kim views Japan’s expanding role in the three-way security set-up as especially threatening.

In the analysis the NIS noted Kim will “go above and beyond” to make sure the next launch of North Korea’s first spy satellite is successful, to “make up for the humiliation” caused by the failure of the first launch earlier this week.

The failed launch, coupled with the changing dynamics of the security cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the US may render Kim more unstable and unpredictable, the NIS said.

“The sense of crisis appeared to be growing for Kim Jong-un, as even Japan, which he viewed as the ‘weaker link’ in the trilateral cooperation, is mending ties with South Korea,” the NIS said in the analysis.

The NIS said the North Korean leader’s “psychological instability” — made worse by the launch’s failure — may manifest as “more venturous military provocations” and resort to “rule by terror” and “rights abuses” domestically.

On top of the spy satellite’s relaunch, North Korea may carry out provocations on multiple fronts including cyberattacks and firing of short-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the NIS said.

In a briefing Wednesday, Rep. Yoo Sang-bum of the National Assembly intelligence committee said the North Korean leader was drinking and smoking heavily and suffering from sleep disorders, citing the NIS. Based on an artificial intelligence-assisted analysis, Kim was thought to weigh around 140 kilograms.

___

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

americanmilitarynews.com · by Asia News Network · June 7, 2023

4. N.K. hacking group monitored ex-ministers' emails for months: police

Beware the all purpose sword. The hackers of the Kim family regime have deeply penetrated many networks.

Excerpts:

The NPA said it and the National Intelligence Service have identified Kimsuky as the culprit after analyzing about 5,800 phishing emails and confirming internet protocol addresses of the sources of the hacking attacks and the methods of establishing waypoints.

Kimsuky was found to have taken control of a total of 138 servers -- 36 in South Korea and 102 abroad -- by hacking and laundered internet protocol addresses before distributing the phishing emails, the agency said, adding it has identified a new four-step attack method of North Korean hacking organizations, including Kimsuky.

N.K. hacking group monitored ex-ministers' emails for months: police | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · June 7, 2023

SEOUL, June 7 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean hacking group has secretly monitored emails of former South Korean Cabinet minister-level officials for months over the past year and stolen their personal information, police said Wednesday.

The North's hacking organization identified as "Kimsuky" has been found to be behind a large amount of phishing emails sent to the South's officials in the fields of diplomacy and security last year, the National Police Agency (NPA) said.

This photo provided by the National Police Agency shows a phishing email sent by North Korean hacking group Kimsuky to a South Korean official. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The NPA said Kimsuky distributed malicious emails to 150 diplomacy and security experts from April to July last year to induce them to access their phishing sites. Then, a total of nine people -- three former minister-level and vice minister-level officials, one incumbent government official, four academics and experts and one reporter -- have been confirmed to have accessed the North's phishing sites and have their account information stolen, it noted.

Kimsuky is said to have monitored the victims' email transmission and reception details in real time for four to nine months and stolen their attached documents and address directories, though there were no confidential materials among the stolen information, the NPA said.

Kimsuky is widely known for its 2014 hacking of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., a South Korean power generation agency. The Seoul government imposed unilateral sanctions on Kimsuky last Friday.

The NPA said it and the National Intelligence Service have identified Kimsuky as the culprit after analyzing about 5,800 phishing emails and confirming internet protocol addresses of the sources of the hacking attacks and the methods of establishing waypoints.

Kimsuky was found to have taken control of a total of 138 servers -- 36 in South Korea and 102 abroad -- by hacking and laundered internet protocol addresses before distributing the phishing emails, the agency said, adding it has identified a new four-step attack method of North Korean hacking organizations, including Kimsuky.

ycm@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · June 7, 2023

5. Financial Institutions in US, East Asia Spoofed by Suspected North Korean Hackers

Excerpts:

This past April, the U.S. sanctioned three individuals associated with the Lazarus Group, accusing them of helping North Korea launder stolen virtual currencies and turn it into cash.

U.S. Treasury officials levied additional sanctions just last month against North Korea’s Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, which develops tools and operations to be carried out by the Lazarus Group.

The Lazarus Group is believed to be responsible for the largest theft of virtual currency to date, stealing approximately $620 million connected to a popular online game in Match 2022.

Financial Institutions in US, East Asia Spoofed by Suspected North Korean Hackers

June 06, 2023 10:58 AM

Jeff Seldin

voanews.com

Washington —

There are renewed concerns North Korea’s army of hackers is targeting financial institutions to prop up the regime in Pyongyang and possibly fund its weapons programs.

A report published Tuesday by the cybersecurity firm Recorded Future finds North Korean aligned actors have been spoofing well-known financial firms in Japan, Vietnam and the United States, sending out emails and documents that, if opened, could grant the hackers access to critical systems.

“The targeting of investment banking and venture capital firms may expose sensitive or confidential information of these entities or their customers,” according to the report by Recorded Future’s Insikt Group.

“[It] may result in legal or regulatory action, jeopardize pending business negotiations or agreements, or expose information damaging to the company’s strategic investment portfolio,” it said.

The report said the most recent cluster of activity took place between September 2022 and March 2023, making use of three new internet addresses and two old addresses, and more than 20 domain names.

Some of the domains imitated those used by the targeted financial institutions.

Recorded Future’s named the group behind the attacks Threat Activity Group 71 (TAG-71), which is also known as APT38, Bluenoroff, Stardust Chollima and the Lazarus Group.

This past April, the U.S. sanctioned three individuals associated with the Lazarus Group, accusing them of helping North Korea launder stolen virtual currencies and turn it into cash.

U.S. Treasury officials levied additional sanctions just last month against North Korea’s Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, which develops tools and operations to be carried out by the Lazarus Group.

The Lazarus Group is believed to be responsible for the largest theft of virtual currency to date, stealing approximately $620 million connected to a popular online game in Match 2022.

A Hidden Player: The Significance Of Mongolia In Geopolitics – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Matija Šerić · June 8, 2023

Mongolia is a country that has a unique geographical, demographic, economic and geopolitical position. And it is not favorable at all, at least at first glance. Mongolia has no access to the sea, it is located in the climatically cruelly cold East Asia. It has the lowest population density of any sovereign state in the world: two inhabitants per square kilometer.

Its three million inhabitants live in an area the size of Alaska (1.5 million square km), and it is surrounded by 133 million Russians in the north and 1.4 billion Chinese in the south. Although all the above factors greatly limit the economic development of Mongolia, it nevertheless has the best cashmere in the world, a huge potential for eco and cultural tourism, and possesses huge mineral resources: copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, fluorite, uranium, tin and tungsten.

Mongolia is actually an enclave between the superpowers of Russia and China. It is currently a democratic enclave surrounded by autocracies. It is this fact, apart from its harmful effects, that gives this country an important and potentially decisive importance in international relations. Hypothetically and in reality, Mongolia can be a crucial geopolitical player that can seriously damage the Russian-Chinese alliance and lead to a split between these two countries, and on the other hand, it can become a key American partner in the challenging Far East region.

Mongolia has a rich history dating back to the founding of the famous Mongol Empire (1206-1368) and Genghis Khan, who created the largest land empire in history. Historians believe that this is a ruler who was the creator of the Mongolian nation, respected the rule of law, protected religious freedom, promoted international trade and established new diplomatic relations between Asia and Europe. The Mongol Empire connected the previously disconnected world by creating “a unique intercontinental system of communication, trade, technology and politics”.

Genghis Khan shook the world and created a new world order. After his death, the empire was divided, but it survived in some form until the occupation by the Chinese Qing dynasty, which lasted from 1691 to 1911. Then Mongolia overthrew the local ruler and declared independence. The Kyakhta Treaty of 1915 briefly re-established Chinese control, but Russia helped Mongolia finally break free from Chinese rule after the October Revolution of 1917. Mongolia declared independence in 1921. The Soviet Red Army was stationed in the country, and the Soviet Union used Mongolia as a a satellite communist state and a buffer zone with China. Mongolia maintained good relations with both China and the Soviet Union until the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s. The Soviets had six military divisions in Mongolia, which Russia kept there until December 1992.

The disappearance of the USSR led Mongolia to two major problems. The first problem was the severe economic crisis. Trade with the USSR accounted for 40% of Mongolia’s GDP. All gasoline was imported from Russia, 90% of machinery and 50% of consumer goods. As Russia retreated into itself, the Mongolian economy collapsed. The second problem was of an existential nature. Mongolia was truly independent for the first time in modern history. Although Beijing recognized Mongolian independence in 1945, it is no secret that certain Chinese circles still harbor territorial claims against their northern neighbor. Some see Mongolia as part of China’s historical sphere, and Mongolian elites are concerned that younger and more nationalistic Chinese might try to implement annexation. China’s behavior in relation to provinces such as Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan is not encouraging.

The area of modern and internationally recognized Mongolia is also called Outer Mongolia, while the area where the Mongolian people live is much larger and includes: the Chinese autonomous province of Inner Mongolia, Dzungaria (the northern half of the Chinese province of Xinjiang), the Russian republics of Buryatia, Tuva and Altai, and Transbaikal region and the Irkutsk region. All the mentioned regions are part of the pan-Mongolian irredentism that aspires to create Greater Mongolia. Such groups are marginal, but they exist.

According to its political structure, Mongolia is a multi-party democratic republic. The president is directly elected, as are the members of parliament by the Grand State Khural. The president appoints the prime minister, and on the proposal of the prime minister, he appoints the cabinet. The Constitution of Mongolia guarantees all possible freedoms, including full freedom of expression and religion. Mongolia has a number of political parties, the largest being the Mongolian People’s Party and the Democratic Party. According to the opinions of professional organizations that study the degree of democratic freedom, such as Freedom House, it is a democratic and free state.

Currently, the president of the republic is Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh who comes from the left-wing social-democratic Mongolian People’s Party. He won the 2021 presidential election with 72% of the vote and previously served as prime minister from 2017 to 2021. Khürelsükh is a “macho” type of president as he was photographed topless on a Putin-style horse and became known by the nickname “the fist”. after punching an MP in parliament in 2011. However, he has since improved his public image.

After the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, the idea of the “end of history” by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama became popular. In the world, there was great initial enthusiasm for liberal democracy and neoliberal capitalism with one superpower, the USA. Such a situation turned out to be short-lived. Around 2014 at the latest, it became clear that the competition between the superpowers of the USA, Russia and China was in full force. In the chess game of the world’s three most powerful powers, along with many regional powers, Mongolia has an important but largely hidden geopolitical role.

Due to its unique “buffer position” between Russia and China, the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity is the main priority of contemporary Mongolia. Precisely because of these circumstances, Mongolia’s foreign policy can maneuver between two strategies: the “good neighbor” policy with Russia and China and the “third neighbor” policy in which it strives to build strong ties with other countries – the USA, Japan, North and South Korea , India, European Union countries, Australia and Canada.

In its south, along the Gobi desert, lies the Mongolian border with China. It is interesting that as many as six million Mongolians live in the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia, which is twice as many as in the mother country. China has the most influence on its northern neighbor with its powerful economy. About 80% of all Mongolian exports go to China, mostly coal, copper, unprocessed cashmere. At the same time, more than one third of imports to Mongolia come from China. China is also the largest single foreign investor in the country. Cooperation with China is vital for the Mongolian economy. China relies on the New Silk Road strategic project, that is, on transport infrastructure and commodity trade flows. One of the project’s six transnational corridors would connect China to Eastern Europe via Mongolia and Russian Siberia. The realization of this corridor created an opportunity for Mongolia to export its minerals and would become a regional logistics center. Although the Chinese are rapidly building expensive infrastructure around the world, the project is moving slowly.

The trade war between the US and China directly affects Mongolia. Given that China uses its 80 percent share of global production of rare minerals as a geopolitical tool, Chinese pressure on Mongolia, which is abundant in these resources, is possible. This geo-economic situation makes Mongolia very vulnerable to Chinese economic fluctuations, but it can also be a great advantage. For example In 2017, with the participation of China, Japan and South Korea, the IMF approved a financial package of 5.5 billion dollars for the Mongols, which is the fourth largest financial package in history. The program supports the economic recovery plan and focuses on creating foreign exchange reserves, putting debt within sustainable frameworks, strengthening the banking sector and ensuring stable and long-term growth.

Economic leverage is a powerful tool of Chinese foreign policy that affects other spheres as well. For example In 2016, Beijing closed its borders with Mongolia and imposed import tariffs on Mongolian goods as punishment for a visit by the Dalai Lama. Mongolia has historical ties to Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama, a title first created by the Mongolian leader Altan Khan in the 16th century. After extracting a promise from Ulaanbaatar not to invite the Dalai Lama in the future, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was overjoyed.

The strongest influence on Mongolia is the Sino-Russian political, economic and military alliance formed by these two superpowers to counter US hegemony. As the Sino-Russian alliance strengthens, it is possible that Mongolia’s value as a token in the geopolitical game will diminish. However, despite the public hype, the Russian-Chinese alliance is not ideal. Moscow still sees Beijing as a potential long-term threat as Chinese claims to Russian territories persist. Russia is concerned that if its 3,485-kilometer border with Mongolia falls under Chinese control, its Siberian bottom will be exposed to a potential Chinese attack.

To counter such ideas, the Russians prioritize balancing Chinese influence in Mongolia by trying to strengthen their economic ties. Undoubtedly, the Russians have a strong influence over the Mongolian economy. Russia supplies about 80% of Mongolia’s oil market, since 2017 trade has increased by almost 40%, Moscow owns a 51% stake in Mongolian railways. In 2019, the two countries announced a strategic partnership that includes a $1.5 billion infrastructure investment fund, an upgrade of the Trans-Mongolian railway, and the possible passage of a Russian-Chinese gas pipeline through Mongolian territory. Russian influence is also present in other areas. Remnants of the Soviet era are visible through the most casual stroll through Ulaanbaatar, which reveals the enduring cultural legacy of Soviet rule, from the Opera House to the Wedding Palace to the Zaisan Memorial. At the same time, Russian territorial ambitions elsewhere on the globe (Ukraine, Kuril Islands) worry Ulaanbaatar because of their potential to strengthen China’s arguments for a potential invasion of Mongolia.

In order to break their dependence on Russia and China and assert themselves as a nation, the Mongols began to increasingly accept the aforementioned “third neighbor” policy – to connect with countries in the region and the world with which they do not directly border. Through strong relations with democratic and non-democratic countries such as the USA, Japan, North and South Korea, India; Mongolia works to strengthen stability and cooperation in Asia. It is rich in uranium but supports nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful resolution of disputes in the region.

Accordingly, the Mongols balance diplomatic ties with North and South Korea and seek to promote stability on the Korean Peninsula. Mongolia describes the United States as its “most important” third neighbor and uses this relationship with Washington to influence political processes globally. Mongolia constantly participates in global peacekeeping operations of the United Nations (about 10 percent of the Mongolian armed forces serve in UN peacekeeping missions). The interoperability and capacity of the Mongolian military have been strengthened through engagement in campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. Khaan military exercises are held in the country almost every year in the summer, simulating UN peacekeeping operations in which contingents from numerous countries participate.

Since Mongolia’s location is strategically important in geopolitics, the United States has broader interests in that country. These interests include trade, investments, preservation of democracy and sovereignty, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, maintenance of peace in the region. What the United States wants most is the survival of Mongolia as a sovereign, independent and prosperous country that plays a constructive role in the region and beyond. This is not strange, since Ulaanbaatar is in the arms of two Americans, perhaps not “mortal enemies”, but certainly two of the biggest rivals in the world. In recent years, the desire to spread democracy in the foreign policy of the USA has fallen to low branches, which also applies to the Far East (the bitter experience of Myanmar). However, US defense and security strategies are closely linked to superpower competition and provide an opportunity to support small states.

American policymakers have interests in the Far East that favor Mongolia, and they are essentially the same under Trump and Biden. It is that the United States is trying to use every means to loosen the Russia-China alliance, is strategically positioning itself towards the Indo-Pacific region, and is trying to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. Mongolia can be a point of contention between the Russians and the Chinese, and it is also very important because of its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Ulaanbaatar has excellent relations with Pyongyang and can facilitate peace talks between North Korea and the US.

Ulaanbaatar and Washington also support common goals and values in partnerships on the international scene. For example, Mongolia chaired the US-backed Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental organization based in Warsaw that advocates shared democratic values. The two countries also cooperated in the ASEAN Regional Forum. At the United Nations, Mongolia has proven to be a reliable US ally, consistently voting with the US on General Assembly resolutions. In addition, Mongolia has won America’s favor by implementing UN Security Council sanctions targeting North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The alliance with the US influences Mongolia to prioritize the policy of the third neighbor at the expense of the policy of the good neighbor. In particular, Mongolia has resisted becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is led by Moscow and Beijing, in part because of the signal it could send to Washington and other Western capitals. Similar considerations influence Ulaanbaatar’s participation in China’s New Silk Road initiative. By strengthening ties with the US, Mongolia can stand up to powerful neighbors and chart its own foreign policy direction.

In the end, although it may sound contradictory, it is true: the biggest guarantors of Mongolian sovereignty and influence in the region are Russia and the USA. Russia, due to its fear of China, has a permanent interest in an independent Mongolia. Russia’s current strategic control over Mongolia’s energy and transportation sectors makes Mongolia a powerful deterrent to potential Chinese threats. Along with good relations with Russia, the alliance with America and allies in the Indo-Pacific also represent a strategic tool that will repel potential Chinese aspirations.

After nearly seven decades as a satellite state of the USSR, Mongolia made a peaceful transition to democracy and free markets. It currently plays an important role in a new chapter of world history in the 21st century. Mongolia can once again become an influential state through the application of freedoms and the rule of law, participation in international trade, and active diplomatic engagement among feuding states. Not only can it help the reconciliation of the two Koreas, but also the relaxation of relations between the superpowers, especially after the deterioration of relations between Russia and the USA because of Ukrainian crisis.

eurasiareview.com · by Matija Šerić · June 8, 2023

7. S. Korean, U.S. special operations generals stage 'friendship' parachute jump

Congratulations to Maj Gen Mike Martin on a very successful tour as the Commander of Special Operations Korea (SOCKOR). It will be great to see him take over as the J3 at USSOCOM soon.

(LEAD) S. Korean, U.S. special operations generals stage 'friendship' parachute jump | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · June 8, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS more info in last 2 paras)

SEOUL, June 8 (Yonhap) -- The top South Korean and American special operations commanders conducted a "friendship" parachute jump earlier this week, a U.S. military unit here said Thursday, as the two countries mark the 70th anniversary of their alliance.

In a Facebook post, the U.S. Special Operations Command-Korea (SOCKOR) said that South Korea's Special Warfare Command Commander Lieut. Gen. Son Sik and SOCKOR Commander Major Gen. Michael E. Martin staged a high altitude low opening (HALO) freefall on Monday.

It did not specify where the event took place.

South Korea's Special Warfare Command Commander Lieut. Gen. Son Sik, U.S. Special Operations Command-Korea (SOCKOR) Commander Major Gen. Michael E. Martin and other officials pose for a photo as they meet to stage a joint "friendship" parachute jump on June 5, 2023, in this photo captured from the Facebook account of SOCKOR. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

"Together, we are prepared to defend our Homelands as a combined and ready force," the U.S. unit said.

The "friendship" event included core infiltration training with South Korean and U.S. special operations forces executing static line jumps and HALO jumps, it added.

SOCKOR has also released a set of photos showing Martin taking part in a "friendship" dive with South Korea's Naval Special Warfare-Flotilla Command chief Rear Adm. Park Hu-byeong in Changwon, about 300 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on May 30.

Martin, who took the SOCKOR helm in June 2021, will leave the commander post next Monday, according to his unit. He will move to the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, where he will serve as the J3 director of operations. Brig. Gen. Derek N. Lipson is set to replace him.

"This command is unlike any other, and I am proud of the work we have done in maintaining peace and stability in the region together," he was quoted by his office as saying.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · June 8, 2023

8. N. Korea says it 'never recognizes' IMO resolution condemning its missile launches

The Kim family regime is actually pretty thin skinned and cannot take the criticism of its actions.

(LEAD) N. Korea says it 'never recognizes' IMO resolution condemning its missile launches | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · June 8, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS comments from South Korea's foreign ministry in last 3 paras)

SEOUL, June 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Thursday it "rejects and never recognizes" the latest resolution adopted by an international maritime safety agency denouncing the North's missile launches following its attempt to launch a spy satellite.

A spokesperson at the North's Maritime Administration denounced the resolution by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as "unfair and illegal" and demanded the agency reflect the North's stance in its official document, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Last week, the IMO adopted its first-ever resolution "strongly" condemning North Korea's missile tests, following Pyongyang's failed launch of its first military spy satellite on May 31.

The North's official said the IMO had told the North that it is not obligatory to inform the U.N. agency of a satellite launch plan, as navigation warning is directly delivered to vessels through the world navigational warning system in case of a satellite launch.

"Therefore, we cannot but express strong regret and displeasure at the fickle attitude of the organization," the spokesman was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

North Korea had notified Japan and the IMO of its plan to launch a satellite between May 31 and June 11. In response to the IMO resolution, the North hinted it may forgo a prior notice to the U.N. maritime safety agency for its future satellite launch.

Meanwhile, South Korea's foreign ministry voiced "deep regret" over the North's latest statement.

"We express deep regret over North Korea for shifting the responsibility of its illicit actions onto others while warning that provocations in the future could be staged without prior notice and threatening the international community," Ahn Eun-ju, the ministry's deputy spokesperson, said in a regular press briefing.

Ahn urged Pyongyang to abide by the U.N. Security Council resolutions and drop its plans to launch the spy satellite, saying it poses a serious threat to the security of the region and the safety of crew members on vessels.

This photo, carried by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on June 1, 2023, shows the North's launch of the new Chollima-1 rocket carrying a military reconnaissance satellite, Malligyong-1, from Tongchang-ri on the North's west coast the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · June 8, 2023

9. North Korean diplomat’s wife and son go missing in Russian far east

Did they attempt to escape? What is their fate?

North Korean diplomat’s wife and son go missing in Russian far east

Case is viewed as possible defection attempt ahead of border reopening that would force them to return home.

By Kim Jieun and Park Jaewoo for RFA Korean

2023.06.07

Russian media released this leaflet showing Kim Kum Sun, 43, and Park Kwon Ju, 15, who are wife and son of a North Korean trade representative in Vladivostok, Russia. It reads, “On June 4, 2023, they left the North Korean Consulate which is on Nevskaya str., 12. The situation is unknown so far.”

rfa.org

Russian authorities have issued a missing persons alert for the family of a North Korean diplomat, in what local and international media reports said could be an attempted defection.

According to a public notice issued Tuesday, Kim Kum Sun, 43, and her son Park Kwon Ju, 15, were last seen on Sunday leaving the North Korean consulate in Vladivostok, in Russia’s far east, and their whereabouts are unknown.

They are the wife and son of a North Korean trade representative in his 60s surnamed Park, sources in Vladivostok told RFA’s Korean Service. Park, considered a diplomat, had returned to North Korea in 2019, they said.

Park and his family were dispatched to Russia prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, where they were assigned to earn foreign currency for the North Korean regime by running the Koryo and Tumen River restaurants in Vladivostok, a source in Vladivostok who declined to be named told Radio Free Asia.

The missing woman was identified as Kim Kum Sun, who was the acting manager of both restaurants on behalf of her husband, according to a Russian citizen of Korean descent familiar with confidential news involving North Korean state-run companies in Vladivostok. He spoke to Radio Free Asia on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

Rode off in taxi

On the day they disappeared, the mother and son rode a taxi and got off on Nevskaya Street, which is not far from the consulate, Russian Media reported. The consulate reported to authorities that they had lost touch with the pair after they were not able to contact them.

“[The mother and son] had been detained in the North Korean consulate in Vladivostok for several months and then disappeared during the time they had once per week to go out,” the Russian citizen of Korean descent said.

“Park said he would return after the restaurant’s business performance review, but he was not able to return because the border has been closed since COVID hit,” he said, adding that the pandemic was rough on business at the Koryo restaurant, that Kim Kum Sun was running in her husband’s stead.

“In October of last year, the assistant manager, who oversaw personnel escaped,” the Korean Russian said.

The assistant manager of the Koryo restaurant, Kim Pyong Chol, 51 attempted to claim asylum but was arrested.

Shortly afterward, the consulate closed the restaurant fearing that others would also attempt to escape, he said.

“The acting manager and her son were then placed under confinement inside the consulate in Vladivostok,” said the Korean Russian. “They were allowed to go out only one day a week since they did not commit any specific crime, they just did chores inside the consulate and were monitored.”

Fear of returning

Rumors about a possible reopening of the North Korea-Russia border have made North Koreans stranded in Russia by the pandemic anxious that they might have to return to their homeland soon, another North Korea-related source in Vladivostok told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.

“They fear that when they return to North Korea, they will return to a lifestyle where they are cut off from the outside world,” the North Korea-related source said.

The fear of returning to one of the world’s most isolated countries is palpable among the fledgling community of North Korean dispatched workers and officials in Vladivostok, said Kang Dongwan, a professor at Busan’s Dong-A University, who recently visited the far eastern Russian city.

“The North Korean workers I met in Vladivostok were in a harsh situation and were quite agitated,” he said. “If [a border reopening] happens, there is a high possibility that North Korean workers and diplomats’ families will return to North Korea. So they may have judged that the only chance to escape North Korea is now.”

According to South Korea’s Dong-A Ilbo newspaper, the presidential office in Seoul has confirmed that the mother and son have gone missing, and the related South Korean agencies are actively searching for their whereabouts. They have not made contact with South Korean authorities.

An official from the office told Dong-A that the case is “not yet at the stage where they are trying to seek asylum in South Korea, as far as I know.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

10. Public struggle session carried out against 10 people in Hyesan

We must not become numb to the terrible human rights abuses in north Korea. We need a human rights upfront approach.

Public struggle session carried out against 10 people in Hyesan

One person received 10 years of reform through labor, while the others received two to seven years of reform through labor

By Mun Dong Hui - 2023.06.07 10:00am

dailynk.com

A panorama of Hyesan taken in 2013. (Wikimedia Commons)

In March, North Korean authorities publicly condemned around 10 young people in Yanggang Province who engaged in anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior, Daily NK has learned.

“A public struggle session was carried out against 17 young people who were caught watching impure videos or using South Korean speech at a stadium in Hyesan, Yanggang Province in mid-March,” a source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Thursday, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “The young person who was the ringleader was given 10 years of forced labor.”

The other young people were given seven years of forced labor, while several minors who were caught using South Korean speech were given two years of juvenile reeducation.

In March, Daily NK obtained a video showing a public struggle session for Pyongyang residents accused of various crimes.

North Korea appears to be carrying out struggle sessions to stop anti-socialist and non-socialist phenomena in other regions as well, just as they are doing in Pyongyang.

“Struggle sessions against violators of Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act are taking place nationwide in accordance with an order from the Central Committee issued in February,” the source said. “The sessions are conducted in each province, city and county on a case-by-case basis, with each case reported to Pyongyang.”

Singling young people out

The struggle session efforts are reportedly aimed at young people in particular.

“Members of the Korean Children’s Union, university students and young workers participate in the struggle sessions,” the source said. “Officials from the Socialist Patriotic Youth League appear and call out the names of problematic youth along with a list of all their misdeeds.

“The struggle sessions mostly take place in stadiums or cultural centers, and when they end, the subjects of criticism are punished with reform through labor or short-term forced labor. Their families are criticized, too, but they are not punished.

“When organized struggle sessions are carried out in schools, classes and agencies, ideological struggle meetings are convened where dozens of people intensively criticize the wrongdoers, and after the wrongdoers engage in self-criticism, they all engage in mutual criticism.”

North Korea is making efforts to prevent the spread of South Korean pop culture, meting out strong punishments toward people for watching South Korean TV shows or movies or using South Korean speech, all of which have grown increasingly popular among the country’s youth.

In fact, North Korea has been cracking down especially hard on young people through the adoption of a series of laws, including the 2020 Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act, the 2021 Youth Education Guarantee Act and the 2023 Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act.

With the authorities adding struggle sessions on top of all these legislative efforts, the state appears intent in instilling fear among young people to prevent them from getting absorbed into capitalist culture.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

11. U.S., South Korea seek to deepen ties as alliance marks 70 years

U.S., South Korea seek to deepen ties as alliance marks 70 years - UPI.com

By Darryl Coote

upi.com

1/3

U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg gives the keynote speech during a special session on the 70th anniversary of the South Korea-U.S. alliance at the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity on Thursday in South Korea. Photo by Darryl Coote/UPI

JEJU ISLAND, South Korea, June 7 (UPI) -- As the United States and South Korea celebrate their alliance's 70th anniversary this year, they approach a pivotal juncture as they attempt to deepen ties while navigating an increasingly volatile geopolitical theater.

Experts in U.S.-Korea relations and officials of the two governments were bullish on the prospects and potential of the growing relationship during the recent Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity in a special session dedicated to examining the past, present and future of the alliance.

They described it as a stalwart pillar to uphold peace, prosperity and security, not only on the Korean Peninsula, but in Asia and the wider world.

U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg, who gave the keynote speech during the panel held Thursday on South Korea's southernmost resort island of Jeju, said Seoul and Washington are "natural partners because our alliance is based on shared values" and a shared vision of a world governed by democratic norms, human rights and the rule of law.

"Together, the United States and Korea have molded a present where we are partners for good, where we combine our strengths to create innovative solutions and secure our mutual prosperity," he said, adding that the alliance is agile and has adapted to changing landscapes while incorporating "every aspect of global security, sustainable development and technological advancement and economic stability."

He also credited the alliance for providing South Korea with the security umbrella that allowed it to progress into a technological and scientific superpower that is exporting its culture around the world.

Japan relations

The session was held as South Korea under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has taken bold steps to thaw frigid relations with Japan and deepen military ties with the United States that were met with criticism at home.

Patrick Cronin, the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute and a scholar in residence at Carnegie Mellon University, called Yoon's outreach to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to settle historical grievances and restore military ties an act that took "a lot of courage."

The United States, South Korea and Japan share common values and together can revise "the rules of the road" for issues spanning from war to technology and economic policy, he said.

"That's what this new global strategic alliance can do."

Cronin proposed the trio could be a second pillar to Australia, Britain and the United States' AUKUS group, which signed an agreement in March to build a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to counter Chinese aggression in the Pacific.

South Korea, with its technological knowhow, could also contribute to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of Australia, India, Japan and the United States, as well as to the Group of 7 and NATO.

"All of those issues are things that Korea needs to be contributing to, providing those global public goods," he said. "We need Korea to be part of the solution to the policy crisis."

U.S. relations

The fostering of relations with Japan is evidence of South Korea's further stretching out into the International community, and Cronin described the U.S.-South Korea alliance as a lynchpin of freedom, prosperity and security that should be extended beyond the Korean Peninsula.

However, the relationship between the United States and South Korea is on the verge of evolution in the wake of Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden issuing the so-called Washington Declaration in April during the South Korean president's visit to the White House.

The panelists discussed the declaration as a reaffirmation of joint values and a recommitment of the United States to protect the Korean people from any North Korean nuclear attack.

The declaration established the Nuclear Consultative Group, which aims to extend deterrence and manage the threat posed by the North's Kim Jong Un regime.

While some may view it as South Korea dismissing its own nuclear sovereignty, since the declaration states Seoul reaffirms its commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Cronin argued that what Yoon negotiated in return was a greater say in the potential use of the U.S. weapons arsenal.

"Yes, the finger on the button remains in Washington, but the voice is in the ear of Washington every second of every day," he said.

He also added that Yoon avoided having to incur the costs to build nuclear weapons while having access to the United States, which "we couldn't build again if we had to start from scratch."

Allison Hooker, senior vice president at American Global Strategies with more than 20 years' government experience in Asia, said the alliance should extend farther than the peninsula and beyond just confronting the North Korean challenge.

Last year's global comprehensive strategic alliance agreement between Yoon and Biden not only deals with peace, but calls for the deepening of economic and technology partnerships between the two nations, including sectors from electric vehicle batteries to quantum technology and artificial intelligence

"Our countries have a great record on innovation and we should be working together to make advancements in these fields and we are, and I believe this is the future of the alliances, as well," she said.

The work conducted together will have a positive impact on the global supply chain by making it more resilient and on economic security and prosperity, she said.

"During my time in government, we always wanted to be able to say [the alliance] is the strongest it's ever been, and I really think we can say that now," she said.

upi.com

12. Former North Korean agent gives his first interview since defecting in 2014

Excerpts:

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) Based on what we know about the protocols and the traditions behind North Korea's leadership succession, as of now, there is no concrete evidence for us to argue Kim Jong Un's daughter's going to be the next in line for North Korea's regime leadership succession as of now.

KELLY: But she keeps coming in pictures. We keep - he keeps appearing with her - seems deliberate.

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) Kim Jong Un, the current leader, does consider Kim Ju Ae as his heir, the next in line to the succession of power. If that is truly his intention, it does come to risk for the current government to make the decision. The danger is if Kim Jong Un, the current leader, makes a public decision recognizing Kim Ju Ae, his daughter, as a leader too soon, it creates speculations on - currently he is only in his mid-30s, I believe, late 30s - so why is he so impatient to designate successor? It could lead to questions on health, for instance - that maybe the leader is not healthy and therefore the leader needs to pick his successor too quickly. And that's speculations that probably Kim Jong Un, the current leader, does not want to get entrapped in. What I have just explained is arguably a rational prediction of what leadership succession should look like in North Korea. However, even though logically I analyze it's unlikely for Kim Ju Ae to be recognized a leader, not yet at least, I'm also aware that seemingly unlogical (ph), unrational (ph) decisions have occurred in North Korean politics. So the possibility of Kim Ju Ae, as you've mentioned, as becoming recognized as a successor is a distinct possibility that I'm not going to completely dismiss out of hand.

KELLY: So who knows (laughter)? Who knows is the...

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) If Kim Jong Un does make it official public decisions to recognize his daughter as successor, it could be a clue or sign that there might be certain new changes to his own physical or political health of a current leader. And therefore, leadership succession has become urgent for the regime. So that could be an indicator. However, even among North Korean analysts, no one can make concrete predictions on this way or that way. So even among ourselves, we weigh the possibilities and look for more signs.

KELLY: Kim Hyun-woo, until 2014, he held a senior post in North Korea's Ministry of State Security. This is his first interview. Tomorrow, part two, his view on his country's relations with the U.S. and whether he will ever be able to go home. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.

Former North Korean agent gives his first interview since defecting in 2014

ctpublic.org · June 7, 2023

MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:

I'm about to introduce you to a man who had never set foot on American soil before yesterday, never given an interview either. When Kim Hyun-woo stepped into our studios here in Washington to speak with me through an interpreter for more than an hour, he was doing something that in his past life would have gotten him killed.

KIM HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) For 17 years in North Korea, I worked for North Korean intelligence agency.

KELLY: You were a spy?

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) My role was more about protecting the regime's security internally.

KELLY: Mr. Kim worked for North Korea's Ministry of State Security.

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) Main task was not to send out agents abroad, but rather to track down, identify and catch what the regime views as hostile agents or hostile activities within the state.

KELLY: As you may have gathered from the fact that he's speaking now, Kim Hyun-woo defected in 2014. Today he lives in Seoul, South Korea. He got his kids out, his immediate family. But Kim's decision put his wider family still in North Korea in danger.

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) Sadly, I do not know what happened to my relatives. And that's why when I'm in South Korea, every day - morning, daytime and evening - I pray earnestly that God will keep them safe in North Korea - all my cousins and relatives.

KELLY: Mr. Kim works now for the Institute for National Security Strategy. That's a state-funded think tank in Seoul. He is still tracking North Korea closely.

So I'm curious about so many things about life in North Korea. What do we know of the pandemic, of COVID, of how badly North Korea has been hit?

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) I predict that North Korea suffered from pandemic even more severe than other countries fundamentally because North Korea's health care infrastructure is severely deficient. So there would have been inadequate proper responses in mitigating and containing the spread and the illness from the pandemic.

KELLY: Do we know for sure that there was spread because Pyongyang was saying there are no cases, no problem because we closed the borders?

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) I question the credibility of North Korea's official state message that due to locking down the country, there was no spread of pandemic. It's because 13 years ago, in 2010, there was actually another case of spread of epidemic. In 2010 case and today's case, what we know is that because North Korean regime lacks proper resources to deal with pandemic, only realistic option, a measure they could take, is literally lock down the entire country. North Korea's lockdown measures, however, from the past case from 2010, we can extrapolate that it likely was insufficient in actually preventing the spread of epidemic. And yet the regime, obviously, to be transparent in full data of the impact of pandemic, could have caused political and social instability within the country. That is why I believe with confidence that North Korea regime has been intentional in minimizing broadcast information and coverage about the actual state of damage from the recent pandemic.

KELLY: Can you tell how tightly sealed the borders are now?

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) First two years of COVID pandemic, the borders were heavily locked down and controlled. Starting in 2022, what we are seeing is that while human travel, so human interactions, are still strictly monitored and curtailed, there has been signs of revival of cargos passing between China and North Korea border. So in that sense, at least in terms of shipments of goods, yes, it seems for the past year there's been relaxation of the border control.

KELLY: What kind of goods are coming in?

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) To give an example, so last summer, June and July specifically, construction materials have been shipped from China into North Korea. We speculate that North Korean higher-ups, so elites, they also need luxury goods. And we predict that these goods have also found the ways to be imported from overseas.

KELLY: Let me ask you about succession. We see photos of a girl, Kim Jong Un's daughter. Is she the heir apparent?

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) Based on what we know about the protocols and the traditions behind North Korea's leadership succession, as of now, there is no concrete evidence for us to argue Kim Jong Un's daughter's going to be the next in line for North Korea's regime leadership succession as of now.

KELLY: But she keeps coming in pictures. We keep - he keeps appearing with her - seems deliberate.

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) Kim Jong Un, the current leader, does consider Kim Ju Ae as his heir, the next in line to the succession of power. If that is truly his intention, it does come to risk for the current government to make the decision. The danger is if Kim Jong Un, the current leader, makes a public decision recognizing Kim Ju Ae, his daughter, as a leader too soon, it creates speculations on - currently he is only in his mid-30s, I believe, late 30s - so why is he so impatient to designate successor? It could lead to questions on health, for instance - that maybe the leader is not healthy and therefore the leader needs to pick his successor too quickly. And that's speculations that probably Kim Jong Un, the current leader, does not want to get entrapped in. What I have just explained is arguably a rational prediction of what leadership succession should look like in North Korea. However, even though logically I analyze it's unlikely for Kim Ju Ae to be recognized a leader, not yet at least, I'm also aware that seemingly unlogical (ph), unrational (ph) decisions have occurred in North Korean politics. So the possibility of Kim Ju Ae, as you've mentioned, as becoming recognized as a successor is a distinct possibility that I'm not going to completely dismiss out of hand.

KELLY: So who knows (laughter)? Who knows is the...

HYUN-WOO: (Through interpreter) If Kim Jong Un does make it official public decisions to recognize his daughter as successor, it could be a clue or sign that there might be certain new changes to his own physical or political health of a current leader. And therefore, leadership succession has become urgent for the regime. So that could be an indicator. However, even among North Korean analysts, no one can make concrete predictions on this way or that way. So even among ourselves, we weigh the possibilities and look for more signs.

KELLY: Kim Hyun-woo, until 2014, he held a senior post in North Korea's Ministry of State Security. This is his first interview. Tomorrow, part two, his view on his country's relations with the U.S. and whether he will ever be able to go home. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.

ctpublic.org · June 7, 2023

13. First FA-50 for Poland rolls out as security ties deepen

The partner in the arsenal of democracy continues to produce weapons for like minded nations.

Wednesday

June 7, 2023

dictionary + A - A

First FA-50 for Poland rolls out as security ties deepen

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/06/07/national/defense/Korea-KAI-Korea-Aerospace-Industries/20230607173115825.html

Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak and Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup stand in the center of a photo lineup at a Wednesday ceremony in Sacheon, South Gyeongsang, marking the rollout of the first FA-50 light attack aircraft designated for export to Poland. [KOREA AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES]

The first Korean FA-50 light attack aircraft earmarked for export to Poland was rolled out in a Wednesday ceremony that highlighted the two countries' growing defense industry ties.

The ceremony, titled “Firm Commitment, Secure Future,” took place at the headquarters of Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) in Sacheon, South Gyeongsang.

KAI is scheduled to deliver 12 FA-50s before the end of the year as part of a contract it signed with Poland’s Armament Agency to supply Warsaw with 48 FA-50 aircraft.

The aircraft are formally designated as FA-50GF, with the GF standing for “gap-filler,” highlighting the jets’ intended role as replacements for Poland’s aging fleet.

The ceremony was attended by Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup and his Polish counterpart, Mariusz Blaszczak.

Others in attendance included Korean Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Jung Sang-hwa and Defense Acquisition Program Administration director Eom Dong-hwan.

Lee attributed the quick turnaround between the signing of KAI’s contract with Warsaw and the rollout of the first FA-50 jet “not only to the company’s outstanding technology and production capacity but also to the trust between the two countries and Poland's determination.”

Blaszczak said that swift production has bolstered his country’s ongoing rearmament.

“Thanks to the speedy release of FA-50GF, Poland is now able to equip itself with more advanced military strategies and realize military modernization,” he said, adding, “I look forward to seeing FA-50GF fly in the airspace of Poland.”

The other 36 FA-50 jets that are scheduled for delivery between 2025 and 2028 will be an upgraded version, named the FA-50PL.

Improvements that distinguish the FA-50PL from the FA-50GP include an expanded range through an aerial refueling function, an enhanced active electronically scanned array radar, and its ability to carry air-to-surface and air-to-air weapons, according to KAI.

Poland became the largest customer of Korean defense systems last year after it signed contracts worth $14 billion to acquire 180 K2 main battle tanks, 212 K9 self-propelled howitzers and 48 FA-50 light fighters.

The deals are part of a massive rearmament push by Warsaw amid the ongoing Russian invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Poland’s largest defense company, Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), has also expressed interest in Korea’s KF-21 Boramae multirole fighter project, according to a recent report by Polish media.

PGZ officials told the Polish news outlet Defence24 last month that they are eyeing 2026 as the timeframe where they would commit to the KF-21 program.

The sources also told Defence24 that “it is possible there will be future industrial cooperation in the development and production of the KF-21 Boramae, where the natural partner for KAI would be, among others, Wojskowe Zaklady Lotnicze [Military Aviation Plant] No. 2 in Bydgoszcz.”

That plant is a leader in aviation assembly and maintenance in Poland, with experience in the maintenance and restoration of F-16s and the C-130 Hercules.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

14. Japanese sincerity and Korean forgiveness: beyond apology, compensation

Wise words from India:

For a better future concerning South Korea-Japan relations, Japan needs to comprehensively address the issue. South Korea need not keep repeating its demand for an apology and compensation and rather, try to bring forgiveness to its approach. It is both a moral and pragmatic strategy on the part of South Korea. The top leaders of both countries should not try to superficially address these emotive issues and should try to create a sensitive framework for them.

Japanese sincerity and Korean forgiveness: beyond apology, compensation

The Korea Times · June 8, 2023

By Sandip Kumar Mishra

It happened after a long time. The top leaders of South Korea and Japan visited each other's capital cities in quick succession. First, the South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol visited Japan on March 16-17 and then the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited South Korea on May 7-8. The visits brought optimism for an improvement in their economic, cultural, educational and people-to-people exchanges.

With regional security imperatives pushing both countries to forge trustworthy and close relations, it is a welcome step that the two leaders finally decided to reconnect the interests of their two countries. However, the problem is that in the process that they have been trying to hurriedly resolve: the emotive issues of sex slaves and forced labor, are layered and complicated.

On the forced labor issue a fund has already been established by the Yoon Suk Yeol government before his visit to Japan and for compensating the sex slaves, an $8 million fund was announced in 2015, through a final and irreversible agreement between the two countries. During his visit to Seoul, Kishida also said that his "heart ached deeply for the pain and sadness that so many people suffered under the harsh circumstances of those days" and many observers argue that the demand for apology and compensation on these emotive issues has been addressed.

Actually, the South Korean President himself has said that Japan does not need to apologize for something which "happened hundred years ago" or his statement that Japan does not need to apologize to South Korea anymore since they had already done it "several dozen times."

Nonetheless, critics say that the statement of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida was neither an apology on behalf of Japan nor an admission about who perpetrated the pain. His statement did not mention any specific acts of atrocities. The demands for apology and compensation must be understood in more comprehensive and nuanced terms. Korean people feel a sense of humiliation due to colonial Japan forcing girls and laborers in Korea into inhuman exploitation. In general, they want four things from the current Japanese state and Japanese people.

One, South Koreans want Japan to accept the role of the Japanese state in such atrocities. Two, Japan must also accept that such acts were illegal and immoral. Three, Japan must give a sincere apology. Here the apology must be by the Japanese state not by any particular leader. Here sincerity means that the Japanese state must conduct itself in a manner that aligns with the formal apology. Four, Japan must compensate the victims of these atrocities.

Actually, lots of observers feel that already Japan has compensated South Korea through the 1965 normalization agreement, through a fund for comfort women and now another fund by South Korea for forced laborers. They also feel that Japanese leaders have tendered their apologies multiple times and thus South Korea's demands for an apology are not appropriate. However, these observers do not realize that the compensation and apology come third and fourth in the priority order. A real beginning would be to accept the role of the Japanese colonial state in specific atrocities and their illegalities. Otherwise, the apologies and compensation would appear as if Japanese leaders were saying that though we did not have any formal role in these atrocities, since Korea suffered, we are apologizing and ready to compensate.

In the light of above understanding, a comprehensive and final solution to these issues is neither easy nor imminent. Now, the South Korean state and society have to reflect that if the Japanese state and its society are not ready to have a comprehensive reassessment of their grievances, is it possible for South Korea to force them to do so? Actually, all such attempts by South Korea so far have been futile and it will remain so in the near future.

Therefore, would it not be better, if South Korea articulates a framework for forgiveness in which it does not ask any such thing from Japan? It does not mean that they have to forget these atrocities, but healing may happen if a strong South Korean society, state and victims decide to forgive the perpetrator. It would be a morally high position and it may give an important message to the Japanese people. Moreover, it would also be pragmatic to do so as both countries could reap immense benefits from their bilateral cooperation in various domains.

For a better future concerning South Korea-Japan relations, Japan needs to comprehensively address the issue. South Korea need not keep repeating its demand for an apology and compensation and rather, try to bring forgiveness to its approach. It is both a moral and pragmatic strategy on the part of South Korea.

The top leaders of both countries should not try to superficially address these emotive issues and should try to create a sensitive framework for them.

The author is associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India and could be reached at sandipmishra10@gmail.com

The Korea Times · June 8, 2023

15. north Korea Borders, Smuggling, Markets, and Suffering - John Batchelor Show

Comments based on the Reuters special report on the north Korea border "walls)" and fences at the link below. I highly recommend reading the Reuter's report with the interactive imagery (which I sent out a couple of days ago)

#Koreas: Smugglers: David Maxwell, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

Link to the interview:

https://audioboom.com/posts/8314025-koreas-smugglers-david-maxwell-senior-fellow-at-the-foundation-for-defense-of-democracies-and?fbclid=IwAR0F3HcQIPr9NNRzdoPDzfz1peQScmAOdjILazLWqU0kDFChLQLvWvsuvYo

Reuters Report:

https://www.reuters.com/graphics/NORTHKOREA-BORDER/byvrlwjreve/index.html

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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