Quotes of the Day:

"The true test of civilization is, not the census, nor the size of the cities, nor the crops – no, but the kind of man the country turns out."

-Ralph Waldo Emerson

"Those who tell the stories rule society."

- Plato

"Let us not look back in anger, nor forward in fear, but around in awareness." 

- James Thurber

1. U.S. leaders insist war with Russia must end before Ukraine joins NATO

2. Opinion | A NATO Invitation Will Make or Break Ukraine

3. The Asian ‘Tiger’ Economy That Never Quite Roared

4. ‘Ukrainian strategy has become a model’: Taiwanese beef up military to face China threat

5. U.S. fighting China on the wrong battlefield (US Kinetic vs. Chinese Political Warfare)

6. Wagner PMC Exemplifies How Putin Has Destroyed Russian State – Analysis

7. Top US military leader must step down as Sen. Tuberville continues blocking replacement

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2023

9. An Accident Waiting To Happen: NATO Looks To Asia – OpEd

10. She dreamed of defending Japan. Instead, her fellow soldiers sexually assaulted her

11. Analysis | A fateful summit 15 years ago hangs over the NATO meeting in Vilnius

12. Ukraine Summer Counter-Offensive Update for July 10: ‘30 Russian Airstrikes Versus 1 Ukrainian Airstrike’

13. China’s Advances in Space Warfare Are Terrifying

14. Amid Ukraine War and Internal Spats, NATO Seeks Show of Unity

15. 500 Days of Learning (Part 1) - Ukrainian Strategic Adaptation in Defending their Homeland by Mick Ryan

16. Trump's Campaign Is Already Shaping Global Affairs

17. NATO Promises Ukraine Membership – But Not So Fast

18. Anarchy Is a Bridge: Russia and China Are Pushing NATO and Japan Together

19. How capable is today’s Marine Corps to answer a 9-1-1 call? Not very by Gen. James Conway (retired) and Gen. Anthony Zinni (retired)

20. Why America Has a Launch on Attack Option

21. A Stronger NATO for a More Dangerous World By Jens Stoltenberg

22. NATO’s Worst-of-Both-Worlds Approach to Ukraine

23. 6 Characteristics Shared by Successful Special Ops Candidates

1. U.S. leaders insist war with Russia must end before Ukraine joins NATO

Excerpts:

“We’re determined to [protect] every inch of territory that is NATO territory,” Biden said, noting that if Ukraine were part of NATO, it would put the alliance at war with Russia.

Biden added that it was “premature” to call for a vote on Ukrainian membership because the country still has to meet some NATO qualifications. Biden said he and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have spoken at length about the issue of membership, and said the two have laid out a “rational path for Ukraine to be able to qualify.”

Still, Biden said the United States remains committed to supplying the war-torn nation with the security assistance it needs to continue fending off Russia.

Like Biden, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said talk of Ukraine’s membership is “too premature.” McCaul told CNN’s Jake Tapper on Sunday that Ukraine has to win the counteroffensive against Russia, secure a cease-fire and negotiate a peace settlement before joining NATO.

“We cannot admit Ukraine into NATO immediately; that would put us at war with Russia under Article 5 of the United Nations,” McCaul said.

U.S. leaders insist war with Russia must end before Ukraine joins NATO

By Mariana Alfaro

Updated July 9, 2023 at 4:43 p.m. EDT|Published July 9, 2023 at 1:02 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Mariana Alfaro · July 9, 2023

Ahead of this week’s NATO summit in Lithuania, U.S. leaders are insisting that the war with Russia must end before Ukraine is invited to join the powerful military alliance.

President Biden said during an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria that aired Sunday that he doesn’t believe there will be “unanimity” on the issue of Ukraine’s membership while the nation remains “in the middle of a war.”

“We’re determined to [protect] every inch of territory that is NATO territory,” Biden said, noting that if Ukraine were part of NATO, it would put the alliance at war with Russia.

Biden added that it was “premature” to call for a vote on Ukrainian membership because the country still has to meet some NATO qualifications. Biden said he and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have spoken at length about the issue of membership, and said the two have laid out a “rational path for Ukraine to be able to qualify.”

Still, Biden said the United States remains committed to supplying the war-torn nation with the security assistance it needs to continue fending off Russia.

Like Biden, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said talk of Ukraine’s membership is “too premature.” McCaul told CNN’s Jake Tapper on Sunday that Ukraine has to win the counteroffensive against Russia, secure a cease-fire and negotiate a peace settlement before joining NATO.

“We cannot admit Ukraine into NATO immediately; that would put us at war with Russia under Article 5 of the United Nations,” McCaul said.

Sen. Christopher A. Coons (D-Del.) told CBS News’s “Face the Nation” that the war “has to end with Ukrainian victory,” and that Ukraine also has to join the European Union, which involves “improving their transparency, their rule of law, their civil society, which lays the foundation for NATO membership in the future.”

Zelensky, in an interview that aired Sunday on ABC, said inviting Ukraine into the alliance is “all a matter of political will.” In the meantime, Zelensky said Ukraine “should get clear security guarantees” from NATO members in the effort against Russia.

“It would be an important message to say that NATO is not afraid of Russia,” he said.

Zelensky said he will attend the summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, this week, to do whatever he can to “expedite that solution to have an agreement with our partners.”

“I don’t want to go to Vilnius for fun,” he said.

John Kirby, the spokesman for the U.S. National Security Council, said on ABC’s “This Week” that strong commitments will be made to Ukraine during the upcoming summit.

“You’re going to see the allies really stay unified on supporting Ukraine in this fight against Russia on their soil,” Kirby said. “You’re also going to see from all the allies a concerted, unified approach to making it clear that NATO is eventually going to be in Ukraine’s future, and that in between the time of the war ending and that happening, that the allies will continue to help Ukraine defend itself.”

While Biden remained skeptical of Ukraine’s ascension into the alliance in the immediate future, he told CNN he remains optimistic that Sweden, which has also been fighting for membership, will become a NATO member soon. Extending membership to a new nation requires the approval of all NATO allies, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban have cited objections to adding Sweden.

“Sweden has the same value set that we have in NATO, [is] a small nation, but has a capacity to defend itself, as they know how to fight,” Biden said, echoing other statements he has made in the lead-up to the summit. “I think they should be a member of NATO.”

Turkey has criticized Sweden for refusing to extradite individuals it sees as terrorists, including members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and a movement accused of trying to overthrow the Turkish government in 2016. Turkey also has complained about anti-Erdogan protests held in Sweden and demonstrations at which Qurans were burned.

Officials in Hungary, meanwhile, have cited a variety of reasons for their country’s refusal to ratify Sweden’s accession, from what a government spokesman said was Stockholm’s eagerness to “bash Hungary” to the Nordic country’s “crumbling throne of moral superiority.”

Biden, in the interview with CNN, responded to Turkey’s criticisms by arguing that it isn’t “Swedes that are burning the Quran. They are immigrants who are burning the Quran.”

Nitasha Tiku contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Mariana Alfaro · July 9, 2023

2. Opinion | A NATO Invitation Will Make or Break Ukraine

Excerpts:

Some reluctant NATO leaders might say that they don’t have anything against Ukraine’s invitation to the alliance in general, but the timing is not right. But is there any such thing as perfect timing? Next year, at the Washington NATO summit while the United States is in the midst of a presidential campaign? That seems doubtful.

Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership will not go away. Ukraine will be knocking at NATO’s door again and again to remind Western capitals that it was precisely their fear of escalation from Putin’s side that led to Europe’s largest war since World War II.

America put an end to Mr. Putin’s plans to recreate a Russian empire by helping Ukraine to defend itself. Now it’s time to bury Moscow’s imperialist dreams. There is no better way to do it than by granting Ukraine a political invitation to join NATO in Vilnius now.

Opinion | A NATO Invitation Will Make or Break Ukraine

The New York Times · by Alyona Getmanchuk · July 9, 2023

Guest Essay

A NATO Invitation Will Make or Break Ukraine

July 9, 2023, 6:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Yves Herman/Reuters

By

Ms. Getmanchuk is the founder and director of the New Europe Center.

KYIV, Ukraine — For decades, discussions about whether or not Ukraine should be admitted to NATO have revolved around the risks — to both Ukraine and member nations — of Ukraine being in the alliance. And at the core of those risks had been one overriding fear: that Ukraine’s membership might push President Vladimir Putin of Russia into a corner, prompting him to escalate his war.

The question of Ukraine’s potential NATO membership has been revived once again as the bloc’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, approaches this week, and Ukraine has stated its ambition to the leaders gathering there to be granted a political invitation to join.

To be clear, Ukraine is not asking for immediate NATO membership. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky now acknowledges that it should join after the war ends, and doesn’t want to drag NATO members into its war with Russia by invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. What Ukraine wants is a political invitation that will end the so-called “strategic ambiguity” at play since the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, where the alliance decided Ukraine should eventually become a member but offered no clear path for it to do so. By giving Ukraine a destination but no itinerary, NATO left the nation uniquely vulnerable and ultimately opened the door for Mr. Putin’s invasions.

Now, as in previous years, the hand-wringing over the attendant risks of inviting Ukraine into NATO has cropped up again. And again, it is focused on the danger of further provoking Mr. Putin.

But for the 78 percent of Ukrainians who have close relatives or friends who have been killed or wounded in Mr. Putin’s war, and for those who suffer from continuous Russian missile and drone strikes, this argument sounds ridiculous.

And any thought of keeping Ukraine out of NATO to forestall further Russian aggression makes no sense. Mr. Putin threatened to dip into his nuclear arsenal long before Ukraine requested a political invitation at Vilnius, and he will continue to do so regardless of whatever decision is made there. Perhaps more to the point, nobody is more reluctant to escalate Russia’s war against Ukraine into World War III than Mr. Putin himself. The Russian Army has no chance in a military confrontation with NATO; it is barely coping with the armed forces of Ukraine.

So what about the risks of not inviting Ukraine to join NATO?

Anything except a political invitation for Ukraine at Vilnius will surely be perceived by Mr. Putin as a victory, allowing him to retain his de facto veto on the process of NATO enlargement and giving him confirmation that his policy of waging wars and occupying other countries to prevent them from joining works. As long as Ukraine remains in NATO limbo, Putin will attack Ukraine again and again with the hope of creating a new Russian Empire. There is no better insurance for Ukraine against new attacks than the guarantee of future NATO membership.

Further delaying the decision will also have a negative impact on the democratic transformations underway inside Ukraine. While Ukraine is required to conduct some of these reforms as part of its accession to the European Union, such as strengthening its judiciary and anti-corruption measures, others, like moving Ukraine’s military under civilian control, are more likely to succeed if they are included as a precondition to joining NATO. If that process stalls, NATO might face the reality of a million-strong army operating indefinitely outside full democratic civilian control. The army, which is emerging as one of the strongest at the European continent and the only one with recent battlefield experience fighting Russia, should be a part of the collective security structure, not acting alone.

Finally, should NATO members fail to act this week on Ukraine, the alliance will be discredited in the eyes of Ukrainians and millions of other residents of NATO member states who support inviting Ukraine to join. According to a recent opinion poll, 70 percent of Americans, 56 percent of the French and 55 percent of Dutch citizens who expressed opinions on Ukraine’s NATO membership support the idea of inviting Ukraine into NATO in Vilnius this week, even if some of them would prefer actual accession to happen after the war.

Maintaining the status quo will send the wrong signal to the Ukrainian mothers of teenage boys, who are frightened about having to send their sons into a series of endless conflicts with Russia. It would demotivate Ukrainian soldiers who are already fighting in extremely difficult conditions to liberate Ukrainian land. It would scare away investors who might be interested in participating in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction. And it would discourage the millions of Ukrainian refugees who consider a commitment on Ukraine’s future membership as the only solid precondition for them to consider returning home.

Some reluctant NATO leaders might say that they don’t have anything against Ukraine’s invitation to the alliance in general, but the timing is not right. But is there any such thing as perfect timing? Next year, at the Washington NATO summit while the United States is in the midst of a presidential campaign? That seems doubtful.

Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership will not go away. Ukraine will be knocking at NATO’s door again and again to remind Western capitals that it was precisely their fear of escalation from Putin’s side that led to Europe’s largest war since World War II.

America put an end to Mr. Putin’s plans to recreate a Russian empire by helping Ukraine to defend itself. Now it’s time to bury Moscow’s imperialist dreams. There is no better way to do it than by granting Ukraine a political invitation to join NATO in Vilnius now.

Alyona Getmanchuk is the founder and director of the New Europe Center think tank in Kyiv and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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The New York Times · by Alyona Getmanchuk · July 9, 2023

3.

The Asian ‘Tiger’ Economy That Never Quite Roared

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-07-08/bloomberg-new-economy-the-asian-tiger-economy-that-never-quite-roared?sref=hhjZtX76

A portrait of Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej sits in front of the Grand Palace in Bangkok on May 6. His reign saw major economic development, but the nation’s competitiveness faded soon before he died in 2016.Photographer: Andre Malerba/Bloomberg

ByPhilip Heijmans and Chris Anstey

July 8, 2023 at 6:45 AM EDT

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Amid all the buzz over friend-shoring and reworking global supply chains, India, Vietnam and Mexico get a lot of attention these days. One nation that doesn’t is Thailand. But it wasn’t always that way.

Four decades ago, Thailand was leaping ahead at a time when China was just starting to emerge from economic ruin. Global automakers were pouring in so much money that the Southeast Asian nation was dubbed the Detroit of Asia.

Thailand stood out for its political stability in a region still working through the ravages of war. A relatively stable exchange rate and attractive tax regime were further pluses. By 1990, it was racking up double-digit growth as a column in the New York Times proclaimed it the next “tiger” economy. There was, it said, “excitement of an emerging economic and political power in Bangkok.”

That exciting time seems long gone. More than 30 years and three military coups later, Thailand seems incapable of breaking out of its status as a middle-income country. Once way ahead of China in per-capita wealth, today it’s notably behind. The reversal of fortunes illustrates how trajectories can change thanks to self-made errors.

This week in the New Economy

• China ends crackdown on private-sector tech giants with big fines.
• India’s push to boost rupee’s global role is off to a slow start.
• Brazil moves ahead to overhaul complex, growth-damping tax code.
• Turkey hikes taxes to pay for spending pledges and quake toll.
• Zuma stymied green power. Now he pitches Belarus carbon in Africa.

To be sure, Thailand continues to pursue an export-led strategy. It still draws foreign direct investment (FDI), which relative to GDP hit 50% by 2017.

But the bigger picture is that it’s fallen well behind. China’s GDP per capita, for example, has towered over Thailand’s in recent years and could soon double it, with World Bank data from 2022 showing China at $12,720 versus $6,909 for Thailand.

Thailand Lost Its Edge in Wealth Creation

Per-capita GDP shows China now far ahead of Thailand

Source: World Bank, gross domestic product per capita, current US dollar series

There are a host of issues that explain why Thailand is lagging behind. Underlying most of them is the country’s politics.

The relative stability and what seemed to be budding democratic credentials back in the 1990s were wrecked over the subsequent decades. Deep political infighting between the military-backed establishment in Bangkok and pro-democracy parties, often backed by business tycoon and onetime prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, did deep damage.

A focus on power struggles arguably took the nation’s collective eye away from setting and executing on longer-term development goals. Legal uncertainties and ownership restrictions are chief complaints among investors. 

Trade is a key example of this. While most Thai neighbors have inked or are working on new deals, Thailand has fallen woefully behind. Negotiations with the European Union only restarted this year after a 2014 coup brought them to a halt (and even nixed a Taylor Swift tour. Thailand wants to resurrect it). Vietnam inked a deal with the EU four years ago.

And while a host of East Asian economies have joined together in the soon-to-be 12-nation Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Thailand remains on the outside.

The lack of commitment has had consequences. Thailand attracts less FDI than regional competitors Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, and last year it posted the slowest growth rate among Southeast Asia’s major economies.

Governance issues are also cropping up in Thailand’s financial markets, with a spate of corporate scandals in recent months. While even developed markets see such incidents, it’s hardly helped the nation’s reputation.

Tourists walk along a beach at dusk in Pattaya, ThailandPhotographer: Andre Malerba/Bloomberg

Failure to move up the production scale more decisively has left almost one-third of Thailand’s labor force still in agriculture, compared with less than a quarter in China. And its relative reliance on tourism left it almost uniquely exposed to the ravages of the pandemic.

Today, another political showdown is casting a shadow. It’s been nearly two months since a pro-democracy coalition won a majority of lower house seats in a national election, but no new government is in place. Doubts remain over whether the coalition’s candidate for prime minister, Pita Limjaroenrat, will be able to take the government’s reins.

That’s left most businesses freezing new investment decisions until clearer directions from the new administration emerge, Kriengkrai Thiennukul, chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries, said last month. And this against a backdrop of weak exports.

Demographics, in the meantime, aren’t working in Thailand’s favor. Of its 67 million residents, 12 million are elderly. That’s not great when it comes to a manufacturing sector that increasingly depends on a workforce that must handle new and complex technologies.

Manu Bhaskaran, a founding partner of Centennial Asia Advisors, a policy advisory firm in Singapore, says: “Thailand’s bottom-up micro economy has been strong in the past, but we do not see the kind of entrepreneurial energy and start-ups in the tech space that we are seeing in Vietnam [and] Indonesia.”

4. ‘Ukrainian strategy has become a model’: Taiwanese beef up military to face China threat

Will Taiwan resist and fight at the same level as the Ukrainians?

Excerpts:

As part of a campaign to promote the idea of national service, in April the ministry published a manga-style comic strip about a conscript who learns about the values of military training and the existential threats facing Taiwan.

Morale among troops is another problem, with some fearing that, in the face of Chinese aggression, defeat would be inevitable. That is in part because of Chinese “cognitive warfare”, says Max Yu. Chinese agents spread disinformation on social media about corruption in the Taiwanese military and the strength of the PLA, he says. So, as well as military training, Taiwanese conscripts watch weekly videos “to promote a kind of patriotism”. The videos are designed to “strengthen their determination to resist invasion” and to “recognise China as an enemy”.

The real problem may be money. In the past decade, defence spending’s share of the government budget has hardly altered. But now politicians are changing tack. Last year, the legislature approved a 13.9% increase to the defence budget for 2023, reaching 2.4% of GDP. The double-digit rise was a sharp increase on slow growth in defence spending since 2017.

In January, Taiwan’s voters will choose a new president. Both main parties accuse the other of being the party that will draw Taiwan closer to a conflict with China. Whoever wins the race, digging deeper into the government coffers for more weapons, more soldiers and more training will be near the top of their in-tray.

​

‘Ukrainian strategy has become a model’: Taiwanese beef up military to face China threat

Amy Hawkins

Senior China correspondent

Conscripts will serve longer in attempt to improve current crop of ‘strawberry soldiers’ who bruise too easily

The Guardian · by Amy Hawkins · July 9, 2023

For many people in Taiwan, the threat of conflict with China is a distant prospect that has been lingering in the air for some seven decades. Concern in the west that the Chinese Communist party, led by Xi Jinping in Beijing, is moving ever closer towards attempting to realise its goal of “reunifying” China and Taiwan, by force if necessary, can seem hysterical.

The only beneficiary of the increasing tension between China and Taiwan is the US, which is making money from selling arms to Taipei, jokes one resident of Kinmen, a small Taiwanese island a few miles from China’s eastern coastline.

One constituency for whom the threat of war is about to have very material consequences is young men. From 1 January 2024, men born after 2005 will have to complete one year of military service, up from the current four months. The extension was announced in December by President Tsai Ing-wen, who called it a “difficult decision” but one that was informed by lessons from Ukraine and the need to boost Taiwan’s defence capabilities. This year, the military also started to allow women to volunteer for the reserve forces for the first time.

“Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence has studied the Russia-Ukraine war very closely,” says Max Yu, a retired major general and former head of the cultural and psychological division of the defence ministry’s political warfare bureau. “Ukrainian soldiers’ defence strategy and how they defend their territory has become a model for Taiwan to follow.”

A man poses for photos with a pilot mascot at an army recruitment event in Taipei, Taiwan, this month. Photograph: Ann Wang/Reuters

While Taiwanese civilians can seem sanguine about the prospect of an attempted annexation by Beijing, politicians and military analysts are increasingly concerned that the island’s defences are not strong enough to repel an invasion from a more powerful aggressor. In the first half of this year, there were 854 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, up from 555 in the same period in 2022, according to data compiled by defence analysts Gerald C Brown, Ben Lewis and Alex Kung, based on government statistics.

Taiwan’s military has about 190,000 active personnel and some 2 million reservists. But while the war in Ukraine has underlined the importance of civilians in helping to fend off a powerful invader, only a fraction of the reservists are thought to be combat-ready. Last year, the government announced plans to double the number of reservists trained annually, to 260,000, and to intensify their training.

Historically, politicians have been wary of urging closer ties with the military. For older civilians, the armed forces are tainted by memories of martial law, when Taiwan was ruled as a brutal military dictatorship between 1949 and 1987. Between 3,000 and 4,000 actual or perceived critics of the military government were executed during the decades known as the “White Terror”. Some 140,000 were imprisoned.

The military suffers from a “perception problem,” says Dean Karalekas, an expert on civil-military relations in Taiwan at the University of Central Lancashire. “Not enough has been done to completely divest itself of the lingering association with its past … and adopt a new, more applicable institutional culture as a military of Taiwan, for Taiwan.”

Still, surveys suggest that public opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of extending conscription to one year. Polling by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation in December found that only one age-group were slightly more likely to oppose the idea than support it: 20 to 24-year-olds.

For younger people, a more pressing concern is the nature of the service itself. Some joke that the current four-month programme breeds “strawberry soldiers” who bruise easily and lack the training and knowledge that would be useful in a war. In 2021, the defence ministry overhauled the training programme so that conscripts would spend time with field units, but there are still complaints that the drills lack urban warfare or modern weaponry instruction.

“The training details should be upgraded, not the time spent,” says Li Hao-lun, an official in Kinmen for the ruling Democratic Progressive party. “The training details are from the past but today we’re talking about a modern war.”

Enoch Wu, a former special forces soldier and the founder of Forward Alliance, a defence thinktank that runs civil defence training courses, “The public is concerned that compulsory service would be extended without substantive reform.”

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A Manga-style comic promoting the new conscription policy, released by the defence ministry in Taiwan in April. Photograph: PR

Karalekas notes that the defence ministry’s promise to allocate every conscript 800 rounds of ammunition is “nowhere near enough to develop the required proficiency”.

As part of a campaign to promote the idea of national service, in April the ministry published a manga-style comic strip about a conscript who learns about the values of military training and the existential threats facing Taiwan.

Morale among troops is another problem, with some fearing that, in the face of Chinese aggression, defeat would be inevitable. That is in part because of Chinese “cognitive warfare”, says Max Yu. Chinese agents spread disinformation on social media about corruption in the Taiwanese military and the strength of the PLA, he says. So, as well as military training, Taiwanese conscripts watch weekly videos “to promote a kind of patriotism”. The videos are designed to “strengthen their determination to resist invasion” and to “recognise China as an enemy”.

The real problem may be money. In the past decade, defence spending’s share of the government budget has hardly altered. But now politicians are changing tack. Last year, the legislature approved a 13.9% increase to the defence budget for 2023, reaching 2.4% of GDP. The double-digit rise was a sharp increase on slow growth in defence spending since 2017.

In January, Taiwan’s voters will choose a new president. Both main parties accuse the other of being the party that will draw Taiwan closer to a conflict with China. Whoever wins the race, digging deeper into the government coffers for more weapons, more soldiers and more training will be near the top of their in-tray.

Additional research by Chi Hui Lin

The Guardian · by Amy Hawkins · July 9, 2023

5. U.S. fighting China on the wrong battlefield (US Kinetic vs. Chinese Political Warfare)

​There is a most excellent photo/meme with this article at the link (US Kinetic Warfare versus Political Warfare): https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/u-s-fighting-china-on-the-wrong-battlefield?utm_source=pocket_saves​

U.S. fighting China on the wrong battlefield - The Sunday Guardian Live

​sundayguardianlive.com · by Grant Newsham & Cleo Paskal · July 8, 2023

While the U.S. has been focused on preparing for the kinetic warfare battlefield, China has been registering big wins on the political warfare battlefield. You can see it all over the Pacific Islands.

Saipan

Exactly 79 years ago, on 9 July 1944, the American military secured the island of Saipan—a key component of Imperial Japan’s defence plan. Tens of thousands died in the battle, and the island was devastated.

Then it was rebuilt for war—with a massive effort to put in runways. Saipan and the neighboring island of Tinian, were soon among the busiest airports in the world, as waves of B-29s took off to bomb Japan—which was now in range—and markedly fewer B-29s returned.

On the top of Mount Tapochau, the highest point on the island, you can still see the scars seared in by the war. And from Mount Topachau, you can see the mismatched battlefield of the current cold war.

Out on the horizon, anchored off Saipan, are three U.S. Navy prepositioning ships, fully stocked and ready to respond to war and disaster. The kids of Saipan know that if they suddenly disappear from the horizon, something bad has probably happened. Yes, they respond to natural disasters, but they are also there, waiting, for “kinetic” conflict—a shooting war.

Meanwhile, also from Mount Tapochau, you can see the downtown hub of Garapan. The biggest building in downtown, by far, is the not quite finished massive Imperial Palace casino, backed by Chinese investors. Currently closed and being liquidated, the casino has wreaked havoc on the politics and economy of Saipan. And it’s still not over.

LOOKING AT THE WRONG BATTLEFIELD

While the U.S. has been focused on preparing for the kinetic warfare battlefield, China has been registering big wins, largely unopposed (except perhaps occasionally by its own corruption and ineptitude), on the political warfare battlefield.

You can see it all over the Pacific Islands—not coincidentally the zone of some of the most vicious fighting of World War II. Geography means that any Pacific Asian country that wants to project its power, must first contain or control this area.

The Chinese Communist Party knows this history. It is targeting the same deep ports, strategic airfields, and resources the Japanese did, but they are doing it through political warfare, while the US looks for kinetic signals.

For example, in May, the United States made what seemed to be big gain on the kinetic front, when a defence deal was agreed with Papua New Guinea (PNG). Less noticed was that, in June, PNG Prime Minister James Marape presented a reciprocal visa waiver agreement with China to Parliament, saying: “This reciprocal visa waiver agreement is a significant step towards enhancing business and tourism potential between China and Papua New Guinea.”

Not long after that, two officials from the USINDOPACOM’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance did not obtain visas to participate in a PNG-approved disaster response exercise. This has echoes of the US Coast Guard ships on illegal fisheries patrols not being able to obtain entry to Solomon Islands or Vanuatu ports.

All are hits to the US on the political warfare front—blocking them out of working with allies, building trust and bolstering relationships. It’s below the kinetic threshold so it barely registers in Washington, but it’s a win for China (and a loss for the people of those countries who want both more humanitarian assistance and help with illegal fisheries).

It’s almost as if the US is colour blind and can’t see the countries being painted red—it at best talks of things getting a bit more grey (zone).

CENTRALITY OF THE CENTRAL PACIFIC

An area where the stakes for the US (and those who believe in a free and open Indo-Pacific) of getting it wrong are especially high is the Central Pacific. Included in the Central Pacific are two parts of the United States—Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), of which Saipan is a part.

Also included are three island nations, stretching from west to east—Republic of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and Republic of Marshall Islands—that occupy an area about as large as the continental United States. This is strategic geography by any standard.

Starting nearly 40 years ago, each of those three independent nations entered into a “Compact of Free Association” (COFA) with the US. These countries are known collectively as the Freely Associated States (FAS).

These complex agreements, currently being renegotiated, provide the three countries with financial and other assistance—to include the right of their citizens to live and work in the United States. Washington also undertook responsibility for the nations’ defence, to include the right to prevent any foreign military presence in each of the COFA states.

The deep relationship between the US and the FAS is considered such a given, unimpeded access has been an unspoken assumption in US defence plans for decades.

However, over the last 30 years (some would say longer) the People’s Republic of China has insinuated itself into the commercial and political systems of each FAS nation, to the point American control is no longer the “sure thing” it was once thought. Indeed, one of the three, Marshall Islands, has yet to complete its renewal of the financial and services portion of its COFA—something that expires on 30 September 2023.

Ultimately, the United States took the FAS for granted—apparently assuming that since it “had a contract” there was nothing to worry about. Washington also assumed that all would be well since it was providing considerable aid to the FAS—direct financial payments as well as support for education, health care, infrastructure development, and even postal services and weather forecasting services, as well as offering the right of FAS citizens to reside in the United States and providing “military protection” for the island nations.

The PRC took advantage of American complacency and patiently and diligently went about establishing and expanding its influence in the FAS. The Chinese applied a recognizable “sequence”—starting with a commercial presence that included Chinese nationals on the ground and operating businesses—and down to the corner shop level.

Chinese economic inroads also included Chinese involvement, and indeed, outright control of key industries—including local fishing industries—that are the main economic resources for the FAS nations. There is also substantial PRC-linked criminal activity.

This commercial/criminal presence created political influence—directly with local officials and other citizens who saw the Chinese presence as a valuable thing in an economy with limited prospects. It was also personally valuable for many local officials and politicians. In Palau, the Chinese successfully “weaponized” the tourism industry to influence local officials and others. And this approach has also been used in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) via the offer of massive investments by Chinese resort companies.

All in all, the Chinese were (and are) seen by many in the FAS as an economic lifeline. And while the local intention may be to have Chinese money in addition to American support via the COFAs, the effect—and the PRC’s intentions—are to eventually displace the United States in the Central Pacific. Then forget any economic largess from anyone—China will block economic access by others and revert to its usual purely parasitic economic engagement while setting up the infrastructure it wants to project political and kinetic power.

A necessary step towards that goal to get the two FAS that recognize Taiwan, Palau and Marshall Islands, to derecognize Taipei so that China can set up the forward operating base of political warfare, a Chinese Embassy.

U.S. (NON)-RESPONSE

The US has been too slow to recognize what has been happening—even though Chinese influence efforts have been reported—even via US diplomatic channels. And, of course, there is a whacking great, gilded casino in the heart of Saipan.

It failed, but that was because the operators (who are still floating around Saipan) cut corners. It never should have been started. The Americans had (and still have) no political warfare scheme of their own—so the Chinese have effectively operated unchallenged.

While bribery and under the table payments are part and parcel of Chinese activities in each FAS nation, there is next to no downside risk to taking Chinese money owing to scant prospects of such activities being revealed or, if revealed, punished.

The US also has been unsuccessful in drawing major commercial interests into the region in any meaningful way. This could be owing to a lack of business know-how and imagination in US diplomatic and official circles. It is exacerbated by a failure to work together with partners—such as the Japanese, Taiwanese, South Koreans, and Indians on commercial and other broader approaches to bolstering the US and other free-nations’ presence and interests in the region.

WHAT TO DO

The majority of citizens in the region want nothing to do with the PRC. But they want, indeed they need, the Americans and other like-mindeds to “step up” and demonstrate their reputed commitment to the region. In many ways, this is what India has been trying to do in similar circumstances in the Indian Ocean, and tentatively, since Prime Minister Modi’s visit to PNG in May, in the Pacific.

While not ignoring kinetic preparations, including in places like the Himalayas and Taiwan, it would help to start mutual reinforcements on the political warfare battlefield, realize what is at stake and quickly develop and implement a proper campaign plan to bolster presence and position and to take on Chinese influence efforts—to include the PRC’s highly effective use of under the table financial and other corrupt methods of establishing Beijing’s influence. This needs to be exposed—and intelligence and law enforcement resources need to be deployed at proper scale.

Locals fighting to liberate their countries, and economies, are clear. In a February 2023 Senate hearing, CNMI Governor Arnold I. Palacios said: “The interests of the Marianas in getting our government’s financial house in order, shoring up our economy, strengthening our infrastructure, and stabilizing our population are inextricably linked with the interests of our nation and our allies in a secure and peaceful Indo-Pacific.”

What help has he asked for? Tanks, ammunition, missiles? He wants FBI agents, forensic audits, tax investigators, lawyers and a range of other fighters that can really make a difference on the political warfare battlefield, especially when the invading force is using criminality as its weapon of choice.

Governor Palacios gets it. Saipan is back on the frontline. The battle looks different this time but, left undefended, the outcome might be just as dire. Seventy-nine years ago, a massive effort was made to rebuild Saipan (and the region) for kinetic war. Rebuild it (and the region) now for a viable and defensible peace, and we have a chance to avoid that sort of war, and keep those prepositioning ships reassuringly in sight of the children of Saipan.

Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine Colonel and the author of When China Attacks. Cleo Paskal is Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies and The Sunday Guardian Special Correspondent.

sundayguardianlive.com · by Grant Newsham & Cleo Paskal · July 8, 2023

6. Wagner PMC Exemplifies How Putin Has Destroyed Russian State – Analysis

Conclusion:

Many remain reluctant to speak of Russia as a failed state because some components of the Russian political system remain strong. However, this hesitation misses the point that a failed state is not one without powerful players, but rather a political system without a controlling center, and, if the personalist dictator holding things together passes from the scene, the lack of such institutionalization can prove fatal. (On that critical distinction and the need to make it in the Russian case, see this author’s article, “Russia as a Failed State: Domestic Difficulties and Foreign Challenges,”2004.) As Putin’s power ebbs in the wake of the Prigozhin mutiny and because his aging has elevated concerns about what he will leave behind, the fact that the Kremlin leader has destroyed rather than rebuilt the Russian state will become ever-more central to discussions about the future of the Russian Federation.

Wagner PMC Exemplifies How Putin Has Destroyed Russian State – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Paul Goble · July 10, 2023

Russian President Vladimir Putin has long promoted himself as the man who rebuilt the power of the Russian state after the chaos of the 1990s. However, the Wagner Group mutiny highlights why that rings false—not only because it was an armed challenge to Putin’s authority but also because the relationship between the Kremlin leader and Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner “private military company” (PMC), is a model of how Putin has dealt with others in the Russian political elite across the board.

In case after case, the Russian president has destroyed the institutions of the Russian state and replaced them with others based on personal ties and private understandings, a situation that has led some observers to describe the Putin regime as a failed state. This in turn amplifies worries about the coming post-Putin transition, where the absence of institutions linked together by law and transparent practice could easily lead to a war of all against all in which force alone will determine the outcome. (For a magisterial discussion of this, see Bugajski, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, 2022).

Most Western commentaries on the Wagner uprising have focused on the events themselves rather than on the ways in which the actions of both Prigozhin and Putin act as an X-ray into the inner workings of the current Russian system of power. On the contrary, an increasing number of Russian observers are focusing on precisely this aspect of the situation. (See, for example, Novayagazeta.eu, June 27; Reforum.io; Svoboda; Kasparov.ru, July 2). Perhaps the most thoughtful and comprehensive of these analyses is offered by Ilya Matveev, a Russian scholar who now teaches at the University of California, Berkeley, on the Important Stories portal (Istories.media, June 27). He argues that Prigozhin’s PMC and its actions are not some outlier in the Russian landscape as many think but rather highlight the ways in which, as a result of Putin’s pursuit of a personalist dictatorship, such organizations have displaced not only the Russian military but effectively destroyed the Russian state as such.

According to Matveev, what most people even now continue to refer to as the Russian state is in fact one giant set of privatized and semi-privatized institutions that are related to one another and to the Kremlin on the basis of that reality rather than according to the traditional norms of a functioning state. When Putin became president, the Russian scholar says, he declared that “Russia needs strong state power and must have it”; however, over the 23 years of his rule, Putin has weakened the state both in terms of its monopoly on the use of violence and its status as a single entity effectively controlled by a single center. As a result, Matveev continues, Putin’s much-ballyhooed “power vertical” has turned out “to be as fragile as a porcelain cup”—and this has happened not because of some tectonic shift but as the direct result of Putin’s actions. The Kremlin leader wanted to modernize the Russian economy but “did not trust either private business or, what is if anything more important, the state itself.” Consequently, Putin turned to the formation of “state corporations” that occupied a gray zone between the two and then extended the principles on which they were put together to other parts of the political system.

Thus, Matveev continues, “’statism’ in Putin’s version is not a commitment to the Weberian ideal of a rational, meritocratic corps of bureaucrats but rather to an ideology of specifically understood ‘national interests’ for the implementation of which all means are good and formalities are of little importance.” Under these arrangements, personal loyalty to Putin became everything and loyalty to the state ever-less important. That in turn has led to a situation in which state corporations, and the PMCs that are a subset of them, often resisted the demands of the state, typically in non-violent ways but now by violent means as well (Istories.media, June 27).

Putin did this “because his main task was the support of a regime of personal power” rather than the creation of a powerful state as such. Yet, paradoxically, the Russian scholar argues, “the strengthening of the political regime (that is, the regime of Putin’s personal power) led to a weakening of the state”—and the converse would be true as well, making any future transition difficult for a leader seeking to build his own power. Citing the work of British scholar Neil Robinson, Matveev says that it is quite possible to distinguish in the Russian case between state building and regime building and to see clearly how the pursuit of one can lead to the weakening of the other. Except since the very start of his rule, Putin has focused on the latter rather than the former—and the result is the Prigozhin mutiny, “which revealed the weakness of the Russian state” that Putin’s own policies have generated.

“Behind the monolithic façade of Putinism are clans, networks and corporations pursuing their own goals and quite capable of bringing the country to collapse and civil war,” asserts Matveev. Indeed, it is instructive that the revolt of one of these entities was contested by another—that of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen forces. Any movement toward democracy will involve the disorganization of the state as happened in the 1990s, he argues. “But only a democratic transition can ultimately lead to the emergence of a strong, capable state in Russia” (Istories.media, June 27). Putin was right in 1999; but since then, he has done everything but follow his own understanding in the hopes of maximizing his own power.

Many remain reluctant to speak of Russia as a failed state because some components of the Russian political system remain strong. However, this hesitation misses the point that a failed state is not one without powerful players, but rather a political system without a controlling center, and, if the personalist dictator holding things together passes from the scene, the lack of such institutionalization can prove fatal. (On that critical distinction and the need to make it in the Russian case, see this author’s article, “Russia as a Failed State: Domestic Difficulties and Foreign Challenges,”2004.) As Putin’s power ebbs in the wake of the Prigozhin mutiny and because his aging has elevated concerns about what he will leave behind, the fact that the Kremlin leader has destroyed rather than rebuilt the Russian state will become ever-more central to discussions about the future of the Russian Federation.

This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 109

eurasiareview.com · by Paul Goble · July 10, 2023

7. Top US military leader must step down as Sen. Tuberville continues blocking replacement

Excerpts:

Speaking about his hold on the appointments in February, Sen. Tuberville said he would hold all officer nominations unless Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin seeks Congressional permission for abortion services for service members.

“This is an illegal expansion of DoD authority and gross misuse of taxpayer dollars— and I will hold him accountable. The American people want a military focused on national defense, not facilitating a progressive political agenda,” Tuberville said in a statement to Fox News in February.

In June, the White House called Sen. Tuberville’s hold on military nominations a “threat to national security,” and said his position is risking military readiness and harming military families.

The Senator has disagreed. He tweeted in June that he does not believe the situation is preventing military officials from doing their jobs.

“All of these jobs are being done,” he said.

Top US military leader must step down as Sen. Tuberville continues blocking replacement

Stars and Stripes · by Sarah Whites-Koditschek · July 10, 2023

Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., attends a Capitol Hill news conference on June 14, 2023. (Joe Gromelski/Special to Stars and Stripes)

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(Tribune News Service) — Sen. Tommy Tuberville’s hold on military nominations means the Biden Administration won’t be able to permanently replace a top leader in the Marine Corps who is required by law to leave his post on Monday.

Commandant Gen. David Berger must step down Monday from his four-year tour, a term of service that cannot be extended unless the U.S. is at war or in the event of a national emergency.

President Joe Biden nominated Gen. Eric Smith to replace Berger. But for now Smith’s appointment will be on a temporary basis, as Tuberville, Alabama’s senior Senator, has placed a hold on all Defense Department appointments.

Spokespeople for Sen. Tuberville did not respond to a request for comment Sunday.

The senator placed the hold on nominations in mid-February in response to the Department announcing policies to give assistance for service members seeking abortions. The policies allow them to request administrative absence for “non-covered reproductive health services,” including elective abortions and IVF, for themselves of their partners. The policies also offer transportation allowances for travel to states that offer abortions.

Other top military positions are slated to become vacant soon and could be impacted if Tuberville’s continues his blockade of appointments.

Speaking about his hold on the appointments in February, Sen. Tuberville said he would hold all officer nominations unless Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin seeks Congressional permission for abortion services for service members.

“This is an illegal expansion of DoD authority and gross misuse of taxpayer dollars— and I will hold him accountable. The American people want a military focused on national defense, not facilitating a progressive political agenda,” Tuberville said in a statement to Fox News in February.

In June, the White House called Sen. Tuberville’s hold on military nominations a “threat to national security,” and said his position is risking military readiness and harming military families.

The Senator has disagreed. He tweeted in June that he does not believe the situation is preventing military officials from doing their jobs.

“All of these jobs are being done,” he said.

Stars and Stripes · by Sarah Whites-Koditschek · July 10, 2023

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 9.
• The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Ukrainian forces are attempting to soften Russian defenses before liberating territory, accepting a slower pace of advance.
• US President Joe Biden stated that Ukraine cannot join NATO until Russia’s war in Ukraine is over.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed Turkey’s decision to allow the release of five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan on July 9.
• The Russian ultranationalist community continued to blame the Kremlin for trusting Turkey to uphold the deal and to keep Azovstal defenders in Turkey.
• Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) is deliberately censoring him.
• Central African Republic (CAR) Presidental Spokesperson Albert Yaloke Mokpem stated on July 8 that Wagner Group personnel leaving CAR are conducting rotations and are not withdrawing.
• Unknown persons leaked an image of what appears to be the Wagner Group’s founding charter on July 9, possibly to present the Wagner Group as a professional organization.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not rapidly dispose of the Wagner Group and prosecute rebellion participants is placing himself and his subordinates in an awkward position.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Russian forces advanced as of July 9.
• Ukrainian forces continued to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area, and continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces reportedly continued to reestablish previously flooded positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly accepting Wagner Group mercenaries for contract service with the Russian MoD in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 9, 2023

Jul 9, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 9, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on July 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 9. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces successfully continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction.[1] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking Russian positions in small groups and are targeting Russian rear positions, warehouses, and infrastructure.[4] Ukrainian military officials also reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing their interdiction campaigns in southern and eastern Ukraine.[5]

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Ukrainian forces are attempting to soften Russian defenses before liberating territory, accepting a slower pace of advance.[6] The WSJ also reported that Ukrainian forces are focusing on dislodging Russian forces from fortifications and minefields, which are over 24km deep in some areas of Russian occupied territory.[7] Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Telehin of Ukraine’s 108th Territorial Defense Brigade told the WSJ that Russian forces are continually able to bring in replacements even if Ukrainian forces destroy entire units.[8] ISW has assessed that Russian forces lack operational reserves. Telehin’s statement likely refers to locally available tactical reserves. Another unit commander in the 108th Territorial Defense Brigade stated that the shortage of armored vehicles makes it difficult for Ukrainian forces to advance on well-prepared positions. WSJ sources also cited the lack of Ukrainian air superiority as one of the factors slowing down Ukrainian counteroffensives. ISW continues to assess that the current pace of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is reflective of a deliberate effort to conserve Ukrainian combat power and attrit Russian manpower and equipment at the cost of slower territorial advances.[9]

US President Joe Biden stated that Ukraine cannot join NATO until Russia’s war in Ukraine is over. Biden told CNN on July 9 that it is premature to vote on Ukraine’s NATO membership and that the alliance should “lay out a rational path for Ukraine to be able to qualify to be able to get into NATO.”[10] Biden’s statement follows Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s July 7 statement that Ukraine “deserves NATO membership” and precedes the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11 and July 12.[11]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed Turkey’s decision to allow the release of five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan on July 9.[12] Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey previously agreed in September 2022 that Azovstal commanders would remain in Turkey for the duration of the war after Russia freed some Azovstal defenders in an Ankara-brokered prisoner exchange.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky brought five Azovstal commanders home to Ukraine on July 8.[14] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced that Lavrov and Fidan discussed the situation regarding the release of Azovstal defenders in a phone call initiated by the Turkish side but did not provide additional details regarding the discussion.[15] Lavrov reportedly emphasized to Fidan that further deliveries of military aid to Ukraine are “destructive” and “can lead to negative consequences,” likely in an effort to discourage further military support for Ukraine. The Turkish MFA also noted that Fidan and Lavrov discussed the United Nations-brokered grain export deal, while the Russian MFA predictably blamed the West for its “inability to take necessary steps” to implement the agreement.[16] The grain deal expires on July 17, and it is likely that the Kremlin will threaten to not extend the deal to advance its objectives.[17]

The Russian ultranationalist community continued to blame the Kremlin for trusting Turkey to uphold the deal and to keep Azovstal defenders in Turkey. Russian ultranationalists have been consistently criticizing the Kremlin’s decisions to free Azovstal defenders in other prisoner exchanges because the Kremlin had portrayed these Ukrainian fighters as “Nazis” during the Battle of Mariupol.[18] One Russian milblogger observed that the release of Azovstal defenders undermines Russia’s aim to ”denazify” Ukraine, while another milblogger implied that Russia should not have trusted Turkey to uphold the deal given that Turkey is Russia’s ”historical enemy.”[19] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russia could have avoided this release by not organizing the initial prisoner of war (POW) exchange in 2022, and another Russian milblogger stated that Russia was once again misled because Russian officials irresponsibly prioritized the release of Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk - who is a godfather to one of Putin’s children - from Ukrainian captivity.[20] Another milblogger stated that the news of the Azovstal commanders’ release had upset Russian military personnel on the frontlines and urged people to reevaluate the reasons for Wagner Group’s armed rebellion – implying that the rebellion’s goals of changes within the Russian military command and information space are still needed in Russia.[21] The milblogger added that this incident is one of many incidents since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that are dividing Russian society.[22]

Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) is deliberately censoring him. Girkin reported that his talk about the Wagner Group armed rebellion was canceled at the Listva bookstore in St. Petersburg on July 9 after St. Petersburg law enforcement responded to a claimed bomb threat at the bookstore.[23] Girkin and Listva complained on July 8 that St. Petersburg police warned Listva not to host the event, but Listva claimed it would host the event despite the warning.[24] Russian police routinely cancel events under the premise of bomb threats to censor public figures.[25] Girkin claimed that someone attempted to censor his event and discussed three potential culprits.[26] Girkin sarcastically hypothesized that the government perceives him as a greater threat than Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and 15,000 Wagner military personnel. Girkin also noted that Prigozhin may own and fully control the Listva bookstore.[27] Listva has notably promoted Girkin and hosted many prior events with him, and it is unclear why a Prigozhin-owned bookstore would first try to host such an event and then cancel it.[28] Girkin also suggested that UZKS Head Lieutenant General Aleksey Zhalo may have censored his event, either because he had gone crazy or because he is under Prigozhin’s influence.[29] Girkin’s mention of Zhalo stands out as the only serious theory Girkin offered.

The FSB’s possible soft censorship of Girkin may be part of a longstanding feud between Girkin and Zhalo. Zhalo previously orchestrated FSB crackdowns on Russian ultranationalist groups and charged their leaders with terrorism and fraud.[30] Girkin, who led an ultranationalist movement, publicly criticized Zhalo and the FSB in 2018 for further arrests of individuals in the ultranationalist pro-separatist movement and for failing to combat the Ukrainian Azov Regiment’s recruitment measures.[31] Girkin claimed in 2018 that he personally knew Zhalo, criticized Zhalo as a ”thief” and a ”hypocrite,” and claimed that Zhalo is one of multiple Russian officials who stand against him.[32]

Central African Republic (CAR) Presidential Spokesperson Albert Yaloke Mokpem stated on July 8 that Wagner Group personnel leaving CAR are conducting rotations and are not withdrawing.[33] Reuters reported that a CAR military source claimed that several hundred Wagner forces recently left CAR, and ISW observed footage published on July 6 purportedly showing 600 Wagner personnel departing from an airport in Bangui, CAR.[34] ISW previously assessed that some Wagner personnel in CAR may be leaving after refusing to sign contracts with the Russian MoD given similar reports of Wagner personnel departing Syria.[35] Wagner personnel may be attempting to remain in CAR to maintain control over Wagner-owned natural resource extraction operations in CAR.[36]

Unknown persons leaked an image of what appears to be the Wagner Group’s founding charter on July 9, possibly to present the Wagner Group as a professional organization. The document, dated May 1, 2014, commits Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner Group commander Dmitry Utkin to follow a set of rules for their new private military company’s participation for combat in eastern Ukraine.[37] Prigozhin’s duties as “director” include the responsibility to provide weapons and funding; provide guarantees for the killed and wounded; provide permanent work; protect personnel against criminal charges for mercenaryism (article 359 of Russia’s Criminal Code); resolve all issues “collegially”; participate in person; and not go against the Russian nation.[38] Utkin’s responsibilities as “commander” were to select and train personnel; get rid of deserters; prohibit alcohol and drugs; resolve issues “collegially”; implement lessons learned and complete tasks to the end; not go against “VVP” (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin); and not lie or deceive and always tell the truth as it is.[39] It is unclear who leaked this document or why. Russian law enforcement, which raided Prigozhin’s home, and pro-Prigozhin actors likely had access to the document.[40] The leak may be part of an effort to rehabilitate Wagner’s image following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion. The document reiterates that Wagner’s founding principles are to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine in loyal service to Russian President Vladimir Putin and “the Russian nation.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not rapidly dispose of the Wagner Group and prosecute rebellion participants is placing himself and his subordinates in an awkward position. It remains unclear who benefits from the leak of Wagner’s alleged founding document as the document makes the Wagner Group look professional and appealing in comparison with the regular Russian military. Wagner is still reportedly recruiting within Russia while the Russian MoD is reportedly conducting a competing effort to recruit Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the MoD.[41] Putin’s decision to not dispose of the Wagner Group – previously Russia's most combat capable force – is making it difficult for Putin and other Russian power players to know how to interact with the Wagner Group and its leaders and fighters.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 9.
• The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Ukrainian forces are attempting to soften Russian defenses before liberating territory, accepting a slower pace of advance.
• US President Joe Biden stated that Ukraine cannot join NATO until Russia’s war in Ukraine is over.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed Turkey’s decision to allow the release of five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan on July 9.
• The Russian ultranationalist community continued to blame the Kremlin for trusting Turkey to uphold the deal and to keep Azovstal defenders in Turkey.
• Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) is deliberately censoring him.
• Central African Republic (CAR) Presidental Spokesperson Albert Yaloke Mokpem stated on July 8 that Wagner Group personnel leaving CAR are conducting rotations and are not withdrawing.
• Unknown persons leaked an image of what appears to be the Wagner Group’s founding charter on July 9, possibly to present the Wagner Group as a professional organization.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not rapidly dispose of the Wagner Group and prosecute rebellion participants is placing himself and his subordinates in an awkward position.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Russian forces advanced as of July 9.
• Ukrainian forces continued to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area, and continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces reportedly continued to reestablish previously flooded positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly accepting Wagner Group mercenaries for contract service with the Russian MoD in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna on July 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Berestove (20km northeast of Svatove), Novoselivske (13km northwest of Svatove), Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), Spirne (25km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[42] Footage posted on July 9 purportedly shows Ukrainian forces respelling a small platoon-sized Russian assault with tank and infantry fighting vehicle support near Bilohorivka.[43] Footage posted on July 9 purportedly shows artillery elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) operating near Kotlyarivka (27km northwest of Svatove), units of the 120th Guards Artillery Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating near Kreminna, and units of the 3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade operating in the Lyman direction.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Svatove direction and near Novovodyane (25km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), Torske (16km west of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (33km south of Kreminna).[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area on July 9. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have been successful and continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made some advances west of Andriivka (8km south of Bakhmut) but that they failed to capture a dominant height approaching Andriivka.[47] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) were unsuccessful. Other Russian milbloggers claimed that the situation for Ukrainian forces near Klishchiivka is improving and restated that Russian control of this settlement is vital to the broader Russian defense of Bakhmut.[48] One milblogger complained that the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps) is inadequately defending in the Klishchiivka area and left holes in its defensive lines that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division must fill.[49] Elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade previously failed to hold their positions against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area in May 2023, demonstrating pervasive issues with the Russian force generation effort and drawing extensive ire in the Russian information space.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian 98th VDV Division is defending against Ukrainian ground attacks near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[51]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted failed ground attacks from their positions in Berkhivka.[53] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces had unspecified tactical successes north of Bakhmut, however.[54]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Russian forces advanced as of July 9. Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances southwest of Vesele (4km northeast of Avdiivka) as of July 9.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhaillivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted unsuccessful ground attacks southwest of Avdiivka.[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske, and Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka).[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area on July 9. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and counter-battery measures in the Berdyansk direction.[59] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Pryyutne (17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) from the north and are currently about 2km away from the settlement.[60] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked from the direction of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) towards Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[61] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Blahodatne.[62]

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Russian “Vostok” volunteer battalion and Russian artillery, missile, and air strikes repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv), Novodanylivka (6km southeast of Orikhiv), and Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv).[63] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks towards Robotyne but were not successful.[64] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian assault group broke through Russian defenses on the seam between unspecified Russian regiments northeast of Robotyne and that fighting is ongoing for control over positions of the 7th company of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]).[65] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew personnel from Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) but noted that Ukrainian forces retain positions between Zherebyanky (27km southwest of Orikhiv) and Pyatykhatky.[66] ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming Russian claims at the time of this publication. A Russian source indicated that elements of the Russian BARS-1 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) volunteer detachment are operating as part of the 70thGuards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, SMD) alongside drone operators from the “Tsarskiye Volky” (Tsar’s Wolves) detachment in the Zaporizhia direction.[67] A Russian source also noted that elements of the Russian “Osman” Spetsnaz unit are fighting in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

Russian forces reportedly continued to reestablish positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River that were previously flooded after the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[69] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Captain Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are partially successful in restoring some positions but continue to encounter mines that dispersed throughout Russian positions during the flood.[70] Humenyuk noted that many Russian servicemen are reluctant to return to their abandoned positions due to mining but that the Russian military command forces them to do so. Russian milbloggers previously claimed that Russian forces suffered significant casualties along the coast after being caught in minefields as they attempted to suppress Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge.[71]

Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 9. Crimean Occupation Head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defense systems shot down a cruise missile in the Kerch area, and Crimean Occupation Ministry of Transport reportedly temporarily stopped traffic over the bridge resulting in a 3.5km to 6km traffic jam.[72] Russian milbloggers shared footage of Russian air defense systems activating but it is unclear what weapon these systems shot down.[73] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger doubted Aksyonov’s claim about Russian forces shooting down a cruise missile, noting that Ukrainian aircraft would need to launch a missile from a dangerously close position near the frontline.[74]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly accepting Wagner Group mercenaries for contract service with the Russian MoD in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai. Independent Russian media outlet SOTA reported on July 9 that the MoD introduced new requirements for Wagner fighters who join the regular Russian military and shared a screenshot with a list of the numerous documents which Wagner fighters must submit to the Russian MoD to sign a contract.[75] Wagner fighters reportedly must provide documents about fighters’ psychological and physical health and financial documents to ensure the Wagner fighters are not in debt.[76] SOTA reported that the Russian MoD is currently in processing Wagner fighters at an unspecified facility in Molkino in Krasnodar Krai.[77] It remains unclear how many Wagner fighters are opting to sign contracts with the Russian MoD as opposed to remaining with the Prigozhin-led Wagner elements that will reportedly relocate to Belarus within the next few months.

Russian Telegram channels are promoting recruitment for a Russian Orthodox “Archangel Michael” volunteer battalion.[78] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified a recruitment advertisement on July 9 for the Orthodox “Archangel Michael” volunteer battalion, which offers its fighters a monthly salary of 215,000 rubles (about $2,356) - an increase from its previous offered pay of 195,000 rubles (about $2,137) earlier in July.[79] The advertisement states that the battalion will accept any volunteer regardless of military specialty.[80] The battalion has been operating in Ukraine since at least May 2022. Russian sources reported that the “Archangel Michael” battalion was active near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast, in May 2022, and near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, in September 2022.[81]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) 

Russian occupation authorities continue forced passportization in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials issued resident permits for three months to all hospital employees who did not receive a Russian passport Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast.[82] The General Staff reported that Russian occupation officials are forcing hospital employees to obtain Russian passports within three months or risk property confiscation and deportation from occupied territories to an unspecified area. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation authorities are offering maternity capital if parents apply for Russian passports for children up to 14 years old.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian authorities kidnap and torture civilians who refuse Russian passports and noted that Russian forces tortured civilians for refusing Russian passports in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast.[84] ISW has previously reported on continued Russian forced passportization in occupied Ukraine.[85]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

9. An Accident Waiting To Happen: NATO Looks To Asia – OpEd

Some of these comments really indicate the author's agenda:

But the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Washington’s beady eyes in Canberra, celebrated this “shift to taking a truly global approach to strategic competition”.   

...

 The latest talk of further Asian engagement should also be greeted with a sense of dread.

...

Even that old provoking power, the United States, is not entirely sure whether doors should be open to Kyiv

​Conclusion:

The record of this ceramic breaking bloc speaks for itself. In its post-Cold War visage, the alliance has undermined its own mission to foster stability, becoming Washington’s axe, spear and spade. Where NATO goes, war is most likely. Countries of the Indo-Pacific, take note.

​

An Accident Waiting To Happen: NATO Looks To Asia – OpEd – Eurasia Review

eurasiareview.com · by Binoy Kampmark

Since the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has distinctly strayed from its original purpose. It has become, almost shamelessly, the vessel and handmaiden of US power, while its burgeoning expansion eastwards has done wonders to upend the applecart of stability. 

From that upending, the alliance started bungling. It engaged, without the authorisation of the UN Security Council, in a 78-day bombing campaign of Yugoslavia – at least what was left of it – ostensibly to protect the lives of Kosovar Albanians. Far from dampening the tinderbox, the Kosovo affair continues to be an explosion in the making. 

Members of the alliance also expended material, money and personnel in Afghanistan over the course of two decades, propping up a deeply unpopular, corrupt regime in Kabul while failing to stifle the Taliban. As with previous imperial projects, the venture proved to be a catastrophic failure. 

In 2011, NATO again was found wanting in its attack on the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. While it was intended to be an exemplar of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, the intervention served to eventually topple the doomed Colonel Gaddafi, precipitating the de-facto partitioning of Libya and endangering the very civilians the mission was meant to protect. A continent was thereby destabilised. The true beneficiaries proved to be the tapestry of warring rebel groups characterised by sectarian impulses and a voracious appetite for human rights abuses and war crimes.

The Ukraine War has been another crude lesson in the failings of the NATO project. The constant teasing and wooing of Kyiv as a potential future member never sat well with Moscow and while much can be made of the Russian invasion, no realistic assessment of the war’s origins can excise NATO from playing a deep, compromised role. 

The alliance is also proving dissonant among its members. Not all are exactly jumping at the chance of admitting Ukraine. German diplomats have revealed that they will block any current moves to join the alliance. Even that old provoking power, the United States, is not entirely sure whether doors should be open to Kyiv. On CNN, President Joe Biden expressed the view that he did not “think it’s ready for membership of NATO.” To qualify, Ukraine would have to meet a number of “qualifications” from “democratisation to a whole range of other issues.” While hardly proving very alert during the interview (at one point, he confused Ukraine with Russia) he did draw the logical conclusion that bringing Kyiv into an alliance of obligatory collective defence during current hostilities would automatically put NATO at war with Moscow.

With such a spotty, blood speckled record marked by stumbles and bungles, any suggestions of further engagement by the alliance in other areas of the globe should be treated with abundant wariness. The latest talk of further Asian engagement should also be greeted with a sense of dread. According to a July 7 statement, “The Indo-Pacific is important for the Alliance, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. Moreover, NATO and its partners in the region share a common goal of working together to strengthen the rules-based international order.” With these views, conflict lurks.

The form of that engagement is being suggested by such ideas as opening a liaison office in Japan, intended as the first outpost in Asia. It also promises to feature in the NATO summit to take place in Vilnius on July 11 and 12, which will again repeat the attendance format of the Madrid summit held in 2022. That new format – featuring the presence of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, or the AP4, should have induced much head scratching. But the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Washington’s beady eyes in Canberra, celebrated this “shift to taking a truly global approach to strategic competition”.  

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg is also much in favour of such competition, warning member states of Beijing’s ambitions. “We should not make the same mistake with China and other authoritarian regimes,” he suggested, alluding to a dangerous and flawed comparison between Ukraine and Taiwan. “What is happening in Europe today could happen in Asia tomorrow.”

One of the prominent headscratchers at this erroneous reasoning is French President Emmanuel Macron. Taking issue with setting up the Japan liaison office, Macron has expressed opposition to such expansion by an alliance which, at least in terms of treaty obligations, has a strict geographical limit. In the words of an Elysée Palace official, “As far as the office is concerned, the Japanese authorities themselves have told us that they are not extremely attached to it.” With a headmaster’s tone, the official went on to give journalists an elementary lesson. “NATO means North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” The centrality of Articles 5 and 6 of the alliance were “geographic” in nature.

In 2021, Macron made it clear that NATO’s increasingly obsessed approach with China as a dangerous belligerent entailed a confusion of goals. “NATO is a military organisation, the issue of our relationship with China isn’t just a military issue. NATO is an organisation that concerns the North Atlantic, China has little to do with the North Atlantic.”

Such views have also pleased former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, whose waspish ire has also been trained on the NATO Secretary-General. In his latest statement, Stoltenberg was condemned as “the supreme fool” of “the international stage”. “Stoltenberg by instinct and policy, is simply an accident on its way to happen”. In thinking that “China should be superintended by the West and strategically circumscribed”, the NATO official had overlooked the obvious point that the country “represents twenty percent of humanity and now possesses the largest economy in the world … and has no record for attacking other states, unlike the United States, whose bidding Stoltenberg is happy to do”.

The record of this ceramic breaking bloc speaks for itself. In its post-Cold War visage, the alliance has undermined its own mission to foster stability, becoming Washington’s axe, spear and spade. Where NATO goes, war is most likely. Countries of the Indo-Pacific, take note.

eurasiareview.com · by Binoy Kampmark

10. She dreamed of defending Japan. Instead, her fellow soldiers sexually assaulted her

Another tragic military story.

There is also a video report at this link: https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/07/10/exp-japan-rinas-war-marc-stewart-071003aseg1-cnni-world.cnn

She dreamed of defending Japan. Instead, her fellow soldiers sexually assaulted her

https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/09/asia/japan-self-defense-force-sexual-harassment-hnk-intl-dst/

By Emiko Jozuka, Marc Stewart, Junko Ogura, Moeri Karasawa and Daniel Campisi, CNN

Updated 2:51 AM EDT, Mon July 10, 2023

TokyoCNN — 

Rina Gonoi is a fighter.

As a former soldier, as a judo practitioner, and as a woman battling on behalf of all women to bring those who sexually abused her to account.

When Gonoi served in Japan’s Self-Defense Force (JSDF), she says she endured physical and verbal sexual abuse on a daily basis for more than a year, and vowed when she left the force in June 2022 after two years’ service that she would bring her tormentors to justice.

At first, authorities seemed unwilling to believe her. When she reported the alleged abuse to military authorities, two investigations were launched, but both were dropped on grounds of lack of evidence.

Undefeated, she approached TV stations. When they ignored her, she took her battle to social media – a rare move in a country where sexual assault survivors can face backlash for raising their voices.

“I wanted to help other people who had also been sexually harassed (in the JSDF). As for the perpetrators, I wanted an apology and for them to admit to what they had done; I wanted to prevent others from going through what I went through; that’s why I spoke out,” she said.

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Gonoi wanted to be a professional judoka as a child. Now, she teaches other women how to defend themselves.

Courtesy Rina Gonoi

Gonoi’s refusal to be silenced eventually prompted a wide-sweeping probe into sexual harassment across the JSDF and prosecutors reopened an investigation that found she had endured physical and verbal sexual harassment daily between autumn 2020 and August 2021, according to Gonoi’s defense team.

The findings resulted in a groundbreaking moment: a rare admission of guilt and a public apology from Japan’s Ministry of Defense, as Ground Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Yoshihide Yoshida bowed deeply, saying: “On behalf of the Ground Self-Defense Forces, I would like to express my deepest apologies to Ms. Gonoi, who has been suffering for a long time. I am very sorry.”

Five servicemen were also dishonorably dismissed and four others punished last December, according to NHK, Japan’s public broadcaster. Gonoi also said she received in-person apologies from several officers.

But this, she said, is not enough, and she is now pursuing both criminal and civil cases in the courts. At the start of the year she filed lawsuits against the government and her alleged assailants – three of whom were indicted in March on charges of sexually assaulting Gonoi. In the criminal case, to date, neither the defendants nor their lawyers have issued statements. Public prosecutors in Japan have not released information regarding the case and did not respond to CNN’s request for comment. In the civil case, four of the five accused recently denied sexual abuse, while a fifth admitted the accusation.

The state has responded saying harassment “cannot be tolerated” but has not yet commented on Gonoi’s lawsuit.

Regardless of the outcome of those lawsuits, Gonoi believes there is a bigger battle to be fought against what she sees as a culture of sexual harassment in the male-dominated military.

Rina Gonoi, a former member of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, checks old photos on her phone.

Philip Fong/AFP/Getty Images

Speaking out

Japan’s struggles with gender inequality, which were highlighted during the #MeToo campaign, are well-documented. The country ranks bottom of all the G7 nations and 116th out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum’s index for gender inequality.

But Gonoi’s experience is likely to be particularly damaging for the JSDF, which has poured much effort into promoting an image of itself as an institution that promotes gender equality.

Fumika Sato, a sociologist at Hitotsubashi University, said many women opt to join the military as they see it as offering greater job security and gender equality than the private sector.

“(Women) choose the JSDF because they think it is an organization that will recognize their abilities fairly. It’s very rare to hear that they joined to protect the country out of a sense of national defense,” Sato said.

Gonoi, for instance, joined the ground forces in April 2020, seeing it both as a way of “paying it forward” but also a way of achieving her dreams of training as a judoka and competing at the Olympics.

Despite the JSDF’s image, Sato said sexual harassment within the ranks has long been an issue but it is often hidden because people in the military often find it hard to admit vulnerability.

“There’s an image that only strong personnel are considered suitable for the organization, and there’s the attitude that those who say they are victims of harassment have no place in the organization,” Sato explained. “That makes it hard for people to speak out.”

Rina Gonoi says she endured physical and verbal sexual abuse while she served in Japan's Self-Defense Forces.

Courtesy Rina Gonoi

Recruitment shortfall

Gonoi’s fight also comes just as the JSDF faces a recruitment shortfall that is undermining its efforts to grow its military amid rising regional tensions with North Korea and China.

Last year, Japan announced it would boost its defense budget for 2023 to a record 6.8 trillion yen ($55 billion), a 26% increase, raising its defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2027.

Experts say attracting enough women will be key to Tokyo meeting its objectives. The JSDF is meant to have a strength of around 250,000 service members but has consistently failed to reach its recruitment goals and says it is understaffed by around 16,000 service members – a shortfall that experts say has limited its operational abilities.

The force has spent years trying to encourage female enrollment, in line with the “womenomics” policy of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe aimed at combating the effects of Japan’s aging population and shrinking workforce. In April 2015, the Defense Ministry launched a series of initiatives in which funds were allocated for everything from gender awareness programs to establishing of day care centers for children of JSDF employees.

But Japan still lags its peers. According to the Defense Ministry, as of March 2022, there were 20,000 women in the JSDF, comprising around 8% of the organization’s total strength, which still lags the NATO average of 12% as of 2019. And to reach that threshold by 2030, Tokyo needs to reach more women.

A spokesperson for Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force told CNN, “We believe that the promotion of female SDF personnel is important for securing high-quality personnel in a stable manner and for incorporating diversity into the organization. The SDF continues to actively recruit female SDF personnel with the aim of increasing the proportion of women in all SDF personnel to 12% or more by (fiscal year) 2030.”

Japanese former soldier Rina Gonoi takes part in a press conference at the National Press Club in Tokyo on January 30, 2023.

Richard A. Brooks/AFP/Getty Images

Setback for progress

The JSDF has made progress in this regard. When it was first formed in 1954, women were recruited exclusively as nurses.

Japan’s navy accepted its first female recruits in 1977. And in the early 1990s, most roles – except those requiring combat – opened up to women.

In 1992, Japan’s National Defense Academy finally began accepting women, which made it possible for them to become senior officers. Since then, new women leaders have started taking the reins. For example, in March 2018, Japan’s navy appointed the first woman commander of a warship squadron. Later that year, it appointed its first woman fighter pilot.

As a child, Gonoi says she saw JSDF members as heroes. She grew up wanting to be like them after women officers – in particular – came to her rescue following the deadly 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster that decimated her hometown of Higashi-Matsushima in Japan’s northern prefecture of Miyagi.

Gonoi had marveled at how the JSDF members helped citizens regain a sense of normalcy, she said, making sure they had makeshift areas to bathe, for instance. The young Gonoi was sold by that human touch.

A dream dashed

Years later, it would be a posting to a JSDF station in Fukushima – another area that was decimated by the 2011 disaster – where she tells CNN she first experienced sexual harassment.

“They’d comment on my body and the size of my breasts. Or they’d come up to me in the hallways and suddenly hug me in the corridor. That kind of thing happened daily,” Gonoi recalled of her time in the station.

The last straw came in August 2021, when Gonoi said she was pinned to a dormitory floor as several senior male officers simulated sexual intercourse. It was this incident that convinced her to come forward and report her assailants.

But Gonoi’s claims were dismissed, and no action was taken internally within the JSDF.

“They initially didn’t admit that they’d done anything wrong. They tried to cover up what I’d gone through, but then a re-investigation was ordered. That’s when they admitted what I’d gone through,” said Gonoi.

An external investigation was also dropped due to “lack of evidence” as none of the male personnel who witnessed her sexual assault would provide testimony.

Eventually, Gonoi says she felt like she had no other choice but to quit in June 2022.

Japan's top pop agency apologizes for alleged sexual abuse by late founder

Sato, the sociologist, said that it was only by taking her fight to social media to publicize her case that Gonoi had been able to pressure the JSDF into a rethink.

“The Defense Ministry acted as it had always done in the past, taking the side of the perpetrators and isolating the victims. However, this resulted in so much public outrage, surprising so many people in the Defense Ministry, that they realized that if they didn’t take proper action, the reputation of the (military) itself would be at stake,” Sato said.

In recent months, the Defense Ministry has sought to improve its image. In March, Japan’s Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada asserted that “harassment shakes the foundations of the JSDF by destroying mutual trust among its members and is something that should never be allowed to happen.”

A spokesperson for the Ground Self-Defense Force told CNN, “Harassment is a violation of basic human rights and, of course, must never be allowed to happen in the Ground SDF, where unit actions are the basis, as it causes loss of mutual trust and shakes the strength of the personnel.

“For this reason, the GSDF is actively participating in various efforts to eradicate harassment based on the minister’s directive and is carefully implementing measures such as education for its commanders and others.

“To this end, we will continue to implement measures such as group education and e-learning to raise the awareness of personnel, education to promote understanding and improve the leadership skills of personnel (especially managers) and improve and strengthen the consultation system.”

Rina Gonoi, a former member of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, pictured on February 22, 2023.

Philip Fong/AFP/Getty Images

A battle won, now the war

Gonoi tells CNN she went back and forth on her decision, before finally raising her voice.

“When you speak out there is a big risk that you’ll be beaten down and people will slander you, even though what you went through is real and you’re really suffering,” Gonoi said.

But she didn’t back down.

“(The JSDF) initially didn’t admit that they’d done anything wrong – they tried to cover up what I’d gone through, but then a re-investigation was ordered; that’s when they admitted what I’d gone through.”

The government has yet to respond to Gonoi’s lawsuits, but last October Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said he understood that sexual harassment cases were handled inappropriately by the Self-Defense Force and the Ministry of Defense during a parliamentary meeting.

He added that though harassment should “not be tolerated in any organization,” there have been instances where cover-ups have been pointed out.

He asserted that the government and Defense Ministry are committed to eradicating all forms of harassment.

“We are aware that the perpetrators of sexual harassment cases are scheduled to be punished severely. We are also conducting a special defense inspection to thoroughly identify harassment. We are committed to eradicating all forms of harassment,” he said.

In a news conference last year, Gonoi said three of her perpetrators got down on their hands and knees to apologize after she received direct apologies from four of her assailants. She said the perpetrators acknowledged their actions and repeatedly bowed their heads, and one was crying.

“When I joined the JSDF, I had a lot of dreams of what I wanted to achieve there. Had the JSDF fully investigated what happened to me I feel like I could’ve still stayed on there. Everything came too late,” she said.

The officers were dismissed last December, but Gonoi questions the sincerity of their apologies and decided to pursue both a civil and criminal case – not for money, she says, but because she wanted “an apology from the heart.”

In the civil case, four of the five plaintiffs recently denied sexual abuse, while a fifth admitted the accusations. Gonoi told reporters after the hearing, “I felt a variety of feelings – sadness, frustration, anger, etc – that I can’t express in words. I knew that their apology was only a formality.”

Meanwhile, the government has said it will continue to “establish drastic measures” that strive to “build an organizational environment that does not tolerate harassment at all.”

Today, Gonoi said she receives abuse on social media with some users commenting on her appearance or accusing her of tarnishing the JSDF’s reputation.

She has battled depression and still has flashbacks of what happened to her, but is grateful for the support she received on social media.

She wants the JSDF to educate its forces to recognize harassment as a crime, to install surveillance cameras and to not allow women officers to be left alone in situations where they are highly outnumbered by male colleagues.

But she said she hasn’t lost faith in the JSDF. Mostly, she wants it to be a safer place, so other new recruits will not have to endure what she did. She wants to travel and keep practicing judo.

“In Japan, there’s a kind of view that you can’t laugh, can’t enjoy yourself after you’ve been a victim, but I don’t want my life to be defined by that,” Gonoi said.

“I’m glad I joined the SDF and I was able to work for my country. It wasn’t all bad and I want to live life as normally as possible, knowing that everything ultimately works out somehow in the end.”

11. Analysis | A fateful summit 15 years ago hangs over the NATO meeting in Vilnius

Excerpts:

Fifteen years ago, Putin was present in Bucharest, on NATO’s invitation, and is said to have privately told Bush then that he didn’t see Ukraine as a “real nation-state.” In a speech he delivered to the NATO crowd, he described membership in the alliance for Georgia and Ukraine as a “direct threat” to Russia. He also spoke of Ukraine as a Soviet invention and cast doubt on its sovereignty, suggesting a major chunk of its population were simply “Russians” and that Crimea itself was almost exclusively Russian.

Putin reprised such rhetoric last year before launching his nation’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, as NATO leaders convene this week in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, Ukrainian officials are demanding Western counterparts remember the legacy of Bucharest.

“‘The doors are open,’ they told us, but they didn’t show us where to find these doors, how to get in,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov told my colleagues, referring to the summit 15 years ago.

“Do not repeat the mistake Chancellor Merkel made in Bucharest in 2008 when she fiercely opposed any progress towards Ukraine’s NATO membership,” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told German newspaper Bild, saying that it “opened the door” for Putin to carry out his neo-imperialistic aggression. “The only way to shut the door for Russian aggression against Europe … is to take Ukraine in NATO,” he concluded.

Analysis | A fateful summit 15 years ago hangs over the NATO meeting in Vilnius

Analysis by Ishaan Tharoor

Columnist

July 10, 2023 at 12:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · July 10, 2023

You’re reading an excerpt from the Today’s WorldView newsletter. Sign up to get the rest free, including news from around the globe and interesting ideas and opinions to know, sent to your inbox every weekday.

The antecedents to the Russian invasion of Ukraine arguably lie in a NATO summit 15 years ago. Leaders at the 2008 meeting of the Western military alliance in the Romanian capital, Bucharest, failed to find unanimity on whether to grant membership to former Soviet republics Georgia and Ukraine. The two countries were offered a vague commitment of entering the alliance at some point in the future, with no established plan regarding how or when that could be achieved.

The halfhearted gesture reflected division within the West at the time. On one side, you had the administration of President George W. Bush, deeply unpopular abroad after the ruinous war in Iraq and eking out its final year in office, which sought to offer the two countries a formal NATO “Membership Action Plan.” On the other, a clutch of Western European governments, led by Germany and its chancellor, Angela Merkel, believed that neither Georgia nor Ukraine were politically ready to enter the alliance and looked askance at initiatives that may “poke the bear” of the Kremlin.

Their disagreement yielded an outcome that satisfied few. Depending on who you listen to, the summit in Bucharest made Georgia and Ukraine targets for Russian invasion either because it provoked Russian President Vladimir Putin into taking action against the threat of NATO on his border or because it precisely failed to clearly extend NATO’s collective security protections to these states. Just a few months later, Russian forces seized the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, installing puppet regimes that few outside Moscow recognize to this day. In 2014, after protests brought down a pro-Moscow government in Kyiv, Ukraine, Russia illegally annexed Crimea and backed a separatist insurgency in Ukraine’s southeast.

Fifteen years ago, Putin was present in Bucharest, on NATO’s invitation, and is said to have privately told Bush then that he didn’t see Ukraine as a “real nation-state.” In a speech he delivered to the NATO crowd, he described membership in the alliance for Georgia and Ukraine as a “direct threat” to Russia. He also spoke of Ukraine as a Soviet invention and cast doubt on its sovereignty, suggesting a major chunk of its population were simply “Russians” and that Crimea itself was almost exclusively Russian.

Putin reprised such rhetoric last year before launching his nation’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, as NATO leaders convene this week in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, Ukrainian officials are demanding Western counterparts remember the legacy of Bucharest.

“‘The doors are open,’ they told us, but they didn’t show us where to find these doors, how to get in,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov told my colleagues, referring to the summit 15 years ago.

“Do not repeat the mistake Chancellor Merkel made in Bucharest in 2008 when she fiercely opposed any progress towards Ukraine’s NATO membership,” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told German newspaper Bild, saying that it “opened the door” for Putin to carry out his neo-imperialistic aggression. “The only way to shut the door for Russian aggression against Europe … is to take Ukraine in NATO,” he concluded.

Kyiv may not expect immediate NATO membership or all the protections the alliance affords — given that it’s locked in a state of war with Russia — but it does expect an invitation into the alliance and significant security guarantees from the West in the years to come. Last week, President Volodymyr Zelensky called on President Biden to invite Ukraine into the alliance “now.” His hopes are shared by many of NATO’s Eastern European member states and a significant proportion of Washington’s own foreign policy community.

But, in an inversion of the politics of 2008, the United States is now the nation moving more cautiously. During an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Biden said Ukraine was “not ready” to enter the alliance, gesturing to the ongoing war as well as other political conditions, including concerns over corruption, that need to be resolved before entry. “We have to lay out a rational path for Ukraine to be able to qualify to get into NATO,” he said.

U.S. officials insist this tempered approach is important for the unity of the alliance and hardly reflects a lack of commitment to Ukraine. Biden “has been clear that we are going to support Ukraine for as long as it takes and provide them an exceptional quantity of arms and capabilities — both from ourselves and facilitating those from allies and partners — but that we are not seeking to start World War III,” Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, told reporters Friday. “That is the course that we’ve been on since the start of this conflict.”

The leaders gathering in Vilnius will be convening after months of complex, delicate wrangling. “They will seek agreement through two parallel quests,” the Economist explained. “One is to reach a linguistic compromise signaling that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO membership — without promises of quick accession. The second concerns a lattice of enduring bilateral and multilateral security commitments to bolster pledges to support Ukraine ‘for as long as it takes.’”

Analysts in favor of NATO fast-tracking Ukraine’s accession argue that the lesson of 2008 is that the West can no longer be afraid of “poking the bear,” as Putin’s aggression unfurled in the absence of a NATO membership process.

“Since the very creation of NATO, strategists, as prominent as George Kennan, have been worried about provoking Moscow with our alliances in Europe,” wrote Michael McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia. “Kennan opposed the creation of NATO. But strikingly, from the very beginning of the alliance until today, Kremlin leaders — from Stalin to Putin — have never attacked NATO members. And NATO, of course, has never attacked the Soviet Union and will never attack Russia. War in Europe has only come to where NATO is not.”

That’s a reality that has dawned on some of the principal actors at Bucharest in 2008. In a joint op-ed published last month, Stephen Hadley, Bush’s national security adviser, and Christoph Heusgen, then Merkel’s top foreign policy and national security adviser, acknowledged their differences 15 years ago. But they now see eye-to-eye on the need for Ukrainian membership in NATO after the war ends.

“Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, we had some sympathy for the idea that Ukraine could be a bridge between Russia and the West,” Hadley and Heusgen wrote. But, they added, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 destroyed that idea, especially for Ukrainians. With its aggression, Russia brought about the very things that it later saw as compromising its security interests. It put NATO enlargement back on the agenda.”

The Washington Post · by Ishaan Tharoor · July 10, 2023

12. Ukraine Summer Counter-Offensive Update for July 10: ‘30 Russian Airstrikes Versus 1 Ukrainian Airstrike’

A telling headline.​

Graphic at the link: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/19272

Ukraine Summer Counter-Offensive Update for July 10: ‘30 Russian Airstrikes Versus 1 Ukrainian Airstrike’

Ukrainian assaults in 3 theaters; interdictions on Russian rear; 30 Russian airstrikes versus 1 Ukrainian airstrike; 100 settlements shelled in 8 regions; grim grind of advancing with no air cover.

by Kyiv Post | July 10, 2023, 8:53 am | Comments ( 1)

kyivpost.com

Snapshot

Ukrainian offensive action in Bakhmut, western Zaporizhzhia and eastern Zaporizhzhia; Ukrainian interdictions on Russian logistics continue; 30 Russian airstrikes versus 1 Ukrainian airstrike; 100 settlements shelled in 8 regions; the grim grind of advancing with no air cover goes on.

Analysis

From the Institute for the Study of War:

Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine. The Russian military intended to take Kyiv within three days but failed to accomplish any of its intended objectives in Ukraine.

Determined and skillful Ukrainian resistance has forced the culmination of multiple Russian offensives including the one aimed at Kyiv and has liberated the Sumy and Chernihiv regions, as well as the parts of the Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions that Russian forces had temporarily seized.

Ukrainian forces have secured and retained the initiative and are conducting counteroffensive operations along most of the frontline with Russian forces focused almost entirely on trying to hold on to the Ukrainian lands they still occupy.

General Developments

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 9, ISW said.

Ukrainian military officials also reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing their interdiction campaigns in southern and eastern Ukraine, ISW said.

Poland revealed that it has provided “around 10” Mi-24 helicopters to Ukraine, according to WSJ.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev threatened to strike three Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) and nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe if an alleged attempt by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to attack the Smolensk NPP in Russia with “NATO missiles” is confirmed.

Operational Aspects in Luhansk, Avdiivka, Mariinka, Kherson, Russia and other areas

· Russian officials claimed there were explosions / activated air defense systems in Bryansk, Belgorod and Rostov regions in Russia, near the Kerch bridge in occupied Crimea region and in occupied Luhansk region

Explosions reported from Russian-occupied Sorokyne, Luhansk Oblast.

You can hear secondary explosions which points an ammunition dump.

Russian-occupied Sorokyne is more than 134km away from the next Ukrainian Army position.https://t.co/SpHMRjR7Qk#Ukraine #Luhansk #Sorokyne pic.twitter.com/BwCsOcHIWi

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) July 7, 2023

Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine was hit with Russian S-300 missiles, according to the local Mayor.

· Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna, ISW said.

· Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Russian forces advanced as of July 9, ISW said.

Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances southwest of Vesele (4 km northeast of Avdiivka) as of July 9, ISW said. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (11 km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3 km northwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11 km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13 km southwest of Avdiivka), Maryinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhaillivka (10 km southwest of Donetsk City).

Ukraine’s General Staff reported 30 Russian airstrikes and 49 rocket attacks using MLRS. Ukraine conducted one airstrike yesterday.

Around 100 Ukrainian population settlements across the Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson regions were hit by Russian artillery fire, said the General Staff.

A leading pro-Russian source said that “in the Kherson direction [ed. – near the Antonivka bridge], the enemy is still preparing a large-scale landing operation. Continues the landing of small landing groups.”

Operational Aspects in Zone A. TO518 / Mokri Yaly River Axis - boundary of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, and Zone B. Western Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zone B) and Melitopol (Zone A) directions, ISW reported.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks in the western Zaporizhzhia region, ISW reported.

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia region on July 9, including at Robotyne, Novodanylivka, and Mala Tokmachka, according to ISW and pro-Russian sources.

A pro-Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking Russian positions in small groups and are targeting Russian rear positions, warehouses, and infrastructure, ISW reported.

Meanwhile, Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar said about these Zones that “the process of consolidation on the reconquered areas continues. Our troops carry out aerial reconnaissance of the terrain, are engaged in clearing the terrain and inflict fire damage with artillery on the identified enemy targets, carry out counterbattery measures, in readiness for the continuation of offensive operations.”

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Pryyutne (17 km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) from the north and are currently about 2 km away from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked from the direction of Urozhaine (9 km south of Velyka Novosilka) towards Blahodatne (5 km south of Velyka Novosilka). The Ukrainian General Staff similarly reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Blahodatne, according to ISW.

There was loud explosion reported at a purported Russian military base in the occupied city of Melitopol, according to its exiled Mayor.

Operational Aspects in Zone C. Bakhmut

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky stated that Ukrainian forces successfully continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction.

However, the situation on the eastern and southern fronts near Bakhmut did not undergo significant changes, but there is “a certain advance of troops” on the southern flank, according to Malyar.

kyivpost.com

13. China’s Advances in Space Warfare Are Terrifying

Excerpts:

Yet, as Gertz notes in his Washington Times piece, the Biden administration announced a unilateral halt to anti-satellite missile tests, even as China and Russia continue such tests. The Mitchell Institute report quotes from the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: “China is steadily progressing toward becoming a world-class space leader, with the intent to match or surpass the United States by 2045.” Galbreath told Gertz that the threat posed by China is more urgent than that. We don’t have the luxury of time given China’s push for greater counterspace capabilities. “A U.S. failure to field counterspace capabilities,” Galbreath said, “will erode our deterrent posture and place our military at increased risk.” This would not be the first time that the U.S. intelligence community underestimated emerging threats from adversarial powers.

Galbreath urges U.S. policymakers to take a “robust, full-spectrum approach” to ensure that we have “continuous access to and unimpeded use of space.” Arms control is not the answer. What is needed is the improved resiliency of space assets, increased capabilities to defend space assets, and offensive capabilities to achieve space dominance in the event of war.

The arms race in space is part of the broader arms race in the Indo-Pacific that includes conventional and nuclear forces — and now space forces. The outcome of this arms race may determine the destiny of the Indo-Pacific and global balances of power for the rest of the 21st century.

China’s Advances in Space Warfare Are Terrifying 

“China is steadily progressing toward becoming a world-class space leader, with the intent to match or surpass the United States by 2045.”

by FRANCIS P. SEMPA

July 9, 2023, 11:08 PM

spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · July 10, 2023

China’s Advances in Space Warfare Are Terrifying

“China is steadily progressing toward becoming a world-class space leader, with the intent to match or surpass the United States by 2045.”

July 9, 2023, 11:08 PM

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama in March 2023 (U.S. Space Force)

The indefatigable Bill Gertz of the Washington Times has a page-one story highlighting a Mitchell Institute report that warns that the United States is falling behind China in “counterspace capabilities” that will be crucial to success in any future war.

To quote the report: “The U.S. advantage in space is at risk … [T]he United States must maintain its access to space capabilities that are now threatened by China. And the United States must have the potential to deny China access to the space capabilities it needs to threaten U.S. space and terrestrial forces and national interests.”

The Mitchell Institute report is authored by Charles S. Galbreath, a senior resident fellow for space studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies and a retired Space Force colonel. His 28-page paper is a siren call for the United States to wake up to the growing danger presented by China’s “alarming array of operational counterspace weaponry” that includes ground-based anti-satellite weapons, electronic warfare platforms, and killer satellites “capable of attacking U.S. assets in orbit. “China,” he writes, “has the most rapidly developing counterspace capabilities of any nation and is expanding its overall space program with the intent to surpass the United States.”

Two recent novels about a future U.S.–China war — Ghost Fleet and 2034 — envision initial Chinese space and cyberattacks on U.S. communication and military satellites that prevent commanders in the field, at sea, and in the air from communicating with each other and with the Pentagon. The Mitchell Institute report notes that U.S. armed forces increasingly rely on space assets for many crucial missions, including satellite communications, position navigation and timing, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, warnings of missile attacks, and weather conditions. China, the report states, “now believes attacking U.S. space systems is essential to prevailing in a conflict with the United States and is actively fielding the most extensive collection of counterspace threats of any nation.” Meanwhile, due to what Galbreath calls a “decades-long view of the space domain an an operational sanctuary,” most of our space systems are “big, fat juicy targets for emerging Chinese … counterspace forces.”

Yet, as Gertz notes in his Washington Times piece, the Biden administration announced a unilateral halt to anti-satellite missile tests, even as China and Russia continue such tests. The Mitchell Institute report quotes from the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: “China is steadily progressing toward becoming a world-class space leader, with the intent to match or surpass the United States by 2045.” Galbreath told Gertz that the threat posed by China is more urgent than that. We don’t have the luxury of time given China’s push for greater counterspace capabilities. “A U.S. failure to field counterspace capabilities,” Galbreath said, “will erode our deterrent posture and place our military at increased risk.” This would not be the first time that the U.S. intelligence community underestimated emerging threats from adversarial powers.

Galbreath urges U.S. policymakers to take a “robust, full-spectrum approach” to ensure that we have “continuous access to and unimpeded use of space.” Arms control is not the answer. What is needed is the improved resiliency of space assets, increased capabilities to defend space assets, and offensive capabilities to achieve space dominance in the event of war.

The arms race in space is part of the broader arms race in the Indo-Pacific that includes conventional and nuclear forces — and now space forces. The outcome of this arms race may determine the destiny of the Indo-Pacific and global balances of power for the rest of the 21st century.

spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · July 10, 2023

14. Amid Ukraine War and Internal Spats, NATO Seeks Show of Unity

The Asia Pacific Four will be at the NATO Summit.

Excerpts:

Joining alliance leaders will be peers from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, with whom NATO is aligning on a range of issues, particularly China. French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed wariness of deepening Asia-Pacific ties, arguing it is more a role for the European Union.

NATO has long grappled with internal conflicts, Stoltenberg noted recently. The Suez Crisis of 1956 pitted the U.K. and France against the U.S. In 2003, the second Gulf War split allies.

Amid Ukraine War and Internal Spats, NATO Seeks Show of Unity

Ahead of annual summit, Biden says Kyiv isn’t ready to join alliance amid some calls for speedier membership

https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-ukraine-war-and-internal-spats-nato-seeks-show-of-unity-cf9a0ad2?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Daniel Michaels

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Updated July 9, 2023 2:46 pm ET

BRUSSELS—The outcome of NATO’s annual summit, a gathering of three-dozen world leaders in the planning for months, is going down to the wire amid wrangling over what to offer Ukraine, which isn’t a member.

At issue is how much of a promise the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will make to Ukraine over its eventual membership. NATO in 2008 promised Ukraine a place at its table—eventually. Now, Kyiv’s unexpected success eroding Russia’s army and even sparking a mutiny by Russian paramilitaries has emboldened President Volodymyr Zelensky to agitate for fast action on accession.

President Biden on Sunday pushed back on those hopes, saying it was premature to call for a vote on admitting Ukraine into the alliance.

“I don’t think it’s ready for membership in NATO,” Biden said on CNN, describing accession as “a process that takes some time to meet all the qualifications.”

In the interim, he offered “to provide security” similar to what the U.S. provides Israel in terms of the ability to defend itself following an end of fighting with Russia.

“It’s going to take a while,” he said of Ukraine joining.

Pushing for speedy membership are alliance members that were once under Moscow’s thumb. The leader of one, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, says she has been reading a history of NATO expansion since the Cold War to sharpen her arguments in Ukraine’s favor.

The dispute, which boils down to the wording of as little as a single sentence in the two-day summit’s official communiqué, is one of several disagreements keeping NATO’s 31 members at odds. While differences aren’t unusual for the large and growing alliance, this year they take on greater significance due to the war in Ukraine and because NATO works by consensus. 

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As Sweden waits for NATO to approve its membership, WSJ’s Sune Engel Rasmussen explains what the country can bring to the alliance and why Turkey and Hungary are blocking its application. Photo Composition: Marina Costa

“We always negotiate until the last minute” to reach full agreement, said NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in an interview. He said the alliance is on track for a “successful and very substantive summit,” which he expects Zelensky to attend.

Zelensky told The Wall Street Journal last month that he might not attend the summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, if Ukraine doesn’t secure commitments it is seeking. Kyiv’s pressure campaign is unabashed. 

“Ukraine is performing the task NATO was created for,” Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said recently.

NATO summits are stage-managed to come off as displays of unity and strength. Intra-alliance disputes, such as frequent differences between historic rivals Greece and Turkey, often require extra time and attention to resolve. The U.S., meanwhile, is by far NATO’s biggest member and the force behind most of what it does, but Washington tries not to impose its will—at least not without first wooing and cajoling allies.

“The only thing they really have to deliver is cohesion,” said former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute.

On the surface, NATO cohesion looks strong. All members vocally support Ukraine in its fight against Russia and agree Kyiv will eventually join the alliance. They have backed alliance plans to rebuild military structures that atrophied after the Cold War. Turmoil around Wagner Group’s mutiny has reinforced a conviction across NATO that it must be ready for the unexpected.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, speaking in Slovakia on Friday, continued making the case for Ukraine’s entry into NATO. PHOTO: TOMAS BENEDIKOVIC/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Beneath that accord, though, conflicts threaten to make the two-day summit, which starts Tuesday, a tense affair. Turkey and Hungary are balking at approving Sweden’s bid to join the alliance, frustrating allies. Canada and many European members spend far less on defense than they committed to nine years ago, and now pressure is growing to raise the commitment level.

Even the choice of names used to designate two waterways has sparked fights and delayed approval of alliance-wide defense plans that all members otherwise agree on.

Joining alliance leaders will be peers from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, with whom NATO is aligning on a range of issues, particularly China. French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed wariness of deepening Asia-Pacific ties, arguing it is more a role for the European Union.

NATO has long grappled with internal conflicts, Stoltenberg noted recently. The Suez Crisis of 1956 pitted the U.K. and France against the U.S. In 2003, the second Gulf War split allies.

Lithuanian Army service members took part in a training exercise last month. Lithuania is set to host NATO leaders this week for talks on issues including defense. PHOTO: VALDA KALNINA/ZUMA PRESS

“It has happened before. It certainly will happen again—that there are disagreements in NATO,” he said.

Coordinating summits has also been problematic. In 2009, then-President Barack Obama thought Turkey had agreed on Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen becoming secretary-general, only to discover at a summit dinner that the deal wasn’t done. It took a night and morning of diplomacy before Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed, recalled former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker.

Allies and NATO officials were so unsure about former President Donald Trump’s commitment to the alliance and willingness to sign off on a communiqué that one leaders’ gathering wasn’t called a summit, eliminating the need for a joint declaration. In 2018, Trump sent a meeting into extra time by angrily listing allies’ defense-spending shortfalls, according to people involved in the meeting.

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Today, relations are more harmonious, even though most members are irked by delays in Sweden’s accession. On Monday, Stoltenberg will host Erdogan and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson in the hope of winning the Turkish president’s assent.

The biggest differences within NATO, over how much to offer Ukraine, are being hashed out in calls between government leaders and in days of meetings at NATO’s Brussels headquarters that have left participants looking haggard. Members want Ukraine to see progress in its relations with the alliance, but most also want to avoid specific pledges such as a membership timeline that they would later be obliged to deliver on.

Instead, NATO plans to offer a package of political and practical support that, when taken together, will offer Zelensky enough to call a win. 

Military assistance and pledges of help—a huge part of what NATO members are offering to Ukraine—are being handled outside of the alliance itself, so that the group can continue to avoid direct conflict with Russia and call itself purely a defensive alliance. It is possible that the U.S. and other members will make a statement about lethal aid and security promises in Vilnius, say diplomats, but that would be in parallel to official summit proceedings.

One offering for Kyiv that members recently agreed on is to elevate its status in relation to the alliance. A new NATO-Ukraine Council will replace an existing lower-level commission. A negligible change in name, it holds great political significance, Stoltenberg said. 

Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom discussed NATO issues in Brussels this month. PHOTO: YVES HERMAN/REUTERS

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Ukraine Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in London in June in a show of support. PHOTO: LEAH MILLIS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

In the new council, Ukraine will sit as a peer with NATO, not a junior partner, as in the commission. Ukraine will have the right to call a meeting of the council, which will have a crisis consultation mechanism, be able to establish working committees and take binding decisions. 

Stoltenberg plans to convene the Ukraine council’s first meeting Wednesday, with Zelensky participating. NATO’s only other council, with Russia, has been suspended since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

“The NATO-Ukraine Council is a lot more important than people think, because a lot of work can be done,” said Camille Grand, a former NATO assistant secretary-general now at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

NATO also plans to offer Ukraine $500 million in nonlethal military aid, which includes help bringing the country closer to NATO standards in areas such as civilian control of the military.

Zelensky has acknowledged that his country won’t join NATO while a war is raging, so what he is seeking is clarity on how and when it will accede after hostilities end.

NATO officials say they are trying to craft what might be only one sentence to augment their 2008 promise at a summit in Bucharest, Romania. They are walking a line between repeating the Bucharest pledge and making firm promises.

“It is hard to go beyond Bucharest,” because that statement was “pretty crystal clear” that Ukraine will join the alliance, said U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith. “That has been the challenge for us.”

Estonia’s Kallas wants specific steps for Ukraine’s path forward. “The only security guarantee that works and is much cheaper than anything else is NATO membership,” she said recently on Twitter.

German and U.S. diplomats are less aggressive. The U.S. finding itself in the minority, being pushed to action, is anomalous, said Volker.

“There’s a lot between restating Bucharest and inviting them to join,” said Smith, who said Zelensky won’t leave disappointed.

“We are going to show up in Vilnius with a package of actions,” Smith said. It will include words “paired with practical and political support.”

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

15. 500 Days of Learning (Part 1) - Ukrainian Strategic Adaptation in Defending their Homeland by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

The Learning War Continues

There are other aspects of Ukraine’s strategic adaptation that I would like to explore, but for which there is presently insufficient information. One subject is civil-military relations and how national security, and defence, planning has evolved over the last 500 days. Another topic, which is likely to remain a sensitive subject for some time to come, is the research and development being conducted in Ukraine – and on its behalf – to produce a technological edge over Russian forces.

Be that as it may, over 500 days of war, both the Ukrainians and Russians have demonstrated the ability to learn, adapt and then continue that process. It has occurred at multiple levels, although not always in a systemic manner. That said, the strategic adaptation demonstrated by the Ukrainians and explored in this article has been critical to their military effectiveness. These two aspects of adaptation will continue to evolve and remain critical to the defence of Ukraine.

But Ukraine has also shown it can learn and adapt elsewhere. And, as I will explore in the second part of this series, their ability to do so at the operational level of war has also been critical.

500 Days of Learning (Part 1)

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/500-days-of-learning-part-1?utm

Ukrainian Strategic Adaptation in Defending their Homeland

MICK RYAN, AM

JUL 10, 2023

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Ukrainian Soldiers (Image: @DefenceU)

Over the weekend, the 500-day mark since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was reached. It has been 500 days of appalling Russian brutality, torture, murder and wanton destruction in Ukraine. At the same time, we have witnessed the resilience, courage and inventiveness of Ukrainian society and the various elements of their defence and national security apparatus.

One of the frameworks that I use when studying war generally, and the war in Ukraine in particular, is of war as a learning opportunity. It is an adaptation battle between the belligerents.

Back in December last year, I explored war as a learning opportunity, writing that:

A central responsibility for the most senior leaders in any military, or national security, institution is providing the incentives for innovation during peace time, so that the good ideas, appropriate organisations and leading-edge technology can be combined to provide an advantage over adversaries in war. This, in turn, requires a cultural predisposition to learning and sharing lessons widely, accepting failure as an opportunity to learn, and a well-honed understanding of risk.

Throughout this war, learning and adaptation has occurred on both sides. The learning and adaptation that occurs in an enemy force, as it has with the Russians over the past 500 days, must also be the subject of close study. This is to ensure we understand where the enemy, in this case the Russians, might produce sources of advantage.

My last article that examined Russian adaptation was published back in April. In it I explored Russian tactical adaptations, as well as how these adaptations might be neutralised or minimised in the adaptation battle. As I wrote then:

Contrary to the ‘Russian are stupid’ stereotypes that have developed throughout the war in Ukraine, they have demonstrated an ability in some areas to learn and adapt. This isn’t a statement of admiration; far from it! It is however necessary, through military prudence, to understand where the Russian are adapting and to assume that they may continue to do so in the coming months. In understanding Russian adaptation, we can ensure Ukrainian forces understand tactical and operational risks, and that they are best prepared for the months ahead.

The Ukrainians, therefore, are dealing with an adaptive enemy. In response, they have undertaken a process of learning and adaptation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

My aim in this short series of articles is to look at Ukrainian adaptation at each level of war. In this first part of 500 Days of Learning, I will cover some aspects of Ukraine’s strategic level adaptation. Two subsequent articles will explore operational and tactical adaptation by the Ukrainians since the beginning of the Russian invasion.

Ukrainian Strategic Adaptation

Strategic adaptation is the learning and adaptation that occurs at the strategic level, and which has an impact on the development and implementation of national and military strategy and the direction of the war overall. Ukraine has implemented a variety of strategic adaptations since the beginning of the Russian invasion. 

Strategic adaptation should, in theory, increase the strategic effectiveness of the institution undertaking these changes. In Military Effectiveness, Allan Millett and Williamson Murray define the strategic level of military activity as “the employment of national armed forces to secure, by force, national goals defined by political leadership.” Strategic effectiveness is about doing this better than ones adversary.

This concept of strategic effectiveness is an important one when exploring Ukraine’s innovation to improve its performance against the Russian military. Ukraine needs to be better than Russia at strategy to ensure it generates an advantage on the battlefield. While it does not have to be better by much, it does need to consistently test its approach and assumption about its strategy to ensure it stays ahead of Russian strategic thinking and action.

During this war, two adaptations have been crucial to the continuous improvement of Ukraine’s strategic effectiveness in this war. These are: first, the transition to a NATO-Style military; and, second, the development of a national Integrated air, missile and drone defence network.

Transition to a NATO-Style Military

This transition from Soviet era weapons and systems to NATO systems commenced before the war. The Ukrainian government adopted a policy the mid-1990s of moving towards a military organization that more aligned with NATO processes, equipment and organisations. You can find a full timeline of the development of the Ukraine-NATO partnership, including the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, here.

However, many of these reforms moved only incrementally before the 2014 Russian invasion. And as Margarita Konaev and Owen Daniels note in Agile Ukraine, Lumbering Russia, “underfunded, poorly trained, and crippled by corruption, the Ukrainian military failed to repel the Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas in 2014 and could not regain lost ground.” The 2014 Russian invasion changed this.

Transition to a NATO-style military accelerated after the Russian 2014 invasion, but much still remained to be done when Russian forces invaded Ukraine in 2022. In 2021, Ukraine’s armoured vehicle fleet consisted largely of upgraded Soviet-era T-64, T-72 and T-84 main battle tanks as well BMP and BTR variants for armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. While not yet obsolete, they were not first-rate contemporary armoured platforms. The air force was equipped with Soviet legacy fighters, such as the MiG-29 Fulcrum, Su-27 Flanker, Su-24 Fencer and Su-25 Frogfoot. In 2021, none of these aircraft were state of the art in military aviation.

As the Russian invasion began, a trickle of hand-held anti-tank and air defence systems began to flow which was eventually followed by the U.S. and Europe dispatching artillery and munitions. The reformation of Ukrainian artillery thereafter is an example of the shift from older Soviet technology to more modern NATO-standard equipment and munitions. Among the capable artillery systems provided over the first year were over 400 towed guns, including the U.S. M777 155mm towed howitzer (provided by multiple countries), as well as older 105mm howitzers such as the British L119 and American M119s guns.

Ukrainian Bohdana SP artillery and German PzH 2000 (Images: @DefenceU & @Combined2Forces)

Self-propelled artillery began to be provided as well, including the M109 self-propelled 155m system, the German Pz2000 self-propelled gun and French Ceasar 155mm 6x6 self-propelled gun. This influx of towed and self-propelled gun systems changed the balance of Soviet-era and NATO systems in Ukraine’s ground forces. Given the significant battle damage and losses of Ukrainian systems in the first year of the war, NATO provided artillery has ensured that Ukraine did not cede the field in artillery to the Russians over the last 500 days.

The arrival of the HIMARS-fired GMLRS missiles in mid-2022 improved the situation for Ukrainian fire support. At the same time, the introduction of digital systems to better coordinate and prioritize the use of artillery, and to speed up the time to bring Russian targets under fire, enhanced the tactical effectiveness of the Ukrainians. New equipment from NATO countries also enabled the adoption of NATO-like approaches to precision engagement and digitized battlefield command and control.

While Ukrainian artillery has been examined here, similar evolution has taken place in other capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. Air defence and armoured vehicles are two other areas where there has been a large inflow of western systems, adding to the speed of the transition to NATO standards for the Ukrainians.

The physical materiel of war is not the only aspect of this transition to a more NATO-aligned Ukrainian military. There has also been an increase in the adoption of intellectual aspects of NATO-alignment. Challenges with the supply of ammunition to gunlines, and the very long front line, have meant that Ukrainian artillery has been more dispersed than Soviet describes. As a consequence, the Ukrainians had little choice but to shift from an approach that used massed fires to one where precision was used more widely. Precision munitions provided by European and US partners, including the GPS-guided M982 Excalibur and SMArt 155 systems, have permitted this shift to precision-based fire support to combat forces.

This intellectual shift has also been aided by many nations providing training for Ukrainian soldiers and officers. While much of this training assistance comprises technical training on new equipment, NATO training assistance has been much broader. Operation Interflex, a UK-led training mission that coordinates the training of Ukrainian soldiers across multiple countries trained over 10,000 Ukrainians in 2022 alone. This training program was expanded in 2023 to include the training of Ukrainian marines as well as fighter pilots.

In Europe, the United States and NATO established the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine to coordinate other training of Ukrainian military personnel. Under this program, Ukrainian unit groups have been trained on US-provided equipment but also how to call for artillery fire and in planning and conducting combined arms combat.

These efforts will underpin the ongoing intellectual transition of the Ukrainian military from older Soviet doctrines and training methods to more Western aligned approaches.

The desire by the Ukrainians to make this intellectual shift has an important element of the command philosophy of Commander in Chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Zaluzhny’s consideration of Western military thinking was clarified while he was a student at the National Defense University of Ukraine. There, he produced a paper comparing the U.S. and Ukrainian militaries, finding his own military paled in comparison to the U.S. armed forces, particularly in leadership development. In a May 2023 interview, Zaluzhny described how:

The most important thing is that I try to change the culture within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To change it. So that everyone listens to the opinion of the subordinate. My subordinates know that if I find a little representative of some Soviet Army, somewhere at any post I will not be looking into the matter for too long.

The physical and intellectual transition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to NATO standards remains an incomplete undertaking, however. Some old Soviet Ideas and process remain. But results on the battlefield, and leadership from strategic leaders such as Zaluzhny, are steadily ensuring that the strategic adaptation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to be a NATO-like military continues apace.

And it goes without saying, this week’s NATO Summit will hopefully provide a further impetus for these efforts, and the Ukrainian partnership with NATO and its members.

Integrated Air, Missile and Drone Defence

The Ukrainian armed forces have assembled an increasingly effective integrated air, missile and drone defence system in the last 500 days. With a stated intention of “closing the skies”, this air defence system is now able to detect and intercept the gamut of Russian offensive strike systems, from simple drones to the most sophisticated of Russian missiles. It has provided vital air cover for high value targets such as headquarters and logistics nodes, as well as for civilian infrastructure and cities. But it has taken trial, error and much adaptation to get this this point.

This strategic adaptation has taken place in several pulses of innovation, which has occurred in response to Russian changes in tactics with the use of their drones and strategic missile forces.

In February 2022, the Ukrainian air defence system was comprised of Soviet legacy systems including the S-300 (SA-12 Gladiator for NATO), the Tor-M short range system and a variety of point defence weapons including SA-8 Gecko, SA13 Gopher and SA-19 Grison. These air defence missile launchers, and their associated radars and command support systems, were supplemented with ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft guns as well as towed 23mm and 57mm anti-aircraft guns.

To inform this air defence network, Ukraine possessed a variety of air defence radar systems which included those that were integral to its S-300, 2K12 Kub, Tor and Buk-M1 air defence capabilities. But Ukraine also joined the NATO Air Situation Data Exchange programme in July 2006. This program, designed to improve awareness and aviation safety through of air situation data, provided vital early warning and location data for the Ukrainians in the early hours of the war. According to NATO, it has continued to collaborate closely with the Ukrainian military to provide the most relevant air situational awareness data possible throughout the war.

In the first days after the Russian invasion began, jamming equipment and aerial decoys deployed by the Russian military were effective at degrading the Ukrainian air defence system. The Ukrainians had anticipated that their air defence network was the primary target for early Russian strikes and had relocated many of their radars and engagement systems. However, Russian were able to target and destroy many of the Ukrainian air defence radars. At the same time, surface to air missile systems like the SA-11 and S-300 were destroyed in the north and the south of the country. As Justin Bronk has written, ground based air defence in the first days of the war was relatively ineffective and overall defence of the air domain was carried out by Ukrainian air force fighters.

The Ukrainian air defence network was able to repair damaged sensors and engagement systems, however, and to redeploy it to new positions to avoid follow-up Russian strikes. Concurrently, the Russians experienced significant electronic fratricide with the systems that had previously been effective at degrading Ukrainian air defence capabilities. As Justin Bronk has described, Russian “electronic warfare assets began to greatly scale back their operations after the first two days. This allowed newly relocated Ukrainian SAM systems to regain much of their effectiveness.”

The next pulse of innovation from the Ukrainians occurred when Russia shifted it focus to launching missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy and transportation sectors and blatant terror attacks against civilians in mid-2022. Attacks on oil refineries caused fuel shortages throughout Ukraine over the northern summer. Russian missile strikes also aimed to slow down the flow of military aid from the West to Ukraine through attacks on Ukraine’s rail infrastructure. The effects of these Russian strikes were mitigated through an evolved Ukrainian air defence network, as well as adaptations in the Ukrainian logistics network to make targeting it more difficult.

A third pulse of adaptation occurred as Russia evolved its strategy after the appointment of General Surovikin in October 2022 and began to target civilian facilities across Ukraine, including power and water networks. Using cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as their newly acquired Iranian Shahed 136 loitering munitions, Russian strikes began on 10 October 2022 with 83 missiles and drones launched at various targets. While 43 were shot down by the Ukrainian air defence system, the other 40 found their targets and caused civilian deaths and damage to civilian infrastructure.

This prompted the Ukrainian President to re-emphasise the need for sophisticated Western air defence systems. Speaking to a meeting of G7 leaders on 11 October 2022, he described how “it is important that we have sufficient missiles for the air defense and anti-missile systems provided and that these systems are integrated with our defense system”.

Avenger unit and NASAMS launcher (Images: @DefenceU & @Combined2Forces)

The Ukrainians also adapted to use fighter aircraft to shoot down some incoming missiles and drones to preserve the rapidly dwindling numbers of air defence missiles. But this was a losing battle for the Ukrainians. Their stocks of air defence missiles were smaller than Russian stocks of missiles and Iranian drones. Russia launched over 150 missiles and drones in the first three days of its October aerial onslaught. And at least in the case of the Iranian drones, these were much cheaper (around US$20,000 each) to shoot at a Ukrainian target than the air defence missile that was used to destroy them.

This was a cost-imposition strategy being executed by the Russians. If the Ukrainians did not adapt their approach, they would expend their missiles and the Russians would have more freedom in Ukrainian skies. This would have been terrible for the defence of critical civilian and military infrastructure as well as military units in the field.

The Ukrainians then developed more mobile anti-drone teams and expanded the air defence reporting network through the deployment of a mobile phone app that permitted civilians to report sightings of Russian drones and missiles. Released in October 2022, the air defence app, developed by Ukraine’s tech industry, added another layer to Ukrainian air situational awareness.  The app was yet another example in this war of the meshing of civilian and military intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.

Since October 2022, the performance of the Ukrainian air defence network has improved considerably. With data collected from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council and the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff, American Ian Williams has published analysis that shows that Ukraine improved its interception of Russian missiles from around 10% between February and July 2022, to 75-80% by December 2022.

While there is significant learning and adaptation by Ukrainian air defence operators that has contributed to this improvement in performance, another important contribution has been the adaptation of the Ukrainian air defence network in late 2022 driven by the arrival of advanced Western air defence systems. Initially provided with older US Hawk air defence missiles, the newer German IRIS-T and US National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMs) air defence systems began to be absorbed into the Ukrainian armed forces. Both the IRIS-T and NASAMS have their own radars, fire control centres and missile launchers, each of which added a layer of capability and redundancy to the Ukrainian armed forces approach to air defence. These were reinforced with the even more capable Patriot air defence system in 2023.

Longer-range systems are now complemented with mobile teams equipped with cheaper anti-missile and drone systems. There are self-propelled systems such as the armoured German Flakpanzer Gepard, the Strela-10, U.S. anti-drone 30mm gun trucks, ZSU 23-4, and more improved systems such as 12.7mm machine guns bolted to the trays of offroad vehicles. Short range air defence missiles such as the Mistral, Igla, Strela-2, Stinger man portable air defence weapons are also used.

Electronic warfare systems also feature heavily in Ukraine’ evolved air defence environment. A range of anti-drone detection systems, jammers and spoofing systems, both man portable as well as heavier systems, have been provided by foreign donors of military assistance. And finally, the Ukrainians are acting as a test bed for other more advance anti-drone and anti-missile systems provided by the United States such as mobile counter-UAS laser-guided rocket systems.

Brought together and networked by secure, digital command and control architectures, the Ukrainian air defence network could probably be described now as the most effective in existence anywhere in the world. No single country has come under such sustained attack from such a diversity of different aerial weapon systems in many decades. The Ukrainians have had to learn and adapt since the beginning of the war to reach this point.

By May 2023, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian air defence system was resulting over 90% of missiles and drones being shot down. The effectiveness of the network is exemplified by a 28-29 May 2023 series of raids on the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. Russia fired several barrages of missiles and drones at the Kyiv region. These included Iskander ballistic missiles Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed drones. Across three separate raids 87 Shaheds, 40 cruise missiles and 11 ballistic missiles were fired at Kyiv. Only 6 of the 148 missiles and dronesreached their targets.

The adaptations to the Ukrainian air defence network have had a strategic impact on the war. They have ensured that Ukrainian military operations are able to be conducted with less molestation from Russian missiles, drones and aircraft. This has reduced Russian capacity to undertake surveillance of the Ukrainians and has enhanced the freedom of movement of the Ukrainian armed forces. This very effective air defence environment has also reduced (but not yet removed) the threat to Ukrainian civilians and civil infrastructure. It is an important moral and humanitarian outcome, and it also assists in keep Ukrainian factories open that are supporting the war effort.

The Learning War Continues

There are other aspects of Ukraine’s strategic adaptation that I would like to explore, but for which there is presently insufficient information. One subject is civil-military relations and how national security, and defence, planning has evolved over the last 500 days. Another topic, which is likely to remain a sensitive subject for some time to come, is the research and development being conducted in Ukraine – and on its behalf – to produce a technological edge over Russian forces.

Be that as it may, over 500 days of war, both the Ukrainians and Russians have demonstrated the ability to learn, adapt and then continue that process. It has occurred at multiple levels, although not always in a systemic manner. That said, the strategic adaptation demonstrated by the Ukrainians and explored in this article has been critical to their military effectiveness. These two aspects of adaptation will continue to evolve and remain critical to the defence of Ukraine.

But Ukraine has also shown it can learn and adapt elsewhere. And, as I will explore in the second part of this series, their ability to do so at the operational level of war has also been critical.

16. Trump's Campaign Is Already Shaping Global Affairs

Not partisan. Just the facts. I hear about the fears of a second term from many counterparts. Hedging strategies are necessary.

Trump's Campaign Is Already Shaping Global Affairs

America’s friends and rivals are hedging their foreign policies in case the ex-president is reelected. 

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-07-09/trump-s-possible-win-is-shaping-policies-of-china-russia-japan-eu?utm_source=pocket_saves&sref=hhjZtX76

ByHal Brands

July 9, 2023 at 8:00 AM EDT

The shadow of the future hangs heavy: What people do today is influenced by the bets they make about what tomorrow may hold. The same is true for global affairs. Foreign policy officials make judgments that involve the highest stakes in an atmosphere of extreme uncertainty. And because the US is so influential, countries almost everywhere must base their policies in part on educated guesses about its future reliability and power.

So it’s only natural that something as potentially disruptive as a second Donald Trump presidency is entering their calculus. Trump may be in prison come January 2025, or he may be in the Oval Office — rarely has more uncertainty attended the fate, personal and political, of a major candidate. Yet the mere possibility of Trump’s return is already shaping international affairs.

Over the past year, I’ve had discussions about the future of US foreign policy with officials and analysts from multiple continents. From the halls of the Kremlin to the tense waters of the Western Pacific, the possibility of a Trump resurrection is affecting global strategy and diplomacy in ways that present opportunities — but many more challenges — for those conducting US policy in the here and now.

Trump’s foreign policy was a bewildering medley of tradition and revolution.

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Candidate Trump ran for the presidency on a platform as radical as that of any major contender in modern history. He didn’t just threaten to “cancel” the Paris climate accords and the Iran nuclear deal. He didn’t simply deprecate democratic values while offering admiring compliments to anti-American tyrants.

The core issue was that Trump openly mused about abandoning US allies, ripping up trade deals, and tearing down the international system the US had spent decades constructing. Even the language Trump used was taken from another era: “America First” was the movement that preached isolation as the world burned in 1940-41.

By this standard, Trump’s presidency was remarkably normal. The US withdrew from no alliances; it cut no grand bargains with rivals. If anything, America took sharper positions toward China and Russia, while strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Eastern Europe and investing in bodies, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, meant to secure the Indo-Pacific — initiatives Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, has adopted as his own.

The Trump administration typically opted to renegotiate, rather than terminate, trade deals; it intensified the campaign against the Islamic State while pursuing closer ties with traditional US partners in the Persian Gulf.

These policies could have been the handiwork of any Republican president. Even where Trump did pull back more dramatically, such as withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and trying to do likewise from Afghanistan, he was mostly in step with US politics and public opinion. In these respects, America First was part of the national mood, which is why Biden has sometimes found himself emulating Trump’s economic protectionism and his military retrenchment from the Middle East.

Yet in other ways, it definitely wasn’t business as usual during the Trump years. No prior president had so eagerly unwound the most painstakingly negotiated multilateral agreements reached by his predecessor — the Paris accords, the Iran nuclear deal and TPP. No prior president had so gleefully practiced economic confrontation with America’s friends as well as its enemies. No prior president had so assiduously praised the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, while brawling repeatedly with democratic allies. No prior president had so outrageously undermined US policy for dirt on his chief political rival.

No prior president had tried to terminate US military interventions with a tweet; no prior president had governed with such incompetence and chaos. And never before had the threat of more radical departures been so omnipresent: Trump’s advisers had to dissuade, or simply bamboozle, the chief executive when he sought to quit NATO, the North American Free Trade Agreement and other trade and security pacts.

Trump clearly preferred the angry, atavistic unilateralism he had campaigned on rather than the more measured American internationalism his administration often delivered. And the general rule was that the more the president participated in any issue, the Trumpier the policy got. As one high-ranking US official told me, things were normal during the Trump years — until the president got involved.

The reason the policies were more orthodox than the president had much to do with the inertia created by decades of American globalism. Trump may have hated NATO, but the patterns of institutionalized cooperation the alliance fosters help keep transatlantic relations on course.

It also had to do with personnel and politics. Trump’s Republican allies on Capitol Hill were mostly committed internationalists, willing to defy him on issues — whether Russian sanctions or troop withdrawals from South Korea — where he might have taken US policy off the rails.

Because Trump was such a foreign affairs neophyte, he surrounded himself with aides — Secretary of State James Mattis and National Security Advisers H.R. McMaster and John Bolton, among others — who disagreed with him on policy matters and, in some cases, detested him personally. Some of those advisers headed complex, unwieldy bureaucracies that Trump found difficult to move. In other words, the Trump revolution was moderated by powerful constraints, which might not be there in the future.

There’s little chance Trump, so vexed by his advisers during his first term, would appoint anyone but committed loyalists during a second. He has already announced plans to purge and politicize the civil service. Trump would also have greater, though certainly not total, control of a Republican Party that has been remade in his political image over the past eight years. Not least, a Trump with more experience might not be so tempered by inertia this time around: Top aides such as Bolton believe he might have withdrawn from NATO had he won a second term in 2020.

Of course, we can only speculate about what Trump might do about NATO or any other issue if he returns to power. Would he cut off aid to Ukraine in a bid to end that war “in 24 hours?” Would he again trade geopolitical benefits for political favors? Would he withdraw from the World Trade Organization and ditch Biden’s climate-change agenda?

Those are questions that countries around the world are asking themselves. Much rides on the choices of a superpower. So the prospect of Trump 2.0 is already having global effects.

Exhibit A is the most consequential issue the world faces: The war in Ukraine.

Putin has gotten himself into a truly terrible position: A war that was supposed to end with a glorious thunder run into Kyiv is devouring his army and destabilizing his regime. But Putin keeps fighting for several reasons — because of his obsession with Ukraine and renewing the Russian empire; because he calculates Kyiv will run out of men and materiel over time; and because he believes the Western coalition will crack after November 2024.

Trump has bragged that Putin never invaded Ukraine on his watch. Yet Putin may now see Trump as his path to salvation.

Trump has said that Russia will eventually “take over all of Ukraine.” He laments that America is “giving away so much equipment.” The scenario that gives Putin hope, high-ranking US officials have hinted in public — and stated explicitly in private — is one in which Trump is reelected and then pressures Kyiv to settle while winding down America’s life-giving aid. This is more or less what Trump has said he would do, and what Putin’s top European ally, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, has predicted.

The reality might not be so simple. Senate Republicans strongly support Ukraine, even if Republican voters are conflicted. British officials are confident that the UK and other European countries would keep backing Kyiv even if the US dropped out.

But perception can make its own reality, and the chance of a Trump restoration is helping protract a devastating war by giving Putin confidence that his persistence may pay off in the end. Which is also why Ukraine feels such pressure to succeed in its current offensive: This is its best chance to retake territory and make the case for further aid before the politics of the war potentially shift in 2024.

The possibility of Trump’s return is also creating opportunities for China. No one should expect Trump to drastically mellow US policy: His trade platform for 2024 promises to “tax China to build up America.” Chinese analysts certainly aren’t holding their breath for a return to “rationality” in Washington.

But everyone should expect Trump to neglect the careful coalition-building that has characterized US policy under Biden — an approach, one Chinese hawk comments, that has caused more “difficulties” and “pressure” than “Trump’s unilateral strategy” did. In particular, a second Trump presidency would likely create new wedges between Washington and Europe, the group of democratic allies the former president so enjoyed tormenting. That fact is not lost on Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Since ending its Covid-zero policy and muting its wolf-warrior diplomats, China has welcomed President Emmanuel Macron of France, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and other European leaders to Beijing. The goal is to sustain and strengthen Europe’s trade and tech ties to China, reducing the chances European countries will align fully with Washington against Beijing.

Xi has many reasons to pursue this policy: Geopolitics dictate trying to distance America from its allies. But quasi-official mouthpieces are relishing the polarization and division another Trump presidency would bring. And with 56% of Europeans saying a future Trump administration would damage the transatlantic relationship, this strategy makes all the more sense if Beijing believes the US will start sabotaging its own alliances again.

What about the Persian Gulf? Here, Biden has no shortage of troubles as he tries to navigate relations with autocratic allies, namely Saudi Arabia, while reviving some détente with America’s adversary, Iran. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s government in Saudi Arabia is in no hurry to placate the US on human rights, oil prices or other issues, in part because it may fare better if Trump — who took a “see no evil” approach to the kingdom’s political excesses and regional destabilization — comes back.

The Saudis “have chosen Trump over Biden, and they’re sticking to their bet,” former CIA official Bruce Riedel has said. One reason the Iranians, for their part, have been slow to return to any nuclear deal with Washington is that their experience with Trump showed that future presidents can simply tear up any executive agreement their predecessors ink.

The shadow of a Trumpian future thus informs the calculations of America’s friends as well as its foes. Yet the effects aren’t all terrible for the US.

In Europe, Trump-phobia does limit the willingness to follow the US into a sharper posture vis-à-vis China, because the continent can’t afford to find itself facing high tensions with both Trump’s Washington and Xi’s Beijing. The experience with Trump has certainly motivated Macron to keep pushing “strategic autonomy,” not that many countries want a European project led by Paris.

Yet fear of what may come also seems to be encouraging the European Union to work more closely with the Biden administration on climate issues, technological cooperation and Ukraine, in recognition that there isn’t infinite time to lock in transatlantic gains. Uncertainty does sometimes yield diplomatic leverage.

In East Asia, too, the US may be benefitting from uncertainty. Just look at what is happening in Japan.

Tokyo is conducting a halfway-revolution in foreign and defense policy. In the past year, it has sealed plans to vastly increase military spending so it can purchase fifth-generation fighter jets and “counterstrike” missiles that bring China and North Korea within range. Tokyo has signed a mini-alliance of sorts with Australia; it is expanding engagement across Southeast Asia. Japan was once content to free-ride on American protection. But as China pushes for regional and global hegemony, Tokyo is making itself a more potent player in the Western Pacific and beyond.

Japanese officials say these reforms will make their country a better ally to the US — and bilateral cooperation is flourishing. But they also admit, in private, that Japan is shortening the runway to a more independent foreign policy should the US lapse back into America First unilateralism. As columnist Hiro Akita puts it, Japan prefers a “Plan A+” in which the US and its allies do more together. Yet Tokyo also needs a “Plan B” in case it must look after itself.

It’s a mistake to make everything about Trump, of course. The specter of change after the next election always hangs over US diplomacy. The possibility of Trump’s return is hardly the only thing shaping policies around the world. It’s also silly to pretend that Trump is the sole source of tension with US allies: Many European countries dislike Biden’s tech and green energy subsidies, which seem like Democratic echoes of Trump’s agenda.

Yet Trump is still one of a kind. Yes, a President Ron DeSantis might cause problems for Ukraine. A second-term President Biden might not do much to restart the global trade agenda. But no other candidate has the combination of illiberalism, unilateralism and incompetence that marked Trump’s first term — and might prove still more disruptive in the second.

A concern I have heard many times is that the world is more dangerous than a half-decade ago, amid a hot war in Ukraine, a cold war between America and China, a slow-motion nuclear crisis with Iran, and other problems. The margin for erratic or gratuitously abrasive behavior by a global superpower is smaller than when Trump first held office, which makes the expected implications of a return more pronounced.

The responses we have seen to those expectations aren’t uniformly damaging, from Washington’s perspective. If the possibility of a Trump return hastens Japan’s transition from a consumer to a provider of security in the Indo-Pacific, what’s not to like? In an odd way, the ideal equilibrium might be one in which Trump or someone like him never retakes the White House, but the chance of that happening still spurs greater activism among countries committed to the present international order.

But in the end, Trump’s shadow is largely shaping the world in less favorable ways. It encourages Putin to hang tough in a terrible war. It adds to Beijing’s hopes of splitting America from its European friends. It deprives the US government of leverage in dealing with friends and foes in the Middle East.

It would be unfair to blame Trump for all of these strategic problems. It’s not unfair to say that he contributes to them. Whether or not he wins the presidency again, the Age of Trump isn’t over. The challenge his return could pose for US policy is already here.

More From Hal Brands at Bloomberg Opinion:

• What Does Ukraine Need Most? Ammo
• Russia’s Uprising Is a Serious Threat to China as Well
•  US-China Talks Look More Like a Trap for Biden

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This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

Hal Brands at Hal.Brands@jhu.edu

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net

17. NATO Promises Ukraine Membership – But Not So Fast

NATO Promises Ukraine Membership – But Not So Fast

The elephant in the room at this week's NATO summit will be what to do about membership for Ukraine

Published 07/09/23 07:06 AM ET

Joshua Keating

themessenger.com · July 9, 2023

Tuesday’s NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, is likely to feature all manner of tributes to the Ukrainian cause and pledges to continue military support to the country. But it’s still not clear how far NATO leaders will go toward fulfilling Ukraine’s long-standing demand to actually join the alliance.

The fact that NATO membership for Ukraine is even on the table reflects a remarkable shift. Russian President Vladimir Putin justified his invasion last year in part as a response to NATO’s expansion into what he views as Russia’s sphere of influence, and to prevent Ukraine from being the next country absorbed into the alliance. Sixteen months later, it’s because of Putin’s invasion, or more precisely, Ukraine’s surprisingly effective military resistance, that Ukrainian NATO membership has become a real possibility.

“It's been very clear that the NATO allies are bending over backwards to send the message to Ukraine that it is on a clear path to NATO membership,” Rose Gottemoeller, former NATO Deputy Secretary General, told The Messenger.

Ukrainians from the diaspora demonstrate in front of NATO headquarters on July 7, 2023 in Brussels, Belgium.Thierry Monasse/Getty Images

Indeed, Gottemoeller’s old boss Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary General, said during a visit to the White House last week that at the Vilnius summit, leaders would “make clear that Ukraine’s future is in NATO.”

Ukrainian leaders are also optimistic. Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister, told The Messenger, “There's definitely a political consensus on the fact that Ukraine is to become a member of NATO. The only discussion is about the modalities and the timelines and the formats.”

But Ukraine has received promises of membership before. And there is plenty of debate when it comes to the timeline for Ukraine’s “future in NATO.” The question in Vilnius will be whether there’s enough consensus to assure the Ukrainians that this time, the promises are real.

The case for - and against - Ukraine joining NATO

The argument for admitting Ukraine to NATO is straightforward. Under the alliance’s “Article 5” guarantee, members pledge to treat an attack on any other member as an attack on their own territory and respond with force if necessary. Advocates for Ukrainian membership say Russia would never have attacked Ukraine had it been in the alliance before 2022. The best evidence for this is that Russia has refrained from attacking current NATO members like Poland and Romania that are directly supporting Ukraine’s war effort.

The argument against membership is that Putin or another future Russian leader might push their luck and attack Ukraine anyway, which - were Ukraine in NATO - could draw the U.S. and its allies into a potentially catastrophic superpower war. Despite the extensive military support it has provided Ukraine, the U.S.--NATO’s preeminent military power–has been cautious to avoid direct combat between American and Russian troops.

For that reason, Ukraine acknowledges that it won’t be able to join the alliance until after the war ends, but the country wants firm guarantees that it will get an invitation once the fighting stops.

The cautionary tale hanging over this week’s meeting is NATO’s 2008 summit in the Romanian capital Bucharest. Back then, the alliance was split, with George W. Bush’s administration pushing to grant Ukraine and Georgia a “Membership Action Plan”--a preliminary step toward membership–and several European countries wary that those steps might provoke Russia. The compromise that resulted, which vaguely promised that someday the two countries “will become NATO members,” satisfied no one.

“We want to avoid a scenario reminiscent of 2008,” said Rachel Rizzo, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, “where we put Ukraine and Georgia in the worst position possible by basically promising that they would eventually join the alliance but giving them no clear timeline as to how or when, which just invited Russian aggression.”

Poland and the Baltic states have been the most enthusiastic in advocating for what Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas has called “practical, concrete steps on the path to NATO membership.”

Some formerly skeptical leaders, including France’s Emmanuel Macron, have also come around. The French president called for the first time for a “path” toward membership for Ukraine after a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in May.

Zelenskyy has been on a whistle stop tour of NATO nations this week to press the case. On Thursday, he visited the capitals of the Czech Republic and Bulgaria to receive assurances of support. On Friday, he met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for talks which Stefanishyna said would also include the NATO question. Erdogan has played the spoiler role in blocking Sweden’s accession to the alliance in recent months.

Other governments may be a tougher sell. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has said that Ukrainian NATO membership is a question for after the war, and that any security guarantees offered to the warring countries must be different from those granted to NATO members. Hungarian President Viktor Orban–who has maintains far closer relations with Russia than most of his European counterparts–made his feelings known in April by tweeting “What?!” in response to an article about Stoltenberg expressing support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

The divisions suggest that any commitments coming out of Vilnius may not be as ironclad as Ukraine would like.

“The language that's going to come out of the summit is going to be watered down enough that it papers over any existing disagreements,” said Rizzo. “I have a hard time thinking that there's going to be a very clear-cut answer and pathway for what Ukraine's future with NATO might look like.”

The path forward

How might those differences be papered over? Traditionally, aspiring NATO members are given what’s called a “Membership Action Plan” (MAP), under which they have to undertake a number of reforms and policy changes before they are granted membership. This is what Ukraine was seeking, with U.S. support, back in 2008.

But Gottemoeller says the MAP “can also be used to set up a series of barriers” that keep countries in a kind of indefinite NATO waiting room. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, was granted a MAP back in 2010 but still isn’t a member.

The Biden administration is reportedly open to a plan under which Ukraine would be put on an accelerated path to membership, without a MAP. That’s another example of how much the war has changed thinking; as recently as 2021, Biden said that “school’s out” on Ukrainian NATO membership and that Kyiv still had more work to do on cleaning up the country’s endemic corruption.

In the meantime, one of the ideas the alliance is discussing is upgrading Ukraine’s political role by forming a “NATO-Ukraine Council”--a permanent mechanism for security consultation. Stoltenberg has said that in such a council, Ukraine and its partners would be “sitting at the table as equals to discuss key issues for our security.”

There’s some irony here: Back in 2002, when relations between Russia and the West were at a relative high point, a similarly structured “NATO-Russia council” was formed. Relations between Brussels and Moscow deteriorated sharply after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the council hasn’t met since last year’s invasion.

While this kind of relationship is short of the ironclad Article 5 guarantees that Ukraine is seeking, Stefanishyna said that “being part of the NATO infrastructure is a strategic security guarantee itself.”

Lingering questions

Any agreements made today about Ukraine’s relationship with NATO will be contingent on how the war ends. Some advocates for fast-tracked Ukrainian membership argue it could actually make a negotiated end to the conflict more likely since, as former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul said, “Zelenskyy would know that an end of hostilities would enhance his country’s security immediately.”

But some NATO members might worry if the war ends in a settlement that leaves patches of Ukrainian territory under Russian control. NATO has never extended Article 5 guarantees to a country under partial foreign occupation, though Gottemoeller points out that West Germany became a member in 1955, when East Germany was still under Communist rule.

For the moment, Ukrainian officials say this is a non-issue; Kyiv’s official stance is that it will not consider a ceasefire that leaves Ukrainian territory in Russian hands.

There’s also the question of whether, given Putin’s extreme hostility toward Ukrainian membership, he might keep the war going longer in order to prevent it.

For all the unanswered questions, Stefanishyna says the priority now is to get the process in motion.

“We understand that joining NATO is a process and that the summit will set up the preconditions for this process,” she said. “But making the political decision [to admit Ukraine] does not need to be a long process. It can simply be made.”

themessenger.com · July 9, 2023

18. Anarchy Is a Bridge: Russia and China Are Pushing NATO and Japan Together

Not only Japan but the Asia Pacific Four: Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and Australia.

Excerpts:

Charting the Future Course

The rapprochement under way and its military, nontraditional, and economic security implications signal to friends and foes alike that two of the world’s most powerful alliances have a shared vision of how the world ought to be and the intention to realize it together. Doing so sends a strong message to the many neutral countries attempting to hedge between the United States and China that NATO and Japan stand together. This can simultaneously reassure allies and potential allies while dissuading rivals from aggression. This will help ensure peace and stability in a free and open Indo-Pacific and beyond.

While cooperation is increasing, the relationship will likely remain evolutionary rather than revolutionary due to article nine of Japan’s constitution, which restricts the use of force abroad. Articles five and six of NATO’s charter also define the territorial boundaries of the bloc’s collective defense, which exclude Japan. Dissent within NATO, including France’s opposition to opening the office in Tokyo, and longstanding hesitation within Japanese political circles to militarily engage outside of the U.S. alliance, may slow progress. This is both expected and reasonable –– careful incremental growth should be prioritized over radical and risky change.

Still, it is clear that Chinese and Russian behavior is building a bridge of solidarity between NATO and Japan that is buttressed by mutual and wide-ranging security challenges that demand closer cooperation moving forward. While a fully institutionalized global alliance between NATO and Japan remains a distant prospect, it is closer today than ever before. Given the momentum for and shared interests in further rapprochement, the future course of engagement between NATO and Japan is both hopeful and imperative.

Anarchy Is a Bridge: Russia and China Are Pushing NATO and Japan Together - War on the Rocks

MATTHEW BRUMMER AND WRENN YENNIE LINDGREN

warontherocks.com · by Matthew Brummer · July 10, 2023

After nearly 70 years of distant relations, security ties between NATO and Japan are flourishing. A number of important initiatives have recently been adopted, including high-level political dialogues, joint military training, and cooperation in science, technology, and cyber security. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited Tokyo in February 2023 and signed a joint declaration with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida committing the two parties to increased strategic cooperation as “reliable and natural partners who share common values and security interests.” In May, Japan announced plans to open a NATO liaison office in Tokyo, marking a significant milestone in the burgeoning cooperation: Such offices can portend future NATO membership and, if established, would be the only of its kind in Asia. On July 11, Kishida will attend the two-day NATO summit in Lithuania, where an agreement on further security and practical cooperation is expected. Indeed, the recent rapprochement is beginning to transform the relationship into a strategic partnership, and there are many potential benefits to both parties in terms of military, nontraditional, and economic security.

This rapid advancement in relations between the security bloc and Japan follows the signing of the E.U.-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2019 and has largely come about as both sides seek to balance against Chinese expansion and Russian aggression. Beijing is increasingly the focus of European and American security interests and is now seen as a threat to the alliance. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept outlined for the first time how China challenges member country “interests, security, and values.” Beijing uses bombastic wolf warrior diplomacy, where Chinese diplomats in the Xi Jinping administration use overtly hostile rhetoric, and has overseen coercive policies to weaponize strategic dependencies in space, cyber, and sea and disrupt materials and supply chains to its advantage. The Chinese Communist Party has also overseen strategic expansion into several NATO member states via the Belt and Road Initiative, all of which has raised security concerns among members of the alliance. While Japan has long viewed Chinese behavior as threatening, NATO now also sees it as such, which has pushed the alliance to expand its presence in the Indo-Pacific and collaborate with partners in the region.

Moscow’s recent aggression, especially its invasion of Ukraine, has also changed Japanese threat perceptions and security policy, which has led to its closer alignment with like-minded nations. Tokyo was proactive in joining the sanctions regime led by G7 nations (the other six of which are NATO members) against Russia and openly condemned its attack on Ukraine. Kishida has pledged steadfast support to Ukraine, including recently at the 2023 G7 summit in Hiroshima, and has already committed over $7.1 billion in humanitarian, financial, and nonlethal defense equipment aid to “lead the world” in fighting Russian aggression. In just a few years, Japan has abandoned its policy of preferential treatment toward Russia, even labeling it a serious violator of international law in its 2022 National Security Strategy. Thus, while Russia was long a factor complicating Japan’s engagement with NATO, it is now a factor promoting it.

Become a Member

China’s expansion, Russia’s aggression, and increased Chinese-Russian “no limits” military and political alignment have fundamentally shifted threat perceptions around the world. In response, the security calculus in both NATO and Japan has moved from being regionally to globally focused: China now falls within NATO’s scope of concern in addition to the bloc’s primary focus on the European continent, and Russia within Japan’s, which has traditionally been fixated on threats emanating from Northeast Asia. This has incentivized defense cooperation, resulting in a genuine upgrading of political and military ties between Japan and countries within the NATO alliance. As Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi recently put it when asked about the growing cooperation, “It is not possible to speak about the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region separately.”

Washington has welcomed, indeed pushed for and helped facilitate, the warming of relations between its principal multilateral and bilateral alliances as it continues its reorientation toward the Indo-Pacific. As part of this shift, the United States is now actively uniting its allies in Europe and Asia in order to take on China and Russia. This includes promoting dialogue to address common challenges, such as safeguarding the rules-based international order among NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners — Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India — who have not cooperated extensively in post–Cold War security affairs. To this end, President Joseph Biden arranged an historic trilateral meeting with Japan and South Korea on the sidelines of the 2022 NATO Madrid summit, the first ever attended by a Japanese prime minister. Japan will again join the summit to be held in Lithuania in July 2023. All of this comes at a time when Japan is also simultaneously developing a number of bilateral security agreements with NATO members, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, which should help it to align with the bloc’s security objectives over time.

However, more must be done to further cement these relationships if the current rapprochement is to last long-term and benefit all parties involved. First and foremost, a concerted effort must be made to increase trust and reduce misperceptions between NATO members and Japan. The United States, as the common denominator to both the Atlantic and Japanese alliances, should take the lead in institutionalizing interoperability — the capacity of military technologies and people to operate in conjunction with each other — on land, sea, air, and space. There are many opportunities, in particular, for maritime cooperation to meet increasing security demands at a time of rising competition at sea, such as monitoring and protecting shipping routes and subsea cables. Building on recent progress, Japanese diplomatic representation within NATO should also be further expanded in both decision-making bodies such as the North Atlantic Council (as a regular observer) and in project-level prioritized areas of cooperation, including disarmament and nonproliferation, arms transport, and weapons storage. Such efforts can assist in aligning military and economic security at a time of heightened competition in both pillars of statecraft. Finally, France’s untimely protest against the proposed NATO liaison office in Tokyo should not stymie efforts to open it: The office would start small, likely nestled within the sprawling U.S. Yokota Air Base, but can serve critical bureaucratic functions while also sending a clear signal that NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners stand together. Strengthening the alignment will require slow, incremental action, but this is as it should be. Stepwise growth can meet key objectives without drawing criticism at home or abroad. After all, it’s the tortoise, not the hare, that wins the race.

Bridges Over the New Geography of Danger

The rapprochement between Japan and NATO has been spearheaded by high-level political exchanges and agreements, including the 2013 Joint Political Declaration and 2014 Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program, which put in writing the commitment to work together to enhance interoperability and build capabilities to address challenges to “shared strategic interests” inherent to the shifting security environments in both Europe and Asia. In their joint statement in early 2023, Stoltenberg and Kishida reinforced the importance of a “staunch” NATO-Japanese partnership, which “will demonstrate its value under this severe and complex security environment.”

Japanese personnel have been increasingly integrated into NATO’s institutions, participating in political dialogues and in NATO foreign minister meetings, in addition to the Madrid and forthcoming Vilnius summits. In 2019, Japan established an initial formal mission to NATO in its embassy in Belgium and then upgraded it to a permanent diplomatic mission and ambassadorship at NATO headquarters in 2023. The May 2023 announcement of plans to open a NATO liaison office in Tokyo would cement the alignment, literally. At the Vilnius summit in July, a further upgrade and even more ambitious partnership agreement will be unveiled under the auspices of NATO’s new Individually Tailored Partnership Program, with the understanding that cooperation on priority issues will be accelerated, streamlined, and expanded. NATO-Japan relations have gradually been institutionalized over the past decade, but the pace, level of integration, and planned commitment to the relationship over the past year alone are unprecedented.

These political developments have been coupled with practical steps toward interoperability and capability-building, especially in the maritime domain. In 2018, Tokyo established a designated liaison officer in NATO’s Maritime Command, and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces conducted exercises with NATO’s Maritime Standing Group I in the Baltic Sea and in Spain. In 2022, cooperation intensified when Tokyo participated in training missions alongside NATO vessels in the Mediterranean for the first time. In June 2023, Japan joined the historically massive two-week Air Defender exercise alongside 23 NATO members and Sweden, demonstrating Japan’s commitment to the alliance’s show of solidarity amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. The exercise took place shortly after the NATO ministers of foreign affairs informal meeting in Oslo, where Stoltenberg declared that “what happens in Asia matters for Europe and what happens in Europe matters for Asia.” Stoltenberg’s statement echoed that of Kishida a year earlier at the Madrid summit when he remarked that the “the international community stands at a crossroads in history” and that the participation of NATO’s Asia-Pacific partners in the summit “expresses the realization that the security of Europe and of the Indo-Pacific is inseparable. Russian aggression against Ukraine is not a problem for Europe alone, but instead an outrageous act that undermines the very foundation of international order.”

Japan has also started to work alongside NATO countries to provide relief and military assistance. In March 2023, for the first time, Japan conducted joint international emergency operations as part of the NATO-coordinated air bridge that delivered disaster relief to earthquake-stricken regions in Turkey. The contribution was described by NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu as “a historic first” that “demonstrates again how Japan’s cooperation with NATO helps bolster international peace and security.” Japan has also shown checkbook commitment to NATO and has emerged as the lead nonmember financial supporter of NATO missions, including over $30 million to its comprehensive assistance package trust fund to provide equipment and supplies to Ukraine. Yoshimasa clarified Japan’s rationale for such recent engagement with NATO as “Something happening in East Europe … affects directly the situation here in the Pacific.”

Finally, cooperation has also increased in the realm of technology and cyber defense. In 2021, Japan and NATO jointly held the world’s largest cyber defense war game, and in 2022, Tokyo formally joined the NATO Cyber Cooperation Center in Estonia and designated experts to be stationed there. There has also been an uptick in emerging and disruptive technology sharing, including in areas such as quantum computing, novel materials, and AI. NATO approved Japan as an enhanced opportunity partner of its science and technology organization in 2021, expanding the group of then-nonmembers to four along with Australia, Sweden, and Finland. Japan now contributes to NATO’s Science for Peace and Security program, with experts on such issues as border and port security and nanotechnology for infrared sensors, as well as health responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agent exposure. A leading innovator in this field, Japan is also one of four partners to join Science for Peace and Security’s most recent initiative “Futures in the Indo-Pacific,” launched in early 2023, with the aim to strengthen ties with partners who “play an important role in the new international security landscape.”

Alignments Have Consequences

The implications of NATO-Japan alignment are significant, not least in terms of how China and Russia might respond. Beijing has already stated its disapproval on several occasions; China’s foreign ministry called alignment between NATO and Japan “a push for bloc confrontation [that] calls for high vigilance.” At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s top security summit, in June 2023, Defense Minister Li Shangfu blasted such ties in its neighborhood as “holding countries in the region hostage and play[ing] up conflict and confrontation.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in May that the plan to open the NATO office in Tokyo is “yet further proof of NATO’s ambitions to entrench in the region to spread an anti-Russia and anti-China agenda” and that “NATO’s advance in Asia will lead to the militarization of the region and an escalation in bloc conflicts.” Both countries such rhetoric to foment support for what otherwise could be unpopular or costly foreign policies, framing the United States and the West as threatening Chinese and Russian sovereignty. It is therefore likely that NATO-Japan engagement will lead to more Chinese Communist Party and Kremlin statements that focus on U.S.-led containment and encirclement, which can grease the wheels of defense production to meet Xi’s “comprehensive national security” goals and Putin’s war machine in Ukraine.

China’s and Russia’s displeasure is not totally unfounded — a closer NATO-Japan relationship could, in fact, mean a stronger deterrent in both Europe and Asia. Although currently at the fledgling stage, as NATO and Japan continue to increase cooperation, interoperability between America’s two great alliances will only increase. The strengthening of this interoperability should be a key objective for the burgeoning NATO-U.S.-Japanese nexus, and it should undertake expanded joint exercises, defense training, and weapons development. Both NATO and Japan also have strong capabilities and mutual interests in outer space, but so far there are few concerted joint initiatives. This should be expanded.

Japan in particular can learn a great deal from how NATO is assisting Ukraine in terms of resupply of both arms and noncombat materials, a role it would likely find itself in if China invades Taiwan. And while, for example, NATO joining the fight in a Taiwan contingency or Japan doing the same in the Baltics is difficult to imagine, deepening of NATO-Japan interoperability, understanding, and solidarity will increase costs for any potential aggressor and will decrease their likelihood of victory.

Increased NATO-Japan cooperation will also help both parties to address shared nontraditional security challenges. Peacekeeping operations, for example, should be better prioritized. Japan could support ongoing and deepening NATO operations in Kosovo, for instance. Japanese expertise in institution-building, gleaned from its deployments and building and training programs in Africa and Southeast Asia, would be particularly helpful, especially in the northern regions that have seen recent instability.

NATO and Japan should also begin to plan for managing the monumental task of stabilizing and rebuilding postconflict Ukraine — reconstruction planning and security planning go hand in hand, after all. They can take advantage of NATO’s expertise in security provision and Japan’s in reconstruction and capacity-building. Likewise, further effort should also be paid to deepening maritime domain awareness and information exchange on counterpiracy, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, human trafficking, and drug smuggling, areas where Japan coordinates closely with Indo-Pacific allies outside of the NATO context, such as India. By uniting NATO and Japanese resources, capabilities, and networks in nontraditional security contexts, both parties can better address these common threats.

Closer military relations can also facilitate closer cooperation in economic security — trade and industrial policy tend to follow the flag. The United States, Japan, and the European Union are all in the process of adopting new “support and protect” regimes in frontier technologies — such as the CHIPS and Science Act and a series of export controls focused on AI and semiconductors in the United States. These programs seek to promote domestic technological capabilities through increased investment in research and development while protecting critical supply chains from adversaries. In order to achieve this, the United States and Europe must decrease interdependence with rivals, including China and Russia, while building closer ties with like-minded countries, especially Japan, which accounts for 52% of materials and 30% of equipment in the global value chain for semiconductors. Such an agenda is daunting but is qualitatively less so among militarily aligned countries where trust and transparency are high and shared interests many.

Early signs of success can be seen in the recent U.S.-Dutch-Japanese export control agreement on semiconductors designed to “choke off” strategic rivals from supply networks. Yet far more must be done to militarily and economically integrate Japan. One of many new initiatives that could help do this would be NATO’s recently announced Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell. Japan, a juggernaut in this area, should be brought into this initiative, and joint strategies should be developed to lay, repair, and protect subsea fiber optic cables and other assets critical to data flow for economic security. NATO-Japanese cooperation can produce much-needed economic security benefits in an era of growing protectionism and great power rivalry.

Charting the Future Course

The rapprochement under way and its military, nontraditional, and economic security implications signal to friends and foes alike that two of the world’s most powerful alliances have a shared vision of how the world ought to be and the intention to realize it together. Doing so sends a strong message to the many neutral countries attempting to hedge between the United States and China that NATO and Japan stand together. This can simultaneously reassure allies and potential allies while dissuading rivals from aggression. This will help ensure peace and stability in a free and open Indo-Pacific and beyond.

While cooperation is increasing, the relationship will likely remain evolutionary rather than revolutionary due to article nine of Japan’s constitution, which restricts the use of force abroad. Articles five and six of NATO’s charter also define the territorial boundaries of the bloc’s collective defense, which exclude Japan. Dissent within NATO, including France’s opposition to opening the office in Tokyo, and longstanding hesitation within Japanese political circles to militarily engage outside of the U.S. alliance, may slow progress. This is both expected and reasonable –– careful incremental growth should be prioritized over radical and risky change.

Still, it is clear that Chinese and Russian behavior is building a bridge of solidarity between NATO and Japan that is buttressed by mutual and wide-ranging security challenges that demand closer cooperation moving forward. While a fully institutionalized global alliance between NATO and Japan remains a distant prospect, it is closer today than ever before. Given the momentum for and shared interests in further rapprochement, the future course of engagement between NATO and Japan is both hopeful and imperative.

Become a Member

Matthew Brummer is an assistant professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and a Policy Innovations Fellow at Harvard University’s Program on U.S.-Japan Relations.

Wrenn Yennie Lindgren is a senior research fellow and Head of Center for Asian Research at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) and an associate fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Image: U.S. Army

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Matthew Brummer · July 10, 2023

19. How capable is today’s Marine Corps to answer a 9-1-1 call? Not very

How capable is today’s Marine Corps to answer a 9-1-1 call? Not very

marinecorpstimes.com · by Gen. James Conway (retired) and Gen. Anthony Zinni (retired) · July 7, 2023

The American people and a growing ­number of elected representatives are beginning to suspect something some ­Marine Corps leaders have been unwilling to admit: United States Marines are no longer capable of responding to global crises and contingencies quickly and ­effectively, and in some cases, at all.

During February 2022, the ­Marine Corps was unable to meet a U.S. ­European Command request to surge a Marine ­expeditionary unit — a force of about 2,200 specially trained Marines and sailors embarked on amphibious ships — to the Mediterranean in response to ­Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for Combat Development and Integration, told the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee. A month would pass before a Marine expeditionary unit could sail from North Carolina.

The absence of a forward-deployed ­Marine expeditionary unit in the ­European theater arguably weakened NATO’s deterrence.

A year later, the Marines were unable to send a large disaster relief force to ­Turkey after a devastating earthquake, the commandant confirmed.

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Again, there were no embarked ­Marines aboard amphibious ships in the region. The best the Marines could do was send a small detachment of 34 Marines by air.

Two months after the Turkey ­earthquake, Marines watched as U.S. Special Operations Forces evacuated American citizens from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, amid deteriorating security conditions.

According to some estimates, ­another 16,000 Americans were left to fend for themselves, “a startling break with ­American precedent,” contributing writer and Marine veteran Elliot ­Ackerman wrote in The Atlantic. Once again, there were no Marine expeditionary forces ­either afloat or ashore that could respond to time-sensitive requirements of regional military commanders.

In all three of these cases, Marine ­leadership identified the lack of available amphibious shipping as the main reason for the absence of forward-deployed Marine forces.

However, the leaders failed to mention that during 2021 and 2022 the Marine Corps had ended the rotational ­deployments of three forward based special purpose Marine air-ground task forces, focused on crisis response missions in the Southern Command, Africa Command and Central Command areas.

The deployments were ostensibly ended to fund Force Design 2030 initiatives.

These events suggest a disturbing trend that should alarm those entrusted with our national defense and beg the question: How capable are the Navy and Marine Corps to answer a 9-1-1 call for future military and humanitarian emergencies?

Timely and effective global response across the spectrum of conflict requires a combination of amphibious lift for forward presence, maritime prepositioning for rapid deployment and sustainment, and a combined arms force that can be task organized for everything from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to major combat against a determined enemy. Neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps can meet these essential requirements today.

The two services have dramatically ­reduced the nation’s requirement for amphibious ships, emasculated the maritime prepositioning force and dangerously crippled the combined arms capabilities of the Marine air-ground task forces.

In 2009, the commandant of the Marine Corps, the chief of Naval operations and the secretary of the Navy reached an agreement for 38 amphibious ships.

Progress toward that goal from a nadir of 28 ships in 2010 was slow, but steady.

Yet, in 2019, the commandant of the Marine Corps unilaterally abandoned this requirement. Only after the Navy announced its own questionable intentions to dramatically reduce the size and composition of the fleet did the Marine Corps feel compelled to articulate a “new” minimum requirement for 31 ships.

Given the current historically low operational readiness rate of the amphibious fleet, the Marines are often unable to continuously project two U.S.-based Marine expeditionary units forward in the Mediterranean and Indo-Pacific areas.

In 2017, three maritime prepositioning squadrons were forward-based to support crises and contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. One squadron of six ships was based in the Mediterranean, a second squadron of seven ships in the Western Pacific, and a third squadron of seven ships in the Indian Ocean.

Each of these squadrons supported a fly-in Marine expeditionary brigade (16,500 Marines and sailors) for 30 days of combat.

Today, the Mediterranean squadron has been deactivated and the other two squadrons are being reduced to four and three ships respectively and being reconfigured to support a smaller Marine force.

Had the Mediterranean squadron still existed, a Marine task force could have quickly flown to Turkey, “married up” with supplies and equipment from the ships, and provided a meaningful contribution to the earthquake relief effort. Prepositioning capability has been so severely truncated that it now may be irrelevant.

Four years ago, the Marine Corps was the world’s premier expeditionary, combined arms force. Marines could be task organized for any crisis or contingency, and immediately deployed anywhere.

They were scalable, capable of rapidly converging and building from small units to a corps-size force. They were expeditionary, able to sustain themselves until follow-on reinforcements (if needed) arrived.

Today, the Marine Corps has or will cut 21% of Marines in infantry battalions, all tanks and bridging, 67% of direct support cannon artillery, most rapid and in-stride breaching and proofing capabilities, almost 30% of tactical aviation, and much organic logistical support. Simply stated, Marines can no longer be effectively task organized for crises and contingencies “in every clime and place.”

Marine Corps leaders are being disingenuous when they tell Congress and the American people that the Marine Corps is the nation’s 9-1-1 force, fully capable of responding to crises and contingencies across the spectrum of conflict and in every “clime and place.” It no longer is and the Navy shares much of the blame.

The Navy-Marine Corps team is now a shell of the capacity that served our maritime nation so effectively for over two centuries.

Until Marines are properly supported with adequate amphibious ships, bolstered by a robust maritime prepositioning force and restored to a true combined arms force, they will remain incapable of fulfilling the will of the 82nd Congress: “to be most ready when the nation is generally least ready.”

Gen. James Conway (retired) is a career infantry officer with extensive experience in global response operations. He was the operations officer for the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit during contingency operations in Beirut, commanded Battalion Landing Team 3/2 during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force during two consecutive combat tours in Iraq. His last assignment was 34th commandant of the Marine Corps.

Gen. Anthony Zinni (retired) is a career infantry officer with extensive experience in global response operations. He commanded the 35th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which was deployed twice to the Philippines to conduct emergency security operations and disaster relief operations. He also served as the director of operations for the Unified Task Force in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. His last assignment was commander, United States Central Command.

20. Why America Has a Launch on Attack Option

Conclusion:

We do agree with Montoya and Kemp when they write, “Instead of holding fast to the idea of immediate launch, it is far sounder to build a nuclear capability that can survive a first strike and for which decision-makers are not pressed to make decisions with incomplete information.” To achieve this objective, it will take strategic decisions like building mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, increasing the number of hardened and deeply buried facilities, and placing strategic bombers on dispersed nuclear alert. Continuing on America’s current modernization trajectory will never achieve what both Montoya and Kemp and these authors desire.

It is important to maintain an on-alert missile force capable of launching under attack if the United States desires to deter Russia from contemplating a first strike on the nation’s missile fields. Removing the launch under attack option will not improve the credibility of American deterrence or reduce the risk of accidental detonation or war. It will only further undermine American credibility. With President Putin suspending Russian participation in the New START Treaty, a breakout from treaty restrictions cannot be ruled out. Such a decision would only make a launch under attack option even more important for maintaining deterrence.

Why America Has a Launch on Attack Option - War on the Rocks

ADAM LOWTHER AND DEREK WILLIAMS

warontherocks.com · by Adam Lowther · July 10, 2023

If Russia were to maintain its nuclear forces at current levels, it would take more than its entire land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force to destroy America’s land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. This requirement serves as an effective deterrent, since it makes an attack on American missile fields a high-risk option. Unfortunately, the New START Treaty that bound Russia to limits on operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons faltered amidst serious tensions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent decision to suspend the treaty’s implementation.

We believe Russia’s continued observance of New START Treaty limits is increasingly unlikely. Russian President Vladimir Putin could rely more on nuclear weapons to compensate for his declining conventional performance in Ukraine. Should Russia do so and, on the worst day, choose to preemptively strike the U.S. nuclear arsenal in a crisis, President Putin has a range of options to employ against America’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. For this and other reasons discussed below, we believe that the United States should keep its intercontinental ballistic force “on alert” and maintain its “launch under attack” option to both ensure the force’s survivability in a conflict and deter adversaries from seriously contemplating a first strike.

In a March 17 War on the Rocks article, “Launch Under Attack: A Sword of Damocles,” Natalie Montoya and R. Scott Kemp recommended eliminating the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile force’s launch under attack option based on the results of Montoya’s baccalaureate thesis (2021). Unfortunately, the recent article does not accurately reflect how the United States conducts nuclear deterrence operations.

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We are focusing on three aspects of the larger debate surrounding the advisability of a launch under attack option for the intercontinental ballistic missile force: intercontinental ballistic missile tactics, the accidental launch fallacy, and technical imperatives. We suggest that those, like Montoya and Kemp, arguing for a change in the alert posture of the intercontinental ballistic missile force are mistaken in their assessment of how such a move would affect American deterrence.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Tactics

Montoya and Kemp’s article summarizes the findings of Montoya’s thesis, in which she uses publicly available data to develop simulations of Russian nuclear attacks on America’s intercontinental ballistic missile fields. The pair suggest that at least 100, and possibly up to 200, of the nation’s land-based ballistic missiles would survive a first strike and remain available to the president for a retaliatory strike.

They argue that the option to launch the American land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force under attack is dangerous, provocative, and unnecessary because these missiles are survivable enough to absorb an attack and have the necessary retaliatory forces required. In fact, they argue that by absorbing a first strike, the advantage shifts to the United States because Russia has used the majority, if not all, of its nuclear forces to destroy only part of the American land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force.

While not stated directly, the only way to demonstrate a commitment to end the launch under attack option and to prevent the president from executing this option is to de-alert the force. These actions would be dangerous and would undermine America’s response to the rapid nuclear breakout of China and Russian aggression.

Montoya and Kemp are correct in suggesting that it is difficult to successfully eliminate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in a first strike because of the total number of weapons required for this task. The 400 missiles, across 450 silos, with 45 launch control centers, and the ability to launch from the Airborne Launch Control System, make the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the nuclear triad a formidable challenge to a Russian first strike. These characteristics of the nation’s silo-based single-warhead missiles make them valuable; ensuring their destruction is a daunting task that enhances American deterrence.

We disagree with Montoya and Kemp when they say that “the United States maintains a posture it calls “‘launch under attack,’ a doctrine that permits U.S. missiles to be loosed from their shelters after ‘multiple, independent sensors’ detect an incoming attack from an adversary.” According to the State Department fact sheet they cite, “The United States does not have a launch on warning doctrine [a term used interchangeably with launch under attack].”

It is also important to distinguish between posture and doctrine. Using the terms correctly is important because force posture has a very specific meaning and is detailed in classified documents such as the “President’s Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons” and other documents that are used by the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the services to influence acquisition and operations. Joint and service doctrine establishes how, in the case of the former, the joint force will operate and, in the latter, how each service thinks about and conducts operations.

Montoya and Kemp are correct in saying that “the United States currently maintains the option to launch under attack so that in the event of a first strike by Russia, U.S. silo-based missiles could be launched before they are destroyed.” An option does not constitute a posture or a doctrine.

The primary purpose of a launch under attack option is to enhance not missile survivability but deterrence. Deterrence is a psychological effect achieved in the mind of an adversary. The United States enhances deterrence by threatening cost imposition, reducing the benefits of action, and encouraging restraint. Launch under attack reduces the benefits of action by increasing uncertainty and perceived risk. President Putin does not know if he will strike empty silos.

If the United States de-alerts its intercontinental ballistic missile force, Russia could take a very different tactical approach to striking these forces. After an initial strike, Russia could conduct space-based battle damage assessment using its surveillance and reconnaissance satellites to determine which targets were not destroyed and then restrike surviving launch facilities. As part of a shoot-look-shoot tactic, which is only possible if the missile force is de-alerted, Russia could conduct wave attacks, reducing the number of weapons required on each target in a first strike.

With a ballistic missile force on alert, Russia must employ a shoot-shoot-look tactic because it must achieve complete destruction with a first strike or risk retaliation. This is necessary because the current launch under attack option forces Russian planners to employ a much higher percentage of the force in a first strike, hoping the United States does not launch its long-range missiles before Russian reentry vehicles strike their targets. This creates the uncertainty needed to deter a first strike.

It is also worth reiterating that a Russian first strike is highly unlikely prior to a breakout that gives the Russian military significantly more fielded warheads than the United States. In such a situation, launch under attack becomes even more important because a larger Russian arsenal means the percentage of their force needed to conduct a first strike decreases, and exchange ratios are meaningless.

Montoya and Kemp’s piece ignore the threat of conventional attack on American land-based ballistic missiles. This is surprising because in a 2022 study, Montoya wrote, “One of the most salient issues that surfaced in our study is the projected medium-term increase in the vulnerability of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile to attack by precision conventional weapons.” Russian performance in Ukraine has underwhelmed observers, but Russia still possesses an arsenal of long-range cruise missiles that can strike anywhere in the United States with accuracy. Since the United States does not field a network of continental air defenses, the homeland is largely unprotected from cruise missile attack.

Russia is unlikely to use precision conventional weapons to strike missile silos. Instead, cruise or hypersonic missiles are more useful in targeting terrestrial radars, command and control facilities, bombers on the ground, and ported ballistic missile submarines. Such an attack is a way to prevent the United States from building a clear picture of the attack, which makes a response more challenging. The loss of some or most of the bomber and ballistic missile submarine fleet to conventional strike dramatically reduces the president’s response options. If the president also lacks accurate situational awareness from strikes on command and control facilities, the problem is compounded.

With conventional strikes on these other elements of the nuclear triad, Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles can focus on destroying American launch facilities.

Putin’s recent suspension of Russian participation in New START only underscores our view that any Russian strike on the United States will take place after a breakout that is unmatched by the United States. Given Russia’s track record for cheating on treaties (Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and Open Skies), it is unwise to think they would abide by treaty requirements prior to a nuclear strike on the United States.

The Fallacy of Accidental Launch

In addition to suggesting that a significant portion of the intercontinental ballistic missile force would survive a Russian nuclear strike, Montoya and Kemp argue that “there are many historical examples of early-warning systems generating false alarms or computer-generated messages pretending to be actual warnings. When combined with a launch on warning posture, these glitches create real risks of accidental war.”

What they fail to mention is that in every example, all of which are decades old, redundant safety measures ensured that any one failure in the system did not lead to an actual failure with nuclear weapons. The U.S. military expects the humans operating the nuclear arsenal and its command and control system to make mistakes. While the military strives for perfection, everything from the weapons themselves to the crews that maintain and operate them are designed to mitigate error.

This is done through the safety measures built into the weapons, training of crews, the personnel reliability assurance program, operational procedures, and a command and control system comprised of layers specifically designed to prevent the very accidental war Montoya and Kemp fret about. In every instance of a mistake or error that detractors can provide, the simple fact is that the redundancy built into the system worked.

In 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons, the United States never experienced an accidental detonation or miscalculation leading to war. Arguments suggesting that because part of the system failed, the entire system failed willfully ignore that the system, which is much better today than when the last accident occurred four decades ago, was specifically designed to account for the inevitable mistakes that would happen.

The same is true of errors in the systems that comprise American integrated tactical warning and attack assessment. Where one layer failed, another layer succeeded. This layering of systems is sometimes referred to as Reason’s Accident Causation Model, or the Swiss cheese model. There may be holes in one slice of cheese (system), but no hole runs all the way through the entire block of cheese (system of systems). If slices of Swiss cheese are like the layers of redundancy, each slice may have holes in different places, but none of the holes line up perfectly on every slice. Thus, a hole (mistake/error) in one slice is covered in another slice.

In the aviation world, the crew resource management model builds redundancies into the system to prevent human error when it comes to the combat crews flying nuclear-armed bombers. Similar approaches are in effect across the nuclear enterprise to prevent the kind of accidents Montoya and Kemp fear. Nowhere in the system does safety rely on a single point of failure. Multiple failures must occur, both mechanical or technical and human, before an accidental detonation or nuclear war can happen. It is certainly worth pointing out that no system is perfect. There is always some level of risk, even if it is very small.

In reality, every human or technical error that occurred in the past was carefully analyzed and used to make the system safer. It is for good reason that the United States has been accident-free for four decades. To continue this safety record, America must invest in people, weapons systems, and nuclear warhead production infrastructure. Regularly building new nuclear warheads that continue to enhance safety and use control is the most reliable way to ensure the least possible risk.

Technical Imperatives?

Proponents of eliminating the launch under attack option are incorrect to suggest that technological developments are not putting the nation’s ballistic missile submarine fleet at risk. Ballistic missile submarines have a long history of vulnerability to attack when in and leaving port. In 1974, the USS James Madison collided with a Soviet attack submarine sent to stalk U.S. submarines leaving the naval base at Holy Lock in Scotland. Similar incidents occurred when U.S. submarines stalked Soviet submarines leaving their submarine pens.

High-performance computing is also making it easier to analyze space-based surveillance data with a level of fidelity not possible in past decades. Unmanned underwater vehicles, passive sonar, and other advanced capabilities are also making it harder to hide submarines in the ocean. While submarines are survivable once in their deep ocean boxes, we must continue to invest in keeping them survivable for tomorrow and hedge against technological breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare.

It is important to keep in mind that the small portion of ballistic missile submarines at sea at any given time are susceptible to attack by conventional torpedo. Submarines in port could face Russian low-observable cruise missile attack. Again, no nuclear strike is needed to decimate the leg of the triad responsible for more than half of all nuclear warheads.

Since 1991, the bomber fleet has not maintained day-to-day nuclear alert. Both intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are armed and ready to launch at a moment’s notice. The bomber fleet must essentially shift from conventional to nuclear operations and move weapons from storage areas to aircraft. This is no easy task. Absent significant warning, the bomber fleet is at considerable risk from both a conventional and a nuclear strike.

Thus, arguments that suggest an attack on the missile fields are somehow acceptable because the submarine and bomber legs of the triad will go untouched in a conflict are fundamentally flawed. We assess that any attack will begin with attempts to blind the United States by taking out space-based integrated tactical warning and attack assessment capabilities, all while cyber attacks and sabotage attempt to take out command and control. In our assessment, attacks on submarine and bomber bases are also likely to precede or coincide with attacks across the missile fields.

Military planners must consider the enemy’s most dangerous course of action, in which a Russian attack employs surprise and, consistent with Russia’s operational approach, uses overwhelming force in an initial attack. This leaves the United States insufficient time to deploy the submarine fleet or load and disperse bombers. Under these conditions, ported submarines and much of the bomber fleet are early casualties in a Russian first strike. With the development of a second nuclear-armed peer adversary, America must take the steps necessary to enhance survivability across the triad.

Conclusion

We do agree with Montoya and Kemp when they write, “Instead of holding fast to the idea of immediate launch, it is far sounder to build a nuclear capability that can survive a first strike and for which decision-makers are not pressed to make decisions with incomplete information.” To achieve this objective, it will take strategic decisions like building mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, increasing the number of hardened and deeply buried facilities, and placing strategic bombers on dispersed nuclear alert. Continuing on America’s current modernization trajectory will never achieve what both Montoya and Kemp and these authors desire.

It is important to maintain an on-alert missile force capable of launching under attack if the United States desires to deter Russia from contemplating a first strike on the nation’s missile fields. Removing the launch under attack option will not improve the credibility of American deterrence or reduce the risk of accidental detonation or war. It will only further undermine American credibility. With President Putin suspending Russian participation in the New START Treaty, a breakout from treaty restrictions cannot be ruled out. Such a decision would only make a launch under attack option even more important for maintaining deterrence.

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Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He spent more than two decades in uniform and as an Air Force and Army civil servant working on nuclear issues. He is also the host of the NucleCast podcast.

Lt. Col. Derek Williams is a B-52 Weapons System Officer and graduate of Sandia National Laboratories’ Weapons Intern program.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Adam Lowther · July 10, 2023

21. A Stronger NATO for a More Dangerous World By Jens Stoltenberg

Well timed (and coordinated with CFR).

Excerpts:

Now we are taking further major steps to strengthen our deterrence and defense. We will agree to new, detailed regional defense plans, which are fully connected with the forces, capabilities, and command and control needed to execute them. NATO will have 300,000 troops on higher alert, including substantial air and naval combat power.

NATO is a regional alliance, but the challenges we face are global.

We are adapting our command structures to reflect the new geography of the alliance, with Finland’s membership, which has doubled NATO’s land border with Russia, and soon Sweden’s membership. This is a game-changer for European security and will provide an uninterrupted shield from the Baltic to the Black Sea. We are also substantially increasing cooperation with the defense industry to ramp up production, both for Ukraine’s defenses and for ours.

This fundamental shift in our collective defense requires a generational commitment to increase defense spending. We are making real progress, but not as quickly as this dangerous world demands. In Vilnius, NATO allies will make a more ambitious commitment to invest two percent of GDP in our defense. This figure should be a floor to build on, not a ceiling to reach. We need to invest more and invest it now, because security is the foundation for our economies and societies to thrive. Preventing aggression today is less costly than fighting a war tomorrow.

Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered any remaining illusions of peaceful cooperation, so we must spend more and do more together to stay safe. The challenges are great, but NATO has been an anchor of stability for Europe and North America for almost 75 years. In a world of growing dangers, NATO will continue to protect our people, defend our democratic values, and keep our nations strong.

A Stronger NATO for a More Dangerous World

What the Alliance Must Do in Vilnius—and Beyond

By Jens Stoltenberg

July 10, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Jens Stoltenberg · July 10, 2023

Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine is a turning point in history. War has returned to Europe and great-power rivalries are growing. Authoritarian regimes are coming together to challenge the global rules and institutions that underpin peace and stability. Russian President Vladimir Putin is clamping down on freedoms and deepening divisions within his own country, as the Wagner paramilitary company’s rebellion clearly demonstrated. But no one should underestimate Russia or the dangers facing the world today.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is responding to a more unpredictable world with unity and strength. NATO allies in Europe and North America, and our partners across the globe, have provided unprecedented economic and military support to Ukraine. Over the last decade, NATO has implemented the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation. We have strengthened our military presence in eastern Europe and increased defense spending. With Finland’s membership—and soon Sweden’s—NATO is growing stronger and larger.

We must continue this momentum and maintain our strength and unity. This is exactly what NATO leaders will do when we meet for our summit in Vilnius tomorrow. I expect NATO allies to confirm our unwavering support for Ukraine, continue to strengthen our own defense, and increase our cooperation with our European and Indo-Pacific partners to defend the global rules-based order. These are my main priorities for Vilnius and beyond, as I have the honor to serve this alliance for another year.

What we do—or do not do—now will define the world we live in for generations. So we will send a clear message: NATO stands united, and authoritarian aggression will not pay off.

FREEDOM FOR UKRAINE

When I visited Ukraine this spring, I witnessed the terrible suffering, but also the tremendous bravery and resolve, of the Ukrainian people in defending their freedom. On the train to Kyiv, I was struck by how many fresh graveyards lined the railway tracks. I visited Bucha, just north of the capital, and heard about the horrors of Russian occupation. I also saw the efforts to rebuild a better, stronger Ukraine.

The Ukrainian forces are now engaged in fierce fighting to reclaim occupied territory, but they face strong Russian defenses and tough terrain. If Russia stops fighting, there will be peace. If Ukraine stops fighting, it will cease to exist as a nation. Ukrainians will not waiver, because the more gains they make on the battlefield, the stronger their hand will be at the negotiating table.

Everyone wants this brutal war to end, but a just peace cannot mean freezing the conflict and accepting a deal dictated by Russia. A false peace would only give Moscow time to regroup, rearm, and attack again. We must break the cycle of Russian aggression, and the best way to achieve lasting peace tomorrow is to support Ukraine, so that it prevails as a sovereign nation now.

NATO allies have stood by Ukraine since it gained independence 30 years ago. We provided years of training and support after Russia illegally annexed Crimea and destabilized the Donbas in 2014. Since Moscow’s February 2022 invasion, we have stepped up unprecedented support for Ukraine’s right to self-defense, enshrined in the UN Charter. Over the last year and a half, NATO countries have trained and equipped new Ukrainian armored brigades and provided tanks, combat vehicles, and advanced air defenses. NATO allies will also train Ukrainian pilots on fourth-generation fighter jets. This support shows that we are committed to Ukraine for the long haul.

We must break the cycle of Russian aggression.

To strengthen Ukraine, we will agree on a multi-year package of support at the Vilnius summit. So far this year, pledges already amount to over $500 million. This package will help Ukraine rebuild its defense and security sector, so that it can defend against further aggression. It will ensure that the Ukrainian armed forces are fully interoperable with NATO forces.

Over the last 18 months, Ukraine has taken huge strides in transitioning away from military doctrines, training methods, and equipment dating from the Soviet era, toward NATO standards and equipment. Ukraine is more integrated with our alliance than ever before, and so we must take steps to reflect this reality.

In Vilnius, we will upgrade our political ties by hosting the first meeting of the new NATO-Ukraine Council, together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This is a platform for decisions and crisis consultation, where NATO allies and Ukraine will sit as equals to tackle shared security concerns. All NATO allies agree that Ukraine will become a member of NATO. NATO’s door remains open, as we have proved by inviting Finland and Sweden to join last year. Ukraine’s NATO membership is a matter for NATO allies and Kyiv to decide: Russia does not have a veto. In Vilnius, we will set out a strong vision for Ukraine’s future and bring the country closer to NATO.

ADDRESSING AUTHORITARIANISM

After the Cold War, NATO worked hard to forge more constructive relations with Moscow, including on arms control, countering terrorism, combating piracy, and increasing our scientific cooperation. But Putin walked away from peaceful cooperation, with a pattern of increasingly reckless behavior from Chechnya to Georgia, and Syria to Ukraine. He has dismantled the international arms control architecture and is engaging in dangerous nuclear saber-rattling.

Even if the war were to end tomorrow, there is no sign that Putin’s broader ambitions have changed. He sees freedom and democracy as a threat and wants a world where big states dictate what their neighbors do. This puts him in constant confrontation with NATO’s values and international law.

If Putin wins in Ukraine, it would be a tragedy for Ukrainians and dangerous for the world at large. It would send a message to other authoritarian regimes that they can achieve their objectives through force. China, in particular, is watching to see the price Russia pays, or the reward it receives, for its aggression. It is learning from Moscow’s military failures and the response of the international community. When I visited Japan and South Korea at the start of this year, their leaders were clearly concerned that what is happening in Europe today could happen in Asia tomorrow.

NATO does not see China as an adversary. We must continue to engage with Beijing to tackle today’s global challenges, including nuclear proliferation and climate change. At the same time, China should use its considerable influence over Russia to end its illegal war in Ukraine. So far, however, Beijing has not condemned Moscow’s aggression, and instead is increasing its economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation with Russia. The Chinese government’s increasingly coercive behavior abroad and repressive policies at home challenge NATO’s security, values, and interests. Beijing is threatening its neighbors and bullying other countries. It is trying to take control of critical supply chains and infrastructure in NATO states. We must be clear-eyed about these challenges and not trade security interests for economic gains.

As autocratic regimes draw closer to one another, those of us who believe in freedom and democracy must stand together. NATO is a regional alliance of Europe and North America, but the challenges we face are global. That is why I have invited the leaders of the European Union and of our Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—to join us in Vilnius. We must have a common understanding of the security risks we face and work together to strengthen the resilience of our societies, economies, and democracies.

HARDER, BETTER, FASTER, STRONGER

Russia’s pattern of aggression is a stark reminder that we cannot rule out the possibility of an attack against NATO countries. We must continue to strengthen and invest in our deterrence and defense. But we are not starting from scratch. Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the alliance has undertaken a fundamental shift from military missions beyond its borders back to collective defense. The last ten years were a decisive decade of adaptation, preparing NATO for an unpredictable future.

Since 2014, we have deployed combat-ready troops to the eastern part of NATO territory for the first time, put more troops on higher readiness across the alliance, and adapted to defend NATO states in space and cyberspace as effectively as we do on land, at sea, and in the air. This year, the defense spending of European allies and Canada will grow by 8.3 percent in real terms. This is the biggest increase in decades, and the ninth consecutive year of increased defense spending across NATO. The United States is increasing its spending as well.

Now we are taking further major steps to strengthen our deterrence and defense. We will agree to new, detailed regional defense plans, which are fully connected with the forces, capabilities, and command and control needed to execute them. NATO will have 300,000 troops on higher alert, including substantial air and naval combat power.

NATO is a regional alliance, but the challenges we face are global.

We are adapting our command structures to reflect the new geography of the alliance, with Finland’s membership, which has doubled NATO’s land border with Russia, and soon Sweden’s membership. This is a game-changer for European security and will provide an uninterrupted shield from the Baltic to the Black Sea. We are also substantially increasing cooperation with the defense industry to ramp up production, both for Ukraine’s defenses and for ours.

This fundamental shift in our collective defense requires a generational commitment to increase defense spending. We are making real progress, but not as quickly as this dangerous world demands. In Vilnius, NATO allies will make a more ambitious commitment to invest two percent of GDP in our defense. This figure should be a floor to build on, not a ceiling to reach. We need to invest more and invest it now, because security is the foundation for our economies and societies to thrive. Preventing aggression today is less costly than fighting a war tomorrow.

Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered any remaining illusions of peaceful cooperation, so we must spend more and do more together to stay safe. The challenges are great, but NATO has been an anchor of stability for Europe and North America for almost 75 years. In a world of growing dangers, NATO will continue to protect our people, defend our democratic values, and keep our nations strong.

• JENS STOLTENBERG is the Secretary-General of NATO.

Foreign Affairs · by Jens Stoltenberg · July 10, 2023

22. NATO’s Worst-of-Both-Worlds Approach to Ukraine

Excerpts:

In an ideal world, NATO would not need to risk anything to admit Ukraine because the country would already be a member. Declassified American evidence shows speculation about that prospect occurring at least as early as fall of 1994. On October 13 of that year, Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, wrote to his boss, President Bill Clinton, about the “possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine and Baltic States.” Clinton drew two vertical lines next to a recommendation to “keep the membership door open for Ukraine, Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria (countering Allied inclinations to ‘tilt’ in favor of the Visegrad countries).” In Lake’s view, Washington should not simply “consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence.” Clinton drew a large check mark the cover page of Lake’s recommendations and wrote, “looks good.”

Although that speculation did not yield membership for Ukraine, in contrast to the Baltics, in an ideal future Kyiv will become a NATO member. For that to happen without misleading Ukraine again, it is essential for the alliance to avoid making vague pledges without substance. NATO should avoid phrases such as “after the war” or “after the fighting” and follow the one component of the Cold War German model that is applicable. The alliance should confirm that Ukraine can and will accede when it once again has what West Germany had: fixed borders. But in today’s tragic world, adding Ukraine to NATO while its boundaries are sites of active conflict with Russia would come at a high cost.

Considering this cost, rather than conduct a divisive debate over membership now, the alliance should instead focus in Vilnius on determining what Ukrainians need to succeed in their counteroffensive—and then getting that support to them swiftly. Put simply, NATO should give Kyiv what it needs to accomplish, as soon as possible, what truly matters: the restoration of fixed borders. They are, after all, the answer to the accession question. Once Ukrainians have those, the alliance should hasten to welcome the country as an ally. Like West Germany, Ukraine can then serve as a clear and strong front line against Moscow.

NATO’s Worst-of-Both-Worlds Approach to Ukraine

Why the German Model Won’t Solve a Problem of the Alliance’s Own Making

By M. E. Sarotte

July 10, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post–Cold War Stalemate · July 10, 2023

As NATO states meet in Vilnius this week, they are confronting, yet again, the accession question: that is, whether to turn rhetoric about Ukrainian membership into reality. Ever since the coalition’s 2008 summit in Bucharest, where the allies issued a declaration stating that both Georgia and Ukraine “will become members of NATO” at some undefined point in the future, member states have debated how (or whether) to implement that pledge. Yet despite the passage of 15 years, neither Georgia nor Ukraine has joined the alliance.

Kyiv has made it clear that after years of fighting Russia, it is tired of waiting. The government wants to see a clear path to membership laid out at the Vilnius summit. Many allies are inclined to accede to Ukraine’s wishes—despite the war raging within its borders. To fulfill Ukraine’s hopes, a growing list of former policymakers are floating a proposal for partial membership. Stephen Biegun, a former deputy secretary of state; Ian Brzezinski, a former deputy assistant secretary in the U.S. Department of Defense; Evelyn Farkas, the executive director of the McCain Institute; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former secretary-general of NATO; Randy Scheunemann, strategic counselor at the Halifax International Security Forum; and Alexander Vershbow, a former NATO deputy secretary-general, have all recently argued that the current de facto Russian control over many parts of Ukraine should not block Kyiv’s swift accession. Rather, they say, the alliance should treat Ukraine as it did the divided Cold War-era Germany, where only the western portion of the country was able to join NATO until the two Germanys reunified in 1990.

This model has since gained broader traction. On July 8, the Washington Post published an op-ed calling for NATO to use the German model with Ukraine at Vilnius—echoing the New York Times, which had previously run a piece entitled, “If a Divided Germany Could Enter NATO, Why Not Ukraine?” The idea also arose at a public event in late June featuring Ihor Zhovkva, the deputy head of the office of the president of Ukraine, and Eric Ciaramella, the former National Security Council director for Ukraine. And in a podcast hosted by the Center for a New American Security, Vershbow said that Washington should immediately begin “engaging allies” on this model, specifically on “providing a security guarantee for territories that are fully under Ukrainian government control—right now, even before there’s a cease-fire or armistice.” Failing to do so, he said, would give Moscow the ability to “hold the situation hostage indefinitely.”

To many of its proponents, adopting such a proposal might also feel like a form of atonement—a way to make up for 15 years without accession and the damaging consequences. By pledging to give Georgia and Ukraine membership but not following through, NATO left those states in the worst of all possible worlds. The Bucharest declaration gave both Georgia and Ukraine a misleading sense of how much NATO support they would have in dealing with Russia, leading them to make decisions based on assumptions later proven false. And since it is well known that NATO abhors adding members engaged in conflicts, both became targets of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who realized that giving vent to his desire to restore Moscow’s control over former Soviet areas would have the added benefit of impeding accession. After Mikheil Saakashvili, then Georgia’s president, sent troops in August 2008 into the breakaway region of South Ossetia, recognized internationally as part of Georgia, Putin invaded the country in response. Russian troops remain in Georgia to this day. And when a pro-Western popular revolt toppled Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, the Kremlin responded by seizing Crimea and attacking Ukraine’s eastern regions. Putin subsequently elevated the Ukrainian conflict to a major land war in February 2022.

Supporters of using the German model have admirable motives and are rightly outraged at what has happened to Georgia and Ukraine. But trying to use Cold War Germany as a precedent for Ukraine risks repeating the damaging mistake of 2008: misleading Kyiv about the difficulty of its path to accession. The German precedent would make it harder, not easier, for Ukraine to re-establish its territorial integrity; weaken NATO’s deterrent power; and undermine the alliance’s unity at a time when Ukraine needs it most. It could, in other words, create yet another worst-of-all-worlds scenario—something neither Ukrainians nor the alliance can afford during a major land war.

HIGH RISK, LOW REWARD

Advocates of the German model for Ukraine misread history. Saying that a divided Germany entered NATO, as the New York Times headline does, is inaccurate. What became a member of NATO was a rump state called the Federal Republic of Germany, also known as West Germany, which emerged from the combination of the British, French, and U.S. post-World War II occupation zones. In a copycat move, the Soviet Union recast its occupation zone into a state called the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, which Moscow then made part of its involuntary alliance, the Warsaw Pact.

Advocates of applying this history to Ukraine are, consciously or unconsciously, proposing accession in mutually exclusive ways. Either they seek to draw a new NATO border within Ukraine, dividing Russian-held from Ukrainian-held territory, or they argue that its membership should include no fixed border at all, allowing Ukraine’s battlefield performance to determine which territory falls under NATO’s protection right away and which territories join later. Each scenario might seem appealing to some advocates, but neither would end well for anyone outside the Kremlin.

Consider, for example, the first option. Expressed in practical terms, it would mean that NATO’s security guarantee—known as Article 5, after the provision in the alliance’s 1949 Washington Treaty specifying that NATO states should treat an attack on one member as an attack on all—would extend only to a specific dividing line, presumably close to the current front. But this line would consign eastern Ukrainians to the fate of East Germans—extended subordination to Moscow—and create a de facto West Ukraine and East Ukraine. Worse, this outcome would roughly parallel one proposed by the former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, who has called for Ukraine to be partitioned.

Advocates of using the German model for Ukraine misread history.

Nor would Kyiv have many options for aiding its fellow citizens on the wrong side of that line once established. To gain Article 5 protection in 1955, West Germany had to forswear all “recourse to force” to achieve national reunification or even any “modification of the present boundaries.” Kyiv would face similar pressure to abjure all military attempts to retake lost territory because if it did so, it would put not just itself but all allies at risk.

In short, this model would compel Ukraine to wrestle with a bitter question during a brutal war: Which is more important, NATO membership or holding out hope for retaking territory? Given the tragic nature and long-lasting consequences of this choice—the division of Germany lasted over 40 years—it is not one that Ukrainians or outsiders should be eager to make.

There’s another way supporters of this view are misreading history. In the aftermath of World War II, European neighbors scarred by memories of Nazis were understandably hesitant to let Germans rearm. But the combination of Soviet strength and a divided Germany’s weakness at the front line trumped bitter memories. European neighbors could live with a rump portion of divided Germany rearming as a NATO ally in the face of the Soviet threat. Put bluntly, German division enabled West German accession to NATO. Today the opposite would unfold: Ukrainian accession to NATO would enable Ukrainian division.

Now consider the second option: avoiding Ukrainian division by, as Brzezinski and Vershbow suggested, providing a fluid security guarantee for territories that are under Ukrainian control and, as Rasmussen said, adding others later. In theory, this option need not partition Ukraine, since the Article 5 coverage area could and would evolve over time.

Ukrainian membership is being held up by countries with diverse motivations.

But this option would undermine Article 5’s credibility. Security guarantees are, for better or worse, inseparable from fixed borders. West Germany could become part of NATO because its eastern border represented a clear line of division—one emerging from occupation zones that predated NATO’s creation. By contrast, Ukraine’s line of control is constantly in motion. It would be difficult to ascertain what land Article 5 would cover at any given minute or hour, let alone on any given day. Article 5 would become a matter of debate rather than a deterrent—and that debate could become a violent and risky one in the face of Russian aggression.

To reassure allies worried about such risks, Scheunemann and Farkas have called attention to Article 5’s flexibility. They point out, rightly, that the article does not “mandate a specific response by member states,” such as a military attack. As a result, if Ukraine became a fellow member state, allies would not be dragged into participating in a full-scale war, because they could respond to Russian aggression in what Scheunemann and Farkas term “a minimal manner.” But other allies would then be left to wonder whether their Article 5 guarantee was similarly minimal. In a worst-case scenario, Putin might finally feel emboldened enough to attack Estonia or Poland, since Article 5 would apparently no longer guarantee a NATO military response.

Under all these scenarios, the consequences for the alliance would be enormous. At the core of NATO is the credible threat of a strong, united response to aggression. Calling Article 5 into question—either in terms of its jurisdiction or the severity of its implementation—would fundamentally call NATO as an institution into question. That would help neither its current member states nor Ukraine.

PAST AND PRESENT

The debate over whether to add Ukraine to the alliance now by following the German model ignores another basic fact. NATO operates by consensus. Every existing member needs to approve the admission of a new country. The sad reality is that there is no consensus for taking immediate, practical steps toward Ukrainian accession at Vilnius (to say nothing of Georgian accession).

It is hard to see that changing, at least in the near term: unlike Sweden’s candidacy, Ukrainian membership is being held up by countries with a diverse set of motivations. They include Hungary, which has closer ties to Russia than most other NATO members. But they also include Germany and the United States. These countries worry about the difficulty of implementing Ukrainian membership under current conditions and are understandably hesitant to become material parties to the war by taking that step.

This reluctance is another reason that forcing an answer to the accession question at Vilnius would come at a cost. The alliance has yet to resolve the much less controversial question of Swedish membership. Adding a new fight over Ukrainian accession “right now,” in Vershbow’s words, would exacerbate tensions between allies even more. As Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan rightly argued in Foreign Affairs in April, “neither Ukraine nor its NATO supporters can take Western unity for granted.”

NATO must avoid making vague pledges without substance.

In an ideal world, NATO would not need to risk anything to admit Ukraine because the country would already be a member. Declassified American evidence shows speculation about that prospect occurring at least as early as fall of 1994. On October 13 of that year, Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, wrote to his boss, President Bill Clinton, about the “possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine and Baltic States.” Clinton drew two vertical lines next to a recommendation to “keep the membership door open for Ukraine, Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria (countering Allied inclinations to ‘tilt’ in favor of the Visegrad countries).” In Lake’s view, Washington should not simply “consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence.” Clinton drew a large check mark the cover page of Lake’s recommendations and wrote, “looks good.”

Although that speculation did not yield membership for Ukraine, in contrast to the Baltics, in an ideal future Kyiv will become a NATO member. For that to happen without misleading Ukraine again, it is essential for the alliance to avoid making vague pledges without substance. NATO should avoid phrases such as “after the war” or “after the fighting” and follow the one component of the Cold War German model that is applicable. The alliance should confirm that Ukraine can and will accede when it once again has what West Germany had: fixed borders. But in today’s tragic world, adding Ukraine to NATO while its boundaries are sites of active conflict with Russia would come at a high cost.

Considering this cost, rather than conduct a divisive debate over membership now, the alliance should instead focus in Vilnius on determining what Ukrainians need to succeed in their counteroffensive—and then getting that support to them swiftly. Put simply, NATO should give Kyiv what it needs to accomplish, as soon as possible, what truly matters: the restoration of fixed borders. They are, after all, the answer to the accession question. Once Ukrainians have those, the alliance should hasten to welcome the country as an ally. Like West Germany, Ukraine can then serve as a clear and strong front line against Moscow.

• M. E. SAROTTE is Marie-Josée and Henry R. Kravis Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the author of Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post–Cold War Stalemate.

Foreign Affairs · by Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post–Cold War Stalemate · July 10, 2023

23. 6 Characteristics Shared by Successful Special Ops Candidates

In case anyone reading this is interested in joining special operations.

6 Characteristics Shared by Successful Special Ops Candidates

military.com · by Stew Smith, CSCS® · July 6, 2023

Are you physically, mentally and emotionally prepared for any special ops-level training program that is both competitive to enter and requires enduring a high attrition rate selection to graduate?

The answer is broad enough to create a book, but here is a concise answer that may help you understand some of the concerns, besides physical preparation, that go through the minds of recruits and candidates:

Stew, out of the people you have worked with or trained over the years, what are the characteristics of those that make it or those that do not when preparing special ops training? Is it more mental or physical? Appreciate you. Dan

Here are six things that successful candidates tend to have in common:

1. They Show Up (Plus).

The people consistently present in the six-day-a-week training program do well physically. These workouts are at 6 a.m., requiring some to travel 30-45 minutes or more to attend. This is a physical minimum standard to getting to and through selection.

The secondary workouts later in the day focused specifically on the weakness experienced that morning and is a characteristic that yields success. This daily commitment is needed and will help you improve your discipline and dedication, and build some needed mental toughness one day at a time.

Showing up when you do not feel like getting out of bed is a great daily test. We all need to learn how to pass this test when establishing why we want to do these types of jobs.

2. They Work Harder but Also Smarter.

The people who can make the workouts a little tougher in some fashion also do well. For instance, add a weight vest to pull-ups, run faster, do more intervals than prescribed or add more reps. Smartly added extra credit can also go a long way to building confidence and durability to handle longer days/nights of selection training.

A second workout on most days is something most successful candidates create for themselves, but you have to adhere to logical split routines and recovery protocols even more.

3. They're Serious About Recovery.

Do not waste a hard workout day on missed sleep, poor food choices or late-night partying if you want optimal results. If you take this journey seriously, take your recovery seriously as optimal performance is mastering recovery.

4. They Get to Work.

Adding in a physical labor job or challenging college class schedule can also be helpful to success on the special ops journey. If you find yourself doing hard workouts throughout the day or taking a nap in between, you may miss out on some of the long days of activity training you need.

The physical challenges are tough, and you need to prepare properly for them, but a long day of work or moving around is a grind. Some of the best students I have seen over the years did early morning workouts before work or school.

Then they worked or attended classes all day and squeezed in another workout or sport at the end of the day. Of course, these are stressful on the mind and body, but managing your day with constant activities, deadlines and workouts will always build an exceptional candidate.

5. They're More Mature.

Both physical and emotional maturity are critical to success. Most of the attrition rate in special ops is riddled with teenage candidates. Some have not even finished growing yet, and many have recently graduated high school, which creates a perfect storm of failure with homesickness, constant negative feedback and being required to perform at the highest levels physically that they did not realize was even possible.

Take some time to grow up fully before attending these programs; they are not for kids.

6. They Don't Have a Good Plan B.

If you have a good secondary option to serve, ending your special ops journey can be much easier. You have to want this chosen profession so badly that all other options are not part of your thought process when you are cold, swimming in dark water, uncomfortable and exhausted on a day seemingly without end. "How bad do you want it?" is always easier to answer when comfortable and pain free.

People have many characteristics and mannerisms when dedicated to a goal in their future, regardless of that goal. The key is to keep grinding and working on those weaknesses whenever you get the opportunity to do so.

Stew Smith is a former Navy SEAL and fitness author certified as a Strength and Conditioning Specialist (CSCS) with the National Strength and Conditioning Association. Visit his Fitness eBook store if you're looking to start a workout program to create a healthy lifestyle. Send your fitness questions to stew@stewsmith.com.

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military.com · by Stew Smith, CSCS® · July 6, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com