Quotes of the Day:

"The happiness of your life depends upon the quality of your thoughts; therefore, guard accordingly, and take care that you entertain no notions unsuitable to virtue and reasonable nature."

– Marcus Aurelius

“The Soviet military was misused in Afghanistan in a similar way that the U.S. military was misused in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Yes, wars can be audits of whole societies. And warfare showed that Russia in 2022 through 2024 may indeed have gone backward since the days of the old Soviet Union. A Russian victory in Ukraine can only come about through the sheer, brutal application of fresh troops and materiel.”

– Robert D. Kaplan, Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis 

“It is not enough for a naval officer to be a capable mariner. . . . He must also be a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.”

– John Paul Jones 

1. Is the OPCON Transfer What North Korea Has Been Waiting For?

2. A civilizational vision for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis

3. Inside North Korea: What I saw before escaping the Regime | #62 Hyunseung Lee

4. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests - Defense Priorities

5. Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors

6. In a Good-Will Gesture, South Korea Returns Stranded Fishermen to the North

7. Rubio Visits Asia as Trump Raises Trade-War Tensions

8. 'Restrainers' propose slashing US troop numbers in South Korea, Okinawa

9. China’s influence is now shaping decisions in South Korea’s legislature

10. U.S. interested in S. Korea's proposal on shipbuilding, semiconductor cooperation: trade minister

11. Boat carrying repatriated N. Koreans safely docks at port in North: official

12. Vice FM Park has brief exchanges with FMs of China, Japan at ASEAN meeting

13. Lee calls for efforts to restore inter-Korean relations

14. China's embassy in N. Korea holds reception to mark 64th anniv. of key treaty signing

15. N. Korea youth defy state crackdowns with bold fashion, hairstyle trends

16. N. Korean teachers skip mandatory indoctrination sessions, face public criticism

1. Is the OPCON Transfer What North Korea Has Been Waiting For?

Another brilliant and important essay from my good friend and colleague at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS), Ms. Ji Hyun Park. She is a member of the north Korean diaspora as an escapee from north Korea. She is now a political leader and human rights activist in the UK.

This is arguably a very important essay that I wish would be read by US and ROK political leaders.

I have only one minor quibble but it is something that she cannot really know about and it in no way detracts from the brilliant argument she is making but I have to call attention to it for those who deeply follow these issues. The US will not lose "command authority" in Korea. RIght now and even after OPCON transition the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (which will remain intact and simply be commanded by a ROK General with a US Deputy Commander) remains under the control of the MIlitary Committee which includes plenary and permanent members. The plenary members are the ROK and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the ROK Minister of Defense, and the US Secretary of Defense, the Commander of USINDOPACOM and the senior US Military Officer in Korea. The permanent military committee members are the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Senior US MIlitary Officer in Korea. So whether there is a US general in command or a ROK general in command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command it will still answer to the Military Committee which represents the National Command and Military Authorities of both countries. The ROK/US Combined forces Command is a bilateral command that "belongs" equally to both nations. It is not a US command and the US does not control ROK forces. This is the most misunderstood aspect of "military sovereignty" and OPCON transition. 

Below her essay is a link and abstract to a long, complex, and exhaustive study on Korean command and control by the equally brilliant Colonel Shawn Creamer for those who want to delve into the complicated nature of Korean command and control relationships.

All that said, I am a supporter of OPCON transition. I want a ROK general in command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command for two simple reasons. If we send any forces into north Korea whether in response to a north Korean attack on the South or if the regime collapses, military operations should be led by a Korean general. First, the outcome of either war or regime collapse can only be a free and unified Korea and the military will have to support the political process of unification. and this must be done by Koreans and not foreigners. This is important for the long term legitimacy of a free and unified Korea. Second, the US cannot afford the perception of another Iraq and Afghanistan with the US appearing to be an occupying force. Yes the US military forces will enter north Korea as part of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command but they will be under the OPCON of the ROK/US CFC commanded by a ROK general officer answering to the Military Committee. Again, this is important for the long term legitimacy of a free and unified Korea which again must be established by Koreans.

게시판

Is the OPCON Transfer What North Korea Has Been Waiting For?

https://m.blog.naver.com/freedom88-/223928905415

freedom88-

2시간 전

 이웃추가

본문 기타 기능

I’m not sure if I, someone still lacking in knowledge about international affairs, am qualified to speak on such matters. However, as a North Korean defector, I would like to share my thoughts on the issue of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON).

I was born and raised in North Korea, and after escaping in search of freedom, I found myself looking at the Korean Peninsula from the outside.

Fortunately, by learning English, I gained access to many history books and the opportunity to view both North and South Korea—not from within South Korea’s own perspective, but from an external and broader point of view.

As someone who observes both Koreas from abroad, I find it impossible to overlook the renewed discussions in South Korea about the repatriation of wartime operational control (OPCON).

I believe this issue goes far beyond a question of who holds military authority. It is directly connected to South Korea’s national security, the strategic balance in Northeast Asia, and the survival of liberal democracy on the Korean Peninsula.

 OPCON Transfer — A Scenario North Korea Hopes For?

The OPCON transfer is often packaged as a matter of “restoring military sovereignty.” However, in reality, it aligns closely with the strategic goals that North Korea has long pursued. North Korea has consistently insisted on the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in its negotiations with the United States.

What matters here is the language they use. “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” doesn’t merely refer to North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons. It also includes the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and the dismantling of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command.

In short, if OPCON is transferred solely to the South Korean military, U.S. command capabilities will be effectively excluded from the country’s defense posture. This would create the strategic environment North Korea has long sought.

Whenever North Korea attends talks with the U.S., the U.S. discusses denuclearization, but North Korea has never once entered negotiations with genuine intentions to denuclearize.

 The Dangerous Link Between the End-of-War Declaration and OPCON Transfer

During the Moon Jae-in administration, efforts to issue a so-called “end-of-war declaration” were strongly pursued, and discussions on OPCON transfer were accelerated in parallel.

The administration and left-leaning political forces described this as “progress toward peace,” but in reality, it served to relieve international pressure on the North Korean regime and helped lay the groundwork for justifying a withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The Korean War is not over. The peace that South Koreans enjoy today does not come from the war having ended; it is merely a temporary pause.

In such circumstances, combining an end-of-war declaration with OPCON transfer is a dangerous formula that could shake the very foundations of South Korea’s national security.

 President Syngman Rhee and the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty

President Syngman Rhee understood this better than anyone. That’s why, on October 1, 1953—immediately after the armistice—he signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. He refused to sign the armistice unilaterally and focused on securing a concrete military commitment and alliance from the U.S.

This treaty officially came into effect on November 18, 1954, and it provided South Korea with a military shield capable of protecting its freedom.

The treaty was not just a diplomatic document; it was a declaration by the free world against communist threats. It was also the foundational pillar that allowed South Korea to survive.

What President Rhee wanted—and what motivated the U.S. to enter into this alliance—was not just strategic calculation. It was about shared values: defending freedom, stopping communism, and protecting human dignity and democracy. That’s what the ROK-U.S. alliance was built upon: a values-based partnership.

 The ROK-U.S. Alliance Was Not Built with Money — It Was Built with Blood

The Trump administration, as in its first term, is once again demanding that South Korea pay $10 billion annually in defense cost-sharing. The tone suggests that South Korea is benefiting unilaterally from U.S. protection. This narrative is often repeated in the media, and even some South Korean conservatives echo the U.S. position.

But I do not agree.

The ROK-U.S. alliance is not one founded on money — it is one founded on sacrifice and blood.

During the Korean War, countless young Americans and soldiers from United Nations forces gave their lives to protect South Korea’s freedom. South Koreans, too, risked their lives to resist communist aggression.

This alliance was built on such sacrifices. Today’s freedom and prosperity in South Korea are the result of that bloodshed.

That’s why the United States is not just a “friendly nation,” but a security partner with whom we share responsibilities and duties. South Korea is not simply a dependent needing to pay for protection. It is a trusted ally who stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S.

Why, then, are there repeated attempts to reduce this alliance to a cost-benefit calculation?

Why do these demands keep resurfacing—particularly under the Trump administration?

I love the United States. I respect its values and its spirit.

The capitalism I’ve come to know in America is nothing like the “rotten capitalism” I was taught about in North Korea. In North Korea, capitalism is portrayed as a system where money controls people. But true capitalism offers opportunity, fosters creativity, and allows individuals to thrive in freedom.

If alliances start being measured in dollars, then we’re embracing the very version of “rotten capitalism” that North Korea denounces.

And that is not the capitalism we allied with the United States to defend.

 China and Russia Are Watching — And Waiting

Who benefits the most from the complex interplay of OPCON transfer, the end-of-war declaration, and rising tensions over defense costs?

China and Russia.

China has long viewed the Korean Peninsula as a strategic buffer zone. Russia wants to see U.S. influence in Northeast Asia diminish.

If the ROK-U.S. alliance weakens—if U.S. forces withdraw or are excluded from operational authority—then the Korean Peninsula will once again become a geopolitical chessboard for the great powers.

The transfer of OPCON, far from strengthening autonomy, may push South Korea into greater isolation and vulnerability.

Military sovereignty must be pursued within the context of a reliable alliance, maintaining a strong and integrated defense posture. That is South Korea’s realistic survival strategy.

 What South Korea Must Choose Today

What South Korea needs today is not abstract slogans about “regaining sovereignty,” but realistic decisions that safeguard freedom and peace.

What must be protected now is the safety of the people and the future of a free South Korea.

P.S. South Korea must not be brought down by those who seek to destroy its freedom from within.

We must clearly recognize what is truly important right now.

Raising concerns about election integrity may be important—but if we focus on only one issue, we may fail to see that national security is collapsing around us.

https://icks.org/data/ijks/1498534150_add_file_3.pdf

Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea 

Colonel Shawn P. Creamer, U.S. Army U.S. Army War College Fellow to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Abstract 

The theater-level command relationships in the Republic of Korea are complex and nuanced. They are often misunderstood by American and South Korean military and civilian leaders. Available open source resources often focus on specific elements of the command relationships, sometimes over-relying on official rhetoric from the respective commands. These narratives don’t provide a complete picture of how these distinct organizations work together towards the common goal of defending South Korea from North Korean aggression. This paper consolidates and amalgamates relevant open source resources to provide clarity to what was previously an opaque understanding of the interconnected, yet distinct relationships between the four concurrently operating theater-level commands that have roles in defending South Korea. In particular, this paper dissects each command’s roles, its relationships with the commands, and guidance and direction governing each command.   

2. A civilizational vision for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis

The "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice Agreement - the unnatural division of the peninsula) must be solved by the Korean people.

My 12 words:

"Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights."

Excerpts:

What Korea needs now is not another summit or sanctions resolution, but a generational vision. The Korean Dream provides exactly that. It aligns moral legitimacy with strategic necessity. It empowers the Korean people -- in both North and South, as well as throughout the global Korean diaspora -- to take ownership of their shared destiny.

And it provides the international community with a coherent and forward-looking narrative -- one that transcends transactional diplomacy and embraces principled statecraft.

Only through unification grounded in shared identity, individual freedom and human dignity can the Korean Peninsula be truly stabilized and transformed. The Korean Dream is the roadmap -- not only for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, but for unlocking the full potential of the Korean nation and presenting the world with a model of principled reunification rooted in peace and prosperity.

World News July 8, 2025 / 11:04 AM / Updated July 8, 2025 at 12:46 PM

A civilizational vision for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis

If we are to resolve this crisis, we must move beyond narrow diplomacy and adopt a transformative, visionary framework. That framework is the Korean Dream.

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/07/08/korea-analysis-korean-dream-south-korea-north-korea/6571751984917/

By Youngjun Kim

A photo released by the official North Korean Central News Agency shows North Korea conducting the first test firing of the weapon systems on the multi-mission destroyer Choe Hyon at an undisclosed location in North Korea in late April. KNCA/EPA-EFE

July 8 (UPI) -- North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons. This is not a matter of opinion, but a strategic fact rooted in decades of historical precedent, failed diplomacy and shifting global dynamics.

Despite successive rounds of sanctions, summits and deterrence-based policies, Pyongyang's nuclear program has only advanced. For the regime, nuclear weapons are not mere bargaining tools -- they are the ultimate guarantor of survival. And recent events have only hardened that conviction.

The U.S. precision airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in June served as a stark warning to nuclear aspirants. But to Pyongyang, the lesson was not about deterrence -- it was about vulnerability.

Iran had restrained itself within international norms, only to see its key infrastructure reduced to rubble. Meanwhile, China, the largest importer of Iranian crude, suddenly found one of its critical energy lifelines threatened should the conflict escalate.

The message was clear: Strategic autonomy requires robust deterrence. In the eyes of North Korea's leadership, nuclear weapons are the only true shield.

Simultaneously, Pyongyang has solidified its place within an emerging axis of resistance. Its partnership with Iran, decades in the making, includes missile development, sanctions evasion and technical cooperation.

Its relationship with Russia has grown dramatically in the context of the Ukraine war, with thousands of troops committed to it and reports of artillery transfers from North Korea in exchange for advanced military and satellite technology. These are not transactional alliances -- they represent a reorientation of global power, and North Korea is positioning itself as an indispensable node in this new order.

In this geopolitical climate, efforts to achieve denuclearization through economic incentives or coercion are increasingly futile. The nuclear issue is not the disease -- it is a symptom of deeper structural conditions: division, distrust and existential insecurity. If we are to resolve the North Korean crisis, we must move beyond narrow diplomacy and adopt a transformative, visionary framework. That framework is the Korean Dream.

The Korean Dream is not a political slogan. It is a civilizational blueprint rooted in Korea's founding ideal: Hongik Ingan, "to live for the benefit of all humanity."

This ancient philosophy, which predates the peninsula's modern divisions, envisions a Korea unified not by conquest or coercion, but by shared identity, spiritual purpose and democratic ideals. It offers a future grounded in human dignity, freedom and mutual prosperity -- not only for Koreans, but as a model for the world.

Central to this vision is the establishment of a unified liberal democratic republic on the Korean Peninsula -- one that guarantees the God-given rights of all people, North and South, and transcends the Cold War paradigm of containment.

The Korean Dream provides a way to move forward without demanding the violent collapse of the North Korean regime. Just as Mongolia transitioned peacefully after the fall of Soviet communism, so too can North Korea contribute to the future of a unified Korea if its leadership is given security assurances and a stake in peaceful integration.

Such a process would allow for the organic resolution of the North's nuclear and human rights challenges. As the North becomes part of a greater national framework rooted in freedom and transparency, it would naturally erode the rationale for nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the integration of the North's labor force and natural resources with the South's capital, technology and global networks could elevate a unified Korea into the ranks of the world's top five economies.

This new unified Korea would emerge not only as a regional stabilizer in Northeast Asia, but as a moral and economic leader in an era of fractured global governance.

President Lee Jae Myung's early move to suspend loudspeaker broadcasts along the Demilitarized Zone was a small, but significant, gesture. It signaled, intentionally or not, a desire to reopen channels of dialogue.

Historically, Pyongyang has been more responsive to progressive South Korean leaders who emphasize mutual respect and reconciliation. If this overture is followed by a broader strategy grounded in the Korean Dream, it could serve as the beginning of a new phase in inter-Korean relations -- one based not on fear, but on aspiration.

To be clear, the Korean Dream is not naïve. It does not ignore the dangers posed by North Korea's nuclear arsenal or the regime's history of repression. But it rejects the notion that permanent division and cyclical crisis are inevitable.

It offers an alternative to the failed frameworks of the past -- an alternative rooted in Korea's unique cultural heritage and its potential role as a bridge between East and West, authoritarian past and democratic future.

What Korea needs now is not another summit or sanctions resolution, but a generational vision. The Korean Dream provides exactly that. It aligns moral legitimacy with strategic necessity. It empowers the Korean people -- in both North and South, as well as throughout the global Korean diaspora -- to take ownership of their shared destiny.

And it provides the international community with a coherent and forward-looking narrative -- one that transcends transactional diplomacy and embraces principled statecraft.

Only through unification grounded in shared identity, individual freedom and human dignity can the Korean Peninsula be truly stabilized and transformed. The Korean Dream is the roadmap -- not only for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, but for unlocking the full potential of the Korean nation and presenting the world with a model of principled reunification rooted in peace and prosperity.

3. Inside North Korea: What I saw before escaping the Regime | #62 Hyunseung Lee

From my friend and colleague at the Global Peace Foundation Hyun Seung Lee, who is a member of the north Korean diaspora as an escapee from the north. 

A long podcast so here are the parts: 

Episode Timeline:

00:00 Introductions

02:50 Growing up in North Korea

51:23 When was it time to leave?

01:13:52 Your Escape

01:35:59 Total Defectors?

01:48:22 North Korean Food

01:53:25 Nuclear Weapons

01:56:06 Battleship Sunk

02:03:48 Dennis Rodman

02:07:59 What does Liberation look like?

02:25:15 Your Mission

02:28:04 A Message for Kim

02:29:19 Closing

Inside North Korea: What I saw before escaping the Regime | #62 Hyunseung Lee

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/10/lessons-in-finlands-conscription-model/

by SWJ Staff

|

07.09.2025 at 10:06pm

Inside North Korea: What I saw before escaping the Regime | #62 Hyunseung Lee – Published by Matt Beall Limitless

“In this gripping episode, Hyunseung Lee shares his powerful story of life under North Korea’s brutal regime. From his early childhood inside the hermit kingdom to the moment he knew he had to escape, Hyunseung recounts his harrowing journey to freedom. We discuss what daily life is really like in North Korea, the dangers of defecting, the truth about food shortages and nuclear ambitions, and even surprising moments like Dennis Rodman’s infamous visit. Hyunseung also shares his mission to help others, a personal message for Kim Jong-un, and what liberation truly means for the North Korean people.”

Hyunseung Lee had this to say on Linkedin:

Last month, I had the opportunity to sit down with @MattBeall, CEO of Bealls Inc, for a deep and meaningful conversation about North Korea—its hidden realities, the resilience of its people, and the global implications we often overlook.

Matt’s curiosity and openness created the perfect space to share stories that are rarely heard but urgently needed. From regime dynamics to defector journeys, we covered a wide range of topics that challenge assumptions and inspire critical thinking.

 Check out the full episode here.

I’m grateful for leaders like Matt who use their platforms to amplify voices that matter. I hope you’ll give it a listen—and share it with someone who wants to better understand one of the world’s most closed-off societies.

#NorthKoreaa #Leadership #HumanRights #Bealls #Podcast #VoicesForFreedom

4. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests - Defense Priorities

As an aside a perfect storm of biblical proportions could be brewing around the ROK/US alliance - giving the fundamental nature of the liberal government in South )orea (the never stated but well known belief that US forces are an impediment to peace) and factions within the Trump administration who want allies to go it alone while other factions want to extort huge sums of money from South Korea - from tariffs to paying for US forces to defend the South (the assumption is South Korea is a money making machine only made possible by the protection of US troops for he past 7 decades). The report below is already contributing to that perfect storm as it is making the news in South Korea.

This is a long report (28 pages) The key points and the introduction  only are excerpted below. This is the "China only" and isolationists' dream (with little to no support for allies)

Please go to the link to view this online with all the charts: https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/aligning-global-military-posture-with-us-interests/

Or download the 28 page PDF at this link: https://www.defensepriorities.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Aligning_global_military_posture_with_US_interests.pdf

This is making the news in Korea already and our allies are zeroing in on this chart with these numbers (e.g., decrease US forces in Korea to 10,000). In my opinion this is a recipe for the loss of the US ability to protect its interests in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and globally.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kOPxd4WUf_ila98wQxP5e9zuFJtFwbKw/view?usp=sharing

Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests - Defense Priorities

Key points

1. The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others.
2. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security.
3. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers.
4. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn.
5. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.

What is the global posture review?

The U.S. military is a global force. As of 2025, over 200,000 American soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen were deployed at hundreds of U.S. military bases around the world.1

For many policymakers, this forward deployed military power is an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy. Advocates of a large and active U.S. military footprint overseas argue that U.S. troops operating abroad maintain global stability, reassure allies, protect international commerce, and prevent aggression that threatens U.S. interests.2 They also argue U.S. personnel based abroad gain experience working with allies and partners, increase interoperability, and can respond to crises more quickly than if they were stationed at home.3

Critics of the global U.S. military presence see things differently. They argue the U.S. military is overextended and that forward deployments provide few benefits while creating entanglements that risk pulling the United States into unnecessary wars that do not advance U.S. interests.4 This group is more skeptical of the deterrent value of U.S. military forces. It argues that, in any case, the United States does not need a large forward military presence to be secure, as it is surrounded by water on two sides and weak neighbors to the north and south.5

Moreover, in almost any future conflict the United States and its allies might face, they would be protecting the status quo and as a result could leverage the many benefits of defensive warfare—including lower force requirements.6 Critics suggest that a strong U.S. security blanket turns allies and partners into free-riders that underinvest in their own military.

Apart from its benefits, risks, and costs, the U.S. forward military posture can be difficult to change. Once forces are sent abroad, the United States is often slow to bring them back home, even when the threat or mission that prompted the initial deployment ends. As a result, it is common for the number of U.S. forces stationed overseas to increase over time, as what was a surge posture slowly becomes the new status quo. This can rapidly lead to a fundamental misalignment between U.S. military presence and U.S. national security and strategic interests.

To weigh these different factors and considerations, when new leaders arrive in the Pentagon following a change in presidential administrations, they typically launch a Global Posture Review (GPR). The GPR is intended to evaluate the locations and numbers of U.S. military forces stationed overseas and make adjustments based on an updated threat assessment and the new administration’s reading of U.S. interests and priorities. While the results of the review are typically classified, an unclassified summary is usually released, especially when major changes are planned.

The last Global Posture Review was released in November 2021, about 10 months into President Joe Biden’s term. For many observers, the 2021 review was a disappointment that failed to respond to changes in the global balance of power or to reflect emerging limits and constraints on American military power. After much hype, the document concluded that the U.S. military posture was generally aligned with U.S. needs and interests and recommended few major changes.7 Most significantly for the review’s critics, the Biden team failed to notably increase the U.S. posture allocated to Asia, failing to meet one of its early policy commitments.

Outside of Biden’s GPR, over the four years of Biden’s tenure, the U.S. global posture became more bloated and imbalanced. After arriving in office, the administration canceled the withdrawal of 12,000 troops from Germany that had been planned under the first Trump administration and increased the U.S. presence in Europe by another 20,000 troops after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.8 Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Biden began a series of U.S. posture increases in the Middle East, including sending additional naval, air defense, and tactical air assets to the region.9 Biden’s Pentagon also increased the number of U.S. forces rotationally deployed in Africa, supporting counterterror operations and train-and-assist missions.10 Changes made in Asia were comparatively small. There, the Biden team signed the AUKUS agreement (which would change posture only in the longer term), gained access to four additional bases in the Philippines, and made permanent some previously rotational deployments in South Korea.11

As it conducts its posture review, the Trump administration has a chance to realign the United States’ global military footprint with U.S. national interests, correcting the mistakes of the Biden years and the lingering aftereffects of the global war on terror. This report aims to assist Pentagon officials as they carry out their posture review and decide how they will reshape the U.S. military posture over the next four years. It makes posture recommendations that are consistent with the Trump administration’s stated national security priorities and that advance core U.S. interests by narrowing U.S. military commitments and moving toward a grand strategy of restraint.

The next section of the report lays out the priorities used to guide our review and recommendations as well as our assumptions. We then devote one section to each of the three major regions—Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—and one section to other global missions. In each we discuss the current U.S. posture and then our recommended changes and their rationales. We conclude by summarizing and describing the implications of the posture changes we propose for U.S. national security.

5. Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors

Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/north-korean-defector-children

July 8, 2025

Feature

By Noël Um-Lo and Eunsook Jang

Map of North and South Korea (Map: iStock.com/omersukrugoksu)

More than 34,000 North Koreans, most of them women, have fled to South Korea since the two countries were divided 80 years ago. Over the decades, as geopolitical tensions and globalization have reshaped migration out of North Korea, the composition of this population has shifted in ways the South Korean government has yet to fully address. 

In This Article

• Defections from North Korea have fluctuated over the years
• Movement has become increasingly gendered
• Family reunification has brought third-country-born children into a legal gray zone in South Korea
• South Korean policymakers have made some strides, but significant gaps remain

Among the most notable changes is the quiet but steady rise of children born in China to North Korean mothers. In 2023, 71 percent of the approximately 1,800 children ages 6 to 24 with a North Korean mother who were residing in South Korea had been born in a third country (primarily China, although some may have arrived from Russia or elsewhere), up from 45 percent in 2014. These children were born during defectors’ years-long—and sometimes decades-long—stays in China, during which women and girls are often trafficked into sex work or forced marriages. Neither the children born of these arrangements nor their North Korean mothers are entitled to legal status in China, and many women live in fear of repatriation to North Korea by Chinese authorities. In order to secure safety and employment, many choose to continue to South Korea first on their own, with their children following years later.

As migration from North to South Korea has slowed over the years, the movement of these third country-born children appears to have increased. Yet data are limited. Due to South Korea’s fragmented policy landscape and narrow legal definitions for defectors, these children of North Korean background are not counted in official records and have been excluded from government supports aimed at facilitating full societal inclusion of North Koreans. 

Lacking a formal legal classification, the government of South Korea (formally known as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) has labeled them “children of North Korean defectors born in third countries after leaving the DPRK [the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or North Korea] but before entering the ROK,” a long-winded designation that places them within the law’s “multicultural” category and outside the scope of rights and resources allocated to North Korean families. This classification withholds from these children access to specialized language education, career counseling, mental-health resources, and education subsidies—resources which are all the more crucial given that these children often arrive with little to no proficiency in the Korean language. Media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often refer to these children using terms such as second-generation North Koreans, children of a North Korean background, or displaced youth.

This article outlines the increasing migration of third country-born children of North Korean mothers in South Korea, the government’s slow legal reforms to support them, and the gaps that remain.

North Korean Migration Trends across Asia

Migration pathways from North Korea have changed dramatically over the past eight decades, shaped by war, famine, changes in state power, and formation of new transnational networks. Although the geography, motivations, and politics of this emigration have shifted, many of South Korea’s policies have not.

Figure 1. North Korean Defector Arrivals in South Korea, 1998-2025*

* Data for 2025 cover the first three months of the year.

Note: Data are not available for 1999 or 2000.

Source: South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU), “Policy on North Korean Defectors,” accessed May 30, 2025, available online.

Historical Shifts in North Korean Emigration

From 1945 to 1953, the period spanning Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule and the armistice ending the Korean War, approximately 900,000 North Koreans fled to the South. After the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was fortified on July 27, 1953, migration between the countries all but ceased. Defections between 1953 and the 1990s were rare and highly politicized, often involving North Korean elites such as military leaders or high-ranking party members. Fewer than 1,000 North Koreans defected during this 45-year period.

That changed during the North Korean famine of 1995-98 and the collapse of the DPRK’s public distribution system, which caused an estimated 600,000 to 3 million deaths and triggered a new wave of survival migration. Following the famine, increasing numbers of North Korean peasants crossed the Tumen and Yalu Rivers into northeastern China in search of food. 

In winter, when the rivers freeze over, some attempt to bribe North Korean border guards and walk across the border. While a small portion of defections have occurred by sea or across the DMZ, most migration has taken place across the border with China.

Arrivals steadily increased after 1998, when South Korea’s Ministry of Unification (MOU) began releasing data on defectors, reaching a peak of more than 2,900 in 2009. Those who seek to reach South Korea often do so through Southeast Asia, relying on a network of Chosŏnjok (ethnic Korean-Chinese), brokers in China, churches, and NGOs. Because the People’s Republic of China is an ally of North Korea, harboring and aiding North Koreans constitutes illegal criminal activity.

As emigration increased, the DPRK government responded with stricter border control and pressure on China for greater policing. Technological advances in the 2010s aided increased surveillance and made border crossing more difficult. This led to a sharp decline in defections which, in conjunction with COVID-19-era border closures, have remained low: Since 2019, no more than 236 defectors have arrived in a single year. While the cost of defection varies, the average price per person rose from approximately $8,900 in 2016 to as much as $16,000 in 2018; according to defector networks, these costs have continued to rise in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Once in South Korea, after a three-month orientation, North Koreans are automatically given citizenship and a one-time payment of 8 million won (about U.S. $5,700) plus financial incentives including a maximum of 25.1 million won ($18,000) for completing vocational training or getting a job and housing subsidies of 16 million won ($11,400). The defectors are also offered career counseling and job placement, employment protection, cash and other benefits via the Basic Livelihood Security Program, special admissions to college, and tuition exemptions at public universities.

Despite these immediate benefits, long-term institutional welfare support remains unavailable to North Korean defectors. Many work in manual labor, where they face social and employment-related discrimination. Their rates of unemployment and school dropout are about double the national average; they also have higher rates of suicidal ideation and face significant barriers to integration within South Korea’s high-stakes, hypercompetitive education system and workforce.

Journeys to South Korea

The journeys to reach South Korea are physically demanding and can be financially difficult, which can create long delays in transit. Many North Koreans take multiple years to achieve their destination, during which time some form new families (frequently by force or coercion; see below). The travel also carries enormous risks. Although some individuals may obtain falsified identification by bribing an official, most North Korean defectors travel without papers and face constant threat of arrest and deportation by Chinese authorities, extortion by brokers, and sex and human trafficking. Those from higher-income North Korean households or with family members already in South Korea often can facilitate shorter stays in China by paying large sums to brokers to provide protection and transportation during the journey. 

Although researchers and rights organizations have focused primarily on migration that ends in South Korea, many North Korean migrants have no intention of residing in the South. Some plan to stay in China permanently to send remittances back to family, including by gaining Chinese citizenship (often via bribery). Others seek to return to North Korea with money earned in China. Up to 200,000 North Koreans and their children may have been resident in China as of 2024, according to Council on Foreign Relations estimates, many without legal status. China does not recognize North Koreans as refugees, instead classifying them as “illegal economic migrants,” a status that allows them to be forcibly repatriated if discovered by authorities. 

Still, many see South Korea as a place with more freedom, including legal recognition. Over time, a route through China and Southeast Asia solidified into a de facto refugee corridor, offering one of the few viable pathways for North Koreans to seek protection, despite the absence of formal refugee recognition in most transit countries. The goal is typically to reach Thailand, Laos, or Vietnam, which have South Korean embassies that can facilitate transfer to Seoul. During the 2000s, a decentralized asylum infrastructure comprised of activists, churches, and NGOs emerged. This informal system has been compared to a modern-day underground railroad, and provided aid in the form of encrypted communication, safehouses, wire transfers, and transportation to help migrants move southward. As routes through Laos, Myanmar (also known as Burma), and Vietnam became more restricted, Thailand has emerged as the preferred destination. Migrants may trek for days through dense jungle terrain along the China-Laos border before crossing the Mekong River into Thai territory.

Once in Thailand, defectors typically turn themselves into the police and are detained, processed, and fined for illegal entry as “economic migrants.” From there, they wait for South Korea to negotiate their release from detention and deportation, a lengthy process in poor conditions. In 2007, hundreds of North Korean migrants jailed in Bangkok’s Immigration Detention Center went on a hunger strike to draw attention to overcrowded prison conditions and demand faster transfer to South Korea. This hunger strike led to negotiations between the ROK and Thai governments that shortened detention times, which helped solidify the China-Thailand route.

Gendered Migration and the Growing Sex Trade

The rise in Chinese-born children of North Korean mothers is linked in part to the increasingly gendered nature of North Korean migration. While North Korean men, women, and children have long faced risks of trafficking into forced labor and the sex trade, the gender imbalance among defectors has grown more pronounced since the early 2000s. In 2002, the number of North Korean women entering South Korea surpassed that of men for the first time, according to South Korean government data. The percentage of women has continued to rise (aside from the COVID-19 period), reaching a staggering 97 percent of all new arrivals in the first three months of 2025 (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2. Share of North Korean Arrivals in South Korea Who Are Female, 1998-2025*

* Data for 2025 cover the first three months of the year.

Note: Data are not available for 1999 or 2000.

Source: MOU, “Policy on North Korean Defectors,” accessed May 30, 2025.

A rare exception to this pattern emerged in late 2024, when reports surfaced of North Korean men escaping from Russian military training grounds. An estimated 10,000-12,000 North Korean soldiers and students had been stationed in Russia’s Kursk Oblast to provide services supporting the invasion of Ukraine; some have since sought refuge. While not yet statistically significant, these cases suggest the gender dynamics could shift as geopolitical pressures evolve.

This gendered trend reflects both push and pull factors. North Korean men are typically under stricter surveillance in government-assigned workplaces, making escape difficult and increasing the consequences for those who are caught. North Korean women, by contrast, are frequently targeted by brokers who offer false promises of jobs in China but instead traffic them into sex work.

NGOs estimate that more than 60 percent of North Korean girls and women between ages 12-29 who escape are trafficked into China’s lucrative sex trade. Most trafficked females are sold to brothels in northeastern Chinese border towns, while more than 30 percent are believed to be sold into forced marriages with rural Chinese men. In recent years, a growing number (approximately 15 percent of those trafficked) have been coerced into cybersex, which includes livestreamed sexual abuse and rape to a paying clientele of mostly South Korean men.

While in China, these women are typically hidden by traffickers or husbands, endure gender-based violence, and live under constant threat of arrest. They are ineligible for refugee protections and if forcibly repatriated to North Korea face detention, torture, forced labor, or internment in political prison camps. 

Some women who avoid trafficking marry into ethnic Korean-Chinese communities in border provinces and gradually acquire local language skills. Whether trafficked or not, most of these North Korean women give birth to children in China; according to a 2023 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) survey, 80 percent of North Korean women residing in China reported having children while there.

Family Reunification Has Brought Children into a Legal Gray Zone

As a result of these trends, there has been a noticeable uptick in Chinese-born children of North Korean mothers entering South Korea within the last decade. Although these children are granted ROK citizenship through the Nationality Act, which offers citizenship to children and foreign-born spouses of North Koreans, the immigration system has been slow to accommodate their rising numbers because the legal status for defectors was not designed for families.

Figure 3. Share of Children (ages 6-24) of a North Korean Background in South Korean School Who Were Born in China, 2011-24

Source: Kim Jin-cheo, “탈북민이 중국에서 낳아 한국에 데려온 아이들은 ‘비보호 청소년’,” The Hankyoreh, November 15, 2025, available online; Migrant Youth Foundation, “Migrant Youth Status (General),” updated April 4, 2023, available online; Korean Educational Development Institute, “연도별 북한배경학생 수 변화,” updated April 2024, available online. 

In 1962, South Korea first established the “special law on the protection of defectors from the North,” which offered generous aid packages correlated to their status in North Korea and the amount of intelligence they could provide to South Korea. Under Article 2 of the 1997 North Korean Defectors Act, one must have resided in North Korea and left without acquiring foreign citizenship to formally qualify as a defector, a status that at that time reflected South Korea’s political framing of these migrants as emblems of anti-communism and South Korean exceptionalism.

In 1997, President Kim Dae-jung established the Ministry of Unification to manage DPRK defectors and enacted the North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Act as part of his Sunshine Policy aiming to improve relations with the North. At the time, defections had just begun to increase and had not yet become gendered, so defectors’ children were an afterthought. Starting in 2002, as the number of trafficked North Korean women and pregnancies began to rise, so too did the population of their children born in China. These children began appearing in South Korean schools a decade later, as mothers gradually secured the funds to reunite with them.

Once they arrive, second-generation North Korean children find themselves in a legal gray zone. They are excluded from many resources offered by the 1997 North Korean Defectors Act and have complex backgrounds that are not accounted for in the language education programs and vocational training offered through the Multicultural Families Support Act, which is designed for immigrant spouses. As a result, ROK government agencies lack coordinated classification systems and service protocols. The result is a growing population of children excluded from settlement subsidies and the Korean language education necessary for integration. 

Many also fall through the cracks of China’s system. According to Article 4 of China’s Nationality Law, any person born in China to at least one Chinese national is considered a Chinese citizen. However, because most North Korean women residing in China do so without authorization, many are unable to legally register their children’s births or enroll in the household registration (hukou) that is essential for accessing public education, health care, and legal protections. Some families are able to purchase hukou for their children through bribes, and some fathers legally adopt their children. But many Chinese-born children without these protections grow up effectively stateless.

Although they become South Korean citizens upon arrival, the children remain in many ways more vulnerable than their North Korean-born peers.

Legal Reform and Remaining Gaps 

These exclusionary outcomes are reinforced by statistical blind spots. South Korea’s MOU does not collect data on third-country-born children, despite granting them legal recognition; data from the Ministry of Education shows their increasing presence in the school system, but tracks only enrolled students ages 6-24, omitting younger children or those not in education. As a result, analysts lack the data to conclusively measure the rising number of Chinese-born children of North Korean mothers now residing in South Korea.

By the time the Chinese-born children arrive, some North Korean mothers have married a South Korean man and have started a new family. This situation—along with prolonged separation, language barriers, and inadequate access to mental-health resources—can result in strained relations between reunited mother and child. In some cases, mothers abandon their children, sending them back to family in China or relinquishing legal guardianship to a South Korean. In 2017, the MOU announced a new support program granting North Korean defector parents a one-time subsidy of 4 million won (about $2,900). This policy, however, does not apply to children of a North Korean background with South Korean legal guardians.

 In 2024, the National Assembly passed an amendment to the North Korean Defectors Act (effective April 2025) expanding educational support to “North Korean defectors and their children.” This was a meaningful step toward inclusion. However, its implementation has stalled, and with the inauguration of new President Lee Jae-myung, who has a peace-oriented approach to North Korea, the political will to expand inclusion beyond the education system remains uncertain. The fact that these children are still treated as special cases suggests the government lacks a comprehensive and inclusive policy framework to accommodate shifting North Korean migration trends.

North Korean defectors would seem to meet the international legal definition of refugees: individuals who would face persecution upon return to their origin country. However, UNHCR typically classifies North Korean escapees as “persons of concern,” a nonbinding designation that offers no formal protection or legal status. This legal ambiguity is further complicated by South Korea’s own framework, which considers North Koreans to be South Korean citizens, who therefore are not eligible for refugee status. 

This unique legal position leaves most North Korean defectors and their children excluded from protections typically granted to refugees. China has exploited this ambiguity. Under its 1986 Mutual Cooperation Protocol with North Korea, Chinese security officials are required to arrest and deport North Korean escapees, treating them as criminal trespassers rather than humanitarian migrants. Despite criticism that this violates international law, China has continued to forcibly repatriate North Koreans; more than 600 individuals were returned in 2023 and 260 in 2024.

Citizenship but Not Full Inclusion

Under Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, refugees’ children are entitled to equal protection regardless of their parentage, nationality, or political or legal status. South Korea’s Constitution likewise prohibits discrimination and guarantees equality before the law for all citizens. Yet in practice, third country-born children of North Korean defectors are often denied the resources necessary for full participation in South Korean society.

Rights advocates and NGOs commended the 2024 amendment to the Defectors Act as a step in the right direction. However, neither the government nor public media has otherwise addressed the situation for these children. Advocates have called for greater government coordination and media attention to provide meaningful inclusion, such as by extending college tuition support, creating Korean language textbooks catered specifically to second generation North Koreans, and providing career counseling that leverages Chinese language skills.

South Korean officials often refer to defectors as a “bridge” toward unification, and “the first to enact unification” (mŏnjŏ on t’ongil). If that is so, observers note that defectors' children represent a test case for the inclusiveness of that unification process. While no policy is perfect at inception, continuing to overlook the needs of this growing population of children risks reinforcing structural inequalities.

Sources

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Bremer, Ifang. 2024. Seoul Weighs Increased Support for North Korean Children Born in Third Countries. NK News, May 28, 2024. Available online.

Bremer, Ifang, Joon Ha Park, and Lina Park. 2024. China Repatriated at Least 260 More North Koreans Last Month, Rights Groups Say. NK News, May 3, 2024. Available online.

Burt, James. 2018. Us Too: Sexual Violence Against North Korean Women and Girls. London: Korea Future Initiative. Available online.

Choi, Gyubin. 2018. North Korean Refugees in South Korea: Change and Challenge in Settlement Support Policy. The Korean Journal of International Studies 16 (1): 77-98. Available online.

Clark, Doug Bock. 2019. The Underground Railroad of North Korea. GQ, March 26, 2019. Available online.

Fong, Clara. 2024. The China-North Korea Relationship. Council on Foreign Relations, November 21, 2024. Available online.

Haggard, Stephan and Marcus Noland, eds. 2006. The North Korean Refugee Crisis: Human Rights and International Response. Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Available online.

Han, Heidi. 2007. Destination Thailand: The Case of North Korean Asylum Seekers. Osaka: Human Rights Education Institute of Japan. Available online.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2002. The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of China. New York: HRW. Available online.

Kim, Bo-geun. 2021. [Interview] Shattering the Myth that All N. Koreans Want to Defect to S. Korea. Hankyoreh, February 4, 2021. Available online.

Kim, Ji-soo. 2024. Tackling Korean Language Education for Children of North Korean Defectors. The Korea Times, October 10, 2024. Available online.

Kim, Jin-cheo. 2025. 탈북민이 중국에서 낳아 한국에 데려온 아이들은 ‘비보호 청소년’. The Hankyoreh, November 15, 2025. Available online.

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Kook, Yoonjin. 2023. 탈북학생 63％, 수도권 거주…교육 현장 다녀와보니. TBS Seoul, January 12, 2023. Available online.

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6. In a Good-Will Gesture, South Korea Returns Stranded Fishermen to the North

​Good will? The height of naivete. Good will means nothing to the regime. It only seeks to exploit these people. If north Korea does anything publicly with these people it will be for propaganda purposes. Unfortunately at best these people will be isolated and "re-educated" for their exposure to the South.

In a Good-Will Gesture, South Korea Returns Stranded Fishermen to the North

The fishermen’s boats had drifted into South Korean waters, officials said. The South’s new president has been trying to improve ties with North Korea.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/09/world/asia/south-korea-returns-north-korean-fishermen.html

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South Korea’s Unification Ministry released this photo, which it said showed fishermen returning to North Korean waters on Wednesday.Credit...South Korean Unification Ministry, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

July 9, 2025

Six North Korean fishermen, who had been stranded in South Korea for months after ​drifting into its waters, were allowed to return home with one of their boats on Wednesday, in what appeared to be a good-will gesture to the North from the government of South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae Myung.

The repatriation took place at the countries’ maritime border off the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. Since taking office last month, Mr. Lee — whose predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol, took a hard line toward the North — has called for dialogue and political reconciliation. ​Relations had chilled in recent years, with the North cutting off all communication, calling the South its principal enemy and threatening to use nuclear weapons should war break out.

Two of the fishermen were found in a boat off South Korea’s west coast in March, and the four others were in a boat discovered in May off the east coast. In both cases, the fishing crews, all men in their 30s and 40s with families in the North, ​had drifted into the South’s waters after their engines failed, South Korean officials said.

The inter-Korean border is one of the world’s most heavily guarded. But North Koreans, sometimes entire families, have occasionally fled by boat to seek asylum in the South, and fishermen from the North have accidentally wound up in the South’s waters on numerous occasions. ​Small, ​wooden North Korean boats, some so primitive that they used stones for anchors, have ​also washed up on the coasts of Japan and Russia — most empty​, but some with hungry survivors aboard, and others containing human remains.

Generally, w​hen South Korea finds North Korean fishermen ​adrift in its waters — usually because of engine ​failure or a lack of navigational equipment — its navy tows them ashore. After extensive debriefing, they are given the choice of returning home or, if they want to defect, staying in the South. These debriefings take time as the South Korean authorities try to establish the fishermen’s motives for defecting, and ensure that they are not spies.

But sending North Koreans back can be a delicate matter. During the Cold War, both ​Koreas used such repa​triations for propaganda purposes. The South would give North Koreans new clothes and other gifts before handing them over across Panmunjom, the sole contact point on the land border. Once they crossed the border, the North Koreans would strip down to their underwear, hurling ​away the gifts from the capitalist South,​ as officials from both sides watched.

​Repatriating North Koreans​ can also raise legal issues in South Korea, whose Constitution ​claims the entire Korean Peninsula as its territory and treats North Koreans as its citizens.

In 2019, two North Korean fishermen fled by boat to the South, where they confessed to having murdered 16 of their shipmates at sea. Earlier this year, four former senior officials in the South were found guilty of having abused their power by sending the men back to North Korea against their will, instead of granting them refugee status or a chance to​ be tried for their crimes in the South. Rights groups said the men were likely to have been executed in North Korea.

The six fishermen who were found earlier this year were asked repeatedly whether they really wanted to go back to the North, South Korean officials said. But there was another problem: North Korea did not respond to the South’s recent statements that it was willing to send the men home, in keeping with its policy of refusing to engage the South in dialogue.

That left the fishermen stranded in the South for months. Eventually, Mr. Lee’s government decided to act unilaterally.

“If they crossed the border while they were adrift and wanted to return to their hometowns, where they have families and livelihoods, we should let them​, out of ​a humanitarian​ perspective,” Kang Yu-jung, Mr. Lee’s spokeswoman, told reporters on Monday, conveying the president’s position on the matter.

The South fixed one of the North Koreans’ boats — the other was beyond repair — and let all six men take it to the North on Wednesday morning.

It was not the first gesture from Mr. Lee aimed at improving ties with the North. ​Last month, his government switched off propaganda loudspeakers that had been broadcasting K-pop songs, news and other content across the border for the past year. The North made no public comment about ​that, but it reciprocated by turning off its own loudspeakers along the border.

That pattern apparently repeated itself on Wednesday morning, when the North Koreans were returning home.

The South had notified North Korea that it would release the men on Wednesday, communicating through the United Nations Command, which ​runs a hotline with the North at Panmunjom. The North did not respond. But when the fishermen crossed the maritime border, a North Korean patrol boat was waiting there to escort​ the boat, the South’s Unification Ministry said​ in a statement.

“In the end, they returned home smoothly and safely,” it said​.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea.

7. Rubio Visits Asia as Trump Raises Trade-War Tensions

 But not to Korea.

Rubio Visits Asia as Trump Raises Trade-War Tensions

Secretary of State Marco Rubio talks about countering China as it expands its global influence. But President Trump’s tariff threats have created friction with U.S. partners.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/09/world/asia/rubio-asia-diplomacy-tariffs.html

Secretary of State Marco Rubio arriving at Subang Air Base outside Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on Thursday.Credit...Pool photo by Mandel Ngan

By Edward Wong

Reporting from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, during Marco Rubio’s first trip to Asia as U.S. secretary of state

Published July 9, 2025

Updated July 10, 2025, 6:48 a.m. ET

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Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in Malaysia on Thursday for a gathering of top diplomats from Asian nations, as many of them were grappling with new tariff threats from President Trump.

Mr. Rubio attended a meeting with counterparts from countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations soon after landing in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. “We’ve been engaged for a very long time, and we have strong partnerships,” Mr. Rubio said in his opening remarks. “We have no intention of abandonment.”

He also met with Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, on Thursday evening. The Trump administration has been trying to negotiate a settlement to halt the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but Russia has been resistant.

Mr. Rubio is scheduled to have a variety of other diplomatic talks on Friday before flying back to Washington. Top diplomats from China, Japan and South Korea are also holding meetings in the city this week.

The State Department is framing Mr. Rubio’s whirlwind trip as an effort to reinforce alliances and partnerships that the United States has across Asia and to counter China by building up those ties.

“In his first trip to Asia as secretary of state, Secretary Rubio is focused on reaffirming the United States commitment to advancing a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific region,” said Tammy Bruce, the State Department spokeswoman, at a news conference in Washington on Tuesday, using a stock phrase that U.S. officials employ to try to underscore China’s aggressive maritime and territorial moves in the region.

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However, Mr. Trump’s sudden announcement on Monday that he would impose higher tariffs on 14 nations if they do not reach trade deals with the United States by Aug. 1 is sure to overshadow whatever discussions Mr. Rubio aims to have with the American partners. At least eight of the 14 countries are expected to have diplomats at meetings in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia, the host nation, is one of the 14.

Malaysian officials were surprised by Mr. Trump’s proposal of a 25 percent tariff on the country’s exports to the United States, which would be paid by American companies importing the goods.

The number was almost the same as the 24 percent figure that Mr. Trump proposed in April before suspending the action for 90 days. Malaysia has been trying hard to negotiate a trade deal with the United States since then, and officials from the two governments have held 25 rounds of talks.

On Wednesday, the day before Mr. Rubio’s arrival, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia called on Southeast Asian officials to more tightly coordinate their foreign and economic policies in the face of Mr. Trump’s threats.

Image

Malaysia’s prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, said on Wednesday that trade restrictions had become “the sharpened instruments of geopolitical rivalry.”Credit...Hasnoor Hussain/Reuters

“Tariffs, export restrictions and investment barriers have now become the sharpened instruments of geopolitical rivalry,” he said in the opening speech of a gathering of Southeast Asian foreign ministers. “This is no passing storm. It is the new weather of our time.”

China’s top foreign policy official, Wang Yi, is expected to attend the conclave this week and will no doubt promote his nation as a reliable trade partner, in contrast with the United States.

Mr. Trump has alternately lavished praise on China’s authoritarian leader, Xi Jinping, and criticized the country for unfair trade practices. China has been a main target in the trade war that Mr. Trump started soon after taking office in January.

However, rather than working closely with U.S. partners to present a united front against China on trade issues, Mr. Trump has gone on a broad assault against many of those nations.

“The U.S. intends to use these negotiations to pressure countries to curtail trade and investment ties with China,” said Stephen Olson, a visiting senior fellow at the ISEAS — Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and a former U.S. trade negotiator. “That will inevitably bleed over into U.S.-China discussions and obviously complicate third-country relationships with China.”

Many of the countries trade more with China than with the United States, so Mr. Trump’s pressure campaign could backfire. And there is an “open question,” Mr. Olson said: “As Trump continues to move the goal posts and blow through deadlines, will countries start to question the point of attempting to negotiate?”

Image

Yangshan Port in Shanghai. China’s top foreign policy official, Wang Yi, is expected to be in Kuala Lumpur this week and is likely to promote China as a more reliable trade partner than the United States. Credit...The New York Times

Mr. Trump appears to be seeking trade agreements with countries to present as wins to the American public, even if the terms do not amount to obvious victories for U.S. commercial interests.

Across Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States has struggled to show Asian nations that it has a strategic vision for the region and is committed to counterbalancing China across economic, diplomatic and military fronts. Mr. Trump’s tariff threats aimed at treaty allies, including Japan and South Korea, raise further doubts about that commitment.

In March, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth visited the Philippines and Japan, both allies of the United States, and reiterated Washington’s support for them.

However, the Trump administration could try to unwind some of the military initiatives in the region that the Biden administration pushed. The Pentagon is reviewing the deal that President Joseph R. Biden Jr. reached with the leaders of Australia and Britain to provide nuclear-powered submarines and related technology to Australia, an agreement known as AUKUS. Some Pentagon officials have expressed skepticism about sending advanced U.S. weapon systems to allies.

Mr. Rubio is arriving in Asia more than five months after becoming secretary of state, and after traveling to Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe and the Middle East.

He could have committed to a longer trip in Asia and stopped at more countries, but he stayed in Washington at the start of this week to attend meetings at the White House with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel.

Some American foreign-policy advisers say the U.S. government has spent too much time and resources on conflicts in the Middle East in recent decades and not enough on Asia, which has the world’s most populous nations and largest economies outside the United States.

Derek J. Grossman, an analyst of Asia security issues and a former U.S. intelligence official, wrote online on July 3 that a brief trip by Mr. Rubio to Asia “raises concerns, again, that Indo-Pacific isn’t really the priority theater.”

Zunaira Saieed contributed reporting from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Alexandra Stevenson contributed from Jakarta, Indonesia.

Edward Wong reports on global affairs, U.S. foreign policy and the State Department for The Times.

8. 'Restrainers' propose slashing US troop numbers in South Korea, Okinawa

'Restrainers' propose slashing US troop numbers in South Korea, Okinawa

asia.nikkei.com · by Read Next

Indo-Pacific

Recommendations include centering Pacific presence further away from China

The U.S. stations some 28,500 soldiers in South Korea but a new report by two analysts who advocate a more restrained presence is proposing deep cuts. © AP

KEN MORIYASU

July 9, 2025 23:00 JST

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. military should shrink its global footprint, including by slashing the scale of American forces in South Korea by more than 60%, a report by two prominent analysts from the so-called restrainer camp proposed on Wednesday.

The report recommended that the number of U.S. forces deployed to South Korea be around 10,000, not the 28,500 of today. The analysts envision turning primary responsibility for the country's defense back to Seoul.

asia.nikkei.com · by Read Next

9. China’s influence is now shaping decisions in South Korea’s legislature

​Excerpts:

A region without anchors

The broader security environment offers little comfort. North Korea remains nuclear-armed and unpredictable. Japan, still constrained by its pacifist constitution and domestic priorities, plays a minimal role in collective regional defense.

South Korea is finding itself increasingly isolated.

Its primary strategic partners are either absent, indifferent, or actively punitive. That vacuum is precisely the condition in which Beijing’s incrementalism thrives.

Between alliance fatigue and authoritarian pressure

Seven abstentions on a symbolic vote may seem insignificant. But when combined with growing Chinese influence, American economic pressure, and weakened regional cooperation, it signals a deeper unraveling.

Whether these lawmakers acted out of fear, ideology, or indifference, they owe both the public and the international community a clear explanation. In the absence of one, the public – and Beijing – will be left to draw their own conclusions.

China’s influence is now shaping decisions in South Korea’s legislature - Asia Times

Seven lawmakers abstained from condemning Beijing’s maritime aggression – exposing a democracy’s growing vulnerability

asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · July 9, 2025

On July 3, South Korea’s National Assembly passed a resolution condemning China’s unilateral installation of steel-frame structures in the West Sea (also known as the Yellow Sea) – in an area that falls well within South Korea’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The vote was overwhelming: 252 in favor, none against.

While the resolution was non-binding, it carried powerful symbolic weight. Territorial sovereignty is not a partisan issue. That seven legislators declined to support a resolution defending South Korea’s maritime rights raises uncomfortable questions.

China, which continues its encroachment on South Korean sovereignty, is likely to view this political hesitation as a green light to act more boldly.

Abstention signals quiet alignment with Chinese interests

The seven abstaining lawmakers came from the Democratic Party (Kim Young-bae, Lee Ki-heon, Hong Kee-won), the Reform Party (Shin Jang-sik), and the Progressive Party (Yoon Jong-oh, Son Sol, Jeon Jong-deok).

Lawmakers from the Democratic and Reform parties offered no explanation. The Progressive Party claimed that “escalating tensions” was not the right approach, though the resolution was restrained in tone and it was China that initiated the provocation.

All seven represent left-leaning parties, and while abstention is not equivalent to endorsement, it reflects a troubling reluctance to push back against Chinese violations.

Although the steel-frame structures China erected are not minor marine markers, the Chinese Embassy in Korea describes them as “deep-sea aquaculture facilities in China’s coastal waters.” Yet they sit within the Provisional Measures Zone – a disputed area where China holds no recognized jurisdiction.

They are part of a broader salami-slicing strategy – a slow, incremental encroachment tactic designed to change facts on the ground without triggering outright conflict. This is the same playbook Beijing has used in the South China Sea.

By installing permanent infrastructure in the region, Beijing appears to be asserting de facto control under the guise of civilian use.

Despite official protests from South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a near-unanimous resolution in parliament, these seven lawmakers refused to join the national consensus.

Soft power hardening

This may be the most visible sign yet that Beijing’s influence in South Korea has moved beyond soft power and into the very machinery of representative government.

Over the past decade, China has systematically cultivated elite relationships in liberal democracies – through financial leverage, academia, media and party-to-party ties. South Korea’s geopolitical importance makes it a prime target. The abstentions suggest that this strategy may be paying off.

Conservative lawmaker Yoo Sang-beom condemned the abstentions. “There can be no neutrality when sovereignty is at stake,” he said. “Those who cower before China and abandon even the most basic resolution to defend our seas are unfit to represent the people.”

This resolution wasn’t about militarism or nationalism. It was about affirming that a neighboring superpower cannot unilaterally install structures inside South Korea’s EEZ without consequence. Silence, in this case, is submission.

While China encroaches, the US makes things worse

If Beijing is the long-term challenge, Washington is doing little to help. In fact, the US may be worsening the problem.

On July 7, the Trump administration notified Seoul that it would impose a 25% tariff on imports from South Korea, citing trade imbalances and economic security.

This comes at a time when South Korea’s economy and political system are already being swayed by Chinese influence. The US decision undercuts a key democratic partner precisely when it needs support, not punishment.

Even traditionally pro-US voices in South Korea are struggling to justify American actions. Tariffs like these not only strain the alliance but create room for Beijing to exploit Seoul’s frustration and push its narrative of American unreliability.

A region without anchors

The broader security environment offers little comfort. North Korea remains nuclear-armed and unpredictable. Japan, still constrained by its pacifist constitution and domestic priorities, plays a minimal role in collective regional defense.

South Korea is finding itself increasingly isolated.

Its primary strategic partners are either absent, indifferent, or actively punitive. That vacuum is precisely the condition in which Beijing’s incrementalism thrives.

Between alliance fatigue and authoritarian pressure

Seven abstentions on a symbolic vote may seem insignificant. But when combined with growing Chinese influence, American economic pressure, and weakened regional cooperation, it signals a deeper unraveling.

Whether these lawmakers acted out of fear, ideology, or indifference, they owe both the public and the international community a clear explanation. In the absence of one, the public – and Beijing – will be left to draw their own conclusions.

asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · July 9, 2025

10. U.S. interested in S. Korea's proposal on shipbuilding, semiconductor cooperation: trade minister

​We need a JAROKUS shipbuilding consortium (Japan, ROK, US)

U.S. interested in S. Korea's proposal on shipbuilding, semiconductor cooperation: trade minister | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 10, 2025

By Kim Na-young

YEONGJONGDO, South Korea, July 10 (Yonhap) -- The United States has shown interest in South Korea's proposal for manufacturing cooperation, particularly in the shipbuilding and semiconductor sectors, during recent trade talks, Seoul's top trade negotiator said Thursday.

Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo briefed reporters on his trip to Washington, where he held tariff negotiations with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer and members of the U.S. Congress.

His visit came as South Korea enters the final three weeks of ongoing trade negotiations, after the Donald Trump administration said it would impose 25 percent reciprocal tariffs on Korean products beginning Aug. 1.

During two meetings with Secretary Lutnick, Yeo emphasized Seoul's commitment to deepening manufacturing ties and urged the Trump administration to grant "favorable treatment" to Korean firms when considering tariffs on imported cars, steel and other products, according to his office.

"The U.S. side was very interested in bilateral collaboration in the areas of shipbuilding and semiconductors, as they are crucial sectors in terms of industrial competitiveness and national security, and in how Korean companies can contribute to Washington's goal of rebuilding its manufacturing sector," Yeo told reporters upon his arrival at Incheon International Airport, west of Seoul.

This photo provided by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy shows South Korean Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo (R) shaking hands with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in Washington on July 10, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Yeo said his visit focused on accelerating trade negotiations to reach "a landing zone" within three weeks, noting that he plans to visit Washington again for further negotiations before August.

"The Trump administration is very committed to structurally reducing Washington's trade deficits ... through negotiations on tariff and non-tariff issues with its trading partners," Yeo said.

"We now have a broad picture of what the U.S. wants, so it is time for us to make a strategic decision on what kind of regulatory improvements we can realistically pursue, while also defending domestically sensitive issues," he added.

The Trump administration is known to have asked for greater access to the South Korean market for the agriculture, automotive, digital and service sectors during recent bilateral trade consultations.

Earlier this year, the USTR issued a report on foreign trade barriers, which pointed to a number of non-tariff trade measures by Seoul, including its import ban on American beef from cattle aged 30 months or older, emission-related regulations on imported cars, proposed online platform regulations and restrictions on the export of location-based data.

Regarding South Korea's potential participation in the Alaska liquefied natural gas project, Yeo said he met with Dan Sullivan, a U.S. senator from Alaska, and agreed to continue discussions, noting the U.S. "strongly" wants Seoul's participation.

Asked whether South Korea and the U.S. will seek a package deal incorporating trade and defense issues, he said only that it could be considered as part of a broader framework at some point.

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 10, 2025

11. Boat carrying repatriated N. Koreans safely docks at port in North: official

Boat carrying repatriated N. Koreans safely docks at port in North: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 10, 2025

SEOUL, July 10 (Yonhap) -- A wooden boat carrying six North Koreans has safely docked at a North Korean port, a South Korean government official said Thursday, a day after they were repatriated across the sea border following their rescue in the South.

Boarding the wooden boat they had been rescued in by South Korean authorities, the six North Korean fisherman were sent back home the previous day across the Northern Limit Line in the East Sea.

Four of them had drifted into the southern side of the East Sea and were rescued in May, while the other two were rescued in March in the Yellow Sea in a similar incident. All of them wished to go back to North Korea.

The repatriated ship safely reached the shore along North Korea's east coast the previous day, an official at South Korea's unification ministry said, without specifying the port where it docked.

A large North Korean vessel was used to tow the wooden boat to the port, ministry officials said.

As of Thursday morning, North Korea had shown no response to the repatriation.

A wooden boat carrying North Koreans moves northward in the East Sea on July 9, 2025, in this photo provided by the unification ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 10, 2025

12. Vice FM Park has brief exchanges with FMs of China, Japan at ASEAN meeting

Vice FM Park has brief exchanges with FMs of China, Japan at ASEAN meeting | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 10, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

KUALA LUMPUR, July 10 (Yonhap) -- First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo had brief encounters with the top diplomats of China and Japan in Malaysia on Thursday, marking the first such in-person exchanges between senior diplomats of the three Asian neighbors since the launch of the Lee Jae Myung government.

Park was seen approaching Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, followed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, exchanging handshakes and brief greetings with both ministers ahead of a multilateral meeting involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the three countries.

Although brief, the interaction marked the first face-to-face encounter between a senior South Korean diplomat and the two ministers since the Lee administration took office early last month.

Park was attending a series of ASEAN-hosted high-level meetings this week as the country's top representative, standing in for the foreign minister whose nomination is under way pending parliamentary confirmation.

Details of their conversations were not immediately known.

First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo (C) greets Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, ahead of the ASEAN Plus Three meeting, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on July 10, 2025. Seated on the right is Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

In the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) session, Park highlighted the role of the APT framework as a major economic engine, accounting for over 40 percent of global growth.

Taking note of South Korea's contribution to the various regional initiatives, ranging across financing, food and security, Park expressed hope for continued joint efforts to address shared regional challenges.

Ahead of the APT session, Park attended the South Korea-ASEAN meeting, during which he reaffirmed South Korea's commitment to deepening ties with ASEAN under the Lee government, with an emphasis on sustainable growth and regional cooperation.

Park highlighted Seoul's efforts to advance the comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) with the 10-member bloc, expressing hope for joint efforts to build a sustainable partnership with ASEAN.

He particularly called for closer collaboration under the forthcoming plan of action for 2026-30, based on the agreed-upon CSP framework.

"Based on the new Plan of Action (POA), ASEAN and Korea will navigate our way forward to addressing challenges we face together, such as global supply chain uncertainties, climate change and transnational crime, among others," Park said in the opening remarks.

"The new POA will also serve as a guiding document to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation on future-oriented areas, including AI, digital transition and green transition," he said.

Park also underscored South Korea's support for the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, a long-term road map aimed at strengthening economic integration, enhancing regional security and stability, and promoting sustainable development.

First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo speaks during the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, in conjunction with the 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting and related meetings at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on July 10, 2025, in this photo released by the Bernama news agency. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 10, 2025

13. Lee calls for efforts to restore inter-Korean relations

Lee calls for efforts to restore inter-Korean relations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 10, 2025

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 10 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung called for efforts Thursday to mend strained inter-Korean ties, saying peace between the two Koreas is the most realistic and practical path to ensuring national security.

Lee made the remarks while presiding over a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, the first since he took office in early June, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung told reporters.

"We must make efforts to restore severed relations between South and North Korea," Lee was quoted as saying. "Peace and coexistence between the two Koreas is the most realistic and practical option for safeguarding our national security."

He urged participants to take a comprehensive view of the shifting international order, the domestic political situation and North Korea-related factors to prevent national security threats.

Lee has ordered a halt to the military's propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts along the border and called on civic groups to suspend their distribution of anti-Pyongyang leaflets, expressing hope that the reconciliatory gestures could pave the way for resuming dialogue with the North.

The NSC meeting was attended by Prime Minister Kim Min-seok, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, senior presidential aides, the deputy chief of the National Intelligence Service and senior officials from the ministries of national defense, foreign affairs, unification and safety.

President Lee Jae Myung speaks at a meeting with senior presidential aides at the presidential office in Seoul on July 10, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 10, 2025

14. China's embassy in N. Korea holds reception to mark 64th anniv. of key treaty signing

Still closer than lips and teeth?

(LEAD) China's embassy in N. Korea holds reception to mark 64th anniv. of key treaty signing | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 10, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with comment from Seoul in last para)

SEOUL, July 10 (Yonhap) -- The Chinese Embassy in North Korea has hosted a reception to celebrate the 64th anniversary of the signing of a mutual defense treaty between the two nations, Pyongyang's state media reported Thursday.

The event came as North Korea's ties with China, the North's traditional ally, showed some signs of improvement after their bilateral relationship remained cool amid Pyongyang's close alignment with Moscow over Russia's war with Ukraine.

China's top envoy to Pyongyang, Wang Yajun, hosted the reception the previous day, attended by Chinese Embassy officials and North Korea's key officials, according to the Korean Central News Agency.

The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed on July 11, 1961, by the North's state founder Kim Il-sung and then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.

In a speech, Wang said that "China will always firmly support North Korea's efforts to move toward its independent development, reaffirming that the spirit of the treaty will forever shine."

Kang Yun-sok, vice chairman of the standing committee of the North's Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), said the North will make joint efforts for the development of the friendly relationship with China.

Since the signing of the treaty, the embassies of China and North Korea have held receptions in the host countries every year to celebrate it. From North Korea, a vice chairman of the presidium of the SPA mostly attended such events.

But the North sent an official whose social status remains lower than the SPA's vice chairman to last year's reception. The president of the Kim Il Sung University attended it as the main guest, and the North's state media did not report the event in detail.

Some experts said China appears to be seeking to improve ties with North Korea on concerns that its influence on the North may diminish after Pyongyang and Moscow signed a mutual defense treaty in June last year.

Citing a higher-level North Korean presence and more detailed media coverage, an official at South Korea's unification ministry assessed that a "subtle change" has been detected in the North's handling of the anniversary this year, suggesting a potential improvement in Pyongyang-Beijing ties.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 10, 2021, shows the North's State Affairs Commission hosting a reception in Pyongyang ahead of the 60th anniversary of the signing of a mutual defense treaty between North Korea and China. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 10, 2025

15. N. Korea youth defy state crackdowns with bold fashion, hairstyle trends

​Indications of instability and/or resistance potential?

Beware threats to the regime.

N. Korea youth defy state crackdowns with bold fashion, hairstyle trends

Article 41 of North Korea's Youth Education Guarantee Act forbids young people from "wearing clothes or grooming themselves in strange ways that are un-Korean"

By Lee Chae Eun - July 10, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korea youth defy state crackdowns with bold fashion, hairstyle trends - Daily NK English

FILE PHOTO: A woman in her twenties who was forcibly filmed by the authorities for wearing foreign styles of clothing. (Daily NK)

North Korean authorities have intensified crackdowns on young people’s clothing and hairstyles since enacting the “Youth Education Guarantee Act,” but North Korea’s youth — accustomed to outside culture — continue seeking change despite state restrictions.

“New fashions and hairstyles that differ from last year are trendy among Hamhung’s youth,” a Daily NK source in South Hamgyong province said recently. “Crackdowns intensify every year, yet young people’s appearance becomes more non-socialist the harder the authorities crack down.”

Young people wearing various clothing styles can easily be spotted on Hamhung’s streets — especially this summer, when the number of young women wearing colorful one-piece dresses or skirts has noticeably increased.

According to the source, short-sleeved, above-the-knee one-piece dresses are trendy this summer. Particularly popular are low-cut ones with especially short sleeves.

“These kinds of one-piece dresses slowly became trendy about two or three years ago, and now everyone wears them,” the source said. “They used to cost 500 to 1,500 Chinese yuan at first, but this year they’re much cheaper at 200 to 300 yuan.”

“People think you’ll get in trouble for wearing a low-cut dress, but young people nowadays actually prefer them,” the source said. “They also look for short skirts, thinking that long dresses — even if low-cut — are tacky, and they think nothing of wearing sleeveless dresses.”

Among young men, black shirts made in China, which cost around 200 yuan, are reportedly popular. “Black shirts with russet details slightly visible inside the collar are popular among men, who think they look cool,” the source said. “Nowadays, people express their personality through their clothes.”

Young people are also sensitive to hairstyle trends. “Recently, more young women are getting magic straight perms,” the source said. “If you get a magic straight perm, your hair looks full and lustrous, and you can also dye it a natural dark brown.”

Because dyeing one’s hair exceeds the government’s limits and is subject to crackdowns, young North Koreans still try to fulfill their desires — at least partially — while staying as close as possible to the authorities’ boundaries.

Young people “laugh” at socialist styles

In North Korea, maintaining a tidy appearance is considered a serious ethical issue. The authorities strongly demand that people wear clothes and hairstyles that conform to socialist lifestyles, arguing that clothing and hair reflect the wearer’s ideological spirit.

Article 41 of North Korea’s Youth Education Guarantee Act forbids young people from “wearing clothes or grooming themselves in strange ways that are un-Korean.” North Korea has emphasized the need for youth education and intensified crackdowns based on this law, yet young North Koreans’ desire to express themselves through foreign-influenced clothing and hairstyles continues to grow.

“Young people don’t wear clothing or groom themselves in ways that conform to socialist lifestyles. In fact, they laugh at such styles,” the source said. “If the authorities intensify controls and crackdowns by enforcing standardized appearances and taking ideological issue with people who violate this, young people will experience even greater contradictions between what they express and what they think, and the state will be responsible for this.”

Read in Korean

Lee Chae Eun

Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK's full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

16. N. Korean teachers skip mandatory indoctrination sessions, face public criticism

​Teachers are the catalysts for change (and revolution).

N. Korean teachers skip mandatory indoctrination sessions, face public criticism

"Five-minute indoctrination" sessions — conducted daily by whoever teaches the first class — teach students loyalty to the ruling party and North Korea's leadership

By Eun Seol -

July 10, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korean teachers skip mandatory indoctrination sessions, face public criticism - Daily NK English

Home News

North Korea's Rodong Sinmun reported Jan. 12 that activities teaching university students about the leadership's greatness "actively encourage the preparation of university students as trustworthy talent for the party and revolution." The photo shows students at Pyongyang Teachers Training College studying Kim Jong Un's accomplishments. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)

North Korean authorities have emphasized the importance of ideological indoctrination for youth, the future generation, but on the educational front lines, ideological education for young people is either perfunctory or omitted entirely.

“On the afternoon of June 28, an ideological struggle session was held in the auditorium of Chongjin Medical College for instructors who didn’t conduct the ‘5-minute indoctrination’ session that must precede regular classes,” a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong province said recently. “The university party committee put three educators on stage and went around to each department, making them criticize the three one by one.”

“Five-minute indoctrination” sessions — conducted daily by whoever teaches the first class — teach students loyalty to the ruling party and North Korea’s leadership. North Korea has held them since the time of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Educators at all schools — from elementary school to university — are required to conduct them as a mandatory procedure.

Recently, however, educators on the ground often perform the sessions in a perfunctory manner or skip them entirely.

When this happened at Chongjin Medical College, the university administration — recognizing the seriousness of the problem — suddenly made departments observe one another.

Each department’s chief and head lecturer were required to observe the first classes of other departments to confirm whether the “5-minute indoctrination” sessions were actually being conducted. However, some professors were completely unaware of the observers and omitted the indoctrination sessions as usual.

“A grave act that blocks progress of the revolution”

The professors were so accustomed to skipping the 5-minute sessions that they simply jumped into their classes, feeling no need to perform the indoctrination.

The university’s party committee ultimately held the struggle session, where it criticized the professors and severely rebuked them. “This attitude is a grave act that blocks the progress of the revolution, and educators — professional revolutionaries — must never engage in it.”

“In years past, we used to read straight from material called ‘365 Days of Indoctrination Material’ that organized North Korean leaders’ accomplishments day by day, but now the authorities just order you to carry out the sessions unconditionally with few materials available and repeatedly demand you think of new indoctrination methods to focus students’ attention during that short time.”

Many teachers in schools are unhappy about this.

“They tell you to conduct the 5-minute sessions using new methods to move students, but many teachers say they have no idea what they’re going to do,” the source said. “Higher-ups tell you to devise new indoctrination methods like singing songs or writing poems, but teachers are resisting, saying they’re not movie stars.”

Read in Korean

Eun Seol

Eun Seol is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com