Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The greatest cunning is to have none at all."

- Carl Sandburg

"Sit down and put down everything that comes into your head and then you're a writer. But an author is one who can judge his own stuff's worth, without pity, and destroy most of it."

- Sidonie-Gabrielle Colette

"The purpose of anger is to let us know that something in our life needs changing and to provide the energy to make a change."

- Garrison Wynn

1. Erdogan links Turkey’s European Union bid to Sweden’s NATO hopes

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2023

3. Wagner Leader Prigozhin Met With Putin Days After Aborted Russian Revolt

4. Biden Is Right on Cluster Bombs for Ukraine (WSJ Editorial Board)

5. Opinion | The Flawed Moral Logic of Sending Cluster Munitions to Ukraine (NY Times Editorial Board)

6. Turkey Agrees to Support Sweden’s NATO Bid, Clearing Main Obstacle

7. Tuberville holds on military nominations hurting readiness against China, says Deputy Defense Sec

8. Iran, Russia, and the Challenges of “Inter-Pariah Solidarity”

9. Charting the Military’s Path Across the Technology Valley of Death Using Bar Napkin Math

10. Chinese Women Economists Who Met Yellen Called Traitors Online

11. Opinion With the counteroffensive underway, 12 charts show the latest from Ukraine

12. Opinion | Ukraine in NATO? My heart says yes. But my head says no. by Max Boot

13. Opinion How the Biden administration sealed the Sweden deal with Erdogan

14. Winning friends by training workers is China’s new gambit

15. Special Operations News Update - July 10, 2023 | SOF News

16. Opinion | NATO Isn’t What It Says It Is

17. Wagner fighters neared Russian nuclear base during revolt

18. Videos - SWCC: Making an Operator | SOF News

19. RTX Head Greg Hayes Says US Can’t Decouple From China But Can “De-Risk.” Biden Gets It, But Some Big Companies Don’t.

20. How China Exports Secrecy

21. The Rapid Rise of Threads Appears to Be Hurting Twitter

1. Erdogan links Turkey’s European Union bid to Sweden’s NATO hopes

Good news. Finally.

Erdogan links Turkey’s European Union bid to Sweden’s NATO hopes

The Washington Post · by Kareem Fahim · July 10, 2023

ISTANBUL — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday linked Sweden’s NATO bid to Turkey’s long and fruitless effort to join the European Union, throwing a potential new obstacle in the way of Western efforts to enlarge the transatlantic alliance and project unity during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Erdogan had previously stated his opposition to Sweden’s membership for a long list of reasons, including Stockholm’s refusal to extradite individuals wanted by Turkey, a NATO member, and its permitting of anti-Erdogan protests.

But the linkage to European Union membership, an issue Erdogan first raised in a phone call with President Biden on Sunday, appeared to be a new condition — raising questions about whether the Turkish leader was determined to act as a spoiler at the NATO Summit in Lithuania on Monday, or was instead trying to wring as many concessions as possible from Western allies before agreeing to Sweden’s membership.

“We want our promises to be kept,” Erdogan said, speaking to reporters in Istanbul before departing for the summit. “First, come and pave the way for Turkey in the European Union, then let’s pave the way for Sweden, just as we paved the way for Finland,” he said.

Turkey, he added, “has been waiting at the door of the E.U. for 50 years.”

The European Union quickly dismissed the idea of tying Sweden’s NATO bid to E.U. enlargement.

“You cannot link the two processes,” Dana Spinant, a spokesperson for the European Commission, said Monday.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz echoed the sentiment, saying there is no reason to see them as a “connected issue.”

The unusual demand from Erdogan comes after months of obstruction by the Turkish leader, who won a closely fought election in May, extending his rule into a third decade.

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last February, Finland and Sweden abandoned years of military nonalignment to seek security in NATO — only to face pushback from Turkey. Joining NATO requires unanimous approval from existing member countries.

A year ago, at the NATO meeting in Madrid, Erdogan dropped his opposition to Finnish and Swedish membership at the summit, stealing the show and raising hope for a quick accession process.

But the deal soured quickly, with Turkey continuing to call out Sweden for its refusal to hand over Kurds accused of being militants, and Hungary, an ally of Ankara, also signaling opposition. Ultimately, Finland decided to move ahead without Sweden, joining the alliance in April after Turkey approved its membership.

Provocative remarks from Erdogan in the run-up to this year’s summit have left officials and analysts wondering whether Sweden’s bid is doomed — or if Erdogan plans to cut a deal and is simply negotiating.

“It’s possible that Erdogan could be staging this so he could be the good guy,” said Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council, “saving the summit by giving a unilateral green light.”

If so, it is a strategy that may have cost Erdogan goodwill within the alliance at a time when unity is seen as pivotal.

The fact that only 29 of 31 members have ratified Swedish membership has made “NATO look weaker,” Wieslander said “and that benefits Russia.”

Rauhala reported from Vilnius. Beatriz Ríos in Brussels and Kate Brady in Berlin contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Kareem Fahim · July 10, 2023

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2023

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian officials stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Bakhmut and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around the city.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10.
Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov’s first public appearance since Wagner’s rebellion supports ISW’s previous assessment that he will likely retain his official position within the Russian military.
The Kremlin and Western intelligence officials reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 29 (and/or July 1) following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.
Putin’s decision to meet with Prigozhin is inconsistent with the Kremlin’s prior rhetoric about Prigozhin and his role within the Wagner private military company (PMC).
A Kremlin-affiliated war correspondent characterized the Putin-Prigozhin meeting as the Kremlin’s attempt to “gently” replace Prigozhin and restructure Wagner.
Gerasimov’s public reemergence and the acknowledgment of the Putin-Prigozhin meeting is likely a part of the Kremlin’s wider narrative effort to portray itself as fully in control following Wagner’s rebellion while also reaching out to those who lean toward loyalty toward Wagner and especially Prigozhin himself.
It is unclear whether any agreements between the Kremlin and Prigozhin will prompt significant numbers of Wagner personnel to agree to sign contracts with the MoD.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces have deployed to the Bakhmut direction, but a local Ukrainian commander denied having encountered Chechen forces, suggesting that these Chechen elements are not making significant frontline contributions to Russian operations in Ukraine.
Former Russian officer and prominent critical nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin claimed on July 10 that he managed to deliver a speech in St. Petersburg despite efforts by law enforcement to censor him and prevent the speech from happening
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut direction.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10.
Russian forces are continuing to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield.
Russian occupation officials acknowledged widespread utility service disruptions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 10, 2023

Jul 10, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 10, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian officials stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Bakhmut and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around the city.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have taken control of unspecified heights around Bakhmut, allowing Ukrainian forces to establish fire control over Bakhmut itself.[2] Ukrainian officials have recently signaled that Ukraine seeks to trap Russian forces within the city, and it appears that Ukrainian operations in the Bakhmut area in recent days have been intended to slowly envelop Russian troops in Bakhmut and on its flanks.[3] ISW was previously conservative when assessing claims of Russian fire control and general interdiction of Ukrainian lines of communication in and around Bakhmut as Russian forces gradually took control of the settlement, but Ukrainian claims of establishing fire control may be more credible. [4] Both Ukrainian and Russian sources have indicated in recent days that Ukraine is gaining ground in the Bakhmut area and on its southwestern flanks including specific terrain features that can give Ukrainian forces fire advantage. The fear of Ukrainian fire control and imminent threats to Bakhmut is also permeating the Russian information space, and Russian milbloggers have repeatedly expressed fear over Ukrainian forces encircling Russian forces in Bakhmut.[5] Russian sources claimed at least since February that Russian forces maintained fire control over critical Ukrainian GLOCs around Bakhmut, while Ukrainian officials and sources did not express concern over these Russian claims, in contrast, and withdrew their forces in good order in the face of the Wagner Group‘s expensive frontal assaults.[6] The persistent signaling of Ukrainian officials about Ukrainian operational intent in Bakhmut, alongside the clear concern of milbloggers over exactly what this intent may be, suggests that Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in this direction may be credibly threatening the Russian hold on Bakhmut, although it is far too early to forecast the liberation of the city.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10. Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian troops continued offensive actions in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated four square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction over the past week, and a total of 24 square kilometers since starting counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut direction (likely around early June).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops advanced up to one kilometer in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions, and a total of 8.6 kilometers since Ukrainian troops initiated counteroffensive operations in these directions.[9] Since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4, ISW has calculated based on its own control of terrain data that Ukrainian forces recaptured approximately 253 square kilometers of territory. (Ukrainian official accounts of the area liberated differ from ISW’s, almost certainly because Ukraine calculated its initial control of terrain differently. ISW is presenting its own figure of liberated land to make an apples-to-apples comparison of Russian and Ukrainian gains.) Russian forces have captured a total of 282 square kilometers in the entire theater since January 1. In five weeks, Ukrainian forces have liberated nearly the same amount of territory that Russian forces captured in over six months.

Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov’s first public appearance since Wagner’s rebellion supports ISW’s previous assessment that he will likely retain his official position within the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on July 10 showing Gerasimov receiving reports about alleged Ukrainian attempts to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and Rostov and Kaluga oblasts.[10] ISW previously assessed that Gerasimov’s past long periods of public absence have not been indicators of his official position within the Russian military leadership and that Putin will likely not remove Gerasimov as the overall theater commander or Chief of the General Staff, as doing so would be too damaging to the Kremlin’s and the MoD’s reputation.[11] The Kremlin has previously responded to speculations about Gerasimov’s public absences by affirming his role as Chief of the General Staff and appears to be currently publicizing Gerasimov’s presence at the meeting to respond to a new bout of rumors about his absence following Wagner’s rebellion on June 24.[12] ISW has previously observed Russian speculations that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has recently assumed Gerasimov’s responsibilities for Russian operations in Ukraine, although there continues to be no confirmation of these speculations.[13] Gerasimov’s first public appearance since the rebellion was notably focused on alleged Russian internal security issues and not necessarily on Russian operations in Ukraine that the overall theater commander oversees.

The Kremlin and Western intelligence officials reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 29 (and/or July 1) following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Putin met with Prigozhin and all of the Wagner commanders (35 people in total) in a three-hour meeting in the Kremlin. Peskov claimed that Putin gave an assessment of Wagner’s actions during the “special military operation,” gave his assessment of the armed rebellion, and listened to commanders’ explanations.[15] Putin also reportedly offered Wagner commanders “further employment options,” while the Wagner commanders assured Putin that they are loyal supporters and soldiers of the state and Putin. Peskov refused to answer a question about whether Russian MoD officials were present at the meeting. French outlet Liberation previously reported on July 7, citing Western intelligence officials that Prigozhin and Wagner’s top commanders met with Putin, Head of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) Viktor Zolotov, and Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin on July 1.[16] It is unclear if Liberation is referring to the claimed June 29 meeting or an additional meeting in the Kremlin.

Putin’s decision to meet with Prigozhin is inconsistent with the Kremlin’s prior rhetoric about Prigozhin and his role within the Wagner private military company (PMC). Peskov stated on June 29 that he did not have information about Prigozhin’s whereabouts.[17] Putin had also claimed in his speech on June 27 that “the owner of Concord company” (the Concord company is the parent company of Prigozhin’s catering company) provided catering services for the Russian army, while the Russian state fully funded and supplied Wagner forces.[18] Putin was clearly referring to Prigozhin in this statement given that Prigozhin is the owner of the Concord company and previously served as Putin’s caterer in an effort to deliberately deprive Prigozhin of the title of Wagner financier and undermine his role in the Wagner PMC. Putin’s meeting with Prigozhin and the later acknowledgment erodes these efforts and contradicts Putin’s condemnation of the rebellion’s organizers.[19] The Kremlin may have sought to publicize the meeting to address the number of questions arising regarding Prigozhin’s ability to freely move around Russia without facing legal action.

A Kremlin-affiliated war correspondent characterized the Putin-Prigozhin meeting as the Kremlin’s attempt to “gently” replace Prigozhin and restructure Wagner.[20] The milblogger claimed that the Kremlin is very dependent on Prigozhin’s structures within Wagner and that their destruction would seriously damage the Wagner PMC, confirming ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin is gradually attempting to separate the Wagner PMC from Prigozhin.[21] ISW also previously assessed that the Kremlin relied on irregular armed formations and their patrons to outsource reservist recruitment and crowdfunding efforts, which may be one of many forms of the Kremlin’s structural dependencies on Prigozhin-lead Wagner PMC.[22] The milblogger noted that the meeting aimed to close out any issues that were not discussed during the negotiations between Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov that ensured security guarantees for Prigozhin. The milblogger noted that some of these issues included the fate of Wagner PMC as well as Prigozhin’s businesses and personal affairs. The milblogger added that Prigozhin is still allowed to operate his businesses and not face charges in Russia but had lost access to his media companies and faces a smear campaign in the state media, as ISW has also assessed.[23]

Gerasimov’s public reemergence and the acknowledgment of the Putin-Prigozhin meeting is likely a part of the Kremlin’s wider narrative effort to portray itself as fully in control following Wagner’s rebellion while also reaching out to those who lean toward loyalty toward Wagner and especially Prigozhin himself. The MoD published the footage of Gerasimov on the same day that the Kremlin acknowledged Putin’s June 29 meeting with Prigozhin, likely signaling a rejection, at least officially, of the rebellion’s call to replace senior Russian military leadership. A notable Russian milblogger argued that Gerasimov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s media appearances show that there will be no command reshuffles and observed that Putin never fires people under external pressure.[24] Acquiescence to Prigozhin’s demands to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov would have likely damaged Putin’s regime security by creating a precedent that resistance and outright rebellion are legitimate means to achieve desired goals. The public backing of Shoigu and Gerasimov and the acknowledgment of Putin’s meeting with Prigozhin indicates that the Kremlin likely aims to portray the rebellion, its potential fallout, and the calls to replace disdained MoD establishment figures as a settled affair. The Kremlin may have chosen to portray itself as solving this issue now because of Lukashenko’s apparent attempt on July 6 to distance himself from the deal he mediated between the Kremlin and Prigozhin.[25] The meeting and the publicized support for Shoigu and Gerasimov are in line with what ISW continues to assess to be the Kremlin’s attempt to balance a desire to mitigate the widespread disdain for MoD establishment figures that fueled Wagner’s rebellion while also trying to disempower those who sympathized or supported the rebellion.[26]

It is unclear whether any agreements between the Kremlin and Prigozhin will prompt significant numbers of Wagner personnel to agree to sign contracts with the MoD. A Russian milblogger interviewed a Wagner assault group commander on July 10 and claimed that the commander stated that no personnel in his unit have signed the contract with the MoD.[27] The Wagner commander reportedly stated that Wagner is united around Prigozhin and a common ideology of fighting for the motherland instead of a military contract.[28] The commander reportedly stated that he will either continue serving with Wagner or demobilize.[29] It is unclear what proportion of Wagner fighters has this deep ideological loyalty to Prigozhin and Wagner as an independent organization, although such an ideological commitment will likely prove a significant obstacle for MoD efforts to subordinate Wagner. Prigozhin ramped up efforts to disseminate Wagner’s militarism and ideology throughout Russia in March, and Prigozhin may have similarly intensified internal ideological messaging within Wagner itself at the time.[30]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces have deployed to the Bakhmut direction, but a local Ukrainian commander denied having encountered Chechen forces, suggesting that these Chechen elements are not making significant frontline contributions to Russian operations in Ukraine. Kadyrov claimed on July 9 that Akhmat Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Commander Apty Alaudinov recently visited Akhmat Spetsnaz near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces recently decided to transfer Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Bakhmut direction, allegedly reflective of the Russian General Staff’s trust in Akhmat’s combat capabilities.[31] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Bakhmut direction stated on July 10 that Ukrainian personnel have yet to encounter any Akhmat units near Bakhmut, however.[32] A Russian source claimed on July 6 that “bearded mountain men” were taking pictures at the Bakhmut Raion welcome sign, likely hinting that Chechen forces were coming to the Bakhmut area for propaganda purposes.[33]

Kadyrov recently claimed on May 31 that Akhmat Spetsnaz assumed responsibility for the Russian offensive to capture Marinka southwest of Donetsk City.[34] Kadyrov also reportedly deployed Akhmat Spetsnaz to border areas in Belgorod Oblast to defend against limited all Russian pro-Ukrainian cross-border raids.[35] ISW has observed Akhmat Spetsnaz elements fighting near Bilohorivka south of Kreminna and operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[36] Kadyrov has previously claimed that 7,000 Chechen servicemen are operating in Ukraine but that there are 70,000 active Chechen personnel in the entire Russian military.[37] If Akhmat forces are deployed across five different sectors of the front, it is likely that each grouping lacks significant manpower and provides limited combat capabilities to ongoing Russian operations in each sector. Akhmat forces have allegedly been fighting in Marinka for over a month and have yet to produce the significant breakthroughs that they promised. Akhmat forces have been engaged in Russian offensives south of Kreminna since at least February 2023 with a similar lack of Russian advances in the area.[38] Akhmat Spetsnaz thus appears unlikely to make even a tactically significant impact in their alleged deployment to the Bakhmut area. Kadyrov is likely promoting Akhmat as a heavily involved force in Ukraine in order to curry favor with the MoD and with Putin. It is unclear how involved Akhmat forces are in Russian operations in each sector that they are reportedly deployed to, and Kadyrov may be intentionally shielding these forces from combat and degradation in a bid to retain the influence these paramilitary structures provide.

Former Russian officer and prominent critical nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin claimed on July 10 that he managed to deliver a speech in St. Petersburg despite efforts by law enforcement to censor him and prevent the speech from happening. Girkin previously accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of fabricating a bomb threat at the Listva bookstore in St. Petersburg to prevent him from speaking about the Wagner Group rebellion.[39] On July 10, Girkin posted an update claiming that he still delivered the lecture in St. Petersburg, and the Listva bookstore reported that Girkin spoke in a pre-prepared spare room while the law enforcement raid was ongoing.[40] Girkin stated that the only thing that law enforcement accomplished during the raid was making a stronger point against itself and its resort to censorship than even he could.[41] Girkin went on to complain that he is preparing to leave St. Petersburg for Moscow as it is clear he is no longer welcome in the city.[42] ISW previously assessed that the FSB-fabricated bomb threat at Girkin’s event is likely part of a long-standing feud between the FSB and Girkin and the larger ultranationalist community, and the fact that Girkin supposedly went ahead with his speech despite the censorship attempts is likely to exacerbate the feud.[43]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian officials stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Bakhmut and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around the city.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10.
Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov’s first public appearance since Wagner’s rebellion supports ISW’s previous assessment that he will likely retain his official position within the Russian military.
The Kremlin and Western intelligence officials reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 29 (and/or July 1) following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.
Putin’s decision to meet with Prigozhin is inconsistent with the Kremlin’s prior rhetoric about Prigozhin and his role within the Wagner private military company (PMC).
A Kremlin-affiliated war correspondent characterized the Putin-Prigozhin meeting as the Kremlin’s attempt to “gently” replace Prigozhin and restructure Wagner.
Gerasimov’s public reemergence and the acknowledgment of the Putin-Prigozhin meeting is likely a part of the Kremlin’s wider narrative effort to portray itself as fully in control following Wagner’s rebellion while also reaching out to those who lean toward loyalty toward Wagner and especially Prigozhin himself.
It is unclear whether any agreements between the Kremlin and Prigozhin will prompt significant numbers of Wagner personnel to agree to sign contracts with the MoD.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces have deployed to the Bakhmut direction, but a local Ukrainian commander denied having encountered Chechen forces, suggesting that these Chechen elements are not making significant frontline contributions to Russian operations in Ukraine.
Former Russian officer and prominent critical nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin claimed on July 10 that he managed to deliver a speech in St. Petersburg despite efforts by law enforcement to censor him and prevent the speech from happening
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut direction.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10.
Russian forces are continuing to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield.
Russian occupation officials acknowledged widespread utility service disruptions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 10. Geolocated footage published on July 9 indicates that Russian “Storm-Z” assault detachments made marginal gains within Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (16km northwest of Svatove).[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 10 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults and sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novoselivske.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) on July 10 and captured unspecified positions near Kuzemivka (16km northwest of Svatove) on July 9, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of either claim.[46] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Karmazynivka (12km south of Svatove) and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted successful offensive operations near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 10 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults west of Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks around Bakhmut on July 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated four square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction in the past week and have liberated 24 square kilometers in total since the start of the Ukrainian offensives in the Bakhmut direction.[50] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister reported that Ukrainian forces established fire control over Bakhmut itself and made unspecified advances south of Bakhmut.[51] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander General Oleksandr Syrskyi also told ABC News in an interview published on July 9 that he is confident Ukrainian forces will retake Bakhmut.[52] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on Berkivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] Footage published on July 10 purportedly shows elements of the “Prizrak” (Ghost) Battalion (a Luhansk People‘s Republic formation) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) repelling a Ukrainian attack near Klishchiivka.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut) and Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Berkhivka and Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut).[56] Footage published on July 10 purportedly shows elements of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Bakhmut direction.[57]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[58] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valery Shershen and the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka).[60] Footage amplified on July 9 purportedly shows elements of the 9th Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) and 10th Tank Regiment (3rdArmy Corps, Western Military District) operating in the Avdiivka direction.[61] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Nevelske and Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka).[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on July 10. The Russian MoD claimed on July 10 that Ukrainian troops conducted sabotage and reconnaissance attempts near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attempts to advance south of Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and near Staromaoirske (8km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine (8km south of Velyka Novosilka).[64] One milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized (Mountain) Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled a Ukrainian attack in the area south of Velyka Novosilka.[65] Another milblogger claimed that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” operational-tactical formation and unspecified Russian infantry elements are defending near Urozhaine.[66]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10. Geolocated footage posted on July 10 suggests that Ukrainian forces conducted a mechanized push and advanced to within 2km northeast of Robotyne (14km south of Orikhiv).[67] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted attacks near Robotyne, and one prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces operating Western-provided fighting vehicles advanced towards the defensive lines of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Southern Military District) just northeast of Robotyne.[68] Geolocated footage posted on July 9 additionally shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southeast of Orikhiv towards Novopokrovka (15km southeast of Orikhiv).[69] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted limited reconnaissance-in-force attacks with a group of around 30 personnel along the Pyatykhatky-Zherebryanky line (about 25km southwest of Orikhiv).[70] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces operating near Pyatykhatky deliberately abandoned and mined trenches to encourage Ukrainian forces to enter mined trench areas, thereby suffering significant casualties.[71]

Russian forces conducted air, missile, and artillery strikes against the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast and Mykolaiv Oblast on July 10. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated on July 10 that Russian forces conducted 60 artillery strikes with 365 shells against settlements and Ukrainian positions on the west bank and conducted 3 KAB laser-guided bomb strikes against Beryslav Raion.[72] Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv City with likely Iskander-M ballistic missiles early in the morning on July 10 and shelled Ochakiv from positions on the Kinburn Spit.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that the situation on the east (left) bank is unchanged and that Russian forces continue counter-battery fire and aerial reconnaissance against Ukrainian positions on the west bank.[74] Another Russian milblogger posted footage claiming to show Russian drones striking Ukrainian equipment near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east bank.[75]

Russian officials continue to struggle with traffic and logistics issues at the Kerch Strait Bridge associated with the continued tourist season in occupied Crimea. Russian sources widely reported on July 10 that over 1,200 cars waited in line to cross the Kerch Strait Bridge on the Krasnodar Krai side of the bridge, reportedly because the Ministry of Emergency Situation suspended movement across the bridge due to poor weather conditions.[76] ISW previously assessed that the constant influx of Russian tourists into occupied Crimea, a critical rear area of an active warzone, is causing severe logistical issues along one of Russia’s most fundamental ground lines of communication.[77]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces are continuing to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield. BBC’s Russian service confirmed the deaths of 553 servicemen between July 4 and July 7 using information available in the open source.[78] BBC noted that the exact dates of death for 313 confirmed servicemen are not available and noted that the unconfirmed number of casualties is likely significantly greater. BBC also confirmed the deaths of one Russian general, two colonels, three lieutenant colonels, and 12 officers in the specified timeframe. Russian opposition outlets Mediazona and Meduza reported that approximately 47,000 servicemen died between February 24, 2022, to May 30, 2023, according to the Russian Registrar for Inheritance Cases.[79] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to comment on Mediazona’s and Meduza’s report, noting that only the Russian MoD has information on casualty numbers.[80] The UK MoD assessed that Russian forces are struggling to provide medical assistance to servicemen after suffering on average around 400 casualties a day for 17 months.[81] The UK MoD added that up to 50 percent of Russian combat fatalities could have been prevented with proper first aid and noted that the leading causes of fatalities are slow evacuations of wounded and inappropriate use of Russian combat tourniquets. Elements of the Russian “Storm-Z” convict assault detachment of the 27th Separate Guards Motorized Brigade operating in the Luhansk direction recorded an appeal complaining about lack of medical assistance and short recovery time periods before the wounded servicemen return to the frontlines.[82] Elements of the “Storm-Z” detachment noted that their unit only has 25 servicemen remaining from the original 110 troops.

Russian forces are continuing their efforts to recruit volunteers for military contract service. Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division – elements of which are currently operating on the northern flanks of Bakhmut – announced the recruitment of volunteers and promised monthly salaries of 204,000 rubles ($2,252) with additional one-time federal and regional compensations.[83] Putin signed a bill simplifying applications for residence permits for foreigners who sign military contracts with the Russian MoD.[84]

Russian defense industrial base (DIB) officials are claiming that Russia is maintaining the production of Kinzhal ballistic missiles. First Deputy Director General of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, Vladimir Aryakov, stated that Rostec is mass-producing Kinzhal missile systems to fulfill Russian MoD orders.[85] Russia is likely procuring supplies for Kinzhal missiles via sanctions evasion if Aryakov’s claims are true.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials acknowledged widespread utility service disruptions in occupied Donetsk Oblast as of July 10. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin stated that 80 percent of respondents in a utility services poll for occupied Donetsk Oblast reported that they have access to water supplies only every other day.[86] Other residents reportedly complain about a complete lack of water, non-compliance with water supply schedules, low water pressure, poor water quality, and water supply-related accidents.[87]

The Kremlin continues to offer preferential lending and business opportunities to establish further economic control in occupied territories. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law in July prohibiting banks and microfinance organizations from collecting overdue debts from residents of the occupied territories until 2026.[88] The Kherson Oblast Prosecutor's Office announced on July 10 that it will provide free legal assistance to entrepreneurs in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast.[89]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Wagner Leader Prigozhin Met With Putin Days After Aborted Russian Revolt

Excerpts:

“Putin really needs Wagner because his fate is being decided on the battlefield and there he has serious problems,” said Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin aide who is now a critic. “At the same time, Prigozhin has interest in regime survival because he likely won’t survive if Putin falls.”

The Wagner leader’s public statements lambasting the military and government officials have made him unpopular among some in the country’s ruling elite.

Putin has sought to project his authority in the wake of the Wagner mutiny and the Kremlin has sought to discredit Prigozhin, who is popular among ordinary Russians, by, among other things, having state TV show video from inside the mercenary leader’s opulent St. Petersburg mansion.

At the same time, it has apparently allowed Prigozhin to return to Russia after a brief exile in neighboring Belarus, and let him sit down for a lengthy, three-hour talk with Putin on June 29, in which he and Wagner leaders explained the rationale for their revolt.

That same day, Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, when asked about the paramilitary leader’s whereabouts, said he didn’t know where he was.

Wagner Leader Prigozhin Met With Putin Days After Aborted Russian Revolt

Russian president met paramilitary chief and his commanders on June 29, Kremlin says

By Matthew Luxmoore. Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev

Updated July 10, 2023 12:30 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/wagner-leader-prigozhin-met-with-putin-days-after-aborted-revolt-kremlin-says-f10e2f1d

Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and his lieutenants met with Russian President Vladimir Putin days after the group’s short-lived revolt against Moscow, according to the Kremlin, a sign that the paramilitary chief and his forces remain important players in Russian security and politics.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the men discussed Wagner’s aborted June mutiny as well as fighting in Ukraine. Peskov said Wagner unit commanders pledged fealty, saying “they are staunch supporters” of Putin and “are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

Monday’s announcement marked a sharp turn from Putin’s initial public condemnation of Prigozhin and his backers as treasonous rebels and signaled a new phase in Russia’s internal political maneuvering as the country’s ruling elite contends with mounting losses in Ukraine.

The Wagner Group didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment about the meeting. Prigozhin hasn’t been seen in public in the more than two weeks since his abandoned revolt.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has tried to shore up his support following a failed revolt by Wagner Group. PHOTO: ALEXANDER KAZAKOV/KREMLIN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Prigozhin and his private military company have played an important role in Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, earlier this year capturing the small eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, a rare recent Russian gain after one of the longest and bloodiest engagements of the war. Top Ukrainian officials have praised Wagner fighters as more disciplined and resilient than Russia’s regular army.

But Prigozhin has also been an increasingly strident critic of Russian military commanders and their conduct of the war, and his armed march on Moscow, in a column complete with tanks and artillery, was the biggest challenge to Putin in the Russian leader’s 23 years in power.

“Putin really needs Wagner because his fate is being decided on the battlefield and there he has serious problems,” said Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin aide who is now a critic. “At the same time, Prigozhin has interest in regime survival because he likely won’t survive if Putin falls.”

The Wagner leader’s public statements lambasting the military and government officials have made him unpopular among some in the country’s ruling elite.

Putin has sought to project his authority in the wake of the Wagner mutiny and the Kremlin has sought to discredit Prigozhin, who is popular among ordinary Russians, by, among other things, having state TV show video from inside the mercenary leader’s opulent St. Petersburg mansion.

At the same time, it has apparently allowed Prigozhin to return to Russia after a brief exile in neighboring Belarus, and let him sit down for a lengthy, three-hour talk with Putin on June 29, in which he and Wagner leaders explained the rationale for their revolt.

That same day, Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, when asked about the paramilitary leader’s whereabouts, said he didn’t know where he was.

Appeared in the July 11, 2023, print edition as 'Mutiny Leader Met Putin, Kremlin Says'.

4. Biden Is Right on Cluster Bombs for Ukraine

Biden Is Right on Cluster Bombs for Ukraine

Officials in Kyiv are best suited to weigh the risks to their own civilians.

By The Editorial Board

July 9, 2023 3:15 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-is-right-on-cluster-bombs-for-ukraine-russia-war-weapons-military-aid-defense-f22667d3?mod=opinion_major_pos2

A man walks past an unexploded tail section of a 300mm rocket which appears to contain cluster bombs in Lysychansk, Ukraine, April 11, 2022. PHOTO: ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

No sooner had the Biden Administration announced that cluster bombs will be included as part of its $800 million package of military aid to Ukraine than President Biden was attacked by members of his own party and even some allies. Our only criticism is that the decision could have done more good earlier.

Mr. Biden says it was a “very difficult decision.” Cluster bombs are anti-personnel weapons that eject multiple smaller bomblets over a large area. They can be very effective, and Russia has used them against Ukrainians from the start of the war. But 123 countries—not including the U.S., Ukraine or Russia—have signed a treaty banning their use because the unexploded bomblets can harm civilians years after the fighting has ceased.

The higher the percentage of unexploded bomblets, or dud rate, the greater the menace. The Pentagon says the cluster bombs they are sending to Ukraine have a dud rate of 2.35%. That compares with dud rates of up to 40% for Russian cluster bombs.

The U.K., Canada, Spain and New Zealand criticized Mr. Biden’s decision. And in the Washington Post, former Sen. Patrick Leahy and current Sen. Jeff Merkley called cluster bombs ”a weapon that the United States should be leading the global effort to prohibit.”

Pennsylvania Democrat Chrissy Houlahan, an Air Force veteran who co-chairs a bipartisan congressional caucus on unexploded ordinance, said the decision is “blurring the lines of moral high ground.”

Ukraine isn’t seeking to use these bombs against civilians. It wants them because they are running out of other munitions and figures they can compensate for some of the advantage Russia still holds. The greater risk to Ukrainian civilians is from Russia’s invading army and indiscriminate weapons targeting.

If you can’t see a moral distinction between Russia’s aggression and Ukraine’s use of cluster bombs for defense, then you have the blurred vision. Those best suited to make the tradeoff between risks are the Ukrainians whose lives are on the line every day.

Opinion | The Flawed Moral Logic of Sending Cluster Munitions to Ukraine

The New York Times · by The Editorial Board · July 10, 2023

The Editorial Board

The Flawed Moral Logic of Sending Cluster Munitions to Ukraine

July 10, 2023, 1:00 a.m. ET

The editorial board is a group of opinion journalists whose views are informed by expertise, research, debate and certain longstanding values. It is separate from the newsroom.

In the brutal logic of warfare, cluster munitions may appear to make solid sense for Ukraine’s slow-moving counteroffensive against well dug-in Russian troops. Delivered by artillery, a 155-milimeter shell packed with 72 armor-piercing, soldier-killing bomblets can strike from 20 miles away and scatter them over a vast area.

On Friday, the Biden administration announced it would start delivering these weapons to Ukraine, over objections from, among others, human rights organizations and key allies. President Biden said the United States would supply cluster munitions from its large stockpile until suppliers could catch up with Ukraine’s shortage of conventional artillery shells, a key weapon in the static warfare in eastern and southern Ukraine.

With Ukraine using up ordinary artillery shells at a huge rate (the United States alone has sent more than two million rounds to Ukraine), the cluster munitions, of which the United States has a bountiful supply, could give Ukrainian forces an advantage in prying the Russians from their trenches and fortifications along the 620-mile-long front. Besides, Russia has been using its own cluster munitions, as has Ukraine, from the outset of the war, and Ukraine’s leaders have been urgently asking for more.

This is a flawed and troubling logic. In the face of the widespread global condemnation of cluster munitions and the danger they pose to civilians long after the fighting is over, this is not a weapon a nation with the power and influence of the United States should be spreading.

However compelling it may be to use any available weapon to protect one’s homeland, nations in the rules-based international order have increasingly sought to draw a red line against use of weapons of mass destruction or weapons that pose a severe and lingering risk to noncombatants. Cluster munitions clearly fall into the second category.

The reason is that not all bomblets explode as they’re meant to, and thousands of small, unexploded grenades can lie around for years, even decades, before somebody — often, a child spotting a brightly colored, battery-size doodad on the ground — accidentally sets it off. The weapons used today by Russia and Ukraine are said to leave as many as 40 percent unexploded duds lying around, and they will remain a threat to the people of Ukraine no matter what the outcome of this conflict.

This danger prompted the adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008. The United Nations secretary general at the time, Ban Ki-moon, spoke of “not only the world’s collective revulsion at these abhorrent weapons, but also the power of collaboration among governments, civil society and the United Nations to change attitudes and policies on a threat faced by all humankind.” As of today, 123 nations — including many of America’s allies — have agreed never to use, transfer, produce or stockpile cluster munitions.

But not Russia or Ukraine, nor the United States, which used cluster munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, the United States actively opposed the treaty. This editorial board argued at the time that, “As the main holdout, the United States gives cover to countries like Russia and China, which also rejected the ban. The treaty is weaker for it: together, these three nations have more than a billion cluster munitions stockpiled, far more than the number of weapons expected to be destroyed.”

Defending the decision to supply the weapons to Ukraine, President Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, argued that Ukraine would not be using the munitions in a foreign land, but on its own territory. “These are their citizens they’re protecting, and they are motivated to use any weapon system they have in a way that minimizes the risk to these citizens,” he said.

In fact, there is considerable risk. Cluster munitions used by both Ukrainian and Russian forces have led to, reportedly, at least dozens of civilian deaths and serious injuries, according to a Human Rights Watch report published Thursday. Specifically, the report said Ukrainian cluster-munition rocket attacks on Russian-controlled areas around the city of Izium in 2022 “caused many casualties among Ukrainian civilians.” (Ukraine denied that cluster munitions were used there.)

While it is Ukraine’s decision to choose what weapons it uses in its defense, it is for America to decide which weapons to supply. At the outset of the conflict, the United States resisted sending advanced weapons for fear of encouraging a wider war and Russian retaliation. But as the fighting dragged on and Ukraine proved increasingly capable of standing up to Russia, line after line has been crossed, with Washington and its allies agreeing to provide sophisticated weapons like the Patriot air-defense system, the Himars long-range rocket launcher, the Abrams tank and soon the F-16 jet fighter.

There is a legitimate debate about whether this amounts to the sort of mission creep that marked conflicts in Vietnam or Afghanistan. Sending cluster munitions to Ukraine amounts to a clear escalation of a conflict that has already become far too brutal and destructive. But the greater issue here is sharing a weapon that has been condemned by a majority of the world’s nations, including most of America’s close allies, as morally repugnant for the indiscriminate carnage it can cause long after the combatants have gone.

The Pentagon’s central defense against such proscriptions is that the “dud rate” of the American weapons — the number of bomblets that do not explode and are left on the battlefield — is down to 2.35 percent, as compared to Russia’s alleged 40 percent. In 2008, the Pentagon set a limit of 1 percent on cluster munitions, and Congress has since banned the use, production or transfer of weapons over that rate. Even the 2.35 percent rate, an average, may be misleading. As John Ismay reported in the The Times on Saturday, the cluster munitions in question may include an older type known to have a failure rate of 14 percent or more. That could leave the land littered with unexploded duds.

The White House bypassed Congress by invoking a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act that allows the president to disregard arms export restrictions if he deems the aid to be a vital national security interest. Several members of Congress have denounced the export of these weapons and will add an the amendment to the annual defense bill that would prohibit export of almost all cluster munitions.

This board has consistently supported the supply of arms to Ukraine by the United States and its allies. Ukraine is battling an invader prepared to use all sorts of weapons, including indiscriminate shelling of civilian targets. It needs and deserves help.

But providing weapons that much of the world justifiably condemns is wrong. The United States had wisely started to move away from the use of cluster munitions. To now disregard the long-term consequences of these weapons would undermine one of the fundamental reasons to support Ukraine — to defend the norms that secure peace and stability in Europe, norms that Russia violated so blatantly. Encouraging the use and proliferation of these weapons could weaken the support of allies who until this point have rallied behind American leadership.

The rain of bomblets may give Ukraine a military advantage in the short term, but it would not be decisive, and it would not outweigh the damage in suffering to civilians in Ukraine, now and likely for generations to come.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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The editorial board is a group of opinion journalists whose views are informed by expertise, research, debate and certain longstanding values. It is separate from the newsroom.

The New York Times · by The Editorial Board · July 10, 2023

6. Turkey Agrees to Support Sweden’s NATO Bid, Clearing Main Obstacle

Turkey Agrees to Support Sweden’s NATO Bid, Clearing Main Obstacle

By STEVEN ERLANGER, Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Lara Jakes, Ben Hubbard, , Shashank Bengali, Anatoly Kurmanaev, Matthew Mpoke Bigg, Cassandra Vinograd, Paul Sonne The New York Times24 min

July 11, 2023

View Original

Turkey agreed on Monday to clear the way for Sweden to join NATO, a sudden reversal just hours after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the European Union should first advance his country’s bid to join the E.U. bloc.

NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, announced Turkey’s decision from Vilnius, Lithuania, where the alliance was preparing to open its annual summit on Tuesday.

Mr. Stoltenberg said that Mr. Erdogan had lifted his objections to Sweden’s entry into the alliance and would take the country’s bid to his Parliament for ratification as soon as possible.

In return, Sweden and Turkey would continue to work bilaterally against terrorism, Sweden would help reinvigorate Turkey’s application to enter the European Union, and NATO would establish a new “special coordinator for counterterrorism,” he said.

The two countries agreed that “counterterrorism cooperation is a long-term effort, which will continue beyond Sweden’s accession to NATO,” a statement by the alliance said.

“This is good for all of us,” Mr. Stoltenberg said. “This is good for Sweden — Sweden will become a full member — and it’s good for Turkey because Turkey is a NATO ally that will benefit from a stronger NATO.”

The statement said Mr. Erdogan met on Monday with Mr. Stoltenberg and Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson of Sweden to discuss the country’s bid, which had been held up by Turkey’s demands that Sweden crack down on dissidents whom Turkey considers terrorists, including pro-Kurdish activists and members of a religious group that Turkey has accused of planning a coup attempt in 2016.

“This has been a good day for Sweden,” Mr. Kristersson told reporters, saying that the joint statement represented “a very big step” toward the final ratification of Sweden’s membership of NATO.

Hungary is the only other NATO member that has yet to approve Sweden’s bid, but Hungarian officials have said that if Turkey’s position changes, they would not obstruct the process.

President Biden, who arrived in Vilnius on Monday, said in a statement that he welcomed Mr. Erdogan’s commitment to submitting Sweden’s bid for “swift ratification” by the Turkish Parliament.

“I stand ready to work with President Erdogan and Turkey on enhancing defense and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic area,” Mr. Biden said. He also thanked Mr. Stoltenberg for his “steadfast leadership” and added that he looked forward to welcoming Mr. Kristersson and Sweden as the alliance’s 32nd member.

Mr. Erdogan’s demand on E.U. membership — a day before the opening of NATO’s two-day summit — appeared to have erected a new obstacle to the admission of Sweden, a major manufacturer of artillery, airplanes and other arms with crucial geographic value allowing control the airspace over the Baltic Sea.

Sweden’s application had been expected to be a central topic at the gathering, where NATO leaders are expected to make a show of their unity and resolve 16 months into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kyiv, too, has sought to join the alliance — although leaders, including Mr. Biden, have said that will have to wait until the end of the fighting.

Turkey applied to join the European Union in 1987, but there has been scarcely any progress in its bid since 2016, when the European Parliament voted to suspend accession talks while criticizing a vast Turkish government crackdown on political opponents after a failed coup against Mr. Erdogan.

“First, clear the way for Turkey in the European Union, then we will clear the way for Sweden as we did for Finland,” Mr. Erdogan told reporters before traveling to the summit, referring to his country’s decision to drop objections to the application of Finland, which joined the alliance in April.

Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership last year, after Russia’s invasion. At a NATO summit in Madrid last year, officials from Turkey, Sweden and Finland outlined steps that would secure Turkey’s support — a crucial requirement, because all NATO nations must agree to admit new members.

In recent months, Sweden made efforts to meet Turkey’s demands, amending its Constitution, passing new counterterrorism legislation and agreeing to extradite several Turks who stand accused of crimes in Turkey. But Swedish courts have blocked other extraditions, and Swedish officials have said that they cannot override their country’s free-speech protections.

Mr. Erdogan continued to say that Sweden must do more.

A new complication arose last month, after a man publicly burned a Quran at a protest in Stockholm on a major Muslim holiday. Mr. Erdogan criticized Sweden for permitting the protest and said that the Swedish authorities needed to fight Islamophobia, even though that had not been among the issues Sweden had agreed with Turkey to address.

But the breakthrough on the eve of the summit could mean that Sweden might join the alliance in short order. Turkey’s Parliament is in session until July 27, and the body needed just two weeks to approve Finland’s bid after Mr. Erdogan agreed to support it in March.

Ben Hubbard reported from Istanbul, and Lara Jakes and Steven Erlanger from Vilnius, Lithuania. Gulsin Harman contributed reporting form Istanbul, and Christopher F. Schuetze from Berlin.

— and Reporting from Istanbul and Vilnius, Lithuania

Yevgeny Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, as the Wagner forces began to end the rebellion last month.Credit...Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

7. Tuberville holds on military nominations hurting readiness against China, says Deputy Defense Sec

Tuberville holds on military nominations hurting readiness against China, says Deputy Defense Sec

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Kathleen Hicks takes a phone call from a senator shortly before her Senate confirmation hearing for Deputy Secretary of Defense in Washington, D.C. Feb. 2, 2021. DoD photo by EJ Hersom

From NDAA amendments and ‘poison pill’ spending bills to promotion holds, Republicans' efforts are frustrating Pentagon officials

July 10, 2023 10:23 AM ET

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

July 10, 2023 10:23 AM ET

FORT SHAFTER, Hawaii–Alabama Sen. Tommy Tuberville’s 9-month-long hold on more than 250 different Defense Department promotions is undermining the U.S. military in the Pacific, according to the Pentagon’s second-highest-ranking civilian official.

“One really good example of the challenge we're facing is…the third Marine Expeditionary Force. This is our primary force to do the naval expeditionary movements in any fight that could happen in the Western Pacific,” Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks told reporters at a recent roundtable in Hawaii with representatives from INDOPACOM, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, and base officials at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.

“What we're seeing there right now is we've had a delay in that transition of that commanding general from [III MEF.] Really disrupting to the Marine Corps’ largest expeditionary standing force. And it's here in INDOPACOM. And that's a real challenge. That's one specific example. But it layers on to this overall problem where we have maybe up to 89% of our general flag officer positions that could be vacant [in the coming year] So no matter what one thinks about the number of general officers in the military, which I've heard come up before, I don't think anyone would argue we [only] need 11 percent of them,” she said.

Over the course of her two-day trip, Hicks spoke with INDOPACOM officials about their most pressing technology needs and how the Defense Department is looking to help them build new networking environments to better train with allies and scale up technology more quickly, including artificial intelligence solutions to match high-tech Chinese capabilities. Military officials and other experts worry that China could make a military play for Taiwan in 2027, the date by which Chinese President Xi Jinping has told his military to be ready for such a move.

But much of the work the Defense Department is doing to meet what they define as the pacing challenge is being undermined by efforts from some Republican lawmakers, Hicks said. Tuberville’s holds are one dramatic example, but there are others.

For instance, the House version of the 2024 NDAA includes amendments to roll back DOD climate initiatives. On Friday, Hicks visited Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, where the Defense Department is undertaking a $2.8 billion improvement and construction effort. Many of those improvements are aimed at making sure the base is better prepared for sea-level rise and other effects of climate change. “Any time we see challenges to the military just trying to be as resilient as possible, as effective as possible in the range of futures that we face, I think that’s destructive to the military’s capability and its readiness…So, yes, it’s a challenge,” Hicks said.

But of greater concern for Hicks and the Pentagon is the looming possibility of a government shutdown. House Republicans are pushing spending bills that dramatically cut spending levels that both parties had previously agreed to, raising the prospect of a shutdown later this year.

“By far, our most important priority is to make sure that we have on-time appropriations, and I am very worried about enough poison pills to create a shutdown scenario,” said Hicks. “As bad as it would be to have a [continuing resolution], which we always want to avoid, it would be even worse for the defense of the nation to have a shutdown. So getting the bills through the system is very, very important to us.”

8. Iran, Russia, and the Challenges of “Inter-Pariah Solidarity”

Excerpts:

Unwilling to counter this partnership militarily, Western countries have implemented policies including sanctions, economic decoupling, and diplomacy to isolate these two countries. Commentators and officials characterize Iran and Russia as “pariah states” to the West. However, declaring Russia and Iran “pariahs” and isolating them economically will not necessarily make them so. Since the early 2000s, Iran and Russia have worked in tandem to build a global network of solidarity with countries similarly distanced from Western powers, such as Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea, which has contributed to their resilience. Despite “maximum pressure” exerted by the Donald Trump administration on Iran, for example, or European “sanctions packages” on Russia, Western powers have not managed to change the strategic path of these regimes, nor to fully deprive them of their domestic and international supports.

Iran, Russia, and the Challenges of “Inter-Pariah Solidarity” - War on the Rocks

MATHIEU DROIN AND NICOLE GRAJEWSKI

warontherocks.com · by Mathieu Droin · July 11, 2023

On March 31, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new Russian foreign policy concept that hailed the ongoing “formation of a more equitable multipolar world order.” The concept highlighted Moscow’s intent to strengthen its ties with the non-West, in particular “developing full-scale and trusting cooperation” with Iran and other states discontented with Western policies toward their countries. While the Russian-Iranian relationship has been strengthening for years, this showed that the alliance was deepening, especially as a result of the war in Ukraine.

This partnership is not merely a transactional alliance of convenience; it is a complex and multifaceted relationship with a long and fraught history. Over the course of the past 20 years, Russia and Iran have espoused shared perspectives on many global issues and affairs. The two countries are first tied by a shared animosity with the “collective West,” whose values and strategic objectives present, according to their perspective, a hostile ideological challenge that can endanger their social cohesion and political stability. Russia and Iran also share a common concern for regime survival. They both have faced internal upheaval and international sanctions that have led them to develop mirror narratives centered around resilience, self-sufficiency, and resistance. This has drawn the two states closer.

Unwilling to counter this partnership militarily, Western countries have implemented policies including sanctions, economic decoupling, and diplomacy to isolate these two countries. Commentators and officials characterize Iran and Russia as “pariah states” to the West. However, declaring Russia and Iran “pariahs” and isolating them economically will not necessarily make them so. Since the early 2000s, Iran and Russia have worked in tandem to build a global network of solidarity with countries similarly distanced from Western powers, such as Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea, which has contributed to their resilience. Despite “maximum pressure” exerted by the Donald Trump administration on Iran, for example, or European “sanctions packages” on Russia, Western powers have not managed to change the strategic path of these regimes, nor to fully deprive them of their domestic and international supports.

Western powers should, therefore, consider whether these policies of ostracism are effective. While Western states should certainly defend their interests and values, they should also accept that they may not be able to decouple Iran and Russia. Instead, Western powers should accept a form of “strategic patience”; it rarely proves productive to engage these states in dialogue, nor is it effective to respond to their provocations. These standoffs ultimately validate their narrative.

Western powers should instead adopt a three-pronged approach: First, they should hedge against the threats posed by these regimes through strengthened deterrence, resilience, and contingency; second, they should engage the diaspora and civil societies from these two countries to clarify that they are opposed not to their countries or population but to the regimes who oppress them; and third, they should engage further the club of countries or “middle powers” that provide vital support to these regimes, offering a listening ear to their concerns rather than summoning them to take sides.

From Foes to Partners

Russia and Iran are somewhat surprising political allies considering the salient tensions that have historically marred their relations. After the rise of Peter the Great and the fall of the Safavids in the 18th century, the successive dynasties of the Russian and Persian empires had mostly hostile relations, punctuated by five wars that ultimately resulted in Russian victory.

Throughout the 20th century, regime changes in Russia and Iran — the foundation of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty and, later, the Islamic Republic of Iran — led to hostility between the two states. Only during the Mikhail Gorbachev era, from 1985 to 1991, did Moscow and Tehran develop more diplomatic, military, and economic ties, which included arms sales and civilian nuclear cooperation.

The relationship during the 1990s fluctuated as post-Soviet Russia worked to build a more cooperative relationship with the United States. Between 1995 and 2000, Russia suspended its advanced weapons trade with Iran to relieve some pressure from Washington over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

When Putin took office in 2000, however, he realigned Russia toward Iran. He restarted Russia’s arms sales to Iran and hammered out a 20-year cooperation agreement with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2001. The exposure of Iran’s secret nuclear program in the early 2000s created renewed problems for Moscow with the United States, and Putin limited relations with the Islamic Republic. He and his government also supported several United Nations Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Moscow’s worries escalated in 2009 when the United States, the United Kingdom, and France revealed Tehran’s plans to build a second enrichment facility. Russia under President Dmitry Medvedev imposed further sanctions, including a prohibition on selling the S-300 system to Tehran.

However, the first decade of the 21st century made increasingly clear that Russia and Iran harbored similar discontent with the international system and had aims at reshaping regional orders. With the hardline conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as its president from 2005 until 2013, Iran adopted a confrontational stance toward the West and an opportunistic regional policy. The country took advantage of chaos in Iraq and in Lebanon to strengthen its influence through its proxies in these countries, including through Shia militias such as Hezbollah or Asa’ib Ahl al Haq. In Russia, Putin resented the wave of antiregime protests in Central Asia known as “color revolutions” and NATO’s expansion eastward in formerly Soviet countries, which he perceived as a U.S.-led enterprise to antagonize Russia. As he said in his annual news conference in December 2021: “You promised us in the 1990s that [NATO] would not move an inch to the East. You cheated us shamelessly.”

From Like-Minded to Brothers-in-Arms

The nature of Russian and Iranian cooperation changed during the Syrian civil war. In the context of the “Arab spring,” a wave of upheavals that deposed a series of autocrats in the Arab world in the early 2010s, Iran and Russia did not want Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, and his government to meet a similar end. Both regimes have had ties with the Assad regime since the 1970s, and the geographic location of Syria makes it essential for both regimes: for Russia, it provides the sole direct access to the Mediterranean through the naval base of Tartus, and for Iran, the country serves as a land link between Iraq and Lebanon, two countries under strong Iranian influence.

In 2013, Iran and Russia received confirmation that Western states would not militarily confront Assad’s regime after the Barack Obama administration backpedaled on its chemical weapons “red line.” The road to Damascus was wide open. The two countries decided in 2015 to coordinate their military operations in Syria — Russia entered the Syrian war with Iran as its ally in September 2015, tipping the balance of power.

Their strategic success on the battlefield, as they managed to stop a range of armed opposition groups and to reclaim large swathes of land, emboldened Russia and Iran in their beliefs of their own military prowess.

A “Strategic Pariah-nership”

The two regimes are now cooperating more than ever before as a result of the war in Ukraine. Although Russia has maintained an upper hand in the bilateral relationship as a superior military and economic player and a key oil and gas exporter, its struggle to secure victory in Ukraine has led to a rebalancing of the relationship. Moscow has now needed to ask for Tehran’s help.

In July 2022, Putin visited Iran, his first trip to a foreign country outside the former Soviet Union since the start of the war in Ukraine. There, he received vocal support for the war: Khamenei offered a strongly worded endorsement, saying that Russia was confronting NATO as a “defensive act.” Iran has provided Russia with hundreds of drones and sent trainers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to Crimea to aid Russian Armed Forces in drone warfare. The Islamic Republic likely receives, in return, sophisticated military platforms including satellite imagery, fourth-generation Su-35 fighter jets, and air defense systems.

Beyond the war, Moscow and Tehran are also working on a strengthened 20-year strategic partnership to update the one signed in 2001. The two countries also signed a key memorandum of understanding between Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled energy giant, and the National Iranian Oil Company to export liquefied natural gas, and they have established direct links between their banking systems

However, the deepening of the bilateral relationship is not enough for these countries to withstand the impact of Western sanctions and ostracization. The two countries have, therefore, turned to a largely similar playbook to evade sanctions and consolidate a multilateral order.

A Global Solidarity Network

To offset the effects of sanctions and policies of ostracization, the two countries have strived to build their own international networks of solidarity. They worked, either jointly or in parallel, on two axes: they shifted to the East and took advantage of other countries’ discontent with the current international order.

First, as Russia and Iran became pariahs to the West, they have sought to strengthen partnerships to their south and east. Iran’s Look to the East (Negah-e beh sharg) strategy was developed under the mandate of Ahmadinejad in 2005, and Russia’s Pivot to the East (Povorot na Vosotok) strategy was announced by Putin in 2012.

China is now the most powerful partner for both regimes. Beijing has left Russia and Iran to fight their own local wars, in Syria and in Ukraine, without being directly involved or intervening, but it is also not neutral. China has been the main beneficiary of discounted oil and gas that Iran and Russia cannot export elsewhere due to international sanctions. Recent Chinese sponsorship of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow are also clear signs of the rising profile of China as the “main Eurasian power.” The Iranian and Russian regimes, therefore, will be increasingly dependent on China for their survival.

Russia and Iran have also managed to maintain balanced relations with both Pakistan and India. Russia has become India’s top oil supplier in 2022, while remaining India’s major arms supplier, but also maintains a close relationship with Pakistan. Iran’s trade with India and Pakistan has been affected by U.S. sanctions, but it remains substantial and is set to grow. Tehran also has key shared interests with New Delhi, in Afghanistan, and on regional connectivity, including through the port of Chabahar strategically located on the Indian Ocean, where India has built two terminals.

Second, Russia and Iran are also trying to exploit grievances against the current international order across the low- or middle-income countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, known as the “global south.” Both countries have a long history of cooperating with countries like North Korea and Belarus, considered pariahs in the global diplomatic community. However, in the past decade, the two countries have dedicated special efforts to alliances in Latin America and Africa. In the former, they both have developed close ties with Venezuela. The three countries held joint drills in 2022, while Caracas and Tehran signed a 20-year cooperation plan. Moscow and Tehran’s chief allies in the region also include Nicaragua, where Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was in June, and Cuba.

Russia and Iran have also actively sought to develop their influence on the African continent. Both countries have three main targets. First, they want to maintain close relations, economically and politically, with regional powerhouses such as Nigeria, which has signed agreements for military cooperation with both Iran and Russia, Algeria, and South Africa. Second, resource-rich countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Equatorial Guinea, are former USSR partners who are still important clients for Russian arms. Finally, both countries target crumbling regimes where they can either present themselves as last-resort guarantors, as Russia did with Sudan in 2017, with the Central African Republic in 2020, and with Mali in 2021, with the Wagner group mercenaries. Iran also exploited weaknesses in Somalia and Eritrea, gaining footholds and economic concessions in return for security guarantees.

Can the West Shape the Limits of the “Pariah-nership”?

Efforts to drive wedges between Iran and Russia have not proven successful because shared interests between the two countries far outweigh their differences. The “pariah-nership” between Iran and Russia is therefore likely to endure as long as the current regimes are in place.

In the face of the resilience of these regimes, Western nations should not stand idle, but should instead adopt “strategic patience” and acknowledge that they have few levers to change the strategic path that Russia and Iran have chosen. They should instead redirect their energy toward the parties that might be able to actually affect these regimes: civil societies within Russia and Iran, and the global partners that support these two regimes.

Build Strategic Patience, Covered by Deterrence and Resilience

When dealing with regimes seeking international attention, Western countries should avoid engaging them in ways that allow them either to “save face” or to “lose face.” The first condones them, the second emboldens them. The 2015 Minsk agreement with Russia to halt the war in Ukraine or the talks with Iran over its nuclear program show that engagement can slow down, but not alter, these regimes’ plans. This is not because the initiatives were misconceived, but because these regimes are not programmed to concede or compromise. Rather than seeking changes of behavior, Western powers should therefore accept “strategic patience,” which means remaining in a position of strength while avoiding political moves that could fuel Moscow’s and Tehran’s narratives of Western hostility toward them.

To do so, Western powers should be perceived as the ones seeking solutions through public diplomacy. Cognizant that these regimes consider talks to be transactional standoffs, Western-led initiatives should not be too explicit on potential concessions and should, rather, be designed to assert interests while showing openness to dialogue, as was with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan for Ukraine.

When the two regimes resort to provocation, notably through “nuclear blackmail,” as has been the case with Iran’s uranium enrichment and Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling in Ukraine, cool-headed reactions based on international law and obligations, rather than rhetorical escalation or additional sanctions, will be the best way to deescalate.

Concurrently, Western countries should hedge against the most acute threats posed by Iran and Russia to their security. This would involve a wide spectrum of efforts, starting with robust nuclear deterrence, including continued aircraft carrier deployment and the deployment of dual-capable aircraft to the region, despite the priority given by the United States to the Indo-Pacific. This would also require addressing the technological challenges posed by these two countries through the development of new, highly lethal capabilities, such as hypersonic and directed energy weapons, or unmanned vehicles. Finally, it would entail building resilience against cyber and hybrid threats and fighting against disinformation or destabilization campaigns.

Redirect the Energy to Civil Societies and “Swing States”

As argued by Agathe Demarais in her book, Backfire, efforts to decouple people from their regimes through sanctions that affect their daily lives generally end up turning the people against the state issuing the sanctions. Western states should recalibrate their approach and support civil society in Iran and Russia, which will be key to potential change in the event of a weakening or a collapse of these regimes. This strengthening of civil society could be achieved through better calibrated public communication that clearly makes the distinction between the population and the regimes, or through increased engagement with the diasporas of both countries.

Finally, should Western states really want Russia’s and Iran’s regimes to become pariahs, they should engage primarily with those countries that keep them as key allies. The United States and its closest partners should focus on the big “swing states”: countries that value liberal-democratic standards while also sympathizing with the discontent of countries like Russia or Iran with the current international order. This club includes eight of the G20 countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. These are major economies and rising powers that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran to varying extents are actively trying to influence.

As suggested by Tim Sweijs and Michael J. Mazarr in their article for War on the Rocks, “Mind the Middle Powers,” Western powers need to recalibrate the way they engage with these countries, “toward a more inclusive and less coercive approach,” treating them as peers rather than as variables in systemic competition. Western reengagement should not resemble a “neo–Cold War” approach, forcing countries to take sides through “carrots and sticks.” Instead, it should be a strategic dialogue aimed at better understanding main drivers of the key swing states to maintain ties with Russia and Iran, to assess if the West can offer something more attractive.

These efforts combined might have little to no impact in the short run, but in the long game that Russia and Iran are playing, they can help to thwart the consolidation of a “multi-pariah order” that the two regimes are building.

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Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Mr. Droin served as deputy head of the strategic affairs unit at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MFA). He previously served in the French embassies in Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates.

Dr. Nicole Grajewski is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affair’s Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Kennedy School. She received a PhD in International Relations and MPhil in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford.

Image: Mehr News Agency

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Mathieu Droin · July 11, 2023

9. Charting the Military’s Path Across the Technology Valley of Death Using Bar Napkin Math

Graphics (charts and bar napkins) are at the link: https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/charting-the-militarys-path-across-the-technology-valley-of-death-using-bar-napkin-math/

Excerpts:

This article might be sobering for a business trying to break into working with the Defense Department. Only a minimal number of new technologies will attain successfully fielded status along with the ultimate reward of a long-term procurement and sustainment contract. If successful fielding is not attainable with the Department of Defense, then businesses should focus their efforts on the private-sector application of the technology. Many technologies that did not initially transition into the military were still extremely successful in the commercial market and some did eventually transition to the Defense Department after achieving commercial success. Both technology push and technology pull have produced amazing outcomes for the military and the private sector. The military funded the development of the internet, Global Positioning System, self-driving cars, advanced drone technology, robotics, lasers, satellite technology, artificial intelligence, etc., and private businesses have profited from these technologies in immeasurable ways.

Fortuitously, the award of a Department of Defense research development contract directly offsets a company’s development costs, saving them from selling out to venture capitalists.

I believe the Department of Defense cannot hamstring its technologists and needs to continue to fund as many research and development projects as possible, even if most of the technologies will not transition. During the early stages of a technology development project, the Department of Defense will likely not be able to accurately and/or methodically figure out a project’s value (bang for the buck). More importantly, the military needs to let its technologists mature the projects for two to five years with a “fail fast” mindset, while “desired” technology projects may be allowed a longer maturation schedule. Once technology development projects start to prove their legitimacy, the Defense Department needs its innovators to start doing the hard work of research and analysis to assess the projects implementability and sustainability. This assessment will determine a project’s value (bang for the buck) and allow for the worthiest projects to move forward towards successful fielding.

Charting the Military’s Path Across the Technology Valley of Death Using Bar Napkin Math - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Ray Khan · July 11, 2023

Department of Defense leaders, technology developers, self-proclaimed innovators, and many others are obsessed with the apparent lack of adoption and slow speed of integrating new technology into the military. There are many reasons that Defense Department “innovators” can point to for this apparent lack of adoption, ranging from the budget process to how the military sets requirements for new weapons developments to a whole host of bureaucratic and cultural challenges embedded in the acquisition process.

Many Department of Defense leaders and innovators incorrectly focus on increasing the transition rate of new technology into military operations. I will show, with simple bar napkin math, that increasing the technology transition rate is not fiscally feasible. The best path for the military is to continue to fund as much technology development as the budget allows and then conduct internal research and analysis to transition the technologies that will have the greatest “implementability” and “bang for the buck.” Based on my math, I believe that a sustainable technology transition rate for the military is between 1 and 10 percent. Also, the percentage of projects successfully fielding is even smaller depending on Department of Defense plans and resources, and advancements by America’s adversaries.

To fiscally optimize the integration of new technology, the Defense Department needs to prioritize the efforts of some of its scientists, engineers, and innovative thinkers to focus on figuring out which new technology is going to deliver the best bang for the buck. This determination will take a lot of research and analysis and will not feel as awesome as delivering a perfect one-minute elevator pitch to a budget owner.

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The challenges that new technologies face with integration into the Department of Defense is often blamed on the “technology valley of death,” a notional chasm where taxpayer-funded projects that did not transition into operational defense capabilities languish without going into production. Getting into the valley is easy. Businesses and their advocates in the government only need to stumble on the path that circumnavigates the labyrinth of bureaucracy to get projects funded. Interestingly, there is little talk about how expensive it is to integrate new technology into the Department of Defense.

In fact, the low number of technology adoption transitions is not the fault of the technologists or their government sponsors stumbling through the bureaucracy. In reality, the Defense Department budget guarantees that most technology development projects not tied to an existing program of record are destined for purgatory in the valley of death. Luckily, department administrators have charted a narrow path to cross the valley. I believe that up to 10 percent of technology development projects (in a single budget cycle) can transition into a deployed and sustained military capability. The reality is that the defense budget cannot absorb the lifecycle costs incurred from a higher technology transition rate without degrading currently funded programs.

The defense acquisition system does not need a major overhaul to increase technology transfers. The military does not need disrupters to buy weapons faster or to break the acquisitions system used by the Department of Defense. The department needs its scientists, engineers, and innovative thinkers to assess the implementability and sustainability of a technology project. This assessment will determine a project’s value and allow for the worthiest projects to be transitioned and/or successfully fielded within the government’s allocated budget.

Truth Data, Definitions, and Assumptions

I believe that it is possible to support strategic planning with simple “bar napkin math” using publicly available information. I, of course, realize that Department of Defense acquisition budgets and technology transition are very complex topics, but if one were to make some reasonable assumptions, and use simple math, an overall strategy for integrating new technology can be clearly developed.

First, the numbers for my calculations will not be adjusted for inflation, except for the adjustments already included in the publicly available budget numbers. Second, in this discussion, technology transition will be defined as the moment that a developing technology receives a positive decision to become part of and/or its own program of record. Third, a program of record is defined as the moment a program receives procurement and/or operations and maintenance funding in the Fiscal Year Defense Plan and is particularly added as a line item in the Department of Defense budget. Fourth, the cost for a fully funded program of record, in this discussion, will be based on the project’s lifecycle costs, but this article will not address the lifecycle costs for disposal due to a lack of publicly available data.

Table 1 amalgamates publicly reported Department of Defense budget numbers found in the: FY20XX Department of Defense Agency Financial Report/Performance and Accountability Report. Numbers are in billions of dollars.

I recognize that other military budget lines (military personnel and military construction) do contribute resources towards technology transition. Realistically, the majority of the personnel and construction budgets are expended on efforts that are not directly related to technology transition. For simplicity, I have omitted the military personnel and construction budget lines for assessing the percentage of new technologies that can transition within the department.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation publishes an Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide. The table below amalgamates lifecycle cost estimates by percentage for select military systems.

Note3: The median values are: 7 percent for research & development; 30 percent for procurement; 61 percent for operations & sustainment; and add up to 98 percent (7+30+61 = 98). The missing 2 percent could be added proportionally or evenly spread into the costs, either way the outcome of the bar napkin math would not significantly change. The article will not account for the missing 2 percent of lifecycle costs.

To further simplify the bar napkin math, I assumed a project will need five years of technology maturation before its ready to become a program of record. I also assumed that the development costs of a project will be a constant percentage of the Department of Defense’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation budget for the year it was initially funded and the following four consecutive years (five years total for technology maturation). The cost percentage will not change with budget increases or decreases.

The technology transition rate and the development costs for the transitioned projects are linearly related. Consequently, transitioning 5 percent of the projects that started in FY2018 (can represent 10, 100, or any number of technology projects) will cost 1 percent of the total Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation budget over five years (FY2018 to FY2022). Looking at it another way, the technology maturation costs are determined by dividing the transition rate (5 percent) by the technology maturation period (five years). This results in a cost of 1 percent per year of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation budget. The total cost to fully develop the technologies equals 1 percent of the budget per year over the five-year maturation period added together. This linear relationship keeps the math simple and relevant.

The second to last assumption is to equally weight the military systems and use the median lifecycle cost numbers from Table 2. I used the median values in the table because the lifecycle cost data is skewed (the median and average values are not symmetric) and the median values are often the best measure of central tendency in skewed cases.

The final assumption is that the eight military system types in Table 2 will account for 100 percent of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation budget expenditure. It is true that many technology development projects are not related to one of the eight military system types. However, for strategic planning purposes using 100 percent of the budget will indirectly account for all technology transitions and will not make a significant impact on the conclusions. A well-funded government report will significantly increase the accuracy of the data but likely have similar results.

The Bar Napkin Math for One Year of Technology Transitions

A technology transition rate of 30 percent or higher, in one year, is likely unsustainable as the procurement and operations and maintenance costs, according to my math, are approximately equal to an entire year of those budgets. The procurement costs could be executable by cutting some congressionally approved systems like aircraft. The bigger challenge is reprogramming $270.3 billion of the operations and maintenance budget over the next few years, without the current programs of record accepting painful resource cuts.

Compounding Technology Transition Costs Over Five Years

I also calculated the compounded costs of an annual technology transition rate of 5 percent and 10 percent starting with the FY2014 budget using the same bar napkin math. Projects starting in FY2014 will transition in FY2018, or every five years to allow for technology maturation.

Table 3: Top-Level Research & Development Budget Numbers FY2014 to FY2018

From Table 4, a 5 percent technology transition rate each year for five years will cost $93.2 billion in procurement dollars and $189.6 billion in operations and maintenance dollars. These costs come out to approximately 13 percent of the total procurement and operations and maintenance budget over those same five years (FY2018 to FY2022). Extrapolating this out, the Department of Defense would turn over nearly 100 percent of its systems every 38.5 years. This appears to be a very sustainable technology transition rate based on current service life estimates of military systems.

A 10 percent technology transition rate each year for five years will cost $186.4 billion in procurement dollars and $379.1 billion in operations and maintenance dollars (Table 5). These costs are approximately 26 percent (using the same math) of the total procurement and operations and maintenance budget over those same five years. Extrapolating this out, the Department of Defense would turn over nearly 100 percent of its systems every 19.2 years. A complete turnover of systems in the Defense Department every 19.2 years would be welcomed by many and is likely too slow for some innovators. In reality, this pace of turnover is unsustainable for many reasons, mainly that the current service life for most military systems is 20 to 40 years.

Not all research, development, test and evaluation activity is unplanned, as Department of Defense budget lines do account for some technology transition. This is typically research and development money spent by system program offices on fielded systems for things like upgrades that are “too desired to fail.” Procurement and sustainment dollars for these “desired” technology projects are also likely baked into the budget. Unfortunately, system program offices will also need to spend research and development dollars on unplanned upgrades or “fixes” that cause budget revamps or “unfunded requests” to happen. Finally, there are system program offices for development programs that are in the early stages of procurement and/or have not started procurement. These programs will also have planned and unplanned technology development projects but many of the procurement and sustainment dollars for these projects are usually minimally budgeted for, if at all, and are often estimates that may not be truly accurate.

Because “desired” technology development programs are already funded for transition, the remaining resources available for unplanned or innovative technology transitions are likely the “most valuable dollars” in the military’s acquisition budget. These “most valuable dollars” need to include a mix of the budget’s research, development, test, and evaluation, procurement, and operations and maintenance dollars. Additionally, recall that disposal costs were not considered in the math and I used a five-year technology maturation cycle. If disposal costs are added (likely exponentially higher due to recent environmental policies) and a shorter technology maturation timeframe is desired (one to three years versus five years), then a lower technology transition percentage rate will be realized by the military.

Innovators Need to Focus Beyond the Technology Valley of Death

This article might be sobering for a business trying to break into working with the Defense Department. Only a minimal number of new technologies will attain successfully fielded status along with the ultimate reward of a long-term procurement and sustainment contract. If successful fielding is not attainable with the Department of Defense, then businesses should focus their efforts on the private-sector application of the technology. Many technologies that did not initially transition into the military were still extremely successful in the commercial market and some did eventually transition to the Defense Department after achieving commercial success. Both technology push and technology pull have produced amazing outcomes for the military and the private sector. The military funded the development of the internet, Global Positioning System, self-driving cars, advanced drone technology, robotics, lasers, satellite technology, artificial intelligence, etc., and private businesses have profited from these technologies in immeasurable ways.

Fortuitously, the award of a Department of Defense research development contract directly offsets a company’s development costs, saving them from selling out to venture capitalists.

I believe the Department of Defense cannot hamstring its technologists and needs to continue to fund as many research and development projects as possible, even if most of the technologies will not transition. During the early stages of a technology development project, the Department of Defense will likely not be able to accurately and/or methodically figure out a project’s value (bang for the buck). More importantly, the military needs to let its technologists mature the projects for two to five years with a “fail fast” mindset, while “desired” technology projects may be allowed a longer maturation schedule. Once technology development projects start to prove their legitimacy, the Defense Department needs its innovators to start doing the hard work of research and analysis to assess the projects implementability and sustainability. This assessment will determine a project’s value (bang for the buck) and allow for the worthiest projects to move forward towards successful fielding.

Become a Member

Ray Khan is a 28-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force. Duties performed include: engineer, program manager, tester, technologist, intelligence, information operations, search and rescue controller, electronic warfare operator, military diplomat, acquisitions professor, and innovator. Experience includes: two joint tours (Joint Warfare Analysis Center and Air Attaché to Oman); Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency intern; Director of Airborne Laser Program Engineering Division; Deputy department chair and senior military advisor at Defense Acquisition University, and Director of the AFWERX Las Vegas Hub and AFWERX Open Topic Phase II Lead.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Ray Khan · July 11, 2023

10. Chinese Women Economists Who Met Yellen Called Traitors Online

Are women in leadrehip roles a threat to the Chinese Communist Party? Are diversity considerations a threat to the CCP?

Chinese Women Economists Who Met Yellen Called Traitors Online

Nationalists accuse woman of being a spy for meeting Americans
Treasury chief shares experience of being only woman in room

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-10/chinese-women-economists-who-met-yellen-called-traitors-online?utm_source=pocket_saves&sref=hhjZtX76

Janet Yellen attends a meeting in Beijing on July 8.Photographer: Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images

ByBloomberg News

July 10, 2023 at 1:51 AM EDT

A group of Chinese female economists and entrepreneurs who dined with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen have been blasted by online nationalists for betraying their country by interacting with the US official.

While the Treasury department skipped identifying attendees from the meeting on Saturday, a group photograph of the gathering posted to China’s Twitter-like Weibo was used to identify some participants. It was not clear who first shared the image online.

“There’s no such thing as a free meal,” wrote Shen Yi, a professor in international politics at Fudan University, who has over two million followers on the platform. “They’ll need deliver KPIs in exchange,” he added, using the acronym for key performance indicators, implying the women would have to give something to the US government.

The criticism mostly targeted two women who posted about their experience on social media: Liu Qian, the Economist Group’s managing director for Greater China, and author Hao Jingfang, who previously worked for the China Development Research Foundation, which is managed by a branch of the State Council.

In a now-deleted exchange, one Weibo user asked Hao, whose award-winning novel Folding Beijing is widely considered to be about income inequality in the capital, why she attended the dinner. Hao replied: “Because Yellen is the friendliest American official, she’s always dedicated to developing friendly China-US relations.”

Several users accused Hao of being an “American spy,” while a post that garnered some 600 comments criticized the elite status of the women selected, saying “they have not worked in factories.”

Hao JingfangPhotographer: Visual China Group/Getty Images

Yellen’s exchange with women economists and entrepreneurs telegraphed the importance she places on female representation in elite decision-making. During her four-day trip to Beijing to stabilize ties with America’s biggest rival, the Chinese government exclusively put forward male officials to meet the first woman to run the US Treasury, according to publicly available information.

“I see it all the time when I’m almost the only woman in the room,” Yellen told the women. “I’m sure many of you have that same experience at decision-making tables.”

President Xi Jinping excluded women from China’s top leadership at last year’s congress for the first time in 25 years. Furthermore, as China struggles with a record low birth rate, women are being encouraged to take on more traditional care-giving roles.

READ MORE ON GENDER EQUALITY IN CHINA:China Politburo Excludes Women for First Time in 25 Years
China Tells Women to ‘Respect Family Values’ in Revised Law
Chinese Women Found Their Voice in 2022. Is Anyone Listening?
Ex-China Official in Tennis #MeToo Scandal Appears at Xi Speech

The backlash against the women echoes attacks waged by online nationalists against foreign female journalists of ethnic Chinese origin working for Western news organizations.

“Attackers routinely disparage their coverage of China and make crude sexual innuendos, including alarming threats of physical violence,” the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China wrote in a report last year on the issue.

“Women’s participation in the workforce is one of the major drivers of creating inclusive growth,” the Treasury said in a statement after Yellen’s meeting. “Women’s contributions to economics, in particular, are important to help ensure that economic research and policymaking appropriately reflect society’s priorities.”

— With assistance by Colum Murphy, Jing Li and Yihui Xie

11. Opinion With the counteroffensive underway, 12 charts show the latest from Ukraine

Please go to the link to view the charts. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/interactive/2023/ukraine-war-analysis-stalemate-economy-aid/

Opinion With the counteroffensive underway, 12 charts show the latest from Ukraine

By Michael O’Hanlon,

Constanze Stelzenmüller and

David Wessel

July 10 at 2:00 p.m.

186

Michael O’Hanlon is the Philip H. Knight chair in defense and strategy and director of the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Brookings Institution. Constanze Stelzenmüller is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. David Wessel is the director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings. The authors comment individually on the data that they and their Brookings Institution colleagues have gathered below.

Ukraine has begun its long-awaited counteroffensive after withstanding a months-long and ongoing battering from Russian missiles and drones. Nine new Ukrainian brigades, totaling perhaps 30,000 troops, with modern armored vehicles and well-trained soldiers (though little air power) are moving into action. But because Russia has prepared for them, they face uncertain prospects. Even the recent Putin-Prigozhin melodrama might not change the standoff substantially — though it is too soon to be sure how Wagner mercenaries will perform with their former leader on the ropes.

Russia’s economy has limped along better than expected, even as price caps on its oil and gas exports have limited the country’s revenue. Ukraine continues to have strong backing from most NATO countries and other like-minded states, including a steady supply of weaponry and financial and humanitarian aid. Russia has so far received military aid only from the likes of Iran and North Korea.

As NATO prepares for its July 11-12 summit in Lithuania, member states are divided over Ukraine’s plea to join the alliance, and over what security guarantees to offer should there be no consensus on membership. Much hinges on how the war proceeds over the next few weeks.

Stalemate continued

O’Hanlon: Ukraine’s territorial division by share of land mass remains only slightly changed since last fall. Sustained Russian attacks through the winter and spring around Bakhmut, in Ukraine’s east, yielded only modest gains for President Vladimir Putin; Ukraine’s counteroffensive to date has also had only modest effects. Russia still holds just over 17 percent of Ukraine, including the 7 percent (Crimea and eastern Donbas) that it stole from Kyiv’s control before its full-scale invasion began on Feb. 24 last year.

Alas, that just over 17 percent includes a similar proportion of Ukrainian citizens, who now live under Moscow’s diktats. Russian authorities have forcibly deported to Russia more than 19,500 Ukrainian children from these occupied regions; for this, the International Criminal Court has charged Putin personally with war crimes. Casualties to date include perhaps 200,000 Russian soldiers and Wagner group mercenaries (up to one-quarter of them killed, the rest wounded), more than 100,000 Ukrainian fighters killed and wounded, and at least 40,000 Ukrainian civilians killed (and doubtless tens of thousands more wounded), according to estimates from the U.S. and European governments. After 16 months of war, the grand total from all sides is about 400,000 casualties — including about 100,000 dead.

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Ukraine defenses stand firm

O’Hanlon: In the past 16 months of war, Russia has subjected Ukraine to various forms of bombardment. Beginning early last fall, Putin sought to bring fear and privation to Ukrainian cities — even those far removed from the front lines — by sending thousands of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. In recent months, Ukraine has claimed to shoot down 80 or 90 percent of incoming cruise missiles on any given day — after intercepting only about 10 percent in the war’s early months, and closer to 50 percent last summer. What’s now worrying is that Kyiv’s supply of air defense missiles might have fallen uncomfortably low. Yet, the Ukrainian people continue to show remarkable resolve. After months of attacks, only a small percentage say they favor negotiations to end the war before the rest of their country is liberated.

[Opinion from April: What 6 data points tell us about the status of the war in Ukraine]

Economic silver linings emerged for Ukraine

Wessel: The price cap on Russian crude oil, an idea hatched in the U.S. Treasury Department in 2022 amid derision from industry experts, is achieving its twin goals: to maintain the flow of Russian oil to sustain the global economy and yet reduce the oil revenue that helps Russia finance its war. Embraced by the Group of Seven leading economies and Australia, all of which have stopped importing Russian oil, the cap permits tankers carrying Russian oil to other countries to tap essential British and European insurance and other maritime services only if the oil was purchased for no more than $60 a barrel. This cap has driven a wedge between the world oil price (Brent basket on the chart) and the price Russia receives (Urals).

Although China and India have not adopted the price cap, it enhances their bargaining power with the Russians — and has helped smaller oil-importing countries buy Russian oil cheaply. According to the International Energy Agency, Russian oil revenue in May was 7.8 million barrels a day, about the same as a year ago, but revenue was down 36 percent year over year.

To be sure, the decline in the global price of oil (Brent) since the beginning of the year — caused in part by slowing economic growth — has helped keep Russian revenue down. In any case, Russia’s diminishing revenue has yet to restrain Putin’s war machine. And there are increasing signs that Russia is finding ways to evade the cap by operating a “dark fleet” of tankers, some uninsured and some covered by Russian or Chinese insurers and using technological tricks to obscure their location.

Wessel: Ukraine’s public spending, around 60 percent of it going to the military, continues to far outstrip its revenue, but the central bank says it hasn’t printed money to finance the government for six months, and this has helped restrain inflation. Instead, grants and loans from the United States, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions have filled the hole. Foreign support and an increase in Ukraine’s foreign-currency reserves have also helped the government sell more bonds to domestic investors. And Kyiv is planning to roll back some of the costly emergency measures it put in place when Russia invaded. At the IMF’s urging, the government also plans to raise prices for heating and electricity before next winter. Nevertheless, Ukraine will remain heavily dependent on its allies’ financial support.

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U.S. and Europe aid remained high

O’Hanlon: In assessing the support that outside countries have provided to Ukraine, two realities stand out. First, despite sometimes acrimonious debates over whether to supply Kyiv with tanks, fighter aircraft and longer-range missiles, the level of aid has remained high and steady by historical standards, with total assistance approaching $250 billion USD. Second, Europe has been even more generous than the United States, when all types of assistance are aggregated (even acknowledging that much of Europe’s financial aid is in the form of loans, not grants). Japan and several other non-Western countries have also contributed significantly.

One-quarter of Ukrainians remain displaced

Stelzenmüller: The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) records more than 5 million refugees from Ukraine globally, excluding Russia. More than 90 percent of them are in Europe. More than 5 million people remain internally displaced in Ukraine. The sharp increase in Russian missile and drone attacks since early May is forcing citizens into bomb shelters night after night, challenging their resilience. And the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in southern Ukraine has created a humanitarian and ecological disaster of staggering scale that will hurt the country and the region for years to come.

President Volodymyr Zelensky is keeping the world focused on Ukraine

Zelensky’s speeches that targeted foreign audiences

Count of speeches:■1■2■3

Data as of June 22

Source: Official website of President of Ukraine, compiled by Brookings Institution

Stelzenmüller: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues his intense campaign of global outreach, making speeches online and, increasingly, in person. His visits to foreign capitals are often preceded or followed by major new aid packages. During Zelensky’s first wartime trip to Washington in December 2022, the United States committed an additional $1.85 billion of military aid, including one Patriot air defense battery and munitions. He took further trips in February and April. In May, Zelensky visited nine countries — in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia — meeting with leaders who have supported Ukraine’s defense and some who have not. Through this engagement, Zelensky aims to keep attention focused on the conflict and maintain international support.

The war has revitalized the role of international institutions

Stelzenmüller: The U.N. General Assembly has passed six emergency resolutions in support of Ukraine, with overwhelming majorities condemning the Russian aggression, expressing concern over the humanitarian consequences, defending the principle of territorial integrity, and urging a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.

The question remains, however, how best to stop Russian aggression and ensure Ukrainian security and stability in the future. As NATO members prepare for their summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, many Central and Eastern European states, now with support from France, are pushing for concrete steps toward Ukraine’s admission into the alliance. Others — most notably the United States and Germany — remain hesitant about extending an Article 5 guarantee to a country actively defending itself against a nuclear power, and are instead discussing a package of bilateral security guarantees.

Press Enter to skip to end of carouselOpinions on the war in Ukraine

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Ukraine in NATO? My heart says yes. But my head says no.

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I’m a Ukrainian soldier. The reality of war is strangely normal.

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Ukraine will get meaningful security guarantees at the NATO summit

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Hold Russia accountable for its war crimes

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Ukraine is developing remarkably innovative ways to reach people in need

June 30, 2023

A slow Ukrainian counteroffensive can’t prompt a Western retreat

June 30, 2023

5 questions about Ukraine’s counteroffensive, answered

June 10, 2023

Ukraine must keep pressing on its counteroffensive

June 29, 2023

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Ukraine should use seized Russian assets for rebuilding

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Don’t second-guess the Ukrainian counteroffensive. It’s just starting.

June 29, 2023

Kyiv must seize this moment. Otherwise, stalemate might be inevitable.

June 26, 2023

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About this project

The data is collected and tracked by the Brookings Institution. Special thanks to Natalie Britton, Ted Reinert, Alejandra Rocha, Sophie Roehse and Mallika Yadwad.

12. Opinion | Ukraine in NATO? My heart says yes. But my head says no.

Excerpts:

These are the models that the United States should follow with Ukraine. The Biden administration should pledge that the United States will provide sufficient weapons, training and intelligence support to allow Ukraine to maintain its sovereignty (preferably within the 1991 international borders), and Congress should write that pledge into law. If a Republican-controlled House agrees, that would provide a powerful signal of bipartisan support for Ukraine. Other NATO members should make similar pledges.

It is also imperative for the West to provide a continuing stream of monetary aid to ensure Ukraine’s economic viability despite the war, which has devastated its industrial and agricultural base. The European Union should take the lead in offering Ukraine a road map to membership — which would force Ukraine to take tough action against corruption in return for eventual access to E.U. subsidies. Western countries should also pledge to turn over to Ukraine roughly $300 billion in Russian funds frozen in Europe and the United States to finance the reconstruction of war damage.

Even without offering the guarantees of Article 5, NATO states can greatly strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russian aggression over the long term and make clear to Putin that this is a war he cannot win.

Opinion | Ukraine in NATO? My heart says yes. But my head says no.

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · July 9, 2023

The NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12 will focus on the difficult question of whether Ukraine should be given an invitation to join the transatlantic alliance. My heart says yes, but my head says no.

There is undoubtedly a powerful case for admitting Ukraine capably laid out in a recent op-ed in the Hill by my friends Randy Scheunemann, who was John McCain’s chief foreign policy adviser, and Evelyn Farkas, who is executive director of the McCain Institute. There is little doubt that Ukraine has earned the moral right to be part of the Western alliance. Its heavy sacrifices, after all, are indirectly protecting NATO members from being menaced in the future by the Russian war machine. (The head of the British armed forces just said that Russia had lost half of its combat effectiveness in Ukraine, including as many as 2,500 tanks.)

There is also little doubt that NATO expansion has been a powerful force for peace and stability in Europe. The very reason Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is invading Ukraine — rather than Poland or the Baltic states, which were also once part of the Russian Empire — is that those other countries are in NATO and Ukraine is not. For all of Putin’s bravado, he does not want to risk a conflict that would trigger NATO’s Article 5 collective security guarantee, including the ultimate deterrent provided by the United States’ nuclear forces. It’s bunk to say, as Kremlin apologists do, that NATO expansion to Eastern Europe has caused Russian aggression. The illiberal nature of Putin’s regime accounts for its aggression — and the Kremlin would be a far greater threat if Putin knew he could attack more of Russia’s neighbors with impunity.

Yet there is deep and understandable reluctance among Western European states and the United States to admit Ukraine to NATO, because it is at war with Russia and will be for the foreseeable future. This isn’t a stable stalemate like the division of East and West Germany or North and South Korea. This is a dynamic, ongoing conflict that, if NATO were to take in Ukraine, could draw other members into a shooting war with a nuclear-armed Russia.

It’s true, as Scheunemann and Farkas argue, that Article 5 — which holds “that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies” — “does not mandate a specific response by member states.” NATO members could say they are complying with Article 5 by doing what they are already doing: supplying Ukraine with weapons, training and intelligence and imposing sanctions on Russia. But there has always been an implicit assumption that an armed attack on a NATO member would result in military action by other NATO members. If that’s not the case, it would risk watering down Article 5 and reducing the overall effectiveness of the NATO alliance. Do we really want to send a message to Putin that he could invade, say, Lithuania and the West won’t fight to defend that embattled democracy?

NATO could try to skirt that difficulty by announcing that Ukraine will not be admitted now but in the future, once its war with Russia is over. But that would create a perverse incentive for Russia to keep fighting so as to prevent Ukraine’s entry into the transatlantic alliance. NATO should not make the same mistake it made at its Bucharest summit in 2008 when it declared that it “welcomed” the “aspirations” of Ukraine and Georgia to “become members of NATO” but did not agree on a Membership Action Plan to turn aspirations into reality. That only increased Putin’s incentive to attack those countries before they were granted admission to NATO — as he did with Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.

The good news is that, even without admitting Ukraine, it is possible for NATO members to bolster long-term security ties with Kyiv and make clear to Russia that it will never be able to destroy Ukraine’s freedom. As Eric Ciaramella of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued in a recent policy paper, Washington’s relationships with Israel and Taiwan point the way. Neither is a treaty ally, but in both cases, the United States is bound by law and diplomatic agreements to arm them so that they can resist aggression.

Since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which Israel nearly lost, successive U.S. administrations have pledged to help the Jewish state maintain a “qualitative military edge” over its Arab neighbors. This concept was eventually codified by Congress into law. The United States and Israel have also negotiated a series of “memorandums of understanding” that commit Washington to provide fixed levels of aid. (The most recent memorandum, signed in 2016, pledges the United States to provide $38 billion in military aid between 2019 and 2028.) These U.S. commitments have allowed the Israel Defense Forces to remain the most powerful military force in the Middle East.

Opinion writers on the war in Ukraine

Post Opinions provides commentary on the war in Ukraine from columnists with expertise in foreign policy, voices on the ground in Ukraine and more.

Columnist David Ignatius covers foreign affairs. His columns have broken news on new developments around the war. He also answers questions from readers. Sign up to follow him.

Iuliia Mendel, a former press secretary for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, writes guest opinions from inside Ukraine. She has written about trauma, Ukraine’s “women warriors” and what it’s like for her fiance to go off to war.

Columnist Fareed Zakaria covers foreign affairs. His columns have reviewed the West’s strategy in Ukraine. Sign up to follow him.

Columnist Josh Rogin covers foreign policy and national security. His columns have explored the geopolitical ramifications of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. Sign up to follow him.

Columnist Max Boot covers national security. His columns have encouraged the West to continue its support for Ukraine’s resistance. Sign up to follow him.

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The United States ended its formal military alliance with Taiwan in 1979 when it established diplomatic relations with Beijing. But at the same time Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that Washington will sell weapons to Taiwan so that it can “maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and that the United States will “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security … of the people of Taiwan.” The United States has not provided Taiwan with nearly as much military aid as Israel, but U.S. support has allowed Taiwan to remain de facto independent of the Communist regime on the mainland.

These are the models that the United States should follow with Ukraine. The Biden administration should pledge that the United States will provide sufficient weapons, training and intelligence support to allow Ukraine to maintain its sovereignty (preferably within the 1991 international borders), and Congress should write that pledge into law. If a Republican-controlled House agrees, that would provide a powerful signal of bipartisan support for Ukraine. Other NATO members should make similar pledges.

It is also imperative for the West to provide a continuing stream of monetary aid to ensure Ukraine’s economic viability despite the war, which has devastated its industrial and agricultural base. The European Union should take the lead in offering Ukraine a road map to membership — which would force Ukraine to take tough action against corruption in return for eventual access to E.U. subsidies. Western countries should also pledge to turn over to Ukraine roughly $300 billion in Russian funds frozen in Europe and the United States to finance the reconstruction of war damage.

Even without offering the guarantees of Article 5, NATO states can greatly strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russian aggression over the long term and make clear to Putin that this is a war he cannot win.

The Washington Post · by Max Boot · July 9, 2023

13. Opinion How the Biden administration sealed the Sweden deal with Erdogan

Opinion How the Biden administration sealed the Sweden deal with Erdogan

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/10/biden-erdogan-turkey-sweden-nato/

By Asli Aydintasbas

Updated July 10, 2023 at 7:46 p.m. EDT|Published July 10, 2023 at 2:30 p.m. EDT

NATO summits usually start with drama and often end with a happy family photo. This time, the drama was over before the summit even started.

During the run-up to the summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, all eyes were on Ukraine’s prospects for membership. But Sweden’s membership bid was also up in the air, held up by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Erdogan knew that Vilnius was the moment he could extract maximal concessions from the West. However, the breakthrough on Swedish membership came earlier than everyone expected. Erdogan drove a hard bargain but, behind the scenes, President Biden and his team worked hard to get Erdogan to “yes” and are to be applauded for their efforts. The cutthroat geopolitical competition against China and Russia does not give Washington the luxury to maintain its policy of social distancing toward Erdogan, despite his awful record on democracy.

Over the past few days, Erdogan had pushed aside NATO’s boilerplate language on alliance solidarity and had forced the West to address his demands. He met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and declared that Ukraine was fit to be a member of NATO, only to also remark that Sweden was not yet ready to join the alliance — that it needed to do more on “terrorism” (a reference to Sweden allowing supporters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, to hold protests in Stockholm).

He then urged the alliance to send a “clear and strong message” about Turkey’s bid to join the European Union — even though membership for his country in the E.U. is likely a pipe dream.

Turkey drops opposition to Sweden’s NATO bid on eve of summit

Behind all the public bluster, Erdogan’s most important ask has long been clear: He needs the United States to sell him F-16s. Turkey made a strategic blunder in 2017 by purchasing S-400 missile systems from Russia only to be slapped with U.S. sanctions. Now that Ankara desperately needs to modernize its air force fleet, it has made a formal request to buy new F-16s and upgrade 80 planes in its existing inventory.

The Biden administration has long been in favor of the transaction, but Congress had been blocking it. For many lawmakers on Capitol Hill, Turkey has been an “unfaithful ally,” and congressional leaders have expressed reservations about Turkey’s democratic backsliding and its threatening tone toward its neighbors, including Greece. According to my sources, the White House made headway over the weekend in convincing congressional leaders — in particular, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) — that it is better to keep Turkey inside the NATO tent by going ahead with the sale.

On Sunday, Erdogan pointedly thanked Biden for his efforts in trying to secure the F-16s. On Monday afternoon, after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s announcement that Turkey would ratify Sweden’s entry into NATO, Biden’s official statement read “I stand ready to work with President Erdogan and [Turkey] on enhancing defense and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic area.” The F-16s might not come immediately, but it’s likely that strong assurances were given that they would eventually be delivered.

Erdogan also might have gotten some concessions from Europe. As part of the announcement, Sweden agreed to support expanding the E.U.’s free-trade arrangement with Turkey. With Washington lobbying behind the scenes, I understand that other E.U. members are open to negotiations.

14. Winning friends by training workers is China’s new gambit

Soft Power.

Good training with a dose of subtle indoctrination/propaganda?

Winning friends by training workers is China’s new gambit

The Washington Post · by Shibani Mahtani · July 10, 2023

PONOROGO, Indonesia — The rice fields in this part of East Java are still plowed by buffalo. There is little in the way of manufacturing or tourism. Every year thousands of residents follow a well-worn path to jobs as domestic helpers in Hong Kong or construction workers in Saudi Arabia.

Ziofani Alfirdaus, however, believes he will have a career and a future here. The 16-year-old is clear on the source of his optimism — China.

China’s global leap

At every point of the compass, China is quietly laying the foundations of its new international order.

End of carousel

His local school hosts a Luban Workshop, a Chinese-funded and -directed vocational training program that teaches students how to service Chinese electric-vehicle engines, operate Chinese commercial drones and assemble Chinese robots. The educational assistance, all provided at no cost, has revolutionized the provincial school here with new technology and machinery to train students, as well as trips to vocational schools in China to build the skills of Indonesian educators.

Students who have gone through the workshops emerge sold on the merits of Chinese technology and, by extension, China itself, teachers and alumni say. Alfirdaus said he didn’t know what drones were until he started studying how to operate them, and now hopes to make a career using drones to make video and other visual content. China’s technology, he said, “will be helpful to all of mankind.”

Ziofani Alfirdaus's school in Ponorogo hosts a Luban Workshop, where the 16-year-old learned about drones. China’s technology, he said, “will be helpful to all of mankind.”

There are more than 30 Luban Workshops in 25 countries around the world, largely in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, offering a host of skills training programs, from manufacturing systems using artificial intelligence to traditional Chinese medicine. Tens of thousands of young people have graduated from them. And in April, Beijing formed a special committee to help plan and construct new workshops, which are increasingly being trumpeted by China as an example of its generosity and a rebuttal of criticism that large infrastructure projects paid for with Chinese loans and constructed with Chinese labor were doing little for the development of other economies.

When they were first introduced in 2016, the workshops were a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global network of infrastructure projects to cement China’s industrial power and economic influence. They have expanded in reach and sophistication, emblematic of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s efforts to extend his country’s soft power alongside its economic might, especially in the Global South. They showcase an accelerating effort by Beijing to wield its companies and educational institutes as an arm of diplomacy, positioning China as an alternative power and model to the United States by harnessing China’s technological prowess.

Students who have gone through the workshops emerge sold on the merits of Chinese technology and, by extension, China itself, teachers and alumni say.

There are more than 30 Luban Workshops in 25 countries around the world, largely in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, offering a host of skills training programs.

A 16-year-old workshop student sits for a haircut, which all male students must get each month. The haircuts are meant to maintain a semi-military atmosphere at the school.

They are also part of a wider shift to modulate the coercive foreign policy that emerged in Xi’s first years by striking a variety of tones in Beijing’s approach to the world and forging unexpected forms of engagement. China in many ways has begun to emulate the American approach of developing a menu of hard- and soft-power options to advance its national interests

“China’s overseas economic aim is to tie the emerging economies of the world more closely to China’s industrial system,” said Dirk van der Kley, a research fellow at the Australian National University and author of an upcoming report on the workshops. “Xi Jinping is trying to create a new world order in which the U.S. role is reduced. … In the case of Luban, which can provide genuine benefits for recipient states, the underlying goal of reshaping the world order does not go away.”

Indonesia’s working culture, said Syamhudi Arifin, the school principal in Ponorogo, tended to “lean more toward America, Japan and Europe,” especially when it came to training and operational standards. But it was China that was willing to donate its technology and underwrite instruction.

“We wanted to enhance our students’ competence,” Arifin said.

Syamhudi Arifin, the school principal in Ponorogo.

The workshops have echoes of and sometimes operate in tandem with Confucius Institute learning centers. Confucius Institutes on American and other Western campuses have closed in recent years over concerns that they were propaganda arms of the Chinese government and limited discussion on issues that Beijing considers politically sensitive, such as Tibet or Xinjiang. At their height in 2018, there were 530 Confucius Institutes in 149 countries.

With their emphasis on practical training, the workshops and other forms of vocational education sponsored by China or Chinese companies have drawn much less scrutiny than the institutes — and, ultimately, may serve China’s ideological goals more effectively through the accretion of goodwill.

Hosting leaders from Central Asian countries in May, Xi singled out for mention the recently opened Luban Worshop in Tajikistan, the first in the region, with more under construction as part of a billion-dollar Chinese assistance package. Addressing Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, Xi urged him to “run the Luban Workshop well” as part of broader efforts to deepen economic cooperation and tell “China-Tajikistan friendship stories.”

The first Luban Workshops were led by the local government in Tianjin, a coastal area just south of Beijing dominated by industries like petrochemicals, car manufacturing and metalworking and with a large network of vocational schools. A chemical supply company based in Tianjin and a vocational school in the same city sponsored the first workshop in 2016, in Ayutthaya, Thailand. Students learned to operate hydraulic systems and digital circuits used in high-skill manufacturing, using equipment that was donated by the company.

Analysts said the involvement of Tianjin authorities and regional companies was a way for local officials and businesspeople to endear themselves to the central government by showing they were committed to Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, implemented just a few years earlier. In an official document, the Tianjin municipal government said it was building the workshops based on the needs of Belt and Road projects, opening a “new era of the Chinese model” through vocational education.

“China’s overseas economic aim is to tie the emerging economies of the world more closely to China’s industrial system.”— Dirk van der Kley, a research fellow at the Australian National University and author of an upcoming report on the workshops

In May 2017, the second Luban-branded workshop opened, at Crawley College, south of London, offering a one-year diploma in Chinese culinary arts. It was sponsored by another Tianjin-based company, the Tianjin Food Group. Chefs from the city flew in to teach students how to make Chinese pastries and kung pao chicken. The program ended in 2020, but Crawley College was “proud to be involved in the pilot,” a statement from the college said.

The Luban Workshop in Ponorogo was the third to open, in late 2017, facilitated partly by a Chinese-born business executive, Jasper Ho, who had ties to both Tianjin and Indonesia. The Ponorogo school focused on automotive manufacturing skills, drone technology, robotics and IT. A Tianjin-based company that provides IT services and tech products, Qicheng Technology, helped train Indonesian teachers and provided technological support. The workshops, Ho said, represented a business opportunity for the Tianjin companies. If more people were trained on their systems and technologies, they could grow a bigger market share in those countries.

Students attend a class at the SMK PGRI 2 Ponorogo.

Shoes outside a computer network engineering classroom.

The workshop area of a Luban Workshop in Ponorogo.

The Luban Workshops — named after Lu Ban, a 5th-century master carpenter and inventor revered in Chinese legends — then started to appear in Chinese Communist Party speeches and bilateral meetings between China and other countries. With Beijing now promoting the initiative, the Luban Workshops expanded into Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and Lahore, Pakistan. A workshop opened in Portugal, one of China’s closest partners in the European Union, focusing on electrical automation and industrial robots. The president of the Tianjin Vocational College of Mechanics and Electricity, which co-founded the Portugal workshop, said the export of Chinese technology to a “developed country” was testament to China’s advancements. Xi announced the building of 10 workshops across Africa at a diplomatic summit on China-Africa cooperation in October 2018, and they subsequently opened in Kenya, Djibouti, Mali, Ivory Coast and Ethiopia. Several on the continent offer university-level certificates that incorporate Mandarin language training.

The Chinese consul general in South Africa, opening a Luban Workshop at the Durban University of Technology, said the program was a goodwill present to the country, and, quoting Xi, said it should “set a good example for China and South Africa cooperation projects.” A piece in the state-run China Daily on a workshop in Mali specializing in Chinese medicine compared it to the work of 14th-century Chinese explorer and mariner Zheng He, who, “instead of seizing a colony or establishing a military base” on visits to Asia and Africa, “made gifts of China’s then-advanced achievements and civilized artifacts.”

It was not all pure benevolence. Chinese partners decide what each workshop specializes in, and some are tailored to Belt and Road and other major Chinese projects. The goal is to have local workers staff these projects and work for Chinese companies, reducing the reliance on imported Chinese workers. In Djibouti, the workshop trains people to operate the Chinese-financed electric railway to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and in Uganda, the Luban Workshop was set up with a practical training school at the Chinese-run Sino-Uganda Mbale Industrial Park.

“It is a really smart way of both addressing a long-standing criticism around the use of Chinese labor and also finding a way to subtly ensure that there’s a future orientation in these countries toward adopting Chinese technologies,” said Steven Feldstein, a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“We are learning examples of Chinese innovation, and understanding how to apply it to big projects.”— Tsegaye Alamu, an Ethiopian doctoral student in Tianjin

Criticized for leaving developing nations indebted to China, Beijing has since the pandemic downscaled its Belt and Road program and had to offer rescue packages to countries that took out infrastructure loans. More than $78 billion in loans to foreign infrastructure projects had to be renegotiated or written off between 2020 and the end of March, according to data from the Rhodium Group research institute. Nine countries, including Ghana, Sri Lanka and Lebanon, have defaulted on their debts since 2020. Though Chinese banks are now more wary of financing the Belt and Road Initiative, the two other drivers of the program — Chinese industry and the Chinese state — still want to push on, said Rebecca Ray, senior academic researcher at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center.

“The shift is to keep being active more overseas but in a more targeted way, because the money isn’t flowing anymore,” she said. The Luban Workshops, Ray said, continue to make sense under Xi’s new Belt and Road mantra of “small and beautiful” projects.

The workshops in Africa have been billed as a key component of Sino-African cooperation, part of a broader effort to engage the region economically in exchange for diplomatic support at forums such as the United Nations and on China’s Taiwan policy.

In April, Teshale Berecha Yadessa, the Ethiopian state minister for technical and vocational affairs, visited Tianjin, where officials announced the expansion of the Luban Workshop in Addis Ababa, established in 2021, with a focus on robotics and manufacturing that incorporates artificial intelligence.

The Confucius Institute library at Surabaya State University in Indonesia is stocked with Chinese language games and cultural objects. The Luban Workshops follow the model of the Confucius Institutes, but with a focus on vocational training.

The Ethiopian workshop also trains faculty to teach at workshops across East Africa and illustrates China’s comprehensive approach to training and education overseas. The workshop there is part of the government-run Technical and Vocational Education and Training Institute (TVET), which also hosts a Confucius Institute. The Confucius Institute cooperates closely with government agencies, providing courses including a Chinese language and culture class for employees of the Ministry of Labor and Skills. In April, Huawei, the Chinese tech company that has been linked to China’s surveillance programs and is the target of a U.S. effort to limit its global expansion, launched a program at the TVET Institute providing technical training specific to Huawei’s technology and products.

Tsegaye Alamu, an Ethiopian doctoral student in Tianjin who helped set up the Luban Workshop in Addis Ababa as a trainer, said China has helped “change the attitude” of students in line with the “Luban spirit,” which to him encapsulates the virtues of passion and hard work.

“We are learning examples of Chinese innovation, and understanding how to apply it to big projects,” he said.

After a lull during the pandemic, when training moved online, there is fresh impetus to take workshops and other Chinese training programs to a wider array of schools and industries across the Global South, including further expansion in Indonesia. In Ponorogo, some 3,600 students have gone through the Luban program, now a mandatory part of the curriculum in vocational education. About 72 percent found jobs after graduating, many in construction.

Ho, the Chinese business executive who aided the opening of the first Luban Workshop in Indonesia, said he had two meetings in just a week in April with school principals who now needed no introduction to the program.

“A lot of cities are trying to establish something similar,” he said.

Some of the training that the workshops have modeled is expanding into sectors such as mining, historically plagued by clashes between Chinese and local Indonesian workers and a major contributor to a host of environmental issues from deforestation to flooding.

In January, an Indonesian worker and a Chinese worker died in a clash involving workers from the two countries at a nickel smelter in Sulawesi, a sector China has tapped amid a growing global demand for electric-vehicle batteries. Two months later in March, three Chinese workers died in a coal-mining tunnel in South Kalimantan. Complaints of mistreatment and poor labor conditions at Chinese-led projects have come from both local Indonesian and Chinese workers.

“They are both victims,” said Yeremia Lalisang, an assistant professor at the University of Indonesia who studies topics including perceptions of China in Indonesia. China “simply wants to wash sins. We’re talking about huge damage that has been created by unsupervised Chinese economic engagement in Indonesia.”

Chinese companies appear to be increasingly aware of the need to address such criticism. A Chinese heavy-machinery company, LiuGong, posted a YouTube video in March promoting a training initiative that showed Chinese supervisors teaching Indonesians how to operate specialized trucks at a mine site.

Staff of the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail project sit at the Indonesian Railway Polytechnic in Madiun.

China, working with the polytechnic, is training local workers to operate the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway, a signature project of the Belt and Road Initiative.

An instructor at the polytechnic translates Chinese to Indonesian.

China is also training a group of Indonesian workers to operate the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway, a signature project of the Belt and Road Initiative, though it has been plagued by cost overruns, delays and safety issues. On a weekday morning, a few dozen employees of the state railway operator sat in a stuffy classroom, learning the technicalities of the high-speed rail system and how it differs from the diesel one they’ve worked on so far. They came from all over the country, brought to the railway polytechnic in the East Javan town of Madiun to be a part of a new, signature project of the Indonesian and Chinese governments. If they pass, they will be the first Indonesian workers to staff the new railway.

But some found the teaching hard to follow. The Indonesian workers were learning everything online from a lecturer speaking Mandarin over a computer screen and with slides entirely in Mandarin. An interpreter in the classroom translated between Indonesian and Mandarin.

“It is sometimes hard to understand the technical terms,” said a student training to be part of the railway’s operational control center. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because the rail operator, Kereta Cepat Indonesia China, did not authorize staff or students to speak to The Washington Post. “I just wish there was a lecturer present in the class.” The rail operator did not respond to questions from The Post.

Despite the difficulties, he too believes that China has elevated Indonesia’s development and his own career.

“I’m proud to be a part of this,” he said.

The training programs and investment in vocational education appear to be helping boost public perceptions on China among those who have attended them. More than a dozen teachers, students and alumni of the Luban Workshops interviewed by The Post in Indonesia, Ethiopia and South Africa were strikingly grateful to China and dismissive of criticism of Beijing’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic and its treatment of minorities, particularly Uyghur Muslims.

This bucks broader trends in Indonesia, where there has been a decline in positive perceptions of China in the Muslim-majority country. A poll by the Australian Lowy Institute in 2021 found that 6 in 10 Indonesians either agreed or strongly agreed that their country should join with other countries to “limit China’s influence.”

Analysts said concern about China among Indonesians was driven in part by the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang — who have been arbitrarily detained, sent to mass reeducation camps and forced to denounce their religion — as well as perceptions that Chinese workers are taking Indonesian jobs. Yet, Indonesia, according to a 2022 paper by van der Kley at ANU and co-authors Gatra Priyandita and Benjamin Herscovitch, works with Huawei as a key cybersecurity partner and has expressed little to no concern about its involvement in sensitive infrastructure, 5G networks or potential surveillance.

The success of Huawei, the authors argue, is partly due to training programs similar to the one launched at the TVET Institute in Ethiopia. Huawei’s training program is in more than 33 colleges and universities across Indonesia. The company has trained some 7,000 Indonesian government employees since 2019, and in 2020 pledged to train 100,000 Indonesians on technology including cloud computing and 5G, according to the company.

Participants in the Chinese program in Ponorogo are also bucking the broader trends, grateful for the economic opportunities offered by China and convinced, based on their visits to China or limited exposure to alternative information, that Muslims are treated well in China.

Students and teachers from Ponorogo who visited Tianjin were taken to the Great Mosque by their hosts, who also facilitated their need for halal food. Irfan Priyono, a teacher who spent 40 days training in automotive engineering, robotics and drones in China, said he wore his Muslim skullcap and traveled to the mosque every Friday as he would in Indonesia.

“I think they respect Muslims,” Priyono said.

Ponorogo software engineering students Ardyna Anggraeni and Mita Tri Anggraini, both 16.

When asked about the Uyghurs, Agus Pariadi, who helped establish ties between the Ponorogo school and its partner school in Tianjin, said, “We don’t know about that kind of persecution. … All we know is they welcomed us, and let us pray according to our beliefs.”

The Luban Workshop, said Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, a researcher at the Jakarta-based Center of Economics and Law Studies, is part of Beijing’s broader efforts to build goodwill, especially among Muslim communities in Indonesia. Those efforts include partnerships with Islamic educational institutes — including by establishing Confucius Institutes — and other Muslim organizations as a form of “faith diplomacy.”

Similar efforts are underway in other Muslim-majority countries. A new batch of Luban Workshops are opening across Central Asia, following the one in Tajikistan, which launched in December, focusing on geothermal energy and the transport of natural gas. The new workshops will be in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

Rakhmat documented in a research paper how China has also offered scholarships to students pursuing Islamic studies, some of whom have returned from China and published articles disputing the persecution of Uyghurs. Overwhelmingly, he said, partnerships between Indonesian universities and educational institutes that involve sending students to China have led to the students’ adopting China’s positions on key issues.

“It is part of China’s efforts to present a good image of itself,” Rakhmat said. “And it works.”

Kya Kya, a Chinatown in Surabaya, East Java province.

Adi Renaldi in Jakarta and Vic Chiang in Taipei, Taiwan, contributed to this report.

About this story

Story by Shibani Mahtani. Photos by Joshua Irwandi. Story editing by Peter Finn. Project management by Courtney Kan. Photo editing by Olivier Laurent. Design and development by Kathleen Rudell-Brooks and Yutao Chen. Design editing by Joe Moore. Research by Cate Brown. Map by Cate Brown and Samuel Granados. Copy editing by Susan Doyle and Martha Murdock.

The Washington Post · by Shibani Mahtani · July 10, 2023

15. Special Operations News Update - July 10, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - July 10, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · July 10, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: U.S. Air Force personnel jump out the back of an HC-130J Combat King II assigned to the 81st Expeditionary Rescue Squadron (ERQS) over Djibouti, May 9, 2023. The 81st ERQS is a rapidly deployable combat search and rescue force that can conduct tactical air refueling, airdrop and airland of personnel and/or equipment during day or night operations in support of combat personnel recovery within Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa area of responsibility. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Aaron Irvin)

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SOF News

New Cdr and CSM for CSOJTF-L. Brig. Gen. Philip Ryan assumed command of the Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force – Levant from U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Claude Tudor during a Transfer of Authority ceremony held June 14, 2023. Command Sgt. Maj. Fields is replacing Command Sgt. Maj. Frank Wilson. CSOJTF-L, located in Jordan, is a Joint Task Force composed of special operations forces from the United States and multiple partner nations. It is responsible for conducting special operations in the Levant region in support of U.S. Central Command’s mission. “Brig. Gen. Ryan Assumes Command of CSOJTF-L“, DVIDS, July 5, 2023.

Info on AF Pararesecue. Learn about the origins of the the Air Force’s pararescue units, current training, and missions sets. “‘That Others May Live’: What it Takes to be an Air Force Pararescueman”, Coffee or Die Magazine, July 6, 2023.

SOF and SF? Marty Skovlund explains the difference between special operations forces and Special Forces. He provides a primer for those in the news media that have difficulty with journalistic accuracy. “The Difference Between ‘Special Operations’ and ‘Special Forces’“, Havok Journal, July 6, 2023.

Characteristics of Spec Ops Candidates. There are a number of characteristics that successful candidates for special operations training have in common. Showing up, work harder and smarter, good recovery practices, managing workouts and timelines, maturity, and lack of a Plan B. “6 Characteristics Shared by Successful Special Ops Candidates”, Military.com, July 2023.

MARSOC 3 Update. The Marines are not setting asise the charges for drinking on duty for two Marine Raiders involved in the death of a retired Green Beret, Richard Rodriguez, in Iraq in 2019. “Corps won’t dismiss drinking convictions of 2 ‘MARSOC 3’ Raiders”, Marine Corps Times, July 7, 2023.

International SOF

Special Reconnaissance Course of Belgian Military. Learn all about the training that candidates go through to complete the Basic Reconnaissance Course to become elite Special Recondos of the Belgian military. In the course they master the art of Special Reconnaissance and preparing themselves for the challenges of operating behind enemy lines. “Basic Reconnaissance Course 2023: Building the Future of Special Reconnaissance”, Spec Ops Magazine, July 10, 2023.

Norway Rotary Wing Upgrade. The acquistion of new helicopters to support the nation’s special forces will be delayed for at least 15 years. The country has decided instead to upgrade its elderly Bell 412 helicopters and postpone a recapitalization of its rotorcraft fleet around a single aircraft family. Nine of the 18 Royal Norwegian Air Force’s Bell 412s will be upgraded for the special forces mission. “Norway to partially upgrade Bell 412 fleet as it postpones special forces acquisition”, FlightGlobal, July 6, 2023.

Canadian SOF Need Better Helicopters. Canadian Forces will continue to operate the Griffon helicopters for the next decade . . . but . . . “Canadian special forces pilots warn they are being held back by inferior equipment and the obsolete Giffon helicopter”, Ottawa Citizen, July 5, 2023. (subscription)

UK SF Investigation. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense has confirmed that UK special forces are at the center of the Afghanistan war crimes inquiry. (Jurist, Jul 6, 2023). See also “UK Special Forces under investigation in Afghan war crimes inquiry”, AOAV, July 5, 2023.

SOF History

On July 8, 1961, the 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated in Birmingham, Alabama.

https://www.specialforceshistory.info/groups/20sfga.html

On July 9, 1941, the First Special Service Force was officially activated.

https://armyhistory.org/first-special-service-force/

On July 9, 1961, teams of Green Berets began organizing and training tribesmen in the Central Highlands of Vietnam into the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). The CIDG program was devised by the CIA in early 1961 to counter expanding Viet Cong influence in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands. Beginning in the village of Buon Enao, small A Teams from the U.S. Army Special Forces moved into villages and set up Area Development Centers. Focusing on local defense and civic action, the Special Forces teams did the majority of the training.

Ukraine Conflict

Resistance Lessons from Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine has shown how important it is that the general population be included in the defense of a country by a larger invading adversary. The nature and tasks of the Ukrainian resistance movement is different than those of a traditional resistance movement of past conflicts. The study of the Ukrainian resistance movement deserves special attention – as it can help in adapting existing doctrines and training programs for resistance movement specialists to the realities that they may face in future conflicts. Read Oleksandr V. Danylyuk’s thoughts on this topic in “Against the Odds: Lessons from the Ukrainian Resistance Movement”, RUSI, July 4, 2023.

IO and the ‘Strategic Corporal’. A tour of the Ukrainian front lines by media folks reveal that the Ukrainians are very adept at information warfare and leveraging social media platforms. Read more on this topic in an article by Austin Gray entitled “What’s Special About Ukraine’s Frontline Information Warfare?”, Real Clear Defense, July 6, 2023.

More U.S. Assistance for Ukraine. The Department of Defense has announced another security assistance package for Ukraine that will support that country’s counteroffensive operations over the next few months. The package includes additional munitions for the U.S.-provided Patriot air defense systems and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems. The U.S. has been pushing weapons and munitions to that country on a continous and periodic basis. “DOD Announces $800M Security Assistance Package for Ukraine”, DOD News, July 7, 2023.

NATO Membership for Ukraine? Unlikely. The meeting of NATO in Lithuania this week see a lot of discussion about giving Ukraine membership; but that is not going to happen soon. At least not while the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is going on. “NATO to offer Ukraine continuing support but not immediate membership”, Military Times, July 7, 2023.

Cluster Bombs for Ukraine. The White House has approved providing Ukraine with cluster munitions that can be delivered on the battlefield by aircraft or artillery. This has caused a flurry of media attention over the past several days with supporters of the decision as well as critics weighing in on the issue. The decision by President Biden comes after months of internal debate within the administration. Humanitarian rights groups are deeply opposed – citing the danger to civilians long after the conflict ends. Over 120 nations have signed on to the Convention on Cluster Munitions – which bans the weapons. The U.S., Russia, and Ukraine are not signatories. (CNN Politics, July 7, 2023).

Sudan Conflict and Evac of Foreign Nationals

War to Widen? The United Nations says that Sudan is on the brink of a full-scale civil war after nearly three months of fighting. The strife began almost 18 months ago between two generals who had led a military coup in October 2021. (Associated Press, Jul 9, 2023).

Update on the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), ceasefire, humanitarian crisis, and evacuation of foreign nationals.

https://www.national-security.info/country/sudan/sudan-neo.html

Commentary

SOF Institution Building. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) proved instrumental in assisting some NATO countries and Ukraine developing institutions to increase the capability of sustainin SOF units in an advisory effort known as Special Operations Forces Institution Building (SOFIB). This is a framework for developing and sustaining SOF institutional capabilities at the national level. Read more in a long essay on this topic in “Special Operations Forces Institution- Building: From Strategic Approach to Security Force Assistance”, Joint Force Quarterly, National Defense University Press, July 7, 2023.

Exporting IW Doctrine. The promoting of irregular warfare by the United States as a method to confront Russia, China, and other adversaries is recommended in this article. The authors argue that the U.S. has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War. “US Irregular Warfare Capability Building Capability Assistance as Competitive Edge in Great Power Competition”, The Cove, July 5, 2023.

National Security

NATO Meeting. Representatives of the nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treat Organization will meet in the Vilnius, Lithuania this week. The top agenda item will be Ukraine – one of the issues will be future membership of that country. Another important issue is the blocking of Swedish membership in NATO by Turkey. Read more on what will be disucssed in “Explainer: What’s on the table for NATO at Vilnius summit?”, Reuters, July 10, 2023. See also a brief by the Congressional Research Service entitled “Previewing NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit”, CRS IN12192, July 5, 2023, PDF, 4 pages.

Baltic States and NATO. Three of the countries taking part in the NATO conference were once occupied for decades by the Soviet Union. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 they were among the first to send assistance to Ukraine. Read about the history, vulnerabilities, and defense posture of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. “Why are the Baltic states strategically important for NATO?”, Reuters, July 10, 2023.

Drone Strike on ISIS Leader. U.S. Central Command has published a press release saying that it conducted a strike in Syria that resulted in the death of an ISIS leader in eastern Syria. There were no reported civilian casualties. The strike was conducted by a MQ-9 Reaper. “U.S. Airstrike Targets ISIS Leader in Eastern Syria”, CENTCOM, July 9, 2023.

Blacksmith Publishing is a media partner of SOF News. They are a book publishing firm, sell ‘Pinelander Swag’, have a weekly podcast called The Pinelander.

Afghanistan

Afghan Terp for SF shot in D.C. A former interpreter who worked for U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan was shot and killed in Washington, D.C. a week ago Monday. He was a driver for Lyft – working long hours to provide for his family and sending money home to relatives in Afghanistan. He managed to escape Afghanistan in August 2021 during the Kabul NEO and moved to D.C. with his family. “He served the Army in Afghanistan. He was killed driving for Lyft in D.C.”, The Washington Post, July 8, 2023. (subscription)

Hotbed of Terrorism. According to security experts of the United Nations Afghanistan has once again become a sanctuary for terrorist groups – a place where they can train, organize, and potentially launch attacks against the United States and other countries around the world. Efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency to work with the Taliban in an attempt to contain these terrorist groups are being criticized by some observers who see these efforts as ‘legitimizing’ the Taliban regime. “Thanks to the Taliban, Afghanistan is once again a hotbed of terrorism”, The Hill, July 6, 2023.

Upcoming Events

August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida

Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion

CDF

August 12, 2023

11th Special Forces Group Reunion

Fort Meade, MD

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Books, Pubs, and Reports

The Mini-Manual for the Urban Defender: A Guide to the Strategies and Tactics of Defending a City, by John Spencer. This publication was first published in English shortly after the Russian invasion (2022) of Ukraine. Within months it was published again in Ukrainian. The mini-manual is now available in Finnish.

History of FM 3-24. The Global War on Terror saw the Army needing to update its doctrine on conducting counterinsurgency. The Army published FM 3-24 in 2006. “TRADOC and the Release of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency”, U.S. Army, July 7, 2023.

Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Video – SOCKOR Mission. Special Operations Command Korea plans and conducts Special Operations in support of the Commander of United States Forces/United Nations Commander/Combined Forces Commander in armistice, crisis and war. SOCKOR is a functional component command of United States Forces Korea, tasked to plan and conduct Special Operations in the Korean theater of operations. (U.S. Air Force video by Senior Airman Jack LeGrand). July 6, 2023, DVIDS, 1 minute. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/889344/sockor-mission

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Initiative

https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · July 10, 2023

16. Opinion | NATO Isn’t What It Says It Is

Excerpts:

No matter their ascendance, Atlanticists fret over support for the organization being undermined by disinformation and cybermeddling. They needn’t worry. Contested throughout the Cold War, NATO remained a subject of controversy into the 1990s, when the disappearance of its adversary encouraged thoughts of a new European security architecture. Today, dissent is less audible than ever before.

Left parties in Europe, historically critical of militarism and American power, have overwhelmingly enlisted in the defense of the West: The trajectory of the German Greens, from fierce opponents of nuclear weapons to a party seemingly willing to risk atomic war, is a particularly vivid illustration. Stateside, criticism of NATO focuses on the risks of overextending U.S. treaty obligations, not their underlying justification. The most successful alliance in history, gathering in celebration of itself, need not wait for its 75th anniversary next year to uncork the champagne.

Opinion | NATO Isn’t What It Says It Is

The New York Times · by Thomas Meaney · July 11, 2023

By Grey Anderson and Thomas Meaney

Mr. Anderson is the editor of “Natopolitanism: The Atlantic Alliance Since the Cold War,” to which Mr. Meaney is a contributor.

Guest Essay

NATO Isn’t What It Says It Is

July 11, 2023, 1:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Virginia Mayo/Associated Press

NATO leaders convening this week in Vilnius, Lithuania, have every reason to toast their success.

Only four years ago, on the eve of another summit, the organization looked to be in low water; in the words of President Emmanuel Macron of France, it was undergoing nothing short of “brain death.” Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the situation has been transformed. As NATO plans to welcome Sweden into its ranks — Finland became a full-fledged member in April — and dispatch troops to reinforce its eastern flank, European Union allies are finally making good on long-deferred promises to increase military spending. Public opinion has followed suit. If Russia sought to divide Europe, President Biden could plausibly declare last spring that it had instead fully “NATO-ized” the continent.

This turnabout has understandably energized the alliance’s supporters. The statement of purpose from Jens Stoltenberg, its secretary general, that “the strength of NATO is the best possible tool we have to maintain peace and security” has never had more loyal adherents. Even critics of the organization — such as China hawks who see it as a distraction from the real threat in East Asia and restrainers who would prefer that Washington refocus on diplomatic solutions and problems at home — concede that NATO’s purpose is primarily the defense of Europe.

But NATO, from its origins, was never primarily concerned with aggregating military power. Fielding 100 divisions at its Cold War height, a small fraction of Warsaw Pact manpower, the organization could not be counted on to repel a Soviet invasion and even the continent’s nuclear weapons were under Washington’s control. Rather, it set out to bind Western Europe to a far vaster project of a U.S.-led world order, in which American protection served as a lever to obtain concessions on other issues, like trade and monetary policy. In that mission, it has proved remarkably successful.

Many observers expected NATO to close shop after the collapse of its Cold War rival. But in the decade after 1989, the organization truly came into its own. NATO acted as a ratings agency for the European Union in Eastern Europe, declaring countries secure for development and investment. The organization pushed would-be partners to adhere to a liberal, pro-market creed, according to which — as President Bill Clinton’s national security adviser put it — “the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets” and “the promotion of collective security” marched in lock step. European military professionals and reform-minded elites formed a willing constituency, their campaigns boosted by NATO’s information apparatus.

When European populations proved too stubborn, or undesirably swayed by socialist or nationalist sentiments, Atlantic integration proceeded all the same. The Czech Republic was a telling case. Faced with a likely “no” vote in a referendum on joining the alliance in 1997, the secretary general and top NATO officials saw to it that the government in Prague simply dispense with the exercise; the country joined two years later. The new century brought more of the same, with an appropriate shift in emphasis. Coinciding with the global war on terrorism, the “big bang” expansion of 2004 — in which seven countries acceded — saw counterterrorism supersede democracy and human rights in alliance rhetoric. Stress on the need for liberalization and public sector reforms remained a constant.

In the realm of defense, the alliance was not as advertised. For decades, the United States has been the chief provider of weapons, logistics, air bases and battle plans. The war in Ukraine, for all the talk of Europe stepping up, has left that asymmetry essentially untouched. Tellingly, the scale of U.S. military aid — $47 billion over the first year of the conflict — is more than double that offered by European Union countries combined. European spending pledges may also turn out to be less impressive than they appear. More than a year after the German government publicized the creation of a special $110 billion fund for its armed forces, the bulk of the credits remain unused. In the meantime, German military commanders have said that they lack sufficient munitions for more than two days of high-intensity combat.

Whatever the levels of expenditure, it is remarkable how little military capability Europeans get for the outlays involved. Lack of coordination, as much as penny-pinching, hamstrings Europe’s ability to ensure its own security. By forbidding duplication of existing capabilities and prodding allies to accept niche roles, NATO has stymied the emergence of any semiautonomous European force capable of independent action. As for defense procurement, common standards for interoperability, coupled with the sheer size of the U.S. military-industrial sector and bureaucratic impediments in Brussels, favor American firms at the expense of their European competitors. The alliance, paradoxically, appears to have weakened allies’ ability to defend themselves.

Yet the paradox is only superficial. In fact, NATO is working exactly as it was designed by postwar U.S. planners, drawing Europe into a dependency on American power that reduces its room for maneuver. Far from a costly charity program, NATO secures American influence in Europe on the cheap. U.S. contributions to NATO and other security assistance programs in Europe account for a tiny fraction of the Pentagon’s annual budget — less than 6 percent by a recent estimate. And the war has only strengthened America’s hand. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, roughly half of European military spending went to American manufacturers. Surging demand has exacerbated this tendency as buyers rush to acquire tanks, combat aircraft and other weapons systems, locking into costly, multiyear contracts. Europe may be remilitarizing, but America is reaping the rewards.

In Ukraine, the pattern is clear. Washington will provide the military security, and its corporations will benefit from a bonanza of European armament orders, while Europeans will shoulder the cost of postwar reconstruction — something Germany is better poised to accomplish than the buildup of its military. The war also serves as a dress rehearsal for U.S. confrontation with China, in which European support cannot be so easily counted on. Limiting Beijing’s access to strategic technologies and promoting American industry are hardly European priorities, and severing European and Chinese trade is still difficult to imagine. Yet already there are signs that NATO is making headway in getting Europe to follow its lead in the theater. On the eve of a visit to Washington at the end of June, Germany’s defense minister duly advertised his awareness of “European responsibility for the Indo-Pacific” and the importance of “the rules-based international order” in the South China Sea.

No matter their ascendance, Atlanticists fret over support for the organization being undermined by disinformation and cybermeddling. They needn’t worry. Contested throughout the Cold War, NATO remained a subject of controversy into the 1990s, when the disappearance of its adversary encouraged thoughts of a new European security architecture. Today, dissent is less audible than ever before.

Left parties in Europe, historically critical of militarism and American power, have overwhelmingly enlisted in the defense of the West: The trajectory of the German Greens, from fierce opponents of nuclear weapons to a party seemingly willing to risk atomic war, is a particularly vivid illustration. Stateside, criticism of NATO focuses on the risks of overextending U.S. treaty obligations, not their underlying justification. The most successful alliance in history, gathering in celebration of itself, need not wait for its 75th anniversary next year to uncork the champagne.

Grey Anderson is the editor of “Natopolitanism: The Atlantic Alliance Since the Cold War,” to which Thomas Meaney is a contributor.

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

The New York Times · by Thomas Meaney · July 11, 2023

17. Wagner fighters neared Russian nuclear base during revolt

But was there ever really a revolt or coup attempt?

Wagner fighters neared Russian nuclear base during revolt

Reuters · by Reuters

July 11 (Reuters) - As rebellious Wagner forces drove north toward Moscow on June 24, a contingent of military vehicles diverted east on a highway in the direction of a fortified Russian army base that holds nuclear weapons, according to videos posted online and interviews with local residents.

Once the Wagner fighters reach more rural regions, the surveillance trail goes cold – about 100 km from the nuclear base, Voronezh-45. Reuters could not confirm what happened next, and Western officials have repeatedly said that Russia's nuclear stockpile was never in danger during the uprising, which ended quickly and mysteriously later that day.

But in an exclusive interview, Ukraine's head of military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, said that the Wagner fighters went far further. He said that they reached the nuclear base and that their intention was to acquire small Soviet-era nuclear devices in order to "raise the stakes" in their mutiny. "Because if you are prepared to fight until the last man standing, this is one of the facilities that significantly raises the stakes," Budanov said.

The only barrier between the Wagner fighters and nuclear weapons, Budanov said, were the doors to the nuclear storage facility. "The doors of the storage were closed and they didn't get into the technical section," he said.

Reuters was not able to independently determine if Wagner fighters made it to Voronezh-45. Budanov did not provide evidence for his assertion and he declined to say what discussions, if any, had taken place with the United States and other allies about the incident. He also didn't say why the fighters subsequently withdrew.

A source close to the Kremlin with military ties corroborated parts of Budanov's account. A Wagner contingent "managed to get into a zone of special interest, as a result of which the Americans got agitated because nuclear munitions are stored there," this person said, without elaborating further.

A source in Russian occupied east Ukraine, with knowledge of the matter, said this caused concern in the Kremlin and provided impetus for a hastily negotiated end to the rebellion on the evening of June 24, brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

U.S. officials expressed doubts about this account. In response to a query about whether Wagner forces reached the base and sought to acquire nuclear weapons, White House National Security Council spokesman Adam Hodge said, "We are not able to corroborate this report. We had no indication at any point that nuclear weapons or materials were at risk."

The Kremlin and Wagner commander Yevgeny Prigozhin did not respond to questions for this article.

Matt Korda, a Senior Research Associate and Project Manager for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said it would be "virtually impossible for a non-state actor" to breach Russian nuclear security. Wagner may have had thousands of troops at its disposal, he said, but it's unlikely any of them knew how to detonate a bomb.

"If you had a malicious actor who was able to get their hands on a nuclear weapon, they would find the weapons stored in a state of incomplete assembly," he said. "They would need to be completed by installing specialised equipment and then unlocking permissive action links, and in order to do that they would need the cooperation of someone from the 12th Directorate" responsible for protecting Russia's nuclear arsenal.

Budanov is the first official to suggest Wagner fighters came close to acquiring nuclear weapons and further escalating an armed mutiny that has been widely interpreted as the biggest challenge to Russian President Vladimir Putin's power. U.S. officials have long feared the nightmare possibility that strife in Russia might lead to nuclear devices falling into rogue hands.

Wagner fighters drove in the direction of Voronezh-45 after peeling away from a larger convoy of heavy weaponry that was advancing along the M4 highway that runs north from Rostov, where the rebellion began. This smaller group headed east, and engaged Russian forces in a firefight at the first village it reached, according to residents and social media posts. But then it appears to have passed without hindrance for 90 km, including driving unchallenged through the centre of a town that houses a military base.

Reuters followed the group's progress to the town of Talovaya, about 100 km from the base, which dates back to the Soviet era. It is one of Russia's 12 "national-level storage facilities" for nuclear weapons, according to a report by U.N. scientists. At Talovaya, Russian forces attacked the column, according to local people who spoke to Reuters. A Russian helicopter was shot down, killing the two crew.

Reuters interviewed Budanov in his Kyiv office, which Russia targeted with strikes as recently as May. Dressed in military fatigues with a black pistol tucked into his waistband, Budanov spoke in front of a painting that depicts an owl, a symbol of Ukraine's spy bureau, clutching a bat, symbol of Russia's military intelligence agency. He said Voronezh-45 houses small nuclear devices that can be carried in a backpack. "This was one of the key storage facilities for these backpacks," he said, without providing evidence for this assertion. Reuters was unable to establish if the backpack-sized nuclear charges, referred to by Budanov, are kept at Voronezh-45.

Such small nuclear bombs – light enough to be carried by a single person – are Cold War relics. American troops trained to parachute from planes with nuclear weapons strapped to their bodies and Soviet troops trained to deploy them behind enemy lines on foot. But by the early 1990s, both nations agreed to remove them from their arsenals as tensions eased, and did so, though Russia kept some to mine harbours, said Hans Kristensen, who leads the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, based in Washington.

Several former U.S. nuclear nonproliferation officials cautioned that it's difficult to know for sure whether the Russians kept their promise to destroy their backpack-style nuclear weapons. "I don't believe the Russians still have them, but I wouldn't bet my life on it," said David Jonas, former general counsel to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, which tracks atomic weapons and radioactive material worldwide.

Amy Woolf, a nuclear weapons specialist for U.S. lawmakers at the Library of Congress from 1988 to 2022, raised doubts about the potency of such weapons if they do still exist. "It's possible there's still some old crap stuck in storage somewhere," she said. "But is it operational? Almost certainly not."

Jonas, who advised top Pentagon officials on nonproliferation, agreed, noting that such portable weapons need to be maintained and updated, and degrade over time. He said Russia has struggled to maintain its conventional forces, let alone its atomic stockpile.

A FALLING OUT

Wagner was founded by Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, a former special forces officer in Russia's GRU military intelligence. Cast as a private army, Wagner enabled Russia to dabble in wars in countries including Syria, Libya and Mali with full deniability. U.S. officials also say Prigozhin's business operated a social media troll factory that interfered with the 2016 American presidential election. In recent days, Putin confirmed the Russian state financed Wagner. State television reported that Prigozhin's operations had received more than 1.7 trillion roubles ($19 billion) from the Russian budget.

Prigozhin fired the opening salvo of his mutiny on June 23 when he accused the Russian military of launching a missile strike on a Wagner camp in Russian-occupied east Ukraine. Russia denied any such operation.

At least half a dozen sources inside and outside Russia say the conflict had been brewing for some time and that money and tensions between rival clans lay at its heart. For months, Prigozhin had been openly insulting Putin's most senior military men, casting Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov as corrupt and incompetent and blaming them for reversals in Russia's war in Ukraine.

The insults went unanswered in public for a long time. Then Shoigu hit back. On June 10, he ordered Wagner fighters to sign contracts with his ministry agreeing to become part of the regular army by month's end. Prigozhin refused. On June 13, Putin publicly sided with Shoigu. The state was moving to cut Wagner's funding and this, the sources inside and outside Russia told Reuters, was the trigger for the mutiny.

In the early hours of June 24, Wagner forces arrived in the southern city of Rostov, an important command centre for Russia's operations in Ukraine. Wagner took charge of the base there and within hours video emerged of Prigozhin chatting with Russian commanders. Around the same time, other contingents of Wagner forces struck out north, heading in the direction of Moscow along the M-4 highway.

Wagner fighters encountered little resistance.

Some Russian units that stood in their path or were instructed to intercept them did nothing, according to five sources: a Russian security source, three people close to the Kremlin, and a person close to the Russian-installed leadership in eastern Ukraine. The security source said two Russian military formations around the south-west of the country received orders to resist Wagner but they did not act on the command.

Some Russian units did nothing because they were taken by surprise and were outgunned, the sources said, while others stood by because they assumed, until Putin went on television at 10:00 a.m. Moscow time to denounce Prigozhin, that Wagner was acting on the Kremlin's orders. The sources said some officers were reluctant to move against Wagner because they felt solidarity with the private army and shared Prigozhin's disillusionment with the way the Defence Ministry top brass was running the war.

Major General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Military Intelligence of Ukraine, speaks during an interview with Reuters, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine July 6, 2023. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko/File Photo

At the Bugayevka crossing between Ukraine and Russia, images posted by a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel on the morning of June 24 showed dozens of Russian troops standing in line, unarmed. The caption said they had laid down their weapons.

Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, told Reuters that many in the Russian military sided with Prigozhin. "There are so many commanders who sympathise with Wagner and don't want to follow Putin," he said, adding that he knew of 14 Russian generals who supported Prigozhin. Reuters was not able to independently verify his account about the generals.

One branch of the Wagner force headed north along the M-4 highway, in the direction of Moscow. Their route took them right past Boguchar, a garrison town where a Russian unit is stationed. Three local residents who spoke to Reuters said that the military there did nothing to resist, and that a significant number of people in the town, including people serving in the military, felt sympathy with the Wagner force.

One woman said of Prigozhin: "Who else should we support? At least there's one dignified person who was not frightened." Another female resident also said Wagner had widespread support in the town, and that many Wagner fighters are from Boguchar. "They're all friends," she said.

A NUCLEAR DETOUR

As the main Wagner column advanced northwards towards Moscow, a group of military vehicles, and some civilian pickups and vans, turned eastwards. The moment is captured on a video posted on a Voronezh region news site. Reuters geo-located the video to a junction near the town of Pavlovsk. The breakaway contingent rumbled through villages and along a road that cut through patches of forest and flat farmland, skirting gulleys carved out by tributaries of the Don River.

A video posted on a local online bulletin board shows a field in the dawn light near the village of Elizavetovka on June 24. In the distance there is an explosion and gunfire, and panicked cries from a male voice: "Has a war started?"

Then a fresh round of automatic gunfire, closer this time.

Reuters spoke to the man's neighbour, who said the Russian military had attacked the Wagner force. At 08:24 am, a user on the same online bulletin board, Anna Sandrakova, wrote: "Shells are flying, low-flying helicopters, we could hear explosions, automatic gunfire." Maxim Yantsov, the local government chief for Pavlovsk district, wrote on his Telegram channel that 19 households were damaged as a result of shooting around Elizavetovka.

A few hours later, the convoy passed through another village, Vorontsovka, still moving in the direction of the nuclear facility. Two videos posted to Telegram show more than a dozen vehicles, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and trucks mounted with machine guns or carrying artillery.

Next on the route, the convoy reached Buturlinovka, according to posts on the town's online bulletin board and a video that Reuters identified as being recorded in the town. Buturlinovka, closer still to the nuclear facility, is the location of a military air base.

By Saturday evening, users on a VKontakte online forum started reporting the presence of a military column at the town of Talovaya, 110 km from the military base. A video shared by a local resident with Reuters shows a column of military vehicles moving through the outskirts of the town. A second video, provided by another resident, showed at least 75 vehicles in a convoy on the edge of the town, including 5 armoured personnel carriers, two ambulances, and an artillery gun towed behind a truck. A third resident said local people offered food and water to the Wagner troops. The situation was calm, he said, until a Russian helicopter fired at the column. It fired back and the helicopter fell to the ground, followed by explosions and a cloud of smoke.

Russian state media later broadcast video of a wooden cross erected at the site in Talovaya district where the helicopter, a Ka-52 attack aircraft, crashed. Pskov region governor Mikhail Vedernikov said the two crewmen who were killed were stationed at a military base in his region, in north-west Russia. "True to their oath, they did everything to protect our country," he said in a video address posted on his Telegram channel.

Reuters couldn't determine what the column did next. A resident of Talovaya said that as far as he was aware, it did not move any further and the following day – after the truce was announced – the column turned around and went back the way it came.

Budanov said in his interview that an unspecified number of fighters did in fact press on to Voronezh-45 with the intention of seizing portable, Soviet-era nuclear weapons stored at the facility.

The nuclear facility at Voronezh-45 is operated and guarded by military unit no. 14254, part of the defence ministry's 12th Main Directorate responsible for protecting Russia's arsenal of nuclear weapons, according to the Russian Defence Ministry's website and publicly available records. What is stored there is a closely guarded secret. Russia does not publicly acknowledge even keeping nuclear weapons there; that information has emerged from the reports of foreign scientists.

Reuters was unable to establish if the backpack-sized nuclear charges referred to by Budanov are kept at the facility. But there is evidence that such devices were developed by the Soviet Union. In testimony to the U.S. Congress, in 1997 Alexei Yablokov, a former Russian presidential science advisor, said Soviet scientists in the 1970s created suitcase-sized nuclear munitions for use by secret agents.

Kristensen, the Federation of American Scientists researcher who said that Russia and the United States discarded thousands of suitcase-sized nukes in the 1990s, said that he doubts any remain stored Voronezh-45. He said he believes – but cannot be certain – that other nuclear weapons are stored at Voronezh-45, which satellite images show to be well-maintained.

Given the 12th Main Directorate's control over the facility, the movement of weapons would take time and likely be detected by U.S. satellites, he added.

Further north, there is evidence that the Russian military undertook drastic measures to block off another potential access route to Voronezh-45. The E-38 road branches off the M-4 highway at a settlement called Rogachevka. This road also leads to Voronezh-45. On the evening of June 24, local residents reported hearing explosions. A video posted on a Telegram channel captured the sound of an aircraft followed by an explosion. A motorist driving along the E-38 posted a video that shows the road covered in debris near a bridge over the river Bityug. In one lane is a deep crater.

A DEAL IS STRUCK

On the evening of June 24 there was an unexpected announcement by Belarusian state media. The country's president, Alexsandr Lukashenko, had negotiated Prigozhin's agreement to halt his forces' advances. Prigozhin said in an audio message that his forces had come within 125 miles of Moscow and were "turning around" to head back to their training camps. Under the deal, Russia would not prosecute the rebels and Wagner fighters would either withdraw to Belarus or join Russia's regular army.

A European intelligence source said Prigozhin was persuaded to abandon his revolt after realising he didn't have sufficient support amongst the military.

Prigozhin's whereabouts and future plans are unclear.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Monday that Putin held talks with the Wagner leader on June 29 and "gave his assessment of the events" of June 24.

One of Prigozhin's private jets has made multiple trips between Belarus and Russia in the days since the rebellion, according to flight tracking data.

When Belarusian president Lukashenko hosted a group of journalists in Minsk on July 6, he said Wagner's fighters had yet to arrive at their new Belarusian base. "As for Yevgeny Prigozhin, he's in St Petersburg. Or perhaps this morning he flew to Moscow. Or perhaps he's somewhere else. But he's not in Belarus," Lukashenko said.

(Reporting by Mari Saito, Tom Balmforth, Sergiy Karazy and Anna Dabrowska in Kyiv, John Shiffman and Phil Stewart in Washington, Polina Nikolskaya in London, Maria Tsvetkova in New York, Anton Zverev, Christian Lowe in Paris, David Gauthier-Villars in Istanbul, Stephen Grey, Reade Levinson and Eleanor Whalley in London, Milan Pavicic and Daria Shamonova in Gdansk; edited by Janet McBride)

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

18. Videos - SWCC: Making an Operator | SOF News

Some hooah videos. But seriously the Special Warfare Combatant Crewman (SWCC) are under-appreciated and unsung heroes in SOF. Perhaps I am biased since I was able to spend some time on their boats in the Philippines (they even let me drive a Mark V once!)

Videos - SWCC: Making an Operator | SOF News

sof.news · by DVIDS · July 11, 2023

Watch these three very excellent videos about the training one has to go through to become a Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewman (SWCC) in the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community.

**********

SWCC: Making an Operator, All Hands Magazine, July 4, 2023, YouTube

Episode 1, 16 minutes

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvVyDhGuSTw

Episode 2, 24 minutes

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d399gVkbU5c

Episode 3, 16 minutes

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q470w6HMoGQ

**********

Image by Austin Rooney, Defense Media Activity, July 5, 2023.

sof.news · by DVIDS · July 11, 2023

19. RTX Head Greg Hayes Says US Can’t Decouple From China But Can “De-Risk.” Biden Gets It, But Some Big Companies Don’t.

RTX Head Greg Hayes Says US Can’t Decouple From China But Can “De-Risk.” Biden Gets It, But Some Big Companies Don’t.

Forbes · by Loren Thompson · July 10, 2023

Biden wants to get along with China, but not by letting Beijing surpass U.S. technological prowess.

Wikipedia

The Chairman and CEO of RTX, the world’s biggest aerospace company, used the occasion of this year’s Paris Air Show to deliver an important message to Washington.

Greg Hayes told the Financial Times that it isn’t feasible for U.S. manufacturers to fully decouple from China, but they can take steps to reduce potential vulnerabilities.

Citing his own company’s relationship with “several thousand” Chinese suppliers, CEO Hayes said “we are not in a position to pull out of China the way we did out of Russia.” Raytheon contributes to my think tank.

The Hayes view may not have been well received among some hardline critics of China, but it has the twin virtues of being honest and accurate. Any effort to fully exit China would be horrendously expensive and time consuming, reducing the competitiveness of US products.

What US policymakers and producers need to do is find a middle ground between pulling out and stoking China’s superpower pretensions. In the past, Washington has been too willing to overlook China’s transgressions. Now it needs to avoid over-reacting in the opposite direction.

The Biden administration understands this, but some big companies such as Microsoft MSFT have been slow to recognize the changing climate in relations. Let’s begin by looking at what Biden has done to date to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

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In February of 2021, only weeks after his inauguration, President Biden issued an executive order directing assessment of US supply-chain dependencies. The order singled out four areas for special attention: pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, critical minerals, and high-capacity batteries.

As noted in the order, the resulting studies were a continuation of work begun in the Trump administration, which in its final industrial-capabilities report to Congress decried the “steady deindustrialization” of the US economy.

That trend had been largely ignored by the Bush and Obama administrations. By the time Biden took office China’s manufacturing capacity had matched that of the US, Japan and European Union combined. Moreover, Beijing made little effort to conceal its goal of becoming the world’s leading source of advanced technology.

Biden and company did not wait until the year allotted for the sector studies had elapsed. By June of 2021, they had an agenda to remedy the most pressing vulnerabilities. These included:

A multifaceted plan to revitalize domestic production of vital drugs, including off-patent generics where China had assumed a dominant role in supplying essential precursor chemicals.
A program of subsidies and tax credits aimed at rebuilding the US semiconductor manufacturing base, which had declined to 12% of global capacity despite America generating 34% of demand.
A multiagency initiative to identify opportunities for the domestic mining and processing of minerals such as rare earths critical to defense production and implementation of clean-energy plans.
A ten-year plan for building a resilient supply chain in support of lithium batteries and other technologies suited for compact, high-capacity storage of electricity.

This was just the beginning. The administration followed through with a series of legislative measures such as the Chips Act that have produced a surge in construction of domestic facilities for manufacturing cutting-edge microelectronics and energy storage devices—much if it funded by foreign companies.

China wasn’t the only reason for these efforts, but the administration’s environmental and workforce goals in many cases dovetailed nicely with its desire to counter China’s technological aspirations.

The first faint hints of a national industrial policy that emerged during the Trump administration have now coalesced into a comprehensive agenda for economic renewal. Some facets of administration activity, such as antitrust enforcement, haven’t quite caught up with where the White House wants to go, but the overall direction of policy is clear.

That, however, brings us to the issue of companies that don’t seem to have gotten the message. Some of the nation’s biggest and most progressive enterprises still are too heavily exposed to China for their own good, and the good of the nation.

Take Apple AAPL , the world’s most valuable company. Apple remains heavily dependent on Chinese facilities for the assembly of its signature iPhone. Sadanand Dhume noted in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed that since 2007, the portion of China’s contribution to the value of iPhones has risen from 4% to 25%.

And then there is Apple’s decision to source its new virtual-reality headset exclusively to Chinese manufacturer Luxshare—apparently the first time this has ever happened at the launch of a new Apple product. Talk about bad timing.

To take another example, Microsoft continues to employ thousands of software engineers at its Chinese research locations, many of whom are working on cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence.

Geoffrey Cain of the Foundation for American Innovation complained in June 13 congressional testimony that Microsoft’s Beijing research center “is the laboratory that went on for two decades to train many of the top AI technologists and developers in China.”

While Microsoft rival Google GOOG has avoided significant exposure to the Chinese market, Cain says Microsoft has made itself the centerpiece of the Chinese AI ecosystem.

These companies and others need to get in step with where Washington is headed. President Biden is, if anything, more forgiving of China’s many transgressions against global norms than the next Republican president is likely to be.

So, while Greg Hayes is right about finding a middle ground between decoupling and letting US deindustrialization continue, some of his tech-industry brethren need to wise up to a rapidly changing great-power dynamic.

RTX and Google contribute to my think tank.

Forbes · by Loren Thompson · July 10, 2023

20. How China Exports Secrecy

Excerpts:

Democracies must be far more proactive in their public defense of openness. Chinese authorities are making an argument, often dressed up in grandiose language, about the ostensible benefits of their development approach. As Xi put it at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, this approach offers a “new option for nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” It is a message that China’s global propaganda machine relentlessly pushes—and that democratic governments must aggressively counter. As part of their communication strategy, democracies should highlight Beijing’s use of secrecy to dominate and exploit other countries. At the same time, they should challenge Chinese companies to make all of their contracts transparent.

Finally, open societies will need to develop the structures and instruments to deal with the unique challenges presented by the Chinese party state. When negotiating bilaterally with other countries, China is usually able to get its way because it is invariably the stronger party. That is why Beijing works so hard to prioritize bilateral relationships over multilateral ones. To address this challenge, open societies will need to form new and adaptable coalitions to negotiate with China from a position of greater strength.

Beijing’s drive to export secrecy is an underappreciated dimension of its foreign power projection. China’s emerging global secrecy regime represents a systemic threat to open and accountable governance—and will require a purposeful and sustained response from democracies to expose and neutralize it.

Again, my thesis on China: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

How China Exports Secrecy

Beijing’s Global Assault on Transparency and Open Government

By Christopher Walker

July 11, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Christopher Walker · July 11, 2023

China thrives on secrecy. Beijing’s approach to governance, which relies on surveillance and control rather than openness and deliberation, requires secrecy. And to sustain it, the Chinese government suppresses independent journalism, censors digital information, and closely guards the kind of information that democracies freely disclose.

This commitment to secrecy and censorship is a long-standing feature of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. But under President Xi Jinping, whose ideas about governance may shape the world for years to come, the CCP has grown even more furtive. In recent months, the Chinese government has obscured the deaths of as many as one million people after it abruptly abandoned its harsh “zero COVID” policy. It has manipulated and withheld data about the pandemic. And it has broadened its draconian counterespionage laws to assert even greater control over China’s information environment.

Beijing has also emerged as a stealth exporter of secrecy abroad. This was seen most vividly in China’s manipulation of the World Health Organization. Chinese authorities suppressed domestic discussion of the Wuhan outbreak and refused to share information with global health authorities, hobbling the WHO’s response and forcing millions of people beyond China’s borders to pay a terrible price. Later, Beijing tried to manipulate the outcome of WHO inquiries into the origins of COVID-19. More than three years since the onset of the pandemic, Chinese authorities continue to resist WHO requests for data that might shed light on the source of the virus.

But it’s not just international organizations that have been affected by Beijing’s obsession with secrecy. As China projects its political, economic, and technological power globally through big-ticket infrastructure contracts, educational and media partnerships, and agreements to supply surveillance technologies, Beijing’s model of concealment is spreading beyond China’s borders. Countries striking deals with Beijing are discovering that they are expected to follow China’s lead, limiting transparency and accountability just as Chinese leaders do at home. The result of this pattern of engagement is a gradual erosion of global norms of transparency and open government—and the rise of new ones of concealment and opacity.

HUSH MONEY

When Chinese government entities make agreements with foreign governments or businesses, they often demand that the details be kept secret. The Mauritius Safe City Project—under which the Chinese technology giant Huawei partnered with Mauritius Telecom and the Mauritian police to install intrusive surveillance systems, including 4,000 cameras with facial recognition and license plate recording capabilities—is a case in point. The adoption of the project was opaque and proceeded with scant public debate. Despite its enormous $500 million price tag, financed by a loan from the Export-Import Bank of China, the initiative was casually announced in the Mauritius National Assembly and has since evaded oversight. Mauritian officials even waived a competitive bidding requirement for public procurements in order to select Mauritius Telecom to implement the project. When members of Mauritian civil society raised questions about the initiative, government officials hid behind the confidentiality clauses signed by the Mauritian police, Mauritius Telecom, and Huawei.

A similar scenario played out in Serbia, where the government signed a deal with Huawei to install a comprehensive surveillance system of 8,100 cameras. Citizens were told that these cameras would improve safety and that the technology could not be abused. But as was the case in Mauritius, no meaningful public debate preceded the system’s adoption and citizens were told little about the deal. Where such systems are imposed on uninformed publics, governments can gain effectively unchecked capabilities of surveillance and control.

Given the rapid pace at which advanced digital platforms are being adopted, the risk of entrenching authoritarian norms of surveillance is rising. In many countries, authorities are averse to disclosing information about the contracts through which they procure surveillance technologies. As a result, it can be exceedingly difficult for nongovernmental actors to discern who is actually behind these initiatives. Clarity on this is made more difficult by the overlap between the Chinese government and Chinese companies. In such an environment, China’s penchant for secrecy risks infecting other countries, especially those with weak institutions.

CONTRACT, WHAT CONTRACT?

Resistance to transparency is spreading. In Latin America, the Chinese government makes use of confidential debt contracts, which bar their signatories from disclosing their terms to the public. These deals, which are typically sealed swiftly and in secret, often sideline civil society and even national legislatures. Credit contracts between Chinese banks and the Ecuadorian government, for example, only came to light after the Panama Papers leak in 2016.

The story is the same elsewhere. In Canada, universities that wish to sign contracts with Huawei for research initiatives have been prohibited from discussing them publicly. The same is true in Kenya. The country’s $5 billion standard-gauge railroad, which was completed in 2017, is its most expensive infrastructure project, and it has been plagued by accusations of corruption. Local activists seeking information on the project petitioned the courts to release loan contracts signed by Chinese and Kenyan authorities. But once again, these agreements’ confidentiality clauses were invoked as a way of rebuffing the activists’ request for transparency.

China’s insistence on secrecy is reversing decades of progress toward greater transparency.

Again and again, countries that do business with the Chinese government or its affiliated companies are required not to disclose the terms of their agreements. In some cases, they are required to keep secret the very existence of contracts. According to a 2021 study of 100 debt contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 countries, China’s unusual lending terms were highly standardized and did not differ significantly by geographic region, hinting at the globalized nature of Beijing’s secrecy push.

In instances when activists or elected legislators have requested more information about these projects, governments have repeatedly invoked the confidentiality clauses in their agreements with Chinese companies. Where information has come to light, it has been unearthed by journalists and civil society activists, not disclosed by governments. This insistence on secrecy is reversing decades of progress toward greater transparency and openness and encouraging governments to resist accountability. With each deal done in the darkness, Beijing pushes countries toward less transparent and less accountable governance standards.

China’s emphasis on secrecy is especially corrosive in fragile, at-risk countries whose roots of institutional governance are shallow. This has real implications for institutions such as the Open Government Partnership and Millennium Challenge Corporation that have sought to encourage the adoption of openness and transparency as governance norms. China’s approach is disincentivizing such norms.

In short, China’s global secrecy drive is exacting economic as well as noneconomic costs. Opaque government processes and the high levels of corruption that often go with them can take a toll on economic productivity, reducing countries’ attractiveness to foreign investors. These qualities can also erode the integrity and sustainability of independent institutions, thereby undermining standards and practices of accountable governance. Finally, secrecy threatens the nongovernmental sphere, including the media, universities, and technology firms. To the extent that Beijing succeeds through the exertion of sharp power in weakening the ability of such institutions to scrutinize and interrogate its deals, the cycle of secrecy is bound to intensify.

LET IN THE LIGHT

Open societies should respond to these challenges by strongly privileging transparency and reaffirming principles and practices of openness. Secrecy is a competitive advantage for China, whose leadership has fine-tuned governance by concealment at home, and which is unaffected abroad by legislation forbidding foreign bribery. Democracies, however, have their own competitive advantage: openness. They should use it to expose the practices of Beijing and its proxies, including the serial writing of secrecy clauses into agreements. Democratic countries should also sharpen the distinction between their approach to governance and China’s by strengthening their transparency efforts.

Democratic governments and nongovernmental organizations must also do a better job of explaining the problems that result from Beijing’s secretive and often corrupting practices. A clearer understanding of the downsides of engagement with China will help countries avoid making choices that compromise democratic integrity, thereby reducing Beijing’s competitive advantage.

Democracies must be far more proactive in their public defense of openness. Chinese authorities are making an argument, often dressed up in grandiose language, about the ostensible benefits of their development approach. As Xi put it at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, this approach offers a “new option for nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” It is a message that China’s global propaganda machine relentlessly pushes—and that democratic governments must aggressively counter. As part of their communication strategy, democracies should highlight Beijing’s use of secrecy to dominate and exploit other countries. At the same time, they should challenge Chinese companies to make all of their contracts transparent.

Finally, open societies will need to develop the structures and instruments to deal with the unique challenges presented by the Chinese party state. When negotiating bilaterally with other countries, China is usually able to get its way because it is invariably the stronger party. That is why Beijing works so hard to prioritize bilateral relationships over multilateral ones. To address this challenge, open societies will need to form new and adaptable coalitions to negotiate with China from a position of greater strength.

Beijing’s drive to export secrecy is an underappreciated dimension of its foreign power projection. China’s emerging global secrecy regime represents a systemic threat to open and accountable governance—and will require a purposeful and sustained response from democracies to expose and neutralize it.

CHRISTOPHER WALKER is Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment for Democracy. He is a co-editor with William J. Dobson and Tarek Masoud of the forthcoming book Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power.

Foreign Affairs · by Christopher Walker · July 11, 2023

21. The Rapid Rise of Threads Appears to Be Hurting Twitter

I joined Threads (@maxoki161). But it has a long way to go for me to make it as productive as Twitter is for me (as a very useful news que by following the right people and organizations). Also there is not yet a desktop application for Mac iOS, only iPhone which makes it hard for me to link my daily news reports. I was not a user of Instagram and my instagram followers are not really the target audience I have for my news feed that I post on Twitter. I have to build a new list of who to follow on Threads.

The Rapid Rise of Threads Appears to Be Hurting Twitter

Third-party estimates suggest people have been switching to Meta’s new microblogging service from Elon Musk’s Twitter

By Sarah E. Needleman

Updated July 10, 2023 5:21 pm ET

The ultrafast growth of Threads looks like it is already taking a toll on Twitter.

Mark Zuckerberg, chief executive of Threads parent Meta Platforms META 1.23%increase; green up pointing triangle, said the new microblogging platform hit 100 million sign-ups less than a week after launching. At least two third-party estimates suggest Twitter traffic has been falling in tandem, an indication that its users may be leaving it for Threads rather than attempting to juggle both.

Twitter said it had roughly 535 million monetizable monthly active users in June, The Wall Street Journal reported last week.

The two products look and function in similar ways. Both focus on sharing short snippets of text but also allow users to post photos and videos. One distinction is that joining Threads requires having an account with Meta’s Instagram, which has more than 2 billion monthly users. That has made signing up easy and fast, though deleting a Threads account means also having to delete one’s Instagram account.

In the first two days that Threads was fully available, traffic to Twitter’s website was down 5% compared with the same two days of the previous week, according to SimilarWeb, which tracks online activity. Year over year, such traffic was down 11%, the firm said.

On Sunday Matthew Prince, CEO of cloud-infrastructure company Cloudflare, tweeted “Twitter traffic tanking” alongside a chart showing a decline in Twitter’s web domain ranking relative to other top internet destinations. A spokeswoman for Cloudflare said it ranks domains according to the volume of requests for access.

In a post on Threads, Zuckerberg said the 100 million sign-ups are from “mostly organic demand and we haven’t even turned on many promotions yet.”