Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie — deliberate, contrived, and dishonest — but the myth — persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Too often, we hold fast to the cliches of our forebears. We subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought."

– John F. Kennedy

"One good teacher in a lifetime may sometimes change a delinquent into a solid citizen."

– Philip Wylie

"God is not on the side of the big battalions, but on the side of those who shoot best."

– Voltaire

1. Jitters increase about future of South Korea-U.S. alliance

2. As the dust settles in Iran, all eyes turn to North Korea

3. South Korea is the ideal anchor for the first island chain

4. What South Korea Can Learn from the US Defense-Tech Sector

5. Trump gov't taking 'prudent,' 'strategic' approach toward N. Korea: U.S. official

6. N. Korea, Russia reaffirm strong ties in foreign ministers' talks: reports

7. N. Korea, China to resume Pyongyang-Beijing passenger train services after 5-yr hiatus: NHK

8. North Korea supplies 40% of Russia's ammunition, Ukrainian intel chief tells Bloomberg

9. Opinion | South Korea cut a deal with Trump. It didn't matter.

10. N. Korean military officials’ wives help choose official drivers

11. US troop cuts in South Korea 'realistic within four years,' expert says

12. N. Korean teacher reprimanded over poor student test scores

13. S. Korea, US continue joint efforts to 'make progress' toward OPCON transition: Pentagon official

14. At ASEAN meetings, S. Korea reaffirms alignment with US, Japan, pushes for NK dialogue

15. ASEAN, regional partners call for 'complete denuclearization' of Korean Peninsula

16. Your next K-pop album might cost 25% more, thanks to Trump’s latest tariffs

17. Shifting U.S. security priorities put Korea-U.S. alliance under strain

1. Jitters increase about future of South Korea-U.S. alliance

Are we at an inflection point or a perfect storm for the ROK/US alliance? What is Kim Jong Un observing and how does he intend to exploit any cracks in the alliance?

Is anyone assessing the actions of both the ROK and the US in terms of the threat and strategy from the north as well as from China?

Jitters increase about future of South Korea-U.S. alliance

In Washington, suspicions about new President Lee; in Seoul, fears of Trump

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

By - The Washington Times - Friday, July 11, 2025

SEOUL, South Korea — Foreign relations experts are worrying that the leaders of Seoul and Washington could do what no enemy has managed in 75 years: Fray the two democracies’ alliance to the breaking point.

In Southeast Asia Friday, top diplomats from Seoul, Tokyo and Washington huddled. On the same day in Northeast Asia, warplanes from the three nations drilled together in the clouds over a strategic island, while generals talked regional deterrence.

Those cheery photo ops and upbeat military vibes, however, may not allay deeper fears.

In Washington, concerns are simmering that South Korea’s newly elected liberal president, Lee Jae-myung, could degrade the bilateral alliance.

And in Seoul, those sentiments are mirrored in fears that President Trump’s intermingling of commercial and strategic issues could hurt the relationship, specifically if he were to link his promised tariffs on South Korea with the U.S. military’s presence there.

Diplomats chat, chiefs talk, warplanes thunder

Top diplomats from the U.S., South Korea and Japan met for 40 minutes Friday on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

While none of the three countries is an ASEAN member, attending the meeting were Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo. Mr. Park was deployed as the foreign minister-appointee of the Lee administration, which took office in June, is undergoing hearings.

The trio affirmed their resolute commitment to North Korean denuclearization, per Korean media.

Also Friday, but in Seoul, the top military brass of all three nations held their annual meeting.

“We’re illuminating a future path together, a path where partnerships can evolve through persistent and regular engagement from building capacity to really sharing responsibility,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine told his counterparts, noting that North Korea and China are “undergoing an unprecedented military build-up with a clear and unambiguous intent to move forward with their own agendas.”

And South Korean and Japanese jets drilled with a U.S. B-52 strategic bomber in international airspace close to South Korea’s Jeju Island.

The holiday isle enjoys a near-perfect strategic location south of the peninsula and northeast of Shanghai at the convergence of the Yellow and East China seas.

Chinese naval bases, naval shipyards and one of Beijing’s three fleet commands lie on the Yellow Sea littoral. Moreover, any North Korean warship seeking to cross from the peninsula’s east coast to its west coast — or vice versa — must traverse the area.

Jeju’s naval base offers South Korean and visiting U.S. assets an ideal staging point for regional operations inside the First Island Chain.

Despite Friday’s multiple, amicable gatherings, pundits fret over the relationship.

Lee: New pragmatist or old leftist?

Some pundits consider Mr. Lee, who took power in June after conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his martial law attempt in December, an unreformed radical.

Formerly known to despise Japan and favor better ties with China and North Korea, Mr. Lee pivoted once the Blue House came within reach.

He rebranded his liberal Democratic Party of Korea as “center right” and talked of “pragmatic” politics. He vowed to maintain Seoul’s alliance with the U.S. and its emergent trilateral ties with Japan — ties long-desired by the U.S. and championed by Mr. Yoon.

So far, he has kept his word.

His first major diplomatic engagement was with Japanese Premier Shigeru Ishiba at the June Group of Seven summit in Canada. That went so well that Mr. Ishiba visited the Korean Embassy in Tokyo days later to celebrate six decades of diplomatic ties.

And Mr. Lee’s national security adviser, visiting Washington in recent days, urged Mr. Rubio to set up a Lee-Trump meeting.

None of that has stopped U.S. conservatives from issuing dire warnings.

In a June op-ed in The Hill, conservative pundit Gordon Chang wrote that Mr. Lee “almost certainly wants American troops off South Korean soil,” citing comments made earlier in his career that they are “an occupying force.”

He warned that Mr. Lee may govern as “an anti-American, pro-China, pro-North Korea leftist.”

Any Korean president seeking to end the U.S. alliance faces an uphill battle. A 2025 poll by Seoul’s Asan Institute found that 96% of Koreans consider the alliance necessary and support for GIs in Korea stood at 80.1%.

“The whole development of South Korea was made possible under the umbrella provided by the U.S.” said Michael Breen, Seoul-based author of “The New Koreans.” “Neither side of the political aisle since Korea became a democracy has wanted to change that.”

Seoul’s previous liberal government, under President Moon Jae-in from 2017-2022, dragged relations with Tokyo to all-time lows. However, though Mr. Moon held summits with North Korea’s leader more often than any prior Seoul president, he neither broke sanctions against Pyongyang nor ended the U.S. alliance.

“Some elements in Lee’s party are anti-U.S. but they are fringe … he will be as pragmatic as possible,” predicted Jeffrey Robertson, an international relations expert at Seoul’s Yonsei University. “Like all former progressive presidents, he will stick to the center line.”

Concerns about Trump’s Korea strategy

Some fear the latest news coming out of Washington.

“It depends on who Trump is listening to in the U.S.,” Mr. Robertson said. “If he gets the idea that Lee is anti-U.S … that is illegitimate.”

Potential cuts to U.S. Forces Korea, or “flexible” use of the forces for off-peninsula roles, could be in play. In a Cabinet meeting this week, Mr. Trump raised the issue of South Korea paying more for GIs stationed there.

More disturbing for some is Mr. Trump’s habit of packaging together separate issues.

“Trump is tying trade and security together and I don’t agree with that, I think they should be separate,” said Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general. “He is describing USFK as a bargaining chip, and that is really disturbing.”

The ploy, he said, could blow back by playing to Seoul’s hard left.

“As some Korean progressives don’t see North Korea as a security threat, they may accept a trade-off — U.S. troop cuts for tariffs — which is ridiculous,” Mr. Chun said.

Mr. Trump said this week he would levy 25% tariffs on South Korea starting Aug. 1 if a trade deal between the two countries isn’t reached before then.

Other Koreans fear tariffs could reignite mass anti-Americanism, dormant in South Korea since the 2008 protests over U.S. beef imports.

“If Trump wages tariff war against South Korea, threatens to withdraw U.S. forces and demands increased defense spending and burden sharing, I think the majority of South Koreans will be critical of him and the U.S.” said a Seoul-based academic with ties to the Lee government.

Minefields also lie ahead in the diplomatic space.

“Lee has made it clear he wants to keep the alliance and honor trilateral relations,” said the academic, who spoke off the record as he did not want to be considered an administration spokesperson. “However, he also wants a cooperative partnership with China and better diplomatic ties with Russia.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

2. As the dust settles in Iran, all eyes turn to North Korea

All eyes? Are there even any eyes tha can even locate north Korea? Yes I am being sarcastic but my point is north Korea does not rise to any level of concern (much less understanding) until it does something dramatic and then attention will fade after the 24 hour news cycle.

That said, I do hope Kim gets the message. Sure the Iran action reinforces his belief that a leader must never give up his nuclear weapons and it will harden his resolve to retain his nuclear weapons forever. However, he should also be considering that the US has the capability to strike his weapons (and more important nly him) and has demonstrated the will to do so.

That said, given the conditions in Seoul and Washington I am sure he is working out how to improve his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies to exploit what he perceives is opportunity with both POTUS and POTROK.

Excerpts:

Decisive though the American response may have appeared, it cannot compare with the bombing needed to wipe out North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Iran may have been on the brink of producing its first nuclear warheads, but North Korea has made dozens of them — perhaps 100 or so. Kim is very unlikely to yield to U.S. and South Korean demands that he give up his entire nuclear program. At least, however, the American bombing, as well as strikes by Tomahawk missiles fired by American submarines, should demonstrate what the American military machine is theoretically capable of doing to the North Koreans.

Trump and South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae-myung, are both looking for renewed dialogue with North Korea. There is little chance of either of them endorsing a strike against North Korea. By attacking the Iranian sites, however, Washington should have given Pyongyang an idea of the hell that might befall North Korea if Kim were to begin to make good on his threats against South Korea It’s possible, optimistically, to speculate that Kim, far from responding adversely, may be inclined to talk after seeing this display of military might against his Iranian friends.

It’s also possible that Kim might choose to strengthen his own defenses, to make the North Korean sites beyond the reach of any bunker-busters, while shoring up his ties to Russia as well as China. Time will tell.

As the dust settles in Iran, all eyes turn to North Korea

by Donald Kirk, opinion contributor - 07/11/25 2:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5395271-iran-nuclear-bombing-north-korea-reaction/

All the talk about the damage done to Iran’s nuclear facilities during last month’s bombing and shelling by the Israelis and the Americans has to be speculative. No one on the ground in Iran is telling us whether the deepest complex at Fordow was destroyed or badly damaged; we’re not likely to know for months or years — if ever — what really happened in the labyrinth of tunnels dug into the side of a mountain.

President Trump may be forgiven for engaging in hyperbole when he says Fordow was “obliterated” by the bunker-busters dropped from B2 bombers, while his critics, in reverse hyperbole, insist the Iranian nuclear program was set back only a few months. Both these estimates have their roots in political bias as much as physical or scientific evidence.

One set of foreign observers, though, has got to know more: the North Koreans, who have long been advising, aiding and abetting Iran on its nuclear program.

Former President George W. Bush, in his first “state of the union” address in 2002, described North Korea and Iran as poles in an “axis of evil” that also included Iraq, then ruled by Saddam Hussein, overthrown by U.S. forces on Bush’s orders more than a year later. The axis, without Iraq, has flourished ever since the North Koreans provided first the missiles and then the technology for producing its own version of the North’s mid-range Rodong.

There’s no word how many North Korean advisers were still in Iran during what Trump has called the “12-day war,” but it’s safe to assume North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, would have gotten a realistic version of what really happened. How could it have been otherwise, considering that most of the missiles fired back at Israel by the Iranians were of North Korean design?

Iranian and North Korean experts have been going back and forth ever since Saddam Hussein initiated the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, when the North began plying Iran with artillery shells and other armaments. After Pakistan tested its first nuclear device in 1998, the “father” of the Pakistani bomb, physicist AQ Khan, provided North Korea with nuclear technology that the North then passed on to Iran. Considering the North’s central role as the source of Iran’s rise as a near-nuclear power, we may be sure Kim will want to maintain a relationship from which his regime has reaped billions of dollars.

“Hundreds of people are still working on missile sites” in Iran, Bruce Bechtol, author of numerous books and articles on North Korea’s armed forces, remarked on a podcast as the bombs and shells were still falling on Iran. “North Korea does not evacuate its people when war breaks out.” If Iran is to recover from the strikes, it will be with North Korean advice and assistance as usual.

All eyes are now on North Korea for its response to the Israeli and American strikes.

“I doubt that it will take any provocative action,” David Maxwell, a retired American army colonel who did five tours in South Korea as a special forces officer, remarked to me in an email, “but I would like to see if it takes any action to secure its own facilities out of fear of a US strike.” North Korea “will certainly want to get [bomb damage assessment] from the Iranian facilities,” he said. “They will want to learn from these strikes and determine what modifications they will need to make their own facilities to further harden them. They will want to know if our ‘bunker buster’ can really bust their bunkers.”

Decisive though the American response may have appeared, it cannot compare with the bombing needed to wipe out North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Iran may have been on the brink of producing its first nuclear warheads, but North Korea has made dozens of them — perhaps 100 or so. Kim is very unlikely to yield to U.S. and South Korean demands that he give up his entire nuclear program. At least, however, the American bombing, as well as strikes by Tomahawk missiles fired by American submarines, should demonstrate what the American military machine is theoretically capable of doing to the North Koreans.

Trump and South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae-myung, are both looking for renewed dialogue with North Korea. There is little chance of either of them endorsing a strike against North Korea. By attacking the Iranian sites, however, Washington should have given Pyongyang an idea of the hell that might befall North Korea if Kim were to begin to make good on his threats against South Korea It’s possible, optimistically, to speculate that Kim, far from responding adversely, may be inclined to talk after seeing this display of military might against his Iranian friends.

It’s also possible that Kim might choose to strengthen his own defenses, to make the North Korean sites beyond the reach of any bunker-busters, while shoring up his ties to Russia as well as China. Time will tell.

Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He is currently a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea, and is the author of several books about Asian affairs.

3. South Korea is the ideal anchor for the first island chain

Excellent. This is the thinking we need from strategists in both Seoul and Washington. We have to recognize the geostrategic importance of the Korean peninsula.

Korea contributes to the strategic agility US and its allies need to ensure a free and open Asia-Indo-Pacific. We need strategic agility platforms and Korea is one of the key ones.

Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/

Excerpts:

Similarly, viewing South Korea as a more regionally focused power-projection platform allows other options for US forces departing from Okinawa, per the terms of the Defense Policy Review Initiative: The US government is obligated by the government of Japan to remove 9,000 US Marines from Okinawa, of the over 18,000 stationed there, a movement that has already begun. The US military is currently on track to move these troops to Guam and Hawaii. This places nearly one-half of this element of the US stand-in force beyond the first island chain, undermining a key element of US defense posture across that chain. But Korea is thousands of miles closer to any place US forces will fight. Moreover, Korea, where anti-Chinese attitudes are on the rise, would likely accept the additional investment. Korea would foot much of the bill for infrastructure supporting these additional forces per the terms of the Special Measures Agreement and is likely to continue to pay for their sustainment in the future.

Finally, the US military could store critical munitions and other material required for a fight against either North Korea or China in South Korea. The extensive lines of communication between the first island chain and resupply points in Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States would impose great cost on any US campaign in the region. Again, South Korea’s proximity and available space make it ideal as an anchor for the first island chain. Moreover, South Korea has demonstrated its willingness to tap into its own wartime stocks, illustrated by its donation of more artillery shells to Ukraine than all of those donated by Europe combined. Similarly, South Korea won’t prevent the United States from using its munitions for any fight it chooses to, whether against North Korea or China.

The risk of simultaneous wars with China and North Korea only seems to increase, and such an occurrence would undermine regional and global stability. Neither of these fights are isolated. Should the United States defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, South Korea will inevitably become involved. So, too, will China become involved in any US effort to defend South Korea from North Korean attack, likely seizing the opportunity to make coercive and military gains against Taiwan.

US planners should build these assumptions into their planning frameworks to seize the opportunities that exist. Peninsular stability and Taiwan Strait stability are one and the same. Investing in South Korean security serves as an investment in Taiwan security.

Issue Brief

July 10, 2025 • 2:35 pm ET

South Korea is the ideal anchor for the first island chain

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/south-korea-is-the-ideal-anchor-for-the-first-island-chain/

By Brian Kerg

Overwhelmingly, commentary regarding Chinese military aggression focuses on the area known as the “first island chain,” stretching from the Philippines to the south, through Japan in the north, with Taiwan at the centerpiece. Taiwan remains the focus because control of Taiwan, whether by military force or other coercive means, remains a national security objective of the Chinese Communist Party. As this geography includes mutual-defense treaty allies of the United States, it is understood as a multinational chain restraining Chinese hostility. Should China attempt a military seizure of Taiwan, the likelihood of the conflict expanding to include the entirety of the first island chain—and US forces stationed or deployed there—remains high.

However, this discussion largely omits another likely participant that could prove decisive in deterring such a fight and in determining its outcome: South Korea. Indeed, while an island only in the sense that its infrastructure is not connected to the Asian mainland because of the obstacle of North Korea, South Korea is geographically the “anchor” of the first island chain and could operationally serve in that role. By addressing the assumptions that lead analysts to exclude Korea from assessments of Chinese military aggression, the advantages to regional security that arise from Korean investment become clear.

Why is Korea excluded from discussion of a US-China conflict involving Taiwan? The United States currently assesses China as the country’s pacing threat, and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could likely be a catalyst for war between the United States and China. South Korea’s primary threat—North Korea—is not perceived to be as dangerous to US national security interests relative to China. US defense planners compartmentalize the threats posed by China and North Korea, and there is an incorrect perception that US military assets stationed in Korea cannot be used in a fight against China. As a result, Korea gets short shrift in this discussion. But the assumption that Korea would be excluded from such a conflict is baseless.

First, this bias is premised on the assumption that South Korea would only fight alongside the United States in a war against North Korea and not become involved in a war between the United States and China. However, the US-South Korean mutual defense treaty does not contain this limitation. Rather, it states clearly: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Moreover, attitudes within South Korea are becoming more supportive of military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. An attack against the United States in the Pacific is increasingly likely to facilitate South Korean participation in that conflict, regardless of the belligerent. And in a US-China war over Taiwan, China has many sound operational reasons for attacking US forces across the region and in Korea.

Second, analysts assume that US forces and matériel placed in South Korea is held hostage there, so to speak, and may only be used to defend South Korea against North Korea. Within US military planning circles, this is referred to as the “black hole theory” of the Korean peninsula. Indeed, Combined Forces Command, the warfighting headquarters that fully integrates US and South Korean forces, is optimized for and conducts exercises to defend South Korea from North Korean aggression.

However, the mission of Combined Forces Command is not exclusive to North Korean threats and includes deterring and defeating “outside aggression” against South Korea. Similarly, US Forces Korea, which is separate from Combined Forces Command, deters and defends against any aggression to maintain stability in Northeast Asia. The former commander of both organizations, General Paul LaCamera, publicly noted that planning for his forces encompasses any contingency, including those that occur outside of Korea. His successor and the current commander, General Xavier Brunson, reinforced this notion by highlighting the proximity of South Korea to China and the broader, regional, strategic utility of US forces in South Korea beyond the threat posed by North Korea.

Finally, there is no agreement, regulation, or document that traps US forces on the Korean peninsula. If the Pacific becomes a war zone, no matter the threat, the United States gets a decisive vote in how its forces are employed, whether on or off the Korean peninsula. US forces have historically been deployed far from Korea for combat operations elsewhere. In the most recent example, a Patriot missile unit deployed from Korea defended the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar from Iranian missile attacks in June of 2025. In short, the black hole theory is a myth. That it is a myth is illustrated perhaps most clearly by the other side of this coin—the North Korean threat. North Korea has shifted munitions and troops from the Korean peninsula in support of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. Troops and matériel will be committed wherever each nation’s security interests lie, regardless of their geography.

These facts should be contextualized against the real threat of simultaneity of conflict throughout the region. Great power wars tend to expand horizontally and there are many paths by which a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could lead to a North Korean attack on South Korea and vice versa. Further, the likelihood of Chinese interference in a Korean crisis will only increase as Chinese-US tensions rise. Finally, an increased footprint of US forces in Japan as a check against these threats is an untenable solution, as the US started honoring its legal obligation to start reducing total forces in Okinawa last year.

To summarize:

the United States should expect South Korean co-belligerency if the United States is attacked in the Pacific region per the US-ROK mutual defense treaty;
there is nothing preventing the use of US assets staged on the Korean peninsula in contingencies that occur off the Korean peninsula;
any Chinese-initiated conflict will almost certainly expand to Korea in some fashion; and
a North Korean-initiated conflict will almost certainly involve Chinese belligerency to some degree.

This being the case, opportunities exist for integrating South Korea into a wider defense across the first island chain.

First, investing US resources in South Korean security should rightly be seen as simultaneously defending against both North Korean and Chinese aggression. This form of dual deterrence is akin to moving a chess piece to simultaneously threaten two enemy pieces. The Chinese certainly view it this way, illustrating their perception quite clearly in their angry reaction to the 2016 deployment of a US Terminal High Altitude Anti Area Defense anti-missile battery in South Korea. While explicitly deployed to intercept North Korean missile strikes, this battery could also intercept Chinese missile launches, and this reality triggered a plethora of Chinese retaliatory and coercive actions against South Korea, to which South Korea did not yield.

Second, South Korea should be viewed through the lens of its proximity to the decisive space for any potential fight and not through the outdated view of compartmentalized conflicts. This immediately solves fundamental operational problems of time, space, and force. Forces stationed outside of the first island chain, especially those based in the continental United States, likely won’t be able to safely enter the conflict zone once it becomes contested in time to influence the decisive, opening phases of any conflict. Forces stationed within South Korea, meanwhile, are in position to support the defense against threats from both North Korea and China.

With these views informing policy, forces that could be useful in either a Korea or China scenario currently stationed in the United States could instead be based in South Korea. For example, US Army Pacific continues to advertise its potential as the linchpin of the joint force in a China fight, but it is hard pressed to fill this role because its forces are overwhelmingly based in the United States—over 5,000 miles away from the first island chain. Moving such mass across the Pacific Ocean without dominance of the air and maritime domains will only sacrifice an unacceptable number of US troops for no operational gain. But basing them instead in South Korea closes this distance, steals a march against two adversaries at once, allows for a much more rapid shift of these forces to key terrain at the start of a fight, and contributes meaningfully to deterrence before a fight.

Similarly, viewing South Korea as a more regionally focused power-projection platform allows other options for US forces departing from Okinawa, per the terms of the Defense Policy Review Initiative: The US government is obligated by the government of Japan to remove 9,000 US Marines from Okinawa, of the over 18,000 stationed there, a movement that has already begun. The US military is currently on track to move these troops to Guam and Hawaii. This places nearly one-half of this element of the US stand-in force beyond the first island chain, undermining a key element of US defense posture across that chain. But Korea is thousands of miles closer to any place US forces will fight. Moreover, Korea, where anti-Chinese attitudes are on the rise, would likely accept the additional investment. Korea would foot much of the bill for infrastructure supporting these additional forces per the terms of the Special Measures Agreement and is likely to continue to pay for their sustainment in the future.

Finally, the US military could store critical munitions and other material required for a fight against either North Korea or China in South Korea. The extensive lines of communication between the first island chain and resupply points in Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States would impose great cost on any US campaign in the region. Again, South Korea’s proximity and available space make it ideal as an anchor for the first island chain. Moreover, South Korea has demonstrated its willingness to tap into its own wartime stocks, illustrated by its donation of more artillery shells to Ukraine than all of those donated by Europe combined. Similarly, South Korea won’t prevent the United States from using its munitions for any fight it chooses to, whether against North Korea or China.

The risk of simultaneous wars with China and North Korea only seems to increase, and such an occurrence would undermine regional and global stability. Neither of these fights are isolated. Should the United States defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, South Korea will inevitably become involved. So, too, will China become involved in any US effort to defend South Korea from North Korean attack, likely seizing the opportunity to make coercive and military gains against Taiwan.

US planners should build these assumptions into their planning frameworks to seize the opportunities that exist. Peninsular stability and Taiwan Strait stability are one and the same. Investing in South Korean security serves as an investment in Taiwan security.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg is an active-duty US Marine Corps operational planner and a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a 2025 nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

4. What South Korea Can Learn from the US Defense-Tech Sector

(And as an aside, the other way around as well, especially when it comes to shipbuilding.)

Excerpts:

Commission the Future

South Korea doesn’t need to mimic Detachment 201. It needs its own version adapted to its particular environment, rooted in its values, shaped by its institutions, and led by its best minds.

Create a fusion corps and embed technologists in defense planning and operations. Let AI researchers spend rotations in strategic command units. Build a two-way bridge between Gwacheon (the center of administration) and Pangyo (South Korea’s Silicon Valley). Because in the next war, it won’t be the biggest guns or the most battalions that decide who wins. It’ll be the best minds, the fastest loops, and the countries that figured out how to get their coders and colonels speaking the same language before it was too late.

Innovation doesn’t wear a uniform. But maybe it should.

What South Korea Can Learn from the US Defense-Tech Sector

The National Interest · by Schoni Song · July 11, 2025

Topic: Security

Blog Brand: Korea Watch

Region: Asia

Tags: Defense Technology, Silicon Valley, and South Korea

July 11, 2025

By: Schoni Song

Seoul must figure out how to replicate Washington’s success in fusing its national security apparatus with Silicon Valley.

Silicon Valley is commissioning coders into camouflage—and it’s not cosplay. In fact, it’s a bold bet on brainpower as the next battlefield advantage. Seoul, with all its talent and tech, should be taking notes and building its own fusion force to fight the next war.

South Korea is many things. A semiconductor juggernaut. A soft power exporter. A rising player in defense manufacturing. But one thing it is not (at least not yet) is a country that knows how to let engineers and colonels sit at the same table without flinching. And that’s a problem.

Because in the age of AI warfare, drone swarms, and autonomous kill chains, the next decisive battlefield won’t just be kinetic. It’ll be cognitive. And for that, militaries won’t just need brigades. They’ll need brainpower.

Enter Detachment 201. This small but symbolic US Army unit recently made headlines for commissioning executives from Meta, OpenAI, Palantir, and other frontier tech firms into the Army Reserve as lieutenant colonels. Their job? To serve in a newly created “Executive Innovation Corps” and bridge the yawning gap between military needs and commercial capability.

Meta’s CTO, Andrew Bosworth. OpenAI’s Kevin Weil. Palantir’s Shyam Sankar. These aren’t lobbyists or defense contractors. They’re the kind of people who get pinged by tech journalists the moment they sneeze on Twitter. And now, they wear the uniform—figuratively and literally—as part of an institutional bet on America’s considerable tech talent.

Why Fusion Works—and Has Always Worked.

Let’s dispense with the myth: military-civil fusion is nothing new. Napoleon’s logistical revolution, which saw mass mobilization powered by standardized conscription and state-led provisioning, changed how Europe fought, and later, how it built railways, ran postal services, and measured time.

World War II gave us radar, synthetic rubber, and the modern aircraft industry. The Cold War brought satellites, the microchip, and eventually the internet. DARPA wasn’t built to launch startups. It was built to beat the Soviets. The byproduct? Google Maps, voice recognition, GPS, and your iPhone’s touchscreen. War doesn’t just change borders. It rewires economies. And America understood early on that civilian technologists can solve military problems.

America’s Secret Weapon Isn’t a Weapon

The United States has spent the better part of a century perfecting the art of weaponized innovation through the open architecture of its technology ecosystem. America has Lockheed Martin, Stanford, MIT, Andreesen Horowitz, and DARPA all speaking, roughly, the same language.

Where else but in America could the same person fund a food delivery app and a missile tracking startup in the same quarter? Where else can a Defense Secretary be on texting terms with tech unicorns, or a drone startup get its first funding from both venture capital and the Pentagon?

That’s why China, for all its slogans about “military-civil fusion,” hasn’t cracked the code. State-led integration is not the same as innovation. Beijing can mandate partnerships between defense SOEs and tech platforms. But what it can’t do—what no command economy has ever done—is manufacture the serendipity, chaos, and friction that make innovation real.

Russia? Its private sector is mostly state-penetrated. Its top engineers are fleeing. Its defense sector is trapped in 1987. Fusion doesn’t work when the reactor is broken.

A Window Worth More Than Optics

For South Korea, some green shoots are emerging from the soil. President Lee’s recent appointment of Ha Jung-woo—a seasoned technologist from Naver’s AI Innovation Center—as South Korea’s first-ever senior presidential secretary for AI is more than symbolic. Ha has long been a vocal champion of AI sovereignty, open-source ecosystems, and the kind of accelerator access that could keep the ROK competitive in a world where GPUs are the new oil.

It’s the right move. And the timing is sharp. With Ha reporting directly to the chief of staff for policy, the Lee administration has effectively elevated AI to the same level as other core pillars of national strategy.

Add to that the appointments of a defense reformist as first deputy national security director, and a seasoned diplomat and economic security expert to round out the trio, and the message is clear: this administration is trying to stack the deck with capability.

But good hires aren’t enough when the task is to rewire the entire DNA of how South Korea thinks about tech, defense, and the fusion of both. What’s needed now is velocity, procurement reform, and use cases where military applications and civilian innovation converge.

With the Democratic Party of Korea holding a commanding majority in the National Assembly, there is a fleeting but powerful window to drive legislation, budget allocation, and structural change. No excuses. No gridlock. No veto politics.

But here’s the risk: the DPK’s well-documented reflex toward strategic appeasement—especially vis-à-vis China and North Korea—could throttle the momentum before it even builds. If old instincts return, if the impulse is to temper ambition in the name of “balance” or to decouple economic and security strategy in the name of outdated realpolitik, we may look back at this moment as the one we wasted.

The Cost of Caution

This is where South Korea should be watching with more curiosity, and frankly, more urgency.

Because while Seoul is investing billions into defense exports, AI, and other critical technologies, the institutional culture still treats military-civil fusion like it’s a security threat. The defense establishment is wary of the tech sector. The tech ecosystem is wary of the defense establishment. And the bureaucrats? They’re mostly just wary in general.

We celebrate when South Korean missiles hit their targets. But we look away when someone asks why the software inside them is still decades behind. We tout our global AI competitiveness. But we forget that the smartest AI people in the country rarely, if ever, touch a single defense program. Why? Because our system is allergic to cross-pollination.

In South Korea, if a Meta executive tried to serve as a reserve officer advising defense procurement, eyebrows would be raised. Legal questions would fly. Headlines would imply undue influence or favoritism. But the real loss wouldn’t be reputational. It would be strategic.

A New Mandate for Allies

The United States doesn’t expect allies to replicate its system. But it does need partners who can contribute meaningfully to the evolving alliance architecture.

That means interoperable weapons and interoperable innovation cultures. It means defense ministries that can work with startups. It means academic researchers who don’t see security as a dirty word. It means tech leaders who view service not only as a civic duty, but also as a national security multiplier.

Japan is already taking cautious steps in this direction, quietly expanding its dual-use research and development footprint. Australia is doubling down on defense innovation hubs. But what about South Korea? It has the talent, the capital, and the ambition. Yet, what it lacks is the connective tissue. But that can change.

The future of South Korean defense isn’t just K9 howitzers and KF-21 jets; it’s also swarms of autonomous drones, zero-trust cyber infrastructure, generative AI simulations, and the ability to out-think an adversary before the first shot is fired.

And for that, you need fusion, not as a buzzword, but as a backbone.

Commission the Future

South Korea doesn’t need to mimic Detachment 201. It needs its own version adapted to its particular environment, rooted in its values, shaped by its institutions, and led by its best minds.

Create a fusion corps and embed technologists in defense planning and operations. Let AI researchers spend rotations in strategic command units. Build a two-way bridge between Gwacheon (the center of administration) and Pangyo (South Korea’s Silicon Valley). Because in the next war, it won’t be the biggest guns or the most battalions that decide who wins. It’ll be the best minds, the fastest loops, and the countries that figured out how to get their coders and colonels speaking the same language before it was too late.

Innovation doesn’t wear a uniform. But maybe it should.

About the Author: Schoni Song

Schoni Song is Junior Partner and Global Business Lead at Macoll Consulting Group, South Korea’s premier public and government affairs consultancy, where he advises Fortune 500s and global nonprofits on how to win influence and shape policy in one of Asia’s most dynamic markets. Schoni also serves as Co-Chair of the Chemical Committee at AMCHAM Korea and has previously worked at the US State Department’s INL Bureau, the Korean National Assembly, and the Asia Society. He holds a BA from Yonsei University and an MA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. His opinions are his own.

Image: Flying Camera / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Schoni Song · July 11, 2025

5. Trump gov't taking 'prudent,' 'strategic' approach toward N. Korea: U.S. official

While we want to reduce military tensions we must remember what the proximate cause of those tensions are - the hostile policy of north Korea. We must also understand that appeasing the Kim family regime will not reduce military tensions but wil only cause Kim to double down because he will assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy as successful.

Perhaps it is time for our policymakers to sinders these five basic questions.

1. What do we want to achieve in Korea?

2. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement (i.e., "end state") that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

3. Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)

4. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?

5. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?

The answers to these questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government with respect for individual liberty, the rule of law, and human rights, determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or, in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

Excerpts:

During a press briefing, State Department deputy spokesperson Mignon Houston stressed the trilateral relationship among South Korea, the United States and Japan as a "substantial" partnership for a "free and open" Indo-Pacific, while acknowledging efforts by Seoul and Tokyo to overcome historical challenges and deepen cooperation.

"The United States has always been committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. This is a commitment because we understand ... following this commitment, we are ensuring the stability of the region," she said during a press meeting at the Foreign Press Center in Washington.

"So we're working together on a number of fronts with our partners and our allies, particularly as it relates to sort of reducing the military tensions in this region and protecting the safety and security of the Korean Peninsula."

Houston added that the Trump administration is working with allies to ensure "transparent" defense measures, "efficient and effective" military cooperation and appropriate risk mitigation measures for security on the peninsula.

"These are the steps that we're taking together in this administration. These are prudent steps. They're strategic steps to ensure a safe and secure Korean Peninsula," she said.

...

She went on to say that the trilateral relationship is a partnership that is "integral" to promoting regional peace.

Casting South Korea as the "linchpin of peace, security and safety in the Indo-Pacific," she underscored the U.S. administration's "modernized and future-forward" priority for the Seoul-Washington relationship.

Trump gov't taking 'prudent,' 'strategic' approach toward N. Korea: U.S. official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 12, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, July 11 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is taking a "prudent" and "strategic" approach to addressing North Korean challenges, a U.S. diplomat said Friday, reiterating its stated commitment to the "complete denuclearization" of North Korea.

During a press briefing, State Department deputy spokesperson Mignon Houston stressed the trilateral relationship among South Korea, the United States and Japan as a "substantial" partnership for a "free and open" Indo-Pacific, while acknowledging efforts by Seoul and Tokyo to overcome historical challenges and deepen cooperation.

"The United States has always been committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. This is a commitment because we understand ... following this commitment, we are ensuring the stability of the region," she said during a press meeting at the Foreign Press Center in Washington.

"So we're working together on a number of fronts with our partners and our allies, particularly as it relates to sort of reducing the military tensions in this region and protecting the safety and security of the Korean Peninsula."

Houston added that the Trump administration is working with allies to ensure "transparent" defense measures, "efficient and effective" military cooperation and appropriate risk mitigation measures for security on the peninsula.

"These are the steps that we're taking together in this administration. These are prudent steps. They're strategic steps to ensure a safe and secure Korean Peninsula," she said.

State Department deputy spokesperson Mignon Houston speaks during a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington on July 11, 2025. (Yonhap)

The deputy spokesperson was responding to a question about how the Trump administration would characterize its approach to North Korea. The administration of former President Joe Biden branded its approach to the North as a "calibrated" and "practical" one.

She reiterated the U.S.' priority to ensure steady three-way cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, which has deepened amid improvements in Seoul-Tokyo ties long strained over historical and territorial feuds.

"We've seen the relationship between Japan and South Korea at this point be better than it has ever been, and we recognize that both countries have grappled with painful histories. Working together to address and counter shared opportunities and challenges is something that we continue to focus on and this administration, in particular, is prioritizing this," she said.

She went on to say that the trilateral relationship is a partnership that is "integral" to promoting regional peace.

Casting South Korea as the "linchpin of peace, security and safety in the Indo-Pacific," she underscored the U.S. administration's "modernized and future-forward" priority for the Seoul-Washington relationship.

"South Korea has an extensive trading relationship with the U.S. Our trade relationship currently supports at least 350,000 American jobs. It's based on high-value products. We welcome their leadership in the 2025 APEC," she said. APEC is short for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

Touching on tensions with allies about Trump's tariff policy, Houston defended it as a "strategic" step toward fair trade relations.

"This is not a punitive step, but a strategic step to work together with our allies and our partners around the world, ensuring that these trade arrangements meet us at a place of fairness ... when we believe, through working together with our partners, that we will see, through good-faith efforts, negotiations that can get us there," she said.

South Korea, Japan and other countries have been in trade negotiations with the U.S. to reach trade deals as Trump's "reciprocal" tariffs, including 25 percent duties on Korea, are set to take effect on Aug. 1.

The steep tariffs took effect on April 9, but Trump placed a 90-day pause on them that same day to allow for negotiations. The pause was initially set to expire this week, but Trump extended the deadline until Aug. 1.

"We look forward to working closely with our partners and allies around the world to see these trade imbalances be a little more leveled so we can play on the same level-playing field. And that's a priority for us at this time," she said.

In response to a question about the possibility of the Quad forum's extension to include new members like South Korea, Houston said that while there might not be space for new member, there might be chances for cooperation with Korea within the group that consists of the U.S., Australia, Japan and India.

"There are, on many work streams, opportunities for us to work very closely with South Korea as it relates to our shared interests and shared priorities for the region," she said.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 12, 2025

6. N. Korea, Russia reaffirm strong ties in foreign ministers' talks: reports

The stones on the three dimensional Go/Baduk board are gaining new territories.

(2nd LD) N. Korea, Russia reaffirm strong ties in foreign ministers' talks: reports | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 12, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with talks; CHANGES headline, lead; ADDS photo)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, July 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea and Russia reaffirmed their strong ties Saturday during a meeting of their top diplomats in a coastal North Korean resort city, Russian news agencies reported.

North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui met her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Wonsan for the second round of strategic talks between the two countries, a day after Lavrov arrived in the city, where a tourist zone opened earlier this month, according to TASS.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2nd from L) and his North Korean counterpart, Choe Son-hui (2nd from R), attend the second round of strategic talks between the two countries in Wonsan, North Korea, on July 12, 2025, in this photo provided by the Russian Embassy in North Korea on Telegram. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

In opening remarks, Lavrov reaffirmed Choe's earlier description of their bilateral ties as an "invincible military brotherhood," citing North Korean troops who fought alongside Russian soldiers against Ukrainian forces in Russia's western region of Kursk.

He also pledged to make efforts so that more Russian tourists will visit the resort city, such as increasing flights, TASS reported.

Choe reaffirmed her country's support for Russia, describing their ties as rising to an "unbreakable" level.

"The strategic choice and will of the DPRK government is to defend, unconditionally and consistently support Russia's policy of protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity," TASS quoted her as saying.

DPRK stands for North Korea's official name -- the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Lavrov's trip to the North will last until Sunday, when he is set to fly to China to attend a foreign ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states.

His trip comes as Moscow and Pyongyang have been reinforcing their broad-based cooperation since Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty during a summit in Pyongyang in June last year.

This photo, captured from a broadcast of Korean Central TV, shows Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov shaking hands with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui as they meet for talks in Pyongyang on Oct. 19, 2023. (For Use Only in South Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 12, 2025

7. N. Korea, China to resume Pyongyang-Beijing passenger train services after 5-yr hiatus: NHK

Again, the stones on the three dimensional Go/Baduk board are gaining new territories.

N. Korea, China to resume Pyongyang-Beijing passenger train services after 5-yr hiatus: NHK | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 12, 2025

TOKYO, July 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea and China have agreed to resume passenger train services between Pyongyang and Beijing as early as next month after a five-year hiatus, Japanese broadcaster NHK reported Saturday.

The two countries are in final talks for the resumption of such services between their capitals after their suspension in January 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the broadcaster said, citing multiple sources.

It quoted a source as saying that North Korean travel to China increased after May this year for training purposes and that bilateral ties appear to be warming.

When asked about the possible resumption of the services, China's foreign ministry said it was not aware of such activities and referred the inquiry to relevant authorities, NHK said.

This undated file photo shows a passenger train crossing a border bridge between China and North Korea. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 12, 2025

8. North Korea supplies 40% of Russia's ammunition, Ukrainian intel chief tells Bloomberg

Saturday

July 12, 2025

dictionary + A - A

North Korea supplies 40% of Russia's ammunition, Ukrainian intel chief tells Bloomberg

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-07-12/national/northKorea/North-Korea-supplies-40-of-Russias-ammunition-Ukrainian-intel-chief-tells-Bloomberg/2351244

Published: 12 Jul. 2025, 10:35

Updated: 12 Jul. 2025, 12:18

A building in Odesa, Ukraine, is damaged by a Russian drone strike on June 11. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

North Korea is supplying as much as 40 percent of Russia's ammunition used in the war in Ukraine, according to a Bloomberg report on Saturday.

It cites Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukrainian military intelligence, who told the news outlet that “North Korea has huge stockpiles and production goes on around the clock.”

Trump administration resumes sending some weapons to Ukraine after Pentagon pause

Top U.S. military officer calls for trilateral cooperation amid military buildup by North Korea, China

He added that North Korea is supplying not only ammunition but also ballistic missiles and artillery systems to Russia, noting, “Those are good weapons.”

In the past three months, about 60 percent of the losses suffered by Ukrainian intelligence units were due to artillery fire using North Korean-made weapons, Budanov said.

Since signing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russia last year, North Korea has been strengthening its military cooperation with Moscow.

Military intelligence authorities in Ukraine and the West believe that North Korea’s arms support is a key factor prolonging Russia’s invasion.

Bloomberg noted that it could not independently verify Budanov’s claims. Continuing evidence, however, suggests that North Korean weapons are being actively used on the Ukrainian frontlines.

The Ukrainian military on Saturday, for instance, released a video on its Telegram channel showing the destruction caused by the North Korean-made weapons on the front lines.

The video showed a North Korean Type 75 multiple rocket launcher that was hidden in the bushes in Kupiansk, eastern Ukraine, being destroyed by a drone strike.

The Ukrainian military said the strike was carried out by the First Presidential Burevii Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, claiming, “North Korea couldn’t withstand the reality of the front lines.”

Ukraine had also released a video last month showing the destruction of a North Korean-made M1991 multiple rocket launcher supplied to Russia.

Security experts believe North Korea is using the war in Ukraine to test the performance of its conventional weapons and to gain real combat experience through proxy deployment.

Regarding U.S. President Donald Trump, Budanov told Bloomberg: “His position [on ceasefire] is consistent, one should not judge him by media characteristics,” and added, “As head of a special service, I know more things,” signaling support for Trump.

Budanov then went on to emphasize that ceasefire negotiations should be reached within this year, stating, “Is it realistic to do so - yes. Is it difficult - no.”

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

LEE HAY-JUNE [lee.jian@joongang.co.kr]

9. Opinion | South Korea cut a deal with Trump. It didn't matter.

We forget that the ROK agreed to a revised Free Trade Agreement during President Trump's first term.

But I think Grover Norquist sums it up well in this quote which I think I will borrow.

Excerpts:

Trump has brought back mercantilism, the outdated economic theory that a nation's wealth and power were measured by exporting more than it imported. The U.S. and other world powers largely moved away from that model and toward more and more free trade after the Great Depression and World War II, when they realized that trade barriers hurt more than they helped.

Anti-tax conservative activist Grover Norquist summed it up in a discussion of tariffs at an April event with journalist Steve Clemons.

“In trade wars, all the casualties are friendly,” he said. “Everybody doesn’t shoot across World War I trenches at other guys. They shoot down the trench at their own team.”

Opinion | South Korea cut a deal with Trump. It didn't matter.

The president's latest tariff threat shows the futility of negotiating with the U.S. right now.

msnbc.com · by Joseph Zeballos-Roig · July 11, 2025

In 2018, South Korea handed President Donald Trump the first trade victory of his administration.

Under the agreement, new South Korean steel export restrictions were put in place and more U.S. automakers could export their cars to South Korea.

The president hailed it as "a historic milestone," a "great deal for American and Korean workers" and a "fair and reciprocal" deal. That was probably overselling what amounted to a modest rewrite of a pre-existing trade agreement, but South Korea was happy to play along if it meant buying peace and quiet.

When Trump took office in January, South Korea seemed well-positioned to weather the looming tariffs the president was eager to implement. But it was not to be. Earlier this week, Trump announced he would impose a 25% tariff on South Korean exports starting Aug. 1, unless its government agreed to even more concessions.

The new threat sent a message that resonated far beyond Seoul: Trump can't be trusted.

Foreign leaders have already noticed that nobody is safe from the mercurial temperament of the U.S. president and his endless appetite for tariffs and and a light-switch approach to flipping them on and off. So far in his second term, Trump has broken more trade deals than forged new ones, and the goalposts are constantly moving. The president inked a sweeping deal with Canada and Mexico in his first term, then turned around and launched another trade war earlier this year.

The behavior might earn the “dealmaker-in-chief” a new nickname: the “dealbreaker-in-chief.”

On Monday, Trump blasted out letters to over a dozen trade partners threatening to reimpose tariffs on Aug. 1 if they didn’t cut new trade agreements. South Korea was among the countries put on notice for a 25% tariff, and more are being posted on social media through the week.

“We invite you to participate in the extraordinary Economy of the United States, the Number One Market in the World, by far,” Trump said in the letter addressed to South Korean President Lee Jae-myung. Notably, the president left wiggle room to adjust the tariffs up or down based on his feelings about the outcome of the negotiations.

It was a far cry from the trade agreement with South Korea in 2007, the U.S.’s first bilateral trade pact with a major Asian power, negotiated over 10 months under the second Bush administration in an environment where free trade was ascendant in both parties. It went into force five years later.

While Washington viewed that deal as key to its approach to the Pacific, the current fight is just one of dozens that Trump has started in recent weeks on large and small nations alike. South Korean officials are working hard to come up with an agreement that would please Trump, but progress has stalled as there's little clarity on what he even wants as the endgame.

“We are doing our best to bring about a result mutually beneficial to both sides, but we have been unable to establish what each side exactly wanted from the other side,” Lee said last week.

While past presidents viewed South Korea as a valuable military ally against North Korea, an isolated totalitarian state that occasionally makes threats against the U.S., Trump sees it as a freeloader taking advantage of incompetent American leadership. In his first term he referred to the updated 2012 trade agreement with South Korea as "a horrible deal" and "a Hillary Clinton disaster" that was a "one-way street."

South Korea will probably have to accept the fact that Trump's idea of a good trade deal is a one-way street in his favor. The Trump administration touted a new accord with Vietnam last week that kept a 20% tariff on Vietnamese imports while clearing the way for U.S. exports to Vietnam to face no import taxes. Stephen Miran, a Trump economic adviser, praised it as an “extremely one-sided” deal.

But that doesn't mean it's a good deal for the U.S. exactly. After all, it's U.S. companies that will be forced to pay those tariffs. For smaller businesses that have long worked with Vietnamese counterparts to, say, build the furniture that they sell, the trade deal locks in higher prices for the near future and years of hassle as they try to reorient their supply chains.

Trump has brought back mercantilism, the outdated economic theory that a nation's wealth and power were measured by exporting more than it imported. The U.S. and other world powers largely moved away from that model and toward more and more free trade after the Great Depression and World War II, when they realized that trade barriers hurt more than they helped.

Anti-tax conservative activist Grover Norquist summed it up in a discussion of tariffs at an April event with journalist Steve Clemons.

“In trade wars, all the casualties are friendly,” he said. “Everybody doesn’t shoot across World War I trenches at other guys. They shoot down the trench at their own team.”

msnbc.com · by Joseph Zeballos-Roig · July 11, 2025

10. N. Korean military officials’ wives help choose official drivers

Ha ha. I guess in all militaries spouses wear their spouse's rank (please note the attempt at humor and I mean no disrespect to military spouses).

N. Korean military officials’ wives help choose official drivers

The officials' wives value drivers with good driving skills and wealthy family backgrounds. They also tend to select people from their hometowns

By Jeong Tae Joo - July 11, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korean military officials’ wives help choose official drivers - Daily NK English

North Korean soldiers. / Image: Sogwang

North Korean military officials have begun involving their wives in choosing military drivers for official vehicles as soldiers graduate from the driver’s school at North Korean Air Force headquarters.

“Officials from the Air Force headquarters have been busy selecting drivers for their official vehicles,” a Daily NK source in the North Korean military said recently.

“After a list of candidates is compiled from male enlisted personnel aged 19 to 20 who graduate from the driver training center between late June and early July, the officials show their wives the candidates’ documents and have them meet with some of the prospects, as if the wives were doing the choosing themselves.”

According to the source, the personnel department of the Air Force headquarters sent officials detailed documents that include each graduate’s name, photo, place of birth, parents’ occupations, vehicle repair experience, and driving skills.

However, some officials take the documents home and review them with their spouses while discussing whom to choose, with the spouses having significant input in selecting the right person.

Wives act as unofficial recruiters

The wives treat the documents like a shopping catalog, comparing the candidates and voicing their specific preferences with comments like, “This kid looks more innocent,” “I’d prefer a tall kid,” “The son of a trading company vice president would be better than the son of a village party secretary,” and “I’d prefer somebody from Hamgyong, Hwanghae or Kangwon provinces over someone from Pyongyang.”

The officials’ wives value drivers with good driving skills and wealthy family backgrounds. They also tend to select people from their hometowns.

This unofficial personal intervention by the wives influences the selection of official vehicle drivers, completely bypassing army regulations and procedures.

“Connections have always played a role in selecting drivers for officials’ families, but rarely have officials brought official documents home to show their wives and get them directly involved in selections like this year,” the source said.

In North Korea, official vehicle drivers don’t simply drive. They also work closely with the officials’ wives, helping them shop and handling household matters, so the wives increasingly take an active role in selecting them.

“Graduates of the driver training centers are well aware of this,” the source said. “The graduates say that driving skill isn’t enough — that they must be tall, fair-skinned and clean-cut to get chosen to drive an official vehicle.”

“Given that drivers of official vehicles practically live in the officials’ homes, graduates joke that the selection process feels like getting married,” he said.

Read in Korean

Jeong Tae Joo

Jeong Tae Joo is one of Daily NK's full-time journalists.

dailynk.com

11. US troop cuts in South Korea 'realistic within four years,' expert says

It pains me to read and disseminate such ill-informed commentary.

This is an article rehashing the recent Defense Priorities report.

We should never be talking about cuts (unless you want to undermine the ROK/US alliance). Instead we must always focus on modernizing the alliance, and evolving it to support US and ROK national security interests. Depending on the situation and strategic assumptions and an assessment of US national security interests US force posture could be revised to include more or less troops. But we should never be making cuts just for the sake of cuts. And in some contexts and concepts we could actually improve deterrence and defense with different capabilities that might or might not include a smaller number of troops. But those who only focus on troop numbers are not employing sufficient analytic and intellectual rigor to support US national security interests.

People

US troop cuts in South Korea 'realistic within four years,' expert says

Analysts say Seoul is ready to take on more defense responsibilities as OPCON transfer advances

https://www.chosun.com/english/people-en/2025/07/11/NBO5CCZEGVF6HHJFDAN3BJME34/

By Kim Eun-joong (Washington),

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2025.07.13. 00:10

Updated 2025.07.13. 00:18

Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities./Defense Priorities

As the Pentagon prepares to unveil its next National Defense Strategy as early as August, two U.S. defense analysts are urging a dramatic downsizing of American military presence in South Korea — a shift one expert believes could happen within four years.

In a new joint report, Dan Caldwell, a former senior adviser to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow at the Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities, recommend withdrawing most of the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in South Korea. Their proposal: retain only about 10,000 troops, largely for strategic support functions.

The suggestion reflects a growing view within Washington that long-standing U.S. troop deployments in East Asia may no longer align with the country’s broader national security interests — and that a more agile, “strategically flexible” posture may now be necessary.

“The drawdown of U.S. troops in Korea is part of a broader trend — one that goes beyond Trump-era foreign policy,” Kavanagh said in a phone interview with The Chosun Ilbo on July 9. “Even if the final number is smaller than what we’ve proposed, I believe some level of withdrawal is realistic within four years. Over the long term, the U.S. could substantially reduce its military presence on the peninsula.”

Kavanagh, a veteran of the RAND Corporation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, currently directs military analysis at Defense Priorities.

Vehicles are seen lined up at Camp Humphreys, a U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea./U.S. Forces Korea

Why now?

“The Pentagon is reassessing the global posture of U.S. forces, and as it prepares a new defense strategy, we hope our recommendations will help shape the conversation. Washington remains committed to its defense pledges to allies, but there is a clear desire for those allies to shoulder more of the burden — both financially and militarily. That will likely be reflected in the upcoming strategy. The debate in D.C. is centered on how the U.S.-South Korea alliance can best serve American interests: whether that means Seoul taking on more defense responsibility or whether U.S. bases in Korea can be used more flexibly to support wider operations across the Indo-Pacific.”

But doesn’t South Korea already spend more than most allies on defense?

“Absolutely. South Korea has been one of the most serious among U.S. allies in investing in its defense. It deserves credit for that. It is also well-positioned to counter North Korea’s conventional forces — probably better positioned than anyone else, short of nuclear deterrence. If South Korea continues to invest in ammunition stockpiles and advanced systems, it can assume even more responsibility for its conventional defense. The ongoing discussions around wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer may be an early step toward a reduction in U.S. ground forces.

What posture changes might the Pentagon consider?

“South Korea is geographically vital to U.S. strategy, and the Pentagon will have to think carefully about how its bases there could be used in future Indo-Pacific operations. But there are constraints. The number of troops the U.S. could rapidly redeploy from Korea in a crisis is limited, and it’s not guaranteed that American bases in South Korea would be available for operations elsewhere. To keep nearly 30,000 troops forward-deployed in one theater without clear flexibility is a risk for the U.S. military. That’s why I believe the Pentagon will scrutinize this posture closely.”

Wi Sung-lac, South Korea’s national security adviser, shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio during a meeting in Washington on July 7, 2025./South Korean Presidential Office

What role does the U.S. envision for South Korea in a Taiwan contingency?

“In the event of a Taiwan crisis, the U.S. would likely want to use bases in Korea to launch contingency operations — for instance, flying missions to defend Taiwanese airspace or conducting strikes in the Yellow Sea (West Sea). But there’s no guarantee that South Korea would approve such actions. That’s why it may be more feasible to reconfigure those bases to focus on support roles like logistics, maintenance, and intelligence — roles that are less politically sensitive but still crucial.”

Is a U.S. withdrawal from Korea truly possible?

“Yes. Even if it doesn’t happen at the scale we’ve proposed, some reduction is quite plausible within the next four years. We’re not calling for U.S. withdrawal everywhere. But long term, I do believe the U.S. will sharply reduce its footprint in Korea. That reflects not just Trump-era thinking, but a deeper realignment in American foreign policy. Over the past several months, we’ve seen this shift emerge more clearly — in Europe, and increasingly in Asia.”

Would this mean walking away from U.S. defense commitments to South Korea?

“We’re not suggesting that the U.S. would abandon South Korea in the event of war. We believe the U.S. would still deploy reinforcements and offer air support if needed. But the expectation should be that South Korea defends its own frontlines.”

How should South Korea respond to Trump’s renewed demands for higher defense contributions?

“My advice to South Korean leaders would be the same as I give to European ones: start planning now for the possibility that you may need to defend yourself without American help. Identify where you are most dependent on U.S. support, and invest in those areas. That would signal a genuine commitment to burden-sharing and help sustain the alliance over the long term.”

12. N. Korean teacher reprimanded over poor student test scores

Perhaps they will dismantle the North Korea Department of Education since teachers are failing. (note attempt at sarcasm).

N. Korean teacher reprimanded over poor student test scores

Since students' test scores are used to evaluate teachers' performance, teachers frequently manipulate test questions to avoid criticism or even earn praise for their students' good scores

By Eun Seol - July 11, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korean teacher reprimanded over poor student test scores - Daily NK English

A middle school in Jagang province. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)

A math teacher at a high school in the North Korean city of Hyesan was recently reprimanded by his principal after students performed poorly on a test.

A source in Ryanggang province told Daily NK recently that first-year high school students scored lower on average than other grades during a school-wide math contest on June 26.

During a teachers’ meeting held after the contest, the principal criticized the grade’s homeroom math teacher, calling him unqualified and incompetent.

“I did my best to teach the students this semester, but the questions were too difficult for them to handle,” the criticized teacher protested.

Tests in these periodic school-wide contests typically consist of 20% review questions, 40% practice questions, and 40% general questions. Since the general questions usually require advanced problem-solving skills, most teachers adjust the difficulty to match the average student’s ability.

The math teacher who was criticized during the meeting is relatively new to the job. While experienced teachers make sure to keep test questions within students’ reach, this teacher followed the official guidelines without considering the difficulty level.

Veterans share survival tips

After the teachers’ meeting, veteran staff members offered some practical advice to the math teacher. “Nobody wants to get yelled at, so just keep the questions simple,” one teacher suggested.

“As long as your students get good scores, you won’t have any problems with the principal,” another said.

“The top students all transferred to better schools, and many students here will never get a perfect score. You can raise the average by making the questions easier,” a third added.

“The faculty understand that students’ grades are ultimately in their own hands. Teachers who write questions for school-wide subject tests always struggle with how to avoid getting reprimanded,” the source said.

“Whenever students have low test scores, the principal scolds teachers for being unqualified. Teachers like to point out that nobody will work to improve students’ abilities if it means getting yelled at.”

Since students’ test scores are used to evaluate teachers’ performance, teachers frequently manipulate test questions to avoid criticism or even earn praise for their students’ good scores.

The source said that as long as teachers are blamed for low scores in the subjects they teach, they will continue resorting to the questionable practice of filling their tests with easy questions.

Read in Korean

Eun Seol

Eun Seol is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

13. S. Korea, US continue joint efforts to 'make progress' toward OPCON transition: Pentagon official

NO NO NO. The largest misinformation problem with the ROK/US alliance is perpetuated by this article.

Wartime operational control does not remain in US hands. It is not in US hands. The ROK/US Combined Forces Command answers to the Military Committee which consists of representatives of both nations' National Command and Military Authorities (NCMA). It is a bilateral command equally "owned" by the ROK and the US. The US does not have OPCON of South Korean forces any more than the ROK will have OPCON as US forces when the OPCON transition occurs. The only difference is that after OPCON transition the ROK/US CFC will have a ROK General Officer in command with a US Deputy Commander. That Commander, like the current one, will still answer to the MIlitary Committee. And of course the US will continue to provide a General Officer to command the United Nations Command (who answers to the US Chairman of the JCS) as well as the Senior US Military Officer in Korea who is a permanent member of the Military Committee.

If you listen to the statement of every ROK/US CFC Commander since 1978 he will tell you he works equally for borth POTUS and POTROK.

S. Korea, US continue joint efforts to 'make progress' toward OPCON transition: Pentagon official

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · July 12, 2025

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine (left) participates in a Guest Book Signing and Photo with South Korea's JCS Chairman Adm. Kim Myung-sooat the Ministry of Defense in Seoul, South Korea, on Thursday. (US Department of Defense)

South Korea and the United States continue cooperation to "make progress" toward the transition of wartime operational control to Seoul, a Pentagon official said Friday, indicating that discussions on the major alliance issue are ongoing.

The official made the remarks as new South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's administration seeks to retake it at a time when US President Donald Trump's administration has been urging allies to take a greater security burden while prioritizing deterring Chinese threats.

"The U.S. and ROK continue to work together to make progress toward OPCON transition," the official told Yonhap News Agency. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

The official added that the Pentagon has nothing to announce at this time.

Seoul and Washington have been working on the "conditions-based" OPCON transfer. Conditions include South Korea's capabilities to lead combined Korea-US forces, its strike and air defense capabilities, and a regional security environment conducive to such a handover.

During an interview with Yonhap News Agency in May last year, Elbridge Colby, currently under secretary of defense for policy, expressed his backing for the swift OPCON transition, saying the Asian ally should undertake "overwhelming" responsibility for its own defense.

Retaking OPCON from Washington was among Lee's campaign pledges.

On Wednesday, Wi Sung-lac, Lee's top security adviser, reiterated that the OPCON transition is one of Lee's pledges, while noting that past governments had also pursued the transfer.

The public has been divided over the timing of the OPCON transition. Opponents have raised concerns that the OPCON transfer could lead to a weakening of America's security commitment at a time of deepening North Korean threats, while supporters argue the transfer would bolster efforts to enhance South Korea's independent military capabilities and greater autonomy in the security alliance.

South Korea handed over operational control of its troops to the US-led U.N. Command during the 1950-53 Korean War. Control was then transferred to the two allies' Combined Forces Command when the command was launched in 1978. Wartime operational control still remains in the U.S. hands, while South Korea retook peacetime OPCON in 1994.

The OPCON transfer was supposed to occur in 2015 but was postponed, as the allies agreed in 2014 to a conditions-based handover -- rather than a timeline-based one -- due to Pyongyang's advancing nuclear and missile threats. (Yonhap)

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · July 12, 2025

14. At ASEAN meetings, S. Korea reaffirms alignment with US, Japan, pushes for NK dialogue

Push and push. But does Kim want to talk and if so why?

At ASEAN meetings, S. Korea reaffirms alignment with US, Japan, pushes for NK dialogue

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · July 12, 2025

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo (from left) pose for a photo at the start of their meeting on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on Friday. (Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo has wrapped up his visit to Malaysia after attending a series of multilateral meetings led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a venue marked by three-way talks with the United States and Japan, and calls for dialogue with North Korea.

Park's three-day trip, which concluded Friday, also set the stage for Seoul to reaffirm its commitment to ASEAN diplomacy under the new government of President Lee Jae Myung and to demonstrate resilience in the wake of the political turmoil sparked by ousted former President Yoon Suk Yeol's short-lived martial law attempt.

The trilateral talks, joined by Park, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya on the margins of the gathering, took place despite South Korea not yet having a new top diplomat, as the appointment process is still under way.

Park attended the ASEAN meetings in place of the foreign minister.

To that end, holding the first high-level diplomatic dialogue since the Lee government's launch reflected their commitment to advancing their trilateral partnership following the change of leadership in Seoul.

It also offered an opportunity for Seoul and Washington to make up for their missed bilateral talks after Rubio canceled his planned visit to South Korea, which was originally scheduled to take place before the meetings in Malaysia.

At the talks, the three sides reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea and agreed to maintain a strong deterrence based on close trilateral coordination.

At the same time, Park used the meeting to explain South Korea's efforts to ease inter-Korean tensions and resume dialogue with the North, calling for close cooperation with the U.S. and Japan in that regard.

A senior foreign ministry official told reporters after the talks that the US and Japan are believed to share Seoul's position.

"It appeared that they shared the same stance in leaving the door open for dialogue with North Korea," he said.

Since taking office, Lee has called for renewing talks with Pyongyang as a key element of his inter-Korean policy, a shift from his predecessor's hard-line approach toward the North.

Park echoed this push for easing tensions throughout the ASEAN meetings.

Park used the ASEAN Regional Forum to highlight such efforts, saying that the Lee government will work to make tangible progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula.

At the ministerial meeting of the East Asia Summit, Park called for unified efforts toward resolving the North's nuclear issues.

With ASEAN, Park reaffirmed South Korea's commitment to deepening ties with the 10-member regional bloc under the Lee government, concluding the adoption of plans of action for 2026-30 based on their comprehensive strategic partnership.

The plans call for expanding cooperation in addressing common challenges like global supply chain uncertainties, climate change and transnational crimes, and in areas including artificial intelligence, digital and green transitions.

As in previous years, this year's ARF had been closely watched to see whether North Korea would attend, as it is the only multilateral forum regularly attended by Pyongyang.

As widely expected, North Korea skipped the forum, its first absence in 25 years since joining the platform in 2000. Its severed diplomatic ties with Malaysia are believed to have influenced the decision.

Another key takeaway from the meetings was whom Park would personally engage with, inside and outside the sessions.

He was seen having a brief first in-person encounter with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and speaking closely with Rubio before the meetings began.

No interaction was observed with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

While attending the ASEAN meetings, Park held talks with the five Mekong nations -- Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. He also met bilaterally with the top diplomats and his counterparts of Thailand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Malaysia. (Yonhap)

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · July 12, 2025

15. ASEAN, regional partners call for 'complete denuclearization' of Korean Peninsula

ASEAN is a consensus organization. All must agree.

ASEAN, regional partners call for 'complete denuclearization' of Korean Peninsula | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 12, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

KUALA LUMPUR, July 12 (Yonhap) -- Southeast Asian countries and Indo-Pacific partners, including South Korea and the United States, have called for efforts to achieve the "complete denuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula, a joint statement showed Saturday, as they concluded this week's multilateral gathering led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The chair's statement from the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), released Friday, also underscored the need to resume dialogue among concerned parties for peace and stability, a call that comes at a time when South Korea is seeking to improve inter-Korean relations under the new government of President Lee Jae Myung.

"The Meeting called for the full implementation of all relevant UNSC Resolutions and noted international efforts to bring about the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," the statement read.

"The Meeting ... stressed the importance of resuming peaceful dialogue among all concerned parties in order to realize lasting peace and stability in a denuclearized Korean Peninsula," it said.

The use of the word "complete" to describe the North's denuclearization contrasts with last year's statement that called for "complete, verifiable and irreversible" denuclearization -- language seen as carrying a stronger tone.

This EPA photo shows a general view of the 32nd Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on July 11, 2025. (Yonhap)

The ARF statement released every year following the ASEAN meetings draws attention for how it reconciles the differing positions on key security issues among participating countries, which also include China, Russia and North Korea.

The changes in the latest statement possibly suggest Seoul's softer approach in its inter-Korean policy. Lee has called for easing tensions between the two Koreas and pursuing dialogue with Pyongyang, while continuing to respond firmly to the North's nuclear and missile threats in coordination with the international community.

First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo, who attended this week's ASEAN meetings as the top representative, highlighted these calls throughout the venue.

North Korea has severed all communication with the South amid the stalled nuclear talks, which collapsed without a deal in Hanoi in 2019.

The participating countries also again voiced "grave concern" over North Korea's increasing missile launches that destabilize the Korean Peninsula, urging Pyongyang to fully comply with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions.

The ARF is an expanded security forum joined by the 10 ASEAN member states, the United States, China, Japan, the European Union and other countries in South Asia and the Pacific, as well as North Korea.

However, North Korea did not attend this year's session, its first absence from the forum since joining the gathering in 2000.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 12, 2025

16. Your next K-pop album might cost 25% more, thanks to Trump’s latest tariffs

So many second and third order effects.

Your next K-pop album might cost 25% more, thanks to Trump’s latest tariffs

The U.S. is slapping a 25% tariff on all South Korean goods — and for K-pop fans, that means pricier albums, photocards, and merch

https://qz.com/south-korea-trump-tariffs-kpop-albums-bts

Shannon Carroll

Published Yesterday

The next time a K‑pop fan hits “buy” on a signed BTS album, they might not just find themselves paying for the photocard, the poster, or the exclusive preorder benefit — but for a 25% tariff, courtesy of U.S. trade policy. Beginning August 1, all South Korean imports to the U.S. will be hit with a blanket tariff just announced by President Donald Trump. While he advertised the policy as targeting steel and semiconductors, the K‑pop business — a $300 million-plus export engine powered by a global fandom — could take one of the more surprising hits.

That’s a problem for K‑pop, because it still lives and dies by physical album sales, and the timing could hardly be worse, given that BTS, the world’s most popular K-pop group, is just now reuniting after the seven members performed their mandatory military service.

Last year, South Korea exported nearly $292 million in physical K-pop albums alone, according to Korea Customs data. The U.S. accounted for a substantial portion of that, with American fans among the most voracious consumers of albums, tour merch, and collectibles. That doesn’t even include the mountain of lightsticks, hoodies, photo books, and limited-edition fan drops flooding into the U.S. from platforms such as Weverse (the HYBE-powered sales platform that’s essentially Amazon, Ticketmaster, and Reddit all rolled into one), Ktown4u, SM Global Shop, and Hello82.

Now, every single one of those goods is staring down a big price hike at the border.

K‑pop fans don’t just stream their favorite group’s music — they invest in it. They don’t just buy one version; they buy two or four (or maybe 10), and they coordinate bulk orders with friends. Album sales power Billboard charting, unlock fansign raffles, and keep smaller groups and labels financially viable.

And K-pop fans spend big. BTS’ most recent album, the 2022 anthology “Proof,” sold over two million physical copies worldwide on its first day of release and almost 425,000 copies total just in the U.S. Blackpink’s 2022 album, “Born Pink,” moved more than 400,000 physical copies in the U.S., making it the best-selling female K-pop album in U.S. history. Stray Kids, ATEEZ, Seventeen, and Twice have all hit No. 1 on the Billboard 200 album chart thanks largely to physicals. K-pop culture is one that merges community with consumption, and it’s one that doesn’t scale well with added costs.

Merch is the engine behind touring revenue. Every $80 Blackpink hoodie, $52 Stray Kids lightstick, and $110 Twice varsity jacket is part of a carefully calibrated global ecosystem. Disrupt that with a flat 25% tax and you’re not just inflating prices. You’re risking real attrition — and fans’ fury.

The tariffs risk dampening one of the most efficient, loyal, and globally mobilized fan bases in the music business. Labels face a lose-lose dilemma: Pass on the costs to fans and risk softening demand or absorb them and dent profit margins already squeezed by international logistics and marketing costs. “Tariffs on Korea starting August 1st apparently and I’m still waiting on one package to arrive… HURRRRRRYYYYYYY PLSSSS,” one fan posted on X, summing up the mood across what has been known as stan Twitter. “I don’t think I’m going to purchase K‑pop albums for the foreseeable future,” one fan tweeted. “It was already expensive to ship from Korea, but now… it’s going to be insane.” Another was already tallying the damage: “Albums and merch are already expensive,” they wrote. “Does [Trump] really want to piss off K‑pop stans?”

Jung Yeon-je/AFP via Getty Images

Sticker shock for stans

The timing, of course, couldn’t be worse, now that BTS is officially back. All seven members are reunited for the first time since 2022, and they confirmed during a livestream — watched in real time by over 7.3 million fans — that they’ll release an album in March 2026. (Because nothing in K‑pop is ever just a coincidence, the group’s fans, ARMY, are already convinced the drop date is March 6 because of a suspiciously frozen “3:06” clock in concept art.)

With the group — and others — readying comebacks, the buying cycle is about to kick into overdrive. But instead of prepping spreadsheets for group orders and bookmarking fan benefits, U.S. fans are now doing tariff math. A $75 Weverse Shop order could balloon to nearly $95 with the tariff — before shipping, which can already cost $30-60.

For big South Korean entertainment companies such as HYBE, SM, JYP, and YG, the immediate damage may be manageable. Stock in BTS’ parent company, HYBE, is still up around 40% year to date, driven by comebacks by the group (and others under HYBE's umbrella) and the company’s aggressive U.S. expansion — including domestic fulfillment operations that could blunt some of the tariff’s bite. But smaller and mid-tier groups rely heavily on international merch and album sales to fund tours, comebacks, and staff payroll. A 5-10% drop in U.S. revenue could mean scaled-down album packaging or tour delays.

Trump’s tariffs could inject volatility into an ecosystem that has so far been relatively insulated from global trade fights. And while it's true that most K‑pop companies have diversified into digital, virtual, and streaming-first strategies, physical albums remain a core revenue driver and branding pillar. Trump’s tariffs have no carveout for culture. They apply to all Korean imports — period. That will hurt indie, fan-favorite retailers, such as Choice Music LA and Hello82, which import Korean albums in bulk and distribute them quickly to U.S. fans.

K‑pop fandom is an ecosystem where consumers are also participants, where buying is an act of love, and where fan-run group orders are events in themselves. When the government intervenes in that space — even indirectly — it reshapes the emotional economy of the genre. K-pop is one of the few industries where U.S. imports are driven entirely by fans, not corporations. This isn’t Hyundai shipping cars, it’s a 17-year-old in Los Angeles buying a $134 NCT Dream collector’s pack because it includes a holographic Jeno photocard.

Comebacks with a catch

Online, the reaction to the tariffs has been as loud as a fan chant. There are memes comparing Trump’s policy with economic warfare, screenshots of overloaded carts hitting $187 pre-tariff, and a steady stream of protest disguised as stan humor.

K‑pop is one of South Korea’s most successful soft-power exports, a cultural force whose global fanbase has done more for the country’s image than most diplomatic envoys. BTS has been called a “strategic national asset,” and the group helped raise South Korean cultural exports to $13.6 billion in 2024. (In 2019, a report from the Hyundai Research Institute estimated that BTS brought in over $4.65 billion annually to South Korea’s economy — and the group has only gotten bigger internationally since.) Top K-pop idols are the faces of major fashion brands and frequently appear on the carpet of the Met Gala. And now, that entire self-sustaining, highly profitable, fan-powered pipeline is at risk.

Trump’s trade war wasn’t aimed at K‑pop, but it might be pricing some fans out of the experience entirely. If the tariff takes hold — and if labels can’t find a workaround — expect prices to spike, merch drops to slow, and fans to face the chilling effect of policy made continents away.

The U.S. hasn’t officially declared war on photocards, but if Trump’s latest round of tariffs go live on August 1 as planned, the newest BTS album or Twice deluxe edition might come with sticker shock. Sure, when BTS finally drops that album next spring, fans will show up. They always do. But if prices keep rising, shipping gets messier, and retailers pass on every cent of that 25% hike? Even the most loyal stan may have to choose: bias list — or grocery list.

17. Shifting U.S. security priorities put Korea-U.S. alliance under strain

Excerpts:

The geopolitical value of the peninsula is rising amid intensifying rivalry between the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc and the North Korea-China-Russia axis. Still, U.S. decisions are likely to be made unilaterally, regardless of Korea’s views. It would not be the first time. In 1969, President Richard Nixon declared in the Guam Doctrine that Asian nations should defend themselves, leading to partial troop withdrawals.

In 2015, while helping draft Korea-U.S. combined operational plans, I realized how difficult it was to reflect Korea’s strategic preferences in key planning documents. That frustration still resonates.

Korea may have to accept a redefined role for USFK, perhaps even accelerated Opcon transfer. This issue was a major focus during my tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Roh Moo-hyun administration initially aimed for a time-based transfer in 2012, but in 2014, the two allies agreed to shift to a condition-based approach. The three key conditions were: adequate military capabilities for combined defense, comprehensive allied capability to counter North Korean nuclear threats and a stable regional security environment. None of these conditions are easily met.

In April, Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Caine told a congressional hearing that Korea still had not met these standards, implying that Seoul’s defense capabilities remain insufficient.

Still, Korea cannot afford to rely on the United States alone. As threats mount, Seoul must prepare for contingencies where U.S. support may be limited. The time has come to ready our own defenses — if not with teeth, then with gums.

Shifting U.S. security priorities put Korea-U.S. alliance under strain

koreajoongangdaily.joins.com · July 11, 2025

Published: 11 Jul. 2025, 00:03

Choi Yoon-hee

The author is president of the Sea Power League of the Republic of Korea and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Korea-U.S. combined defense system is the foundation of the Republic of Korea’s national security, designed to deter and respond to threats from North Korea. It includes the United Nations Command, the Combined Forces Command, wartime operational control (Opcon), South Korean forces, and United States Forces Korea (USFK). Yet growing concerns have emerged regarding the future of this alliance, especially in the wake of the Donald Trump administration’s foreign policy shift.

A report released Thursday by former U.S. defense officials, including Dan Caldwell, recommended reducing U.S. ground combat troops in Korea and scaling back U.S. air squadrons — cutting the total U.S. troop presence from 28,500 to just 10,000. Earlier, Elbridge Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, stated that “the United States has no reason to get involved in a major conflict with North Korea.” These views reflect a broader shift in Washington, where discussions about redefining USFK’s role, accelerating Opcon transfer and increasing Seoul’s financial burden are gaining traction.

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivers his speech during the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31. [AP/YONHAP]

Some reports suggest that the UN Command could relocate from Seoul to Japan with a U.S. commander stationed in Japan assuming leadership. Such moves would mark a significant shift in the security posture on the Korean Peninsula. These developments echo the former Acheson Line, which excluded Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter — a mistake that led to a major miscalculation by the North.

There are two key ways to interpret recent U.S. moves. First, the United States is struggling to counter China’s growing influence while maintaining global commitments. China’s maritime expansion threatens U.S. naval dominance, a core pillar of American strategic interests. Second, Washington may be signaling its discomfort with Seoul’s inconsistent policies toward the U.S. and China, which shift with each new Korean administration.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s statement at the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 31 — “There is no such thing as relying on the U.S. for security and China for the economy” — was a clear rebuke of Korea’s perceived policy of “security with the U.S., economy with China.”

U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan (2nd from R, front row) visits the shipyard of Hanwha Ocean Co. in the southeastern industrial city of Geoje on April 30. [YONHAP]

Regardless of administration changes, countering China remains Washington’s top strategic priority. However, the United States is no longer as dominant as it once was. China continues to expand its maritime presence, having constructed artificial islands in the South China Sea and now installing permanent structures in the Yellow Sea. China’s naval strategy includes establishing ports in 12 countries, which could soon double as military bases.

In contrast, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has declined since the Ronald Reagan administration ended subsidies for the sector following the Cold War. Today, the United States has fewer than five functioning shipyards while China’s shipbuilding capacity is 230 times greater. As of the early 2020s, China possessed about 7,000 merchant vessels capable of transporting military goods, compared to just 82 in the United States.

If conflict were to erupt in the Taiwan Strait under these conditions, the consequences could be disastrous. When I accompanied U.S. Navy Secretary John Phelan on a visit to HD Hyundai Heavy Industries in May, I saw firsthand how concerned U.S. officials were about this imbalance. Washington’s new SHIPS Act seeks to rebuild maritime strength, but restoring the industry will take decades. In the meantime, the United States is turning to Korean shipbuilding — a rare strategic opportunity that Korea should leverage in security and trade negotiations.

At the same time, Korea must anticipate U.S. pressure to shoulder more of its defense burden. This includes more than just increased contributions to USFK. On June 28, U.S. Forces Japan Commander Stephen Jost wrote in the Japanese press that U.S. command authority in the region would gradually expand. He also mentioned the possibility of relocating the Combined Forces Command to Japan. While UN Security Council Resolution 84 of 1950 does not specify the command’s location, such a move would shift the UN Command’s focus from Korean Peninsula deterrence to broader regional management.

The geopolitical value of the peninsula is rising amid intensifying rivalry between the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc and the North Korea-China-Russia axis. Still, U.S. decisions are likely to be made unilaterally, regardless of Korea’s views. It would not be the first time. In 1969, President Richard Nixon declared in the Guam Doctrine that Asian nations should defend themselves, leading to partial troop withdrawals.

In 2015, while helping draft Korea-U.S. combined operational plans, I realized how difficult it was to reflect Korea’s strategic preferences in key planning documents. That frustration still resonates.

Korea may have to accept a redefined role for USFK, perhaps even accelerated Opcon transfer. This issue was a major focus during my tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Roh Moo-hyun administration initially aimed for a time-based transfer in 2012, but in 2014, the two allies agreed to shift to a condition-based approach. The three key conditions were: adequate military capabilities for combined defense, comprehensive allied capability to counter North Korean nuclear threats and a stable regional security environment. None of these conditions are easily met.

Retired U.S. Lt. Gen. John Daniel Caine, U.S. President Donald Trump's nominee for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testifies before a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington on April 1. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

In April, Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Caine told a congressional hearing that Korea still had not met these standards, implying that Seoul’s defense capabilities remain insufficient.

Still, Korea cannot afford to rely on the United States alone. As threats mount, Seoul must prepare for contingencies where U.S. support may be limited. The time has come to ready our own defenses — if not with teeth, then with gums.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

koreajoongangdaily.joins.com · July 11, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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