​Quotes of the Day:

"He that would live in peace and at ease must not speak all he knows or all he sees." 

~ Benjamin Franklin

"A person's humility is known through two things: talking a lot about useless things, and telling stories even though they are not asked." 

– Plato

“Just that you do the right thing. The rest doesn't matter." 

– Marcus Aurelius

1. VIdeo From HRNK - White Horses and Absolute Power: Inside Kim Jong Un’s Equestrian Life

2. My Interview with John Batchelor on the Future of ROK policy toward north Korea

3. Human Rights Activists Attend Captive Nations Summit

4. South Korea’s post-American Finlandization

5. Senate committee seeks safeguard against US troop reductions in South Korea

6. USFK commander stresses alliance during S. Korean drills in Australia

7.  Retrial of ex-President Park Chung-hee's assassin begins

8. Ex-national security adviser calls for early return of wartime operational control from U.S.

9. AMCHAM hosts cybersecurity seminar, urges global cooperation amid rising digital threats

10. North Korea claims leap in AI capabilities11. 

11. Farmers threaten collective action against possible opening of agro market to U.S. amid tariff talks

12. Senior diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold talks in Japan this week

13. N. Korea cracks down on officials selling public goods for private profit

14. N. Korean smartphone app evolved from simple ID tool to permanent surveillance platform

15. N. Korea orders flood prevention work but leaves locals to pay for materials

16. Ex-US diplomat alleging vote fraud in S. Korea barred from meeting Yoon Suk Yeol

17. N. Korea unveils Pyongyang-Beijing rail schedules amid report of service resumption

18. 'Back to the Line': Why American Soldiers Should Be on the Korean DMZ

19. America First, Allies Always: securing the Asia-Indo-Pacific together

1. VIdeo From HRNK - White Horses and Absolute Power: Inside Kim Jong Un’s Equestrian Life

This ​is a great video from our great HRNK Interns. This is excellent counter-propaganda to help us understand the themes and messages the north Korean Propaganda and Agitation Department are employing to enhance the perceived legitimacy of Kim Jong Un and the Kim family regime. Produced by young interns, on a shoestring budget. Who in the US government is conducting equivalent operations? (rhetorical question that we all know the answer to)

https://youtu.be/ZtTcKcgHhgY

This original HRNK video explores the surreal and symbolic world of North Korea’s equestrian propaganda—where luxury horses, sacred mountains, and slow-motion spectacle are used to build the myth of Kim Jong Un’s absolute power. From the snowy slopes of Mt. Paektu to Pyongyang’s exclusive Mi-rim Riding Club, North Korea's state media uses the image of the white horse to communicate dynastic legitimacy, divine destiny, and elite privilege. But beneath the symbolism lies a grim reality: widespread poverty, famine, and repression. Through archival footage, research, and narration, this video examines:

• North Korea’s extravagant import of Orlov Trotters

• The symbolic weight of Mt. Paektu and Chollima

• The Mi-rim Riding Club as a cinematic illusion of prosperity

• The growing presence of Kim Jong Un’s daughter in staged succession imagery

• How horses have become tools of political messaging and myth-making

 Narration: Nate Miller  Script: Hannah Starnes  Video Production: Hannah Whiting  Learn more at: https://www.hrnk.org

2. My Interview with John Batchelor on the Future of ROK policy toward north Korea

Part One of my interview ​with John Batchelor tonight on the Minister of Unification in Korea and the likely trajectory of ROK policy toward north Korea (​ i.e., Sunshine Policy on steroids).

https://audioboom.com/posts/8749603-rok-will-it-become-accommodating-the-kims-again-david-maxwell

​Part Two of my interview.

https://audioboom.com/posts/8749605-rok-accommodating-the-kims-again-david-maxwell-continued

3. Human Rights Activists Attend Captive Nations Summit

​A fascinating 90 minutes, first the discussion with Ambassador Paula Dobriansky about her father's legacy and Captive Nations. Second a panel discussion with people from Captive nations to include on escape from north Korea.

Human Rights Activists Attend Captive Nations Summit

Paula Dobriansky, former under secretary of State for global affairs (George W. Bush administration), discussed the state of Communism today and the legacy of her father, Lev Dobriansky, who authored the Captive Nations Week resolution adopted by Congress and signed into law in 1959 by President Dwight Eisenhower. Ms. Dobriansky was among the speakers at the 2025 Captive Nations Summit hosted by the Victims of Communism Museum in Washington, DC. Also appearing were human rights activists from the five nations still designated as Communist - China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cuba - who recounted their experiences with communist repression in their home countries. This summit was held in solidarity with nations formerly controlled by Communist regimes.Show Less 

https://www.c-span.org/program/public-affairs-event/human-rights-activists-attend-captive-nations-summit/662423

4. South Korea’s post-American Finlandization

​This seems logical in theory. But theory does not provide protection or ensure survival.

I am biased but the only thing that will ensure survival is strength and the ability to defend oneself. And strength is best accomplished through alliances.

​Excerpts:

Finlandization is not capitulation; it is choreography—a careful, calculated performance designed to survive in an unforgiving neighborhood. For South Korea, it would not be a matter of imitation, but adaptation: not Finland’s Cold War path, but a Korean variant suited to the complexities of Northeast Asia today. It would require restraint without passivity, alignment without submission, and flexibility without loss of identity.

In a region where alliances are fraying, pressures are mounting, and certainties are vanishing, such a posture may soon look less like compromise and more like wisdom. If the United States truly steps back, Finlandization won’t be a ghost from the Cold War—it will be a map for the future.

Commentary

South Korea’s post-American Finlandization

Finland took a "pragmatic" path to survival and stability during the Cold War. It's not in error that the Lee Administration's foreign policy uses the same term.

https://www.junotane.com/p/south-koreas-post-american-finlandization?utm

Jul 15, 2025

∙ Paid

As U.S. attention drifts away from East Asia, the unthinkable becomes thinkable. For decades, South Korea has relied on the U.S. alliance not just for security against North Korea, but as a strategic foundation—anchoring its diplomacy, economy, and identity. But what if the United States decides, not under duress but by design, to pull back?

No catastrophic rupture. No betrayal. Simply a cold calculation that the costs of dominance in East Asia outweigh the benefits. In this new world, the U.S. becomes an offshore balancer, focused on preventing hegemony in Eurasia without dominating any single region.

Europe, Russia, India, and China all balance each other imperfectly, but none controls the chessboard. And on the periphery of this new multipolar order sits South Korea—prosperous, nervous, and alone. In such a setting, Finlandization—long dismissed as defeatist or outdated—suddenly becomes viable.

Finlandization refers to a foreign policy posture in which a smaller state retains internal sovereignty and formal independence while informally aligning its external behavior—especially in security and diplomacy—with the preferences of a dominant neighboring power. The term emerged during the Cold War to describe Finland’s careful balancing act with the Soviet Union: democratic at home, neutral abroad, and deliberately non-confrontational toward Moscow. It was not formal subjugation, but strategic self-censorship—designed to preserve autonomy by avoiding provocation.

Though often used pejoratively, Finlandization can be a rational survival strategy for small or medium powers in precarious geopolitical environments. Will Korea become East Asia’s Finland?

Finland took a pragmatic path to survival and stability during the Cold War. By refraining from joining Western military alliances and avoiding overt criticism of the Soviet Union, Finland was able to preserve its sovereignty, maintain a democratic political system, and sustain a capitalist economy—all while sharing an extensive border with a superpower. It avoided occupation, puppet governance, or forced alignment, unlike many of its Eastern European neighbors.

In return for strategic deference in foreign policy, Finland gained internal autonomy and was able to quietly deepen ties with the West in trade, education, and technology, all while steering clear of Cold War flashpoints. It was not ideal—but it was sustainable, and for a small state in a dangerous neighborhood, it worked.

An American retreat transforms what was once a Cold War oddity into a serious policy path for South Korea, with distinct strategic, political, economic, regional, and identity-based dimensions. It makes Finlandization a real choice.

The strategic logic for Finlandization rests with a more distant U.S. Without American forces on the peninsula or credible security guarantees, South Korea would be compelled to seek stability not through deterrence, but through deference.

Without U.S. troops on the ground or guarantees behind the scenes, South Korea would be forced to reimagine its strategic logic. The North remains dangerous, China is unavoidable, and a hedging strategy—aligning too closely with Tokyo or seeking nuclear capability—would provoke either domestic backlash or external isolation. In that vacuum, the logic of informal accommodation emerges. Don’t poke the bear, don’t draw red lines, don’t sign up for other people’s conflicts. Just survive.

A more distant U.S. or at least a less reliable U.S. also changes domestic politics.It flattens the old ideological divide, allowing a new consensus to form—not around allegiance, but around adaptation.

Domestic politics would play catch up. Stripped of the alliance that structured elite alignments for decades, a new consensus could form—not around idealism or ideology, but around risk management. Progressives would no longer face accusations of being anti-American. Conservatives would no longer have Washington to lean on. In that space, a quiet majority might emerge: pro-stability, wary of entanglement, and focused on weathering the storm.

The new domestic political scene would go hand-in-hand with economic realities already playing out. Deep trade interdependence with China, especially in advanced manufacturing and critical supply chains, would reinforce the logic of strategic restraint.

Economics would eventually pull in the same direction. China is already South Korea’s largest trading partner and a critical piece of its industrial supply chain. Without U.S. decoupling pressure, the economic rationale for strategic restraint would grow stronger. U.S. tariff pressure under Trump provides further ammunition.

The lesson from the THAAD boycott and the U.S. tariffs episode: China has a grievance, imposes punishement, but eventually forgives. The U.S. is unpredictable and punishes with out rationale. The lesson, better to bend predictably than to break irationally.

But then, Finland never had an obstreperous, nuclear-armed, authoritarian, northern neighbor, like South Korea. The Soviet Union, for all its power, was a declining empire managing a fragile sphere of influence.

North Korea, by contrast, is volatile, ideologically rigid, and actively hostile—armed with nuclear weapons and a penchant for provocation. Any policy of restraint in South Korea cannot simply mirror Finland’s quiet neutrality; it must also account for the risk of miscalculation or coercion from a regime that thrives on instability. Finlandization in Korea would be less about placating one great power and more about managing two deeply asymmetric threats—one global, one existential, both unpredictable.

Or with a Finlandized South Korea, would China begin to see North Korea as an unwanted regional burden? Would it see a unified Korean Peninsula and the vast redevelopment zone of North Korea as an attractive opportunity? This is the hope of many on the moderate left in South Korea. For others, it’s a scenario built on hypotheticals stacked way too high.

Is it possible? It was not in error that the Lee Administration adopted the term “pragmatic” to describe its foreign policy.

Finland took a pragmatic path to survival and stability during the Cold War. Is South Korea taking a pragmatic path to survival and stability as China-U.S. tensions rise? It is not impossible and has been a subject of research by South Korean government thinktanks and academics.

Indeed, there is even a degree of public support. Many South Koreans view Finland with admiration and curiosity, thanks to its renowned education system, enviable standard of living, celebrated happiness rankings, technological innovation, and cultural values.

Finnish schooling—with its emphasis on equity, teacher professionalism, equality, holistic learning, innovation, and student well‑being—has attracted South Korean educators eager to innovate back home. Finland’s status as the happiest country in the world, consistently topping the World Happiness Report, resonates with South Koreans who grapple with high academic pressure and work‑life imbalance.

It even holds qualities valued by both the political left and the right. On the left, Finland’s universal welfare, trust‑based institutional culture, and democratic values are highly prized. While on the right, its reputation for cutting‑edge technology and economic resilience underpinned by a diversified, innovation‑driven industrial base are highly prized (its reputation as the home of some of the world’s largest underground nuclear bunker network and most lethal wartime snipers also carries a certain appeal among youth on the political right!).

Finlandization is not capitulation; it is choreography—a careful, calculated performance designed to survive in an unforgiving neighborhood. For South Korea, it would not be a matter of imitation, but adaptation: not Finland’s Cold War path, but a Korean variant suited to the complexities of Northeast Asia today. It would require restraint without passivity, alignment without submission, and flexibility without loss of identity.

In a region where alliances are fraying, pressures are mounting, and certainties are vanishing, such a posture may soon look less like compromise and more like wisdom. If the United States truly steps back, Finlandization won’t be a ghost from the Cold War—it will be a map for the future.

5. Senate committee seeks safeguard against US troop reductions in South Korea

​While I have always supported the intent of Congress - sustaining our strong commitment to preventing war on the Korean peninsula which is of vital US national interest, the focus on numbers/troop levels alone may in fact be counter productive.

We have to take a holistic approach to the Asia- Indo-Pacific (and around the world) and all our interests and commitments and optimize of our force structure and force presence (in country, in theater/region, and in CONUS) to achieve multiple objectives - superior warfighting capability for deterrence and defense as well as supporting the political requirements (diplomatic and information instruments of power) of strategic reassurance and strategic resolve to meet our commitments and protect our interests in order to achieve US national security objectives. Focusing only on numbers is easy but is insufficient. We need the right capabilities in the right numbers in the right places. Simply decreasing, increasing, or maintaining the status quo of numbers does not serve us well.

Senate committee seeks safeguard against US troop reductions in South Korea

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · July 15, 2025

U.S. soldiers participate in an Eighth Army run at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, June 9, 2025. (Michelle Lessard-Terry/U.S. Army)

A version of next year’s defense spending bill forwarded recently by the Senate Armed Services Committee would bar the Defense Department from withdrawing troops from South Korea without congressional approval.

The committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act would prohibit “a reduction in U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula … until the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that such action is in the national interest,” according to a fact sheet from the committee released Friday in Washington, D.C.

The bill also requires the commanders of U.S. Forces Korea and Indo-Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs chairman to “conduct an independent risk assessment” of potential troop reductions in South Korea, according to the fact sheet.

The committee on July 9 advanced the bill to the full Senate on a vote of 26-1.

The bill supports $925 billion in defense spending for fiscal year 2026, a $32 billion increase over the current fiscal year.

The Senate plan includes $879 billion for the DOD, $35.2 billion for defense-related programs within the Department of Energy and $10.8 billion for programs outside the bill’s jurisdiction, according to the fact sheet.

The 2025 defense spending plan is $893 billion, including $849.9 billion for the DOD and $33.28 billion for the Energy Department, according to a summary on Congress.gov.

“From rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific to renewed aggression from Russia and the persistent threat of terrorism and cyberattacks, the United States faces a global security environment unlike any in recent memory,” Sen. Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat and the ranking committee member, said in a committee news release Friday. “This legislation invests in the service members, technology, and capabilities we need to deter our adversaries and defend our national interests.”

Sen. Roger Wicker, a Republican from Mississippi who serves as committee chairman, described the bill as a “direct reflection of the severity of that threat environment, as well as the rapidly evolving landscape of war,” according to the release.

The House Armed Services Committee is scheduled to vote Tuesday on its version of the bill.

South Korea’s Defense Ministry is aware of the committee’s version of the bill and is tracking its passage, spokesman Jeon Ha Gyu said during a news conference in Seoul on Monday.

President Donald Trump has often said South Korea pays too little of the cost to keep 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there to deter attacks from North Korea.

Under the five-year Special Measures Agreement signed in November by then-Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea must pay $1.1 billion annually starting in 2026.

The Trump administration considered moving approximately 4,500 U.S. troops in South Korea to other spots in the Indo-Pacific, such as Guam, according to May 23 report by The Wall Street Journal that cited unnamed military officials.

Reports of a troop reduction in South Korea “are not true” and “the U.S. remains firmly committed to the defense” of South Korea, the Office of the Secretary of Defense said in an email attributed to Pentagon press secretary Sean Parnell to Stars and Stripes later that day.

David Choi

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Yoojin Lee

Yoojin Lee

Yoojin Lee is a correspondent and translator based at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. She graduated from Korea University, where she majored in Global Sports Studies.

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · July 15, 2025

6. USFK commander stresses alliance during S. Korean drills in Australia

​Excellent. This is what the alliance must do. We need strategic agility and multiple allies, partners, and friends working together throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific..

USFK commander stresses alliance during S. Korean drills in Australia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 16, 2025

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson has highlighted the strength of the South Korea-U.S. alliance as he attended an exercise conducted by the South's Marines as part of multinational drills under way in Australia, his office said Wednesday.

Brunson observed the live-fire drills by the Marine Corps, held as part of the Talisman Sabre exercise, as he made a three-day visit to Australia this week to discuss defense cooperation and review interoperability outcomes for South Korean and U.S. troops in relation to the multinational drills.

The live-fire demonstration by South Korean Marines from the 11th Artillery Battalion, the 1st Tank Battalion and the 1st Marine Division mobilized the K9 self-propelled howitzer, Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system and K1A2 main battle tank.

"Observing our ROK Marine ally during this live-fire exercise at Talisman Sabre showcases the strength and readiness of our alliance," Brunson said, referring to the South by the acronym of its formal name, the Republic of Korea (ROK).

"These complex combined, joint all domain training events are absolutely essential for enhancing our interoperability and collective defense capabilities," he said.

Maj. Gen. Valerie Jackson, commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Korea, echoed the assessment.

"The participation of leadership from the ROK Marine Corps and USFK at exercise Talisman Sabre truly underscores the strength of our relationships and shared value that we place on multinational training," Jackson said.

South Korea's military dispatched some 840 personnel, including those from the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Army's special operations forces, to take part in the biennial exercise in a northeastern region of Australia than runs through July 27.

Jointly hosted by the United States and Australia, this year's edition of the exercise involves some 30,000 troops, about 30 vessels and 70 aircraft from 19 countries, including Britain, France and Japan.

U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson interacts with South Korean Marines during the Talisman Sabre exercise under way in Australia on July 14, 2025, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 16, 2025

7. Retrial of ex-President Park Chung-hee's assassin begins

​I had no idea this was taking place.

Retrial of ex-President Park Chung-hee's assassin begins | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · July 16, 2025

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- The Seoul High Court on Wednesday began the retrial of former spy chief Kim Jae-gyu, who was sentenced to death for assassinating former President Park Chung-hee in 1979 and executed the following year.

The first hearing came five months after the same court accepted Kim's family's request for a retrial, citing indications the former head of the now-defunct Korean Central Intelligence Agency had been tortured and assaulted during interrogation.

The family had filed for a retrial in 2020, seeking to clear Kim of an insurrection charge.

"It could be considered a murder case against Park Chung-hee as an individual, but the defendant's purpose was to restore liberal democracy by killing Park Chung-hee, not a subversion of the Constitution," one of his lawyers said during the hearing.

"The military junta at the time framed it as an insurrection and distorted the case with the intent of seizing political power."

Kim's younger sister, Jeong-suk, voiced hope that justice will be served.

"Had my brother not stopped it, more than 1 million people would have lost their lives," she said at the hearing. "I trust this retrial can become an opportunity for the judiciary to correct its worst history on its own."

Kim assassinated Park and Cha Ji-cheol, head of the Presidential Security Service, on Oct. 26, 1979, during a private dinner party and was sentenced to death and executed in May 1980.

The court scheduled the next hearing for Sept. 5.

This undated file photo shows former intelligence chief Kim Jae-gyu (R), who was executed in 1980 for assassinating former President Park Chung-hee the previous year. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · July 16, 2025

8. Ex-national security adviser calls for early return of wartime operational control from U.S.

​Conditions based or time based? That is the question.

The buried lede:

Chun also warned of the risks of South Korea's dual diplomacy aimed at maintaining close relations with both the United States and China, saying it could backfire and create misgivings on both sides.

"It may seem like a kind of blessing to receive competing calls from both the U.S. and China, but (South Korea) could instead find itself misunderstood by both sides and in hot water if it takes ambiguous positions to avoid provoking either," he said.

Chun was referring to South Korea's long-standing diplomatic approach of balancing its relations with the two world powers by aligning closely with Washington on security while relying on China for trade.

He pointed to years of economic retaliation by China over the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) on South Korea, saying the move taught South Korea how "complacent and dangerous" such a dual policy can be.

"If there's a way South Korea can get along with China without sacrificing its relations with the U.S., it should definitely take that path, but it's easier said than done," he noted.

The Lee administration need to heed his advice here.

Ex-national security adviser calls for early return of wartime operational control from U.S. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 16, 2025

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- Chun Yung-woo, a former national security adviser, on Wednesday called for the early return of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean troops from the United States, stressing the need for the South's armed forces to strengthen their independent defense capabilities.

Chun, who served as national security adviser to former conservative President Lee Myung-bak, made the remarks in his keynote speech at a symposium hosted by the Korean Peninsula Future Forum, which he founded and leads.

"It is more important to regain it as soon as possible and strengthen the South Korean armed forces' sense of ownership, even though their operational command capabilities still remain insufficient," Chun said, proposing the early return of OPCON.

"It wouldn't be good to keep postponing" the transfer, he noted.

During a parliamentary confirmation hearing on Tuesday, Defense Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back suggested that the Lee Jae Myung government aims to retrieve OPCON of South Korean troops within his five-year term, although Lee's office later described Ahn's remarks as his personal opinion.

In 2006, the administration of then liberal President Roh Moo-hyun agreed with the U.S. to transfer OPCON back to South Korea in April 2012. The planned transfer was postponed once to December 2015 under the subsequent Lee Myung-bak administration, and, later, the following Park Geun-hye administration reached an agreement with Washington to indefinitely postpone it until conditions are met.

Chun also warned of the risks of South Korea's dual diplomacy aimed at maintaining close relations with both the United States and China, saying it could backfire and create misgivings on both sides.

"It may seem like a kind of blessing to receive competing calls from both the U.S. and China, but (South Korea) could instead find itself misunderstood by both sides and in hot water if it takes ambiguous positions to avoid provoking either," he said.

Chun was referring to South Korea's long-standing diplomatic approach of balancing its relations with the two world powers by aligning closely with Washington on security while relying on China for trade.

He pointed to years of economic retaliation by China over the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) on South Korea, saying the move taught South Korea how "complacent and dangerous" such a dual policy can be.

"If there's a way South Korea can get along with China without sacrificing its relations with the U.S., it should definitely take that path, but it's easier said than done," he noted.

To tackle the issue, Chun proposed reducing South Korea's "excessive" reliance on China for its economy by diversifying its sourcing channels for "strategic items" away from China and boosting its competitiveness in major technologies and trade items crucial to the Chinese economy.

"When it comes to survival, (South Korea) should prepare itself with the South Korea-U.S. alliance as its primary insurance and supplement it with South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation as secondary insurance while also working with like-minded countries that share similar threat perceptions," he noted.

This file photo shows former National Security Adviser Chun Yung-woo on Nov. 22, 2017, currently chairman of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 16, 2025

9. AMCHAM hosts cybersecurity seminar, urges global cooperation amid rising digital threats

One of the most critical threats all friends, partners, and allies must defend against.

AMCHAM hosts cybersecurity seminar, urges global cooperation amid rising digital threats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · July 16, 2025

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) held a cybersecurity seminar Wednesday in Seoul, bringing together senior government officials, business leaders and cybersecurity experts to address the growing digital threats in areas of cybersecurity and national security.

Under the theme of cybersecurity, participants explored strategic responses to evolving digital threats, as the United States and South Korea continue to deepen their technology alliance, AMCHAM said.

"Cybersecurity must be recognized not just as a corporate concern, but as a cornerstone of national and economic security," said AMCHAM Chairman James Kim. "The recent SK Telecom incident is a stark reminder of how real and immediate these risks are -- impacting daily life, business operations and public trust."

Choi Woo-hyuk, director general of the cybersecurity bureau at South Korea's Ministry of Science and ICT, echoed such concerns.

"With the rapid advancement of technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), new threats are emerging across every aspect of society, from critical infrastructure to our daily lives," Choi said.

Justin Chang, legal attache of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, underscored the need for international collaboration in combating increasingly complex threats.

"Cyberattacks today are not just a corporate risk -- they are a national and global security threat. In a world where the line between cyber criminals and nation-state actors is increasingly blurred, no single entity can face this challenge alone," Chang said.

This photo provided by the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea on July 16, 2025, shows key attendees of a cybersecurity seminar hosted by the business chamber in Seoul taking a group photo. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · July 16, 2025

10. North Korea claims leap in AI capabilities

"​Is it real or is it Memorex" (rhetoric and fiction?)  

Surely the regime wants to develop these capabilities and has already demonstrated much prowess with its all purpose sword of cyber so this is a natural progression.

Excerpt:

At a parliamentary confirmation hearing on July 14, South Korea’s nominee for unification minister, Chung Dong-young, said Pyongyang appears to be investing heavily in cultivating technology talent, particularly at Kim Il Sung University’s computer science department.“It seems they are reaching a fairly advanced level,” Chung told lawmakers. “We’ve heard they are working to develop their own version of ChatGPT.”

North Korea

North Korea claims leap in AI capabilities

Virtual exhibition, machine translation tools, and localized networks signal push for digital modernization

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/07/16/HNCQACTLFVFTTCVKVUUPNC6EIQ/

By Yun Ye-won,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2025.07.16. 16:22

North Korea is claiming new strides in artificial intelligence and other information technology sectors, according to state media, as the country continues to emphasize technological modernization as a national priority.

On July 15, Pyongyang’s state-run Korea Central Broadcasting Station reported that an “Exhibition of Informatization Achievements” had been held nationwide. The exhibition, the broadcaster said, was accessible both in person and online, allowing participants to interact with software programs “regardless of time or location.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un./News1

Appearing on the broadcast, Yoon Sung-kuk, a manager at Pyongyang’s Information Technology Bureau, highlighted several developments he described as recent breakthroughs. Among them was a wireless “localized network system,” which outside analysts interpret as a rudimentary domestic Wi-Fi infrastructure.

Yoon also pointed to a multilingual AI-powered machine translation program named Ryomyong, along with a Korean-language word processor called Hyangdo, as examples of homegrown software development.

In recent years, North Korea has intensified its focus on emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence. Earlier this month, the ruling Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported that universities nationwide were being instructed to launch new academic departments focused on next-generation disciplines. AI was cited as a key area for innovation and national progress.

In February, the Kim Il Sung University Artificial Intelligence Research Institute was featured in an interview with North Korea’s external propaganda outlet Voice of Korea. During the segment, researchers appeared to be learning how to use ChatGPT.

At a parliamentary confirmation hearing on July 14, South Korea’s nominee for unification minister, Chung Dong-young, said Pyongyang appears to be investing heavily in cultivating technology talent, particularly at Kim Il Sung University’s computer science department.“It seems they are reaching a fairly advanced level,” Chung told lawmakers. “We’ve heard they are working to develop their own version of ChatGPT.”

11. Farmers threaten collective action against possible opening of agro market to U.S. amid tariff talks

Farmers threaten collective action against possible opening of agro market to U.S. amid tariff talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · July 16, 2025

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- A local farmers' group on Wednesday threatened to take collective action if the South Korean government further opens the domestic agricultural market to the United States as part of ongoing tariff negotiations with Washington.

The farming and livestock industries have emerged as key sticking points in the tariff negotiations between Seoul and Washington, with the U.S. having pointed to a wide range of non-tariff measures by Seoul, including its import ban on American beef from cattle aged 30 months or older.

"We will not stand idly by if the government decides to remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers on the agricultural products and livestock without our consent," said the Korean Successor Advanced Farmers Federation at a press conference held in front of the presidential office in central Seoul.

Members of the Korean Successor Advanced Farmers Federation hold a press conference in front of the presidential office in central Seoul on July 16, 2025, in this photo provided by the group. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The farmers group also urged Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo to step down, noting his remarks suggesting that Seoul may make a decision involving the domestic agriculture sector.

Yeo said earlier this week that it was time for South Korea to make a "strategic decision" on agricultural and other pending items on the negotiation table with the U.S.

"It was an irresponsible and complacent thing to say," the group said.

The federation said Washington is highly likely to pressure Seoul to lower tariffs or increase imports on produces, such as rice and beans.

Additionally, it demanded that Industry Minister nominee Kim Jung-kwan clarify his position on the agriculture industry regarding the tariff negotiations with the U.S. at his parliamentary confirmation hearing scheduled for Thursday.

fairydust@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · July 16, 2025

12. Senior diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold talks in Japan this week

​JAROKUS. Keep it going.

Senior diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan to hold talks in Japan this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · July 16, 2025

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- Vice foreign ministers of South Korea, the United States and Japan will hold trilateral talks this week to discuss ways of further enhancing cooperation on North Korean issues and economic security, Seoul's foreign ministry said Wednesday.

First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takehiro Funakoshi are scheduled to meet in Japan on Friday, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The upcoming talks come about nine months after their last meeting held in Seoul in October. It also marks the first since the inauguration of President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump's new administration.

"The three sides plan to hold broad and in-depth discussions on a wide range of topics, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula, regional dynamics, economic security, technology, energy and ways to enhance trilateral cooperation," the ministry said in a press release.

Park plans to hold one-on-one talks with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts on the sidelines of the trilateral meeting, it said.

During the October meeting, the three nations condemned North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and agreed to strengthen their security cooperation.

This photo, provided by South Korea's foreign ministry, shows (from R to L) Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya posing for a photo at the start of their meeting on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations foreign ministers' meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on July 11, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · July 16, 2025

13. N. Korea cracks down on officials selling public goods for private profit

​Capitalism over socialism. Human nature over central control. 

N. Korea cracks down on officials selling public goods for private profit

While embankment construction in border districts such as Hyesan and Kim Jong Suk county along the Yalu River is largely complete, there are still countless areas that need work

By Lee Chae Eun - July 16, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korea cracks down on officials selling public goods for private profit - Daily NK English

A cosmetics gift set for Mother’s Day in North Korea. (Daily NK)

North Korea is warning trading company officials not to sell public goods for personal gain.

“In Saturday study sessions for officials at trading companies in Pyongyang on June 28 and July 25, the Party’s Discipline Inspection Department issued a stern warning about trading company officials selling cosmetic products on the side,” a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK recently.

The lecture materials distributed during three Saturday sessions between June 28 and July 12 contained a notice from the Central Committee’s Discipline Inspection Department. According to the notice, it has become common for trading company officials to report goods at artificially low prices and then sell them at marketplaces for much higher prices, pocketing the difference.

The department notice strongly criticized officials who were arranging or allowing these sales. “These practices are undermining the authority of the state and eroding public trust in the goods it produces,” the notice said.

“The only explanation for market prices being several times higher than the official retail price is that trading company officials are manipulating prices and splitting the proceeds. These items are provided by the Party for a trusting public. To sell those materials on the side is an act of treason against the Party, the supreme leader, and the system itself. Any officials turning a blind eye to such practices will be regarded as accomplices,” the notice stated.

As an example, the Discipline Inspection Department cited a cosmetics set in the Eight Fairies brand by the Chosun Changun Trading Company that was given an official price of 150,000 North Korean won but was actually selling at marketplaces for over one million won. Huge price variations across the country make the official price meaningless, the notice complained.

“The Discipline Inspection Department said this issue, which appears to represent a coordinated scheme for private gain, is a serious political offense that cannot be ignored. They added that the officials in question had already been turned over to authorities for questioning,” the source said.

The Discipline Inspection Department demanded that trade officials acknowledge their ideological errors and view the three weeks of Saturday lectures not as mere study sessions, but as an opportunity for ideological correction.

“After the Saturday study session, there was tension among trading company officials. Some officials were disappointed that their old habit of taking a cut will no longer be tolerated,” the source said.

“Officials are becoming more aware of the surveillance that’s increasingly embedded in their daily lives. They’re reminding each other to watch what they say around others, given the likelihood that work units where problems are detected will be publicly criticized during the project review session at the end of the year.”

Read in Korean

Jeong Seo-yeong

Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK's freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

​14. N. Korean smartphone app evolved from simple ID tool to permanent surveillance platform

​Although there is no economic incentive for them to do so, can't some tech companies develop a capability to counter this?

N. Korean smartphone app evolved from simple ID tool to permanent surveillance platform

The app automatically launches whenever the phone is turned on and requests permission to read and write files stored on the device

By Mun Dong Hui - July 15, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korean smartphone app evolved from simple ID tool to permanent surveillance platform - Daily NK English

Left: APK file of the app “Mobile User Identification.” Center: The app will request permission to send messages after installation. Right: Other apps, such as e-payment solutions, demand mobile user identification numbers during subscription. (Daily NK)

Daily NK has obtained both the original and upgraded versions of an app North Korea uses to identify mobile phone users. A comparison of the two versions shows that the app transformed from a basic data collection module into a comprehensive surveillance platform that permanently monitors smartphones.

The core function of the app “Mobile User Identification,” obtained by Daily NK, is to issue and verify individual “digital numbers” that the state manages for every smartphone user and device.

This isn’t an ordinary app that users download and install themselves. The app remains hidden—it doesn’t even appear in the app folder—and quietly activates when other service apps, such as games or e-payment platforms, require subscriptions or verifications. The app works similarly to how financial apps in South Korea require users to verify their identities using digital certificates or mobile phone verification.

After verification, the server assigns a 10-digit caller ID, or CID, to the user and device. Once issued, this number becomes a permanent “digital citizen ID number” linked to the user’s personal data, SIM card International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), and device International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI).

When users later subscribe to other apps, such as the Samhung Wallet, they must enter the CID, giving the state the technical foundation to comprehensively track and manage the user’s personal activity across all digital services.

From simple module to surveillance platform

Daily NK obtained versions 1.0 and 1.0.2 of the app—the first digit indicates the major release, the second the minor release, and the third a patch. While the jump from version 1.0 to 1.0.2 might suggest minor improvements, analysis revealed substantial changes that fundamentally altered the app’s identity.

Version 1.0 didn’t require any internet access permissions. It used only SMS communication functions in a simple and discreet manner. When users needed verification, the app collected and encrypted the device’s unique IMSI and other key data, then sent it in “data SMS” format—invisible to the user—to North Korea’s specific server number (+8501950003). The amount of data that could be transferred was limited, creating clear restrictions for transmitting complex information in real-time.

However, version 1.0.2 underwent dramatic changes—so significant that it can now be called a “platform.” The most important change is that it adopted the internet as its primary communication channel. This means the “internet access permission” requested by the app is for accessing North Korea’s closed national intranet, not for connecting to the global internet.

Expanded permissions and capabilities

Version 1.0.2 requests several concerning permissions:

INTERNET: The primary channel for exchanging data with servers. This represents the biggest change from version 1.0, which required no such permissions.

READ_PHONE_STATE: Enables user identification by reading the smartphone’s unique ID numbers, such as the IMSI.

RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED: Allows continuous surveillance by automatically launching the app whenever the phone is turned on.

WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE: Permission to read or write files on the device, suggesting the ability to extract data or download additional files.

SEND_SMS / RECEIVE_SMS: Backup communication channel when internet communication isn’t possible.

Analysis of the internal code, which underwent obfuscation, revealed that the app uses “ryomyong.com” as its specific API for communication. This not only provides intranet access but also strictly controls communications, with the app designed to communicate securely only with authorized servers using a public key infrastructure (PKI) that trusts only private certificates issued by the state.

Always-on surveillance

The updated app now runs constantly, representing a complete transformation in its nature. The app automatically launches whenever the phone is turned on and requests permission to read and write files stored on the device. Essentially, the function extends far beyond verification and can potentially spy on the phone, accessing files while permanently residing on the device.

The updated version is no longer a passive “module” that runs only when external services need it, but an active “surveillance platform” embedded on the device that carries out its own objectives.

The updated version demonstrates North Korean authorities’ goals to comprehensively manage all digital activity by citizens using “digital IDs” issued by a central server. This can be seen as building robust infrastructure for digital population control.

Version comparison

Feature Version 1.0 (Simple Module) Version 1.0.2 (Surveillance Platform) Core Goals Issue single-use device registrations and CIDs Continuously manage IDs and verifications Execution Passively runs when called by external apps Automatically starts at boot and runs in background Communication Exclusively uses SMS (discrete, low bandwidth) Primarily internet with SMS fallback (high functionality) Security Basic data hash (SHA256) Independent PKI, native codes, and AES encryption Data Access IMSI and basic personal data ICCID support and file system access Dependencies Standard Android library Standard library and native library Server Endpoint Phone number (+8501950003) https://www.ryomyong.com/?page=cid.gen&action=reg&cert=p12&data=

Read in Korean

Mun Dong Hui

Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters and covers North Korean technology and human rights issues, including the country's political prison camp system. Mun has a M.A. in Sociology from Hanyang University and a B.A. in Mathematics from Jeonbuk National University. He can be reached at dhmun@uni-media.net

dailynk.com

15. N. Korea orders flood prevention work but leaves locals to pay for materials

​Where is the tipping point? How much of this inept leadership can the Korean people in the north take?

The Socialist Workers paradise has lost its luster (long ago).

N. Korea orders flood prevention work but leaves locals to pay for materials

While embankment construction in border districts such as Hyesan and Kim Jong Suk county along the Yalu River is largely complete, there are still countless areas that need work

By Lee Chae Eun - July 16, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korea orders flood prevention work but leaves locals to pay for materials - Daily NK English

Rodong Sinmun reported July 29, 2024, that State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong Un personally visited flood-damaged areas in Sinuiju and Uiju county, North Pyongan province, the previous day (July 28). Kim directly supervised rescue and evacuation efforts for residents in disaster-stricken areas and regions at risk of flooding due to heavy rains. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Korea is repairing embankments and waterways in Ryanggang province as part of large-scale preparations for heavy rains in July and August. Just as in previous years, locals are expected to pay for the materials themselves.

“Flood prevention work is underway in all cities and counties throughout the province, including Hyesan, on orders from the Central Committee. Workers from factories, enterprises, farms and neighborhood watch units have all been mobilized for the work,” a source in the province told Daily NK on Tuesday.

North Korea is calling for thorough precautions given the severe damage caused by flooding in the northern border regions around North Pyongan, Jagang and Ryanggang provinces following heavy rains in July 2024.

While the entire local population has been mobilized for flood prevention, the central government has not provided any of the necessary equipment or materials, the source said.

“The government has ordered everyone at factories, enterprises, farms and neighborhood watch units to show their patriotism by working together to prevent flood damage. But workers on the ground are being ordered to carry out the projects without being provided any materials or equipment. Each worksite is expected to source its own materials this year, just as in the past,” the source said.

Locals mobilized for flood prevention are voicing complaints about the authorities’ negligence. “They’re always just giving orders without doing anything that would actually be helpful,” one griped.

The source quoted one Hyesan resident as saying, “Each year, we’re told again and again to prevent accidents, but never once have they sent us the materials or equipment needed to actually prevent harm. Once again, locals have to carry their own shovels and pickaxes down to the river.”

As if expecting locals to buy their tools out of pocket weren’t bad enough, the Hyesan resident said that every neighborhood watch unit in the city has been ordered to bring two 25-kilogram sacks of dirt and gravel mixture and 15,000 North Korean won for purchasing the materials needed to lay concrete.

While embankment construction in border districts such as Hyesan and Kim Jong Suk county along the Yalu River is largely complete, there are still countless areas that need work. Officials in the relevant government offices are pushing locals to prepare for the heavy rains that are common in the summer months.

There is undoubtedly a human component to North Korea’s disastrous floods. Reckless deforestation and a haphazard approach to disaster prevention makes flood damage worse, both great and small. Nevertheless, the regime is content to issue detached orders and take halfhearted action.

Whenever flood damage occurs, the regime focuses on blaming low-level officials while giving little thought to more fundamental measures. Even North Koreans criticize the regime’s continuing failure to address the root causes of flooding.

“Last year, there was extensive damage from heavy rains and flooding, and now we’re back in summer. But once again, the authorities are running their mouths while leaving all the work for the local community. There’s little chance of the work being done properly. The continuing lack of meaningful action or assistance reveals the government’s complacency and negligence,” the source said.

Read in Korean

Lee Chae Eun

Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK's full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

​16. Ex-US diplomat alleging vote fraud in S. Korea barred from meeting Yoon Suk Yeol

Ex-US diplomat alleging vote fraud in S. Korea barred from meeting Yoon Suk Yeol

koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · July 16, 2025

Former President Yoon Suk Yeol (Pool photo via Yonhap)

A special counsel team looking into detained ex-President Yoon Suk Yeol's alleged insurrection blocked Morse Tan, former US ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice, from visiting Yoon's cell on the outskirts of Seoul on Wednesday.

Tan is now embroiled in a controversy here for his claims about election rigging in South Korea and about incumbent liberal President Lee Jae Myung.

With the special counsel team's measures effective starting Tuesday, Yoon has been barred from meeting anyone other than family or lawyers. He will remain behind bars until his indictment, assistant special counsel Park Ji-young told reporters Wednesday, indicating that Tan would not be an exception to the measures.

Yoon is being detained at Seoul Detention Center in Uiwang, Gyeonggi Province, as he was rearrested last week while the special counsel probe into his Dec. 3, 2024, insurrection is underway.

Park's statement was in response to an announcement by Yoon's legal team on Tuesday that Tan would visit the prison and meet Yoon for about 10 minutes Wednesday afternoon, upon Tan's request. Following the special counsel's briefing, Yoon's legal representatives admitted that the planned meeting of Yoon and Tan "fell through."

Tan arrived in South Korea on Monday and was greeted by scores of Yoon's sympathizers at Incheon Airport.

Morse Tan (left), former US ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice, is seen onstage for a speech at an event held near the Seoul National University's main gate on Tuesday. (Yonhap)

Tan's visit came at the invitation of the Seoul Metropolitan Government to deliver a speech at a forum on North Korean human rights on Tuesday. As controversy grew, the Seoul city government canceled his speech.

He was also scheduled to deliver a special lecture at Seoul National University on Tuesday afternoon, in a session hosted by a far-right group. Seoul National University, however, disallowed the event to take place at a prearranged campus venue. Instead, the organizer moved the event outside near the campus' front gate.

Tan, who served as the first Asian American ambassador-at-large in US history and was formerly dean of Liberty University School of Law in Lynchburg, Virginia, has claimed that elections in South Korea, including the recent presidential election in June, were being rigged due to China's influence.

"What they could not completely win with bullets, they're using weapons like fake ballots," Tan said at the outdoor event near the Seoul National University campus Tuesday. "President Yoon saw the dangers from the Chinese Communist Party and from North Korea and the dangers of fraudulently stolen elections."

Tan also repeated a baseless claim of President Lee Jae Myung having been involved in the sexual assault and murder of a young woman, which prevented him from completing his secondary education.

The claim, originally made at a press event in June at the National Press Club in Washington, has been disproven in a South Korean court.

In the same press event, Tan alleged that South Korea's National Election Commission attacked people who tried to raise questions about the possibility of election fraud.

consnow@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · July 16, 2025

​17. N. Korea unveils Pyongyang-Beijing rail schedules amid report of service resumption

​A Pyongyang to Moscow air route and now Pyongyang to Beijing rail service.

The CRInK is getting stronger. 

N. Korea unveils Pyongyang-Beijing rail schedules amid report of service resumption | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 16, 2025

SEOUL, July 16 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has unveiled a timetable for passenger rail services linking its capital of Pyongyang to China's Beijing amid a news report on the resumption of the route, a state-run North Korean website promoting tourism showed Wednesday.

The website of DPR Korea Tour displayed the timetable for international rail service, showing trains departing Pyongyang at 10:25 a.m. every Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday and arriving in Beijing via the Chinese border city of Dandong.

Trains from Beijing depart at 5:27 p.m. on the same days for arrival in Pyongyang via Dandong, it showed.

The timetable also includes schedules for rail services between Pyongyang and the Russian capital, Moscow, which resumed in mid-June following a nearly five-year suspension due to COVID-19.

The train service to Beijing via Dandong, however, has remained suspended since January 2020 due to the pandemic. NHK, a Japanese broadcasting network, reported last week that North Korea and China have agreed to resume passenger rail service between their capitals.

The website also carried a separate timetable for international flights, showing a new route between Pyongyang and Shanghai, with two flights operating between the cities every week.

In 2023, North Korea resumed the Pyongyang-Beijing flight route, but did not reinstate the Pyongyang-Shanghai service.

A source in China told Yonhap News Agency it has not yet been confirmed whether regular Pyongyang-Shanghai flights have resumed.

The disclosure of the potential resumption of rail and flight services comes as North Korea and China appear to be mending ties strained by Pyongyang's close military alignment with Russia, which has included the deployment of North Korean troops to support Moscow in its war against Ukraine.

This image, captured from the website of DPR Korea Tour on July 16, 2025, shows a timetable for international train service. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 16, 2025

​18. 'Back to the Line': Why American Soldiers Should Be on the Korean DMZ

This is for all those in 2d Infantry Division who patrolled the DMZ, until we didn't in 1991.

'Back to the Line': Why American Soldiers Should Be on the Korean DMZ

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/back-to-the-line-why-american-soldiers-should-be-on-the-korean-dmz/

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by David Maxwell · July 15, 2025

Key Points and Summary – Amid rising threats from a nuclear-armed North Korea and an assertive China, the U.S. should resume combat patrols on the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

-This proposal argues for embedding rotational U.S. infantry units directly with South Korean forces on the front line.

-Such a move would not be an escalation but a powerful reaffirmation of the U.S.-ROK alliance, providing invaluable real-world training and sending an unambiguous signal of resolve to Pyongyang and Beijing.

-By putting American boots back on the DMZ, the U.S. can reinvigorate its “tripwire” deterrence and restore a tangible symbol of its commitment to regional security.

Back to the Line: Rotational US Infantry Patrols on the DMZ to Signal Strength, Solidarity, and Strategic Readiness

Introduction

For nearly four decades, American infantrymen stood watch on the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a volatile front line between democracy and tyranny. Until early 1991, the US 2nd Infantry Division conducted regular combat patrols in the American sector of the DMZ, demonstrating unambiguous resolve against North Korean aggression.

That direct presence quietly ended, but the threat from the North has not. Today, with renewed tensions, a rising Chinese challenge, and a more aggressive Kim regime, the time has come to reintroduce US combat forces to patrol the DMZ, not to escalate tensions, but to reinforce deterrence, demonstrate alliance cohesion, and restore a powerful symbol of American commitment and strategic credibility.

The US infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) presence should receive the additional mission to conduct direct combat patrolling on the DMZ under the tactical control (TACON) of the Republic of Korea (ROK) units. The initiative would not revive a separate “US sector” but instead embed US forces in ROK areas of operation.

This approach enhances interoperability, builds mutual trust, and provides unmatched training in combat patrolling. It will also serve as a visible and visceral signal to Pyongyang and Beijing that the United States stands shoulder to shoulder with its South Korean ally, both literally and figuratively.

A Forgotten Mission with Enduring Relevance

From the Korean War armistice in 1953 through the early 1990s, US forces maintained a forward presence on the DMZ, handling observation posts and conducting regular combat patrols. These patrols were not symbolic.

They were a critical component of tripwire deterrence, monitoring North Korean activity and deterring infiltration or surprise attack. They also fostered tactical proficiency, bolstered morale, and made it clear to adversaries that the United States was physically committed to the defense of South Korea.

The withdrawal of US patrols from the DMZ coincided with broader force reductions, a shift toward strategic flexibility, and a belief that deterrence could be maintained through less direct means. While these changes reflected the geopolitical conditions of the 1990s, the security environment has undergone a fundamental shift today. North Korea is a nuclear-armed state with enhanced conventional capabilities. Kim Jong Un has adopted an openly hostile posture toward the South, renounced peaceful reunification, and intensified military provocations. The ROK/US alliance must adapt and visibly reaffirm its commitment.

A New Rotational Model for Strategic Impact

This proposal envisions a structured, rotational deployment of US IBCTs to South Korea in which a portion of the brigade is dedicated to patrolling the DMZ. Each nine-month rotation would be divided into three distinct phases:

Phase 1 – Pre-Patrol Training (3 Months): Units would conduct specialized training focused on DMZ operations, combined procedures for ROK and US forces, terrain familiarization, rules of engagement, and tactical patrol drills. This training could take place at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex and Warrior Base, utilizing Korea-specific scenarios.

Phase 2 – DMZ Combat Patrols (3 Months): US infantry companies would be placed under the TACON of ROK divisions and battalions responsible for DMZ security. They would conduct combined patrols with ROK units in ROK sectors, observing North Korean positions, deterring infiltration, and building trust through shared risk and responsibility.

Phase 3 – Post-Patrol Collective Training (3 Months): Following patrol operations, units shift their focus to battalion- and brigade-level combined training exercises, reinforcing lessons learned and enhancing high-end warfighting capabilities. This phase would be the capstone of the rotation, enhancing readiness across the spectrum of conflict.

The concept can also be employed if the decision is made to return to permanently assigned US infantry units in Korea.

Strategic Benefits

Strengthened Deterrence and Resolve

There is no clearer message to Pyongyang than the sight of US infantry shoulder-to-shoulder with South Korean soldiers physically facing North Korean troops across the Military Demarcation Line. This presence would reinvigorate deterrence through active operations, demonstrating not only capabilities but also the political will to fight if necessary. It would remind adversaries that US commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty are not abstract; they are embodied in young American soldiers standing post in harm’s way.

Enhanced Interoperability and Combined Capability

Embedding US forces within ROK formations on the DMZ would foster deep integration at the tactical level, where real warfighting cohesion must be forged. Through shared patrols, mutual support, and combined command relationships, the two forces would build a level of interoperability that cannot be replicated in simulation or exercises alone.

Elite Combat Training in a Real-World Environment

DMZ patrolling offers uniquely challenging small-unit operations, terrain navigation, stealthy movement, observation discipline, and combat operations in accordance with established rules of engagement. These are invaluable experiences for US infantry units. Rather than repetitive rotations that focus solely on garrison and rear-area training, this model would provide meaningful, mission-driven combat readiness in a real-world setting.

Elevated Morale and Warrior Ethos

There is no substitute for the psychological edge gained by staring down an adversary across a live front line. US soldiers conducting DMZ patrols would be infused with a sense of purpose and pride that only such a mission can generate. The patrolling experience would shape careers, forge unit cohesion, and reinforce a warrior ethos grounded in the defense of freedom.

Strategic Signaling to Regional Allies and Rivals

The return of US combat patrols to the DMZ would be noted far beyond Korea. It would reassure allies across the Asia-Indo-Pacific that the United States is not retreating from the front lines of democracy. It would underscore that rotational forces are not merely training expeditions; they are forward-deployed instruments of strategy. And it would signal to China that the US is willing to engage with a forward presence, not just over-the-horizon power projection.

Operational Considerations

Command and Control: US units would remain under US operational control (OPCON), but would be placed under TACON to ROK division or corps-level commands for day-to-day patrol coordination, enabling seamless integration while preserving US command

Rules of Engagement: US patrols would operate under established ROE harmonized with ROK procedures and consistent with the Armistice Agreement and US and ROK policies. Engagement authority would be clearly defined and mutually agreed upon.

Infrastructure and Support: Existing US installations near the DMZ, such as Camp Casey and Camp Bonifas, could provide logistical support for patrolling units. No new bases would be required.

Conclusion: Reclaim the Front Line

The return of US infantry patrols to the Korean DMZ would be more than a military adjustment. It would be a bold statement of shared sacrifice, readiness, and an unshakable alliance. It would reconnect today’s force to a legacy of courage and vigilance.

And it would remind North Korea and the world that the United States does not deter from afar, but by standing with its allies at the point of contact.

It is time to put American boots back on the line.

About the Author: David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation (where he focuses on a free and unified Korea). He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, The International Council on Korean Studies, and the OSS Society, and on the board of advisers of Spirit of America and the Special Operations Association of America, and is the editor-at -large at Small Wars Journal. You can follow him on X: @DavidMaxwell161.

Military Concepts

A 7th Generation Fighter Is Coming

NATO’s Challenger 3 Tank Can’t Beat Math

The B-21 Raider Is No ‘Battleship’

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by David Maxwell · July 15, 2025

19. America First, Allies Always: securing the Asia-Indo-Pacific together

My formal remarks to the Asia-Pacific Policy Strategy Dialogue, House of Lords, United Kingdom and the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea at the U.K.

I also said: "Allies First, America Always."

World News July 15, 2025 / 11:30 AM

America First, Allies Always: securing the Asia-Indo-Pacific together

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/07/15/korea-perspective-david-maxwell-speech/8541752588776/

By David Maxwell

South Korean marines aim weapons in a landing drill with the United States in Pohang, South Korea, in 2023. The two nations held the amphibious assault exercise for the first time in five years amid a growing threat from North Korea. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo

July 15 (UPI) -- Editor's note: This speech was presented to the Asia-Pacific Policy Strategy Dialogue, House of Lords, United Kingdom and the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea at the U.K. Parliament on July 1, 2025. It presents a comprehensive strategic vision for United States and allied engagement in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region.

Arguing for a paradigm built on "America First, Allies Always," the address emphasizes that alliances are the United States' and its partners' asymmetric advantage in countering authoritarian threats from the China-Russia-Iran-north Korea axis (CRInK).

It calls for rejecting false dichotomies in regional prioritization (for example, Taiwan versus Korea) and instead advancing simultaneous and integrated strategies anchored in deterrence, influence operations, and human rights.

Key proposals include the institutionalization of a "Two Plus Three" strategy for the Korean Peninsula (that results in a free and unified Korea), the deployment of Strategic Agility Platforms across the region, and the elevation of human rights as a frontline strategic tool. The speech concludes with a call to avoid the strategic ambiguity of the past and embrace collective defense and moral clarity to prevail in this era of multidomain ideological competition.

The entire report from the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy can be accessed here: https://apstrategy.org/2025/07/13/appsd/

Introduction

My lords, ladies and distinguished guests -- especially the U.K. All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea and its chairs, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Sir Iain Duncan Smith, MP.

It is a great honor to speak before this historic body on the future of a region that may well determine the course of the 21st century. The Asia-Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant geopolitical theater. It is the central arena of strategic competition, ideological confrontation and alliance cooperation.

Today, I bring a message of unity and resolve: the United States and its allies possess the strategic agility and collective strength to face and overcome multiple simultaneous security challenges in the region.

But we must act with clarity. We must act together. We must act now.

As a former serving U.S. Army officer, I am no longer constrained by military doctrine, government funding or a chain of command, so I can give you my objective assessment. That said, if I were asked to do so, I would provide this as my best military and national security advice for my country and our allies.

Except for those who are actually from or have lived there, there are no experts on North Korea. I am merely a student of one of the most complex strategic challenges we face. Although I may sound like I am speaking with authority based on my years of study and internalization of the problem, the fact is North Korea is a "hard target" and that anything I say can and should be challenged.

I come to you with a simple, but powerful, message: Our organizing principle must be: "America First, Allies Always." We possess the strategic agility to manage multiple security challenges in the Asia-Indo-Pacific simultaneously, and we must do so in concert with our allies.

Our strength is not only in our forces, but in our friendships. "America First" does not mean America alone. It means "Allies Always" -- because alliances are America's asymmetric advantage. At the same time, alliances are the asymmetric advantage for our allies. The silk web of alliances allows all to punch above their weight. They cannot be matched by any authoritarian bloc.

But, let me also add that I know U.S. domestic politics are challenging and frustrating for our allies. I would like to offer that in my many discussions with U.S. officials that there is absolute certainty that allies are critical to U.S. national security, and that every military and civilian professional I have spoken with will advocate for our alliances. I know there are many who would agree with this construct, "Allies First, America Always." I know I certainly do.

To overcome these challenges from our domestic politics, my recommendation is to adopt the concept that already exists -- "burden owning." We all must own the burden of our own defense, and then together we can develop alliance strategies to address the mutual threats that face us in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and around the world.

Strategic environment in the Asia-Indo-Pacific

Let us begin by examining the terrain we are navigating. I use Asia-Indo-Pacific quite deliberately because I do not believe we can neglect Asia in our description. I know the policymakers will argue Asia is within the Indo-Pacific. But Asia is at the center of the Indo-Pacific, and it is where the military, political and economic power reside. Although beyond the scope of this presentation, I would argue that due to the increasing interconnectedness and the shrinking of the globe, we should also always talk in terms of Eurasia.

The Asia-Indo-Pacific region today is shaped by the contest among three categories of powers:

First, modern nation-state powers, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These states uphold the international system based on individual liberty, liberal democracy, free markets, the rule of law and universal human rights. We have values based alliances and partnerships from the QUAD to AUKUS to the Indo-Pacific Four with NATO. (Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea).

Second, revisionist powers like China and Russia, who seek to reshape that international order to better serve authoritarianism.

Third, revolutionary or rogue powers -- North Korea, Iran and violent extremist organizations -- that aim to destroy and replace the existing global order altogether.

In actuality, the new descriptor that some scholars are using, the "CRInK" (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) might itself be considered the revolutionary power that seeks to destroy the rules based international order that was conceived after World War II.

This axis of authoritarians, or Dark Quad as Christopher Ford has named them, are creating crises around the world that challenge the countries who seek stability and security so that all can share in prosperity. Robert Kaplan, in his recent book, Waste Land, describes the current geopolitical challenges and issues best in this excerpt:

"This is certainly not a world governed by a rules-based order, as polite gatherings of the global elite like to define it, but rather a world of broad, overlapping areas of tension, raw intimidation and military standoffs. Indeed, there is no night watchman to keep the peace in this brawling, tumultuous world defined by upheaval.

"Globalization, which is based on trade, the large-scale movement of people by jet transportation and rapid technological advances in the electronic and digital realms, fits neatly together with a world in permanent crisis. That is because the permanent crisis demands a dense webwork of interactions between crisis zones across the Earth, which globalization produces."

The real threat might be what the U.S. intelligence community's Annual Threat Assessment describes as "adversarial cooperation." Although the United States considers China as the "pacing threat," I argue that U.S. alliances and partnerships must recognize and address the larger threat of cooperation, collaboration and collusion among the so-called "CRInK."

At the heart of this strategic competition between the "CRInK" and the modern nation-states is an ideological contest. This requires deft use of the diplomatic and informational instruments of power and not only the military and economic tools. The permanent crises Kaplan describes are a result of the conflict between open and closed societies.

We should ask ourselves what brings the "CRInK" together and how is it like our alliances? There are four reasons for their cooperation: Fear, weakness, desperation and envy.

They fear the strength of our alliances, as despite our current frictions time and again, we have demonstrated the power of alliances. They have inherent weaknesses within their political systems that make them vulnerable -- Putin's weakness is highly visible in his war in Ukraine, his inability to keep Assad in power and the support he is currently unable to provide to Iran.

They are desperate for support, particularly Russia and North Korea, as seen in their current military cooperation. Lastly, they envy our alliances. However, they will never share the values and trust that we do, and their relationships can never be more than transactional. This is playing out with Iran who is receiving very little support if any from the members of the "CRInK." There are already cracks in the "CRInK" that we should exploit.

These threats require a strategy of comprehensive deterrence, agile response, seizing the initiative, and unified resolve. We cannot fight yesterday's wars. We must prepare for tomorrow's contingencies while addressing the ongoing crises throughout the world.

Taiwan and Korea: Not either-or, but both-and

There is an unstated policy debate that focuses on the question: If we must choose, is Taiwan or Korea more important to U.S. national security? This is a false choice.

The answer is unequivocal: we must prepare to deter war and defend in both.

Weakness in one part of the theater invites adventurism in the other. China watches the Korean Peninsula for signals of American resolve. North Korea watches Taiwan for signs of distraction. We cannot afford to let one crisis unravel the deterrence architecture of the other.

That is why the United States must optimize its posture across the region. This includes:

• Strengthening joint force integration and command relationships in Korea and Japan

• Enhancing the rotations of U.S. forces in Australia and the Philippines

•- Prepositioning equipment and expanding access agreements with trusted regional partners; and ensuring that all U.S. forces are ready for simultaneous contingencies, not just sequential crises.

We must remember that strategic competition is not linear. It is concurrent, multi-domain and ideological.

Strategic agility platforms across the region

To support this level of preparedness, the United States and its allies must invest in and deploy Strategic Agility Platforms throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific. These are not merely forward bases or logistics hubs.

They are modular, adaptive and resilient platforms -- physical, digital and doctrinal -- that enable rapid projection of power, engagement and influence across contested and uncertain environments.

They are built on existing military bases throughout the region but also require development of others in strategic locations throughout the region in concert with our friends, partners and allies.

Strategic agility platforms include:

• Prepositioned equipment and munitions in dispersed, survivable facilities across Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands and in Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Australia-

• Mobile command and control nodes that can relocate dynamically and maintain operational tempo during cyber or kinetic disruptions

• Interoperable logistics and sustainment networks built in cooperation with allies and capable of supporting multi-domain operations from Australia to Korea

• Digital infrastructure for defensive and offensive information warfare, enabling coalition-wide influence operations, cyber defense and real-time strategic communications. Underpinning all of this is the absolute requirement for deep investments in integrated missile defense.

The purpose of these platforms is to avoid a single point of failure, enhance decision-making speed and ensure our ability to operate from a network of locations rather than a handful of vulnerable bases. SAPs will allow us to impose multiple dilemmas on our adversaries, complicating their targeting calculus, while reinforcing our own flexibility and initiative.

In short, strategic agility must be more than a concept. It must be built into our physical infrastructure, our planning assumptions and our alliance integration.

The two-plus-three strategy for Korea

To address the unique security challenge of the Korean Peninsula, we advocate a two-plus-three strategy. This strategy is founded on two enduring pillars and three transformative components.

The first pillar is military deterrence to prevent war. Deterrence remains the most vital national interest of the United States on the peninsula. The permanent stationing of U.S. troops, combined with the Republic of Korea's advanced military, has been the backbone of peace for 70 years.

The second pillar is strategic strangulation -- a deliberate use of economic sanctions, law enforcement, diplomatic pressure, cyber defense and cyber offense, and financial actions to cut off North Korea's access to illicit revenue, proliferation networks and international legitimacy. We must target the regime's lifelines, from weapons sales to Iran and Russia, to overseas slave labor and cybercrime.

But these two pillars are not enough. The North Korean threat cannot be restrained indefinitely. It must be solved. That is where the three transformative components come in:

• A human rights upfront approach. We must put the human rights of the Korean people on every agenda. The regime commits crimes against humanity to stay in power. These abuses are not only moral outrages, but the also are indicators of regime vulnerability. Information about universal human rights is an existential threat to Kim Jong Un.

• A comprehensive information and influence campaign. The most dangerous weapon against a closed society is the truth. We must equip the Korean people in the north with the knowledge, tools and networks to organize, communicate and ultimately seek their own destiny. As history shows, regimes built on lies collapse when their people learn the truth.

• Support for Korean self-determination. The "Korea question," the unnatural division of the peninsula as described in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, must be solved by the Korean people. Our role is not to dictate unification, but to enable it. A free and unified Korea, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK) is the only path to true denuclearization, permanent peace and justice.

While these three components are not new ideas, what makes this transformative is that all three must be combined and prioritized for action in ways that have never been tried. This is a radical departure from the long-held belief that we must be single focused on the nuclear threat.

Linking freedom in Taiwan to unity in Korea

There is an ideological connection between the defense of Taiwan and the liberation of the Korean people in the north. Both stand as flashpoints between open and closed systems. Both are test cases of our credibility.

Taiwan is a thriving democracy facing relentless pressure from Beijing. If Taiwan falls, it will embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere. But a free Taiwan is of little strategic value if, in the same breath, the Korean Peninsula is lost to a combined North Korean and Chinese sphere of influence.

That is why our strategy must be whole-of-theater, not piecemeal. As the U.K. understands from its global maritime legacy, freedom of navigation, access to sea lanes and open trading systems depend on regional stability in East Asia and throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific.

Allies as asymmetric advantage

Allies are not liabilities. They are our force multipliers, intelligence enhancers, logistics enablers and moral compass. This is why our posture must be anchored in our alliances. And allies gain as much asymmetric advantage from owning their defense burden while operating within a silk web of alliances.

Japan's evolving defense policy and closer U.S.-Japan command integration are game-changers. Australia's rotational hosting of U.S. Marines enhances southern theater readiness. AUKUS will boost our strategic capabilities. The Philippines' access agreements expand operational reach. South Korea remains a global pivotal state and a top-tier contributor to the rules-based order and is a partner in the arsenal of democracies.

Let us be clear: Authoritarian powers have no real allies. China has client states. Russia has enablers. North Korea has customers. But the free world has partners.

That is why we must say: "America First, Allies Always."

The moral imperative of human rights

As we pursue hard power strategies, we must not neglect the moral dimension. The crimes committed by the Kim family regime are the worst since the Holocaust. Gulags. Starvation. Slave labor. Repression. And our silence is complicity.

A human rights upfront approach is not a distraction from security. It is integral to it. As President Reagan said, "A bird cannot fly with only one wing." Military strength must be matched with moral clarity.

Human rights are not only a moral imperative; they are a national security issue. The Kim family regime must violate human rights to build its nuclear weapons. The regime derives hard currency from its overseas slave labor. It survives only through the denial of the human rights of the Korean people in the north.

By empowering the Korean people with truth, solidarity and hope, we undermine the regime's legitimacy from within. As Gandhi inspired Martin Luther King, and as the American Declaration of Independence inspired Korea's 1919 March 1st movement and Declaration of Independence, so too must we complete the virtuous circle of liberty and unification.

I describe a Korean strategy in 12 words: "Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through human rights."

Strategic recommendations

To sustain peace and secure freedom in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, I offer these strategic recommendations:

• Elevate Korea policy to a strategic priority equal to Taiwan. Simultaneity must replace sequential, or worse, stove-piped or compartmented planning.

• Institutionalize the two-plus-three strategy with full alliance coordination.

• Expand rotational access and interoperability across Australia, the Philippines and Micronesia.

• Restructure U.S. forces for dual-apportioned missions to respond to both Korea and Taiwan.

• Fund and empower political warfare capabilities to expose and defeat China's and North Korea's subversion -- China's unrestricted warfare and its "three warfares" and the Kim Family regime's political warfare with Juche characteristics.

• Support South Korea's 8.15 Unification Doctrine, which offers the clearest path to resolving the Korean question.

• Adopt whole-of-society information campaigns to support human rights, fight censorship and enhance digital resistance and resilience.

• Invest in strategic agility platforms to ensure flexible, survivable and scalable operations throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific.

• Sustain the "silk web" of alliances and partnerships from the five bilateral treaty alliances to QUAD and AUKUS and support security arrangements directly among allies.

Conclusion

Let me close with a historical caution: In 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech that excluded Korea from America's defense perimeter. Six months later, war broke out. Miscalculation thrives in strategic ambiguity.

Today, let us not repeat the Acheson mistake. Let us draw the line of defense boldly, through unity, strength and purpose. Or perhaps we should draw no line at all.

The Asia-Indo-Pacific is not America's burden alone. It is the shared responsibility of all free nations. With strategic agility, trusted allies and unshakeable values, we will prevail.

America First, Allies Always.

Thank you.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, and is the editor-at-large for the Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com