Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"He that would live in peace and at ease must not speak all he knows or all he sees."

~ Benjamin Franklin

"A person's humility is known through two things: talking a lot about useless things, and telling stories even though they are not asked."

– Plato

“Just that you do the right thing. The rest doesn't matter."

– Marcus Aurelius

1. Soft power for a tough world: America needs more than tanks and aircraft carriers. By William H. McRaven

2. US-China spy wars intensify under Trump 2.0 as tech competition heats up

3. In the Indo-Pacific, US defense industrial partnerships go much deeper than AUKUS submarines

4. U.N. ambassador nominee Waltz downplays 'Signalgate' controversy

5. Pentagon yanks speakers from Aspen Security Forum, blasts its values

6. House NDAA draft mandates database of contractors used in covert operations

7. The Secret Service Failure at Butler, Pa., a Year Later

8. Through Trial and Error, Iran Found Gaps in Israel’s Storied Air Defenses

9. Regime Change in Tehran Isn’t Worth the Risk

10. The Right’s 1939 Project

11. Australian Leader’s Bonhomie in China Belies Delicate Balancing Act

12. Is This ‘What They Signed Up For?’ New Military Missions Ignite Interest in Conscientious Objectors

13. Senate confirms controversial vet to lead Pentagon personnel office

14. Lawmakers want details on plans to privatize military stores

15. Pacific Military Balance Tilting in China’s Favor, Says New Defense of Japan Report

16. Mike Waltz pledges to make UN ‘great again’ in confirmation hearing

17. Senate committee seeks safeguard against US troop reductions in South Korea

18. Information Management Driving Decision Supremacy

19. The Limits of Putin's Balancing Act

20. How India Can Placate America

21. Lessons Observed from the War Between Israel and Iran

22. To build 'peace through strength,' restore this pillar of US power

23 A Little-Known Microsoft Program Could Expose the Defense Department to Chinese Hackers

24. Commander’s Intent for Machines: Reimagining Unmanned Systems Control in Communications-Degraded Environments

25. Development or Dependence? Rethinking China’s Economic Playbook in the Americas

26. The Curious Case of Slife the Knife

27. Carlyle 'Smitty' Harris, Vietnam POW Who Originated 'Tap Code,' Dies

28. The US Army’s second rebirth: From post-Vietnam to post-GWOT

1. Soft power for a tough world: America needs more than tanks and aircraft carriers. By William H. McRaven

Three key concluding points:

Every right-minded person I know agrees that the State Department needs to establish clear priorities, reduce waste and have an organizational structure that supports our national goals. However, because the State Department budget is less than half a percent of federal spending and USAID is less than one percent, I would offer that these expenditures of American dollars are well worth the investment.

Eliminating USAID and the Voice of America and underfunding the State Department will put every American, both at home and abroad, at risk. George C. Marshall, who as Army chief of staff led American forces during World War II and later served as the 50th secretary of state, once said: “Diplomacy is not a sign of weakness. It is a sign of strength, of a confident nation ready to lead with wisdom, not just weapons.”

If we want the world to see us as strong, confident and having the wisdom to lead on the global stage, then this administration, and this Congress, must find a way to reinvigorate and reinvest in the State Department and USAID. Our national security depends on it.

Opinion

Soft power for a tough world

America needs more than tanks and aircraft carriers.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/15/mcraven-soft-power-usaid-weapons-diplomacy/

July 15, 2025 at 6:43 p.m. EDTYesterday at 6:43 p.m. EDT

Demonstrators hold signs in support of laid-off government workers leaving the State Department on Friday. (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

By William H. McRaven

William H. McRaven, a retired Navy admiral, was commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014.

The Defense Department is our hard power; the carriers, the jets, the bombers, the tanks, the infantry, the use of direct action and kinetic power are there to deter, defend and defeat our adversaries. The State Department is always depicted as soft power — as if to imply that the work it does is somehow less demanding, less effective and less critical than that done by those of us in uniform.

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In my experience, those who served in USAID, the Foreign Service and the diplomatic corps were anything but soft. These public servants were in every conflict zone, every theater of war. Wherever there was a natural disaster, young Americans from State and USAID were there. They are as courageous, as heroic and as patriotic as any soldier I ever served with. As important, the work they do is vital — absolutely vital — to our national security. Calvin Coolidge once said, that “No nation ever had an army large enough to guarantee it against attack in time of peace or insure it victory in time of war.” And yet, we continue to grow our military, frequently at the expense of the other elements of national power that are essential to our success.

This is no time to weaken any element of America’s power. The dismissal of highly trained diplomats at the State Department and the dismantling of USAID will jeopardize national security and make the military’s job much more difficult. Our national security has never depended on military strength alone; rather, it relies on collaboration with a strong Foreign Service and diplomatic corps. I’ve stood shoulder to shoulder with these dedicated public servants in some of the world’s most dangerous places, and I have seen firsthand how they advance our national interests.

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In 2001, when the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf kidnapped Martin and Gracia Burnham, two American missionaries in the Philippines, it was Ambassador Frank Ricciardone who coordinated with then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s government in an attempt to rescue the Burnhams.

In 2003, a U.S. surveillance plane went down in Colombia, and the surviving crew members were captured by the FARC insurgent group. It was the U.S. ambassador to Colombia, Anne Patterson, and her team who immediately began to work with the White House to secure the crew’s release. She was followed in Colombia by Ambassador Bill Wood and then Bill Brownfield.

In 2008, Brownfield helped orchestrate a successful rescue of the American hostages.

From 2006 to 2008, I spent time in Africa pursuing Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). None of this work could have been done without the support of U.S. ambassadors in Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Algeria and Nigeria.

In Iraq, it was the phenomenal work of Ambassadors John Negroponte, Zal Khalilzad, Ryan Crocker, Chris Hill and Jim Jeffrey that allowed both the Special Operations forces and the conventional units to do their jobs despite the constant political turmoil on the ground. In Afghanistan, it was the same. Without the likes of Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wood, Crocker, Ron Neumann and Karl Eikenberry, it would have been impossible for our Special Operations forces to keep our troops safe and pursue the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And yes, Crocker and Khalilzad served in both war zones.

In 2005, after Pakistan was devastated by an earthquake in Kashmir that killed more than 73,000 people. Ambassador Crocker immediately requested support from USAID and the Navy. For the next year USAID was on the ground supporting relief efforts. Beyond just the humanitarian nature of this undertaking, the goodwill it generated with the Pakistani government gave our military and interagency forces greater latitude to work against terrorist targets in the country.

In 2009, it was the U.S. ambassador to Yemen, Steve Seche, who negotiated with a mercurial President Ali Abdullah Saleh to allow U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen that eventually resulted in the elimination of two of al-Qaeda’s biggest threats in the region.

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During our Special Operations pursuit of the terrorist group al-Shabab in East Africa, it was Ambassador Don Yamamoto, who served as our point man. Yamamoto, a Japanese American who was ambassador in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia, had more talent, courage, determination and grit than any 10 people I served with.

In Pakistan, after the Osama bin Laden raid, it was Ambassador Cameron Munter who kept the Pakistanis from shutting down the Ground Lines of Communications, the main logistics route supporting our soldiers in Afghanistan.

Later, while I was the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, I worked closely with USAID Director Rajiv Shah to develop plans to reduce poverty and disease in sub-Saharan Africa. I knew that extremist organizations such as Boko Haram and AQIM recruited from the disenfranchised. I believed American aid would help reduce that threat.

Every right-minded person I know agrees that the State Department needs to establish clear priorities, reduce waste and have an organizational structure that supports our national goals. However, because the State Department budget is less than half a percent of federal spending and USAID is less than one percent, I would offer that these expenditures of American dollars are well worth the investment.

Eliminating USAID and the Voice of America and underfunding the State Department will put every American, both at home and abroad, at risk. George C. Marshall, who as Army chief of staff led American forces during World War II and later served as the 50th secretary of state, once said: “Diplomacy is not a sign of weakness. It is a sign of strength, of a confident nation ready to lead with wisdom, not just weapons.”

If we want the world to see us as strong, confident and having the wisdom to lead on the global stage, then this administration, and this Congress, must find a way to reinvigorate and reinvest in the State Department and USAID. Our national security depends on it.

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The comments emphasize the critical role of the State Department and USAID in contributing to national security through diplomacy and humanitarian efforts. Many commenters express admiration for Admiral McRaven's insights, highlighting the importance of "soft power" in preventing... Show more

2. US-China spy wars intensify under Trump 2.0 as tech competition heats up

Excerpts:

“One reason for agencies like MSS to publicise espionage cases is to remind citizens that intelligence and security services can see what they are doing and make arrests to protect regime security, to try to deter citizens from acting in ways the regime does not like,” she said.

Sergey Radchenko of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, who has written extensively on Russian and Chinese foreign and security policies, described Chinese espionage in the West as “pervasive”.

“It’s so pervasive, it’s becoming absurd,” he said, adding that he has been a target a “couple of times.”

Denis Simon, a fellow at the Quincy Institute, said that loosening some controls could “reduce the urgency or desperation that drives some forms of tech theft” and that fully cutting off access to high technology could increase the pressure to circumvent restrictions.

However, he also said US-China relations are framed increasingly in “zero-sum terms” – especially in sensitive sectors such as AI, semiconductors, quantum computing, and aerospace, a competition that “fuels an ongoing ‘intelligence arms race’.”

Noting that Patel continues to “frame China as a top espionage threat, which shapes both elite and public perceptions”, he said that even if some sales resume, “surveillance and public warnings will persist – reinforcing mutual suspicion.”

US-China spy wars intensify under Trump 2.0 as tech competition heats up

Both sides boosting espionage and counter-espionage efforts, increasingly publicise spy arrests and covert operations

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3318356/us-china-spy-wars-intensify-under-trump-20-tech-competition-heats

Khushboo Razdanin Washington

Published: 3:41am, 16 Jul 2025Updated: 3:57am, 16 Jul 2025

When the Federal Bureau of Investigation last week arrested a suspected Chinese hacker for allegedly stealing sensitive American research on Covid-19 vaccines in 2020, the head of America’s top law enforcement agency hailed the episode as “manhunting” the Chinese Communist Party.

“The CCP’s relentless attacks on our institutions will not go unanswered,” FBI Director Kash Patel wrote on social media.

“The FBI will hunt down those who threaten our national security – wherever they hide,” he wrote, adding, “huge ... manhunting the CCP.”

Then, soon after the FBI announced taking 33-year-old Chinese national Xu Zewei into custody at Milan’s Malpensa Airport, China’s Ministry of State Security made a similarly dramatic announcement, saying it had disrupted three foreign espionage plots. It also warned government workers to remain alert.

In one of the cases publicised by the MSS, a provincial official identified as “Li” was allegedly seduced by a foreign intelligence agent while abroad, then blackmailed, using intimate photos, and coerced into stealing “confidential” documents when back in China.

“Foreign spies have become increasingly aggressive in infiltrating China and stealing secrets,” the MSS said in a statement that did not name any particular country but blamed “a weakened sense of discipline” among officials for recent lapses.

New CIA videos seek to lure Chinese officials to leak secrets to US

The announcements come amid a shifting geopolitical tech rivalry between the two superpowers, which experts say has intensified into a broader intelligence contest, as both sides escalate espionage and counter-espionage efforts, and increasingly publicise spy arrests and covert operations.

The US government has toughened measures against technology theft, cyber espionage, and academic infiltration, including revoking visas for Chinese students and researchers deemed security risks. As part of that toughening, Patel has quickly reshaped FBI priorities, calling the Chinese Communist Party the “adversary of our time”.

On the other hand, President Donald Trump has also eased some export controls he imposed earlier this year. On Tuesday, American tech giants Nvidia and AMD said they can resume selling of their artificial intelligence chips in the Chinese market. Earlier this month, the Trump administration lifted some curbs on exports design software to China in exchange for increased flow of critical minerals.

However, there is no expectation the spying competition will slow down.

Both countries have increased espionage against each other “as the relationship has developed into one of intense competition on many fronts from trade to military supremacy to global influence”, Dennis Wilder, the CIA’s deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific from 2015 to 2016, said by email.

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Wilder, who now teaches at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, added that US intelligence agencies have “stepped up ... efforts to recruit Chinese spies using such innovations as direct online appeals to disaffected Chinese officials.”

“Similarly, MSS operations against US citizens and business persons have also intensified,” he said.

He said he doubted that the Nvidia announcement would have any significant impact on the overall espionage efforts of either side.

“China’s intelligence services might shift priorities a bit away from trying to steal secrets related to advanced chips but the overall effort is unlikely to be affected,” Wilder wrote.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens, an associate professor at the University of Texas, Austin, who is writing a book on Chinese internal security, agreed that as strategic competition between the US and China has heated up, “intelligence competition between the two great powers has also intensified.”

“These cases likely reflect the growing global profile of China’s intelligence apparatus — as well as increased global awareness of and efforts to counter Chinese espionage operations abroad,” she said.

Workers set up a robot at the Nvidia booth of ahead of the third China International Supply Chain Expo in Beijing on Monday. Photo: Xinhua via AP

A July 8 report by Kieran Green of Margin Research, an American cybersecurity firm, referred to a Chinese “cyber militia system” composed of “civilian volunteers operating under the dual leadership of local governments” and the Chinese military.

Greitens added that while external observers often look at announcements by agencies such as MSS through the lens of foreign policy, “it is important to remember that these communications have a domestic audience also”.

“One reason for agencies like MSS to publicise espionage cases is to remind citizens that intelligence and security services can see what they are doing and make arrests to protect regime security, to try to deter citizens from acting in ways the regime does not like,” she said.

Sergey Radchenko of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, who has written extensively on Russian and Chinese foreign and security policies, described Chinese espionage in the West as “pervasive”.

“It’s so pervasive, it’s becoming absurd,” he said, adding that he has been a target a “couple of times.”

Denis Simon, a fellow at the Quincy Institute, said that loosening some controls could “reduce the urgency or desperation that drives some forms of tech theft” and that fully cutting off access to high technology could increase the pressure to circumvent restrictions.

However, he also said US-China relations are framed increasingly in “zero-sum terms” – especially in sensitive sectors such as AI, semiconductors, quantum computing, and aerospace, a competition that “fuels an ongoing ‘intelligence arms race’.”

Noting that Patel continues to “frame China as a top espionage threat, which shapes both elite and public perceptions”, he said that even if some sales resume, “surveillance and public warnings will persist – reinforcing mutual suspicion.”

The FBI under Patel, with other agencies, has made a series of public spying disclosures in recent months while Beijing has announced spy arrests of its own.

US federal prosecutors last week charged two Chinese nationals with attempting to recruit US Navy personnel to leak classified information to the MSS. The suspects were on June 27 in Oregon and Texas by the FBI after allegedly making a $10,000 “dead drop” payment for military secrets.

Also in June, three Chinese researchers were arrested in Michigan for allegedly attempting to smuggle biological materials into the US using false statements. The arrests followed the March arrest of two active-duty and one former US Army soldier of Chinese origin, accused of conspiring to sell “sensitive” and “top secret” national defence information to China.

On the Chinese side, in June, China arrested a Chinese couple said to have worked at “core” confidential departments in a Chinese state agency on charges of spying for British intelligence.

Chinese students and researchers at American universities have now come under intense scrutiny as counter-intelligence efforts have ramped up.

That scrutiny includes a congressional investigation of ties between major US universities and the China Scholarship Council, which lawmakers say operates as a channel for Chinese intelligence, and an administration inquiry into the University of California, Berkeley’s failure to report US$220 million in Chinese government funding linked to its partnership with Tsinghua University.

In addition, in May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced visa revocations for Chinese students with ties with Chinese Communist Party or involvement in sensitive scientific research.

“We may be entering a new phase in which mutual paranoia is the default posture, particularly in frontier technologies,” Simon said, adding that both the US and China increasingly treat every connection – whether a tech firm, scholar, or dating app – as a potential espionage risk.

Khushboo Razdan

Khushboo Razdan is a senior correspondent based in Washington. Prior to this, she worked for the Post in New York. Before joining the team, she worked as a multimedia journalist in Beijing and New Delhi for over a decade. She is a graduate of the Columbia Journalism School.

3. In the Indo-Pacific, US defense industrial partnerships go much deeper than AUKUS submarines

Excerpts:

Together, PIPIR and AUKUS Pillar II could prove to be vital to deterrence and defense in the Indo-Pacific. While diplomatic messages and military exercises are immediate, visible, and necessary to shore up deterrence in the near term, aligning defense on industrial capabilities to match China’s massive armament program is the more important strategic move for the years ahead. The US Navy has acknowledged that China has 230 times more shipbuilding capacity than the United States. To provide both a qualitative and quantitative response to China’s push to become a “world class” military power, the need for the United States to integrate the industrial capacity and comparative technological advantages of allies and partners in the region has never been greater. Pitting the US defense industry against China’s without the help of Washington’s allies and partners, is a recipe for the failure of deterrence and, perhaps, catastrophic defeat. As US President Donald Trump has put it in the past, “America first does not mean America alone.”

Further defense industrial cooperation and integration can yield immense and local benefits for the US warfighter. However, these benefits must be carefully balanced with the need to ensure that the US government is not replacing US capacity and jobs with foreign ones to cut costs and speed up timelines. The Trump administration’s recently announced review of AUKUS, and its likely already completed review of PIPIR, under an “America first” framework, will be critical to mitigating this risk. A revitalized AUKUS and PIPIR model can create coproduction and cooperative models, allowing the United States to bring its strengths to the table. The better the United States can work with its regional partners on munitions and systems of mutual use, such as addressing the meager supply of 155mm artillery shells, the more effectively Washington can equip its warfighters to deter, and if necessary, win a prolonged war.

As the Trump administration prepares a national security strategy to help restore US greatness, regional defense industrial base partnerships must play a central role in restoring domestic manufacturing and increasing US lethality and deterrence. The early successes of AUKUS Pillar II and the announcement of marquee PIPIR projects have built a solid foundation for what should be an even more ambitious program of integration and cooperation.

In the Indo-Pacific, US defense industrial partnerships go much deeper than AUKUS submarines

atlanticcouncil.org · by dhojnacki · July 15, 2025

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This week, Australian and US forces began Talisman Sabre, a major biennial military exercise that sends a powerful message of the two countries’ resolute bilateral ties and joint capabilities. This year’s iteration is being described as the “largest and most sophisticated war fighting exercise ever conducted in Australia,” involving some 35,000 personnel. The successful completion of this major, three-week exercise will hopefully alleviate some of the anxiety that has built up following the US Department of Defense’s recent decision to review the defense industry pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS.

Much of this anxiety was misplaced in the first place. The US review is not the alliance-busting event that some have portrayed it as. Far from it. It is reasonable and expected that a new US administration would review such an agreement, and it is something that new governments in both the United Kingdom and Australia have also completed. Moreover, the review of AUKUS should be understood as just one part of a larger US effort to accelerate and refine defense industry cooperation to meet shared security goals in the Indo-Pacific.

What else is included in this larger US effort? In a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, for example, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the first tranche of Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) projects. It was a decisive move toward deepening US-led defense industrial base cooperation—within the administration’s “America first” framework—to counter China’s looming threat. PIPIR and AUKUS, if employed properly, will be powerful tools to achieve the Trump administration’s vision of ensuring US deterrence against aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

AUKUS: The submarines aren’t the only substance

The first problem is that the AUKUS pact is widely misunderstood. It is not a new trilateral “alliance.” AUKUS does not, for instance, involve new commitments on the use of military force. Nor is it a political coalition, like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue made up of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Further, despite the focus of recent media coverage, AUKUS is not just about a new submarine sales deal that cut France out of selling diesel submarines to Australia. AUKUS has two “pillars,” both of which hold important benefits for the United States and particularly its Indo-Pacific Command.

Pillar I is about developing nuclear-powered, but nonnuclear armed, attack submarine capability operating out of Australia. This has already started, with Australians training on nuclear submarine technology with US and UK counterparts, and with US submarines making more port calls at Perth in Western Australia. The next major milestone will be in 2027, when Submarine Rotational Force-West will be established at Perth, initially with US and UK submarines. Then, in the early 2030s, the United States will sell Australia Virginia-class submarines as an interim measure while Australia develops its own nuclear submarine production capability. By the early 2040s, Australia will be building and operating its own subs of the new SSN-AUKUS class, an Australia-UK-US design.

However, concerns are rising that the US industrial base may not be able to produce enough Virginia-class submarines to provide for both Australian and US requirements for Pillar I. Since 2022, the United States has only been able to produce 1.2 Virginia-class submarines a year. It has not reached the targeted procurement rate of two new submarines per year, much less the 2.33 production rate required to provide submarines to Australia. While the US Congress and the Australian government have directed billions of dollars to defense industrial base investments, reaching this production rate in the next few years is a herculean task. However, in the interim, even if Pillar I only results in US and UK attack submarines operating out of Western Australia—much closer to the key flashpoints of the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea—then it has had a meaningful impact.

AUKUS Pillar II, meanwhile, is a much broader effort at defense industrial cooperation in a range of important areas. This includes long-range fires, quantum computing, unmanned underwater vehicles, electronic warfare capabilities, and artificial intelligence, pooling the advanced research efforts of all three countries to deliver new capabilities in the short term. These baskets of capability are not as simple and powerfully symbolic as new nuclear subs, but they are very important. In fact, there’s a strong argument that the focus and funds for AUKUS should shift away from the signature submarine programs to build out these new systems right away. Further, unlike Pillar I, Pillar II has a real prospect of including additional regional allies in specific Pillar II projects beyond the original three partners. Unlike AUKUS Pillar I, which has hard production limitations focused on a very expensive platform type with a long production timeline, Pillar II is bearing fruit quickly. One example of an AUKUS Pillar II capability is the imminent deployment of a “trilateral algorithm” to share classified information from P-8 sonobuoys across each country’s systems, increasing the range and maritime domain awareness of allied anti-submarine warfare efforts.

PIPIR: Leveraging regional US partnerships

PIPIR is less prominent than AUKUS, but it is more expansive and may prove to be even more important. Since its founding in May 2024, PIPIR has evolved from an agreed-upon concept to a plan of action in recent weeks. Announced in late May, the first set of marquee projects shows how the United States looks across the region at opportunities to save taxpayer money and improve US sustainment capability. For example, one new project aims to “establish repair capability and capacity for P-8 radar systems in Australia.” The P-8 is a critical aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Currently, repair efforts on the radar system are limited to the continental United States. The ability to repair both US and partner P-8 radar systems out of range of most China’s missiles will enhance both deterrence and sustainment capabilities in the event of a conflict.

Another new project involves identifying standards for small unmanned aerial systems and secure supply chains for production. Currently, China controls nearly 90 percent of the commercial drone market, and the Department of Defense’s innovation unit claims that “China could shut [the drone industry] down globally for a year.” Efforts to build ally and partner supply chains are essential for deterrence and lethality. The commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, has continued to emphasize the importance of the “Hellscape” concept of massed unmanned systems to fight China. This new PIPIR project will help buttress the Department of Defense’s Replicator Initiative to ensure “Hellscape” is a credible option that is truly free of Chinese components.

Other PIPIR efforts include expanding in-theater ship repair, cooperation with Australia to produce artillery shells and guided missiles, and even coproduction with India on “equipment needed to deter aggression.” Hegseth’s public release of these projects indicates that partners and allies in the region are confident about PIPIR and the United States’ commitment to its success, with likely even more cooperation occurring behind closed doors.

The way forward

Together, PIPIR and AUKUS Pillar II could prove to be vital to deterrence and defense in the Indo-Pacific. While diplomatic messages and military exercises are immediate, visible, and necessary to shore up deterrence in the near term, aligning defense on industrial capabilities to match China’s massive armament program is the more important strategic move for the years ahead. The US Navy has acknowledged that China has 230 times more shipbuilding capacity than the United States. To provide both a qualitative and quantitative response to China’s push to become a “world class” military power, the need for the United States to integrate the industrial capacity and comparative technological advantages of allies and partners in the region has never been greater. Pitting the US defense industry against China’s without the help of Washington’s allies and partners, is a recipe for the failure of deterrence and, perhaps, catastrophic defeat. As US President Donald Trump has put it in the past, “America first does not mean America alone.”

Further defense industrial cooperation and integration can yield immense and local benefits for the US warfighter. However, these benefits must be carefully balanced with the need to ensure that the US government is not replacing US capacity and jobs with foreign ones to cut costs and speed up timelines. The Trump administration’s recently announced review of AUKUS, and its likely already completed review of PIPIR, under an “America first” framework, will be critical to mitigating this risk. A revitalized AUKUS and PIPIR model can create coproduction and cooperative models, allowing the United States to bring its strengths to the table. The better the United States can work with its regional partners on munitions and systems of mutual use, such as addressing the meager supply of 155mm artillery shells, the more effectively Washington can equip its warfighters to deter, and if necessary, win a prolonged war.

As the Trump administration prepares a national security strategy to help restore US greatness, regional defense industrial base partnerships must play a central role in restoring domestic manufacturing and increasing US lethality and deterrence. The early successes of AUKUS Pillar II and the announcement of marquee PIPIR projects have built a solid foundation for what should be an even more ambitious program of integration and cooperation.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and at the N7 Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He previously served as an aide in the United States Senate, supporting Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee members, including as Senator Joni Ernst’s foreign policy advisor.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leading the Council’s Tiger Project on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of service as an intelligence officer and strategist, including twelve years stationed overseas in the region. He posts as @Mister_G_2 on X.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

4. U.N. ambassador nominee Waltz downplays 'Signalgate' controversy

U.S. News July 15, 2025 / 4:16 PM

U.N. ambassador nominee Waltz downplays 'Signalgate' controversy

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2025/07/15/mike-waltz-senate-hearing/3941752608838/

By Mike Heuer

1 of 4 | Former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz speaks during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on his nomination to be ambassador to the United Nations at the U.S. Capitol on Tuesday. Photo by Bonnie Cash/UPI | License Photo

July 15 (UPI) -- U.N. ambassador nominee Mike Waltz denied any sensitive information was shared during a controversial mobile app chat in March while undergoing a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Tuesday.

The hearing was the first Congressional appearance by Waltz since his controversial participation in a Signal app chat that inadvertently included a journalist while discussing a pending military operation in March against Houthi targets in Yemen.

Waltz was the Trump administration's national security adviser when the chat occurred, but no mention of the Signal chat occurred until past the hearing's first hour.

Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., raised using the Signal app to discuss classified matters, which since has been dubbed "Signalgate."

Waltz said no classified information was shared during the discussion that accidentally included The Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg.

"That engagement was driven by and recommended by the CyberSecurity Infrastructure Security Agency [and] by the Biden administration," Waltz said, as reported by ABC News.

Waltz said Signal is an encrypted app that was authorized by the CSISA and recommended by the Biden administration.

"We followed the recommendation," Waltz said. "But there was not classified information shared."

Coons responded by saying he had hoped Waltz would express "some sense of regret" over the matter that he said included "very sensitive, timely information about a military strike on a commercially available app."

Waltz told Coons they have a "fundamental disagreement" because no classified information was shared during the Signal chat.

Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., said the Defense Department's inspector general and the Air Force have separate investigations ongoing in the matter and have not drawn any conclusions.

"There are two investigations going on at the Pentagon precisely to determine in an objective and independent way whether classified information was shared," Kaine said.

Waltz declined to comment because the investigations are ongoing.

The U.N. ambassadorship is the last vacancy to be filled by the Trump administration, and Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah, called Waltz one of the nation's "most well-qualified" U.N. ambassador nominees when introducing him to the committee members, CBS News reported.

Lee said Waltz is skilled at negotiations and has a lot of policy experience to guide him while dealing with the United Nations and representatives of its member nations.

"With Waltz at the helm, the U.N. will have what I regard as what could and should be its last chance to demonstrate its actual value to the United States," Lee told the committee.

5. Pentagon yanks speakers from Aspen Security Forum, blasts its values

But it is a lost opportunity to challenge values you do not like and to have DOD leaders inform the public on key national security issues to include especially in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region.

I wonder what the message is that the public receives by this action?

Excerpts:

This year’s forum, which begins Tuesday, had expected to host multiple top generals, admirals and defense officials, including Navy Secretary John Phelan, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command head Adm. Samuel Paparo, U.S. Special Operations Command head Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, U.S. Space Command head Gen. Stephen Whiting and U.S. Transportation Command head Air Force Gen. Randall Reed.

Also scheduled to speak this week were Army Lt. Gen. John Brennan, deputy commander of U.S. Africa Command; Defense Intelligence Agency director Air Force Lt. Gen. Jeff Kruse; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency director Vice Adm. Trey Whitworth; and Defense Innovation Unit director Doug Beck.

The officials were slated to discuss topics ranging from the the evolution of warfare to security and strategy in Africa, to artificial intelligence and national security and adopting commercial technology for warfighting, among others.

Pentagon yanks speakers from Aspen Security Forum, blasts its values

Defense News · by Stephen Losey · July 14, 2025

This story has been updated with a statement from the Aspen Institute.

The Pentagon abruptly pulled several of its top officials from speaking this week at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado, saying Monday the forum’s organizers do not share values with the Defense Department.

“Senior Department of Defense officials will no longer be participating at the Aspen Security Forum because their values do not align with the values of the DOD,” Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement to Defense News. “The department will remain strong in its focus to increase the lethality of our warfighters, revitalize the warrior ethos, and project peace through strength on the world stage. It is clear the ASF is not in alignment with these goals.”

The Aspen Institute, which stages the forum every summer, said in a statement to Defense News that it sought to include top leaders from President Donald Trump’s administration in its discussions on national security, and that the canceled speakers are still welcome there.

The institute describes itself as a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that aims to create “a free, just and equitable society.”

“For more than a decade, the Aspen Security Forum has welcomed senior officials — Republican and Democrat, civilian and military — as well as senior foreign officials and experts, who bring experience and diverse perspectives on matters of national security," the institute said. “This year, we extended invitations to senior Trump administration officials, including several cabinet-level leaders. ... We will miss the participation of the Pentagon, but our invitations remain open.”

For years, top generals and defense officials have appeared at the Aspen Security Forum for wide-ranging discussions on topics including the global security environment and the Pentagon’s highest priorities.

This year’s forum, which begins Tuesday, had expected to host multiple top generals, admirals and defense officials, including Navy Secretary John Phelan, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command head Adm. Samuel Paparo, U.S. Special Operations Command head Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, U.S. Space Command head Gen. Stephen Whiting and U.S. Transportation Command head Air Force Gen. Randall Reed.

Also scheduled to speak this week were Army Lt. Gen. John Brennan, deputy commander of U.S. Africa Command; Defense Intelligence Agency director Air Force Lt. Gen. Jeff Kruse; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency director Vice Adm. Trey Whitworth; and Defense Innovation Unit director Doug Beck.

The officials were slated to discuss topics ranging from the the evolution of warfare to security and strategy in Africa, to artificial intelligence and national security and adopting commercial technology for warfighting, among others.

The digital news publication Just the News, which first reported the Pentagon’s withdrawal of speakers from the Aspen forum, quoted Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson as denouncing the Aspen Institute as an organization that backs “the evil of globalism.”

“The Department of Defense has no interest in legitimizing an organization that has invited former officials who have been the architects of chaos abroad and failure at home,” Just the News quoted Wilson as saying. “They are antithetical to the America First values of this administration. Senior representatives of the Department of Defense will no longer be participating in an event that promotes the evil of globalism, disdain for our great country, and hatred for the President of the United States.”

The forum runs from Tuesday through Friday and is expected to conclude with a roundtable discussion between former secretary of state and current co-chair of the Aspen Strategy Group Condoleezza Rice, former defense secretary Robert Gates and former national security advisor Jake Sullivan, who served in the Biden administration and is a vocal critic of Trump.

About Stephen Losey

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

6. House NDAA draft mandates database of contractors used in covert operations

Covert or clandestine? They are not the same. Basic differences:

Clandestine means "hidden," where the aim is for the operation to not be noticed at all.

Covert means "deniable," such that if the operation is noticed, it is not attributed to a group,

And of course covert action requires a presidential finding and is the province of the CIA.

I hope that the database would not be made public:

Excerpts:

While not specified in the outline, it’s likely the database would be marked classified and not open to the public. But it could serve as a tool for Congress to conduct oversight if conflicts, operational failures or ethical concerns emerge around how private firms are used in clandestine missions.

Similar databases have already been put into existence. The Defense Contract Management Agency handles hundreds of thousands of contracts with the defense industrial base. The National Industrial Security Program also tracks companies that have clearances to access sensitive facilities or computer systems.

While various Pentagon service branches maintain internal systems to manage classified contracts, those databases are often program-specific and are not built to track contractor participation in clandestine or covert missions.

...

The list of contractors in the proposed database would be exhaustive and could encompass clandestine operations conducted both physically and electronically. Lawmakers have recently pitched private sector operatives as potential tools for use in offensive cyber operations that would target foreign adversaries like China and Russia.

For many years, hacking and surveillance capabilities have largely been undergirded by the private sector. The NSA and Cyber Command — the latter of which is a DOD combatant command — have relied on longstanding relationships with telecommunications providers to eavesdrop on conversations that cross the internet backbone. Many cyber threat intelligence providers also share data with the Defense Department and related national security units across the government.

House NDAA draft mandates database of contractors used in covert operations

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/07/house-ndaa-draft-mandates-database-contractors-used-covert-operations/406750/?oref=d1-featured-river-secondary

By David DiMolfetta

Cybersecurity Reporter, Nextgov/FCW

July 15, 2025 05:04 PM ET

defenseone.com · by David DiMolfetta

Kevin Carter / Getty Images

The early stage defense bill draft would create an internal list of contractor clients that assist the U.S. military in its secret operations “to facilitate deconfliction and risk assessment.”

By David DiMolfetta

Cybersecurity Reporter, Nextgov/FCW

July 15, 2025 05:04 PM ET

The House of Representatives draft version of the fiscal 2026 defense policy bill would require the Pentagon to create and maintain a database of all commercial vendors involved in clandestine military operations, a move aimed at tightening oversight and reducing counterintelligence risks across the U.S. defense ecosystem.

A draft outline from the House Armed Services Committee’s intelligence and special operations panel lists the measure as part of the sweeping FY26 National Defense Authorization Act. The massive defense package is in the early stages of undergoing markups, and congressional appropriators have not yet assigned it a spending value. It will also need to be reconciled with a separate draft in the Senate.

The current bill text would require the Defense Department to “establish, maintain, and continuously update a database for vendors supporting clandestine activities to facilitate deconfliction and risk assessment,” known as the “Clandestine Activities Vendor Database,” the draft text says.

For years, U.S. military and intelligence forces have relied on a shadow workforce of contractors to help augment areas like surveillance, cyber operations and logistics for secret missions. Some of that work falls under clandestine activities, where the operations themselves are hidden. Others are covert, where U.S. involvement is fully obscured to avoid public scrutiny and give officials room to deny involvement.

While not specified in the outline, it’s likely the database would be marked classified and not open to the public. But it could serve as a tool for Congress to conduct oversight if conflicts, operational failures or ethical concerns emerge around how private firms are used in clandestine missions.

Similar databases have already been put into existence. The Defense Contract Management Agency handles hundreds of thousands of contracts with the defense industrial base. The National Industrial Security Program also tracks companies that have clearances to access sensitive facilities or computer systems.

While various Pentagon service branches maintain internal systems to manage classified contracts, those databases are often program-specific and are not built to track contractor participation in clandestine or covert missions.

Past watchdog reports have called for more visibility into military contracting, but efforts to centralize that oversight have largely stalled. The new proposal codifies a formal, continuously updated database specifically focused on vendors supporting clandestine military activity, paired with mandated congressional reports that could become one of the most robust military contractor oversight tools of its kind.

The War on Terror shed light on the advent of private military contracting when Blackwater and other firms took on frontline roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, Blackwater contractors were implicated in the Nisour Square massacre, prompting scrutiny over the legal gray zones in which private forces operated on behalf of the U.S. government. In 2020, President Donald Trump pardoned the four security guards involved in the Nisour Square shooting, which killed 14 civilians, including two children.

The list of contractors in the proposed database would be exhaustive and could encompass clandestine operations conducted both physically and electronically. Lawmakers have recently pitched private sector operatives as potential tools for use in offensive cyber operations that would target foreign adversaries like China and Russia.

For many years, hacking and surveillance capabilities have largely been undergirded by the private sector. The NSA and Cyber Command — the latter of which is a DOD combatant command — have relied on longstanding relationships with telecommunications providers to eavesdrop on conversations that cross the internet backbone. Many cyber threat intelligence providers also share data with the Defense Department and related national security units across the government.

7. The Secret Service Failure at Butler, Pa., a Year Later

The Secret Service Failure at Butler, Pa., a Year Later

The protection agency needs more agents and less bureaucracy.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/secret-service-butler-pa-report-rand-paul-donald-trump-81664dab

By The Editorial Board

July 15, 2025 6:04 pm ET

U.S. Secret Service agents respond at a campaign rally, Butler, Pa., July 13, 2024. Photo: Evan Vucci/Associated Press

When the Secret Service failed to stop a gunman from taking eight shots at Donald Trump last summer at a campaign rally in Butler, Pa., the country came close to a political disaster. A year later it isn’t clear that enough has changed.

In a Senate report released Sunday, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairman Rand Paul called the near miss on Mr. Trump’s life that also killed an attendee and injured two others a “cascade of preventable failures.” The report concludes “the consequences imposed for the failures so far do not reflect the severity of the situation.”

Many details of the Secret Service’s failure in Butler have been documented. Inadequate preparation was exacerbated by a breakdown in communications among Secret Service agents, local law enforcement providing additional security at the site, and counter-snipers unaware of intelligence regarding threats against Mr. Trump.

The amateur profile of the shooter made his near success an even greater humiliation. “A 20-year-old gunman was able to evade detection by the country’s top protective agency for nearly 45 minutes,” the committee report says. “Known line-of-sight vulnerabilities were identified in advance but not addressed,” and despite these rudimentary lapses, “not a single person has been fired.” Several agents were recently put on temporary leave.

The report says the Secret Service told the committee that before the Butler rally the agency had rejected requests for additional staff and “assets,” including counter-unmanned aerial system assets, to protect Mr. Trump, often because the Secret Service was stretched too thin. At a July 2023 rally in South Carolina, Mr. Trump’s protective detail requested “counter sniper assets” which were not provided “primarily due to manpower constraints.”

A similar denial affected a July 9, 2024, event in Doral, Fla., which the report says was expected to have 10,000 to 15,000 in attendance but couldn’t be accommodated “due to POTUS travel and the NATO NSSE (National Special Security Event) during this time frame.”

Conspiracy theorists will run with any suggestion that Mr. Trump was denied protective assets during the Biden Administration, but the problem seems to be bureaucratic bungling. “Notwithstanding the history of denials from USSS Headquarters,” the report says, “the current Chief Counsel of USSS, appointed by President Trump, told the Committee that there was no discernible evidence of political animus related to the reason for these denials.”

The Secret Service has struggled with a mission divided between protecting the President and other potential targets and the odd-duck pairing of financial investigations. Agents rotate between protective details and desk jobs, an arrangement that has left the Service with an annual attrition rate from 8% to more than 10% in recent years. That’s several times the rate at the FBI or CIA.

The Butler failure boggles the mind, but the most effective short-term reforms will address the on-site communications breakdown that allowed a disgruntled loner to defeat an agency with a “zero-fail” mission. The agency also needs more protective agents in the field who aren’t working desk jobs on the side.

Review and Outlook: A bipartisan House task force with subpoena power can keep the Biden probe into the assassination attempt on Donald Trump honest. Photo: Kent Nishimura/Getty Images

Appeared in the July 16, 2025, print edition as 'The Secret Service Failure a Year Later'.

8. Through Trial and Error, Iran Found Gaps in Israel’s Storied Air Defenses

Can we learn from this?

Please go to the link to view the maps, graphics, and proper formatting.

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-air-defense-362826e3?st=6u4FUg&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Through Trial and Error, Iran Found Gaps in Israel’s Storied Air Defenses

The proportion of missiles that slipped through doubled during the 12-day war, data show

The remains of an Iranian missile lie near an Israeli settlement in the West Bank in the aftermath of the war. Photo: Menahem Kahana/AFP/Getty Images

By Zvi Smith and Benoit Faucon

July 15, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Key Points

What's This?

The war between Israel and Iran showed that even advanced missile-defense systems can be penetrated.
Iran adapted its tactics throughout the conflict, testing and finding gaps in Israel’s defense system.
Data shows Iran’s success rate rose as the war progressed, with more missiles bypassing Israeli interceptors.

Israel’s recent war with Iran served as a cautionary tale for countries with sophisticated missile defenses and those that seek to have them. Over 12 days, Iran pierced Israel’s defenses with increasing success, showing that even the world’s most advanced systems can be penetrated.

While most of Iran’s missiles and drones were knocked down, Tehran changed tactics and found gaps in Israel’s armor through trial and error.

Tehran began to launch more advanced and longer-range missiles from a wider range of locations deep inside Iran, according to missile-defense experts who analyzed open-source data and public images of missile fragments. The regime also altered the timing and pattern of attacks and increased the geographic spread of targets, the analysts found.

As the war went on, Iran fired fewer missiles, but its success rate rose, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data from think tanks based in Israel and Washington, D.C.

In the first half of the conflict, 8% of Iran’s missiles slipped through Israel’s defenses. By the second half of the war, 16% got past Israel’s interceptors, according to data from the Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America, or Jinsa.

The success rate doesn’t take into account missiles that failed to launch or were intercepted before reaching Israeli airspace, said Mora Deitch, head of the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. Nor does it distinguish between missiles that were allowed to strike open areas in Israel and those that Israeli interceptors missed, said Deitch, whose think tank provided data on Iranian strikes and Israeli defense capabilities.

Iran’s most successful set of attacks came on June 22, two days before the end of the war, when 10 out of 27 missiles hit Israel, according to the Jinsa data. The data suggest that Iran successfully adapted “how, when and what” it was firing, said Ari Cicurel, associate director of foreign policy at Jinsa.

The Israeli military declined to comment on Jinsa’s figures beyond saying it doesn’t share specifics on interception rates.

Israel’s aerial defense—including the famed Iron Dome that intercepts short-range rockets from Gaza and Lebanon—is among the best in the world and was developed in partnership with the U.S.

“Any missile system, even a sophisticated one like Israel’s, will leak eventually,” said Raphael Cohen, a senior political scientist at Rand, created as a Pentagon think tank. “The key for any air-defense system is less that you build a perfect system with any one layer and more the cumulative effect.”

An analysis of Israel’s public statements indicates that its interception rate declined over the course of the war. During the conflict, the Israeli military said it was intercepting 90% to 95% of Iran’s missiles. After the cease-fire on June 24, the military said it had intercepted 86% overall.

In January, President Trump signed an executive order to develop the “Iron Dome for America,” a $175 billion missile-defense system originally named after Israel’s array and now called Golden Dome, to protect the U.S. from potential missile attacks. America’s size would make its skies much harder to defend than Israel’s.

Location of damage points

LEBANON

Area of detail

SYRIA

TEL AVIV

WEST

BANK

Mediterranean Sea

Dead

Sea

JORDAN

GAZA

STRIP

ISRAEL

EGYPT

Note: Map includes locations of reported likely damage up to June 23 and is not exhaustive.

Source: Damage analysis of Copernicus Sentinel-1 satellite data by Corey Scher and Jamon Van Den Hoek of Oregon State University’s Conflict Ecology lab (damage points)

Drew An-Pham/WSJ

Ukraine offers a better example of defending a large territory over a yearslong war, but its air defenses are a patchwork of American, European and homegrown technologies. Israel’s advanced integrated system is more akin to what the U.S. seeks to develop, Cohen of Rand said.

Israel’s own success at attacking Iranian missile launchers prevented Iran from deploying its older, less accurate and shorter-range missiles. But it also meant that Tehran reached for its more advanced and longer-range missiles sooner in the conflict.

Fragments of Iran’s hypersonic Fattah-1 missile fell in at least two Israeli towns, according to footage of debris analyzed by missile experts.

The Fattah-1 descends at a sharp angle from outside the Earth’s atmosphere at over 10 times the speed of sound and features a warhead that detaches in flight and can dodge interceptors. Only Israel’s most advanced systems—the Arrow 3 and David’s Sling—can change course midflight to track it.

Iranian missiles that reached Israeli airspace, June 13–24

Hit

Intercepted

0 missiles

June 13

P.M.

A.M.

Noon

4 hits

40 missiles reached Israeli airspace at 11 p.m.

One missile entered and struck at 6 a.m.

Over 45% of the missiles fired at 7:30 a.m. hit

Beginning at 5:15 a.m., Iran launched several waves, each firing one to three missiles.

Source: Jewish Institute for National Security of America

Ming Li/WSJ

Iran also pivoted from firing large overnight barrages to launching smaller waves during daylight hours and from a wider variety of locations.

Tehran further tested Israel’s interceptors by changing up its firing patterns, targeting far-apart cities and varying the intervals between attacks.

“They tried to separate the Israeli defense system,” said Yehoshua Kalisky, a missile-defense expert at INSS.

As the conflict wore on, a declining number of interceptors and their high cost would also have compelled Israel to conserve resources and only target missiles from Iran that posed the greatest threat, missile experts said.

Israeli and Iranian officials have independently called for reviews of their aerial capabilities.

“We are both on a learning curve,” said Kalisky, “they’re trying to improve their attacks, and we, our defense.”

An apartment building damaged by missile fire in Ramat Gan, Israel. Photo: Ohad Zwigenberg/Associated Press

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com

9. Regime Change in Tehran Isn’t Worth the Risk

What is the answer?

Regime Change in Tehran Isn’t Worth the Risk

Seth Cropsey’s recommendation is based more on hope than good sense.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/regime-change-in-tehran-isnt-worth-the-risk-iran-cropsey-mideast-bfcc6d76

July 15, 2025 5:48 pm ET

A billboard in Tehran, July 9. Photo: -/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Seth Cropsey writes that the only way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is by overthrowing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (“The Perfect Time for Regime Change in Iran,” op-ed, July 9). Yet this recommendation is based more on hope than good sense. Such efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya—all of which created more problems for the U.S. than they solved, at a higher cost than anticipated—inspire no confidence that a similar campaign in an even larger country would be any different.

Decapitating the Iranian regime sounds manageable if it weren’t for the risks, including unleashing the infighting between various domestic constituencies that we saw in Iraq. The difference is that the fallout to regional stability would likely be greater today. Even in its weakened state, Iran has more capacity to inflict problems than Saddam Hussein ever had, leading to the possibility of U.S. troops being deployed to stabilize any flare ups.

Mr. Cropsey writes that “Mr. Khamenei’s absence would likely elevate a military-led regime that could be convinced . . . to dismantle its nuclear program and end its proxy wars.” But how can we be sure? Rather than sit down with Washington and negotiate an end to its nuclear program and a re-orientation of its foreign policy, the new Iranian leadership could do the opposite. It’s hard to see how regime change would encourage any successor government simply to bet on Washington’s good graces, particularly when the U.S. has a tendency to ostracize states that don’t cater to its whims.

Dan DePetris

Defense Priorities

New Rochelle, N.Y.

Appeared in the July 16, 2025, print edition as 'Regime Change in Tehran Isnât Worth the Risk'.

10. The Right’s 1939 Project

A long read. Yes, a critique on a certain MAGA faction's foreign policy views. But not MAGA alone.

Two key excerpts:

I believe this emerging movement can best be understood as the 1939 Project—a decentralized, right-wing, online analogue to the left’s 1619 Project. While differing in content and cultural context, both initiatives aim to radically revise Americans’ understanding of their national story, their cultural mores, and conversational guardrails in order to seize power.

The 1619 Project, launched by The New York Times, argued America’s 1776 founding was subordinate to the arrival of African slaves in 1619. Slavery was portrayed as not merely tragic but foundational to America. America, in other words, should not be celebrated for its exceptionalism in ending slavery, but condemned for being like most other countries that allowed it at all.

The 1939 Project is similar in its ambitions and revisionism. It seeks to discredit America’s role in World War II and the postwar international order it shaped, replacing it with a dark vision of America sitting atop a globalist empire run by shadowy “warmongers”—including Winston Churchill himself.

A powerful critique in this second excerpt:

None of this means American foreign policy is beyond critique. Indeed, I have spent years writing and speaking about the significant foreign-policy misjudgments that have eroded America’s strategic position.

Among those mistakes: Policymakers from both parties assumed trade and diplomacy alone could soften adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Since the apex of American power at the end of the Cold War, policymakers turned their focus on the global war on terrorism, but rather than end its just post-9/11 military campaign in Afghanistan after destroying jihadist cells, the Bush administration grew its ambition and engaged in nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq that proved foolish—and led to an emboldened Iran.

If the liberal idealist fantasy of building liberal democracies in the Middle East wasn’t bad enough, the United States failed to maintain a defense industrial base capable of maintaining the production capacity to produce weapons at the scale necessary to deter a major power war. Today, for the first time in the nation’s history, the United States must deter not just one peer nuclear adversary like it did during the Cold War, but two: China and Russia.

But the 1939 Project is not interested in such criticism. Instead, it attributes these failures not to mistakes or misjudgments but to a nefarious cabal of globalist elites who have intentionally harmed Americans at home in order to pursue adventurism abroad.

They say we should turn our attention solely to domestic problems: the homeless, expensive housing, the drug pandemic, and unemployment, as though any of those serious challenges will be easier to contend with if the United States surrenders its power and influence in the world—and as if it’s a zero-sum decision. It is, in fact, possible to fight both the scourge of fentanyl addiction at home and help our ally stop a regime that has promised “death to America.” It’s not just possible, it is our obligation.

GOP voters remain, like Trump himself, skeptical of directionless wars, yet supportive of strong alliances, deterrence, and decisive military action when necessary. Which is why following Trump’s decisive Iran strikes, Republican voters rallied behind him.

The Right’s 1939 Project

How a visible faction of the MAGA movement is revising American history, reviving dangerous conspiracies, and erasing the taboo against open bigotry.

By Rebeccah L. Heinrichs

07.15.25 — U.S. Politics

https://www.thefp.com/p/the-rights-1939-project

Not only did President Trump initiate U.S. strikes against Iran, he also took aim at those who sought to deter him from doing so. (Illustration by The Free Press; photo by Manel Ngan via Getty Images.)

0:00

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Listen to Article

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Produced by ElevenLabs using AI narration

When President Trump ordered B-2 stealth bombers to fly 37 hours from Missouri to the Middle East and back to drop bunker busting bombs on Iran’s nuclear facilities last month, he wasn’t merely backing up Israel’s war or demonstrating superpower military competency. He was also rejecting the growing clamor from a visible faction of the MAGA coalition that sees the use of American power abroad as fundamentally illegitimate and a danger to the American people.

These voices had spent months issuing hysterical warnings about “World War III” if America became involved in the war. Candace Owens took a break from musing on the validity of blood libels to urge active-duty military personnel to desert rather than “die in a foreign land,” should war break out with Iran. The libertarian comedian Dave Smith, who endorsed the president in 2024, defended Iran against Israel’s military campaign, saying Tehran’s leadership “probably don’t feel that they have the option not to respond.” He called Trump “a war criminal who should spend his life in prison,” and said the president might be “the most impotent bitch of a leader imaginable.”

But no one was more emphatic than Tucker Carlson, who warned: “The first week of a war with Iran could easily kill thousands of Americans. It could also collapse our economy. . . . Consider the effects of $30 gasoline. . . . Iran has powerful allies. It’s now part of a global bloc called BRICS, which represents the majority of the world’s. . . military power. Iran has extensive military ties with Russia. It sells the overwhelming majority of its oil exports to China. An attack on Iran could easily become a world war. We’d lose.”

All of this talk was aimed directly at convincing the president.

Carlson and his ilk failed. And spectacularly so.

Not only did President Trump initiate U.S. strikes against Iran, he also took aim at Carlson directly, saying to reporters, “I don’t know what Tucker Carlson is saying. Let him go get a television network and say it so that people listen.” He then posted on Truth Social: “Somebody please explain to kooky Tucker Carlson that Iran can not have a nuclear weapon!”

Read

Pseudo-Scholars and the Rise of the Barbarian Right

For a moment, it felt like this wing of MAGA, self-styled as “anti-war,” had suffered a true political defeat, and that perhaps they would do what they longed for the U.S. to do in the world: retreat.

That’s not what happened.

That these MAGA influencers and pundits were out of step with the American president, the creator and standard-bearer of MAGA, and that their doomsday scenarios never materialized, did little to humble them.

Dave Smith called for Trump’s impeachment. Candace Owens said the president has “been a chronic disappointment, and I feel embarrassed that I told people to go vote for him.” And in a newsletter the day after Israel commenced Operation Rising Lion against Iran, Tucker Carlson suggested the U.S. military was being controlled by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Earlier this week, unnamed Washington sources expressed concern over Israel’s ability to fend off Iran’s retaliation, which would inevitably lead to Benjamin Netanyahu ordering the American military to step in and fight on his country’s behalf,” he wrote. As if the most powerful leader of the powerful military of the most powerful country in the history of the world does the bidding of a country in the Middle East the size of New Jersey. Sure.

Carlson’s views might seem outlandish, but he isn’t dumb. He is among the savviest operators out there. And he is well aware that anti-Israel invective and conspiracy thinking attracts attention in a culture that has lost trust in expertise and institutions—and is hunting for a scapegoat for America’s very real challenges.

MAGA influencers and pundits were out of step with the American president, the creator and standard-bearer of MAGA, and their doomsday scenarios never materialized.

In this, he is far from alone. He represents an influential segment of an emerging online movement that never encounters a conspiracy about American military power, Jewish power, or Israel that it doesn’t embrace. And it is on a collision course with the president himself.

From Online Fringe to Real-World Influence

For a time, it was possible to imagine that this cohort was a fringe or strictly online phenomenon. No longer. For evidence of its real-life power, look no further than the Turning Point USA (TPUSA) conference this past weekend.

TPUSA is technically a conservative student organization. But it’s much more than that: It is among the most influential organizations on the right—full of energy and zeal to sway the cultural right, and therefore the Republican Party.

Charlie Kirk, TPUSA’s founder and president, is popular among young conservatives, and the political arm of TPUSA, called Turning Point Action, raised tens of millions for Trump’s 2024 election. When Kevin McCarthy made his public pitch to be speaker of the House in 2018, he did it, of all places, at a Turning Point conference for high schoolers.

The point is that what happens at TPUSA matters. Trump pays attention to it. And it signifies which way the right-wing winds are blowing.

This year, at the organization’s conference of 7,000 people, Jews and Israel were main topics of discussion.

Tucker Carlson suggested that the fact that the Trump DOJ found that there is no Jeffrey Epstein client list misses the real question. “The real question is,” he said, “why was he doing this, on whose behalf, and where did the money come from?” Carlson then offered his own theory: The deceased convicted child sex trafficker was working for Israel’s Mossad. He said it is “extremely obvious” that Epstein “had direct connections to a foreign government.”

While Donald Trump reaffirms the principles that underpinned his first term, he is increasingly out of step with a critical constellation of right-wing influencers, podcasters, and contrarian intellectuals.

Carlson went on: “Now, no one’s allowed to say that that foreign government is Israel, because we have been somehow cowed into thinking that that’s naughty.”

He offered no evidence to support his claims while projecting maximum confidence in his theory, and then emphatically urged the audience to reject anyone who would not take this “questioning” seriously. (Candace Owens praised Carlson’s remarks, writing, “Tucker is a real one.”)

The next day, Kirk himself hosted a debate between comedian Dave Smith and conservative intellectual Josh Hammer about U.S. support for Israel. During the debate, Smith said: “The level of Israeli control over our politics is frankly pretty undeniable.”

At the close of the debate, Kirk said from the stage, “This Jew-hate stuff has no place in public discourse. Period.” The crowd cheered approvingly.

It was a welcome statement, but did little to address the cumulative effect of the conference: that Tucker Carlson’s views and Dave Smith’s views deserve center stage.

While Donald Trump reaffirms the principles that underpinned his first term—that America remains the leader of the world’s most successful military alliance (NATO), a committed supporter of the Jewish State, lead defender of the global commons, and is willing to use military force when necessary—he is increasingly out of step with a critical constellation of right-wing influencers, podcasters, and contrarian intellectuals.

For them, America’s history as a global superpower is morally suspect, if not outright criminal. Our victories become losses, our alliances sinister entanglements, and our deterrence campaigns provocations. Why? Because they must revise the past to justify and satisfy their policy preferences in the present.

Radicalized by incentives that reward sensationalism, these influencers exploit understandable distrust of elites and expertise. Their content deliberately pushes audiences toward simplistic slogans and paranoid conspiracies. It demonizes Jewish Americans by demonizing Jewish power—including the basic right of Jewish American citizens to advocate, like all Americans, for policies they prefer. Carlson in particular plays with the canard of dual loyalty, suggesting that Americans who have served in the Israel Defense Forces “should lose their citizenship.”

If this critique sounds familiar, it is because it has been the worldview of the far left since the Cold War’s outset. Only now, it is being articulated and advanced by the right.

The big question is whether they or Trump himself represent the future of the MAGA movement.

The 1939 Project

Many have tried to make sense of this emerging coalition of conspiracy theorists, cranks, and the craven. Some have called it “woke right.” Still others have rightly described it as the meeting of the horseshoe—the strange reality wherein Marjorie Taylor Greene praises Zohran Mamdani.

I believe this emerging movement can best be understood as the 1939 Project—a decentralized, right-wing, online analogue to the left’s 1619 Project. While differing in content and cultural context, both initiatives aim to radically revise Americans’ understanding of their national story, their cultural mores, and conversational guardrails in order to seize power.

The 1619 Project, launched by The New York Times, argued America’s 1776 founding was subordinate to the arrival of African slaves in 1619. Slavery was portrayed as not merely tragic but foundational to America. America, in other words, should not be celebrated for its exceptionalism in ending slavery, but condemned for being like most other countries that allowed it at all.

The 1939 Project is similar in its ambitions and revisionism. It seeks to discredit America’s role in World War II and the postwar international order it shaped, replacing it with a dark vision of America sitting atop a globalist empire run by shadowy “warmongers”—including Winston Churchill himself.

Read

Bari Weiss: Against the Vandals

The year 1939 is fitting: It marks the start of a global war the Nazis in Germany would start and America would help win—a victory this movement resents profoundly.

The year 1939 is meant to replace the national identity marked by 1945, the year the United States, with its allies, liberated Europe from Nazi tyranny, dropped the atomic bombs to end Japanese imperialism, ended the war, stopped the genocide of the Jewish people, and saved the free world. It is the year the United States, along with its allies, declared “Never Again” to the antisemitism that was tolerated by “decent” people—until the Nazis murdered millions of Jews and others.

The Allies’ victory in that war led to the creation of NATO, a political-military alliance of democratic sovereign nations, held together by the commitment to stave off another massive world war initiated by another imperialist authoritarian nation. In this postwar era it established a consensus that nuclear weapons should not become normalized as warfighting weapons, and that it’s better for countries that do not have them to refrain from acquiring them. The United States extended a nuclear umbrella to allies to encourage nonproliferation.

The results of this post–World War II international order are astonishingly positive. There has been a dramatic drop in wartime fatalities as a percentage of the world population. Economic prosperity for Americans has steadily improved. Life expectancy has grown longer and of a higher physical quality.

But if the 1939 Project people are right, and Churchill was in fact the warmonger, and if Hitler really wanted peace and perhaps had a point about the outsize and nefarious impact of Jewish people, and if the United States was wrong to drop the atomic bombs, then NATO was a mistake, the ties to the nation of Israel is a mistake, and none of the post–World War II international order is worth maintaining today, let alone restoring or defending.

I believe this emerging movement can best be understood as the 1939 Project—a decentralized, right-wing, online analogue to the left’s 1619 Project.

The moral foundation of America’s global role since 1945 has been victory in World War II. It has shaped our modern defense strategy, and asserted our moral claim for global leadership. Thus, the 1939 Project has turned its focus toward undermining the righteousness of the U.S. and America’s participation in the war itself.

They need to retcon the past in order to loosen the affection and support Americans feel for and have for our allies in Europe and Israel. This is necessary to weaken the American people’s support for U.S. statecraft in the world, whether in the form of sanctions, military deployments, or military action in defense of its allies and stated and official interests. Their increasingly casual antisemitism is not simply evil—it is strategic. It has become the glue that binds the various strains of the insurgent ideology.

Last year, Carlson called amateur historian and podcaster Darryl Cooper “the best and most honest popular historian in the United States.” Cooper, appearing on Carlson’s and Joe Rogan’s podcasts, judged Winston Churchill “the chief villain of World War II,” blaming Churchill’s stubborn insistence to free Europe from Hitler—rather than the Nazis’ conquest of the continent—for the bloodshed that followed. (To this day, Carlson persists in calling Cooper “the most august historian in America.”)

Read

Victor Davis Hanson: The Truth About World War II

In January, Carlson speculated openly to an aghast Piers Morgan whether modern Europe would have been better off under Nazi rule: “I’m not defending Nazis. I’m just saying, where is Western Civilization? What did [Churchill] preserve?”

Implicit here is the grotesque suggestion that defeating Hitler’s Germany directly led to Europe’s modern “woke” culture—in other words, that a Nazi victory might have preserved traditional, Christian civilization. Carlson suggestively raises the question, but Cooper and others on social media answer explicitly:

@martyrmade via X

The Fight for the Future of MAGA

None of this means American foreign policy is beyond critique. Indeed, I have spent years writing and speaking about the significant foreign-policy misjudgments that have eroded America’s strategic position.

Among those mistakes: Policymakers from both parties assumed trade and diplomacy alone could soften adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Since the apex of American power at the end of the Cold War, policymakers turned their focus on the global war on terrorism, but rather than end its just post-9/11 military campaign in Afghanistan after destroying jihadist cells, the Bush administration grew its ambition and engaged in nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq that proved foolish—and led to an emboldened Iran.

If the liberal idealist fantasy of building liberal democracies in the Middle East wasn’t bad enough, the United States failed to maintain a defense industrial base capable of maintaining the production capacity to produce weapons at the scale necessary to deter a major power war. Today, for the first time in the nation’s history, the United States must deter not just one peer nuclear adversary like it did during the Cold War, but two: China and Russia.

GOP voters remain, like Trump himself, skeptical of directionless wars, yet supportive of strong alliances, deterrence, and decisive military action.

But the 1939 Project is not interested in such criticism. Instead, it attributes these failures not to mistakes or misjudgments but to a nefarious cabal of globalist elites who have intentionally harmed Americans at home in order to pursue adventurism abroad.

They say we should turn our attention solely to domestic problems: the homeless, expensive housing, the drug pandemic, and unemployment, as though any of those serious challenges will be easier to contend with if the United States surrenders its power and influence in the world—and as if it’s a zero-sum decision. It is, in fact, possible to fight both the scourge of fentanyl addiction at home and help our ally stop a regime that has promised “death to America.” It’s not just possible, it is our obligation.

GOP voters remain, like Trump himself, skeptical of directionless wars, yet supportive of strong alliances, deterrence, and decisive military action when necessary. Which is why following Trump’s decisive Iran strikes, Republican voters rallied behind him.

Due to our geographic blessings, Americans often experience a recurring impulse to retreat inward. But the narrative offered by the 1939 Project will not offer a safer alternative than facing the growing threat from multiple imperialist authoritarian powers. Indeed, a movement that recasts America as the villain, that depicts our history of global leadership as malevolent, and that seeks to rewrite the moral foundation of America’s postwar identity, is more than “isolationist.” It is delusional.

For now, the people behind the 1939 Project have increasing cultural power online, but on policy outcomes, they are losing. What remains entirely uncertain is whether Republican leaders will have the courage to see what’s unfolding in front of their eyes, and then the courage to publicly and loudly reject it.

Rebeccah L. Heinrichs is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and director of the Keystone Defense Initiative. She specializes in U.S. national defense policy with a focus on strategic deterrence.

11. Australian Leader’s Bonhomie in China Belies Delicate Balancing Act

All our Asia-Indo-Pacific allies are conducting a delicate balancing act.

Australian Leader’s Bonhomie in China Belies Delicate Balancing Act

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is trying to deepen ties with China, his country’s biggest trading partner, while being under pressure from the United States.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/15/world/asia/china-australia-trade-security.html

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Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia arriving in Beijing on Monday.Credit...Lukas Coch/AAP, via Reuters

By Victoria Kim and David Pierson

Victoria Kim reported from Sydney and David Pierson from Hong Kong

July 15, 2025

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Since landing in Shanghai this weekend, Australia’s prime minister has repeatedly highlighted China’s importance to his country. He has talked up how Australia supplies more than half of China’s iron ore imports, how Chinese tourists spend billions of dollars every year in Australia and how Australian cherries, beef and wine feature in Lunar New Year celebrations in China.

On Tuesday, Anthony Albanese met with China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, in Beijing, pushing for even deeper ties with his country’s largest trading partner.

Neither leader publicly mentioned the United States or President Trump but the backdrop of Washington’s volatile trade policies and increasing demands on allies was apparent. Both Mr. Albanese and Mr. Xi said they had pledged to strengthen their relationship and look for areas of cooperation, a sign of the allure of the Chinese economy and the limits of Mr. Trump’s push for U.S. partners to restrict trade with China.

Mr. Xi said ties between China and Australia should continue to grow “no matter how the international landscape may evolve.”

“I note your comments in your opening remarks about seeking common ground while sharing differences, that approach has indeed produced very positive benefits for both Australia and for China,” Mr. Albanese responded.

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Mr. Albanese has made stabilizing relations with China a hallmark of his foreign policy. But he faces an increasingly delicate balancing act between maintaining ties with Australia’s most important ally, the United States, and its biggest economic patron, China. He is trying to bolster trade with China, even as Beijing asserts its military dominance closer and closer to Australia’s shores.

Mr. Xi acknowledged the turnaround in ties, saying relations “have emerged from their low point.”

Image

Mr. Albanese and Xi Jinping in Beijing on Tuesday.Credit...China Daily, via Reuters

Mr. Albanese also met with Premier Li Qiang, China’s second-highest-ranking official, on Tuesday.

But despite his efforts to keep the trip focused on trade, questions about security loomed over the six-day visit. Mr. Albanese’s arrival in Shanghai coincided with a report in the Financial Times that the Pentagon was pressuring Australia and Japan to specify what they would do if China and the United States went to war over Taiwan, the self-governed island claimed by Beijing.

After their meeting, Mr. Albanese said Mr. Xi made no mention of U.S. demands regarding Taiwan. The prime minister said he reaffirmed Australia’s position of supporting the “status quo” on Taiwan.

Both Japan and Australia are U.S. allies, but committing to a response in such a war would be crippling to their important trade relationships with China, and highly unusual on the world stage. Even the United States itself will not say whether it would go to war for Taiwan, as part of a decades-old policy that aims to both deter China from attacking and dissuade Taiwan from seeking formal independence.

But Washington could try to exert pressure on Canberra. Last month, the Pentagon said it was reviewing whether a three-way security pact with Britain to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines aligns with the Trump administration’s “America First criteria.”

“The tightrope along which it’s been walking between the U.S. and China just got pulled tighter at both ends,” said James Curran, a historian at the University of Sydney.

Mr. Xi’s team will likely privately underscore to Australian officials how U.S. calls for greater commitments over Taiwan make Washington an increasingly unreliable partner.

Beijing is trying to persuade countries like Australia not to enter trade deals with the United States that would restrict Chinese exports. China has been casting itself as a defender of the global trading system, criticizing the Trump administration for disrupting the international economy with tariffs.

“In the face of the chaotic international situation, all countries should work together to uphold international justice, safeguard multilateralism and free trade,” Mr. Xi said during the leaders’ meeting.

Asked later how Mr. Trump’s trade policies have affected Sino-Australian ties, Mr. Albanese deflected, saying “Our relationship with China is very separate from that.”

Mr. Albanese’s first visit to Beijing as prime minister in 2023 came after several years of barbed rhetoric and punishing trade restrictions on Australian exports under an earlier government. Since then, Australia has largely played up the importance of the economic relationship while remaining restrained in talking about China as a security threat.

In a sign of both nations’ desire for improved relations, on Tuesday, some of the points of contention between the appeared to have been glossed over or simply not broached.

Mr. Albanese said Mr. Xi did not bring up the port of Darwin, whose lease is held, controversially, by a Chinese company. The Australian leader said he talked about Yang Hengjun, an Australian held on national security charges in China and facing a death sentence, but that no “immediate outcome” should be expected.

Still, Mr. Albanese’s approach in doubling down on economic relations carries its own pitfalls, said Michael Shoebridge, an analyst at Strategic Analysis Australia and a former defense and intelligence official.

“The thing that he overlooks is the enormous vulnerability and risk in deepening Australia’s already extraordinary level of trade dependence,” Mr. Shoebridge said. “It turns out that greed beats fear every time.”

Berry Wang contributed reporting from Hong Kong.

Victoria Kim is the Australia correspondent for The New York Times, based in Sydney, covering Australia, New Zealand and the broader Pacific region.

David Pierson covers Chinese foreign policy and China’s economic and cultural engagement with the world. He has been a journalist for more than two decades.

A version of this article appears in print on July 16, 2025, Section A, Page 10 of the New York edition with the headline: Australia on a Tightrope In Warming Up to China. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

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12. Is This ‘What They Signed Up For?’ New Military Missions Ignite Interest in Conscientious Objectors

A new challenge. What will be the impact on recruiting?

I think the military services need to recognize and understand the views of the younger generation.

I don't think we have seen the full effects (which could be long term) on the young generation that has been influenced by Hamas' attack on Israel on Oct 6, 2023. Is this an inflection point that will influence a whole generation on military service and service to their nation?

Excerpts:

Shaken by the United States’ support for Israel’s protracted bombing campaign on Gaza, Metzler took the dramatic step of applying for conscientious objector status, a way out of the military reserved for those who can prove that their beliefs no longer align with service. For her, an eight-month application process involving probing interviews and pages of essays resulted in her successful discharge as a conscientious objector in April.

But the emotionally grueling decision can come with a steep cost, from alienating military comrades and even family members to paying back tens of thousands of dollars for tuition and other military benefits.

Historically, the number of service members applying for conscientious objector status in the last quarter century from an all-volunteer force has been relatively low, with the Army seeing a dozen or fewer applications per year since 2019 and fewer than 75 in any year since 2001. By contrast, during the Vietnam War—the last U.S. conflict to employ a conscripted force—some 170,000 men across multiple services were granted conscientious objector deferments, and about 61,000 in 1971 alone.

Is This ‘What They Signed Up For?’ New Military Missions Ignite Interest in Conscientious Objectors

For U.S. troops conflicted about their service, following their conscience can be costly

thewarhorse.org · by Hope Hodge Seck · July 10, 2025

Joy Metzler had expected to still be in uniform, working as a junior officer at her Air Force engineering job. Instead, she found herself protesting outside the United Nations, weakened from participating in a 40-day fast as she called on authorities to deliver full humanitarian aid to Gaza and end U.S. weapons transfers to Israel.

The soft-spoken 23-year-old had pursued military service with enthusiasm. She graduated from the Air Force Academy in 2023 and received her commission the same year, hoping that the military would provide a meaningful way to give back to a country that became her home when she was adopted from China as an infant.

“I wanted to protect people. I wanted to serve,” said Metzler, who met her husband, now an officer in the Space Force, at the academy. “And I don’t think it’s a far cry to say that I’m the kind of person who doesn’t mind putting my body on the line for things I believe in. So the military really just kind of made sense.”

Then, a crisis of conscience changed everything.

An Emotionally Grueling Decision

Shaken by the United States’ support for Israel’s protracted bombing campaign on Gaza, Metzler took the dramatic step of applying for conscientious objector status, a way out of the military reserved for those who can prove that their beliefs no longer align with service. For her, an eight-month application process involving probing interviews and pages of essays resulted in her successful discharge as a conscientious objector in April.

But the emotionally grueling decision can come with a steep cost, from alienating military comrades and even family members to paying back tens of thousands of dollars for tuition and other military benefits.

Historically, the number of service members applying for conscientious objector status in the last quarter century from an all-volunteer force has been relatively low, with the Army seeing a dozen or fewer applications per year since 2019 and fewer than 75 in any year since 2001. By contrast, during the Vietnam War—the last U.S. conflict to employ a conscripted force—some 170,000 men across multiple services were granted conscientious objector deferments, and about 61,000 in 1971 alone.

Volunteers who field calls from troops in moral quandaries say they recently experienced a surge that appears to be driven by another conflict: President Donald Trump’s contested order last month that sent 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines to Los Angeles to quell protests related to immigration enforcement operations.

Soldiers with Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment, California Army National Guard arrive at the Wilshire Federal Building in Los Angeles on June 22. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Christy L. Sherman)

Steve Woolford first noticed a change at the GI Rights Hotline the week of June 8. That was when Trump doubled the presence of National Guard troops in Los Angeles and ordered a contingent of Marines—an infantry battalion from Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center 29 Palms, California—into the city.

US Military Pledges Principled, Responsible Approach to Artificial Intelligence

While the hotline typically receives between 200 and 250 calls a month, about 50 calls came through that Sunday alone, with additional messages left by callers who couldn’t get through, Woolford said.

Most, he said, also didn’t fit the conventional definition of a conscientious objector, opposed to wars and warfighting.

“What a number of them spoke to was, ‘I do not want to be part of pointing a gun at U.S. citizens and maybe shooting it, like, I’m here to protect U.S. citizens, even if they have different beliefs,’” Woolford told the War Horse. “So there were people who were having, I guess, a different version of ethical dilemma. … They just didn’t believe this is all what they signed up for or agreed to.”

Following the Commander in Chief

To be sure, it’s too early to know if the flurry of hotline calls might lead to a spike in conscientious objectors; it would be months before any resulting applications are processed.

At the heart of the tension is a court-contested deployment of troops—the members of the Guard, in a notable departure from standard practice, without approval from California Gov. Gavin Newsom—to back up domestic law enforcement, including support of ICE operations.

The ongoing legal dispute leaves troops little choice for now but to follow Trump’s order, said Carrie A. Lee, a senior fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a former professor at the U.S. Army War College.

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“It’s actually a very high bar for thinking about disobeying unlawful orders,” Lee told The War Horse. “There is no provision for what a service member decides is immoral or unethical, because those are personal judgments based on personal decisions about morality and ethics. And you know, you can’t be injecting every unique individual’s own ethics into military orders.”

The cluster of groups that staffs the GI Rights Hotline is cognizant of that tension. It means, at minimum, that refusing to go when ordered comes with a cost. Woolford, whose father was a Navy officer but who found his way into anti-war activism as an adult, says he practices “nondirective counseling”—helping troops identify their situation, options, and possible resources rather than pushing them toward a course of action. Sometimes, he said, that’s frustrating to callers.

U.S. Marines with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, guard a federal area in Los Angeles on July 4. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jaye Townsend)

“Some people, whatever they saw online [regarding the LA deployment] gave them the expectation that I was going to be able to say, ‘Yes, [the orders are] illegal and you can refuse them and nothing will happen to you,’” Woolford said. “But, yeah, I would not be telling someone truthful information if I said that.”

The Combat Medic Who Earned A Medal of Honor

While the GI Rights Hotline dates to 1994, groups supporting conscientious objectors predate the all-volunteer force. The Center on Conscience and War, which supports the hotline, was founded in 1940 by churches disturbed at the abuse conscientious objectors underwent in World War I, according to Bill Galvin, the organization’s counseling director.

Conscientious objection, for its part, predates the Revolutionary War, as many early settlers, particularly in colonies like Pennsylvania, were Quakers, who were pacifists as part of their religious practice. Perhaps the most famous American conscientious objector was Desmond Doss, a World War II combat medic who refused to bring a weapon into battle yet earned the Medal of Honor—the nation’s highest military award—for heroism in saving dozens of wounded men under fire.

President Harry Truman pins the Medal of Honor on World War II combat medic Desmond Doss, the first conscientious objector to be awarded the country’s highest military award. (U.S. Government photo)

The typical call to the GI Rights Hotline comes from service members who have experienced a religious conversion or other change that alters their views on warfighting.

Another common call, Galvin said, comes from people registering as required by law with the U.S. Selective Service System who want to put their conscientious objection on the record in the event the country ever brings back a military draft.

By the start of July, hotline calls had largely returned to the normal volume and rhythm, Woolford said.

In today’s all-volunteer force, enlistees must sign an affidavit that they don’t have an objection to war as part of entry paperwork. To be a successful objector after a service member has donned the uniform requires proving a genuine change of heart or conviction and showing they’re now opposed to bearing arms in war in any form. Opposition to a specific war or certain military policy doesn’t meet that bar.

While Metzler’s objection to war began with Gaza, it quickly broadened into opposition to supporting the military in any capacity. On the advice of her counselors in the organization Veterans for Peace, she avoided getting drawn into arguments about how she felt about World War II and other past conflicts when making her case to the military. These, she said, could trip objectors up while missing the point.

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“How do you even define what warfare is? Because they don’t give you an answer for that,” Metzler said. “You don’t have to be a full-on pacifist to be a conscientious objector, I would say.”

Weighing the Personal Costs

Even when a service member meets the requirements, the path of conscientious objection carries significant personal costs. Flat refusal to follow an order can come with jail time. Those who apply for conscientious objector status must submit to months of scrutiny from senior officers seeking to determine that a change of heart from when they enlisted is sincere and consistent.

James Matthew Branum, who staffs calls for the hotline and also provides independent legal information to troops through his organization the Military Law Task Force, said objectors often have a monetary cost to pay as well.

“If you received an enlistment bonus, you’re going to repay that. If you received educational benefits, for someone, let’s say, who went to West Point, that could end up meaning … you potentially are owing around $200,000,” Branum said. “There are ways of fighting that … but it can be very challenging.”

The social stigma from acquaintances, employers, and even family members that often comes with taking the objector’s path out of the military represents another level of cost, he said.

Just over two years ago, Joy Metzler saluted, alongside President Joe Biden, at her graduation from the Air Force Academy. She now owes the Air Force about $150,000 for her “unfulfilled commitment.” (Photo courtesy of Joy Metzler)

Metzler said she hasn’t received much direct blowback from friends and family about her decision, but the cost has raised eyebrows.

“Specifically, on the financial part, I think a lot of people go behind my back and talk to my husband and say, ‘Well, are you OK with this?’” Metzler said. “And to me, that signifies that they don’t really understand the gravity of the decision I was making.”

She’s on the hook for a prorated amount of her Air Force Academy tuition, Metzler said, “based on unfulfilled commitment” that amounts to more than $150,000.

She said she’s treating it like college debt.

Isaac Hummel, Metzler’s husband, said taking on the financial burden was a focus of their many conversations around her decision. They figured they were coming from a “place of privilege” and could afford to pay it off with his Space Force salary. He pushed her to see every side, to be certain she was as sure as she sounded, Hummel said.

“I don’t think she ever doubted if it was worth it,” he said.

While they’d both felt similarly about Gaza, Hummel said, he’d never considered taking such a radical step.

“I don’t think I could ever be brave enough to do that,” he said.

He acknowledged that seeing the Marines deployed in California “really kind of shook me.”

“I don’t want to be associated with the military to any degree if the public is going to see us in a certain light,” he said.

Working at the Space Force, Hummel said, has given him “the privilege to feel a little disconnected from everything that’s going on.” But he knows he’s still part of the military. His coworkers fall into two camps on his wife’s decision: voice support or avoid the subject entirely. Only once, he said, has a colleague openly confronted him. The conversation ended in respectful disagreement.

Numbers Rise Around New Missions

The number of would-be conscientious objectors has remained relatively small in the years since Sept. 11, 2001, but the numbers rise around new missions. The post-Vietnam peak followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In the Army, the largest of the military services and the most commonly represented in both foreign and domestic missions, the highest number of conscientious objector applications over the last quarter century came in 2005, with 74 applications, of which 39, or 52%, were approved. By comparison, more than 73,000 soldiers joined the Army that fiscal year, and about 60,000 soldiers transition annually out of the service for all reasons.

In 2024, the Army granted five applications and denied one; to date this year, three have been granted and two are pending, according to data provided by Army headquarters. Given the work required to submit a conscientious objector application, it’s unlikely these numbers reflect any recent callers to the GI Rights Hotline.

(Click here if you can not view the graph)

So far, no military voices from the LA deployment have come forward publicly to describe the specific thinking of troops on orders there.

“Most of the people who have talked to me were pretty scared,” Woolford said. “Like, they wanted to get out of this, but didn’t want to bring extra attention to themselves or their family.”

Galvin said he tries to make service members aware of alternatives to declaring themselves conscientious objectors, such as raising family hardships or preexisting medical issues that need to be addressed. Guard members, he said, can also claim community hardship, stipulating that their civilian job is too essential to leave for a deployment.

Lee, the German Marshall Fund fellow, said she appreciated the work groups like Galvin’s do to help troops think through moral and ethical issues. But, she said, quandaries in war and personal disagreement with a military order were not new and did not absolve troops from following the order.

“The ability to divorce your professional identity from your personal identity is the hallmark of a member of the profession of arms,” she said. “Part of that involves respect for the chain of command and respect for the missions that your president asks you to go do. And the ability to divorce that from your personal identity and what is going on with your family is incredibly difficult, but also extremely necessary.”

Lee said she worries, however, about the broader long-term impacts of the Los Angeles deployment and how it signals a shift in how the military is used.

“This suggests to me that the administration has some intention of using either federalized guardsmen or active-duty military quite regularly to support law enforcement,” she said. “If that is the case, then I think you’re looking at some really significant morale issues, some really significant retention issues, and potentially down the line, real recruiting issues.”

A Growing Divide

Notably, the controversy over the LA deployment comes as military recruiting experiences a historic boom, with the service branches hitting accession goals months early and the Pentagon touting the enthusiasm among recruits choosing to serve under President Trump.

Kevin Wallsten, a political science professor at California State University, Long Beach, said an unscientific survey of 400 veterans he conducted earlier this year ran aggressively along political lines: Conservatives are now extremely likely to recommend military enlistment, while liberals are extremely unlikely to do so.

“I think the longer-term question,” he said, “the longer-term problem, the longer-term challenge, is to find a foundation for military recruitment that becomes less dependent on the personalities that are setting policy in the Pentagon or in the White House.”

For Metzler, seeing active-duty troops deployed in a role that might require them to use force against American civilians was shocking and further affirmed the conviction she felt that she could not wear the uniform.

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At the end of June, following the conclusion of her protest outside the UN—during which she was briefly arrested—she had her first meal following the 40-day fast: three pieces of pizza.

Next, she said, she plans to enter a graduate school program in mechanical engineering at the University of Central Florida. She’s still working to make sense of her brief time in the military. Though she never deployed and never served in combat, she feels guilt even over having supported military research in developing weapons of war.

Now, when Metzler considers her decision to leave behind the military, she expresses relief. Being able to look at suffering in places like Gaza and feel horror instead of rationalizing military objectives means she’s held on to a valued piece of her humanity, she said.

“Even though it’s emotionally taxing, I feel very fortunate that I still have the ability to not glaze over that,” she said. “I almost lost that because of being in the military.”

This War Horse story was edited by Mike Frankel, fact-checked by Jess Rohan, and copy-edited by Mitchell Hansen-Dewar. Hrisanthi Pickett wrote the headlines.

thewarhorse.org · by Hope Hodge Seck · July 10, 2025

13. Senate confirms controversial vet to lead Pentagon personnel office

I am curious about something. I have no real experience with OSD Personnel and Readiness. Since it is the Services that manage personnel how much authority, power, and influence does this position hold over personnel management which it seems the title of the office would imply?

But perhaps we should look for changes to the DOD health care and education and post exchange and commissary policies and systems (so I guess I have some experience with the areas of responsibility of this position). But maybe he can fix the Defense travel system which I think everyone hates.

Excerpt:

The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness oversees a host of Pentagon program offices, including the Department of Defense Education Activity, the Military Health Care System, the Defense Commissary Agency and the Defense Travel Management Office.

Senate confirms controversial vet to lead Pentagon personnel office

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · July 15, 2025

The Senate on Tuesday confirmed retired Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Tata as the next Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, putting the controversial nominee in charge of a host of department programs supporting troops and their families.

Tata was approved for the post by a partisan 52-46 vote, with all Republicans present in the chamber backing his nomination and all Democrats opposing it.

He served as Deputy Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division during its deployment to Afghanistan in 2006. After his retirement from the military in 2009, he spent time as a public school administrator and as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Transportation.

Tata served as a senior advisor to the Defense Secretary during President Donald Trump’s first term in office, a position he was appointed to after a failed attempt to gain confirmation as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Dems blast Trump’s pick for military personnel policy as too combative

Nominee Anthony Tata offered a partial apology for past comments attacking Democrats and Trump critics as traitors.

His bid was derailed by the revelation of numerous inflammatory comments on social media and in past media appearances, including labeling of former President Barack Obama as a “terrorist leader” and a secret Muslim believer.

Ahead of Tuesday’s vote, Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Jack Reed, D-R.I., said that Tata has shown little remorse for those comments and remains too volatile for the critical Pentagon leadership role.

“Mr. Tata has a misguided and discriminatory view of military and civilian workforces he would oversee,” Reed said.

“Our servicemembers and their families and the civilian employees who support them come from all backgrounds and political persuasions … Mr. Tata, to be effective, would need to serve all members of the Department of Defense and their families, not just those with whom he agrees politically. His public record and past performance at the Pentagon do not inspire confidence in this regard.”

During his confirmation hearing in May, Tata said he regretted some of his past statements and pledged to “be an apolitical leader that is trying to take care of the men and women in uniform” in his new role.

Democratic objections in the chamber were not enough to stave off Tata’s confirmation this time.

The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness oversees a host of Pentagon program offices, including the Department of Defense Education Activity, the Military Health Care System, the Defense Commissary Agency and the Defense Travel Management Office.

Several of those have already been involved in controversies regarding new policy mandates from the Trump administration, with critics charging that the moves are politicizing support services for troops and their families.

Tata is expected to be sworn into the new role in the next few days.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

14. Lawmakers want details on plans to privatize military stores

So I guess this will be BG Tata's first big task: privatization of the commissary and exchange system.

Lawmakers want details on plans to privatize military storesBy Karen Jowers

Jul 15, 2025, 01:40 PM

Lawmakers want details on the anticipated benefits of privatization. Shown here are the commissary and exchange at Fort Belvoir, Va. (Defense Commissary Agency)

Lawmakers are hoping to put the brakes on a Defense Department initiative moving toward privatizing retail programs on military bases, such as commissaries, exchanges and other retail outlets.

They’ve asked for a report on DOD’s plans by March 31, 2026, as part of the House draft on the annual defense authorization bill today. Lawmakers want details on plans for maintaining the current benefits for service members and their families.

“The committee is concerned that privatization of retail programs could result in disruptions to benefits and productivity without providing substantial improvements,” stated the amendment adopted by the House Armed Services Committee. So they direct the Secretary of Defense to submit the report to the House and Senate armed services committees on the plans and processes being used for evaluating whether to privatize the retail programs.

The provision will have to survive negotiations over the next few months before the final compromise bill is settled.

Lawmakers are responding to an April 7 memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg on restructuring the DOD civilian workforce, which stated, “All functions that are not inherently governmental (e.g. retail sales and recreation) should be prioritized for privatization.”

Other information lawmakers would require include the feasibility of privatizing retail programs at remote and overseas locations. Critics of privatization have said that while private entities might be willing to operate large stores in the U.S. such as those at Fort Belvoir, Va., and San Diego, it would be less financially viable to operate stores overseas and in remote areas.

Lawmakers want details on the anticipated benefits of privatization, to include savings and operational efficiencies; an analysis of key challenges associated with privatization; effects on current appropriated-fund employees of the programs; and effects on contractors supporting the retail programs, such as those supplying groceries sold in commissaries and the items sold in military exchanges.

They’re also asking for an assessment of the disruption to the benefits and workflow of retail programs during transition.

Various groups within and outside the Defense Department have proposed commissary privatization over the past several decades, eyeing the billion-plus dollars of taxpayer money used to operate the stores, but those proposals have been rejected as advocates defended the benefit.

Defense officials kept commissaries open during the COVID-19 pandemic, deeming them “mission essential.”

By law, commissaries must provide an average overall savings of 23.7% compared to civilian grocery stores. To provide the savings, the stores rely on the annual appropriation of more than $1.4 billion in taxpayer dollars for the costs of operations, including employee salaries. In 2022, then-Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin directed DOD to fully fund commissaries in order to cut costs at the register in an effort to help families with the rising costs of food.

On the other hand, military exchanges don’t use taxpayer dollars for their operations. They provide department-store goods at varying discounts. They also operate gas stations, convenience stores and liquor stores. Eateries ranging from Burger King to Panera Bread also have agreements with the exchanges to operate on many military bases. Military exchanges are also tasked with operating the school meal programs for school-age children at DOD schools on overseas military bases.

Deputy editor Leo Shane III contributed to this report.

About Karen Jowers

Karen has covered military families, quality of life and consumer issues for Military Times for more than 30 years, and is co-author of a chapter on media coverage of military families in the book "A Battle Plan for Supporting Military Families." She previously worked for newspapers in Guam, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Fla., and Athens, Ga.

15. Pacific Military Balance Tilting in China’s Favor, Says New Defense of Japan Report

The 34 page report can be accessed online here: https://news.usni.org/2025/07/15/pacific-military-balance-tilting-in-chinas-favor-says-new-defense-of-japan-report

Pacific Military Balance Tilting in China’s Favor, Says New Defense of Japan Report - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · July 15, 2025

Cover of Defense of Japan 2025 White Paper

Officials in Tokyo released their Defense of Japan 2025 white paper this week with findings the international community is facing its greatest risk of conflict since World War II. The paper pointed to Russia, China and North Korea as primary regional security threats. The report also found U.S. U.S.-China strategic competition has been escalating and that the military balance between China and Taiwan has been rapidly tilting in China’s favor.

Like in past versions of the paper, Russia, China and North Korea are the largest concerns to Japan’s security.

“China’s external posture, military activities, and other activities are a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge,” reads the document. China’s activities in the East and South China Sea have been intensifying, reads the report.

The report highlighted China’s increased military activities around Taiwan. The military balance between China and Taiwan was tilting in favour of China, and there is growing concern over China’s pursuit of unification through gray-zone military tactics, reads the paper. In the event of a blockade of Taiwan, there is a possibility that China will deploy its coast guard at the forefront to carry out the blockade within the gray zone.

Russia and China’s joint military cooperation, which includes joint bomber flights and naval navigations with Russia in the vicinity of Japan, is a growing concern, according to the report.

“These repeated joint activities are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are a grave concern from the perspective of the national security of Japan,” reads the report.

The DOJ2025 also condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war. ’If such aggression is tolerated, it could send out the wrong message and implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are also acceptable elsewhere,” reads the report. “It cannot be ruled out that a serious situation similar to the aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in the future, particularly in East Asia.”

“Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, coupled with its strategic partnership with China, are posing a strong security concern,” reads the report.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments were highlighted as a grave threat to Japan and “seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community,” reads the report. North Korea is focusing on qualitatively improving its nuclear and missile capabilities, such as diversifying its systems and acquiring intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to aid its nuclear missile program.

JSDF Image

Political, economic and military competition between the U.S. and China has become more evident in recent years, reads the report. The white paper also reiterated the importance of the U.S.–Japan alliance, “Japan will further deepen discussions with the U.S. on each country’s respective roles, missions, and capabilities to further reinforce Japan-U.S. joint deterrence capabilities.”, read the white paper.

The DOJ2025 document included details of ongoing initiatives and efforts to improve the condition of JSDF personnel and improve recruitment and retention.

The report also includes a graphic showing the capabilities of the under-construction Aegis System Equipped Vessel (ASEV). The two ASEV destroyers are scheduled to be completed in 2027 and 2028. The graphic stated that the Improved Type 12 anti-ship missile, Tomahawk cruise missiles and energy weapons to combat drone saturation attacks are planned to be installed after 2032.

Currently, the full DOJ2025 document is available only in Japanese with digest summaries in English and Chinese.

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · July 15, 2025

16. Mike Waltz pledges to make UN ‘great again’ in confirmation hearing

MUNGA

Make the UN Great Again. Can we make this catch on at the UN? Unlike the US which is and always has been great, the UN does very much need a greatness makeover.

(My apologies MIke - I do not mean to disparage your remarks by proposing a new acronym but I could not resist. I for one would like you to make the UN Great Again).

Mike Waltz pledges to make UN ‘great again’ in confirmation hearing

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2025/07/15/mike-waltz-pledges-to-make-un-great-again-in-confirmation-hearing/

By Farnoush Amiri, The Associated Press and Matt Brown

Jul 15, 2025, 12:00 PM

Former White House National Security Adviser Mike Waltz is now going through the Senate confirmation process to become U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Waltz was ousted as national security adviser in May for mistakenly adding a journalist to a private Signal chat used to discuss sensitive military plans. (Alex Brandon/AP)

Mike Waltz told lawmakers Tuesday at his confirmation hearing to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations that he plans to make the world body “great again,” echoing President Donald Trump’s message for revamping America.

“We should have one place in the world where everyone can talk — where China, Russia, Europe and the developing world can come together and resolve conflicts,” Waltz said. “But after 80 years, it’s drifted from its core mission of peacemaking.”

Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is the first time Waltz is facing lawmakers since he was ousted as national security adviser for mistakenly adding a journalist to a private Signal chat used to discuss sensitive military plans. More than an hour into the hearing, no lawmakers had mentioned the episode.

The U.N. post is the last one to be filled in Trump’s Cabinet following months of delay, including the withdrawal of the previous nominee. Waltz, a former Florida congressman, was introduced by Sens. Mike Lee of Utah and Rick Scott of Florida as “a seasoned policy mind and skilled negotiator.”

“With Waltz at the helm, the U.N. will have what I regard as what should be its last chance to demonstrate its actual value to the United States,” Lee said. “Instead of progressive political virtue signaling, the Security Council has the chance to prove its value, and settling disputes and brokering deals.”

First opportunity to ask about the Signal chat

The hearing is providing senators with the first opportunity to grill Waltz over revelations in March that he added The Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg to a private text chain on an unclassified messaging app that was used to discuss planning for strikes on Houthi militants in Yemen.

Waltz took responsibility even as criticism mounted against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who shared the sensitive plans in the chat that included several other high-level national security officials. Hegseth shared the same information in another Signal chat that included family, but Trump has made clear Hegseth has his support.

Waltz was removed as national security adviser in May — replaced by Secretary of State Marco Rubio — and nominated for the U.N. role.

Trump praised Waltz in the announcement, saying he has “worked hard to put our Nation’s Interests first.”

United Nations is facing major changes

If confirmed, Waltz would arrive at the U.N. at a moment of great change. The world body is reeling from Trump’s decision to slash foreign assistance — affecting its humanitarian aid agencies — and it anticipates U.S. funding cuts to the U.N. annual budget.

Under an “America First” foreign policy realignment, the White House has asserted that “some of the U.N.’s agencies and bodies have drifted” from their founding mission and “act contrary to the interests of the United States while attacking our allies and propagating anti-Semitism.”

With America being the largest United Nations donor, cutting U.S. funding to the U.N. budget would greatly impair operations.

Facing financial instability, the U.N. has spent months shedding jobs and consolidating projects while beginning to tackle long-delayed reforms. The U.N. is also facing growing frustration over what critics describe as a lack of efficiency and power in delivering on its mandate to end conflict and prevent wars.

John Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. who was also national security adviser during Trump’s first term, was critical of the current state of the U.N.

“It’s probably in the worst shape it’s been in since it was founded,” Bolton, now an outspoken Trump critic, recently told The Associated Press.

Waltz accuses UN of antisemitism

Waltz painted a similar strategy to tackling the U.N. job as the previous nominee for the post, with a focus on combating China’s influence around the globe, review U.S. funding to U.N. agencies and initiatives as well as rooting out what he called deep antisemitism within the international body.

His priorities echo Trump and Secretary of State Rubio’s larger foreign policy platform, which has sought to reshape American diplomacy and worked aggressively to shrink the size of the federal government, including recent mass dismissals at the State Department.

Trump’s first nominee, Rep. Elise Stefanik, had a confirmation hearing in January and was expected to be confirmed, but Trump abruptly withdrew her nomination in March, citing risks to the GOP’s historically slim House majority.

At the time, the loss of a mere handful of seats could have swung the House majority to Democrats and derailed their recently successful efforts to enact Trump’s sweeping agenda.

Waltz is still on the White House payroll

Waltz, whose Florida House seat was filled during a special election earlier this year, has spent the last few months on the White House payroll despite being removed as national security adviser. The latest list of White House salaries, current as of July 1, includes Waltz earning an annual salary of $195,200.

A White House official, granted anonymity to discuss personnel matters, said Waltz stayed on to “ensure a smooth and successful transition given the extreme importance of the role of NSA.”

Waltz was the first Green Beret elected to the House and easily won reelection for a fourth term in November before Trump asked him to join the administration.

Amiri reported from the United Nations. Associated Press writer Seung Min Kim contributed to this report.

17. Senate committee seeks safeguard against US troop reductions in South Korea

While I have always supported the intent of Congress - sustaining our strong commitment to preventing war on the Korean peninsula which is of vital US national interest, the focus on numbers/troop levels alone may in fact be counter productive.

We have to take a holistic approach to the Asia- Indo-Pacific (and around the world) and all our interests and commitments and optimize of our force structure and force presence (in country, in theater/region, and in CONUS) to achieve multiple objectives - superior warfighting capability for deterrence and defense as well as supporting the political requirements (diplomatic and information instruments of power) of strategic reassurance and strategic resolve to meet our commitments and protect our interests in order to achieve US national security objectives. Focusing only on numbers is easy but is insufficient. We need the right capabilities in the right numbers in the right places. Simply decreasing, increasing, or maintaining the status quo of numbers does not serve us well.

Senate committee seeks safeguard against US troop reductions in South Korea

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · July 15, 2025

U.S. soldiers participate in an Eighth Army run at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, June 9, 2025. (Michelle Lessard-Terry/U.S. Army)

A version of next year’s defense spending bill forwarded recently by the Senate Armed Services Committee would bar the Defense Department from withdrawing troops from South Korea without congressional approval.

The committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act would prohibit “a reduction in U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula … until the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that such action is in the national interest,” according to a fact sheet from the committee released Friday in Washington, D.C.

The bill also requires the commanders of U.S. Forces Korea and Indo-Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs chairman to “conduct an independent risk assessment” of potential troop reductions in South Korea, according to the fact sheet.

The committee on July 9 advanced the bill to the full Senate on a vote of 26-1.

The bill supports $925 billion in defense spending for fiscal year 2026, a $32 billion increase over the current fiscal year.

The Senate plan includes $879 billion for the DOD, $35.2 billion for defense-related programs within the Department of Energy and $10.8 billion for programs outside the bill’s jurisdiction, according to the fact sheet.

The 2025 defense spending plan is $893 billion, including $849.9 billion for the DOD and $33.28 billion for the Energy Department, according to a summary on Congress.gov.

“From rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific to renewed aggression from Russia and the persistent threat of terrorism and cyberattacks, the United States faces a global security environment unlike any in recent memory,” Sen. Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat and the ranking committee member, said in a committee news release Friday. “This legislation invests in the service members, technology, and capabilities we need to deter our adversaries and defend our national interests.”

Sen. Roger Wicker, a Republican from Mississippi who serves as committee chairman, described the bill as a “direct reflection of the severity of that threat environment, as well as the rapidly evolving landscape of war,” according to the release.

The House Armed Services Committee is scheduled to vote Tuesday on its version of the bill.

South Korea’s Defense Ministry is aware of the committee’s version of the bill and is tracking its passage, spokesman Jeon Ha Gyu said during a news conference in Seoul on Monday.

President Donald Trump has often said South Korea pays too little of the cost to keep 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there to deter attacks from North Korea.

Under the five-year Special Measures Agreement signed in November by then-Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea must pay $1.1 billion annually starting in 2026.

The Trump administration considered moving approximately 4,500 U.S. troops in South Korea to other spots in the Indo-Pacific, such as Guam, according to May 23 report by The Wall Street Journal that cited unnamed military officials.

Reports of a troop reduction in South Korea “are not true” and “the U.S. remains firmly committed to the defense” of South Korea, the Office of the Secretary of Defense said in an email attributed to Pentagon press secretary Sean Parnell to Stars and Stripes later that day.

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Yoojin Lee

Yoojin Lee is a correspondent and translator based at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. She graduated from Korea University, where she majored in Global Sports Studies.

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · July 15, 2025

18. Information Management Driving Decision Supremacy

I do not think we can overestimate the importance of this issue.

My recommendation is to adjust the five paragraph operations order and special paragraph 5: command and signal. I think we have lost the art of determining not just what information commanders need but what are the actual discussions the commander must make as well as subordinate commanders. The result of the COA development and wargaming and COA selection would also include an analysis of the key decision a commander must make as well as what decision are delegated to subordinate commanders. Before you can identity the information required for decisions you must identify the decision that need to be made. Although it seems obvious what are those decision, I would posit the commander has to make too many decisions and if you can identify the key decisions he must make (and this the information necessary to support those decisions) you can provide the commander (and subordinate commanders) more opportunity to exercise "'Fingerspitzengefühl 'in command and control that emphasizes an intuitive grasp of the situation and the ability to respond appropriately and tactfully. It goes beyond the literal translation of "fingertip feeling" to describe a deep situational awareness and the skill to react effectively to evolving circumstances" while they are operating on mission and intent (Auftragstaktik or Mission Command). Identifying critical command decisions must be a central focus of the staff and in parallel it should also be looking to reduce the number critical decisions the commander must make. This could have the added benefit of reducing micromanagement as well as demanding only the necessary information for decision making from subordinate units thus reducing information overload (too often we operate our information processes on the concept of more is better nad I will know what I want/need when I see it).

My bottom line is that we should add a supporting sub-paragraph to Paragraph 5 that identifies critical Command decisions at appropriate command levels. Then we can employ effective information management processes to support those decisions.

Information Management Driving Decision Supremacy

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/16/information-management-driving-decision-supremacy/

by Michael Kidd, by Violet Johnston

07.16.2025 at 06:00am

IS1 Rob Stiver, (Woodbridge, Virginia), CTO1 Jon Gordon, (Gainesville, VA), and IS1(AW) Jack Barrett (Leesburg, VA) analyze maritime traffic using the Navy Reserve's Littoral Surveillance System during the Gulf Coast Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative 2005 held August 15-19 on board Naval Station Pascagoula, Mississippi. Please Credit Photo By: PH1 Timm Duckworth USNR.

Introduction

In today’s complex and fast-paced battlespace, the ability to make swift, informed decisions is often the difference between success and failure. Yet, many organizations, including those responsible for transatlantic defense interests, have lost their way regarding Information Management (IM). This allows this critical discipline to devolve into a mere support function—a service desk for troubleshooting computer issues—rather than the operational enabler it must be. This drift from its core purpose undermines IM’s potential to accelerate the decision cycle, leaving commanders without the timely, actionable information they need to maintain a strategic edge. Meanwhile, our adversaries recognize the power of information supremacy and rapidly advance their capabilities, potentially outpacing us in areas that matter most. We explore the organization, processes, and infrastructure necessary to reclaim IM as a warfighting advantage. This will reignite its role as a force multiplier driving operational success. The stakes are too high for complacency; it is time to act with urgency and purpose.

Background Context and Decision Supremacy

Historic commanders could count on military genius to effectively cut through Clausewitz’s Fog of War, forming a quick, intuitive understanding of the battlefield; however, modern commanders deal with operational problems of greater complexity and constant evolution. Undoubtedly, Napoleon Bonaparte and Gustavus Adolphus were military innovators, but their span of control and available data pale compared to Dwight Eisenhower or Georgy Zhukov.

Advocates of intuitive decision-making argue that senior leaders possess the experience to choose the right course without relying on data or structured analysis. Indeed, senior leaders are undoubtedly skilled; however, if they know more than their staff in every specialty, it signals a failure in staff development, not a testament to a leader’s brilliance. Leadership excellence isn’t innate, it’s built through systematic study, rigorous professional development, and exposure to structured decision-making processes. Leaders need a well-trained staff capable of synthesizing data into actionable recommendations. This will ensure decisions are made with clarity and speed.

Information as a Warfighting Enabler

At its core, the decision cycle—the process of gathering, analyzing, and converting information into actionable options—determines victory at every level of war. A commander who cycles through this process faster than the enemy gains a decisive edge. By assessing, adapting, and acting before the opponent has finished analyzing, a commander forces the adversary into a constant state of reaction, always struggling to catch up. This effect compounds in crises, where rapid decisions shape the battlespace in real-time.

Army doctrine emphasizes the disruptive power of a fast decision cycle, stating that a commander “can generate confusion and disorder and slow an adversary’s decision making.” This focus on tempo is not exclusive to Western militaries; China’s People’s Liberation Army is aggressively investing in artificial intelligence to accelerate battlefield decision-making. Yet, it must be noted that Russia’s failures in Ukraine highlight the dangers of valuing speed at the expense of precision. Agility matters, but effectiveness demands that decisions be not only fast but also sound.

While every military organization has its individual approach to the decision cycle, most follow similar principles. These frameworks are not far removed from those used by corporations and management consultants. The U.S. Army follows a cycle of Understand, Visualize, Describe, and Direct, : Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. Regardless of the terminology or origin, the goal remains the same: apply a structured method and ensure decisions are driven by well-analyzed information.

Understand the Decision Cycle

The OODA loop is a cornerstone of military decision-making, ensuring commanders act swiftly and accurately. Effective IM underpins this process, keeping decisions timely and well-informed. When IM falters—due to missing data, delays, or misinterpretation—the entire cycle risks collapse, leading to battlefield failure.

1. Observe

This phase gathers intelligence from surveillance, reconnaissance, and reports, with IM organizing data into a clear operational picture. A compromised Observe phase leaves commanders reliant on outdated or incomplete data, creating blind spots and flawed assumptions that weaken decision-making. Without robust observation, operations become reactive, forfeiting strategic advantage.

2. Orient

Raw data transforms into actionable intelligence, linking information to objectives and trends. Effective orientation identifies patterns and anticipates threats. Failures, whether from misinterpretation or information overload—lead to flawed assumptions and disjointed decisions. Without proper orientation, commanders risk confusion and paralysis.

3. Decide

Decision-making translates analysis into action, evaluating options based on intelligence. IM ensures clarity and accuracy, preventing rushed or flawed choices. Poor IM can delay decisions or lead to reckless actions, particularly in fluid environments where errors have immediate consequences.

4. Act

Execution depends on clear communication and real-time data access, with IM facilitating adjustments as conditions change. Weak IM in this phase disrupts coordination, slows responsiveness, and creates vulnerabilities. These issues cause delays that force reactive operations, compromising mission success.

Speed

A strong decision is only as valuable as its timing. The key is completing the cycle faster than the adversary, forcing them to restart and keeping them perpetually behind. A well-functioning OODA loop ensures strategic dominance by enabling proactive, decisive action before the opponent can react.

The cycle helps commanders act quickly and wisely, but balancing speed with depth is both an art and a science. Agility allows rapid adaptation, while depth enhances decision quality. An appropriate balance depends on the level of war, decision urgency, and risk tolerance.

At the tactical level, speed is critical—commanders must react fast to threats and opportunities. IM filters noise and delivers key data for swift action. At the operational level, coordination requires both speed and depth. IM consolidates diverse information into a cohesive picture, enabling broad assessments without losing momentum. At the strategic level, thoroughness is essential, as decisions shape campaigns. IM tools like or stochastic simulations, which provide decision-makers with probabilities of likely outcomes for a range of military operational or logistics problems, aid long-term planning, though adaptability remains vital.

Across all levels, effective IM turns raw data into actionable intelligence, keeping commanders ahead of adversaries.

Risk Tolerance and Decision Speed

Risk tolerance influences how fast decisions are made. Risk-tolerant commanders prioritize agility, acting with incomplete data. Here, IM must highlight only the most critical information to avoid delays. Risk-averse commanders, seeking certainty, rely on IM for detailed analysis, scenario modeling, and cross-checking. This is slower but more deliberate.

Strong knowledge management enforces a structured decision cycle, ensuring a reliable flow of vetted information. Systems that document and validate decision-making instill confidence, distinguishing well-developed recommendations from impulsive ideas. Without such systems, commanders may question whether a proposal is thoughtful analysis or mere speculation.

Historic Examples

Success, in retrospect, is often attributed to personalities and individuals rather than systems. People are far more willing to shift blame to a system when attempting to understand defeat. Napoleon’s 1812 Russian campaign and MacArthur’s 1951 forced retreat in Korea are well-studied failures in decision cycle dynamics. Some equally insightful but less studied include Lord Raglan’s Charge of the Light Brigade and Custer’s defeat at Little Bighorn which both exemplify failed IM processes within the commands.

Procurement failures lack the drama of battle, but their impact can be just as costly. We’ve all seen massive resources wasted on projects doomed from the start—failures that, in hindsight, were entirely predictable. Many stem from poorly defined requirements that proper analysis would have flagged. Even more concerning is when organizations, both within and outside government, allow contractors to define operational needs, creating a clear conflict of interest that prioritizes vendor agendas over mission success.

Three Pillars

Understanding the framework underlying a command’s IM needs, a commander must understand the organizations, processes, and infrastructure required to achieve efficient decision cycles in support of decision supremacy.

Organization

Modern organizations face a critical challenge: ensuring IM systems are run by experts, not unqualified personnel who reshape IM functions to fit their limited capabilities. Over time, these misalignments have transformed IM from a warfighting enabler into little more than a service desk, eroding its core mission. Look at any IM operation that spends the majority of its time validating email accounts or providing user training, and one can safely assume that they are not focused on decision superiority.

To reverse this trend, organizations must hire, train, and develop operationally minded IM professionals with the expertise to design systems that drive decision superiority. Accredited training and certification programs are essential to building a workforce capable of executing these high-stakes tasks. The significant breadth of programs under the IM (sometimes Knowledge Management) umbrella requires focused decisions on which approach an organization will pursue. Somewhat narrower in scope, existing military training programs lean toward the intelligence field, while the civilian training opportunities provide limitless options for specificity of approach. These programs must embed IM into operational planning, ensuring personnel can support fast, precise, and mission-critical decision-making in complex environments.

Beyond a skilled workforce, leadership is essential. Senior leaders must have the authority to enforce best practices and prevent drift toward inefficiency. They must protect the core mission, ensuring teams stay focused on operational priorities rather than being sidetracked by administrative tasks. By fostering a culture of accountability—where IM is a strategic enabler, not a back-office function—organizations can reclaim IM as a force multiplier, driving decision superiority and operational success.

Processes

Hiring and training lay the groundwork, but sustainable, long-term change requires policy reform to reshape organizational culture. A clear framework define roles, responsibilities, and objectives to align IM across divisions and vendors while accelerating the decision cycle.

IM professionals should drive decision superiority, designing systems that deliver fast, actionable intelligence. Policy must integrate IM into operational planning, while IT divisions focus on secure, scalable infrastructure that enables IM without dictating objectives. Vendors and contractors must be held accountable to strict requirements, ensuring they support, not influence, operational planning. Strong policies enforce accountability, prevent mission drift, and reclaim IM as a strategic advantage.

One of the key policy areas must always relate to the control of agreed-upon source data. Reliable data underpins every process, yet version control issues frequently disrupt workflows, slowing operations and creating uncertainty. In a data-driven environment, commanders must trust that information is accurate and singular—multiple versions breed confusion and operational chaos. While flexibility in decision-making is key, confidence in data integrity is non-negotiable. Beyond the battlefield, authoritative data also supports automation, allowing personnel to focus on complex problem-solving rather than routine tasks.

Policy must standardize IM best practices to ensure consistency, security, and efficiency. This includes strong data governance, adherence to decision-support protocols, and rigorous security standards. Regular audits and reviews maintain compliance, refine processes, and prevent drift. Embedding these standards into policy keeps IM aligned with operational priorities, responsive to emerging challenges, and fosters accountability.

With a strong policy foundation, IM evolves from a support function into a strategic force multiplier, fully integrated into the decision cycle. Clearly defined roles, disciplined requirement generation, and adherence to best practices ensure IM remains mission-focused, laying the groundwork for decision supremacy and operational success.

Infrastructure

With organization and policy in place, the next step is investing in infrastructure and technology to accelerate decision-making. IM provides tools that balance speed and depth, ensuring optimal decisions in any scenario.

Infrastructure decisions must separate requirements generation from service provision to prevent conflicts of interest. IM needs should be defined internally by operational personnel focused on efficiency and interoperability. Allowing vendors to dictate requirements leads to fragmented, inefficient systems. Organization-driven requirements ensure alignment with strategic objectives, fostering integration and reducing redundancy.

A major challenge is the shortage of professionals who can translate operational needs into effective architecture. Too often, IM leadership is filled by IT technicians who defer requirements to external providers, leading to reactive, disjointed solutions. While “innovation cells” attempt to compensate for weak IM leadership, they are temporary fixes that degrade long-term IM expertise. Without skilled professionals bridging operations and technology, decision superiority remains out of reach.

Infrastructure categories include IM systems that enhance decision speed by filtering and prioritizing data, ensuring commanders receive only high-impact information. Dashboards for real-time operational snapshots, consolidate key metrics for rapid situational awareness. For deeper analysis, scenario modeling and predictive analytics simulate potential outcomes, aiding risk assessment and long-term planning. Automated reporting systems eliminate manual updates, delivering critical information on schedule or on demand. By aligning with the battle rhythm, they enable faster responses to evolving conditions.

Commercial Solutions

Industries beyond the military are revolutionizing IM with tools that transform raw data into real-time, actionable insights. AI-driven platforms like Palantir and Splunk process massive datasets at high speed, using machine learning to detect patterns, predict trends, and flag anomalies for decision-makers. Collaborative data ecosystems such as Microsoft Azure Synapse and Google Cloud’s BigQuery integrate disparate sources into a single, accessible platform, streamlining cross-functional data sharing and ensuring personnel work from a unified source of truth. Imagine a command environment where maps, intelligence reports, and logistics updates are instantly available without navigating multiple systems.

However, tools are only as effective as the systems supporting them. The military’s long history of structured decision-making provides a wealth of policies and procedures to guide IM. Yet, the true challenge lies in discipline—following each step rigorously. Too often, organizations bypass inconvenient steps, justifying shortcuts under crisis, pressure, or time constraints. Without structured adherence to processes, even the most advanced technology cannot guarantee superior decision-making.

While we recognize that there are times when commanders must make snap judgments, we find that most of the time, the decision is not so urgent that an accelerated cycle could not be implemented. The best organizations enforce high levels of discipline without creating information delays or bottlenecks.

Call to Action

Modern warfare is not won by firepower alone—it is won by those who out smart, out decide, and out maneuver the adversary in the information space. Yet, our systems lag, burdened by outdated processes, while adversaries move decisively. China’s AI-driven systems accelerate battlefield agility, threatening to surpass the West. Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine were wake-up calls. We cannot wait for another crisis. The time to act is now.

Imagine a battlefield where intelligence, logistics, and operations data flow seamlessly, free from email chains and PowerPoint slides. This is not a distant vision; it is a necessity. Victory depends on IM systems that cut through noise, prioritize critical data, and deliver real-time intelligence. Automation, predictive analytics, dynamic dashboards, and real-time collaboration already exist. What’s missing is the urgency to adopt them and the discipline to implement them effectively.

The stakes have never been higher. Inaction means slower decisions, allowing adversaries to exploit our weaknesses. But this is not inevitable. By treating IM as a warfighting advantage, building a mission-driven IM workforce, and embracing cutting-edge tools, we can seize the initiative and redefine how we fight.

Incremental change is no longer enough. Lead the way. Demand more from IM teams, commanders, and yourself. The West’s dominance depends on it. Decision supremacy must remain ours—not just today, but for every battle ahead.

(Disclaimer: The views in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of NATO or The US Navy and all opinions are our own. None of the discussion should be taken as an official endorsement by NATO or the U.S. Navy of the products and services mentioned.)

Tags: Decision Information, Decision Supremacy, Information Management, information operations, Information Technology, Ooda Loop

About The Authors

Michael Kidd
Captain Michael Kidd was recently the Operations Branch Head at the NATO Joint Logistics Support Group Naples Italy. He has over 20 years of experience and has written on issues of military risk and logistics.
View all posts
Violet Johnston
Ms. Violet Johnston is with the UNC-Chapel Hill Department of Peace, War, and Defense Studies and has driven partnerships between the school and NATO.

19. The Limits of Putin's Balancing Act

Excerpts:

These developments could disturb the equilibrium that Putin has so assiduously cultivated. At the moment, Russians are far from revolting against the regime, but they could start to turn against the war, refusing to enlist and publicly questioning the merits of this seemingly endless conflict. In the summer of 2023, the mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mounted a small mutiny, dispatching a convoy of tanks toward Moscow before striking a deal with Putin and, two months later, dying in a plane crash that was almost certainly orchestrated by the Kremlin. Soldiers and veterans exhausted and disillusioned by the war could be harder for Putin to handle. For this reason, the Kremlin has bent over backward to mollify them with money and privileges. Another potential source of disruption is the Russian elite itself. Although so far there is no sign of insubordination among the government-dependent Russians who command wealth and power, some may be tempted to explore subtle forms of dissent, testing the waters by suggesting that the war should be moderated, slowed down, or ended.

To suppress potential political threats, Putin would surely double down on the war, bidding farewell to his domestic political balancing act. He might agree to temporary cease-fires and to cosmetic diplomacy, even to the pretense of a negotiated settlement, but he cannot let go of a simple fact: that Russia’s military, by his logic, has not accomplished enough. Russia does not control Ukraine, and any settlement that leaves Ukraine outside of Russian control—that is, a Ukraine free to integrate into Europe—would amount to a defeat. For the time being, the war Putin waged to halt Ukraine’s westward turn has only propelled Ukraine westward. That remains an outcome that Putin will never accept.

Within Russia, Putin has many options. He commands the infrastructure for mass mobilization, including the security services and the state-controlled media. He could enact a ruthless, ideological conscription campaign with harsh punishments for those unwilling to enlist. If Putin has so far refrained from traveling down this path, it is not because he is unwilling to deploy coercive power in Russia but because he is hesitant to destroy the calm that he has so painstakingly fashioned. Were he to abandon that equilibrium, Putin would end up waging a fanatic’s war in Ukraine, dragging Russia further in and wreaking ever greater havoc on the Ukrainian people. He would be unrestrained as generalissimo abroad and as tyrant at home. As such, he could transform a tacit dictatorship into a full-blown one, with a dictatorship’s grim political prerogatives and a dictatorship’s unbound geopolitical appetites.

The Limits of Putin's Balancing Act

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael Kimmage · July 16, 2025

The Limits of Putin’s Balancing Act

What the Kremlin Will Sacrifice in Pursuit of Victory in Ukraine

July 16, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Eurasian Economic Forum, Minsk, June 2025 Sergey Bobylev / Reuters

MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America. He is the author of Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability.

MARIA LIPMAN is a Visiting Research Scholar at the Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University and Co-Editor of the institute’s website, Russia.Post.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin has achieved an eerie calm at home. Shortly after assuming the presidency in 2000, he tied once independent oligarchs to the state while placating the growing middle class with rising living standards and greater material comforts. Gradually, he assembled a ruling ideology from bits and pieces of Russia’s past, one that was nationalistic enough to inspire pride but not so nationalistic as to be divisive.

As a result, after a quarter century in power, Putin has brought Russia to a point of equilibrium. Russian life can now be soothingly predictable, even if it demands adaptation at times. Chaos is engulfing the Middle East, American politics can be tempestuous, and Europe is witnessing its worst war since 1945. But Putin has given Russians the gift they were most eager to receive: stability. The country is not enduring visible disruptions or political tumult. Indeed, Russia hardly has any politics at all—it lacks real political parties and does not stage meaningful elections. The state, which reserves the right to repress, mostly represses those who dare to display their disapproval, a vanishingly small minority of Russians. In this arrangement, the Kremlin retains control and most Russians can go about their business, provided that their business is unobtrusive.

Another reality shadows this carefully crafted equilibrium. Putin has long promised Russians a country gilded with ambition, power, and glory. He stressed a “belief in the greatness of Russia” as early as his 1999 “millennium manifesto,” an article published in a Russian daily shortly before he assumed the presidency. In that essay, Putin implied that Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, and Boris Yeltsin, the first president of a post-Soviet Russia, had brought Russia to its knees, in part by letting post-Soviet states and former Warsaw Pact countries spin out of its orbit. Putin’s historic task, as he saw it, was to restore Russia as a major actor on the international stage. At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, he approached the West without any deference, reproaching the United States and its allies for “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions” that had “caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension.”

Four months later, Putin dispatched tens of thousands of Russian troops to Georgia, seizing a fifth of that country’s territory. In 2014, Russia invaded the Donbas, in eastern Ukraine, and annexed Crimea. The following year, the Russian military demonstrated its expeditionary capabilities in Syria. And in 2022, Putin launched a full-scale war on Ukraine, with the intent of redrawing the map of Europe and asserting Russia’s global heft.

Yet overreach abroad has landed Putin in a dilemma. Russia’s foreign policy is increasingly marked by failure. The war in Ukraine has stalemated. Contrary to Putin’s hopes, U.S. President Donald Trump’s election in 2024 did not compel the West to abandon Kyiv. In the Middle East, Israel has assailed Russia’s clients and partners. It might be tempting to view these developments as harbingers of Russia’s eventual retreat from Ukraine, but they are not. Putin can afford to lose influence in the Middle East, which is not an existential theater for him, but he will not reverse course in Ukraine, where he recognizes no dilemma. If pushed, he would likely sacrifice Russia’s equilibrium to a mass mobilization and to harshly coercive measures. Russia’s rise to greatness may be Sisyphean for Putin, but he will go to extreme lengths to avoid defeat. In Ukraine, Putin will risk everything.

For him, equilibrium—the complacency he has inculcated in the Russian population—is in danger of becoming a faded luxury. The grim necessity is the war.

AN EERIE CALM

Russia’s current placidity stems in large part from the changes of the past decade. Putin’s popularity, which has always been high, surged following his annexation of Crimea, in 2014. Russians greeted a more muscular foreign policy with a pride that was hard to detect in the late Soviet decades and in early post-Soviet Russia. This patriotism did not require sacrifice from Russians. After all, the rupture with the West was limited; the sanctions that Western countries imposed on Russia in 2014 proved to be weak.

Putin had begun this balancing act—behaving assertively abroad while insulating the home front from risk—two decades ago. By 2022, he had perfected it. At first, the public struggled to understand the full-scale war on Ukraine, but Putin exploited the conflict to strike patriotic chords and to consolidate devotion to the state. He was helped by the exodus of many Russians opposed to the war and of dozens of journalists and media figures critical of the government. Putin had never welcomed criticism. After 2022, he could stigmatize any attempt at political opposition as an affront to the war effort. Vaguely defined antiwar sentiment was criminalized, and many vocal critics went into exile or were imprisoned.

For many of the Russians who stayed, the war brought opportunity. Economic activity in defense-related manufacturing sectors took off, and the unemployment rate plummeted. It currently stands at a historic low of 2.2 percent. The Kremlin got hundreds of thousands of young men to enlist, enticing them with substantial sign-up bonuses, while most Russians could ignore the war altogether. Sanctions and visa restrictions have curtailed some high-end consumerist pleasures, and vacations in Europe are mostly off limits to non-wealthy Russians, but many countries continue to export to Russia, and Russians are free to travel throughout much of Asia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the South Caucasus. One can make do and get ahead in Putin’s Russia without being ardently patriotic—as long as one avoids being notably unpatriotic.

Unlike Joseph Stalin, Putin has not maximized the state’s dictatorial potential. The Russian president has eschewed mass bloodshed internally. Instead, he has become skilled in the practice of representative violence. There are around 2,000 political prisoners in Russia today. In their growing sum, they form a warning to everyone else. Although young people are increasingly subjected to indoctrination, apolitical adults can lead their professional and private lives largely untroubled by the government. The state rarely makes onerous demands on the Russian public, mostly leaving the urban and middle classes to their own devices. Even with mandatory military service, Russians are more or less free to choose how much or how little to participate in the system. Some opt for a martial patriotism, voluntarily enlisting or just waving the flag at rallies. The quiet majority, by remaining quiet, gets to enjoy relative prosperity and the relative indifference of the state.

COMPOUNDING PRESSURES

The equilibrium that Putin has fostered, however, is more fragile than it seems. A short, victorious war in Ukraine would have safeguarded the status quo at home. Successful wars strengthen the domestic political position of the victors, and Putin might have spun a narrative of triumph over NATO and over a United States that had once credited itself for winning the Cold War. On the eve of invasion, Putin may have had this outcome in mind: a shoring up of Russian nationhood so profound that it would allow him to anoint a successor and to keep the ship of state moving along.

But unfortunately for the Kremlin, the war in Ukraine has been anything but a triumph. By February 2026, the war will have lasted as long as the fight against Nazi Germany did for the Soviet Union. World War II launched the Soviet Union into superpower status, whereas Russia’s position in Europe and in the world more broadly is deteriorating. By pouring vast resources into the war, Moscow has constrained its military positions elsewhere. In 2023, Russia did nothing when its partner Armenia lost Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. And late last year, it failed to prevent the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Another of Russia’s key partners, Iran, has been getting pummeled by Israel and the United States, while Moscow stands helplessly on the sidelines. Russia is increasingly dependent on China for access to foreign markets and for dual-use goods that fuel the war effort, but Chinese direct investment and transfers of technology have been limited.

All told, Russia has burned through enormous resources in a war it is not winning. Ukraine is itself very far from victory, but the country’s biggest cities and much of its territory are beyond the Kremlin’s grasp. The territories that Russia has managed to occupy do not constitute a vital bridge to Europe. Rather than flourishing colonies, they are places scarred by immiseration and war. Ukraine’s talent for technological innovation poses another problem for the Kremlin. In May, Ukraine orchestrated an extraordinary attack on airbases deep within Russia. As the war drags on, the Ukrainian armed forces may spring similarly bold surprises.

Last week, Trump shifted gears on Ukraine. He has pledged to supply the country with advanced weaponry, via NATO, and criticized Putin for needlessly prolonging the war. Meanwhile, Europe is spending more on defense and NATO member states are stepping up their military coordination. In the unlikely event that the United States were to altogether abandon Ukraine, Europe will not follow suit. Prosperous, strong European countries will continue to back Kyiv. And no major European country is likely to lift sanctions or return to prewar levels of trade with Russia.

In the face of these compounding pressures, Putin is not backing down. Determined to win whatever the cost, he has chosen to subordinate the Russian economy to the war, devoting more and more resources to producing materiel. Because of sanctions, the loss of the European market, and the inefficiencies of wartime spending, the Russian economy is stagnating, with high inflation and ever lower rates of growth. The Kremlin recently acknowledged that a recession looms. And crises outside of Russia, such as the collapse of the Iranian government or a global economic downturn, could make things even worse.

A DICTATORSHIP UNBOUND

These developments could disturb the equilibrium that Putin has so assiduously cultivated. At the moment, Russians are far from revolting against the regime, but they could start to turn against the war, refusing to enlist and publicly questioning the merits of this seemingly endless conflict. In the summer of 2023, the mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin mounted a small mutiny, dispatching a convoy of tanks toward Moscow before striking a deal with Putin and, two months later, dying in a plane crash that was almost certainly orchestrated by the Kremlin. Soldiers and veterans exhausted and disillusioned by the war could be harder for Putin to handle. For this reason, the Kremlin has bent over backward to mollify them with money and privileges. Another potential source of disruption is the Russian elite itself. Although so far there is no sign of insubordination among the government-dependent Russians who command wealth and power, some may be tempted to explore subtle forms of dissent, testing the waters by suggesting that the war should be moderated, slowed down, or ended.

To suppress potential political threats, Putin would surely double down on the war, bidding farewell to his domestic political balancing act. He might agree to temporary cease-fires and to cosmetic diplomacy, even to the pretense of a negotiated settlement, but he cannot let go of a simple fact: that Russia’s military, by his logic, has not accomplished enough. Russia does not control Ukraine, and any settlement that leaves Ukraine outside of Russian control—that is, a Ukraine free to integrate into Europe—would amount to a defeat. For the time being, the war Putin waged to halt Ukraine’s westward turn has only propelled Ukraine westward. That remains an outcome that Putin will never accept.

Within Russia, Putin has many options. He commands the infrastructure for mass mobilization, including the security services and the state-controlled media. He could enact a ruthless, ideological conscription campaign with harsh punishments for those unwilling to enlist. If Putin has so far refrained from traveling down this path, it is not because he is unwilling to deploy coercive power in Russia but because he is hesitant to destroy the calm that he has so painstakingly fashioned. Were he to abandon that equilibrium, Putin would end up waging a fanatic’s war in Ukraine, dragging Russia further in and wreaking ever greater havoc on the Ukrainian people. He would be unrestrained as generalissimo abroad and as tyrant at home. As such, he could transform a tacit dictatorship into a full-blown one, with a dictatorship’s grim political prerogatives and a dictatorship’s unbound geopolitical appetites.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael Kimmage · July 16, 2025

20. How India Can Placate America

Excerpts:

With India’s economy punching below its weight, however, Modi’s inner circle realizes the status quo is no longer tenable. In recent years, India has raised tariffs, steadfastly remained outside mega-regional trade pacts, and subsidized domestic industry to stimulate investment. Collectively, these protectionist measures have failed to trigger an economic takeoff. If Modi can deftly use Trump as a foil—framing domestic tariff cuts as a tactical move to placate a capricious U.S. president—he can unlock trade reforms that better integrate India into global supply chains and yield long-term economic gains.

If anybody has the latitude to make such concessions to a bullying Washington, Modi does. Although the Modi-led BJP suffered a temporary setback in last year’s general elections, it remains dominant. In regional elections held over the past year, the ruling party decisively defeated opponents in key states, defying predictions of “peak Modi.” Few elected leaders enjoy Modi’s political space to take the high road with Trump. If he does so, he might succeed in insulating the U.S.-Indian relationship from the tumultuous present to reap the benefits of a more congenial future.

Some Indian strategists rightly worry that it takes a dangerous leap of faith to bet on the United States returning to moderation in 2028. But the alternative—strategic estrangement—could come at an even greater cost. In an era of global uncertainty, strategic altruism may be the highest form of self-interest India can exercise.

How India Can Placate America

Foreign Affairs · by More by Milan Vaishnav · July 16, 2025

In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

July 16, 2025

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., February 2025 Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

MILAN VAISHNAV is Senior Fellow and Director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Over the past quarter century, few countries have commanded as much sustained attention from U.S. foreign policy officials as has India. Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has placed India not just at the heart of its approach to Asia but at the center of its global strategy.

This enduring partnership rested on an unspoken doctrine of strategic altruism. U.S. policymakers believed that supporting India’s rise—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—would pay dividends for the United States in the long term. A stronger, more prosperous India would open markets for American companies, bolster regional deterrence against China, and serve as a democratic counterweight to authoritarianism in Asia. India’s ascent was perceived not as a threat but as an opportunity. Because India’s rise aligned with American goals, Washington made substantial investments in India without demanding immediate returns. That long-term bet endured across both Democratic and Republican administrations—including President Donald Trump’s first term.

But Trump’s return to office could mark the end of this approach. The second Trump administration is driven not so much by transactionalism as it is by an insatiable desire to burnish its dominance in virtually all its foreign relationships. Its dealings with India have been no exception.

To preserve the relationship, it now falls to India—not the United States—to practice strategic altruism: making concessions to, generating deliverables for, and limiting what it asks of a U.S. administration primarily concerned with maintaining the upper hand. For a country committed to strategic autonomy and “multialignment,” this is an uncomfortable proposition. Nevertheless, it may be India’s best bet for weathering Trump’s second term and positioning itself for a more favorable future.

IN A GIVING MOOD

The United States’ policy of strategic altruism toward India was most clearly articulated in Foreign Affairs in 2019 by former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and the South Asia scholar and former National Security Council member Ashley Tellis. Blackwill and Tellis argued that, beginning at the turn of the century, U.S. foreign policy officials realized it would be inherently beneficial for the United States if India emerged as a fast-growing, democratic, and militarily capable power in Asia. With Beijing emerging as a strategic competitor, Washington came to see New Delhi not only as a natural partner but as an Asian power with a shared interest in preventing China from dominating the region and undermining the rules-based international order. A stronger, more prosperous India could serve as a counterweight to an assertive, authoritarian China.

U.S. foreign-policy makers believed that the long-term strategic convergence with India outweighed the inevitable frictions the two countries might experience on other issues, such as climate change, trade, or reform of the multilateral system. As the authors wrote: “Generous U.S. policies were not merely a favor to New Delhi; they were a conscious exercise of strategic altruism. When contemplating various forms of political support for India, U.S. leaders did not ask, ‘What can India do for us?’ They hoped that India’s upward trajectory would shift the Asian balance of power in ways favorable to the United States.”

To preserve the relationship, India must now be generous to the United States.

Although strategic altruism was never enshrined in official doctrine, it underpinned U.S. policy toward India for two decades. To be sure, successive U.S. administrations placed their own stamp on the budding partnership. The George W. Bush administration prioritized a landmark civil nuclear deal in 2005 that was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2008, eventually removing India from the ranks of nuclear pariahs. The Obama administration perceived India as a linchpin in its “pivot to Asia” and a crucial protagonist in its vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Trump’s first term, despite its volatility, maintained continuity. Following China’s reckless incursions in 2020 along the disputed border in the rugged Himalayan region separating the two countries, India began to shed long-standing caution about antagonizing Beijing. This paved the way for the rejuvenation of the Indo-Pacific partnership known as the Quad (bringing together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and expanded bilateral defense and diplomatic collaboration between India and the United States. The Biden administration strengthened these partnerships and added a new element—an ambitious new framework for collaborating with India on critical and emerging technologies that resulted in joint initiatives on semiconductor manufacturing, codevelopment and coproduction of sensitive defense systems, and increased collaboration on space exploration and research.

Strategic altruism encountered speed bumps in the first Trump administration, when the president’s “America first” rhetoric left little room for magnanimity. But Trump’s penchant for transactionalism was tempered by several factors. First, several cabinet officials in the first Trump term were members of the traditional Republican foreign policy elite for whom the challenge posed by China, and India’s intrinsic utility to the United States in helping deal with that challenge, were hugely important. Their presence insulated India from the full brunt of Trump’s mercurial tendencies.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic suspended normal diplomatic activity, drawing attention away from points of friction in the bilateral relationship that might have received more attention in the Trump White House. Instead, India’s generic pharmaceutical industry emerged as a critical asset during the pandemic and made New Delhi a more sympathetic partner for Washington, especially given that India also experienced significant pandemic-related deaths and dislocation.

Third, China’s risky 2020 border gambit offered a pretext for India and the United States to deepen cooperation in the sensitive areas of intelligence sharing, defense coproduction, and space collaboration. After years spent nudging India to align its cautious public messaging about China with its more strident private rhetoric, the United States found it was pushing on an open door. U.S.-Indian relations emerged from Trump’s first term in better shape than U.S. ties with many (if not most) other countries—reinforcing the notion that Democrats and Republicans agreed on India even when they agreed on little else.

WHAT’S IN IT FOR ME?

With Trump’s victory in the November 2024 presidential election, many in India believed the country was well positioned to manage his return, given the experience of his first term. It has slowly become clear to Indian policymakers, however, that while Trump 1.0 was unpredictable, Trump 2.0 is unbound.

The second Trump administration is driven by an unyielding conviction that the United States has been badly taken advantage of, especially by its so-called allies and partners. Trump and his lieutenants claim that the United States has borne a disproportionate share of the burden in its myriad partnerships with little reciprocal benefit. Unlike its first iteration, this administration has fewer foreign policy veterans who believe in India’s intrinsic value as a bulwark against China.

In addition to skepticism about partnerships, the current administration’s incoherence about China has left India on uncertain ground. Although it is still early days, this Trump administration’s China policy is strikingly muddled. In Washington, it is an open secret that the administration has not one China strategy but many. Competing factions and schools of thought vie for influence. Trump’s team includes skeptics who downplay the China threat, hard-liners who champion Biden-era curbs on investment and technology, and dealmakers (possibly including Trump himself) who dream of a personal détente with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. In New Delhi, Indian officials struggle to parse the mixed signals.

In this Trump administration, few officials believe in India’s intrinsic value.

Trump has thus ended—or at least paused—the U.S. policy of strategic altruism. If successive U.S. leaders refrained from asking, “What can India do for us?” the current administration is shouting this question from the rooftops. Indeed, it is instructive that the administration has conditioned a broader dialogue with New Delhi on India acceding to several key demands.

First, as part of its policy of “reciprocal tariffs,” the Trump administration has threatened India with an across-the-board 26 percent tariff unless it delivers generous trade and market access concessions. India has emerged as one of the most enthusiastic suitors of a trade pact with the United States, with a tentative deal expected to be reached before the president’s new, arbitrary August 1 deadline. Although this “early harvest” deal may outline only basic terms, officials on both sides hope for a formal pact by this fall’s Quad summit in New Delhi.

Second, the administration has publicly pressed India to increase purchases of U.S.-made defense equipment. Although India has long relied on Russian arms imports, it has meaningfully diversified its portfolio of new purchases over the last decade, increasing the military equipment it buys from the West—notably from France, Israel, and the United States. In a February meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Trump floated the possibility of granting India access to buy cutting-edge F-35 stealth fighter jets, an offer normally restricted to the closest U.S. allies. India currently buys more arms from Russia and France than from the United States. Although it is unlikely that the United States could become India’s preferred military supplier even if New Delhi were so inclined—cost considerations alone would rule this out—Trump’s team believes India has been slow to accelerate the purchase of U.S. weapons.

Finally, the administration has also implored India to do more on energy. It wants India to buy more U.S. liquid natural gas and oil, and India seems to be complying. In 2025 alone, India has more than doubled its oil imports from the United States. Washington is also lobbying New Delhi to amend its liability laws to allow for foreign firms to invest in the country’s civilian nuclear sector—the prime reason why the celebrated U.S.-Indian civil nuclear deal has never been consummated. Although the ink on the bilateral accord has long dried, India’s onerous regulations regarding liability issues continue to stymie American investment in Indian nuclear reactors.

RETURNING THE FAVOR

With strategic altruism in Washington on ice, India faces a new reality: New Delhi may have to swallow the bitter pill of making sacrifices today for the promise of security and prosperity tomorrow. In this reversal, it is India—not the United States—that must embrace delayed reciprocity, delivering tangible benefits without expecting short-term returns. For a country that has long prized strategic autonomy, this posture is an uncomfortable departure, although perhaps a necessary one. In the short term, it allows India to withstand the Trump storm in the hopes that either the current administration tempers its transactionalism or that it is eventually followed by a more traditional, strategically minded administration. Over the long run, India’s need for a strategic partnership with the United States remains as vital as it has been for the past quarter century.

That is because India requires significant foreign capital to help finance its ambitious domestic transformation. Although India’s trend growth of roughly 6.5 percent is robust by global standards, it is inadequate given the country’s development goals and the urgent needs of its burgeoning, young, and rapidly urbanizing workforce. To realize the Modi government’s vision of attaining developed-country status by 2047—an aspiration that implies a $30 trillion economy—India will require a massive influx of investment. At present, foreign direct investment inflows into India are muted; last fiscal year, India recorded its lowest level of net FDI inflows in at least two decades. For India to return to double-digit growth rates, renewed investment from the United States will be paramount.

India also needs American support in matters of security. The conflict with Pakistan in May underscored that India was fighting not one neighboring adversary but two; Pakistan used Chinese weapons systems to repel Indian attacks, relied on Chinese satellite imagery of Indian assets, and received real-time intelligence from Beijing on battlefield movements. India’s strategic vulnerability to China has only grown in recent years. Both countries remain locked in an unresolved standoff in the mountains of Ladakh, China has expanded its military infrastructure in the border region, and Beijing continues to encircle India through economic and military advances across South Asia. Despite its rhetoric of strategic autonomy, India cannot deter China alone; its defense posture and economic resilience hinge on American partnership to varying degrees.

So, too, do India’s technological ambitions. India boasts world-class engineering talent, but it lacks the necessary resources and infrastructure to be an industry leader in the rapidly expanding field of artificial intelligence. In February 2026, India will host the next global AI summit. U.S. officials have privately suggested that this gathering could be an opportunity for large U.S.-based tech giants to unveil major investments in state-of-the-art AI infrastructure across India. Indeed, much of India’s tech talent has found a home not in India but in the United States. Often dismissed as a source of “brain drain,” the migration corridor between the two countries—the sixth largest globally—also brings substantial gains. In the last fiscal year alone, India received over $135 billion in remittances from around the world, nearly 30 percent of which originated in the United States.

DOMESTIC PRESSURES, GLOBAL IMPERATIVES

Within India, adopting a policy of strategic altruism toward the United States does carry risks. Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has long cultivated a muscular, nationalist image in contrast to the dovish, secular Indian National Congress. Concessions to Trump risk undercutting that image, especially given recent accusations that Modi yielded to White House pressure to finalize a cease-fire with Pakistan in May.

On the substance of its concessions, here, too, India will have to tread carefully. Energy and defense purchases may not be the stuff of mass political campaigns, but issues related to farmers and agriculture are. If India makes significant market access concessions to cater to American agricultural interests, Modi’s government will come dangerously close to touching the third rail of Indian politics. This is why India is more likely to offer the United States tariff relief on products such as ethanol, almonds, wine, and spirits rather than on staples such as rice, wheat, or dairy products.

With India’s economy punching below its weight, however, Modi’s inner circle realizes the status quo is no longer tenable. In recent years, India has raised tariffs, steadfastly remained outside mega-regional trade pacts, and subsidized domestic industry to stimulate investment. Collectively, these protectionist measures have failed to trigger an economic takeoff. If Modi can deftly use Trump as a foil—framing domestic tariff cuts as a tactical move to placate a capricious U.S. president—he can unlock trade reforms that better integrate India into global supply chains and yield long-term economic gains.

If anybody has the latitude to make such concessions to a bullying Washington, Modi does. Although the Modi-led BJP suffered a temporary setback in last year’s general elections, it remains dominant. In regional elections held over the past year, the ruling party decisively defeated opponents in key states, defying predictions of “peak Modi.” Few elected leaders enjoy Modi’s political space to take the high road with Trump. If he does so, he might succeed in insulating the U.S.-Indian relationship from the tumultuous present to reap the benefits of a more congenial future.

Some Indian strategists rightly worry that it takes a dangerous leap of faith to bet on the United States returning to moderation in 2028. But the alternative—strategic estrangement—could come at an even greater cost. In an era of global uncertainty, strategic altruism may be the highest form of self-interest India can exercise.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Milan Vaishnav · July 16, 2025

21. Lessons Observed from the War Between Israel and Iran

Lessons "Observed" (the right characterization based on my one of my many mentors' work on Iraq and Afghanistan - Joe Collins)

Excerpts:

The 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran signaled a profound shift in the character and conduct of regional warfare. It reaffirmed the centrality of alliances, psychological operations, and precision targeting, while also highlighting the evolving role of strategic deterrence and information warfare in shaping outcomes.

The successful targeting of Iran’s nuclear facilities — executed with surgical precision and coordinated through joint U.S.–Israeli intelligence — proved that well-executed, pre-emptive action can yield measurable delays in adversarial weapons development. These strikes were not only militarily effective but psychologically disorienting, undermining confidence within Iran’s defense establishment and signaling Israel’s reach, capability, and intent.

Just as importantly, the campaign revealed that influence is now a force multiplier. Strategic communication, public diplomacy, and psychological operations achieved effects far beyond the battlefield. They neutralized panic at home, destabilized enemy cohesion, and helped shape global narratives. As such, psychological operations and information dominance now sit alongside airpower and cyber warfare as core pillars of modern national defense.

Equally critical was the role of strategic partnerships. Without U.S. intelligence, missile defense assets, and military coordination, Israel would have struggled to execute a campaign of such scale and precision. The conflict reinforced the idea that no nation, however capable, can operate alone in a multi-domain war. Success depends on interoperability, trust, and shared strategic objectives among allies.

The June 2025 conflict was not merely an episode in the Israeli-Iranian rivalry — it was a glimpse into the future of warfare. It showcased the fusion of conventional and unconventional tools, the necessity of operational resilience, and the unpredictability of asymmetric threats. It also raised enduring questions of how tactical victories can deliver strategic outcomes (which Israel has failed to do), and how nations can adapt to a battlefield that is no longer bound by geography or traditional rules of engagement.

As strategists and decision-makers assess the legacy of Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer, they should look beyond the metrics of destruction. The real measure of success lies in whether enduring security, stability, and deterrence have been achieved or whether this was merely the opening salvo in a new era of protracted, hybrid confrontation. The battlefield of tomorrow is not coming — it has already arrived. And only those nations that can operate across domains, at pace, and with strategic discipline will endure.

Lessons Observed from the War Between Israel and Iran - War on the Rocks

Bilal Y. Saab and Darren D. White

July 16, 2025

warontherocks.com · July 16, 2025

The outbreak of direct hostilities between Israel and Iran in June represents one of the most significant geopolitical escalations in the Middle East in recent history. What began as a calculated pre-emptive strike by the Israel Defense Forces against Iranian nuclear facilities, under the codename Operation Rising Lion, swiftly evolved into a multi-theater war involving cyber, air, and naval engagements.

Within days, the United States entered the conflict through Operation Midnight Hammer, employing more than 125 aircraft and seven B-2 Spirit bombers — the latter dropping 14 bunker-buster bombs, 30,000 pounds each, against Iranian nuclear infrastructure. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine described the operation as the “largest B-2 operational strike in U.S. history.”

Iran retaliated through a mixture of ballistic missile and drone strikes, as well as cyber attacks. It would have loved to utilize the firepower of its once robust network of armed non-state proxies in the region — Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, the Houthis in Yemen, and the militias in Iraq — but it couldn’t because Israel had done a terrific job of massively degrading their military capabilities (at least Hizballah and Hamas). During the brief but intense Iranian-Israeli confrontation, those proxies remained largely silent either because they couldn’t get into the fight in a meaningful way or because they were unwilling due to domestic political constraints.

While a fragile ceasefire was brokered after 12 days of combat, the nature of the conflict underscored the transformation of modern warfare — hybrid, decentralized, and fought across physical and digital domains.

BECOME A MEMBER

Multi-Domain Combat in Action

The Israeli military’s initial operation demonstrated unparalleled coordination of stealth aircraft, intelligence, cyber disruption, and psychological warfare. More than 200 sorties, involving F-35I Adir and F-15I Ra’am aircraft, struck over 100 targets across Iran, including nuclear sites at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. These kinetic actions were preceded by months of intelligence-gathering, sabotage, and cyber intrusions executed by Mossad, the Israeli foreign intelligence agency, and Israel’s Unit 8200.

In parallel, Israel’s air superiority campaign is reported to have suppressed more than 70 Iranian surface-to-air missile systems, paving the way for deeper strikes. The United States entered the fray days later, targeting deeply fortified Iranian sites using Massive Ordnance Penetrators launched from B-2 bombers. These strikes inflicted damage on key enrichment support structures, but there is an intense debate at the moment about the level of damage and whether Iran still has enriched uranium. Based on early intelligence, European officials claimed that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is largely intact. However, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said he was unaware of any intelligence suggesting Iran had moved any of its highly enriched uranium to shield it from U.S. strikes.

Simultaneously, Iran retaliated by launching anywhere from 370 to 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones against Israel, complemented by cyber operations against Israeli critical infrastructure. Israel claims that the vast majority of the strikes were intercepted by its integrated and multi-layered air and missile defense system (with a 90 percent interception rate) — the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems, all of which were assisted by American Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense batteries. However, the sheer scale of the attacks — unique in Israel’s history — revealed stress points in Israel’s defensive grid.

Cyber Warfare

Judging by the level of synchronization of cyber actions with kinetic campaigns, the Iranian-Israeli war is a reminder of how cyber warfare is now a core domain of military strategy, not merely a supplement. Both Iran and Israel experienced the limits of cyber deterrence, particularly where private sector networks were inadequately protected.

Indeed, cyber operations played a pivotal role on both sides. Israel initiated the conflict with a cyber barrage that disabled Iranian radar systems, electronic warfare stations, and communications. Conversely, Iranian hackers targeted Israeli power grids, train networks, and digital infrastructure, with varying degrees of success.

Operational Successes and Shortcomings

Israel’s tactical victories were marked by the achievement of rapid air dominance, high interception rates against Iranian missile barrages, and the disruption of Iran’s command-and-control structure. U.S. kinetic strikes reinforced the impression of an overwhelming technological edge. Civil preparedness, with Israeli civilians reacting swiftly to warnings and occupying shelters, further limited casualties and infrastructure damage. Iran’s ballistic missile attacks killed 28 people — all but one of them civilians — and wounded over 3,000.

Multi-domain integration — particularly the fusion of cyber, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and kinetic firepower — allowed Israel to operate with tempo and precision. Intelligence-led targeting, coordinated with Mossad’s human intelligence network, ensured that Israel’s initial strike had strategic depth and psychological impact, especially in the targeted killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior commanders including Saeed Izadi, a veteran commander who led the Palestine Corps of the Quds Force, and Behnam Shahriyari, commander of the Quds Force’s Weapons Transfer Unit.

Despite these successes, the conflict exposed limitations in strategic overreach, proxy elimination, and escalation control. Iran’s proxy forces, though badly hurt, still had capabilities that could have been used to support Iran’s campaign. Hizballah’s much reduced but continued missile capacity exposed the difficulty of destroying entrenched non-state actors with conventional force.

The Israeli defense grid experienced signs of fatigue. Batteries had to be rotated and reloaded at an unsustainable pace, underscoring the need for scalable and autonomous missile defense systems. Iran’s cyber retaliation also demonstrated that even a state as cyber-capable as Israel remains vulnerable without a robust civilian digital defense strategy.

The effectiveness of American bunker-buster bombs against hardened sites is very much unclear. U.S. President Donald Trump claimed the strikes against Iran “completely and totally obliterated” its ability to produce nuclear weapons. Jeffrey Lewis, a weapons and nonproliferation specialist with the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, argued that the attacks do not appear to have destroyed Iran’s nuclear program. A classified U.S. intelligence report was leaked to several U.S. media outlets suggesting that the U.S. strikes damaged but did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear capacity. Further, an intercepted call between Iranian officials was leaked to the media: These officials reportedly said they were surprised the U.S. attack on the nuclear facilities had not been larger and more damaging. Absent a comprehensive bomb damage assessment by the U.S. government (which could take weeks for the military to finish and release), it is hard to tell whether the bombs fully destroyed the nuclear facility at Fordow.

Lessons for the Future

The June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran yielded a range of critical doctrinal insights for modern military planning. It not only reaffirmed the continuing relevance of conventional capabilities but also underlined the importance of cyber integration, information dominance, strategic precision, and alliance cooperation in 21st-century conflict scenarios. From this conflict, we derive nine lessons.

One, try not to fight alone (especially if you have powerful friends). Israel’s ability to execute Operation Rising Lion and maintain a credible deterrent posture in the face of Iranian retaliation would have been significantly impaired without the support of strategic partners — chief among them, the United States. The June 2025 conflict underscored the strategic, operational, and technological benefits that arise from such alliances. Direct American involvement sent an unambiguous message of alliance solidarity. U.S. military assets were deployed rapidly, demonstrating America’s unique capacity for global strike operations. More importantly, U.S. forces provided critical missile defense support through the deployment of several kinds of advanced missile defense batteries in both Israel and the Gulf region. This operational integration allowed Israel to concentrate its Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems on civilian areas, knowing that U.S. systems could help shield military installations and broader regional assets. Such cooperation extends well beyond munitions — it reflects deep interoperability, joint planning doctrines, and shared intelligence frameworks.

Two, establish air superiority. Air superiority remains the cornerstone of operational success, but it ought to be supplemented by cyber dominance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance integration, and electronic warfare. Israel’s early success in neutralizing Iranian radar systems and air defenses enabled its air force to carry out long-range operations with minimal resistance. The seamless coordination of stealth aircraft, real-time intelligence feeds, and electronic suppression created the conditions necessary for operational freedom.

Three, ensure strategic precision. The success of targeted strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure demonstrated the enduring power of strategic precision. Israeli and U.S. forces, operating in concert, were able to destroy critical enrichment sites, disable support systems, and severely degrade Iran’s nuclear research timeline. Although the most deeply buried facilities such as Fordow withstood direct assault due to hardened construction, surrounding infrastructure was incapacitated. These strikes delayed Iran’s nuclear progress by an estimated 18–24 months and served as a reminder that targeted, intelligence-led operations can deliver disproportionate strategic effect. Israel’s access to U.S. satellite surveillance, AI targeting support, and shared signals intelligence significantly enhanced the precision and tempo of its strikes. Joint intelligence assessments also enabled rapid battle damage assessment and facilitated strategic decision-making within hours of engagements.

Four, master drone warfare. Drones have evolved into a strategic weapon system, capable of saturation, deception, and long-range attritional warfare. Iran’s drone swarms, while largely intercepted, tested the limits of Israel’s multi-layered air defenses and forced Israel to expend high-value interceptors on low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles. Future warfare will require investment in AI-driven targeting algorithms, directed energy weapons, and low-cost drone countermeasures to neutralize large-scale unmanned threats without depleting strategic resources.

Five, anticipate and embrace hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare — encompassing physical, cyber, informational, and psychological domains — is now the prevailing model of conflict. Israel’s campaign combined high-value kinetic strikes with psychological operations, digital disinformation management, and cyber operations, sowing disarray within Iran’s command structure and public communications. In this new battlespace, success demands anticipatory intelligence, rapid adaptability, and strategic messaging that shapes both battlefield perception and international opinion.

Six, invest in integrated air and missile defense. Had Israel not done precisely that, it would have been in a world of trouble. Iran’s missile and drone attacks would have caused much more significant infrastructure damage and greater casualties. Thanks to U.S. sponsorship and Israeli technological ingenuity, Israel boasts one of the most effective air and missile defense systems in the world. This is a lesson the Gulf Arab states should learn and should have learned a long time ago. These countries should come together on this issue and waste no more time creating a shared early-warning system across the Gulf region. Such a system, which the Gulf Arab states would have to obtain from Washington, is the most critical element of integrated air and missile defense — the first layer of defense. It provides fast and uninterrupted reporting on the location and trajectory of ballistic missile launches so countermeasures can be prepared, and civilian populations can be warned and protected. Imagine if the Iranian ballistic missile strike on June 23 on the U.S. military base of Al Udeid in Qatar had been more extensive. It would have required the assistance of Doha’s neighbors — except that they can’t help, at least effectively, because they are not on the same network or information-sharing platform. They need a common regional missile defense architecture of satellite and radar data to counter Iran’s missile and drone threats.

Seven, contain and ideally eliminate the capabilities of proxy forces. For years, Iran’s reliance on Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias has created layered threats across four geographic theaters. These actors not only expanded the battlefield but allowed Tehran to wage indirect war while oftentimes retaining plausible deniability. For states such as Israel, countering this asymmetric depth requires a broader doctrine encompassing sustained counter-proxy disruption, regional coalition-building, and legal frameworks for preemptive and retaliatory action against non-state belligerents.

Eight, don’t downplay psychological operations. Psychological operations and strategic information management were key features of Israel’s campaign. These tools were used not only to paralyze Iranian response networks but also to potentially influence decision-makers, shape public perception, and manage escalation on both domestic and international fronts. In the early hours of Operation Rising Lion, Israeli operatives reportedly sent direct warnings to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers moments before airstrikes. While designed to reduce collateral casualties, these calls also served a psychological purpose inducing fear, confusion, and mistrust within Iran’s military command. By suggesting intimate knowledge of individual movements and locations, Israel sowed doubt in the security of Iran’s internal communications and protection protocols. The psychological impact of Israeli precision strikes (particularly the assassination of high-ranking revolutionary guard officers) was felt beyond the military. Civilian populations across Iran reportedly experienced waves of panic, fueled by social media reports of air incursions, disrupted communications, and conflicting government statements. This internal disquiet, while not amounting to civil unrest, applied pressure on Tehran to consider de-escalation pathways. In effect, psychological operations operated as a non-kinetic force multiplier, amplifying the strategic effects of kinetic strikes without expanding battlefield footprints.

Nine, rethink deterrence. The war demonstrated that deterrence in modern warfare is no longer a static binary. It is fluid, multifaceted, and cumulative. Israel’s ability to deliver high-impact strikes while defending its population centers showcased a powerful deterrent capacity. However, Iran’s survival, retaliation, and proxy endurance highlight the difficulty of achieving strategic resolution through force alone. Future deterrence ought to be calibrated through visible military capability, political clarity, alliance cohesion, and control over the escalation ladder.

The Changing Character of Regional War

The 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran signaled a profound shift in the character and conduct of regional warfare. It reaffirmed the centrality of alliances, psychological operations, and precision targeting, while also highlighting the evolving role of strategic deterrence and information warfare in shaping outcomes.

The successful targeting of Iran’s nuclear facilities — executed with surgical precision and coordinated through joint U.S.–Israeli intelligence — proved that well-executed, pre-emptive action can yield measurable delays in adversarial weapons development. These strikes were not only militarily effective but psychologically disorienting, undermining confidence within Iran’s defense establishment and signaling Israel’s reach, capability, and intent.

Just as importantly, the campaign revealed that influence is now a force multiplier. Strategic communication, public diplomacy, and psychological operations achieved effects far beyond the battlefield. They neutralized panic at home, destabilized enemy cohesion, and helped shape global narratives. As such, psychological operations and information dominance now sit alongside airpower and cyber warfare as core pillars of modern national defense.

Equally critical was the role of strategic partnerships. Without U.S. intelligence, missile defense assets, and military coordination, Israel would have struggled to execute a campaign of such scale and precision. The conflict reinforced the idea that no nation, however capable, can operate alone in a multi-domain war. Success depends on interoperability, trust, and shared strategic objectives among allies.

The June 2025 conflict was not merely an episode in the Israeli-Iranian rivalry — it was a glimpse into the future of warfare. It showcased the fusion of conventional and unconventional tools, the necessity of operational resilience, and the unpredictability of asymmetric threats. It also raised enduring questions of how tactical victories can deliver strategic outcomes (which Israel has failed to do), and how nations can adapt to a battlefield that is no longer bound by geography or traditional rules of engagement.

As strategists and decision-makers assess the legacy of Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer, they should look beyond the metrics of destruction. The real measure of success lies in whether enduring security, stability, and deterrence have been achieved or whether this was merely the opening salvo in a new era of protracted, hybrid confrontation. The battlefield of tomorrow is not coming — it has already arrived. And only those nations that can operate across domains, at pace, and with strategic discipline will endure.

BECOME A MEMBER

Bilal Y. Saab is senior managing director of TRENDS US and a former senior advisor for security cooperation in the U.S. Department of Defense.

Darren D. White is a retired U.K. servicemember and a former military intelligence operator.

Image: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · July 16, 2025

22. To build 'peace through strength,' restore this pillar of US power

Excerpts:

In this context, weakening the U.S. research ecosystem—especially by severing ties between the federal government and leading universities—is not just short-sighted. It is dangerous.

For more than 80 years, the collaboration between the U.S. government and its universities has been one of the greatest engines of innovation and national strength in the world. To win the race for the future—and to preserve peace through strength—we must reaffirm this partnership, not dismantle it.

Yes, universities must do more to uphold the values of open debate, pluralism, and accountability. But punishing institutions that house the very laboratories, research centers, and talent pipelines our national defense depends on is not the answer.

Now is the time for strategic investment, not political retribution. The future of American security—and global leadership—depends on it.

To build 'peace through strength,' restore this pillar of US power

Administration cuts are breaking the federal-academic partnership that incubates U.S. technology and talent.

By Frank A. Rose

President, Chevalier Strategic Advisors

July 14, 2025

defenseone.com · by Frank A. Rose

The Trump administration’s move to cut off research funding to universities—ostensibly, for failing to adequately address antisemitism on campus—has implications far beyond the current political debate. It directly threatens one of the most critical foundations of U.S. national security: the longstanding partnership between the federal government and American research universities. This partnership has been essential to maintaining the U.S. military’s technological edge against adversaries such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and now, China.

President Trump has declared that “peace through strength” is a central pillar of his national security strategy, and his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, has emphasized the need to increase the “lethality” of the U.S. military to counter 21st-century threats. But these goals will be unattainable if we undermine the very talent base and research infrastructure that makes American military strength possible in the first place.

The partnership between government and academia has deep roots. During World War II, Vannevar Bush—former dean of MIT’s School of Engineering and asked by President Roosevelt to oversee the Office of Scientific Research and Development—helped mobilize American scientific talent based at U.S. universities to support the war effort. OSRD was instrumental in developing game-changing technologies, from radar and proximity fuses, to new blood substitutes to assist wounded troops, to the atomic bomb through the Manhattan Project.

Given the role science played in the U.S. success during the war, FDR asked Bush to present a vision for how the federal government should support science during peacetime. In response, Bush wrote Science, The Endless Frontier, a visionary report he submitted in July 1945 to then-President Truman. In it, he warned that America’s wartime scientific success had come dangerously close to failure due to inadequate peacetime preparation. He called for a permanent investment in scientific research — particularly at civilian universities — as both a national-security imperative and as a means to achieve other critical national economic and public health goals. That vision became the blueprint for a postwar ecosystem of innovation grounded in a close collaboration between government, academia, and industry.

Bush’s vision was based on two key core beliefs. First, funds for scientific research should be awarded by the federal government based upon merit as judged by other top scientists, not distributed based on political or geographical considerations. Second, by awarding government research funds to universities and supporting their existing educational and research infrastructure, as opposed to creating a federalized system of research laboratories, these federal dollars would do “double duty,” supporting not only new scientific advances and innovation, but simultaneously helping to educate and train the next generation of scientific talent required to protect future U.S. national and economic security interests.

This model helped the United States outpace the Soviet Union in everything from nuclear propulsion to microelectronics. And it continues to serve the nation well today in areas critical for our future military success including AI, advanced manufacturing, material research, and biotechnology.

During my tenure as Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration from 2021 to 2024, I saw firsthand the vital role that universities play in U.S. national security.

For example, the Laboratory for Laser Energetics at the University of Rochester conducts critical implosion experiments in support of the national Inertial Confinement Fusion program. These experiments and the large and complex research tools and equipment they support are essential to ensuring the reliability of America’s nuclear arsenal without conducting live nuclear tests.

Another key partnership is the Consortium on National Critical Infrastructure Security, which includes institutions like the University of Texas at San Antonio, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and North Carolina A&T. This program helps train students for careers in cybersecurity—an area of growing strategic importance given the evolving threat landscape. It also supported fundamental scientific research for which while the potential public benefits for the work were great, industry would not invest because the research was far too risky and potential direct returns to the company uncertain.

These are just two examples of the thousands of collaborations between federal agencies and American universities that contribute directly to the safety and security of the United States and its allies.

Today, the stakes are higher than ever. The United States faces an unprecedented strategic competitor in China, which is pursuing a whole-of-government approach to becoming a global science and technology superpower. According to a recent threat assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, China is investing heavily in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, and semiconductors—areas vital to both economic and military dominance. It is also investing heavily in its universities to provide the infrastructure and required STEM talent base to achieve its goal of global scientific and technological leadership.

China’s technology sectors are projected to account for as much as 23 percent of its GDP by 2026, more than double their 2018 level. In April, the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology warned that “China is quickly ascending to biotechnology dominance,” and that the United States has only a narrow window—just three years—to respond.

In this context, weakening the U.S. research ecosystem—especially by severing ties between the federal government and leading universities—is not just short-sighted. It is dangerous.

For more than 80 years, the collaboration between the U.S. government and its universities has been one of the greatest engines of innovation and national strength in the world. To win the race for the future—and to preserve peace through strength—we must reaffirm this partnership, not dismantle it.

Yes, universities must do more to uphold the values of open debate, pluralism, and accountability. But punishing institutions that house the very laboratories, research centers, and talent pipelines our national defense depends on is not the answer.

Now is the time for strategic investment, not political retribution. The future of American security—and global leadership—depends on it.

Frank A. Rose is President of Chevalier Strategic Advisors, a strategic advisory firm focused on geopolitics and defense technology. He previously served as Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration from 2021-2024, and Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance at the U.S. Department of State from 2014-2017.

defenseone.com · by Frank A. Rose

23. A Little-Known Microsoft Program Could Expose the Defense Department to Chinese Hackers

Please go to the ink to read the entire (long) article. I had no idea about this kind of work taking place in China.

https://www.propublica.org/article/microsoft-digital-escorts-pentagon-defense-department-china-hackers

A Little-Known Microsoft Program Could Expose the Defense Department to Chinese Hackers

by Renee Dudley, with research by Doris Burke

July 15, 2025, 5 a.m. EDT

ProPublica is a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power. Sign up to receive our biggest stories as soon as they’re published.

Reporting Highlights

Chinese Tech Support: Microsoft is using engineers in China to help maintain the Defense Department’s computer systems — with minimal supervision by U.S. personnel.
Skills Gap: Digital escorts often lack the technical expertise to police foreign engineers with far more advanced skills, leaving highly sensitive data vulnerable to hacking.
Ignored Warnings: Various people involved in the work told ProPublica that they warned Microsoft that the arrangement is inherently risky, but the company launched and expanded it anyway.

These highlights were written by the reporters and editors who worked on this story.

Microsoft is using engineers in China to help maintain the Defense Department’s computer systems — with minimal supervision by U.S. personnel — leaving some of the nation’s most sensitive data vulnerable to hacking from its leading cyber adversary, a ProPublica investigation has found.

The arrangement, which was critical to Microsoft winning the federal government’s cloud computing business a decade ago, relies on U.S. citizens with security clearances to oversee the work and serve as a barrier against espionage and sabotage.

But these workers, known as “digital escorts,” often lack the technical expertise to police foreign engineers with far more advanced skills, ProPublica found. Some are former military personnel with little coding experience who are paid barely more than minimum wage for the work.

“We’re trusting that what they’re doing isn’t malicious, but we really can’t tell,” said one current escort who agreed to speak on condition of anonymity, fearing professional repercussions.

The system has been in place for nearly a decade, though its existence is being reported publicly here for the first time.

Microsoft told ProPublica that it has disclosed details about the escort model to the federal government. But former government officials said in interviews that they had never heard of digital escorts. The program appears to be so low-profile that even the Defense Department’s IT agency had difficulty finding someone familiar with it. “Literally no one seems to know anything about this, so I don’t know where to go from here,” said Deven King, spokesperson for the Defense Information Systems Agency.

24. Commander’s Intent for Machines: Reimagining Unmanned Systems Control in Communications-Degraded Environments

Very interesting ideas that I think we need to think through.

Conclusion:

While technically feasible, current unmanned military systems are generally not designed to operate without direct human connection in dynamic environments. As more unmanned platforms with increasingly autonomous capabilities are developed, the challenge shifts from a technological one to one of employment techniques. Commander’s intent, a well-known and tested method of issuing guidance in uncertain and communications-restricted situations, is a promising avenue on which to pursue a solution to this employment challenge. By predeploying key tasks and end state in the form of discrete instructions, as well as the augmentation of existing drones with autonomous navigation and aided target acquisition systems, US Army units will be best positioned to leverage drones’ unique capabilities to accomplish missions in the face of future jamming environments.

Commander’s Intent for Machines: Reimagining Unmanned Systems Control in Communications-Degraded Environments - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Matthew Corbett · July 16, 2025

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine has dramatically shifted the way the US Army envisions the employment of unmanned systems. Unmanned aircraft systems—drones—reportedly account for two-thirds of Russia’s daily losses, surpassing all other weapon systems. First-person-view drones, small aircraft that require a human operator to essentially drive an explosive-laden system into a target, have become popular as cheap and effective weapons. As a direct result, countries around the world are scrambling to develop systems to both defeat them and adapt their arsenals to integrate them.

To do so, jamming has been employed against the small systems most prevalent on the battlefield. This involves disrupting the electronic control link between the drone and its human operator. Severing this link denies the direct connection needed for the operator to guide the system along its terminal path to an intended target, rendering it ineffective.

The prominence of jamming on the battlefield exposes a fundamental problem—the vulnerability of the link between a drone and its human operator. In all but a few systems, human operators are required for flight control, terminal guidance, payload and camera operations, and navigation. To mitigate this, autonomous systems are fielded in smaller numbers. However, these systems still require human input in the form of a rigid mission plan, and do not have methods to modify their tasks in the face of a changing mission without explicit human input.

This is the challenge, then, for military forces like the US Army that seek to leverage the capabilities of unmanned platforms while reducing their vulnerability to jamming: creating a method to provide intent to autonomous systems. The Army already has a model for this—the doctrinal concept of commander’s intent. This is the method by which a commander gives subordinates a required end state and key tasks, and it becomes especially important when original mission parameters become untenable or communication with a higher headquarters is lost. Providing these machines with a version of commander’s intent, coupled with AI systems to parse and create machine-readable tasks, offers a method to overcome vulnerabilities to jamming with minimal human oversight. While this idea does not necessarily remove the human operator from lethal kill chains, it does allow for more flexible and redundant drone employment in the hostile environments of the future.

A New Type of War

At the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, drones were a part of ground combat in limited numbers. By 2024, both Ukraine and Russia were fielding drones capable of a myriad of tasks, both lethal and nonlethal. The production of hundreds of thousands of these systems has become a top priority for both countries, with Ukraine setting up domestic mobile production shops that specialize in the efficient manufacture of the smallest versions of these systems. As traditional weapons such as manned aircraft and armored vehicles have been attrited or have become too vulnerable to be tenable, these systems have replaced them as the most lethal weapon of this conflict.

As each side responded by jamming adversary drones, an ever-evolving game of cat and mouse emerged, leading to the introduction of so-called tethered drones. These systems create a physical connection between the system and its operator and reduce the possibility of electronic attack on the control link. As evidence of the use of these systems, recent pictures have emerged of treetops in the contested areas of Ukraine littered with fiber-optic cables from active or previous drone use. More recently, Ukraine has reportedly fielded semiautonomous drones capable of lethal strike to defeat Russian jamming.

Commander’s Intent: A Model for Mitigating Control Link and Human Vulnerabilities

Both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Western militaries have identified that rigid orders and inflexible tasks create unnecessary casualties on modern battlefields. In lieu of a direct connection to a higher command, soldiers must be able to create new tasks at lower echelons to achieve the overarching original goal of the higher headquarters. In the US Army and others worldwide, the overall intention for the end of an operation is communicated as the commander’s intent.

In the US Army, commander’s intent “provides a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within an overarching framework.” To repurpose this concept for unmanned systems, one subcomponent of commander’s intent is the most important: key tasks. Key tasks are “significant activities the force must perform” to achieve a desired end state, the terminal condition of a given mission. Key tasks can include effects on the enemy force or required friendly conditions. These discrete, well-defined tasks are the most easily translated into the tangible machine inputs we desire. Other elements of intent are also relevant. Some types of the commander’s critical information requirements, for example—like the location of particular enemy systems or the location of friendly assets—can be preprogrammed before launch.

Aerial Reconnaissance: A Case Study

Key tasks can take many forms, some of which are not easily translated into discrete tasks for a machine. However, as a case study, we examine aerial reconnaissance, a common drone mission set, to explore the possibilities of using this information. Consider a fictional scenario in which a ground force is tasked to search for and destroy key enemy systems, identified in earlier planning and listed in order of importance (e.g., a high-payoff target list). These systems have been assumed to be around the unit’s battlespace, identified in specific areas called target areas of interest (TAIs). The unit has been assigned the tasks of finding these systems and producing fire missions for subordinate artillery or other fires platforms.

The ground unit intends to use its assigned small, aerial drone platforms, each equipped with cameras and potentially lethal payloads. The unit assumes a position near the expected location of the targets and launches the drones. However, due to the impact of jamming and the lack of a physical tether, these systems are quickly isolated from their human operators. The operators can no longer give flight control commands or operate the drone’s attached camera or weapon systems. Luckily, the drones are equipped with a method to respond to such a condition. They can adhere to the key tasks for the mission because they have been preprogrammed to revert to these tasks if their human counterparts are no longer available.

The drones move to their preprogrammed TAIs in sequential order. Each is equipped with modern aided target acquisition systems, using AI techniques like advanced object detection to scan incoming video frames for a particular set of objects, like the enemy systems identified on the high-payoff target list. If the enemy has also degraded their ability to locate themselves using GPS, as is often the case in Ukraine, these systems can do so using onboard inertial movement sensors and reverse mapping of their environment (e.g., simultaneous localization and mapping, or SLAM, a common technique for localization of mixed reality devices). This is roughly similar to the way the US military teaches land navigation.

If, at these TAIs, the drone’s aided target acquisition system identifies an object or position that is classified by the same name as one or more of the items on its high-payoff target list, the system can produce a military grid coordinate based on its estimated location (assuming a GPS-denied environment) and a rough trigonometric transformation. All of this, however, is useless if the target information cannot be translated into a fire mission. The drone now requires a connection to its human counterpart to complete its assigned mission. Using the same inertial navigation from before, the drone can move toward the initial area where jamming severed its control link, and along the vector toward its operator, until such a link is reestablished and the target location can be transmitted. The drone is then retasked with the same intent or a new version as needed.

Technical Challenges

The underlying technical capabilities needed to adopt commander’s intent for drones exist, but are currently unavailable in a single military unmanned system. Ukraine has fielded a lethal, autonomous version already. While its full capability is unknown, open-source information about it shows that a weaponized, drone-borne object-detection capability is already a reality. Encoding written intent as machine-readable tasks is possible as well. This is necessary to extract the key tasks and end state that may be especially useful in the commander’s intent. Existing research already has shown that natural language processing can extract the semantics of written intent and translate this into its component elements and tasks. Beyond this basic and general research, little work exists that is focused on a military context. Finally, localization and navigation from known points without the aid of GPS satellites is an active field of research, but no research exists to leverage this technique for object detection and aided target acquisition. This is required for autonomous navigation in the GPS-denied environments that exist today and will likely exist in the future. Synchronizing this existing work with an eye toward military use cases is still necessary to fully implement intent in these machines.

Ethical Implications

Our fictitious drone from the story above was not required to use its lethal payload to destroy the target it located. Had such a need arisen, existing policies would govern the use of force by autonomous systems (or, in our case, a semiautonomous system operating in an autonomous mode). In the United States, current policy dictates that these systems are designed to allow their operators to “exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” Using lethal force without explicit human approval is still a matter of debate and concern worldwide, and it raises questions about the uncertainty of identification, especially in civilian-populated areas. However, nonlethal drones, or lethal drones undertaking an exclusively nonlethal mission, are less of a problem. In our example, unless that drone’s key task was to destroy the identified target on the high-payoff target list, direct and lethal force was never required. Indirectly, however, the system relayed coordinates, likely resulting in lethal action taken by other units.

While ethical discussions surrounding this selective autonomy are likely to involve slippery slope arguments, countries like Ukraine and Russia have already begun developing and fielding autonomous systems. If more countries decide to follow suit, the question of how to guide and safeguard autonomy will remain. Specific, close-ended tasks, like those already given as part of the commander’s intent, are an excellent option to mitigate these concerns and keep humans a part of the kill chain.

While technically feasible, current unmanned military systems are generally not designed to operate without direct human connection in dynamic environments. As more unmanned platforms with increasingly autonomous capabilities are developed, the challenge shifts from a technological one to one of employment techniques. Commander’s intent, a well-known and tested method of issuing guidance in uncertain and communications-restricted situations, is a promising avenue on which to pursue a solution to this employment challenge. By predeploying key tasks and end state in the form of discrete instructions, as well as the augmentation of existing drones with autonomous navigation and aided target acquisition systems, US Army units will be best positioned to leverage drones’ unique capabilities to accomplish missions in the face of future jamming environments.

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Corbett, PhD, is a military intelligence officer and research team leader at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, NY. He has extensive experience in tactical intelligence operations, targeting, and human-machine integration.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Jennifer Posy, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Matthew Corbett · July 16, 2025

25. Development or Dependence? Rethinking China’s Economic Playbook in the Americas

Please go to the lnk to view the tables: https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/china-economic-influence-latin-america-caribbean/

Development or Dependence? Rethinking China’s Economic Playbook in the Americas

July 16, 2025 by Leland M. Lazarus, Guido L Torres Leave a Comment

Editor’s Note: This article was written in anticipation of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s South America in Competition Conference, which will feature keynote speakers and expert panels examining the region’s role in strategic competition, including a focus on China’s economic influence in Latin America. One of the article’s co-authors, Leland M. Lazarus, will serve as a panelist on the Economic Statecraft and Supply Chains panel.

Introduction

“Economic security is national security.” This core principle, long echoed across the U.S. interagency—from the White House’s National Security Strategy to Treasury and Commerce policy directives—has gained renewed urgency as strategic competition intensifies in the Western Hemisphere. In no place is this more evident than in Latin America and the Caribbean, where economic statecraft has become the terrain of contestation.

For three years, this slogan permeated out of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), stressing that a nation’s economic and national security are intertwined and that economic over-reliance on China could infringe on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)’s sovereignty. While the slogan certainly resonated in Washington, we often discussed with colleagues in the region whether LAC citizens felt the same way.

Oftentimes, they didn’t. Part of the reason is the U.S.’s own fraught history of imperialism in the region, where it militarily intervened in LAC countries dozens of times under the infamous Monroe Doctrine. In the minds of some LAC leaders, U.S. warnings about Chinese threats to their economic and national security come off as hypocritical.

That being said, it is disappointing that the same kind of domestic political discourse in many LAC countries where politicians jealously guard their sovereignty from the clutches of a Monroe Doctrine 2.0 doesn’t also include the same fervent effort to protect their sovereignty from China.

Beijing often cloaks its regional projects in strictly commercial language, but the substance is strategic: using economic leverage to shape the policy behavior of smaller states. In LAC, this coercion is increasingly subtle, pervasive, and effective. China’s tactics constitute a form of irregular warfare as old as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. An ancient Chinese idiom captures this approach well: ‘subdue the enemy without fighting.’ Therefore, LAC countries must identify when and how China is deploying economic coercion, and develop strategies to successfully counteract them and proactively protect their sovereignty.

The following table illustrates all instruments wielded by Chinese embassies.

Irregular Warfare Framed through DIME-FIL

Instruments of PowerChina’s ActionsImplications for IWDiplomacyChinese embassies serve as the center of gravity for all CCP actions, overt and covert.Coordinates influence across domains, pressuring and bribing elites behind closed doors, and reinforcing dependency through covert inducements—blurring the line between statecraft and subversion.InformationState-linked media outlets and social influencers amplify CCP narratives—framing infrastructure as win-win.Shapes local perceptions, reducing resistance to dual-use assets.MilitaryDual-use ports (e.g., Chancay) serve as platforms for CCP access and placement.Enables maritime presence & access to strategic key terrain under cover of civilian logistics.EconomicCompanies like Huawei and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) develop infrastructure projects.Expands CCP control over telecom, cyber networks, and critical infrastructure.FinanceHeavy lending via Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-like instruments, resulting in debt and substandard construction projects, leading to pressures (e.g., Peru).Builds financial dependency that doubles as political leverage.IntelligenceSatellite-linked operations in Cuba, data centers, undersea cables, and space sites expand People’s Liberation Army (PLA) access and global capabilitiesEnhances SIGINT collection capabilities across the hemisphere and possess risks to U.S. on-orbit capabilities.Lawfare/Law enforcementLegal agreements and nebulas language embed Chinese arbitration terms, complicating renegotiation.Creates coercive strategic traps through binding agreements.

Economic Statecraft as Irregular Warfare

At the heart of China’s statecraft is a global network of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), policy banks, politically connected private firms, Chinese diaspora leaders, and local businesspeople. These actors extend China’s reach through infrastructure projects, trade ties, loans, and in some instances, bribery. These relationships are not purely commercial; they’re tools of foreign policy. This is Chinese state capitalism, or as China scholar Jude Blanchette calls it, “CCP, Inc.” By dominating strategic sectors—ports, power grids, telecommunications—Chinese firms make countries reliant on Beijing for economic growth and essential services, which in turn further ensure the Chinese Communist Party’s long term stability. That dependence becomes leverage. If a government supports Taiwan, criticizes Chinese policies, or edges closer to the U.S., China can retaliate by canceling projects, restricting imports, delaying vaccine shipments, or suspending tourism.

The Caribbean

Nowhere in the hemisphere is China’s per-capita investment footprint more concentrated than in the Caribbean. Through a mix of concessional loans, tourism-focused developments, and high-visibility infrastructure projects, Beijing has embedded itself in the political economies of small island states. For many of these nations, Chinese capital fills critical development gaps left by traditional Western actors. Yet beneath the surface, these engagements function as strategic footholds—testing how commercial dependency can evolve into geopolitical leverage.

Guyana is illustrative. Chinese companies are increasingly engaged in the oil rich country, especially in energy and construction. In early 2021, Guyana announced it would allow Taiwan to open a small trade office in Georgetown. But within 24 hours, Guyana abruptly reversed course after China purportedly threatened to delay COVID-19 vaccine shipments or curtail investments in energy and infrastructure. Local Guyanese have also expressed dismay at the proliferation of Chinese supermarkets and retailers undercutting local businesses.

In the Bahamas, the $3.5 billion Baha Mar resort—financed by the China Export-Import Bank and built by China Construction America (CCA)—became the largest single-phase resort in the Caribbean. When the project went bankrupt, Chinese entities forced out the original developers and seized control through legal and financial maneuvering. A New York state court ruled that CCA induced the project’s financial collapse through fraud and misrepresentation.

In Jamaica, China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC)—which was blacklisted by the U.S. Commerce Department for building artificial military islands in the South China Sea- constructed the North–South Highway and was later awarded contracts for port expansion and logistics hubs. While Jamaica maintains strong ties with the U.S., it consistently avoids antagonizing Beijing.

In Trinidad and Tobago, Chinese companies have become involved in the oil industry, built a $500 million drydock and a $102 million industrial park in La Brea, made significant investments in the telecommunications sector, and donated hundreds of police motorcycles and buses. This has caused concerns about over-reliance.

In Antigua and Barbuda, a Chinese SOE secured the rights to a large swath of land to build a deep water port and special economic zone with everything from logistics to cryptocurrencies. This raised concerns in Washington that China could potentially use this area for commercial and military purposes. The project’s opacity, combined with its proximity to major maritime routes, mirrors similar dual-use infrastructure strategies employed by Beijing in Africa and the Indo-Pacific. Such developments underscore how seemingly benign investments can serve as prepositioning platforms for influence projection, economic leverage, or even future People’s Liberation Army (PLA) logistical access in the hemisphere.

There are also more subtle tactics. Prominent members of the local Chinese diaspora community with direct ties to top political leaders help facilitate Chinese business projects in their respective countries. Some Caribbean countries have also received an influx of Chinese nationals acquiring citizenship by investment who then help expand Chinese business interests and try to persuade some governments to ditch Taiwan.

China is not just investing—it is rehearsing influence. The Caribbean provides a low-risk, high-return environment for the CCP to refine coercive economic tools. These engagements, when left unchecked, enable Beijing to shape elite behavior, compromise digital and physical infrastructure, and embed long-term dependencies under the guise of partnership.

Central America

Central America is a key battleground for China’s campaign to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. Since 2017, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and most recently Honduras have switched recognition to Beijing—each after receiving promises of investment, aid, or infrastructure.

In Honduras, the decision came in 2023 after officials openly compared what Taiwan and China could offer. Honduras reportedly asked Taiwan for $2 billion in development assistance, including a hospital and a hydroelectric dam, though the Honduran government denied this. When Taipei declined, Honduras quickly sealed a deal with Beijing. China rewarded the move with state visits and new cooperation agreements. Whether the promises will materialize remains to be seen—but the diplomatic result was already banked.

El Salvador followed a similar path in 2018, announcing its break with Taiwan just months after President Nayib Bukele came to power. China quickly pledged a new stadium, library, and water treatment plants—while U.S. officials warned that the proposed La Unión port project could serve dual military purposes. El Salvador’s economy is now more entwined with Chinese capital—and its foreign policy more circumspect.

In Panama, China’s influence extends well beyond trade. After switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2017, Panama signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and welcomed a surge of Chinese business delegations. The Trump administration decried the fact that the Hong Kong-based company CK Hutchison Holdings operated two key port terminals on both sides of the Panama Canal. A U.S. company, BlackRock, has since sought to acquire the ports, although the deal is currently in legal limbo. Panama’s president Jose Raul Mulino also said Panama has withdrawn from the BRI, and the U.S. is helping Panama replace Huawei telecommunications equipment in 13 sites around the country. Mulino and subsequent Panamanian officials will now have to walk a careful line—placating U.S. national security concerns around the canal while not appearing as a U.S. puppet and continuing to welcome Chinese capital.

South America

In South America, China’s strategy hinges on dominating trade. Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina all count China as their largest export destination. With stakes in copper, lithium, soy, and rare earths, China has embedded itself deeply in these economies.

But that trade relationship can become a political tool. In Brazil, when President Bolsonaro threatened to ban Huawei from 5G contracts, China delayed key vaccine ingredients. Shortly after Brazil softened its position, shipments resumed. Beijing never admitted a link—but Brazilian governors certainly noticed.

Brazil’s current president Lula da Silva has been much more cooperative with the Chinese, and Brazil is courting Chinese electric vehicle and tech companies to invest in the country.

However, there is an ongoing debate in Brazil about how a further increase in Chinese exports due to overcapacity of both high and low-end manufactured goods could exacerbate the de-industrialization of Brazil’s manufacturing sector; this is why Brazil has imposed anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese iron, steel, and fiber optic cables.

Elsewhere, Chinese firms have invested in ports, highways, and energy grids. In Peru, two Chinese companies have a virtual monopoly over Lima’s electrical grid. China is financing Peru’s Chancay megaport, which Chinese scholars of Latin America call one of China’s “strategic support points,” a term used by the PLA and military researchers denoting ports with both commercial and strategic purposes. In Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela, Chinese companies have built space research infrastructure that could also serve dual-use purposes; local governments can push back on these projects for only so long until they suffer economic retaliation. While many of these projects appear beneficial, they deepen structural dependence on Chinese capital—making future coercion easier and more effective.

Policy Recommendations

All these examples point to the need for local LAC leaders to take stock of the very real irregular tactics China uses to undermine their sovereignty. As such, LAC countries must reduce their economic over-reliance on China with the same fierceness they use to guard against U.S. or other big country interference. Fortunately, there are already playbooks Global South countries can use to further shore up their economic security. The following recommendations are intended for both LAC governments and their U.S. and international partners:

Recommendations for LAC countries:

Institutionalize awareness of CCP economic coercion. The Atlantic Council’s Chinese economic coercion report can act as a guide. It provides case studies and operational tactics to recognize early indicators of economic warfare. Regular public-sector training in ministries of trade, economy, and foreign affairs should include scenario-based simulations of coercive trade behavior, investment withdrawal threats, and digital authoritarian entrenchment.
Seek transparent, high-quality alternatives. Pursue the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), and Inter-American Development Bank-financed infrastructure that emphasizes governance, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards, and local capacity building. Critically, demand conditionality transparency in all future foreign infrastructure contracts—especially those related to ports, fiber-optic cables, energy grids, telecommunications, space, artificial intelligence, and data centers.
Coordinate regional response mechanisms. Develop rapid-response economic teams to support countries facing Chinese retaliation—whether through trade substitution, diplomatic backing, or financial relief.
Strengthen investment screening. Review foreign investment deals for national security risks, similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. or Canada’s recent amendments to its foreign direct investment rules. This includes legal reforms to screen foreign direct investment in strategic sectors, empowering defense and intelligence ministries to contribute to risk assessments, and publicizing CCP-linked corporate acquisition trends for transparency.
Support export diversification. Reduce overreliance on Chinese demand by identifying new markets, building downstream industries (e.g., lithium battery tech, rare earth separation), investing in logistics modernization, and expanding trade facilitation efforts. Some partners like the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and India are also looking to expand economic partnerships with LAC. Market diversification through free trade agreements offers sustainable pathways to reduce coercion exposure.

Recommendations for U.S. and partner nations:

Expand and Reauthorize the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Congress should reauthorize the U.S International Development Finance Corporation and double its capital portfolio to $120 billion from $60 billion. The U.S. should not try to match China dollar-for-dollar, but it can match China in reliability. Under the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act, this should be coordinated with the Office of Strategic Capital and the proposed National Security Council Economic Statecraft Integration Cell, enabling the Development Finance Corporation to deliver targeted, secure infrastructure financing at scale.
Maintain persistent engagement. Diplomatic absence creates space for China and diplomatic consistency is as important as financial presence. Regular high-level visits, economic dialogues, and people-to-people exchanges can reaffirm U.S. commitment. Moreover, the U.S. should embed Economic Influence Monitoring Teams—comprising State, Treasury, DOD (SOUTHCOM), and Commerce officials—at embassies in vulnerable LAC countries. These teams would provide early warning of coercion attempts, vet infrastructure proposals for embedded risk, and coordinate direct reporting mechanisms.
Elevate Civil Society Capacity through Targeted Legal and Media Support. Fund regional investigative media hubs, legal watchdog networks, and civic tech platforms to expose hidden debt clauses, political financing flows from CCP-linked firms, and disinformation tied to foreign investment. The Global Magnitsky Act should be utilized to protect journalists and civil society actors at risk from transnational repression or corruption.

Strategic Action Framework: Countering CCP Economic Influence in LAC

Line of EffortLead ActorsStrategic MechanismsDesired OutcomesRecognize and Counter Economic CoercionLAC Ministries of Trade, Economy, Foreign AffairsPolicy training and coercion recognition exercisesLocal leaders can detect and resist coercive pressureBuild Strategic Economic AlternativesLAC Governments, IDB, PGII, G7 PartnersPGII/IDB infrastructure packages with conditionality transparencyLAC nations access transparent, sovereign-aligned development pathwaysEnhance Regional Defense and CoordinationLAC Regional BlocsEconomic resilience compacts and trade substitution protocolsCollective response capability to CCP retaliation or economic pressureModernize Investment OversightLAC National Security and Economic MinistriesForeign investment screening legislation and risk auditsScreen out predatory investments and preserve national autonomyPromote Export DiversificationLAC Trade and Industry MinistriesNew trade agreements, logistics hubs, downstream processing investmentReduce overdependence on Chinese commodity demandExpand U.S. Strategic Finance ToolsU.S. Congress, DFC, Treasury, OSC, NSCFY25 NDAA authorities, BUILD Act, OSC mobilizationScale reliable capital deployment for key infrastructure projectsDeploy Economic Influence Monitoring TeamsNSC, State Department, DOD, TreasuryEmbassy-embedded interagency teams with OSINT and risk flagsEnable real-time risk identification and policy coordinationStrengthen Civil Society Watchdog CapacityStateMedia hubs, legal watchdog grants, Magnitsky protectionsExpose malign influence and protect democratic resilience

Conclusion

China’s expanding economic engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean is reshaping the region’s strategic landscape. Beijing has positioned itself as an indispensable development partner—especially for those who perceive traditional Western actors as inconsistent, conditional, or disengaged.

Yet China could use the same levers of commercial cooperation to deploy irregular tactics to undermine LAC countries’ sovereignty, especially when those countries make decisions that go against China’s interests. Governments that cross Beijing—by recognizing Taiwan, criticizing its human rights record, or aligning more closely with Washington—risk subtle but tangible forms of retaliation: project cancellations, delayed trade, suspended medical shipments, or withdrawal of tourists and investors. This is irregular warfare by design—waged in boardrooms, tenders, and trade agreements. Subversion replaces confrontation; contracts replace conflict.

LAC governments must guard their sovereignty from China or risk seeing the Monroe Doctrine replaced by Sun Tzu Doctrine. The U.S. interagency—along with its allies and partners—must do more to provide alternatives to LAC countries to ensure the region experiences true unfettered freedom.

Leland M. Lazarus is the founder and CEO of Lazarus Consulting, LLC, a strategic consulting firm focused on U.S.-China-Latin America relations. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and is a former SOUTHCOM official and U.S. diplomat.

Guido L. Torres is the executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program.

Views expressed in this article solely reflect those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Image generated by ChatGPT using DALL·E, OpenAI (July 14, 2025).

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26. The Curious Case of Slife the Knife

A long read.

This is a disturbing story that illustrates that "cancel culture" is deeply embedded in the political extremes.

Excerpts:

Flag officers of the United States Air Force were maligned by a partisan dark money group in a national media outlet. It was suggested, without foundation, that they had behaved dishonorably. Acted in contravention to the oaths they swore and the values to which they pledged commitment.

And no one in the United States Air Force said a word in protest. Not the Chief of Staff. Not Public Affairs. Not the superiors to which they reported.

Not a dueling partisan dark money group. Not the Avon Lady.

No one defended them. They were permitted to just sit there and burn.

Now let’s put aside for a moment the fact that the people who made this disgrace happen spent a decade lecturing us all on how people shouldn’t be cancelled over differences of opinion. Sure, they were mainly trying to protect assholes, but the principle was still correct. We should not cancel people over differences of opinion.

Background and reason for firing?

What it made him in today’s America is something like a woke spokesman in the eyes of many. Or a “wokesman,” if you will.

This made his firing about as difficult to predict as Biff picking World Series winners with his sports almanac from the future. Even Slife himself would have found it too predictable to be interesting, his office knick-knacks undoubtedly packed into a collapsible moving box before the Senate recorder’s ink dried on Hegseth’s 51st aye.

What is interesting is that DEI is what brought Slife down. He’s carried a bad reputation for a long time, earning the pejorative “Slife the Knife” from his own tribe in Air Force special ops.

Intransigent, given to bullying and toxicity, a prick with a needlessly prickly demeanor. These are the themes of Jim Slife.

None of which slowed his ascendancy. Until recently, these traits made him officially popular. Exactly what the Air Force was looking for. He was known to be tough. Uncompromising. Most of all, willing to weaponize whatever quasi-philosophical chatter might emerge from the pecking congregation of nabobs in the E-ring and jam it down the throats of airmen while poking their ribs with a bayonet. Fair or unfair, this was Slife’s brand. And when you’re a 4-star, unfair no longer really exists.

It seems unlikely Slife would deny or forsake being known as a hardcore authoritarian who gets things done. Not a blocker or a decoy, but a ball carrier who can do the hard yards. Albeit leaving a ditch full of corpses behind.

He also has supporters. But they’ve been conditioned to refrain from saying politically incorrect things, and right now that definition includes any expression of support for Slife, regardless of facts or truths or even the quaint concept of honor.

Which brings us to my main concern. It’s not that Slife was fired, or even that he was fired for the sin of publicly disagreeing with his boss before his boss was even his boss. You don’t have to be able to read Ulysses to decode all that.

What concerns me is the salting of the Earth he walked upon, what that salting says about the Air Force’s institutional health, and what it means for future generals and the airmen they command.

Conclusion:

The best argument for why Presidents and their minions should be permitted to fire for political convenience is that they deserve the best military advice from people they can work with effectively.

That argument gets undermined when someone is fired but not back-filled. Slife’s seat remains empty. Are we really better off with no Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force than a guy with the “wrong views” on one subject?

That argument also gets undermined when someone doesn’t give military advice. By imitating a houseplant in public, Gen. Allvin makes it fair to question whether he’s exercising any real influence behind the scenes.

If not, he has the “wrong views” on leading in a blue uniform.

And if we’re looking for a decent recent to jettison a senior officer, being feckless enough to watch your wingman bleed out seems a good place to start.

There’s always a point in any great mob saga where the gangsters start killing off their own lawyers, usually because they know too much but sometimes just for sport.

As an audience, we don’t give it much thought. After all, they’re lawyers. Certainly they deserve it for any number of reasons.

What we don’t think about is that in that same world, the next generation of gangsters ends up with shitty lawyers. Because no one wants to get killed for simply doing your job.

I don’t have the answers. But I think we need to ask more questions.

The Curious Case of Slife the Knife

Firing generals is nothing new, but cancelling them is an interesting innovation

https://radarblog.substack.com/p/the-curious-case-of-slife-the-knife?r=2948ic&utm

Tony Carr

Jul 15, 2025

After the election but before inauguration, there was a piece in the New York Post which made waves in military circles but would have been meaninglessly banal to everyone else. It discussed a list of senior officers. A blacklist.

An anti-Leftist opposition group called American Accountability Foundation (AAF) decided, based on evidence not provided and publicly inscrutable, that certain officers had flown too close to wokery. They had to be cancelled. AAF sent Pete Hegseth a letter with the blacklist, urging immolation of these public servants, which would be nothing more than he had promised in prior remarks.

Never mind the AAF or how wrong they are to blacklist military officers without showing and allowing to be challenged the evidence they rely upon. The reason I mention the article is that it’s the first moment I knew we were in deep shit.

Not because it was written or published, though both are ridiculous facts. But that’s what happened. It’s what didn’t happen that mortifies me.

Flag officers of the United States Air Force were maligned by a partisan dark money group in a national media outlet. It was suggested, without foundation, that they had behaved dishonorably. Acted in contravention to the oaths they swore and the values to which they pledged commitment.

And no one in the United States Air Force said a word in protest. Not the Chief of Staff. Not Public Affairs. Not the superiors to which they reported.

Not a dueling partisan dark money group. Not the Avon Lady.

No one defended them. They were permitted to just sit there and burn.

Now let’s put aside for a moment the fact that the people who made this disgrace happen spent a decade lecturing us all on how people shouldn’t be cancelled over differences of opinion. Sure, they were mainly trying to protect assholes, but the principle was still correct. We should not cancel people over differences of opinion.

Let’s also put aside the fact the officers involved, to the extent they had anything to do with military diversity programs, were following orders in the same way the current administration expects them to follow the inverse set of orders it now commands.

Hell, let’s even put aside the ambient self-selectiveness of the article, specifically the fact that anyone who would buy into it would need 1/3 more brain to be at 2/3 the capacity of an amoeba with brain worms that had recently been struck by lightning after being kicked by a mule.

Even all that considered, an article attempting to piss on flag officers, generals of America’s air service, must not earn tacit acknowledgement via cowardly silence.

They have earned the right to be free of piss. Unless and until there is evidence to the contrary. Not innuendo. Not speculation. Not bald accusation via anonymous shitbags. Evidence.

II.

Generals of the Air Force are there because the Air Force put them there. If they don’t belong there, then they fooled the Air Force or the Air Force fooled them. If they don’t belong there, the Air Force’s processes failed many times over.

If they do belong there, then they are entitled to have their sixes guarded by wingmen. Such as other generals.

Want to instantly persuade every airman they’ve committed to a fake value system and wear a uniform not worthy of its own heritage?

Show them generals who won’t take risk to protect each other, much less anyone else.

Gen. Dave Allvin, whose backbone I’ve questioned on other grounds, sat this one out. Pathetic, predictable, par for the course.

And totally unacceptable.

And like I said, an early warning that we were headed for a bad place. We’re now in that bad place, and along the way, there have been other signs.

Let’s talk about one of them.

III.

General Jim Slife was fired by Pete Hegseth in February as part of a purge. He was Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and had previously commanded Air Force Special Operations Command. Across 36 years, Slife recorded a career of exceptional achievement in combat, on staffs, and in senior roles. None of this is disputed.

No reason has been given for his sacking. No reason is required. Officers in 3 and 4 star roles are nominated by and serve at the pleasure of the President.

Not commonly grasped within or beyond military circles is that senior officers are more politician than leader. If they are perceived to be out of alignment with an administration’s defense platform, they’ve traditionally been marginalized and eased into retirement.

Over the past 20 years, firing for political convenience has been normalized. The Trump Administration is simply continuing in an established direction of travel.

At the Pleasure of the President

Tony Carr

Mar 17

Read full story

The hastening of this tendency has been noticed by the services. Two organizational pathologies have developed as a result.

First, generals who want to survive in shifting political tides have concluded they must be willing to reverse their views, change what they talk about and emphasize, and engage in various shows of force to mollify their civilian masters.

The really smart and pragmatic ones have developed the skill of talking about nothing at all, so they can’t be pinned down by either side.

If you want a live example, Google Gen. Dave Allvin, the Air Force Chief of Staff. See if you can find one statement he’s ever made in his entire career where he risked official disapproval or future controversy. See if you can locate moments where he’s leaned into what he thinks or believes is right. One moment where he took a strident position without a 15-knot political tailwind. Good luck.

We’ll come back to “Foxhole Norman” in a bit.

Foxhole Norman

Tony Carr

Mar 27

Read full story

The second pathology is institutional. If a service wants to thrive in budget competition and be robustly represented in combatant commands, the interagency environment, and in senior joint positions, it needs to develop officers who can thrive in a politically charged environment.

Officers who can walk between the raindrops. Officers skilled in perception management, adept at kicking inconvenient issues into the tall weeds, and able to appear serious and credible while deploying politburo-styled tactics to delay and deny government accountability. Military-industrial glad-handers who are right at home in back room environments where un-elected shit merchants trade nest feathers while licking each others coats.

Not leaders.

And if the game is developing politicians, not leaders, then you start testing for political skill early. You elevate those who show the most promise, defined as the most convincing ability to scrub away personal or professional convictions and embrace Washington nihilism while representing themselves to the contrary.

This explains why leadership has been less often glimpsed atop the services in recent times. Few leaders are surviving the flaming hoop jump to make the big time. Indeed, most strong leaders are self-eliminating early, as the stench of politics thickens and they comprehend their predicament.

It’s why you’ve heard me shouting that we need different generals.

We Need Different Generals

Tony Carr

Jan 24

Read full story

Actually it’s more like wish casting. Unless Robin Olds is resurrected and appointed Chief of Staff with total reform latitude, we’re going to keep screwing our Air Force into the ground.

Which brings us back to Slife.

While no official reason was given, we know why he got canned. He was vocal on the Air Force’s diversity initiatives. He proposed that the military was guilty of institutional racism. He reconsidered whether he himself had been inclusive-minded enough. He openly reconsidered his stance on shaving waivers, acknowledging their association with bias settling particularly upon black men.

At best this would have made him a fashion mug preening for head pats by clutching ascendant talking points.

What it made him in today’s America is something like a woke spokesman in the eyes of many. Or a “wokesman,” if you will.

This made his firing about as difficult to predict as Biff picking World Series winners with his sports almanac from the future. Even Slife himself would have found it too predictable to be interesting, his office knick-knacks undoubtedly packed into a collapsible moving box before the Senate recorder’s ink dried on Hegseth’s 51st aye.

What is interesting is that DEI is what brought Slife down. He’s carried a bad reputation for a long time, earning the pejorative “Slife the Knife” from his own tribe in Air Force special ops.

Intransigent, given to bullying and toxicity, a prick with a needlessly prickly demeanor. These are the themes of Jim Slife.

None of which slowed his ascendancy. Until recently, these traits made him officially popular. Exactly what the Air Force was looking for. He was known to be tough. Uncompromising. Most of all, willing to weaponize whatever quasi-philosophical chatter might emerge from the pecking congregation of nabobs in the E-ring and jam it down the throats of airmen while poking their ribs with a bayonet. Fair or unfair, this was Slife’s brand. And when you’re a 4-star, unfair no longer really exists.

It seems unlikely Slife would deny or forsake being known as a hardcore authoritarian who gets things done. Not a blocker or a decoy, but a ball carrier who can do the hard yards. Albeit leaving a ditch full of corpses behind.

He also has supporters. But they’ve been conditioned to refrain from saying politically incorrect things, and right now that definition includes any expression of support for Slife, regardless of facts or truths or even the quaint concept of honor.

Which brings us to my main concern. It’s not that Slife was fired, or even that he was fired for the sin of publicly disagreeing with his boss before his boss was even his boss. You don’t have to be able to read Ulysses to decode all that.

What concerns me is the salting of the Earth he walked upon, what that salting says about the Air Force’s institutional health, and what it means for future generals and the airmen they command.

IV.

Salting the Earth

There is a normal course of events when a 4-star general retires. A medal is pinned. Thanks are given on behalf of a grateful nation. The family is recognized. The officer, no matter how unpopular, is appropriately regaled for dedicating their whole adult life to public service. The Chief of Staff says nice things, sometimes in a short article or a press release. The official biography of the retiree becomes part of the service’s story, with a retirement date added to signify their passage from the present into the past.

None of this happened in Jim Slife’s case.

Hegseth issued a boilerplate firing statement. And that was that.

Someone mentioned a curious fact in an online forum, so I checked for myself.

Sure enough, Gen. Slife’s biography is no longer available on the Air Force’s official website. You can find it on Wikipedia, with a footnote to the source material still listed as a vestigial dead link.

I sent the bio folk an email, which they promptly recovered from their spam filter and electronically round-filed before immolating the server, melting the ashes in an acid bath, and pouring the resulting slurry into an urban storm drain. This is how my emails are generally handled.

All I can say, echoing the immortal words of the anonymous police sergeant from Christmas Vacation, is “that’s pretty low.”

I was able to confirm only one other retired general’s bio being omitted. Art Lichte retired as a 4-star in 2010, but was subsequently demoted to 2-star in retirement after a complaint of sexual misconduct was substantiated.

Now if you ask me, which no one has or will, the Air Force should have had the stones to recall Lichte to active duty and court-martial him if his conduct was serious enough for retroactive demotion.

But given the decision to demote Lichte to 2-star, the service is stipulating he served honorably for more than 30 years and retired honorably in a senior grade. His bio should public as part of the service’s story.

You might disagree, which would be reasonable. In that case, here are some other officers whose bios are publicly available, but which perhaps ought not be given their misconduct and the disrepute they’ve brought upon the Air Force.

Maj. Gen. Mike Keltz, who remarked during a disciplinary hearing that an officer looked “drunker than 10,000 Indians” in a photo.

Maj. Gen. Phil Stewart, who was court-martialed for various shenanigans and has two federal convictions on his record. He’s asked President Trump for a pardon, blaming his fate on a vast woke conspiracy.

Stewart shares a special podium with William Cooley, the only other Air Force general court-martialed. Cooley was busted to O-6 after his convictions. If you ask me, which no one has or will, both of these schlubs should be setting pins in a bowling alley and never again commanding anyone to do anything. I wouldn’t buy an apple from either one of them.

But as far as John Q. Public is concerned, Stewart (left) is still a good guy. His bio contains no trace of his sex creep persona.

Brig. Gen. Christoper Finnerty, who lost a star but still retired honorably after an IG investigation substantiated several inappropriate and adulterous sexual relationships, including one with an enlisted airman, one with the wife of a junior officer, and three with women who worked on Capitol Hill while he was serving as the service’s legislative liaison. It’s not clear how Finnerty had time or energy to actually do his job, but he retains his laurels in the service’s official story.

Maj. Gen. Mike Carey, who was reprimanded after a bout of drunken revelry during a nuclear inspection visit to Russia riled his hosts and created a diplomatic crisis.

Maj. Gen. John Dallager, who lost a star after the Air Force determined he had fallen short of his duty as Superintendent of the Academy during a scandal arising from cases of sexual assault in which the victims were punished while the perpetrators walked away unscathed.

Brig. Gen. Taco Gilbert, who was Commandant of the Academy during that same scandal and removed from his position, yet continued his career unscathed.

Maj. Gen. Craig Franklin, who lost a star after overturning a sexual assault conviction in a case he reviewed. This is widely regarded as the first huge stumble in the Air Force chain of command losing the authority to prosecute such cases.

Now, to be clear, I’m not asserting any of these bios should be removed. The story is the story. Each of these men played a role. They served. They made mistakes. Some failed to uphold standards. Some committed crimes. Some were just dicks.

But they retired honorably with stars on their shoulder. By this standard, they should be included in the service’s public-facing story, as should Arthur Lichte, warts and all.

As should Jim Slife, who fell afoul of no standard, committed no crime, engaged in no misconduct, and lost no stars, yet is getting buried deeper than any of the assholes listed above.

Inconsistency is a master caution of unprincipled behavior. The Air Force has an integrity problem on many levels. Not least its transparent and pathetic attempts to manicure a narrative.

Less than 18 months before Slife’s sacking, Gen. Allvin presided over his ascension, approving or at least refraining from objection as Slife was made deputy of the whole Air Force. His silence while that deputy was dragged into a fresh green pasture and put down like livestock is deafening.

He was lying then or he’s lying now. Meanwhile, he allows the Earth where his deputy roamed to be tilled, burned, and salted, seemingly oblivious that dignity denied one of us is denied us all.

What This Says About the Air Force

It says we’ve finally passed abeam the line separating “almost screwed” from “moral oblivion” and we’re picking up speed.

It says Ron Fogleman’s commitment to integrity, his modeling of integrity, and his demand that honesty be a requirement for leadership in a blue uniform is dead. Not one general or senior executive service member said anything nice about Jim Slife or his family. Not one who had misgivings about his removal had the balls to say so out loud, finding their own skin too precious.

There is no greater principle in the Air Force than backing your wingman. If you won’t guard the six of the person who fights with and for you then you are truly nothing.

For Gen. David “Foxhole Norman” Allvin to be silent as his deputy was shit-canned is not acceptable. For him to preside over the omission of Slife’s story from the service’s official online archive makes him complicit in a dishonor. Unless he didn’t know about it, which would constitute felonious ineptitude.

I know Allvin will be rationalizing to himself that he needs to keep his job so he can shepherd the service’s budget into fruition. So he can deliver the modernization he believes and perhaps even thinks is necessary.

But people with principles don’t need to rationalize. They hold to principle even when it’s inconvenient. They don’t make decisions about engaging their teams based on what’s politically faddish. Allvin has appeared in a video talking to airmen about dress and appearance. He’s joined the collective, fraudulent bleat about physical fitness in response to the Hegseth dog whistle. He’s sent people out to the field to make sure DEI is properly cancelled, and showered troops with memos about beards and nail polish. And of course, he’s talked about the budget, which is his main concern as a jumped up finance officer garbed in leader camouflage.

These are all undercurrents in the political flow. They don’t inspire. They don’t recognize or motivate. They don’t dignify or affirm. They’re just a continuation of corporate PR. Tasteless word salads served extra oily, extra bland, with not even a granule of pepper.

VI.

What This Means for Future Generals

It means they’ll be poor.

Because no one signs up for a job where you can’t be honest. Where you’ll be cancelled for disagreement. Where decades of public service will be instantly meaningless if you offend Caesar. Or have offended Caesar before he became Caesar.

Where a junior-brained ingenue with low experience and less humility can become your boss, calmly apply his clown makeup, and then end you without being questioned, much less challenged.

A job where your family’s sacrifices are cheapened and silently mocked. Where you don’t even get to rest on a warm piece of the sidewalk before going to Dog Heaven. Where you can build an Everest-sized mountain of goodness one rock at a time only to have the whole world pretend it’s a few measly pebbles of imperfection that matter.

A world where your swan song is a perp-walk despite committing no crime.

The Air Force will get the generals it deserves. Picking from a bushel basket of reject, worm-infested, grubby apples means a rotten bunch of leaders is the best you’re going to do. That’s the future to which these chuckleheads are consigning our air service. Being king of clowns means you’re still a clown, and anyone with a brain knows that.

VII.

The evidence doesn’t say Jim Slife was below par. It says he was out of alignment with politics before they became the politics. If he had continued to espouse old views under new politics, he could have been fired for disagreement. As it stands, he’s been fired for saying words the new regime didn’t like before they were in charge.

There’s no evidence he positively discriminated or took any actions on the basis of hollow philosophies in which he likely wasn’t invested. While I personally believe Slife and others were way too far out over their skis on DEI, I wouldn’t want them cancelled for disagreement any more than I’d expect to be cancelled for saying what I just said.

Slife wasn’t bucking for sainthood. I do find that the emphasis on DEI strayed into looney tunes territory. But if you believe, as I do, that officers like Matt Lohmeier should not have been fired for exercising his right to free expression, then you shouldn’t be pissing on Slife’s grave. At least not for this reason.

Remember, this is all happening in an infinite game. When government policies or actions prevent free expression before it can even happen, we’re in prior restraint territory. We’re off the free speech paved surface.

Those watching Slife get walked off the plank will be less likely to communicate openly in the future. Instead of us knowing who they are and what they’re about, we’ll have ambiguity. Instead of a hearty debate on the merits of dueling ideas, we’ll have legions of Foxhole Normans keeping their heads down until they know politics is on their side.

Take a look around and tell me we’re not there already.

VIII.

We should be firing people for being too willing to change their stripes, or for painting over their stripes altogether. Not for having the guts to be themselves.

Real leaders are capable of disagreeing with the entrenched philosophy while committing to the law and enforcing the rules.

We have to be mature enough to tolerate disagreement. Not only because the best operations we’ve ever fought have arisen from deep disagreements over how to solve a combat problem, but because there is nothing more American than working in unison with someone you don’t like. One might say the whole fucking point of military service, culturally speaking, is that we find unison in a higher purpose, and everything else melts away.

We laugh about our differences. We make nicknames out of them. None of that works when partisan muck-raking infects military life in a vain and dumbass attempt to cultivate a brainless, gutless borg. Assimilation has its narrow place in boot camp. Out in the fleet, we argue. If we’re too thin-skinned and pussified to argue about social issues without dissembling, how in the world are we going to stand up to a real enemy?

There are probably good reasons why Jim Slife could have been fired. Someone on social media said “a kill is a kill,” rationalizing that he’s so bad it’s a victory to see him off no matter why.

That’s fun, perhaps. But it ignores the serious knock-on effects. Today a guy you don’t like is in the frag pattern. Tomorrow it’s a different guy. Then everyone becomes even more tame and cowardly to avoid frag patterns. Those who won’t tame themselves bail. Leaders go from rare to extinct.

And that’s when we get sucker punched.

The dictates of responsibility don’t allow us to allow this. Something foreseeable must be acted upon. We have a duty to get unstuck from stupid.

That duty starts at the top.

I reckon the top of this shitpile is Dave Allvin’s throne. If the role of Chief of Staff doesn’t include explaining why 4-star officers are fired, dignifying their service, and recognizing their families after decades of honorable service and risk in the nation’s defense, then the role doesn’t meaningfully exist.

Which means the wrong individual is in the role. If he were to resign and explain he’s doing so out of principle, it would be a hell of a lot more constructive than modeling how to dance in clown shoes for the Gods of military-industrial wallet-sniffing.

IX.

The best argument for why Presidents and their minions should be permitted to fire for political convenience is that they deserve the best military advice from people they can work with effectively.

That argument gets undermined when someone is fired but not back-filled. Slife’s seat remains empty. Are we really better off with no Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force than a guy with the “wrong views” on one subject?

That argument also gets undermined when someone doesn’t give military advice. By imitating a houseplant in public, Gen. Allvin makes it fair to question whether he’s exercising any real influence behind the scenes.

If not, he has the “wrong views” on leading in a blue uniform.

And if we’re looking for a decent recent to jettison a senior officer, being feckless enough to watch your wingman bleed out seems a good place to start.

There’s always a point in any great mob saga where the gangsters start killing off their own lawyers, usually because they know too much but sometimes just for sport.

As an audience, we don’t give it much thought. After all, they’re lawyers. Certainly they deserve it for any number of reasons.

What we don’t think about is that in that same world, the next generation of gangsters ends up with shitty lawyers. Because no one wants to get killed for simply doing your job.

I don’t have the answers. But I think we need to ask more questions.

Tony is a retired Air Force officer and aspiring novelist who also writes about real world things.

27. Carlyle 'Smitty' Harris, Vietnam POW Who Originated 'Tap Code,' Dies

Another great American.

Anyone who has attended SERE training has learned the tap code he used in Vietnam.

For those who are unfamiliar with the tap code you can read about it here:

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/honor-tap-code/

Full transparency, I was not proficient though I suppose with enough time in captivity we would all get very good at using it.

Carlyle 'Smitty' Harris, Vietnam POW Who Originated 'Tap Code,' Dies

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · July 14, 2025

July 14, 2025 | By John A. Tirpak

Retired Air Force Col. Carlyle “Smitty” Harris, who introduced the “tap code” used by prisoners of war to communicate from their separate cells during the Vietnam War, died July 6 at the age of 96.

Harris was shot down over North Vietnam on April 4, 1965, while flying an attack run against the Than Hoa bridge in an F-105 during the Rolling Thunder campaign. He was soon captured and was among the first American flyers imprisoned during the war. He survived nearly eight years of interrogation, torture, solitary confinement, and malnutrition—his weight plummeted from 160 to 90 pounds during that period.

Unable to use Morse Code on the concrete walls of their cells—because there was no way to make a “dash” noise—Harris and the other first three POWs worked out the Tap Code, which he remembered from a book about World War II prisoners of war. It used a five-by-five grid for the alphabet, which allows each letter to be represented by fewer than five taps (C and K shared the same grid square). Prisoners familiar with the code passed it on to new arrivals, despite the risk of severe punishment for doing so.

The code was crucial for communication, maintaining morale, and providing a means for the prisoners to feel less isolated and resist their captors. Harris told an interviewer that he would use the code when sweeping, or even coughing, since communications between prisoners was usually forbidden.

During his captivity, Harris was imprisoned at the infamous “Hanoi Hilton” as well as the Son Tay POW camp and several other locations.

Repatriated during “Operation Homecoming” in 1973, Harris recovered from his ordeal for a year at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. While there, he completed Air War College, recertified as a pilot, and earned a Master’s in Business Administration from Auburn University in Montgomery. He remained on the Air War College faculty as a curriculum planner until his retirement in July 1979. During that time, he compiled the basis of his autobiography, “Tap Code: The Epic Survival Tale of a Vietnam POW and the Secret Code that Changed Everything,” largely about his experiences as a POW. Though he never planned to release the work, which he described as a “chronicle,” Harris bowed to long family pressure and published the book in 2019 to favorable critical reviews.

He retired from the Air Force having received two Silver Stars, three awards of the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, two awards of the Bronze Star with V for Valor, two Air Medals, two awards of the Purple Heart, and two Commendation Medals. After the Air Force, Harris completed a law degree and practiced law in Mississippi, also managing a law firm and serving as a bank executive, while serving on numerous community charitable committees and organizations.

Ret. Col. Carlyle “Smitty” Harris, former Vietnam prisoner of war, and Ret. Lt. Col. Richard “Sonic” Johnson, former Columbus Air Force Base member, talk about Harris’ memorabilia Sept. 18, 2020, in Tupelo, Miss. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Davis Donaldson

Harris was honored by the city of Tupelo, Miss. in 2015, which installed an F-105 painted to look like the one Harris flew in Vietnam in Veterans Memorial Park. Placards around the aircraft relate the tale of Harris’ mission and capture. In 2021, a post office in Tupelo was named after Harris by Congress, and the Smithsonian displays some of the artifacts of Harris’ internment, such as his tin cup.

Rep. Trent Kelly (R-Miss.) said that Harris was both a national and a local treasure.

“He was an amazing man and an amazing hero,” Kelly said. Harris “endured eight years of imprisonment under awful conditions” because “he was … a man of compassion and positive attitude.”

History

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · July 14, 2025

28. The US Army’s second rebirth: From post-Vietnam to post-GWOT

The future of our Army is on the line.

The US Army’s second rebirth: From post-Vietnam to post-GWOT - Breaking Defense

In this op-ed, AEI's John Ferrari offers advice for keeping the Army's transformation initiative on track — starting with the budget.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari · July 15, 2025

A U.S. Soldier assigned to 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment reaches for a unmanned aerial system during Project Flytrap at Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels Training Area, Hohenfels, Germany, June 19, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Brent Lee)

As we look at the Army’s transformation in 2025 under united leadership, it’s impossible to miss the echoes of the painful yet ultimately fruitful decade that followed the Vietnam war. Then, as now, a bruised force staggered home from a frustrating war, only to find that its real test lay ahead in rebuilding for the future.

To do so, leaders at the Pentagon and within the Army must not only build on recent momentum to drastically improve everything from technological innovation to cooperation with industry but they need to team together to provide the sorely needed funding.

In the late 1970s, the Army faced a crisis of confidence, resources, and people. The humiliations of Vietnam were compounded by what became known as the “hollow force.” By 1979, discipline problems, drug abuse, and low morale were pervasive. The Army, just transitioning to the all-volunteer force, faced a recruiting shortfall so severe that it risked lacking the soldiers needed to defend NATO against a Soviet threat that remained very real.

Yet the Army did not remain static. A major catalyst for change came not from Washington but from the Middle East. The 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Israeli forces battled Egyptian and Syrian armies equipped with modern Soviet weapons, shocked American military planners. The conflict underscored the lethality of air defense missiles, the importance of electronic warfare, and the devastating effectiveness of armored warfare when combined with well-integrated artillery.

Out of that period of reflection emerged the Army’s renaissance. Out of that renaissance came “Big Five” weapons systems−the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Black Hawk and Apache helicopters, and the Patriot missile system−which formed the backbone of American land power for decades.

Just as important was the intellectual rebirth in the AirLand Battle doctrine, which fused maneuver, deep fires, and joint integration, and the professionalization of the non-commissioned officer corps. Together, these reforms prepared the Army for success in the Gulf War and helped deter Soviet aggression until the Cold War’s end.

Fast forward to today, and the parallels are striking. After two decades of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan the Army finds itself again at a crossroads. By 2023, the service faced the worst recruiting crisis in half a century. The disconnect between the military and much of American society had widened, and the Army struggled to articulate why it mattered in an era where many young Americans questioned whether wars abroad were worth fighting.

Once again, the real wake-up call came from overseas. The Russian invasion of Ukraine turned into a grinding, high-casualty war that defied predictions of rapid and overwhelming victory. For military professionals, Ukraine was a grim but invaluable laboratory: it showcased the importance of cheap drones and resilient communications as well as the need for dispersed logistics under constant surveillance and the return of large-scale artillery duels. The message was clear; the US Army had to change.

Today, in 2025, we are witnessing the Army’s second rebirth. This time, the transformation is defined by technology and flexibility. The Army is incorporating autonomous systems to extend reach and reduce risk to soldiers. Artificial intelligence supports decision-making and targeting. Hypersonic weapons and long-range precision fires are reshaping operational concepts. The new doctrine embraces multi-domain operations, recognizing that future conflicts will unfold simultaneously across land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

Critically, the Army is starting to reconnect with American industry. It is drawing talent from technology and cyber sectors while also enticing the trillion-dollar tech companies to build its digital backbone. The service even says it’s clearing recruiting goals ahead of time.

Yet even as we celebrate progress, history teaches us that transformation must be sustained. The Army’s rebirth in the 1980s succeeded not just because of new equipment but because of sustained commitment: resources, leadership, and a willingness to challenge old ways of thinking.

Here are several recommendations to help ensure the Army’s current transformation fulfills its promise:

First, the secretary of defense must remain committed to the Army as he builds the fiscal 2027 budget and distributes the recently enacted reconciliation funds. Within the halls of the Pentagon are those who, seeing long-distance naval and air battles in the Pacific as the only conflict the military should prepare for, wish to dismantle the Army’s funding and end strength. Success must be rewarded, and the Army is on the right track. Only Secretary Pete Hegseth and Deputy Secretary Steve Feinberg can protect the Army.

The Army only received about 5 percent of the recent $150 billion-plus within the reconciliation process, however, Hegseth received about $50 billion that is under his control. About $15 billion of that $50 billion should be allocated to the Army to resource drones, communication gear, and munitions.

Next, the Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll must reform how the service does acquisition. Now that the Army has the right requirements and funding for new technology, the only thing standing in its way is its process of acquiring it. The Army acquisition community needs dramatic and rapid reform. Only Driscoll can do that.

Finally, Gen. Randy George, the Army chief of staff, must continue to infuse a culture of change into the Army that puts engineers and soldiers together to drive modernization. He seems to be well on his way there, turning the once sacrosanct training centers into laboratories of innovation. The next generation of Army leaders must be rewarded for experimentation and agility, while ensuring that the institutional bureaucracy enables innovation and does not stifle it.

The Army’s journey from Vietnam to Desert Storm showed that renewal is possible even after strategic disappointment. Today, after the long shadow of the post-9/11 wars, the Army is once again on the cusp of transformation. With sustained commitment, bold thinking, and public support, this rebirth can build a force ready to deter and, if necessary, defeat the threats of tomorrow.

Yet as the Army charts this course, the president must beware of the modern sirens’ call: voices who argue that the Army should shrink dramatically, focusing solely on a conflict with China and leaving ground forces as an afterthought. History teaches that seductive simplicity often masks real danger.

True “Peace through Strength” comes not by abandoning balance, but by building an Army that is both technologically advanced and large enough to meet the unpredictable demands of a still-dangerous world.

Maj. Gen. John Ferrari, US Army (ret.), is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and is the former director of program analysis and evaluation for the US Army.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari · July 15, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Information Management Driving Decision Supremacy

Introduction

Background Context and Decision Supremacy

Information as a Warfighting Enabler

Understand the Decision Cycle

Speed

Historic Examples

Three Pillars

Call to Action

About The Authors

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