Quotes of the Day:

“It is usually futile to try to talk facts … to people who are enjoying a sense of moral superiority in their ignorance.” 

- Thomas Sowell

“All men make mistakes, but a good man yields when he knows his course is wrong, and repairs the evil. The only crime is pride.” 

- Sophocles

"It is in the nature of a group and its power to turn​ ​against independence, the property of individual strength."

​- Hannah Arendt​

​1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2023

2. Special Operations News Update - July 17, 2023 | SOF News

3. Xi Jinping's foreign minister has vanished from public view. His prolonged absence is driving intense speculation

4. Ukraine claims responsibility for new attack on key Crimea bridge

5. Black Sea grain deal to expire Monday on Russia suspension

6. Majority of Americans say TikTok is a threat to national security

7. Putin’s Threats To Zaporizhhia Nuclear Power Plant Endangers Energy Transition

8. Ex-paratrooper walking around nation for awareness (Taiwan)

9. Typo leaks millions of US military emails to Mali web operator

10. The disturbing evolution of China’s foreign policy

11. Six partners, 3,000 miles: Air Mobility Command undertakes largest readiness exercise in Indo-Pacific

12. India Ups the Ante Against China in Beijing’s Lake

13. China’s Economy Barely Grows as Recovery Fades

14. Light Reaction Regiment: The Sharpshooters of Death (Philippines)

15. Troops break away from multinational exercise to save mariners stranded in Western Pacific

16. Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Congressional Notification Requirements (R45191)

17.  U.S. and Allies Maintain Unity Against Russia. Can They Do The Same With China?

18. A sensible approach to AI regulation

19. Why AI detectors think the US Constitution was written by AI

20. The Treacherous Silicon Triangle

21. Taiwan’s HAWK missiles likely headed to Ukraine

22. Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2023

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort.
• Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers.
• Teplinsky himself set the precedent for the acts of insubordination that are currently plaguing the Russian MoD.
• The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.
• The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly.
• Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization.
• The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale.
• The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine.
• The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains.
• Kiriyenko’s role in this consolidation is notable given his increasing reach in the Russian federal government and prior connections to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and did not make confirmed advances.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kreminna and made tactical advances.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that some Chechen forces have deployed to the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area and made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances in the area.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge and did not claim any Russian or Ukrainian advances in the area.
• Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of attempting an aerial and maritime drone strike against unspecified targets in the Black Sea near Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on July 15 to 16.
• Russian “Lancet” drone (loitering munition) producer Zalo Aero Group announced the production of a new generation of drones with automatic targeting systems and the intention to expand production abroad.
• A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue persecuting religious minorities in occupied Ukraine as part of a broader cultural genocide aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian national and cultural identity.
• Wagner Group forces will reportedly integrate into the Russian-Belarusian Union State Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV).

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 16, 2023

Jul 16, 2023 - Press ISW

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 16, 2023, 8:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort. The recent dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander (CAA) Colonel General Ivan Popov and the reported dismissal of 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov prompted further discussions of other alleged recent dismissals and arrests.[1] Russian sources amplified an alleged audio message from personnel of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division on July 15 in which the personnel claimed that the Russian military command dismissed 7th VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev in early July.[2] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities arrested 90th Tank Division (Eastern Military District) Commander Major General Ramil Ibatullin as well as two unspecified deputies on an unspecified date.[3] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger suggested that the Russian military command is also planning to dismiss the 31st VDV Brigade Commander, who is reportedly Colonel Sergei Karasev.[4]  Russian sources speculated that the Russian MoD may be preparing to arrest VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[5] ISW has not observed confirmation of Seliverstov’s and Kornev’s dismissals nor of Ibatullin’s arrest, although these claims follow a pattern similar to that of previous claims of command changes that have proven true.[6]

These formations and units are conducting defensive and offensive operations in key sectors of the front in Ukraine. The 58th CAA has conducted a relatively successful defense against Ukrainian counteroffensives in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the 106th Division is committed to defending against Ukrainian assaults on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.[7] ISW has observed elements of the 7th VDV Division deployed to east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge as well as to unspecified areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Russian milbloggers have claimed that the 31st VDV Brigade is also defending in the Bakhmut direction and that elements of the 90th Tank Division are involved in ongoing limited assaults west of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast.[9]

The reported dismissal and arrest of commanders leading combat effective units and formations appears to be associated with cases of insubordination. Popov flagrantly attempted to bypass Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and directly bring his complaints about the frontline in western Zaporizhia to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[10] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Seliverstov’s dismissal was a result of similar insubordination, and Russian sources claimed that Seliverstov had a reputation for speaking up on behalf of his soldiers.[11] Kornev may have voiced criticism of a host of potential issues on behalf of the 7th VDV Division, including the likely failure to be notified beforehand about the Russian destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station (KHPP) on June 6, reported attritional fighting that failed to eliminate a Ukrainian presence near the Antonivsky Bridge, or conditions in western Zaporizhia Oblast similar to those that Popov complained about.[12] Ibatullin’s arrest may be associated with the 90th Tank Division’s resumption of assaults in Luhansk Oblast, where it conducted widespread offensive operations that failed to achieve territorial gains during the Russian 2023 winter offensive campaign.[13] It is unclear why Ibatullin would have been arrested, if, indeed, he was, when the other commanders were reportedly simply removed from their commands.

Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers. Russian milbloggers shared an audio excerpt on July 16 in which the alleged elements of the 7th VDV Division threatened that they would withdraw from their positions in occupied Kherson Oblast if the Russian MoD arrests Teplinsky or threatens his life.[14] The elements of the 7th VDV Division also claimed that they would defend Teplinsky against the Russian MoD and asserted that the high command is targeting Russia’s most combat effective commanders. This audio appeal, if legitimate, is a threat of mass desertion in the face of the enemy on behalf of Teplinsky. Desertion in the face of the enemy is a capital offense in many militaries. The VDV servicemen are blackmailing the Russian MoD to ensure that Teplinsky continues to command troops in Ukraine, despite Teplinsky’s previous affiliation with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin who had led an armed rebellion on June 24 to overthrow Shoigu and Gerasimov.[15]

Teplinsky himself set the precedent for the acts of insubordination that are currently plaguing the Russian MoD. The Russian MoD had previously attempted to launch wide-scale personnel changes within the Russian Armed Forces in January-February 2023 to replace some commanders who had been insubordinate to Shoigu and Gerasimov throughout the invasion. The Russian MoD announced on January 11 that Gerasimov assumed the position of overall theater commander in Ukraine, which upset a group of commanders and Russian irregular formations such as Wagner that supported Gerasimov’s predecessor, Army General Sergei Surovikin.[16] Teplinsky was one of these commanders, and he reportedly resigned on January 12 following an altercation with Gerasimov over Gerasimov’s use of elite VDV forces in human wave attacks.[17] Teplinsky later recorded a video on February 23 in which he confirmed his resignation and implied that Russian commanders in charge of the Russian winter offensive paid for captured villages with soldiers’ lives.[18] Teplinsky’s resignation was not in itself insubordinate--resigning is one of the legal actions an officer can take when he decides that he cannot in good conscience execute a lawful order. Releasing a video criticizing the theater commander, however, was insubordinate and would likely be viewed as conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, which is a violation of military law in many militaries. Teplinsky’s video likely publicly blamed Gerasimov for Russian casualties during the winter offensive in an effort to undermine his command and set informational conditions to signal the need for Gerasimov’s replacement to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[19] Teplinsky later mobilized support within the VDV veteran community and directly appealed to Putin on March 15 regarding the Russian MoD’s poor treatment of Wagner forces and poor conduct of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[20] Putin rewarded Teplinsky’s insubordination by reappointing him as the VDV commander on April 1 instead of punishing him for his public actions undermining the theater commander.

Popov’s leaked audio recording demonstrated a striking resemblance to Teplinsky’s appeals as it portrayed Popov’s insubordination as an attempt to improve conditions for 58th CAA’s servicemen. Popov did not claim responsibility for leaking the audio recording, however, he likely intended to evoke similar support for himself as the voice of opposition to the Russian MoD among servicemen and veterans of the 58th CAA. Both Teplinsky and Popov demanded radical changes in the Russian conduct of the war – that, however necessary they might be, are impossible for Gerasimov or Shoigu to execute given Putin’s unrealistic demands for the war effort, constraints on Russian mobilization, and the Russian MoD’s persistent incompetence. Putin reportedly signed a decree deploying Popov to Syria on July 14 on Gerasimov’s recommendation.[21] ISW assessed on April 30 that the Kremlin demoted several commanders by transferring their responsibilities from combat in Ukraine to Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh and that these apparent demotions leave open the possibility that these commanders could return to Putin’s favor.[22]

The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine. Putin consistently bypassed or ignored the established chain of command in hopes of securing rapid successes on the battlefield throughout the war, degrading Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s authority – especially when military failures on the frontlines also eroded their reputations. Putin had cultivated an environment in which military personnel, officials, and even Russian war correspondents bypassed Shoigu and Gerasimov to present Putin their understandings of the current state of the war and recommendations for what to do.[23] It is unusual but not unique for a commander in chief to solicit views on the war from outside experts. It is more problematic, although still not unique, for a commander in chief to solicit the views of subordinates opposed to senior leadership directly. But allowing a quasi-military commander such as Prigozhin to conduct his own campaign parallel but not subordinate to the one being executed by the formal chain of command is extraordinarily unusual and badly corrosive of the authority of the formal military leadership.

Putin also established the Russian MoD as the scapegoat for all Russian military failures, which saddled Shoigu and Gerasimov with a reputation for incompetence and failure that they are unlikely to repair.[24] ISW previously assessed that Putin regularly grants and withdraws his support for different commanders in hopes generating rapid improvements in Russia’s military fortunes but without always doing so formally.[25] Shoigu and Gerasimov likely expected that Putin would restore their full authority over the Russian military’s decision-making processes given their loyalty to him after Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24. Putin, however, has clearly not done so. He has instead followed his normal pattern of seeking to divert backlash away from himself and rotating commanders instead of outright dismissing them.[26] Intensifying insubordination and widespread outrage in response to the ongoing officer purge may force the Kremlin to reconsider its partial backing for Shoigu and Gerasimov in the wake of Wagner’s rebellion.

The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly. ISW has previously assessed that Teplinsky and Popov have established precedents for Russian military officers to challenge the authority of senior commanders and for to use their responsibility for key sectors of the front to cajole the Kremlin into supporting them.[27] Insubordinate commanders appear to be more actively emulating this approach to achieving their desired aims and are likely aware of the constraints the MoD faces in punishing them. These commanders present themselves as defenders of their soldiers, tapping into longstanding grievances about the war effort that the Kremlin routinely attempts to avoid exacerbating but has been unable or unwilling to address.[28] The Kremlin’s relatively soft reaction to insubordination likely incentivizes strong-willed commanders to engage in these patterns of insubordination, knowing that they offer substantial rewards with relatively low risks. These commanders appear to be deftly drawing a line between themselves and Prigozhin by centering their soldiers in their complaints and avoiding the appearance of promoting their personal ambitions, which had made Prigozhin appear a threat to the Kremlin (they are also, obviously, avoiding leading armed forces in a march on Moscow).[29] As the Kremlin fails to adequately punish commanders who challenge Gerasimov’s and Shoigu’s authority it becomes more logical for commanders who wish to protect their soldiers (or to appear to be doing so) to engage in this kind of behavior. Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s attempts to remove and punish these commanders will likely cause some commanders to intensify their insubordination and draw public attention to their conflicts with the senior Russian military leadership in hopes of making the Kremlin more hesitant about supporting Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s efforts. It may cause the fainter of heart to become more pliable yes-men and, thus, likely less effective on the battlefield.

Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization. Teplinsky and Popov may have leveraged Russian military and ultranationalist communities to bring awareness to the Russian MoD’s intentions to dismiss military commanders and thus spark backlash within these communities.[30] This effort has the potential to drive the Kremlin to undo or halt the Russian MoD’s command changes.[31] Teplinsky’s earlier involvement of veteran communities allowed him to reestablish control of the VDV and occupied southern Ukraine, and it is likely that these commanders are aware of their ability to garner support on Russian social media platforms under the guise of attempting to save their troops from the Russian MoD.[32] ISW assesses that some of these commanders, like many Russian officials, likely have personal connections to Russian Telegram channels and social media networks that they use to spread their desired narratives and objectives.[33] Russian servicemembers routinely engage with milblogger content to follow the war in Ukraine, and insubordinate commanders likely rely on servicemembers consuming this content to garner support for their opposition to the Russian senior military leadership.

The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale. The 7th VDV Division’s threat to withdraw in response to the latest speculations about dismissals and arrests of commanders suggests that Russian servicemembers are actively engaging with this content.[34] Russian milbloggers also often amplify videos and letters from servicemen further confirming the interactions between milbloggers and the Russian forces on the frontlines.[35] ”Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky (who is currently fighting in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) argued that Russia will lose the war in Ukraine if Russian authorities arrest Teplinsky.[36] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger rhetorically asked who would lead Russian forces to victory if there are only commanders who do not stand up for their soldiers and fear upsetting the General Staff with their ”panicked” reports about the situation on the frontlines.[37] Another Russian source, that promotes narratives sympathetic to the insubordinate commanders, claimed that the situation is reminiscent of the demoralization of the Soviet military at the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.[38] One milblogger noted that the degree of speculation and claims about the dismissals and arrests is indicative of widespread concern among the Russian military about this issue.[39] These narratives threaten to cause a widespread loss of confidence in the Russian command and an overall sense of defeatism if Gerasimov and Shoigu continue to remove and/or punish the commanders whom many view as ”heroes born of the Special Military Operation.”[40]

The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine. Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine follow a pattern in which one echelon of Russian forces slows and degrades attacking Ukrainian forces until a second echelon counterattacks from prepared defensive positions to roll back the Ukrainian advances.[41] Tactical counterattacks from prepared (and therefore likely relatively safe and defensible) positions require a degree of motivation and morale that the chain of command crisis may undermine to the point of failure. Elements of the 58th CAA and the 7th VDV Division are engaged in the defense of areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast and are likely already experiencing pronounced morale issues in the wake of the controversies surrounding their dismissed commanders. Ukrainian assaults also appear to be occurring along seams of the Russian defense between different formations and units in some areas, and insubordination and command and control issues may lead to a lack of cohesion between these defending units.[42] ISW has not observed direct indicators of these developments at this time.

The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine. It is unlikely that the Kremlin will allow the conflict between these commanders and the Russian senior military command to escalate to a point where personnel follow through on threats like the one the 7th VDV division made, although the continued hollowing out of support for the Russian military leadership among field commanders will produce morale issues throughout the theater. Further controversies about insubordination and command changes will likely increasingly reach a wider domestic audience as the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community continues to closely follow and amplify these developments. The Kremlin’s failure to appeal to these commanders and their personnel while also failing to fully back Shoigu and Gerasimov may increasingly undermine the Kremlin’s desired goal to be viewed as an effective manager of the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains. Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains northwest of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.[43] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1km in an unspecified area in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area).[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast area).[45] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Bakhmut area and are defending new positions on the flanks of Bakhmut against Russian ground attacks.[46] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut), parts of heights near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and a fortified area west of Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut).[47] Russian President Vladimir Putin denied Ukrainian successes in the counteroffensive and claimed that Ukrainian forces have not been able to break through Russian defenses on July 16.[48] Putin notably told a journalist that he would answer a question about further goals of the war if the journalist turned off the camera.[49] Ukrainian forces have, however, advanced in southern Ukraine where Russian forces have prepared the most extensive fortifications. ISW calculated based on its own control of terrain data that since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4 to July 9 Ukrainian forces liberated approximately 253 square kilometers of territory.[50] (Ukrainian official accounts of the area liberated differ from ISW’s, almost certainly because Ukraine calculated its initial control of terrain differently. ISW is presenting its own figure of liberated land to make an apples-to-apples comparison of Russian and Ukrainian gains.)[51]

Ukrainian officials indicated that extensive Russian minefields and shortages of Western mine clearing equipment have slowed the pace of Ukrainian advances in the counteroffensive. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi acknowledged in an interview with CNN published on July 14 that the tempo of counteroffensive operations is slower than expected citing “complex and dense minefields” in areas through which Ukrainian forces intend to move.[52] The Washington Post reported on July 15 that Russian forces heavily mined areas between five and 16 kilometers behind the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, which has slowed Ukrainian advances and forced Ukrainian forces to conduct ground attacks with infantry rather than Western kit.[53] An unnamed Ukrainian officer told the Washington Post that Russian forces have prioritized destroying more advanced mine-clearing systems over Leopard tanks.[54] An unnamed senior Ukrainian official told the Washington Post that Ukraine received less than 15 percent of the quantity of mine clearing and engineering material it requested ahead of the counteroffensive with some equipment arriving only last week.[55]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to increase its control over Russian social media outlets to set conditions for the 2024 Russian presidential elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko is brokering a deal to purchase the Russian division of media giant Yandex on behalf of investors heavily affiliated with billionaire Yuri Kovalchuk, a close Kiriyenko ally and reported personal banker to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[56] Meduza reported that these investors will likely transfer their shares of Yandex to another entity, such as Kovalchuk or one of his holdings, after a period of time. Meduza noted that Yandex corporate advisor Alexey Kudrin and Putin personally approved an earlier deal to sell Yandex to investors with less direct connections to the federal government, but the deal fell through after an investor withdrew under fear of Western sanctions should he proceed with the purchase.[57] Meduza reported that Kudrin hoped that the new Yandex buyers would have less explicit federal government ties, but that Kiriyenko’s influence likely swayed Putin to this new deal.[58] A Russian insider source claimed that Telegram channels affiliated with Kiriyenko accused RT editor in chief and Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan of spreading fake information to try to take control over Telegram.[59] The source also claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) recent detention of the Russian Deputy Minister of Digital Development, Maxim Parshin, and of Russian insider sources is part of a broader Russian federal effort to take more direct control over Russian social media.[60]

Kiriyenko’s role in this consolidation is notable given his increasing reach in the Russian federal government and prior connections to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. ISW reported recently on claims from former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin accusing Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk of directly acting as Prigozhin’s patrons.[61] The degree of Kiriyenko’s and Kovalchuk’s support for Prigozhin in recent months, and especially following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion, is currently unclear, however. Some Russian sources continue to postulate that Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk are firm Prigozhin supporters.[62] Other sources have claimed that Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk have distanced themselves from Prigozhin in recent months due to Prigozhin’s escalation of his conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov prior to the rebellion.[63] Kovalchuk, Kiriyenko, and Prigozhin all reportedly contributed to the effort to elect Beglov to his office in 2019, but the Prigozhin-Beglov relationship deteriorated.[64] Some sources assert that Kovalchuk – and likely Kiriyenko as a result – firmly backed Beglov in his feud with Prigozhin.[65] Kiriyenko has consistently postured himself as a firm Putin loyalist, and his increasing role in the Russian information space reflects both Putin’s trust in him as a result of his labors thus far and Kiriyenko’s desire to further advance his influence with Putin.[66]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort.
• Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers.
• Teplinsky himself set the precedent for the acts of insubordination that are currently plaguing the Russian MoD.
• The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.
• The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly.
• Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization.
• The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale.
• The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine.
• The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains.
• Kiriyenko’s role in this consolidation is notable given his increasing reach in the Russian federal government and prior connections to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and did not make confirmed advances.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kreminna and made tactical advances.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that some Chechen forces have deployed to the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area and made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances in the area.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge and did not claim any Russian or Ukrainian advances in the area.
• Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of attempting an aerial and maritime drone strike against unspecified targets in the Black Sea near Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on July 15 to 16.
• Russian “Lancet” drone (loitering munition) producer Zalo Aero Group announced the production of a new generation of drones with automatic targeting systems and the intention to expand production abroad.
• A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue persecuting religious minorities in occupied Ukraine as part of a broader cultural genocide aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian national and cultural identity.
• Wagner Group forces will reportedly integrate into the Russian-Belarusian Union State Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and did not make confirmed advances on July 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks south of Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk).[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued advancing in Novoselivske and attacked Ukrainian positions near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and Dvorichna (17km northeast of Kupyansk).[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Karamzynivka (12km southwest of Svatove) on July 15.[69] Ukrainian military officials acknowledged on July 16 that Russian forces are conducting active offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and that Ukrainian forces are defending in the area.[70] Russian forces have likely slightly increased their tempo of offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line in order to pin existing Ukrainian forces there or draw additional Ukrainian forces to this area of the front and away from ongoing counteroffensive operations. Russian forces may also be attempting to capitalize opportunistically on claimed tactical gains in the area. ISW has observed no indication of new Russian units, equipment, or large-scale operations that would indicate the start of a new major Russian offensive on this axis.

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kreminna and made tactical advances as of July 16. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made marginal gains west of Berestove (30km south of Kreminna). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks east of Vesele (31km south of Kreminna).[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued attacks west of Kreminna on the Torske-Makiivka line near Torske, Yampolivka, Novosadove, and Makiivka (all 11-25km northwest and west of Kreminna).[72] The milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces attacked in a forest area west of Kreminna and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south) and Spirne (25km south).[73] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Novovodyane (23km northwest of Kreminna), Makiivka, the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna), Bilohorivka, and Vesele.[74]

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of targeting Luhansk City with Storm Shadow missiles on July 16.[75] Geolocated footage shows smoke clouds rising from the outskirts of the city, and one Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces hit the Machinska mine just southwest of the city.[76] A Ukrainian source suggested that Ukrainian forces may have struck an ammunition depot.[77]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced on July 16. Some Russian sources, including one Wagner Group affiliated source, claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Zaliznyanske (10km northwest of Bakhmut), a fortified area west of Andriivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut), and parts of heights near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[78] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces held their positions in the area, and one prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces even recaptured some areas near Klishchiivka while defending against Ukrainian attacks.[79] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified counteroffensive operations near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[80] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Bakhmut area and are defending new positions on the flanks of Bakhmut against Russian ground attacks.[81] A Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian forces may further intensify counteroffensive operations to take advantage of the dismissal of the 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.[82]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Bakhmut area and did not advance on July 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in the Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) areas, and southwest of Andriivka.[83] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Berkhivka and Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut).[84] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces are attempting to construct further defensive fortifications to defend Bakhmut.[85]

Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that some Chechen forces have deployed to the Bakhmut area as of July 16. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” special forces are operating alongside the 346th Special Forces Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) and 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps near Klishchiivka.[86] Cherevaty confirmed that Ukrainian forces did detect a small group of Chechen forces near Klishchiivka. Kadyrov first claimed that Chechen forces deployed to the Klishchiivka area on July 9 for what Kadyrov claimed was the Russian General Staff’s faith in Chechen forces.[87] Kadyrov more likely deployed Chechen forces around Bakhmut for propaganda, however.[88]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance on July 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[89] Russian milbloggers also reported ongoing fighting in these areas.[90] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Russian forces aim to capture Marinka and set conditions to encircle Avdiivka.[91]ISW has observed no indications that Russian forces are close to accomplishing either objective, however. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) indicated that the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) is operating near Marinka.[92]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area and made limited gains as of July 16. Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains northwest of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[93] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attempt to restore lost positions in northern Staromayorske, acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have entered the settlement.[94] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Ukrainian forces advanced one kilometer in an unspecified area in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area).[95] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Staromayorske, while others claimed that Russian forces, including unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements and the ”Kaskad” Operational Combat Tactical Formation, repelled Ukrainian forces from positions in northern and northwestern Staromayorske and that Russian forces control the settlement.[96] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian artillery units are using cluster munitions near Staromayorske, though ISW has not observed any evidence to verify this claim.[97]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances in the area on July 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia area).[98] [99] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured new positions from Kamianske (30km southwest of Orikhiv) to east of the E105 Zaporizhzhia City - Vasylivka-Melitopol highway, and advanced in a forest area along a rail line west of Dorozhnyanka (33km southeast of Orikhiv).[100] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv) and stopped efforts against Zherebyanky (27km southwest of Orikhiv.[101] Russian sources claimed that the tempo of Ukrainian operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast slowed, which one Russian milblogger attributed to heavy rains.[102]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge and did not claim any Russian or Ukrainian advances in the area.[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have failed to dislodge Ukrainian forces from positions near the Antonivsky Bridge for the past week due to heavy Ukrainian counter-battery fire.[104]  Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian artillery fire prevented two Ukrainian boats from crossing the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge.[105]

Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of attempting an aerial and maritime drone strike against unspecified targets in the Black Sea near Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on July 15 to 16. Footage published on July 16 purportedly shows Russian forces firing at a watercraft near Sevastopol.[106] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two UAVs, electronic warfare disabled five UAVs, and Russian forces destroyed two autonomous maritime drones.[107] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the aerial drones targeted a thermal power plant and Russian air defense installations near Kozatska Bay.[108]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian “Lancet” drone (loitering munition) producer Zala Aero Group announced the production of a new generation of drones with automatic targeting systems and the intention to expand production abroad. Zala Aero Group Chief Designer Alexander Zakharov announced on July 16 that Zala Aero Group, a Kalashnikov Concern subsidiary, is producing a new generation of the “Lancet” drone that will automatically identify targets and that the drone operators will only determine the drone’s area of operation.[109] Zakharov stated that the company is discussing expanding production to “several continents” and claimed that there is steady international interest in the expansion.[110]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)  

A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue persecuting religious minorities in occupied Ukraine as part of a broader cultural genocide aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian national and cultural identity. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation authorities confiscate land and other property of Protestant churches in occupied territories and noted instances of parishioners disappearing – possibly due to kidnapping or other unlawful detention.[111] ISW has reported extensively on Russian kidnappings, asset seizures, and legislative measures to prevent the practice of Ukrainian religions in occupied territories.[112]

Ukrainian partisans attacked Russian military personnel and vehicles in occupied Kherson Oblast on July 14. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 15 that members of the Atesh partisan movement killed six Russian military personnel and destroyed two vehicles during an attack at an abandoned gas station in Velyki Kopani, Kherson Oblast.[113]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Wagner Group forces will reportedly integrate into the Russian-Belarusian Union State Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV). A Belarusian insider source claimed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will fund Wagner forces as part of the Union State RGV.[114] A Russian insider source corroborated the Belarusian insider sources’ claim but did not specify whether the Russian or the Belarusian MoD will fund Wagner, however.[115]

Elements of Wagner forces appear to continue to move from Russia to Belarus. Footage posted on July 15 purportedly shows Wagner forces driving on the M4 highway in Voronezh Oblast to Belarus with a Russian police escort, and footage posted on July 16 allegedly shows the Wagner convoy in Gomel Oblast, Belarus.[116] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that redeployment of Wagner forces from field camps in Russia to Belarus has entered its main phase.[117]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Special Operations News Update - July 17, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - July 17, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · July 17, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: U.S. Army Paratroopers descend on a drop zone during airborne training at an airfield in Daugavpils, Latvia, June 29. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Alex Soliday)

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SOF News

Navy’s ‘Iron Man’ Dive Suit. A new dive suit is being developed that will enhance diver safety and allow them to work longer and in deeper waters. The Deep Sea Expeditionary with No Decompression System or DSEND is a form-fitting atmospheric dive suit composed of rotating and flexibe joints that provide greater mobility while also keeping internal pressure steady. “The Navy is working on a transformational ‘Iron Man’ dive suit”, Navy Times, July 10, 2023.

Pontoons for the MC-130J? USSOCOM continues its search for air capability that can operate on water. This would be a great benefit for conducting operations in the Indo-Pacific region. Learn more in “Air Force Special Ops Wants Runway Independence, More Speed”, National Defense Magazine, July 14, 2023.

MEU SOCs and Questions. A recent article posted by SOF News (courtesy of DVIDS) announced that the Marines were redesignating the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit as Special Operations Capable. Some readers responded to this with questions like “Why was the MEU SOC concept discontinued in the first place?” and “Is this an attempt to justify the proposed cut of ARSOF by 10 to 20%?”. Things that make you go “Hmmm”.

SERE School. The U.S. Air Force has a Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape school that teaches Airmen how to live off the land, evade enemy forces, and . . . if captured, how to resist their captors and survive captivity. “SERE School: The Infamous Course That Teaches US Troops to Survive With Honor”, Coffee or Die, July 13, 2023.

Award for CRD 10th SFG. The 82nd Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was awarded the MG William L. Sibert Award for the second year in a row. The Sibert Award is a recognition of excellence by the Chemical Corps Regimental Association. The 82nd CRD was recognized as the best detachment over all Chemical Teams in the U.S. Army. “82nd Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment Sibert Award Winners”, DVIDS, June 29, 2023.

AFSOC General to be Deputy Director of DTRA. U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Matthew Davidison has been assigned as the Deputy Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA has a special relationship with the special operations community and is charged with countering weapons of mass destruction. (DVIDS, July 13, 2023).

USSOCOM Contracts for PGKs for 81mm Mortar Rounds. A $2 million contract will provide Precision Guidance Kits for the 81mm mortar rounds used by SOF personnel. The PGK will provide a more reliable targeting solution for SOF teams. “OKSI Awarded USSOCOM Contract for 81mm Mortar Precision Guidance Kit”, PR Newswire, July 11, 2023.

Guardian Angels Conduct Medical Evacuation Mission. A crew member on a fishing boat in the Pacific suffered a serious life-threatening head injury but was saved due to the actions a pararescue team. The team parachuted from a HC-130 Combat King II aircraft into the Central Pacific Ocean to get onto the fishing vessel and provide medical treatment. The patient was transported to a hospital and was reported to be making steady improvement. “129th Rescue Wing conducts multi-day rescue mission of the coast of Costa Rica”, DVIDS, July 13, 2023.

USSOCOM and JADC2. The three services are in the process to develop a joint all-domain command and control program – and USSOCOM will likely be a big part of that effort as well. “Special Operations Command Has Key Role to Play in JADC2 Success“, National Defense Magazine, July 11, 2023.

AFSOC Training Reorganization. The Air Force Special Operations Command is reframing their thinking on how they organize, train, and equip Air Commandos to meet future challenges. AFSOC has stood up the Air Commando Development Center – Provisional (ACDC-P). The new organization is comprised of the AF Special Operations School, 371st Special Operations Combat Training Squadron, and the new 370th Special Operations Combat Training Squadron. “492nd SOTRG change of command, Air Commando Development Center – Provisional activation”, AFSOC, July 14, 2023.

International SOF

Philippines Light Reaction Regiment. The Philippine Army’s counterterrorism unit was officially established in 2004. The LRR was mandated to conduct CT and other SOF type missions on Philippine soil. Learn about the history, deployments, doctrine, organization, training, and weapons of the LRF. “Light Reaction Regiment: The Sharpshooters of Death”, Grey Dynamics, July 4, 2023.

AFSOC Cdr Meets With ROKAF CoS. U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind (AFSOC) and Brig. Gen. Derek Lipson (SOCKOR) recently met with Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Air Force. “Republic of Korea Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Leaders Reflect on Decades-long Alliance”, DVIDS, July 13, 2023.

SOF Vehicles for Romania. Polaris has been awarded a contract to provide DAGOR ultralight tactical vehicles to Romania. The Deployable Advanced Ground Off-Road vehicles are to be provided under a $10 million contract. “Romania orders Polaris DAGOR special operations vehicles”, Shephard Media, July 12, 2023.

Kenya SF Attack on al-Shabaab. Security forces ambushed militants in northest Kenya. Six government soldiers were killed during the combat engagement. There has been a spate of terror along the border of Kenya and Somalia recently. The border between the two countries has been closed for over a decade; but may soon reopen. Kenyan has troops deployed in Somalia with the Africa Union-led peacekeeping forces. “Kenya Special Forces Kill 23 al-Shabab Militants”, Voice of America, July 7, 2023.

SOF History

Creation of COI. On July 11, 1941 the Coordinator of Information (COI) was established. President Franklin Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to head a new civilian office attached to the White House. The office was an intelligence and propaganda agency of the U.S. government. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Coordinator_of_Information

The Devil’s Brigade. The Canada-U.S. First Special Service Force played a leading role in the Italian campaign during World War II. (Legion Magazine, July 10, 2023).

Remembering MH17. On this day, on July 17, 2014, a Russian Buk shot down a passenger aircraft flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur over the eastern section of Ukraine. All 283 passengers and 15 crew were killed.

Ukraine Conflict

Reservists to Europe? President Biden has signed a document that provides for the activation of reservists to serve in an overseas assignment in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. The move is likely to shore up staff and support positions in Europe to account for the stepped up level of operations by European Command in eastern Europe and the support being provided to Ukraine. There are about 80,000 U.S. troops in Europe. “Biden Approves Mobilization of Reserves to Support EUCOM”, DOD News, July 13, 2023.

Russian Chain of Command. Since the mutiny by the Wagner Group senior officers in the Russian military have been playing musical chairs or ‘retiring’. Putin and the MoD is conducting an increased number of reassignments amongst senior military leaders. It is speculated that this is a purge of officers seen as insubordinate. (Institute for the Study of War, July 15, 2023).

Kerch Bridge Damaged? There are reports that the bridge connecting Crimea to the Russian mainland has been damaged with mulitiple explosions – possibly by Ukrainian drone boats or a missile strike on Monday, July 17th. The Kerch Strait Bridge had been severely damaged in October 2022. The bridge is a key logistics route for Russia. “Russia’s Kerch Strait Bridge Has Been Badly Damaged”, The Drive, July 17, 2023.

Wagner Group. President Putin says that he intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up. Whether this happens or not remains to be seen. The paramilitary organization is not believed to be heavily committed to the Ukraine conflict at this time. Many Wagner Group personnel have relocated to a military camp in Belarus. (Institute for the Study of War, July 14, 2023).

U.S. Cluster Bombs Arrive in Ukraine. Munitions needed by Ukraine to continue its summer offensive have now arrived according to the Joint Staff. The decision to send these munitions to Ukraine was hotly contested in the U.S. and in Europe due the possibility of long-term civilian casualties in the years to come.

National Security

Border Security. One of the primary regions of migration (legal and illegal) across the southern border is from Northern Central America. Root causes for people departing that region include poor economic prospects and lack of security. Read more in Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF11151, updated July 10, 2023, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11151

CENTCOM and the ME. The nations in the U.S. Central Command area of operations remain important to the U.S. National Defense Strategy and are a big consideration when addressing the concerns of stratetic competion. The threats from China, Russia, Iran, and extremist groups remain a focus of the command. “CENTCOM Remains Important to National Defense Strategy, Official Says”, DOD News, July 15, 2023.

Russian Aircraft in Syria. U.S. forces have been increasingly harassed in Syria over the past several weeks. A particular target are U.S. drones flying over Syria. Another instance is an AN-30 aircraft loitering over the Al Tanf garrison for an extended period of time. The Antonov AN-30 is a surveillance and survey aircraft loaded with cameras for mapping and photographic purposes. The Al Tanf garrison is close to the border junction of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. It serves as a launch point for counter-ISIS operations and training site for Syrian opposition factions fighting the jihadist group.

TikTok a National Security Threat. A majority of Americans see TikTok as a threat to the security of the United States. Congress is questioning the platforms ties to China and the security of users’ data. More Republicans than Democrats view the platform as a threat; and older people see it more as a threat than do younger people. “Majority of Americans say TikTok is a threat to national security”, Pew Research Center, July 10, 2023.

Combat Swimmer Operations and Strategic Competion. A rethinking of how SOF conducts operations has taken place over the past few years with the shift of focus from CT / COIN to near-peer conflict with adversaries like China and Russia. The number of combat swimmer operations conducted during the twenty-year long Global War on Terror was probably not a large percentage of Naval Special Warfare missions. However, in the event of possible conflict with a near-peer adversary this would be very different. Read more on this topic in “Combat Swimmer Operations and Their Importance in a Near-Peer Conflict”, SANDBOXX, July 10, 2023.

Old Salt Coffee is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. The company offers a wide range of coffee flavors to include Green Eyes Coffee, a tribute to those Navy special operations personnel who operate in the night.

Upcoming Events

July 21, 2023. Iowa

Ride Across Iowa Fundraiser (RAGBRAI)

Three Rangers Foundation, SOWF, and Gold Star Peak

August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida

Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion

CDF

August 12, 2023

11th Special Forces Group Reunion

Fort Meade, MD

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

Books, Pubs, and Reports

Report on Covert Action. Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community, Congressional Research Service, CRS R45191, Updated July 10, 2023, PDF, 14 pages.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45191

Book – By All Means Available. Micheal Vickers is interviewed about his book detailing his career in service of his country. Vickers is a former Green Beret, CIA officer, and high-level Pentagon official. His Cold War memoir is being highly praised for the explanation of world events that he was involved in over the past several decades. (The Washington Post, Jul 10, 2023) (subscription)

Videos and Movies

Video – Special Ops: Lioness. The Lioness Program enlists female special operators to operate undercover among the power brokers of State terrorism in the Central Intelligence Agency’s efforts to thwart the next 9/11. Paramount, June 8, 2023, one minute. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3axWgmlwnl4

Video – Inside America’s Secret War in Somalia. Reporters and TV cameras accompany U.S. special operations forces in country. NBC News, July 9, 2023, 11 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jplJ1U1TeU4

Video – SFACON 2023 Highlight Episode. #EverydayGSD Podcast was in attendance at the Special Forces Association Annual Conference recently held in May 2023 in Indianapolis, Indiana. While there a number of attendees were interviewed. View some highlights of the speakers. July 1, 2023, 16 minutes.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tDFex_fpLRY

Video – CSM Robert Abernethy – Senior Enlisted Advisor, EUCOM. U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Abernethy is the SER for U.S. European Command. In this video he talks about his career in Special Forces, valuable takeaways from working at the highest levels, and advice to those in the force to remain ready and vigilent. SOFCast, USSOCOM, Jun 21, 2023, 54 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOfBx-2XLa4

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Initiative

https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · July 17, 2023

3. Xi Jinping's foreign minister has vanished from public view. His prolonged absence is driving intense speculation

A serious issue or nothing to see here? Health reasons or has there been a firing/purge?

Xi Jinping's foreign minister has vanished from public view. His prolonged absence is driving intense speculation | CNN

CNN · by Nectar Gan · July 17, 2023

Hong Kong CNN —

China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang has not been seen in public for three weeks, an unusually long absence during a busy period of diplomatic activity in Beijing, sparking intense speculation in a country known for its political opaqueness.

Qin, 57, a career diplomat and trusted aide of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, was promoted to foreign minister in December, after a brief stint as ambassador to the United States.

As foreign minister, Qin has delivered searing rebukes of Washington after relations plunged to a new low in the aftermath of a suspected Chinese spy balloon that was shot down over the US.

He has also played a key role in subsequent efforts by both sides to stabilize rocky ties and restore communication, including meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his visit to Beijing in mid-June.

But the high-profile diplomat has not been seen in public since June 25, after he met with officials from Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Russia in Beijing.

In his last public appearance, a smiling Qin was seen walking side by side with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko, who flew to Beijing to meet with Chinese officials after a short-lived insurrection by the Wagner mercenary group in Russia.

“Given China’s status and influence in the world, it’s indeed very strange that its foreign minister has not appeared in public for more than 20 days,” said Deng Yuwen, a former editor of a Communist Party newspaper who now lives in the US.

When asked about Qin’s prolonged absence at a press briefing Monday, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said she had “no information to provide,” adding that China’s diplomatic activities are being carried out as usual.

Qin’s absence was made all the more conspicuous by the flurry of diplomatic activity in the Chinese capital in recent weeks, including high-profile visits by senior US officials Janet Yellen and John Kerry.

Qin was supposed to meet European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell earlier this month in Beijing but the meeting was pushed back after China informed the EU that the dates were “no longer possible,” Reuters reported, citing an EU spokesperson.

The EU was informed of the postponement just two days before Borrell’s scheduled arrival on July 5, according to Reuters.

Qin also failed to show up at an annual foreign ministers’ meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia last week. Instead, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi attended the gathering in his place.

A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry told a regular news briefing last Tuesday that Qin could not attend the ASEAN meeting “because of health reasons,” according to Reuters.

But that response was missing from the briefing’s official transcript posted later on the ministry’s website. The Chinese Foreign Ministry often leaves out content it deems sensitive from the transcripts of its regular briefings.

The brief health reason cited by authorities, however, has failed to quell a groundswell of largely unsubstantiated speculation as to why Qin has not been seen.

These rumors are driven by a lack of transparency in the Chinese political system, in which information is closely guarded and important decisions are mostly made behind closed doors, said Deng, the US-based analyst.

Under Xi, this political opacity has only intensified, as he cracks down on dissent and concentrates power in his own hands.

“This is a problem for totalitarian regimes. Totalitarian regimes are inherently unstable because everything is decided by the supreme leader alone,” he said.

“If anything unusual happened to a senior official, people will wonder if their relations with the top leader have soured or whether it is a sign of political instability,” said Deng.

Senior Chinese officials have disappeared from public view in the past, only to be revealed months later by the ruling Communist Party’s disciplinary watchdog that they’ve been detained for investigations. Such sudden disappearances have become a common feature in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.

Adding to the sensitivity of Qin’s absence is his perceived close ties to Xi, who secured a norm-breaking third term in power last autumn with a new leadership team stacked with loyal allies, according to Deng.

“Qin Gang was single-handedly pulled up the ranks by Xi. Any problems with him will reflect badly on Xi too – implying that Xi failed to choose the right person for the job,” said Deng.

CNN’s Wayne Chang contributed to this reporting

CNN · by Nectar Gan · July 17, 2023

4. Ukraine claims responsibility for new attack on key Crimea bridge

Graphics and video at the link: https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/16/europe/russia-crimea-bridge-intl-hnk/

Ukraine claims responsibility for new attack on key Crimea bridge

By Josh Pennington, Alex Stambaugh and Brad Lendon, CNN

Updated 6:09 AM EDT, Mon July 17, 2023

Video Ad Feedback

First video of damage to Crimean Bridge surfaces after reported strike

01:50 - Source: CNN

CNN — 

Two people have been killed and their daughter wounded in an attack on the vital bridge linking the annexed Crimean peninsula to the Russian mainland, according to a local official, in an incident that has been claimed by Ukrainian forces.

The nearly 12-mile crossing, also known as the Kerch Bridge, is the longest in Europe and carries both road and rail traffic. It holds huge strategic and symbolic importance for Moscow.

A source in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told CNN the attack was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukraine’s naval forces. The source spoke on condition of anonymity because they had not received authorization to speak on the record.

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Two strikes were reportedly carried out around 3 a.m. local time Monday (8 p.m. ET Sunday), damaging part of the bridge, according to Telegram channel Grey Zone, which supports the Wagner mercenary group led by Yevgeny Prigozhin.

LIVE UPDATES: Russia's war in Ukraine

Explosions were heard around 3:04 a.m. and 3:20 a.m. local time, Grey Zone and popular Crimean blogger ‘TalipoV Online Z’ said on Telegram.

CNN is unable to verify those reports.

The governor of Russia’s Belgorod region, Vyacheslav Gladkov, confirmed that two people were killed and a third person was injured in the incident.

Gladkov said a girl was injured and her parents were killed while traveling in the car that was damaged in the incident.

“There is damage to the roadway on spans of the Crimean Bridge,” Russia’s Transport Ministry said on Telegram. The spans on a bridge are the lengths between the support piers. Images showed a partial collapse of a section of the roadway portion of the bridge, which also carries railroad tracks.

On his Telegram channel, Vladimir Konstantinov, head of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, blamed the damage to the bridge on a Ukrainian attack.

“Tonight the terrorist regime in Kyiv committed a new crime – it attacked the Crimean bridge,” Konstantinov said.

“The railroad track was not damaged by the strike,” Konstantinov added.

Sergey Aksenov, the Russia-appointed head of Crimea, said an “emergency incident” had been reported, halting traffic on the bridge, which serves as a vital logistical node for Moscow’s military in its war against Ukraine.

Videos posted on Telegram by Baza, Grey Zone and other Crimean news outlets appeared to show part of the bridge collapsed and a vehicle damaged in the latest incident.

Emergency responders and law enforcement have been dispatched to the scene, said Aksenov, the head of Crimea. The Transport Ministry said an inspection of the bridge was underway.

Aksenov urged residents and those traveling to and from Crimea to choose an alternative land route.

Last October, another huge blast partially damaged the crossing, causing parts of it to collapse.

The bridge was severely damaged on October 8 when a fuel tanker exploded and destroyed a large section of the road.

Russia built the 19-kilometer bridge at a cost of around $3.7 billion after Moscow illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014. It was the physical expression of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objective to take over Ukraine and bind it to Russia forever.

Russian investigators work at the scene on the section of the bridge damaged on July 17, 2023.

Investigative Committee of Russia/Reuters

It is a critical artery for supplying Crimea with both its daily needs and supplies for the military, in addition to fuel and goods for civilians.

A Russian-backed official of the peninsula, Elena Elekchyan, said Crimea is well supplied with fuel, food and industrial goods.

After the October 8 blast, Russia quickly set about repairs to the span. It was fully reopened to traffic in February.

Earlier this month, Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar made what appeared to be the clearest admission yet that Ukrainian forces were responsible for the October attack.

A Ukraine official on Monday said damage to the bridge could hamper Russian logistics.

“Any logistical problems are additional complications for the occupiers, which create potential advantages for the Ukrainian defense forces,” Representative of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine Andrii Yusov said to Ukraine’s public broadcaster, Suspilne.

5. Black Sea grain deal to expire Monday on Russia suspension

We can expect global food prices to be affected, to include ours in the US but of course those in at-risk/food insecure areas such as Africa will suffer the most.

Black Sea grain deal to expire Monday on Russia suspension

Reuters · by Michelle Nichols

UNITED NATIONS, July 17 (Reuters) - A pact that has allowed the safe Black Sea export of grain from Ukraine for the past year will expire at the end of Monday after Russia said it will suspend its participation.

The deal, brokered by the United Nations and Turkey last July, aimed to alleviate a global food crisis by allowing Ukrainian grain blocked by the Russia-Ukraine conflict to be exported safely.

The last ship left Ukraine under the deal on Sunday. Russia's February 2022 invasion and blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea ports sent global grain prices soaring. Ukraine and Russia are among the world's top grain exporters.

Nearly 33 million metric tons of corn, wheat and other grains have been exported by Ukraine under the arrangement.

Russia has formally notified Ukraine, via the Russian embassy in Minsk, that it was suspending its participation in the Black Sea grain deal.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Monday that the Black Sea agreements ceased to be valid today.

"Unfortunately, the part of these Black Sea agreements concerning Russia has not been implemented so far, so its effect is terminated," he said.

He said the decision not to renew the deal was unrelated to an overnight attack on the bridge between Russia and Crimea, which he called a "terrorist act" and blamed on Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military suggested the attack could be some kind of provocation by Russia itself but Ukrainian media cited unidentified sources as saying that Ukraine's Security Service was behind the incident.

Russia had threatened to quit the pact because it has said its demands to improve its own grain and fertilizer exports have not been met. Russia also has complained that not enough grain has reached poor countries. The United Nations has argued that the arrangement has benefited those states by helping lower food prices more than 20% globally.

"As soon as the Russian part of the agreements is fulfilled, the Russian side will return to the implementation of this deal, immediately," Peskov added.

European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called Russia's decision to suspend a Black Sea grain export deal a "cynical move", adding that the EU would continue to work towards ensuring food security for poor countries.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said that he believed Russian President Vladimir Putin wants the continuation of the deal, adding that he will discuss it when they meet in person in August.

Denys Marchuk, deputy head of the Ukrainian Agrarian Council, the main agribusiness organisation in Ukraine, said alternative routes such as river ports were more expensive to use in terms of transportation costs.

However, he expected a solution.

"As an option, why don't we assess the possibility of the continuation of the grain deal without Russia? We had experience of this already in November 2022," he added.

The reaction on the grains market was modest, with U.S. wheat futures up about 3% and European futures up about 2%, a German grains trader said.

"I think there is market belief that Russia and the EU have large supplies of wheat which can meet world demand in the coming months, with harvests arriving," he added.

However, Hasnain Malik, head of equity research at Tellimer Research said: "Suspension of the Black Sea deal is not unexpected and may bring to an end the recent softening of commodity grain prices. That's bad news for smaller and poorer importers in emerging markets such as Egypt."

A key Russian demand has been for the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) to be reconnected to the SWIFT international payments system. The bank was cut off from SWIFT by the European Union in June 2022 over Russia's invasion.

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres made a final effort on Tuesday to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to extend the grain deal for several months in exchange for the EU connecting a subsidiary of Rosselkhozbank to SWIFT for grain and fertilizer transactions, sources said.

Reporting by Michelle Nichols; additional reporting by Rachel More in Berlin, Micheal Hogan in Hamburg Bansari Mayur Kamdar in Bangalore, Huseyin Hayatsever and Ali Kucukgocmen in Istanbul, Max Hunder in Kyiv and Reuters bureaux; writing by Nina Chestney; Editing by Will Dunham, William Maclean and David Evans

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Michelle Nichols

6. Majority of Americans say TikTok is a threat to national security

Graphics at the link: https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/07/10/majority-of-americans-say-tiktok-is-a-threat-to-national-security/

JULY 10, 2023

Majority of Americans say TikTok is a threat to national security

BY COLLEEN MCCLAIN

About six-in-ten Americans (59%) see TikTok as a major or minor threat to national security in the United States, according to a new Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults that comes as the platform faces scrutiny from lawmakers over its ties to China and the security of users’ data.

How we did this

Just 17% of Americans say the platform is not a threat to national security and another 23% aren’t sure.

Opinions about the national security threat posed by TikTok differ along partisan lines, as was the case in another recent survey that asked Americans about a government ban on the platform. In the new survey, seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say TikTok is a threat to national security in the U.S., compared with 53% of Democrats and Democratic leaners.

Conservative Republicans stand out in how big of a threat they see in TikTok. Half say TikTok is a major threat to national security in the U.S., while about a quarter or fewer say the same among moderate or liberal Republicans or among Democrats of any ideology.

Views of TikTok as a threat also vary by age. Just 13% of adults ages 18 to 29 say TikTok is a major threat. This share climbs steadily across age groups, reaching 46% among Americans 65 and older.

Adults who do not use TikTok are more likely than those who do to consider it a national security risk. Still, about four-in-ten TikTok users say the platform is a threat to the country. Among users, those ages 30 and older are more likely than those 18 to 29 see the platform as a threat (47% vs. 34%). Republican TikTok users are also more likely than Democratic users to hold this view (48% vs. 40%).

Policymakers at the federal and state levels have increasingly questioned TikTok’s practices regarding user data in recent months, fearing that the Chinese government could access information about Americans. These concerns led to the banning of the app from federal government devices and from all devices in the state of Montana. Recent accusations that TikTok misled Congress about its data use practices – and that the Chinese government may have accessed Hong Kong users’ data – continue to fuel debate.

The Center’s survey was conducted in mid-May, around the same time Montana’s TikTok ban was announced.

The survey also finds that the public is uneasy about TikTok’s data use practices. Some 64% of Americans say they are very or somewhat concerned about how TikTok uses data it collects from its users. Another 34% are not at all or not too concerned.

Republicans – especially those who identify as conservative – again are more wary than Democrats about the platform. About seven-in-ten Republicans (72%) are very or somewhat concerned about how TikTok uses data it collects from its users, compared with 60% of Democrats.

Roughly half of conservative Republicans (48%) say they are very concerned about TikTok’s data use practices, compared with much smaller shares of moderate or liberal Republicans and Democrats across ideological groups.

Age is also a factor when it comes to concern about TikTok’s data use practices. Three-quarters of adults ages 65 and older are at least somewhat concerned about how this data is being used by TikTok, compared with 68% of those 50 to 64, 61% of those 30 to 49 and 54% of those 18 to 29.

Views also vary by use of the platform, though reservations about TikTok’s data collection are not uncommon among users. Some 69% of Americans who have not used TikTok say they’re at least somewhat concerned about how the platform uses the data it collects, compared with half of TikTok users who say the same.

Note: Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

Topics Defense & National SecurityOnline Privacy & SecurityTikTok

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Colleen McClain  is a research associate focusing on internet and technology research at Pew Research Center.

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7. Putin’s Threats To Zaporizhhia Nuclear Power Plant Endangers Energy Transition

Excerpts:

The situation at the ZNPP is grim. Not only is Putin playing Russian roulette with the apocalypse, but he could damage one of the greenest sources of energy necessary to decarbonize. Even if absolutely nothing goes wrong at the ZNPP and all the accusations are merely psyops, or if something minor occurs, consider for a moment the damage the Three Mile Island accident had in the United States on nuclear power, even though zero people were harmed. Chernobyl (1986) and the Fukushima-Daiichi accident in Japan (2011) changed the worldwide discourse on nuclear power (although Japan has re-embraced it).

...

The Geneva Convention and the Budapest Memorandum, in conjunction, create a legal basis for protecting the ZNPP. While the difficulty in enforcing international law is hardly unique to Russia and the ZNPP, nuclear industry powers, including the U.S., France, Korea, Japan, and yes, China, need to increase the application of available legal and sanctions tools against Russia and Russian state and quasi-state actors.

Putin’s Threats To Zaporizhhia Nuclear Power Plant Endangers Energy Transition

Forbes · by Ariel Cohen · July 16, 2023

Carl Sagan once said, “The nuclear arms race is like two sworn enemies standing waist-deep in gasoline, one with three matches, the other with five.” The near-universal recognition of the futility of an all-out nuclear war led to widespread cuts in nuclear armaments since Gorbachev’s perestroika and the Soviet collapse in 1991. Even anti-communist hawks like former President Ronald Reagan pragmatically cut nuclear arms. The US and the USSR cut strategic arsenals from over 30,000 warheads each to approximately 1550 by 2011.

For decades, nuclear saber-rattling was mostly excised from “polite geopolitics” and confined to “eccentric” rouge states like North Korea, while the anti-status quo powers like Iran made an all-out effort to acquire nukes for regional domination and regime protection.

That was until Russia re-invaded Ukraine in February 2022, putting Ukraine’s massive nuclear energy sector, which generated 50 percent of the country’s electricity before the war, at risk.

Since the invasion, Russia has consistently threatened nuclear retaliation and escalated its rhetoric toward the West with nuclear threats as its conventional army flounders. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian troops dug trenches at, and spread radiation from, the infamous Chornobyl nuclear plant during their initial attack on Kyiv. They recklessly attacked the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in March 2022 even as technicians were livestreamed begging the Russians to stop endangering the safety of Europe by shooting at the plant.

... [+]Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

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Former Russian President Dimitry Medvedev repeatedly warned of a “nuclear apocalypse”, as Russia has stationed nuclear weapons in Belarus, and the Russian military consciously interdicted Ukrainian nuclear targets, first and foremost Zaporizhzhia, and threatened their capacity to operate safely. Now, Russia is courting disaster at the ZNPP during Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

This should not be viewed as merely “the boy who cried wolf.” There is a consistent pattern of Russian rhetoric and threats that warrants serious attention. Moscow endeavors to control threat escalation by accusing Ukraine of what Russia does. Before Russian provocations in the past, such as with the explosion of the Nova Kakhovka dam, Moscow claimed Ukraine would do that. Russia acted precisely as it accused its enemies.

Worryingly, Russian state media agency TASS proclaims Ukraine may attack the ZNPP with radioactive bombs, while evidence has emerged of Russian sabotage at the ZNPP, which the Kremlin denies. Ukraine has absolutely no incentive to irradiate its territory and isolate its vital allies amid a counter-offensive.

The situation at the ZNPP is grim. Not only is Putin playing Russian roulette with the apocalypse, but he could damage one of the greenest sources of energy necessary to decarbonize. Even if absolutely nothing goes wrong at the ZNPP and all the accusations are merely psyops, or if something minor occurs, consider for a moment the damage the Three Mile Island accident had in the United States on nuclear power, even though zero people were harmed. Chernobyl (1986) and the Fukushima-Daiichi accident in Japan (2011) changed the worldwide discourse on nuclear power (although Japan has re-embraced it).

At the November 2022 Dialogue of Continents, I joined top nuclear policy experts to discuss how to prevent this situation from arising in the first place. There are two primary ways to prevent a repeat of the ZNPP situation, technological and institutional.

Technologically, progress is already being made. Modern Small-Modular Reactors (SMRs) under development by companies like NuScale, TerraPower, and Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) are smaller, prefabricated, cheaper, and easier to maintain and move compared to their predecessors. Even traditional large-scale nuclear power plants using new materials under development by companies like Westinghouse and Bechtel are being constructed? in Ukraine’s neighbors in Poland and Romania, which are far more durable to even direct attacks. Western governments and investors should embrace the potential of this new technology and not allow ephemeral concerns to derail this potential.

Institutionally, multiple mechanisms can be employed to protect nuclear power plants. The wartime status of nuclear power plants is outlined in the Article 56 of the Protocol Additional (I) to Geneva Conventions. The Protocol text reads that a military may not attack a nuclear plant or any objects in its vicinity unless they provide “regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.”

The Budapest Memorandum reinforces the Geneva Conventions Protocol Additional (I) and is specific to Ukraine. In the agreement, Ukraine gave up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons in exchange for protection under Russia’s nuclear umbrella and specific security guarantees for not just Ukrainian sovereignty (which Russia violated), but also for Ukrainian nuclear power generation.

The Geneva Convention and the Budapest Memorandum, in conjunction, create a legal basis for protecting the ZNPP. While the difficulty in enforcing international law is hardly unique to Russia and the ZNPP, nuclear industry powers, including the U.S., France, Korea, Japan, and yes, China, need to increase the application of available legal and sanctions tools against Russia and Russian state and quasi-state actors.

Russia is endangering civilian nuclear power for its short-term war goals in Ukraine, possibly in the hope that it can shut down any sources of power generation which might wean the West off its hydrocarbons in the long term. It may even accomplish this without a significant nuclear accident if the past events are any precedent. In the process, it will shoot its own nuclear behemoth, Rosatom, in the head.

One can only hope that Russia’s actions are unlikely to deter China’s nuclear power push or totally derail nuclear power worldwide. The West must embrace new nuclear technologies and enforce international institutional safeguards and tools to prevent the ZNPP crisis from happening, not abandon our cleanest and most efficient energy source. In an age of drones and asymmetrical warfare, we should prioritize nuclear safety but also remember that blackmail should never be rewarded.

Forbes · by Ariel Cohen · July 16, 2023

8. Ex-paratrooper walking around nation for awareness (Taiwan)

Taiwan needs to demonstrate the resolve to defend their country and use all means and all people to do so.

Excerpts:

His backpack has Taiwan’s national flag attached to it, as well as a composite patch made up of the Taiwan, Japan, Ukraine and US national flags, and a sign reading “in the middle of a round-island march.” He is also carrying a blue replica rifle.

...

A retired officer who runs an online site called “Simple talk about politics and military” (政軍簡單聊) recently tracked the former paratrooper down, for a brief talk and asked him some questions.

“No matter if you identify with the ROC [the Republic of China] or Taiwan, we all belong to this homeland. You can be a descendant of the Han race, or an indigenous person, we are all people living on this land and everyone is a firm believer in freedom and democracy,” the site quoted him as saying.

“All rivers run to the sea, which accommodates all water, and the same goes for Taiwan, which can accommodate all kinds of people. We can all live together, and we shall defend our homeland and safeguard our fellow citizens to preserve our freedom and democracy. We must do this now, and we need you and me and everyone to stand up to uphold peace,” he said.

• Home Taiwan News

Sun, Jul 16, 2023 page2

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/07/16/2003803261?utm

Ex-paratrooper walking around nation for awareness

• By Wu Che-yu and Jason Pan / Staff reporters
• 
  
•  
•  
• A former special forces paratrooper has been walking around Taiwan in the summer heat while carrying a full pack and wearing field gear to raise public awareness about national defense amid the military threat posed by China.
• Sightings of him have sparked discussions on social media, especially in groups dedicated to “huandao” (環島), or round-island travel. People have posted updates on his whereabouts, locating him near Yunlin County ‘s Douliou City (斗六) on Thursday.
• The former paratrooper has refused to give his name, but has said that he completed his service as a non-commissioned officer of the Airborne Special Operations Forces.
• 
  

A former paratrooper from the special forces, who is walking around the island, is pictured in an undated photograph.

• Photo courtesy of online site “Simple talk about politics and military”
• People in the huandao groups said he gained their attention as it is rare to see someone hiking in 37°C temperatures while wearing a uniform, flak jacket and protective pads, and carrying a full pack.
• His backpack has Taiwan’s national flag attached to it, as well as a composite patch made up of the Taiwan, Japan, Ukraine and US national flags, and a sign reading “in the middle of a round-island march.” He is also carrying a blue replica rifle.
• Many people are following him on social media, and some said he was heading south on Friday from Yunlin County to Chiayi County. Locals have also taken photographs with him and posted them online.
• A retired officer who runs an online site called “Simple talk about politics and military” (政軍簡單聊) recently tracked the former paratrooper down, for a brief talk and asked him some questions.
• “No matter if you identify with the ROC [the Republic of China] or Taiwan, we all belong to this homeland. You can be a descendant of the Han race, or an indigenous person, we are all people living on this land and everyone is a firm believer in freedom and democracy,” the site quoted him as saying.
• “All rivers run to the sea, which accommodates all water, and the same goes for Taiwan, which can accommodate all kinds of people. We can all live together, and we shall defend our homeland and safeguard our fellow citizens to preserve our freedom and democracy. We must do this now, and we need you and me and everyone to stand up to uphold peace,” he said.
• 
  

9. Typo leaks millions of US military emails to Mali web operator

Huh?? What the....? It will be interesting to learn the "rest of the story" on this.

Excerpts:

The problem was first identified almost a decade ago by Johannes Zuurbier, a Dutch internet entrepreneur who has a contract to manage Mali’s country domain.

Zuurbier has been collecting misdirected emails since January in an effort to persuade the US to take the issue seriously. He holds close to 117,000 misdirected messages — almost 1,000 arrived on Wednesday alone. In a letter he sent to the US in early July, Zuurbier wrote: “This risk is real and could be exploited by adversaries of the US.”

...

Control of the .ML domain will revert on Monday from Zuurbier to Mali’s government, which is closely allied with Russia. When Zuurbier’s 10-year management contract expires, Malian authorities will be able to gather the misdirected emails. The Malian government did not respond to requests for comment.

Zuurbier, managing director of Amsterdam-based Mali Dili, has approached US officials repeatedly, including through a defence attaché in Mali, a senior adviser to the US national cyber security service, and even White House officials.

Typo leaks millions of US military emails to Mali web operator

Financial Times · by Chris Cook · July 17, 2023

Millions of US military emails have been misdirected to Mali through a “typo leak” that has exposed highly sensitive information, including diplomatic documents, tax returns, passwords and the travel details of top officers.

Despite repeated warnings over a decade, a steady flow of email traffic continues to the .ML domain, the country identifier for Mali, as a result of people mistyping .MIL, the suffix to all US military email addresses.

The problem was first identified almost a decade ago by Johannes Zuurbier, a Dutch internet entrepreneur who has a contract to manage Mali’s country domain.

Zuurbier has been collecting misdirected emails since January in an effort to persuade the US to take the issue seriously. He holds close to 117,000 misdirected messages — almost 1,000 arrived on Wednesday alone. In a letter he sent to the US in early July, Zuurbier wrote: “This risk is real and could be exploited by adversaries of the US.”

One misdirected email included the travel itinerary of General James McConville, the US army’s chief of staff, and his delegation as they prepared for a trip to Indonesia earlier this year

Control of the .ML domain will revert on Monday from Zuurbier to Mali’s government, which is closely allied with Russia. When Zuurbier’s 10-year management contract expires, Malian authorities will be able to gather the misdirected emails. The Malian government did not respond to requests for comment.

Zuurbier, managing director of Amsterdam-based Mali Dili, has approached US officials repeatedly, including through a defence attaché in Mali, a senior adviser to the US national cyber security service, and even White House officials.

Much of the email flow is spam and none is marked as classified. But some messages contain highly sensitive data on serving US military personnel, contractors and their families.

Their contents include X-rays and medical data, identity document information, crew lists for ships, staff lists at bases, maps of installations, photos of bases, naval inspection reports, contracts, criminal complaints against personnel, internal investigations into bullying, official travel itineraries, bookings, and tax and financial records.

Mike Rogers, a retired American admiral who used to run the National Security Agency and the US Army’s Cyber Command, said: “If you have this kind of sustained access, you can generate intelligence even just from unclassified information.”

“This is not uncommon,” he added. “It’s not out of the norm that people make mistakes but the question is the scale, the duration and the sensitivity of the information.”

One misdirected email this year included the travel plans for General James McConville, the chief of staff of the US army, and his delegation for a then-forthcoming visit to Indonesia in May.

The email included a full list of room numbers, the itinerary for McConville and 20 others, as well as details of the collection of McConville’s room key at the Grand Hyatt Jakarta, where he received a VIP upgrade to a grand suite.

Rogers warned the transfer of control to Mali posed a significant problem. “It’s one thing when you are dealing with a domain administrator who is trying, even unsuccessfully, to articulate the concern,” said Rogers. “It’s another when it’s a foreign government that . . . sees it as an advantage that they can use.”

Lt. Cmdr Tim Gorman, a spokesman for the Pentagon, said the Department of Defense “is aware of this issue and takes all unauthorised disclosures of controlled national security information or controlled unclassified information seriously”.

He said that emails sent directly from the .mil domain to Malian addresses “are blocked before they leave the .mil domain and the sender is notified that they must validate the email addresses of the intended recipients”.

When Zuurbier — who has managed similar operations for Tokelau, the Central African Republic, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea — took on the Mali country code in 2013, he rapidly noticed requests for domains such as army.ml and navy.ml, which did not exist. Suspecting this was actually email, he set up a system to catch any such correspondence, which was rapidly overwhelmed and stopped collecting messages.

Zuurbier says that, after realising what was happening and taking legal advice, he made repeated attempts to alert the US authorities. He told the Financial Times that he gave his wife a copy of the legal advice “just in case the black helicopters landed in my backyard”.

His efforts to raise the alarm included joining a trade mission from the Netherlands in 2014 to enlist the help of Dutch diplomats. In 2015, he made a further effort to alert the US authorities, to no avail. Zuurbier began collecting misaddressed email once again this year in a final bid to alert the Pentagon.

The flow of data shows some systematic sources of leakage. Travel agents working for the military routinely misspell emails. Staff sending emails between their own accounts are also a problem.

One FBI agent with a naval role sought to forward six messages to their military email — and accidentally dispatched them to Mali. One included an urgent Turkish diplomatic letter to the US state department about possible operations by the militant Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) against Turkish interests in the US.

One FBI agent regularly mistyped their own email when forwarding notes, including an alert from the Turkish embassy in Washington on potential activities by a designated terrorist group

The same person also forwarded a series of briefings on domestic US terrorism marked “For Official Use Only” and a global counter-terrorism assessment headlined “Not Releasable to the Public or Foreign Governments”. A “sensitive” briefing on efforts by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to use Iranian students and the Telegram messaging app to conduct espionage in the US was also included.

Gorman told the FT: “While it is not possible to implement technical controls preventing the use of personal email accounts for government business, the department continues to provide direction and training to DoD personnel.”

Around a dozen people mistakenly requested recovery passwords for an intelligence community system to be sent to Mali. Others sent the passwords needed to access documents hosted on the Department of Defence’s secure access file exchange. The FT did not attempt to use the passwords.

Many emails are from private contractors working with the US military. Twenty routine updates from defence contractor General Dynamics related to the production of grenade training cartridges to the army.

Some emails contain passport numbers sent by the state department’s special issuances agency, an entity that issues documents to diplomats and others travelling on official business for the US.

The Dutch army uses the domain army.nl, a keystroke away from army.ml. There are more than a dozen emails from serving Dutch personnel that included discussions with Italian counterparts about an ammunition pick-up in Italy and detailed exchanges on Dutch Apache helicopters crews in the US.

Others included discussions of future military procurement options and a complaint about a Dutch Apache unit’s potential vulnerability to cyber attack.

The Dutch ministry of defence did not respond to a request for comment.

Eight emails from the Australian Department of Defence, intended for US recipients, went astray. Those included a presentation about corrosion problems affecting Australian F-35s and an artillery manual “carried by command post officers for each battery”.

The Australian defence ministry said it does “not comment on security matters”.

Financial Times · by Chris Cook · July 17, 2023

10. The disturbing evolution of China’s foreign policy

Conclusion:

In light of China’s increasing defiance, it is imperative that the international community rally behind these activists, ensuring their safety and continuing to uphold the values of freedom and democracy. Most importantly, countries such as Australia, the US and the UK should get ready for the resurgence of Chinese ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ and growing statecraft capabilities. As we witness a surge in China’s destabilising actions, it is essential to have coordinated and assertive responses to address this emerging global challenge.

The disturbing evolution of China’s foreign policy | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Sunny Cheung · July 14, 2023

The international community has recently been rocked by the Hong Kong government’s chilling decision to place bounties on eight exiled activists, two of whom are currently residing in Australia. This show of transnational repression, a disturbing extension of law enforcement beyond territorial borders, is a brazen violation of human rights, personal freedoms and national sovereignty.

While it may seem like a drastic manoeuvre to silence dissidents, thereby accelerating Hong Kong’s metamorphosis into an autocratic society, this move prompts us to delve deeper into the real motives. A majority of these activists have been living in exile for two to three years. Their international advocacy against China’s restrictive policies is a matter of public record—and, more importantly, many of them had already been wanted by authorities prior to the bounty announcements. So why the sudden decision to put a price on their heads in front of the world?

The answer may lie in a critical event that transpired just two days before the bounty hunt was announced. On 1 July, the new Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China came into effect after it was ratified by the National People’s Congress. The legislation anchors President Xi Jinping’s control over all of China’s diplomatic and national security affairs, marking a significant shift in the country’s global orientation.

The timing of these arrests suggests an attempt by the Hong Kong government to signal its unwavering alignment with Beijing. By placing a bounty on the heads of these exiled activists, the Hong Kong authorities are demonstrating that the days of foreign influence and ‘collusion’ are unequivocally over.

Hong Kong, long viewed as an Achilles’ heel by Beijing, has been a symbol of pro-democracy sentiment and the fight for universal suffrage for decades. The region’s civic tenacity was most clearly demonstrated during the anti-extradition bill protests of 2019, when around two million people took to the streets in a powerful display of civic dissent. The protests severely embarrassed Xi and the Chinese Communist Party, leading them to label the movement a ‘colour revolution’ and accelerate their efforts to repress such dissent.

Likewise, the influence of the Hong Kong activists reached well beyond their city to help reshape international relations and foreign policy during the movement. A particularly powerful achievement was the successful push for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2019 in the US Congress. The bipartisan and bicameral legislation marked a major turning point in relations between the US and China, unprecedentedly authorising the US administration to sanction Hong Kong and Chinese officials in response to the clash. That move further inspired Hong Kong activists to push for similar bills across the globe, including the ratification of a global Magnitsky-style act in Australia.

This, of course, unsettled Beijing. By transforming Hong Kong from an alleged domestic issue into a global concern, the activists have put pressure on China and forced it to deal with an international audience.

The sequence of legislation and action by Beijing should therefore not come as a surprise. With the introduction of the national security law in Hong Kong in 2020, followed by the anti-foreign sanctions law in 2021, the anti-espionage law in April 2023 and the latest foreign relations law in China, Xi’s growing intolerance for international intervention and sanctions has become increasingly apparent. These laws are both silencing the very nationals who dare to voice their dissent and building a line of defence against the West’s economic and military statecraft.

To have a closer look, Article 7 of China’s anti-espionage law vaguely but pointedly states that all citizens bear the obligation to protect the country and its national security, honour and interests. Article 8 of the new foreign relations law and Article 10 of the anti-espionage law both state that ‘anyone or any organisation that violates this law and relevant laws, and engages in activities harming national interests in foreign relations, shall be held legally responsible’. Notably, these laws don’t only target foreigners but extend to everyone residing in the country, making it clear that anyone aiding foreign actions contrary to Beijing’s interests could face severe legal consequences.

The new laws vest local authorities with sweeping powers to neutralise anyone suspected of aiding, abetting or encouraging foreign sanctions or actions deemed adversarial to Beijing and Xi. After the decision to place bounties on the activists, the Hong Kong National Security Police took away for questioning two family members of one of the wanted activists. That action also fits right into the narrative, serving as a form of relational repression aimed at isolating and intimidating dissidents—a strategy consistently adopted by the CCP in mainland China.

Coincidentally, a day after the widely publicised bounty announcement, China said that it would impose export restrictions on gallium and germanium products—critical components in computer chips—purportedly to protect national security interests. This will have an adverse impact on global supply chains and is a reminder to the world that China is gearing up to take a stand and unwilling to be passive in the face of perceived foreign hostilities and sanctions. China understands well that its biggest asymmetric advantage comes from its economic strength, surveillance capabilities and transnational repression.

In light of China’s increasing defiance, it is imperative that the international community rally behind these activists, ensuring their safety and continuing to uphold the values of freedom and democracy. Most importantly, countries such as Australia, the US and the UK should get ready for the resurgence of Chinese ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ and growing statecraft capabilities. As we witness a surge in China’s destabilising actions, it is essential to have coordinated and assertive responses to address this emerging global challenge.

Sunny Cheung is a visiting fellow at Johns Hopkins University and a former protest leader in Hong Kong. Image: Fred Dufour/AFP via Getty Images.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Sunny Cheung · July 14, 2023

11. Six partners, 3,000 miles: Air Mobility Command undertakes largest readiness exercise in Indo-Pacific

One law cannot be violated no matter how hard we try: the law of physics - time and distance.​ Unfortunately this law especially governs our activities in the INDOPACIFIC.

Six partners, 3,000 miles: Air Mobility Command undertakes largest readiness exercise in Indo-Pacific

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · July 17, 2023

KC-135 Stratotankers park at Yokota Air Base, Japan, July 7, 2023. The aircraft were taking part in Mobility Guardian 23, the largest readiness exercise in Air Mobility Command's history. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

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YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — Thousands of airmen and dozens of aircraft are deployed throughout the Indo-Pacific this month for the largest readiness exercise in the history of Air Mobility Command, according to the U.S. Air Force.

Mobility Guardian, which began July 5 and concludes Friday, involves forces from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, France and Japan, the service said in a statement at the start of the drill.

The exercise, held in the Indo-Pacific for the first time, involves moving more than 15,000 U.S. and international forces across the region, the statement said.

The training includes resupply missions, aerial refueling and medical evacuations at bases in Hawaii, Guam, Australia and Japan.

U.S. and British airmen carry out medical training aboard Royal Air Force A400M Atlas over Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, July 14, 2023. The drill was part of Mobility Guardian 23. (Devin Rumbaugh/U.S. Air Force)

Mobility Guardian includes 70 aircraft at multiple spots across a 3,000-mile exercise area. One of them is the Air Force’s newest tanker, the KC-46 Pegasus, the service said in a follow-up statement July 5.

Pegasus tankers and active-duty and Reserve airmen from the 22nd and 931st Air Refueling Wings passed through Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, earlier this month as part of the training, Capt. Allen Gutierez, a 5th Air Force spokesman said in an email July 10.

“Their final destination is Australia where they will support MG23 operations,” he said.

The Air Force released photos on July 11 of KC-135 Stratotankers taking part in the exercise at Yokota, the U.S. airlift hub in western Tokyo.

An E-3 Sentry aircraft refuels somewhere over the Indo-Pacific region during Mobility Guardian 23, July 12, 2023. (Zachary Willis/U.S. Air Force)

The exercise comes amid heightened tensions with Beijing, which has been investing heavily in its military. Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated his intent to reunite the autonomous and democratic island of Taiwan with mainland China, by force if necessary.

Air Force Gen. Michael Minihan, who oversees the Air Mobility Command’s fleet of transport and refueling aircraft, in January warned his airmen to speed their preparations for a potential conflict, citing Xi’s aspirations and the possibility that Americans will not be paying attention until it is too late.

“I don’t believe conflict is inevitable. I don’t believe it’s unavoidable,” Minihan told NBC News for a Thursday report from Pacific Air Forces headquarters in Hawaii. “But I also believe that ready now is what matters most. So ready now is the foundation of deterrence. And ready now is also the foundation of decisive victory.”

The general said he isn’t trying to be provocative.

“I’m trying to provide my formation with the tools and the action and the priority necessary to win,” he said.

Seth Robson

Seth Robson

Seth Robson is a Tokyo-based reporter who has been with Stars and Stripes since 2003. He has been stationed in Japan, South Korea and Germany, with frequent assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Australia and the Philippines.

previous coverage

• US general warns troops that war with China is possible in two years

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · July 17, 2023

12. India Ups the Ante Against China in Beijing’s Lake

Excerpts:

The big question, however, is whether India’s cautious entanglement with such a system would really pay New Delhi off. In simple words, would the US come to India’s help in the wake of an actual military conflict with China in Ladakh?

As critics have pointed out, in any potential conflict between China and India, the battlefield would be Ladakh, not the US, which means the US would have no direct stake in such a conflict. There is not a hint of a defense treaty that would make the former’s participation mandatory, nor is there likely to be anytime soon. Even if India decides to engage with NATO, the latter is far from having a formal military presence in the region, as many ASEAN countries remain very much open to extending and deepening trade ties with China and creating a system of complex interdependence.

New Delhi’s options are further complicated by the fact that Washington is unlikely to offer a formal defense treaty against China without extracting critical concessions from India, especially with regard to India’s ties with Moscow.

In other words, for India to really up the ante against China in the region, it needs Washington’s help. But Washington’s help is unlikely to become fully-fledged without India making critical changes in its foreign policy. The Indian leader gave a hint of possible change at the SCO summit. Whether or not this will take a permanent turn remains to be seen. However, if – and whenever – India takes that turn, this will also mark the end of its strategic autonomy within today’s multipolar world.

POLITICS

India Ups the Ante Against China in Beijing’s Lake

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/india-against-china-ladakh?utm

Decision to support UNCLOS decision lays down a regional marker

JUL 17, 2023

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By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

The surprise reversal by India of its previously neutral stance to extend its support to the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea nullifying the legitimacy of China’s so-called “nine-dash line” is a step by Delhi to raise its regional profile and delineate a more vigorous role against Beijing.

China has ignored the July 12, 2016 decision by the arbitral tribunal in the Hague, which held overwhelmingly for the Philippines, determining that major elements of China’s claim including recent land reclamation on islets and other activities in Philippine waters were unlawful under the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

India’s statement of support for the Philippines, delivered to Enrique A. Manalo during a June visit by the Philippines’ foreign secretary, comes at a time when China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are in the midst of intense negotiations over a mutually agreed code of conduct for the strategically crucial sea corridor that China claims as its exclusive region. With India changing its stance in the wake of its own tensions with China in Ladakh, Beijing is increasingly facing diplomatic isolation.

New Delhi has apparently started a game of real politics. For India, taking a standard position on this regional dispute means tapping into a major geopolitical alignment that has its roots spread as far as Washington, where policymakers, for the past several years, have been trying to build a global coalition against China. In Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, New Delhi does have a prominent role to play. Now that New Delhi is starting to reinforce Washington’s stance vis-à-vis China and its involvement in regional disputes, it can only be a very encouraging sign for the Biden administration as well as that of the littoral nations of the South China Sea, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, which have been the most confrontational to China, albeit ineffectively in the face of China’s overwhelming military advantage and aggressiveness.

India’s decision to reverse its previous position comes against the backdrop of New Delhi’s own inability to reclaim the territory it lost to China in the Ladakh region a few years ago. As Indian intelligence reported to the Indian Congress in August-2020, China has about 1,000 sq. km in Ladakh under its control. With Delhi finding itself unable to push China back, it finds itself in the same position as the Southeast Asian nations. Supporting the latter’s stance against China, therefore, makes sense for India.

This diplomatic reversal is also tied to India’s other forays into Southeast Asia. With an eye on the ASEAN countries’ territorial conflict with China, Delhi is actively seeking to sell its arms to them to better equip themselves against a Chinese confrontation. In March, the India-based defense firm BrahMos Aerospace said it was in advanced discussions with Indonesia on a US$200 million supersonic cruise missile deal. The Philippines is also scheduled to receive its first delivery of these missiles from India.

In May, India held its first maritime exercise with ASEAN in the South China Sea, leading Chinese maritime militias to approach the area where the exercise was being held. Although China denied its presence, Indian authorities confirmed that they were tracking at least five Chinese vessels, symbolizing the coming together of India and ASEAN against a coming rival. For many, this is the coming of age of India’s “Look East” policy.

This coming of age is coinciding with a growing shift in India’s foreign policy towards Washington, most recently evident in the recent SCO summit, where India’s Modi, in sharp contrast to the Chinese and Russian leaders, not only questioned the SCO’s feasibility but also downplayed its significance when he invited the organization to “ collectively ponder upon” whether the SCO is “evolving into an organization that is fully prepared for the future,” 

Modi and his administration are thus also warming to an organization prepared well for the future: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its growing presence in Asia. In fact, Washington’s NATO Ambassador Julianne Smith recently said that, while the organization was not looking to have any members from Asia, it was very much open to more engagement with countries like India.

“In terms of the future with India, I think NATO’s door is open in terms of engagement should India be interested,” she said. “But we would not want to at this stage invite them to NATO ministerial until we knew more about their interest in engaging the alliance more broadly.”

This possibility of engagement with India is encouraged by the fact that four countries located outside of the Euro-Atlantic region have already established ties with NATO and their officials were present in the recent meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in April. These are Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan. Of these four, India is already allied with Australia and Japan alongside the US in the anti-China Quadrilateral Security Group (QUAD), consequently binding India with a presence in the region with a visible preference for a Euro-Atlantic-led system of combined security.

The big question, however, is whether India’s cautious entanglement with such a system would really pay New Delhi off. In simple words, would the US come to India’s help in the wake of an actual military conflict with China in Ladakh?

As critics have pointed out, in any potential conflict between China and India, the battlefield would be Ladakh, not the US, which means the US would have no direct stake in such a conflict. There is not a hint of a defense treaty that would make the former’s participation mandatory, nor is there likely to be anytime soon. Even if India decides to engage with NATO, the latter is far from having a formal military presence in the region, as many ASEAN countries remain very much open to extending and deepening trade ties with China and creating a system of complex interdependence.

New Delhi’s options are further complicated by the fact that Washington is unlikely to offer a formal defense treaty against China without extracting critical concessions from India, especially with regard to India’s ties with Moscow.

In other words, for India to really up the ante against China in the region, it needs Washington’s help. But Washington’s help is unlikely to become fully-fledged without India making critical changes in its foreign policy. The Indian leader gave a hint of possible change at the SCO summit. Whether or not this will take a permanent turn remains to be seen. However, if – and whenever – India takes that turn, this will also mark the end of its strategic autonomy within today’s multipolar world.

Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). He holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from SOAS, University of London. He is a longtime regular contributor to Asia Sentinel

13​. China’s Economy Barely Grows as Recovery Fades

Graphics at the link.

China’s Economy Barely Grows as Recovery Fades

The country’s rebound from its Covid-19 reopening has lost momentum

By Jason Douglas

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Updated July 17, 2023 7:04 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-economy-barely-grows-as-recovery-fades-5652a92a?mod=hp_lead_pos1

China’s retail sales in June rose just 0.2% compared with May, a sign that households are wary of spending. PHOTO: CFOTO/NURPHOTO/ZUMA PRESS

SINGAPORE—China’s economy barely grew in the second quarter from the first quarter and youth unemployment hit a record high in June, providing evidence of a fading recovery that risks leaving the global economy underpowered this year as recession stalks the U.S. and Europe.

The sluggish pace of growth in 2023 is piling pressure on Beijing to reignite an expansion that is in danger of fizzling out as consumers refrain from spending and exports slump. A drawn-out real estate crunch and shaky local-government finances are compounding the gloom. 

China’s economy grew just 0.8% in the second quarter compared with the first three months of the year, and more than a fifth of Chinese aged 16 to 24 are out of work.

The struggle to keep growth motoring ahead is the most pressing challenge among a lengthy list of issues facing Chinese leader Xi Jinping and his top officials. A difficult relationship with the U.S.-led West is squeezing investment in China. Beijing is sparring with Washington over semiconductors and the materials needed to make them. Russia, an ally, is sunk in a quagmire of its own making in Ukraine.

Growth in the second quarter was less than half the 2.2% quarterly pace recorded in the January-to-March period. The result reflected weak retail sales, subdued private-sector investment and a reversal in exports, which had propelled growth throughout the pandemic but are suffering now as major central banks ratchet up interest rates.

On an annual basis, economic growth accelerated, helped by a favorable comparison with 2022, when growth collapsed because of sporadic lockdowns under a government policy aimed at eliminating even the tiniest Covid-19 outbreaks. That weakness in 2022 means the economy is still expected to meet or even exceed officials’ goal of expanding by around 5% this year. 

But the loss of momentum after an initial burst of activity at the beginning of the year means China will need to do more to revive household and business confidence and get the economy back on track, economists say. China’s currency, the yuan, was down 0.2% against the U.S. dollar in offshore trading early Monday in Asia. 

“The Chinese economy is clearly sputtering,” said Eswar Prasad, professor of trade policy and economics at Cornell University and a former head of the International Monetary Fund’s China division. He said the figures highlight the need for more stimulus to power faster growth, as well as policy changes that will help revive confidence in China’s private sector and spur faster productivity growth.

Compared with the same quarter the previous year, growth in the second quarter accelerated to 6.3% from a 4.5% annual pace in the first quarter, a worse performance than the 6.9% pace expected by economists polled by The Wall Street Journal. The pickup in the annual rate was flattered by a deep slump in the second quarter of last year, when businesses in Shanghai were closed to contain a citywide outbreak of Covid-19. 

Beijing abandoned its strict Covid controls around the turn of the year, paving the way for a rebound in activity as businesses resumed trading and consumers spent some of the savings they had squirreled away during the pandemic.

The hope was that China’s consumers would step up to power a durable recovery and a prolonged slide in the real-estate sector would turn around, buoying the economy with demand for exports weakening as stubbornly high inflation and rising borrowing costs curbed spending in the West.

Monday’s data suggests that hope was misplaced. Retail sales in June rose just 0.2% compared with May, a sign that households are wary of spending. Economists say their caution reflects anxiety about jobs and the wider economy as well as the lingering scars of the pandemic, such as lost income and jobs.

China’s headline measure of joblessness, the surveyed urban unemployment rate, held steady at 5.2% in June. But youth unemployment rose yet again, with joblessness among those aged 16 to 24 rising to 21.3% in June from 20.8% in May.

Investment in buildings, machinery and other fixed assets rose just 0.4% in June compared with May, hurt by weakness in real estate. Industrial production expanded 0.7% over the same period. 

Residential buildings under construction in Zhengzhou, China. PHOTO: QILAI SHEN/BLOOMBERG NEWS

China’s postpandemic recovery has taken a different shape than those of other major economies. Consumer spending in the U.S. and Europe bounced back quickly after their reopenings thanks to government support for workers’ incomes. Joblessness fell. Inflation shot up, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent global food and commodity prices higher. 

China, by contrast, recorded zero inflation in June. That was weaker than in Japan, for years a poster child of economic stagnation and sinking prices.

There has been better economic news in the U.S. Inflation cooled last month to its lowest pace in two years, strengthening expectations the Federal Reserve will be able to finish its interest-rate increases without tanking the economy.

Elsewhere, though, economic signals suggest the global economy is losing steam. Manufacturing activity is weak across the board. Data from China and other Asian economies suggest trade is taking another lurch downward. 

The World Bank expects global economic growth to slow in the second half of the year as aggressive moves by central banks to tame inflation take a toll on activity. The Washington, D.C.-based lender expects the global economy to expand 2.1% this year, down from 3.1% in 2022. 

Economists say Chinese authorities will need to do more to prop up the faltering recovery. The People’s Bank of China has cut benchmark interest rates in an effort to drive growth, but economists say lower borrowing costs might not help much since consumers and businesses seem reluctant to take on new loans.

Instead, economists say the government should step in with direct support for households to buoy consumption, create new jobs and reignite confidence in the economy. Measures could include handouts to low-income households, income-tax cuts or lifting spending on social programs to free up more household income for spending, said Prasad, of Cornell University.

Chinese officials have signaled a reluctance to undertake large-scale stimulus measures, preferring instead a piecemeal approach so as to avoid piling on too much debt. Beijing is also seeking to shift the country’s priorities away from rapid growth at all costs toward steps that help prepare China for rising tensions with the rest of the world and possible conflict.

“China’s recovery is going from bad to worse,” said Harry Murphy Cruise, an economist at Moody’s Analytics, in a note to clients. “Increasingly, 2023 is looking like a year to forget for China.” 

Write to Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the July 17, 2023, print edition as 'China’s Economy Barely Grew in Quarter'.

​14. Light Reaction Regiment: The Sharpshooters of Death (Philippines)

Members of 1st Special Forcse Group should be proud of this effort. They built a self sustaining organization and worked themselves out of a job.

Light Reaction Regiment: The Sharpshooters of Death

greydynamics.com · by Mark Christian Soo · July 4, 2023

The Light Reaction Regiment (LRR) is the Philippine Army’s counterterrorism unit that was officially established on February 1, 2004. The LRR is mandated to conduct counterterrorism and other special forces operations on Philippine soil. The unit is sometimes known as the Philippine Delta Force due to its counterterrorism experience and lineage from receiving American special forces training and in particular Delta Force. [source].

The LRR is based in Fort Ramon Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, where they are posted alongside the Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) [source]. The unit is under the command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command (AFPSCOCOM) [source].

The unit’s motto is Tiradores de la Muerte (Sharpshooters of Death), which was adopted from the Luna Sharpshooters, an elite unit of marksmen formed by General Antonio Luna of the Philippine Revolutionary Army [source].

Colonel Monico E. Abang was appointed as the unit’s commanding officer, taking over from Brigadier General Monico S. Batle [source].

1.0. History

In 2000, The United States Pacific Command (now US Indo-Pacific Command) planning team under ADM Dennis C. Blair of Special Operations Command – Pacific (SOCPAC), the Joint U.S Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), the Philippine Government, and the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) met in Manila to begin planning to organize, train, and equip the Philippines’ own Counter Terrorism (CT) force. [source]

B Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) was tasked to develop a comprehensive six-month training for the 1st Light Reaction Company. The first company was composed of members from the Philippine Army Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) (SFR[A]) and the Philippine Army First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR). The training was based on the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School’s Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, and Exploitation Techniques Course (SFARTAETC), a CT training outside of CAG’s Operator’s Training Course (OTC). [source]

The plan was reinforced and enhanced after the 9/11 attacks when the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and designated the Philippines as a Non-Major Treaty Ally. [source]

1.1. First Deployment

After the LRC was established on February 1, 2004, the unit was deployed to Mindanao to conduct hostage rescue operations.

1.1.1. First name change

The unit renamed the Light Reaction Battalion in 2008, was temporarily posted in Metro Manila after the events of the siege at the Peninsula Manila Hotel due to an attempted coup in November 2007 [source].

1.1.2. Scandal

The LRB was in a scandal when 50 operators, including 3 officers, were placed on suspension due to possible involvement in killing civilians on February 4, 2008, during combat operations against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) [source]. An investigation later revealed that an unreliable informant provided false information so that he can take advantage of the ongoing combat operations to get rid of a rival clan [source].

During the hostage crisis incident at Quirino Grandstand, Rizal Park in Manila, the unit was offered to the PNP to be involved in a possible hostage rescue op [source]. They were only told to be on standby and wait for orders.

1.1.3. Second Name Change

In 2014, the LRB changed names again, this time to the Light Reaction Regiment, due to their efforts in fighting against rogue Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighters in Zamboanga City in September 2013. Defense Secretary Voltaire Defense Secretary Gazmin authorized the name change on January 16, 2014. This also included the establishment of three more companies to the LRR to complement the first three companies, giving the unit a combat strength of 600 operators [source].

On September 4, 2018, the U.S. Counterterrorism Train and Equip Program provided the LRR with 5 million rounds of ammunition worth Php117.4 million ($2.2 million) [source].

LRR commandos; via Philippine government Public Domain.

2.0. Doctrine

The Light Reaction Regiment is the dedicated Special Missions Unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Its doctrine is Counterterrorism, Special Operations, and Unconventional Warfare. Its main mission is to conduct surgical strike operations against high-value targets and support conventional units in conventional operations.

3.0. Organisation

Open sources indicate that the Light Reaction Regiment is composed of one (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Support Company (HHC), six (6) Light Reaction Companies, and the Light Reaction School (LRS). The unit’s headquarters is located in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija. [source]

3.1. Headquarters

• Commanding Officer, Light Reaction Regiment
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (G1)
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2)
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G3)
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics (G4)
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans (G5)
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Surveillance (G6)
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations (G7)
• Headquarters Support Company

3.2. Line Commands

• 1st Light Reaction Company (Exemius Ferratus)
• 2nd Light Reaction Company (Nasiglat)
• 3rd Light Reaction Company (Way Kurat)
• 4th Light Reaction Company (Perdigones)
• 5th Light Reaction Company (Mandaragit)
• 6th Light Reaction Company (Dares Against Odds)

4.0. SELECTION AND TRAINING

All candidates must be Special Forces or Scout Ranger-qualified and have served at least two years in combat deployment. The Light Reaction School administers the selection and training of potential candidates. The selection kicks off with the traditional mase-mase (intense physical exercises) immediately followed by a Physical Fitness Test (PFT) without rest. After the PFT, candidates are subjected to a series of timed land navigation exercises with unknown distances and time-limit, similar to the US Army’s CAG selection process. [source]

It ends with a panel interview with the unit’s commanding officer, available assistant chief of staffs, the unit’s sergeant major, and line company commanders.

4.1. The Counter Terrorism Course

The Counter Terrorism Course (CTC) is divided into four (4) distinct modules:

1. Combat Life-Saver Phase

• The length of this module is three (3) weeks that teach CT candidates Tactical Combat Casualty Care Procedures (TCCCP), TCCP is the middle ground of basic combat first-aid and advanced combat medical care.

1. Basic Pistol/Rifle Marksmanship Phase

• Mastering the basics is a fundamental aspect of being an operator. This phase essentially gives already SOF-qualified candidates a crash course to further enhance their existing marksmanship skillsets before advancing to more advanced modules.

This phase ends with a graded marksmanship test using M4 with iron sight and an M1911 pistol.

1. Combat Marksmanship Phase

• This phase teaches candidates how to shoot, move, and communicate in a dynamic combat environment. The TTPs in this phase are classified and unique only to the unit.

This phase ends with a stress test where candidates are subjected to different battle scenarios that will assess their competencies in combat marksmanship.

1. Close Quarters Battle (CQB) Phase

• This is the longest phase of the whole CTC course that spans at least two (2) months. The CQB Phase teaches candidates how to conduct surgical operations on urban terrain. From mission planning to a proficient execution of the operation.
• This phase ends with a whole-day culminating graded pass/fail event that will test candidates in all of the modules in a series of simulated events. Failed candidates are given a chance to recycle on the next CT course.

Light Reaction Sniper Course (formerly known as Special Operations Target Interdiction Course)

The unit’s successful exploits in the Marawi Siege compelled the regiment to change SOTIC’s curriculum by applying the lessons learned during the siege. Before the curriculum change, potential snipers for the unit are culled from those who performed well during the Combat Marksmanship Phase – however, the new curriculum dictates that potential snipers should be CTC-qualified before going to the Light Reaction Sniper School. The new curriculum focuses on long-distance shooting using high-tech equipment and advanced shooting using a variety of rifles. [source]

5.0. Weapons

The LRR is known to have the following weapons:

• Assault rifles
• M4 carbine [source]
• HK 416 carbine [source]
• Sniper rifles
• CS-LR4 sniper rifle
• M24 sniper rifle
• SR-25 sniper rifle [source]
• Shotguns
• Remington 870 shotgun
• Pistols
• M1911A1 pistols upgraded by Government Arsenal

6.0. Future

The threat from Insurgents and other terrorists in the Philippines has not gone away. While the siege at Marawi enabled the Philippine military to take out most of ISIL’s appointed leaders, there are other groups that still threaten Philippine national security. This also goes for pro-communist-inspired terrorists like the NPA.

The LRR will continue to train with other special forces units in the Philippines and overseas in order to improve their capabilities.

greydynamics.com · by Mark Christian Soo · July 4, 2023

15. Troops break away from multinational exercise to save mariners stranded in Western Pacific

​A coalition force for good.

Troops break away from multinational exercise to save mariners stranded in Western Pacific

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · July 14, 2023

French A400 Atlas pilots scan the Pacific Ocean for a disabled ship near the Northern Marianas, July 10, 2023. (Michael Cossaboom/U.S. Coast Guard)

A multinational group of sailors and airmen in the Western Pacific diverted from their training recently for a real-life rescue of 11 mariners stranded on a disabled vessel near the Northern Marianas.

U.S., French and Canadian aircraft found the mariners and their 21-foot vessel, the Full 20 Horizon, in 8-foot seas approximately 30 nautical miles northwest of Rota, U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam said in a Tuesday news release.

The Coast Guard received a distress call from the disabled ship, which had no active GPS onboard, around 5 p.m. Watchstanders issued a maritime alert and coordinated with local responders from the Northern Marianas to mount a rescue, according to the release.

Simultaneously, a French air force A400 Atlas military transport launched from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and discovered the ship around 8 p.m. Strong winds and waves, however, prevented the local responders from reaching the mariners.

"Aircraft crews play a crucial role in our efforts to save lives in challenging maritime situations,” Capt. Nick Simmons, commander of U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam, said in the release. “Using aerial assets, combined with our local partnerships, ensures a swift and effective response to distress calls, ultimately increasing the chances of a successful rescue.”

A French airman scans the Pacific Ocean for a disabled ship near the Northern Marianas, July 10, 2023. (Taylor Crul/U.S. Coast Guard)

Trying for a work-around, the Air Force’s 36th Wing at Andersen diverted a Canadian air force HC-130 search-and-rescue aircraft to relieve the French A400 that was running low on fuel, according to the release.

Around 1 a.m. Tuesday, a U.S. Navy MH-60 Nighthawk helicopter successfully hoisted the 11 mariners off the Full 20 Horizon and took them to the nearby Rota airport without injury, according to the release.

The Coast Guard is uncertain why the vessel became disabled, but the number of passengers and the foul weather possibly contributed, U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam spokeswoman Chief Warrant Officer Sara Muir told Stars and Stripes by email Friday.

The Coast Guard cutter Myrtle Hazard towed the vessel to Rota, where Northern Marianas law enforcement started an investigation, Muir said.

The French and Canadian aircraft were participating in Exercise Mobility Guardian 2023, hosted by the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command.

The training, which runs through July 21, includes 70 aircraft and more than 15,000 people from seven countries - the U.S., Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom - and is the “largest full spectrum readiness exercise” in the command’s history, Air Mobility Command said in a July 6 news release.

Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson covers the U.S. Navy and other services from Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. Originally from Knoxville, Tenn., he holds a journalism degree from the University of North Florida. He previously covered crime and the military in Key West, Fla., and business in Jacksonville, Fla.

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · July 14, 2023​

16. Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Congressional Notification Requirements (R45191)

The July 2023 edition can be downloaded here: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45191/9

Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Congressional Notification Requirements (R45191)

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R45191

Title:

Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Congressional Notification Requirements

Report#:

R45191

Author(s):

Michael E. DeVine

Date:

July 10, 2023

Summary 

Section 3091 of Title 50, U.S. Code requires the President of the United States to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are “kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity,” significant intelligence failures, illegal intelligence activities, and financial intelligence activities. 

In fulfilling this statutory requirement, the President must notify Congress of all covert actions and significant clandestine activities of the Intelligence Community (IC). Congress’s interest in being kept informed of these activities originated from instances in the 1970s when media disclosure of past intelligence abuses during times of relatively limited congressional oversight underscored the importance of Congress taking a more active role. Over time, these notification requirements were written into statute or became customary. 

Covert action is codified in Title 50, U.S. Code as an intelligence activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. The term clandestine describes a methodology used for a range of sensitive intelligence and military activities—conducted under Title 50 or Title 10 U.S. Code authority—in which the activity itself, as well as U.S. sponsorship, is secret. Congress’s particular interest in these activities is, in part, due to the characteristics that they have in common: they involve particularly sensitive sources and methods, have significant implications for U.S. foreign relations, and incur serious risk of damage to U.S. national security or loss of life in the event of exposure or compromise. 

Different committees exercise oversight jurisdiction depending upon how a particular activity is defined and the statutory authority under which it is conducted. Most intelligence activities, to include covert action, are authorized under Title 50, U.S. Code. Title 10, U.S. Code provides authorities for the military, to include clandestine activities of the military. 

The President and intelligence committees are responsible for establishing the procedures for notification, which are generally to be done in writing. Partly in deference to this higher standard, such notifications are sometimes limited to specific subgroups of Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in certain circumstances, as defined by law and custom. 

This report is accompanied by two related reports: CRS Report R45175, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions, by Michael E. DeVine, and CRS Report R45196, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for Congressional Oversight In Brief, by Michael E. DeVine. 

17. U.S. and Allies Maintain Unity Against Russia. Can They Do The Same With China?

I think the assumption of unity on Russia is also suspect.

Excerpts;

Should China attack Taiwan leading to a war with the U.S., NATO members aren’t obligated to join since the group’s treaty invokes a mutual defense obligation for attacks in Europe and North America. What the U.S. will expect from Europe, said American University’s Goldgeier, is diplomatic support and backing for sanctions against China. 

“Those discussions should be taking place now rather than waiting for a Taiwan scenario to arise,” said Goldgeier.

U.S. and Allies Maintain Unity Against Russia. Can They Do The Same With China?

Allies call out Beijing and Moscow for working in concert, but put priority on bolstering Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-allies-stick-together-to-confront-russia-and-chinafor-now-76156bf7?utm

By​ ​Charles Hutzler​ ​ in Washington and​ ​Daniel Michaels​ ​in Vilnius, Lithuania

July 14, 2023 12:55 pm ET

President Biden gesturing toward Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida as they shared a stage with other allied leaders in Lithuania this week. PHOTO: KACPER PEMPEL/REUTERS

The U.S. and allies across Europe and the Asia-Pacific are holding together in confronting what they see as an increasingly entwined challenge from Russia and China, with a bout of diplomacy this past week showing the resilience as well as the limits of allied unity. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Lithuania offered up new support for Ukraine, maintaining alliance cohesion though stopping short of granting Kyiv a clear path to membership while the country remains under assault from Russia. At the same gathering, the group for the first time called out Beijing for working with Moscow and their “mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order.” 

The diplomatic choreography underscores the balancing act the Biden administration is conducting. If Russia with its war on Ukraine is the more urgent priority for the U.S. and its allies, tighter coordination between Moscow and Beijing raises the prospect of a two-front conflict on both ends of the Eurasian continent. 

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has aligned Beijing more closely with Russia over the past decade to undermine the U.S.-led world order. That appeared to ramp up when Xi traveled to Moscow in March. He urged Russian President Vladimir Putin to work together to drive that change. For the U.S., with its security commitments to allies in Europe and Asia, simultaneous challenges from Moscow and Beijing could stretch American military resources, making dependable alliances all the more necessary. 

“If there is one thing that has changed in the past year it is the impact of the no-limits partnership between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin,” said Mathieu Droin, a former French foreign ministry official now at the Washington think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That perspective, he said, is felt especially keenly among Central and Eastern European allies on the front lines of Russian pressure.

“They are more and more genuinely convinced that China and Russia are two faces of the same coin, and they are more and more internally convinced of the need to tackle the China challenge,” said Droin. 

With the U.S. still the dominant NATO member, Biden sought to use the summit and other events to mobilize allies to confront Russia and China while holding together the security alliance of 31 countries whose strategic priorities at times diverge. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow in March. PHOTO: ALEXEI MAISHEV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN/REUTERS

Biden ruled out quick Ukrainian membership before the summit opened, saying its democracy wasn’t yet ready. His administration shut down last-minute attempts by Ukraine and its supporters in NATO to discuss a timeline for joining, calling it a distraction to ending the war.

The issue risked splitting NATO following an angry message on Twitter from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before he arrived at the summit. Ultimately, the U.S. got its way on Ukraine and allies fell in line.  

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to allow Sweden to join NATO, potentially ending a yearlong impasse and expanding the alliance. On the sidelines, the Group of Seven leading economies, which includes six NATO members and Japan, jointly declared support for Ukraine, a step forward in providing Kyiv security guarantees while it waits for membership.

Biden touted that expanded role for Japan in the Ukraine coalition as a win for his globalist foreign policy. Japan attended NATO’s summit for the second year running alongside Washington’s other close allies from the Asia-Pacific—South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. 

Biden said he brought the NATO and Asia-Pacific allies to the summit “to deepen connections between the Atlantic and Pacific democracies.” He praised them for standing together when Russia attacked Ukraine and glancingly suggested they may have to do so against China.

“Will we turn back naked, unchecked aggression today to deter other would-be aggressors tomorrow?” he said in the speech at Vilnius University on Wednesday. 

NATO Pledges Ukraine Support Without Clear Path to Membership

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NATO leaders wrapped up two days of meetings in Lithuania on Wednesday having reaffirmed political pledges to Ukraine, but failing to agree to a timeline for its admission to the alliance. Photo: Ludovic Marin/AFP/Getty Images

Getting the disparate nations to act in concert is proving more difficult.

French President Emmanuel Macron, for one, has said France and the rest of Europe shouldn’t be dragged into a conflict over Taiwan, a long-running flashpoint between China and the U.S. Beijing has long vowed to take control of the democratically run island, with which the U.S. has growing defense ties. 

NATO this year discussed setting up a representative office in Japan. The alliance’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, signed a declaration with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in February to increase strategic cooperation, given their shared “values and security interests.” France, however, objected to the representative office, and the communiqué from this week’s summit made no mention of it. 

Germany, which counts China as its largest trading partner, telegraphed its ambivalence this week. The German government released its first ever China strategy on Thursday, recognizing Beijing as a competitor and strategic rival and citing the need to reduce reliance on the Chinese market. The policy document, however, didn’t require German companies to disclose their China exposure and called for sustaining strong economic relations. 

“The United States has long wanted to be able to get the Europeans on board to taking the China threat more seriously,” said James Goldgeier, a professor of international relations at American University. “That said, Europe has economic interests that it does not want to jeopardize.”

The Biden administration too has tried to reassure Beijing that it isn’t trying to sever economic ties but instead the U.S. needs to diversify supply chains for certain critical goods. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen carried that message to Beijing last week, telling China’s top economic team that such U.S. actions are taken for national-security concerns and are narrowly targeted to minimize the impact on the wider economic relationship.

Overall, however, the U.S. has charted a sharper approach to China, clamping in place restrictions to prevent Beijing from accessing advanced semiconductors that would help China’s military. The Biden administration has secured new defense arrangements with Australia, Japan and South Korea and forged a closer relationship with India. 

Beijing has seen the moves as efforts to constrain China’s further development and the Communist leadership’s ambitions to vault the country to the pinnacle of the global order. At the same time, Beijing has also tried to divide the U.S. from its allies, most recently by sending its No. 2 leader, Premier Li Qiang, to Europe last month to discuss economic cooperation.

Rather than drive confrontation with China, the NATO summit held out the possibility of working with Beijing. A priority for the Biden administration has been to keep China from bolstering Russia’s war effort with armaments, despite expanding Chinese purchases of Russian energy. The NATO communiqué urged China to refrain from providing lethal aid and to play a constructive role in the United Nations Security Council.

Should China attack Taiwan leading to a war with the U.S., NATO members aren’t obligated to join since the group’s treaty invokes a mutual defense obligation for attacks in Europe and North America. What the U.S. will expect from Europe, said American University’s Goldgeier, is diplomatic support and backing for sanctions against China. 

“Those discussions should be taking place now rather than waiting for a Taiwan scenario to arise,” said Goldgeier.

Write to Charles Hutzler at charles.hutzler@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the July 15, 2023, print edition as 'U.S., Allies Stick Together to Confront Global Tensions'.

​18. A sensible approach to AI regulation

​

Excerpts:

We can complement regulatory efforts with more investment in research to create a common vocabulary and frameworks for AI alignment that will guide future research efforts, ensuring that advancements in AI align with human values and societal well-being. And it’s essential that we invest more in R&D to automatically detect fake content.

The AI revolution is moving so rapidly that we can’t wait long to address these concerns. If we act now, creating the baseline regulations for AI assurance, we can ensure that AI technologies operates in a safe and accountable manner. We need thoughtful regulation that balances innovation with risk mitigation to harness the full potential of AI while safeguarding our society.

A sensible approach to AI regulation

c4isrnet.com · by T. Charles Clancy · July 14, 2023

Americans have watched as AI systems incorrectly matched 28 members of Congress to criminal mugshots, demonstrated bias against women and people of color, and caused a lawyer to inadvertently cite fake cases.

In a recent MITRE-Harris Poll survey, most Americans expressed reservations about AI for high-value applications such as autonomous vehicles, accessing government benefits, and healthcare. Only 48% believe AI is safe and secure, and 78% are very or somewhat concerned that AI can be used for malicious intent. And 82% percent are in favor of government regulation for AI.

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The fight in Ukraine has underscored just how effective smart tech accessible to anyone may be in neutralizing the elaborate tools of conventional warfare.

Even Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, has called for regulation.

The rapid growth of large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have changed how people view AI. It has become anthropomorphized and viewed as a standalone entity with its own agency and objectives. This is very different than only a year ago when AI was understood by most to be smart software that lived inside a digital system. When contemplating an approach to AI regulation, it is helpful to treat these two models differently.

For AI as a component within an engineered system, AI assurance–assuring that an AI application does what it’s expected to without unacceptable risks, and in the right context at the right time–is the name of the game. As with any software component, we need testing and validation that verifies things like robustness, security, and correctness. The best equipped to evaluate these attributes are the existing regulators who already have responsibility for relevant industries like healthcare or critical infrastructure. These regulators would be the right group to evaluate risk within the context of their own industry norms.

However, this new domain of LLMs with human-like behaviors and understanding requires a different approach. There are a few scenarios to consider.

First, humans will use AI as a co-pilot to make them more efficient in unwanted or criminal digital behavior, like cyberattacks or misinformation campaigns. While the LLM here is an enabler, the human ultimately remains responsible for their AI-augmented actions in cyberspace. We must ensure we can prevent, defend, remediate, and attribute these actions— much as we do today—but at what will likely become a larger scale.

Second, humans will give agentic AI systems malicious goals. For example, AgentGPT is an instance of GPT with internet access that attempts to execute a high-level task by developing and executing a series of derivative tasks. ChaosGPT is an instance of AgentGPT tasked with exterminating humanity. Fortunately, ChaosGPT has not made much progress in hacking into any national nuclear arsenals, but it represents a hyperbolic example of what may come. Expect criminal ransomware groups to begin using these tools in the near future.

Human accountability

Addressing this scenario, solutions include holding accountable the human who gave the system the malicious goal and continuing to increase the assurance level of critical digital infrastructure to prevent AI-orchestrated network intrusions from being successful. Interfaces where AI is deliberately connected to such systems should also be carefully regulated.

Third, there is considerable concern around AI systems that inadvertently establish their own sub goals that could be unintentionally dangerous. While this may occur, it is just as, if not more likely, that malicious humans will give AI dangerous sub goals. Thus, the solutions to this scenario are the same as the above example.

A few other thoughts on how we can avoid potential dangers with AI technologies without choking innovative research and development:

— Best practices and regulatory standards that apply to traditional software should also extend to AI components. However, it’s important to acknowledge that AI software may introduce unique vulnerabilities that demand assurance measures, including testing standards, standardized code development practices, and rigorous validation frameworks.

— Regulated industries should develop a response plan based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework. Compliance with the NIST framework should be the starting point for identifying potential regulatory approaches in these industries.

— Development of “assurance cases” prior to deployment would provide documented evidence of a system’s compliance with critical assurance properties and behavior boundaries.

— For AI intended to augment human capabilities, regulation should prioritize system transparency and auditability. Holding individuals accountable for intentionally misusing AI to cause harm requires documenting their intent and execution of such intent.

We can complement regulatory efforts with more investment in research to create a common vocabulary and frameworks for AI alignment that will guide future research efforts, ensuring that advancements in AI align with human values and societal well-being. And it’s essential that we invest more in R&D to automatically detect fake content.

The AI revolution is moving so rapidly that we can’t wait long to address these concerns. If we act now, creating the baseline regulations for AI assurance, we can ensure that AI technologies operates in a safe and accountable manner. We need thoughtful regulation that balances innovation with risk mitigation to harness the full potential of AI while safeguarding our society.

T. Charles Clancy is a senior vice president at MITRE, where he serves as general manager for MITRE Labs and chief futurist. This article is adapted from the recently published paper, “A Sensible Regulatory Framework for AI Security.”

19. Why AI detectors think the US Constitution was written by AI

A cautionary tale.

FOUR SCORE AND SEVEN BEERS AGO —

Why AI detectors think the US Constitution was written by AI

Can AI writing detectors be trusted? We dig into the theory behind them.

BENJ EDWARDS - 7/14/2023, 7:00 AM

Ars Technica · by Benj Edwards · July 14, 2023

Enlarge / An AI-generated image of James Madison writing the US Constitution using AI.

Midjourney / Benj Edwards

If you feed America's most important legal document—the US Constitution—into a tool designed to detect text written by AI models like ChatGPT, it will tell you that the document was almost certainly written by AI. But unless James Madison was a time traveler, that can't be the case. Why do AI writing detection tools give false positives? We spoke to several experts—and the creator of AI writing detector GPTZero—to find out.

Among news stories of overzealous professors flunking an entire class due to the suspicion of AI writing tool use and kids falsely accused of using ChatGPT, generative AI has education in a tizzy. Some think it represents an existential crisis. Teachers relying on educational methods developed over the past century have been scrambling for ways to keep the status quo—the tradition of relying on the essay as a tool to gauge student mastery of a topic.

As tempting as it is to rely on AI tools to detect AI-generated writing, evidence so far has shown that they are not reliable. Due to false positives, AI writing detectors such as GPTZero, ZeroGPT, and OpenAI's Text Classifier cannot be trusted to detect text composed by large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT.

If you feed GPTZero a section of the US Constitution, it says the text is "likely to be written entirely by AI." Several times over the past six months, screenshots of other AI detectors showing similar results have gone viral on social media, inspiring confusion and plenty of jokes about the founding fathers being robots. It turns out the same thing happens with selections from The Bible, which also show up as being AI-generated.

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To explain why these tools make such obvious mistakes (and otherwise often return false positives), we first need to understand how they work.

Understanding the concepts behind AI detection

Different AI writing detectors use slightly different methods of detection but with a similar premise: There's an AI model that has been trained on a large body of text (consisting of millions of writing examples) and a set of surmised rules that determine whether the writing is more likely to be human- or AI-generated.

For example, at the heart of GPTZero is a neural network trained on "a large, diverse corpus of human-written and AI-generated text, with a focus on English prose," according to the service's FAQ. Next, the system uses properties like "perplexity" and burstiness" to evaluate the text and make its classification.

Enlarge

Bonnie Jacobs / Getty Images

In machine learning, perplexity is a measurement of how much a piece of text deviates from what an AI model has learned during its training. As Dr. Margaret Mitchell of AI company Hugging Face told Ars, "Perplexity is a function of 'how surprising is this language based on what I've seen?'"

So the thinking behind measuring perplexity is that when they're writing text, AI models like ChatGPT will naturally reach for what they know best, which comes from their training data. The closer the output is to the training data, the lower the perplexity rating. Humans are much more chaotic writers—or at least that's the theory—but humans can write with low perplexity, too, especially when imitating a formal style used in law or certain types of academic writing. Also, many of the phrases we use are surprisingly common.

Let's say we're guessing the next word in the phrase "I'd like a cup of _____." Most people would fill in the blank with "water," "coffee," or "tea." A language model trained on a lot of English text would do the same because those phrases occur frequently in English writing. The perplexity of any of those three results would be quite low because the prediction is fairly certain.

Now consider a less common completion: "I'd like a cup of spiders." Both humans and a well-trained language model would be quite surprised (or "perplexed") by this sentence, so its perplexity would be high. (As of this writing, the phrase "I'd like a cup of spiders" gives exactly one result in a Google search, compared to 3.75 million results for "I'd like a cup of coffee.")

Enlarge / The sole Google search result for "I'd like a cup of spiders." It's not a common phrase, so it has very high perplexity. In theory, it's therefore unlikely that a machine would write this.

Ars Technica

If the language in a piece of text isn't surprising based on the model's training, the perplexity will be low, so the AI detector will be more likely to classify that text as AI-generated. This leads us to the interesting case of the US Constitution. In essence, the Constitution's language is so ingrained in these models that they classify it as AI-generated, creating a false positive.

GPTZero creator Edward Tian told Ars Technica, "The US Constitution is a text fed repeatedly into the training data of many large language models. As a result, many of these large language models are trained to generate similar text to the Constitution and other frequently used training texts. GPTZero predicts text likely to be generated by large language models, and thus this fascinating phenomenon occurs."

The problem is that it's entirely possible for human writers to create content with low perplexity as well (if they write primarily using common phrases such as "I'd like a cup of coffee," for example), which deeply undermines the reliability of AI writing detectors.

Enlarge / A section of the Book of Genesis from The Bible gets flagged as 88.2 percent AI-generated by ZeroGPT.

Ars Technica

Another property of text measured by GPTZero is "burstiness," which refers to the phenomenon where certain words or phrases appear in rapid succession or "bursts" within a text. Essentially, burstiness evaluates the variability in sentence length and structure throughout a text.

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Human writers often exhibit a dynamic writing style, resulting in text with variable sentence lengths and structures. For instance, we might write a long, complex sentence followed by a short, simple one, or we might use a burst of adjectives in one sentence and none in the next. This variability is a natural outcome of human creativity and spontaneity.

AI-generated text, on the other hand, tends to be more consistent and uniform—at least so far. Language models, which are still in their infancy, generate sentences with more regular lengths and structures. This lack of variability can result in a low burstiness score, indicating that the text may be AI-generated.

However, burstiness isn't a foolproof metric for detecting AI-generated content, either. As with perplexity, there are exceptions. A human writer may write in a highly structured, consistent style, resulting in a low burstiness score. Conversely, an AI model might be trained to emulate a more human-like variability in sentence length and structure, raising its burstiness score. In fact, as AI language models improve, studies show that their writing looks more and more like human writing all the time.

Ultimately, there's no magic formula that can always distinguish human-written text from that composed by a machine. AI writing detectors can make a strong guess, but the margin of error is too large to rely on them for an accurate result.

A 2023 study from researchers at the University of Maryland demonstrated empirically that detectors for AI-generated text are not reliable in practical scenarios and that they perform only marginally better than a random classifier. Not only do they return false positives, but detectors and watermarking schemes (that seek to alter word choice in a telltale way) can easily be defeated by "paraphrasing attacks" that modify language model output while retaining its meaning.

"I think they're mostly snake oil," said AI researcher Simon Willison of AI detector products. "Everyone desperately wants them to work—people in education especially—and it's easy to sell a product that everyone wants, especially when it's really hard to prove if it's effective or not."

Additionally, a recent study from Stanford University researchers showed that AI writing detection is biased against non-native English speakers, throwing out high false-positive rates for their human-written work and potentially penalizing them in the global discourse if AI detectors become widely used.

The cost of false accusations

Some educators, like Professor Ethan Mollick of Wharton School, are accepting this new AI-infused reality and even actively promoting the use of tools like ChatGPT to aid learning. Mollick's reaction is reminiscent of how some teachers dealt with the introduction of pocket calculators into classrooms: They were initially controversial but eventually came to be widely accepted.

"There is no tool that can reliably detect ChatGPT-4/Bing/Bard writing," Mollick tweeted recently. "The existing tools are trained on GPT-3.5, they have high false positive rates (10%+), and they are incredibly easy to defeat." Additionally, ChatGPT itself cannot assess whether text is AI-written or not, he added, so you can't just paste in text and ask if it was written by ChatGPT.

Enlarge / An AI-generated image of a student getting help from a robot.

Midjourney

In a conversation with Ars Technica, GPTZero's Tian seemed to see the writing on the wall and said he plans to pivot his company away from vanilla AI detection into something more ambiguous. "Compared to other detectors, like Turn-it-in, we're pivoting away from building detectors to catch students, and instead, the next version of GPTZero will not be detecting AI but highlighting what's most human, and helping teachers and students navigate together the level of AI involvement in education," he said.

How does he feel about people using GPTZero to accuse students of academic dishonesty? Unlike traditional plagiarism checker companies, Tian said, "We don't want people using our tools to punish students. Instead, for the education use case, it makes much more sense to stop relying on detection on the individual level (where some teachers punish students and some teachers are fine with AI technologies) but to apply these technologies on the school [or] school board [level], even across the country, because how can we craft the right policies to respond to students using AI technologies until we understand what is going on, and the degree of AI involvement across the board?"

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Yet despite the inherent problems with accuracy, GPTZero still advertises itself as being "built for educators," and its site proudly displays a list of universities that supposedly use the technology. There's a strange tension between Tian's stated goals not to punish students and his desire to make money with his invention. But whatever the motives, using these flawed products can have terrible effects on students. Perhaps the most damaging result of people using these inaccurate and imperfect tools is the personal cost of false accusations.

Enlarge / A screenshot of the GPTZero website in July 2023.

Ars Technica

A case reported by USA Today highlights the issue in a striking way. A student was accused of cheating based on AI text detection tools and had to present his case before an honor board. His defense included showing his Google Docs history to demonstrate his research process. Despite the board finding no evidence of cheating, the stress of preparing to defend himself led the student to experience panic attacks. Similar scenarios have played out dozens (if not hundreds) of times across the US and are commonly documented on desperate Reddit threads.

Common penalties for academic dishonesty often include failing grades, academic probation, suspension, or even expulsion, depending on the severity and frequency of the violation. That's a difficult charge to face, and the use of flawed technology to levy those charges feels almost like a modern-day academic witch hunt.

“AI writing is undetectable and likely to remain so”

In light of the high rate of false positives and the potential to punish non-native English speakers unfairly, it's clear that the science of detecting AI-generated text is far from foolproof—and likely never will be. Humans can write like machines, and machines can write like humans. A more helpful question might be: Do humans who write with machine assistance understand what they are saying? If someone is using AI tools to fill in factual content in a way they don't understand, that should be easy enough to figure out by a competent reader or teacher.

AI writing assistance is here to stay, and if used wisely, AI language models can potentially speed up composition in a responsible and ethical way. Teachers may want to encourage responsible use and ask questions like: Does the writing reflect the intentions and knowledge of the writer? And can the human author vouch for every fact included?

A teacher who is also a subject matter expert could quiz students on the contents of their work afterward to see how well they understand it. Writing is not just a demonstration of knowledge but a projection of a person's reputation, and if the human author can't stand by every fact represented in the writing, AI assistance has not been used appropriately.

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Like any tool, language models can be used poorly or used with skill. And that skill also depends on context: You can paint an entire wall with a paintbrush or create the Mona Lisa. Both scenarios are an appropriate use of the tool, but each demands different levels of human attention and creativity. Similarly, some rote writing tasks (generating standardized weather reports, perhaps) may be accelerated appropriately by AI, while more intricate tasks need more human care and attention. There's no black-or-white solution.

For now, Ethan Mollick told Ars Technica that despite panic from educators, he isn't convinced that anyone should use AI writing detectors. "I am not a technical expert in AI detection," Mollick said. "I can speak from the perspective of an educator working with AI to say that, as of now, AI writing is undetectable and likely to remain so, AI detectors have high false positive rates, and they should not be used as a result."

Ars Technica · by Benj Edwards · July 14, 2023

20. The Treacherous Silicon Triangle

Could chips be to China in the 21st century as energy and other resources were to Japan in the 1920s-1930s?

The Treacherous Silicon Triangle

How to Strengthen the Semiconductor Supply Chain Without Endangering Taiwan

By Larry Diamond, Jim Ellis, and Orville Schell

July 17, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Larry Diamond, Jim Ellis, and Orville Schell · July 17, 2023

Two of the biggest areas of risk in an increasingly fraught U.S.-Chinese relationship are the security of Taiwan and the security of the semiconductor supply chain. Each is high stakes and difficult in its own right. But taken together, they become even more challenging. Although each is critically important to the United States, their solutions do not always neatly align. The most obvious ways to reduce the risk in one area can easily increase risk in the other, and vice versa. Finding a way to manage this treacherous “silicon triangle” among Beijing, Taiwan, and Washington is thus one of the most important—and trickiest—challenges for U.S. foreign policy today.

The United States remains a world leader in semiconductor research and design, but its share of global manufacturing has fallen from 37 percent in 1999 to 12 percent today. Taiwan now accounts for the largest share of fabrication by far—producing 60 percent of the world’s chips and more than 90 percent of its leading-edge logic chips, key components in the world’s most advanced communications tools and computers and critical in the race for leadership in artificial intelligence. After Taiwan, the other top manufacturers of semiconductors are South Korea (which leads in the production of memory chips), Japan, and China, in that order. The United States has fallen to fifth place.

Policymakers broadly recognize the dangers of leaving the supply chain of such an essential component in an increasingly digital economy vulnerable to prolonged disruption—or worse, to deliberate denial by an adversary. The “chip famine” that emerged globally in 2020 wreaked havoc across a wide variety of industries. Worse still would be a chip shortage, or an embargo imposed by a hostile power, that crippled the production and maintenance of advanced U.S. weapons systems.

That fear is one of many reasons for concern about the security of Taiwan. Beijing’s escalating military and geopolitical pressure raises an enormous risk for the United States and its allies: if Beijing was able to successfully seize Taiwan, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s regime could suddenly gain dominance over the most critical manufactured commodity in the world—if the conflict did not disable or destroy much of Taiwan’s capacity to produce semiconductors.

Some strategists assume that the semiconductor industry constitutes a “silicon shield” for Taiwan, because chips are now so critically important to the global economy and to China’s economy that, in the absence of an extreme crisis or provocation, Chinese leaders would be unlikely to risk a conflict that could destroy or severely disrupt China’s own (and the world’s) supply of chips. What is more, the reliance of much of the rest of the world on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry gives a host of other governments an added stake in deterring conflict over Taiwan. Yet placing too much stock in this logic would be unwise; if Beijing decides to use force, it will be impelled principally by other political and geopolitical reasons.

In this silicon triangle, the United States has two intertwined interests: to safeguard the security of global supply chains for semiconductors—which must include some prudent degree of reshoring of production—and to ensure security and autonomous choice for Taiwan. The challenge is to forge a cooperative strategy in which the pursuit of each goal does not undermine the other. That requires building on the unique geopolitical strength of the United States—its dense web of partnerships and alliances—to enhance the resilience of the supply chain while at the same time working with Taiwan to jointly strengthen military and economic capabilities to deter aggression by Beijing. The United States needs investment from Taiwan to expand semiconductor manufacturing on American soil, thus creating jobs and enhancing the resilience of U.S. supply chains; Taiwan needs the security assistance of the United States to protect both its semiconductor industry and its democracy from aggression. Pursued together, while also deepening cooperation with other U.S. partners and allies crucial to global semiconductor production, these aims can reinforce one another in ways that will enhance both supply chain resilience and the security of Taiwan.

THE NEW OIL

In strategic terms, chips may be “the new oil,” as one formulation posits, but their journey from raw material to end use is far more complex. Their production depends on advanced designs and enormously sophisticated (and expensive) equipment. The most advanced chips are “fabbed” by state-of-the-art machines that use extreme ultraviolet lithography. These machines are produced by just one company, Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography, which is based in the Netherlands. In addition to raw materials and highly capital-intensive plants and equipment, production requires a close-knit, highly educated, and well-trained workforce of engineers and technicians. Once fabricated, chips must go through assembly, testing, and packaging, which are most often done in other plants based in other countries. And each fab is also dependent on continual program upgrades and technical maintenance. Often, these critical roles are divided among different countries. The United States, accordingly, must aim to ensure that the bulk of its demand for semiconductors (including the most advanced chips) is filled at each step in the supply chain by friendly countries committed to maintaining stable trading partnerships.

It is wise to seek to locate production of a wide variety of chips on U.S. soil by providing financial incentives for reshoring, as the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act does. But even if the United States doubles its share of global chip production in the coming years, it will still depend heavily on global supply chains, which must engage trusted partners. Principally, these will be the United States’ friends and allies, not just Taiwan but also France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, and South Korea. (India is also poised to become a player in the industry, and the United States should help encourage investment in manufacturing there.) And even chip manufacturing in the United States will depend on working with the most technologically capable companies, many of them non-American. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, for example, is already building a $12 billion manufacturing plant for leading-edge chips in Phoenix. Last December, it announced it would build a second, even more advanced plant there, bringing TSMC’s total investment in the United States to $40 billion, already exceeding the $39 billion in subsidies for U.S. chip manufacturing provided by the CHIPS Act.

Even if the United States doubles its share of global chip production, it will still depend heavily on global supply chains.

In addition to subsidies, the United States must provide lower costs, ample infrastructure, expanded services, and engineering talent to attract further private investment in semiconductor manufacturing. Congress can help by extending 100 percent tax depreciation for short-lived capital assets (a rule that lapsed at the end of last year). Doing so would reduce the massive upfront costs of semiconductor manufacturing equipment needed to set up a new fab and offset other construction costs that TSMC has estimated to be four times higher in the United States than in Taiwan. Congress should also extend the chip manufacturing tax credit in the CHIPS Act beyond its 2027 sunset provision and broaden the credit to cover key material inputs and the manufacture of equipment. Federal and state government should also ease regulatory burdens to make it possible to construct plants in the United States more quickly. Given the industry’s relatively short technology cycles, multiyear environmental reviews will make a significant expansion in chip manufacturing a futile task. States can also help lure investment by ensuring adequate water and electricity supplies and providing incentives for related service and equipment companies, fostering the kinds of geographic clusters that helped drive Taiwan’s semiconductor miracle.

Partnering with Taiwan also offers huge opportunities on the technological front. U.S. research centers and universities can benefit from Taiwanese support on talent development, while Taiwanese firms can benefit from expanding research and development efforts in the United States. U.S. policy could help incentivize such collaborations. It could invite leading semiconductor companies from Taiwan (as well as from South Korea) to join the United States’ new public-private National Semiconductor Technology Center, while also building on efforts such as a collaboration between Purdue University and the Taiwanese chip designer MediaTek to develop a new joint chip design center. Policymakers can also enhance education and training in the United States, by encouraging the “semiconductor colleges” embedded in Taiwan’s top universities to partner with a proposed American Semiconductor Academy, as well as providing more funding for Taiwanese students to study in the United States and for American students to study in Taiwan. Broader economic and technological ties between the United States and Taiwan would also be strengthened by a treaty precluding double taxation of expatriate workers and by completing negotiations on a free trade agreement.

Yet as it fosters chip manufacturing at home, Washington must do more to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Here, key lessons of the war in Ukraine are instructive. Although it is always better to deter an attack than to try to repel it after it has begun, both tasks depend on the delivery of effective weaponry—especially the kind of mobile weaponry that can help turn Taiwan into a “porcupine” that the People’s Liberation Army would be unable to swallow. Expertise and investment from Taiwan are essential to developing additional chip manufacturing capacity on U.S. soil; similarly, the United States must do more to help Taiwan get the additional advanced weapons it needs. Given the long delays in Pentagon procurement, Washington should pursue licensing agreements with Taiwan’s manufacturing sector to rapidly scale up local production of weapons such as Javelin antitank missiles, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, drones, and satellite communications systems.

STRONGER TOGETHER

As it strengthens partnerships with and attracts investment from friends and allies, the United States must also exercise vigilance about China’s semiconductor ambitions. It is not realistic or desirable to freeze China out of the global supply chain entirely. Instead, the goal must be to ensure that neither China nor any other potential future adversary can weaponize its position in semiconductor supply chains. On the domestic front, this will require more vigorous and transparent review of inbound investments by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to ensure that potential adversaries do not acquire effective control over key U.S. technologies. There may also be value in reviewing and restricting outbound investments in critical foreign technologies, and in implementing new technology export controls to protect the most sensitive U.S. intellectual property—building on the Biden administration’s decision to restrict the export of technologies and tools that would help China make advanced logic chips. Another risk to guard against is Chinese dumping of certain kinds of lower-end chips, which could allow Beijing to drive out competitors from and achieve a dominant position in important segments of the market. These “legacy” chips are heavily used not only in consumer products but also in U.S. weapons systems. Chinese dominance of this market would thus pose serious economic and security risks.

According to U.S. intelligence and other analysts, Xi has set 2027 as the year by which China must be militarily ready to attack Taiwan. Although Xi may have been given second thoughts by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, there is still little time to lose in projecting U.S. readiness and resolve and in strengthening Taiwan’s ability to protect its democracy and the world’s microchip supply chain. Economic, technological, and strategic competition between China and the United States will remain the dominant feature of geopolitics for years, if not decades, to come. To enhance its chances of prevailing in this competition, the United States will need reliable international partners with whom it can reconfigure and strengthen its semiconductor supply chain. No partner is more important in this effort than Taiwan.

• LARRY DIAMOND is William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.
• JIM ELLIS is Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and served as Commander of the United States Strategic Command.
• ORVILLE SCHELL is Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society and the author of the novel My Old Home.
• They are co-editors of a Hoover Institution–Asia Society report titled Silicon Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security.
• MORE BY LARRY DIAMONDMORE BY JIM ELLISMORE BY ORVILLE SCHELL

Foreign Affairs · by Larry Diamond, Jim Ellis, and Orville Schell · July 17, 2023

21. Taiwan’s HAWK missiles likely headed to Ukraine

Taiwan’s HAWK missiles likely headed to Ukraine

US reportedly plans to buy back retired missile system and ship to Ukraine to replenish its dangerously depleted SAM stockpiles

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 17, 2023

The US may send surface-to-air missiles (SAM) previously shipped to Taiwan to Ukraine to strengthen its faltering air defenses against Russia’s aerial onslaught and firm up prospects for Kiev’s stalling counteroffensive.

The Warzone reported this month that the US government plans to buy back recently retired HAWK missile systems from Taiwan, which the US would then transfer to Ukraine to bolster its war effort. The Warzone report says that US and Taiwanese authorities reached the agreement sometime last year.

The US has denied details of the potentially sensitive transaction, with a Pentagon spokesperson saying, “We will not discuss specific numbers related to production capacity or inventory, nor will we discuss the location or unit where Ukraine security assistance is drawn from… we will not discuss specific equipment before it is announced.”

Denials aside, The Warzone notes that, in November 2022, the US military allocated “funding to refurbish HAWK air defense missiles for inclusion in future Presidential Drawdown packages” as part of a larger aid package paid through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

It notes that a “drawdown” means transferring material directly from US stocks, with the US Marine Corps being the last US military user. The report also notes that the US military said in February it would buy back two HAWK air defense firing units with USAI funds, without saying from where.

The Warzone says that Taiwan first acquired the HAWK in the 1960s and retired the last of the system in June 2023, with its Improved HAWK (I-HAWK) being the best maintained and most readily transferable to Ukraine.

It notes that the I-HAWK has Low-Altitude Simultaneous Hawk Engagement (LASHE) capability, allowing it to target multiple low-altitude threats simultaneously.

The HAWK missile system in Taiwan. Image: Taiwan Ministry of Defense

Ukraine’s air defenses have been battered by Russia’s successive missile and drone attacks, depleting Kiev’s critically limited missile stocks.

In an April 2023 article for Time Magazine, Sanya Mansoor notes that while Ukraine began the war with the largest SAM arsenal in Europe, excluding Russia, with the Soviet-era S-300 and Buk making up 89% of its air defenses, missiles for those systems are expected to have been depleted by mid-April or early May.

Mansoor notes that the Russian Air Force sustained heavy losses deep in Ukrainian territory at the start of the war, forcing Russia to use long-range cruise missiles that the S-300 and Buk have focused on intercepting.

However, Mansoor notes that if S-300 and Buk missile stocks run low, Russian aircraft will have more freedom to operate over the front lines, noting that Russia has a massive stockpile of bombs that must be delivered on aircraft flown above a target.

She asserts that Ukraine’s depleted SAM stockpiles could allow for the use of huge reserves of Russian bombs that could inflict quick damage.

With the possible depletion, or near depletion, of Ukraine’s SAM reserves, the Russian air force may start to play a more significant role in Ukraine war combat operations, with precision-guided munitions and attack helicopters taking out critical targets and key Ukrainian armor.

Adding to Ukraine’s air defense woes, Ian Williams notes in a June 2023 article for the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that Russia is not going to run out of missiles anytime soon, as it can reportedly manufacture 60 cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles and two Kinzhal hypersonic missiles per month.

Moreover, Asia Times reported in June 2023 that Russia and Iran plan to open a drone factory with a capacity of 6,000 drones in the coming years, with production scheduled to start in 2024.

Previously, Iran supplied its Shahed-136 loitering munitions to Russia via the Caspian Sea. Iran recently provided drone parts to Russia to speed up production in Russian factories using Iranian parts.

In an April 2023 Wavell Room article, Sergio Miller mentions that Ukrainian air defenses have no adequate response to Russian precision-guided munitions (PGMs) launched outside Ukraine’s territory.

Miller notes that Russia’s first recorded use of PGMs occurred between March 11-12 this year, in which ten Su-35S fighters launched as many as 11 glide bombs and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile hitting four settlements 10-15 kilometers away from the Russian border.

He says that Western-made air defense systems and missile storage sites were the possible targets of the attack, with the Russian jets operating comfortably outside the range of Ukraine’s air defenses.

In addition, Asia Times reported in June 2023 that Russia’s attack helicopter fleet, battered during the opening days of the Ukraine war, now uses new technology and tactics to blunt Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive by destroying tanks and other armored vehicles.

In one such incident, a Russian Ka-52 helicopter with Vitebsk-25 countermeasures evaded 18 missiles while on a combat mission in Ukraine, jamming the missiles, completing its mission and returning to base unharmed, according to reports.

Russia has also been deploying its Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters in hunter-killer teams, with their countermeasure suites complementing each other.

While the Ka-52 has countermeasures against infrared (IR) guided missiles, the Mi-28 has countermeasures against radar-guided missiles. Pairing the two models thus provides an all-around defense against both types of missiles.

While Ukraine has received top-of-the-line air defense systems such as the Iris-T from Germany and NASAMS from the US, the deliveries have been piecemeal while some units have reportedly been destroyed in combat.

On top of depleted SAM stocks, cranked-up Russian missile and drone production, improved Russian attack helicopter tactics and slow deliveries of Western air defense systems, the Russian Air Force still has plenty of combat power relative to the Russian Army.

Handout video grab released by the Russian Defense Ministry shows a pilot of the MiG-31K fighter-interceptor with hypersonic Dagger (Kinzhal) missiles at an unknown location in Russia. Photo: Russian Defence Ministry / Sputnik

In an Insider article this month, Christopher Woody mentions that, after 16 months of fighting, the Russian Air Force still has nearly all its combat aircraft, with Russia possessing 100 combat aircraft for every 15 held by Ukraine.

Woody says Russia could more readily exploit its air power advantage if Ukraine’s air defense network starts to falter. Still, he notes that Russia may have lost its small cadre of skilled pilots after more than a year of attrition warfare and Western sanctions may limit its ability to build and repair fighter jets.

But even if ex-Taiwanese and other Western air defense systems arrive in timely fashion in Ukraine, Russia has shown that it is willing to burn through manpower and materiel despite the staggeringly high costs to its big and powerful air force.

Related

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 17, 2023

22. Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty

Conclusion:

Nearly 2,500 years ago, Thucydides warned, “It would be a mistake for you to think that because of your city’s present military might, or because of the gains you have made, luck will always go your way. Prudent men preserve their gains with a view to the uncertainty of the future and this makes them able to deal with disaster more intelligently when it comes.”29 We do not want disaster; we want to deter war, but if it comes, this Joint Force must be prepared to prevail.

The Joint Force faces an uncertain future, and the challenges are multifaceted, complex, rapidly approaching, and unrelenting—demanding comprehensive modernization of our forces, concepts of employment, supporting technology, infrastructure, and training. We are undertaking several initiatives to transform, such as the JWC, JP 1, and JROC revitalization and developing a joint organization focused solely on the future, unencumbered by current crises and near-term constraints.

I leave my post as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this fall, and after nearly 44 years of military service, I am confident that we will remain the most lethal, resilient, and capable force the world has ever seen, but we need to fundamentally change the way we do business, and we need to do it now. JFQ

Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty

By General Mark A. Milley Joint Force Quarterly 110

ndupress.ndu.edu

Download PDF

General Mark A. Milley is the 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

U.S. Coast Guard–manned LCVP from USS Samuel Chase disembarks troops of Company A, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, wading onto Fox Green section of Omaha Beach, early on June 6, 1944 (U.S. Coast Guard/Robert F. Sargent); Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer, by Caspar David Friedrich, oil on canvas, ca. 1817 (Hamburger Kunsthalle); Drone swarm (Shutterstock/Chesky); Army Futures Command IVAS Concept Art, circa 2019 (U.S. Army)

Geostrategic competition and rapidly advancing technology are driving fundamental changes to the character of war. Our opportunity to ensure that we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is fleeting. We must modernize the Joint Force to deter our adversaries, defend the United States, ensure future military advantage, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. The Joint Force has taken the first step by developing and publishing the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) and updating Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. The JWC is a joint, combined vision for how the U.S. military will operate across all domains. The next step is to create a leadership structure that turns concepts into capabilities. The Joint Force must make fundamental changes now to win the next war and, by doing so, we will deter the war from happening in the first place.

When we look to the future, we can see broad outlines, but the details are clouded in fog and mist. Our path is rarely clear and never certain. Nevertheless, we must make choices for the future of the Joint Force. We know we will not get it right, but we must strive to get it less wrong than the enemy, paraphrasing the late historian Michael Howard.1 The new Joint War­fighting Concept (JWC) is our guide to that future. It will drive our doctrine, organizational design, training, and ultimately warfighting itself.

This is not the first time we have adapted to address an uncertain future. Seventy-nine years ago, on June 6, 1944, ordinary Americans came from all walks of life to enter the crucible of combat. Over 154,000 troops from eight Allied nations boarded 6,000 vessels to cross the choppy English Channel. As the moon illuminated the night sky, 24,000 Allied paratroopers and glider infantry drifted down to the coast of France. The continuous roar from the 88mm guns pierced the serenity of the night. The stream of lead from the German MG-42s raked the beaches of Normandy. For many American Soldiers, the taste of saltwater and the sharp smell of gunpowder were their first experiences of combat. These brave troops answered our nation’s call to defend freedom and democracy. The cost was tremendous. Twenty-six thousand Americans were killed in action from the storming of Normandy to the liberation of Paris. Between 1914 and 1945, 150 million people were slaughtered in the Great Power wars of World War I and World War II.

Since 1945, there have been several limited and regional wars, but there has not been another Great Power war. There are many reasons for this outcome. Two of the most important reasons are the rules-based international order enforced by a network of allies and partners and the dominant capability of the U.S. military. This order has held for almost eight consecutive decades. Unfortunately, we now see tears in the fabric of the rules-based international order as adversarial global powers continuously challenge the system. The time to act is now.

The U.S. military’s purpose is simple and contained in our oath to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, both foreign and domestic, and to protect the American people and our interests. Since World War II, the strength of our nation and military, alongside that of our allies and partners, has deterred Great Power war. Freedom is not guaranteed. As Ronald Reagan warned, “Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction. It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly by each generation.”2

In 2023, the rules-based international order is under intense stress. Simultaneously, we are witnessing an unprecedented fundamental change in the character of war, and our window of opportunity to ensure that we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is closing. What we do in the next few years will set conditions for future victory or defeat. The U.S. military is the most effective fighting force the world has ever known, but maintaining this advantage is not a given. There are two critical areas where the Joint Force must adapt now:

• a conceptual roadmap—a unifying joint operational vision—that deliberately drives future force development and design
• a leadership structure to turn that vision into reality.

Changing Character of War

The rapid change in the character of war demands a corresponding fundamental shift in our Joint Force. As Carl von Clausewitz stated, the nature of war—a violent contest of wills to achieve political aims—is immutable. Humans will continue to impose their political will on opponents with violence. Clausewitz also tells us the nature of war involves fear, friction, uncertainty, and chance inherent in the dynamic interaction among the government, the people, and the military.

However, the character of war—how, where, with what weapons, and technologies wars are fought—is changing rapidly.3 For example, the last fundamental change in the character of war occurred between World War I and World War II. Technological advancements fundamentally transformed the character of warfare: mechanization and the use of wheeled and tracked vehicles; widespread employment of the aircraft, including development of bombers and fighters; and proliferation of radio to coordinate and synchronize dispersed units. The way militaries conducted warfare—the character—shifted drastically and drove a change in organizational structure, training, and leadership development. The nations that capitalized on these changes created the greatest advantages in battle.

Almost all developed nations had access to these technologies—Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States—but it was only the German Wehrmacht that initially optimized all three technological advancements, combining them into a way of war called Blitzkrieg that allowed them to overrun Europe in just 18 months.4 Germany eventually lost to the overwhelming industrial might of the United States, in conjunction with the Soviet Union and other Allies, but we may not get 18 months to react to a future enemy onslaught.

Today, we are witnessing another seismic change in the character of war, largely driven again by technology. The next conflict will be characterized by ubiquitous sensors with mass data collection and processing ability that minimize the opportunity for military forces to hide. Low-cost autonomous platforms, coupled with commercial imagery and behavior tracking data augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) and analysis tools, will accelerate the ability to sense and make sense of the environment. Inexpensive drones, loitering munitions, and precision-guided munitions with increasing speed, range, and accuracy will further reduce the time it takes to close the kill web. Robotics and additive manufacturing will change the way militaries supply and sustain their forces. Pervasive sensors, AI-driven weapon systems, and long-range precision fires will make the fastest platforms seem slow and leave the most hidden formations exposed.

Finally, the increasing development of space and cyber platforms and capabilities, both kinetic and nonkinetic, ensure the next war’s decisive terrain will not be limited to the earth’s surface. In short, the battlefield fundamentals of see, shoot, move, communicate, protect, and sustain are changing in fundamental ways. The attributes of organizations will—by necessity—be small, widely dispersed, nearly autonomous and self-sustaining, capable of constant motion, and able to periodically mass effects for decisive action. This operational environment will place a premium on decentralized mission command. Centralized micromanaged leadership from the top will be ineffective. The American homeland has almost always been a sanctuary during conflict, but this will not be the case in a future war. Robust space and cyber capabilities allow adversaries to target critical national infrastructure. We cannot be sure that adversaries will ethically constrain emerging technologies or restrain their use of weapons of mass destruction.5

The Joint Force is actively harnessing these technologies, but as the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown, technology alone does not guarantee success in the next war. The Joint Force must adopt innovative technology; modernize or divest older systems; train, organize, and equip the warfighter in new ways; update our doctrine to be effective in the operating environment; develop resilient leaders who can successfully conduct operations with little guidance and execute the true meaning of mission command; and work as a truly joint and combined team. But we are not adapting fast enough to optimize the force and keep pace with the changing character of war. We must adapt much faster than we are doing now.

British “Experimental Company” participates in Project Convergence 22, Fort Irwin, California, November 4, 2022 (Courtesy British Army/Donald C. Todd)

Changing Global Order

The global geopolitical situation has also changed fundamentally. During the Cold War, there were two competing superpowers. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a brief so-called unipolar moment. Now it is clear, we are in a multipolar world with at least three Great Powers—the United States, China, and Russia—with other countries rapidly emerging as regional and potential global Great Powers. We can say with reasonable certainty the future will be increasingly complex. Additionally, the rules-based international order established 80 years ago is currently under tremendous strain. The United States now faces two nuclear armed powers. Therefore, we must do everything in our power to deter conflict. We may be in competition and confrontation, but we are not yet in conflict.

The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge” and its “pacing challenge.”6 More specifically, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that the PRC is a revisionist power that employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its allies and partners.7 In 2018, it was reported that China’s President Xi Jinping stated to the 13th National People’s Congress in Beijing, “We are resolved to fight the bloody battle against our enemies . . . with a strong determination to take our place in the world.”8 China seeks to fundamentally revise the system while still operating within it.

The world is also facing the greatest shift in economic power in well over 100 years. The PRC has leveraged economic growth to invest heavily in its military with the stated intention of exceeding the capability of the U.S. military in the Western Pacific in the next decade and globally by 2049.9 Through economic coercion, the PRC is expanding its global footprint and increasing its ability to project military power at range and scale. In addition, it is aggressively modernizing its military to develop nuclear, space, cyber, land, sea, and air capabilities to erode the competitive advantages that the United States and its allies have enjoyed for decades. The PRC’s goal is to revise the global international order by midcentury and become the regional Asian hegemon in the next 10 years. The PRC is taking increasingly aggressive action toward those ends with a publicly unambiguous national aspiration and roadmap. This represents a real and growing national security challenge for the United States and its allies. While the PRC is an increasingly capable strategic competitor, history is not deterministic, and war is neither inevitable nor imminent. It is important that we keep our relationship with the PRC at the level of competition and not allow it to escalate into conflict.

While the PRC is the Joint Force’s pacing challenge, Russia poses an acute threat. The NSS warns that Russia “poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe.”10 Russia is a revanchist actor seeking to return to an era when it dominated the “Near Abroad” in a 19th- and 20th-century imperial system.11 Furthermore, Russia employs disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United States and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries.12

Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused untold human suffering. Vladimir Putin’s war of choice not only threatens peace and stability on the European continent but is also a frontal assault on the basic rules of the post–World War II United Nations Charter. Ukraine has been an independent country since 1991. Russia’s war of aggression to redraw country borders is an existential threat to Ukraine and a direct threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the rules-based international order. The United States and many of its allies and partners are supporting Ukraine with materiel and training to ensure that the international order is upheld.

Both China and Russia threaten Asian and European geopolitical stability and the international order.13 The challenge is likely to increase in the years ahead.

Air Force Technical Sergeant patrols with Ghost Robotics Vision 60 prototype at simulated austere base during Advanced Battle Management System exercise on Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, September 3, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Cory D. Payne)

A Unifying Joint Vision: The Joint Warfighting Concept

The changing character of war and geopolitical landscape requires an interoperable, multidomain capable, joint and coalition force to demonstrate credible integrated deterrence. To remain the most lethal military in the world, the Joint Force needs a unifying concept and a faster process to field required capabilities. This means we also need authorities and a leadership model that drive deliberate Joint Force Development and Joint Force Design.

The most important thing we can do is to deter Great Power war from happening in the first place. We achieve deterrence by maintaining a highly ready, combat capable force in the present and modernizing the U.S. military to sustain dominant warfighting advantage in a future operating environment. When rational adversaries view the United States as dominant, they realize they cannot and should not engage in conflict with the United States. Implementing a joint warfighting concept is the best preparatory action to deter adversarial actors from military aggression and preserve peace.

The JWC is our roadmap to the future. It is a threat-informed, operational concept that provides an overarching approach to how the Joint Force should fight in a future conflict. After 4 years of focused development, wargaming, and experimentation, the latest version of the JWC provides a unifying vision for the Department of Defense (DOD) to guide Joint Force Development and Joint Force Design, drive DOD investment, and inform how we work in concert with allies and partners. The JWC is nested directly under the NSS, NDS, and National Military Strategy (NMS), so it also describes how the Joint Force will address the top four DOD priorities: defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, deter aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict, and ensure our future military advantage. Most importantly, it challenges the warfighter to make a fundamental shift in the way we think about maneuvering through space and time in a fast-paced, high-tech, rapidly changing, and exceptionally challenging and lethal environment.

The JWC’s lineage traces back to the AirLand Battle (ALB) concept and doctrine developed in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, the U.S. Army and NATO Allies faced the threat of a conventional war in Europe against a numerically superior Soviet Union and its alliances through the Warsaw Pact. After witnessing the modern high-intensity conflict of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, Army planners recognized that NATO and U.S. forces in Europe required new ideas of force employment.14 The subsequent ALB concept reintroduced the operational level of war in its theory of winning decisive first battles on the ground and then conducting precision air interdiction of Soviet echelons.15 The Army introduced ALB in the 1982 edition of Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and it dominated Army design, development, and education for the next decade.

ALB served as an example of successful bottom-up efforts; however, while ALB achieved collaborative force design and development between the Army and Air Force, it did not create necessary jointness to overcome conflicting visions of airpower and responsibility for long-range fires, nor did it incorporate significant roles for maritime forces.16 The JWC describes how the Joint Force will operate across not only the air and land domains but also multiple domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber) and systems. The JWC also provides Joint Force Design with enough flexibility to drive experimentation, exercise, and training of the Joint Force, while leveraging Service iteration and innovation. This JWC is truly joint.

X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator flies near aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, May 14, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Erik Hildebrandt)

Evolution of Concepts

In 1996, Joint Vision 2010 claimed technology trends would change the character of war: “By 2010, we should change how we conduct the most intense operations. Instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve mass in other ways.”17 Key terms included dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection.18 The main idea that emerged—effects-based operations—changed the way we think about warfare.

By 2005, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) 2.0 recognized “dominance” may not be assured, so it called for the Joint Force to think differently and act from multiple directions in multiple domains concurrently, conduct integrated and independent actions, project and sustain the force, act directly on perceived key elements and processes in the target system, control tempo, transition quickly and smoothly among the various actions, manage perceptions and expectations, and act discriminately.19 To accomplish this, the concept demanded certain traits of the future warfighter, including networked, interoperable, resilient, agile, and lethal.20

In 2012, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 recognized “the conventions by which wars are fought are no longer as settled as they once were. Notions of who is a combatant and what constitutes a battlefield in the digital age are rapidly shifting beyond previous norms.”21 In response, the concept proposed a new approach: globally integrated operations22 with eight elements: mission command; seize, retain and exploit the initiative; global agility; partnering; flexibility in establishing joint forces; cross-domain synergy; use of flexible, low-signature capabilities; and increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences.23 Similarly, the 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept called for cross-domain synergy with a “more flexible integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional air-sea-land battlespace than ever before.”24 We knew over 10 years ago that a fully functioning Joint Force would need to outmaneuver, outthink, and outpace malign actors by remaining agile and working as a truly joint team.

Over the past 25 years, we have learned significant lessons. Whereas the 1996 Joint Vision 2010 called for “full spectrum dominance,” we know now that we cannot assume dominance in any domain. Where the 2005 CCJO assumed the Joint Force could move in multiple directions in multiple domains, we now know the Joint Force should not expect freedom of movement. In 2012, the CCJO: Joint Force 2020 called for mission command but lacked mention of joint all-domain command and control.

The JWC builds on these lessons learned. We now have a truly joint all-domain concept. Next month, we will release Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. This updated doctrine will guide the Joint Force in how to fight in the years ahead.

Key Tenets of JWC and JP 1

• Integrated, Combined Joint Force: The concept emphasizes the need for seamless integration of all military Services across all warfighting domains, enabling them to function as a unified force. This type of integration involves synchronized planning, shared situational awareness, and effective communication across different Service components, fully aligned and interoperable with key allies and partners.
• Expanded Maneuver: The expanding operating environment means the Joint Force must also practice expanded maneuver. The JWC challenges the warfighter to think creatively about moving through space and time, including—but not limited to—maneuver through land, sea, air, space, cyber, the electromagnetic spectrum, information space, and the cognitive realm.25
• Pulsed Operations: A type of joint all-domain operation characterized by the deliberate application of Joint Force strength to generate or exploit our advantages over an adversary.
• Integrated Command, Agile Control: Seamless command and control across all domains. Effective command and control aims to integrate sensors, platforms, and decisionmaking processes to achieve real-time battlespace awareness and enable rapid decisionmaking.
• Global Fires: Integration of lethal and nonlethal fires to deliver precise, synchronized global effects across all domains and multiple areas of responsibility.
• Information Advantage: Leveraging advanced technologies, such as AI, big data analytics, and cyber capabilities, to collect, analyze, and disseminate information rapidly, enabling decision superiority and action.
• Resilient Logistics: A system that allows for rapid movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies to places and times of our choosing.

In addition to the tenets, the JWC also highlights individual and organizational attributes. We need our warriors, through selection and training, to possess the traits of agility, rapid decisionmaking, creativity, dispersed teamwork, and extreme resiliency in the face of intense hardship and continuous isolation. Future warfighting attributes must include speed, constant motion, relatively small size, lethality, and self-sustaining autonomous or nearly autonomous abilities. Warfighters must be masters of technological and physical camouflage, concealment, and deception.

Capability Development

While the Joint Force has naturally evolved over the years to identify and procure capabilities through processes and forums like the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Force still lacks an organizational structure—or a coach with the right authorities—to hold the team accountable. The JWC, in and of itself, will not produce the objective Joint Force we need in the future. As aspects of the JWC are validated through rigorous experimentation and analysis, those pieces of the concept must be translated into military requirements, both materiel and nonmateriel. Moreover, they must be fully integrated across DOTMLPF-P before we achieve a true operational capability.26 The JROC is where this happens. It validates these requirements and ensures we have the right people, equipment, training, leader development, and doctrine to deter and, if necessary, win in a future conflict.

Since its establishment in 1986, the JROC has primarily operated through a bottom-up process where combatant commands identified critical gaps in their operational employment concepts and the military Services sponsored requirements to fill those warfighter gaps. Over the last 4 years, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the Service vice chiefs, has focused the JROC on balancing nearer term combatant command needs with the pressing requirement to modernize the Joint Force. The JWC has been the North Star to this process, providing a list of Concept Required Capabilities—critical elements that enable concept execution. Moreover, in 2022, the JROC drove alignment of capability portfolio management with Office of the Secretary of Defense integrated acquisition portfolios to further streamline procurement processes across DOD.

B-21 Raider is unveiled at public ceremony, December 2, 2022, in Palmdale, California (U.S. Air Force)

A Future-Focused Organization for Force Development and Design

The JWC and JP 1 have established a path to modernization. But these alone will not achieve the fundamental changes required to ensure the Joint Force outpaces any adversary and continues to deter aggression. In addition to these reforms, we need a future-focused organization that can drive change. In the 2022 NMS, we highlighted the need to balance both modernizing the Joint Force for future warfare and campaigning today in an era of Great Power competition.27 The Joint Force can strike this balance by using strategic discipline—the ruthless prioritization of operations, activities, and investments to continuously calibrate Joint Force weight of effort between campaigning now and rapidly building warfighting advantage for the future.28 It could seem like a struggle to balance “fight tonight” against “prepare to win tomorrow,” but it is a false choice between current readiness and future modernization—we must do both with the assistance of a Joint Futures organization.

Army Futures Command (AFC) is proof that a future-focused organization can spark the changes required. The AFC model can be replicated at the joint level. It achieved undeniable momentum in delivering advanced capabilities to the warfighter faster. The Army established a four-star operational commander as an authoritative senior advocate for the future—combining the characterization of the future operating environment, concept development, experimentation, and requirements generation with clear priorities and direction. Unlike decades of failed programs like Comanche, Crusader, and Future Combat Systems, the Army is now putting the newest and most innovative technology in the hands of Soldiers. Like AFC, a Joint Futures organization would have the potential to align critical force design and development functions, integrate concepts with experimentation, and synchronize users to accelerate modernization and close capability gaps.

A Joint Futures organization would drive future Joint Force Design. It would be responsible for characterizing the future joint operating environment, looking beyond the current Future Years Defense Program. Building on the success of the JWC and JP 1, this organization would develop and iterate on future joint warfighting concepts. It would ensure capability development is threat informed and concept driven. This organization would not monopolize joint concept development but rather serve as a lead agency that is responsible for collaborating with the Services and combatant commands to identify and help prioritize future operational problems while synchronizing development of warfighting solutions.

This future-focused organization would prioritize joint experimentation to ensure joint concepts are validated through rigorous wargaming, modeling, simulations, and other experimentation. This would strengthen Joint Force Design through competition of ideas, leveraging Service, industry, and academic innovation efforts. It would create experimentation venues to evaluate innovative tactical and operational solutions to inherently joint problems.

This organization would integrate with allies and partners from the very beginning of force design, looking to enhance not only the Joint Force but also the coalition force, through synchronization and integration of coalition design and development. Allies and partners give the United States an asymmetric advantage over competitors. Thus, including them in force design and development allows us to integrate and inform capability development across nations in a way that reduces redundancies, leverages strategic competitive advantages, and strengthens the coalition force, enhancing our alliances and security partnerships and, ultimately, strengthening integrated deterrence.

Finally, and most importantly, we would designate the leader of this organization as the senior advocate solely dedicated to focus on the future joint operating environment, concepts, force design, requirements, and doctrine. He or she would represent the future joint war­fighter in decision forums. This leader and organization would maintain a persistent focus on the fundamental evolution required for our future Joint Force.

Saildrone Explorer unmanned surface vessel and guided-missile destroyer USS Delbert D. Black operate in Arabian Gulf, January 8, 2023 (U.S. Navy/Jeremy Boan)

Conclusion

Nearly 2,500 years ago, Thucydides warned, “It would be a mistake for you to think that because of your city’s present military might, or because of the gains you have made, luck will always go your way. Prudent men preserve their gains with a view to the uncertainty of the future and this makes them able to deal with disaster more intelligently when it comes.”29 We do not want disaster; we want to deter war, but if it comes, this Joint Force must be prepared to prevail.

The Joint Force faces an uncertain future, and the challenges are multifaceted, complex, rapidly approaching, and unrelenting—demanding comprehensive modernization of our forces, concepts of employment, supporting technology, infrastructure, and training. We are undertaking several initiatives to transform, such as the JWC, JP 1, and JROC revitalization and developing a joint organization focused solely on the future, unencumbered by current crises and near-term constraints.

I leave my post as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this fall, and after nearly 44 years of military service, I am confident that we will remain the most lethal, resilient, and capable force the world has ever seen, but we need to fundamentally change the way we do business, and we need to do it now. JFQ

Notes

1 Michael Howard and A.J. Wilson, “Military Science in the Age of Peace,” RUSI Journal 119, no. 1 (March 1974), 4.

2 Ronald Reagan, “January 5, 1967: Inaugural Address (Public Ceremony),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/january-5-1967-inaugural-address-public-ceremony>.

3 Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), book 1, chapter 1, 88–89.

4 Andrei A. Kokoshin, The German Blitzkrieg Against the USSR, 1941 (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2016), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Blitzkrieg%20Final.pdf.

5 Defense Panel Interim Panel Report: The Future of Conflict and the New Requirements of Defense (Arlington, VA: Special Competitive Studies Project, October 2022), https://www.scsp.ai/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Defense-Panel-IPR-Final.pdf.

6 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2022), 11, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

7 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 2022), https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy.

8 James Griffiths, “China Ready to Fight ‘Bloody Battle’ Against Enemies, Xi Says in Speech,” CNN, March 20, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-speech-npc-intl/index.html.

9 Edmund J. Burke et al., People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts, RR-A394-1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA300/RRA394-1/RAND_RRA394-1.pdf. See also Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” speech delivered at 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017, Xinhua, November 3, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.

10 Ibid.

11 Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

12 Defense Panel Interim Panel Report.

13 National Military Strategy 2022: Strategic Discipline (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 2022), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/NMS%202022%20_%20Signed.pdf.

14 Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973–1991 (Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, 2003), https://history.army.mil/html/books/069/69-5-1/cmhPub_69-5-1.pdf.

15 Leon H. Rios, The Linkage of the Strategic and Operational Levels of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1986), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA174246.pdf.

16 Paul Benfield and Greg Grant, Improving Joint Operational Concept Development Within the U.S. Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, October 2021), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/improving-joint-operational-concept.

17 Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1996), 17, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA311168.pdf.

18 Ibid.

19 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2005), 16–20, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA476464.pdf.

20 Ibid., 20.

21 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 10, 2012), 3, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/ccjo_2012.pdf.

22 Ibid., 4.

23 Ibid.

24 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), 16, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.

25 Todd Schmidt, “The Missing Domain of War: Achieving Cognitive Overmatch on Tomorrow’s Battlefield,” Modern War Institute at West Point, April 7, 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/missing-domain-war-achieving-cognitive-overmatch-tomorrows-battlefield.

26 While the official definition of DOTMLPF-P comes from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual, the Defense Acquisition University defines DOTMLPF-P as Doctrine: the way we fight (for example, emphasizing maneuver warfare, combined air-ground campaigns); Organization: how we organize to fight (divisions, air wings, Marine-Air Ground Task Forces); Training: how we prepare to fight tactically (basic training to advanced individual training, unit training, joint exercises); Materiel: all the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces that does not require a new development effort (weapons, spares, test sets that are off the shelf both commercially and within the government); Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight (squad leader to four-star officer, professional development); Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations; Facilities: real property, installations, and industrial facilities (government-owned ammunition production facilities); Policy: DOD, interagency, or international policy that impacts the other seven nonmateriel elements,” https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/ArticleContent.aspx?itemid=457.

27 National Military Strategy 2022.

28 Ibid.

29 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Walter Blanco, ed. Walter Blanco and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), book 4, 151.

ndupress.ndu.edu

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com