Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"A man is great not because he hasn't failed; a man is great because failure hasn't stopped him."

– Confucius

"External things are not the problem. It's your assessment of them. Which you can erase right now."

– Marcus Aurelius

"To win any battle, you must fight as if you are a already dead."

– Miyamoto Musashi

1. Senate Passes Bill to Cancel Funds for Foreign Aid, Public Media

2. China Threatens to Block Panama Ports Deal Unless Its Shipping Giant Is Part of It

3. This New Missile-Defense System Is Challenging the Patriot

4. Nationalist Vigilantes Are Now Policing Russia’s Streets

5. Rep. Jackson Secures Major Victories for TX-13 During the NDAA Markup for Fiscal Year 2026 (USSOCOM and the Irregular Warfare Center)

6. China’s Aircraft Carriers Push Into Waters Long Dominated by U.S.

7. China’s military expansion in the Southwest Pacific

8. German and U.K. Leaders Meet to Cement Ties as America Steps Back

9. Australian premier Anthony Albanese stresses trade with China in meeting with President Xi Jinping

10. Red Lines and Black Boxes: Iran, Deterrence, and the Weaponization of Uncertainty

11. The Army wants an artillery system that can run offense and defense

12. SM-6 Fired At Target Ship Down Under By U.S. Army’s Typhon Launcher

13. Pentagon seeks to surge its multi-domain drone arsenal

14. President Trump Decreased U.S. Defense Budgets, Here’s The Real Impact

15. Trump's soft-power retreat scrambles U.S.-China race

16. From Peace to War: Preparing to Adapt

17. China, North Korea and Russia represent biggest security challenge since World War II, Japan says

18. I'm an FBI spy hunter. This threat could destroy us all

19. Targeting at Machine Speed: The Capabilities—and Limits—of Artificial Intelligence

20. Japan’s Defense White Paper Sounds Alarm Over China’s ‘Gray Zone’ Activities

21. Can the Quad Hold the Line on Taiwan?

22. Australia is right not to commit to hypothetical Taiwan conflict

23. Submarine delays sinking US edge in a Taiwan war

1. Senate Passes Bill to Cancel Funds for Foreign Aid, Public Media

Budget dust.

Will we come to rue this day?

Senate Passes Bill to Cancel Funds for Foreign Aid, Public Media

After late-night session, bill to claw back $9 billion in funds heads to House

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/senate-passes-bill-to-cancel-funds-for-foreign-aid-public-media-20ddf921

By Ken Thomas, Lindsay Wise

Follow and Jasmine Li

Updated July 17, 2025 2:54 am ET

The U.S. Capitol in Washington Photo: Valerie Plesch/Bloomberg News

Key Points

What's This?

The Senate passed a bill to cancel $9 billion in federal funding for foreign-aid programs and public media.
The bill passed 51-48, with some Republicans joining Democrats in opposition; it now heads to the House for approval.
The cuts include $7.9 billion from foreign aid and $1.1 billion from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

The Senate passed a White House-endorsed plan to cancel $9 billion in federal funding for foreign-aid programs and public media after the Republican-led chamber blocked attempts to slim down the package in a marathon overnight voting session.

The measure was approved 51-48 at 2:30 a.m. on Thursday, largely along party lines, with Republican Sens. Susan Collins of Maine and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska joining Democrats in opposition. The bill now heads to the House, which must pass it by Friday or the executive branch is supposed to release the funding.

Republican senators defeated a series of revisions sought by Democrats and some Republicans to restore funding in the package that aims to write into law cuts identified by President Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency effort.

The bill effectively asks lawmakers to claw back funding they previously doled out, including $7.9 billion from foreign-aid programs. The plan also would rescind $1.1 billion from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting—the organization that oversees government funding for National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting Service—defunding it for the next two fiscal years.

Republicans have long criticized NPR and PBS for what they see as a liberal bias and questioned funding them with taxpayer money. Trump called the CPB a “monstrosity” in a social-media post last week and threatened Republican senators that he would withhold his endorsement from anyone who opposed the cuts.

During the late-night session, an effort by Murkowski and Collins failed to salvage most of the funding for public broadcasting through an amendment that would have reduced the cuts to the CPB from $1.1 billion to $8.3 million. The amendment was defeated, 47-51. Murkowski and Collins were the only Republicans to vote “yes,” alongside Democrats.

Ahead of the vote, senators had seen news reports of a powerful offshore earthquake near Alaska’s southern coast, which led to brief tsunami warnings. Murkowski, in a social-media post, said residents and tourists in her home state “were able to evacuate and reach higher ground thanks to federal tsunami advisories relayed through local public broadcasting stations.”

“Some colleagues claim they are targeting ‘radical leftist organizations’ with these cuts, but in Alaska, these are simply organizations dedicated to their communities,” Murkowski wrote.

Sen. Lisa Murkowski Photo: Valerie Plesch/Bloomberg News

Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.) said the Senate was doing its part to cut waste out of the budget, calling it a “small but important step toward fiscal sanity.” The $9 billion in cuts, however, represent about one-10th of 1% of the roughly $7 trillion federal budget. Most of the federal government’s spending is on Social Security, Medicare and related health programs, as well as interest on the debt, all of which weren’t part of the discussions.

Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.) warned that the bill would gut local news, defund rural radio stations, and make America less safe. “And they’re doing it all to continue funding tax breaks for billionaires,” Schumer said. That is a reference to the Senate’s approval earlier this month of a Trump-backed tax-and-spending bill that is projected to add trillions of dollars to the federal deficit in the coming years.

Schumer and other Democrats also complained that the Republicans were ceding Congress’s power of the purse to the executive branch by acquiescing to cut programs lawmakers had previously funded, turning the Senate “into a subservient rubber stamp for the executive, at the behest of Donald Trump.”

Republican senators did reach an agreement on Tuesday to save $400 million of funding for the Pepfar HIV/AIDS relief program. Funding for maternal health, malaria and tuberculosis also will be explicitly protected by new language added, people familiar with the matter said.

Several Senate Republicans had raised concerns about funding for Pepfar, rural public media and global hunger programs. Most voted for it anyway.

“I suspect we’re going to find out there are some things that we’re going to regret…And I suspect when we do, we’ll have to come back and fix them,” said Sen. Thom Tillis (R., N.C.), in a speech explaining his support for the package.

Senate Majority Leader John Thune Photo: Mark Schiefelbein/AP

The bill had narrowly cleared two procedural hurdles in Senate votes late Tuesday after three Republicans joined all Democrats to oppose it—Collins, Murkowski and Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. Vice President JD Vance broke the tie, bringing the vote to 51-50.

Sen. Mike Rounds (R., S.D.) said Tuesday he had reached an agreement with the White House for the administration to redirect $9.4 million in funds from the Biden administration’s climate, healthcare and tax law, the Inflation Reduction Act, to support 28 Native American radio stations in nine states. That includes $800,000 to support four stations in his state of South Dakota, Rounds said. He had withheld his vote amid concerns that canceling funding for the CPB might harm tribal radio stations.

Loris Taylor, chief executive of advocacy group Native Public Media, said in a letter to Rounds that the proposal was “not only structurally impractical, but it also introduces uncertainty into an already underfunded sector, threatening the stability of Tribal media outlets that communities rely on daily.”

Sen. Jerry Moran (R., Kan.), meanwhile, helped protect a food-aid program used by farmers. A provision added to the measure makes clear that none of the funds rescinded can affect U.S. commodity-based food aid, including the Food for Peace program and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and the Child Nutrition Program.

It is rare for Congress to accept rescissions requests from the White House. The last time it happened was in 1999.

Write to Lindsay Wise at lindsay.wise@wsj.com and Jasmine Li at jasmine.li@wsj.com

2. China Threatens to Block Panama Ports Deal Unless Its Shipping Giant Is Part of It

The stones are being blocked on the global "GO" board. China is fighting to maintain influence over this "territory" on the Go board.

China Threatens to Block Panama Ports Deal Unless Its Shipping Giant Is Part of It

Beijing is pushing for state-owned Cosco to become a shareholder of two Panama Canal ports and dozens of others in BlackRock deal

https://www.wsj.com/business/logistics/china-threatens-to-block-panama-ports-deal-unless-its-shipping-giant-is-part-of-it-a88fd77d

By Costas Paris

Follow and Jack Pitcher

July 17, 2025 5:30 am ET

A Chinese Cosco containership in the Panama Canal in January. Photo: Daren Fentiman/ZUMA Press

Key Points

What's This?

China threatens to block the sale of more than 40 ports to BlackRock and MSC if Cosco, a Chinese shipping company, doesn’t get a stake.
The proposed sale of ports owned by CK Hutchison includes two ports at the Panama Canal.
China has leverage over BlackRock, MSC and Hutchison, which are now open to Cosco’s taking a stake.

China’s government is threatening to block a deal that would transfer ownership of dozens of seaports to Western investors if Cosco, China’s largest shipping company, doesn’t get a stake.

The proposed sale includes two ports at the Panama Canal and more than 40 others around the world, all owned by Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison 1 0.52%increase; green up pointing triangle.

China is pushing for state-owned Cosco to be an equal partner and shareholder of the ports with BlackRock BLK 3.45%increase; green up pointing triangle and Mediterranean Shipping Co., a containership operator, according to people familiar with the deal talks. BlackRock and MSC in March reached a preliminary agreement to buy the ports in a deal valued at nearly $23 billion.

Now, BlackRock, MSC and Hutchison all are open to Cosco’s taking a stake, the people familiar with the talks said.

The parties aren’t likely to reach a deal before a previously agreed upon July 27 end date for exclusive talks between BlackRock, MSC and Hutchison, the people familiar with the talks said. The parties can’t strike a deal that includes Cosco until the exclusivity period ends.

Any deal giving a stake in the Panama ports to a Chinese-owned company would likely upset President Trump, who has threatened to take control of the canal and has objected to Hutchison’s ownership of two ports there.

Hutchison and COSCO's port network

Hutchison

Cosco

NETH.

U.K.

GER.

BELG.

OMAN

U.A.E.

Note: Ports in mainland China and Hong Kong not shown.

Sources: CK Hutchison (Hutchison ports); Council on Foreign Relations (Cosco ports)

Emma Brown/WSJ

Hutchison’s initial plan to sell the ports angered Beijing, according to people familiar with the talks. Chinese authorities have told Chinese state-owned companies to freeze any coming deals with Hutchison or other businesses linked to its controlling shareholder, the family of the Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing, these people said.

The proposed sale of the ports has added to the growing tensions between China and the U.S. During U.S.-China trade talks in Switzerland in May, Chinese representatives raised the prospect of China’s involvement in the deal, according to people familiar with the trade negotiations.

Chinese officials have told BlackRock, MSC and Hutchison that if Cosco is left out of the deal, Beijing would take steps to block Hutchison’s proposed sale, according to people familiar with the deal talks.

In past global mergers, China’s Commerce Ministry has asserted rights to review a deal, sometimes insisting on changes that can appear politically motivated. China also has significant leverage over the parties involved in the Panama Canal ports deal. BlackRock and Hutchison have business interests in China, and MSC is one of the biggest movers of Chinese exports around the world.

In 2014, Beijing blocked three Western companies from forming a shipping alliance that could have hurt its trade interests. In that case, China scuttled a deal between MSC, Denmark’s A.P. Moeller-Maersk and France’s CMA CGM in which the companies would have shared vessels and port calls worldwide.

Write to Costas Paris at costas.paris@wsj.com and Jack Pitcher at jack.pitcher@wsj.com

3. This New Missile-Defense System Is Challenging the Patriot

What does Raytheon have to say about this competition?

This New Missile-Defense System Is Challenging the Patriot

Improved European weapon will test the region’s ability to wean itself off American arms

https://www.wsj.com/business/this-new-missile-defense-system-is-challenging-the-patriot-5068e625

By Alistair MacDonald

July 16, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Billions in orders are at stake as Europe’s Samp/T, displayed at the Paris Air Show, competes with the U.S.’s Patriot. Photo: Benoit Tessier/Reuters

Key Points

What's This?

A new European missile-defense system, the Samp/T, will challenge the U.S.-made Patriot, which has secured over 240 orders from 19 countries.
The Patriot’s luster has faded in Ukraine as it finds new Russian ballistic missiles harder to deal with.
European countries are assessing air-defense capabilities amid debates over reliance on U.S. weapons, potentially affecting billions of dollars in trade.

The Patriot air-defense system is lauded by militaries around the world for its ability to shoot down deadly drones and missiles.

Now, a new version of a European weapon is set to challenge its dominance and test whether the region can wean itself off U.S. arms.

Europe’s so-called Samp/T has long been in the shadow of its American rival, which has secured far more orders and has proved itself on the battlefield. The system’s Franco-Italian maker says its next-generation model is better equipped to battle for orders.

The launch comes as Europe works to bolster its defense capabilities and debates whether it should be so dependent on U.S. weapons. U.S. support for Ukraine has at times been uncertain under President Trump, who has called on Europe to look after its own security.

Front and center is air defense, which has proven essential for both Israel and Ukraine in defending against attacks by Iran and Russia, respectively.

The new Samp/T will take on the Patriot at a time when the U.S. system has been increasingly struggling in Ukraine as Russia introduces more maneuverable ballistic missiles, according to a Ukrainian official.

Governments across Europe are assessing their air-defense capabilities. Denmark, which has been angered by Trump’s desire to annex Greenland, has said it plans to decide which system to buy later this year. Defense executives also expect Belgium, Portugal and the U.K. to soon upgrade air defenses.

At stake is billions of dollars in trade—and European pride.

During a recent air show in Paris, Eric Tabacchi pointed at the Samp/T’s new radar as it rotated once a second, peering more than 220 miles into the sky.

“The Patriot has nothing like that,” said Tabacchi, a military consultant at Eurosam, which makes the system. Eurosam is a joint venture of missile maker MBDA and France’s Thales.

The original Samp/T has so far been sold only to Italy and France—the nations that make it—as well as a modified version for Singapore. Since entering service in 2011, it has logged 18 full orders.

By contrast, the U.S.-made Patriot has secured more than 240 orders from 19 countries.

The Patriot’s dominance was cemented in Ukraine, where it has been feted for taking out Russia’s ballistic and hypersonic missiles. In recent months, though, more maneuverable Russian ballistic missiles have been able to avoid its radar, the Ukrainian official said.

RTX, the Patriot’s main contractor, said the system is continuously updated based on real-world engagements.

The Patriot air-defense system has been indispensable to Ukraine. Photo: Wojtek Radwanski/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have separately said the Samp/T struggled to destroy ballistic missiles from the start. An Italian defense official said they had received “positive feedback” on the system from Kyiv.

The next-generation version of the Samp/T has several features that its makers say will now trump the Patriot. Those include a new radar that can monitor a full 360-degrees of the surrounding skies and canisters that rise to a vertical rather than slanted position, allowing it to fire missiles in all directions.

MBDA has also completely redesigned the missile that the Samp/T fires. The new Aster B1NT has a range of more than 90 miles, up from about 62 miles.

Both systems consist of three main distinct parts: a radar, a control unit and a launcher that fires interceptor missiles.

The entire Samp/T system can be set up by as few as 15 people, he said.

The U.S. Army currently uses about 90 soldiers for a Patriot battery. It isn’t clear what the minimum number would be.

RTX said the Patriot has been proven many times in combat and that a new radar—the so-called Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor—will give the system 360-degree coverage.

The new radar is being tested and will be fielded in operational units in fiscal year 2029, according to a U.S. Army spokesman.

Key to winning future orders is being able to supply enough missiles.

Ukraine has now run out of missiles for its two Samp/T systems, the Ukrainian official said.

Last year, MBDA was taking so long to make its Aster missiles that the French government threatened to nationalize production. The company has since pledged to invest billions of dollars to bolster its manufacturing base, including increasing output of Asters by 50% by 2026, compared with 2022 levels.

U.S. officials have previously raised concerns about the availability of the interceptor missiles fired by the Patriot, given the huge demand for them. The Trump administration’s recent decision to withhold Patriot interceptors and other weapons was in part to bolster U.S. stocks. Trump has since said the U.S. would resume providing Ukraine with arms to defend itself—including sending more Patriots, paid for by European nations.

The Patriot’s interceptors are made by Lockheed Martin, which says it will soon be able to produce 600 a year—up from 550 previously. The process still takes longer than the company would like, said Tim Cahill, who runs Lockheed’s missile business.

If successful, Europe’s efforts to develop and sell homegrown alternatives to top-selling U.S. weapons could hurt what has become a lucrative market for American defense companies.

European countries’ recent pledge to increase military spending to 3.5% of gross domestic product from 2% could bring an additional $330 billion of annual spending, much of which will go for equipment, investment bank Bernstein calculates.

The U.S. dominates the global arms trade. It accounted for 43% of global weapons exports over the past five years, up from 35% in the previous five-year period, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a think tank.

Europe makes its own ships and submarines and is a big player in armored vehicles, artillery and military helicopters. But the region is a major buyer of U.S. missiles, top-end drones and jet fighters like the F-35—widely considered the world’s most sophisticated.

U.S. defense-industry executives say they have so far seen no evidence of Europeans cooling on their products. The U.K., for example, recently announced an order of F-35s. Some European lawmakers, though, have suggested they could.

Nine years ago, Danish lawmaker Rasmus Jarlov encouraged his country to order a fleet of F-35s. Now, he says he would push for a European option for aircraft, air-defense and other key military equipment.

“We want an air-defense system from a stable and reliable ally and not one that threatens us and [other] allied countries,” Jarlov said.

Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com

4. Nationalist Vigilantes Are Now Policing Russia’s Streets

A threat to Putin's rule? Or does it support him? What are the long term implications?

Excerpts:

Vigilante groups are increasingly taking control of Russia’s streets and imposing their version of nationalist, pro-Kremlin order as police leave for higher salaries fighting in the war in Ukraine.

...

The war has sapped manpower from jobs throughout the Russian hinterlands as men are lured to the military by signing bonuses of sometimes more than a year’s salary. No void has undermined law and order quite like the one left by police officers for the front.

Authorities, particularly in far-flung places, need help. Russia’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service, is largely focused on acts of sabotage by Ukraine and antiwar sentiment. The Interior Ministry said local police forces had lost some 33,000 police officers in the past year and were currently short some 172,000 new officers.

...

The use of nationalism in politics has always been a double-edged sword in Russia—especially for Putin, who glorifies service to the country in an attempt to tamp down opposition to the war, boost his own popularity and swell recruitment numbers at the front. But in a country with nearly 200 official minorities, he has cautioned against violent ethnic Russian nationalism, which has roots in neo-Nazi movements that took hold after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Nationalist Vigilantes Are Now Policing Russia’s Streets

Far-right groups fill vacuum in cities as many police serve in Russia’s war in Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/nationalist-vigilantes-are-now-policing-russias-streets-02732125

By Milàn Czerny and Thomas Grove

July 16, 2025 11:00 pm ET

An image taken from a video posted on Telegram by Russkaya Obshchina’s St. Petersburg branch.

Key Points

What's This?

Vigilante groups are gaining control in Russia as police officers leave for higher salaries in the Ukraine war, leading to rising crime rates.
Groups like Russkaya Obshchina, with chapters across Russia, are intervening in disputes, conducting raids, and registering people for the military.
The reliance on vigilantes may upset the balance in Russia, especially with the presence of combat-trained veterans and their wide latitude on targets.

Vigilante groups are increasingly taking control of Russia’s streets and imposing their version of nationalist, pro-Kremlin order as police leave for higher salaries fighting in the war in Ukraine.

Some towns and cities across the country are missing as many as half of their patrol and duty officers—and crime rates are rising.

One of the largest groups to step into the void, Russkaya Obshchina, or Russian Community, has 150 chapters across Russia’s 11 time zones. The group’s ranks have swelled as veterans join after returning from the front.

Russkaya Obshchina has boosted its presence on Russia’s biggest social-media platforms such as Telegram and VK, the country’s version of Facebook. It offers a mobile app for anyone to download, with a panic button for emergencies.

Videos on Russian social media show members intervening in everything from alcohol-fueled disputes between neighbors to cases of violence and harassment on the frozen streets of Siberia. Group members sometimes detain people they accuse of petty crimes until the police arrive. But they often go beyond the scope of typical police work, raiding the homes and workplaces of migrants, breaking up private gay parties and forcibly registering people for the military.

The war has sapped manpower from jobs throughout the Russian hinterlands as men are lured to the military by signing bonuses of sometimes more than a year’s salary. No void has undermined law and order quite like the one left by police officers for the front.

Authorities, particularly in far-flung places, need help. Russia’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service, is largely focused on acts of sabotage by Ukraine and antiwar sentiment. The Interior Ministry said local police forces had lost some 33,000 police officers in the past year and were currently short some 172,000 new officers.

“I know that there is a growing shortage of personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system, especially at the grassroots level,” President Vladimir Putin told police officers in Moscow in March. “The problem is, of course, complex.”

Documents are inspected at a retail center during a raid. Photo: Kirill Kukhmar/Zuma Press

A screenshot from a video shows a raid at an LGBTQ party by members of Russkaya Obshchina and police.

Russkaya Obshchina didn’t respond to requests for comment. The group has previously said it isn’t a nationalist organization and subscribes to traditional values, helps clean up parks and celebrates conventional Russian holidays. The head of Russia’s Investigative Committee has publicly backed the group, fueling speculation that it operates with the approval of Russia’s law-enforcement bodies.

“We understand that the police are short on manpower,” said Andrey Tkachuk, a Siberian politician and one of the group’s founders, in an online video. “We’re ready to put a shoulder behind the wheel.”

But Tkachuk also regularly uses derogatory terms in public and in online videos to refer to Muslims. He founded the group along with a television presenter from the country’s most Russian Orthodox and conservative channels.

In the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, where 40% of patrol-officer positions are vacant, members of Russkaya Obshchina went to a construction site and rounded up migrant workers who were inside. Dressed in black and carrying batons, the members filmed the migrant workers as they led them on foot to a nearby police station to check their work status.

Some of the vigilante groups have powerful backers among businessmen and state officials. In Russia’s Far East, Primorsky Krai regional Gov. Oleg Kozhemyako created a unit of volunteers to maintain law and order named Tiger, made up of veterans from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade based in Vladivostok.

Kozhemyako didn’t respond to a request for comment.

In the industrial Siberian city of Tyumen, fighters fresh from the front patrol the streets at night. The group, called Russian Druzhina, has the backing of powerful pro-Kremlin businessman Konstantin Malofeyev.

Malofeyev didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at a meeting of the Interior Ministry board in Moscow. Photo: Mikhail Metzel/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The use of nationalism in politics has always been a double-edged sword in Russia—especially for Putin, who glorifies service to the country in an attempt to tamp down opposition to the war, boost his own popularity and swell recruitment numbers at the front. But in a country with nearly 200 official minorities, he has cautioned against violent ethnic Russian nationalism, which has roots in neo-Nazi movements that took hold after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The increasing reliance on vigilante groups may upset that delicate balance, especially with the presence of veterans, who are trained in combat and potentially traumatized by war. It also runs counter to propaganda that the Kremlin has used to justify its war in Ukraine: that it is fighting fascists.

“This could also backfire against the Russian state as it is effectively sharing its monopoly on violence,” said Vera Alperovich, a human-rights advocate at Sova, a Moscow-based nongovernmental organization that tracks extremism in Russia.

While the groups are helping police, they also appear to have wide latitude over whom to target in raids. Targets often end up being immigrants or those who have run afoul of the Kremlin’s embrace of what it describes as traditional values.

In the small, hardscrabble town of Kamensk-Uralsky, Russkaya Obshchina said that alongside police it raided a small private LGBTQ party, taking photos and videos of male participants with makeup on and naming some of them on social media.

Members of Russkaya Obshchina take part in a religious commemoration in the Russian city of Novocherkassk, in an image taken from a video.

A screenshot of patches on a bag, including the logo of Russkaya Obshchina and a modified version of the Russian imperial flag.

The nationalist group “Northern Man,” founded by a rapper and with dozens of regional chapters, often participates in raids to detain hundreds of migrants along with Russkaya Obshchina and police forces. Northern Man also exerts pressure on LGBTQ bars and nightclubs, and its raids have led to the closure of one such establishment in the city of Krasnoyarsk.

In the Russian-occupied Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, Russkaya Obshchina said its members broke into a nightclub, checking the documents of those inside. The group said that while no one at the club was breaking any laws, it had summoned 14 people to the military enlistment office, without elaborating.

“In a normal world, institutes meant to protect the rights of citizens must not be political…or ideological,” said Valery Vetoshkina, a lawyer associated with Russian nongovernmental organization OVD-Info, which focuses on law-enforcement agencies. But Russkaya Obshchina’s growing authority “is the result of this shortage of personnel in the police.”

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

Appeared in the July 17, 2025, print edition as 'Vigilantes Police Russia’s Streets'.

5. Rep. Jackson Secures Major Victories for TX-13 During the NDAA Markup for Fiscal Year 2026 (USSOCOM and the Irregular Warfare Center)

Of course this is only the markup so it is a long way from becoming law.

What are the implications of having USSOCOM assume control of the Irregular Warfare Center?

What will Senators Reed and Kelly have to say about their John McCain Center for Irregular Warfare concept and this initiative?

Excerpt:

Wins for Special Operational Forces (SOF):

Grants SOF rapid acquisition authority and authorizes $100 million to meet urgent mission needs.
Examines how the Global Force Management framework supports fast, flexible responses to emerging threats and strategic signaling.
Authorizes U.S. Special Operations Command to launch a digital force protection pilot program to identify security gaps, train teams, and test secure communications tools.
Places U.S. Special Operations Command in charge of the Irregular Warfare Center.

Rep. Jackson Secures Major Victories for TX-13 During the NDAA Markup for Fiscal Year 2026

https://jackson.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2386

Washington, July 15, 2025

WASHINGTON — Today, Congressman Ronny Jackson (TX-13) championed Texas’ defense priorities during the House Armed Services Committee’s markup of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026. The legislation passed out of committee with strong support, 55-2, and is expected to be considered on the House floor in the coming weeks.

“Today, the House Armed Services Committee advanced the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026,” said Rep. Ronny Jackson. “I’m proud to have secured major wins and investments for Texas’ Thirteenth Congressional District, including support for Pantex, Bell Helicopter, Sheppard Air Force Base, and more. This year’s NDAA enhances the military’s efficiency and readiness, supporting President Trump’s and Secretary Hegseth’s commitment to building a modern, lethal force. Thanks to Chairman Mike Rogers’ leadership we are delivering a strong America First NDAA that will have a lasting impact on our warfighters, their families, and our national defense.”

“Chairman Ronny Jackson is leading the charge to ensure America’s special operations forces and intelligence community stay ahead of our adversaries,” said Chairman Mike Rogers. “Through his vital work on the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee, he’s delivering investments in the FY26 NDAA that strengthen cutting-edge technologies and equip our warfighters with the tools they need to keep America safe. Chairman Jackson knows that maintaining our edge in advanced tech is essential to defeating threats in the shadows and preserving our national security.”

National Wins:

Quality of Life and Readiness: The Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) NDAA increases recruitment, expands training opportunities, prioritizes innovative capabilities, and improves Servicemembers’ Quality of Life.
Deterrence and Innovation: The FY26 NDAA prioritizes modern weapons, Artificial Intelligence, hypersonics, and unmanned systems to ensure America stays ahead of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, or any other adversary.
Acquisition Reform: Defense funding should go to safeguarding our warfighters and advancing our national security, not entrenched bureaucracies. By reforming acquisition, cutting red tape, and improving Congressional oversight, we can streamline operations and improve efficiency for taxpayers.
Peace Through Strength: This bill delivers on President Trump’s promise to rebuild America’s military power, restore deterrence, and put America First.

Wins for Amarillo:

Modernizes the V-22 Osprey fleet with upgrades such as the nacelle improvement program.
Highlights critical upgrades, such as the Structural Improvements and Electrical Power Upgrades, which expand the capabilities of the AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y helicopters.
Advances warhead assembly and disassembly modernization at the Pantex Plant to ensure this critical facility keeps pace with Department of Defense modernization.
Requests a modernization plan from the Office of Secure Transportation for the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Authorizes the Secretary of the Army to accelerate the fielding of the MV-75 Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA).

Wins for Wichita Falls and Sheppard Air Force Base:

Requires the United States Air Force to establish a Technical Training Center of Excellence, positioning Sheppard Air Force Base for designation due to its incomparable technical training expertise.
Drives the Department of the Air Force to upgrade logistics and maintenance training and incorporate improved information technology systems.
Supports expedited production of the T-7 aircraft program and calls on the Department of the Air Force to explore opportunities to accelerate the delivery of the aircraft to pilot training installations like Sheppard AFB.
Directs the Air Force to consider expanding and strengthening the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program to include Pacific allies like Japan and Australia.
Allows American pilots to use Link-16 secure communications capabilities in all special airspaces, so our pilots can train the way they fight.
Ensures Congressional oversight of Air Force aircraft readiness rates, including for fighter and trainer jets.
Directs the Air Force to provide a plan to maximize pilot training throughout.

Wins for Special Operational Forces (SOF):

Grants SOF rapid acquisition authority and authorizes $100 million to meet urgent mission needs.
Examines how the Global Force Management framework supports fast, flexible responses to emerging threats and strategic signaling.
Authorizes U.S. Special Operations Command to launch a digital force protection pilot program to identify security gaps, train teams, and test secure communications tools.
Places U.S. Special Operations Command in charge of the Irregular Warfare Center.

Wins for Military Readiness:

Prohibits Department of Defense funding from universities like Columbia and Harvard where academic administrators have failed to address antisemitic demonstrations on their campuses.
Calls on U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Transportation Command to identify stealth transport and refueling requirements.
Establishes partnerships between the Department of Defense and Industry to expedite approvals of critical minerals and rare earth magnet sources outside of China.
Supports Army efforts to acquire a robust inventory of counter-drone systems.
Authorizes the establishment of a National Security and Defense Artificial Intelligence Institute to advance warfighting capabilities and collaboration between the Department of Defense, academic institutions like Texas A&M, and industry.
Champions joint directed energy research and testing for counter-drone use.
Advances the Army Research Lab’s partnership with universities, including the University of North Texas, working on hypersonic weapons propulsion and materials.
Elevates the capabilities of surface- and ground-launched Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles.
Strengthens critical mineral recovery efforts to reduce reliance on China for rare earth elements.
Highlights the essential functions of Expeditionary Medical Ships.
Promotes depot maintenance considerations to inform Joint Force wartime requirements.
Reviews existing U.S. and host nation air and missile defense capabilities protecting U.S. military personnel and equipment at Al Udeid Air Base to ensure adequate protection of American servicemembers.
Promotes the use of predictive analytics at the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence.

Wins for Servicemember Healthcare and Benefits:

Establishes a new brain research program to treat the more than 300,000 servicemembers who have suffered traumatic brain injuries.
Builds on previous year’s efforts to improve support, care, and accountability across all military branches.
Examines the Department of Defense’s wound care strategy, including prevention, treatment, and infection control in future operations.
Praises the Secretary of Defense’s Quality of Life efforts and supports childcare needs at military installations.
Explores the feasibility of establishing co-working spaces for military spouses at remote military installations in the United States.
Supports greater accountability for privatized housing contractors amid ongoing housing quality concerns.

6. China’s Aircraft Carriers Push Into Waters Long Dominated by U.S.

Please go to the link to view the map/graphics and proper article format.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/17/world/asia/china-carriers-us-japan.html?unlocked_article_code=1.XE8.1rQR.lycpHgfzSb9M&smid=url-share

China’s Aircraft Carriers Push Into Waters Long Dominated by U.S.

Recent drills near Japan reflect China’s ambitions to extend its navy’s reach and exert greater influence, in the Pacific and beyond.

Fighter jets could be seen on the flight deck of China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, the Shandong, as it was anchored in Hong Kong this month.Credit...May James/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Chris BuckleyGraphics by Marco Hernandez

July 17, 2025,

12:01 a.m. ET

As China girds for a deepening global rivalry with the United States, Beijing is testing how far its navy can operate from home, and how well its warships can work together on the open seas. In recent exercises involving two aircraft carriers, China gave a bold display of how it seeks to assert dominance in the western Pacific.

From late May and for much of June in seas near Japan, the two Chinese carriers — the Liaoning and the Shandong — practiced takeoffs and landings of fighter jets and helicopters, as many as 90 or more times on some days, according to reports from the Japanese military’s joint staff. Each carrier was protected by several warships.

The exercises, which caused Japan to express “serious concerns,” were a template for how China could use a growing collection of aircraft carriers to project armed power into the Pacific and try to overawe Asian neighbors aligned with Washington.

This was the first time that two Chinese carriers had ventured together past the “first island chain” — the barrier of islands east of China that includes the Japanese island of Okinawa, where U.S. Marines are based, and Taiwan — and toward Guam, a U.S. military hub, said Christopher Sharman, the director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. Guam is part of what is called the “second island chain,” which stretches from Tokyo to south of Palau.

The Chinese naval activities near or past the second island chain signal that U.S. forces “operating in the vicinity of Guam could be at greater risk,” Mr. Sharman said.

Chinese aircraft carriers’ moves in the Pacific

The Liaoning

The Shandong

Japan

Sea

JAPAN

Yellow

Sea

June 20

CHINA

May 25

Okinawa

June 7

July 3

Hong Kong

June 10

June 7

South

China Sea

Guam

Philippine

Sea

PHILIPPINES

Palau

300 miles

Source: Ministry of Defence of JapanThe New York Times

“These aircraft carrier operations are a harbinger of what is to come,” said Mr. Sharman, a former U.S. Navy attaché in Beijing. China “wants its carriers to be capable of operating independently at remote locations from the mainland, in both peacetime and wartime,” he said. “That means training for longer periods of time and at increasing distances from China.”

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China’s navy said last month that the two carriers and accompanying warships were practicing “far-sea defense and joint operations.” The two carrier groups also squared off against each other in a simulated confrontation, said Xinhua, China’s official news agency.

Some jet fighters that took off from the carriers flew perilously close to Japanese surveillance aircraft, Japan’s defense ministry said.

The exercises were not just for show. Operating aircraft from carriers is demanding and risky, Mr. Sharman said. By training far out in the Pacific, the carriers and accompanying vessels gained “valuable operating experience in unfamiliar waters, thereby providing the crew with skills that are applicable to future operations elsewhere in the world,” he said.

In the coming years, China may deploy aircraft carriers and accompanying naval vessels to bolster its claims in the South China Sea or in territorial disputes with South Korea or Japan. China could also send carriers to more distant parts of the world as a show of force to defend its economic and security interests.

China has only one significant overseas military base, in Djibouti, but carriers give it “the option of carrying out myriad aviation missions anywhere its navy sails,” said Timothy R. Heath, a senior researcher at RAND, an organization that provides analysis for the Pentagon and other clients. “The most important routes are those to the Middle East along the Indian Ocean.”

Still, the carriers are not a guarantee of Chinese regional maritime dominance.

In a toe-to-toe confrontation between China and the United States, each side’s carriers could be vulnerable to the other’s torpedoes or missiles. Given those risks, carriers may play a limited role, at least initially, in any potential clash over Taiwan, the self-governed island that China claims as its territory, several military experts said.

And because Taiwan is close to mainland China’s coast and its many air bases, the aircraft carriers would not be crucial for trying to dominate the skies in a war over the island, said Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University who studies Chinese military strategy.

China could send its carriers farther out into the Pacific to fend off U.S. forces steaming to Taiwan’s aid, though the carriers would then be much more exposed to U.S. attacks, Ms. Mastro said.

But China could also deploy the carriers as part of an effort to choke Taiwan off from the world.

“Chinese aircraft carriers will be useful in imposing a blockade on Taiwan,” said Narushige Michishita, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo who studies China’s military. “Aircraft carriers can surveil large areas and put coercive pressure on both military and commercial ships and aircraft.”

China now has three carriers, all running on diesel and generally less advanced than the United States’ 11 nuclear powered carriers. By 2040, China may have six carriers, according to U.S. Navy estimates. China appears to be building a fourth carrier, which analysts say may use nuclear power. That would give it far greater range without the need to refuel.

Side-by-side carriers

These are China’s three aircraft carriers, and how they compare to the world’s largest aircraft carrier.

Chengdu J-20

to scale

The Liaoning

Brought from Ukraine to China in 2002, this diesel aircraft carrier is a Chinese modernization of an unfinished Soviet vessel.

997 ft long

The Shandong

China’s second carrier is very similar to The Liaoning, also an enhanced Soviet model, with a faster cruising speed of up to 31 knots. Its predecessor could cruise at up to 29 knots.

997 ft

The Fujian

This aircraft carrier enhanced China's capabilities to launch heavier and larger fixed-wing aircraft. However, like its predecessors, it is diesel powered.

1,037 ft

F-22 Raptor

to scale

The USS Gerald R. Ford

This is currently the largest aircraft carrier in the world, and is nuclear powered. China’s new aircraft carrier is expected to be of a similar length, and may be nuclear powered.

1,106 ft long

Sources: Center for Strategic and International Studies and U.S. NavyNote: Artist impressions based on photos, models and diagrams of the carriersThe New York Times

Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, appears to have decided that the country must have more carriers, and other big military assets, to cement its position as a global power. After the two Chinese carriers finished training in the Pacific this month, one of them, the Shandong, docked in Hong Kong, and selected members of the public were allowed to tour the vessel.

“Politically, they are one of the ultimate status symbols for any country,” Mr. Heath, the researcher at RAND, said of aircraft carriers. China’s enthusiastic publicity about the carrier maneuvers in the Pacific indicated that its “leadership highly values the political symbolism of owning such a powerful warship,” Mr. Heath said.

Decades ago, Chinese leaders had resisted acquiring aircraft carriers, deciding that they were too costly at a time when China’s economy was much smaller.

That began to change after 1996, when the United States deployed two carrier battle groups to the waters near Taiwan to deter Beijing from further escalating tensions with the island. China had been firing ballistic missiles near Taiwan’s main ports, hoping to scare voters inclined to support President Lee Teng-hui, who Beijing saw as pushing pro-independence policies.

Two years after that crisis, a Chinese businessman bought a rusting, unfinished ex-Soviet carrier that was owned by Ukraine. China later bought and finished the ship, which debuted in 2012 as its first carrier, called the Liaoning.

These days, budget limits are not such a worry for China’s navy. But its leaders are not rushing headlong into carrier expansion.

Image

The Fujian, China’s third aircraft carrier, during its maiden sea trial in 2024.Credit...Ding Ziyu/Xinhua, via Associated Press

The Shandong — China’s second carrier and its first built at home — was launched in 2017. The latest, the Fujian, was launched in 2022 and has still not been placed into active service. The Fujian uses an electromagnetic catapult system to launch aircraft, which is more technically challenging than using a deck with a ski slope-like ramp, but makes it possible to fly heavier, better-armed planes.

“Chinese carrier operations are still in a rudimentary phase,” said Mr. Michishita, of the institute in Tokyo. China, he said, is “taking a steady step-by-step approach to improve their capabilities.”

Kiuko Notoya in Tokyo contributed reporting.

Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for The Times, reports on China and Taiwan from Taipei, focused on politics, social change and security and military issues.

Marco Hernandez is a Times graphics editor covering visually driven stories.

7. China’s military expansion in the Southwest Pacific

The buried lede - while the US has a myopic geographic focus on Taiwan, China is expanding its influence with hard and soft power.

Excerpt:

However, as the U.S. narrows its focus on Taiwan’s security, China is steadily expanding its military and economic interests beyond the South China Sea, increasingly encroaching on the Southwest Pacific and Oceania. Beijing’s growing influence in the Pacific is shifting the balance of power, posing a challenge to the long-standing security dominance of Western nations in the region.

Beijing is testing the limits of what its military and paramilitary forces can do without violating international law. These efforts showcase China’s military capabilities beyond its nearshore waters and are part of an ongoing effort to normalize its military activity across the Indo-Pacific.

Are we missing the broader Chinese strategy?

My assessment is that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan)

China’s military expansion in the Southwest Pacific – GIS Reports

gisreportsonline.com · July 15, 2025

SECURITYJuly 15, 2025

China’s military expansion toward the Southwest Pacific and Oceania

Riley Walters

Reading time: 9 min

Beijing is increasing military activities and economic influence in the Indo-Pacific and transforming the regional security landscape.

April 25: A Chinese warship spotted in the West Philippine Sea. Beijing has been growing its military ambitions, which extend well beyond the South China Sea. © Getty Images

In a nutshell

China’s navy challenges Australia, New Zealand and U.S. strategies
Chinese military exercises extend beyond Taiwan into Oceania
Beijing’s economic push includes BRI projects in Pacific Island nations
For comprehensive insights, tune into our AI-powered podcast here

There is a particular interest in China’s recent military activities around Taiwan and their implications for the broader Indo-Pacific region. At an annual defense conference in May, United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated, “Any attempt by communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world.”

However, as the U.S. narrows its focus on Taiwan’s security, China is steadily expanding its military and economic interests beyond the South China Sea, increasingly encroaching on the Southwest Pacific and Oceania. Beijing’s growing influence in the Pacific is shifting the balance of power, posing a challenge to the long-standing security dominance of Western nations in the region.

Beijing is testing the limits of what its military and paramilitary forces can do without violating international law. These efforts showcase China’s military capabilities beyond its nearshore waters and are part of an ongoing effort to normalize its military activity across the Indo-Pacific.

Nevertheless, this strategy is not going unnoticed and it is encouraging countries across the Indo-Pacific region to invest more in their own defense and security capabilities.

China’s bold military moves

The Southwest Pacific serves as a crucial transit zone for military shipping, while a large volume of commercial cargo also passes through the region, including agricultural exports from Australia and New Zealand, energy shipments from Australia to the U.S. and East Asia, and much of America’s exports to the Asia-Pacific markets.

Australia and New Zealand are also two of the five members of the Five Eyes, an intelligence-sharing alliance with the U.S., Canada and the United Kingdom.

In mid-February, vessels from China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy were seen transiting key waterways such as the Torres Strait and near Papua New Guinea, including drone activity within the latter’s airspace.

Shortly after this incident, the Chinese navy announced live-fire naval exercises in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand, marking its first recorded operational engagement in this strategically sensitive area. Its task group included the guided-missile frigate Hengyang, the cruiser Zunyi and the replenishment ship Weishanhu. For nearly a month, Australian forces were on high alert as Chinese naval ships made an unannounced journey around the continent, provocatively navigating in and out of Australia’s exclusive economic zone.

The drills led to the rerouting of many international flights due to safety concerns, signaling Beijing’s disregard for established norms of transparency in global airspace and maritime safety. The sudden presence of Chinese warships near the maritime boundaries of Australia and New Zealand caught both countries’ defense establishments off guard – in fact, it was a Virgin Australia pilot who alerted Australian authorities about the Chinese live-fire drill. The incident sparked strong reactions from policymakers and military analysts, and raised questions about China’s intentions in the broader Southwest Pacific.

Facts & figures

China’s live-fire drill in the Tasman Sea

The incident raised questions about China’s intentions in the broader Southwest Pacific. For Australia and New Zealand, both of which depend on open and secure sea lanes of communication for their economies and military coordination, Beijing’s drills underscored a rising Chinese presence in what was until recently considered a relatively insulated maritime region. The Australian 2024 National Defense Strategy highlighted concerns about China’s rapidly growing military and economic footprint in the Southwest Pacific region. Other countries across the Indo-Pacific are also aware of China’s growing military reach.

Strategically, the exercises in February indicated China’s intent to test or challenge existing security assumptions. They also suggest the possibility of a future where the Southwest Pacific, including the Tasman Sea, could become a contested zone, compelling Australia, New Zealand and their ally, the U.S., to reevaluate their strategies.

Following the incident, Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong confronted her Chinese counterpart during a G20 summit, expressing concerns about the lack of prior notification for the exercises. Defense Minister Richard Marles acknowledged the exercises were legal, but also criticized the absence of prior communication, which forced the Australian Defence Force to rely on commercial pilot alerts to track activity. Opposition leaders in Australia called for a tougher response to China’s assertiveness.

New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Winston Peters called the incident a “failure” in diplomatic communication, while Defense Minister Judith Collins emphasized the strategic seriousness of the deployment, noting that the Chinese flotilla included vessels armed with ballistic missiles capable of reaching Australia. Prime Minister Christopher Luxon underscored the need to reassess New Zealand’s defense posture.

Feb. 20: Wang Yi (left), the foreign minister of China, greets Penny Wong, Australian minister for foreign affairs, at the G20 Foreign Minister’s Meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa. During her meeting, Ms. Wong stated she clearly communicated to her Chinese counterpart that the conduct of the live-fire drills “did not meet our expectations and was of deep concern.” © Getty Images

A multifaceted security strategy

Since 2022, China has intensified its military activity around Taiwan, extending beyond daily operations in the Taiwan Strait. It now includes more frequent large-scale exercises involving both the military and paramilitary forces, such as the coast guard, often featuring live-fire drills. Last year, two exercises, respectively named Joint Sword-2024 A and B, saw record-setting military activity by China’s forces.

While the focus of these forces has been around the island of Taiwan and its satellite islands, it should not be surprising to see these types of exercises now incorporating operations in regions like the Southwest Pacific.

Economic power and regional shifts

In recent years, China’s activities in the Southwest Pacific have increasingly aligned with long-term strategic, military and diplomatic interests. Beijing often presents its outreach as focusing on development, infrastructure and mutual benefit, but its actions indicate a deeper goal of reshaping the regional balance of power and challenging traditional U.S. and allied influence.

In 2019, both the Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched from diplomatically recognizing Taiwan, to officially considering it part of China. Nauru made the same decision in 2024. Following this change, the Solomon Islands also signed a security agreement with China in 2022. The deal shocked regional powers, especially Australia and the U.S., due to a clause allowing China to make port visits and conduct logistics replenishment.

Beijing is also intervening in international frameworks, leveraging its influence to shape global norms and institutions in ways that align with its strategic interests.

In May, Daniel Waneoroa, a member of parliament of the Solomon Islands, resigned from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, an international cross-party network of lawmakers that collaborates to address the challenges posed by the policies and influence of the Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Waneoroa faced persistent intimidation from the People’s Republic of China, including direct actions by its embassy in Honiara. Some Chinese officials reportedly warned of economic retaliation if he refused to leave the alliance.

Although China has not released an official policy document explicitly outlining its interests in the Southwest Pacific, its increasing economic activity in the region indicates clear strategic intent. By investing in infrastructure (especially dual-use ports which ostensibly are designed for commercial shipping but have capabilities to serve naval vessels), signing resource agreements and engaging in aid diplomacy, China is deepening its involvement with several Pacific Island nations.

Scenarios

Likely: China increases scale and frequency of military operations in the Pacific

Countries near China are already familiar with its increasing military and paramilitary activities in the region. Taiwan sees dozens of military aircraft and naval vessel activity near its islands every day. Beijing continues to use its coast guard to harass and intimidate Philippine vessels in the South China Sea and the Japanese coast guard near the Senkaku Islands.

China’s military activities are likely to extend beyond the waters around Taiwan, the South China Sea and Japan into new areas such as Oceania and the Indian Ocean. Like the large military exercises conducted around Taiwan, China is not only expanding the scale of its military operations but also integrating various military and paramilitary forces. Beijing will not just broaden its reach but also step up the frequency of these military activities to normalize its actions.

Most likely: Australia to partner with regional partners to counter China

The growing presence of China’s navy and surprise military activities around Australia will very likely lead to two outcomes. First, Australia, the U.S. and their partners will probably conduct more freedom of navigation operations and joint drills to assert their presence. Second, these countries will likely stress an even greater need for better maritime domain awareness and real-time information sharing.

Given Canberra’s repeated concerns about Beijing’s expanding economic and diplomatic involvement in the region, it will be no surprise that Australia will work with other regional leaders, like Japan, to counter China’s economic and strategic investments.

Finally, the combination of China’s escalating military activity in the Indo-Pacific region and the diplomatic uncertainty from Washington will likely lead to more rhetoric from countries like Australia, New Zealand and others calling for enhanced domestic defense and security capabilities.

About the expert

Riley Walters

is an Asian affairs expert.

gisreportsonline.com · July 15, 2025

8. German and U.K. Leaders Meet to Cement Ties as America Steps Back

German and U.K. Leaders Meet to Cement Ties as America Steps Back

Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s trip to London on Thursday is the latest sign of a new world order, in which European nations are uniting amid growing instability.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/17/world/europe/germany-uk-merz-starmer-meeting.html

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From left: President Emmanuel Macron of France, Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany and Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain at the NATO summit in The Hague, in June. Credit...Pool photo by Ludovic Marin

By Mark Landler and Jim Tankersley

Mark Landler reported from London and Jim Tankersley from Berlin.

July 17, 2025,

12:01 a.m. ET

There won’t be a horse-drawn carriage ride or a lavish banquet at Windsor Castle, as there was during last week’s state visit of President Emmanuel Macron of France. But when Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany visits London on Thursday, it will add another layer to the portrait of Europe uniting against foreign threats.

Britain and Germany are expected to sign an Anglo-German treaty on defense, energy, economic cooperation, and migration, officials from both countries said this week. The defense accord will build on an agreement signed last October, under which the two agreed to cooperate on mutual defense, with joint military exercises and the development of sophisticated weapons.

Mr. Merz, a center-right leader who came to power in May, has quickly emerged as a linchpin in Europe’s effort to build a more independent role in its security since the return of President Trump to the White House. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who will meet Mr. Merz at 10 Downing Street, has likewise tried to position Britain as a key player in European support for Ukraine in its war against Russia.

Details of the treaty were still being worked out this week, officials said, but it is likely to include a pledge by both countries to regard a threat against one as a threat against the other.

Such a commitment to mutual defense would echo language adopted by Britain and France, which pledged last week to more closely coordinate their nuclear arsenals in responding to threats against European allies.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Germany and the United Kingdom? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Germany does not possess nuclear weapons, but it is the third-largest supplier of military hardware to Ukraine, after the United States and Britain, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Under Mr. Merz, Germany has agreed to increase its military spending to 3.5 percent of gross domestic product by 2029, its most ambitious rearmament since the end of the Cold War.

German officials told reporters this week that the agreement, which they refer to as a “friendship contract,” is the latest effort to bring the two countries closer at a time of heightened security concerns, and to bridge divides that had been opened by Britain’s exit from the European Union.

At a time of economic stagnation in Britain and Germany, the friendship agreement will include steps to strengthen commercial ties, from a scientific research partnership to improved rail connections. It will also feature several measures related to migration.

Those include new cooperation to combat human trafficking and more targeted efforts to make it easier for British or German citizens to visit each other’s countries post-Brexit — like easier passage for British people at German airports, and simpler requirements for German schoolchildren visiting London.

Migration was the centerpiece of Mr. Macron’s visit to Britain. He and Mr. Starmer agreed to a pilot program, nicknamed “one-in, one-out,” under which Britain would send back to France about 50 people a week who had made risky crossings of the English Channel in small boats. In return, it would accept a comparable number of migrants with processed claims to asylum in Britain.

For reasons of diplomatic protocol, Mr. Merz’s visit will be more modest and businesslike than that of Mr. Macron. Unlike Mr. Macron, Mr. Merz is not a head of state (Germany has a largely ceremonial president). Mr. Starmer is the chancellor’s host, while King Charles III invited Mr. Macron, reciprocating for his own state visit to France in 2023.

Like Mr. Macron, Mr. Trump will get the full ruffles and flourishes when he makes a rare second state visit to Britain in mid-September. Later this month, Mr. Trump will make a semiprivate visit to his two golf clubs in Scotland. He is expected to meet with Mr. Starmer, though not with the king, while there.

Still, the lack of pomp and pageantry for Mr. Merz says little about the importance of the relationship between him and Mr. Starmer. Both are centrist leaders, struggling to govern in polarized political systems. Both are also relatively new — Mr. Starmer just marked his first anniversary in office. Mr. Macron, by contrast, is in the twilight of his presidency, with elections in France scheduled for 2027.

Stephen Castle contributed reporting

U.K. and France Sign First Nuclear Pact to Fend Off Threat to Europe

July 10, 2025

Mark Landler is the London bureau chief of The Times, covering the United Kingdom, as well as American foreign policy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has been a journalist for more than three decades.

Jim Tankersley is the Berlin bureau chief for The Times, leading coverage of Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

9. Australian premier Anthony Albanese stresses trade with China in meeting with President Xi Jinping

There is more to this article than the headline, particularly about "Defense Diplomacy." What do we gain by these "frank conversations" with our allies that coerces them into saying publicly that they will defend Taiwan? How does that contribute to strategy and campaigning? II seems like Canberra responded frankly and directly to Bridge Colby.

Excerpts:

Defense and diplomacy

However, in a meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Mr. Trump indicated he was unfamiliar with AUKUS.

The Financial Times reported last month that Mr. Colby was reviewing AUKUS. He worries that the U.S. lacks the capacity to build enough nuclear attack submarines for the Navy.

Attack submarines are considered key deterrents against a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

On Sunday, the Financial Times reported that Mr. Colby has demanded that Australia and Japan clarify their roles in a potential defense of Taiwan.

After publication, Mr. Colby posted on X: “Some among our allies might not welcome frank conversations.”

Canberra responded frankly.

“The sole power to commit Australia to war or to allow our territory to be used for a conflict is the elected government of the day,” Mr. Conroy said. “Sovereignty will always be prioritized.”

Australian premier Anthony Albanese stresses trade with China in meeting with President Xi Jinping

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

Premium

By - The Washington Times - Tuesday, July 15, 2025

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

SEOUL, South Korea — Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese emphasized his country’s economic ties with China over the U.S. in a meeting Tuesday with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in anticipation of a higher U.S. tariff on Australian goods starting next month.

Australia is hosting a massive military exercise with more than a dozen nations, including the United States.

“China is our major trading partner, the destination for more than 1 in 4 of our export dollars,” Mr. Albanese told a post-summit press conference. “Our trade with the U.S. is less than 5%.”

The Australian prime minister’s summit with Mr. Xi has generated scrutiny because Mr. Albanese has yet to meet with President Trump. Mr. Trump’s tariffs have roiled Australian markets and irked its leaders.

U.S. tariffs have raised special ire in Australia, which — unlike regional powerhouses China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan — has run trade deficits with the United States since the 1990s. Only in 2025 has Australia lodged a modest surplus.

“We continue to put our case forward that [the U.S. tariff] shouldn’t be 10[%],” Mr. Albanese said last month. “It should be zero. That is what a reciprocal tariff will be. We have a U.S. free trade agreement.”

Mr. Trump has called for U.S. tariffs to increase to 30% on Aug. 1 if trade deals with targeted nations, including Australia, have not been secured.

“There clearly isn’t a strong personal rapport” between Mr. Albanese and Mr. Trump, the right-leaning Australian think tank Lowy Institute said. It added that the leaders’ dissonance will likely “reverberate throughout their respective systems.”

The Lowy Institute noted that recent polls have found Mr. Trump deeply unpopular among Australians. It opined that Mr. Albanese, who won reelection in May in a landslide, “need not dance to Trump’s tune. … Just as Trump likes to invoke America First, Albanese has his own version.”

“There is probably some animosity toward [Mr. Albanese’s] Labor Party,” said David Arase, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. “Trump would probably rather have dealt with the conservatives.”

Mr. Albanese told reporters in Beijing that Australia’s trade is overweighted toward China. “We want to see a diversification of our trade,” he said.

Talisman Sabre

Amid economic tensions with the United States, Australia is hosting its largest military exercise. It is expected to attract the attention of Chinese spy ships as 35,000 international troops engage in war games on land and sea, as well as in the air, space and cyberspace.

Military personnel from 19 nations, including Britain, Canada, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Tonga, will participate over three weeks, Australia’s defense agency said. Malaysia and Vietnam are attending as observers.

Known as Exercise Talisman Sabre, the war games started in 2005 as a biennial exercise between Australia and the United States. For the first time, Talisman Sabre has expanded outside Australia. It is taking place in Papua New Guinea, Australia’s closest neighbor.

Though the war games do not target any enemy state, participating democracies broadly agree that China is the key regional threat.

Chinese surveillance ships have monitored naval exercises off the Australian coast during the past four Talisman Sabre exercises and are expected to surveil the current exercise, Defense Industry Minister Pat Conroy said.

Australian divers have been pinged by Chinese sonar in recent months, and Australian aircraft have been buzzed by Chinese jets. In February, Chinese warships circumnavigated Australia and conducted live-fire drills in international waters off its coast.

Asked about the meeting in Beijing, Mr. Albanese said he told Mr. Xi that “there was no breach of international law by China … but we were concerned about the motive and the way it happened, including the live-fire exercises.”

Pressed by reporters, Mr. Albanese said: “I put forward Australia’s position, which is that we want peace and security in the region. That is in the interests of Australia and China.”

Defense and diplomacy

Canberra, a U.S. treaty ally, has long been a foul-weather friend. It deployed troops to U.S.-led expeditionary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq but did not escape U.S. criticism of its defense spending.

“Australia is currently well below the 3% [of gross domestic product] level advocated for NATO … and Canberra faces a far more powerful challenge in China,” Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby said during his confirmation hearing in March.

Mr. Albanese has committed to increasing defense spending to 2.33% of GDP, much of which will be devoted to AUKUS, Australia’s 2021 trilateral security agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States.

Two Canberra administrations and two London governments have invested significant political capital in AUKUS, the most ambitious and expensive defense project in Australian history. Under the agreement, Britain and the U.S. will supply Australia with nuclear submarine technologies.

However, in a meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Mr. Trump indicated he was unfamiliar with AUKUS.

The Financial Times reported last month that Mr. Colby was reviewing AUKUS. He worries that the U.S. lacks the capacity to build enough nuclear attack submarines for the Navy.

Attack submarines are considered key deterrents against a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

On Sunday, the Financial Times reported that Mr. Colby has demanded that Australia and Japan clarify their roles in a potential defense of Taiwan.

After publication, Mr. Colby posted on X: “Some among our allies might not welcome frank conversations.”

Canberra responded frankly.

“The sole power to commit Australia to war or to allow our territory to be used for a conflict is the elected government of the day,” Mr. Conroy said. “Sovereignty will always be prioritized.”

• This article is based in part on wire service reports.

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

10. Red Lines and Black Boxes: Iran, Deterrence, and the Weaponization of Uncertainty

Excerpts:

Tehran’s goal, at least until recently, was to be a nuclear threshold state. Not to build a bomb—but to make sure everyone knew it could. This ‘sweet spot’ strategy allowed Iran to remain inside the NPT, avoid pariah status, and project deterrence without triggering regional arms races. Or so they thought.

And that is the dilemma. The regime is caught between two contradictory imperatives: the need to project strength, and the desire for survival. Its recent missile responses to U.S. actions—mild, telegraphed in advance, and largely symbolic—mirror the playbook it used after Qassem Soleimani’s assassination. This isn’t escalation or de-escalation; it’s disciplined signaling. Tehran wants to be seen retaliating, but not so aggressively as to invite a real war.

In the end, we should be clear-eyed. There is no returning to the status quo ante. The damage to facilities may or may not delay Iran’s progress, but it definitely erodes trust, reduces transparency, and increases the likelihood of miscalculation. Iran may not have been actively weaponizing before the strikes. But now, the U.S. won’t know if they start.

Even full weaponization carries its own traps. As former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has said, if the Iranians had in fact wanted to weaponize, they could have done so long ago, warning that such weapons would not make the region safer. A nuclear Iran would likely spark a regional cascade, inviting Persian Gulf rivals to buy their own bombs. Moreover, the moment deterrence becomes proliferation, Iran’s geographic and strategic depth may evaporate.

And in a nuclear age, it’s not just what others are doing—it’s what you think they might be doing. That is how deterrence becomes paranoia. How uncertainty becomes escalation.

And how red lines, drawn in concrete, turn into black boxes we can no longer open.

Opinion / Perspective| The Latest

Red Lines and Black Boxes: Iran, Deterrence, and the Weaponization of Uncertainty

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/17/iran-deterrence-strategy-red-lines/

by Siamak Naficy

07.17.2025 at 06:00am

In the shadow of Israel’s air campaign and amid the policy whiplash of the Trump administration’s return to the scene, Iran finds itself cornered, battered, and yet, utterly unmoved. The Islamic Republic has absorbed military strikes on critical infrastructure, watched its economy plunge further into crisis, and received a vague from Washington that may or may not be real. And yet Tehran’s red lines, particularly on uranium enrichment, remain firmly in place. Why?

Because in Iranian strategic culture, compromise with a heavy-handed force isn’t pragmatism—it’s weakness. And weakness invites destruction. It’s dangerous to confuse tactical success with strategic victory—legitimacy is fluid, and humiliation can be politically generative. Deterrence doesn’t die with generals, political bureaucrats, or nuclear scientists. Deterrence is a wicked problem—it adapts, it mutates. Likewise, regimes don’t always end when their air defenses fall. They end when people stop believing in their necessity and legitimacy.

Iran’s security doctrine has rested on two assumptions: first, that the international system is inherently hostile to its regime; and second, that no foreign partner—no matter how transactional—can be counted on when it matters.

Too often, American policy assumes that pain is a useful teacher. The US assumes that when punished sufficiently, states will moderate their behavior to meet American interests. But for Iran’s leadership—steeped in revolutionary paranoia, grievances both real and imagined, as well as the memory of abandonment during the Iran–Iraq War, pain is not deterrence. It is confirmation. Each new military humiliation, each economic blow, simply proves the point: the West cannot be trusted, and only self-reliance ensures survival.

This is why, even after being attacked by Israel, whose missiles and assassinations caused mayhem and destruction throughout the country, the Islamic Republic has shown no willingness to abandon its enrichment program or accept inspections beyond what it deems tolerable. The centrifuges may be damaged, the economy in freefall, but Tehran remains firm: uranium will be enriched on Iranian soil. This is not because the program is efficient (it’s not), nor because it is beloved by the Iranian public (it’s not—or at least it wasn’t), but because conceding it would be a concession too far.

To understand this logic, one has to decouple cost from behavior. Iran’s nuclear program is a financial disaster. It provides roughly 1% of the nation’s electricity while costing billions in direct investment and many billions more in sanctions-induced revenue loss. But arguably, Tehran never saw this program simply as a utility. It is, and has always been, a strategic totem—a proof of autonomy, of sovereignty, a hedge against regime change, and a signal to domestic and international audiences alike that Iran will not be dictated to.

This isn’t new. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s security doctrine has rested on two assumptions: first, that the international system is inherently hostile to its regime; and second, that no foreign partner—no matter how transactional—can be counted on when it matters. This memory, rooted in the horror of chemical warfare and international indifference, shaped an enduring logic of flexibility and self-reliance. “Strategic independence,” as articulated by the Supreme Leader, doesn’t mean efficient globalization—it means never again being vulnerable to the whims of international supply chains or sanctions regimes.

Thus, even proposals that offer Iran a face-saving off-ramp—like enrichment abroad via a multilateral consortium—are stillborn. To Tehran, surrendering control over enrichment is tantamount to the regime inviting the blade by bending the knee. It would mark not just technical dependency, but ideological surrender. That, more than the loss of centrifuges, is the regime’s red line.

Here’s where things get more dangerous. The Israeli strikes, while tactically successful, have triggered a thoroughly predictable response: suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and obscuring its nuclear activities behind layers of ambiguity. The international community is now blind to critical elements of Iran’s nuclear program. No inspectors. No access. No data.

This blackout isn’t accidental—it’s strategic. Iran understands the power of ambiguity. The Israeli intelligence community may still retain visibility through its own channels, and American satellites still peer down from above. But the primary organ of verification—the IAEA—has been blinded. Back in March, before Israel’s war began in earnest but war plans were already made, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified before Congress that American intelligence agencies had determined that the Iranians were not actively pursuing weaponization. This assessment was corroborated by IAEA head, Rafael Grossi, in June—just days before Israeli warplanes loomed over Tehran.

There’s irony in Tehran’s strategy. Iran may be trying to mirror Israel’s nuclear playbook—deceiving the U.S., cultivating ambiguity, signaling capability, stopping short of declaration. But Israel’s opacity works because it has friends. Iran’s doesn’t. There is an “Animal Farm” world order where some are more equal than others. And without powerful allies to absorb the backlash, ambiguity becomes exposure.

For a state without allies, half-measures in nuclear posture offer no shelter. Iran tried to follow the rules of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) while still projecting strategic depth—but found itself isolated. What Iran wanted was leverage. What it got was exposure. It chased the Israeli model without the Israeli insurance policy. When Israel called its bluff, the regime had neither the bomb nor the backing to stand tall.

Meanwhile, the United States finds itself drifting. The Trump administration’s erratic signaling—floating diplomacy one day and airstrikes the next—has undermined strategic coherence.

Now, in the absence of eyes, suspicion grows. Soon after the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, the IAEA found Iran in noncompliance with its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. This was again a predictable response from the Iranians as it could give them greater leverage in any future re-negotiations. Now, its director cannot even assert that the program is peaceful, despite the absence of hard evidence to the contrary.

Herein lies the paradox: the more degraded Iran’s infrastructure becomes, the easier it is to conceal a smaller, more focused weaponization effort. Building a bomb is not the same as enriching uranium. Building a bomb is faster, quieter, and requires fewer visible facilities. Iran doesn’t need Natanz or Fordow to become a latent nuclear state. It just needs intent – and a bit of time in the dark.

Meanwhile, the United States finds itself drifting. The Trump administration’s erratic signaling—floating diplomacy one day and airstrikes the next—has undermined strategic coherence. The talks that occurred before the recent strikes were desultory, scattered across a handful of short sessions mediated by Oman. Iran refused direct engagement with the U.S., citing mistrust. The U.S., for its part, fielded a team short on both institutional memory and bandwidth. There were no draft texts, no redlines on paper—just talk of talking, without a center of gravity.

This is not how real diplomacy works. You cannot negotiate when each side is performing strength for its domestic audience and neither side is willing to write anything down. Real agreements are written line by line, fought for paragraph by paragraph. Anything else is theater.

And that is the dilemma. The regime is caught between two contradictory imperatives: the need to project strength, and the desire for survival.

Yet the security and the economic incentives remain. Iran’s currency responds almost immediately to the prospect of negotiations with the U.S. The potential for sanctions relief—however distant—still matters. It’s not that the regime believes in foreign investment or a “Trump Tower” in Tehran. What it wants is relief without intrusion. Oxygen without strings.

Tehran’s goal, at least until recently, was to be a nuclear threshold state. Not to build a bomb—but to make sure everyone knew it could. This ‘sweet spot’ strategy allowed Iran to remain inside the NPT, avoid pariah status, and project deterrence without triggering regional arms races. Or so they thought.

And that is the dilemma. The regime is caught between two contradictory imperatives: the need to project strength, and the desire for survival. Its recent missile responses to U.S. actions—mild, telegraphed in advance, and largely symbolic—mirror the playbook it used after Qassem Soleimani’s assassination. This isn’t escalation or de-escalation; it’s disciplined signaling. Tehran wants to be seen retaliating, but not so aggressively as to invite a real war.

In the end, we should be clear-eyed. There is no returning to the status quo ante. The damage to facilities may or may not delay Iran’s progress, but it definitely erodes trust, reduces transparency, and increases the likelihood of miscalculation. Iran may not have been actively weaponizing before the strikes. But now, the U.S. won’t know if they start.

Even full weaponization carries its own traps. As former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has said, if the Iranians had in fact wanted to weaponize, they could have done so long ago, warning that such weapons would not make the region safer. A nuclear Iran would likely spark a regional cascade, inviting Persian Gulf rivals to buy their own bombs. Moreover, the moment deterrence becomes proliferation, Iran’s geographic and strategic depth may evaporate.

And in a nuclear age, it’s not just what others are doing—it’s what you think they might be doing. That is how deterrence becomes paranoia. How uncertainty becomes escalation.

And how red lines, drawn in concrete, turn into black boxes we can no longer open.

About The Author

Siamak Naficy
Siamak Tundra Naficy is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. An anthropologist by training, he brings an interdisciplinary perspective to the study of strategic culture, conflict resilience, and the human dimensions of security. His work draws from both naturalist and classical realist traditions, emphasizing how power, interests, the history of ideas, and human nature shape conflict. His research interests span conflict theory, wicked problems, leadership, sacred values, cognitive science, and animal behavior—viewed through an anthropological lens. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, or the Naval Postgraduate School.

11. The Army wants an artillery system that can run offense and defense

Excerpts:

“So if we look out for an air defense system or a long-range fires system, we want it to be one system, optionally manned,” Donahue said. “We want to be able to take munitions from any country and shoot through that.”

The Army is set to make a big investment this year into its existing and in-development fires systems through the reconciliation bill. Congress would need to allocate additional funding to get a common launcher system off the ground.

“I think, across the board, they understand exactly what the requirements are and what we need to do, and they're very supportive,” Donahue said.

The Army wants an artillery system that can run offense and defense

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

U.S. Army Cpl. Alain Joseph Adona, and Sgt. Jesse Bailon load 30mm ammo into the Stryker variant gun systems before entering a live fire range near Osku, Hungary, June 19, 2025. U.S. Army / Pvt. 1st Class Luis Jimenez

Fires technology is getting close to an optionally-manned common launcher, U.S. Army Europe and Africa commander says.

July 16, 2025 06:42 PM ET

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

July 16, 2025 06:42 PM ET

The future of artillery is a system that can do both offense and defense, the head of U.S. Army Europe and Africa said Wednesday—and the service believes it’s finally at a place to make that happen.

Ukraine’s valiant effort to beat back Russia’s invasion, along with the conflict in the Middle East, is “forcing” technology to mature more quickly, Gen. Chris Donahue told reporters during a press conference at AUSA’s LANDEURO exposition, and the Army is looking to capitalize.

“So I do think that we're probably at the point where technology, industry and then, as importantly, how we are going to employ these? It's all coming together,” Donahue said.

The Army is now looking to industry to build the solution, he added, with some extra features.

“So specifically, what we want to develop is a common launcher, a common launcher that is both offensive- and defensive-capable,” Donahue said earlier during the conference. “We want a common fire-control system so that any nation can use that fire control system.”

It will also need to have an unmanned capability, he added.

“So if we look out for an air defense system or a long-range fires system, we want it to be one system, optionally manned,” Donahue said. “We want to be able to take munitions from any country and shoot through that.”

The Army is set to make a big investment this year into its existing and in-development fires systems through the reconciliation bill. Congress would need to allocate additional funding to get a common launcher system off the ground.

“I think, across the board, they understand exactly what the requirements are and what we need to do, and they're very supportive,” Donahue said.

12. SM-6 Fired At Target Ship Down Under By U.S. Army’s Typhon Launcher

SM-6 Fired At Target Ship Down Under By U.S. Army’s Typhon Launcher

The Army plans to field the Typhon system permanently in the Indo-Pacific, which will provide persistent long-range strike capability on China's doorstep.

Thomas Newdick

Jul 16, 2025 12:48 PM EDT

109

twz.com · by Thomas Newdick

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

For the first time, the U.S. Army has conducted a live-fire exercise with its Typhon ground-based missile system outside of the continental United States. The system, which can also fire Tomahawk cruise missiles, used an SM-6 multi-purpose missile to successfully sink a target at sea, during Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 in Australia. Using the Typhon against a maritime target demonstrates an important capability for the system, with this role especially critical in the Indo-Pacific context.

The 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force (3MDTF) conducts the first Typhon live-fire exercise outside of the continental United States during Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 on July 16, 2025. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Perla Alfaro SGT ALFARO

The live-fire exercise involving the Typhon, alternatively known as the Mid-Range Capability (MRC), took place yesterday. At this stage, the target used for the sink exercise (SINKEX) is not known, but we have approached the Army for more details. Imagery released by the Army so far shows the SM-6 blasting out of its launcher somewhere in Australia’s Northern Territory.

The current generation of Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles used in the Typhon system has land attack and anti-ship capabilities. The SM-6 is primarily an air defense weapon, but as integrated on Typhon, is intended to be employed mainly against targets ashore and at sea, essentially as a short-range ballistic missile. The Army also envisages Typhon as a “strategic” weapon system that can also be used against higher-value targets like air defense assets and command and control nodes.

A complete Typhon battery consists of four launchers, a trailer-based mobile command post, and other ancillary vehicles and equipment, according to information the Army has previously released.

A full battery set of four Typhon launchers, as well as the trailer-based command post. U.S. ArmyA U.S. Army briefing slide detailing elements of the complete Typhon system. U.S. Army

It is also worth noting that Australia, too, uses both the Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles, which arm its Hobart class destroyers.

For the Talisman Sabre 25 live-fire exercise, the Typhon was operated by the Army’s 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), which forward-deployed to Australia and then worked alongside the Australian Army, as part of a joint, multi-domain Land Effects Coordination Cell. This organization was responsible for command and control and targeting for the engagement.

“The deployment of the MRC and successful execution of an SM-6 live-fire against a maritime target is another significant step forward in our ability to deploy, integrate, and command and control advanced land-based maritime strike capabilities,” said Col. Wade Germann, commander of the 3rd MDTF, in an Army press release.

The latest edition of the Talisman Sabre exercise began on July 14. The maneuvers involve 19 nations and over 30,000 service members, according to the Australian Department of Defense. Most significantly, however, this is billed as the largest bilateral military training event between the United States and Australia to date.

Lt. Gen. Joel Vowell, deputy commanding general for U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), addresses media at the opening ceremony for Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 onboard HMAS Adelaide in Sydney, New South Wales. ADF photographer LSIS Danyellah Hill

Increasingly, Australia is seen as a key ally when it comes to the U.S. military challenging China in the Indo-Pacific. For its part, Australia has been working to modernize and otherwise bolster its armed forces to better meet this aim. The most prominent effort in this regard is the Royal Australian Navy’s planned acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine force with the assistance of its American and British allies. This is part of the larger trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense cooperation agreement.

In its own press release marking the official start of the drills, the Australian Department of Defense notes that Talisman Sabre’s “strategic message is unmistakable,” with the exercise representing “a cornerstone of allied military cooperation between Australia and the United States.”

Talisman Sabre is taking place at the same time as Resolute Force Pacific (REFORPAC) 2025, which the U.S. Air Force describes as its biggest-ever contingency response exercise in the region, and which you can read more about here. REFORPAC is, in turn, part of a broader series of exercises organized by the U.S. Air Force at multiple locations across the United States and Indo-Pacific, with a focus on the latter theater.

While this is the first time that the Typhon system has been involved in a live-fire event outside of the continental United States, it has previously been deployed to the Indo-Pacific region, specifically to the Philippines, as we have discussed in the past.

U.S. personnel unload a trailer-based launcher associated with the Typhon system from a C-17A transport aircraft in the Philippines on April 7, 2024. U.S. Army

On that occasion, elements of the system were deployed by the 1st MDTF in April 2024 to participate in Exercise Salaknib 24, but there was no live-fire demonstration of the unit’s capabilities.

A Typhon launcher is loaded onto a C-17A at Joint Base Lewis-McChord for its trip to the Philippines in 2024. U.S. Army

The live-fire exercise during Exercise Talisman Sabre provides a very clear signal to Beijing of the Army’s plans to expand its Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) capabilities. Ultimately, this should include permanently basing Typhon systems in the Indo-Pacific region.

With Tomahawk, Typhon offers the Army a way to hold targets on land and at sea at risk anywhere within a bubble stretching roughly 1,000 miles in any direction from where it is deployed, making it especially relevant across the huge expanses of the Pacific theater. As for the SM-6, this provides the Army with a notably flexible surface-to-surface weapon, with a ballistic-missile-like capability that makes it hard to intercept.

A U.S. Army Typhon launcher fires an SM-6 missile during an earlier test. U.S. Army

Ahead of any permanent basing of the systems in the region, successive deployments of Typhon to the Indo-Pacific region demonstrate the Army’s ability to more rapidly deploy these systems to forward areas in response to a crisis or contingency. Since they can be accommodated in U.S. Air Force C-17s, which have significant short- and rough-field capabilities, Typhons can be delivered to more remote and austere locations, if required.

A Typhon launcher in the Philippines. U.S. Army

For China, the Typhon system presents a notable challenge to Chinese forces that might face it in combat. Its flexibility and responsiveness mean the system would be able to strike a range of targets throughout the region in the opening phases of a conflict. At the same time, the fact that it’s road-mobile makes it harder to target.

It has long been clear that, in any future major conflict with China, much will rest upon the U.S. military’s overall capacity to launch anti-ship strikes across large swathes of the Indo-Pacific. The task is only becoming more critical as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to add larger and otherwise more modern surface warships to its already substantial combat fleets.

Sending elements of Typhon to the Indo-Pacific for exercises also has relevance to the Army’s broader plans. This is a type of weapon system that the U.S. military was previously banned from fielding under the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF, with Russia (and the Soviet Union before it). In the current security environment, Typhon is seen as a linchpin of future conventional long-strike capabilities. These will eventually include other systems, too, such as the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile.

One of the first Dark Eagle launchers delivered to the U.S. Army, loaded with an inert missile canister. U.S. Army

With Europe’s strategic significance also on the rise, in 2021, the Army reactivated the 56th Artillery Command in Germany, specifically to oversee forward-deployed units equipped with Typhon and other future conventional long-strike weapons. In the Cold War, this same unit was responsible for Pershing and Pershing II nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that were eventually outlawed by INF.

Ultimately, U.S.-owned and operated Typhon systems in Europe could be joined by more examples fielded by Germany.

Earlier this week, German Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius confirmed that a letter of request had been sent to the Pentagon with a view to buying an undisclosed number of Typhon systems via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channels. Pistorius told reporters that Germany needs a conventional long-strike weapon to match capabilities already deployed by Russia.

For Germany, Typhon is seen as an interim system that will fill the gap before the arrival of new weapons being developed under the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA). France, Germany, Italy, and Poland launched the ELSA project last summer and were later joined by Sweden and the United Kingdom. This effort calls for the development of a new capability for “long-range strikes,” although the type of weapon being pursued is not yet clear.

In the meantime, in the Indo-Pacific context, the successful demonstration of the Typhon system against a maritime target sends a powerful signal to China, as well as a message of resolve to allies in the region.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Thomas Newdick

Staff Writer

Thomas is a defense writer and editor with over 20 years of experience covering military aerospace topics and conflicts. He’s written a number of books, edited many more, and has contributed to many of the world’s leading aviation publications. Before joining The War Zone in 2020, he was the editor of AirForces Monthly.

twz.com · by Thomas Newdick

13. Pentagon seeks to surge its multi-domain drone arsenal

It's "drone day."

Pentagon seeks to surge its multi-domain drone arsenal

During an event in the Pentagon courtyard, DOD leaders shared new details about near-term plans to quickly and drastically enhance the military’s drone arsenal.

Brandi Vincent

defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · July 16, 2025

As a leader of the Trump administration’s new high-priority plan to “unleash American drone dominance,” the Pentagon is moving to reduce bureaucratic barriers and speedily expand the quantities and types of U.S.-approved autonomous systems military personnel can access for operations across warfighting domains, senior officials told a small group of reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday.

“We will speed up the timeline of rapid innovation. We have to, on behalf of our warfighters, on behalf of the threats that we face around the globe, on behalf of the changing face of warfare,” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said.

During the “Multi-Domain Autonomous Solutions” event in the Pentagon courtyard, Hegseth and other Defense Department leaders shared new details about their near-term plans to quickly and drastically enhance the military’s drone arsenal, and deepen partnerships with producers across the sprawling American industrial base as they confront a range of contemporary policy and supply chain challenges.

Eighteen autonomous prototypes currently under accelerated development to support joint military operations were showcased at the event, which was hosted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Some of those systems included the long-endurance unmanned aerial system with a 36-foot wingspan dubbed Vanilla and the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft, or GARC — a small unmanned surface vehicle that can deploy independently or as a swarm.

“[This is] really a whole effort to sort of adapt to the current threat environment, which has changed in the last … year. And what you see here is a response to that. And you’ll see continued iterations — we are not stopping. This is just the beginning of what a rapid program looks like, and a rapid effort looks like,” Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Emil Michael told reporters.

The prototypes on display, he noted, went from concept to development in an average of 18 months.

“It’s an extraordinary achievement. This kind of thing was going to take five, six years,” Michael said.

It’s no secret that over the last half-decade, the U.S. military has increasingly faced serious challenges with buying, integrating and defending against unmanned systems. Further, while America has excelled at producing sophisticated, high-priced drones, the industrial base is struggling to compete with the proliferation of smaller and lower-cost systems being developed by China, Iran and other adversaries.

DOD leaders during the Biden administration launched the Replicator initiative in August 2023, with the overarching vision to accelerate industrial production and the military’s adoption of different drones in multiple combat domains through replicable processes by mid-2025. Future plans to continue or cancel that effort have not been revealed by Trump appointees to date.

“This is not the Replicator initiative,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prototyping and Experimentation Alex Lovett said at the event. “The Replicator phase I tranche was looking at scaling. What we were able to do is — and you’ll see some of the platforms here were also participating in the evaluation of that — but our experimentation identified capabilities that were ready to scale for some of those.”

DOD’s new approach to “rapid prototyping experimentation,” according to Lovett, marks the institutionalization of the now defunct Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER), also set up under the Biden administration, to get new technologies in the hands of combatant command users as early as possible for testing and refinement.

“What we learned is: Yes, that is good and it is working. We don’t need a separate program telling me to go do RDER. We’ve adopted that and established [Mission Capabilities] under Mr. Michael as an entire directorate that does mission-based analysis, engineering experimentation, and operational assessment to facilitate the transition. So we’ve completely adopted that, and we’re continuing to do operational experimentation,” Lovett explained.

Technology Readiness Experimentation (T-REX) events were a key component of those RDER pursuits in recent years.

For now, the T-REX live-fire exercises and prototype demonstrations are set to continue to unfold at least twice a year to help military users assess the capabilities of new and innovative technologies for use in real-world operations.

“If you’re looking for a new initiative, part of this enabling of drone dominance [per Hegseth’s guidance] is the services now are standing up, [first-person view] drone schools and drone capabilities. At this next T-REX [in August], we will be starting to host ‘Top Gun’ school. We’re going to start playing red versus blue. Their best will come after our best defenses,” Lovett told DefenseScoop at the event.

“We are [also] looking at how to expand our T-REX too, in conjunction with NASA and the [Federal Aviation Administration] and the department. So again, across the whole federal government, that says we’re working together and breaking down the barriers,” he said.

All of the drones on display Wednesday already passed through the T-REX program and are being evaluated by the services for transition and fielding.

“What we’re trying to do is lower the barriers [and] invite more people in to do experimentation if they want to — but there’ll be other kinds of things [as well],” Michael said.

In his view, President Donald Trump’s recent drone-accelerating executive orders and Hegseth’s related memorandum will help address policy constraints and open the DOD’s aperture for drones and systems to accept.

“[They] say, ‘Hey, we’re open for business. We want your inventions. We want you to be qualified on our [Blue UAS] list, and we want the services to see what you can have — so you can build it, so that they can buy it,’” Michael said.

The undersecretary declined to comment on any forthcoming plans to change or cancel the 14 critical technology areas identified under the previous administration for strategic and focused investments.

In response to questions from DefenseScoop on that topic, Michael responded: “It’s drone day!”

Written by Brandi Vincent

Brandi Vincent is DefenseScoop’s Pentagon correspondent. She reports on emerging and disruptive technologies, and associated policies, impacting the Defense Department and its personnel. Prior to joining Scoop News Group, Brandi produced a long-form documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. She grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland.

defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · July 16, 2025

14. President Trump Decreased U.S. Defense Budgets, Here’s The Real Impact

Excertps:

Opportunity to Restore Peace Through Strength

That is why President Trump must treat the congressional plus-up in the 2026 Big Beautiful Bill not as a fleeting bonus, but as a down payment on a long-overdue course correction. Rather than a temporary surge, it should mark the beginning of a sustained campaign to rebuild the strength, scale, and technological superiority of the Department of the Air Force. The $38.6 billion in the 2026 supplemental funding should be used to establish a new floor for future Department of the Air Force defense budgets.

Beginning in fiscal year 2027, President Trump should propose a base defense budget that absorbs this supplemental funding as a permanent, structural increase. That means locking in the gains made possible by the FY26 plus-up—accelerated modernization, expanded production lines, expanded force capacity, and increased readiness—and using them as the benchmark for further growth. Future budgets must build from this enhanced baseline to close the gap between America’s strategic objectives and the tools required to achieve them.

Doing so would signal a clear break from the era of hollow rhetoric and declining U.S. aerospace power. It would demonstrate to allies and adversaries alike that America is serious about restoring peace through strength. And it would finally put an end to the dangerous illusion that the world’s greatest air and space power can compete and win in tomorrow’s wars while spending less than it did the year before.

President Trump has a historic opportunity to realign America’s defense trajectory. Making the FY26 congressional plus-up a permanent fixture of future defense budgets is the first and most essential step.

President Trump Decreased U.S. Defense Budgets, Here’s The Real Impact

ByDavid A. Deptula, Contributor. I write on defense, strategy, the profession of arms, and aerospace.

Jul 16, 2025, 06:15am EDTJul 16, 2025, 10:06am EDT

President Trump announces the F-47 Air Force fighter. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

Getty Images

In a world increasingly shaped by the hard edges of power, the most dangerous illusion is the belief that the United States can deter, compete, and win in future conflicts without major reinvestment in its military. Yet that is exactly the illusion perpetuated by President Trump’s proposed fiscal 2026 defense budget. Despite the rhetoric of rebuilding our armed forces, President Trump’s budget is smaller than that of his predecessor.

Peace Through Strength or a Defense Budget Cut?

In March 2024, then-President Biden’s 2025 defense request totaled $849.8 billion—an increase of four percent over the previous year. That was not enough to restore readiness or recapitalize the Air Force’s geriatric aircraft inventory, but it at least acknowledged the rising tide of global threats. Compare that to President Trump’s 2026 defense request: $848.3 billion, a $1.5 billion reduction. Factor in three percent inflation, and that results in a $25.4 billion loss in buying power.

This budget is a cut rather than a path to peace through strength.

Much has been made of the additional $113 billion for defense contained in the Big Beautiful Bill Act, and while this cash injection undeniably helps accelerate some programs, much of it merely backfills long-term, unfunded requirements. The trouble is that by supplementing defense with a one-time plus-up, the measure does not solve the long-term failure to invest in Air Force and Space Force modernization. Only sustained annual increases in the base defense budget can address that.

Victory in future war demands more than slogans. It requires commitment, clarity, and sufficient funding. The Department of the Air Force—comprising the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Space Force—provides the two indispensable military forces upon which all U.S. joint force operations depend. Its ability to achieve and sustain air and space superiority underwrites the success of all other domains. No large-scale U.S. joint force operation can be conducted without some element of the Department of the Air Force.

Yet since 1990—35 years—the Air Force has had to conduct continuous combat operations with declining resources. That underfunding of the Air Force for over three decades has eroded combat capacity and capability and driven mounting risk. In the 20 years after 9/11, funding for the Army and Navy was greater than the Air Force—to the tune of $1.3 trillion more for the Army and nearly $1 trillion dollars more for the Navy. The result is the U.S. Air Force is now the oldest, the smallest, and least ready in its 78-year history.

The U.S. Air Force is in a Nose Dive

Worse, the Department of the Air Force budget is on track to get even smaller over the next five years. In fiscal 2025, the budget calls for retiring 250 Air Force aircraft while buying only 91; the trend accelerates in fiscal 2026, with 340 aircraft retiring against only 76 new aircraft purchases.

Today’s Air Force has over 2,600 aircraft—about two-thirds of its total inventory—that first flew more than 50 years ago. Fighting capacity continues to shrink. The Air Force possesses less than half the numbers of fighters and bombers it had in 1991—the last time we fought a major regional conflict.

The Space Force, meanwhile, is a malnourished youngster. Just over five years old and charged with protecting critical satellites in a contested domain, it lacks the material and human resources to mature into the warfighting service it must become.

The recent Operation Midnight Hammer in which U.S. bombers struck three nuclear targets in Iran, prove that air and space superiority remain decisive. But it also raises a sobering question: Can we sustain those operations if a war were to drag on beyond a few weeks? The answer, based on current trends, is no.

The Factual Amount of the 2026 Budget Request

The Department of the Air Force’s 2026 budget request is publicly listed as $301.1 billion, but this figure includes the congressional supplement from the Big Beautiful Bill labeled as "mandatory" that adds $38.6 billion, making the request appear larger. Excluding this supplement, the administration’s actual budget request for the Department stands at $249.6 billion. Of funds that actually go to the Air Force Department, that amount is overstated by over 20 percent. This is because of a lingering vestige of the Cold War known as “passthrough.” Some $51.5 billion passes through the Department of the Air Force and flows directly to other defense agencies outside the Air Force’s control. Removing that “passthrough” leaves $211.0 billion which is the factual amount of the 2026 budget request for the Department, and is $6.5 billion, or three percent less than what President Biden requested for 2025. Within this sum, the Air Force receives $184.9 billion and the Space Force $26.1 billion, representing decreases of one percent and nine percent, respectively, compared to the previous year’s budget request for these services before adjusting for inflation.

Air and space superiority are crucial capabilities that both deter war and shorten the time it takes to bring wars to an end. That is evident in what Israel and the United States achieved against Iran and is, perhaps, even more clear in what Russia has failed to achieve in its war against Ukraine.

Russia’s inability to establish air superiority against Ukraine in the early days of its invasion effort—and Ukraine’s inability to do likewise, due to its lack of weapons and restrictions to use those western weapons to greatest effect—demonstrate what happens without air and space superiority. Today, both sides are locked both into a grinding war of attrition.

In a potential conflict with China spanning the Indo-Pacific region, range, tempo, and information dominance—all attributes provided by air and space power—will decide the fight. America cannot afford to show up with a hollow aerospace force.

The solution is investment—sustained, robust, and focused on modernizing and equipping America’s Air Force and Space Force. We need to buy back readiness, replace obsolete aircraft and spacecraft, scale and deploy uninhabited aerial vehicles where they can contribute most effectively, grow our space architecture, and accelerate new Air Force and Space Force capabilities. That means establishing budgets and plans with real increases, not sleight of hand or one-time cash infusions.

Dramatically increasing investment in our Air Force and Space Force is a strategic necessity. In an era of rising authoritarianism and sharpening threats, the administration must put its money where its mouth is. Peace through strength cannot be a mere slogan. It requires consistent funding to reverse the decline of our Air Force and to build up the nascent capabilities of our Space Force.

Opportunity to Restore Peace Through Strength

That is why President Trump must treat the congressional plus-up in the 2026 Big Beautiful Bill not as a fleeting bonus, but as a down payment on a long-overdue course correction. Rather than a temporary surge, it should mark the beginning of a sustained campaign to rebuild the strength, scale, and technological superiority of the Department of the Air Force. The $38.6 billion in the 2026 supplemental funding should be used to establish a new floor for future Department of the Air Force defense budgets.

Beginning in fiscal year 2027, President Trump should propose a base defense budget that absorbs this supplemental funding as a permanent, structural increase. That means locking in the gains made possible by the FY26 plus-up—accelerated modernization, expanded production lines, expanded force capacity, and increased readiness—and using them as the benchmark for further growth. Future budgets must build from this enhanced baseline to close the gap between America’s strategic objectives and the tools required to achieve them.

Doing so would signal a clear break from the era of hollow rhetoric and declining U.S. aerospace power. It would demonstrate to allies and adversaries alike that America is serious about restoring peace through strength. And it would finally put an end to the dangerous illusion that the world’s greatest air and space power can compete and win in tomorrow’s wars while spending less than it did the year before.

President Trump has a historic opportunity to realign America’s defense trajectory. Making the FY26 congressional plus-up a permanent fixture of future defense budgets is the first and most essential step.

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15. Trump's soft-power retreat scrambles U.S.-China race

Excerpts:

By the numbers: A new Pew Research poll of 25 countries found that China — not the U.S. — is now the world's leading economic power.

China was seen as the top power by pluralities in 13 of those 25 countries, vs. just six countries in a similar poll in 2023.
China's favorability in most countries polled by Pew has ticked upward, while America's global favorability has diminished significantly since Trump took office.
Still, suspicion toward China persists — particularly in Indo-Pacific countries like Japan, India and South Korea, where the U.S. remains the more trusted partner.

4 hours ago -Politics & Policy

Trump's soft-power retreat scrambles U.S.-China race

Photo illustration: Sarah Grillo/Axios. Photo: Joshua Roberts/Getty Images

https://www.axios.com/2025/07/17/trump-china-retreat-soft-power

President Trump has set a radical new course in the U.S.-China rivalry, ceding ground to Beijing in pursuit of a far narrower vision of America's role in the world.

Why it matters: Six months into office, the Trump administration has hollowed out the machinery of American soft power and retreated from key arenas where the U.S. has sought to blunt China's rise.

Some of it is strategic: an "America First" rejection of the institutions and norms Trump officials view as bloated, failed or captured by a liberal foreign policy establishment.
But some of it, critics warn, is shortsighted: focused more on scoring domestic political points than sustaining the long-term foundations of American exceptionalism.

Driving the news: Voice of America — the U.S.-funded broadcaster long trusted to reach audiences inside authoritarian regimes — has gone dark in key regions after the Trump administration gutted its parent agency.

Chinese state media is moving aggressively to fill the vacuum, expanding broadcasts in Nigeria, Thailand, Indonesia and other countries where VOA once saturated the airwaves, The Wall Street Journal reports.
In a scathing report this week titled "The Price of Retreat," Senate Democrats accused Trump of damaging America's diplomatic toolkit and failing to offer "a viable alternative" to counter Chinese propaganda.

The big picture: Across domains where the U.S. once projected influence without military force, the Trump administration is unilaterally disarming.

Alliances: Trump's tariff threats and bullying have undermined trust among allies critical to countering China's influence, complicating efforts to present a unified front in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Trump officials say the president has been consistent — and successful — in his demand for allies to do more to pay for their own defense.
Global institutions: Trump has pulled the U.S. out of multilateral bodies he deems hostile or ineffective, such as the World Health Organization and UN Human Rights Council.
Science: Trump's funding cuts to research and crackdown on elite universities have triggered fears of a U.S. "brain drain." China is making massive, long-term investments and recruiting top talent in AI, biotech and space — and already leads the U.S. in 57 of 64 advanced technologies tracked by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Clean energy: The passage of Trump's "Big, Beautiful Bill" is poised to kneecap America's renewable energy boom, widening China's already dominant lead in electric vehicles, batteries and clean tech supply chains.

Zoom in: In prioritizing trade and market access, Trump has adopted a less confrontational approach to the Chinese national security challenges that had — until recently — united Washington across partisan lines.

AI chips: Trump reversed course this week and approved the sale of advanced chips to China after a personal request by Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. Some national security experts also warn that Trump's push to make the Persian Gulf a hub for AI development could give China backdoor access to cutting-edge U.S. technology.
TikTok: Trump has openly defied a new law requiring Chinese parent company ByteDance to divest from the popular app or face a ban in the U.S. He's repeatedly granted extensions, brushing off the national security concerns that his own administration elevated during his first term.

What they're saying: "The Biden administration oversaw a bloated and waste-ridden operation that doled out billions of dollars annually without oversight and resulted in duplicative or even contradictory foreign policy," White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said in a statement.

"President Trump and Secretary Rubio have made America respected again while ensuring that all actions align with the America First agenda that people voted for."

Between the lines: While Beijing has stepped into some voids left by America's retreat, it has shown little appetite for taking on large-scale humanitarian aid or governance reform work.

China has had some success in pitching itself as the more globally responsible superpower, but Beijing's aid commitments and diplomatic initiatives often are less substantive than they might appear, says Elizabeth Economy, a former Commerce Department adviser on China now at the Hoover Institution.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a China hawk who aggressively advocated for foreign aid as a senator, has embraced the "America First" model of tying U.S. assistance to the nation's interests, rather than promoting values.

"What Marco is doing is turning that upside down. He's saying, 'We have our interests. What are yours?' And if there's mutual benefit, let's do it," an outside adviser to the Trump administration told Axios.
"Ambassadors are lining up for this and saying, 'Thank God — you're not telling us what to do.'"

The intrigue: Rubio's firing of thousands of State Department officials, including China policy staff, has raised concerns that the U.S. is sidelining its own expertise in ways that ultimately could benefit Beijing.

"What you're hearing is the howling of the dying establishment that fed like pigs at the trough — a bunch of Oberlin grads pushing climate change and gender now don't have a job," the outside adviser argued.
"And they think Russia and China are celebrating. But the fact is, this means we're being realists for the first time in a long time."

The flipside: Economy argues there's a dangerous short-termism to the administration's cuts in areas such as foreign aid or educational exchanges.

"These things aren't always 1-to-1, you give this and get that. You're building up goodwill and support over the long term," she says, citing U.S. investments after World War II to rebuild countries that became democratic allies — and still are, 80 years later.
"You don't win over friends with the kind of coercive diplomacy this administration prioritizes."

By the numbers: A new Pew Research poll of 25 countries found that China — not the U.S. — is now the world's leading economic power.

China was seen as the top power by pluralities in 13 of those 25 countries, vs. just six countries in a similar poll in 2023.
China's favorability in most countries polled by Pew has ticked upward, while America's global favorability has diminished significantly since Trump took office.
Still, suspicion toward China persists — particularly in Indo-Pacific countries like Japan, India and South Korea, where the U.S. remains the more trusted partner.

Axios' Marc Caputo contributed reporting.

16. From Peace to War: Preparing to Adapt

A number of important recommendations for consideration.

Excerpts:

Conclusion: Adaptation Begins Now

The strategic effectiveness of adaptation from peace to war can have a major influence on the trajectory of a conflict. Wars may well be won or lost depending on the quality of decision-making in this rapid adaptation phase. As such, the ability to make many, good decisions in circumstances of high uncertainty and strategic risk as part of a nations (often unanticipated) adaptation from peace to war is an inherent responsibility of government, military and national security leaders.

Many leaders will not have the intellectual capacity, risk tolerance or moral clarity to be able to lead in such circumstances. And just because every threat cannot be predicted does not mean that preparations for adaptation from peace to war is unnecessary or wasteful. But as this article has proposed, there are many elements of preparing for, and executing, adaptation from peace to war that can be put in place in peacetime by thoughtful leaders.

Given the potential for Chinese surprise attacks against Taiwan, or other nations along the Pacific Rim, and Russia’s aggression towards European nations besides Ukraine, the imperative to be able to rapidly adapt from peace to war is urgent.

A large proportion of the preparations for adaptation from peace to war do not need massive amounts of resources. But all of them require intellectual preparation, and most importantly, will. And ‘will’ is something that has been lacking in many Western governments recently.

From Peace to War: Preparing to Adapt

Effective adaptation from peace to war can have a major influence on the trajectory of a conflict. Wars can be won or lost depending on the quality of decision-making in this rapid adaptation phase.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/from-peace-to-war-preparing-to-adapt?r=7i07&utm

Mick Ryan

Jul 17, 2025

∙ Paid

Image: @DefenceU and 22nd Mech Brigade

If only we could see the heavy storm gathering over our heads. Illia Ponomarenko, I Will Show You How it Was: The Story of Wartime Kyiv.

In February 2022, the nation of Ukraine had to make a sudden shift from a nation at peace to a nation at war. Ukraine had been fighting the Russians in the Donbas since 2014 and had seen the Russian illegally occupy Crimea. Its military forces were continuously rotating units into the eastern combat zone and many of those who gained experience during the period from 2014 to 2022 now occupy senior command positions in the Ukrainian military.

But the Ukrainian population were generally not exposed to the most destructive and deadly elements of the Donbas campaign. That all changed in a single evening on 24 February 2022. In the space of a few hours, the entire nation had to transition to a nation at war. While the confrontation with Russia had been ongoing for years, and this allowed for some preparations, the final transition from peace to war is almost always a shock for military institutions and societies.

Military institutions and other national security agencies operate within a competitive learning environment. This is the case in peace and in war. This competition, between services, and between nations, drives the need to build and evolve learning and adaptation cultures, which include both individual and institutional endeavours.

Perhaps the most understudied, yet vital, aspect of adaptation is how nations and military institutions adapt from peace to war.

As such, that is the focus of this article. I will explore the different kinds of adaption, why peace to war adaptation is important, and how nations might better prepare themselves for this sudden and often traumatic shift in the life of their nation.

Different Forms of Adaptation

Ukraine and Russia have both undertaken learning and adaptation since 2014. This has accelerated since February 2022 and has resulted in the emergence of a complex adaptation battle where both sides fight to attrit the forces and morale of their adversary. They are also engaged in a struggle to learn, adapt and improve their military effectiveness. But as I highlighted in a recent article, this learning and adaptation in Ukraine has now metastised into a global adaptation war. Involving closer collaboration and learning between Iran, Russia, China and North Korea, this is a strategic endeavour that is also gathering speed, particularly in the collaboration and sharing of ideas and technologies.

When exploring how the contemporary adaptation war is taking place and evolving, one must appreciate the kinds of learning and adaptation that are taking place concurrently in different nations. For example, Ukraine, Russia, Israel and Iran are adapting during war. Other countries, such as the UK, the United States and China, remain in peace time adaptation settings.

Three forms of adaptation are relevant to the exploration of military adaptation: adaptation before war, peacetime adaptation; adaptation between peace and war; and adaptation during war.

Adaptation Before War. Peacetime adaptation has been the subject of multiple studies in the past several decades. Studies by people such as Aimee Fox, Williamson Murray, Frank Hoffman, David Johnson, Dima Adamsky, Michael O’Hanlon and others have examined and proposed methods by which peacetime military organisations can learn and adapt more quickly to retain a competitive edge for when war inevitably arises.

In peace time, military institutions must possess the ability to draw lessons from their previous combat or the combat of others that might be occurring elsewhere, analyse these lessons, develop solutions to new problems, and then ensure that the solutions are rapidly shared through the entire organisation. While it is possible such a system could emerge during a conflict, the existence of one beforehand, as part of an integral learning culture, is a more effective strategy.

Adaptation During War. Adaptation in war has likewise been the subject of an impressive array studies in military literature. Wartime adaptation can be existential in nature and generally occurs at a quicker speed than that which happens during peacetime learning and adaptation. The breadth of learning and adaptation that occurs in war also vastly outstrip those undertaken in peacetime. The combination of these two aspects means that military and even political leaders must pay even more attention to learning and adaptation as part of their expanded wartime responsibilities.

There are many examples of where leaders get this wrong. One example of the literature that explores what occurs when leaders fail to adapt is Cohen and Gooch’s terrific book, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War.

But there are also many historical examples of good leadership nurturing wartime innovation, learning, dissemination of lessons and organisational adaptation. In Learning to Fight, British historian Aimee Fox chronicles how the British Army learned and adapted during World War One. Her research challenges some of the existing narratives about intellectual rigidity in the allied high command. She found that “through a combination of its pre-war ethos and increased fluidity in wartime, the army displayed organisational and cultural flexibility, allowing for high levels of learning and adaptation. This was not limited to a single formation, branch or expeditionary force. It was an institutional undertaking.”^[i]

For Peace to War: The Most Rapid Adaptation

The one form of adaptation which does not receive the same level of attention in the literature is adaptation from peace to war. The transition from peace to war is a different form of adaptation from that which occurs in peace time or during war. It is a shorter process, primarily cognitive, and involves a massive change in mindset overnight.

As Meir Finkel writes in Military Agility, “a successful transition depends on many variables that are usually covered by the term readiness, [but] to conduct a successful transition from peace to war, other ‘softer’ aspects of readiness, such as cognitive and mental flexibility, must be addressed.”

This might be the most important form of adaptation for us to understand and prepare for because it plays out over the shortest amount of time of all the kinds of adaptation. As such, decisions made in the short period of time in which peace to war adaptation occurs can have out-sized impacts on the trajectory of a war. Providing the foundations for effective peace to war adaptation therefore is a crucial undertaking for military and national security leaders in peace time.

One recent study of this phenomenon is Trent Hone’s Learning War. The book explores how the U.S. Navy between 1898 and 1945 developed what Hone calls “a sophisticated learning system.” This learning system was crucial to the U.S. Navy’s response to the surprise at Pearl Harbour and its adaptation from peace to war. The pre-war Navy learning system proved crucial in permitting the U.S. Navy to quickly exploit what it learned in its early combat operations and transform these insights into new plans, tactics and force structures. As Hone notes in Learning War, “it helped the Navy overcome initial Japanese advantages and maintain a faster rate of learning.”

This overcoming initial enemy advantages and then outpacing their learning as time goes on is the essence of an effective ‘peace to war adaptation’ approach.

Meir Finkel’s Military Agility is perhaps the best study that is focused purely on the adaptation that occurs from peace to war. As he writes early in his book, “the need to enter a conflict rapidly is an enduring global demand, given today’s dynamic geopolitical environment, has become more relevant than ever.” Finkel proposes that peace to war adaptation is a cognitive-mental process, and is an undertaking that involves improvisation, risk-taking and speed of decision-making and action.

Besides its speed, several other characteristics of peace to war adaptation are important.

First, peace to war adaptation requires not only a military response but a whole-of-societal response. Wars are not just military endeavours but national ones. Therefore, while military organisations need a peacetime learning and adaptation culture to better enable their transition to wartime demands, governments must also undertake a range of resilience and preparation activities to ensure their various constituent communities are physically and morally able to cope with fast passage from peace to war.

Second, the capacity to adapt from peace to war will be influenced by whether a country is the aggressor or if it is defending against another nation or alliance which commences hostilities. Hostile states that initiate a conflict will have much more time to intellectually, morally and physically prepare their military organisations as well as many other elements of their nations for the coming of war at a time they choose.

Those who are on the other side of this calculation, particularly nations that are subject to surprise attacks, will have much less time to adapt. Because of this, they will begin their adaptation from peace to war so from a position of disadvantage. Preparing their military, societies and national infrastructure for absorbing surprise attacks, and adapting their capacity and mindset in the wake of the shock generated by surprise is an imperative for governments.

A third and final characteristic of peace to war adaptation is that some countries employ strategies that deliberately blur the differences between peace and war. These nations, especially China and Russia, prefer to operate in the less attributable and beneath the ‘violence threshold’ grey spaces between war and peace. In his book, The Dragons and the Snakes, Australian strategist David Kilcullen has described this as “liminal warfare”. It is a form of confrontation that exploits ambiguity, and “rides the edge, surfing the threshold of detectability.”Consequently, a neat transition from war to peace may be very difficult because of the blurring of the edges between war and peace. This may induce slower or paralysed decision-making in government and military endeavours, which an adversary will exploit.

Notwithstanding the complications that are inherent in these characteristics, military and national security organisations must undertake the appropriate preparation to adapt from peace to war. The next part of this article explores what might be done to do so.

Preparing to Quickly Adapt from Peace to War

As Frank Hoffman describes in Mars Adapting, in the transition from peace to war, “each institution had to adapt its predispositions and alter its repertoire of competences – in doctrine, organization, and equipment- in order to adapt to shifting circumstance of a conflict that was not well anticipated.” Building the ability for a nation to be able to quickly adapt from peace to war is a two-phase undertaking: the preparatory phase, and the actual phase where the adaptation from peace to war occurs. The action required by governments in these two phases is explored below.

The Preparation Phase

Treat Threats Honestly. One of the most important responsibilities of any government, and its constituent intelligence and military organisations, is to take threats to its security and its foreign interests seriously. History is replete with rulers and governments who refused, or were intellectually incapable, of taking external threats to their nation seriously. Intelligence agencies must be appropriately resourced to identify threats and incentivised to provide honest (if difficult) assessments about those threats to government. The government must be capable of effective deliberations about those threats, and the options to address them. Finally, governments must be capable of having honest conversations with their people about threats, how they can be addressed and the national resources needed to do so.

Build Appropriate Readiness Settings. A follow-on effort from identifying threats, and the options to address them, is ensuring national security institutions have the right resources, guidance and cultures so that they are adequately prepared to deter threats, or to overcome threats that cannot be deterred. Readiness settings include an appropriate level of stockpiling military munitions and materiel, building resilient national infrastructure, as well as stockpiling a range of other national requirements (including energy). Ultimately, readiness is a mindset. It is about recognising threats and leaning into them. The ‘fight tonight’ culture of several Pacific armies is an example of building the appropriate readiness settings that provide the foundation for rapid adaptation from peace to war.

Build Various National Contingency Plans and Rehearse Them. The process of planning for contingencies not only builds plans that can drive preparations for adaptation for peace to war, it also hones the mindset of those doing the planning and prepares them intellectually for if adaptation from peace to war is required. All kinds of planning and wargaming activities must be conducted in peacetime to intellectually prepare leaders for the rapid transition to war. This planning must also extend into mobilization plans. Not only does this provide a foundation for decision-making about military and industrial expansion during the peace to war adaptation phase, it can also act as part of a nation’s strategic deterrence regime.

Select the Right Leaders. Perhaps the most important decision that any government can make in the preparatory phase is to put in place the right people to lead the many different military and national security institutions that will be involved in the rapid adaptation from peace to war. This can be difficult given that some peacetime imperatives for leadership do not exist in war, and vice versa. People whose capacity suits them for peacetime management may not be well suited for the high pressure environment of wartime leadership. Despite this, governments when undertaking peacetime appointments must consider the potential effectiveness of all military and national security leaders in a wartime environment. And, if they get it wrong, governments must be willing to remove those leaders if they prove unsuited to the demands of peace to war adaptation or wartime leadership.

The ‘Peace to War Adaptation’ Phase

Identifying the Change in Reality. The first and most important element of the adaptation from peace to war is, as Meir Finkel describes, “the capacity of governments and military organisations to define the new situation as war, and the need to be able to rapidly shift routine methods of activity from those embedded in institutions for peacetime processes to those essential in war.” Government and military leaders must be capable of rapidly appreciating the profound change in national circumstances, and be able to make a multitude of strategic decisions in a short amount of time. But to do that, they must first fight through the cognitive shock that they are no longer living in the circumstances they lived in just a short while ago.

Fight through the shock of change. Surprise generally results in shock. Shock has an impact on individuals, which can range from mild cognitive dislocation through to profound, immobilising trauma. It also has an impact on institutions, which can be paralysed by a lack of contingency planning, low levels of personnel, training and equipment readiness, high degrees of organisational uncertainty, bad or absent leadership, or a combination of these factors. Regardless, pre-war preparations for conflict must accept that some degree of shock is inevitable for military institutions, other government agencies and the broader society. While every element of the preparation phase described above will contribute to the capacity of military organisations and a nation to fight through shock, the most important determinant of the timing and success of this will be good leaders who provide purpose and communicate it effectively.

Communicating and Leading Change. A crucial responsibility of leaders in the peace to war adaptation phase is to communicate with each other and with those they lead. Consistency in messaging is vital, but even more important will be reassuring citizens and explaining of purpose to them. While the imperative to provide purpose extends across both wartime and peacetime leadership functions, getting it wrong in wartime has a much greater cost for a nation.

Leading Ongoing Learning and Adaptation. Adaptation does not end once a nation emerges from the immediate shock of entering a war and stabilises itself. The imperative to learn and adapt is constant. Failing to do so is existential for nations that fail to nurture and invest in the tactical and strategic learning and adaptation systems that provide the foundation for new sources of military and national advantage.

Conclusion: Adaptation Begins Now

The strategic effectiveness of adaptation from peace to war can have a major influence on the trajectory of a conflict. Wars may well be won or lost depending on the quality of decision-making in this rapid adaptation phase. As such, the ability to make many, good decisions in circumstances of high uncertainty and strategic risk as part of a nations (often unanticipated) adaptation from peace to war is an inherent responsibility of government, military and national security leaders.

Many leaders will not have the intellectual capacity, risk tolerance or moral clarity to be able to lead in such circumstances. And just because every threat cannot be predicted does not mean that preparations for adaptation from peace to war is unnecessary or wasteful. But as this article has proposed, there are many elements of preparing for, and executing, adaptation from peace to war that can be put in place in peacetime by thoughtful leaders.

Given the potential for Chinese surprise attacks against Taiwan, or other nations along the Pacific Rim, and Russia’s aggression towards European nations besides Ukraine, the imperative to be able to rapidly adapt from peace to war is urgent.

A large proportion of the preparations for adaptation from peace to war do not need massive amounts of resources. But all of them require intellectual preparation, and most importantly, will. And ‘will’ is something that has been lacking in many Western governments recently.

17. China, North Korea and Russia represent biggest security challenge since World War II, Japan says

Where is the "I" in CRInK?

Japan recognizes the threat of "adversarial cooperation."

Interestingly when we were in London earlier this month some diplomats from the Foreign Office pushed back on adversarial cooperation. They are skeptical that there is any real substantive cooperation. They said talking about it will make it come true!

China, North Korea and Russia represent biggest security challenge since World War II, Japan says | CNN

CNN · by Brad Lendon · July 16, 2025

Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani speaks during a joint news conference with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on March 30, 2025, in Tokyo, Japan.

Kiyoshi Ota/Pool/Getty Images

Seoul, South Korea CNN —

Japan is facing its most severe security environment since World War II as three potential adversaries in East Asia – China, Russia and North Korea – ramp up military activities in the region, the country’s defense minister said Tuesday.

“The existing order of world peace is being seriously challenged, and Japan finds itself in the most severe and complex security environment of the post-war era,” Defense Minister Gen Nakatani said in an introduction to the ministry’s annual defense white paper.

China’s military activities present “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” to Japan, the report said.

Beijing is “rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner” while “intensifying” activities around the region, Nakatani said, specifically mentioning the Senkaku Islands, a chain in the East China Sea that Tokyo controls but which is also claimed by Beijing, which calls them the Diaoyus.

An aerial photo shows Chinese marine surveillance ship Haijian No. 66 (top) trying to approach a Japanese fishing boat (bottom) as Japan Coast Guard vessel Ishigaki cruises next to the Chinese ship, in the East China Sea, near what are known as the Senkaku isles in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China, in this photo taken on April 23, 2013.

Kyodo/Reuters

The 34-page document gives a dire outlook on the future of the region, especially on the rivalry between China and the United States, Tokyo’s most important ally.

“The global balance of power is shifting dramatically and competition among states continues. In particular, the inter-state competition between the United States and China is likely to intensify even further in future,” the white paper says.

The paper says escalating Chinese military activity around the democratically controlled island of Taiwan poses a threat.

“China seeks to create a fait accompli where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities,” it says.

It cites a similar situation in the South China Sea and says PLA actions there are a legitimate Japanese concern because Tokyo has major sea lanes running through the waterway.

Jiang Bin, a spokesperson for China’s Defense Ministry, said Wednesday that Japan was “hyping up the ‘China threat,’ and grossly interfering in China’s internal affairs.”

“The Japanese side is fabricating false narratives to find excuses for loosening its military constraints,” Jiang said, referring to Japan’s strict post-war constitution, which limits its military forces to self-defense only.

And Japan’s invocation of World War II is controversial in a region where fissures over Tokyo’s devastating militarism during the period sour relations with many of its neighbors to this day.

“We urge the Japanese side to deeply learn from history, cease slandering and accusing China,” Jiang said.

But the Japanese paper didn’t only focus on Beijing’s unilateral actions.

A group of disputed islands, Uotsuri island (top), Minamikojima (bottom) and Kitakojima, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China is seen in the East China Sea, in this photo taken on September 2012.

Kyodo/Reuters

Russia and North Korea

As part of its expanded activities, the PLA is increasing cooperation with Russian armed forces, including joint bomber flights and naval patrols near Japan, the paper says.

“These repeated joint activities are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan,” it says.

The report says that in the past fiscal year Japanese fighter jets scrambled 704 times, including 464 times in response to approaching Chinese aircraft and 237 times for Russian aircraft, a rate of almost two scrambles a day.

Russia’s three-and-a-half-year-old invasion of Ukraine, along with the buildup in the Russian military that has come with it, is a worry for Japan, especially because of its status as a key US ally, the report says.

“The security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is inseparable,” it says, and warns that a Ukraine-like war is possible in the region – without specifically mentioning where that might occur.

The report says some of Russia’s newest military hardware has been deployed to the Pacific.

Moscow has added troops, missiles and warplanes to islands north of Japan, which the Soviet Union took toward the end of World War II, but which Japan says are sovereign Japanese territory illegally occupied now by Russia.

North Korea, meanwhile, is further developing nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, the report says.

Pyongyang’s ballistic missiles, believed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads, can cover the entirety of the Japanese archipelago, it says.

“North Korea’s military activities are posing an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s security than ever before,” the paper says.

The Japanese paper echoed many of the concerns the head of the US military’s Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel Paparo, voiced in a posture paper in April.

“China continues to pursue unprecedented military modernization and increasingly aggressive behavior that threatens the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our partners,” Paparo said.

The US commander also said the deepening cooperation between China and Russia as well as North Korea presents an increasing threat in the Pacific.

“Together, these countries’ growing ties create a complex, interconnected challenge to U.S. national security and regional stability,” Paparo said.

CNN’s Joyce Jiang contributed to this report.

CNN · by Brad Lendon · July 16, 2025

18. I'm an FBI spy hunter. This threat could destroy us all

An interesting read. This is an important idea. It is the human domain that is critically important.

Excerpts:

Since then, my path has evolved. I transitioned from spy hunter to national security attorney and cybersecurity strategist. But one constant remains: I view the cyber threat landscape through the lens of a spy hunter.

Because the truth is, there are no hackers. There are only spies.

We have mistakenly framed cybercrime as a technical problem. In reality, it is an intelligence problem. Hacking is simply the natural evolution of espionage.

I'm an FBI spy hunter. This threat could destroy us all

By ERIC O'NEILL FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

Published: 15:49 EDT, 15 July 2025 | Updated: 15:49 EDT, 15 July 2025

Daily Mail · by Eric O'neill · July 15, 2025

Robert Hanssen was the most damaging spy in American history.

A senior FBI agent turned traitor, he sold classified secrets to Russia for more than two decades, compromising US intelligence at the highest levels.

I was the undercover operative assigned to stop him. Working inside FBI headquarters, I became Hanssen's assistant in name, while secretly gathering the evidence that would lead to his arrest.

That operation became the basis of my book Gray Day and the film Breach, in which Ryan Phillippe portrayed me.

Since then, my path has evolved. I transitioned from spy hunter to national security attorney and cybersecurity strategist. But one constant remains: I view the cyber threat landscape through the lens of a spy hunter.

Because the truth is, there are no hackers. There are only spies.

We have mistakenly framed cybercrime as a technical problem. In reality, it is an intelligence problem. Hacking is simply the natural evolution of espionage.

The tactics haven't changed, only the tools. Whether it's a hostile nation-state actor or a cybercriminal syndicate, the method of attack is rooted in deception. The goal is always the same: gain access, gather intelligence and exploit the target.

Robert Hanssen (pictured) was the most damaging spy in American history. He was arrested in 2001, after an operation led by Eric O'Neill

Laura Linney (left) and Ryan Phillippe (right) in the movie Breach, based on O'Neill's book about the capture of Robert Hanssen

Eric O'Neill (pictured) was the undercover operative assigned to stop superspy Robert Hanssen, and whose evidence led to his arrest

What separates a cyber spy from a cybercriminal is not technique, but intention. The spy infiltrates quietly, extracts valuable information, and disappears without leaving a trace.

The criminal does the same - until the moment of departure. That's when the damage becomes visible.

Data is encrypted or destroyed, and the victim is hit with a ransom demand. We call it ransomware, but it's just espionage with a smash-and-grab exit.

And all of it - the malware, the stolen credentials, the illicit transactions - flows through the same underground marketplace: the dark web.

Today, the dark web operates like a shadow economy. If it were a country, it would rank as the third-largest economy in the world, behind only the US and China.

Cybercrime now generates over $12trillion annually. That figure is expected to balloon to $20trillion by 2026.

These numbers aren't abstract, they represent real people, businesses, hospitals, governments and families, all suffering real losses.

The dark web is no longer the domain of a few hoodie-clad hackers typing in basements.

It's a sophisticated criminal ecosystem. Malware is bought and sold like software. Stolen data is packaged and priced by the terabyte. Ransomware is offered as a service, complete with customer support.

It's industrialized crime, scaled by artificial intelligence, fueled by human error and enabled by global anonymity.

And if you think you're not a target, think again.

Pictured: Robert and Bonnie Hanssen (top center) with their six children, photographed in the early 1990s before his arrest

A senior FBI agent turned traitor, Hanssen sold classified secrets to Russia for more than two decades, compromising US intelligence at the highest levels

Even with my background in espionage and cybersecurity, I nearly fell victim to a cyberattack a few years ago. It started with what seemed like a legitimate request: an invitation to speak at an international conference at a spectacular venue.

Everything looked real. The conference had a website. The organizer had a professional email signature and speaker's contract. The offer included business-class travel, five-star accommodations, and a generous speaking fee.

But something felt off. I couldn't shake the sense that it was all a little too perfect. My instinct - the same one that once kept me alive during undercover operations - told me to investigate further.

EXCLUSIVE

I fell for a common online scam that ruined my life ... how to avoid being next

In my case, the organization claimed to be affiliated with a global church network, but the domain name didn't match. A quick check of the contact's credentials turned up nothing verifiable.

And the deeper I dug, the clearer it became: this was a scam. A sophisticated one, designed to trick speakers into sharing personal data and banking information. I used my investigative skills to identify the criminals, reported them to local police and moved on.

But the experience stayed with me. If I almost fell for it, anyone could.

This is the world we live in now. A world where digital trust is a liability. Where cybercriminals don't break into your systems, they walk through the front door because someone accidentally handed them the keys. And often, that 'someone' is you.

We are all on the front lines - every employee, every parent, every student, every business owner. Cybersecurity is no longer just an IT concern, it is personal security, and we can't outsource it anymore.

That's why I wrote Spies, Lies, and Cybercrime, a practical field manual for defeating digital deception. It draws from my experience in the FBI and my years advising individuals and companies.

The book outlines how to think like a spy - understanding the tactics used against you - and act like a spy hunter. We may not be able to eliminate cybercrime, but we can outsmart it.

Here are five key principles I use and teach to stay ahead of the threat.

Kill the password

Passwords are broken. Most people reuse them; many can be cracked in seconds.

Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) adds a second layer - like locking your front door and adding a bolt.

The dark web is no longer the domain of a few hoodie-clad hackers typing in basements

Passwords are broken - most people reuse them; many can be cracked in seconds

Whether it's a biometric scan, a one-time code or an authentication app, it's your best shot at locking out unauthorized access. Use it everywhere.

Use an app like Duo Mobile (my favorite) or Google or Microsoft Authenticator.

Turn on MFA for your email, bank and all social media.

Ditch text message codes if possible - they're better than nothing, but not ideal.

Develop 'cop instinct'

When I was undercover, I learned to listen to my gut. If something felt off, I paid attention.

In the digital world, this instinct is just as important. Be skeptical of every email, message or text. Inspect addresses, scrutinize links and verify everything before you trust it.

If a message pressures you to act fast, offers something too good to be true, or comes from someone you haven't heard from in a while, pause. Investigate. Cybercrime thrives on urgency and distraction. Slow down and think.

Hover over links before clicking - does the URL look legit?

Call or text someone if an email from them feels off. Don't trust, verify!

Don't download attachments from unknown senders.

Never share personal info unless you're 100 percent sure who you're talking to.

Never scan a QR code unless you are 100 percent certain it's safe.

Beware your lying eyes

We are entering the age of synthetic media. AI can now clone voices, mimic writing styles, and generate hyper-realistic video deepfakes. What you see is not necessarily what's real.

A British man was recently conned out of hundreds of pounds after being bombarded with messages from deepfake celebrity accounts on social media.

Paul Davis, 43, who suffers from depression, said he was 'relentlessly' targeted by AI-generated videos - including ones that appeared to feature Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and Jennifer Aniston.

Tragically, Paul believed the message was real and sent money in the form of non-refundable Apple gift cards.

I have brilliant friends who have tossed out their smartphones altogether and have chosen to write on aged, mechanical typewriters, all to protect their most critical information.

Others have replaced their recorded voicemail messages with the generic robotic message.

By 2026, experts predict that 90 percent of online content will be synthetic. That means almost everything you read or watch could be manipulated.

Paul Davis said he was 'relentlessly' targeted by AI-generated videos - including ones that appeared to feature Jennifer Aniston

Tragically, Paul believed the message was real, and he sent the money in the form of non-refundable Apple gift cards

Therefore always assume deception. Train yourself to question authenticity. Verify through secondary channels.

That urgent phone call from your daughter? Cybercriminals only need a 20-second sample to create an AI-generated cloned voice, so settle on a family code phrase to ensure that the person you are talking to is who you think they are.

That message from your boss asking you to send a wire or pay an invoice? It might be a scammer deceiving you with a deepfake email.

That Zoom invite from a business partner? Criminal gangs have stolen billions from organizations with AI avatar imposters on video conferences.

Compartmentalize your digital life

In espionage, spies don't keep all their secrets in one place - you shouldn't either.

Use different email addresses for different aspects of your life such as personal, financial, work and shopping.

Store passwords in a secure manager like 1Password or Bitwarden, or use Microsoft or Apple Passkeys.

And don't overshare on social media. That includes details like your full birthday, your kids' school names, details about your work or daily routine and your vacation dates (that's an open invite for burglars).

Kim Kardashian said she blamed herself for a terrifying armed robbery in Paris in 2016 that resulted in the loss of $10 million-worth of jewelry, and vowed to stop flaunting her wealth on social media.

Kim Kardashian (pictured above with mom Kris Jenner and security guards) said she blamed herself for the terrifying armed robbery in Paris in 2016, and vowed to stop flaunting her wealth on social media

The reality TV star appeared in court in 2025 to testify against the thieves

The more data you expose, the easier it is for criminals to profile and exploit you.

Keep your digital footprint as minimal and fragmented as possible.

Monitor your exit points

Spies don't just infiltrate, they exfiltrate.

In cybersecurity, the same principle applies - so know what's leaving your system.

Use tools like GlassWire, Bitdefender or Little Snitch (Mac) that alert you to large data transfers or unauthorized access.

Install cybersecurity protection software such as Symantec, Malwarebytes or AVG Internet Security (Mac).

Regularly check app and device permissions. Who has access to your cloud storage? What apps are using your camera, mic or location? Remove anything you don't use or recognize.

And keep your software updated, because outdated programs are full of holes. Don't wait for your data to walk out the door before you realize there was a breach.

The truth is that cybercrime will continue to grow. It will outpace security spending. It will evolve faster than most people can respond. But that doesn't mean we are powerless. We just need to change how we think.

Stop thinking like a victim. Start thinking like a spy, then act like the person hunting them. Because the dark web isn't going anywhere, but neither am I.

Eric O'Neill is a former FBI counterintelligence operative, national security attorney and author of Gray Day and the forthcoming Spies, Lies, and Cybercrime (October 7). He is the founder of The Georgetown Group and speaks internationally on espionage, cybersecurity and how to defeat digital deception. Follow Eric at ericoneill.net/newsletter.

Daily Mail · by Eric O'neill · July 15, 2025

19. Targeting at Machine Speed: The Capabilities—and Limits—of Artificial Intelligence

Conclusion:

At a fundamental level, incorporating AI into D3A is about optimizing the targeting workflow. In multidomain operations, accelerating sensor-to-shooter kill chains, reducing cognitive burden, and improving commanders’ decision-making in contested environments is the goal. By embedding AI where it adds the most value, and ensuring humans remain central at key decision points, the Army can modernize its targeting process while honoring its moral and legal responsibilities. In doing so, it can ensure that D3A remains both fast and just, anchored in human judgment, yet elevated by intelligent machines.

Targeting at Machine Speed: The Capabilities—and Limits—of Artificial Intelligence - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jesse R. Crifasi · July 17, 2025

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The United States Army’s ability to deliver precision fires and effects is fundamentally tied to its doctrinal targeting methodology: decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A). Field Manual 3-60, Army Targeting prescribes the use of D3A as an integrative approach requiring cooperation across multiple warfighting functions. As the Army advances under the pressures of multidomain operations as its operational concept, optimizes its contributions to US strategic competition with near-peer adversaries, and pursues its recently announced transformation initiative, the necessity of integrating artificial intelligence into targeting workflows is paramount.

AI technologies have already proven their utility across a range of defense applications, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance processing, decision support, and autonomous systems operations. Over the past several years, a growing body of academic research has explored these capabilities, yielding insights with significant implications for military policy and doctrine. Key takeaways from this body of work include:

AI in targeting presents a moral dilemma—it must be employed as a tool, not as a substitute for the warfighter’s judgment.
Time is the most compelling performance metric for evaluating AI effectiveness in the targeting process.
AI offers undeniable scaling advantages, particularly in data processing and decision acceleration.
Human commanders must remain the final arbiters of lethal force, preserving the principle of human-on-the-loop decision-making.
AI should augment—not replace—critical targeting functions, such as rules of engagement validation, proportionality assessments, and determinations of military necessity.

Even with these insights established by research, AI’s integration into the D3A targeting methodology remains underdeveloped in operational doctrine. There is therefore a central question the Army has yet to answer: Can AI enable the D3A cycle to achieve faster, more reliable, and more effective targeting—while preserving accountability through human oversight?

Emerging programs such as the Israeli AI-enabled system known as “the Gospel,” the US Department of Defense’s Project Maven, and other kill chain automation initiatives reflect a growing desire to accelerate targeting cycles. These efforts are largely aligned with the F2T2EA (find, fix, track, target, engage, assess) model used in joint targeting. The Army, however, continues to rely on D3A as the doctrinal cornerstone of fires and effects integration at the brigade and division levels. To adapt AI to the D3A methodology, a modular and doctrinally grounded approach is required—one that maps AI capabilities to discrete phases of the targeting cycle and identifies value-added contributions to each step.

Building on a recent study in the Naval Engineers Journal, which mapped AI methods to F2T2EA kill chain functions, we can extrapolate AI applications for each phase of D3A. In the decide phase, tools such as game theory models, decision trees, and logistic regression algorithms can support enemy course-of-action development, attack asset prioritization, and effects determination. During detect, AI excels at target recognition via pattern association and anomaly detection, leveraging sensor fusion and deep learning. This will greatly reduce the time it takes to determine a target’s functional characterization, especially at large scales. For deliver, optimization algorithms and prescriptive analytics can refine weapon-target pairing and target engagement timings. This has the potential to eliminate human-introduced error in the target vetting process. Finally, in the assess phase, battle damage estimation benefits from clustering models and explainable AI tools that support image interpretation and effects validation. Along with correlation modeling this can bring greater transparency to the combat assessment process, saving precious time and munitions as well as bringing greater clarity to the commander’s decision support tools.

The study published in the Naval Engineers Journal examined eight specific AI methods relevant to targeting, using empirical methods of analysis. These included logistic regression, linear regression, clustering, association rule learning, and several others. However, not all methods proved suitable for targeting. Random forest and generative adversarial networks were dismissed for their black-box characteristic—when tasked with justifying and rationalizing their targeting solutions, these systems were incapable of explanation. This is not just a technical problem but, more importantly, a legal showstopper. As those familiar with theater rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict know, commanders are directly responsible for ensuring compliance with the tenets of military necessity and proportionality when conducting targeting operations. Under these circumstances, black-box systems are a liability rather than an asset. Moreover, AI methods like advanced neural networks, while promising for other applications, require vast and labeled datasets—often unavailable in tactical contexts. Naïve Bayes methods were also rejected as unsuitable. They exhibited a tendency to assume independent values between variables such as speed, altitude, and heading—an untenable simplification in target analysis. Ultimately, while these methods expedited the mechanics of targeting workflows they failed to capture a critical function: AI-enabled targeting doctrine must codify decision points where human intervention is not just preferred—but required.

While DoD experimentation exercises like Project Convergence are eager to showcase the application of AI technologies, these technologies are not without limitations. For example, current large language models (LLMs), such as Meta’s LLaMA, can present a unique risk: They operate via statistical prediction without true comprehension of doctrinal terminology or contextual nuance. If we were to prompt a commercial, off-the-shelf LLM on how to destroy a particular target, this type of AI would not inherently grasp the human understanding of the concept. Believe it or not the targeting effect destroy is a complex notion, one filled with contextual relations. Achieving the effect destroy beyond simply physical damage also has a time component. Destroy also means ensuring the target cannot fulfill its primary function for the remainder of a mission. Such comprehensive understanding requires structured LLM training on doctrinal lexicons, rules-based decision trees, and munitions modeling—all things that are not in these generalist models.

At a fundamental level, incorporating AI into D3A is about optimizing the targeting workflow. In multidomain operations, accelerating sensor-to-shooter kill chains, reducing cognitive burden, and improving commanders’ decision-making in contested environments is the goal. By embedding AI where it adds the most value, and ensuring humans remain central at key decision points, the Army can modernize its targeting process while honoring its moral and legal responsibilities. In doing so, it can ensure that D3A remains both fast and just, anchored in human judgment, yet elevated by intelligent machines.

Jesse R. Crifasi is a retired US Army chief warrant officer 4, former division artillery targeting and division field artillery intelligence officer for the 82nd Airborne Division. He is a senior advisor in the defense industry specializing in joint fires and targeting, and a PhD student in public policy and national security at Liberty University. He has authored multiple doctrinal and technical assessments on digital fires and artificial intelligence integration in targeting operations.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Rebecca Watkins, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jesse R. Crifasi · July 17, 2025

20. Japan’s Defense White Paper Sounds Alarm Over China’s ‘Gray Zone’ Activities

Excerpts:

“China’s active military activities have reached a situation that could have a serious impact on the security of our country, and this is of strong concern,” the white paper said, the first time it has used such language.

On North Korea, the defense report said Pyongyang is clearly continuing to pursue the development and improvement of its offensive capabilities, including hypersonic weapons, in an attempt to penetrate missile defense networks. Based on conical and flat warheads that have been confirmed, the white paper continued, there is a possibility that North Korea is planning to develop hypersonic weapons with different ranges and flight patterns by developing different warheads in parallel, in order to complicate the enemy’s response. The report urged Tokyo to keep a close eye on North Korea’s technological advances.

The white paper also noted that Pyongyang appears to continue developing nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.

The white paper addressed the recent close relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang. It noted that North Korea has been providing weapons and ammunition, including ballistic missiles, to Russia since 2023, and that in October 2024, North Korean soldiers were confirmed to have been deployed to Russia, and that these soldiers have now participated in combat against Ukraine. The 2024 version of Japan’s defense white paper did not mention North Korean soldiers participating in the war in Ukraine.

The Chinese government quickly responded to Japan’s latest defense white paper. At a press conference on July 15, Lin Jian, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, expressed “strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition” to the paper, claiming that it had incited the threat of China based on “erroneous perceptions.” He said that the Chinese government had lodged a protest with the Japanese side.

Japan’s Defense White Paper Sounds Alarm Over China’s ‘Gray Zone’ Activities

For the first time, the annual white paper expressed Japan’s concern over the expanding military role of the China Coast Guard.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/japans-defense-white-paper-sounds-alarm-over-chinas-gray-zone-activities/

By Takahashi Kosuke

July 15, 2025

This handout photo, provided by the Japan Coast Guard, shows a China Coast Guard vessel and a helicopter within the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on May 3 2025.

Credit: Japan Coast Guard

In its latest defense white paper, Tokyo for the first time sounded the alarm over China’s “gray zone” activities – particularly the expanding role of the China Coast Guard, which is strengthening its cooperation with the Chinese military.

“The Chinese military and the China Coast Guard have been conducting joint navigation and joint training. This strengthening of cooperation between the military and the People’s Armed Police, including the China Coast Guard, is thought to be intended to improve operational capabilities in gray zone situations,” the annual defense white paper, titled “Defense of Japan 2025,” pointed out.

The “gray zone” refers to a wide range of ambiguous situations that blur the boundaries of peacetime and wartime.

“In a gray-zone situation, for example, a country that confronts another over territory, sovereignty or maritime and other economic interests uses some forceful organization to demonstrate its presence in the relevant disputed region in a bid to alter the status quo or force other countries to accept its assertions or demands,” the Japanese defense paper, published on July 15, explained.

Gray zone situations also include hybrid warfare, such as cyber attacks and cognitive warfare, which intentionally blur the line between military and non-military activities. “The so-called gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications,” the white paper said.

The report noted that the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), a paramilitary force generally tasked with both internal security and support for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has the China Coast Guard under its umbrella. The CCG is said to be the world’s largest maritime law enforcement agency.

“In recent years, the China Coast Guard’s vessels have become larger and more armed. At the end of December 2024, the China Coast Guard possessed 161 ships with full load displacement of 1,000 tons or more, including two 10,000-ton-class patrol ships, among the world’s largest ones,” the paper stated.

The annual report noted the increasing number of military exercises by the Chinese military around Taiwan as part of its concern over gray zone activities:

There is growing concern over China’s pursuit of unification through gray-zone military activities. Some point out that military intimidation, blockades, and other such means are currently China’s main options to be used against Taiwan. In the event of a blockade of Taiwan, there is a possibility that China will deploy its coast guard at the forefront to carry out the blockade within the gray zone.

The defense white paper pointed out, “In the Chinese military’s exercises around Taiwan, it is believed that some military operations aimed at the unification of Taiwan, including an invasion operation against Taiwan, may be being rehearsed.” It’s the first time Japan’s public defense report has raised such a concern.

It described a case in which China started military exercises on May 23, 2024, just three days after Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te gave his inauguration speech. At that time, China publicly announced for the first time that the China Coast Guard had been active in the waters east of Taiwan.

Furthermore, the paper noted that “during the exercise in October 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels sailed around Taiwan, and the activities of the Coast Guard have been expanding, suggesting that China may be placing greater importance on the role of the Coast Guard in creating so-called gray zone situations.”

Regarding Chinese military movements in the sea and airspace around Japan, like last year’s edition, this year’s defense white paper pointed out:

The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These activities include those allegedly based on China’s unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities, creating a situation of great concern to Japan.

The Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan, are also claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands.

The paper cited the first-ever intrusion into Japan’s airspace by a Chinese military aircraft off the coast of Nagasaki Prefecture in August 2024, and the first voyage of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island in Okinawa Prefecture in September of the same year.

“China’s active military activities have reached a situation that could have a serious impact on the security of our country, and this is of strong concern,” the white paper said, the first time it has used such language.

On North Korea, the defense report said Pyongyang is clearly continuing to pursue the development and improvement of its offensive capabilities, including hypersonic weapons, in an attempt to penetrate missile defense networks. Based on conical and flat warheads that have been confirmed, the white paper continued, there is a possibility that North Korea is planning to develop hypersonic weapons with different ranges and flight patterns by developing different warheads in parallel, in order to complicate the enemy’s response. The report urged Tokyo to keep a close eye on North Korea’s technological advances.

The white paper also noted that Pyongyang appears to continue developing nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.

The white paper addressed the recent close relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang. It noted that North Korea has been providing weapons and ammunition, including ballistic missiles, to Russia since 2023, and that in October 2024, North Korean soldiers were confirmed to have been deployed to Russia, and that these soldiers have now participated in combat against Ukraine. The 2024 version of Japan’s defense white paper did not mention North Korean soldiers participating in the war in Ukraine.

The Chinese government quickly responded to Japan’s latest defense white paper. At a press conference on July 15, Lin Jian, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, expressed “strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition” to the paper, claiming that it had incited the threat of China based on “erroneous perceptions.” He said that the Chinese government had lodged a protest with the Japanese side.

Authors

Contributing Author

Takahashi Kosuke

Takahashi Kosuke is Tokyo Correspondent for The Diplomat.

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21. Can the Quad Hold the Line on Taiwan?

Do we really think the demand for public commitments by allies really helps? What strategic effects does it provide?

Can the Quad Hold the Line on Taiwan?

U.S. calls for clearer commitments on Taiwan underscore the growing pressure on the Quad, as the Taiwan issue increasingly tests the group’s unity and strategic purpose.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/can-the-quad-hold-the-line-on-taiwan/

By Rishab Rathi

July 16, 2025

The Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., July 1, 2025. From left, Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.

Credit: Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett

Taiwan’s 40th Han Kuang military exercise, its most extensive to date, will span ten days and simulate a full-scale Chinese invasion. These drills incorporate amphibious assaults, joint-force coordination, and extensive civilian-military integration across multiple domains. Taiwan also showcased enhanced deterrent capabilities with U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket systems, F-16V fighter jets, and indigenous Sky Sword II and Sky Bow III missile systems. The activation of 22,000 reservists marked an unprecedented expansion of national defense mobilization, signaling Taiwan’s growing commitment to preparing for conflict rather than merely deterring it.

This shift is a direct response to the increasingly aggressive behavior of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Gray zone coercion has become routine. PLA aircraft and naval incursions across the Taiwan Strait’s median line surged from 565 in 2022 to over 3,070 in 2024, an average of more than eight per day. In January 2025 alone, Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone recorded 248 crossings, which represents a 75 percent increase compared to January 2022. These provocations are designed to wear down Taiwan’s defenses without crossing the threshold into open conflict, reflecting China’s long-term strategy of psychological pressure, strategic normalization, and the gradual erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty through fatigue

Taiwan is no longer waiting passively for external support. It is building an active and layered defense strategy in anticipation of a volatile future. This recalibration has drawn attention from Taiwan’s strategic partners, particularly the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad): Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

Originally conceived as a maritime security initiative, the Quad has evolved into a broader Indo-Pacific framework committed to ensuring a free, open, and rules-based regional order. Yet the Taiwan question exposes the grouping’s limitations.

Unlike NATO, the Quad is not a military alliance. Still, the urgency of Taiwan’s situation has sparked debate over whether the group should develop a more coherent strategy for collective deterrence. The United States has called for greater clarity from its allies Australia and Japan regarding their roles in a potential Taiwan conflict. The Pentagon is also actively working to align operational plans with allies through behind-the-scenes consultations and strategic dialogues. However, progress remains slow, hindered by political constraints and divergent national priorities.

Japan has strengthened its defense posture, increasing its budget from 6.8 trillion yen in 2023 to 8.7 trillion yen in 2025, or 1.8 percent of GDP. It has expanded joint drills with the United States and is reassessing its strategic doctrines. However, constitutional limits and public ambivalence remain obstacles. A survey by Asahi Shimbun found that 62 percent of Japanese citizens consider a regional conflict likely, yet a majority prefer that Japan pursue a path of neutrality and global cooperation, with only 18.7 percent supporting closer alignment with the United States.

Australia has also adopted a cautious approach. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to China this week highlights the dual-track strategy of deepening U.S. defense ties while preserving strong economic relations with China. Amid U.S. calls for clarity on Taiwan, the Australian government stated that “it would not commit troops in advance to any potential conflict.”

The stakes are significant, as Australia’s exports to China reached AU$196 billion (US$$128 billion) last year, exceeding the combined total of Australia’s next four largest markets. A report by the Bankwest Curtin Economics Center estimated that Australia’s trade with China contributes an additional AU$2,600 to the average household income each year. In contrast, recent tariffs imposed by the United States average around 10 percent, while those under the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement remain at just 1.1 percent. This disparity has strengthened the perception of China as a more stable and economically reliable partner for Australia.

India, the only member of the Quad that is not a U.S. ally, continues to maintain deliberate silence on Taiwan, consistent with its longstanding recognition of the One China policy since 1949. Even amid rising cross-strait tensions, New Delhi has avoided statements in forums such as ASEAN, reflecting a strategic calculation to avoid provoking China, especially given unresolved border disputes in the Himalayas.

At the same time, India has steadily expanded its engagement with Taiwan. Companies like Foxconn and Pegatron are integral to Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat, and bilateral trade has increased sixfold since 2001. Talks on a free trade agreement and semiconductor cooperation are progressing. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would severely disrupt global supply chains and pose significant economic risks, which India increasingly recognizes.

While the July 2025 Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting expressed “serious concerns” over rising tensions in the East and South China Seas, it refrained from directly condemning China.

Strategic and economic divergences within the Quad underscore its central dilemma. The alliance was never designed for collective military action and lacks both the institutional structure and legally binding mutual defense commitments that define NATO. However, China’s growing assertiveness over Taiwan and its expanding capabilities demand a more coordinated response.

Even as public statements remain measured, the Quad must avoid strategic drift. Coordinated efforts in contingency planning, intelligence sharing, and logistical interoperability need to accelerate. The alliance’s credibility, and that of the broader rules-based order, depends on readiness and sustained alignment. China will continue to test the Quad’s cohesion, but this also presents an opportunity to forge a more adaptable and politically viable model of deterrence, one rooted in regional awareness, interoperability, and expanding partnerships particularly with ASEAN.

Taiwan is no longer a peripheral concern. It has become the crucible in which the Quad’s purpose and unity will be tested. As pressure mounts in the Taiwan Strait, the time for strategic ambiguity is narrowing. The stability of the Indo-Pacific may well depend on the Quad’s ability to adapt, align, and act with resolve.

Authors

Guest Author

Rishab Rathi

Rishab Rathi is a research assistant at the Centre of Policy Research and Governance (CPRG), leading the Conflict Studies vertical with a special emphasis on South Asia. With an academic background in international relations and political science, his work explores geopolitical dynamics, post-colonial governance, and conflict resolution across diverse global contexts.

22. Australia is right not to commit to hypothetical Taiwan conflict

Why should Australia have strategic clarity and the US have strategic ambiguity? Is Mr. Colby in over his head trying to practice defense diplomacy?

Australia is right not to commit to hypothetical Taiwan conflict - Asia Times

PM has declined to make a public commitment, alluding to the ‘strategic ambiguity’ about how the US itself would respond

asiatimes.com · by John Blaxland · July 15, 2025

The United States can count on Australia as one of its closest allies.

Dating back to the shared experiences in the second world war and the ANZUS Treaty signed in 1951, Australia has steadfastly worked to help ensure the US remains the principal security guarantor in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia’s track record speaks for itself. Yet additional demands have been placed that rankle. The Pentagon wants to know how Australia – and other allies such as Japan – would respond in the event of a war with China over Taiwan.

Making these demands – which are being sought as part of the review of the AUKUS nuclear submarine agreement – is both unjustified and unreasonable.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Defense Industry Minister Pat Conroy have declined to make a public commitment, alluding to the United States’ own policy of “strategic ambiguity” about how the US would respond.

‘100 years of mateship’

Since federation in 1901, Australians have found themselves alongside US counterparts in almost all the major conflicts of the 20th century and beyond.

It is this shared experience that led former Ambassador to Washington Joe Hockey to coin the term “100 years of mateship.”

The pinnacle of the security relationship is the ANZUS Treaty which is a loosely worded document barely 800 words long.

However, it is important to remember AUKUS is just that – a technical agreement, albeit premised on the century-spanning trusted collaboration across the full spectrum of national security ties.

Goldilocks solution

More recently, the US administration has made demands of allies, including Australia, the likes of which have not been seen in living memory.

This spans not just tariffs, but also increased defense spending. American policymakers appear oblivious of or unconcerned about the blowback they are generating.

It is this context that makes the US demands for a broad-ranging and largely open-ended commitment over the defense of Taiwan, in advance of any conflict, so extraordinary and unhelpful.

Australia has long had a fear of abandonment. Ever since the searing experience of the fall of Singapore in 1942, officials have been eager to burnish ties with US counterparts. Conversely, there has always been a strong element in the community that has feared entrapment in yet another US-led war in Asia.

The experience in the Korean and Vietnam wars, let alone Afghanistan and Iraq, left many guarded about the efficacy of hitching the wagon to US-led military campaigns.

In essence, though, Australian policymakers have long sought the Goldilocks solution: not too enthusiastic to trigger entrapment and not too lukewarm to trigger abandonment.

No guarantees

Now Australia, Japan and others face a surprising new push by American officials for a commitment to a hypothetical conflict, under open-ended circumstances.

The irony is that American demands for a commitment fly in the face of the loosely worded ANZUS alliance – which stipulates an agreement to consult, but little more than that.

The AUKUS agreement includes no such guarantees, either. The overt and confronting nature of Washington’s demands means the prime minister effectively has no option but to push back:

We support the status quo when it comes to Taiwan. We don’t support any unilateral action […] we want peace and security in our region.

Defense Industry Minister Pat Conroy was adamant Australia would not be committing forces ahead of any “hypothetical” conflict:

The decision to commit Australian troops to a conflict will be made by the government of the day, not in advance, but by the government of the day.

A further irony is Australia, like Japan, is already hugely invested in its US military relationship, particularly through its military technology.

The purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, for instance, was meant to help enable the generation of interoperable forces, yet no such demand has been made when it comes to an advance commitment over their use in support of US ambitions.

So why invoke AUKUS in such a way?

Evidently, the way the US is trying to stand over Japan and Australia is harmful to its own interests. Such adversarial and unduly transactional behaviour could provoke a popular backlash in Australia and elsewhere.

The government has rightly rebuffed the calls saying it would be up to the government of the day to make such a decision. It is likely this will not be well received by the Trump administration. The PM is right though, to say it’s hypothetical and not worthy of a public endorsement.

Strategic ambiguity

Yet a further irony is that this is mostly a moot point.

The key benefit of alliance collaboration is already in place – and that relates to the efforts to deter China from ever acting on its desire to change the status quo in the first place.

As former PM, now ambassador to Washington, Kevin Rudd explained in his book, The Avoidable War, geopolitical disaster is still avoidable, particularly if the US and China can find a way to coexist without betraying their core interests through managed strategic competition.

This strategic ambiguity is meant to complicate a potential adversary’s military planners and political decision makers’ thought processes over the advantages and disadvantages of going to war.

China already knows a clash over Taiwan would mean US allies like Japan and Australia would find it virtually impossible to avoid being entangled. The strategic ambiguity can be maintained ad infinitum, so long as an outright invasion is averted.

And the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan? I remain sanguine that conflict can be avoided.

But to do so would involve clear and compelling messaging: both through diplomatic channels and through the demonstration of robust military capabilities that war would be too costly.

John Blaxland is a professor, at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by John Blaxland · July 15, 2025

23. Submarine delays sinking US edge in a Taiwan war

Conclusion:

Ultimately, the US’s edge beneath the waves is eroding not from enemy fire, but from self-inflicted industrial stagnation and delay. Unless urgently addressed, these setbacks could hand China a dangerous opportunity in the Indo-Pacific and a potential Taiwan war win.

Submarine delays sinking US edge in a Taiwan war - Asia Times

US Navy’s deferred procurement of next-gen SSN(X) attack submarine comes as China accelerating its undersea buildup

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 17, 2025

A widening gap between US submarine ambitions and industrial capacity is reshaping the undersea balance just as China accelerates its challenge beneath the waves.

This month, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted that the US Navy has deferred procurement of its next-generation attack submarine, the SSN(X), from fiscal year 2035 to 2040 due to overall budget constraints, as stated in the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan.

The delay raises concerns about a critical production gap following the completion of the Columbia-class line and threatens continuity in the submarine industrial base. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the average unit cost of the SSN(X) at US$8.7 billion, 23% higher than the Navy’s own $7.1 billion projection.

Designed to exceed adversaries in speed, stealth, payload capacity and autonomous system integration, the SSN(X) draws on traits from the Seawolf, Virginia and Columbia classes, with CBO estimating a displacement of roughly 10,100 tons.

The deferral has reignited debate over propulsion choices, but the US Navy maintains its opposition to low-enriched uranium (LEU), citing endurance losses, developmental uncertainties and a potential 20–30-year, $25 billion timeline for an alternative fuel system.

General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) are expected to share construction duties, but the five-year delay casts doubt on workforce retention and supplier viability. Congress faces growing pressure to reconcile fiscal constraints with strategic imperatives as China accelerates its undersea buildup.

The deferral underscores a growing mismatch between strategic urgency and industrial capacity, exposing vulnerabilities in undersea readiness just as China ramps up its naval modernization. Production bottlenecks, workforce attrition and tight budgets are converging to undermine the one domain where the US has still retained its clear advantage.

Underscoring this strategic importance, William Toti writes in a December 2023 Proceedings article that US attack submarines (SSNs) will serve as the linchpin of undersea dominance in a Taiwan Strait crisis, conducting high-risk anti-surface warfare (ASuW) to blunt China’s potential invasion or blockade.

He notes that SSNs can operate covertly in shallow, contested waters, striking People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) amphibious vessels and aircraft carriers with torpedoes while remaining undetected. Their stealth, he argues, allows early deployment without escalating tensions, though their limited numbers highlight dangerous shortfalls.

Toti emphasizes that with US air power likely constrained and surface forces withheld in early stages of a conflict, SSNs may constitute the only decisive maritime counterforce. He calls for expanding the submarine fleet, speeding up weapons production and prioritizing ASuW readiness in anticipation of Indo-Pacific contingencies.

However, even the world’s best submarines may face formidable odds. Bryan Clark writes in a December 2022 Hudson Institute article that China’s layered anti-submarine warfare (ASW) network—including passive seabed sensors, low-frequency active sonar, ASW missiles and mines—could expose and suppress US submarines in contested waters.

Clark warns that China’s growing fleet of modern conventional submarines, including the air-independent propulsion (AIP)-equipped Yuan-class, may overwhelm US ASW capabilities at chokepoints like the Miyako and Luzon straits. Without integrating unmanned systems such as relocatable sonar arrays and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) with towed sensors, he says, the US Navy risks tactical paralysis.

Meanwhile, the US submarine force is overstretched. Jerry Hendrix notes in a 2024 American Affairs article that the Navy’s current fleet of 53 fast-attack submarines suffers from chronic maintenance delays, with nearly a third sidelined.

He argues that these issues diminish operational readiness, reduce surge capacity during crises and compromise deterrence credibility. He adds that US submarines often must enter contested zones ahead of surface or air forces, making their availability critical.

Further, a February 2025 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlights persistent delays in shipbuilding, noting that from 2019 to 2023, the US Navy significantly underdelivered Virginia-class submarines compared to its shipbuilding plans from FY2019 to FY2023.

The report identifies workforce shortages, supplier constraints and overly optimistic schedule assumptions as key contributors. The report states that the Columbia-class program also faces risks due to industrial base limitations.

GAO criticizes the lack of performance metrics and coordination in Navy investments, warning that without structural reforms and sustained workforce development, the Navy may struggle to meet future shipbuilding goals.

By contrast, Sarah Kirchberger writes in a September 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that China’s submarine industrial base has expanded rapidly due to massive state investment, civil-military integration and modular shipbuilding practices.

She notes that major shipyards such as Bohai and Wuchang have significantly increased construction capacity, positioning them to support the development of strategic platforms like the Type 095 and Type 096.

However, Kirchberger cautions that China continues to lag in key technological areas, including nuclear propulsion, acoustic quieting, and advanced materials—factors that directly impact submarine stealth and survivability.

She adds that China still relies on foreign—particularly Russian—technologies, and that limited transparency hinders external assessments of its actual capabilities. While China’s progress in scaling production is notable, Kirchberger argues that persistent technical shortfalls limit its ability to challenge US undersea dominance in the near term.

Reinforcing this view, Ryan Martinson notes in a June 2025 Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) article that Chinese submarines face “extremely high” detection risks immediately after leaving port due to the US Navy’s three-dimensional undersea surveillance network.

He describes a system combining seabed sensors, ASW aircraft, satellites, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and sonar-equipped vessels across the First Island Chain.

Martinson adds that PLAN experts themselves admit interception risks remain high even in China’s “near seas,” raising doubts about strategic utility and nuclear deterrence. The saturated acoustic environment, he says, renders Chinese submarines effectively “not-so-silent,” limiting their survivability and wartime deployment.

Ultimately, the US’s edge beneath the waves is eroding not from enemy fire, but from self-inflicted industrial stagnation and delay. Unless urgently addressed, these setbacks could hand China a dangerous opportunity in the Indo-Pacific and a potential Taiwan war win.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 17, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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China, North Korea and Russia represent biggest security challenge since World War II, Japan says | CNN

Russia and North Korea

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Kill the password

Develop 'cop instinct'

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Compartmentalize your digital life

Monitor your exit points

Targeting at Machine Speed: The Capabilities—and Limits—of Artificial Intelligence - Modern War Institute

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Can the Quad Hold the Line on Taiwan?

Australia is right not to commit to hypothetical Taiwan conflict - Asia Times

Submarine delays sinking US edge in a Taiwan war - Asia Times