Quotes of the Day:
"The most rewarding things you do in life are often the ones that look like they cannot be done."
- Arnold Palmer
"The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for existence. One cannot help but be in awe when he contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely to comprehend a little of this mystery each day. Never lose a holy curiosity. ... Don't stop to marvel."
- Albert Einstein from Life May 2, 1955, p.64.
"Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is either a daring adventure or nothing."
- Helen Keller
1. Setting the Record Straight on OPCON Transition in the U.S.-ROK Alliance
2. Mexico Floats Restoring Diplomatic Relations With North Kore
3. The Nuclear Future Of East Asia – Analysis
4. A North Korea Collapse Means One Thing: Find the Nuclear Weapons, Fast.
5. Can South Korea Build an ‘Iron Dome’ to Protect Against North Korean Artillery?
6. N. Korea's imports from China surge on-month in June
7. N.K. media outlet reports on S. Korean criticism of call for abolishing unification ministry
8. N. Korea warns youth against adopting foreign speaking habits, lifestyles
9. Why is Kim Jong-un clamping down on millennials, K-pop and slang?
10. The truth about our 'abandonment' and reclaiming our Korean identity
11. How to enhance peaceful nuclear cooperation between Korea, US
12. Return to Korean-style Confucianism
1. Setting the Record Straight on OPCON Transition in the U.S.-ROK Alliance
Excellent article. Shawn Creamser is one of our nation's foremost experts on the command relationships in Korea.
We are at a point now with the end of one administration and the beginning of another to conduct a strategic reassessment on what has been called OPCON transfer and OPCON transition and is now simply a change of command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command from a US general to a Korean general (and no this will not violate the mythical Pershing Rule if you understand the Kkorean command relationships.). As Shawn argues (and with which I agree) we should discard the OPCON transition paradigm (toss out the 20 cents) and focus on strategic transformation of the ROK/US alliance. This would be in keeping with the Biden-Moon Summit and their joint statement (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/)and the Summit fact sheet (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/fact-sheet-united-states-republic-of-korea-partnership/) (both of these should be re-read and studied by policy makers and strategis and used to drive the strategic transformation of the ROK/US military command structure). The ROK/US alliance is transforming and the ROK/US military command must transform in an appropriate manner.
The strategic reassessment should seek to answer two questions:
1. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance ROK and US alliance interests on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
2. How do we organize, train, and equip a combined military force to provide the optimal capabilities to deter war, defend the ROK, and support the political outcome on the peninsula?
The answer to the first question should lead us to a unified Korean peninsula. As I have often written: “The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).”
One of the problems is the alliance has never provided definitive political guidance for the outcome to the military. In my decades of association with the war plans we never discussed the ultimate objective. US planners did not want to discuss this saying it should be left to the political leadership and that unification was not an American concern or objective and ROK planners did not want to discuss because they felt this was solely the province of the ROK. I would submit that the combined command needs effective political guidance to answer the second question. And I would also say that if there is such guidance as I outline it will lead to the conclusion that we need a combined military command led by a ROK general officer.
Setting the Record Straight on OPCON Transition in the U.S.-ROK Alliance
The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have been pursuing a strategic transformation of their security alliance for almost two decades. Since inception, the effort has evolved under many different names. One of the most widely used labels for this undertaking has been operational control (OPCON) transition. However, the use of this term has grown increasingly problematic. Quite simply, OPCON transition no longer appropriately describes the transformative venture being pursued by the two long-standing allies. This commentary will describe the reasons why and discuss the benefits of pursuing strategic transformation under a different name.
THE NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT
OPCON transition is an expression used to convey the ROK’s aspiration to assume and exercise unilateral control over its armed forces in wartime. OPCON transition is considered by many within the ROK government as a very big step by the country toward becoming militarily powerful enough to one day assume full responsibility for its own national defense. Some pundits speculate incorrectly that the United States’ motive for strategic transformation is to engineer a situation whereby U.S. forces can depart from the Korean Peninsula and set the conditions for the United States to walk away from the security alliance. The fact of the matter is that the effort to strategically transform the alliance is forward looking, an aggressive move by both allies to adapt their relationship to future realities.
The fundamental problem of connecting OPCON transition with the alliance’s strategic transformation effort is that the term misdirects officials and the public from what this process is really about. The alliance’s strategic transformation involves a paradigm shift far beyond adjustments to the combined defense structure.
The fundamental problem of connecting OPCON transition with the alliance’s strategic transformation effort is that the term misdirects officials and the public from what this process is really about. The alliance’s strategic transformation involves a paradigm shift far beyond adjustments to the combined defense structure. It is focused on taking a major leap forward toward ROK national self-defense by measurably improving the quality and scope of the ROK’s contributions to the combined defense through a well-balanced program of acquisitions, fielding, organization, and training.
The above statements are not intended to minimize in any way just how significant it is for both the ROK and the alliance to have a South Korean general officer in a command role over alliance forces. Yet while the reversal in which nation provides the alliance commander is noteworthy, this aspect of strategic transformation is of secondary importance. The goal of strategic transformation was born out of the mutual recognition that the strategic environment had changed, both in terms of South Korea’s place in the world and in how the regional balance of power was evolving in the Indo-Pacific. Washington and Seoul concurred that the bulk of the combined defense of the Korean Peninsula must come from the ROK itself and that the country should maintain robust capabilities in all domains, moving beyond the days when it primarily contributed land forces.
Moreover, the planned acquisition, fielding, organization, and training improvements would empower the ROK to defend itself in all domains, allowing the country to play a middle-power role within the region, both by itself and in conjunction with other partners, including the United States. However, strategic transformation also would provide a much-needed hedge against a most dangerous situation where the United States, as a great power with global obligations, might one day become heavily engaged in simultaneous conflicts. If such a situation were to arise, the United States might be unable to bring the full weight of its military to the combined defense should peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula or in the region be threatened.
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR OPCON TRANSITION
From 2002 through 2007, the ROK and U.S. governments studied numerous combined defense arrangements to achieve the ROK government’s political goal of OPCON transition, while at the same time meeting the unique security and defense needs of the alliance. Under both the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) developed during 2007–10 and the Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA2015), the ROK Armed Forces would significantly increase their involvement and roles in the alliance defense. One major aspect of both plans that is often overlooked was the significant improvements to secure the ROK’s capability to lead alliance operations. However, even under STP and the later SA2015 effort, some ROK and U.S. forces would continue combined operations at the component and task-force levels, while the majority of both national forces would fight separately under national unified commands in a parallel command construct. Moreover, both plans retained the existing bilateral consultative and decision-making body, the Military Committee, which would continue serving as the alliance clearing house for strategic guidance and direction to the respective national forces.
OPCON transition became a full-fledged false narrative after 2015 when the ROK and U.S. governments shifted away from the parallel command experiment and returned to the proven integrated Combined Forces Command (CFC) model under the inappropriately named Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP). The COTP effort involves far more than just changing the alliance commander from an American to a Korean-appointed general officer. Rather, COTP is focused on strengthening the alliance’s combined defense capabilities through the acquisition of ROK military capabilities to enable the ROK Armed Forces to exercise more leadership and expanded their roles in the alliance defense. While the basic alliance combined defense framework is retained under COTP, the plan does expand on the earlier STP and SA2015 efforts to build in significant force improvements for the ROK Armed Forces, in conjunction with South Korea’s own military modernization goals. U.S. military modernization and persistent challenges with implementing ROK military modernization plans resulted in an increased focus on generating improved ROK military capabilities as part of the alliance’s transformation plans.
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT OPCON TRANSITION
OPCON transition is no longer appropriate to describe the strategic transformation of the alliance because the term itself is founded on two false premises. The first is that the ROK Armed Forces would be under U.S. OPCON if a war were to occur under the current CFC framework. The second is that under the new arrangement the ROK government would exercise unilateral control over its forces in wartime. These premises overlook the following features of the alliance framework and how OPCON is exercised within alliances.
First, South Korea has maintained sovereign command authority over its armed forces since its founding on August 15, 1948. The government, or entities within, have exercised command authority over select ROK field forces to perform unsanctioned operational missions while they were ostensibly under the OPCON of the UN Command or the CFC at multiple points over the last 70 years.
Second, since 1994, the alliance’s warfighting command—the CFC—has had no forces assigned during peacetime, except for the command’s headquarters and component command headquarters staffing. U.S. forces in South Korea have been under U.S. unilateral command and control, while the ROK Armed Forces have been under the unilateral command and control of the ROK government.
Third, since 1978, if the armistice were to fail and hostilities resume on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. field commands forward-stationed in South Korea, U.S. reinforcement forces from off the peninsula, and the majority of field commands in the ROK Armed Forces would operate under a form of bilateral control under the CFC. Though the term OPCON is used routinely to describe this control arrangement, multinational OPCON arrangements can differ significantly from those exercised unilaterally due to the influences of command authority and national caveats exercised by the providing governments.
Fourth, in accordance with the ROK-U.S. Terms of Reference agreement, the U.S. government appoints the CFC commander, while the ROK government appoints the deputy commander.
Fifth, the Military Committee is the conduit for all strategic guidance and direction to the CFC leadership. Neither the ROK nor the U.S. government has the authority to circumvent the Military Committee. All three evolutions of the strategic transformation (STP, SA2015, and COTP) have retained this proven construct for strategic guidance and direction to alliance forces.
Last, COTP is the current bilaterally negotiated program driving the alliance’s strategic transformation. It retains the core foundations of the above CFC and Military Committee construct. In addition to reversing the nationality of the commander and deputy commander, COTP also directs the ROK’s acquisition of many capabilities prior to the transition that the two countries agreed were critical to increased leadership in the combined defense.
Given these considerations, the use of the term OPCON transition is inappropriate because there is no transfer of OPCON occurring or scheduled to occur during wartime other than what is already occurring today under the current CFC and alliance framework. Yet the term continues to be used by both ROK and U.S. officials. Much of the confusion arises due to the misconception that the nationality of the alliance’s commander equates to unilateral national control. By this logic, the U.S. government’s appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe means that the United States has control over NATO forces in wartime. NATO has similar rules in place as the U.S.-ROK alliance. It is highly doubtful, however, that Germany, Italy, or the Netherlands sees OPCON lines as flowing through the U.S. government.
Despite the ROK and U.S. transition to a bilateral security relationship in 1978, the relationship itself remains conceptually locked in the historical legacies of the pre-1978 patron-client framework. Viewed from this perspective, OPCON transition appears to run up against the institutional limits of the U.S.-ROK alliance. On the one side, some ROK officials conceive of the transition as overcoming their country’s historical dependence on the United States while also breaking free of U.S. constraints on freedom of action. Those who hold this view perceive the current CFC commanded by a U.S. general as a hindrance rather than as a crucial institution that has preserved and defended the ROK’s national security.
On the other side, U.S. officials view the transition with skepticism insofar as historically the United States has maintained a degree of relative control over the security environment in South Korea and has been very cautious about engaging in a major campaign on the peninsula. Put more bluntly, for many U.S. officials the transition to a future-oriented CFC would place control of U.S. forces under a South Korean commander. This is difficult for them to fathom, even if the organizational structure of the CFC and the existing bilateral consultative mechanisms within it would not actually change.
THE BENEFITS OF STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION
Both sides thus misconstrue the transition as something that is contrary to rather than consonant with their core interests. Such misunderstandings prevent officials from seeing the benefits of further alliance transformation. Not only would the ROK adopt a more independent defense posture; it also would take on a greater burden in the process, both on the Korean Peninsula and regionally. For the ROK to properly take the lead on the peninsula, the allies would need to deepen consultation regarding third-party contingencies (beyond a potential conflict with North Korea), and the ROK would need to more clearly support U.S. treaty responsibilities to other allies, particularly Japan. This could result in greater trilateral cooperation. Although at times the ROK appears to discount the strategic implications and collective security responsibilities that come with the alliance’s strategic transformation, moving forward with the process is the only way for South Korea and the alliance to transform in that direction.
Resolving the issue of inaccurate labels and reducing confusion on what strategic transformation will achieve might allow the two allies to dedicate more organizational energy to accomplishing the important goals contained within the current plan.
Time will tell if the two allies can work through their problems and transform their security relationship to address current and future realities. A good start might be to cease using OPCON transition as a label to describe the effort, followed by the formal renaming of COTP with a more appropriate term. Resolving the issue of inaccurate labels and reducing confusion on what strategic transformation will achieve might allow the two allies to dedicate more organizational energy to accomplishing the important goals contained within the current plan. Strategic transformation, as currently codified, significantly advances the alliance relationship by moving the ROK much closer toward achieving national self-defense, while at the same time realizing U.S. goals for allies and partners to actively contribute militarily to the collective self-defense of the free world. Once this phase of strategic transformation is completed, the two allies should forge ahead toward the mutual goal of an ROK that is self-sufficient militarily, a U.S. ally, and a major contributor to regional peace and stability.
Shawn P. Creamer is an active duty U.S. Army colonel. He was commissioned through the ROTC as an infantry officer in 1995 when he graduated from the Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina. He has served in a wide variety of command and staff assignments over the course of his 26-year career, which includes eleven years assigned to the ROK or working on Korean Peninsula security issues. He was a U.S. Army War College Fellow in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program and is a fellow with the Institute for Corean-American Studies.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Endnotes
[1] Office of National Security of the Republic of Korea (ROK), ROK National Security Strategy (Seoul, 2018), 32–33; and Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2014), 42. It is important to note that “assuming full responsibility” or “future-oriented and autonomous defense capabilities” does not mean that the ROK is seeking a future without allies. Rather, it means that the ROK is able to defend its sovereignty and national interests without or with limited support by an outside power.
[2] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-U.S. Alliance (Seoul, 2014), 298–305.
[3] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2008 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2008), 84–85; Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2014), 123–27; and Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-US Alliance, 280–89.
[4] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, 288; Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2014 Defense White Paper, 126; and Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2016 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2016), 151.
[5] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, 284–85.
[6] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2018 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2018), 48–51, 182, 185.
[7] Bruce W. Bennett, “The Korean Defense Reform 307 Plan,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, April 18, 2011, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-8-the-korean-defense-reform-307-plan-by-bruce-w-bennett-the-rand-corporation1.
[8] Command authority is a nation’s lawful, sovereign exercise of authority over its armed forces.
[9] Shawn P. Creamer, “Theater-Level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in South Korea,” International Journal of Korean Studies, no. 20 (2016): 48; and Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, 277–80.
[10] Shawn P. Creamer, “Joint and Multinational Theater Headquarters in Korea: History, Organization and Manpower Activities,” Institute for Corean-American Studies, January 6, 2020, 12–13, 47, 58.
[11] Creamer, “Theater-Level Command and Alliance Decision-Making,” 48–49; Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2016 Defense White Paper, 150; and Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, 170–74.
[12] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multinational Operations, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, D.C., 2021), I-2, II-1–II-2.
[13] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, 168; and Creamer, “Theater-Level Command and Alliance Decision-Making,” 49.
[14] Creamer, “Theater-Level Command and Alliance Decision-Making,” 49–52.
[15] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2008 Defense White Paper, 87–90; Ministry of National Defense, 2014 Defense White Paper, 123–27; Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2018 Defense White Paper, 184; and Ministry of National Defense (ROK), The History of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, 280–89.
[16] Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2018 Defense White Paper, 184; “Joint Communique of 50th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,” U.S. Forces Korea, Press Release, October 31, 2018, https://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/1679753/joint-communique-of-50th-us-rok-security-consultative-meeting; and Clint Work “The Long History of South Korea’s OPCON Debate,” Diplomat, November 1, 2017.
[17] White House, Interim National Security Strategy Guidance (Washington, D.C., 2021), 6, 8, 10, 19–20.
2. Mexico Floats Restoring Diplomatic Relations With North Kore
Mexico Floats Restoring Diplomatic Relations With North Korea
Foreign minister Ebrard spoke during UN Security Council trip
Mexico cut ties with North Korea under previous government
Mexico is seeking to reopen diplomatic and commercial relationships with North Korea, Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard said.
“We have a position of hands-off around the world, we respect all governments, and we want to reopen the relationship with North Korea as well, like any other country,” Ebrard told reporters on the sidelines of a United Nations Security Council meeting in New York.
He acknowledged that North Korea had committed violations of international law and Security Council resolutions by conducting nuclear tests and launching missiles with long-range ballistic technology.
Ebrard, a potential candidate in Mexico’s next presidential election, may be appealing to the governing Morena party’s base, while showing foreign-policy independence from the U.S.
Mexico cut ties with North Korea under the previous administration. The Mexican presidency has issued a decree instructing government agencies to comply with UN resolutions on North Korea.
3. The Nuclear Future Of East Asia – Analysis
Excerpts:
This paper suggests that developing nuclear weapons may not be the wise choice for East Asian countries at the moment, however, given the fact that regional and international security in the Asia-Pacific is deemed to curtail, regardless of their decision to go nuclear or not, East Asia nations should increase their latency nuclear deterrence.
...
Theoretically speaking, alliance relations with the U.S. assure a certain extent of deterrence by punishment against hostile adversaries.
...
Moreover, even if alliance relations and credibility of extended deterrence is robust at the moment, but the bigger question is—could and should East Asian countries shelter under America’s nuclear umbrella forever?
...
Nevertheless, in addition to strengthening one’s latency nuclear deterrence, as well as obtaining a more equal relationship in the official and unofficial alliance with America, East Asian countries that have similar interest and common enemies should united to form a new military alliance which included security treaty regarding collective defense like the NATO; and focuses more on countering hybrid warfare like the QUAD. If Japan, South Korea and Taiwan ever choose to go nuclear, a common mechanism could be established to ensure that these states would pursue a minimum to limited deterrence capability that do not endanger each other’s security but rather to strengthen it, which would help minimizing the destabilization brought to regional security while constituting a more balanced situation with nuclear-armed rivalries.
After all, proliferation may not be the best solution, it is certainly not the worst either.
The Nuclear Future Of East Asia – Analysis
By Sze-Fung Lee*
In the face of North Korea and China’s continuous expansion and advancement in their nuclear arsenal in the past decade, the nuclear question for East Asian countries is now more urgent than ever—especially when U.S.’s credibility of extended deterrence has been shrinking since the post-cold war era. Whether to acquire independent nuclear deterrent has long been a huge controversy, with opinions rather polarized. Yet it is noteworthy that there is indeed gray zone between zero and one—the degree of latency nuclear deterrence.
This paper suggests that developing nuclear weapons may not be the wise choice for East Asian countries at the moment, however, given the fact that regional and international security in the Asia-Pacific is deemed to curtail, regardless of their decision to go nuclear or not, East Asia nations should increase their latency nuclear deterrence. In other words, even if they do not proceed to the final stage of acquiring independent nuclear deterrent, a latent nuclear weapons capability should at least be guaranteed. Meanwhile, for those who have already possessed certain extent of nuclear latency—for instance, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan—to shorten their breakout time whilst minimize obstacles for a possible nuclearization in the future.
The threat is ever-present—The Nuclear North Korea
Viewing from a realist perspective, the geographical locations of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have always been a valid argument for their nuclearization—being surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbours, namely China and North Korea—these countries have witnessed an escalation of threat on an unprecedented scale since the cold war.
Having its first nuclear weapon tested in 2006, the total inventory North Korea now possess is estimated to be 30-40. With the misstep of relieving certain sanction during the Trump era, North Korea was able to revive and eventually expand its nuclear arsenal, making future negotiation between the Biden administration and the Kim regime much harder and less effective. Not only has North Korea’s missile test on March 25—which is the first since Mr. Joseph Biden’s presidency—signalled a clear message to the U.S. and her allies of its nuclearization will and stance, Pyongyang’s advancement in nuclear technologies also indicates a surging extent of threat.
For instance, North Korea state media KCNA claimed that the latest missile launched was a “new-type tactical guided projectile” which is capable of performing “gliding and pull-up” manoeuvres with an “improved version of a solid fuel engine”. In addition to these suspected “new type of missiles” that travels in low-attitude, the diversity of launches Pyongyang currently possess—from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as the transporter erector launchers (TELs) and the cold launch system—increase the difficulty in intercepting them via Aegis destroyer or other ballistic missile defense system since it is onerous, if not impossible, to detect the exact time and venue of the possible launches. Indeed, the “new type of missile” could potentially render South Korea’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) useless by evading radar detection system through its manoeuvres, according to a study from 38 North at The Henry L. Stimson Center.
Moreover, the cold launch (perpendicular launch) system used by the North also indicates that multiple nuclear weapons could be fired from the same launch pad without severely damages caused to the infrastructure[2]. Shigeru Ishiba, the former Defense Minister of Japan, has noted that not all incoming missiles would be able to be intercepted with the country’s missile defense system, and “even if that is possible, we cannot perfectly respond to saturation attacks”[3].
The Chinese nuclear arsenal
According to the SIPRI yearbook 2020, China’s total inventory of nuclear deterrent has reached 320, exceeding United Kingdom and France’s possession of nuclear warheads, of which London and Paris’s nuclear deterrent were considered as limited deterrence. In spite of the fact that China’s current nuclear stockpiles is still far less that what the Russians and Americans have, its nuclear technologies has been closely following the two military superpowers. For instance, the Chinese have successfully developed Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRVs) and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARVs)—its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) DF-41 is capable of equipping up to 10 MIRVs while its Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) DF-21D could carry MARV warhead that poses challenges to the BMD systems—these advancement in nuclear technologies are the solid proof that the Chinese nukes are only steps away from Moscow and Washington. Yet China’s nuclear arsenal remains unchecked and is not confined by any major nuclear arms reduction treaty such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), of which US and Russia has just reached a mutual consensus to extend the treaty through Feb 4, 2026.
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In addition to China’s expansion of military capabilities and ambition in developing hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and new MARVs, there is no lack of scepticism of its no-first use policy, especially with Beijing’s coercive diplomacy and provocative actions in the East and South China Sea, regarding “freedom of navigation” and other sovereignty rights issues. These all raise concerns and generate insecurity from neighbouring countries and hence, East Asia states i.e. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would inevitably have to reconsider their nuclear option.
In spite of having advanced BMD system, for instance, Aegis Destroyer (Japan), THAAD (South Korea), Sky Bow III (Taiwan), the existing and emerging nuclear arsenal in Pyongyang and Beijing still leave East Asian states vulnerable under a hypothetical attack as mentioned above. Future could be worse than it seems—merely having deterrence by denial is not sufficient to safeguard national security—particularly with a shrinking credibility of U.S.’s extended deterrence since the post-cold war era.
America’s nuclear umbrella and the Alliance Dilemma
Theoretically speaking, alliance relations with the U.S. assure a certain extent of deterrence by punishment against hostile adversaries. For example, U.S. is committed to defend Japan under the 1960 Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet in reality, security could never be guaranteed. In a realist lens, state could not rely on others to defend their national interests, especially when it puts America’s homeland security at risk. Is U.S. willing to sacrifice Washington for Tokyo? Or New York for Seoul?
Strong rhetoric or even defense pact would not be able to ensure collective security, let alone strategic ambiguity, which is a strategy adopted by Washington for Taipei that is neither a binding security commitment nor the stance is clear. Regardless of the prospect of a better future than mere war and chaos, state should always prepare for the worst.
Besides, with Trump’s American First policy continuously undermining alliance relations in the past four years, East Asian countries may find it hard to restore mutual trust since diplomatic tracks are irreversible, despite Biden’s administration intention and effort to repair alliance and U.S.’s integrity as the global leader.
Moreover, even if alliance relations and credibility of extended deterrence is robust at the moment, but the bigger question is—could and should East Asian countries shelter under America’s nuclear umbrella forever? If they choose not to go nuclear, these states would be constantly threatened by their nuclear-armed neighbours, without a credible direct (nuclear) deterrence to safeguard national security; and forced to negotiate, or worse, compromise in the face of a possible nuclear extortion.
Undeniably, horizontal nuclear proliferation is always risky. Not only is it likely to deteriorate diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries, but also generates a (nuclear) regional arms race that eventually trap all nations into a vicious circle of security dilemma due to the lack of mutual trust in an anarchical system, which will consequently lead to a decrease in regional, as well as international security.
Yet with the expansion and advancement of Pyongyang and Beijing’s nuclear arsenal, regional and international security is deemed to curtail, regardless of East Asian countries’ decisions to go nuclear or not. As the official members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Japan’s and South Korea’s withdrawal may encourage other current non-nuclear weapon state to develop nukes. However, current existence of the NPT has already proven futile to prevent North Korea from acquiring its own nuclear weapons; or Israel, India and Pakistan, who are UN members but have never signed any of the treaties, to join the nuclear club.
The major concern about nuclear proliferation is never about the amount of warhead one possesses, but if they are in the wrong hands; for instance, a “rogue” state like North Korea. It is almost certain than none of the latent nuclear East Asia states would be considered “rogue” but just developed nations with rational calculation. In fact, the actual risk for these states joining the nuclear club in reality is not as high as most imagined. It may, indeed, help further bolster alliance relations between U.S., Japan and South Korea if they are able to come to some mutual consensuses in advance—developing independent nuclear deterrent is not an approach of alienating America’s presence as an effective ally but to strengthen security commitment with each other, and that US would support her allies in the Asia-Pacific in such attempt. The current existence of extended deterrence should not be a barrier for nuclearization. Rather, it should act as an extra protection for allied states.
Pave the way for future nuclearization
Admittedly, the road for any East Asia countries to go nuclear would be tough. Taipei’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons would imaginably trigger provocative response from Beijing, if not impossible, a pre-emptive strike that could lead to an escalation of war. Same situation goes for Seoul and Pyongyang even though the risk is relatively lower. As for Japan, although direct military confrontation is less likely comparing to Seoul and Taipei, the challenges Tokyo face for its nuclear option is no easier than any of them.
As the sole nation that has suffered from an atomic bomb explosion, Japan’s pacifism and anti-nuclear sentiment is embedded in its culture and society. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Sankei News in 2017, 17.7% of the respondents agreed that “Japan should acquire its own nuclear weapons in the future” whilst 79.1% opposed to that idea. Despite having the imperative skills and technologies for an acquisition of independent nuclear deterrent (the breakout time for Japan is estimated to be about 6-12 months), Japan also lacks natural resources for producing nuclear warheadsand has to rely heavily on uranium imports. Upholding the three non-nuclear principle since WWII, Japan’s bilateral nuclear agreements with the U.S., U.K, France and Australia specified that all imported nuclear-related equipment and materials “must be used only for the non-military purposes”[4]. Violation of these agreements may result in sanctions that could cause devastated effect on Japan’s nuclear energy program, which supplies approximately 30% of the nation’s total electricity production[5]. These issues, however, are not irresolvable.
Undeniably, it may take time and effort to negotiate new agreements and to change people’s pacifism into an “active pacifism”, yet these should not be the justifications to avoid the acquisition of independent nuclear deterrent as ensuring national security should always be the top priority. It is because in face of a nuclear extortion, the effectiveness of a direct nuclear deterrence guaranteed by your own country could not be replaced by any other measures such as deterrence by denial via BMD system or deterrence by punishment via extended deterrence and defense pact. Therefore, if there are too many obstacles ahead, then perhaps the wiser choice for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan at the moment is to increase their nuclear latency deterrence, shorten the breakout time and pave their way clear for future nuclearization. In other words, to keep their nuclear option open and be able to play offense and defense at its own will when the time comes.
Nevertheless, in addition to strengthening one’s latency nuclear deterrence, as well as obtaining a more equal relationship in the official and unofficial alliance with America, East Asian countries that have similar interest and common enemies should united to form a new military alliance which included security treaty regarding collective defense like the NATO; and focuses more on countering hybrid warfare like the QUAD. If Japan, South Korea and Taiwan ever choose to go nuclear, a common mechanism could be established to ensure that these states would pursue a minimum to limited deterrence capability that do not endanger each other’s security but rather to strengthen it, which would help minimizing the destabilization brought to regional security while constituting a more balanced situation with nuclear-armed rivalries.
After all, proliferation may not be the best solution, it is certainly not the worst either.
About the author: Sze-Fung Lee is a freelance journalist and a researcher at the Global Studies Institute in Hong Kong. He holds a master degree in International Security at the University of Warwick. His research interests are in security policy, hybrid warfare, nuclear proliferation, and the politics of Hong Kong.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Reference:
Hughes, L. (2007). ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan.’ International Security, 31(4), pp.67-96.
Kaneko, K. (1996). Japan Needs No Umbrella. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 52(2), pp.46-51.
(佐瀬昌盛. (2017). 北朝鮮の脅威の下、日本は「非核二原則」への転換を目指せ. 産経ニュース)
Mochizuki, M. (2007). ‘Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo.’ The Nonproliferation Review, 14(2), pp.303-328.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020). World nuclear forces. In ‘SIPRI Yearbook 2020’ (pp. 325-393). Solna: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB20%2010%20WNF.pdf
U.S. Department of Defense. (2019). Missile Defense Review. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf
Yoshida, F. (2018). ‘Japan should scrutinize the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella: an interview with Shigeru Ishiba’. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1(2), pp.464-473
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018.
[2] Yoshida, F. (2018). ‘Japan should scrutinize the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella: an interview with Shigeru Ishiba’. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1(2), pp.464-473
[3] Ibis.
[4] Kaneko, K. (1996). Japan Needs No Umbrella. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 52(2), pp.46-51.
[5] Hughes, L. (2007). ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan.’ International Security, 31(4), pp.67-96.
4. A North Korea Collapse Means One Thing: Find the Nuclear Weapons, Fast.
It is not just nukes but all WMD (production, storage, testing, and launch facilities) and the human infrastructure.
As Bruce Bennett has argued we do not have sufficient manpower to do this as quickly as necessary. Therefore we need to employ alternate means to co-opt and coerce those who have control over WMD. This is vital but we have done absolutely nothing to prepare the information environment sufficiently. We are going to rely solely on manpower, bots on the ground and the old way of doing things. Yes you can say we would be gambling with an information approach and it may not be as effective as we would like. However, I can guarantee our lack of sufficient manpower will result in us not being as effective as we would like. And an information and influence activities strategy employed now is very low cost but could be huge dividends. Yes we will still need sufficient manpower on the ground by an information and influence activities campaign that may buy us needed time to make up for the insufficient manpower.
A North Korea Collapse Means One Thing: Find the Nuclear Weapons, Fast.
Along with the resumption of major military hostilities, the possibility of a North Korean collapse is one of the most concerning potential scenarios on the Korean Peninsula. While such a scenario is unlikely, it would present both South Korea and the United States with a number of challenges, not the least of which would be the need to secure North Korea’s stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This would include both North Korea’s growing arsenal of nuclear weapons as well as its inventory of chemical weapons.
The Collapse Scenario
A wide range of potential sources of instability could contribute to a North Korean collapse, including such things as a major humanitarian or refugee crisis brought about by a severe economic shock or food shortage, as well as political instability resulting from the erosion of regime control over either a public increasingly exposed to outside information and ideas or a potentially disaffected group of elites. Given North Korea’s current food issues and the challenges facing it in the form of both international sanctions and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, speculation has risen about the possibility of a North Korean collapse. Such an outcome appears unlikely, however, with North Korea having endured significantly worse conditions in the past.
Should a North Korean collapse take place at some point in the future, it would bring with it major security and stability challenges that would impact not just the Korean Peninsula but also potentially the region as a whole. These challenges include a major refugee crisis and the possibility of civil war or factional fighting within North Korea, and also includes the possibility of either intentional or accidental use of North Korean WMDs – including both nuclear and chemical weapons – and the risk of the proliferation of these weapons beyond the Korean Peninsula.
OPLAN 5029
South Korea and the United States have planned for the possibility of a North Korean collapse, and have developed contingency plans for such an event in the form of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5029. OPLAN 5029 focuses on “sudden change” crisis scenarios in North Korea and designates elements of both U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) as a combined force tasked with destroying North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction in the event of a DPRK state collapse.
In the event of a North Korean collapse, South Korean and United States military personnel will likely seek to quickly establish a cordon sanitaire around the DPRK in order to prevent the spread of North Korean WMDs. Establishing this boundary – as well as subsequently engaging in efforts to locate and secure both nuclear and chemical weapons – will likely require the introduction of a large number of additional U.S. military forces, with one estimate suggesting that a further 162,000 U.S. troops would be needed.
Finding the WMD
North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear weapons is continuing to grow, with one expert recently assessing that the DPRK’s nuclear stockpile is likely between 20 to 60 weapons with the most likely figure somewhere around 45. Important to note that this estimate does not mean that North Korea is currently in possession of 45 nuclear warheads, but that it has stockpiled enough fissile material to produce that many. North Korea’s stockpile is likely to continue to increase in the coming years, which will increase the challenges associated with securing the DPRK’s entire stockpile. North Korea is believed to store its nuclear weapons and materials at dedicated sites, including at an underground facility at Yongdoktong. In the event of a North Korean collapse, U.S. and South Korean military forces would dedicate substantial efforts to securing this and other similar facilities, and to locate any additional nuclear weapons and material storage facilities.
North Korea’s chemical weapons stockpile is believed to be somewhere between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons. This arsenal is composed of a number of different chemical agents including blister agents, blood agents, choking agents, and riot-control agents, and nerve agents. As with its nuclear weapons, North Korea is believed to store its chemical weapons at dedicated sites, of which there may be as many as 11, while as many as four North Korean military bases may also be equipped with chemical weapons. These would again be a primary target for alliance military forces in the aftermath of a collapse scenario.
5. Can South Korea Build an ‘Iron Dome’ to Protect Against North Korean Artillery?
It can help but there is no silver bullet against north Korean artillery and rocket systems. Quantity has a quality all its own.
Can South Korea Build an ‘Iron Dome’ to Protect Against North Korean Artillery?
If South Korean citizens expect an impenetrable artillery shield, then they risk being disappointed.
South Korea’s Defense Minister Suh Wook announced on June 28, 2021, plans to spend 2.89 trillion won ($2.6 billion) developing an equivalent of the Iron Dome air defense system used by Israel.
Just a month prior, Israeli Iron Dome batteries allegedly shot down 90 percent of the roughly 1,500 unguided rockets fired by Hamas that were bound for populated areas of Israel, out of a total of 4,300 that were launched.
Yet a Korean Iron Dome system might easily face 4,300 projectiles in just one hour should North Korea attack the South—and fewer of those projectiles would go wildly off target.
Just across the demilitarized zone thirty miles away, the Korean People’s Army has deployed hundreds of long-range artillery systems into fortified positions with which Pyongyang has repeatedly threatened to turn the Seoul metropolitan area, home to over twenty-five million people, into a “sea of fire” should there ever be renewed conflict.
The KPA’s arsenal notably include an estimated five hundred 170-millimeter Koksan self-propelled guns that can reach the northwestern districts of Seoul, and around 200 large multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs) ready to launch rapid-fire volleys of 240-millimeter and 300-millimeter rockets at targets up to 40 and 120 miles away.
The long-range artillery systems are a lower-tech but higher volume threat than North Korea’s hi-arcing and potentially nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, which South Korea currently defends against with a mixture of Patriot, KM-SAM, and THAAD missiles.
A study published by Nautilus Institute in 2012 concluded that the threat of the artillery barrage was over-hyped, but nonetheless estimated that just the initial volley of fire from the above weapons would kill roughly 2,800 people if focused on military targets, or 29,661 if focused on civilian targets.
In his announcement, Wook acknowledged that the Korean system would be designed for a more challenging scenario than the Israeli Iron Dome:
Some parts of the system will bear similarities (to the Israeli Iron Dome) but what we are going to build is designed to intercept long-range artillery pieces by North Korea, which requires a higher level of technologies given the current security situation.
The Korean Iron Dome would also be effective against short-range missiles and drones.
Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) has noted that the counter-artillery system is expected to complete development by 2035, though potentially “development of advanced core technologies” may be able to shorten the time frame by two years.
South Korean interest in the Iron Dome first rose in 2010 after North Korean shelling targeting Yeongpyeong Island killed four people. Although a committee concluded Iron Dome in its current form would be inadequate, Seoul nonetheless unsuccessfully sought to acquire Iron Dome tech from Israel in exchange for a sale of Korea’s domestically built jet trainers. That didn’t happen, but study of a domestic Iron Dome-style solution was on the agenda of the 2020 National Defense Heavy Fire Plan, culminating in the June 2021 announcement.
The dilemma remains that the Korean People’s Army has many more artillery shells and long-range rockets than Hamas or Hezbollah do, and that South Korea must defend far larger and more densely populated urban areas.
Israel can afford to expend a $40,000 Tamir missile to kill a crude $300 rocket assembled in a garage because of Hamas’s limited resources—and even then, that offense/defense cost ratio is troublesome. But though South Korea doesn’t lack for money, the volume of fire the KPA can generate is many times greater. And $40,000 is a very low price of surface-to-air missile!
Wook did mention they would seek to “minimize costs”, which might allude to the cost-per-shot issue. He also defined the system’s role as “countering enemies’ long-range artillery threats so as to protect core facilities and military and security infrastructure.”
That doesn’t sound like a broad commitment to protecting population centers, but rather positioning batteries to protect key assets/facilities including missile defense radars, airbases, power plants, the presidential Blue House, and command-and-control facilities.
To be fair, it’s unclear whether North Korea would follow through on threats to concentrate fire on civilian areas, because it would actually be a pretty terrible tactical decision as well as an atrocity. It would be far more effective to direct fire at military targets, especially considering the attrition North Korean artillery units would swiftly incur from South Korean and U.S. counter-battery fire. (The Nautilus study estimated North Korea’s long-range artillery units would mostly be wiped out after a week of sustained fighting.)
Wook also suggested South Korean firms would develop their Iron Dome-equivalent indigenously from the ground up. However, it’s still possible some technology transfers with Israel may be arranged as South Korea already uses Israeli Green Pine air defense radars. However, the U.S. Army found itself unable to integrate Iron Dome into its air defense networks because manufacturer Rafael denied access to the source code.
Still, the original Iron Dome could potentially be introduced to the Korean Peninsula via the U.S. Army, which activated two batteries in November 2020. One of the batteries might be deployed to South Korea to protect the THAAD ballistic missile defense system from rocket artillery threats.
The question remains just how broadly South Korea will attempt to stretch out its Iron Dome given the higher volume threat posed by North Korea’s artillery arm. If the public comes to expect an impenetrable artillery shield, then there is a risk that they will be disappointed. However, a Korean anti-rocket system could protect critical military infrastructure, and if frugally deployed to protect population centers too, could potentially mitigate the loss of civilian life too.
Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.
Image: Reuters.
6. N. Korea's imports from China surge on-month in June
And controlled by the regime. Some very interesting data.
N. Korea's imports from China surge on-month in June | Yonhap News Agency
SHENYANG, China, July 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's imports from China rose sharply to US$12.3 million last month from $2.71 million a month earlier, Chinese trade data showed Sunday.
The North's imports had fallen to $29,000 and $3,000 in January and February, respectively, before rising to US$28.75 million in April and then falling again in May, according to the data.
North Korea's exports to China posted $1.81 million in June, with bilateral trade volume coming to $14.13 million.
The two countries' trade volume in June accounted for just 6 percent of that of a year ago, when it reached $226.6 million, the data showed.
(END)
7. N.K. media outlet reports on S. Korean criticism of call for abolishing unification ministry
Probably because the regime often finds its rhetoric useful as it is sometimes divisive.
N.K. media outlet reports on S. Korean criticism of call for abolishing unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 18 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean propaganda media outlet reported Sunday that the leader of South Korea's main opposition party is under fire over his calls for abolishing the unification ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, a move seen as indirect criticism of the abolition idea.
North Korean media outlets had been silent about People Power Party Chairman Lee Jun-seok's call to dismantle the unification ministry in charge of reconciliation efforts with the North, though the idea faced criticism from both the ruling and opposition parties in the South.
But on Sunday, Tongil Voice, a North Korean propaganda radio broadcast, cited South Korean media reporting that various voices of criticism have been flowing out from the political and social circles, and that some called the idea "foolish, irresponsible and absurd."
Earlier this month, Lee called into question the existence of the unification ministry in a radio interview, saying it is inefficient to separate the duties of the unification ministry from the foreign ministry.
Unification Minister Lee In-young immediately rebuffed his arguments and voiced strong regret. Later, he also criticized the PPP chairman for lacking "historical awareness" with regard to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
The unification ministry has handled all issues related to inter-Korean relations and unification since it was first launched in 1969 as the Board of National Unification and later upgraded into a full ministry
(END)
8. N. Korea warns youth against adopting foreign speaking habits, lifestyles
Yes we keep seeing these reports. But that is because the regime continues to emphasize this because external information and ideas are an existential threat to the regime.
N. Korea warns youth against adopting foreign speaking habits, lifestyles | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 18 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's official newspaper on Sunday called on younger generations to speak the country's own standard language and follow traditional lifestyles, amid the regime's crackdown on language expressions widely used in South Korea.
The Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the North's ruling Worker's Party, made the appeal in an article, saying, "The ideological and cultural penetration under the colorful colored signboard of the bourgeoisie is even more dangerous than enemies who are taking guns."
The newspaper highlighted the superiority of its standard language based on the Pyongyang dialect and stressed the need for the younger people to use it correctly, as well as maintain acceptable lifestyles in terms of attire, haircuts, music and dance.
"When the new generations have a sound sense of ideology and revolutionary spirits, the future of a country is bright. If not, decades-long social systems and revolution will be perished. That is the lesson of blood in the history of the world's socialist movement," the article read.
North Korea has recently toughened the crackdown on the speaking habits of its millennials, who have been mimicking South Koreans, banning them from, for example, calling one's husband "oppa," which means "older brother" but often refers to a spouse or a boyfriend in South Korea, according to the South's National Intelligence Agency.
The regime has called for stronger discipline and ideological education particularly for young citizens, as it is under growing pressure from the fallout of global sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic.
In December, the North reenacted a law that toughens the punishment for possession of videos made in South Korea as part of efforts to prevent the inflow of outside culture that could influence its people's ideology.
(END)
9. Why is Kim Jong-un clamping down on millennials, K-pop and slang?
Yes, millennials and K-Pop are threats to the regime.
[Weekender] Why is Kim Jong-un clamping down on millennials, K-pop and slang?
[Weekender] Why is Kim Jong-un clamping down on millennials, K-pop and slang?
Kim wages culture war against North Korea’s younger generation amid deepening economic crisis
Published : Jul 17, 2021 - 16:01
Updated : Jul 17, 2021 - 16:01
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has a new concern: how to control the country’s younger generation.
The 37-year-old leader warned in April that “a serious change” was taking place in the “ideological and mental state” of young North Koreans, and that their ideological education was vital to the survival of the party and the country.
Furthermore, the reclusive regime has been cracking down hard on the attire, speaking habits and culture of North Korean millennials, also known as the Jangmadang Generation -- people in their 20s and 30s who grew up during the country’s famine in the mid-1990s.
For example, South Korean practices such as a woman calling her husband “oppa” -- which means “older brother” but is often used to refer to a boyfriend or spouse -- are prohibited. So are South Korean-style clothing and public displays of affection, such as hugging on the street, the South’s spy agency said last week.
Recently, Kim also labeled K-pop a “vicious cancer” and said it was corrupting young North Koreans’ “attire, hairstyles, speeches and behaviors,” according to the New York Times. The leader also enacted a sweeping new law mandating stiff punishment for people who consume or smuggle in South Korean entertainment, which can include imprisonment or even execution.
The clampdown against what the North calls “anti-socialist acts” appears to reflect concern that if the younger generation -- which has experienced capitalism and foreign culture -- goes unchecked, it could create cracks in the regime’s legitimacy and potentially jeopardize Kim’s dynastic grip on the country, observers say.
“Korean dramas and films have entered the country and the young North Korean generation is influenced by them, such as fashion styles and the way they talk,” said Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute. “Such transformation is visible in the country and Kim sees this could threaten the North Korean system.”
“Kim, who was educated in Switzerland, is well aware that K-pop or Western culture could easily permeate into the younger generation and have a negative impact on its socialist system,” said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korea Studies. “He knows that these cultural aspects could impose a burden on the system. So by stamping them out, Kim is trying to prevent further troubles in the future.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (Yonhap)
Jangmadang Generation: A force for change
A “jangmadang,” which literally translates to “marketplace,” is a kind of black market that sprang up during the country’s devastating famine of the 1990s. The market stalls became a core part of the North’s economic system, where people led double lives between official state jobs and selling imported foods and other goods to make a living.
North Koreans who were born in the 1980s and 1990s grew up during the famine, relying on these markets for survival, making them known as the Jangmadang Generation. Accounting for around 15 percent of the North’s 25 million people, this generation was exposed to capitalism from a young age, buying food and other goods at the black market rather than standing in line for rations like their parents and grandparents.
Having grown up amid economic uncertainty and in the absence of state rationing, this demographic tends to be individualistic and is more concerned with making money than sticking to ideology, according to the National Intelligence Service. They are largely indifferent to politics and lack a sense of allegiance to Kim Jong-un or the regime.
This generation grew up secretly watching South Korean drama series and listening to K-pop smuggled in on flash drives from China. The glitzy TV dramas gave them a glimpse of life south of the border, convincing them the North was not the socialist paradise they had been taught to believe it was. Some defectors who have settled in South Korea have said it was South Korean dramas that motivated them to risk their lives by crossing one of the world’s most heavily fortified borders.
According to a survey of 116 North Korean defectors published last year by Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 47.4 percent said they had frequently consumed South Korean TV programs, dramas, films and songs when they were in the North, while 44 percent said they had consumed them only once or twice. Only 8.6 percent said they had never consumed them.
Concerned with the far-reaching influence of K-drama and K-pop, in December Kim Jong-un enacted the Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture. Under it, those caught in possession of South Korean materials can face 15 years in prison -- up from the previous penalty of five years -- while those caught distributing it can face the death penalty, according to Rep. Ha Tae-keung, who was briefed by the spy agency.
In May, the country’s official media outlet warned its citizens about the inflow of “capitalistic culture,” saying if it were not restrained, the country could “collapse like a damp wall.”
The paper also warned young people against following the “exotic and decadent lifestyle” of capitalism.
With the generational shift apparent in the North’s top echelon, Kim, who is still in his 30s, views his peers’ ideology with alarm considering that they too will take on more important roles in the near future.
“As seen in the latest Cabinet reshuffle, the age of officials became younger, with people in their 40s to 50s taking the majority. The elite business class also got younger,” said Cheong. “The rise of a younger class could contribute to the country’s economy, but Kim is concerned that it could also weaken their loyalty to the regime.”
Desperate times, tighter control
Tight ideological control and efforts to stamp out foreign culture are nothing new in the totalitarian state led by third-generation leader Kim. But as the North braces for an even more serious food crisis and worse economic hardship amid the pandemic, Kim is looking inward. Through the crackdown, he seeks to secure his grip on power and reinforce internal solidarity.
The isolated nation is said to be facing one of the worst economic situations since Kim took power in 2011. The COVID-19 pandemic forced the North to shut down the border with its largest trade partner, China, causing trade to plummet. Kim also made the rare admission that his country faces food shortages, due to the pandemic and last year’s flooding, which wreaked havoc on its farming sector.
The North also blames the drawn-out UN sanctions, imposed in response to the country’s nuclear weapons program, for its deepening economic crisis.
“With the North facing the ‘triple whammy’ of COVID-19, international sanctions and natural disasters, Kim fears that the younger generation could question and challenge the regime if he doesn’t tighten control,” said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
He stressed that the younger generation, which experienced the market economy and some prosperity while growing up, will feel even more disappointed by the regime’s failure to address the challenges. They are the ones who also witnessed Kim Jong-un meet US President Donald Trump in Singapore and Vietnam and thought changes were happening.
But despite Kim’s high-stakes summitry with Trump in 2018, the nuclear talks collapsed as the two sides failed to agree on details of how sanctions should be lifted in return for steps toward denuclearization.
10. The truth about our 'abandonment' and reclaiming our Korean identity
A little Korean culture for the weekend reading.
The truth about our 'abandonment' and reclaiming our Korean identity
Courtesy of Kara BosThis article is the eighth in a series about Koreans adopted abroad. Korea's nationality law facilitated the procedure of restoring their Korean nationality and allowing dual nationality of their adoptive country from 2010. Kara Bos, who restored her family registration with her birth father, shares her story when she tried to reclaim her Korean nationality and what she found out during the process. Her story provides an opportunity to contemplate the true meaning of nationality to the identity of an individual. ― ED.
By Kara Bos
The Korean Nationality Act Article 12 states: "Any national of the Republic of Korea who falls under one of the following subparagraphs shall lose his or her nationality (1948-present Art. 15) … A person who has been adopted by an alien and has acquired the parent's nationality..."
I, Kang Mee-sook (as shown in my Korean passport), was adopted in 1984 from Korea, and according to this law, I should have lost my Korean nationality when I was naturalized as an American citizen on Dec. 5, 1989, through my adoptive parents in the United States.
As a result of my paternity suit that I won in June 2020, I have gained the right to be legally recognized as my biological Korean father's daughter and be put on his family register as "Oh Kara." This suit allowed me to reclaim my Korean nationality and citizenship.
However, in processing this extremely difficult family registration (the process to register my name in the family register lasted five months, as it was the first time the Ministry of Justice had ever processed such a claim) as a foreign citizen, I found out that my Korean nationality was never expunged. Furthermore, I had to prove that I was indeed naturalized so that Holt could expunge my Korean nationality. This naturalization process was never followed up on after my adoption was finalized with Holt back in 1984.
If it had been, you could also conclude that there wouldn't be a single adoptee from Korea living without citizenship or deported from their adoptive country. If government institutions had mandated that adoption agencies expunge every finalized adoptee's Korean nationality, then they would have had to confirm that the process of naturalization was completed. The adoption agencies in the receiving countries would have needed to send a naturalization certificate to their Korean counterpart adoption agency, just as I recently did. However, once we were adopted out, the final checks were not in place and that is the reason why there are an estimated 26,000 Korean adoptees currently living without citizenship in the US alone.
Furthermore I recently learned via a lecture given by Dr. Lee Kyung-eun, hosted by KoRoot in Seoul ― a nonprofit organization that fights for Korean adoptees' legal rights to their origins ― that when adoption started in Korea (1955) after the Korean War, it was actually illegal to relinquish your child. So, in order to combat local laws and follow international requirements for adoption, they circumvented them by creating the category of "abandoned" children. Even if a family member physically relinquished their child to an adoption agency, they would fabricate a story in order to comply with local laws and international standards.
This goal of evading local laws and complying with international standards is the reason so many of us were "found on the doorsteps of…" or "in a parking lot," "at a train station." If a child was labeled as "abandoned," then a new family register was created to easily process the paperwork for adoption. I've encountered so many adoptees that post-reunion have found out that even though their paperwork from their adoption agency states that they were "found;" in reality, their parents, grandparents, aunts or uncles had actually physically relinquished them at the adoption agency.
"Father: No Record. Mother: No Record. Need for Protection: Abandoned Child."
When/if an adoptee gains access to their file from their adoptive parents or adoption agency, seeing these words above, immediately gives a discouraging affect an adoptee's motivation to search for their birth family.
When strangers ask us as we get older, "Don't you want to find your birth family?" they cannot possibly comprehend how weighted a question like that is, when we constantly hold "abandoned" in the back of our minds. Since Korea used the term, "abandoned," as a legal way to bypass local laws and accommodate international laws, it created for us adoptees a lie that we carry with us our entire lives. It was the reason why I never searched for my birth family until five years ago. I believed fully in the "lie" used by the Korean government and agencies to cover up relinquishments, that I was "abandoned" and therefore could never find my birth family, even if I had any urge to do so.
However, with the development of DNA testing the whole ball game has changed. DNA has pushed wide open a door that government institutions and adoption agencies could never have imagined. Adoptees are finding out the truth behind their "abandonment," and in the majority of cases we are finding that we were never abandoned. Governments need to take responsibility for their creation of these lies, and one step in doing so is to give adoptees their legal right to origin, open up their records completely, and allow direct contact between birth families and adoptees. Only then can forgiveness and peace ever be found amidst the trauma of inter-country adoption, which was founded on such lies.
To be legally registered as being "abandoned" allots for the continuous turmoil many of us who search for our identities later in life face. As a result of this label, the search is painful, defeating, tiresome, degrading, and thus many of us simply give up.
I, however, have not given up. I've found my biological father and part of my story; I've applied for Korean citizenship to reclaim what was stripped away from me as orphan Kang Mi-suk, to replace it with a new Korean identity under the name of Oh Kara. Oh Kara scoops up the helpless crying child Kang Mi-suk at the bus terminal in Goesan and comforts her as a strong, determined woman helping lead her to her mother. Oh Kara will protect her mother, give her peace and healing after a lifetime of shame. Oh Kara may seem like just a name but it represents my grueling fight for justice and truth.
To the Korean government I say, "I urge you to give us our legal right to origin, restore justice for those of us who were never abandoned and who want to know who our families are." To fellow adoptees I say, "I urge you never to give up and to fight for your right to know!"
11. How to enhance peaceful nuclear cooperation between Korea, US
Excerpts:
President Biden is holding onto important themes without distraction: fighting the pandemic and climate change, promoting economic recovery, and restoring relations with allies. Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation in fact dovetails very well with all of Biden's important themes.
At the same time, these are all important themes for Korea as well, and sharing them makes me believe that we must not lose the momentum to implement this timely commitment. Suggestions have already been made by some observers to form a binational, multi-stakeholder group to implement the commitment. Having observed Korea's successful bidding for UAE reactor projects and the 2015 amendment of the agreement, I agree that forming such a group will be a smart and timely starting point.
How to enhance peaceful nuclear cooperation between Korea, US
By Ahn Ho-young
Wrapping up their summit on May 21, Presidents Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden came up with a joint statement, which contained a commitment "to develop cooperation in overseas nuclear markets, including joint participation in nuclear power plant projects." The commitment came as a pleasant surprise to many observers in Korea and the U.S., including me.
I was reminded in particular of the amendment of the Korea-U.S. Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, known in the U.S. as a "123 Agreement," which was completed during my time as ambassador to the U.S. The negotiations for the amendment started in October of 2010 and they were eventually concluded in April of 2015, making them possibly the longest running negotiations between the two countries ever.
There were good reasons why these negotiations took so long. When the existing agreement had entered into force in 1974, Korea did not have any nuclear reactors. In the intervening 40 years, Korea built more than 20 reactors, which provide 30 percent of its electricity. Besides the growing number of reactors, there were significant advancements in technology.
A consortium of Korean companies developed the APR-1400 model, a new-generation, safe and efficient reactor. (The APR-1400 in fact received a design certificate from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2019. According to Dr. Jung Geun-mo, the pioneer among Korean nuclear scientists, it is the only non-U.S. design thus recognized so far.)
The advent of this new reactor made it possible for Korea to win a $20-billion contract to build four nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). All of these developments engendered expectations in Korea for amending the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement. With Korea now a major nuclear industry power, it needed to have access to the full nuclear cycle, including the enrichment of uranium fuel and the reprocessing of spent fuels. Otherwise, the development of the Korean nuclear industry would be constrained.
I understood these expectations. At the same time, I knew that there were different and strong perspectives on the issue in Washington. After the conclusion of the 123 Agreement, in which the UAE gave up on the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel, Washington labeled that agreement as the "Gold Standard," and a large number of people expected to use it as a standard template for future 123 Agreements. The huge gap between Seoul and Washington looked from time to time to be too wide to be bridged.
In the end, a number of compromises were reached in April of 2015. One of the key components of this deal was the agreement to set up a high-level bilateral commission, to be headed by the Korean vice foreign minister and the U.S. deputy secretary of energy, which would oversee the issue of spent fuel management and the assurance of a stable fuel supply.
For the breakthrough, I thought we were lucky to have top-notch negotiators: Ambassador Park Ro-byug, the Korean special representative to the talks, and Ambassador Thomas Countryman, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation. We were also lucky to take full advantage of other positive factors in the U.S.
One such factor was that many actors in Washington, ranging from the government, to the U.S. Congress, to business leaders in particular, understood the importance of the nuclear industry and the potential Korea held as a partner in such an important industry for the U.S.
Appreciation of Korea as a partner grew hugely, thanks to Korea's successful bidding for the four reactors in the UAE. In our first meeting, Marvin Fertel, the CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute, congratulated me on Korea's successful UAE bid and cited the project's benefits for the U.S. industry as well, which would create thousands of jobs in the U.S.
Another important factor was that these Washington actors understood as well that Korea was a "like-minded" country to the U.S., an ally sharing the same values and committed to the same set of rules and institutions. All of these factors worked positively to overcome the daunting challenges. The agreement received legislative approval in both countries, and went into effect on Nov. 26, 2015.
These factors underlying the successful amendment of the 123 Agreement offer useful clues to understanding the motivation of the aforementioned joint statement and, more importantly, how we can move ahead to enhance peaceful nuclear cooperation between our two countries further.
President Biden is holding onto important themes without distraction: fighting the pandemic and climate change, promoting economic recovery, and restoring relations with allies. Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation in fact dovetails very well with all of Biden's important themes.
At the same time, these are all important themes for Korea as well, and sharing them makes me believe that we must not lose the momentum to implement this timely commitment. Suggestions have already been made by some observers to form a binational, multi-stakeholder group to implement the commitment. Having observed Korea's successful bidding for UAE reactor projects and the 2015 amendment of the agreement, I agree that forming such a group will be a smart and timely starting point.
Ahn Ho-young ([email protected]) is the president of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
12. Return to Korean-style Confucianism
Some more Korean history and culture for Sunday reading.
Excerpt: But if you've read my work on "Two Confucianisms" or seen my YouTube video on the subject, you know I am advocating that Korea discard its "recent" Confucianism ― meaning that of the last three centuries, and return to an original, I argue, "Korean-style" Confucianism.
Return to Korean-style Confucianism
By Mark Peterson
This week, through the upside of all this downside known as the COVID-19 pandemic, I will be giving a lecture to an audience based in Brisbane, Australia, at the University of Queensland. The topic: "Two Types of Korean Confucian Cultural Legacy and Its Implication to Contemporary Korean Culture and Society."
I'm looking forward to my Tuesday evening, Australia's Wednesday noontime lecture, because there will be discussants who will respond to my presentation. I hope they like it, but I fear they may not for one of them is the president of the World Foundation for Confucian Culture, based in Andong, Korea, Kwon Du-hyun. It looks for all intents and purposes like he is going to be a pretty conservative critic of what I may say. Maybe not.
But if you've read my work on "Two Confucianisms" or seen my YouTube video on the subject, you know I am advocating that Korea discard its "recent" Confucianism ― meaning that of the last three centuries, and return to an original, I argue, "Korean-style" Confucianism.
My research has shown me, and whoever chooses to accept why I have concluded, that Confucianism came into Korea about 1,500 years ago, but came in making accommodations to Korean culture. It was after the changes that took place in the late 17th century, that Korea transformed and began practicing "Chinese-style" Confucianism. The new interpretation of Confucianism carried with it all the things that people dislike about Confucianism.
Yes, I've been surprised to see in the response to my YouTube channel (a great barometer of the range of attitudes in contemporary Korea) that there are a whole bunch of people that hate Confucianism and everything about it. Many Koreans rightly associate an oppressive hierarchical social structure and with it heavy gender discrimination with Confucianism. But it doesn't have to be so.
These days, the culture wars between Korea and China are heating up, and Koreans are looking at the downside of the Chinese cultural legacy more than the upside, and the Chinese aren't helping matters by trying to claim all things of worth in Korean culture originated in China, ridiculously, like kimchi and the hanbok. Well, here is my fuel for the fire: that the orthodoxy movement that changed Confucianism and change Korean society in the late Joseon period was due to Korea adopting Chinese-style Confucianism.
What was the difference between Korean-style Confucianism and Chinese-style Confucianism? It was mainly a social system based on "patrilineality" ― an odd term in English, perhaps, but a very well-known term in Korean ― "bugye" society. The term patriarchy is sometimes used, but patrilineality is a more accurate term to describe what was going on ― you can have patriarchy, or power in the hands of men, even in a matrilineal society.
The essence of a patrilineal system is that of inheritance, meaning the eldest son received the inheritance from the parents' generation. It led to the formation of lineage groups of agnates ― a fifty-cent word meaning male relatives, or members of an extended family group of people all with the same surname who are related to each other by male connections. Fairly often I hear the erroneous assumption that prior to the patrilineal system in Korea, there was a matrilineal system. This is a simple-Simon deduction that is completely false.
The fact of the matter is that prior to the adoption of the patrilineal system in Korea, there was a "bilateral system" of kinship and social organization, meaning that men and women were on equal footing in family matters. Daughters had full and equal inheritance rights with sons. There were difference in gender roles, yes, for example, only men served in government. But in matters of the family, daughters stood equally with sons.
And we see it was true in matters of marriage. In post-18th-century Korea, marriages were always "sijip ganda" (the wife goes to the husband's house). But prior to the changes of the late 17th century, it was just as common for the husband to marry and move into the wife's house ― "jangga ganda." This fact alone accounts for the fact that most Koreans do not live at their "bon'gwan" ― ancestral home. A remote ancestor moved away to marry into the wife's home, and village, away from his own.
Accommodating differences in Korean culture meant that Confucianism, though based in ancient Chinese patrilineal society, became Koreanized when it came to Korea. For example, another example, the ancestor ceremonies. The texts say the eldest son should perform them. But in Korea, the ceremonies were shared on a rotational basis, with sons and daughters each taking an equal turn.
Until the 18th century when Korea decided to become orthodox ― to do what the texts said ― for more than 1,000 years of Korean-style Confucianism, Korea decided, "sadae-juui" ― do it the Chinese way.
My presentation on Wednesday online via Brisbane is going to argue that Korea would be happier with Confucianism, and there would be fewer objections to Confucian practice, if Korea discarded the Chinese-style and returned to Korean-style Confucianism. I wonder how my traditionally-minded critics will respond.
Mark Peterson ([email protected]) is professor emeritus of Korean, Asian and Near Eastern languages at Brigham Young University in Utah.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
