Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"You can discover what your enemy fears most by observing the means he uses to frighten you."

– Eric Hoffer

"Ideas excite me, and as soon as I get excited, the adrenaline gets going and the next thing I know I'm borrowing energy from the ideas themselves."

– Ray Bradbury

"It's that wonderful old-fashioned idea that others come first and you come second. This was the whole ethic by which I was brought up. Others matter more than you do, so 'don't fuss, dear; get on with it.'"

– Audrey Hepburn

1. Justice Department Announces Coordinated, Nationwide Actions to Combat North Korean Remote Information Technology Workers’ Illicit Revenue Generation Schemes

2. America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran

3. S. Korea's role in a Taiwan crisis on which North might piggyback

4. China sounds out S. Korea on Lee's possible attendance at Sept. military parade: sources

5. S. Korea, China discuss APEC cooperation, steel structures in Yellow Sea

6. N. Korea already using Russia's Pantsir-S1 air-defense system: report

7. U.S. seeks to arrest 4 N. Koreans for posing as IT workers to steal company money

8. DOJ announces sweeping crackdown on North Koreans working for over 100 US firms

9. Russia training North Korean drone pilots near Wonsan resort, capital: Kyiv

10. Chinese citizens marvel at North Korea’s megaresort, and fume at their exclusion

11. UN envoy says world must not give up on Japanese abductees in North Korea

12. Korean population could drop by 85% in next 100 years: study

13. Seoul carefully weighs Beijing's invitation to WWII commemoration

14. N. Korean rice prices hold at record highs as food shortages worsen

15. N. Koreans grow tired of potato-heavy diet

16. N. Korean shipyard workers forced into unpaid overtime

1. Justice Department Announces Coordinated, Nationwide Actions to Combat North Korean Remote Information Technology Workers’ Illicit Revenue Generation Schemes

Operating in plain sight? This is quite an extensive operation that shows how sophisticated and dangerous is the regime's "All purpose sword" of cyber. We have to take north Korea's global threats seriously.

Justice Department Announces Coordinated, Nationwide Actions to Combat North Korean Remote Information Technology Workers’ Illicit Revenue Generation Schemes

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-coordinated-nationwide-actions-combat-north-korean-remote

Monday, June 30, 2025

For Immediate Release

Office of Public Affairs

Law Enforcement Actions Across 16 States Result in Charges, Arrest, and Seizures of 29 Financial Accounts, 21 Fraudulent Websites, and Approximately 200 Computers

The Justice Department announced today coordinated actions against the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) government’s schemes to fund its regime through remote information technology (IT) work for U.S. companies. These actions include two indictments, an arrest, searches of 29 known or suspected “laptop farms” across 16 states, and the seizure of 29 financial accounts used to launder illicit funds and 21 fraudulent websites.

According to court documents, the schemes involve North Korean individuals fraudulently obtaining employment with U.S. companies as remote IT workers, using stolen and fake identities. The North Korean actors were assisted by individuals in the United States, China, United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan, and successfully obtained employment with more than 100 U.S. companies.

As alleged in court documents, certain U.S.-based individuals enabled one of the schemes by creating front companies and fraudulent websites to promote the bona fides of the remote IT workers, and hosted laptop farms where the remote North Korean IT workers could remote access into U.S. victim company-provided laptop computers. Once employed, the North Korean IT workers received regular salary payments, and they gained access to, and in some cases stole, sensitive employer information such as export controlled U.S. military technology and virtual currency. In another scheme, North Korean IT workers used false or fraudulently obtained identities to gain employment with an Atlanta, Georgia-based blockchain research and development company and stole virtual currency worth approximately over $900,000.

“These schemes target and steal from U.S. companies and are designed to evade sanctions and fund the North Korean regime’s illicit programs, including its weapons programs,” said Assistant Attorney General John A. Eisenberg of the Department’s National Security Division. “The Justice Department, along with our law enforcement, private sector, and international partners, will persistently pursue and dismantle these cyber-enabled revenue generation networks.”

“North Korean IT workers defraud American companies and steal the identities of private citizens, all in support of the North Korean regime,” said Assistant Director Brett Leatherman of FBI’s Cyber Division. “That is why the FBI and our partners continue to work together to disrupt infrastructure, seize revenue, indict overseas IT workers, and arrest their enablers in the United States. Let the actions announced today serve as a warning: if you host laptop farms for the benefit of North Korean actors, law enforcement will be waiting for you.”

“North Korea remains intent on funding its weapons programs by defrauding U.S. companies and exploiting American victims of identity theft, but the FBI is equally intent on disrupting this massive campaign and bringing its perpetrators to justice,” said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI Counterintelligence Division. “North Korean IT workers posing as U.S. citizens fraudulently obtained employment with American businesses so they could funnel hundreds of millions of dollars to North Korea’s authoritarian regime. The FBI will do everything in our power to defend the homeland and protect Americans from being victimized by the North Korean government, and we ask all U.S. companies that employ remote workers to remain vigilant to this sophisticated threat.”

Zhenxing Wang, et al. Indictment, Seizure Warrants, and Arrest – District of Massachusetts

Today, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts and the National Security Division announced the arrest of U.S. national Zhenxing “Danny” Wang of New Jersey pursuant to a five-count indictment. The indictment describes a multi-year fraud scheme by Wang and his co-conspirators to obtain remote IT work with U.S. companies that generated more than $5 million in revenue. The indictment also charges Chinese nationals Jing Bin Huang (靖斌黄), Baoyu Zhou (周宝玉), Tong Yuze (佟雨泽), Yongzhe Xu (徐勇哲 andيونجزهي أكسو), Ziyou Yuan (زيو) and Zhenbang Zhou (周震邦), and Taiwanese nationals Mengting Liu (劉孟婷) and Enchia Liu (刘恩) for their roles in the scheme.

“The threat posed by DPRK operatives is both real and immediate. Thousands of North Korean cyber operatives have been trained and deployed by the regime to blend into the global digital workforce and systematically target U.S. companies,” said U.S. Attorney Leah B. Foley for the District of Massachusetts. “We will continue to work relentlessly to protect U.S. businesses and ensure they are not inadvertently fueling the DPRK’s unlawful and dangerous ambitions.”

According to the indictment, from approximately 2021 until October 2024, the defendants and other co-conspirators compromised the identities of more than 80 U.S. persons to obtain remote jobs at more than 100 U.S. companies, including many Fortune 500 companies, and caused U.S. victim companies to incur legal fees, computer network remediation costs, and other damages and losses of at least $3 million. Overseas IT workers were assisted by Kejia Wang, Zhenxing Wang, and at least four other identified U.S. facilitators. Kejia Wang, for example, communicated with overseas co-conspirators and IT workers, and traveled to Shenyang and Dandong, China, including in 2023, to meet with them about the scheme. To deceive U.S. companies into believing the IT workers were located in the United States, Kejia Wang, Zhenxing Wang, and the other U.S. facilitators received and/or hosted laptops belonging to U.S. companies at their residences, and enabled overseas IT workers to access the laptops remotely by, among other things, connecting the laptops to hardware devices designed to allow for remote access (referred to as keyboard-video-mouse or “KVM” switches).

Kejia Wang and Zhenxing Wang also created shell companies with corresponding websites and financial accounts, including Hopana Tech LLC, Tony WKJ LLC, and Independent Lab LLC, to make it appear as though the overseas IT workers were affiliated with legitimate U.S. businesses. Kejia Wang and Zhenxing Wang established these and other financial accounts to receive money from victimized U.S. companies, much of which was subsequently transferred to overseas co‑conspirators. In exchange for their services, Kejia Wang, Zhenxing Wang, and the four other U.S. facilitators received a total of at least $696,000 from the IT workers.

IT workers employed under this scheme also gained access to sensitive employer data and source code, including International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) data from a California-based defense contractor that develops artificial intelligence-powered equipment and technologies. Specifically, between on or about Jan. 19, 2024, and on or about April 2, 2024, an overseas co-conspirator remotely accessed without authorization the company’s laptop and computer files containing technical data and other information. The stolen data included information marked as being controlled under the ITAR.

Simultaneously with today’s announcement, the FBI and Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) seized 17 web domains used in furtherance of the charged scheme and further seized 29 financial accounts, holding tens of thousands of dollars in funds, used to launder revenue for the North Korean regime through the remote IT work scheme.

Previously, in October 2024, as part of this investigation, federal law enforcement executed searches at eight locations across three states that resulted in the recovery of more than 70 laptops and remote access devices, such as KVMs. Simultaneously with that action, the FBI seized four web domains associated with Kejia Wang’s and Zhenxing Wang’s shell companies used to facilitate North Korean IT work.

The FBI Las Vegas Field Office, DCIS San Diego Resident Agency, and Homeland Security Investigations San Diego Field Office are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Jason Casey for the District of Massachusetts and Trial Attorney Gregory J. Nicosia, Jr. of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case, with significant assistance from Legal Assistants Daniel Boucher and Margaret Coppes. Valuable assistance was also provided by Mark A. Murphy of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for the District of New Jersey, Eastern District of New York, and Southern District of California.

Kim Kwang Jin et al. Indictment – Northern District of Georgia

Today, the Northern District of Georgia unsealed a five-count wire fraud and money laundering indictment charging four North Korean nationals, Kim Kwang Jin (김관진), Kang Tae Bok (강태복), Jong Pong Ju (정봉주) and Chang Nam Il (창남일), with a scheme to steal virtual currency from two companies, valued at over $900,000 at the time of the thefts, and to launder proceeds of those thefts. The defendants remain at large and wanted by the FBI.

“The defendants used fake and stolen personal identities to conceal their North Korean nationality, pose as remote IT workers, and exploit their victims’ trust to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars,” said U.S. Attorney Theodore S. Hertzberg for the Northern District of Georgia. “This indictment highlights the unique threat North Korea poses to companies that hire remote IT workers and underscores our resolve to prosecute any actor, in the United States or abroad, who steals from Georgia businesses.”

According to the indictment, the defendants traveled to the United Arab Emirates on North Korean travel documents and worked as a co-located team. In approximately December 2020 and May 2021, respectively, Kim Kwang Jin (using victim P.S.’s stolen identity) and Jong Pong Ju (using the alias “Bryan Cho”) were hired by a blockchain research and development company headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, and a virtual token company based in Serbia. Both defendants concealed their North Korean identities from their employers by providing false identification documents containing a mix of stolen and fraudulent identity information. Neither company would have hired Kim Kwang Jin and Jong Pong Ju had they known that they were North Korean citizens. Later, on a recommendation from Jong Pong Ju, the Serbian company hired “Peter Xiao,” who in fact was Chang Nam Il.

After gaining their employers’ trust, Kim Kwang Jin and Jong Pong Ju were assigned projects that provided them access to their employers’ virtual currency assets. In February 2022, Jong Pong Ju used that access to steal virtual currency worth approximately $175,000 at the time of the theft, sending it to a virtual currency address he controlled. In March 2022, Kim Kwang Jin stole virtual currency worth approximately $740,000 at the time of theft by modifying the source code of two of his employer’s smart contracts, then sending it to a virtual currency address he controlled.

To launder the funds after the thefts, Kim Kwang Jin and Jong Pong Ju “mixed” the stolen funds using the virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash and then transferred the funds to virtual currency exchange accounts controlled by defendants Kang Tae Bok and Chang Nam Il but held in the name of aliases. These accounts were opened using fraudulent Malaysian identification documents.

The FBI Atlanta Field Office is investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Samir Kaushal and Alex Sistla for the Northern District of Georgia and Trial Attorney Jacques Singer-Emery of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.

21 Searches of Known or Suspected U.S.-based Laptop Farms – Multi-District

Between June 10 and June 17, 2025, the FBI executed searches of 21 premises across 14 states hosting known and suspected laptop farms. These actions, coordinated by the FBI Denver Field Office, related to investigations of North Korean remote IT worker schemes being conducted by the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices of the District of Colorado, Eastern District of Missouri, and Northern District of Texas. In total, the FBI seized approximately 137 laptops.

Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the District of Connecticut, the Eastern District of Michigan, the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the Middle District of Florida, the Northern District of Georgia, the Northern District of Illinois, the Northern District of Indiana, the District of Oregon, the Southern District of Florida, the Southern District of Ohio, the Western District of New York, and the Western District of Pennsylvania.

***

The Department’s actions to combat these schemes are the latest in a series of law enforcement actions under a joint National Security Division and FBI Cyber and Counterintelligence Divisions effort, the DPRK RevGen: Domestic Enabler Initiative. This effort prioritizes targeting and disrupting the DPRK’s illicit revenue generation schemes and its U.S.-based enablers. The Department previously announced other actions pursuant to the initiative, including in January 2025 and prior, as well as the filing of a civil forfeiture complaint in early June 2025 for over $7.74 million tied to an illegal employment scheme.

As the FBI has described in Public Service Announcements published in May 2024 and January 2025, North Korean remote IT workers posing as legitimate remote IT workers have committed data extortion and exfiltrated the proprietary and sensitive data from U.S. companies. DPRK IT worker schemes typically involve the use of stolen identities, alias emails, social media, online cross-border payment platforms, and online job site accounts, as well as false websites, proxy computers, and witting and unwitting third parties located in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Other public advisories about the threats, red flag indicators, and potential mitigation measures for these schemes include a May 2022 advisory released by the FBI, Department of the Treasury, and Department of State; a July 2023 advisory from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and guidance issued in October 2023 by the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). As described the May 2022 advisory, North Korean IT workers have been known individually to earn up to $300,000 annually, generating hundreds of millions of dollars collectively each year, on behalf of designated entities, such as the North Korean Ministry of Defense and others directly involved in the DPRK’s weapons programs.

The U.S. Department of State has offered potential rewards for up to $5 million in support of international efforts to disrupt the DPRK’s illicit financial activities, including for cybercrimes, money laundering, and sanctions evasion.

The details in the above-described court documents are merely allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Updated June 30, 2025

2. America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran

This reinforces Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy. Kim is assessing that he has been successful.

Excerpts:

Unlike North Korea, Iran doesn’t yet have a nuclear weapon. But for North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, America’s airstrikes on Iran’s aspirational nuclear infrastructure must have reinforced what he has long held to be true: that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for his and his nation’s survival. Would the United States carry out such a brash, pre-emptive operation if Iran could credibly strike back with the bomb?

This calculus has been at the forefront of Mr. Kim’s mind since taking power from his father more than a decade ago. Nothing has diverted him from driving North Korea’s military, industrial and science communities to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that put targets on the United States and its allies.And remarkably, he’s accomplished those tasks. Despite decades-long efforts by the United States and other world powers to persuade North Korea off the nuclear path, the small, isolated nation is estimated to have assembled around 50 warheads and produced enough fissile material for up to 40 more. Its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles can very likely target every major U.S. city, and thousands of additional missiles are currently in range of U.S. military bases across the Asia-Pacific.

America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/29/opinion/north-korea-nuclear-weapons.html?searchResultPosition=1

June 29, 2025

Credit...Emmanuel Polanco

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By W.J. Hennigan

Mr. Hennigan writes about national security, foreign policy and conflict for the Opinion section.

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One day after 14 American 30,000-pound bombs thundered down on Iran, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a typically florid public statement through its state-run media, claiming the United States had “violently trampled down the territorial integrity and security interests of a sovereign state.”

Unlike North Korea, Iran doesn’t yet have a nuclear weapon. But for North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, America’s airstrikes on Iran’s aspirational nuclear infrastructure must have reinforced what he has long held to be true: that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for his and his nation’s survival. Would the United States carry out such a brash, pre-emptive operation if Iran could credibly strike back with the bomb?

This calculus has been at the forefront of Mr. Kim’s mind since taking power from his father more than a decade ago. Nothing has diverted him from driving North Korea’s military, industrial and science communities to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that put targets on the United States and its allies.

And remarkably, he’s accomplished those tasks. Despite decades-long efforts by the United States and other world powers to persuade North Korea off the nuclear path, the small, isolated nation is estimated to have assembled around 50 warheads and produced enough fissile material for up to 40 more. Its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles can very likely target every major U.S. city, and thousands of additional missiles are currently in range of U.S. military bases across the Asia-Pacific.

The internet is awash with photos of Mr. Kim observing missile tests, meeting with scientists designing those missiles and touring yawning complexes that produce bomb-grade atomic fuel. Mr. Kim wants the world to know that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, already formidable, is advancing each day.

Unlike with Iran, President Trump is not threatening war to disarm North Korea. In fact, five months into his second term, he doesn’t seem to be paying much attention at all, even as Mr. Kim has grown stronger through new nuclear weapons, missiles and alliances. If the United States was unable to inflict irreversible damage to Iran’s nuclear program through airstrikes, as some early intelligence suggests, it’s difficult to imagine the sort of sustained campaign that would be needed to succeed in North Korea.

Now that the flurry of military activity to neutralize Iran’s nuclear ambitions has died down, the intractable problem of North Korea’s program looms even larger. There are no outward signs that a similar mission is being considered. And it shouldn’t be. Let’s think instead about a more promising way forward.

Mr. Kim has repeatedly made it clear that he has no intention of giving up the program, seeing it as essential to ensuring his family’s hold on power. But Republican and Democratic presidents alike have nevertheless spent a quarter-century seeking North Korea’s “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.” (In 2021, President Joe Biden invited talks with Pyongyang with no preconditions, but that offer went nowhere.) This year, Mr. Trump became the latest commander in chief to publicly commit to the unrealistic goal of getting Mr. Kim to abandon his program altogether.

America can no longer afford for its outdated denuclearization demands to be an obstacle to kick-starting diplomacy. Though Washington does not officially acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, the U.S. military already plans and conducts drills based on the fact that North Korea has a nuclear arsenal. Mr. Trump, himself, has publicly said on at least three occasions that it is a nuclear power. Acknowledging this as a diplomatic fact is a difficult decision, to be sure, but it is also necessary to achieve a breakthrough that can reduce tensions, avert unwanted war and prevent hundreds of new weapons from entering North Korea’s ever-growing arsenal.

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The Trump administration should draw up a diplomatic road map that would freeze North Korea’s fast-growing nuclear program in place in exchange for relief from the sanctions that have crippled the nation’s economy. The policy upheaval is almost certain to trigger backlash from South Korea and Japan, the U.S. allies most directly threatened by North Korea’s nuclear program, and stoke concerns among other nations for rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior. But a change in approach is necessary to begin managing the mounting risks.

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To understand the scope and sprawl of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, The Times examined dozens of commercial satellite and state-issued propaganda images collected by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Based on these images, it is hard to envision how Mr. Kim’s multibillion-dollar, yearslong investment in his nuclear and missile complex — spread across 28 sites, with likely many others underground — can ever be entirely dismantled. Acknowledging that reality, and getting Mr. Kim back to the negotiating table, is the only way to contain the growing threat that North Korea poses.

If the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, then Washington’s approach to North Korea certainly meets that mark. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, a policy that no longer makes sense with thousands of centrifuges spinning in North Korea all day, every day. If nothing is done, North Korea’s stockpile will continue to grow, narrowing its gap with the eight other nuclear powers.

North Korea has expanded its nuclear industrial footprint across the country

Nuclear or missile facility

China

Punggye-ri

North Korea

Yongbyon

Hamhung

Sohae

Sea of Japan

Yellow Sea

Pyongyang

Kangson

South Korea

50 miles

Source: Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

Opinion | America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran - The New York Times

Yongbyon

The focus of every denuclearization proposal that the United States has made to North Korea has included the complex at Yongbyon. Comprising hundreds of buildings peppered across about 10 square miles of low-lying hills, the Yongbyon nuclear complex produces North Korea’s plutonium, along with highly enriched uranium and tritium — all materials necessary to make thermonuclear weapons.

Oct. 2024

North

Korea

Yongbyon

New enrichment hall added 2022

2013 expansions

200 feet

Source: Image via Planet Labs, analysis by the Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

Opinion | America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran - The New York Times

Initial construction began at Yongbyon in the 1960s following an atomic energy agreement with the Soviet Union. In 1991, North Korea lost its largest benefactor when the Soviet Union dissolved; the United States subsequently withdrew all its nuclear weapons deployed to South Korea. North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which led to the term “denuclearization” being ensconced in the political lexicon.

Pyongyang, however, pushed ahead with its nuclear weapons program at Yongbyon. The most notorious part of the infrastructure is a five-megawatt reactor, completed in 1986, that produces weapons-grade plutonium. The Clinton administration considered military strikes on the facility in 1994, but it determined the risks of all-out war were too high and opted for diplomacy instead.

The Agreed Framework signed by Washington and Pyongyang that year called for North Korea to halt the reactor and construction of two others, while pursuing follow-on agreements. Diplomacy fell apart in 2002 under the Bush administration when U.S. officials accused North Korea of seeking to enrich uranium. Yongbyon added a new enrichment hall in 2022, according to Middlebury’s analysis, building on other recent expansions to the site. In June, the United Nations noted the suspected construction of yet another centrifuge hall.

Kangson

Secret uranium centrifuge plants and other production facilities have been captured in satellite imagery around the country. Kangson, just outside Pyongyang, is one such location that has undergone recent expansion, according to Middlebury. No outsider had seen the centrifuge hall at Kangson until last September, when Mr. Kim made a high-profile visit to the site ahead of the U.S. presidential election and the government released images of the leader standing between vast rows of the cylindrical devices used to enrich uranium.

Oct. 2024

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Korea

Kangson

Annex for additional cascades built in 2024

200 feet

Source: Image via Planet Labs, analysis by the Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

Opinion | America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran - The New York Times

The Federation of American Scientists, a Washington-based nonprofit, estimated in 2024 that North Korea had produced up to 4,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium and 178 pounds of plutonium. The country can potentially make enough material to build half a dozen new weapons annually.

Emboldened by advancements in weapons production, Mr. Kim first said in 2021 that he would expand his weapons program beyond city-busting hydrogen bombs to start building smaller-yield “tactical” nuclear warheads that are designed to fit on short-range missiles for regional targets. He has since said he’s developed enough of the smaller warheads, which are designed to be mounted on at least eight delivery systems, including a submarine drone.

Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site

After U.S. military forces invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003, North Korea pushed ahead with its missile and nuclear programs. In Pyongyang, the invasion was seen as a grim warning: Mr. Hussein didn’t have the bomb and he lost his power, then, ultimately, his life. North Korea wouldn’t make the same mistake.

Its first nuclear weapon test took place underground in 2006 at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in the country’s mountainous northeast, making North Korea the first and only nation to test a nuclear weapon since all other nations stopped doing so nearly a decade earlier.

The detonation, which was picked up by seismic and radiation sensors around the world, sent the international community in a tailspin. World leaders subsequently persuaded North Korea in 2007 to again agree to shut down a reactor at Yongbyon and invite International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors into the country for verification. It did both, but after diplomatic efforts later collapsed, inspections were no longer allowed and the reactor was restarted.

Sept. 2024

Punggye-ri

North

Korea

Previously destroyed buildings rebuilt since 2022

New entrance to Tunnel 3 built in 2022

500 feet

Source: Image via Planet Labs, analysis by the Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

Opinion | America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran - The New York Times

North Korea has since tested five more devices at the site, and America’s director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, said in March that Mr. Kim was very likely preparing for another one. In 2018, parts of the site were blown up in an apparent show of good faith before a planned summit with Mr. Trump. The summit was canceled, and today, Middlebury analysis shows that North Korea has rebuilt the buildings and a tunnel entrance that were destroyed.

Hamhung

North Korea has built so many short-range missiles that it’s now selling them to Russia for use in Ukraine. All of those missiles are assembled inside a factory in Hamhung, the nation’s second-largest city. Analysts at Middlebury recently spotted two new buildings at the so-called Feb. 11 plant that they believe are being used for missile assembly and worker housing.

Oct. 2024

North

Korea

Hamhung

Missile assembly buildings built in 2022 and 2023

Additional assembly building construction

500 feet

Source: Image via Planet Labs, analysis by the Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

Opinion | America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran - The New York Times

North Korea’s emerging strategic partnership marks one of the biggest opportunities for Pyongyang since the Cold War. For most of North Korea’s existence, China has been its staunchest ally. Beijing sent military forces to fight against the United States in the Korean War, and it has been its strongest trade partner and benefactor.

Last June, Pyongyang signed a mutual defense pact with Russia. Analysts believe Moscow is already providing North Korea with hard-won expertise on missile technology, helping it improve manufacturing practices, produce lightweight composite materials and capture performance data from missiles used on the Ukrainian battlefield. There are even recent reports that Russia is lending its assistance to North Korea’s nuclear submarine program.

Sohae

Although North Korea built and tested missiles under Mr. Kim’s father and grandfather, it wasn’t until the younger Kim took over in 2011 that the program matured after hundreds of tests. Many missile components are tested at Sohae Satellite Launching Station, located alongside the Yellow Sea, about 50 miles from Yongbyon.

The military is now armed with all manner of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic delivery systems and large solid-propellant ICBMs that can be driven on a mobile launcher into a remote area and launched with no warning. Many land in the Sea of Japan, where fishing and shipping lanes separate North Korea and Japan, and some have even flown over parts of Japan.

The missile tests are carried out at a variety of sites across the country, including Sohae, which Middlebury analysis shows has been expanding in recent years.

Mr. Kim’s pace of testing brought Washington and Pyongyang to the brink of war in 2017 during Mr. Trump’s first term, when he threatened to unleash “fire and fury” on North Korea. The heightened tensions ultimately led to a brief détente between the countries, when, for the first time, an American president and a North Korean leader spoke directly.

Three meetings between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim in 2018 and 2019 — as the pair exchanged love letters — that many hoped would slow down North Korea’s nuclear program ended in disappointment due in large part to hasty planning and the United States’ continued insistence on denuclearization. Mr. Kim held back from missile tests in 2018 and launched just a handful in 2020 and 2021, but the pace picked back up in 2022. In the past few years, under the Biden administration, Pyongyang test-fired more missiles than ever before while also revealing an array of new weapons.

Dec. 2024

North

Korea

Sohae

New rocket engine test stand built in 2022

Silo-based ballistic missile test site built in 2023

Vertical test stand rebuilt in 2019

300 feet

Source: Image via Planet Labs, analysis by the Open Source Team at the Middlebury Institute

So what do we know about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? We know that its nuclear program’s infrastructure is vast. We know its weapons work. We know its missiles work. Why wouldn’t the United States negotiate to obtain better insight and open communication channels to help shape Mr. Kim’s choices in a potential crisis?

Pursuing diplomacy with North Korea won’t be universally popular. The regime is far from admirable. It has, among other things, advanced its military capabilities at the expense of its starving and impoverished population. But the looming nuclear threat is now so severe that joint U.S.-South Korea exercises in April involved nuclear weapon effects scenarios. It’s wise that they do, considering U.S. intelligence says North Korea could use a nuclear weapon early in a conflict to make up for its deficit in conventional capabilities.

It makes sense for the Trump administration to shift toward a strategy that aims to contain escalation rather than keep a white-knuckled grip on a failed policy. South Korea bristled when Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth referred to North Korea’s “status as a nuclear power” during the confirmation process on his nomination. It was virtually the same language Mr. Trump offhandedly used when talking to the media. (The White House later walked the comments back.)

But common sense must prevail. No nation armed with an arsenal of this size has ever given it up — other than former Soviet nations, which didn’t control the weapons on their territories. Every president since Bill Clinton has missed an opportunity to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions because of denuclearization’s all-or-nothing approach. Mr. Trump should not allow the shackles of the past to hobble his administration when there are more sensible strategies available to shape a more promising future.

S. Korea's role in a Taiwan crisis on which North might piggyback - Asia Times

With a new president in Seoul, some say Pyongyang’s threat justifies non-involvement in a contingency away from the peninsula

asiatimes.com · by Hanbyeol Sohn · July 2, 2025

This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished here with permission.

The new president of South Korea remains cautious in articulating a position on a potential Taiwan contingency. Still, public and policy discourse within Korea has been active, often gravitating toward a stance of deliberate restraint, arguing that the North Korean threat justifies non-involvement in a different crisis.

Yet this position is riddled with strategic confusion. First, it conflates strategic goals with bargaining positions. Minimizing involvement may be a negotiation tactic, but it should not define a nation’s strategy. Second, it lacks coherence in managing strategic signaling – when to conceal and when to reveal intentions and capabilities. Third, it ignores the risks of strategic miscommunication: warnings meant for adversaries can inadvertently unsettle allies, and domestic political messages can embolden external challengers.

Passive posturing and abstract principles will not suffice. Instead, South Korea must carefully assess the realities it would face during a contingency and map out its strategic options accordingly. This paper explores how South Korea can move from being a silent observer to a strategic enabler in the event of a Taiwan conflict, and what choices and preparations this role would entail.

South Korea’s evolving perception of strategic simultaneity

US planners now treat a dual-front crisis – China over Taiwan, plus North Korea on the peninsula – as a central assumption, not a remote risk. Washington’s 2022 National Defense Strategy elevated “integrated deterrence,” pressing allies to link multiple theaters. For Seoul this means moving beyond a North-Korea-only lens and preparing forces, laws, and public opinion for wider regional contingencies.

Yet, substance lags behind rhetoric. A recent Korea Economic Institute study finds the allies still lack agreed-upon roles, thresholds and command relationships for a Taiwan scenario. The problem is qualitative as much as temporal: Pyongyang leans toward vertical nuclear escalation, while Beijing wields cyber, space and precision-strike tools.

Managing both simultaneously therefore requires new concepts, interoperable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and flexible logistics networks – not just more forces.

The stakes are immediate. In the Guardian Tiger simulation, Chinese strikes on Taiwan coincided with North Korean provocations, forcing US Forces Korea to split attention across two theaters – untenable under current planning.

Because Korean semiconductors, batteries and shipping lanes hinge on cross-Strait stability, neutrality offers no shelter: Bloomberg Economics ranks Korea the world’s second-hardest-hit economy in a blockade scenario.

If Seoul is serious about being a “Global Pivotal State,” it must treat strategic simultaneity not as an added burden but as the price of safeguarding its own prosperity and alliance credibility in an interconnected Indo-Pacific.

Clear objectives, flexible execution

South Korea cannot afford the illusion of neutrality in a Taiwan contingency. Seoul should adopt a phased response that ranges from diplomatic backing and intel-sharing to calibrated base access and limited deployments.

It must also practice strategic signaling, blending public restraint with quiet contingency planning; Guardian Tiger I showed that displaying autonomous strike options while keeping official rhetoric muted can deter Beijing and steady partners.

Finally, Seoul can make a decisive contribution short of direct combat: KEI’s analysis highlights how military bases in Korea would be indispensable for base access and support for coalition ISR, air and maritime protection and logistics even without ROK troops on the front line.

Building on its phased-response plan, Seoul must also prepare for the requests Washington will make if a Taiwan crisis erupts. The United States will seek broad strategic alignment across military, diplomatic, economic and informational fronts – not just battlefield aid.

South Korea can meet this need by setting flexible red lines: internal thresholds that dictate when and how it will step up support, keeping Beijing uncertain while showing domestic audiences that Seoul, not Washington, controls the pace.

CategoryLikely RequestPolicy ConsiderationsDiplomatic SupportPublic statements and joint declarations with the UN, G7, or othersCalibrate language; use backchannel messaging to manage escalation risksIntelligence and Surveillance CooperationEnhanced trilateral intelligence sharing (ROK-US-Japan); emergency intel exchanges during crisisRequires integrated platforms and information-sharing protocolsCyber and Space OperationsJoint cyber defense and offensive coordination; satellite data sharing and space asset cooperationInstitutionalize coordination between cyber commands; establish a joint cyber ops centerHumanitarian and Non-Combat SupportDisaster relief, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); provision of non-military suppliesHigh public support and low legal constraints; caution needed to prevent mission creepAir and Maritime ProtectionSecuring key air and sea lines; naval escort or air interdiction missionsEmphasize a posture of protection and deterrenceBase AccessForward deployment of USAF; support for carrier strike group deploymentEstablish conditional use principlesMRO SupportMRO for US military; civilian-military tech sharingpre-negotiated civilian cooperationLogistics SupportAmmunition, fuel, transport, and maintenance supportDevelop a civilian-military logistics network; coordinate dispersed support with Japan/Philippines/AustraliaRedeployment of USFK AssetsRedeploying ISR and missile defense assets; diversion of USAF squadrons; emergency redeployment of ground forcesAssess trade-offs with North Korea deterrence posture and political constraintsForward Deployment of Strike AssetsHosting long-range strike platforms and surveillance radarRisk of Chinese retaliation; cost of infrastructure and domestic consensus in peacetimeParticipation in Multinational OperationsNaval escort missions, mine clearing, joint fire support; limited participation in multinational operationReduces political risk; requires legal authorizationDeployment of Combat ForcesOverseas deployment of Korean troops and weapon systemsHigh political and public burden; UN resolutions or firm alliance agreements

Washington’s most plausible request will be access to South Korea’s bases. Osan and Gunsan offer hardened runways and fuel; Busan and Jeju can move war stocks and aid at scale, signaling allied resolve and reinforcing integrated deterrence without ROK boots on the ground.

Folding this demand into Seoul’s phased-response playbook and flexible red lines lets Korea meet US needs while retaining political control.

Hosting such operations, however, brings real risks – North Korean opportunism or Chinese retaliation – so Seoul should adopt a “conditional access” principle, for example, barring strikes on the Chinese mainland. Clear boundaries would deter Beijing, reassure allies and keep escalation with Pyongyang in check, allowing South Korea to contribute decisively without strategic overextension.

Solidarity is never automatic

In the climactic scene of the movie “Battleship,” the world comes together to confront an alien threat. It presents a neat narrative: one enemy, one front, one unified response. Reality, however, is far messier. Threats are multifaceted, solidarity is never automatic, and national responses are shaped by diverging interests and internal constraints. A Taiwan contingency will be the ultimate test of such complexity.

South Korea cannot reduce the Taiwan crisis to a simple “intervene or abstain” choice. The peninsula and the strait are tied not just by proximity but by interwoven political, economic, and strategic interests, so turbulence in one will inevitably reverberate in the other. Seoul should recall that its very survival in 1950 hinged on the costly intervention of the United Nations Command – proof that international solidarity can be decisive.

What the ROK-US alliance now needs is detailed internal planning: As the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines shape responses to their own interests, Seoul must shed a North Korea-only mindset. Even without combat troops, enabling allied operations through intelligence, logistics and base access can signal resolve as powerfully as direct intervention. In periods of strategic flux, commitment is measured less by force size than by reliability.

Silent observation is no longer viable; strategic enabling is.

Hanbyeol Sohn PhD (han.b.sohn@gmail.com) serves as a professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU), also embracing a role as the director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). His research areas include nuclear strategy, deterrence and the ROK-US alliance.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Korea National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea or any other affiliated institutions.

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asiatimes.com · by Hanbyeol Sohn · July 2, 2025

4. China sounds out S. Korea on Lee's possible attendance at Sept. military parade: sources

South Korea is a battleground for Chinese and US political warfare (AKA strategic competition).

The fight is on. Will we let emotions guide us or will pragmatic US interests ensure we sustain the strength of the ROK/US alliance (Of course POTROK has a vote in that as well).

(LEAD) China sounds out S. Korea on Lee's possible attendance at Sept. military parade: sources | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 2, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS comments from presidential office in 5th para; RESTRUCTURES)

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, July 2 (Yonhap) -- China has sounded out South Korea about President Lee Jae Myung attending its military parade set for September to mark the 80th anniversary of its victory over Japanese aggression during World War II, diplomatic sources said Wednesday.

Lee's decision, either way, would carry significant diplomatic implications for his administration just weeks into its launch, putting his foreign policy to the test as Seoul increasingly faces the pressure to navigate its path amid the strategic rivalry between China and the United States.

Beijing has put out feelers about Lee coming for the planned event through multiple diplomatic and other channels, with the formal invitation yet to be sent, according to sources with knowledge of the matter.

The apparent move came amid reports that China is also considering inviting U.S. President Donald Trump to the ceremony, scheduled to take place at Tiananmen Square in the Chinese capital on Sept. 3.

The presidential office said in a message to media that it is "in communication" with Beijing regarding Lee's possible attendance, declining to give further details citing diplomatic protocol.

A senior government official in Seoul told Yonhap News Agency earlier that it is "reviewing" Lee's possible attendance.

This file photo, released by China's Xinhua news agency, shows a celebration marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the country in Beijing on Oct. 1, 2019.

Lee, whose oft-expressed pro-China stance has raised eyebrows in Washington, has pledged to pursue diplomacy rooted in the alliance with the United States and to advance trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan since taking office June 4.

If he decides to attend, the move could put him in a delicate position as Lee has not yet met one-on-one with Trump, something every one of his predecessors has done with sitting U.S. presidents in the past.

Lee's office said it is working to arrange a summit between Lee and Trump as soon as both sides are available amid speculation it may take place around the end of this month.

The Lee government has also signaled an intent to manage the ties with China, especially given that it expects Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to be held in South Korea later this year.

Lee's decision will likely take into account former President Park Geun-hye's attendance at the same event in 2015. Park chose to attend despite Washington's displeasure, hoping Beijing would play a constructive role in resolving North Korea's nuclear issue.

However, the move backfired, as Pyongyang conducted its fourth nuclear test and launched long-range missiles the following year. Seoul's decision later to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system on its soil triggered economic retaliation from Beijing.

Another official at the foreign ministry said it is a matter to be looked at "in light of various circumstances."

"There are many factors to take into consideration," he said.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 2, 2025

5. S. Korea, China discuss APEC cooperation, steel structures in Yellow Sea

Beware Chinese Unrestricted Warfare and its three warfares: psychological warfare, legal warfare or lawfare, and public opinion or media warfare. They are playing out before our eyes in South Korea.

(LEAD) S. Korea, China discuss APEC cooperation, steel structures in Yellow Sea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 2, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 5-7)

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, July 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and China have discussed cooperation on the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit here and other pending bilateral issues, likely including Beijing's steel structures in the overlapping maritime zone in the Yellow Sea, Seoul officials said Wednesday.

The working-level dialogue took place Tuesday, led by Kang Young-shin, director general for Northeast and Central Asian affairs at the South Korean foreign ministry, and Liu Jinsong, director general for Asian affairs at China's foreign ministry.

During the talks, the two sides agreed to continue communication at various levels and build on a shared understanding to further develop bilateral relations in light of the APEC summit. China is also due to host next year's APEC gathering.

Kang Young-shin (R), director general for Northeast and Central Asian affairs at the South Korean foreign ministry, poses with Liu Jinsong, director general for Asian affairs at China's foreign ministry, ahead of their talks in Seoul on July 1, 2025, in this photo provided by Seoul's foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

In this vein, they likely discussed the possibility of Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting South Korea for the APEC event, scheduled to be held in the southern city of Gyeongju between late October and early November.

China also reportedly sounded out South Korea about President Lee Jae Myung attending its key military parade slated for September to mark the 80th anniversary of victory over Japanese aggression during World War II.

Beijing is said to have been exploring the possibility of Lee's attendance through diplomatic channels with Seoul.

A Seoul official said it is reviewing the matter, taking into account "various circumstances."

The two officials also exchanged views on "concrete ways to expand cooperation in economic initiatives that can bring tangible benefits" to the peoples of both nations, the foreign ministry said in a press release.

Tuesday's talks also included discussions on issues of mutual interest, including those related to the Yellow Sea and the Korean Peninsula, the ministry said.

South Korea and China have been in a dispute after Beijing built several steel towers in the Provisional Maritime Zone (PMZ), an overlapping sea zone between the two countries.

Seoul has expressed concerns over Beijing's unilateral actions that were not agreed upon in a bilateral agreement on the PMZ signed by the two countries to ensure maritime stability.

Kang and Liu also likely discussed the growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

Early on Wednesday, Liu also met with Deputy Foreign Minister Chung Byung-won as a courtesy call. They discussed continued efforts to advance the strategic cooperation partnership between Seoul and Beijing in a "mature and forward-looking" manner, the ministry said.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 2, 2025

6. N. Korea already using Russia's Pantsir-S1 air-defense system: report

north Korea grows stronger every day while we focus only on the "pacing threat" and fail to disrupt CRInK cooperation, collaboration, and collusion.

N. Korea already using Russia's Pantsir-S1 air-defense system: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · July 2, 2025

SEOUL, July 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has already been using the Pantsir-S1 air defense system provided by Russia to defend the North's capital of Pyongyang, a Ukrainian online newspaper reported Wednesday, citing Kyiv's intelligence chief.

Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR), made the remark in an interview with Hromadske Radio the previous day (local time), according to The Kyiv Independent.

The Pantsir missile system is made up of self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems.

Budanov said the first Pantsir-S1 installations have already been deployed in Pyongyang and are on combat duty. He added that the Russians are retraining North Korean personnel, who will soon be working autonomously on this technology.

The Kyiv Independent described the latest deployment as "another sign that North Korea is improving its weapons technology and military might through cooperation with Russia."

The intelligence chief also noted that Pyongyang is "currently significantly increasing its military power" through direct cooperation with Moscow.

Under a defense agreement signed in June last year, North Korea has provided arms and troops to Moscow in return for training and sophisticated military technology.

Russia has reportedly provided advanced electronic warfare systems to Pyongyang and helped improve its KN-23 ballistic missiles.

This undated file photo, provided by TASS, shows Russia's Pantsir missile system. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · July 2, 2025

7. U.S. seeks to arrest 4 N. Koreans for posing as IT workers to steal company money

U.S. seeks to arrest 4 N. Koreans for posing as IT workers to steal company money | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 2, 2025

SEOUL, July 2 (Yonhap) -- U.S. federal investigators seek to arrest four North Koreans over their alleged involvement in a scheme to steal virtual currency by posing as remote IT workers, the website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showed Wednesday.

The four men -- Kim Kwang-jin, Kang Tae-bok, Jong Pong-ju, and Chang Nam-il -- are wanted for allegedly stealing over $900,000 worth of virtual currency from two companies and laundering the proceeds of those thefts in 2022, according to an FBI notice.

"Using fraudulent names and identification documents, the men allegedly gained employment at two companies as remote IT workers. With these roles, these individuals allegedly abused their access at the companies to steal virtual currency," it said.

Federal arrest warrants were issued for the men on June 24 after they were charged with wire fraud conspiracy, wire fraud, and money laundering conspiracy. The men, aged between 25 and 29, speak English and Korean and have ties to the United Arab Emirates and Laos.

A reward of up to $5 million is being offered for information that leads to the disruption of financial mechanisms of persons engaged in certain activities that support North Korea.

North Korea is known for engaging in illegal cyber activities and cryptocurrency theft as it faces international sanctions due to its nuclear and weapons development programs.

Four North Korean nationals wanted by the FBI for wire fraud and other charges are seen in a wanted poster in this image captured from the FBI's website on July 2, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 2, 2025

8. DOJ announces sweeping crackdown on North Koreans working for over 100 US firms

Kudos to DOJ.

DOJ announces sweeping crackdown on North Koreans working for over 100 US firms

US indicts DPRK workers and arrests American in coordinated actions to cut off funding for Pyongyang’s weapons program

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/doj-announces-sweeping-crackdown-on-north-koreans-working-for-over-100-us-firms/

Shreyas Reddy July 1, 2025

North Koreans using computers at Pyongyang's Sci-Tech Complex | Image: NK News (Oct. 2016)

The U.S. Justice Department has revealed a sweeping operation against North Korean IT workers who raised funds for regime weapons programs through employment at over 100 American companies, announcing the indictment of DPRK nationals, arrest of a U.S. citizen and searches of 29 suspected “laptop farms.”

The series of coordinated actions also saw U.S. authorities seize 29 financial accounts and 21 fraudulent websites as part of the crackdown on illicit networks facilitating Pyongyang’s sanctions evasion, the department said in a press release.

According to court documents released alongside the Justice Department announcement, the DPRK IT professionals used stolen and fake identities to secure remote work with more than 100 U.S. firms, including many Fortune 500 companies.

The scale of the campaign highlights the rapid expansion of Pyongyang’s IT worker schemes, with a U.N. panel estimating last year that the regime uses more than 10,000 skilled professionals worldwide to raise funds for its nuclear and missile development.

On top of generating revenue in violation of international sanctions, these skilled professionals have also been known to exploit their elevated access to steal data from victim companies and extort them for ransom payments.

In the latest campaigns targeted by Washington, the North Koreans worked with numerous partners in the U.S., China, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Taiwan, supporting activities ranging from creating false identities to laundering funds.

After securing jobs under false pretenses, the DPRK IT workers received regular salary payments that would eventually make their way to Pyongyang, but some also exploited their access to employers’ networks to steal virtual currency and sensitive data such as export controlled U.S. military technology.

The Justice Department’s crackdown, carried out alongside law enforcement agencies including the FBI, comes as part of the joint DPRK RevGen: Domestic Enabler Initiative launched last year to disrupt North Korea’s illicit revenue generation activities and their U.S.-based facilitators.

“North Korean IT workers defraud American companies and steal the identities of private citizens, all in support of the North Korean regime,” Assistant Director Brett Leatherman of FBI’s Cyber Division said in Monday’s press release

“Let the actions announced today serve as a warning: If you host laptop farms for the benefit of North Korean actors, law enforcement will be waiting for you,” he added.

CHARGING IT WORKERS

As part of the crackdown on the illicit IT worker schemes, a federal court in Atlanta indicted four North Korean nationals for wire fraud and money laundering linked to the theft of virtual currency worth over $900,000.

According to a court document shared by the Justice Department, Kim Kwang Jin, Kang Tae Bok, Jong Pong Ju and Chang Nam Il used false identities to secure employment at U.S. companies and establish a cryptocurrency laundering network.

The four North Koreans allegedly worked as a co-located team in other countries, including in the UAE, where they perpetrated their fraudulent operations under aliases.

Archive photo of a multi-member North Korean IT worker cell | Image: U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts via U.S. Department of Justice (June 30, 2025)

Using the identity of a Portuguese national known simply as “P.S.,” Kim was employed by an unnamed company to develop source code from about Dec. 2020 to April 2022.

This granted him access to the company’s smart contracts, which are blockchain-based computer scripts that automatically execute agreements, and Kim exploited these privileges to modify the source code for two smart contracts on the Ethereum and Polygon blockchains. He also stole around $740,000 in the form of Elixir, Matic and Start virtual currency tokens from two company pools.

Meanwhile, Jong masqueraded as Malaysian national “Bryan Cho” from about May 2021 to Feb. 2022 to work at another company, from which he stole virtual currency tokens valued at approximately 60 Ether (worth approximately $175,680 at the time).

The two crypto thieves feigned innocence when confronted by their employers, but had already kickstarted the laundering process by passing the funds through cryptocurrency mixers like Tornado Cash, which North Korean cybercriminals often use to conceal the sources of stolen virtual assets.

Jong also convinced his company’s founder to hire his compatriot Chang, who was passing himself off as “Peter Xiao.” Under this alias, Chang worked for the company from about Oct. 2021 to Jan. 2022.

Chang and Kang also opened virtual currency exchange accounts under the fabricated identities of Malaysian nationals “Bong Chee Shen” and “Wong Shao Orm,” respectively, which they used to receive the laundered cryptocurrency tokens.

After the indictment, the FBI announced a reward of up to $5 million under the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program for information about the four wanted North Koreans, who reportedly have ties to the UAE and Laos.

While the remote IT workers targeted U.S. companies, prosecuting and punishing them for their illicit activities remains a challenge as their true whereabouts remain unknown.

Michael Barnhart, the principal insider risk investigator at U.S. cybersecurity firm DTEX, said the Justice Department’s announcement serves as a reminder of the threat that North Korean IT workers’ exploitation of elevated access poses to national security and companies worldwide.

“DPRK actors are increasingly utilizing front companies and trusted third parties to slip past traditional hiring safeguards, including observed instances of those in sensitive sectors like government and the defense industrial base,” he told NK News.

“Organizations must look beyond their applicant portals and reassess trust across their entire talent pipeline because the threat is adapting as we are.”

Photos of the four indicted North Korean IT workers on the FBI’s most wanted list | Image: FBI (July 1, 2025)

TARGETING FACILITATORS

In a separate case, authorities arrested U.S. national Zhenxing “Danny” Wang on charges related to a multi-year IT worker scheme that generated more than $5 million, while a Massachusetts federal court indicted fellow American Kejia “Tony” Wang and their six Chinese and two Taiwanese co-conspirators.

In the course of their operation that lasted from 2021 to late 2024, the group used the identities of more than 80 U.S. persons to help North Korean IT workers obtain remote jobs at over 100 companies, costing the firms at least $3 million in legal fees, computer network remediation costs and other damages.

The North Koreans also allegedly exploited their access to steal sensitive data, including information from a California-based defense firm developing artificial intelligence-powered equipment and technologies.

According to the indictment, the group used Kejia Wang’s two purported software development companies, Hopana Tech and Tony WKJ, and Zhenjing Wang’s firm Independent Lab to facilitate the IT worker operations by receiving laptops from U.S. companies that the North Koreans had deceived and hosting them in a laptop farm at his residence.

The two New Jersey residents allegedly helped the North Koreans remotely access the computers and maintain the pretense that they were operating out of the U.S. by installing unauthorized software. They also received money from the victim companies, most of which they transferred to accounts maintained by their Chinese and Taiwanese partners.

Kejia Wang actively communicated with the North Korean workers and the overseas co-conspirators based in China, Taiwan and the UAE using text-based platforms and email and met some of his partners in Shenyang and Dandong, Chinese cities near the DPRK border.

Dandong-based Jing Bin Huang and two other China-based individuals, Baoyu Zhou and Tong Yuze, allegedly registered accounts with money transfer services and banks to facilitate Pyongyang’s laundering. UAE-based Yongzhe Xu and Ziyou Yuan and another Chinese national residing outside the U.S., Zhenbang Zho, similarly facilitated the schemes by registering money transfer and bank accounts and online infrastructure such as web domains for the Wangs’ companies.

In response to the U.S. actions, China’s foreign ministry reportedly expressed its opposition on Tuesday to “unilateral sanctions” that are not authorized by the U.N. Security Council and pledged to firmly safeguard Chinese citizens’ rights and interests.

However, Washington’s measures do not amount to sanctions, while U.N. restrictions already prohibit Pyongyang’s deployment of workers to other countries to raise foreign currency in support of the North Korean regime’s goals.

The indictment also named two Taiwanese nationals, Mengting Liu and Enchia Liu, as co-conspirators who registered money transfer and bank accounts, and identified five other individuals who supported the scheme by hosting American companies’ laptops and advising Kejia Wang on the required steps.

The Massachusetts case was one of several operations carried out by law enforcement authorities as they targeted laptop farms in 16 states, including the seizure of around 137 laptops from 21 locations in mid-June.

The press release added that federal law enforcement authorities previously recovered more than 70 laptops and remote access devices in Oct. 2024 as part of this investigation, while seizing four web domains linked to the Wangs’ shell companies.

Alongside the Justice Department announcement, the FBI and Defense Criminal Investigative Service seized 17 web domains linked to the DPRK IT worker schemes and 29 financial accounts holding tens of thousands of dollars.

The nationwide crackdown follows several previous actions targeting U.S.-based laptop farms and finance networks under the DPRK RevGen initiative, including the arrests of American nationals, indictments of North Korean IT workers and seizures of website domains.

Dave Yin contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Bryan Betts

Updated at 5:48 p.m. KST on July 1 and at 4:29 p.m. KST on July 2 with Chinese foreign ministry response and details of U.S. reward for information on IT workers

9. Russia training North Korean drone pilots near Wonsan resort, capital: Kyiv

CRInK cooperation.

Russia training North Korean drone pilots near Wonsan resort, capital: Kyiv

Ukraine says specialists learning to operate FPV drones and that DPRK is producing Iranian UAVs with Moscow’s help

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/russia-training-north-korean-drone-pilots-near-wonsan-resort-capital-kyiv/

Anton Sokolin July 2, 2025

North Korean soldiers operating aerial drones during drills overseen by Kim Jong Un at Kangdong in May 2025 | Image: KCNA (May 14, 2025)

Russian instructors are training North Korean drone pilots near the newly opened Wonsan Kalma resort and in Pyongyang, according to Ukrainian intelligence, while assessing that the DPRK has begun local production of Iran’s Shahed attack drones with Moscow’s help.

Andrii Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council, wrote on Telegram on Wednesday that the North Korean specialists are learning to operate first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other attack drones.

Regarding Wonsan, he said the training is taking place near Kalma Airfield, likely referring to the runway for a DPRK air force base next to the massive beach resort. The tourist zone opened to visitors on Tuesday, according to state media, with the first group of Russian travelers set to arrive on July 7.

It’s also possible that Kovalenko was referring to an air club’s runway about 20 km down the coast from the resort. The club is one of many North Korea has built nationwide in recent years, possibly to foster future drone pilots.

Pyongyang’s environs offer ample infrastructure for testing and flying large reconnaissance and attack loitering munitions, as well as FPV drones. These include the Pyongyang Air Club next to a military parade training complex, the Panghyon or Sunchon airbases and a training ground near Kangdong east of the capital.

Some sites where North Korea either tested or could test its drone capabilities near Pyongyang and Wonsan | Image: Google Earth, edited by NK News

Panghyon in the country’s northwest has hosted multiple test flights of drones resembling the U.S. RQ-4B Global Hawk reconnaissance and MQ-9 Reaper attack models. DPRK leader Kim Jong Un last observed drills featuring these types of drones at Sunchon Airbase in May, followed by special forces drills including a tank competition and FPV drone training at Kangdong the same month.

In line with the country’s push to boost UAV capabilities, Kim also oversaw FPV quadcopter strikes and inspected both suicide and reconnaissance drones at Panghyon in March and Pyongyang International Airport last November.

In addition to training support, Kovalenko said Russia has helped North Korea set up infrastructure to produce Geran attack drones, Russia’s version of the Iranian Shahed-136.

Kyrylo Budanov, who heads Kyiv’s military intelligence, explained in an interview on Tuesday that Moscow is not transferring finished Shaheds to North Korea but is providing technology and equipment to establish local production, posing a threat to South Korea.

He previously claimed Russia and the DPRK were in the early stages of cooperation that also involved production of Garpiya long-range attack UAVs.

Notably, North Korea has started construction on two aircraft factories near Panghyon Airbase, possibly related to the production of Saetbyol — U.S. copycat drones — or smaller suicide UAVs.

Meanwhile, Budanov also provided an update on the DPRK’s acquisition of Russia’s Pantsir-S1 air defense system, stating that several units have been deployed on active duty to “guard” Pyongyang.

“The Russians are retraining Korean personnel,” he said. “Soon the North Koreans will be able to operate this equipment independently.”

The comment came shortly after the U.S.-aligned Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team reported in May that Russia has used multiple cargo aircraft to supply Pantsir systems to the DPRK since late 2024. Other alleged deliveries included advanced electronic warfare and jamming equipment.

North Korea launched the Choe Hyon destroyer on the west coast in April featuring what appeared to be a close copy of the Russian Pantsir-ME heavy close-in weapons system.

Ukraine’s latest assessments of Russia-DPRK military cooperation come after state media revealed footage of Kim beside caskets carrying what were presumably the remains of DPRK soldiers killed in Russia’s Kursk, a display likely aimed at highlighting Pyongyang’s sacrifice to secure Moscow’s support beyond the Ukraine war.

Colin Zwirko contributed reporting to this story. Edited by Bryan Betts

10. Chinese citizens marvel at North Korea’s megaresort, and fume at their exclusion

No north Korean love for China.

Chinese citizens marvel at North Korea’s megaresort, and fume at their exclusion

Commenters voice desire to visit Wonsan Kalma amid questions about foreign demand and the return of Chinese tourists

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/chinese-citizens-marvel-at-north-koreas-megaresort-and-fume-at-their-exclusion/

Dave Yin July 2, 2025

Kim Jong Un watches a man go down a waterslide at Wonsan Kalma along with his daughter and wife. | Image: Rodong Sinmun (June 26, 2025)

Chinese citizens have voiced mixed views on North Korea’s new Wonsan Kalma beach resort that opened this week, with online comments ranging from awe at the tourism zone’s scale and expressions of a desire to visit to derision and mockery of the ruling Kim family.

The online response to the resort’s long-delayed opening comes amid questions around when Chinese tourists, historically the largest group of foreign visitors to the DPRK, will be able to return to the country — and whether they will even be interested in trips to Wonsan Kalma if given the opportunity to visit.

Several comments on China’s heavily censored Weibo platform, both in reply to news articles and to posts made by individuals, called official footage of the resort “beautiful” and said that it was “a pity” the venue was not open to the public. The gigantic beachfront resort stretches 3 miles (5 km) and features hundreds of buildings, including 54 hotels, multiple waterparks and other entertainment venues.

A Chinese commentator says that it would be a shame if North Korea’s newly opened Wonsan Kalma resort isn’t open to foreign tourists. | Image: Weibo (July 2, 2025)

Other Chinese commentators were angry that North Korea did not prioritize Chinese travelers, with only Russian tour groups currently scheduled to visit the resort.

“Dedicated to Russian tourists? These sons of bitches have forgotten their roots,” another wrote, in apparent reference to Beijing’s economic or military assistance to Pyongyang.

Still, many asked questions about the legitimacy and logic behind the project, which kicked off in early 2018 before facing construction problems and stalling during the pandemic.

“Where will the cost of maintaining this tourism zone come from? How many tourists can it attract? How long will it take to make back the cost? With such a large investment, why don’t they allocate resources to other infrastructure construction and production infrastructure?” asked one Weibo user.

Another speculated that North Korea had earned the funds to finish the massive resort on “the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield,” referring to the DPRK’s deployment of thousands of troops to Ukraine and sales of weapons to Russia.

“If things go wrong, Chinese tourists will become the main consumer group again,” one commenter stated, without elaborating on potential problems.

Posts on Chinese social media that are deemed sensitive are regularly deleted and the associated accounts suspended or banned, in some cases leading to reports to Chinese authorities, but the comments about Wonsan Kalma suggest Chinese censors allow users to voice a broader range of opinions about the DPRK.

Chinese commentators express anger at North Korea for reserving access to Russian citizens, and point to the apparent lower status of First Lady Ri Sol-ju compared to her daughter. | Image: Weibo (July 2, 2025)

Dozens of comments focused on Ri Sol Ju, the wife of leader Kim Jong Un, with many pointing out that her attendance at the Wonsan Kalma grand opening marked her first appearance in state media in almost a year and a half. During this time, Kim and Ri’s daughter, believed to be named Kim Ju Ae and speculated to be his successor, has appeared alongside the leader at numerous events.

Chinese internet users pointed out that Ri walked several meters behind her daughter, suggesting that the wife had a markedly lower status than her child.

Notably, other Chinese social media users mocked the Kim family, suggesting that the leader and his daughter were splashed while watching a man slide down a water park attraction.

“The general’s chair in the second picture is different from the other two chairs. Are they afraid that the plastic chair cannot support the general’s tall and strong body?” one user said.

“Playing on the water slide in front of [the leader] seems very stressful,” said another.

“If something goes wrong, Chinese tourists will be the main consumer force again,” said one commenter. | Image: Weibo (July 2, 2025)

The Wonsan Kalma resort has an official capacity of 20,000 guests, and its size has fueled speculation about whom it is intended for. While some initially raised the possibility of South Koreans visiting following an inter-Korean detente, others argued that only China could send the volume of tourists needed for the resort to be profitable.

In 2019, prior to the pandemic, hundreds of thousands of Chinese tourists are estimated to have visited the DPRK, but North Korea has only allowed Chinese diplomats, students and select other groups in recent years.

In June, a group of Chinese tour operators reportedly entered the DPRK’s special economic zone of Rason in the northeast, a move that could be aimed at preparing for a broader reopening to Chinese tourists.

The opening of Wonsan Kalma is the latest in a series of tourism-related policy reversals by North Korea. The DPRK first reopened to Russian travelers in Feb. 2024 before allowing foreign tours to the northeastern border city of Rason for less than three weeks.

This was followed by an abrupt shuttering of the city on March 5. While foreigners competed in the Pyongyang marathon the following month, the first edition of the race in five years, the country appeared to reverse course on permitting tourism following the event, possibly due to security concerns.

Edited by Bryan Betts

11. UN envoy says world must not give up on Japanese abductees in North Korea

Human rights upfront always.

UN envoy says world must not give up on Japanese abductees in North Korea

Elizabeth Salmon meets family members of those kidnapped by Pyongyang and stresses need to fight for abductees’ return

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/un-envoy-says-world-must-not-give-up-on-japanese-abductees-in-north-korea/

Shreyas Reddy July 2, 2025

Japanese abductee Megumi Yokota and U.N. Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Salmon | Images: Trump White House via Flickr (May 27, 2019) and U.N. Photo/Eskinder Debebe (Aug. 17, 2023), edited by NK News

The U.N. special envoy for North Korean human rights met with the family members of Japanese nationals kidnapped by the DPRK on Tuesday, reportedly emphasizing that the international community must not “give up” on securing the abductees’ return.

During a meeting with Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Salmon in Tokyo on Tuesday, the abductees’ families called for the U.N. and the U.S. to maintain efforts to ensure the safe return of the Japanese nationals, whom the North Korean regime kidnapped in the 1970s and 1980s to train its spies and provide false identities.

“We have done everything we can and continue to appeal, but after 47 years, we have still not seen anything,” Sakie Yokota, the mother of abductee Megumi Yokota, told reporters after the closed-doors meeting.

Megumi’s brother Takuya Yokota, the head of the Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, stressed that Pyongyang’s “hostage diplomacy and human rights violations” must not be tolerated, and highlighted Salmon’s empathy for the victims and their families.

“She told us that she shares our anger and suffering over our situation. We believe she has gained a very deep understanding,” he said.

“We will continue to fight in the belief that having these kinds of meetings will work against North Korea, which dislikes having human rights issues brought up,” Yokota added.

Addressing their concerns, the U.N. envoy reportedly told the families that “giving up on the victims’ return is not an option.”

Salmon also held talks on Tuesday with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, who also serves as Japan’s minister in charge of the abduction issue.

Ahead of the meeting, Hayashi stressed the importance of resolving the abduction issue, accusing North Korea of infringing Japan’s “national sovereignty” by kidnapping Japanese citizens.

“As the abductees and their families are aging, this is a time-sensitive humanitarian issue that cannot be neglected for even a moment,” he said during a press briefing on Tuesday morning.

Hayashi added that the government has received almost 20 million signatures from citizens so far calling for the resolution of the issue and pledged that the government will “take to heart the feelings contained in each and every signature” as it strives to ensure the victims’ swift return.

The families’ plea to the U.N. special envoy reflects their sense of urgency as the abductees’ relatives grow older, with 89-year-old Sakie Yokota now the sole surviving parent of an abductee. Akihiro Arimoto, the father of abductee Keiko Arimoto, passed away in February.

However, there is no guarantee that the kidnapped Japanese nationals are even alive decades after being taken to the DPRK.

Pyongyang has so far sent back only five of the 17 people Japan officially recognizes as abductees, and claimed after their return in the early 2000s that the others had either died or never entered North Korea in the first place.

Questions also surround the fate of other abductees not formally acknowledged by Tokyo, with the U.N. Commission of Inquiry human rights report assessing in 2014 that Pyongyang may have kidnapped over 100 Japanese citizens.

Nevertheless, the victims’ families have not given up hope that they are alive and will return someday.

“I believe a day will come when all remaining victims come back with smiles,” Sakie Yokota said in February, while calling on the Japanese government to engage with Pyongyang.

Like his predecessors, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has often expressed his willingness to meet Kim Jong Un and ensure the return of the surviving abductees.

However, the North Korean leader’s influential sister Kim Yo Jong declared last year that Pyongyang views the abduction issue as “resolved” and will not entertain any further negotiations with Tokyo.

Edited by Bryan Betts

12. Korean population could drop by 85% in next 100 years: study

Could Korea vanish from the map?

Korean population could drop by 85% in next 100 years: study

koreaherald.com · by Choi Jeong-yoon · July 2, 2025

A street in Myeong-dong, Seoul (Yonhap)

Ratio of 100 working individuals to 30 seniors now could rise to 140 seniors by 2100

South Korea’s population could plummet to just 15 percent of its current level by 2125 if the nation’s ongoing demographic decline continues unabated, according to a private think tank in Seoul on Wednesday.

In its latest long-term forecast, the Korean Peninsula Population Institute for Future used a cohort component method to project Korea’s demographic trends over the next century. This internationally recognized technique estimates future populations by incorporating factors such as birth rates, mortality rates and immigration patterns.

Under the institute’s worst-case scenario, South Korea’s population could drop to 7.53 million by 2125 — a sharp fall from the current 51.68 million. This would be even less than the current population of the city of Seoul alone, which is over 9.3 million.

Even under the most optimistic projection, the population would shrink to 15.73 million, or less than one-third of its current size. The median projection puts the 2125 population at 11.15 million.

The report also highlights the rapidly accelerating pace of population decline. In the median scenario, the population would fall by 30 percent by 2075, and then by more than half over the subsequent 50 years.

This decline is not only due to falling birth rates but also a compounding effect: With fewer people in each successive generation, the pool of potential parents shrinks, further accelerating the decrease.

South Korea’s demographic pyramid, once shaped like a "stingray" with a broad base of younger people, is forecast to morph into a “cobra” shape by 2125, with narrowing bands across all age groups and the population heavily skewed toward older groups.

Population pyramids based on demographic scenarios anticipated in 2050, 2075, 2100 and 2125, from Population Report 2025 (Korean Peninsula Population Institute for Future)

The aging crisis is expected to deepen as well.

In 75 years, the worst forecast is that for every 100 people of working age — defined as 15 to 64 years old — there will be 140 seniors aged 65 or older.

Currently, 100 working-age individuals support around 30 seniors, indicating that South Korea is on track to become an “inverted pyramid” society, where the number of dependents far outnumbers those who provide support.

The report also incorporates a social sentiment analysis based on some 60,000 posts from the workplace community app Blind, focusing on the thoughts of people in their 20s to 40s about marriage and childbirth.

The findings revealed that younger generations now prioritize “money” and “housing” over “love” when discussing marriage. Financial burdens consistently emerged as the dominant concern in the conversations regarding childbirth.

The report concluded that decisions around marriage and parenting are increasingly influenced by economic conditions, rather than personal preference.

The institute proposed a series of urgent policy directions to tackle the crisis, such as expanding support to reduce the burden of childbirth and child-rearing and establishing a practical work-life balance culture. It also emphasized the importance of raising the retirement age and promoting continuous employment while reforming immigration policy.

Above all, the institute stressed the need to restructure the economy around productivity, moving away from a system dependent on demographic growth.

The stark projections underscore the urgent demographic challenge South Korea faces as it grapples with one of the world's lowest birth rates and fastest-aging populations.

As of 2024, South Korea’s total fertility rate — the average number of children a woman is expected to have over her lifetime — has ticked up slightly to 0.75, but it remains well below the replacement level of 2.1.

jychoi@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Choi Jeong-yoon · July 2, 2025

13. Seoul carefully weighs Beijing's invitation to WWII commemoration

Pragmatic diplomacy, kowtow to China, friction in the ROK/US alliance?

Seoul carefully weighs Beijing's invitation to WWII commemoration

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 2, 2025

Invitation tests Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy at sensitive time for Seoul, observers say

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a Cabinet meeting at the presidential office in Seoul on Tuesday. (Yonhap)

Seoul has been carefully weighing whether President Lee Jae Myung will attend China’s Sept. 3 commemoration marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, as Beijing publicly expressed that Lee would be welcome to participate.

Beijing has recently floated the possibility of Lee’s participation through various channels, including not only official diplomatic avenues, but also private meetings involving scholars, according to multiple sources.

An official invitation from the Chinese government has not yet been delivered to the South Korean government, according to government sources.

However, Seoul views Beijing’s continued inquiries about Lee’s willingness to attend — conveyed through diplomatic channels — as effectively constituting a de facto invitation, prompting careful deliberation over its response.

The South Korean presidential office said Wednesday, "Korea and China are communicating regarding whether President Lee Jae Myung will attend China's Sept. 3 Victory Day event marking its 80th anniversary."

"However, it is difficult to disclose the specific details of the discussions held through diplomatic channels," the presidential office said in a statement.

Asked about Beijing’s invitation to President Lee, the Chinese Embassy in Seoul told The Korea Herald, “China welcomes Korea’s participation in this year’s commemorative event."

“When the 70th anniversary ceremony was held, the attendance of the Korean leader at China’s invitation had a positive effect,” the embassy added Wednesday.

The Chinese government has announced plans to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II — observed annually on Sept. 3 — with events including a military parade in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and invitations to foreign leaders.

Seoul and Beijing also discussed Lee’s potential participation in the Sept. 3 celebrations during director general-level talks held in Seoul on Tuesday, The Korea Herald has learned from conversations with government sources.

Kang Young-shin, director general for Northeast and Central Asian affairs at the South Korean Foreign Ministry, met with Liu Jinsong, director general of the Department of Asian Affairs at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, for the talks, the Foreign Ministry in Seoul announced Wednesday.

However, a statement issued by Seoul's Foreign Ministry following the meeting did not mention whether the two sides discussed Lee’s potential attendance at the Sept. 3 commemorations.

“Both the Korean and Chinese sides agreed to continue communication at all levels based on a shared understanding to develop Korea-China relations on the occasion of the APEC Summit in Gyeongju,” the ministry said in a statement.

Echoing the sentiment, the presidential office also underscored that "Korea and China have also been in close communication, based on a shared understanding to advance bilateral relations using APEC as a platform."

The South Korea-hosted Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit will take place in the city of Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, from late October to early November, with China set to host next year’s summit.

Lee formally invited Xi to attend this year’s APEC summit in South Korea during their first phone call in early June. Seoul has high expectations for Xi’s first visit to South Korea since July 2014, on the occasion of the summit.

Then-President Moon Jae-in visited China twice during his term — in December 2017 and December 2019, but Xi did not make a return visit. Seoul views it as the Chinese president’s turn to reciprocate with a visit to South Korea.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is displayed on an outdoor screen as Type 99A2 Chinese battle tanks take part in a parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II, held in front of Tiananmen Gate in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2015. (AP)

Observers note that the invitation, which comes at a diplomatically delicate time for Seoul, is a test of Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy.

“China seeks to achieve a quantum leap in Korea-China relations and to check the United States by reinforcing multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region, through a reciprocal exchange — President Lee Jae Myung’s attendance at the Sept. 3 celebrations in return for President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the Gyeongju APEC Summit,” said Doo Jin-ho, director of the Eurasia Research Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy.

Doo said China regards this year's Victory Day on Sept. 3 and the 2025 APEC Summit in Gyeongju as major political events both domestically and internationally.

“With the launch of the Lee Jae Myung administration, Beijing is seen as having high expectations of better Korea-China ties,” Doo said.

“China’s invitation to the Sept. 3 event — coming before a Korea-US summit has taken place — puts the Lee administration’s pragmatic diplomacy to the test, including its handling of the Korea-US alliance and Seoul’s relations with China and Russia,” he added.

In a previous similar case, then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye attended a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary on Sept. 3, 2015, at Tiananmen Square — becoming the first South Korean president to observe a Chinese military parade.

Park’s presence sparked significant controversy at home over its appropriateness and raised concerns in the US, as most Western leaders — including those from the US, UK, France and Germany — had declined to attend, citing political and historical sensitivities.

dagyumji@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 2, 2025

14. N. Korean rice prices hold at record highs as food shortages worsen

Ae must watch for signs of internal instability. There could be a tipping point.

N. Korean rice prices hold at record highs as food shortages worsen

"With rice prices skyrocketing when nobody can make money in the markets, many people complain they can't put food on the table," a source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - July 2, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korean rice prices hold at record highs as food shortages worsen - Daily NK English

FILE PHOTO: A market official on patrol in Sunchon, South Pyongan province. (The Daily NK)

North Korean rice prices, which broke through 10,000 won per kilogram for the first time in early June, are holding steady at around 12,000 won. However, corn prices have dropped slightly as other grains start appearing in markets.

According to Daily NK’s regular survey of North Korean market prices, rice cost 12,000 won per kilogram in a Pyongyang market on June 22—the same price as two weeks earlier on June 7.

Rice stable, corn falls

Rice prices stayed fairly stable in other regions too. In a Hyesan market in Ryanggang province, rice cost 12,200 won per kilogram on June 22, just 200 won less than on June 7.

Corn prices, however, fell. In Pyongyang and Hyesan, corn cost 4,000 won and 4,100 won per kilogram respectively on June 22—drops of 11.1% and 12.8% from June 7.

The biggest corn price drop was in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, where it cost 3,800 won per kilogram, a 17.4% decrease from two weeks earlier.

Corn prices have fallen noticeably because demand for corn—used as a rice substitute—has dropped slightly with potato and barley harvests beginning.

Cho Chung-hee, director of Good Farmers’ research institute and a North Korea agriculture expert, told Daily NK that corn prices “seem to have dropped a bit as potatoes and wheat start appearing” and that wheat “appears to be reaching markets faster after harvest because grain dryers were distributed this year.”

In previous years, prices for alternative crops typically fell in mid-July because it took time for potatoes and wheat to reach markets even after June harvests. This year, prices dropped earlier.

“Our internal survey found that wheat and barley farming was poor this year,” Cho said. “Good areas harvested about 2.5 tons per 10,000 square meters, while bad areas got about 1.7 tons. At that rate, the total harvest will fall well short of previous years.”

With poor wheat and barley harvests this year, their effect on market grain prices may be short-lived.

Growing food shortages

Food shortages for North Koreans have gotten noticeably worse recently.

“With rice prices skyrocketing when nobody can make money in the markets, many people complain they can’t put food on the table,” a source in Ryanggang province said. “People who can make some money eat rice mixed with corn, but many families can’t even afford that.”

“Elderly households with no income are starving,” the source said. “People say at times like this, they wish the state would provide at least some food rations.”

Even grain merchants are complaining. Market taxes have increased recently, and merchants have seen their business drop significantly as authorities tighten market controls.

According to the source, one market grain merchant complained that “people blame rice merchants completely when food prices go up, treating them like criminals, but that’s not why rice prices rise.” The merchant added that it was “really unfair to stop rice merchants from making money when even the state can’t stabilize food prices.”

Meanwhile, the market exchange rate between North Korean won and U.S. dollars—which shot up to over 20,000 won in early June—dropped slightly in the latest survey, while the won-Chinese yuan rate increased somewhat.

Since neither the dollar nor yuan changed much, import prices stayed roughly the same. In a Pyongyang market on June 22, gasoline and diesel cost 24,300 won and 22,400 won per kilogram respectively—increases of 0.8% and 1.8% from two weeks earlier.

Read in Korean

Seulkee Jang

Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters and covers North Korean economic and diplomatic issues, including workers dispatched abroad. Jang has a M.A. in Sociology from University of North Korean Studies and a B.A. in Sociology from Yonsei University. She can be reached at skjang(at)uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

15. N. Koreans grow tired of potato-heavy diet

N. Koreans grow tired of potato-heavy diet

Most of this year's wheat and barley harvest has been collected by authorities and sent to food processing facilities at both local and national levels

By Seon Hwa - July 2, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Koreans grow tired of potato-heavy diet - Daily NK English

North Korean farmers harvesting potatoes in Ryanggang province. (Rodong Sinmun)

While the summer harvest brings relief from wondering where the next meal will come from, many North Koreans have grown tired of eating mostly potatoes.

A source in South Pyongan province told Daily NK recently that wheat and barley harvests are nearly finished, and potato harvesting is now underway on farms across the province.

North Korea’s potato harvest brings much-needed relief every June. With food shortages common in rural areas, many people feel lucky just to have potatoes to eat. But there’s also growing frustration with potatoes showing up in nearly every meal.

“Often, you’ll see potatoes in all three meals of the day – rice with potatoes, potato soup, and potatoes as a side dish. Kids get sick of potatoes, and adults want to complain too, though they usually just eat them anyway since they know they shouldn’t grumble about having food at all,” the source said.

“It’s mostly potatoes at my house too. Even the snacks given to people working in the fields are usually steamed potatoes, so farmers joke about getting gassy from eating so many potatoes. That’s their polite way of showing they’re fed up. Some people try to cheer others up by saying potatoes are better than going hungry.”

Meanwhile, most of this year’s wheat and barley harvest has been collected by authorities and sent to food processing facilities at both local and national levels.

Some farms do share part of their crops with local residents. In the village of Komsan in Sukchon county, South Pyongan province, each person reportedly received 20 kilograms of mixed wheat and barley.

People grind up the grain and mix it with potatoes to stretch their food supply. Most rural families have to survive on wheat, barley and potatoes until the corn harvest comes in, the source explained.

“We cycle through different main foods throughout the year. People still have to eat whatever crop is available, just like they did long ago. Life in the countryside is still a real struggle,” the source said.

Read in Korean

Seon Hwa

Seon Hwa is one of Daily NK's full-time journalists. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

16. N. Korean shipyard workers forced into unpaid overtime

This is the Social Workers' Paradise.

N. Korean shipyard workers forced into unpaid overtime

"Sinpo Shipyard workers can't leave on time anymore and have to stay an extra hour or two every day doing busy work...," a source told Daily NK

By Eun Seol - July 2, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korean shipyard workers forced into unpaid overtime - Daily NK English

A ship docked at Nampo Port. (Wikimedia Commons)

Workers at Sinpo Shipyard have been forced to work unpaid overtime to “boost their sense of responsibility.” This follows North Korea’s failed destroyer launch at Chongjin Shipyard and the arrest of several people blamed for the disaster.

Workers are complaining that the new policy is unnecessary and hurts their ability to make a living.

According to a Daily NK source in South Hamgyong province, Sinpo Shipyard’s party committee held an internal meeting where they told workers to “boost their sense of responsibility” to prevent incidents like the failed destroyer launch. They called the accident at Chongjin Shipyard “a shame on shipyard workers everywhere.”

The shipyard’s party committee ordered mandatory overtime for all work teams and required workers to carefully document their daily activities in journals.

“Going home right after work shows you lack revolutionary spirit,” officials said, ordering party cell secretaries to report on workers’ attitudes, what time they leave, and whether they skip work without permission.

“Sinpo Shipyard workers can’t leave on time anymore and have to stay an extra hour or two every day doing busy work, but they don’t get paid for the overtime and don’t get extra food rations,” the source said. “Officials demand that workers look busy even when there’s nothing to do, which is making everyone more frustrated.”

“We usually kill time during regular hours doing odd jobs since there’s no real work anyway, and now officials watch us to make sure we stay late,” one Sinpo Shipyard worker said. “It would be fine if there was actual work to do, but I feel awful having to pretend I’m busy just to avoid getting in trouble for leaving when there’s nothing to do.”

Complaining all around

Workers are especially angry about the forced overtime because it directly hurts their families’ income.

“Everyone’s complaining that they need to help their wives at the market after work, but now they can’t because of the extended hours. Many people are saying workers are suffering just so the party committee can impress their bosses,” the source said.

In other words, workers who can barely survive on what their wives earn at markets—since shipyard salaries aren’t enough—are openly complaining about overtime policies designed mainly to make party officials look good.

“The problems at Chongjin Shipyard happened because of technical failures under terrible working conditions, and blaming workers for not being responsible or loyal enough is wrong,” some workers reportedly say. “You can’t weld properly just because you’re patriotic.”

Read in Korean

Eun Seol

Eun Seol is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

N. Korean shipyard workers forced into unpaid overtime - Daily NK English

A ship docked at Nampo Port. (Wikimedia Commons)

Workers at Sinpo Shipyard have been forced to work unpaid overtime to “boost their sense of responsibility.” This follows North Korea’s failed destroyer launch at Chongjin Shipyard and the arrest of several people blamed for the disaster.

Workers are complaining that the new policy is unnecessary and hurts their ability to make a living.

According to a Daily NK source in South Hamgyong province, Sinpo Shipyard’s party committee held an internal meeting where they told workers to “boost their sense of responsibility” to prevent incidents like the failed destroyer launch. They called the accident at Chongjin Shipyard “a shame on shipyard workers everywhere.”

The shipyard’s party committee ordered mandatory overtime for all work teams and required workers to carefully document their daily activities in journals.

“Going home right after work shows you lack revolutionary spirit,” officials said, ordering party cell secretaries to report on workers’ attitudes, what time they leave, and whether they skip work without permission.

“Sinpo Shipyard workers can’t leave on time anymore and have to stay an extra hour or two every day doing busy work, but they don’t get paid for the overtime and don’t get extra food rations,” the source said. “Officials demand that workers look busy even when there’s nothing to do, which is making everyone more frustrated.”

“We usually kill time during regular hours doing odd jobs since there’s no real work anyway, and now officials watch us to make sure we stay late,” one Sinpo Shipyard worker said. “It would be fine if there was actual work to do, but I feel awful having to pretend I’m busy just to avoid getting in trouble for leaving when there’s nothing to do.”

Complaining all around

Workers are especially angry about the forced overtime because it directly hurts their families’ income.

“Everyone’s complaining that they need to help their wives at the market after work, but now they can’t because of the extended hours. Many people are saying workers are suffering just so the party committee can impress their bosses,” the source said.

In other words, workers who can barely survive on what their wives earn at markets—since shipyard salaries aren’t enough—are openly complaining about overtime policies designed mainly to make party officials look good.

“The problems at Chongjin Shipyard happened because of technical failures under terrible working conditions, and blaming workers for not being responsible or loyal enough is wrong,” some workers reportedly say. “You can’t weld properly just because you’re patriotic.”

Read in Korean

Eun Seol

Eun Seol is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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