Quotes of the Day:

"History will be kind to me for I intend to write it." 

– Winston Churchill

"Those who won our independence believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty." 

– Louis D. Brandeis

"The third-rate mind is only happy when it is thinking with the majority. The second-rate mind is only happy when it is thinking with the minority. The first-rate mind is only happy when it is thinking." 

– A. A. Milne

1. S. Korea blares propaganda broadcasts for 4th day; N. Korea sends trash-carrying balloons

2. Will propaganda speakers stop North Korea from sending trash balloons?

3. Alliance, deterrence and nuclear capabilities

4. The presidential office considers inspection and reprimand of NIS officials

5. Korea logs record US trade surplus in 1st half amid surging Trump risks

6. Mongolia forum proposes engagement with North Korea through tree planting

7. An F-16 Super Squadron is Being Formed Right in North Korea’s Backyard

8. Experts discuss effects of indictment of former CIA analyst as South Korea secret agent

9. Developments of North Korea’s Land-based Air Defense Systems

1. S. Korea blares propaganda broadcasts for 4th day; N. Korea sends trash-carrying balloons

Seeking to become the new normal?

(LEAD) S. Korea blares propaganda broadcasts for 4th day; N. Korea sends trash-carrying balloons | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 21, 2024

(ATTN: RECASTS throughout with details; CHANGES headline)

SEOUL, July 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's military blared anti-Pyongyang broadcasts through its border loudspeakers for the fourth straight day Sunday as North Korea has again launched balloons presumed to be carrying trash toward South Korea.

The propaganda broadcasts began at 6 a.m. near the border with North Korea and are set to end 10 p.m., the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said.

The JCS said North Korea's latest balloons appeared to be traveling toward the northern part of Gyeonggi Province that surrounds Seoul and advised the public not to touch fallen balloons and to report them to the military or police.

With the latest launch, North Korea has sent more than 2,000 trash-filled balloons into the South over nine occasions in retaliation for anti-Pyongyang leaflets that North Korean defectors in South Korea send to North Korea using balloons.

South Korea blared anti-Pyongyang broadcasts through its border loudspeakers on June 9 for the first time in six years. But it switched off the loudspeakers the next day in an apparent bid to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control.

On Thursday, South Korea restarted propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea in response to the North's repeated launch of trash-filled balloons into the South.

North Korea has bristled against the loudspeaker campaigns, as well as anti-Pyongyang leaflets, on fears that an influx of outside information could pose a threat to the Kim Jong-un regime.

Kim's powerful sister Kim Jong-un warned last week that South Korea will face "gruesome and dear" consequences if it lets North Korean defectors continue to send anti-Pyongyang leaflets to the North.

One of the hundreds of trash-filled balloons flown by North Korea overnight is found in a rice paddy in the northwestern border county of Ganghwa on June 10, 2024. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 21, 2024

2. Will propaganda speakers stop North Korea from sending trash balloons?

That should not be the intent of the broadcasts. There should not be a tit-for-tat. The intent must be to provide information to the frontline soldiers.

Will propaganda speakers stop North Korea from sending trash balloons?

The Korea Times · July 21, 2024

South Korean soldiers inspect loudspeakers before installing them near the inter-Korean border, in this photo released June 9. Courtesy of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Seoul operates loudspeakers at full scale in response to 9th batch of balloons from Pyongyang

By Lee Hyo-jin

North Korea launched another flotilla of trash-filled balloons toward South Korea, Sunday, just three days after Seoul resumed daily propaganda broadcasts along the border in a tit-for-tat move to counter Pyongyang’s balloon offensive on Thursday.

This latest launch marks the North’s ninth "balloon offensive" since the first one in late May. In response, the South's military has fully implemented its loudspeaker broadcasts along the DMZ starting Sunday afternoon.

Observers say that the South Korean government seems to be caught in a chicken-or-egg dilemma, highlighting the need for more effective measures to address the intensifying cross-border psychological warfare.

In a text message sent to reporters around 9:15 a.m., the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said that the balloons appeared to be heading toward northern Gyeonggi Province.

The military detected around 360 balloons in the air, with approximately 100 falling within South Korea's territory, mostly in Seoul and the surrounding Gyeonggi Province.

“We will respond firmly to these balloons using the loudspeakers currently in operation,” a JCS official told The Korea Times shortly after the balloons were spotted.

Later in the day, the JCS announced that it would operate all fixed loudspeakers across the border regions simultaneously from 1 p.m.

Since last Thursday, the military has been operating several fixed speakers , deployed along the western, central and eastern sections of the DMZ, with broadcasts differing by region and time.

From now on, the speakers will be turned on in all border regions at the same time each day until the North halts its balloon launches, a military official said.

These broadcasts include K-pop songs and news critical of the North Korean regime, such as the defection of North Korean diplomats to the South. High-powered speakers reportedly have a listening range of 10 to 30 kilometers, depending on the equipment and time of day.

A balloon carrying garbage sent by North Korea is seen in Jeongseon, Gangwon Province, June 10. Yonhap

With its ninth balloon offensive, Pyongyang has now launched over 2,000 trash-filled balloons since May 28, according to the JCS. These balloons have primarily contained wastepaper and cigarette butts, with earlier ones even including manure. No hazardous materials have been reported.

Sunday’s launch occurred in the morning, deviating from the usual late-night timing of previous launches. The reason for this change is unclear, but some speculate it could be due to wind patterns or weather conditions during the monsoon season affecting the Korean Peninsula.

The North Korean regime argues that the trash balloons are a tit-for-tat response to South Korea-based activists releasing anti-Pyongyang leaflets and USB drives containing K-pop and trot music into North Korea.

Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, described the situation as a "chicken or the egg" problem.

“The North claims their balloons are in retaliation for South Korea’s propaganda leaflets, while the South Korean military argues that the loudspeakers are a response to these balloon launches. It’s a repeating cycle for the last two months,” Yang said.

However, Yang questioned the effectiveness of the loudspeakers, noting that they have not deterred the North from sending the trash balloons.

"Rather, the speakers might provoke further military provocations from Pyongyang, putting residents near the border in harm's way," the expert said, noting that Pyongyang reacted angrily to the loudspeaker broadcasts in August 2015 by firing artillery shots toward the South.

The Kim regime has warned of "new forms of retaliation" in response to the anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets.

“If 'South Korean trash' persists in their petty and dirty actions, we will inevitably have to change our response methods," Kim Yo-jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, said in a statement released on July 16.

Yang speculated that new forms of retaliation from the North could include disrupting major airports with trash-laden balloons, GPS jamming or cyberattacks on government systems.

Wastepaper from balloons launched by North Korea is scattered on a road in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, Sunday. Courtesy of Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Korea Times · July 21, 2024

3. Alliance, deterrence and nuclear capabilities

This does not answer the key questions:

What deters Kim Jong Un?

Will nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula (either the South's or the US') contribute to deterring north Korea in any significant way more than the current extended deterrence?

What is the ROK concept of employment for nuclear weapons if it develops them? (necessary for contributing to deterrence)

What targets in north Korea require nuclear weapons?

Alliance, deterrence and nuclear capabilities

The Korea Times · July 21, 2024

By Chun In-bum

Chun In-bum

South Korea is a dynamic and fast-paced society. Anyone who doubts this need only look at Korean politics and its often turbulent nature. One issue currently dominating Korean politics is the debate over an indigenous nuclear deterrent for South Korea. Major political leaders from the ruling party have convened at the National Assembly to advocate for either a nuclear-armed South Korea or enhanced nuclear weapons capability.

Polls reveal conflicting data concerning South Korean society's perceptions about homegrown nuclear weapons. One poll found that only 15 percent of Korean "experts" were in favor of a nuclear-armed South Korea, while most public polls show more than 70 percent and even 90 percent support among educated groups. Regardless of these figures, it is evident that Koreans are deeply concerned.

American experts and some South Koreans argue that distrust in the United States and its extended deterrence is the key reason behind the push for a homegrown nuclear capability. However, a more fundamental reason is the pervasive uncertainty in today's global landscape. Despite efforts by the U.S. Joe Biden and South Korea's Yoon administrations, including advancements in the Nuclear Consultative Group and the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group Framework signed Friday, uncertainties remain, stemming not only from North Korea but also from broader international affairs.

In pursuing its case for an indigenous nuclear capability, South Korea must carefully articulate its case. First, it must make it clear that it does not intend to abandon the ROK-U.S. alliance for nuclear weapons. This is crucial in the choice of words and logic. For instance, the ruling party's movement advocating for nuclear latency named itself the Mugunghwa (Rose of Sharon) Forum. While the Rose of Sharon is Korea's national flower and the name of a clandestine 1970s nuclear weapons project, this association may send the wrong signal internationally. Many advocates of South Korean nuclear weapons are dangerously close to presenting themselves as willing to abandon the ROK-U.S. alliance or pursue an independent capability. No nation can defend itself alone.

Second, South Korea has legitimate reasons for recycling nuclear fuel. The country has built numerous nuclear plants since the Kori plant in Busan began operations in 1978. With five sites and 26 reactors, nuclear energy accounted for 29.6 percent of South Korea's power mix in 2022. However, nuclear waste management remains a significant challenge. Producing approximately 600 metric tons of nuclear waste annually, South Korea lacks a long-term disposal solution. Reprocessing used nuclear fuel will offer economic benefits and a waste solution but also opens the door to weaponization.

Third, while the Non-Proliferation Treaty has provided many benefits, it failed to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state. The North Korean nuclear threat is not the sole cause of Korean concern but a final tipping point. The main worry stems from South Korea's geopolitical relations with mainland Asia and emerging international political challenges.

Finally, South Korea is a reliable U.S. ally, consistently demonstrating its commitment to the partnership through combat in Korea and Vietnam as well as Iraq and Afghanistan and various joint military exercises, diplomatic cooperation and economic ties. Any military or nuclear capability developed by South Korea should be viewed as an extension of U.S. deterrence, similar to the strategic dynamics observed with NATO and France, where allied nuclear forces complement the broader deterrent umbrella provided by the United States. Assisting South Korea in enhancing its deterrent capability could also bring transparency to its nuclear ambitions, fostering greater international trust. This collaboration would involve rigorous safety protocols and joint oversight, ensuring that any advancements are in line with global non-proliferation norms. Moreover, such assistance could facilitate the sharing of best practices and advanced technologies, thereby improving the overall safety and security of South Korea's nuclear infrastructure. By reinforcing South Korea's defense posture in this manner, the U.S. would not only strengthen a key alliance but also contribute to regional stability and deter potential adversaries through a united front.

For Koreans, the question is not merely whether South Korea should possess nuclear weapons but also how to maintain the ROK-U.S. alliance while securing nuclear capabilities. Simultaneously, South Koreans must recognize that nuclear weapons will not address all security concerns and understand the significant responsibility that comes with such capabilities. It is crucial to approach this issue with a balanced perspective, acknowledging the strategic benefits and potential risks. Transparent communication and collaboration with international partners will be vital in ensuring that South Korea's actions are not misinterpreted and that global non-proliferation norms are upheld. By doing so, South Korea can enhance its security while contributing to regional and global stability. Ultimately, the pursuit of a nuclear deterrent must be carefully weighed against the broader goals of peace, stability, and the enduring strength of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This careful consideration will help ensure that South Korea's actions align with its long-term national interests and the collective security framework of the region.

Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.

The Korea Times · July 21, 2024

4. The presidential office considers inspection and reprimand of NIS officials

The presidential office considers inspection and reprimand of NIS officials

donga.com

Posted July. 19, 2024 07:45,

Updated July. 19, 2024 07:45

The presidential office considers inspection and reprimand of NIS officials. July. 19, 2024 07:45. by Na-Ri Shin journari@donga.com.

In response to the exposure of the intelligence activities of a National Intelligence Service agent who contacted Korean-American North Korea expert Sue Mi Terry, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the presidential office said it would consider inspecting and reprimanding those involved, calling it “something that happened during the previous Moon administration.”

A presidential office senior official met with reporters the same day. When asked if there was any government-wide inspection or reprimandation for issues such as the exposure of NIS agents, the official said, “The photo was taken during the previous Moon Jae-in administration. So, we are in a situation where we are inspecting and reprimanding actions taken by the Moon administration. It's a good point, and we'll look into it.” The official added, “I think this all happened because after the Moon Jae-in government took power at the time, it removed all the agents capable of professional outside activities from the NIS and replaced them with amateurs.”

Within a day, the presidential office's quick reference to past government accountability appears to emphasize that the alleged bribery involving Researcher Terry, as noted in the arraignment notice, is unrelated to the current Yoon administration. The presidential office emphasizes that the expensive gifts, including luxury coats and purses, were given to Terry from 2019 to 2021 before the current government took office.

In response, Rep. Park Jie-won of the Democratic Party of Korea, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Service under the Moon Jae-in administration, said, “For the presidential office to take the initiative and escalate the issue by talking about ‘inspection and reprimand of Moon Jae-in's NIS’ is the worst solution that does not serve the national interest. Park added, “The government should closely analyze why U.S. prosecutors indicted activities that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned Terry about ten years ago during the Park Geun-hye administration, and whether our intelligence agencies and government were aware of and responded to the indictment in advance.”

한국어

donga.com

5. Korea logs record US trade surplus in 1st half amid surging Trump risks

Korea logs record US trade surplus in 1st half amid surging Trump risks

koreaherald.com · by Kan Hyeong-woo · July 21, 2024

Trump vows to ‘end EV mandate’; Hyundai Motor braces for impact with hybrid options

By Kan Hyeong-woo

Published : July 21, 2024 - 15:19

Vehicles for export are lined up at the Hyundai Motor Group’s Ulsan plant. (Hyundai Motor Group)

South Korea logged an all-time high trade surplus with the United States in the first half of this year based on strong auto exports, as the country monitors the US presidential race carefully and the chances of a second Donald Trump administration’s heavy protectionism.

According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and Korea International Trade Association on Sunday, Korea posted a record US trade surplus of $28.7 billion from January to June this year, up 55.1 percent from the same period last year. The US trade surplus exceeded Korea’s overall trade surplus of $23.1 billion in the first half of 2024.

Korea’s trade balance with the US has been in the black and on the rise in recent years, recording trade surpluses of $11.4 billion in 2019, $16.6 billion in 2020, $22.7 billion in 2021, $28 billion in 2022 and $44.4 billion in 2023. The US became the country with the largest trade surplus for Korea last year, overtaking China for the first time in about 20 years.

For Korea’s record trade surplus with the US in the first half of this year, the automotive sector was the leading factor, as it recorded $19 billion in exports to the US, up 28.9 percent on year. The semiconductor sector came second at $4.5 billion, followed by automotive parts with $4.1 billion, oil products with $2.7 billion, computers with $1.8 billion and batteries with $1.6 billion.

The growth in Korea’s US trade surplus is attributed to various factors, including the upgraded competitiveness of leading exports such as vehicles, the realignment of supply chains due to the trade war between the US and China and the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act aimed at bolstering domestic supply chains and boosting clean energy.

Although Korea has enjoyed upbeat numbers in US exports, Trump’s "America First" policies pose a grim and murky outlook for Korean businesses, as the former US president has proposed a new 10 percent universal tariff on all imports. Trump’s camp pointed to vehicles and auto parts made in Korea, Japan, Europe, Mexico and Canada as factors for the US trade deficit.

According to the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy’s analysis, if Korea is slapped with 10 percent universal tariffs, Korea's exports to the US are forecast to decrease by approximately $15.2 billion, while exports to other countries are projected to decrease by about $7 billion due to indirect effects.

Republican presidential candidate and former US president Donald Trump holds up a fist after speaking at a campaign rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Saturday. (AP-Yonhap)

Trump pledged to bolster the theme of made-in-America for the auto industry in his presidential candidate nomination acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee on Thursday.

“We have long been taken advantage of by other countries. And think of it, oftentimes these other countries are considered so-called allies. They’ve taken advantage of us for years,” he said without mentioning any names.

“The way they will sell their product in America is to build it in America, very simple. Build it in America and only in America. This very simple formula will create massive numbers of jobs. We will take over the auto industry again.”

Hyundai Motor Group, the world’s third-largest automaker, is bracing for the uncertainties of a second Trump administration, as the Korean auto conglomerate will look to cope with Trump’s anti-electric-vehicle stance.

Trump said he will “end the electric vehicle mandate on Day 1” to save the US auto industry from “complete obliteration,” vowing to scrap the Biden administration’s target of having 50 percent of all new car sales electric in 2030.

Hyundai Motor Group’s three brands — Hyundai Motor, Kia and Genesis — combined for over 37,000 EVs sold in the US in the second quarter of this year, making it the second-largest EV seller behind Tesla.

The Korean automaker will look to utilize Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America, a new auto manufacturing site being built in Georgia, to add flexibility in terms of local production. Despite the initial plan to use HMGMA as an EV-only factory, the company later revised the strategy to assemble hybrid vehicles there. HMGMA is expected to begin operation in the fourth quarter of this year.

“(The possibility of a second Trump term) removing EV incentives and the slowing EV growth will temporarily drag down the usefulness of (HMGMA) under construction, but such a setback could be redeemed by expanding the proportion of local production as Trump replaces (the existing government subsidies) with ‘Buy American’ incentives,” said Song Sun-jae, an analyst at Hana Securities.

“(Hyundai Motor) has enough capability for short- to mid-term responses through mixed production (that can roll out both hybrid vehicles and EVs).”

koreaherald.com · by Kan Hyeong-woo · July 21, 2024

6. Mongolia forum proposes engagement with North Korea through tree planting

I planted a tree in Mongolia this year (and last year as well).

​

​

Mongolia forum proposes engagement with North Korea through tree planting - UPI.com

By Michael Marshall

upi.com

July 19 (UPI) -- Participants at a recent conference in Mongolia to address inter-Korean issues and the regional desertification crisis have proposed tree planting as a way to address both issues.

Mongolia already has a One Billion Trees National Campaign in progress and will host an international conference on combating desertification in 2426. Companies and organizations have pledged to plant more than 600 million trees by 2430.

The Gobi desert, which straddles the China-Mongolia border, has been expanding, absorbing agricultural areas and grasslands. This has generated more-intense dust storms that have affected the Korean peninsula and even Japan.

North Korea also has suffered extensive deforestation as a result of poor agricultural practices. This has resulted in topsoil erosion and landslides, further reducing agricultural production. The government wants to reverse this trend and sent a delegation to the U.N. Environmental Assembly in Nairobi last February, a rarity for North Korea.

The conference participants viewed environmental cooperation as a potential path to open engagement with tightly controlled North Korea. They were attending the 6th Mongolia Forum on Northeast Asia Peaceful Development and Korean Unification. Policy experts, environmentalists, civil society leaders, diplomats and legislators took part from Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and America, as well as from the host country.

Former president of Mongolia, Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat, noted the growing tensions across Northeast Asia, saying that a "Cold War atmosphere and partisanship are spreading and the relations between the two Koreas are becoming more and more confrontational."

He said that Mongolia and its civil society organizations are working closely with similar organizations throughout the region and from the United States to promote greater regional cooperation in a variety of fields, including trade, transport, communications and the environment.

Mongolia has diplomatic relations with both Koreas and shares with North Korea the experience of adapting to life after the end of the Soviet Union and of the subsidies it provided. Mongolia's choice for political democracy and a free market economy represents an alternative model to that chosen by North Korea.

The forum was co-sponsored by Mongolia's Blue Banner NGO that promotes nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful dialogue, the Global Peace Foundation, and Action for Korea United, the largest Korean civil society group working for Korean reunification. The founder and chairman of GPF is Dr. Preston Moon, who also is chairman of UCI, which owns UPI's parent company.

upi.com

7. An F-16 Super Squadron is Being Formed Right in North Korea’s Backyard

An F-16 Super Squadron is Being Formed Right in North Korea’s Backyard

The Seventh Air Force in South Korea is enhancing its F-16 Fighting Falcon force at Osan Air Base by adding nine aircraft from Kunsan Air Base, creating a "Super Squadron" with 31 F-16s.

nationalinterest.org

An F-16 Super Squadron is Being Formed Right in North Korea’s Backyard | The National Interest

July 20, 2024 Topic: Security Region: Asia Blog Brand: The Buzz

by Peter Suciu Follow PeterSuciu on Twitter L

Summary and Key Points: The Seventh Air Force in South Korea is enhancing its F-16 Fighting Falcon force at Osan Air Base by adding nine aircraft from Kunsan Air Base, creating a “Super Squadron” with 31 F-16s.

-This temporary one-year shift aims to test and optimize combat capability, increase readiness, and evaluate the impact on sortie generation, maintenance, manpower, and logistics.

-This move is likely in response to potential threats from North Korea and China. Alongside the aircraft, 150 aircrew and support personnel will transfer to Osan. Kunsan AB will retain 13 F-16s, continuing routine training to maintain ROK-U.S. combined readiness.

Here Comes the F-16 Super Squad

Bigger isn’t always better – but then again, sometimes it most certainly is! That is the case made this week by the Seventh Air Force, headquartered at Osan Air Base, South Korea, as it announced it will supersize its F-16 force.

On Thursday, the Seventh Air Force – which continues to play a central role in American military presence as a component of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) – began the initial aircraft and personnel movements that will “temporarily shift” the placement of United States Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons on the Korean peninsula. This is being conducted to test the optimized combat capability while increasing readiness. Though not specifically stated, it is almost certainly to address potential regional threats from North Korea and China, while serving to bolster the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

In the coming weeks, the 36th Fighter Squadron at Osan Air Base will receive nine F-16 Fighting Falcons from the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base. That will increase the strength of the 36th FS to 31, and create what the Seventh Air Force has described as a “Super Squadron.” Though deemed temporary, this development will last for a year, during which time it will allow for evaluations to determine the “impact on sortie generation, maintenance, manpower, and logistic requirements,” while its ultimate goal is to determine maximized combat effectiveness.

“This test is an opportunity for us to see if squadrons of this size increase our training effectiveness while also increasing our combat capability if deterrence fails,” stated Lt. Gen. David. R. Iverson, Seventh AF commander and U.S. Forces Korea deputy commander.

“While we execute this test, we understand these changes may present some challenges for our Airmen and Families,” Iverson added. “We are working to mitigate those impacts while also increasing our readiness and war fighting capability.”

More Than Fighters on the Move

In addition to the nine Fighting Falcons, around 150 aircrew and combat support personnel will also be transferred to Osan Air Base.

The bases are about 105 miles apart, with Kunsan AB located on the southwest coast of South Korea, about 110 miles south of Seoul, while Osan AB is about 40 miles south of the Republic of Korea’s capital. The latter base is also the headquarters of the Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) Operations Command, and it is the arrival point for U.S. government-contracted “Patriot Express” flights that bring U.S. service members as well as their families to South Korea from the United States and Japan.

Kunsan AB will retain a baker’s dozen of Fighting Falcons. Those F-16s will continue to be operated by the 8th Fighter Wing “Wolf Pack,” which according to the Seventh Air Force “will continue to participate in routine, regularly scheduled training events to continue strengthening interoperability and sharpen the combined readiness of ROK and U.S. forces.”

The United States Air Force operates around 840 F-16s of different variants as of this year.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: [email protected].

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

America’s F-35 Stealth Fighter vs. the Lethal F-15SA: Who Wins?

September 24, 2015

by Dave Majumdar

nationalinterest.org

8. Experts discuss effects of indictment of former CIA analyst as South Korea secret agent

Experts discuss effects of indictment of former CIA analyst as South Korea secret agent

July 20, 2024 9:13 PM

• By Young Gyo Kim

voanews.com · July 20, 2024

washington —

The indictment of a former CIA analyst who allegedly worked for the South Korean government — and the abrupt resignation of the top U.S. envoy for North Korea — will not affect the coordination between Washington and Seoul in dealing with Pyongyang's threats, said former U.S. officials who dealt extensively with relations between the United States and South Korea.

Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst and prominent North Korea expert, has been indicted by a New York grand jury on charges of secretly working for the South Korean government, serving as a secret agent for South Korea's main intelligence agency in exchange for luxury goods, expensive meals and $37,000 for a public policy program that she controlled, according to an indictment unsealed last week.

Damning indictment

Terry served in the U.S. government from 2001 to 2011, first as a CIA analyst and later as the deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council, before working for think tanks.

Terry is a well-known North Korea expert with a prominent media presence. News of her indictment rattled North Korea experts in Seoul and Washington.

"At the direction of ROK government officials, Terry advocated ROK policy positions, including in published articles and during media appearances, disclosed nonpublic U.S. government information to ROK intelligence officers, and facilitated access for ROK government officials to U.S. government officials," according to the indictment, which was released Wednesday. ROK refers to the Republic of Korea or South Korea.

Prosecutors say Terry never registered with the Justice Department as a foreign agent. She faces two counts, one for failing to register under the federal Foreign Agents Registration Act and the other for conspiring to violate it.

Abrupt resignation

The indictment of Terry followed the abrupt resignation earlier this month of Jung Pak, the U.S. senior official for North Korea, who oversaw North Korean affairs at the U.S. State Department.

A State Department spokesperson told VOA's Korean Service via email on July 9 that Pak "stepped down from her duties as U.S. senior official for the DPRK and deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on July 5."

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

The indictment and the resignation come as North Korea escalates tensions on the Korean Peninsula while Washington is enhancing security cooperation with Seoul.

U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol met on July 11 on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington. They reaffirmed their commitments to the Washington Declaration, which is designed to reinforce U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea in response to North Korea's advancing nuclear threats.

US-ROK ties

Some South Korean news media outlets raised concerns that the indictment of Terry could affect overall ties between the U.S. and South Korea.

Former U.S. officials say these are separate events that are unlikely to affect the joint efforts by the U.S. and South Korea in addressing the North Korean issues.

Susan Thornton, who served as acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Trump administration, told VOA's Korean Service via email Friday that she doesn't believe there would be any disruption to the U.S.-South Korea bilateral coordination.

"Sue Mi Terry is not in the government and the position of DPRK special representative was created to focus on negotiations with North Korea, which do not appear likely any time soon," Thornton said.

"The two governments currently have ample channels for regular coordination on DPRK threats through the Departments of State, Defense, U.S. forces in Korea and the National Security Council, among others," she added.

"I will say that I foresee no reduction in cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and South Korea, especially in the combined military relationship," said Harry Harris, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea during the Trump administration, in an email to VOA's Korean Service on Friday.

Close coordination

The U.S. dismissed the concerns over the possible friction with one of its closest allies in the world.

"We will continue to consult closely with the Republic of Korea, Japan and other allies and partners about how to best engage the DPRK, deter aggression and coordinate international responses to the DPRK's violations of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions," a State Department spokesperson told VOA's Korean Service in a written statement Friday, referring to South Korea by its official name.

The spokesperson said that the vacancy of the U.S. official, who would solely cover the North Korean affairs, will not affect the U.S. policy toward North Korea.

"EAP Assistant Secretary Dan Kritenbrink is currently overseeing DPRK policy for the Department of State. Ambassador Julie Turner continues to serve as special envoy on North Korean Human Rights," the spokesperson said. EAP is the State Department's term for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

Seoul also stressed that South Korea and the U.S. are cooperating and maintaining close communication at various levels related to North Korea policy.

"The director of the Korean Peninsula Policy Bureau continues to serve as the special representative for North Korea and communicates closely with the U.S. counterpart, and the Director of Diplomatic Strategy and Intelligence Division is discussing issues that require high-level consultations," a spokesperson for the South Korean foreign ministry told VOA's Korean Service via email Friday.

voanews.com · July 20, 2024

9. Developments of North Korea’s Land-based Air Defense Systems

Developments of North Korea’s Land-based Air Defense Systems

• BY: TIANRAN XU
• JULY 19, 2024

https://www.38north.org/2024/07/developments-of-north-koreas-land-based-air-defense-systems/

Missile test conducted on February 2, 2024. (Source: KCNA)

In any high-intensity war with North Korea, South Korea and the United States will heavily rely on air strikes to attack key North Korean locations and assets. Though the dense network of air defense systems in North Korea provides overlapping and redundant coverage of the country at medium and high altitudes, the effectiveness of these systems has drastically diminished in the face of evolving air threats, leaving the country vulnerable to air strikes to the extent targets can be located.[1] However, North Korea has been making efforts to try to reduce this vulnerability, and some technical breakthroughs for upgrading its air defense capabilities might be near at hand.[2] A modernized air defense network could not only better protect strategic locations, but also provide cover for the operations of North Korean troops, especially the nuclear forces.

Mid- and Long-range Air Defense Systems

In a high-intensity war scenario, South Korea, the United States and possibly Japan could launch a wide range of precision land-attack munitions against North Korea from air, land and sea. These munitions mainly include:

• Tactical ballistic missiles and possibly hypersonic missiles in a few years
• Subsonic land-attack cruise missiles
• Loitering munitions and suicide drones
• Guided bombs and other precision munitions

Considering cost-effectiveness, and due to a limited radar line of sight at low altitudes, especially in mountainous terrains, mid- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are better suited to engage manned aircraft, medium and large drones, and, when possible, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles.

In North Korea, obsolete Soviet-era SAMs remain the backbone of ground-based, mid- and long-range air defense systems. These equipment could only pose very limited threats to US and South Korean air assets. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the Soviet S-75 (SA-2) has been the most numerous SAM in North Korea. According to open-source research, North Korea was also able to produce its own S-75 missiles with Chinese assistance.

[3]

Figure 2. Left: North Korea’s S-75 SAM network in the 1970s has remained intact until today. Right: S-75 site to protect shipyard and submarine base at Sinpho (Sinpo). Launchers numbers 1 and 3 are loaded with missiles, and the rest four are empty. (Images: CIA [left], Google Earth [right] and Korean Central Television (KCTV) [insets])

Legacy Systems Upgrade

Both the S-75 (SA-2) and S-125 (SA-3) are guided by radio command. Under this guidance mode, the missile is steered via radio command from a ground-based engagement radar, which tracks both the missile and its target.[4] Judging from limited footage released by state media, North Korea has added an infrared seeker to at least some of its S-75 missiles.[5] This modification would bring about three improvements:

• A terminal infrared seeker could improve accuracy, especially at longer range, as the accuracy of radio command guidance decreases when the missile flies further from its ground-based engagement radar.
• A switch of guidance mode during flight could, in theory, increase difficulties for ECM (electronic countermeasures).
• As soon as the infrared seeker locks onto target, the ground-based radar could choose to disengage, which may slightly improve operational flexibility and survivability of the radar.

In addition, North Korea has also tried to mount S-75 launchers on tracked and wheeled road-mobile platforms, despite the fact that the S-75 is a relatively cumbersome, liquid-propellant missile (with a solid booster). The accumulation of these upgrades led to a unique North Korean S-75 system equipped with infrared seekers and carried by mobile launchers. This modification was first unveiled at the Exhibition House of Military Hardware of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in 2012 (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Top left: Kim Jong Il in front of mobile S-75 launcher. Top right: Mobile S-75 missile launcher. Driver’s cabin (red box) indicates that the launcher is carried by a tracked chassis. Bottom left: Kim Jong Il inspecting an infrared seeker at the tip of an S-75 missile. Bottom right: S-75 missile, possibly with an infrared seeker, carried by a truck-based launcher. (Images: KCTV)

With improved mobility, accuracy and ECCM (counter-electronic countermeasures) capabilities, the upgraded S-75 systems might pose a modest threat to US and South Korean aircraft—although this vintage system is well understood by the alliance, which presumably has deployed various countermeasures against it. If and to what extent these modifications have been adopted by the KPA remains unconfirmed in the open-source domain, though some have claimed that there is a “widespread introduction” of infrared seekers among existing S-75 missiles deployed at fixed sites.[6] Meanwhile, North Korea’s efforts to upgrade the S-125 system appears to have been limited to only improvement in mobility, which possibly is a function of fewer available S-125 units.

Systems Under Development

번개 5 (Pongae-5/Lightning-5/KN-06)

North Korea revealed a new solid-propellant SAM referred to as the Lightning-5 (US designation KN-06) during a military parade in October 2010. Key components of the Lightning-5 appear to be similar to that of the Russian S-300 (SA-10) long-range SAM (Figure 4), and are mounted on wheeled vehicles.

Figure 4. The engagement radar of the Lightning-5 (top left) is clearly of PESA (passive electronically scanned array) type and resembles that of the S-300 SAM (top right). The missile (bottom) also highly resembles S-300 missiles. (Images: Tianran Xu [top left], AusAirPower [top right] and Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) [bottom])

South Korean authorities do not regularly report on North Korean SAM activities. But, according to media reports, the North might have test fired the Lightning-5 in May 2009[7] and June 2011. In a January 2015 KCTV documentary, an engagement radar of the Lightning-5 was seen participating in a joint live fire drill (Figure 5).

Figure 5. The engagement radar of the Lighting-5 appeared in a January 2015 KCTV documentary. Such radars can also be made compatible with old radio command-type missiles like the S-75 and S-125. (Image: KCTV)

North Korean state media publicly reported on the test launch of the Lightning-5 in April 2016[8] and May 2017. According to South Korean authorities, a Lightning-5 missile in the April 2016 test reached a range of around 100 km. Considering that pure radio command guidance would limit the range of a SAM to around 70 km,[9] the Lightning-5 likely adopted a more sophisticated guidance mode.[10]

Overall, the Lightning-5 probably represents substantial improvements in mobility, range and multi-target engagement capabilities in comparison to the S-75, S-125 and S-200 legacy SAMs currently in service with the KPA.[11] During the May 2017 test, Kim Jong Un stated that the Lightning-5 “should be mass-produced to deploy in all over the country like forests.” However, despite Kim’s order, there is no substantial evidence in the open-source domain suggesting that the Lightning-5 has been deployed in any significant numbers or that it has ever entered active service.

There could be a number of explanations for the Lightning-5’s apparent lack of progress after 2017, such as technological flaws, quality issues, inability to initiate mass production or constraints in resources and budget. The appearance of another new-type SAM in 2020, however, indicated that North Korea might have decided to halt the development of Lightning-5 in favor of an even more ambitious project.

별찌-1-2 (Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2)

During a parade in October 2020, another type of long-range solid-propellant road-mobile SAM was put on display. North Korea subsequently claimed that this new SAM was tested in September 2021, November 2022, February 2024 and April 2024. During the April 2024 test, the SAM was referred to by state media as Meteor-1-2.

To meet different range requirements, the Meteor-1-2 can be put on either a short booster or a longer one.[12] After booster burnout, the Meteor-1-2 is then powered by a sustainer motor.[13] Notably, the missile appears to have two sets of aerodynamic control surfaces (eight control surfaces in total, referred to by the KCNA as twin-rudder control technology) and four fixed wings to provide stability and additional lift. This rather unconventional design is reminiscent of Israel’s Stunner missile (Figure 6) and, to a lesser extent, Japan’s Type 03 Chū-SAM.[14]

Figure 6. The Meteor-1-2 has an overall layout reminiscent of Israel’s Stunner missile. (Images: KCTV [left], KCNA [right] and the War Zone [Stunner missile])

Considering its overall layout, the Meteor-1-2 could, in theory, have a longer range and higher maneuverability than the Lightning-5 because:

• A two-stage rocket could enable the missile to fly further than a single-stage rocket of similar size;
• After booster burnout, the missile becomes considerably smaller and lighter than the Lightning-5; and
• It is steered by eight movable fins instead of four.

This comparison seems to support the maneuverability and range aspects of state media’s claim that the Meteor-1-2 features “rapid responsiveness and guidance accuracy of missile control system as well as the substantial increase in the distance of downing air targets.”

According to images released by state media, the engagement radar of the Meteor-1-2 also appears to be different from that of the Lightning-5. Most notably, the absence of the feedhorn behind the phased array antenna (Figure 7) indicates that further modifications have been made to the Meteor-1-2’s radar.[15]

Figure 7. Engagement radars of Lightning-5 (left) and Meteor-1-2 (right). Both radars’ antenna arrays have been elevated to their working position but appear to be locked at different angles. (Images: KCNA)

It is possible that both the Lighting-5 and Meteor-1 systems are supposed to receive target information from the same new-type target acquisition radar and new-type early warning radar North Korea unveiled in 2021, which would possibly serve as crucial components in North Korea’s future air surveillance network. However, there is no updated information regarding these radars at this point.[16]

Short-range Air Defense Systems

Short-range air defense systems are primarily intended to conduct close-in intercepts of low-altitude cruise missiles, loitering munitions, suicide drones, glide bombs and other precision munitions launched from aircraft, as well as manned aircraft within their reach. The ongoing war in Ukraine once again clearly demonstrated the necessity for short-range defense systems to help counter these air threats.

North Korea has produced and deployed relatively modern man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that are intended to engage both aircraft and small, low-altitude targets such as cruise missiles[17] and a large number of towed and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.[18] In addition, the country also operates a number of Soviet 9K35 (SA-13) mobile short-range SAMs. According to currently available open-source information, however, most of these systems lack effective means for target acquisition and fire control by modern standards (Figure 8).[19]

Figure 8. North Korea replaced the original 9M37 missiles of the 9K35 short-range SAM system (left) with eight MANPADS (right), doubling the maximum weapon load. Without an upgrade in the fire control system, target acquisition and tracking are still carried out manually through a daytime optical sight, severely limiting the effectiveness of this system. (Images: KCNA [left] and РИА Новости / © РИА Новости / Илья Питалев [right])

Upgrade Potentials

The most comprehensive short-range air defense suite in North Korea to date could be found onboard a new class of naval corvettes that was revealed by state media in August 2023. The corvette, referred to as the Amnok class by the outside world, features a short-range, low-altitude search radar, electro-optical sensors, Gatling guns and a MANPADS launcher (Figure 9). Compared with surface combatants of developed navies, the Amnok class only has very basic close-in self-defense capabilities. However, the sensors on board, especially the low-altitude search radar and electro-optical sensors,[20] could, in theory,[21] also be incorporated into land-based systems to increase the effectiveness of the North’s short-range air defense assets.[22]

Figure 9. Air defense suite of the Amnok-class corvette. (Image: KCTV)

Systems Under Development

North Korea showcased its most ambitious short-range SAM project during a military parade in October 2020. In concept, this new SAM shares a close resemblance to the Russian Tor (SA-15) and Chinese HQ-17 systems. Same as the Tor and the HQ-17, the new-type SAM appears to have adopted the simple radio-command guidance mode, but should be able to engage more than one target simultaneously thanks to the introduction of an electronically scanned array engagement radar.

It is unclear how many missiles the North Korean version is designed to carry per vehicle. For reference, the Tor M2 variant carries up to 16 vertical launch tubes (Figure 10), while older types and the Chinese HQ-17 carry up to eight tubes. The maximum range of a Tor missile is about 12 km, tripling that of typical MANPADS.

Figure 10. North Korea’s new-type short-range SAM displayed during a 2020 parade (top left). Tor M2 SAM seen from above (top right). Bottom: Rare glimpse of phased array antenna of Tor’s engagement radar. (Images: KCTV [top left], Newsweek [top right] and X [bottom])

If deployed in large numbers, this new-type SAM should, in theory, significantly strengthen air defense at short-range and at low-to-medium altitude,[23] although the Tor system in Ukraine appears to have shown a mixed performance.[24] To date, North Korea has not reported any test fire and the future of this SAM project remains opaque. In addition, in 2021, North Korea also displayed air-to-air missiles with modern aerodynamic layouts in an arms exhibition. These air-to-air missiles, if successfully developed, could be converted into short-range SAMs without major modifications.

Conclusion

Efforts made in the past 20 years have yielded few results in enhancing North Korea’s outdated air defense capabilities, leaving the North’s conventional and nuclear capabilities vulnerable to strikes from the air. On the other hand, North Korea appears to be close to achieving more capable anti-air assets. However, it remains unclear how long it would take the North to upgrade its legacy air defense network across the country, and the extent to which such upgrades would keep pace with evolving aerial threats.

1. [1]
2. Given the obsolescence of the North’s air defense forces, the primary means of protection for North Korean leadership and nuclear weapons almost certainly is mobility, concealment, and the use of underground facilities.
3. [2]
4. C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), ECM (electronic countermeasures, such as GPS jamming), logistics and training of personnel are also crucial aspects of a well-developed air defense network. SAM system capabilities are also heavily dependent on the capabilities of the associated radars and interceptor missiles. These aspects, however, are not included in this article due to the lack of adequate open-source information.
5. [3]
6. The specific criterion of the ability to target aircraft before releasing bombs is singled out because unpowered guided bombs are the most affordable air-launched precision land-attack munitions. As these bombs are unpowered, they must be released from an altitude high enough to achieve a certain range, making the bomb carriers vulnerable to long-range anti-aircraft missiles. Shooting down the carriers of these aerial bombs would considerably disrupt air raid operations.
7. [4]
8. Depending on guidance mode, engagement radars can perform a series of functions such as target detection, target identification, target tracking, missile tracking and missile guidance.
9. [5]
10. To the author’s knowledge, this was first reported in the open-source domain by Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, The Armed Forces of North Korea: On the Path of Songun (England: Helion & Company, 2020), 82.
11. [6]
12. Ibid.
13. [7]
14. Hours after North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, two surface-to-air missiles were reportedly fired from Musudan-ri. On the following day, another one or two surface-to-air missiles were fired again from the east coast. Considering that 1) the reported flight distance of these missiles reached 130 km, surpassing the range of S-75 and S-125; and 2) North Korea’s S-200 long-range surface-to-air missiles are deployed in hardened bunkers far away from Musudan-ri, it might be possible that North Korea launched several Lightning-5 missiles. See: Rhee So-eui, Jon Herskovitz and Jack Kim, “North Korea follows nuclear test with missile launch,” Reuters, May 25, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090531002940/http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SEO175027.htm; Jean H. Lee, “Defying world powers, N. Korea conducts nuke test,” Associated Press, May 25, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090528200244/http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090525/ap_on_re_as/as_koreas_nuclear; Sam Kim, “N. Korea Monday fired two missiles, not three: ministry,” Yonhap, May 27, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20110928044950/http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/05/27/0401000000AEN20090527005000315.HTML; and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Is Said to Test-Fire 3 More Missiles,” New York Times, May 26, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/asia/27korea.html.
15. [8]
16. South Korean authorities stated that two out of the three missiles launched failed shortly after launch. “북한 발사한 지대공 미사일, 3발 중 2발 ‘실패’ 징후 [Two out of three North Korean missiles fired showed sign of failure],” VOA, April 5, 2016, available at: https://www.voakorea.com/a/3269876.html.
17. [9]
18. For example, China’s radio-commanded guided KS-1C SAM has a maximum range of over 70 km.
19. [10]
20. Likely possibilities include track-via-missile (typical example: US Patriot PAC-2, 48N6 and 48N6E2 of the Russian S-300), semi-active radar-homing (typical example: Taiwan’s Tien Kung-1), and active-radar-homing (typical example: China’s HQ-9). In 2021, North Korea displayed air-to-air missiles with modern aerodynamic layouts in an arms exhibition, indicating that the North might be developing semi-active or active radar-homing technologies.
21. [11]
22. A PESA engagement radar is, in theory, able to engage multiple targets within its field of view. For example, China’s KS-1A/HQ-12 system is able to guide six missiles against three targets, while an old “Fan Song” engagement radar of the S-75 system could only guide up to three missiles against one target.
23. [12]
24. It is possible that the two variants with different boosters are referred to as Meteor-1-1 and Meteor-1-2, respectively.
25. [13]
26. North Korea’s KCNA stated that the Academy of Defense Science had applied “double-impulse flight engine” technology to enhance the combat performance of the missile. A dual pulse rocket motor contains propellant that is divided into multiple sections by an internal barrier, which will perforate as the second igniter fires to allow the propellant to exhaust through the same nozzle as the first propellant. Such a configuration allows for different thrust profiles for the two sections, which could be advantageous for anti-aircraft missiles. However, it is not immediately clear whether KCNA intended to refer to this type of motor or it simply meant to say that the missile had two stages.
27. [14]
28. Chū-SAM is also steered by two sets of control surfaces (eight in total), presumably to achieve high maneuverability. Interestingly, some early studies on the engagement envelope of the Type 03 Chū-SAM were leaked to North Korea in 1995. However, it is unlikely that North Korea could have built the Meteor-1-2 based on the leaked documents alone.
29. [15]
30. One possibility is that the radar adopts an AESA (active electronically scanned antenna) array, eliminating the need for the feedhorn. However, other possibilities also exist, and it is premature to arrive at a conclusion.
31. [16]
32. For old information about these radars, see Tianran Xu, “Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Open Nuclear Network, October 18, 2021, https://opennuclear.org/open-nuclear-network/publication/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic.
33. [17]
34. Early MANPADS relied on contact fuse to attack large aircraft such as helicopters. In KCTV footage, North Korean MANPADS are used to intercept small target rockets. As direct hits seem to be unlikely, it is reasonable to assume that these MANPADS are equipped with proximity fuses to increase the kill probability against small targets. Notably, some of these missiles have ended up in Myanmar and factions opposing the Assad regime.
35. [18]
36. Mainly including 14.5-mm towed anti-aircraft guns, 30-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm towed self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and 57-mm towed and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.
37. [19]
38. While it is possible to take down some of the low-flying targets with manually aimed MANPADS and anti-aircraft guns, modern fire control systems enable higher interception rates.
39. [20]
40. It is assessed that the fire control radar is based on the Soviet MR-104 “Drum Tilt” radar, which has outdated performance in a modern threat environment. The North also experimented with pairing anti-aircraft guns with a land-based variant of this radar. In 2012, KCTV footage showed an unknown type of fire control radar installed on a missile boat to direct a 76-mm main gun. Its status remains unknown. Another MR-104 radar was also installed on the same boat to direct a 30-mm Gatling gun.
41. [21]
42. Decent low-altitude search radars should be able to detect small, low-flying targets amid strong clutter at sea and on land. Modern electro-optical sensors are supposed to be able to track targets with small infrared signatures. To what extent North Korean sensors are able to meet these requirements is unclear.
43. [22]
44. For example, Vietnam has replaced outdated Soviet fire control radars and optical aiming sights with modern electro-optical sensors to upgrade its aging short-range defense systems, including ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, and towed anti-aircraft artillery. In addition, Vietnam also developed a truck-mounted MANPADS launcher cued by similar electro-optical sensors, which commonly features a daytime camera, a thermal imaging camera and a laser rangefinder.
45. [23]
46. A shipborne version could also better protect the North’s naval vessels.
47. [24]
48. For example, videos on social media have shown Tor missiles missing small drones and being destroyed by a wide range of weapons. On the other hand, Tor is claimed by Russia to be an effective air defense weapon.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com