Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"We thought that the dispatch of American forces to any of these threatened areas would, in fact, be self-defeating. The idea of strategic bombing as a weapon against communist infiltration and subversion would have been strange to us. What seemed to us desirable was to stimulate and encourage the rise of indigenous political resistance to communist pressures in the threatened countries. We believed that unless the people and governments of those countries operating through their own political systems, could be induced to pick up the great burden of this load, success was not likely. For us to attempt to carry that burden would have effects — such as the paralysis of local initiative and responsibility, or the negative impact which a great foreign presence inevitably has on the natives of a country — which would tend to defeat the purpose of the undertaking."

– George Kennan, 1967

“Such a palpable decline from one group to another, despite individual variations, was related to a decay in the culture of public life, especially the media, in which the forces acting upon all of these men had become more divisive, intolerant, and even hysterical at times. And as the media has become less serious, so have our leaders. The media, with its right-and left-wing extremes, each seeking to proclaim its virtue in its own way, has often encouraged our post–Cold War presidents to be moralistic rather than moral. Passion, often the enemy of analysis, is precisely what is encouraged by social media, which has had such an insidious effect on our politics. To some extent, nations, especially in democracies, get the leaders they deserve. America was a great and well-functioning mass democracy in the print-and-typewriter age. It is unclear whether it can continue as such in a digital-video age aggravated by social media, which promises to be further manipulated by artificial intelligence.”

– Robert D. Kaplan, Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis

“In each succeeding war there is a tendency to proclaim as something new the principles under which it is conducted. Not only those who have never studied or experienced the realities of war, but also professional soldiers frequently fall into the error. But the principles of warfare as I learned them at West Point remain unchanged.”

– John J. Pershing, 'My Experiences in the World War'

1. Preemptive Strikes, Deterrence, and Denuclearization: Ascertaining Pyongyang’s View of U.S. Use of Force Against Iran’s Nuclear Program

2. Will Trump seek rendezvous with N.K. leader during APEC summit in S. Korea?

3. South Koreans Show Increasing Support for President Lee Jae-myung

4. Beyond the Miracle: Inequality in South Korea’s New Economy

5. Seoul’s spy agency reportedly suspends radio, TV broadcasts into North Korea

6. The strange disappearance of the US-North Korea conflict

7. U.S. to deploy MQ-9A Reaper to S. Korean air base this year on rotational basis: source

8. South Korea reviewing various options to improve North Korea ties

9. All eyes on delegation to U.S. as special envoys complete missions to Europe, India

10. Hanwha Systems unleashes Sea Ghosts in unmanned naval push beyond Korea

11. South Korean government reviews individual tourism to the North

12. Hanwha Ocean secures Taiwanese ship order amid sanctions

13. Hanwha Aerospace in talks with Egypt over Chunmoo rocket system export

14. Parents of N. Korean soldiers in Russia demand news

15. N. Korean officer investigated for selling home leave to soldier’s family

1. Preemptive Strikes, Deterrence, and Denuclearization: Ascertaining Pyongyang’s View of U.S. Use of Force Against Iran’s Nuclear Program

Excerpts:

The next natural question is what harm U.S. actions have on nonproliferation diplomacy globally, and prospects for denuclearization diplomacy with North Korea specifically. In this regard, more serious reflection and debate are required, as is a realistic assessment as to the likelihood of meaningful diplomacy with North Korea in the near term. While there has been a recent flurry of policy proposals on the need for the Trump administration to pursue diplomacy, most of these recommendations downplay DPRK agency and thus fundamentally miss the point that, since Kim Jong-un’s post-Hanoi loss of interest in pursuing diplomacy with the United States, Pyongyang has been absolutely nonresponsive over the past five or so years. Multiple approaches by the Biden administration were rejected, and it appears Kim Jong-un has been no more flexible in responding to initial overtures from President Trump.

...

The advent of the Trump and Lee Jae Myung administrations is inevitably going to lead to discussions on how to keep the engagement and deterrence efforts in balance. Efforts at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula must take place in coordination with actions to ensure and enhance deterrence. Such coordination is key given that the orientation of both leaders toward North Korea is markedly different from that of their respective predecessors. Although at times frustrating, this approach has worked in the past and will likely continue to going forward.

...

In this regard, President Trump’s willingness to use force to promote the strategic objective of preventing a nuclear Iran sends a strong signal to those in either South or North Korea who might otherwise have perceived the United States under President Trump withdrawing from the global stage and reluctant to use force where its interests and its ally’s interests are at stake. Kim Jong-un has seen B-2s fly to the Korean Peninsula numerous times in the past, deployments designed, in the words of the U.S. Department of Defense, to “demonstrate the United States’ ability to conduct long range, precision strikes quickly and at will.” Kim has seen inert dummy rounds delivered on these stealth aircraft making the long 6,500 mile, 37-and-a-half hour flight from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to North Korea and back. The theoretical capability has been vividly demonstrated. Now he and the world have seen the B-2 fly 7,000 miles for 37 hours to successfully drop live munitions on underground facilities in Iran. U.S. intelligence assesses North Korea’s underground facility program as “the largest and most fortified in the world,” with these facilities designed to “protect and conceal regime leaders, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, warfighting stores, and elements of military forces and defense industries.” The June 2025 U.S. strike demonstrates that even at the conventional level, the United States can hit key leadership, weapons of mass destruction, and other military targets throughout North Korea in response to any DPRK aggression.

...

Which gets back to the June 22 U.S. airstrikes on Iran. It’s hard to believe that Pyongyang is significantly more committed to its nuclear program than it was on June 21—or at any time in the recent past. There have been no indications that Kim was preparing to positively respond to U.S. calls for dialogue, and that U.S. actions have undermined this in any way. Any lesson the United States may have hoped Kim Jong-un would receive was most likely not “you’re next if you don’t denuclearize.”

So deliberately or not, the message sent, and the message that Kim Jong-un likely received, was one of U.S. intent and U.S. capabilities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Donald Trump is not an isolationist afraid of using force in the advancement of U.S. security interests. Current concerns about U.S.–South Korea relations and the state of the alliance aside, Kim should not miscalculate a lack of will on Washington’s part to come to the defense of South Korea if attacked by North Korea. Another important lesson from the June strike is that the United States has unique capabilities to project power; capabilities such as B-2 bombers and GBU-57 Massive Ordinance Penetrators can fly long distances and hit critical underground targets. That may not get Kim Jong-un to the negotiating table, but it is likely to keep him out of the war room.

Preemptive Strikes, Deterrence, and Denuclearization: Ascertaining Pyongyang’s View of U.S. Use of Force Against Iran’s Nuclear Program

https://www.csis.org/analysis/preemptive-strikes-deterrence-and-denuclearization-ascertaining-pyongyangs-view-us-use

Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary by Sydney Seiler

Published July 17, 2025

The U.S. bombing of key sites related to Iran’s nuclear program has, not surprisingly, generated much debate over the wisdom of such strikes in light of their justification, efficacy, impact on Iran’s capabilities and intent going forward, prospects for future dialogue, and broader global nonproliferation goals. Have strikes convinced Tehran to accelerate toward a bomb faster than they would have considered prior to the strikes? Was diplomacy, particularly under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, given sufficient opportunity to walk Iran away from the path of nuclearization, or was diplomacy merely a means by which Iran could mitigate pressure while covertly moving down a path that was inevitable from the beginning? With the program likely not entirely obliterated, has the bombing nevertheless laid the groundwork for making clear that the United States is prepared to take bold military action to further degrade and impede the growth of the program? For each of these questions, additional data and a commitment to depoliticized and objective assessments will be needed to go beyond what is understood today.

Pyongyang’s Perspective

The impact of these strikes on North Korea (DPRK) requires deeper discussion as well. Although Pyongyang media have justified their nuclear development over the past 30 years by pointing to the threat and “hostility” of the United States, the relatively slow and methodical nature of the program’s development would suggest a lack of urgency or perceived existential crisis by North Korea. Since the beginning of the DPRK “nuclear crisis” in the early 1990s, military options have been discussed and explored multiple times: by President Clinton in 1994, President Bush in 2002, and President Trump in 2017.In each case, the use of force was rejected out of both a concern of uncontrollable escalation even at the conventional level, as well as uncertainty as to such actions’ ultimate efficacy in discouraging Pyongyang from continuing on the nuclear path. Although it may seem natural to ask whether the recent U.S. strike on Iran may hint at opportunities with North Korea, three decades of experience suggest neither the United States nor its ally, South Korea, is willing to consider such a path.

Demise of Diplomacy?

The next natural question is what harm U.S. actions have on nonproliferation diplomacy globally, and prospects for denuclearization diplomacy with North Korea specifically. In this regard, more serious reflection and debate are required, as is a realistic assessment as to the likelihood of meaningful diplomacy with North Korea in the near term. While there has been a recent flurry of policy proposals on the need for the Trump administration to pursue diplomacy, most of these recommendations downplay DPRK agency and thus fundamentally miss the point that, since Kim Jong-un’s post-Hanoi loss of interest in pursuing diplomacy with the United States, Pyongyang has been absolutely nonresponsive over the past five or so years. Multiple approaches by the Biden administration were rejected, and it appears Kim Jong-un has been no more flexible in responding to initial overtures from President Trump. Contrary to assertions of multiple critics of U.S. policy toward North Korea, it has not been that the United States has set the bar unreasonably high by asking for complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea while missing the opportunity for more incremental advances that might restrain further growth while managing tension and escalation through arms control–like dialogue. It is that Kim Jong-un simply is not interested in dialogue with countries unprepared to accept North Korea as an irreversible nuclear power as Russia, for example, has proven to be of late.

For these reasons, it’s a stretch to say that President Trump’s decision on the Iran strikes closes any window for dialogue with Kim Jong-un. There is near unanimity on the assessment that Kim Jong-un, in viewing the U.S. strikes on Iran, likely feels justified and emboldened by the fact that he has nuclear weapons and Iran does not, which is why Iran gets bombed and North Korea does not. It has been, however, decades since North Korea embarked on the path to nuclear weapons, and it would be wrong to see the June 2025 strikes as the definitive straw that broke the camel’s back: When it comes to prospects for a negotiated path to denuclearization, odds for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are no better or worse as a result of the June strikes.

Driving the Deterrence Discussion

Beyond the denuclearization question, it is useful to consider whether President Trump’s decision to use force against Iran diminishes or enhances U.S. deterrence efforts on the Korean peninsula. Deterrence—particularly extended deterrence or the promise of the United States of a nuclear umbrella to protect South Korea—depends to a great degree on one’s view of U.S. intentions and reliability as a security provider. The erosion of South Korea’s confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence in the 2021–2023 period did not reflect diminished confidence in U.S. nuclear capabilities. Rather, it reflected Seoul’s skepticism of Washington’s intent and willingness to use its capabilities in response to potential nuclear use by North Korea. The April 2023 Washington Declaration and subsequent Nuclear Consultative Group meetings have established a more institutionalized structure to help reassure South Korea of U.S. extended deterrence but such reassurances are not a “one-and-done” event. New leadership in both Seoul and Washington will likely require a relook at the extended deterrence demand signal from the new Lee Jae-myung administration as well as the extent of the commitment that the Trump administration will be inclined to provide.

In this regard, President Trump’s willingness to use force to promote the strategic objective of preventing a nuclear Iran sends a strong signal to those in either South or North Korea who might otherwise have perceived the United States under President Trump withdrawing from the global stage and reluctant to use force where its interests and its ally’s interests are at stake. Kim Jong-un has seen B-2s fly to the Korean Peninsula numerous times in the past, deployments designed, in the words of the U.S. Department of Defense, to “demonstrate the United States’ ability to conduct long range, precision strikes quickly and at will.” Kim has seen inert dummy rounds delivered on these stealth aircraft making the long 6,500 mile, 37-and-a-half hour flight from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to North Korea and back. The theoretical capability has been vividly demonstrated. Now he and the world have seen the B-2 fly 7,000 miles for 37 hours to successfully drop live munitions on underground facilities in Iran. U.S. intelligence assesses North Korea’s underground facility program as “the largest and most fortified in the world,” with these facilities designed to “protect and conceal regime leaders, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, warfighting stores, and elements of military forces and defense industries.” The June 2025 U.S. strike demonstrates that even at the conventional level, the United States can hit key leadership, weapons of mass destruction, and other military targets throughout North Korea in response to any DPRK aggression.

Harmonizing Seoul’s and Washington’s Approaches to the North Korea Issue

The advent of the Trump and Lee Jae Myung administrations is inevitably going to lead to discussions on how to keep the engagement and deterrence efforts in balance. Efforts at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula must take place in coordination with actions to ensure and enhance deterrence. Such coordination is key given that the orientation of both leaders toward North Korea is markedly different from that of their respective predecessors. Although at times frustrating, this approach has worked in the past and will likely continue to going forward.

Deterrence requires (1) a clear demonstration of intent to punish in response to threatening actions by one’s adversary, (2) assurance to allies that the U.S. commitment will be fulfilled, and (3) reassurance to one’s adversary that good behavior will be reciprocated. But questions remain: When will extended deterrence muscles need to be flexed? How will goodwill and assurance gestures toward Pyongyang be deployed? How should combined exercises be designed, orchestrated, and signaled to maintain and demonstrate readiness? What should be done when trilateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan exercises generate push-back from Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow?

Over the history of North Korea’s nuclear development, the United States has had periods of engagement and attempts to assure Pyongyang of the benefits of reconciliation and denuclearization, and periods in which strong demonstrations of deterrence were deemed necessary, given North Korea’s increased capabilities and aggressive behavior. Engagement allows for probing intentions and confirming the judgment of skeptics that denuclearization is unlikely. Deterrence reminds Pyongyang of the price of its program. So far, deterrence has held, and door remains open to dialogue whether or not Kim Jong-un decides to reengage.

Before making policy recommendations, an objective assessment of past efforts is crucial. Often there is sloppiness in understanding agency and causality. It was not hardline policies of conservative leaders in Seoul that led Pyongyang to conduct six nuclear tests, hundreds of missile launches, the sinking of South Korean vessels, and the shelling of a South Korean island. Conversely, engagement pursued by progressives did not result in cataclysmic atrophy of military readiness and capitulation to the North. Appeasement has not lead to aggressive exploitation by Pyongyang, and aggressive hardline policies in Seoul have not lead to uncontrolled escalation or advancement of the nuclear program.

Intentionality of respective leaders aside, the cumulative policies of Seoul and Washington over the past three decades have resulted in a mix of (1) compellance, making clear the price Pyongyang would pay for nuclear adventurism, (2) assurance of allies in Seoul and Tokyo of the U.S. extended deterrent, and (3) reassurance to Pyongyang that while failing to halt the growth of North Korea’s nuclear program, and they have prevented dangerous or unwanted escalation of tension on the Peninsula. Deterrence has held over some seven decades of armistice.

Putting Pyongyang at Ease

To understand how the Lee administration may approach North Korea, there is value in reviewing North Korea’s demands of the Moon Jae-in administration that impacted Seoul’s and even Washington’s DPRK policy during the critical years of 2017–2019. Upon returning from a March 2018 trip to Pyongyang, then director of South Korea’s National Security Office Chung Eui-yong quoted Kim Jong-un as having made clear his “commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” asserting that North Korea would “have no reason to possess nuclear weapons should military threats against the North be removed and the safety of its regime be guaranteed.”

On the one hand, this formulation was not new: I personally had seen this over the years of watching North Korean media, and also sat across the table from North Korean officials using this very same language. Claiming an inveterate U.S. hostile policy has been routinely interpreted as Pyongyang’s justifying narrative for its nuclear program and why North Korea could never surrender its weapons. The “military threat removal” language was usually defined as reducing and eliminating U.S.-ROK military exercises, reducing and eliminating strategic asset deployments such as B-52 and B-2 flights, and reducing and eliminating U.S. Forces in Korea. This likely would be the framework today for any “arms control” approach in U.S.-DPRK dialogue, with Pyongyang’s logic being that there is no way the DPRK could consider limits or controls on its nuclear weapons not otherwise agreed to by the United States. In other words, when the U.S. security commitment to South Korea is removed, then North Korea might consider talking about its nuclear program.

System or regime safety is a more abstract and thus difficult challenge. What actions must—or even can—the United States and South Korea take to make sure North Korea’s “system” is “safe” or “stable”? The 2018 demand came in the aftermath of a more aggressive unification push by Moon Jae-in’s conservative predecessor Park Geun-hye, so immediately there began a flow of reassurances from the Moon Administration, and then later in 2018 by U.S. officials, including Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, of non-hostility and non-intent to overthrow the Kim regime or pursue unification. South Korean loudspeaker broadcasts along the demilitarized zone were halted, crackdowns on launches of propaganda balloons by NGOs were carried out, and efforts to discourage defections were carried out to seek to remove as many irritants (“hostile actions,” to use North Korea’s term) as possible from the relationship. Not surprisingly, Pyongyang did not reward Seoul’s goodwill, and inter-Korean relations returned to the status quo ante level of animosity and tension beginning in 2019.

Giving Appeasement a Chance?

Sir Lawrence Freedman is often quoted as warning, “Deterrence works, until it doesn’t,” a reminder of the need for humility in assessing the efficacy or success of deterrence and actions taken in support of that goal. Its corollary is also worth considering: “Appeasement works, until it doesn’t.” There is near-term political value in having calm and quiet on the Korean Peninsula, even as centrifuges spin and missiles move down the assembly line. At a time when Pyongyang might not be in listening (or talking) mode, leaders in Seoul and Washington have other target audiences for their North Korea policy. Domestic policies and politics in both South Korea and the United States often emerge as the dominant considerations and drivers for North Korea policy, particularly when Pyongyang is in a diplomatic shutdown mode as it is now. One might bemoan either a perceived excessively hardline approach of conservatives or the ostensibly naïve engagement approach of progressives. Yet such swings are to be expected, and there may be an argument that in the longer term these shifts could be seen as complementary and necessary, not necessarily irrevocably harmful to deterrence objectives.

Which gets back to the June 22 U.S. airstrikes on Iran. It’s hard to believe that Pyongyang is significantly more committed to its nuclear program than it was on June 21—or at any time in the recent past. There have been no indications that Kim was preparing to positively respond to U.S. calls for dialogue, and that U.S. actions have undermined this in any way. Any lesson the United States may have hoped Kim Jong-un would receive was most likely not “you’re next if you don’t denuclearize.”

So deliberately or not, the message sent, and the message that Kim Jong-un likely received, was one of U.S. intent and U.S. capabilities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Donald Trump is not an isolationist afraid of using force in the advancement of U.S. security interests. Current concerns about U.S.–South Korea relations and the state of the alliance aside, Kim should not miscalculate a lack of will on Washington’s part to come to the defense of South Korea if attacked by North Korea. Another important lesson from the June strike is that the United States has unique capabilities to project power; capabilities such as B-2 bombers and GBU-57 Massive Ordinance Penetrators can fly long distances and hit critical underground targets. That may not get Kim Jong-un to the negotiating table, but it is likely to keep him out of the war room.

Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

The views expressed in this submission are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

2. Will Trump seek rendezvous with N.K. leader during APEC summit in S. Korea?

A rendezvous with destiny?

Excerpts:

Trump's engagement with Pyongyang, if realized, could move along with the North Korea policy of new South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's administration, which has expressed its hope to improve inter-Korean relations following a rough patch under the former government of conservative former President Yoon Suk Yeol.

In a conciliatory gesture last month, the Lee administration suspended loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts against the North along the inter-Korean border, raising cautious hope for improvement in frosty cross-border ties.

During his campaign, Lee also pledged to restore the 2018 inter-Korean military tension reduction pact suspended amid tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang during the Yoon administration.

Despite the allies' willingness to engage with North Korea, close policy coordination is crucial to avoid unnecessary diplomatic friction, analysts have noted, amid concerns that Trump's direct approach to the North could run the risk of South Korea being sidelined or bypassed from the U.S. leader's diplomatic outreach.

The North Korean issue aside, Trump might have a full plate of issues to handle should he join the APEC summit. Among them are tariff issues and his administration's call for greater burden sharing with regional allies and partners, including South Korea.

(News Focus) Will Trump seek rendezvous with N.K. leader during APEC summit in S. Korea? | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 21, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, July 20 (Yonhap) -- With a little over 100 days left before an Asia-Pacific summit in South Korea, questions are emerging about whether U.S. President Donald Trump would seek to restart long-stalled diplomacy with North Korea should he decide to travel to attend the high-profile gathering.

The White House has not announced whether Trump will join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit set to take place in the southeastern city of Gyeongju from Oct. 31 to Nov. 1, but observers do not rule out the possibility of him attending the event and eyeing an interaction with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Trump has expressed his openness to reengaging with Kim, boasting of his "good" relationship with the reclusive leader. Late last month, he said the United States will "get the conflict solved" with North Korea if there is one -- yet another indication of his desire to resume dialogue with Pyongyang.

Despite Trump's repeated show of interest in kick-starting dialogue with Kim, the unpalatable fact for him would be that much will hinge on whether Kim will accede to any diplomatic feeler from the U.S. president at a time when Pyongyang enjoys a deepening partnership with Moscow.

"I wouldn't be surprised if some effort would be made by the Trump administration to see if Kim might meet," Andrew Yeo, the SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies, told Yonhap News Agency via email.

"But it will be Kim, not Trump, who will decide whether a meeting is possible," he added.

Rob Rapson, former acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, said that given "Trump's flair for the dramatic," a visit, meeting or interaction with Kim somewhere in North Korea around the time of the APEC leaders' meeting cannot be completely ruled out.

Rapson made the remarks, recalling the impromptu meeting between Trump and Kim at the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom in June 2019. It was one of the three meetings that the leaders have had, including the first one in Singapore in June 2018 and the second in Hanoi in February 2019.

This file photo, released by AFP, shows U.S. President Donald Trump (R) shaking hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after signing a joint statement at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. (Yonhap)

On Tuesday, South Korea's presidential office said it had sent invitation letters to the leaders of the 21 APEC member economies, including the U.S., China, Japan and Russia, as it is stepping up preparations for the Gyeongju summit to be held under the main theme of "Building a Sustainable Tomorrow."

The likelihood of Trump attending the APEC summit is "considerably high," Cho Hyun, the nominee for foreign minister, told a parliamentary hearing this week without elaborating on the reason why he believed so.

Should his APEC participation materialize, Trump might make a diplomatic gesture toward Kim, analysts predicted, as he has vowed to become a "peacemaker" as seen in his continued drive to end the war between Russia and Ukraine and the war between Israel and the Hamas militant group.

But doubts remain over the prospects for reengagement as Pyongyang appears to have little appetite for talks with Washington at a time when it relies on Moscow for food, fuel, military support and other forms of aid under a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty signed in June last year.

Last month, NK News reported that North Korean diplomats in New York had refused to accept a letter from Trump, which was aimed at reestablishing communication channels between Washington and Pyongyang -- a sign that Pyongyang is not ready for talks with the U.S.

But a window for engagement could open if Kim judges that he should cut back on -- or at least modulate -- reliance on Russia, whose support for the North could dwindle suddenly when the war in Ukraine winds down, eliminating Moscow's need to depend on Pyongyang for military supplies.

Should dialogue between Trump and Kim resume, the North's nuclear quandary is likely to be high on the agenda given Trump's stated commitment to the "complete denuclearization" of North Korea.

But many believe that it might be more difficult than past negotiations to seek a denuclearization deal with the North given the headway the recalcitrant regime has made in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in recent years.

The Trump administration's strike on key Iranian nuclear facilities last month might have further reinforced Pyongyang's belief that it should hew to its nuclear "treasure sword" rather than bargaining it away and potentially putting it at risk of foreign attacks.

"I think one of the costs of our bombing of Iran is that we may have basically ended CVID with North Korea -- complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization with North Korea," Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said during a recent CSIS event.

"Because if anything, the lesson North Korea has taken away from this is ... we need to keep our weapons to avoid a dozen massive ordinance penetrators being dropped on North Korea, like they were dropped on Iran. I think, if anything, they are reaffirmed in their view that they have pursued the right path."

Trump's engagement with Pyongyang, if realized, could move along with the North Korea policy of new South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's administration, which has expressed its hope to improve inter-Korean relations following a rough patch under the former government of conservative former President Yoon Suk Yeol.

In a conciliatory gesture last month, the Lee administration suspended loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts against the North along the inter-Korean border, raising cautious hope for improvement in frosty cross-border ties.

During his campaign, Lee also pledged to restore the 2018 inter-Korean military tension reduction pact suspended amid tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang during the Yoon administration.

Despite the allies' willingness to engage with North Korea, close policy coordination is crucial to avoid unnecessary diplomatic friction, analysts have noted, amid concerns that Trump's direct approach to the North could run the risk of South Korea being sidelined or bypassed from the U.S. leader's diplomatic outreach.

The North Korean issue aside, Trump might have a full plate of issues to handle should he join the APEC summit. Among them are tariff issues and his administration's call for greater burden sharing with regional allies and partners, including South Korea.

"2025 is perhaps the most challenging APEC year in recent memory, if ever, given the turbulence in the region and beyond generated in large part by President Trump and his administration's aggressive trade, investment and security, burden-sharing policies," Rapson said.

Yeo anticipated that if Trump attends the APEC summit, he may discuss new tariffs and trade deals with Asia-Pacific countries, and address America's role in the region and the importance of the Indo-Pacific, a region home to the U.S.' geopolitical rival, China.

Given Trump's general dislike for general disdain for multilateral fora, especially where he is not the lead or center of attention, Rapson pointed out that questions are being raised about what role he might play at the APEC summit: "spoiler, disrupter, facilitator" or other roles.

This file photo, taken June 30, 2019, shows U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un meeting at the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 21, 2025

3. South Koreans Show Increasing Support for President Lee Jae-myung

The will of the people.

Of course the cynic will say it is only the first month and a half of his term.

South Koreans Show Increasing Support for President Lee Jae-myung

thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin

Lee’s approval ratings have exceeded 60 percent, surpassing his 49 percent vote share in the June 3 election.

July 19, 2025

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung addresses the delegates at the Opening Ceremony of the 2025 IPSA World Congress of Political Science, held in Seoul, South Korea, July 13, 2025.

Credit: Facebook/ Lee Jae-myung

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According to the latest polls, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s approval rating reached 64 percent. Following his victory in the snap presidential election on June 3, which was scheduled due to the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol, Lee’s approval ratings have steadily increased.

With Lee’s strong support base among the general public, the ruling Democratic Party’s approval rating has also increased. Meanwhile public approval of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP), the former party of Yoon, has gradually decreased. The latest poll showed that 46 percent of the public support the DP while only 19 percent support the PPP.

Should the public keep supporting Lee and the DP at such a high rate, Lee’s party will likely win a landslide victory in the local elections next year, like it did in 2018. Thanks to then-President Moon Jae-in’s unprecedentedly high approval ratings, the DP won 14 seats of 17 metropolitan governor seats in the 2018 local elections. The PPP only secured two seats.

It’s fairly common for South Korean presidents to enjoy solid support from the public, reflected in positive approval ratings, during the early part of their single five-year term. However, Lee assumed office in unique circumstances, following Yoon’s shocking attempt to control the country through martial law. The public thus far has shown positive reactions to Lee’s attempts to restore the country’s democratic system.

The resurgent stock market following Lee’s victory in the election has also led moderates who did not even vote for Lee to support him. The new president also succeeded in projecting an image of himself as a passionate and hardworking leader, winning over skeptics. Even some conservative observers have admitted that there is nothing they can criticize about Lee’s statesmanship thus far.

As the DP also controls the power in the National Assembly, the party has moved quickly to investigate not only the martial law declaration but other allegations of corruption under Yoon. Three different probes led by special counsels have been launched to look into misdeeds during the Yoon administration, and some of the PPP senior lawmakers’ offices have been raided and searched. The PPP vehemently criticized these investigations while accusing the Lee government of politically suppressing it. However, the PPP’s appeal has not gotten much traction with the public, as evidenced by the latest polls.

The DP’s leadership has clearly implied that it does not have to work with those who did not participate in the National Assembly vote to lift Yoon’s martial law declaration on December 3. The majority of PPP lawmakers did not even head to the National Assembly to participate in the vote. Even after the DP lifted the martial law by itself, thanks to its majority in the National Assembly, the PPP impeded the DP and other parties’ effort to impeach Yoon.

In this context, some lawmakers in the DP and other liberal parties have already submitted a bill calling for disbanding the PPP over its role in cooperating with the “insurrection” led by Yoon’s martial law declaration.

Authors

Contributing Author

Mitch Shin

Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula.

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thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin

4. Beyond the Miracle: Inequality in South Korea’s New Economy

Excerpts:

One of the key drivers of South Korea’s persistent income inequality is the sharp divide between regular and non-regular employment, which remains hidden behind the country’s low unemployment rate. According to the Korea Labor Institute, non-regular workers made up 32.5 percent of the workforce as of August 2023. This group includes fixed-term, part-time, and indirectly employed workers – many of whom are excluded from social protections and long-term career prospects.

The wage gap between these two groups is striking: non-regular workers earned only 54.6 percent of what regular workers made, on average. The disparity is not only in pay but also in benefits – only 36.7 percent of non-regular workers received bonuses, compared to over 80 percent of regular workers. Moreover, more than 60 percent of non-regular workers had no retirement benefits or severance, reinforcing their economic vulnerability. These forms of employment are no longer transitional or marginal – they are becoming normalized. In this context, labor market dualism is a defining axis of systemic inequality in South Korea’s new economy.

As the wage gap widens and mobility narrows, the social contract that once underpinned South Korea’s development miracle is starting to fray. Younger jobseekers, women, and those without elite credentials are disproportionately excluded from stable work, homeownership, and long-term security. The result is a society increasingly divided – not just by income, but by access to opportunity and the possibility of a dignified future.

South Korea is still admired globally for its innovation, digital prowess, and cultural influence. But without confronting inequality head-on, it risks social fragmentation, political volatility, and long-term economic stagnation. What was once a development model celebrated for lifting millions now produces starkly uneven outcomes – raising difficult questions about the sustainability of both its economy and its democracy.

Beyond the Miracle: Inequality in South Korea’s New Economy

From soaring household debt to entrenched labor dualism, inequality – not innovation – has become the defining feature of South Korea’s new economy.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/beyond-the-miracle-inequality-in-south-koreas-new-economy/

By Soeun Jeon

July 18, 2025

Credit: Depositphotos

South Korea’s post-war economic rise has often been described as nothing short of miraculous. From the ashes of the Korean War in the 1950s, the country transformed within a few decades into a global manufacturing and innovation powerhouse. This period of rapid industrialization and export-led growth – popularly known as the “Miracle on the Han River” – saw GDP per capita soar from just $158 in 1960 to over $35,000 in 2023.

Under authoritarian regimes in the 1960s-1980s, the state steered development through chaebol-led industrial policy, investment in education, and aggressive integration into global markets. The democratic transition in 1987 and continued economic expansion further cemented South Korea’s position as one of Asia’s few high-income democracies and a member of the OECD.

Yet behind Seoul’s shimmering skyline and the international success of brands like Samsung and BTS, South Korea faces a sobering paradox. It is now one of the most unequal societies among developed economies. The income gap between rich and poor has widened, and wealth inequality – fueled by soaring real estate prices – has reached historic levels. According to the OECD, South Korea had the highest relative poverty rate among its member states in 2022, with nearly one in six South Koreans living below the poverty line. Youth unemployment remains persistently high, and over 30 percent of workers are in non-regular, precarious jobs. Meanwhile, the gender wage gap is the worst in the OECD. The country’s fertility rate remained critically low at 0.75 in 2025 – up slightly from 0.72 in 2023 – but this marginal increase still reflects persistent concerns over bleak economic prospects and limited social mobility.

Far from a unified success story, South Korea today is fractured along lines of age, class, and geography. Wealth remains concentrated in districts like Gangnam, while rural and post-industrial regions lag behind. Young adults increasingly refer to life in the country as “Hell Joseon,” a reflection of mounting frustration with rigid hierarchies in education, employment, and family life. Even amid rapid digitization and green growth ambitions, inequality – not innovation – has become the defining trait of the nation’s economic reality.

According to Statistics Korea, the income gap between the top 10 percent and bottom 10 percent of households exceeded 200 million won (around $136,000) in 2024 – the first time it’s passed that threshold. Despite decades of GDP growth, households in the bottom 10 percent have seen little to no real income gains, while the top 10 percent have widened their lead dramatically – now earning over 20 times more than the poorest. This growing divide reflects not only unequal wage growth but also the outsized role of capital income and real estate gains at the top.

In Seoul, homeownership has become an increasingly distant prospect for younger and middle-income households. The average price of an apartment in the capital surpassed 1.3 billion won ($960,000) in late 2024, more than 13 times the median annual household income. As housing prices continue to outstrip wage growth, owning property in South Korea is no longer a path to middle-class stability – it has become a marker of inherited privilege. With real estate now making up more than 75 percent of total household assets, renters without family wealth are effectively shut out of the country’s primary avenue for building long-term financial security, deepening the divide between asset owners and everyone else.

At the same time, rising interest rates and stagnant wages have pushed many middle- and low-income households deeper into debt. As of late 2023, South Korea’s household debt surpassed 100 percent of GDP – one of the highest levels globally, outpacing even the United States and Japan. Mortgages, credit loans, and tuition debt now weigh heavily on working families, with younger generations particularly exposed. The sharpest surge in debt has occurred among people in their 30s, many of whom borrowed heavily to buy homes before prices soared further. In today’s South Korea, where property ownership increasingly determines one’s economic trajectory, the old promise of merit-based mobility is giving way to a rigid asset-based hierarchy – leaving renters and the asset-poor with shrinking paths to upward mobility.

One of the key drivers of South Korea’s persistent income inequality is the sharp divide between regular and non-regular employment, which remains hidden behind the country’s low unemployment rate. According to the Korea Labor Institute, non-regular workers made up 32.5 percent of the workforce as of August 2023. This group includes fixed-term, part-time, and indirectly employed workers – many of whom are excluded from social protections and long-term career prospects.

The wage gap between these two groups is striking: non-regular workers earned only 54.6 percent of what regular workers made, on average. The disparity is not only in pay but also in benefits – only 36.7 percent of non-regular workers received bonuses, compared to over 80 percent of regular workers. Moreover, more than 60 percent of non-regular workers had no retirement benefits or severance, reinforcing their economic vulnerability. These forms of employment are no longer transitional or marginal – they are becoming normalized. In this context, labor market dualism is a defining axis of systemic inequality in South Korea’s new economy.

As the wage gap widens and mobility narrows, the social contract that once underpinned South Korea’s development miracle is starting to fray. Younger jobseekers, women, and those without elite credentials are disproportionately excluded from stable work, homeownership, and long-term security. The result is a society increasingly divided – not just by income, but by access to opportunity and the possibility of a dignified future.

South Korea is still admired globally for its innovation, digital prowess, and cultural influence. But without confronting inequality head-on, it risks social fragmentation, political volatility, and long-term economic stagnation. What was once a development model celebrated for lifting millions now produces starkly uneven outcomes – raising difficult questions about the sustainability of both its economy and its democracy.

Authors

Guest Author

Soeun Jeon

Soeun Jeon is a research intern and a graduate student at Pantheon-Sorbonne University. Her interests include politics, economics, and social equity.

5. Seoul’s spy agency reportedly suspends radio, TV broadcasts into North Korea

There is no better indicator of the Lee Administration's policy toward north Korea.

This is a victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy and this of course protects and strengthens his regime.

The question is does this kind of appeasement with Kim Jong Un? Will he respond positively? (a rhetorical question I think we all know the answer to).

Seoul’s spy agency reportedly suspends radio, TV broadcasts into North Korea

Experts say move, if confirmed, would cut off another key source of outside information for the DPRK people

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/seouls-spy-agency-reportedly-suspends-radio-tv-broadcasts-into-north-korea/

Jooheon Kim July 21, 2025

A North Korean living room with a TV | Image: NK News (March 2019)

South Korea’s spy agency suspended all of its radio and TV broadcasts targeting North Korea earlier this month after decades of operation, according to an NGO that also broadcasts into the country, potentially cutting off another avenue for transmitting uncensored information to the DPRK people.

Lee Kwang-baek, president of Seoul-based nonprofit Unification Media Group, told NK News on Monday that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) halted five radio channels and one TV channel broadcasting in early July, citing peace activists who monitor the broadcasts.

“As far as I know, the broadcasts included a wide variety of content ranging from news to K-pop music,” he said.

While the TV broadcasts were only accessible to residents living near the South Korean border, Lee explained that the radio signals could be received throughout North Korea.

NK News was unable to independently confirm the suspension of the NIS broadcasts on Monday, and the NIS did not immediately respond to phone calls seeking comment on Lee’s claims.

The reported cessation of the NIS radio and TV broadcasts come a month after the new Lee Jae-myung administration suspended propaganda loudspeaker operations along the inter-Korean border, a move it framed as a tension-reducing measure. The DPRK responded by turning off its own loudspeakers the following day.

“These [radio and TV] broadcasts were a valuable means of delivering accurate information to North Korean residents, but I am deeply concerned that they were halted within two months of the Lee Jae-myung administration taking office,” Nam Sung-wook, a professor of North Korean studies at Korea University, told NK News.

He said this marks a shift from engaging North Korean residents to focusing solely on the regime, suggesting that the administration is more interested in pursuing an inter-Korean summit than in reaching out to ordinary people.

Park Won-gon, a professor at Ewha Womans University’s Department of North Korean Studies, similarly argued that the move, if confirmed, could undermine North Koreans’ right to access basic information.

“Although the Lee administration seems intent on opening dialogue with North Korea, there needs to be serious reflection on whether such measures can actually pave the way for meaningful talks,” he said, adding that halting the flow of information into the DPRK “could have negative long-term effects on inter-Korean integration and unification efforts.”

NK News previously identified three different TV channels broadcasting into North Korea along the border, featuring content like variety shows, human rights documentaries, and scenes from daily life in Seoul. But Seoul’s unification ministry denied that it was involved, while the defense ministry and NIS did not respond to inquiries.

It’s unclear if any of the three channels were impacted by the reported NIS broadcast suspension.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia has also suspended its North Korea-focused broadcasts and reporting due to Trump administration budget cuts, a development that experts have said silences a key source of uncensored news for information-starved North Koreans.

Edited by Bryan Betts

6. The strange disappearance of the US-North Korea conflict

A conclusion no one likes to say out loud.

Excerpt:

Rather than inattentiveness, the lack of US engagement reflects the realization that Washington is frustratingly powerless to influence decision-making in Pyongyang, and that a tense stability is the best available outcome.

Is KJU's political warfare strategy in a phase that seeks to lull us into a sense of complacency and acceptance while the regime receives new funding and resources from Russia and China?

The strange disappearance of the US-North Korea conflict - Asia Times

The US government found it can tolerate a nuclear-armed DPRK since Pyongyang hasn’t behaved significantly more aggressively

asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · July 21, 2025

If you’d lived in America, fallen into a coma in early 2018 and awakened in 2025, you might wonder what became of the US-North Korea conflict. You would remember that at the time you lost consciousness, war seemed almost inevitable.

US opinion leaders had convinced you that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) government is irrational or reckless. Nightmarishly, the reputedly crazy North Koreans were trying to develop nuclear-armed missiles. Their steady progress was visible to the outside world through test nuclear explosions and practice missile launches.

You would also remember that Pyongyang had repeatedly taunted the Americans, as well as the Japanese and the South Koreans, about its eagerness to nuke them once it had the capability. Outgoing President Barrack Obama had warned incoming President Donald Trump that dealing with North Korea’s ambition to get nuclear weapons should be the new administration’s top priority.

The first-term Trump Administration indicated it was prepared to take preventive military action against North Korea. Trump’s national security advisor said it would be “intolerable” for the North Koreans to “have nuclear weapons that can threaten the United States.” Trump himself said “It won’t happen!” Trump also famously said North Korean “threats”– he didn’t say an actual attack – “will be met with fire and fury.”

In January 2017, Washington seriously considered launching a limited “bloody nose” attack on the DPRK with the hope of frightening Kim into halting his nuclear weapons program. Experts were quick to point out that such an attack could inadvertently lead to a larger war.

Despite the warnings, you would recall, North Korea proceeded with its project. A sixth test in September 2017 of what the DPRK said was a thermonuclear device produced an especially large explosion. North Korean technicians continued to improve on their long-range missiles, with test flights in 2017 indicating the missiles could reach most or even all of the continental US.

Discovering that there had been no second Korean War while you slept, you would ask: did Washington and Pyongyang reach some kind of rapprochement? No, your friends would answer; far from it.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are still high, they would explain. Washington still maintains economic sanctions against the DPRK and demands de-nuclearization, while Pyongyang continues to increase its nuclear arsenal and add more varied and sophisticated delivery systems, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles.

The new solid-fueled Hwasong-19 appears designed to carry multiple warheads to all parts of the US. In 2022 the DPRK government passed a law allowing the launch of a pre-emptive nuclear attack in some circumstances.

The DPRK government has renounced reunification and says it now considers South Koreans enemies. On top of this, North Korea is supporting Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine with troops and supplies of munitions, while presumably gaining in return Russian assistance to enhance the performance of DPRK missiles and submarines.

Why, during the years of our hypothetical coma, did American attention dramatically shift away from the post-nuclear DPRK? There are two parts to the explanation.

First, governments have considerable power to set the agenda of national discourse by highlighting some issues and ignoring others. That power is maximized in the area of foreign affairs, which are generally not as visible to the public as domestic issues. The public is heavily reliant on information provided by the government to know what potentially threatening capabilities a distant hostile country possesses, and whether or not the home country has effective countermeasures.

There are, of course, limits to the ability of officials to control a narrative. The Biden Administration wanted to hide or at least downplay the discovery of a Chinese spy balloon over the US in 2023, but public opinion forced the government to confront the issue after private citizens publicized sightings of the balloon. Similarly, Pyongyang can thrust itself into the limelight through an eye-catching statement or act. But to a large degree the US government, and especially the executive branch, can choose to either elevate or neglect the issue of DPRK nuclear missiles, and the level of interest among the mass public will mostly conform.

The first Trump Administration benefitted from highlighting Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. In 2017 Trump took the opportunity supplied by the DPRK to portray himself as a protector of the American people with the will to destroy an enemy country if necessary.

In 2018 and 2019 North Korea became useful as a Nobel Prize vehicle, with Trump attempting to demonstrate his self-touted diplomatic skills through summitry with Kim Jong-un. In his eagerness to get credit for a success, Trump prematurely announced after the Singapore summit in June 2018 that “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.”

With the collapse of the second summit in Hanoi the following year, there was no prospect of a diplomatic breakthrough for the remainder of Trump’s term. The DPRK became a low-key issue, with Trump taking the position that the North Korea problem was under control because Pyongyang wasn’t testing long-range missiles and because Trump still had a good relationship with Kim.

North Korea remained on the US policy back burner, and hence was little discussed, during the Biden Administration. It became clear Pyongyang intended to keep rather than bargain away its nuclear and missile programs. The Biden team said call us if you want to talk about denuclearization – which Pyongyang did not – and focused on strengthening security cooperation among the US, South Korea and Japan.

The second part of the explanation is the US government has found that it actually can tolerate a nuclear-armed DPRK. Pyongyang has not behaved significantly more aggressively since acquiring nuclear weapons. There have been no fatal “provocations” by the DPRK military since the sinking of the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan and the shelling of South Korea-occupied Greater Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, after which Seoul publicly pledged to retaliate militarily against any future incidents.

Pyongyang has not tried to use nuclear weapons to coerce Seoul into halting military exercises, ceding territory to the DPRK, paying protection money or surrendering South Korean sovereignty. Kim has said he wants his country to gain recognition as a “responsible” nuclear weapons power. The US government has settled into occasionally restating that America’s own nuclear arsenal and the US commitment to protect its East Asian allies are sufficient to deter a North Korean nuclear attack.

Trump seems interested in reviving high-level diplomacy with Pyongyang. However, according to some reports, North Korea will remain a low priority issue as the second Trump Administration focuses instead on China.

If considering a pre-emptive military strike on the DPRK in 2017 was an over-reaction, the US government now draws criticism for growing too comfortable with the new status quo. NK Pro analyst Chad O’Carroll protests that “Washington is asleep at the wheel even as the DPRK advances its nuclear program and deepens military ties with Russia.”

Rather than inattentiveness, the lack of US engagement reflects the realization that Washington is frustratingly powerless to influence decision-making in Pyongyang, and that a tense stability is the best available outcome.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow of the East-West Center, Honolulu.

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asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · July 21, 2025

7. U.S. to deploy MQ-9A Reaper to S. Korean air base this year on rotational basis: source

U.S. to deploy MQ-9A Reaper to S. Korean air base this year on rotational basis: source | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · July 21, 2025

SEOUL, July 21 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. military is planning to deploy the advanced unmanned aerial vehicle MQ-9A Reaper to the U.S. air base in Gunsan on a rotational basis in the second half of this year at the earliest, a source said Monday.

The unmanned aircraft would visit the U.S. Forces Korea 7th Air Force's base in Gunsan, 178 kilometers south of Seoul, as early as the second half of the year, and stay for several months before relocating to another site, though the exact date remains unknown, the military source said.

If realized as planned, the deployment would mark the first time the U.S. drone has been mobilized for a rotational role in South Korea, although it has previously been deployed for training purposes, the source said.

The MQ-9A is designed for both surveillance and attack missions and is capable of long-distance flight. Once deployed, it could potentially conduct surveillance on North Korea and monitor China's assertive activities in the Yellow Sea.

The 7th Air Force said its focus remains on readiness while sustaining and strengthening its alliance with South Korea, although it did not comment on the planned deployment.

This file photo of the U.S. MQ-9A Reaper is provided by the U.S. Air Force. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · July 21, 2025

8. South Korea reviewing various options to improve North Korea ties

For those who know, I believe the caption of the photograph at the link is wrong. It is on the north side of the Imjin River looking south to Imjingak. I believe they are standing on the patio of the old officer's club at Camp Greaves once known as the North of the River Inn.

South Korea reviewing various options to improve North Korea ties

By Reuters

July 20, 202511:13 PM EDTUpdated 8 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-reviewing-various-options-improve-north-korea-ties-2025-07-21/

A visitor takes a picture of the Bridge of Freedom, which connects North Korea and South Korea, at the Imjingak pavilion near the demilitarized zone which separates the two Koreas, in Paju, South Korea, October 16, 2024. REUTERS/Kim Soo-hyeon Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SEOUL, July 21 (Reuters) - South Korea is studying various plans to improve relations with North Korea, a spokesperson for South Korea's Unification Ministry said on Monday, in response to a media report that Seoul is considering allowing individual tours to North Korea.

Koo Byung-sam, a spokesperson for the ministry that handles inter-Korea affairs, refused to comment on a "particular issue".

The Reuters Tariff Watch newsletter is your daily guide to the latest global trade and tariff news. Sign up here.

But, Koo said he understood individual tours were not in violation of international sanctions.

Tourism is one of a narrow range of cash sources for North Korea that are not targeted under United Nations sanctions over its nuclear and weapons programs.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has pledged to improve strained relations with Pyongyang that have reached their worst level in years.

In a bid to ease tensions, Lee suspended anti-North Korea loudspeaker broadcasts along the border and ordered a halt to leaflet campaigns criticising the North's leaders by anti-Pyongyang activists.

The president has said he will discuss further plans with top security officials to resume dialogue with North Korea that is technically at war with the South.

North Korea recently opened a beach resort in the city of Wonsan, a flagship project driven by leader Kim Jong Un to promote tourism.

But, the tourist area is temporarily not accepting foreign visitors, according to a July 16 note by DPR Korea Tour, a website operated by North Korea's National Tourism Administration.

North Korea first needs to open the area to the outside world, the Unification Ministry spokesperson said, asked if South Koreans could travel to Wonsan.

South Korea once ran tours to North Korea's Mount Kumgang area, but suspended them in 2008, when a South Korean tourist was shot dead by a North Korean soldier.

Reporting by Ju-min Park; Editing by Ed Davies

9. All eyes on delegation to U.S. as special envoys complete missions to Europe, India

Sunday

July 20, 2025

dictionary + A - A

All eyes on delegation to U.S. as special envoys complete missions to Europe, India

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-07-20/national/diplomacy/All-eyes-on-delegation-to-US-as-special-envoys-complete-missions-to-Europe-India/2356954

Published: 20 Jul. 2025, 18:55

The U.K. delegation, led by Democratic Party lawmaker Choo Mi-ae, second to left, poses for a photo with British National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell, second from right, in London on July 17. [MINSTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

Special envoys dispatched by President Lee Jae Myung to the European Union, France, India and Britain have completed their missions, with the focus now shifting to the upcoming delegation to the United States.

Speculation is growing over whether the U.S. envoy team will meet with President Donald Trump, as securing such a meeting is seen as the centerpiece of this round of special diplomacy.

President Lee appoints ex-chief of Doosan as special envoy to U.S.

Lee's special envoy meets EU leaders, highlights commitment to stronger ties

Lee considers sending ex-interim leader of PPP as special envoy to U.S.

Envoys visited each country and delivered personal letters from President Lee, then reported back with their findings, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sunday. The EU envoy, led by former Environment Minister Yoon Yeo-joon, met European Council President Antonio Costa in Brussels on July 15 to deliver the letter.

Korea first sent a delegation to the EU during President Moon Jae-in’s administration in 2017. Then-envoy Cho Yoon-je met with the European Council president, as did conservative People Power Party (PPP) Rep. Kim Gi-hyeon during former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s term in 2022, when he met with the executive vice president of the European Commission.

The envoy to India, led by former Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum, met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on July 17. The team also met Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and other key Indian government and parliamentary figures. Modi expressed gratitude for the letter and reiterated an invitation for President Lee to visit India, according to the ministry.

In France, the delegation headed by former Justice Minister Kang Kum-sil met with Emmanuel Bonne, diplomatic adviser to President Emmanuel Macron, to deliver Lee’s letter. Liberal Democratic Party (DP) lawmaker Cheon Jun-ho, a member of the delegation, said Bonne conveyed Macron’s interest in visiting Korea. The team also met with lawmakers from both houses of Parliament and major corporate executives.

Kang Kum-sil, second to left, head of the France delegation, poses for a photo with Emmanuel Bonne, second to right, diplomatic adviser to the French president, in Paris on July 16. [MINSTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

The delegation to Britain, led by DP lawmaker Choo Mi-ae, delivered Lee’s letter to National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell. Powell referenced last month’s Korea-Britain summit on the sidelines of the Group of 7 summit and emphasized his intent to maintain close communication, according to the ministry. The delegation also met Foreign Office Minister Catherine West and other parliamentarians.

Still, some diplomatic observers expressed disappointment that the French and British envoys did not meet directly with President Macron or British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Given the role of presidential envoys and the importance of directly delivering letters from a head of state, such meetings are generally considered a matter of diplomatic protocol.

In 2017, for instance, Cho Yoon-je, serving as envoy under the Moon administration, met directly with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to deliver a presidential letter. Merkel, in response, welcomed the launch of Korea’s new administration and instructed her staff to begin preparing for a summit, Cho said at the time.

President Lee’s government has moved beyond the traditional model of limiting envoy dispatches to the United States, China, Japan and the EU. It is now pursuing a broader multilateral approach by sending teams to over 10 countries. All eyes are now on the next mission: a delegation to the United States led by former Doosan Group Chairman Park Yong-maan.

The presidential delegation to India, led by former Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum, delivers a personal letter from President Lee Jae-myung to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on July 17. [MINSTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

The possibility of a meeting with Trump is at the heart of this trip, though a Korea-U.S. summit has yet to be scheduled. Complicating matters is an approaching Aug. 1 deadline, when 25 percent reciprocal tariffs are set to be imposed. The two countries are currently negotiating a “package deal” that links trade and security, and the outcome could affect the U.S. visit.

Past special envoy missions to the United States have had mixed results in terms of presidential access. In 2017, the envoy under Moon, led by JoongAng Holdings Chairman Hong Seok-hyun, met directly with Trump in the presence of the U.S. vice president, senior White House advisers and the national security adviser. Similarly, in 2008, President Lee Myung-bak’s envoy, led by Asan Institute for Policy Studies Honorary Chairman Chung Mong-joon, met President George W. Bush.

However, in 2022, ahead of President Yoon’s inauguration, the Korea-U.S. policy consultation team, led by former People Power Party lawmaker Park Jin, did not meet with President Joe Biden or Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Instead, they met with National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.

Other past precedents include former President Roh Moo-hyun’s envoy, who delivered a letter to then-Vice President Dick Cheney in lieu of meeting President George W. Bush, and former President Park Geun-hye’s envoy, who met with Secretary of State John Kerry instead of President Barack Obama.

Meanwhile, special envoy delegations will be dispatched to Canada and Malaysia on Tuesday, the presidential office said Sunday.

DP Rep. Kim Byung-joo will lead the delegation to Canada, while former Oceans and Fisheries Minister Kim Young-choon will head the delegation to Malaysia. Both teams plan to meet key officials in their respective host countries and deliver personal letters from President Lee.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

BY PARK HYUN-JU [kim.minyoung5@joongang.co.kr]

10. Hanwha Systems unleashes Sea Ghosts in unmanned naval push beyond Korea

Monday

July 21, 2025

dictionary + A - A

Hanwha Systems unleashes Sea Ghosts in unmanned naval push beyond Korea

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-07-21/business/industry/Hanwha-Systems-unleashes-Sea-Ghosts-in-unmanned-naval-push-beyond-Korea/2355514

Published: 21 Jul. 2025, 07:00

CHO YONG-JUN
cho.yongjun1@joongang.co.kr

Hanwha System's Unmanned Surface Vehicles are in demonstration in 2024 [HANWHA SYSTEMS]

[NEXT CHIP]

For decades, semiconductors and automobiles have dominated Korea’s exports, driving growth and defining its global trade identity. But as shifting global dynamics and mounting uncertainties over U.S. tariffs unsettle traditional trade patterns, a new industrial order is taking shape. Sectors such as shipbuilding and defense are emerging as the next engines of growth. In our “Next Chip” series, we examine the rise of these industries and their potential to reshape Korea’s economic future.

In a striking display of technological coordination, ten unmanned surface vessels (USV) glided across the waters near Changwon, Korea, moving not as isolated machines but as a single, intelligent fleet. Hanwha Systems' demonstration of its USV swarm operation in November 2024 marks a milestone in its unmanned naval vehicles as it sees the segment as a fresh source of revenue and export item on top of its mainstay business centered around multi-function radars and missile defense systems.

Hanwha Systems, a defense electronics affiliate of Hanwha, is now targeting the European continent with its expansive lineup of unmanned naval systems, alongside Asia, the Middle East and potentially North America. In fact, a delegation of the Greek Hellenic Armed Forces had already paid visits to Korea in May to see a demonstration of Hanwha Systems' "Sea Ghost" USVs, one aspect of an autonomous naval vessel market worth approximately $1.65 billion according to Global Market Insights, and is projected to more than double to $4.09 billion by 2034.

Hanwha System's Unmanned Surface Vessel [HANWHA SYSTEMS]

U.S. push with acquisitions

For a U.S. market entry, Hanwha's strategy is centered around acquisitions of assets that already have an established presence in the country.

Hanwha Systems acquired a 60 percent stake in Philly Shipyard, a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-based shipyard, in late 2024, while shipbuilding affiliate Hanwha Ocean acquired 40 percent. With its parent firm Hanwha Aerospace, the company holds a 19.9 percent stake in Australia-based shipbuilder Austal, one of the four largest providers to the U.S. Navy, including the Independence-class combat ships.

“The common denominator of the two — other than them both being a shipyard — is that they are related to the United States,” Choi Byung-woong, director of the naval business division at Hanwha Systems, said.

Hanwha Systems Naval Business Director Choi Byung-woong [HANWHA SYSTEMS]

With the ownership of Philly Shipyard, both Hanwha Systems and Hanwha Ocean are considering building naval ships, although regulatory hurdles need to be resolved.

Hanwha Philly Shipyard CEO David Kim told reporters in Philadelphia Wednesday that the company "in discussion" about joining the U.S. Navy's combat support ship construction project, adding that ir had "already submitted two to three" requests for information and would continue to do so.

The acquisition of Philly Shipyard is beneficial to Hanwha, as a shipyard located in the United States can bypass U.S. import tariffs. It also has the possibility of getting around the Jones Act, which only allows U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, U.S.-flagged and U.S.-crewed ships to be used to transport goods within the country, and the Buy America Act, which prioritizes federally contracted products built in the United States.

The Austal situation, however, is more complicated, as the acquisition of a defense firm by a foreign company is subject to approval from government entities and counterintelligence agencies — it is also the reason why Austal originally declined Hanwha’s $662 million takeover offer in 2024.

With the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States giving Hanwha’s takeover of Austal the go-ahead in June, the firm still requires approval from Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency in the United States.

But entering the U.S. market is not easy, especially for Hanwha Systems, which focuses on unmanned and control software for mission autonomy, which involves vessels completing missions in battle, and platform autonomy, which refers to physically moving the ships.

Hanwha Systems Naval Business Director Choi Byung-woong [HANWHA SYSTEMS]

Choi acknowledged that exporting software for mission autonomy to the U.S. military may be difficult, as that effectively gives foreign firms access to U.S. strategy and plans.

“But the bar on engineering control systems may be lower, since that’s about controlling the mechanics of the ships,” he said. “So, we are looking long-term and we believe we will have more opportunities in 10 or so years.”

Hanwha Systems' Combat Management System on display [HANWHA SYSTEMS]

Offering a comprehensive set

Still, Hanwha Systems believes that the firm's technology can give it the upper hand. Its autonomous technology, based on different Lidar, Radar and optical sensors, can uniformly control a swarm of vessels, undock and berth as well as maneuver to avoid big waves.

"Are we the only firm in the world that has such technology? No. But it's rare for one firm to have all the technologies at hand," Choi said, adding that Hanwha Systems' technology, while still in its development phase, is "comparable to the technology that European and U.S. firms have."

Similar to how drones and unmanned aerial vehicles are proving their effectiveness in the battlefields of Ukraine, the naval industry is also slowly shifting into a replacement phase from human input to AI, while having the unmanned systems work with a conventional manned force, known as manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T).

"You also need remote control technologies for the unmanned vessels," he said. "The MUM-T solution is about manned vessels controlling multiple unmanned surface vehicles and submarines to complete missions. That’s where the trend is and that’s the sector we are increasing our investments in."

With platform autonomy, Choi thinks the company is "about 90 percent there in terms of achieving autonomy in platform movement,” adding that Hanwha Systems would have to constantly update its software for “more complex scenarios.”

For the mission autonomy, Choi said the firm’s software can be applied in the real world “up to a certain point,” but as it requires the use of artificial intelligence for complete autonomy, it would have to be constantly developed and improved upon.

Hanwha Systems signed a memorandum of understanding with five institutions and five firms in July, including Seoul National University, KAIST, Yonsei University, the Air Force Academy and Naver, to research and develop a Korean AI for military use.

"If we can develop a dedicated AI for the military and merge it with the platform software that Hanwha Systems already has, we will be able to provide a more full-fledged AI solution," Hanwha Systems' spokesperson said.

Hanwha System's Unmanned Surface Vehicles are in demonstration in 2024 [HANWHA SYSTEMS]

For the time being, Choi said Hanwha Systems will have to continue to develop and expand its unmanned system portfolio.

“We are currently working to increase our scale from smaller vessels to larger vessels, and at the same time, we will be constantly attempting to sell our products overseas,” he said.

“Because the unmanned systems business is still in the early stages, I think we can try to get some market share as the market grows in the next three to five years.”

"It’s also not about whether the industry will or will not go unmanned, but more like when it will go unmanned, so Hanwha Systems will have to be prepared for the paradigm shift, to be the leader in the global naval defense industry."

Hanwha Systems Naval Business Director Choi Byung-woong [HANWHA SYSTEMS]

BY CHO YONG-JUN [cho.yongjun1@joongang.co.kr]

11. South Korean government reviews individual tourism to the North

A new revenue stream to support the regime? But will KJU accept the risk of engagement and the information that it will bring into the north?

South Korean government reviews individual tourism to the North

Posted July. 21, 2025 07:59,

Updated July. 21, 2025 07:59

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250721/5736571/1

The Lee Jae-myung administration is reportedly considering allowing individual tourism to North Korea as a means of restoring inter-Korean relations. Unlike suspended group tours to Mount Kumgang, the proposed plan would permit individual visits via third countries such as China or Russia. The move is being seen as a tangible step toward reopening communication with Pyongyang.

According to ruling party sources on Sunday, the presidential office and relevant ministries, including the Ministry of Unification, have begun reviewing the proposal. The issue was reportedly discussed at the first full meeting of the National Security Council chaired by President Lee on July 10.

During his presidential campaign in January 2022, Lee said, “Individual tourism is not subject to sanctions against North Korea,” and noted that resuming Mount Kumgang tourism, which had been agreed to by the Moon Jae-in administration and Pyongyang, was feasible depending on the government’s position.

Officials appear to believe that North Korea could be open to the idea, having recently opened the Wonsan-Galma Coastal Tourist Area in a bid to attract foreign visitors despite frozen ties with Seoul. However, experts caution that such a policy would require not only cooperation from the North but also coordination with the United States.

The former Moon Jae-in administration had attempted a similar plan, proposing that South Koreans be allowed to travel to North Korea through a third country if they obtained a North Korean visa. That plan was met with resistance from the Trump administration, which voiced concerns about the approach.

“This is still in the early stages of long-term consideration,” a South Korean government official said.

Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com

12. Hanwha Ocean secures Taiwanese ship order amid sanctions

What will be the PRC response to this?

Hanwha Ocean secures Taiwanese ship order amid sanctions

Posted July. 21, 2025 08:08,

Updated July. 21, 2025 08:08

Hanwha Ocean has been selected as the preferred bidder for a roughly 2 trillion won container ship order from Taiwanese shipping company Yang Ming Marine Transport. Analysts attribute the win to the ripple effects of U.S. sanctions on China’s shipbuilding industry imposed under former President Donald Trump, which have improved the competitive position of South Korean shipbuilders.

On July 17, Yang Ming’s board approved an order for seven 15,000-TEU (20-foot equivalent unit) LNG dual-fuel container ships from Hanwha Ocean, according to a company filing. With the market price for each vessel estimated at $200 million, the contract is expected to total approximately $1.4 billion. If finalized, the ships will be delivered between 2028 and 2029.

This marks another major deal for Hanwha Ocean, following its $1.67 billion contract in March to build six 24,000-TEU ultra-large container ships for Taiwan’s Evergreen Marine.

Chinese shipbuilders have traditionally dominated the container ship market thanks to lower prices. However, U.S. sanctions have led to growing hesitation among global buyers to purchase Chinese-built vessels, giving South Korean firms including Hanwha Ocean new opportunities. Beginning in October, the United States will impose a $50 per gross ton port fee on Chinese-flagged ships and an $18 fee on vessels built in China. These charges are scheduled to increase through 2028.

According to British market tracker Clarkson Research, China’s share of global new ship orders fell to 52% in the first half of this year, down from 68% a year earlier. Over the same period, South Korea’s share rose from 17% to 25%.

Hanwha Ocean has also expanded its presence in the defense sector, securing multiple contracts for the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) of U.S. Navy vessels. In August last year, the company won an MRO contract for the 40,000-ton logistics support ship USNS Wally Schirra. In November, it secured a similar deal for the 31,000-ton replenishment oiler USNS Yukon.

The global naval MRO market is estimated to be worth about $57.6 billion annually. Hanwha Ocean plans to expand its footprint in this sector while partnering with small and mid-sized maintenance firms in the Busan and South Gyeongsang regions to help stimulate the local economy.

“South Korean shipbuilders are gaining renewed recognition for their technology and quality, thanks to the Trump administration’s hard-line policy on China,” a shipbuilding industry official said.

Won-Joo Lee takeoff@donga.com

13. Hanwha Aerospace in talks with Egypt over Chunmoo rocket system export

Hanwha is everywhere.

Hanwha Aerospace in talks with Egypt over Chunmoo rocket system export

https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2025/07/21/VMJAQWHG7ZGPDGVDSBL7NFU7EU/

By Park Sung-woo,

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2025.07.21. 16:44

Hanwha Aerospace Co., South Korea’s leading private aerospace and defense firm specializing in spacecraft engines, aircraft components, and advanced weapon systems, is currently in negotiations with the Egyptian government over a potential export deal for its Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). The discussions reportedly include provisions for local production and technology transfer.

Egypt, which has historically relied heavily on Russian-made weapons, is increasingly turning to South Korean defense systems, drawn by their cost-effectiveness and rapid delivery timelines.

According to Defense Arabia, a Middle East-based military news outlet, and other sources on July 21, Egyptian officials are engaged in talks with the South Korean manufacturer regarding the Chunmoo system. The report noted that the agreement could involve technology transfer, which would enhance Egypt’s defense capabilities and its ability to sustain operations in wartime.

Analysts say Egypt’s interest in Chunmoo has grown in the wake of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, which has strained global arms supply chains as European nations accelerate rearmament. The country continues to face persistent security challenges in the eastern Sinai Peninsula and along its borders with Sudan and Libya.

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that between 2017 and 2021, Russia accounted for 41% of Egypt’s arms imports. France, Italy, Germany, and the United States followed. However, Egypt has recently diversified its procurement channels, increasing purchases from the United States, Germany, and France.

Hanwha Aerospace’s K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS)./Hanwha Aerospace

Chunmoo’s modular open-architecture design allows it to be integrated with a wide range of munitions, including Egyptian-manufactured ammunition and other locally operated rocket systems. The launcher is compatible with 130mm, 239mm, 230mm, 400mm, and 600mm rockets, offering ranges from 36 kilometers to up to 290 kilometers. Neighboring Saudi Arabia is also known to operate the system.

This is not the first collaboration between the two countries. In 2022, the South Korean company signed a $1.7 billion contract to supply K9 self-propelled howitzers and K10 ammunition resupply vehicles—marking the first time South Korean artillery systems were exported to an African nation.

The Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher shown in a photo released by the Saudi Ministry of Defense in 2023./Screenshot from the Saudi Ministry of Defense’s official X account (formerly Twitter)

From the second half of 2023 through December 2024, the K9 underwent extensive durability testing in Egypt using a domestically manufactured engine. The vehicle completed 10,000 kilometers of trials across varied terrain—including desert and mountainous regions—meeting all performance and output requirements.

Some defense analysts believe that negotiations over Chunmoo could accelerate ahead of the fourth Egypt Defence Expo (EDEX), scheduled to take place in December, where the company is expected to participate.

When asked about the status of the talks, a Hanwha Aerospace official said the company “has no information to confirm at this time.”

Hanwha Aerospace’s booth at the 2023 Egypt Defence Expo (EDEX), featuring the K9 howitzer, Chunmoo, and Cheongeom missile./Hanwha Aerospace

#Hanwha

Hanwha Aerospace

14. Parents of N. Korean soldiers in Russia demand news

What will be the long term impact of support to Putin's War on the Korean people and on the regime?

Parents of N. Korean soldiers in Russia demand news

"What I'm told is that when the soldiers return home, they'll all be admitted to the party and given training to join the government," one person inside North Korea told Daily NK

By Lee Sang Yong, Hwang Hyun-uk - July 21, 2025

dailynk.com

Parents of N. Korean soldiers in Russia demand news - Daily NK English

The Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Mar. 7 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had visited important bases of the Korean People’s Army used for operations and training on the western front and toured the training facilities. The photograph shows North Korean soldiers in a military exercise. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

While North Korean media recently published images of Kim Jong Un holding back tears as he held coffins containing the remains of North Koreans who died in battle in Ukraine, the parents of deployed soldiers still anxiously await information about what has happened to their children and when they will return home.

“A,” a resident of North Pyongan province, said she is exhausted by constant changes in the story. “Nobody will tell us when he’s coming home. We were initially told it would be a year, but now we’re hearing that the deployment has been extended,” she told Daily NK.

“B,” from South Hamgyong province, didn’t learn about her son’s deployment until after the fact. She told Daily NK she no longer trusts the North Korean government.

“Even members of his unit seem to be in the dark. The whole thing is being kept top secret. I’ve been seeking out stories about the war in Russia, and I keep hearing that our troops have to stay because the war isn’t going well. For all I know, my son may already have been cremated and turned to ash,” the anxious woman said.

Particularly nerve-wracking for the parents of North Korean soldiers is the fact that no deployed soldiers have returned home and no parents have been notified about deaths on the battlefield.

“I’ve never seen or heard of any wounded soldiers coming back home. Any death notices or certificates sent to families since last year are probably from ordinary soldiers, not soldiers deployed to Russia,” “A” said.

“B” expressed deep cynicism during her interview. “I heard from the unit that no death notices have been sent yet. I have no way of knowing whether my son is dead or alive, whether he’s been wounded, or even whether he’s in Russia. I can’t trust his unit, and I can’t trust the government either,” she said.

These remarks suggest that North Korea is not providing the families of deployed soldiers with any news about their circumstances. Every day is agonizing for parents who have no way of knowing whether their children are in Russia or Korea, whether they are healthy or wounded, or even whether they are alive or dead.

Parents desperate to know why their children have not returned

Even now, the parents of deployed soldiers are begging the government to share some information. There are also signs that the trust and loyalty of parents who sent their children to the army are giving way to despair.

“I sent my son off to defend his country. When I entrusted my son to the party, I hoped he’d return safely, but I also want the Party to spare a thought for parents’ feelings,” “A” said.

“If he died in battle, it’s only right to learn how he died and receive his last effects and letters. Since we willingly gave our child into the care of the state, the state needs to keep its promises about providing compensation and bringing his remains home,” she said.

“B” spoke more sternly. “My son, who is in his twenties, was sent to the war, but nobody knows whether he’s dead or alive. Instead of offering hints about a memorial, they need to publish a list of the dead so that parents can learn about their children’s fate,” she said.

“B” also said, “We don’t need to know any military secrets—just tell us whether our children are dead or alive, and whether they’ve been injured. Parents who trusted the party to take care of their children are overcome with sorrow and fear.”

At the same time, these parents harbor hopes that their children’s experience overseas will bring career opportunities, provided they return home in good health.

“What I’m told is that when the soldiers return home, they’ll all be admitted to the party and given training to join the government,” “A” said.

“B” remarked, “I hope my son will return home alive and later on get to travel overseas as a trade official or state security agent and get to see how the world works. If the government doesn’t do that for him after he risked his life to fight in this war, I will feel, as a parent, that he’s been badly mistreated.”

The North Korean government has received tens of millions of dollars in exchange for sending troops under its pact with Russia, but it remains silent, refusing to fulfill its ethical responsibilities. Amid the long silence, the parents of the deployed soldiers burn with anguish.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service estimated that as of April 2025, North Korean troops deployed to Russia’s war against Ukraine had suffered around 4,700 total casualties, including around 600 fatalities.

In a recent article, Daily NK quoted a source inside North Korea as saying the regime plans to glorify the fallen soldiers as heroes for domestic propaganda purposes in a burial ceremony around July 27, celebrated as Victory Day in North Korea.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

15. N. Korean officer investigated for selling home leave to soldier’s family

Corruption (or capitalism with Juche characteristics?) in the nKPA.

N. Korean officer investigated for selling home leave to soldier’s family

The issue came to light when the brigade's security department conducted a surprise inspection in early July

By Jeong Tae Joo - July 21, 2025

dailynk.com

N. Korean officer investigated for selling home leave to soldier’s family - Daily NK English

North Korean soldiers conducting training drills. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)

A North Korean political officer from a border guard unit in North Pyongan province is under investigation after allowing a soldier to go home during summer training exercises in exchange for money and goods.

According to a Daily NK source in the North Korean army recently, the political guidance officer of a company in the border guard’s 31st Brigade was caught repeatedly ordering a private in his early 20s—identified by his surname Lee—to return home and bring back cash, vinegar and daily necessities. The brigade’s security department has launched an investigation.

The issue came to light when the brigade’s security department conducted a surprise inspection during the unit’s Saturday march on July 5, the first Saturday of the summer exercise. When the inspection found that Lee was absent, it began investigating the reasons and circumstances of his absence.

The brigade’s security department called an emergency assembly of Lee’s company and asked the other members why Lee had gone home and whether there had been similar cases before, making each enlisted man submit their answers in writing.

The brigade security department also conducted separate interviews with the company’s officers. As a result, it discovered that Lee had gone home to carry out a “personal mission” under a separate order from the company’s political guidance officer.

The company’s political officer was found to have ordered Lee to go home several times and bring back money and items so that he could give them to his superiors in the political department, having learned that Lee came from a well-off family.

Lee also went home in early June, before the start of the summer exercise. That time, he submitted a diagnosis for shingles to the battalion, and the issue was quietly dropped.

Transactional relationship exposed

The brigade’s security department notified the party committee and security department of the enterprise where Lee’s parents worked, and got a more detailed picture of the situation. It learned that the company’s political guidance officer had formed a transactional relationship with Lee’s parents, with the officer repeatedly demanding material support in return for recommendations to join the party and to enter a college.

Lee’s parents admitted that they had provided cash and items—per the political guidance officer’s request—in return for sending their son home. The brigade’s security department secured a statement to that effect within 12 hours of launching their investigation into Lee’s absences and began a full-scale internal probe.

“The brigade security department doesn’t see this incident as a simple matter of lax discipline, but as a serious problem involving unofficial transactions—involving political rewards—being conducted openly even during the summer exercises.

“The security department suspects that the company’s political officer used the money and items he acquired through the private to bribe his superiors,” the source said. “Sending a private on personal errands to prepare bribes hurts unit discipline and training, so the brigade security department plans a full-scale inspection to determine if similar instances occur in other companies.”

Read in Korean

Jeong Tae Joo

Jeong Tae Joo is one of Daily NK's full-time journalists.

dailynk.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE