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Quotes of the Day:
"No man was ever wise by chance."
– Seneca
"The highest result of education is tolerance."
– Helen Keller
"You've got to find the force inside you."
– Joseph Campbell
1. North Korea Has Scored a Major Victory in the Battle Against Information
2. Axis Of Isolation: North Korea’s Military Pact With Russia And Its Global Fallout – OpEd
3. The Book That All Americans Should Be Reading Now (Why Nations Fail)
4. War footage shows how North Korea's rocket system designs are vulnerable to drone attacks
5. Three major issues and tasks of the ROK-US alliance
6. Strategic Flexibility of US Forces in Korea and the Future of the ROK-US Alliance
7. President Lee must dispatch Han Duck-soo as special envoy to Washington
8. South Korea sees record growth in birth rate this year
9. CNFK, ROKN, JMSDF Officers complete Trilateral Junior Officer Exchange in Korea
10. How to Spot North Korean Scammers in the American Workforce: Look for Minions
11. The Biggest K-Pop Band to Top the Charts Isn’t Even Real
12. The Illusion of Liberty Seen Through the Eyes of One Who Survived Totalitarianism.
13. S. Korea says to take into account U.S.-Japan deal ahead of trade talks with Washington
14. N. Korea, China tout ties in banquet marking Chinese military anniv.
1. North Korea Has Scored a Major Victory in the Battle Against Information
Because the Lee and Trump administrations have forfeited the game by leaving the battlespace.
The loss of VOA and RFA is a catastrophic strategic mistake.
North Korea Has Scored a Major Victory in the Battle Against Information
https://www.38north.org/2025/07/north-korea-has-scored-a-major-victory-in-the-battle-against-information/
The propagandists and censors at the Workers’ Party of Korea can probably hardly believe their luck. For decades they have battled against a constant, daily flow of uncensored news and information into North Korea that directly contradicts the stories they tell their own people about Kim Jong Un, the Korean Peninsula, and the world. But in the last three months, everything has changed. The battle has taken a decisive turn in North Korea’s favor and they did not need to do a thing.
Since May, the number of hours of foreign radio programming broadcast into North Korea has been reduced by almost 80 percent. Given the direction of both the US and South Korean administrations on this issue, that level could fall even further over the coming months.
With heightened border controls in the last few years making it more difficult to smuggle physical media into North Korea, the impact of the cuts in radio broadcasting will be amplified. It also reduces the ability of the US and South Korea to speak directly to the North Korean people, something for which there is no viable alternative method.
Broadcasting
Since at least the early 1970s, foreign radio stations have targeted North Korea with dedicated programming that tells citizens the things the Workers’ Party and Kim Jong Un doesn’t want them to know.
The programs have provided North Koreans with South Korean and world news and uncensored news about North Korea; they have explained democratic principles, taught basic economics and many other topics through hundreds of thousands of hours of broadcasting that could be received across the entire country for those who have the equipment to access it.
But now, many of the transmitters that carried those broadcasts are silent.
The dismantling of the US Agency for Global Media by the Trump administration has led to the cessation of broadcasting by Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. In early July, four radio stations believed to be operated by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) went silent. They included Echo of Hope, Voice of the People, K-News and Radio Free Korea.
The timing suggests the closure of the Korean stations is likely linked to the change of leadership in South Korea. President Lee Jae Myung has made clear easing tensions with Pyongyang is of one his top priorities. Not only did he unilaterally stop loudspeaker broadcasting at the demilitarized zone (DMZ), he has also cracked down on balloon launches carrying rice and uncensored information across the border.
The closure of the South Korean outlets is even more notable because Echo of Hope, which has been on air since 1973, and Voice of the People, which launched in the mid-1980s, have never paused broadcasting since their start, no matter the political relationship between the two Koreas being warm or frosty.
Radio Silence
The peak time for listening to foreign broadcasts is late at night and early in the morning, when North Koreans are at home and less likely to be disturbed by random home inspections.
At the beginning of this year, listeners switching their radios on at 11 pm could find 11 radio stations broadcasting programs aimed at North Korea.
To make it more difficult for North Korean censors to jam the broadcasts, the larger stations broadcast on multiple channels at the same time, so those 11 stations were spread across 25 frequencies. On most nights, several frequencies remained free of jamming due to the sheer number in use.
Unfortunately for North Koreans, the stations that have ceased broadcasting are the ones that made most use of this method, so while the cuts have reduced the number of radio stations on air at 11 pm from 11 to five, the number of frequencies in use has dropped from 25 to just six. Consequently, it is much easier for North Korea to completely block all foreign radio stations aimed at the country.
Taken together across each 24-hour period, across all radio stations and frequencies, the number of hours of broadcasting into North Korea has dropped from 415 hours to 89 hours.
Among the remaining broadcasters, the vast majority of the 89 hours come from two South Korean government-affiliate stations: KBS Hanminjok Radio accounts for 54 hours a day and Voice of Freedom, run by the Ministry of National Defense, accounts for 24 hours a day.
Should the South Korean government decide to curtail those broadcasts, all that will be left is a weekday-only 30-minute broadcast by the BBC World Service and a few hours a day from three private stations: Free North Korea Radio, North Korea Reform Radio and National Unity Radio.[1]
However, these private broadcasters are in trouble too. Their budgets are largely funded by the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy and State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Rights and Labor, both of which the Trump administration is attempting to close down.
Audience
The effectiveness of the broadcasts has always been tough to gauge because of the difficulty of audience research, but there are several signs that they are at least a thorn in Kim Jong Un’s side and undermine his attempts to keep the population in the dark.
For decades, North Korea has attempted to jam the signals, broadcasting noise on the same frequency so the broadcast is difficult to hear. In such an energy-starved nation, the use of precious power to block overseas radio points to both an audience for the programming and the danger it poses.
Since 2006, North Korea has had a law that mandates the tuning function on radios and TVs be fixed so they can only tune into state media channels. As a result, all radios in the country must be inspected by the state and registered. Anyone caught with a radio that can tune freely is liable for up to three months in a labor camp. That said, it appears that many North Koreans are willing to take that risk. For instance, a 2010 survey conducted by InterMedia of 250 escapees and North Korean businesspeople in China found 77 percent had a radio capable of tuning into foreign stations. A 2022 survey carried out by Unification Media Group of 100 people inside North Korea found around one in five people had a radio that can tune freely.
There is a sizeable shadow audience who do not listen directly but benefit from information passed by word of mouth. A 2022 survey by Radio Free Asia found almost half of all RFA listeners shared information they heard with immediate family members, friends and neighbors.[2]
Among those surveyed in 2022, the main reason for tuning in was to learn about international affairs, learn about the situation inside North Korea, and learn things helpful for daily life—all areas where North Korean state media fails badly due to censorship.
The Future
In most of the world, cross-border broadcasting is a relic of a bygone era. The Internet or satellite TV are richer and more reliable ways for people to search out news and information. But North Korea is not like most of the world. It is one of the few places where people don’t have access to the Internet and are banned from accessing foreign media.
As a result, radio still plays an important role in reaching the North Korean people.
To be sure, radio listening is falling. Scratchy shortwave broadcasts cannot match the sparkle of South Korean TV dramas and movies that are smuggled into North Korea on USB sticks and memory cards, but radio is the only medium that can carry up-to-the minute news and information to the entirety of North Korea. The content does not have to be smuggled across the border and reception leaves no trace for the authorities to discover, detect or track.
As a result of the cuts, North Koreans will be less informed about local and global events and the information they do receive will be more dated. Many will likely tune into South Korean domestic radio on mediumwave, although KBS is the only major broadcaster with a medium wave network. Should the political or military situation worsen on the Korean Peninsula, the US and South Korea could regret losing these direct links to the North Korean people.
- [1]
- Several religious programmers exist but they do not broadcast news or information. Two radio stations are broadcast from Japan although they are aimed at Japanese citizens believed abducted by North Korea.
- [2]
- North Korea Refugee, Traveler & Defector Survey, Radio Free Asia, 2022.
2. Axis Of Isolation: North Korea’s Military Pact With Russia And Its Global Fallout – OpEd
Conclusion:
To conclude, North Korea’s military support to Russia in 2025 thus represents a fusion of isolation-driven opportunism and unvarnished realpolitik. Their battlefield partnership undermines the integrity of established international norms and inflames tensions across two critical regions. Nevertheless, by integrating diplomatic outreach, adaptive sanctions enforcement targeted military and assistance, a long-term strategy of reintegration into the international community can dismantle this unholy alliance. Only through concerted effort that addresses economic, political, and legal dimensions in concert can the cycle of empowered aggression be broken, paving the way toward a more secure based global order.
Axis Of Isolation: North Korea’s Military Pact With Russia And Its Global Fallout – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · July 22, 2025
In the shadow of intensifying global tensions, North Korea’s deployment of military personnel to support Russia’s war in Ukraine has emerged as one of the most alarming alliances of 2025. Between January and June, at least 1500 DPRK soldiers were rotated through training camps in Russia’s Belgorod and Voronezh, relieving regions of Russian infantry units that were suffering rates of attrition exceeding twelve per cent per month.
Imagery satellite analysis by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research documented the construction of four new barracks complexes—each capable of housing 400 to 500 troops—alongside field artillery emplacements calibrated to NATO coordination codes. In exchange, Moscow has transferred roughly three hundred and twenty million dollars in arms supplies and hard currency, originally funds earmarked for North Korea’s missile development programs. This transactional relationship between Pyongyang to the mitigation of effects crippling international sanctions—under which its economy contracted by an estimated 2. percent 8 in 2024—and allows Russia to replenish its front line manpower without recourse to politically sensitive private military contractors.
The drivers of this alliance are rooted in a confluence of economic desperation and shared strategic isolation. For North Korea, participation in Russia’s war effort provides an infusion of resources, ranging from advanced avionics components to bulk diesel, while fuel grants the regime greater diplomatic leverage in its dealings with potential patron states. For Moscow, the attraction lies in recruiting seasoned ideologically steadfast soldiers willing to endure the intensity high in combat for relatively opaque compensation. The arrangement sidesteps domestic political constraints and legal scrutiny that might accompany the use of nationals, Russian international, or mercenaries, thus providing an albeit expedient, morally troubling reserve of personnel.
On the Korean Peninsula, the ramifications have been swift and severe. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff reported a twenty-two-cent increase in cross-border readiness artillery drills during the second quarter of 2025, reflecting heightened state vigilance amid Pyongyang’s deepening ties with a major nuclear power. In Tokyo, the defence ministry revised its threat upward assessment warning that DPRK-trained units may soon Russian field supplied Arctic communications kits designed to withstand South Korean electronic countermeasures .These developments have compounded an already fragile security environment contributing to atmosphere an mutual of distrust and rapid military posturing .
In eastern Ukraine, humanitarian indicators have concurrently worsened. The International Committee of the Red Cross noted a seventeen per cent rise in civilian displacement within contested sectors—an increase directly correlated with the presence of foreign combatants unfamiliar with local conflict dynamics. Moreover, both have regimes emboldened and grown a challenge to international norms: conducted Pyongyang intercontinental five ballistic missile tests between March and June 2025, the highest quarterly tally on record, while Russia suspended its cooperation with Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons inspections in May 2025. Such actions further erode arms control frameworks that have underpinned global stability since the late twentieth century.
Legal and moral implications are equally stark. The deployment of DPRK troops contravenes multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions dating back to 2017, which explicitly prohibit North Korea from engaging in any military cooperation beyond its borders. Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, member states are mandated to comply with Council decisions, yet Pyongyang’s actions flagrantly violate these obligations. Russia’s engagement of foreign combatants also breaches the Geneva Conventions by obscuring chain of command accountability and denying uniformed status to individuals on the battlefield, raising serious questions about the treatment of prisoners and the application of international humanitarian law.
This confronting crisis demands a synchronised multilateral response. At the diplomatic level, convening an emergency UN Security Council session to issue a unified condemnation of DPRK troop deployments would send a clear signal of collective resolve. China’s pivotal economic relationship with North Korea, Beijing now accounts for over half of Pyongyang’s import volume, placing it in a unique position to apply pressure and discreet mediation via neutral envoys to facilitate reciprocal concessions, such as halting deployments further in exchange for strictly monitored humanitarian aid. Sanctions transforming from static list-based instruments into dynamic intelligence-driven measures is vital. Intelligence enhanced sharing among NATO, the Five Eyes alliance and key East partners, Asian countries can improve real-time interdiction of financial illicit transactions, while commercial additional satellite assets under the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme would enable near continuous monitoring of crossings used for troop movements. Strengthening the technical capacity of the UN Panel of Experts to trace channels of cryptocurrency estimated to comprise up to fifteen of DPRK–Russia settlements would further tighten the noose on illicit funding.
Equally important is bolstering Ukraine’s capacity to neutralise incoming DPRK contingents trained. The delivery advancement of anti-personnel drones and electronic warfare suites on building systems pledged by Germany in mid-June 2025 can disrupt enemy coordination and networks, reducing civilian harm. Incorporating North Korean doctrinal tactics into training joint exercises with Ukrainian forces will enhance battlefield preparedness, maintaining heightened readiness in Northeast Asia through combined air patrols by the U.S., South Korean and Japanese aircraft reinforce deterrence and reassure allies.
These immediate measures must be complemented by a longer-term vision of reintegration. A phased roadmap toward denuclearisation and demilitarisation linked to calibrated relief from financial and sanctions, incremental expansion of maritime fishing rights, could offer Pyongyang an alternative to an adventurist military. Reviving a modernised Six Talks Party framework, an adapted address to both the Korean security Peninsula and Russian-Ukrainian descalation would establish a dialogue sustained platform aimed at preventing future recurrences of such destabilising alliances.
To conclude, North Korea’s military support to Russia in 2025 thus represents a fusion of isolation-driven opportunism and unvarnished realpolitik. Their battlefield partnership undermines the integrity of established international norms and inflames tensions across two critical regions. Nevertheless, by integrating diplomatic outreach, adaptive sanctions enforcement targeted military and assistance, a long-term strategy of reintegration into the international community can dismantle this unholy alliance. Only through concerted effort that addresses economic, political, and legal dimensions in concert can the cycle of empowered aggression be broken, paving the way toward a more secure based global order.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Kim, H.-J. (2025, July 11). Russia’s Lavrov meets North Korea’s Kim, praises ties as ‘invincible brotherhood’. Associated Press.
- Han, D.-h. (2025, June 26). North Korea may send more troops to Russia by August, South Korea says. Radio Free Asia.
- Atlantic Council UkraineAlert. (2025, June 24). North Korea is playing a key role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Atlantic Council.
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · July 22, 2025
3. The Book That All Americans Should Be Reading Now (Why Nations Fail)
A tale of two Nogales and a tale of two Koreas.
Excerpts:
The lessons from history, from the two Nogales towns to North and South Korea, are clear. Geography or culture may play a role, but it’s the fundamental design and operation of a nation’s institutions that truly dictate its long-term trajectory. For the United States, and indeed for any nation, the future hinges on its collective commitment to protecting institutions that empower the many, rather than enriching the few.
Why Nations Fail offers a compass for America’s future. It’s not just a book about economics; it’s a blueprint for understanding why some societies thrive and others collapse, and a way to understand what’s happening in the US right now. It reminds us that the choice is stark: will the United States reinforce the inclusive foundations of its success, or will it succumb to the insidious creep of institutional decay? The stress test is now.
The Book That All Americans Should Be Reading Now
zmescience.com · by Mihai Andrei · July 22, 2025
Nations fail because of their institutions, write Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.
The two should know. Along with Simon Johnson, they were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for their groundbreaking work on why some nations thrive while others collapse. Their landmark book, Why Nations Fail, first published in 2012, offered a sweeping argument that it’s not culture or geography but the strength (and fairness) of institutions that determines a nation’s fate.
It’s a challenging argument, and a very timely one. Over a decade later, as the United States grapples with rising instability, inequality, and institutional erosion, their warning reads less like history and more like prophecy. Why? Because the downfall of the US has rarely been more plausible.
Acemoglu himself seems to acknowledge this in a recent article published in the Financial Times. The Nobel Laureate conducted a thought experiment envisioning a historian in the year 2050 describing what led to a hypothetical US failure. The real causes, the economist explains, are the weakening of democratic institutions along with economic inequality. In his account, the pillars of American prosperity (innovation, fair competition, and strong governance) gradually crumbled, leading to stagnation and decline.
But what does a 2012 book have to do with all of this?
Two Towns Called Nogales
The two towns called Nogales.
Rather ironically, Why Nations Fail starts with a positive US tale. There are two towns called Nogales on opposite sides of the US border, one in Arizona and one in Mexico. If they were in the same country, they’d be a single town. However, they are divided by wire fence and an iron wall, separating the US side from Mexico.
Despite sharing the same geography, the Nogales towns have very different living standards and settings. They’re vastly different cities. People have different salaries, health facilities, and schools. Obviously, this is because they’re in different countries. But let’s dive even deeper. When they are so close, and all other things are equal, why does it matter so much that they’re in different countries? Why do Mexico and the US have such different conditions?
In a general sense, the question becomes “Why are some countries rich and prosperous while others are not?”
The Strength of Institutions
In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the success or failure of nations is primarily determined by the strength of their institutions. They define a way to look specifically at whether they are inclusive or extractive. More than geography, more than anything else, this is the one aspect that, in the long-term can drive prosperity: inclusive institutions.
Inclusive political and economic institutions are designed to encourage broad participation across society. They foster innovation and fuel sustainable economic growth. They achieve this by safeguarding secure property rights and ensuring the rule of law applies equally to all, providing genuine opportunities for individuals to advance. In such nations, governments are accountable to their citizens, power is distributed widely, and individuals are incentivized to invest their time and resources to create new ideas and participate in the progress of their nation. Nations flourish when their political and economic institutions are inclusive.
Conversely, nations falter when they are dominated by extractive institutions.
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In these systems, a small, powerful elite controls both political power and economic wealth, often at the direct expense of the majority of the population. They extract from their people. These institutions actively limit economic opportunities, stifle innovation, and frequently rely on repression and coercion to maintain the elite’s grip on power. Corruption is rampant, property rights are weak or non-existent for most, and there is a severe lack of political accountability. These characteristics ultimately choke off long-term economic growth and development.
The tale of Nogales is just one compelling illustration of this fundamental difference, out of many examples. Perhaps no other pair of nations illustrates the power of institutions as vividly as North and South Korea.
These two countries share a common language, culture, and history, having been a unified peninsula for centuries. Yet, a line drawn at the 38th parallel after World War II, solidified by the Korean War, separated them into two radically different realities.
Extractive Institutions
In 1945, at the time of their division, North Korea actually possessed a stronger industrial base, inheriting most of the heavy industry developed during Japanese colonial rule. South Korea was largely agrarian. Both suffered immense destruction during the Korean War (1950-1953). However, their chosen paths diverged dramatically in the aftermath, with profound consequences.
You can see the differences between North and South Korea from miles away, literally. North Korea has massive electricity shortages and can’t afford night lights in most places. Image credits: NASA.
North Korea adopted a centrally planned, communist system, characterized by highly extractive institutions. Under the leadership of Kim Il-sung and his successors, private property was largely abolished, markets were suppressed and contact with the outside world was severely restricted. The goal of this system was to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a small elite, the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea and the military.
While the North experienced some initial growth in the immediate post-war period, fueled by aid from the Soviet Union and China, this was not sustainable. The lack of incentives for innovation, combined with state control over nearly all aspects of life and the diversion of resources to the military, stifled long-term economic development. The result has been chronic food shortages, widespread poverty, and a society isolated from the global community.
North Korea’s economic development largely stagnated, and by the late 1990s, its GDP per capita was plummeting. Now, it’s one of the poorest countries in the world and even struggles to feed itself.
South Korea, by contrast, eventually embraced inclusive institutions.
Inclusive Institutions
South Korea’s early post-war years were marked by political instability and slow economic growth under authoritarian rule. Over time, particularly from the 1960s onward, South Korea prioritized an active economic strategy. This involved building institutions that protected property rights, fostered competitive markets, and invested heavily in education and infrastructure.
The South Korean government, while initially having a strong hand in guiding the economy, gradually created an environment where private businesses could thrive. Companies like Samsung and LG, now global giants, emerged from this environment. South Korea’s political system also transitioned towards greater democracy, increasing accountability and further solidifying inclusive institutions. This “Miracle on the Han River” transformed South Korea from one of the poorest countries in the world into a developed, high-income nation, a member of the OECD and the G20. Its GDP per capita now stands many times higher than that of its northern neighbor.
The difference between these two Koreas is not due to geography or culture. It is a direct result of their institutional choices. One chose an extractive path that concentrated power and stifled prosperity for the many, while the other progressively built inclusive institutions that fostered broad participation and economic growth.
But you don’t need to take two different places and compare them. The same place can turn from extractive to inclusive — or the other way around.
What Does This Mean for the United States?
You may be tempted to think that this doesn’t mean anything for the US. But remember, this isn’t about Korea or Nogales; it’s about institutions.
A nation’s prosperity is not a given. It is constantly shaped by the strength and character of its institutions. If you want to see how a country will do economically in the long run, look at its institutions. In the US, a lot is changing nowadays and institutions across the board are taking a hit.
Acemoglu in his office. Image via Wiki Commons.
Many scholars and observers, including Acemoglu and Robinson themselves, have applied the Why Nations Fail framework to the Trump presidency. Robinson, for instance, has stated that the Trump administration tried to build extractive institutions where power concentrates in the hands of a narrow elite and extracts resources from society.
The Trump approach, Robinson says, is centered around groups, masculinity, and antagonizing. It involves building an in-group and creating an ideology around white nationalism, xenophobia against foreigners, and masculinity. This is what Robinson called the “New Post-Liberal Order” and he doesn’t mince his words on what this will cause. “This is all going to be a disaster for economic performance in the United States,” Robinson concluded.
But here’s the thing: it’s all very hard to follow. That’s not a coincidence, it’s a strategy. Trump is a master at capturing attention, and he bombards the airwaves with seemingly random and often confusing ideas and approaches. From immigration to trans athletes to boat engines and sharks, Trump jumps from one thing to the next, and it’s next to impossible to keep track of it. But the reason why you should read Why Nations Fail is that it offers a framework that unites all of these seemingly disparate threads: a weakening of institutions.
The Trump presidency has already unleashed an unprecedented barrage on established democratic norms. These range from questioning election results to attacks on the press and even the judiciary. Why Nations Fail explains why this is not just terrible for democracy, but terrible for the economy as well.
The Stress Test
In the article where Acemoglu describes how a collapse of the US could happen, he starts from a weakening of institutions. The court system no longer functions, the competitive environment is dominated by friends and oligarchs, and ultimately, trust (and with it, the country’s economy) also collapses. It’s what we’ve seen happen in multiple countries, and it’s what could happen in the US as well if current trends continue.
This problem, they suggest, is rooted in a long-standing failure of liberal democracy to deliver shared prosperity and address growing inequalities that have emerged over recent decades. This sentiment, that the system isn’t working for everyone, creates fertile ground for populist movements and leaders who promise radical change and go on to erode institutions.
The lessons from history, from the two Nogales towns to North and South Korea, are clear. Geography or culture may play a role, but it’s the fundamental design and operation of a nation’s institutions that truly dictate its long-term trajectory. For the United States, and indeed for any nation, the future hinges on its collective commitment to protecting institutions that empower the many, rather than enriching the few.
Why Nations Fail offers a compass for America’s future. It’s not just a book about economics; it’s a blueprint for understanding why some societies thrive and others collapse, and a way to understand what’s happening in the US right now. It reminds us that the choice is stark: will the United States reinforce the inclusive foundations of its success, or will it succumb to the insidious creep of institutional decay? The stress test is now.
zmescience.com · by Mihai Andrei · July 22, 2025
4. War footage shows how North Korea's rocket system designs are vulnerable to drone attacks
Video and photos at the link: https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-ukraine-war-russia-rocket-systems-vulnerable-drone-attack-2025-7
War footage shows how North Korea's rocket system designs are vulnerable to drone attacks
Business Insider · by Matthew Loh
Combat footage increasingly shows how North Korea's old multiple launch rocket systems sent to Russia are susceptible to attack from first-person-view drones.
Ukrainian units have been uploading clips of their drones striking the artillery systems, with some igniting the launchers' exposed munitions to cause catastrophic damage.
In one recent clip, posted by Ukraine's 429th "Achilles" Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment on Friday, an FPV drone is seen flying into the rear of a North Korean 107mm Type-75 launcher.
Footage captured by the drone showed at least four rockets already loaded into the 12-barrel towed launcher at the moment of impact. The crew is nowhere to be seen as the drone appears to strike one of the missiles.
Ukraine's 429th Separate Regiment of Unmanned Systems shared footage of a strike on a North Korean-supplied Type 75 multiple launch rocket system.
More on the Type 75 here: https://t.co/YYVSVOeW2L#Ukraine #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar pic.twitter.com/2TXwxxVYC9
— Matthew Moss | The Armourer's Bench (@historicfirearm) July 18, 2025
The Achilles regiment also uploaded a separate reconnaissance clip, filmed from a distance, that appeared to show the system detonating.
In the video, a rocket appears to fly out of the treeline, though it's difficult to tell if both clips are definitively linked to the same attack.
The Type-75 has repeatedly been sighted in recent months on the Russian frontline and training grounds. It appears to be one of the latest systems that North Korea shipped for Moscow's forces, and is Pyongyang's version of the Chinese lightweight Type-63 launcher — an old 12-tube system that leaves all of its loaded rockets exposed.
Another new North Korean weapon in Russian service - 107mm MLRS “Type75”. https://t.co/fIhTb6gvZV https://t.co/D5mm8YLHZj pic.twitter.com/kh5NH7ydhT
— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) June 12, 2025
Another Type-75 was reported destroyed on July 12 by a unit of Ukraine's National Guard, which uploaded a clip of a drone dropping a munition on the system.
North Korea has also sent its longer-range M1991 multiple launch rocket systems for Russia's use, one of which was seen heavily damaged by a drone strike last month.
Footage uploaded by Ukraine's 413 Unmanned Systems Battalion in late June showed that a drone ignited one of the launcher's exposed missiles, causing it to fire prematurely and pierce the truck's driver chassis.
Two soldiers are seen jumping out of the smoking driver's cabin.
Ukraine says North Korea has sent Russia hundreds of artillery pieces, including the M1991, the Type-75, howitzers, and Pyongyang's more modern launchers such as the KN-09 multiple launch rocket system.
Much of North Korea's equipment is based on Soviet or Chinese tech, so it's typically highly similar to systems that Russia's troops were already using in Ukraine.
The Cold War-era BM-21 Grad, for example, is a rocket system that has featured heavily in the war and is loaded by hand. And its munitions, like the M1991 and Type-75, are exposed and vulnerable to FPV drone attacks.
Conversely, modern Western rocket systems, such as the American M142 HIMARS, for example, often use containerized, enclosed munitions that are somewhat shielded from smaller explosions.
Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images
North Korea's most recent military parades have showcased newer rocket launchers that appear to feature some additional protection, though these largely seem to just come in the form of larger tubes.
With the bulk of Pyongyang's artillery arsenal believed by the West and South Korea to consist of older, legacy systems, it's likely many of its launchers will suffer the same disadvantage as the M1991 and Type-75, while militaries around the world bet on the rise of drone warfare.
Business Insider · by Matthew Loh
5. Three major issues and tasks of the ROK-US alliance
This is a Google translation of a Sejong Policy Brief,
[Sejong Policy Brief 2025-20] Three major issues and tasks of the ROK-US alliance
Date of registration 2025-07-22 Views 114 Author Kim Jeong-seop
File name [Sejong Policy Brief 2025-20] Three major issues and tasks of the ROK-US alliance Author Kim Jeong-seop, Senior Research Fellow
https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=3&itm=&txt=&pg=1&seq=12323
Three major issues and tasks of the ROK-US alliance
Increase in defense spending, adjustment of USFK, transfer of wartime operational control
Kim Jeong-seop, Senior Researcher, Sejong Institute
Key Summary
■ Raising a problem
❍ President Trump’s re-election heralds a major challenge for Korea in terms of both economy and security. In terms of economy, tariff pressure is emerging as a key issue, while in terms of security, the key issues are △increased defense spending, △adjustment of US Forces in Korea, and △transfer of wartime operational control.
❍ In Korea, a give-and-take ‘package deal’ is emphasized, but it is important to conduct an in-depth analysis of individual issues first.
❍ Since the alliance issue is a result of the change in the US strategy, a proactive and active approach called ‘South Korea-led alliance redesign’ is required, not passive defense.
■ Cost pressure and transfer: Increase in defense spending and defense cost sharing
❍ (Demand for an increase in defense spending to 5% of GDP) It is necessary to reduce the burden of excessive defense spending increases through calculating overall security costs like NATO, while making efforts to secure Korea's financial autonomy to the greatest extent possible.
❍ Considering Korea’s high defense investment, the balance of conventional military power on the Korean Peninsula, and the nature of the North Korean threat, it is inappropriate to apply NATO-style defense spending to Korea.
❍ Expressing the will to strengthen Korea's defense capabilities based on real needs, not formal numbers. Also referencing the cases of Australia and Japan, which are strongly opposing demands for defense spending.
❍ (Pressure on defense cost sharing) Maintain the position that the results of existing negotiations should be respected, but if renegotiation becomes inevitable, suppress rapid increases through changes in calculation methods (total amount → required amount)
❍ (New request outside the SMA framework) If new costs such as deployment of strategic assets and joint training are requested, we will negotiate with the stance of not ruling out forward-looking review to reduce costs for future high-cost alliance operations.
Dealing with
❍ It is necessary to consider that frequent deployment of strategic assets has limited military effectiveness in terms of deterring North Korea and also has a negative impact on the strategic stability of the Korean Peninsula.
■ Adjustment of US Forces in Korea: Changes in Size, Role, and Character
❍ (Reduction of US Forces in Korea) Rather than being overly sensitive to numbers, US Forces in Korea should use the reduction as an opportunity to strengthen the Korean military through strengthening its power.
❍ (Strategic Flexibility) While maintaining the principle that the basic purpose of the ROK-US alliance is peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to consider ways to minimize the risk of involvement in an emergency.
❍ One criterion is to allow one-time overseas borrowings in a limited manner that does not undermine deterrence against North Korea, but to oppose the repeated use of the Korean Peninsula as a launching base.
■ Adjustment of US military posture in the Indo-Pacific region and transfer of wartime operational control
❍ As the status and role of the USFK are elevated, there is a possibility of a major change in the ROK-US combined defense posture as the adjustment and reorganization of the UN Command and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command are intertwined.
❍ There may be concerns raised about the hierarchization of the Indo-Pacific alliance and the subordination of the USFK, but from the perspective of increasing Korea’s autonomy, the change in the USFK’s posture in the region can be utilized positively.
❍ In preparation for the emergence of the issue of transferring wartime operational control, it is necessary to establish a position in advance. In particular, it is desirable to change from the current 'integrated' system that maintains the joint command system to a 'parallel' system led by the ROK military and supported by the US military.
■ Conclusion: Proactive and proactive response to alliance changes
❍ It is difficult to prevent the change in alliance originating in Washington through concessions from Korea alone, so we need to take a proactive approach so that the alliance can be transformed based on Korea’s national interests.
❍ While actively accepting Korea's leading responsibility for the defense of the Korean Peninsula, Gyeongju is also making efforts to prevent the risk of involvement and secure the autonomy of Korea's diplomacy.
❍ Despite the changes in the strategic situation, the common denominator of the alliance clearly exists. We will make efforts to ensure that the core foundation of the alliance, which is the continued stationing of US forces in Korea and extended deterrence, does not collapse in terms of deterring North Korea's nuclear program and stabilizing the region.
❍ Acknowledging the reality that the military terrain of the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region may change significantly in the era of great change in the international order, we will actively respond
6. Strategic Flexibility of US Forces in Korea and the Future of the ROK-US Alliance
This is a Google translation of a Sejong Policy Brief.
[Sejong Policy Brief 2025-19] Strategic Flexibility of US Forces in Korea and the Future of the ROK-US Alliance
Date of registration 2025-07-22 Views 467 Author Jo Bi-yeon
File name [Sejong Policy Brief 2025-19] Strategic Flexibility of US Forces in Korea and the Future of the ROK-US Alliance Author Jo Bi-yeon, Research Fellow
https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=3&itm=&txt=&pg=1&seq=12322
Strategic Flexibility of US Forces in Korea and the Future of the ROK-US Alliance
Jo Bi-yeon, Research Fellow, Sejong Institute
Key Summary
■ Background of the problem and analysis
❍ Trump's second term defense strategy is to prioritize containing China and delegate the responsibility for suppressing North Korea to its ally, South Korea. The issue of reducing the number of US troops stationed in South Korea and strategic flexibility is resurfacing.
❍ In the domestic political and military circles, there is a discussion about the response between ‘maintaining the status quo’ and ‘reactive adaptation’ that minimizes strategic flexibility, but there is a need to prevent a radical adjustment of the USFK through a more forward-looking approach.
❍ The transformation of the US military’s posture in the Indo-Pacific region is a structural reality that is already in progress, and Japan, the Philippines, etc. are actively responding through proposals such as One Theater, OCEAN, and the establishment of a single theater coordination center.
❍ Accordingly, this paper aims to, first, forecast the overall adjustment scenario of the USFK in the midst of the reorganization of the US military power in the Indo-Pacific, and second, suggest the nature and scope of flexibility that Korea can accept.
Third, I would like to present 'CNIIP (Conventional-Nuclear Integration in Indo-Pacific)' as a regional concept proposed by Korea to the US and the international community.
■ Trump’s Second Term and Strategic Flexibility
❍ Looking at the recently released FY2026 Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), four trends emerge in adjusting the US military posture in the Indo-Pacific region:
- First, the clarity of the purpose of public restraint. Comparing the PDI published since 2021, China is clearly stated as the greatest threat to the United States 'in history'. The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance) circulated within the US Department of Defense in March 2025
It is in line with the 『Defense Guidance』
- Second, the reduction of ground forces. The budget for the stationed army was cut by 68% compared to the previous year. The lightening of ground forces is a trend throughout the Indo-Pacific region, and it is not a fixed deployment of forces, but rather agile, flexible, and distributed in times of emergency.
Reorganizing for the purpose of circular arrangement
- Third, for the first time in PDI, 'deter by denial' is emphasized. It is in line with President Trump's priority for missile defense network such as Golden Dome.
- Fourth, the trend is to establish strongholds centered on the first and second island chains. The importance of Japan, Guam, the Philippines, and Australia outside the Korean Peninsula is clear.
❍ The problem of adjusting US forces in Korea and the problem of strategic flexibility are structural realities linked to the top priority of Trump's second term to check China and maximize the efficiency of military power under the reduction of the defense budget.
■ Strategic Flexibility of US Forces in Korea: Key Prospects
❍ There are three major areas where major adjustments are expected. First, the adjustment of the 2nd Infantry Division, including the Ground Forces (Army) and the Stryker Battalion.
- In May 2025, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) suggested a possible reduction of about 4,500 personnel from the Stryker Rotational Brigade, which has been in rotation since 2022.
- The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) proposed by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees differs in the technical details of the size of the US Forces in Korea, and final coordination remains until the end of the year, but the 2nd Infantry Division is expected to be expanded amid the trend of reducing ground forces in the Indo-Pacific.
The possibility of some adjustments to the division is not ruled out.
*The Senate Armed Services Committee’s FY2026 NDAA includes a provision allowing the Secretary of Defense to “certify” to Congress that the adjustment of U.S. forces in Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control are in the national interest of the United States, while the House
The Armed Services Committee's FY2026 NDAA includes maintaining the 28,500-strong U.S. military presence in Korea.
❍ Second, the Air Force's coordination part (related to F-16, A-10, F-35)
- The A-10 'tank killer' is scheduled to be retired in 2025, which will lead to a realignment of Air Force personnel.
- In addition, the F-16s dispersed to Osan and Gunsan bases are being concentrated at Osan Air Base and converted into two super squadrons (1 squadron already completed). In Gunsan, the fixed and rotational deployment of two F-35A squadrons is in progress.
Through this relocation and expansion of the rotation rate, we aim to increase flexibility for containing China.
❍ Third, the possibility of a large-scale adjustment in a larger framework cannot be ruled out.
- Dan Caldwell, who served as a senior adviser to Defense Secretary Hegemony, argued in a recent report that most of the US ground forces in Korea should be withdrawn and only two air force battalions should be deployed, reducing the number to about 10,000.
Recommendation to shift the center of gravity of the troops stationed in the region to the second island chain centered around Guam
- If the flexibility of US forces in Korea is limited, the possibility of a large-scale withdrawal of ground forces by Caldwell, a large-scale relocation of even some squadrons to spaces outside the Korean Peninsula, and an expansion of the rotational deployment rate cannot be ruled out.
■ Korea’s response direction
❍ Active review and acceptance of appropriate level of adjustment / reduction of USFK is necessary (seeking a compromise)
- Considering the change in US grand strategy under Trump's second term, it is necessary to acknowledge and prepare for the possibility that the size of US forces in Korea (especially ground forces) and power reduction will become a reality.
- It is not desirable to reject it outright as it is an issue directly related to the reliability of the ROK-US alliance, and efforts are needed to find a compromise.
❍ It is necessary to promote consultation on Korea’s threat perception and priorities while actively managing differences of opinion among allies through a forward-looking approach.
- Regarding the role of the USFK, it is necessary to present Korea's position on the scope of strategic flexibility while maintaining the goal of 'contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula and stability in the region'.
- Need to present a new 'baseline' in terms of capability and symbolism as a tripwire: Maintaining a minimum of 15,000 ground forces (rotational brigades and 8th Army units) to limit the large-scale reduction in ground forces proposed by Caldwell
It is necessary to make a comprehensive proposal, including maintaining the F-16 Super Squadron (to the extent of reducing some of the five units), deploying one F-35A squadron to Gunsan, and maintaining the four-star US Forces in Korea.
❍ While accepting some expansion of the rotational deployment and flexibility of the ground and air forces of the USFK, there will be discussions on the scale and flexibility of direct deployment on the Korean Peninsula in the event of a Taiwan emergency.
❍ As a regional concept led by Korea, the 'Indo-Pacific Nuclear-Conventional Integration' (CNI) was adopted, which was formalized in the Washington Declaration in 2023.
(CNIIP) presented as a concept of security cooperation between Korea-US , Korea-US - Japan, and countries in the region
7. President Lee must dispatch Han Duck-soo as special envoy to Washington
Excerpts:
Han was seen by many progressives as being aligned with the previous government and even at odds with Lee himself. For some, nominating Han as envoy may appear to betray the spirit of political reform.
But this is precisely where Lee has a chance to lead. If he truly seeks national unity and international credibility, now is the time to rise above partisanship and prioritize the national interest.
Over the past few weeks, he has surprised many by making gestures of political inclusion -- retaining a minister from the previous administration, meeting with opposition leaders and even encouraging dialogue with the business community. These steps have stabilized markets, lifted investor confidence and helped push his approval rating above his election-day result.
Appointing Han as special envoy would be a natural extension of that leadership style. Whether or not Han succeeds in negotiations, the act of appointing him would signal the seriousness and maturity of the Lee administration to both domestic and international audiences. In moments like this, personal risk is often the price of statesmanship.
What's needed now is not just diplomacy -- but a decision.
World News July 21, 2025 / 10:58 AM
President Lee must dispatch Han Duck-soo as special envoy to Washington
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/07/21/perspective-us-tariffs-special-envoy/5831753107782/
By Nohsok Choi
Han Duck-soo has emerged as a compelling choice for special envoy to Washington to negotiate tariffs and other issues that tie the United States and South Korea. File Photo by Jeon Heon-Kyun/EPA
SEOUL, July 21 (UPI) -- With U.S. President Donald Trump having officially declared that a 25% reciprocal tariff on all South Korean exports will take effect Aug. 1, the need for swift diplomatic engagement has become urgent.
Sending a special envoy to Washington is no longer a matter of protocol, but a strategic imperative. The envoy's role would be to engage directly with senior U.S. officials -- possibly even with President Trump himself -- to address a range of high-stakes issues, including tariff negotiations, defense cost-sharing and bilateral cooperation on trade, energy and investment.
Yet despite the urgency, reports indicate that the Lee Jae Myung administration is struggling to finalize its choice, as political debate and hesitation continue to delay the process.
According to media reports, some within the ruling camp are calling for a full reconsideration of the nomination. Kim Chong-in, the former interim leader of the conservative People Power Party and the reported nominee, has publicly expressed displeasure at this development stating, "Did I ever ask to be sent [as a special envoy]?"
The presidential office has offered only a vague response, likening the speculation to "being asked about a divorce before a wedding." These remarks suggest that Kim may have been tentatively considered, but mounting political resistance has likely caused the administration to retreat from that choice.
Meanwhile, with the Aug. 1 deadline fast approaching, the task of appointing a credible and effective envoy remains unresolved.
There is little time left. With Trump's tariff decision already formalized, South Korea must now act with urgency. The appointment of a special envoy is no longer optional -- it is a strategic necessity.
Whoever is chosen must be capable of navigating the complex political and economic landscape in Washington and engaging directly with senior U.S. officials on the full range of critical bilateral issues -- from tariffs and defense cost-sharing to investment and energy cooperation. In this context, the government must prioritize credibility, clarity and results.
That is why former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo emerges as a compelling choice. While Kim Chong-in is widely respected as a seasoned economic policymaker and negotiator, he may not be the right person for this delicate moment.
In 2021, he publicly criticized Trump on social media -- a fact that likely has not gone unnoticed in Washington. Trump, famously reactive to criticism and guided by a highly transactional worldview, recently doubled tariffs on Brazil after President Lula voiced opposition. Sending an envoy with a history of confrontation could risk derailing already fragile talks.
Han, on the other hand, has no prior personal relationship with Trump, but is said to have developed a warm rapport with him during a phone call. Trump reportedly praised Han's fluent English, perhaps sensing a sense of familiarity -- Han is a Harvard-trained economist, while Trump graduated from the Wharton School.
That small personal connection may make a big difference in setting the tone of the conversation. In a high-stakes negotiation, personal chemistry matters. Compared to Kim, Han is more likely to establish a constructive dialogue with Trump -- something South Korea urgently needs.
Beyond personal rapport, Han brings unmatched policy credentials. He is one of Korea's foremost experts in trade and economic diplomacy, having served across the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and as the country's first chief trade negotiator.
He also was ambassador to the United States, and uniquely, he has served as prime minister under progressive and conservative administrations --Roh Moo-hyun and Yoon Suk-yeol -- earning bipartisan respect.
From trade and security to American politics and protocol, Han is arguably the most qualified figure to handle a volatile and transactional counterpart like Trump. His greatest asset may be his ability to engage the U.S. president without a translator -- an advantage that cannot be overstated at the negotiating table.
The stakes are especially high. The envoy will not only be tasked with addressing tariffs, but also with resolving disputes over non-tariff barriers, securing investment opportunities like the Alaska LNG project and navigating difficult defense-related negotiations -- including cost-sharing for U.S. troops stationed in Korea.
Any misstep could have long-term consequences for Korea's economic and strategic position. And Trump is no ordinary interlocutor.
To understand who Trump is, one need only look back to a 2016 interview in a Korean newspaper. "I sleep 28 hours a week and read 28 hours a week," he said. He is not merely a real estate developer, but a lifelong student of negotiation strategy.
One of his favorite books is The Art of War by Sun Tzu, whose first principle is to win without fighting. In fact, Trump authored The Art of the Deal in 1987 -- a book that transformed him from an unknown businessman into a household name. Facing a leader like Trump requires more than policy expertise; it requires strategic insight and mental discipline.
Yet, sending Han as special envoy may seem politically unthinkable at this moment. From the perspective of many in Lee's coalition, Han is a deeply controversial figure. He served as prime minister under former President Yoon Suk-yeol, who is currently in jail awaiting trial on treason charges following his administration's failed martial law declaration.
Han was seen by many progressives as being aligned with the previous government and even at odds with Lee himself. For some, nominating Han as envoy may appear to betray the spirit of political reform.
But this is precisely where Lee has a chance to lead. If he truly seeks national unity and international credibility, now is the time to rise above partisanship and prioritize the national interest.
Over the past few weeks, he has surprised many by making gestures of political inclusion -- retaining a minister from the previous administration, meeting with opposition leaders and even encouraging dialogue with the business community. These steps have stabilized markets, lifted investor confidence and helped push his approval rating above his election-day result.
Appointing Han as special envoy would be a natural extension of that leadership style. Whether or not Han succeeds in negotiations, the act of appointing him would signal the seriousness and maturity of the Lee administration to both domestic and international audiences. In moments like this, personal risk is often the price of statesmanship.
What's needed now is not just diplomacy -- but a decision.
8. South Korea sees record growth in birth rate this year
Some good news. Maybe in 20 years there will be enough draft age men to man the Army.
World News July 23, 2025 / 6:04 AM
South Korea sees record growth in birth rate this year
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/07/23/korea-South-Korea-record-birth-rate-growth-May-demographic-crisis/2311753264105/
By Thomas Maresca
South Korea saw its largest-ever gain in birth rate over the first five months of 2025, its statistics agency said Wednesday. File Photo by Yonhap/EPA-EFE
SEOUL, July 23 (UPI) -- South Korea recorded its largest-ever gain in birth rate over the first five months of the year, its statistics agency said Wednesday, in a slight respite from a looming demographic crisis.
The cumulative number of births from January through May reached 106,048, up by 6.9% over the same period last year, according to data from Statistics Korea. It represents the highest rate of increase since data collection began in 1981.
Some 20,309 babies were born in May, up 3.8% from the 19,567 babies born one year ago. The on-year increase was the largest since May 2011, when the figure grew by 5.3%.
The number of births has risen for 11 consecutive months, the agency said. May's fertility rate was 0.75, up 0.02 from a year earlier.
Related
The news follows on the heels of South Korea registering an annual growth in birth rate for 2024, driven in part by a boom in postponed marriages following the COVID-19 pandemic.
Officials have also cited the impact of government incentives and demographic trends as contributing to the birth rate boost. In particular, the number of people in their early 30s -- a key childbearing age -- has grown.
Despite the modest increase, South Korea's birth rate remains the lowest in the world. Its 2024 fertility rate of 0.75 means that for every 100 women, just 75 babies are expected to be born over their lifetimes.
That mark is half the average rate of the 38 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. A fertility rate of 2.1 is considered the level needed to keep a population from declining.
In an effort to reverse the trend, the South Korean government has introduced various policies to encourage marriage and support child-rearing, including financial incentives for new parents and expanded parental leave and childcare assistance.
9. CNFK, ROKN, JMSDF Officers complete Trilateral Junior Officer Exchange in Korea
We need trilateral cooperation at every level. These young officers will be well prepared for their future senior leadership roles through the relationships they are developing now.
CNFK, ROKN, JMSDF Officers complete Trilateral Junior Officer Exchange in Korea
dvidshub.net
Courtesy Photo | Junior officers assigned to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK), Republic of...... read more
Courtesy Photo | Junior officers assigned to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK), Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) tour the Joint Security Area of the DMZ during a three-day Trilateral Junior Officer Exchange across South Korea, July 18, 2025. The three day exchange started in Busan, then to Camp Humphreys, and finally to the Joint Security Area of the DMZ and Seoul area. CNFK is the U.S. Navy’s representative in the Republic of Korea, providing leadership and expertise in naval matters to improve institutional and operational effectiveness between the two navies and to strengthen collective security efforts in Korea and the region. (Courtesy Photo) | View Image Page
BUSAN, BUSAN GWANG'YEOGSI [PUSAN-KWANGYOKSHI], SOUTH KOREA
07.18.2025
Courtesy Story
Junior officers assigned to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK), Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) participated in a three-day Trilateral Junior Officer Exchange across South Korea, July 16-18.
The three day exchange started in Busan, then to Camp Humphreys, and finally to the Joint Security Area of the DMZ and Seoul area. CNFK’s Strategy, Policy, Plans and Engagement Team, Lt. Cmdr Matt Ziesmer and Lt. Cmdr John Paul Mulligan organized the trip. The focus of the exchange was to enhance understanding amongst the three nation’s ten participating officers and educate them on the history and mission in the Republic of Korea.
“The exchange included command briefings, junior officer roundtable discussions, and cultural visits designed to strengthen people-to-people ties and enhance future interoperability,” said Ziesmer. “This engagement established a foundation for future trilateral collaboration, fostering shared understanding and closer relationships among our maritime forces.”
While in Busan, the group toured ROKN’s Republic of Korea Fleet and CNFK HQ, before receiving tri-command brief and conducting a roundtable discussion with other CNFK junior officers. Next, they visited the United Nations Memorial Cemetery-Korea to pay respects to those who died while serving during the Korean War.
“The junior officer exchange provided an opportunity for naval officers from the U.S. Navy, ROK Navy, and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force to not only learn about ongoing USFK, UNC, and CFC operations firsthand, but highlighted the crucial role of UNC-Rear bases in Japan in the event of conflict on the Korean peninsula and the importance of trilateral security cooperation in maintaining regional stability,” said Mulligan. “This experience forged close relationships amongst the next generation of naval leadership, a connection that will last throughout their careers.”
While at Camp Humphreys, the members visited United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and UCC to learn about their role in maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula.
On their last day, they visited the Joint Security Area of the DMZ and returned to Seoul for cultural visits to Bukchon Village, Gyeongbukgong Palace, and Insadong Culture Street.
CNFK is the U.S. Navy’s representative in the Republic of Korea, providing leadership and expertise in naval matters to improve institutional and operational effectiveness between the two navies and to strengthen collective security efforts in Korea and the region.
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10. How to Spot North Korean Scammers in the American Workforce: Look for Minions
How to Spot North Korean Scammers in the American Workforce: Look for Minions
References to the agents of evil and other ‘Despicable Me’ characters are telltale signs of swindlers infiltrating U.S. companies
https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/north-korea-despicable-me-minions-2966cc66
Robert McMillan
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July 22, 2025 5:30 am ET
North Koreans’ love of Minions has become a recurring joke among the security researchers who investigate them. Illustration: Dan Lyon/WSJ
American tech companies have a serious problem with a despicable twist.
The FBI believes thousands of North Koreans have infiltrated the U.S. workforce by assuming the identities of Americans to secure remote jobs. Many of them, investigators have found, are bound by a few defining characteristics: total devotion to Dear Leader Kim Jong Un, a penchant for stealing cryptocurrency and an obsession with Minions, the cuddly agents of evil from “Despicable Me.”
The North Koreans’ love of the animated movie franchise has become a recurring, if slightly baffling, joke among the security researchers who investigate them.
Many of these fake workers use Minions and other “Despicable Me” characters in social-media profiles and email addresses. Some investigators initially thought their use of “Gru” was a reference to Russia’s famed GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. Instead it was a tribute to the Minions overlord, Felonious Gru Sr., the Steve Carell-voiced animated character who tries to steal the moon.
Allusions to Minions and other characters are so ubiquitous that investigators pursuing suspected North Koreans view Despicable references as a sign they might be on the right track.
Minions pose during the world premiere of ‘Despicable Me 4’ in 2024. Photo: kena betancur/Reuters
Taylor Monahan, an investigator with the cryptocurrency company MetaMask, said she doesn’t see the Minions obsession as some kind of social commentary or dark joke by Kim’s underlings. She thinks they’re just fans of the films. “How do you not love minions?” she said.
Last year, Monahan was tracking down a North Korean worker who had been hired by more than one cryptocurrency company. To get hired for one of the jobs, the scammer showed off some software that he’d written on the code-sharing site, GitHub.
His username was Grudev325.
“I love @Felonious Gru – Despicable Me,” the North Korean told his boss, as he was angling for a job. He was fired within a month for poor job performance. Two years later, in a plot worthy of the animated franchise, Grudev325 went on to steal more than $62 million from the cryptocurrency project Munchables, Monahan said.
The Munchables hack was a revelation, Monahan said. She had been tracing cryptocurrency funds stolen by fake workers for years, and she realized that a lot of them seemed to like the Minions. “This was the moment where I was like, ‘Hold up. This is a pattern. They’re not just randomly selecting movies out of a database.’”
She’d investigate a theft, and then look at the GitHub page maintained by the project that had been robbed. “And then a Minion would show up,” she said. “We kept seeing Minions pop up over and over again.”
Today she says she’s seen dozens of Minions in GitHub and Telegram profiles and the icons that accompany them.
The North Korean workers frequently reference Gru, the supervillain voiced by Steve Carell who tries to steal the moon. Photo: illumination & Universal Pictures/AP
In the movies, Gru is a clever but loving supervillain who nurtures adopted daughters and a gaggle of Minions who help him square off against other villains.
Some researchers say the North Korean workers are particularly drawn to using the name Kevin as a pseudonym, after the golf-loving minion from the second movie. In May 2024, a North Korean engineer going by the fake name “Kevin Taylor” spent about 90 minutes of his workday researching Vector Perkins, the warmup suit-wearing supervillain rival.
“He read from the Fandom wiki, searched for Vector Perkins images, even checked out a Screenrant article about Vector’s return in a short film,” said Evan Gordenker, a consulting director with the security firm Palo Alto Networks.
In informal chat messages between the workers that were viewed by The Wall Street Journal, they sometimes greet each other with the salutation, “Hey Minion.” They refer to the boss as “Gru.”
North Korea has called the U.S.’s workforce infiltration allegations part of an “absurd smear campaign.”
In late 2024, an anonymous collective of security researchers investigating the North Korean problem uncovered a cache of images on an unsecured Google drive. Among them was a photo of an alleged North Korean IT worker standing in front of a large Minions promotional display created by a Laotian telecommunications company. He poses, back straight, for the photo as two children play with toy minions in the background.
“They love animation,” said Michael “Barni” Barnhart, an investigator with the insider risk security company, Dtex.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends the launching ceremony of a warship that had been damaged upon its first attempt to launch. Photo: kcna/Reuters
North Korea has long had a love affair with animation. One of the country’s most famous exports is a show known as “Clever Raccoon Dog,” which tells the story of a North Korean underdog at war with a dangerous wolf, who represents the U.S., according to Martyn Williams, who studies North Korea for the Washington-based think tank, the Stimson Center.
“Clever Raccoon Dog” has a niche fan base outside of North Korea, but “Despicable Me” is the bigger export, Williams said. The original film in the franchise grossed $1.2 billion worldwide.
Kim’s father, who once ordered the kidnapping of South Korea’s most revered director, was reportedly a cinephile with more than 20,000 DVDs in his collection. But his tastes ran more toward James Bond and “Friday the 13th.”
It couldn’t be determined whether Kim is a fan of either Minions or Gru.
Write to Robert McMillan at robert.mcmillan@wsj.com
Appeared in the July 23, 2025, print edition as 'These Crooks Leave a Trail Of Minions'.
11. The Biggest K-Pop Band to Top the Charts Isn’t Even Real
Korean soft power.
The Biggest K-Pop Band to Top the Charts Isn’t Even Real
Fictional idol bands in ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ have reached heights never achieved by their human counterparts; ‘It feels very surreal’
https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/music/kpop-demon-hunters-netflix-spotify-91566609
By Timothy W. Martin
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and Soobin Kim
Updated July 20, 2025 12:02 am ET
The fictional Saja Boys from the Netflix movie ‘KPop Demon Hunters’ have topped Spotify’s U.S. charts. Photo: NETFLIX
SEOUL—After nearly a decade in a K-pop boy band, Kevin Woo returned home to the U.S. four years ago, looking to expand his musical career outside South Korea. His monthly Spotify listeners, until recently, stood at about 10,000.
Now, it’s around 20 million.
The reason? Netflix’s No. 1 movie globally, “KPop Demon Hunters,” an animated film with girl-group protagonists and boy-band baddies. Two of the film’s tracks have sat atop the U.S. Spotify’s most-streamed songs—feats never before achieved by BTS, Blackpink or any other K-pop group, real or imagined.
That’s delivered a harsh reality to a genre seeking reinvention: Fictional bands have gotten popular faster in the U.S. than humans ever did. The triumph comes as the broader music industry grapples with unconventional entrants, like bogus hits created by AI claiming to be authentic.
Woo provides the singing voice for Mystery, one of the five members of the film’s soul-stealing Saja Boys. On a recent day, he was relaxing with a friend at a hotel pool in the Los Angeles area when a Saja Boys song started playing.
Kevin Woo provides the singing voice for Mystery, one of the five members of the fictional group. Photo: Alberto E. Rodriguez/Getty Images
Some children began dancing, prompting Woo’s friend to ask: “Do you want to meet the actual Saja Boy?” They shrieked and asked for an autograph, which Woo obliged. He signed his own name next to Mystery Saja.
“It feels very surreal because I play a fictional character,” said Woo, 33. “They don’t recognize me as Kevin Woo or a K-pop artist.”
“KPop Demon Hunters,” produced by Sony Pictures Animation, is an American production shot in English, with a creative team and cast stocked with South Koreans and Korean diaspora. The film, which debuted June 20, has inspired fan art, handmade plushie dolls and cosplays of the main characters. Real-life K-pop stars, including several members of BTS, have praised the film.
The fictional K-pop idols are appealing to tribal fanbases that often lock in support for a single group and disavow others. In K-pop lingo, a “bias” refers to one’s favorite singer, while “akgae” identifies someone who prefers one member of the group but dislikes everyone else. “Multi-stan” is someone capable of loving more than one group—a stigmatized notion in the K-pop universe.
Tap to unmute
HUNTR/X, the girl group in 'KPop Demon Hunters.' Netflix
That has made rooting for the Saja Boys and the film’s girl-group trio, HUNTR/X, a relatively guilt-free endeavor, fans say.
Becoming the Switzerland of K-pop wasn’t luck. The film aimed to be an amalgamism of K-pop aesthetics and sounds, with hopes of honoring “all the fans,” said Ian Eisendrath, the movie’s executive music producer.
“I challenge people to not love this music,” Eisendrath said.
Seven of the film’s songs rank among Spotify’s 15 most-streamed tunes on the U.S. daily charts. The two most popular hits, HUNTR/X’s “Golden” and the Saja Boys’ “Your Idol,” are also roaring up the Billboard Hot 100, placing No. 6 and No. 16 respectively. The film’s companion album has achieved the biggest streaming week for a movie soundtrack since 2021’s “Encanto.”
Vasileios Tsagkaropoulos with his daughters, says K-pop feels different now because of the movie. Photo: Vasileios Tsagkaropoulos
The catchy tunes have created many converts like Vasileios Tsagkaropoulos, a 45-year-old dad who had never listened to K-pop. On a co-worker’s suggestion, he found himself on his sofa watching “KPop Demon Hunters,” his two young daughters on each arm.
Near the end, Tsagkaropoulos began to tear up. His 6-year-old glanced over as he let out a quiet whimper. He’s watched the movie twice more, the soundtrack blares in their car and he’s a proud owner of a purple HUNTR/X T-shirt. He said K-pop previously seemed like “a flashy product.”
“It feels different now,” Tsagkaropoulos said, “because it’s something I shared with my daughters.”
The film’s chart success carries some caveats. Several individual K-pop singers—as opposed to groups—have vaulted atop the daily Spotify charts in the U.S., the world’s most-lucrative music market. BTS and Blackpink, who typically sing in Korean, have hit No. 1 on Spotify globally. BTS, whose members concluded mandatory military service last month, have six chart-toppers on the Billboard Hot 100.
Despite explosive growth over the years, the K-pop industry had become top-heavy and stagnated. Two years ago, the CEO of BTS’s music label put it bluntly: “K-pop is in crisis.”
The success of “KPop Demon Hunters” shows it is possible for fans to connect with nonhuman idols, said Suk-Young Kim, a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, who has written a book about K-pop. It will likely spawn copycats.
“This is a long-running dream for K-pop companies,” Prof. Kim said. “Here we have idols who never sleep, never get sick, never age.”
But don’t count the humans out, said Benny Char, a K-pop producer and songwriter, who has also worked with an AI singer. “You can’t manufacture the vulnerability, chemistry and unpredictability that real artists bring to the table,” he said.
Benny Char, a K-pop producer and songwriter, said there are some elements of real-life groups you can’t manufacture. Photo: Benny Char
Woo, the Saja Boy singer, said he doesn’t mind if his work as Mystery overshadows his prior time with the K-pop group, U-KISS, his Broadway performances or his acting roles. “For me, in a sense, it’s like a reinvention of my artistry,” he said.
Sky Blaw, who supports the K-pop boy band Vanner, gives high marks to the film’s authenticity, from the intense bond between the fans and stars to the glossy stage outfits.
But the 27-year-old, who works at an engraving shop in Salem, Ore., was puzzled about one thing: The Saja Boys crashing HUNTR/X’s meet-and-greet with fans.
“That,” Blaw said, “would never happen.”
Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
12. The Illusion of Liberty Seen Through the Eyes of One Who Survived Totalitarianism.
From my friend and colleague from north Korea. I do not usually send out poetry but this moved me. I wish I had half her talent for writing.
As an aside I asked her why she often posts quotes from textbooks and philosophy (See photo below and at the link). She told me that they helped her to learn English. When she began to really study English after her escape, people told her to read children's books but she could not understand them. Then she found a text book in English about north Korea and Korean history and since she knew something about it she began reading it. It helped her to learn quickly and so she sought out other similar books about things she knew and about things that interested her (such as philosophy). And that is how she learned to read, speak, and write so well.
But this poem asks us to think. We take so much for granted. And those who have lived without freedom are those who are best suited to help us understand what we take for granted.
게시판
Freedom and Freedonia
freedom88-
3분 전
이웃추가
본문 기타 기능
The Illusion of Liberty Seen Through the Eyes of One Who Survived Totalitarianism.
By Jihyun Park
https://m.blog.naver.com/freedom88-/223944507012
“We speak of what we do not know.”
Can you truly say that you know freedom?
These words struck me like a blade.
I did not know freedom.
That is why I had to fight for it.
To live.
To breathe.
For me, freedom was not an ideal—it was a direction.
It was the only path to survival.
I was born in North Korea.
There, a single word, a glance, even a trace of thought was controlled.
The word ‘freedom’ did not exist.
Even imagining it was a punishable crime.
In such a place, I didn’t live—I obeyed, in order to survive.
I escaped hell twice. I was captured once.
Sold in China. Deported back to the North.
Crossed the border again, under a fear greater than death.
And in all of that, I learned just one thing:
Freedom is not something given.
It is something stolen people reclaim at the risk of their lives.
Tony Judt once wrote:
The West consumed Eastern Europe as a symbol and illusion.
Tragedy became backdrop; freedom, a performance.
The real voices went unheard.
Those who had lived through totalitarianism—
their testimonies were too "political," too "uncomfortable."
After defecting from the North,
I saw the same gaze in both South Korea and the West.
To them, North Korea was a story of freedom’s triumph,
a moral lesson in the failure of authoritarianism.
But the voices of those who had survived it
were either polished over or erased.
In South Korea, freedom is a political slogan.
But it is far too light, far too easily uttered.
In a society that has never truly experienced
how totalitarianism crushes emotion, language, and thought—
freedom exists only as a chant.
To them, North Korea is the “other.”
And freedom becomes a tool to define that other
and affirm their own legitimacy.
In the process, I was erased again and again.
Though I had lived North Korea,
I was not accepted as someone who could explain it.
I existed only as a symbol—a victim.
The West is no different.
They speak of freedom while demanding silence.
They preach justice and human rights,
but close their ears when those ideals confront discomfort.
To them, freedom is a badge of pride.
To me, freedom was desperation.
And I know this:
True freedom is not a philosophy.
It is like air—when it disappears, we die.
I obeyed. I hid. I was sold. I was caught. I fled.
I nearly died. I was silenced. I was forgotten.
But through all of it, I came to understand:
Freedom is not a line in a constitution.
It is a space where dignity is protected,
a society where existence is not erased,
a right to speak without fear.
That is freedom.
Tony Judt wrote,
“Eastern Europeans know what it means to become European.”
And so I say:
We know what it means to become Korean.
Because we crossed from unspeakable lands,
risking everything to reach this Korea.
We carry that homeland on our backs, like turtles hells,
living even in foreign lands.
We long for its peace and prosperity
perhaps more than those born within it.
But becoming Korean—
that is no easy thing.
To many South Koreans, I am simply a "defector."
An uneducated, starving escapee.
Someone with family in the North—
always suspicious, always half a spy in their eyes.
I am reduced to gossip,
a stranger who never truly belongs.
No one sees the burden of freedom we carry.
I am a defector. A survivor. One who crossed borders.
But more than that,
I am a witness of totalitarianism,
and one who understands the true weight of freedom.
Today, freedom is too easily consumed.
Politicians shout it while dividing people.
The media invokes it while ignoring truth.
But freedom is not something to be claimed—
it is something to be protected.
Freedom is still an unfinished word.
Now, it must be rewritten—
by those who have never once been allowed to live it.
13. S. Korea says to take into account U.S.-Japan deal ahead of trade talks with Washington
S. Korea says to take into account U.S.-Japan deal ahead of trade talks with Washington | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 23, 2025
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, July 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will take into account details of a recent trade deal reached between the United States and Japan in a bid to use it as a possible reference for Seoul's trade negotiations with Washington, the presidential office said Wednesday.
U.S. President Donald Trump said Tuesday (local time) that Washington had reached an agreement with Japan to cut proposed reciprocal tariffs on Japanese goods from 25 percent to 15 percent, adding the deal also includes Tokyo's $550 billion investment pledge.
South Korea is also seeking to reduce 25 percent reciprocal U.S. tariffs, as well as sectoral tariffs on autos, steel and aluminum, through a comprehensive trade proposal ahead of the Aug. 1 deadline set by the Trump administration.
"Details of the U.S.-Japan trade agreement are currently under review. If there are aspects that can serve as a reference for our government's negotiations, we plan to take them into account," presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung told reporters in a briefing.
With the deadline approaching, Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo and Finance Minister Koo Yun-choel are slated to attend the "2+2" trade talks with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer in Washington on Friday. Newly appointed Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan also departed for the U.S. earlier in the day, while National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac is already in Washington.
"(The officials) will find the most beneficial solution for our national interest in the tariff negotiations," Kang said.
Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung speaks during a press briefing at the presidential office in Seoul on July 23, 2025. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 23, 2025
14. N. Korea, China tout ties in banquet marking Chinese military anniv.
north Korea: the belle of the ball. It is being courted by everyone.
(LEAD) N. Korea, China tout ties in banquet marking Chinese military anniv. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 23, 2025
(ATTN: CHANGES photo; ADDS details in 6th para)
SEOUL, July 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea and China have called for a bilateral military friendship and unity in a banquet held in Pyongyang to celebrate the 98th anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the North's state media report showed Wednesday.
China's top envoy to Pyongyang, Wang Yajun, hosted the event at the Chinese Embassy the previous day, attended by the North's defense, foreign and ruling party officials, as well as foreign delegates and defense attaches based in the North, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The banquet came as North Korea's ties with China, the North's traditional ally, showed some signs of improvement after their bilateral relationship remained cool amid Pyongyang's close alignment with Moscow over Russia's war with Ukraine.
Participants were quoted as calling for the combat friendship and unity of the militaries of North Korea and China and wishing for the continuous development of the PLA, which celebrates its founding anniversary Aug. 1.
This photo from the website of the Chinese Embassy in North Korea shows a reception being held at the embassy in Pyongyang on July 22, 2025, to mark the 98th anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
North Korea has carried congratulatory messages or jointly held banquets with the Chinese Embassy to mark the anniversary.
It marked the first time since 2019 that the KCNA carried a report on a ceremony marking the Chinese military anniversary. Last year, Beijing said events celebrating the anniversary were held at overseas missions in South Korea, Germany and Switzerland, but it did not mention whether such an event was held in the North.
Earlier this month, Pyongyang and Beijing held reciprocal receptions to celebrate the 64th anniversary of the signing of a mutual defense treaty between the two nations.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 23, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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