Quotes of the Day:

"No man was ever wise by chance."

– Seneca

"The highest result of education is tolerance."

– Helen Keller

"You've got to find the force inside you." 

– Joseph Campbell

1. Putin’s Blitz Has United Ukraine

2. Fighting Irregular Wars: Is it Time to Rethink the Laws of Perfidy?

3. Ground-zero for the US AI energy challenge: A state-level case study

4. U.S. and Japan Reach Trade Deal

5. Mission or Meaning? Rethinking the Identity Crisis in U.S. Army Special Forces

6. partial campaign promise scorecard – a few observations by Dr. Cynthia Watson

7.  The Book That All Americans Should Be Reading Now (Why Nations Fail)

8.Visualizing How Rare Earths Power U.S. Defense

9. Kachin Resistance Matters in US/China Competition

10. U.S. Drones Stumble In Alaska: A Wake-Up Call For Military

11. The False Debate That Could Ignite the Next Nuclear Crisis

12. Frontline Fusion: The Network Architecture Needed to Counter Drones

13. Readiness and the Logistics Deterrent Effect

14. Secrets, Lies, and the Sacred Trust

15. Influence by Design: Reassessing U.S. Military Advising

16. Senators say foreign aid cuts could impede work of AFRICOM, SOCOM nominees

17. Fiona Hill, Trump’s Ex-Russia Adviser, on Why Great Powers Fall

18. Exclusive | Inside the elite Ukrainian combat unit revolutionizing modern drone warfare — and its offer to the US

1. Putin’s Blitz Has United Ukraine

Putin’s Blitz Has United Ukraine

Nightly missile and drone barrages on Kyiv and other cities have revived the nation’s will to fight.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/putins-blitz-has-united-ukraine-support-aid-russia-war-drone-cda61942

By Jillian Kay Melchior

Follow

July 22, 2025 4:06 pm ET

A Ukrainian firefighter at work on apartments damaged in an overnight drone attack in Kyiv, Ukraine, July 21. Photo: Patryk Jaracz/Zuma Press

Kyiv, Ukraine

Photojournalist Anton Shtuka has documented the aftermath of Russian attacks across Ukraine. Last month a missile hit close to home—down the street from his parents’ house. When crowds gathered, “it was so weird to see all the people from childhood around that collapsed building—my mom, the mother of my childhood friend,” he recalls. On Instagram he mused that “today came the realization that the front line has moved much closer. . . . Kyiv has turned into Kharkiv,” the hard-hit city just south of Russia.

The sentiment is widespread as Russia conducts missile and drone attacks on the Ukrainian capital and other cities. Vladimir Putin wants this blitz to demoralize Ukrainians, reassure Russians, and persuade the West that Kyiv is losing.

If Russia can overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses, then the country’s military and civilian infrastructures also are vulnerable. But Mr. Putin’s chief goal is “to terrorize the civilian population to influence politics, to start negotiations with Russian conditions,” says Mamuka Mamulashvili, commander of the Georgian Legion of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. The United Nations recorded 232 civilian deaths and 1,343 civilian casualties in June—a three-year high.

In Kyiv this month the air alerts often sounded around midnight and continued for hours. Under Stalin’s terror the Russians discovered that “sleeplessness was a great form of torture,” Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote in “The Gulag Archipelago.” Russia wants to break the Ukrainian will as it seeks to dismantle Ukrainian identity.

Hanna Ustynova of PEN Ukraine says she is equipping the shelter beneath her apartment with bedding, though it means accepting this tough phase of the war won’t end soon. Dark humor is another coping mechanism. One recent Instagram meme recommended “where to go in Kyiv this weekend,” alongside photos of bomb shelters. There was a lull in attacks last week as Donald Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg visited the capital; OK, locals joked, let’s crowd-fund an apartment for him here.

Weary civilians are enraged by the attacks. Many donate to support the military, and the raids could boost voluntary enlistment. “We are really becoming more united,” Ms. Ustynova says.

Some have a counter-intuitive interpretation of Russia’s drone blitz: It’s “an indicator of a lack of success on the battlefield” for Russia, said Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The Kremlin is enlisting Shahed-type drones and missiles, as opposed to planes and bombs, because it has been unable to establish air superiority, said Oleksiy Melnyk of the Razumkov Centre, a Kyiv-based think tank. The situation on the ground is similarly contested. “Let’s be honest: We’re not winning right now,” said Mr. Mamulashvili. “We’re in active defense due to a lack of resources.” But Moscow isn’t winning either, he says.

The Russians have gained about 925 square miles in 2025, according to the Institute for the Study of War. That “looks terrible—it creates the impression that they are moving forward,” said Serhii Kuzan, head of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, a Kyiv think tank. “But when we look at it from a military rather than a civilian point of view, things are different.”

Many Ukrainian civilians I spoke to this month were pessimistic about the ground war, while soldiers and volunteers from the front were more optimistic. None of the territory Russia has seized this year is strategically or even operationally significant. Ukrainian defenses have held around key fortified districts and fortress cities in the east, and “without these spots, you cannot develop your position further, regardless of how many fields you take,” Mr. Kuzan said.

The West harshly judged Ukraine’s fighting potential after its 2023 counteroffensive failed to regain much of the intended territory. But Russia failed in 2022 to seize Kyiv and also hasn’t achieved its more modest goal of gaining full control over Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Its advances in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia have stalled.

Britain’s Defense Ministry says Russia has suffered a million combat losses since 2022 and incurred about 1,080 casualties daily in June. Ukrainians who observe the Russians at the front told me the Kremlin’s so-called meat offensives are taking a toll on enemy morale.

As this becomes a war of attrition, Russia hopes to establish resource superiority. The Kremlin is ramping up production of missiles and artillery in addition to drones, and it has received Iranian and North Korean military support. Ukraine is also stepping up weapons production, but it can’t yet make some essential arms, such as interceptors for ballistic missiles. Kyiv also needs Western funding to help Ukrainian arms production match capacity.

Mr. Putin wants to erode the American and European will to arm Ukraine, and one way is promoting the myth that Russian momentum is unstoppable and Russian victory is inevitable. But Mr. Putin’s drone blitz could backfire with President Trump, who recently announced more support for Ukraine and expressed frustration with the Russian dictator: “I go home, I tell the first lady, ‘You know, I spoke with Vladimir today. We had a wonderful conversation.’ She said, ‘Oh really? Another city was just hit.’ ”

Ms. Melchior is a London-based member of the Journal’s editorial board.

Speaking on July 17, 2025, the U.S.’s top commander in Europe, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, discussed working with Germany on the Patriot transfer to Ukraine, NATO’s recommitment to collective security and the capabilities he needs most from industry.

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the July 23, 2025, print edition as 'Putin’s Blitz Has United Ukraine'.

2.  Fighting Irregular Wars: Is it Time to Rethink the Laws of Perfidy?

​Excerpts:

It was suggested on multiple occasions that the Nuseirat operation may have violated the laws of perfidy. Perfidy is defined in Article 37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions: Art. 37 states that perfidy is the act of a combatant falsely leading their adversary to believe that they are entitled to certain protections under the LOAC, with the intention of betraying this confidence. Article 37 explicitly mentions several examples of perfidious conduct, including feigning surrender, feigning incapacitation due to wounds, and feigning civilian or non-combatant status. In relation to feigning civilian status, Article 44 (3) should also be noted, as it clarifies that if combatants carry their arms openly during attacks and the deployments preceding them, there can be no argument that they have perfidiously feigned civilian status.

Belligerents in armed conflict have practiced perfidious deception to gain an advantage over their adversaries for centuries. In the early 1400s, the Tudors successfully captured Conwy Castle by sending two men claiming to be carpenters undertaking repairs. Once inside, the “carpenters” attacked the guards and opened the castle gates, allowing the Tudor forces to enter. During World War II, perfidious attacks were launched frequently. For example, a British commando, Lieutenant Bernard James Barton, was awarded the Military Cross after he successfully infiltrated a Nazi base and killed the base commandant. Barton reportedly achieved this by disguising himself as a shepherd and concealing his gun in a bundle of sticks. More recently, perfidious conduct became prevalent in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iraqi Fedayeen fighters are reported to have feigned surrender before attacking Coalition forces, as well as a plethora of other perfidious deceits. These examples seek to elucidate the nature of perfidy, whilst also illustrating the fact that perfidy is not a novel, or particularly rare, feature of warfare.

...

Reforming the laws of perfidy is a complex and delicate challenge because of their immense importance. Working to safeguard protected groups and seeking to uphold honor and chivalry in warfare, the laws of perfidy should be considered one of most significant areas of the LOAC. However, friction clearly arises when these laws are applied in the context of modern, irregular wars. It is essential that conventional armies are able to effectively and lawfully combat NSAGs which reprehensibly embed themselves within civilian areas, simultaneously flouting the LOAC and seeking to weaponize the law to their advantage. A balance must be struck between the laws of perfidy’s noble aims and the operational freedom of armies fighting irregular wars. If and where it can be shown that the perfidious use of disguises is a military necessity in the fight against NSAGs embedded within civilian areas, there seems to be a strong case for reform. For example, such a necessity arguably arises in hostage-rescue operations, potentially justifying an alteration of the laws. Overarchingly, however, any reform must be limited in nature to avoid compromising the essential role which the laws of perfidy strive to perform.

Fighting Irregular Wars: Is it Time to Rethink the Laws of Perfidy? - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Nadav Tikochinsky

On June 8, 2024, Israeli forces executed a hostage-rescue operation in Nuseirat, central Gaza. The Israeli operation was widely reported to have utilized civilian disguises, with some forces allegedly being transported in civilian vehicles and wearing civilian clothing. In the aftermath, the former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, contended that these alleged uses of civilian disguises may have violated the laws of perfidy. This contention prompts one to consider the usefulness of disguises in combatting irregular adversaries embedded within civilian areas, and to wonder whether this rescue operation would have been possible without some form of disguise. Could it be that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) prohibit the utilisation of disguises in this manner? This article will analyze the current state of the law and discuss the tensions and dilemmas that arise when the law confronts the realities of irregular wars. Following close examination, there appear to be compelling reasons to debate the suitability of the laws of perfidy in the context of irregular wars, and there might even be a case for limited reform.

It was suggested on multiple occasions that the Nuseirat operation may have violated the laws of perfidy. Perfidy is defined in Article 37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions: Art. 37 states that perfidy is the act of a combatant falsely leading their adversary to believe that they are entitled to certain protections under the LOAC, with the intention of betraying this confidence. Article 37 explicitly mentions several examples of perfidious conduct, including feigning surrender, feigning incapacitation due to wounds, and feigning civilian or non-combatant status. In relation to feigning civilian status, Article 44 (3) should also be noted, as it clarifies that if combatants carry their arms openly during attacks and the deployments preceding them, there can be no argument that they have perfidiously feigned civilian status.

Belligerents in armed conflict have practiced perfidious deception to gain an advantage over their adversaries for centuries. In the early 1400s, the Tudors successfully captured Conwy Castle by sending two men claiming to be carpenters undertaking repairs. Once inside, the “carpenters” attacked the guards and opened the castle gates, allowing the Tudor forces to enter. During World War II, perfidious attacks were launched frequently. For example, a British commando, Lieutenant Bernard James Barton, was awarded the Military Cross after he successfully infiltrated a Nazi base and killed the base commandant. Barton reportedly achieved this by disguising himself as a shepherd and concealing his gun in a bundle of sticks. More recently, perfidious conduct became prevalent in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iraqi Fedayeen fighters are reported to have feigned surrender before attacking Coalition forces, as well as a plethora of other perfidious deceits. These examples seek to elucidate the nature of perfidy, whilst also illustrating the fact that perfidy is not a novel, or particularly rare, feature of warfare.

Crucially, however, it must be noted that perfidy is not necessarily unlawful. Art. 37 only prohibits perfidious deception when used as a means of successfully killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary. Perfidious conduct that does not cause any of these outcomes does not violate the LOAC.

Although the existence of academic debate and uncertainty should be acknowledged, there seems to be relatively strong evidence that the prohibition of perfidious killing and injuring applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts, and that this prohibition is a rule of customary international law. If accurate, this means that all states are bound by this prohibition, in all armed conflicts.

The laws of perfidy serve a crucial purpose within the LOAC—they are a vital pillar of “the principle of distinction.” This is the principle that military persons and objects must be distinguishable from protected persons and objects. Distinction is central to the LOAC’s humanitarian aims, ensuring that military persons can be legitimately targeted, whilst protected persons are kept out of harm’s way. Perfidy strikes at the very core of this principle, blurring the lines between combatants and protected groups, thus making it unclear who is a legitimate military target. Perfidiously feigning protected status may cause belligerents to doubt the status of individuals who are genuinely part of protected groups. This erodes combatants’ respect for the laws that accord these groups protection and could potentially lead to members of protected groups being treated with hostility, on suspicion of being combatants in disguise. “Combatants cannot be expected to honor protections accorded under the [laws of war] if their opponent continuously abuses these protections to gain military advantage.” For example, if a platoon had been deceived by adversaries perfidiously feigning surrender, then that platoon would naturally treat the next unit they encountered waving the white flag with skepticism and hostility. By flouting the sanctity of protected status, perfidy endangers protected groups, degrading the principle of distinction.

The negative impact that perfidious conduct can have on the treatment of protected groups is not merely hypothetical—it can be seen in reality. In the Franco-Prussian War and the early stages of the First World War, German forces faced real and perceived attacks from irregular guerrillas known as “Franc-tireurs” who fought in civilian attire and concealed their arms. This perfidious conduct caused the German forces to treat the civilian population with brutality. During the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam would often perfidiously feign surrender before an attack, reportedly giving rise to a practice within the Sri Lankan Army of killing surrendering fighters. The perfidy of the Fedayeen in Iraq in 2003, who frequently disguised themselves as civilians, caused the US military to authorise the temporary detention of civilians. These examples evidence the suggestion that perfidy places protected groups at risk. They are treated with hostility because perfidy engenders a suspicion that their protected status might not be genuine.

The laws of perfidy also uphold the principle of chivalry. This principle strives to instill the value of honor into warfare, and seeks to ensure that belligerents fight “fair and square.” Perfidious conduct is inconsistent with these values: It has long been considered dishonorable and “treacherous” for a combatant to exploit their adversary’s goodwill by feigning protected status and then using the protection which their adversary has accorded to them to launch an attack.

It is thereby clear that the laws of perfidy play an incredibly important role within the LOAC. This should be established before any discussion of reform. The fact that relaxing the laws of perfidy could encourage dishonorable fighting and endanger protected groups must constantly be borne in mind.

Issues with the laws of perfidy arise within the context of “irregular wars,” defined here as hostilities between conventional militaries and non-state armed groups (NSAGs), drawing upon the latest definition published by the US military. Recent history has seen several irregular wars fought against NSAGs which embed themselves within civilian areas—such as Hamas and Hezbollah—seeking to obscure the distinction between combatants and civilians. For conventional militaries, clear tactical dilemmas arise when combatting such NSAGs.

Imagine a scenario in which a conventional army seeks to attack a NSAG’s cell, located within a densely populated civilian area. The conventional army could attempt a “boots on the ground” operation with uniformed soldiers. However, whilst wearing uniform, the forces would be instantly identified by local civilians and possibly even local sympathisers and fighters for the NSAG. The operation would then stand very little chance of success. The target cell would likely be alerted, allowing them to prepare for the attack, or change their location. The local population may attempt to prevent the soldiers from advancing further into the area, potentially even repelling them by force.

The uniformed soldiers could attempt an attack under the cover of darkness, somewhat like Orde Wingate’s Special Night Squads. However, uniformed operations in civilian areas, even at night-time, carry substantial risks of detection by scouts and local civilians. Moreover, operating at night brings a host of unique problems, such as disorientation and confusion, which might ideally be avoided.

Alternatively, the conventional military could opt for a precision strike on the target’s position. However, with the cell being embedded within a civilian area, an air strike would risk harming civilians and civilian infrastructure.

When faced with this tactical dilemma, a clandestine operation utilizing civilian disguises becomes a highly attractive option. The disguised forces would be able to infiltrate the area undetected and unobstructed, accessing the target without alerting it. This approach would also be more discriminate than an air-strike, potentially reducing the likelihood of civilian harm. However, due to the use of civilian disguises, this operation would likely be perfidious. If the perfidious operation succeeded in killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary, it would probably violate the LOAC. Therein lies the issue with the laws of perfidy: Conventional armies are restricted from employing tactics that might be crucial in their fight against NSAGs.

It could therefore be argued that the laws of perfidy overly restrict the operational freedom of conventional armies, leaving them unable to effectively combat NSAGs embedded within civilian areas. If the laws regarding perfidious disguises are adhered to, conventional armies may be driven to launching operations which have low prospects of success and are highly dangerous for the soldiers, or air-strikes which threaten civilians. Captain Charles Staab argues that adhering to the restrictions upon the use of disguises in clandestine operations “betrays [Special Operations Forces] to their enemy.” Relaxing the restrictions on the use of disguises might provide conventional militaries with vital flexibility in the fight against these NSAGs. This might explain why some militaries have established special units, which do not operate in uniform, to combat NSAGs embedded within civilian areas. The British military established the (now dissolved) “Military Reaction Force” during The Troubles in Northern Ireland, to operate in “those circumstances where soldiers in uniform and with Army vehicles would be too easily recognised.” The Israel Defense Forces also has specialist units, such as “Duvdevan,” which disguise themselves within the civilian population. It is paramount that these NSAGs can be combated effectively and lawfully, or else their reprehensible tactic of surrounding themselves with civilians successfully paralyses conventional armies or pushes them to subvert the LOAC.

One should acknowledge the possibility that the laws of perfidy might not apply in certain scenarios, and thus, a conventional army’s ability to use disguises might not be so restricted. A government may argue that its disguised operations are not acts of hostilities, but rather, they are law enforcement operations, which are governed, not by the LOAC, but instead, by the framework of laws applicable to law enforcement actions, which do not specifically prohibit “undercover” operations.

However, this legal possibility might not actually alleviate the challenges faced by armies seeking to combat NSAGs embedded within civilian areas. There is significant legal uncertainty and debate regarding what qualifies as a law enforcement operation, and when the “law enforcement paradigm” should apply. This uncertainty regarding which legal paradigm governs an operation means that armies usually cannot discount the LOAC’s applicability, and thus, the laws of perfidy will likely be considered, potentially having a restrictive effect on operational freedom even if the army believes that it is undertaking law enforcement operations.

In fact, it seems as though the law enforcement paradigm’s scope of application is perhaps rather restricted. There is a relatively strong body of expert opinion which holds that the LOAC generally takes precedence when the target of the operation is a legitimate target under the LOAC (i.e., an enemy combatant or a civilian directly participating in hostilities, rather than, for example, a mere local criminal). This suggests that the LOAC will often be the relevant framework for armies conducting operations during armed conflicts, rather than the law enforcement paradigm. For example, according to this expert opinion, the LOAC will likely govern military operations targeting a NSAG’s fighters. This reinforces the suggestion that the LOAC will usually be considered, and therefore, the laws of perfidy shall restrict an army’s operational freedom.

Furthermore, armies might deem the law enforcement paradigm to be undesirable, as it imposes strict constraints upon the use of force, “prohibit[ing] the resort to lethal force against persons, unless they pose an imminent threat to life.” Therefore, armies conducting operations might not even contest the applicability of the LOAC and the laws of perfidy.

For these reasons, the fact that the law enforcement paradigm generally permits “undercover” operations does not provide substantial assistance to armies seeking to combat NSAGs embedded within civilian areas. The LOAC will usually be considered and will often be the applicable paradigm, and therefore, the problem remains: The laws of perfidy will create significant operational challenges for armies seeking to combat these NSAGs.

However, operational challenges arguably are not a sufficiently strong reason for law reform. One should recall the crucial role played by the laws of perfidy. Relaxing restrictions and creating some lawful scope for the perfidious use of disguises during attacks would endanger protected groups, as trust in the status of genuine protected persons may be eroded. The consequences of reform could therefore be very severe, and it is questionable whether operational challenges provide a sufficiently weighty justification. Utilizing civilian disguises would probably make combatting NSAGs far easier. However, there is no requirement that military operations should be easy. The LOAC repeatedly restricts expedient military practices to ensure humanitarian protection—this is not unique. Furthermore, whilst disguises might make the conventional army’s soldiers safer, this is a problematic ground for reform. Combatants are expected to face danger as they are legitimate military targets, though armies should undoubtedly have the right to try to safeguard their soldiers. However, relaxing the laws of perfidy would compromise the safety of protected groups in order to enhance the safety of combatants. This would be a flawed trade-off. Colonel William Hays Parks echoes this: “[T]hat military personnel may be at greater risk in wearing a uniform is not in and of itself a sufficient basis to justify wearing civilian clothing. ‘Force protection’ is not a legitimate basis for wearing a non-standard uniform or civilian attire. Risk is an inherent part of military missions and does not constitute military necessity for wear of civilian attire.”

Reform, therefore, might be difficult to justify merely on the basis of making it easier to combat NSAGs. However, a balance must be struck: The law must not make it practically impossible to combat NSAGs either. Hays Parks implies that “compelling military necessity” might justify the “wear[ing] of a non-standard uniform or civilian clothing,” whilst emphasizing that “military convenience should not be mistaken for military necessity.” If it can be established that there are some situations in which the use of disguises is a necessity in the fight against NSAGs embedded within civilian areas, then there might be a strong case for reform.

One might argue that disguises are a military necessity when launching hostage-rescue operations against a NSAG embedded within a civilian area. Hostage-rescue operations will nearly always involve boots on the ground—the physical act of extracting a hostage and transporting them to safety inherently requires foot soldiers. Hostage-rescue operations also demand an element of surprise. If the hostage-taker is alert to the imminent attack, they could relocate or take preparatory countermeasures. Worse still, because the hostage-taker is often in close proximity to the hostage and holds control over them, an alerted hostage-taker could potentially harm the hostage, rendering the rescue operation a failure. “In a hostage rescue situation, a few seconds can mean the difference between success and failure; a terrorist can shoot a hostage or can detonate an explosive device inside the target area. Absolute surprise is necessary to allow the assault force those critical seconds to neutralize the threat. The loss of surprise will almost automatically mean aborting the plan.” If a hostage is held captive by a NSAG embedded within a civilian area, utilizing some form of disguise might be the only way for soldiers to remain undetected and achieve the necessary element of surprise. One may argue that there is a compelling case for reforming the laws of perfidy to account for such situations.

Furthermore, relaxing the laws of perfidy might not actually result in protected groups facing increased danger. In reality, perfidious operations are relatively common, despite the legal restrictions. It might be reasonable to suggest that the frequency of perfidious actions has already eroded belligerents’ trust in purported protected status, and belligerents already treat protected individuals with suspicion. If this is the case, then the damage has arguably already been done—protected groups may already face increased danger due to perfidy. From this perspective, reform might not majorly impact the practices of belligerents or threaten the safety of protected groups but would primarily adapt the LOAC to better reflect the modern requirements and realities of irregular warfare. This suggestion is admittedly speculative, however. Reform could potentially have significant negative effects. By conferring legal legitimacy onto these practices, reform could lead to perfidy occurring more regularly, eroding trust in protected status even further. Reform could also embolden malign actors to push the legal boundaries, compromising the principles of distinction and chivalry even more profoundly.

Reforming the laws of perfidy is a complex and delicate challenge because of their immense importance. Working to safeguard protected groups and seeking to uphold honor and chivalry in warfare, the laws of perfidy should be considered one of most significant areas of the LOAC. However, friction clearly arises when these laws are applied in the context of modern, irregular wars. It is essential that conventional armies are able to effectively and lawfully combat NSAGs which reprehensibly embed themselves within civilian areas, simultaneously flouting the LOAC and seeking to weaponize the law to their advantage. A balance must be struck between the laws of perfidy’s noble aims and the operational freedom of armies fighting irregular wars. If and where it can be shown that the perfidious use of disguises is a military necessity in the fight against NSAGs embedded within civilian areas, there seems to be a strong case for reform. For example, such a necessity arguably arises in hostage-rescue operations, potentially justifying an alteration of the laws. Overarchingly, however, any reform must be limited in nature to avoid compromising the essential role which the laws of perfidy strive to perform.

The views in this article are the author’s own.

Image: Olga Cherevko/OHCHR

fpri.org · by Nadav Tikochinsky

3. Ground-zero for the US AI energy challenge: A state-level case study

EnergySource

July 18, 2025 • 9:00am ET

Ground-zero for the US AI energy challenge: A state-level case study

By Andrea Clabough

atlanticcouncil.org · by srothbardt · July 18, 2025

AI growth, the advent of “hyperscalers”, and plans for new power-hungry data centers dotting the country from coast to coast have overturned previous assumptions of a stable US energy demand growth outlook. One state in particular is at the epicenter of America’s AI revolution: In 2024 alone, Virginia connected fifteen new data centers and anticipates adding another fifteen by the end of 2025. These are not isolated occurrences: already an established hub for US data centers, a recent WoodMackenzie report showed that Virginia lags only Texas as the top destination for newly announced data centers since January 2023 (boasting over 23,000 MW of capacity in the pipeline). Much of this development has been driven by Northern Virginia’s long-standing “Data Center Alley” concentrated around Washington, DC. Meanwhile, the state’s primary utility company, Dominion Energy, has suggested that the average Virginia ratepayer could see their power bills increase by 50 percent over the next fifteen years driven largely by power-hungry new data centers coming online.

As the Commonwealth considers the anticipated wave of new centers, its policymakers have an unmissable opportunity to lead the state toward a clear-eyed, viable path forward to reap economic benefits while ensuring both the affordability and sustainability of its energy system. None of these issues will be resolved quickly or easily but should be front and center as Virginia voters decide on their new governor this year and a new legislature.

STAY CONNECTED

Sign up for PowerPlay, the Atlantic Council’s bimonthly newsletter keeping you up to date on all facets of the energy transition.

Past meets present

Virginia is hardly unfamiliar with the prospect of adding new energy generation capacity to support data center growth. In addition to being a technology hotspot, the state is already a major destination for energy investment abetted by state and local governments’ decarbonization and clean energy targets. In 2019, then-Governor Ralph Northam (a Democrat) signed an executive order prioritizing clean energy expansion across the state, including goals for Virginia’s power system to achieve 30 percent renewable energy resources by 2030 and 100 percent by 2050. The next year, the Virginia state legislature formalized these commitments in the Virginia Clean Economy Act, which remains in force.

These policies have borne fruit. One analysis found that Virginia ranks fifth of all US states in percent increase in renewable energy generation over the last decade, led by growth in solar generation capacity sufficient to power 750,000 Virginia residences. Next year, a 2.6 GW offshore wind project is scheduled to come online. Notably, Virginia’s clean energy growth record and long-term aspirations have been maintained under the state’s current Republican leadership.

Expectation vs. reality

Virginia’s renewable and clean energy goals, however, were developed before generative AI was widely commercialized and Virginia became a key destination for data centers.

A report from Virginia’s Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission describes the growing challenge: while acknowledging that new data centers will benefit Virginia in employment and revenues, it warns that “unconstrained demand for power in Virginia would double within the next ten years, with the data center industry being the main driver.” Moreover, “[b]uilding enough infrastructure to meet unconstrained energy demand will be very difficult to achieve.” The fiscal implications of making necessary investments are potentially enormous with enormous implications for Virginians energy prices and power costs.

Virginia faces a herculean task to meet incoming demand growth via conventional or any other fuels—let alone address it in a manner that leads to net-zero emissions by midcentury.

Adding natural gas infrastructure, which currently supplies about half of the state’s electricity, faces two major barriers even apart from decarbonization considerations. First, the availability of new natural gas generation equipment, especially turbines, is sharply limited by supply chain bottlenecks (a situation complicated by uncertainty around the US international tariff slate). Second, constructing new natural gas power plants would likely entail expanding the network of associated infrastructure and interstate pipelines, which are time-consuming endeavors and can ignite local opposition (as the recent saga of the Mountain Valley Pipeline illustrates).

Similarly, renewables infrastructure can theoretically come online quickly but would entail a massive expansion of transmission, distribution, and long-duration battery storage capacity. Adding renewables also requires community buy-in, which is not always assured.

The way forward

Ample consideration must be given to how data centers are managed within Virginia—specifically in terms of regulations and requirements for new builds. Lawmakers debated a comprehensive state-wide AI regulatory proposal that was ultimately vetoed by Governor Glenn Youngkin (a Republican), but it is still possible to address specific energy infrastructure challenges through careful planning. Virginia officials should consider an approach that puts more responsibility on the hyperscalers themselves but also enables a constructive partnership between project developers, investors, policymakers, and local stakeholders:

The role of state officials

State officials could prioritize or incentivize new builds that can bring (and finance) their own on-site energy sources—ideally with abated, low, or zero emissions—to avoid straining the local grid system. They could also encourage new facilities in parts of the state with plentiful water resources such that the generators do not further strain areas vulnerable to water stress. Officials could adopt efficiency requirements for new builds (such as for technologies like advanced conductors) based on existing Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) criteria, and establish guidance for continuous improvements (similar to the Energy Star model) suitable for this generation of AI.

Local and municipal leaders’ role

Local and municipal policymakers can take leadership in facilitating shared efficiency and mitigation strategies in high-concentration regions for new builds (such as Northern Virginia). Shared infrastructure (e.g., a distribution system built for a grouping of new centers) can mitigate costs and environmental impacts of new equipment.

Investor collaboration

Similarly, multiple investor stakeholders working together could procure, prepare, and operate less commercialized fuel sources like small modular reactors, or develop local carbon sequestration and other abatement options. They could also establish a community fund supported by local project developers to provide monies for areas like local transmission and distribution upgrades, regional transmission and upgrades in cases where imported power from other states is necessary. Such measures can help to reduce inflationary pressure for regular ratepayers and could be managed by city/regional officials and be subject to public oversight.

When to say ‘no”

Importantly, there are likely to be instances where the potential economic benefits associated with certain proposals must be carefully balanced against wider societal impacts—such as the impact of a project on energy access, affordability, and the state’s decarbonization objectives. In cases where proposed data centers fail to meet certain requirements, officials should consider placing them lower in the interconnection queue for review and connection to external power sources. Likewise, new projects may simply be forced to wait regardless of their merits in order to shore up critical infrastructure for constituents who already rely on it. For those developers determined to operationalize as fast as possible, creative solutions or a heightened burden on said developer may be necessary. Policymakers should decide their criteria for “Yes,” “Maybe,” and even “No” since time is of the essence. They should also prepare to coordinate on those policy choices with relevant leadership at other levels of government.

The here and now

Virginia faces a tremendous task ahead: balancing its energy and climate aspirations with a rapidly changing techno-economic context impacting the entire state is no small feat. Thoughtful consideration of both the immediate benefits and long-term implications of today’s decisions is essential, as is a careful eye to energy insecurity and affordability problems percolating throughout the state as matters stand already. To be sure, the AI revolution shows few signs of slowing down. Appropriate policies to smooth the bumpy road ahead should be prepared here and now.

Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

4. U.S. and Japan Reach Trade Deal

U.S. and Japan Reach Trade Deal

Trump says Tokyo will face 15% reciprocal tariffs instead of the 25% he had threatened

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/u-s-japan-strike-trade-deal-trump-says-ab089e11

By Gavin Bade

Follow

 and Megumi Fujikawa

Follow

Updated July 23, 2025 5:24 am ET

New vehicles bound for shipment at a port in Yokohama, Japan, last week. Photo: Toru Hanai/Bloomberg News

Key Points

What's This?

• President Trump announced a trade agreement with Japan, setting so-called reciprocal tariffs at 15%.
• Japan will invest $550 billion in the U.S., with the U.S. receiving 90% of the profits, according to Trump.
• Japan will open its market to U.S. trade, including cars, trucks, rice and other agricultural products.

The U.S. and Japan have reached a trade agreement, President Trump wrote in a social-media post Tuesday evening, saying he would set his so-called reciprocal tariffs at 15% for the country.

Under the deal, Japan will invest $550 billion in the U.S., Trump said in his post on Truth Social. The U.S. will receive 90% of the profits from the investments, he added, without providing further details. Japan will also open to trade, Trump said, listing goods including cars and trucks, rice and other agricultural products.

Critically for Japan and its powerhouse auto industry, Tokyo’s top trade negotiator said tariffs on autos will also be lowered to 15% from their current 25%.

Trump said at a meeting with Republican lawmakers at the White House that the Japan deal is the “largest trade deal in history—maybe the largest deal in history.” He added that the Japanese government would enter a “joint venture” for liquefied natural gas exportation in Alaska. The administration and gas industry have long sought to secure partners for a proposed export project in that state.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said he received a report on the deal from his chief negotiator.

“The government was determined to protect national interests,” Ishiba told reporters Wednesday morning in Tokyo.

The deal “will lead to Japan and the U.S. working together to create jobs, produce high-quality goods, and contribute to fulfilling various roles in the world going forward,” he added.

Tokyo’s chief negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, wrote “mission accomplished” on his personal X account, sharing a photo of himself pointing to a picture on a White House stairway depicting Ishiba in discussion with Trump during the G-7 summit in Canada in June.

The 15% reciprocal tariff rate is lower than the 25% tariff that Trump threatened recently in a letter to the Japanese government. Akazawa told reporters in Tokyo that Japan also negotiated a reduction in separate national security tariffs on autos, to 15% from 25%. But he said there is no change to similar tariffs on steel, currently at 50%.

Automotive levies in particular had been a sticking point in negotiations between the governments for months.

Japan’s Nikkei Stock Average closed up 3.5%, and Toyota Motor shares rose 14% on the news, with investors viewing the blow to Japan’s economy as less severe than feared. Cars are among Japan’s biggest exports.

Write to Gavin Bade at gavin.bade@wsj.com and Megumi Fujikawa at megumi.fujikawa@wsj.com

5. Mission or Meaning? Rethinking the Identity Crisis in U.S. Army Special Forces

​ Access the entire paper here: https://sway.cloud.microsoft/TyTrEIzu39VyZGRv?ref=email&loc=play

Mission or Meaning? Rethinking the Identity Crisis in U.S. Army Special Forces

https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/280

Authored by:

Siamak T. Naficy, PhD, and W5 Maurice "Duc" DuClos

Log in to favorite this publication

Commentary

Web Page

Published on 7/1/2025

Digital Only

The U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) are not suffering an identity crisis; they are experiencing a strategic fracture of meaning. Originally designed to fill a niche no other force could—operating with and through indigenous partners in denied or politically sensitive environments—the Green Berets are now often celebrated for their kinetic capabilities, indistinguishable from other direct-action Special Operations Forces (SOF). This shift is more than mission creep—it is meaning creep: the erosion of the shared narrative, internal coherence, and incentive structures that once unified the Regiment.

This article synthesizes arguments from Colonel Edward Croot and Sergeant Major (Ret.) David Shell with insights from organizational theory, anthropology, and history to argue that SF’s core challenge is not one of confusion, but of existential drift.

Access as a webpage by clicking here or on the image below.

Mission or Meaning? Rethinking the Identity Crisis in U.S. Army Special ForcesBy Siamak T. Naficy, PhD, and CW5 Maurice "Duc" DuclosREAD NOW

6. partial campaign promise scorecard – a few observations by Dr. Cynthia Watson

E​xcertps:

In sum, at the six month mark, President Trump is finding the foreign policy objectives harder to achieve than he expected because other actors do have both their own publics to satisfy and instruments to use in orchestrating their strategies. That does not mean he will fail as he may well convince others to adopt his preferences. But, nations tend to follow their interests, regardless how seductive the idea that personal commitments or iron will can always win the day. President Trump often lauds those leaders he sees as strong and unfazed by opposition at home but is learning that opposition abroad, namely from us, doesn’t always mean they will surrender their positions to accommodate his views, either.

The six month mark, however, leaves this administration three and a half years to achieve its goals. The president has repeatedly argued that surprise is one of his greatest tools for negotiation. The back and forth on tariffs may only signal the beginning of shifts on foreign policy objectives. Many dynamics are at play but I wonder what the president’s priorities are for that remaining 42 months as that isn’t entirely apparent to me, at least.

Actions create consequences

partial campaign promise scorecard

a few observations

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/partial-campaign-promise-scorecard?r=7i07&utm

Cynthia Watson

Jul 21, 2025

The initial six months of the Trump 47 administration shows a dramatic difference between unequivocal domestic and foreign policy delivery on campaign promises. Donald Trump won an Electoral College majority in November 2024 with a sprawling agenda he believes that a plurality of the popular vote delivered to him as a mandate to govern. Today we examine a few pieces of that governing. I acknowledge this is a incomplete list of either campaign promises or subsequent policy steps.

The political landscape within our borders differs substantially from 20 January as a result of the sweeping expansion of Immigration and Customs Enforcement actions, slashing of federal programs and employee ranks, reversals of health advice, and passing the “Big Beautiful Bill”, among a substantial (if controversial) list of other moves. The president and his officials argue the changes reflect what his supporters demanded last fall. The administration has ignited consternation, at a minimum, by those who see these actions as detrimental to the nation but President Trump continues arguing he has delivered more benefits in six months than any president.

Delivering on foreign policy, however, is proving harder. The war between Russia and Ukraine rages, with Trump demanding last week that Putin become more serious within fifty days about ending the conflict. Despite candidate Trump’s assurances he could end this conflict relatively easily, Putin is ignoring Trump’s entreaties, casting doubts on any mutual respect between the two. The clearest indication of President Trump’s frustration was a suggestion that he would reverse his long-held antipathy towards arming Ukraine, though this could change if Russia negotiated in good faith.

Similarly, Israel’s combative Prime Minister is proving harder to rein in than Trump expected. The post-7 October Israeli retribution against Palestinians in Gaza continues to garner international condemnation with no indication that Netanyahu intends to stop. U.S. officials conducted what were initially labelled obliteration of Iranian nuclear capacity just a month ago but many analysts at home and abroad expect that the joint U.S.-Israeli actions will only retard rather than terminate Teheran’s nuclear research. There is nothing to indicate the Middle East, in sum, is entering a conflict-free period. It’s a tough neighborhood for the new U.S. administration like all predecessors, it would seem.

Candidate Trump promised to pull back the American posture around the world, emphasizing strength over cooperation or subservience to others. A raft of steps, ranging from firing officials to eliminating diversity, equity, and inclusion in any corner of the All Volunteer Force, signal a “hardened” military but these actions neither guaranteed more ships, planes, or troops, to the frustration of many who believe we seriously underfund defense obligations (despite almost an annual trillion dollar defense budget) nor ended the majority of our global commitments.

Shuttering both foreign assistance and Voice of America were important priorities for many who viewed these as unnecessary, wasteful expenditures but the elimination of these relatively cheaper, non-military tools to improve our international position at precisely the same time China is expanding its use of these means.

Coincidentally, pushing our overseas partners to increase their defense spending, whether in NATO or East Asia, is proving somewhat successful but with consequences. Growing apprehension that the U.S. commitment to the security of its allies is waning, regardless of treaty arrangements, is motivating others to explore new linkages, such as the triple entente announced last week between the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, to assure future cooperation en lieu of U.S.-driven organizations of the post-World War II world.

Additionally, Australia and Japan over the past six months are worthy cautions of potential dangers to U.S. assumptions. Public opinion “DownUnder” appears increasingly dubious about U.S. leadership over the next decade, potentially encouraging the Albanese government—and by extension that of Keir Starmer in Britain—to reconsider the extremely expensive AUKUS submarine program intended to build submarines and a global network to contain Chinese aggression into the middle of this century. A public opinion poll within the last few weeks highlighted Australian beliefs that China was rising as the dominant state for the next decade.

The concerns, however, are broader than about who will be the dominant state. The Lowy Institute found only 36% of Australians surveyed believed the United States would operate in the global interest, a condemnation more commonly used to describe Beijing as a global player than Washington. The survey shows dramatically shifting views, however. A snapshot but one is a state whose ties matter a great deal to American aspirations around the world.

Similarly, Japan’s Diet elections only yesterday showed popular sentiment not for the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party under Prime Minister Ishiba but increasingly for more conservative elements within the body politic. While Shigeru Ishiba did not satisfy a sufficient number of voters for his party to control the upper house of Parliament, he is hardly a leftist. It leads me to wonder whether his attempts to placate American demands on defense expenditures (already substantial since Tokyo pays much for U.S. basing across that nation) or tariffs turned off voters who prefer politicians espousing a preference for adopting greater independence in its national security posture. What would that mean for U.S. forces reliant on bases on the Home Islands or Okinawa?

Candidate Trump campaigned on promises to implement tariffs, abandoned worldwide as an instrument of statecraft almost a century ago, to coerce other states’ behavior and because he believes others misunderstand the importance of tariffs to combat trade deficits (which we commonly run with most of the world). He is proving surprisingly malleable in determining the levels of those tariffs but it is unclear how successful he will be at altering other governments’s decision-making with these threats. The negotiations remain underway but tariffs, as Trump desires, are in place—as a piece indicated only last week in the Wall Street Journal. Recent indications of tariff-driven inflation could alter that strategy but not presently. His hope to return many jobs, often at relatively low pay in the eyes of critics, to American shores is still a work in progress but closely associated with this method of policy.

Trump also uses tariff threats to force other regimes to alter their policies far beyond trade, the clearest example the threat to impose massive tariffs on Brazil over prosecuting former president (and Trump friend) Jair Bolsonaro for a 2023 coup attempt. The decision to terminate tariff negotiations with Canada, our vast and naturally-endowed neighbor Trump covets as a fifty-first state, would appear similarly driven to force Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government in Ottawa to alter its reluctance to acquiesce to Trump’s preferences well beyond purported trade inequities.

The most mixed messaging in the president’s foreign policy remains the relationship with the People’s Republic of China. While some voices within his administration, led by UnderSecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, clearly seek to reestablish an unquestionable military superiority over China, President Trump’s admiration for the strength of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping adds a wrinkle to the bilateral relationship. The president certainly sees America as greater than China but how he intends to pursue policy options is unclear, as is an unwavering vow to defend Taiwan should Beijing attack.

The president believes he can wring out a far better deal than any of his predecessors from trade talks with PRC officials but Xi Jinping, long obsessed with sealing off his country from external pressures precisely along these lines as if he saw them coming more than a decade ago, has tried to implement his own “China First” policies, reducing reliance on export-driven growth. It’s hard to see how the United States will assure a vastly improved position in the face of a China gearing up for this fight but I am not a trade negotiator by any means.

In sum, at the six month mark, President Trump is finding the foreign policy objectives harder to achieve than he expected because other actors do have both their own publics to satisfy and instruments to use in orchestrating their strategies. That does not mean he will fail as he may well convince others to adopt his preferences. But, nations tend to follow their interests, regardless how seductive the idea that personal commitments or iron will can always win the day. President Trump often lauds those leaders he sees as strong and unfazed by opposition at home but is learning that opposition abroad, namely from us, doesn’t always mean they will surrender their positions to accommodate his views, either.

The six month mark, however, leaves this administration three and a half years to achieve its goals. The president has repeatedly argued that surprise is one of his greatest tools for negotiation. The back and forth on tariffs may only signal the beginning of shifts on foreign policy objectives. Many dynamics are at play but I wonder what the president’s priorities are for that remaining 42 months as that isn’t entirely apparent to me, at least.

What is clear is that we are not privy at this point to seeing how it many successes or disappointments we will confront on 20 January 2029.

I welcome your thoughts on this or any column. I genuinely want to hear others’ analyses, concerns, challenges, or anything else as I do not have all of the answers but do see lots of tugs and pulls in the system.

Thank you for your time. Thanks to the loyal subscribers who contribute financial support to this work to expand civil, measured conversation on the issues of our world. Annual support of $55 (or $8 a month) means a great deal to this work.

Amid the dangerous heat of July, be well and be safe. FIN

Gavin Butler and Michael Sheila McNamee and Shamaa Khalil, “Japan’s PM vows to stay on despite brushing election loss” BBC.com, 20 July 2025, retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8xvn90yr8go

Riley Duke, “US aid cuts are a soft power surrender to China”, TheLowyInstitute.org, 18 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-aid-cuts-are-soft-power-surrender-china

Greg Ip, “Forget TACO. Trump is Winning His Trade War”, WSJ.com, 15 July 2025, retrieved at https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/forget-taco-trump-is-winning-his-trade-war-8af6f777?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

Anastasiia Malenko, Steve Holland, and Peleshiuk, “In reversal, Trump arms Ukraine and threatens sanctions on countries that buy Russian oil”, Reuters.com, 14 July 2025, retrieved at https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/trump-send-patriot-missiles-ukraine-us-envoy-visits-kyiv-2025-07-14/

Ryan Neelam, “2025 Report: Executive Summary”, TheLowyInstitute.org, 16 June 2025, retrieved at https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2025/executive-summary/

7. The Book That All Americans Should Be Reading Now (Why Nations Fail)

​A tale of two Nogales and a tale of two Koreas.

Excerpts:

The lessons from history, from the two Nogales towns to North and South Korea, are clear. Geography or culture may play a role, but it’s the fundamental design and operation of a nation’s institutions that truly dictate its long-term trajectory. For the United States, and indeed for any nation, the future hinges on its collective commitment to protecting institutions that empower the many, rather than enriching the few.

Why Nations Fail offers a compass for America’s future. It’s not just a book about economics; it’s a blueprint for understanding why some societies thrive and others collapse, and a way to understand what’s happening in the US right now. It reminds us that the choice is stark: will the United States reinforce the inclusive foundations of its success, or will it succumb to the insidious creep of institutional decay? The stress test is now.

The Book That All Americans Should Be Reading Now

zmescience.com · by Mihai Andrei · July 22, 2025

Nations fail because of their institutions, write Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.

The two should know. Along with Simon Johnson, they were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for their groundbreaking work on why some nations thrive while others collapse. Their landmark book, Why Nations Fail, first published in 2012, offered a sweeping argument that it’s not culture or geography but the strength (and fairness) of institutions that determines a nation’s fate.

It’s a challenging argument, and a very timely one. Over a decade later, as the United States grapples with rising instability, inequality, and institutional erosion, their warning reads less like history and more like prophecy. Why? Because the downfall of the US has rarely been more plausible.

Acemoglu himself seems to acknowledge this in a recent article published in the Financial Times. The Nobel Laureate conducted a thought experiment envisioning a historian in the year 2050 describing what led to a hypothetical US failure. The real causes, the economist explains, are the weakening of democratic institutions along with economic inequality. In his account, the pillars of American prosperity (innovation, fair competition, and strong governance) gradually crumbled, leading to stagnation and decline.

But what does a 2012 book have to do with all of this?

Two Towns Called Nogales

The two towns called Nogales.

Rather ironically, Why Nations Fail starts with a positive US tale. There are two towns called Nogales on opposite sides of the US border, one in Arizona and one in Mexico. If they were in the same country, they’d be a single town. However, they are divided by wire fence and an iron wall, separating the US side from Mexico.

Despite sharing the same geography, the Nogales towns have very different living standards and settings. They’re vastly different cities. People have different salaries, health facilities, and schools. Obviously, this is because they’re in different countries. But let’s dive even deeper. When they are so close, and all other things are equal, why does it matter so much that they’re in different countries? Why do Mexico and the US have such different conditions?

In a general sense, the question becomes “Why are some countries rich and prosperous while others are not?”

The Strength of Institutions

In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the success or failure of nations is primarily determined by the strength of their institutions. They define a way to look specifically at whether they are inclusive or extractive. More than geography, more than anything else, this is the one aspect that, in the long-term can drive prosperity: inclusive institutions.

Inclusive political and economic institutions are designed to encourage broad participation across society. They foster innovation and fuel sustainable economic growth. They achieve this by safeguarding secure property rights and ensuring the rule of law applies equally to all, providing genuine opportunities for individuals to advance. In such nations, governments are accountable to their citizens, power is distributed widely, and individuals are incentivized to invest their time and resources to create new ideas and participate in the progress of their nation. Nations flourish when their political and economic institutions are inclusive.

Conversely, nations falter when they are dominated by extractive institutions.

Sale

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

• A New York Times and Wall Street Journal Bestseller.
• Finalist for the Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year
• One of the best books of the year, picked by Washington Post, The Economist, Bloomberg
• Acemoglu, Daron (Author)
• English (Publication Language)

$15.23

Buy on Amazon

In these systems, a small, powerful elite controls both political power and economic wealth, often at the direct expense of the majority of the population. They extract from their people. These institutions actively limit economic opportunities, stifle innovation, and frequently rely on repression and coercion to maintain the elite’s grip on power. Corruption is rampant, property rights are weak or non-existent for most, and there is a severe lack of political accountability. These characteristics ultimately choke off long-term economic growth and development.

The tale of Nogales is just one compelling illustration of this fundamental difference, out of many examples. Perhaps no other pair of nations illustrates the power of institutions as vividly as North and South Korea.

These two countries share a common language, culture, and history, having been a unified peninsula for centuries. Yet, a line drawn at the 38th parallel after World War II, solidified by the Korean War, separated them into two radically different realities.

Extractive Institutions

In 1945, at the time of their division, North Korea actually possessed a stronger industrial base, inheriting most of the heavy industry developed during Japanese colonial rule. South Korea was largely agrarian. Both suffered immense destruction during the Korean War (1950-1953). However, their chosen paths diverged dramatically in the aftermath, with profound consequences.

You can see the differences between North and South Korea from miles away, literally. North Korea has massive electricity shortages and can’t afford night lights in most places. Image credits: NASA.

North Korea adopted a centrally planned, communist system, characterized by highly extractive institutions. Under the leadership of Kim Il-sung and his successors, private property was largely abolished, markets were suppressed and contact with the outside world was severely restricted. The goal of this system was to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a small elite, the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea and the military.

While the North experienced some initial growth in the immediate post-war period, fueled by aid from the Soviet Union and China, this was not sustainable. The lack of incentives for innovation, combined with state control over nearly all aspects of life and the diversion of resources to the military, stifled long-term economic development. The result has been chronic food shortages, widespread poverty, and a society isolated from the global community.

North Korea’s economic development largely stagnated, and by the late 1990s, its GDP per capita was plummeting. Now, it’s one of the poorest countries in the world and even struggles to feed itself.

South Korea, by contrast, eventually embraced inclusive institutions.

Inclusive Institutions

South Korea’s early post-war years were marked by political instability and slow economic growth under authoritarian rule. Over time, particularly from the 1960s onward, South Korea prioritized an active economic strategy. This involved building institutions that protected property rights, fostered competitive markets, and invested heavily in education and infrastructure.

The South Korean government, while initially having a strong hand in guiding the economy, gradually created an environment where private businesses could thrive. Companies like Samsung and LG, now global giants, emerged from this environment. South Korea’s political system also transitioned towards greater democracy, increasing accountability and further solidifying inclusive institutions. This “Miracle on the Han River” transformed South Korea from one of the poorest countries in the world into a developed, high-income nation, a member of the OECD and the G20. Its GDP per capita now stands many times higher than that of its northern neighbor.

The difference between these two Koreas is not due to geography or culture. It is a direct result of their institutional choices. One chose an extractive path that concentrated power and stifled prosperity for the many, while the other progressively built inclusive institutions that fostered broad participation and economic growth.

But you don’t need to take two different places and compare them. The same place can turn from extractive to inclusive — or the other way around.

What Does This Mean for the United States?

You may be tempted to think that this doesn’t mean anything for the US. But remember, this isn’t about Korea or Nogales; it’s about institutions.

A nation’s prosperity is not a given. It is constantly shaped by the strength and character of its institutions. If you want to see how a country will do economically in the long run, look at its institutions. In the US, a lot is changing nowadays and institutions across the board are taking a hit.

Acemoglu in his office. Image via Wiki Commons.

Many scholars and observers, including Acemoglu and Robinson themselves, have applied the Why Nations Fail framework to the Trump presidency. Robinson, for instance, has stated that the Trump administration tried to build extractive institutions where power concentrates in the hands of a narrow elite and extracts resources from society.

The Trump approach, Robinson says, is centered around groups, masculinity, and antagonizing. It involves building an in-group and creating an ideology around white nationalism, xenophobia against foreigners, and masculinity. This is what Robinson called the “New Post-Liberal Order” and he doesn’t mince his words on what this will cause. “This is all going to be a disaster for economic performance in the United States,” Robinson concluded.

But here’s the thing: it’s all very hard to follow. That’s not a coincidence, it’s a strategy. Trump is a master at capturing attention, and he bombards the airwaves with seemingly random and often confusing ideas and approaches. From immigration to trans athletes to boat engines and sharks, Trump jumps from one thing to the next, and it’s next to impossible to keep track of it. But the reason why you should read Why Nations Fail is that it offers a framework that unites all of these seemingly disparate threads: a weakening of institutions.

The Trump presidency has already unleashed an unprecedented barrage on established democratic norms. These range from questioning election results to attacks on the press and even the judiciary. Why Nations Fail explains why this is not just terrible for democracy, but terrible for the economy as well.

The Stress Test

In the article where Acemoglu describes how a collapse of the US could happen, he starts from a weakening of institutions. The court system no longer functions, the competitive environment is dominated by friends and oligarchs, and ultimately, trust (and with it, the country’s economy) also collapses. It’s what we’ve seen happen in multiple countries, and it’s what could happen in the US as well if current trends continue.

This problem, they suggest, is rooted in a long-standing failure of liberal democracy to deliver shared prosperity and address growing inequalities that have emerged over recent decades. This sentiment, that the system isn’t working for everyone, creates fertile ground for populist movements and leaders who promise radical change and go on to erode institutions.

The lessons from history, from the two Nogales towns to North and South Korea, are clear. Geography or culture may play a role, but it’s the fundamental design and operation of a nation’s institutions that truly dictate its long-term trajectory. For the United States, and indeed for any nation, the future hinges on its collective commitment to protecting institutions that empower the many, rather than enriching the few.

Why Nations Fail offers a compass for America’s future. It’s not just a book about economics; it’s a blueprint for understanding why some societies thrive and others collapse, and a way to understand what’s happening in the US right now. It reminds us that the choice is stark: will the United States reinforce the inclusive foundations of its success, or will it succumb to the insidious creep of institutional decay? The stress test is now.

zmescience.com · by Mihai Andrei · July 22, 2025

8. Visualizing How Rare Earths Power U.S. Defense

​A fascinating graphic at this link: https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-how-rare-earths-power-u-s-defense/?utm

I had no idea of the sacel described here.

Technology Metals

Visualizing How Rare Earths Power U.S. Defense

Published 2 days ago on July 20, 2025

By Bruno Venditti

Graphics/Design:

Sam Parker

Tweet

Share

Share

Reddit

Email

How Rare Earths Power U.S. Defense

Rare earth elements (REEs) are essential components of advanced military technology. From fighter jets to submarines, these critical minerals power key systems that give the U.S. military a strategic edge.

This infographic explores the quantities of REEs used in major U.S. defense platforms and highlights their specific applications in modern warfare.

It reveals how different military equipment relies on rare earths not just in bulk, but for highly specialized roles, from laser-guided weapons to stealth capabilities.

Key Takeaways

• U.S. military platforms like the Virginia-class submarine and Arleigh Burke destroyer require thousands of kilograms of rare earth elements (REEs).
• F-35 Fighter jets alone use over 400 kg of REEs, essential for weapons targeting systems, lasers, and other advanced onboard technologies.

The data for this visualization comes from Benchmark Mineral Intelligence. It shows how rare earths are embedded in some of the most advanced military equipment in use today. The dataset includes total REEs used (by weight) and typical applications across three key platforms.

Rare Earths in the F-35 Fighter Jet

The F-35 Lightning II requires around 418 kg of REEs per unit. These materials are used in advanced weapons targeting systems, radar, and laser technologies. Elements like neodymium and praseodymium are especially important in the permanent magnets that support flight control and stealth functions.

EquipmentRare Earths Used (kg)Application ExamplesF-35 Fighter Jet418 kgGuided missiles, Lasers used to determine targetsArleigh Burke DDG-51 Destroyer2600 kgAdvanced radar systems, Missile guidance systems, PropulsionVirginia-Class Submarine4600 kgTomahawk missiles, Radar systems, Drive Motors

Massive Demand from Naval Platforms

The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and Virginia-class submarine are two of the U.S. Navy’s most sophisticated vessels. The destroyer uses about 2,600 kg of REEs, while the submarine demands a whopping 4,600 kg. These elements support radar, sonar, missile guidance, and propulsion systems critical for both offensive and defensive missions.

China’s Dominance in REE Supply

While these elements are crucial to U.S. defense, more than 70% of REE imports come from China. This dependence on a single geopolitical rival has raised strategic concerns in Washington, with the Trump administration making efforts to diversify supply chains and boost domestic production.

9. Kachin Resistance Matters in US/China Competition

Resilience and Resistance Strategies

37

Kachin Resistance Matters in US/China Competition

Myanmar's Rare Earths Receive Increased International Attention

https://robertburrell.substack.com/p/kachin-resistance-matters-in-uschina?r=45thzu&utm

Robert Burrell, PhD and Dr. Chris Mason

Jul 22, 2025

Figure 1. Kachin Independence Army cadets in October 2016 (source/VOA)

On 1 July 2025, Dr. Chris Mason and I wrote a piece in the National Interest, highlighting that the Kachin Independence Organization has gained control over one of the largest deposits of rare earths (see figure 2). We recommended that the United States should begin dialog with the Kachin people in support of an independent Kachin nation to cut the Gordian Knot of the world’s longest civil war and reduce China’s virtual monopoly on rare earths - a dominance heavily dependent on exploiting Kachin deposits at a staggering environmental cost to Southeast Asia.

Since that publication, attention on rare earths in Myanmar has exploded. On 11 July, the New York Times highlighted Kachin’s importance to China’s domination of the trade. This story was echoed by NPR on 12 July. On 15 July Stimson Center conducted a webinar on this topic and the importance of Kachin State. On 18 July, Bloomberg published a piece titled “A Rebel Army Is Building a Rare-Earth Empire on China’s Border.” Bloomberg’s essay provides specific details on the rare earth process and potential in Kachin, while also highlighting that the current U.S. administration’s foreign policy in Myanmar is short-sighted. Even CNBC has begun discussing Myanmar’s rare earth reserves and Kachin’s importance in the U.S./China competition.

Figure 2. Rare Earth Mining Production by Nation (source/Department of Interior)

The long arc of history between the United States and Kachin remains extremely important to the current situation and the potential outcomes. At the outset of World War II, the British were rapidly driven out of Burma by Japan. British military efforts to undermine Japanese control of Burma with long range patrols known as Chindits were disastrous. Only the United States, with a large presence in southern China in support of Chiang Kai-shek retained a presence among the strongly anti-Japanese Kachin resistance movement in northern Burma. In 1942, the US began a close relationship with the Kachinese which remains among Kachin elders to this day. A large group of American special forces called Detachment 101 went into the region to support and train the Kachin resistance. The collaboration was remarkably successful in disrupting the Japanese occupation of the region, so much so that the 3,000 Kachin Rangers were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, a recognition that remains a source of pride among the Kachin today. Detachment 101 and the bonds of wartime comradeship forged a lasting positive impression of the United States that is still strong among the Kachin people today.

Since World War II, Kachinese have fiercely fought for their autonomy as an independent nation. In fact, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and their governance counterpart the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), have fought an insurgency nearly continuously since the 1960s. The Kachin have eyed both China and the Myanmar junta as aggressors who have routinely interfered in their territory out of greed and self-interest. In short, the Kachin want their independence and they won’t stop fighting until they get it. As illustrated in Figure 3, the Kachin people in northern Myanmar represent a cohesive people and nation.

Figure 3. Map of Myanmar’s Ethnicities (source/digital commons)

Kachin independence has regional and (due to its large deposits of rare earths) international implications. The reality is that the recognized national borders of Myanmar cannot be maintained by central governance from the capital of Naypyidaw, a fact supported by the Study of Internal Conflict at the University of South Florida. This region has been bogged down in the longest running civil war in history - with no end in sight. The United States should recognize the will of the Kachin people and support its independence.

China is not the only international player with interest in Kachin. Kachin borders India, and there is an established transportation and trade route system between the two in the heart of the territory. Only a few days ago, the Kachinese newspaper Irrawaddy published a piece advocating for both the United States and India to partner with Kachin and oppose China’s “incursion into Myanmar.” Dialogue between the U.S. and India regarding the future of the region is critical to future peace and stability as well as the rare earth mineral trade.

India would appear to be a natural partner in this new approach to Myanmar’s endless civil war. The conflict has been destabilizing India’s eastern region for decades. Furthermore, establishing China’s rare earths hegemony in perpetuity is in no one’s strategic interests except China’s. An independent Kachin would facilitate India’s current Act East policy while securing and stabilizing India’s restive eastern Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Assam states and eventually yield an economic boon in the transportation and refining sectors. In fact, India has supported the KLA in the past and there are reasons to believe that, privately, India is not averse to an independent Kachin.

Kachin, its rare earths deposits, and the China’s exploitation of Myanmar have become a popular topic this month in multiple mediums. The United States should reconfigure its foreign policy to support Kachin’s independence, strengthen its ties with India, halt China’s aggression, and solve its rare earth crisis.

Recommend Resilience and Resistance Strategies to your readers

This is a newsletter about resilience and resistance in today's hotspots around the world!

A guest post by

Dr. Chris Mason

Chris Mason is a retired Foreign Service Officer and former Professor of National Security Affairs at the Army War College. He has worked in and on South Asia for 25 years.

10. U.S. Drones Stumble In Alaska: A Wake-Up Call For Military

​Excerpts:

The Path Forward: Can the U.S. Turn It Around?

Hegseth’s memo pushes for active-duty drone units and streamlined buying processes, with the Defense Contract Management Agency possibly stepping in to scale Blue UAS. The Alaska data is being studied to fix the jamming woes, but time’s ticking. With adversaries fielding advanced drones, the U.S. needs to move faster than a Mavic 4 in Sport Mode. The Artemis project isn’t dead—it’s a learning curve, but the Pentagon’s got to stop treating drones like they’re buying a new battleship.

For now, keep flying your DJI rigs and check DroneXL.co for updates. This Alaska flop is a reminder: your backyard drone is already a star, even if the Pentagon’s still figuring it out. Got thoughts on the U.S. drone struggles? Share them in the comments!

U.S. Drones Stumble In Alaska: A Wake-Up Call For Military

• Rafael SuárezJuly 20, 2025Alaska, Avy, China, DJI Air 3S, DJI Mavic 3, DJI Neo, DJI Spark, Drone Light Show, Drones, Firmware Update, Ukraine14 Comments

dronexl.co · July 20, 2025

U.S. Drones Stumble in Alaska: A Wake-Up Call for Military Tech

A Dragoon Sender drone caught fire after failing to hit its target during attack drone testing near Fort Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska. Credit: Courtney Albon, Defense News.

Amazon Deals: DJI Power 2000 now $1,099 (-42%) and DJI Osmo Mobile 7P for $125 (-16%).

DroneXL readers, brace yourselves for a tale of high-tech hopes and face-planting drones. According to Defense News, the U.S. military’s recent test of small, long-range attack drones at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, was less a triumph and more a lesson in humility.

Picture drones crashing into hills or bursting into flames—hardly the stuff of Pentagon dreams. Let’s dive into this misadventure, unpack why it went wrong, and explore what it means for the future of drone warfare and our beloved #DronesForGood mission.

Red Flag, Rough Landing: The Alaska Trials

While fighter jets roared through the Red Flag exercise at Eielson Air Force Base, a quieter but equally ambitious drone test unfolded 20 miles away at Fort Wainwright. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Pentagon’s tech trailblazers, teamed up with four companies to trial drones built to strike targets despite enemy jamming. Sounds like the kind of mission your Mavic 3 could nail with a firmware update, right? Not quite. Defense News reports one drone missed its target and smashed into a hill, while another overshot and went up in flames.

The culprit? Electronic warfare (EW) jamming scrambled the drones’ navigation, turning them into expensive lawn darts. Trent Emeneker, a DIU official, told Defense News it’s too early to write off the effort, but admitted the results were “not what I would have hoped for.” In other words, it’s back to the lab, and maybe someone’s double-checking the GPS settings.

The Pentagon’s Drone Ambitions Meet Reality

The U.S. military’s been drooling over drones since Ukraine showed how cheap UAVs can turn tanks into scrap metal. For DroneXL readers who geek out over their DJI Air 3s obstacle avoidance, this is familiar territory—drones are game-changers, whether for epic footage or battlefield wins. The Alaska tests, part of the DIU’s Artemis project, aimed to prove small, long-range attack drones could outsmart jamming. Instead, they highlighted how far the U.S. lags behind in the drone race.

Artemis, spun up with $16 million from a Ukraine aid package, moved fast by Pentagon standards, selecting four companies in seven months. But here’s the rub: nobody’s buying. Defense News notes the Army, Navy, and Air Force are hesitant, each wanting drones tailored to their exact needs, like picky customers at a custom drone shop. Emeneker’s been pitching Artemis for a year, but the services keep dragging their feet. It’s the “valley of death”—where promising tech dies in a swamp of bureaucracy, slower than a DJI Neo on its last 15% of battery.

Blue UAS: A Good Idea Buried in Paperwork

Enter Blue UAS, the Pentagon’s attempt to make drone-buying as easy as grabbing a new controller. Launched in 2020, it’s a list of vetted, non-Chinese drones (sorry, DJI) that troops can purchase without jumping through hoops. Chris Bonzagni, a former DIU official, told Defense News the goal was to let a staff sergeant in the field buy a drone like it’s a new lens for their camera. But endless compliance checks—every software update needs a security audit—turned it into a bureaucratic quagmire.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s July 10 memo, delivered with the flair of a drone light show, demands drone units by September and less red tape. But the Alaska flop shows the U.S. is still stuck in first gear while adversaries like China, with their Y-20 drone-dropping plane, are flooring it. The Pentagon wants “drone dominance” by 2027, but right now, it’s more “drone disaster.”

Why This Matters to DroneXL Readers

For those of you tweaking your DJI Mavic 3 Pro in the garage, this story hits close to home. The tech that makes your drone dodge trees is miles ahead of what crashed in Alaska. These military drones wish they had your rig’s smarts. More importantly, this is a #DronesForGood reality check. Drones can save lives, gather intel, and keep troops safe—if the Pentagon can get out of its own way. Imagine U.S. drones swarming like a fleet of angry Phantoms, protecting allies without risking pilots. That’s the goal, but it’s drowning in paperwork.

The Pentagon’s obsession with banning Chinese components (again, sorry, DJI) slows things down. Companies like Neros, churning out 1,500 Archer drones a month, want to hit 10,000 by year’s end, per Defense News. But without buyers, it’s like building the ultimate drone and leaving it on the shelf. Your local drone club would’ve crowdfunded it by now.

The Path Forward: Can the U.S. Turn It Around?

Hegseth’s memo pushes for active-duty drone units and streamlined buying processes, with the Defense Contract Management Agency possibly stepping in to scale Blue UAS. The Alaska data is being studied to fix the jamming woes, but time’s ticking. With adversaries fielding advanced drones, the U.S. needs to move faster than a Mavic 4 in Sport Mode. The Artemis project isn’t dead—it’s a learning curve, but the Pentagon’s got to stop treating drones like they’re buying a new battleship.

For now, keep flying your DJI rigs and check DroneXL.co for updates. This Alaska flop is a reminder: your backyard drone is already a star, even if the Pentagon’s still figuring it out. Got thoughts on the U.S. drone struggles? Share them in the comments!

Photos courtesy of C. Albon / Defense News

Discover more from DroneXL.co

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

MAKE YOUR VOICE HEARD

Proposed legislation threatens your ability to use drones for fun, work, and safety. The Drone Advocacy Alliance is fighting to ensure your voice is heard in these critical policy discussions.Join us and tell your elected officials to protect your right to fly.

TAKE ACTION NOW

Get your Part 107 Certificate

Pass the Part 107 test and take to the skies with the Pilot Institute. We have helped thousands of people become airplane and commercial drone pilots. Our courses are designed by industry experts to help you pass FAA tests and achieve your dreams.

Copyright © DroneXL.co 2025. All rights reserved. The content, images, and intellectual property on this website are protected by copyright law. Reproduction or distribution of any material without prior written permission from DroneXL.co is strictly prohibited. For permissions and inquiries, please contact us first. DroneXL.co is a proud partner of the Drone Advocacy Alliance. Be sure to check out DroneXL's sister site, EVXL.co, for all the latest news on electric vehicles.

FTC: DroneXL.co is an Amazon Associate and uses affiliate links that can generate income from qualifying purchases. We do not sell, share, rent out, or spam your email.

Rafael Suárez

Dad. Drone lover. Dog Lover. Hot Dog Lover. Youtuber. World citizen residing in Ecuador. Started shooting film in 1998, digital in 2005, and flying drones in 2016. Commercial Videographer for brands like Porsche, BMW, and Mini Cooper. Documentary Filmmaker and Advocate of flysafe mentality from his YouTube channel . It was because of a Drone that I knew I love making movies.

"I love everything that flies, except flies"

Articles: 100

dronexl.co · July 20, 2025

11. The False Debate That Could Ignite the Next Nuclear Crisis

​Excerpts:

While many in foreign policy and national security may not explicitly engage with international relations theory, systems thinking is hardly foreign to the field. Concepts like network-centric warfare, which gained traction in the 1990s, treat military forces as interconnected nodes, where information-sharing and distributed decision-making enable faster, more adaptive operations.

Additionally, after 9/11, systems-based frameworks became central to homeland security planning, most notably in the Department of Homeland Security’s recognition of complex interdependencies and the risk of cascading failures from attacks or natural disasters. In other words, we’ve done this before. Systems thinking is not a novelty, but a proven approach with which policymakers can and must reengage, especially in the nuclear domain and particularly now, when the system is stressed and at a higher risk of destabilization.

The lesson has been clear in every era: When we treat parts of the international system in isolation—whether arms control, deterrence, or broader security policy—we risk undermining our own goals. The global landscape is becoming more complex, interconnected, and unpredictable, with feedback loops and nonlinear dynamics accelerating systemic risk. In this environment, siloed thinking is worse than outdated—it’s dangerous. We need not dogma, but nuclear fluency grounded in systems thinking. This means teaching this mindset throughout our institutions, especially in professional military education, where future decision-makers must understand how nuclear weapons function and how the surrounding system behaves. Advancing this kind of thinking is central to the mission of our new lab, because the future of strategic stability may well depend on it.

The False Debate That Could Ignite the Next Nuclear Crisis - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Amy J. Nelson · July 23, 2025

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

As global nuclear risks rise—from Russia’s treaty violations to China’s expanding arsenal—Washington remains caught in a tired debate: Arms control or deterrence? This binary framing is not only misleading; it’s dangerous. Nuclear stability depends on how these concepts interact within a larger system, a view rooted in systems thinking that was once central to US nuclear policy but is now conspicuously absent.

During the Cold War, US policymakers understood arms control and deterrence as interdependent—two tools for reinforcing strategic stability. As Robert Jervis wrote in 2022, “Arms control . . . should be designed to bolster deterrence or at least to avoid weapons configurations that would undermine it and make war more likely.” The 1972 SALT I and ABM treaties, for instance, were negotiated not despite deterrence goals, but in service of them. This essay is not a defense of any single policy, but a call to recover the strategic mindset that saw arms control and deterrence as mutually reinforcing. That approach is increasingly absent in today’s debates.

From Systems Thinking to Siloed Strategy

Many in the foreign policy, defense, and national security communities come from backgrounds in international relations, a discipline in which the concept of the system does the heavy lifting: It refers to the overarching structure of international politics that shapes and constrains state behavior.

Early international relations theorists like Kenneth Waltz described an “anarchic” international system, without a central authority, where power dynamics shape state behavior. Jervis deepened this view, showing how seemingly rational actions can produce chaotic outcomes in a tightly coupled, nonlinear system. Additionally, he enriches our understanding of the system by bringing to bear concepts such as feedback loops, misperceptions, and unintended consequences. In so doing, Jervis pushes international relations scholars to account for the nonlinear dynamics of systemic interaction, an approach that is especially relevant today, as complex global crises—such as climate change, great-power rivalry, and rapid technological disruption—exacerbate complexity, defy straightforward cause-and-effect thinking, and often lead to unpredictable outcomes in a rapidly changing world.

The systems approach also directly influenced nuclear weapons policy, which emerged around the same time as Waltz’s influential book, Man, the State, and War, and is embedded within the broader dynamics of the international system. The holy grail was thought to be strategic stability, describing an international system in which no state has an incentive to launch a first strike because mutual vulnerability and assured second-strike capabilities deter aggression and reduce the risk of escalation. In this system, deterrence, defined as the ability to persuade adversaries not to act by convincing them the costs will outweigh any potential benefits, functions as the behavioral logic that maintains this stability, while arms control, which is defined as the management of military capabilities and behaviors between adversaries to reduce the likelihood, destructiveness, or uncontrollability of conflict, codifies limitations that reduce incentives for preemption or arms racing and promotes the transparency conducive to restraint.

These ideas weren’t academic abstractions; they fundamentally shaped US decision-making during the Cold War, with enormous implications for nuclear strategy today. Yet they’ve largely disappeared from view, just when we need them most.

Arms Control and Deterrence: Not Either/Or

Too often, today’s debate treats arms control and deterrence as competing strategies—despite history and international relations scholarship showing they work best in tandem. Nuclear scholars and policymakers face the challenging task of considering the entire system when thinking about nuclear security, advising, and making policy in order to anticipate how decisions in one area, such as posture, signaling, or arms control, can ripple across the system in unforeseen ways.

With that in mind, the current dichotomy between arms control and deterrence approaches to the US nuclear arsenal is a false one. If arms control falls away, the system risks spiraling into an unconstrained arms race, eroding trust, transparency, and crisis stability. Conversely, if deterrence fails or is ignored, the credibility of US security guarantees collapses, increasing the likelihood of aggression, coercion, or even nuclear use. Strategic stability breaks down when either pillar collapses.

In recent years, a growing divide has emerged in US nuclear policy debates. On one side, some argue deterrence must take precedence in an increasingly competitive world, warning that arms control agreements risk constraining US flexibility without meaningfully influencing adversaries. On the other side, arms control advocates caution that unchecked nuclear modernization and posture shifts, including from reintroducing a nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile capability (known as SLCM-N) or expanding warhead types, risk arms races and crisis instability. These positions are often treated as oppositional, but that division is a break from how US strategy was once conceived.

On one side of the debate, the notion that we must wait for perfect conditions to engage in arms control (sometimes deliberately) misunderstands its purpose: Arms control is not a reward for good behavior but a tool for managing risk, reducing miscalculation, and stabilizing inherently adversarial relationships. Delaying its pursuit only increases the danger of escalation in an already volatile system. Consider the US plan to deploy the SLCM-N. It may strengthen deterrence, but without clear signaling mechanisms, it could increase the risk of miscalculation. Arms control tools like notification protocols or reciprocal inspections can reduce that risk.

On the other side of the debate, some advocates argue that arms control and nonproliferation must always take precedence, even to the point of resisting consideration of new capabilities that might be needed to ensure credible deterrence. They emphasize that the United States, as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is legally committed and morally obligated to pursue the long-term project of arms control as a pathway toward eventual disarmament—a goal that reinforces global norms, sustains international legitimacy, and reduces the existential risks posed by nuclear weapons.

While this perspective rightly underscores the ethical and strategic importance of restraint, it risks overlooking the fact that deterrence and arms control must function to sustain the broader stability of the international system. Refusing to consider evolving deterrence requirements in light of the current security environment may weaken the credibility of US commitments and reduce the leverage needed to bring adversaries to the arms control table. To arms control advocates, deterrence thinking may seem flawed and carry profound risks given its reliance on psychological signaling, threat credibility, and the willingness to follow through on catastrophic action, rather than mutual interest in preventing war. Further, from this perspective, it rests on inherently fragile assumptions and is vulnerable to miscalculation, misperception, and technological disruptions. But this approach does not sufficiently engage with the truth that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, they remain an essential part of the strategic landscape that cannot be ignored.

With that in mind, it is also essential to consider the adaptive nature of deterrence itself. As adversaries develop novel technologies and shift their strategic postures, deterrence strategies must also evolve to remain effective. Refusing to discuss force posture or modernization under the banner of arms control purity may weaken deterrence and embolden potential challengers. Just as arms control is a tool to manage competition, credible deterrence is the foundation upon which arms control agreements are negotiated and sustained. Dismissing one in favor of the other creates strategic blind spots and undermines the systemic balance needed to prevent conflict today.

Reclaiming Systems Thinking for Strategic Stability

While many in foreign policy and national security may not explicitly engage with international relations theory, systems thinking is hardly foreign to the field. Concepts like network-centric warfare, which gained traction in the 1990s, treat military forces as interconnected nodes, where information-sharing and distributed decision-making enable faster, more adaptive operations.

Additionally, after 9/11, systems-based frameworks became central to homeland security planning, most notably in the Department of Homeland Security’s recognition of complex interdependencies and the risk of cascading failures from attacks or natural disasters. In other words, we’ve done this before. Systems thinking is not a novelty, but a proven approach with which policymakers can and must reengage, especially in the nuclear domain and particularly now, when the system is stressed and at a higher risk of destabilization.

The lesson has been clear in every era: When we treat parts of the international system in isolation—whether arms control, deterrence, or broader security policy—we risk undermining our own goals. The global landscape is becoming more complex, interconnected, and unpredictable, with feedback loops and nonlinear dynamics accelerating systemic risk. In this environment, siloed thinking is worse than outdated—it’s dangerous. We need not dogma, but nuclear fluency grounded in systems thinking. This means teaching this mindset throughout our institutions, especially in professional military education, where future decision-makers must understand how nuclear weapons function and how the surrounding system behaves. Advancing this kind of thinking is central to the mission of our new lab, because the future of strategic stability may well depend on it.

Amy J. Nelson is a senior fellow with the Future Security Program at New America, where she serves as director of the Future Security Scenarios Lab.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Vitaly V. Kuzmin

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Amy J. Nelson · July 23, 2025

12. Frontline Fusion: The Network Architecture Needed to Counter Drones

​Excerpt:

The drone threat is here to stay, and it has already outpaced our current capabilities. We won’t solve it by throwing more hardware or isolated systems at it. Victory in the C-UAS fight will go to the side that builds faster, more integrated networks—where any sensor can feed a common operational picture and any shooter can act on it. Sensor fusion, transport, and track identity aren’t back-end tasks; they are foundational elements of the overall C-UAS strategy. The technology exists. What’s needed now is DoD to prioritize common C2 and network architectures that enable true interoperability. We don’t need more kit—we need smarter networks that sense, decide, and act as one. The kill chain starts with the network. Build it or lose the fight.

Frontline Fusion: The Network Architecture Needed to Counter Drones - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Anthony Padalino · July 23, 2025

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

A squad of infantry dismounts their infantry squad vehicle and begins moving toward the objective. As the soldiers approaches their assault position, an alert pings throughout the squad’s command-and-control team awareness kit devices: “HOSTILE GRP 2 DRONE DETECTED, 1.7km, 045°, TRACK-ID 2112.” The drone’s location populates as a red dot on the map, along with its ID, and the text message drops from the screen. The drone was detected by an acoustic sensor from a forward multifunctional reconnaissance company and a small panel radar mounted on an infantry squad vehicle from an adjacent platoon. Although the sensors are distributed among separate echelons, the drone tracks from each sensor are fused into a single track and populated on the squad’s team awareness kit devices. The battalion headquarters sees the same threat and directs its multipurpose company to launch a first-person-view drone with the task of destroying Track 2112. Within seconds, the friendly drone is launched, and the hostile drone is destroyed. As the infantry squad approaches the assault position, the hostile track drops off the map, and a text alert—“Track 2112 destroyed”—is sent throughout the squad.

This is the power of deliberately architected networks and sensor fusion: fast, efficient, shared awareness. One track, one threat, one decision, one common operational picture. As drones proliferate across every theater, this kind of seamless, fused detection will define the difference between successful operations and losses of combat power.

Understanding sensor fusion and network architecture isn’t optional to solve the C-UAS (counter–unmanned aircraft system) problem—it’s the entry fee to the professional conversation. To repurpose a well-known aphorism, amateurs will highlight the newest kit on the market, while professionals will discuss network integration and sensor fusion.

There are two critical tasks the Department of Defense must accomplish to solve its current C-UAS challenges: first, prescribing a common command-and-control (C2) system for all services, and second, implementing a network architecture to share sensor and effector data from the tactical to the strategic levels. Science and technology bureaucrats beware: The good old days of implementing bespoke systems on hub-and-spoke networks are ending, as leaders become more aware of our archaic and siloed air defense architectures.

Beyond New Gadgets: The Need for Seamless C2 Networks

The early response to drone threats has been to throw hardware at the problem—hundreds of millions spent on handheld jammers, exquisite radars, and costly interceptors. Each comes with limitations, but the bigger issue is that they operate independently, on bespoke networks. These siloed tools offer little beyond point-defense solutions. They lack the ability to tap into the abundance of joint and strategic sensor data to enhance their functions, making them blind to the broader battlefield and disconnected from the fight around them. As drones proliferate, the assumption that newer or pricier tech is the answer must be challenged. That thinking has led to the fragmented set of black-box capabilities that defines much of the C-UAS ecosystem today across DoD. The mindset that the solution is to throw kit at the problem must go. A new culture of stitching sensors and effectors together is the only way forward.

Building the layered defense vision depicted on Pentagon OV-1 charts takes more than a fictional green ring above systems that falsely illustrates to senior leaders that everything is connected. The department requires a common C2 system and network to a globally accessible architecture that can rapidly onboard new technology, fuse sensor tracks across echelons, and maintain common track identity. This means integrating multiple sensors and effectors onto real networks to deliver a single common operational picture on a tailored user interface. When two sensors see the same drone, the C2’s common operational picture across the network must show one track—not two. And that fused track needs to be shared in real time across the force so any shooter, at any level, can respond with precision.

No single sensor or shooter is sufficient on its own; success comes from linking assets—sensing, deciding, and acting—in a coordinated web. The term survivable should mean that when a sensor, effector, or C2 system is lost in combat, we should not lose an entire capability.

The same principles of networking and fusion that apply to maneuver formations also extend to the defense of the homeland. Linking sensors and effectors across Department of Defense installations—and integrating those with interagency systems—shouldn’t be like a scene out of a futuristic Hollywood thriller. The technology to do this has existed for years. However, our infatuation as a department with chasing kit has caused us to miss the forest for the trees when it comes to the C-UAS mission.

Want to solve the C-UAS problem? First, let’s start by having a basic understanding of the essential tasks: transport, fusion, and track management.

Transport is the Backbone

Establishing robust transport to connect diverse sensors and effectors into a unified network is a foundational, yet complex, challenge. Without reliable data transport modes, sensor fusion and cooperative engagement leveraging any effector is not possible. The critical hurdle lies in the network plumbing—the infrastructure that allows combat formations to see the same thing in real time. This is why sensors and effectors at the operational and strategic level must live on actual live networks—not a joint data network, integrated fires network, or some other bespoke enclave that is closed off from reality. Networks must enable a cooperative engagement capability for land forces—both at home and abroad. Strategic-level sensor data needs to get back down to the tactical level, and tactical data needs to cue strategic-level sensors and effectors—it’s a two-way street.

Transport is the starting point. Sensor data must move over existing paths to populate C2 nodes with drone tracks. For dismounted infantry or dispersed formations, this typically requires software-defined radios already burdened with voice and operational traffic. At the Army brigade echelon and below, bandwidth becomes a precious and often limited resource, particularly as the number of sensors and effectors increases. In a recent C-UAS exercise in Germany, Project Flytrap, a US Army platoon found 70 percent of its bandwidth consumed by sensor data alone.

Sensors continuously transmit track data—bearing, altitude, range, speed, and time. Higher-fidelity sensors, capable of detecting at longer ranges or generating precise, high-quality track data, will consume more bandwidth, and require lower latencies to enable fire control from exquisite effectors (Coyote, Roadrunner, etc.). Selecting the right sensor at each echelon requires balancing fidelity required (track quality), efficiency, and—most importantly—network capacity. Leaders in the field, and those fielding the kit, must thoroughly understand the bandwidth available for the organization and avoid overwhelming it with high-volume data from sensors that the network cannot support. In short, at the tactical edge, bandwidth is currency.

Sensor Fusion Explained

Sensor fusion is the alignment and merging of detections from multiple sensors into a single object, or track. If five sensors see the same drone, C2 systems across the network must display one track—not five. To stitch air tracks together, sensor fusion requires three things. First, there must be temporal alignment. All sensors, effectors, and C2 nodes must operate on a shared clock). Milliseconds matter for high end effectors. Second, the system must have spatial alignment. Because each sensor has its own frame of reference, fusion engines must translate local sensor detections into a common grid using GPS or inertial measurement unit data. If we put a sensor on a platform or a person, we must ensure we have a way to tell a fusion engine where it is. Finally, deconfliction algorithms are necessary. Techniques like dynamic time warping help correlate data streams with varying latency or reporting intervals. Selection of algorithms at echelon will be important based on compute capability, types of sensors being fused, and most importantly, the track quality requirement.

Ultimately, fusion is a continuous process of hypothesis and resolution: which detections should be grouped into a single track and which should remain distinct. Everything from filtering noise, biological tracks (e.g., birds), and even trash factor into track fusion. Getting this right is essential to avoid mirror tracks, or tracks that clutter the air picture and complicate weapon-target pairing. At scale, fusion enables a common operational picture where the data reflects the battlespace as it truly is—not a fractured collection of guesses.

The Importance of Universal Track Management

Fusion at echelon makes universal track identity management a complex data brokerage problem. Each track must have a unique ID—once assigned, it is maintained or updated across echelons. When a drone is detected by multiple sensors at different echelons, the output of network fusion should result in the same track number.

In an ideal network, a drone detected by a forward-deployed squad sensor will carry the same track number as when it is sensed by brigade, division, or joint-level assets. This continuity is the essence of universal track management—ensuring a single track ID persists across different sensors, C2 nodes, and operational levels.

However, maintaining common identity is especially challenging in a federated network where each echelon fuses its own sensor data locally. Without a shared and enforced track management protocol, the same drone may be assigned multiple IDs by different nodes, resulting in duplicated tracks. These duplicates not only distort the air picture but hinder effective engagement by obscuring which track is valid and which effector should respond.

The consequences are operationally significant. If tactical sensors fuse tracks to refine targeting for long-range interceptors, or if strategic sensors cue short-range effectors, inconsistent track IDs break the chain of custody between sensors and effectors. Coordinated defense becomes guesswork—and weapons cannot be paired to intercept.

Solving this requires robust protocols for track number assignment, deconfliction, and reconciliation across the enterprise. It also demands that track identity management be treated as a core function of C-UAS C2—not an afterthought.

The Path Forward

After years of resources wasted on bespoke kit, and still without an existing solution to tie in all sensors and effectors on a single network across services, it should be apparent that C-UAS isn’t about buying better hardware. It’s about establishing a network architecture on common C2. Fielding sensors and effectors that cannot pass track data across echelons, commands, and services is a recipe for failure. Likewise, continuing to forgo fusion, transport, and track identity will leave formations with siloed systems that can’t leverage the potential of the whole infrastructure.

What’s needed now is a deliberate shift in culture: from hardware-first solutions to architecture-driven integration on a common C2 across the department. The technology is here. The concepts are tested. Senior leaders not only understand the challenge, but are actively driving the enterprise toward scalable, connected, and lethal solutions.

To start down the path to success, and a future where sensors and effectors are parts of a complementary ecosystem, there are five immediate actions DoD should take.

1. Select a common C-UAS C2 for all services. The US Army, the DoD executive agent for C-sUAS, should immediately prescribe the C-UAS C2 system to be used across the department. The C2 system must have a user interface that is intuitive for all occupational specialties, have a web-based, cloud-enabled architecture, and be capable of over-the-air updates for all systems, sensors, and effectors.
2. Create, publish, and manage open-source APIs for integration of C-UAS. The department must define and own the APIs—the application programming interfaces that allow different systems to interact—connecting all sensors, effectors, and C2. This should happen now. DoD’s API technical guidance reinforces that government-owned interfaces are essential to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure interoperability across programs. Without government-controlled, open APIs, each new sensor or effector requires bespoke integration, slowing fielding and increasing cost.
3. Ensure a pub/sub engine at the edge. A pub/sub (publish/subscribe) engine at the edge and at echelon is essential to stitch together the diverse sensors and effectors. It enables real-time data sharing and track fusion across all sensors—allowing effectors to act on a coherent, shared threat picture. Without this layer, each sensor-to-effector link becomes a bespoke integration problem, slowing response and scaling. A common pub/sub backbone ensures modularity, speed, and interoperability across formations and platforms.
4. Prioritize remote sensor tasking. This allows sensors and effectors to be controlled as needed across the network, improving track quality, creating an ecosystem of survivability, and enabling remote fire control and distributed weapon pairing.
5. Emphasize remote fire control and engagement. Any C2 node with permissions must have the capability to launch an engagement with any effector on the network, using data from any sensor with sufficient track quality. This removes the need for dedicated sensor-weapon pairings on hub-and-spoke networks, which limit flexibility and create single points of failure. It enables faster targeting decisions, expands coverage, and allows for continued operation even if some sensors or nodes are lost. This approach replaces the traditional hub-and-spoke model with a more distributed and efficient system.

The drone threat is here to stay, and it has already outpaced our current capabilities. We won’t solve it by throwing more hardware or isolated systems at it. Victory in the C-UAS fight will go to the side that builds faster, more integrated networks—where any sensor can feed a common operational picture and any shooter can act on it. Sensor fusion, transport, and track identity aren’t back-end tasks; they are foundational elements of the overall C-UAS strategy. The technology exists. What’s needed now is DoD to prioritize common C2 and network architectures that enable true interoperability. We don’t need more kit—we need smarter networks that sense, decide, and act as one. The kill chain starts with the network. Build it or lose the fight.

Major Anthony Padalino is the executive officer to the US Army chief technology officer, where he assists planning and execution across Army transformation priorities, including counter-UAS. Previously, he was deployed to Al Asad Air Base with the 10th Mountain Division, where his unit achieved the highest recorded number of one-way unmanned aircraft system intercepts in US Army history. He is a key contributor to the Army’s ongoing C-UAS strategy, driving operational integration of sensors, effectors, and C2.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Anthony Padalino · July 23, 2025

13. Readiness and the Logistics Deterrent Effect

​Excerpt:

Ultimately, the logistics deterrent effect provides a unifying rationale for investing in logistics capabilities. Beyond enabling the military to fight and win, robust logistics architecture disincentivizes war itself. When potential adversaries perceive enhanced ability to endure, they are less likely to engage in conflict. Ideally, stockpiles and redundancies will never have to be used, validating the deterrent value of logistics investments. Prioritizing logistics capabilities is not merely a matter of operational necessity. It is a strategic imperative. By investing in logistics deterrence, the United States can achieve a state of readiness that prevents conflict and ensures peace.

Readiness and the Logistics Deterrent Effect - War on the Rocks

Patrick Kelleher

July 23, 2025

warontherocks.com · July 23, 2025

In the crucible of global conflict, victory often hinges not on the mightiest weapons, but on the sinews of logistics. Just as the Liberty ships and Red Ball Express fueled the Allied advance in World War II, today’s military power rests on a robust logistics architecture — a mighty deterrent that can prevent wars as effectively as it enables them. The Department of Defense’s ability to endure is as important in deterring war as is the ability to destroy. However, unless the Department of Defense fundamentally changes how logistics is viewed and resourced, the United States stands a genuine chance of being unable to sustain protracted conflict against a pacing threat, much less deter a fight. In the realm of defense strategy, logistics has often taken a backseat to the more glamorous aspects of military investment, especially things that go “boom.” The good news is the department is taking concrete steps to address this critical vulnerability and, in doing so, significantly contributing to deterring conflict in the first place. But much more is required to offset the logistics “debt” that has accrued as a result of systemic underinvestment for the past several decades.

Think of it this way: a potential adversary is constantly assessing Defense Department capabilities. They’re not just looking at tanks, planes, and ships — they’re looking at the ability to sustain those tanks, planes, and ships. They’re asking themselves: “Can they execute their plan, and can they sustain their forces to complete that plan?” The department needs to answer that question with a resounding “yes!”

Is America’s logistics enterprise truly ready for the challenges of a modern battlefield? Adversaries aren’t just watching arsenals — they’re scrutinizing endurance. They want to know whether the United States could not only launch a military campaign but sustain it through its final objective.

To shift perception and reality, the Department of Defense should go beyond modest reform. It should pursue sweeping improvements in logistics investment, supply chain resilience, real-time visibility, and strategic investment. Only by confronting logistics debt and embracing endurance as deterrence can America project true strength — without ever firing a shot.

BECOME A MEMBER

Visibility and Control: Inventory Awareness and Logistics Prioritization

Currently, the Department of Defense remains challenged in even seeing on-hand inventory of common items across the services and defense agencies. This must change. The good news is that work to build a common data foundation to see all inventory in near real time has been progressing well over the last two years. The challenge now lies in operationalizing this newfound visibility in two ways:

Real-Time Command Visibility

The ability for commanders to view inventory in real time at echelon will enable more dynamic and responsive logistics support. Where in the past, if I needed a widget, frequently my only available option was to order the widget from the source of supply — often a warehouse — or even a factory far removed from the battlefield. Total visibility, on the other hand, will enable commanders to more rapidly balance resources available to them — or at higher or adjacent units — rather than having to solely rely on an extended supply chain.

Prioritized Requisitions

The Department of Defense remains tied to legacy systems and processes that do not allow for actual prioritization of requisitions truly reflecting operational need. The underlying principle when balancing requisitions of nominally equal priority reflects little more than “first-in, first-out.” The Defense Department must develop the ability to globally prioritize by actual operational requirement, incorporating consideration of the theater, service, and weapon system. This will enable a focus on the greatest actual warfighting requirement. For example, a part for a Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck in Texas is likely not nearly as important as that same part for a system supporting a Patriot battery somewhere in the Middle East. Yet the department lacks the ability to definitively ensure that the part gets to where it is most needed.

Ultimately, all of this is about supporting the warfighter. It’s about ensuring they have what they need, when they need it, to complete their mission and come home safely. But even with perfect visibility and streamlined processes, reaction times will not be quick enough if resources are too far from the point of need. That’s why forward posturing is a critical next step in enhancing logistics deterrence.

Forward Posturing

An argument can be made that forward positioning inventory and capability is not cost-efficient or that it could escalate tensions. And they have a point. A change in posture could be perceived as escalatory, depending on how it’s implemented. And it is certainly not cost effective, but if U.S. forces utilize forward-postured capabilities daily, as used in conflict, it enhances the deterrent effect. Utilizing repair parts, construction material, and fuel, for example, already distributed throughout a theater demonstrates to adversaries that the United States is serious, ready, and not going to be caught off guard. Forward positioning for “known knowns” provides the ability to flex for unknowns. This concept is foundational to implementing a successful regional sustainment framework, which seeks to leverage critical resources in key areas around the globe — enabling a faster and more effective response to any crisis. A functional regional framework weaves together inventory, organic repair capability, and commercial capacity with partners’ and allies’ capabilities. It isn’t just about stockpiling supplies and equipment or signing one-off agreements. It’s the net effect of capitalizing on what the department already has (i.e., deployable organic maintenance, extending interaction with industry, and building relationships with allies and partners).

Another powerful way to enhance forward posture is by synchronizing with the National Guard’s State Partnership Program. I’ve personally talked to guardsmen who testify to the strengths of these partnerships. What started in 1991 as a way to foster cooperation with the former Soviet Bloc nations has become a 30-year-long continuous program. This program is composed of 115 nations whose relationships with the National Guard provide as much to the United States as it does to those partners. Leveraging these existing relationships can provide valuable insights into regional needs, facilitate access to local resources, and enhance interoperability with partner forces.

Strategically positioning resources is only half the challenge. Inventory and capability will only carry us so far without needed investment in distribution capacity. While on still on active duty in the Marine Corps and serving in Iraq, I was responsible for connecting operational and battlefield distribution networks to maintain the ability to maneuver. Based on that experience, I learned that battlefield success unequivocally depends on successful distribution, which remains foundational to logistics and operations, but the current trajectory does not fully fulfill operational requirements. Particularly in extended theaters, the joint force’s ability to maneuver lies almost entirely on the distribution capacity that can be brought to bear quickly. Although interest in low-cost, easily produced, less “exquisite,” and attritable weapons systems is growing, there must be an equal amount of attention and resourcing put on similar platforms for logistics. Too much capability remains concentrated in a few exceptionally expensive platforms. Diversifying inter- and intra-theater lift requirements across lower-cost, easily produced, autonomous capabilities demonstrate a depth and resilience that exemplifies the deterrent effect of logistics in a definitive way.

Supply Chain Depth and Resilience: Building Redundancy

But forward posturing and distribution alone aren’t enough. Supply chain depth and resilience derived from a robust industrial base foundation is an imperative. The defense industrial base has been the subject of significant well-warranted attention recently. Initiatives to increase domestic manufacturing capacity and to achieve a higher degree of manufacturing and industrial refining independence are necessary and overdue. Sometimes less well understood is the fact that the defense industrial base is comprised of two elements. Commercial industrial capacity plus the department’s organic industrial capacity — commonly referred to as the organic industrial base — equals the totality of the defense industrial base. The organic industrial base is codified in statute to provide the department with surge capacity and to serve as a source of repair for aging weapon systems.

Better balanced investments are required to achieve increases in both commercial and organic capacity and depth. Specific investment is needed to build depth in specialized tooling, testing, and diagnostic equipment for aging platforms. For some systems, testing and repair are reliant on a single machine or test set for the entire inventory. Given long lead times to manufacture machining and testing equipment — often measured in years — investment is required now. Concurrently, increased investment is needed to leverage the organic industrial base for extraction and reclamation of critical materials. As a bridging strategy while enduring commercial capability matures, this could help reduce near to midterm reliance on offshore supply lines.

A new perspective about expanding industrial capacity writ large is needed. Given the imperative, non-traditional options for expansion warrant consideration. Most often, investment in new capacity rightly involves an understanding of the long-term requirement and a consistent demand signal from the government to spur commercial investment. However, the department could take an “informed inefficiency approach.” This means teaming with commercial partners, the organic industrial base, and private equity to facilitate capital investment into capacity not necessarily needed now but will be needed to fight and win in the future. The company could be reimbursed to maintain the equipment and offset their costs in exchange for preserving turnkey capacity for the department. If that equipment forever sits idle, and is never needed, logistics deterrence has succeeded.

Building out the organic industrial base’s production capability and integration across the services is driving the Department of Defense’s investment in a digital marketplace where each of the depots will have access to requirements generated by the services to enhance production of mission critical parts and components. In traveling to organic industrial base organizations around the county, it is clear that the depots have capacity to take this idea and make measurable improvements in parts availability through advanced manufacturing and machining of critical items. In speaking with the expert artisans who perform the day-to-day manufacturing and repair work, there is almost a universal desire to contribute more, to help above and beyond what they already do. The depots artisans have the skill, capability, and drive to function as a new source of supply for critical readiness driver parts where there is a lack of current suppliers.

But even the most robust supply chain is useless without the skilled professionals to manage and maintain it. Ultimately, people — their expertise and dedication — are the foundation of logistics deterrent.

People: The Ultimate Deterrent (and Vulnerability)

The workforce — their skills, experience, talent, and the way adversaries perceive them — is a deterrent in itself. But it can also be a vulnerability if large sections of the most experienced individuals within the workforce are lost or not properly cared for.

Over the past several decades, logisticians have created a sense of complacency. When is the last time that operations failed because of logistics? Conflict with non-peers did not stress the department’s logistics capabilities, and maneuver colleagues did not have to question the ability to sustain the operations. Complacency cannot creep back in. Investment must be made in training, education, and retention to ensure the best and brightest logisticians in the world are empowered to challenge policy, disrupt the status quo, innovate, and drive readiness to new heights.

Policy: Roadblock or Roadmap to Readiness?

Defense policy should be an enabler to mission accomplishment, not an impediment. It’s designed to help get the job done and to provide a framework for responsible action. However, the interpretation of policies has arguably become overly cautious, producing a risk-averse culture stifling innovation. Frequently, the worst part is that often the undefined “policy” that everyone claims is holding them back can’t be specifically referenced. I frequently hear, “policy won’t let me,” and almost as often that claim lacks details about exactly what policy is the obstacle. If you’re genuinely hampered by a real policy — quote the citation, chapter, and verse. Department of Defense leadership can challenge and change it, because policy is not law, and readiness is non-negotiable. Let’s cut the red tape and get back to the mission.

Securing the Future

Ultimately, the logistics deterrent effect provides a unifying rationale for investing in logistics capabilities. Beyond enabling the military to fight and win, robust logistics architecture disincentivizes war itself. When potential adversaries perceive enhanced ability to endure, they are less likely to engage in conflict. Ideally, stockpiles and redundancies will never have to be used, validating the deterrent value of logistics investments. Prioritizing logistics capabilities is not merely a matter of operational necessity. It is a strategic imperative. By investing in logistics deterrence, the United States can achieve a state of readiness that prevents conflict and ensures peace.

BECOME A MEMBER

Patrick Kelleher serves as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for materiel readiness, overseeing the Defense Department’s $90 billion maintenance program and shaping policies that ensure readiness across major weapons systems and military equipment. He previously served as principal deputy director for strategic logistics on the Joint Staff, executive director for operations and sustainment at the Defense Logistics Agency, and on the Federal COVID-19 Response Team. He is a retired Marine officer.

The author would like to thank Mr. Dennis Rohler for his assistance with this article.

The perspectives presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or its components.

Image: Seaman Alex Lutje via DVIDS

warontherocks.com · July 23, 2025

14. Secrets, Lies, and the Sacred Trust

​Conclusion:

There are few principles more essential to the preservation of a nation than the trust between the protectorate and the protected. When this sacred trust is compromised, the protectorate can find itself at high risk for reprimand, or worse, replacement. It is the moral and ethical duty of all members of the protectorate to conduct themselves morally and ethically to maintain and strengthen the trust between them and the protected. Secrets must be kept, and significant moral results from carefully analyzed lies must never jeopardize the sacred trust. A crucial question all must constantly ask: “What is the current state of our sacred trust?”

Opinion / Perspective| The Latest

Secrets, Lies, and the Sacred Trust

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/23/secrets-lies-and-the-sacred-trust/

by Kaman Lykins

|

07.23.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract:

What are the differences between secrets and lies? There is a sacred trust between the protected and those responsible for protection. Secrets are an essential part of this trust, as are well-placed and necessary lies. However, when secrets and lies are irresponsibly leveraged, the sacred trust is eroded, and the protected may demand and facilitate a change.

The longevity of any society depends upon the relationship between those protected and those who protect, or the protectorate. The protected rely on the judgment, capability, and integrity of the protectorate and place a sacred trust. The protected maintains the right to define, among other items, the moral, legal, and political parameters in which the protectorate may function. The protectorate guarantees three major functions within this sacred trust. First, there is the guarantee of the protectorate’s ability to protect the protected. Second, it promises its monopoly on absolute violence will never be used to threaten or destroy the protected. Third, the right of the protected to define its will and what courses of action the protectorate may pursue to fulfill obligations aligned with this will.

Moral Ambiguity

This sacred trust is in continuous jeopardy due to the moral ambiguity in which the protectorate must operate. There is a thin grey line between two opposing forces of survival and destruction, and this presents a dangerously unique setting where moral clarity degrades, potential results weigh heavily upon the standard ethical paradigms, and principle is often suspended for immediate survivability and postponed moral outcomes. This ethical arena is constantly navigated by the protectorate, while the moral arena is mainly a luxury perspective of the protected. While ethics and morals overlap in degrees and diverge at increased echelons, the protected should not aggressively scrutinize each minute detail of all decisions or results of the protectorate’s actions, for it is not only unrealistic and dishonest, but also counterproductive. Idealism can easily become the enemy of appropriate and the final judgment of the protected to the protectorate must be tempered with prudent and pragmatic empathy.

The protected must understand that the protectorate, of necessity, operates in the world of secrets and lies to maintain an advantage over common enemies. Capabilities may be understated or overstated, and plans may be leaked or kept a secret to provide the element of surprise or to ensure the success of a strategic objective. This is generally understood, and the protected find solace in their often naïve or willing blindness to these particularly difficult realities. The protected may not be fully aware of the details of the protectorate’s actions. The moral and ethical complications of the protectorate’s actions necessitate trust over detailed explanations for both efficiency and practical exercise of action. Therefore, the protected and protectorate enter a sacred social contract based upon the trust of execution and results.

However, the “prudent empathy” displayed by the protected may be suspended when the protectorate consistently demonstrates patterns of perceived unethical behavior outside the parameters of what has been outlined for the sacred trust. The danger of lies, even of necessity, becoming more common than truth is the erosion of trust, loyalties are shaded in doubt, and ethical and even moral individuals–both protected and protectorate–find themselves questioning their adherence to ethical and moral absolutes in a system seemingly void of these essential parameters. Such an atmosphere promotes distrust between the protected and protectorate and ultimately, the sacred trust is defiled, and the protectorate loses its ethical and moral justification to operate in the ambiguity required for successful defense. The difference between and utilization of lies and secrets must be clear for the effectiveness and longevity of the sacred trust.

Lies and Secrets

Webster’s dictionary defines a lie as “to make an untrue statement with the intent to deceive” and “to create a false or misleading impression.” Additionally, Webster’s dictionary defines a secret as “containing information whose unauthorized disclosure could endanger national security.” Thus, fundamentally, a lie is intended to deceive while a secret is intended to protect. Who is being deceived and who is being protected then becomes a focal point in the morality of both lying and secrets. Specifically, Military Deception (MILDEC) and Operational Security (OPSEC) further darken the lens of ethical and moral perspectives required to maintain the sacred trust between the protected and protectorate. Further, the moral and ethical justifications for lies and secrets, when focused upon a physical enemy, are seemingly unambiguous. However, a danger exists when the definition of “enemy” gradually broadens to include ideological, mental, or even spiritual entities outside of oneself. Thus, secrets and lies are highly effective yet potent tools in the pursuit of survivability.

National-level secrets provide a fortification for a national body, its governing apparatus, and those involved in its execution, both citizen and politician alike. These various “protectorates” utilize secrets against those who desire to execute harm upon the protectorate and those protected, and are therefore moral means for conducting activities in the name of preservation and advantage. Simply stated, secrets support “the greater good,” which does play a persistent and valuable role in the survival of our national sovereignty and its citizens. As such a tool, secrets are not immoral or unethical by nature but rather are important and significant due to the gravity of their potential disclosure.

Lies are untrue statements made with a deceitful intent. The deceit can either be for a moral or immoral purpose; however, the lie itself is always immoral. For example, lying to a murderer to save a potential victim’s life pits the immoral act of lying against the immoral act of murder. The latter certainly outweighs the former; thus, the lie would be considered the lesser of two evils. However, the lie does not convert to a moral act simply due to its potential result. While lying is immoral, no human being in their proper state of mind would allow a person to be killed to protect their personal adherence to honesty. The judgment between immorality and morality, of necessity, weighs and often even depends upon the nature of its outputs. Add the complexity of strategic thinking, and this paradigm becomes even more difficult to navigate ethically or morally.

The Ultimate Slippery Slope

This presents a slippery slope of significant risk when the results of lying are not clear or if intentions are less than admirable. Theoretically, is it ever moral to lie to the protected? For example, telling citizens of the nation you are not conducting illegal surveillance on them, when in fact, you are? Or that there are no troops deployed in a foreign country fighting a major strategic enemy when, in fact, the opposite is true? Is it moral to lie about the death of a famous athlete turned soldier? Or, more complex, is it moral to conduct activities against the legal policies of the very nation you have sworn to protect in the name of truth? Such a quandary should provide illumination for intent and purpose to future persons engaged in the moral haziness required for survival to overcome destruction.

Is the survival of our culture or nation the ultimate morality? This question is at the heart of our understanding of ethical and moral behavior generally, and more specifically, provides an arena for discussing the balance and necessity of secrets and lies. However, without the trust of the protected, the protectorate ultimately fails in its quest for survivability. For if the protected lose their trust of their benefactor in the name of survival, what purpose does the culture continue to serve, and what is the future of the protectorate no longer in a position of trustworthiness? Is the risk of distrust worth the reward of a lesser survival?

Conclusion

There are few principles more essential to the preservation of a nation than the trust between the protectorate and the protected. When this sacred trust is compromised, the protectorate can find itself at high risk for reprimand, or worse, replacement. It is the moral and ethical duty of all members of the protectorate to conduct themselves morally and ethically to maintain and strengthen the trust between them and the protected. Secrets must be kept, and significant moral results from carefully analyzed lies must never jeopardize the sacred trust. A crucial question all must constantly ask: “What is the current state of our sacred trust?”

Tags: civil military relations, civil-military relations, Influence, transparency

About The Author

• 
  
• Kaman Lykins
• MAJOR Kaman Lykins is an Active-Duty Civil Affairs Officer serving in South Korea. He has served in the Middle East and extensively in the Indo-Pacific theater.

15. Influence by Design: Reassessing U.S. Military Advising

​A review of Frank Sobchak's book that is worth reading again (first on IWI and now on SWJ).

Excerpts:

Sobchak’s findings offer critical insights for practitioners and scholars alike. First, while structural factors matter, the design of advising missions can significantly influence outcomes. Even when required by strategic necessity or lack of foresight to work with less-than-ideal partners, U.S. military organizations have the agency to craft an intervention that has a better chance of succeeding. Army Special Forces can take care to be sure that advisors are carefully selected for the mission, abstain from pushing the boundaries and taking over for the local military, and maintain relationships with counterparts through additional rotations in country or through remote advising. Second, institution building is difficult but can result in long-term payoffs through the creation of local host-nation forces that can operate more effectively today and sustain themselves even after advisors depart. Senior SOF advisors should work on building local SOF institutions; this requires an advising force that can operate at a higher echelon and with civilian political leaders. Third, the “sovereignty clock” suggests that security cooperation efforts potentially face diminishing returns, meaning the United States must plan for inevitable host-nation resistance and develop strategies to either achieve its goals quickly or sustain influence beyond an initial window of receptivity.

While these findings are valuable, caution should be taken in drawing broad conclusions from them. What works for local SOF organizations constructed from scratch (the scope of Sobchak’s study) may not necessarily work for the host nation’s conventional forces, where recruiting, training, and equipping at scale becomes difficult given factors like inequality. It is reasonable, though, to expect factors important for interpersonal influence in the SOF context, like consistency in advisor-counterpart pairings, to improve advising of conventional forces. Moreover, we should avoid conflating success at building partner military effectiveness with the achievement of desired strategic outcomes more broadly. From the case studies, it is unclear whether successful capacity building translated uniformly into desired outcomes for the United States. El Salvador ended in a negotiated settlement with the rebels, which begs the question whether such an agreement could have been reached before 12 years of fighting and violence against civilians claimed many lives. Afghanistan ended in a U.S. defeat. Iraq, Colombia, and the Philippines have experienced shaky domestic politics and government repression, with U.S.-advised forces sometimes contributing to instability even as they provided stability in other ways by defeating insurgent groups or fighting them to a draw. Meanwhile, U.S. influence arguably declined over time in Iraq and the Philippines and is now nonexistent in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, history suggests that security force assistance will continue to be an indispensable tool of U.S. policy. Understanding how to do it as best as possible is essential. On that front, Training for Victory provides an important contribution to scholars and practitioners alike.

IWI Republish| The Latest

Influence by Design: Reassessing U.S. Military Advising

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/23/influence-by-design-reassessing-u-s-military-advising/

by Alexandra Chinchilla

|

07.23.2025 at 06:00am

Editor’s Note: this article is being republished with the permission of the Irregular Warfare Initiative as part of a republishing arrangement between SWJ and IWI. The original article was published on 5 June 2025 and is available here.

Introduction: Rethinking U.S. Military Advising

After the failure to build a sustainable Afghan military that could survive without U.S. presence, many scholars and practitioners now argue that U.S. efforts to build foreign militaries are nearly predestined to fail and should rarely, if ever, be undertaken. In Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan, Frank Sobchak pushes back against this view, arguing that “…we have not failed because advising our allies is too hard; we’ve failed because we have never taken it seriously …Building foreign militaries is a difficult, long-term, and often thankless endeavor. But it is not impossible” (2024, 177). To support his argument, Sobchak examines five cases of U.S. military advising: El Salvador during the Cold War, and the Philippines, Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan during the Global War on Terror. While cases like Colombia and El Salvador are considered successes by some scholars, Afghanistan is widely seen as a failure. Sobchak seeks to understand why some advising efforts succeed while others do not. He tackles this challenging analytical problem with a clear research design and well-researched case studies offering new empirical detail on important U.S. advising missions.

Existing explanations attribute security force assistance outcomes to structural conditions or the provider’s use of strategies like carrots and sticks or military-to-military socialization to encourage local compliance. Sobchak’s work broadly supports the findings of researchers who argue that human contact between militaries generates more influence for security force assistance providers. His contribution lies in demonstrating that advising missions vary greatly in their design across cases, and this variation makes some more successful than others at generating influence. Within the U.S. special operations forces (SOF) community—the military organization most frequently engaged in advising—so-called “SOF truths” shape beliefs about how special operations forces should be built and maintained. Despite this shared reference point, in practice, U.S. SOF advise differently across cases. Sobchak leverages variation in the design of military advising missions to determine which are more effective. The implications are important for policy: if certain kinds of advising missions are correlated with better outcomes, security force assistance providers have some control over whether the outcome mirrors Afghanistan or more closely resembles El Salvador.

The Role of Human Relationships in Advising

Military advisors serve the interests of the states that send them by exerting influence, and sometimes even control, over local military institutions and operations on the battlefield. Advising hinges on human contact and personal relationships between advisors and their local counterparts. Advisors use these relationships to transfer useful knowledge to counterparts, as well as to persuade them to adopt the sending state’s preferred course of action. SOF advisors have long hypothesized that strong, enduring relationships are the key to success. Drawing on these folk theories, Sobchak identifies five factors, or independent variables, that strengthen advisor-counterpart bonds: (1) consistency in advisor-counterpart pairings, (2) language and cultural skills, (3) a low partner-to-advisor ratio, (4) the ability of advisors to organize host-nation SOF—not only by training but also by shaping military institutions, and (5) combat advising, which grants credibility and therefore battlefield control to advisors.

Sobchak also carefully conceptualizes and measures the dependent variable of military effectiveness. He defines it through four factors (three skill-based indicators and one battlefield performance indicator): “(1) fighting without advisors present, (2) fighting at night, (3) conducting multi-day combat operations, and (4) consistently defeating enemy forces in combat” (2024, 14). Night operations and sustained combat require significant technical skill, making these particularly useful indicators. Empirical scholars of conflict will appreciate Sobchak’s precise conceptualization and measurement across the qualitative case studies, rich with detail which could inspire new quantitative indicators of military effectiveness.

The key analytical challenge, of course, is determining causation: do the variables that Sobchak identifies actually drive the observed outcomes? Structural conditions—such as host-nation receptivity to external influence—vary widely, meaning advising strategies are just one factor, …and maybe not even the most important one. To address this, Sobchak employs a comparative case study method, analyzing cases where U.S. SOF built partner forces from scratch. This approach enhances comparability across cases by reducing the impact of historical legacies, ensuring similar partner force characteristics, and maintaining consistency in U.S. advising methods, since conventional forces tend to have less experience and interest in advising partner forces and therefore may be less skilled. His cases draw on extensive original interviews with U.S. SOF advisors, and his attention to detail allows him to reconstruct valuable military history across the cases—an important contribution for our understanding of understudied cases, such as U.S. advising in the Philippines.

Assessing Causal Claims and Limitations

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Sobchak finds that combat advising is not necessary for strong relationships with local partners and does not correlate with success. In fact, it can have downsides, as U.S. advisors may become overly focused on combat missions instead of letting local forces operate independently. Sobchak also finds that fluency in the partner’s language is not essential, although he relies on the self-assessment of advisors with limited language skills who may not have been able to fully notice areas of disconnect. Advisors with fluency in the local language believed it provided them with a significant advantage in building relationships. As one advisor put it: “When it comes down to ‘Should I share this tidbit of intel, fuel, ammo, or gossip about internal office politics?’ It is the one who gained rapport who gets it, and the one who doesn’t never knows” (2024, 183). Sobchak argues, however, that advisors can still build deep and enduring bonds in the presence of a language barrier if they maintain connections with local counterparts and repeatedly return to work with them over a long period of time. These strong relationships enhance compliance with influence requests. Sobchak therefore places more weight on consistency in advisor-counterpart pairings compared to language skills. Low partner-to-advisor ratios also matter significantly. Perhaps most important, Sobchak finds, is the ability to organize partner forces. In cases where advisors encountered less resistance from host-nation forces—not just due to interest alignment but also other factors—they were more successful in implementing reforms to improve military effectiveness.

Despite its strengths, Sobchak’s approach does not fully resolve causal inference challenges. He does not control for key host country characteristics, and one of his core variables—the ability of U.S. SOF to organize partner forces—is itself shaped by the design of the advising mission as well as other, unobserved factors. Why were U.S. forces more successful in organizing partner forces in some countries than others? Was it a resourcing issue, or did variation in host-nation receptivity play a role? Unraveling this puzzle is crucial for future research and the design of future SOF advising efforts. It is also essential to determine appropriate policy recommendations; whether the observed advising successes can be attributed to the design of U.S. advising missions or are based on fundamentally unalterable host nation characteristics leads to different recommendations for allocating U.S. security assistance across partners.

The Case of Ukraine

A clear example of the importance of defense institutions—including both SOF-specific institutions as well as their integration with broader military and civilian structures—comes from Ukraine, a case I have studied extensively. The example of Ukraine reinforces Sobchak’s point that the ability to organize local forces is crucial for advising success and a carefully designed advising mission can create better outcomes. After 2015, Ukrainian SOF (UKRSOF) transformed from their Soviet-legacy spetsnaz roots into a highly trained and professional force, thanks to extensive involvement from NATO countries, particularly the U.S. Army’s 10th Special Forces Group, and NATO Special Operations Forces Command. NATO allies prioritized institution-building. Advisors determined early on that training alone would be insufficient without institutional reform; in other words, “there would be no ‘random acts of touching,’ or ‘RATS.’” NATO advisors, backstopped by U.S. senior advisors, engaged high level stakeholders to push for major reforms, including the establishment of Ukrainian SOF as a separate service to ensure its independence.

At the same time, even the best advising mission faces significant challenges to building institutions—and sustaining them over time, especially after external advisors have departed. In other words, the outcome can depend on factors beyond Sobchak’s model. Despite these efforts and clear successes, Ukrainian SOF’s operational and strategic-level institutions remained less developed. In the first year after Russia’s invasion, SOF fought as elite infantry alongside conventional forces or reinforced weaker units, leading to high attrition. In Ukraine’s crowded and competitive SOF landscape, UKRSOF must continue proving its relevance to other military organizations, especially without foreign advisors in country to advocate for continued institutional reform.

The “Sovereignty Clock”: Influence Decay Over Time

One of Sobchak’s most intriguing observations is what he terms the “sovereignty clock”—the fact that receptivity to U.S. influence decays over time in host countries with an active advising mission. Across his case studies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, U.S. forces initially faced little resistance and were able to organize SOF effectively. However, this initial warm welcome eventually turned to resistance or even hostility from the host nation. In the Philippines, for instance, civilian authorities grew wary of U.S. advisors after their U.S.-trained SOF were involved in a 2003 coup attempt, and obstructed U.S. efforts to develop SOF institutions. If the “sovereignty clock” is widespread, it presents a challenge for dominant theories of U.S. influence in security cooperation. The “carrots and sticks” approach assumes powerful states can coerce compliance, yet Sobchak’s cases highlight how local sovereignty limits U.S. leverage over time. Meanwhile, the “socialization” approach suggests sustained advising builds stronger relationships, and by extension influence, which is self-reinforcing over time. However, Sobchak’s cases indicate that prolonged U.S. presence can actually breed resistance. Future research should better incorporate analysis of influence strategies over time to see whether states can successfully prevent the “sovereignty clock” from running out.

Implications for Future Advising Missions

Sobchak’s findings offer critical insights for practitioners and scholars alike. First, while structural factors matter, the design of advising missions can significantly influence outcomes. Even when required by strategic necessity or lack of foresight to work with less-than-ideal partners, U.S. military organizations have the agency to craft an intervention that has a better chance of succeeding. Army Special Forces can take care to be sure that advisors are carefully selected for the mission, abstain from pushing the boundaries and taking over for the local military, and maintain relationships with counterparts through additional rotations in country or through remote advising. Second, institution building is difficult but can result in long-term payoffs through the creation of local host-nation forces that can operate more effectively today and sustain themselves even after advisors depart. Senior SOF advisors should work on building local SOF institutions; this requires an advising force that can operate at a higher echelon and with civilian political leaders. Third, the “sovereignty clock” suggests that security cooperation efforts potentially face diminishing returns, meaning the United States must plan for inevitable host-nation resistance and develop strategies to either achieve its goals quickly or sustain influence beyond an initial window of receptivity.

While these findings are valuable, caution should be taken in drawing broad conclusions from them. What works for local SOF organizations constructed from scratch (the scope of Sobchak’s study) may not necessarily work for the host nation’s conventional forces, where recruiting, training, and equipping at scale becomes difficult given factors like inequality. It is reasonable, though, to expect factors important for interpersonal influence in the SOF context, like consistency in advisor-counterpart pairings, to improve advising of conventional forces. Moreover, we should avoid conflating success at building partner military effectiveness with the achievement of desired strategic outcomes more broadly. From the case studies, it is unclear whether successful capacity building translated uniformly into desired outcomes for the United States. El Salvador ended in a negotiated settlement with the rebels, which begs the question whether such an agreement could have been reached before 12 years of fighting and violence against civilians claimed many lives. Afghanistan ended in a U.S. defeat. Iraq, Colombia, and the Philippines have experienced shaky domestic politics and government repression, with U.S.-advised forces sometimes contributing to instability even as they provided stability in other ways by defeating insurgent groups or fighting them to a draw. Meanwhile, U.S. influence arguably declined over time in Iraq and the Philippines and is now nonexistent in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, history suggests that security force assistance will continue to be an indispensable tool of U.S. policy. Understanding how to do it as best as possible is essential. On that front, Training for Victory provides an important contribution to scholars and practitioners alike.

Tags: advising, Book review, Combat Advising, irregular warfare, SOF, Special Operations, Special Operations Forces

About The Author

• 
  
• Alexandra Chinchilla
• Alexandra Chinchilla is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service and a core faculty member of the Albritton Center for Grand Strategy. Alexandra received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. Previously, she was a Niehaus Postdoctoral Fellow at The John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College and a Minerva/Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace. Alexandra’s research examines how powerful states use security cooperation tools, such as military advisors and arms transfers, to increase their influence over allies, partners, and proxies.

16. Senators say foreign aid cuts could impede work of AFRICOM, SOCOM nominees

Senators say foreign aid cuts could impede work of AFRICOM, SOCOM nominees

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · July 22, 2025

Navy Vice Adm. Frank Bradley, left, and Air Force Lt. Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson testify Tuesday, July 22, 2025, during a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing. Bradley is nominated to be commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Anderson is nominated to be commander of U.S. Africa Command. (Eric Kayne/Stars and Stripes)

WASHINGTON — Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee voiced concerns Tuesday over the Trump administration’s reductions to diplomatic initiatives and foreign aid, arguing the cuts will hamper the work of commanders nominated to lead U.S. troops in Africa and special operations forces.

The senators, mostly Democrats, said they were worried the dismantling of the humanitarian assistance agency USAID, a downsizing of the State Department and other efforts to retreat from America’s global engagement would create a vacuum, especially in Africa, that competing powers such as China and Russia would fill.

“For decades, we have relied upon our State Department diplomats and... USAID to develop deep, lasting relationships in Africa that can outlast China and Russia’s coercion,” said Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the top Democrat on the panel. “I am deeply concerned that our ‘soft power’ leadership in Africa has been significantly undermined over the past several months.”

Misgivings about the cuts repeatedly surfaced at the committee’s confirmation hearing for Air Force Lt. Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson, who is nominated to lead U.S. Africa Command, and Navy Vice Adm. Frank Bradley, the nominee to lead U.S. Special Operations Command.

Anderson now serves as the director for joint force development of the Joint Staff while Bradley is the commander of Joint Special Operations Command.

“You’re going to have diplomatic duty, whether you signed up for that or not,” Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, told Anderson. “You’re going to have to build relationships, not necessarily strictly military, but with the local governments and the local leadership.”

King described the disbanding of USAID in particular as “one of the greatest geopolitical mistakes in my lifetime.”

Anderson did not comment on President Donald Trump’s policy moves but said he worked extensively with the State Department, USAID and non-governmental organizations when he commanded special operations forces in Africa and recognized their strategic impact.

“These programs are important as long as they provide for the security and prosperity of our nation,” Anderson said, referring to USAID and a global program to combat AIDS. “I think as we target those in key areas, they can help build stability in key regions.”

Committee chairman Roger Wicker, R-Miss., asked Anderson how Moscow and Beijing would respond if the U.S. were to abandon its foreign-aid engagements — “I think they’d be celebrating, would they not?”

“I know that if there’s opportunities, they will seize them,” Anderson said.

He said Africa was increasingly at the center of a great-power rivalry and is seeing more activity from China, which is expanding its military footprint on the continent, and Russia, which seeks to destabilize the continent through disinformation campaigns.

“Both of those nations see their futures running through the continent,” Anderson said.

If confirmed, he said he would look at “creative ways” to build relationships in Africa and suggested economic investments through private firms could provide opportunities for engagement as the continent’s population rises.

“One of the things that AFRICOM is positioned well to do is to convene people to have these discussions, understanding we provide the military aspect of it,” Anderson said. “We can provide a venue to bring folks together to look at the security implications of these investments.”

Bradley expressed confidence that meaningful ties could still be forged amid budget cuts. He acknowledged the “important capability” provided by American diplomats and aid providers but said he also recognized the difficulty of managing competing budgetary priorities.

“However the distribution of those tasks and those efforts are made, we will continue to work with them closely to make sure we bring the best combination of those levers and tools to bear,” he said.

The Trump administration’s effort to slash federal spending and rein in the size of the government includes a significant overhaul of the State Department, which Secretary of State Marco Rubio has derided as too bloated, costly and ideological.

Congress last week approved the administration’s request to claw back about $8 billion in foreign assistance and is weighing a budget request to virtually eliminate funding for the U.S. Agency for Global Media that provides news to parts of the world with little press freedom.

Sens. Tim Kaine, D-Va., and Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., said they feared the U.S. was leaving a void in the information space and risked allowing Russia, China and Iran to spread their influence.

Some Republicans on Tuesday objected to the line of questioning by Democrats, defending the administration’s cuts to USAID and other programs as in the best interests of the United States.

“There are smart things to do that aren’t just about blowing things up and killing people but that has been crowded out with a mission creep in this wandering foreign policy that just believes that we can just do all this do-gooding stuff around the world,” said Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo.

Sen. Tim Sheehy, R-Mont., a former Navy SEAL officer, said the ability to project economic power and stability is important but nothing will ever supersede American military might.

“The real power projection is when we can display to the world that we are going to protect our interests and our people ruthlessly, no matter what,” he said. “That is what the real power projection, the U.S. military is about.”

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · July 22, 2025

17. Fiona Hill, Trump’s Ex-Russia Adviser, on Why Great Powers Fall

Fiona Hill, Trump’s Ex-Russia Adviser, on Why Great Powers Fall

The former White House aide recently returned to her roots, advising Britain on defense and taking a role at Durham University in northeastern England. She still has her eye on global threats.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/22/world/europe/fiona-hill-trump-russia-uk-defense.html

By Mark Landler

Reporting from Durham, England

• July 22, 2025

Fiona Hill holds out her hand with a pre-emptive wince. She’s shaken so many hands over the past week, congratulating graduates of Durham University, that her own is hurting. It’s an occupational hazard of being the university’s chancellor, a post she has held since 2023, but it’s one she bears cheerfully.

Presiding over Durham’s graduation exercises earlier this month held deep meaning for Ms. Hill. She grew up in Bishop Auckland, a down-at-the-heels former coal-mining town, 11 miles from Durham. Education, initially at St. Andrews University in Scotland, was her ticket out, the first step on a journey that began in 1984 when her father, a miner turned hospital porter, warned his ambitious daughter, “There’s nothing here for you, pet.”

She landed, instead, in the United States. From Harvard to the Brookings Institution, from the White House to a congressional committee debating whether to impeach President Trump in 2019, Ms. Hill scaled the heights in her adopted land.

Testifying to lawmakers in a distinctive northern burr, she became that rarest of species: a celebrity foreign-policy analyst. Her damning description of Mr. Trump’s pressure on Ukraine to investigate Joseph R. Biden Jr. — she called it a “domestic political errand” — was a riveting moment.

Yet for all that, a part of Ms. Hill stayed back home, in the rust belt of England’s northeast. When Durham University came calling, she readily accepted, taking on the mostly ceremonial post of chancellor.

Image

Ms. Hill, center, after presenting honors to graduating students at Durham University. Education was her ticket out of a former coal-mining town.Credit...Mary Turner for The New York Times

“When my dad said, ‘There’s nothing here for you,’” she recalled, he gave her a title for her memoir. But it rankled some of her fellow northerners. “They wanted to say, ‘Come on, there is something for you here.’”

Now 59, living with her husband and college-age daughter in suburban Washington, Ms. Hill spends about six weeks a year in Durham, presiding over ceremonies, getting briefed on the university’s finances and taking a bus to see her mother, who lives in a nursing home in Bishop Auckland. (Her father died in 2012.)

As she was in academia and at the White House, Ms. Hill is a trenchant analyst of a troubled world. Perched on a sun-dappled bench next to Durham’s cathedral, she ranged across a stormy landscape, from the rise of populism and the crisis in higher education in Britain and the United States to what she considers the twin threats of Donald J. Trump and Vladimir V. Putin.

Ms. Hill has been back in the headlines since the British government asked her to be a co-author of a strategic review of defense policy for an era in which Russia is menacing Europe, and the United States is retreating from it. She is uncertain about whether Mr. Trump’s harsher tone toward Mr. Putin in recent days represents a decisive change in his position, but she is skeptical that it would blunt Mr. Putin’s aggression.

“I don’t think Putin is really concerned if Trump’s angry, because he thinks there’s a limit to what Trump’s going to do — and I think he’s right,” said Ms. Hill, who formulated Russia policy in the National Security Council during Mr. Trump’s first term (she also served under George W. Bush and Barack Obama). “He’s pretty confident right now, particularly given the chaos in the United States, and the United States undermining its own security.”

In the strategic review, Ms. Hill and her co-authors, George Robertson, a former secretary general of NATO, and Richard Barrons, a retired British Army general, called for new investments in British nuclear and conventional forces. They also focused on the home front, arguing that Britain needed a whole-of-society approach to make it more resilient against proliferating threats.

Image

Durham, England, where Ms. Hill is chancellor of the university. “Why did the northeast of England go from being the Silicon Valley of its age to being a forgotten backwater?” she asked.Credit...Mary Turner for The New York Times

“It’s a different way of thinking about it,” she said, noting that higher-education institutions and Britain’s National Health Service, not just the military, play integral roles in the country’s preparedness. “We should be thinking of defense as a form of insurance and be willing to pay premiums for it.”

Education is the link in the chain that most troubles Ms. Hill these days. British universities, she says, are poorly financed and ill suited to a world in which technology is revolutionizing the nature of war and work.

“I did wonder, as the graduates walked across the stage, will everything they trained for still require a person?” Ms. Hill said. “It’s not wrong to think universities need to have a major period of introspection.”

Durham University, founded in 1832, is one of the oldest universities in England. Its majestic buildings, including a Norman castle used as a student dormitory, belie a parlous financial position.

Image

The center of Durham, home to one of the oldest universities in England.Credit...Mary Turner for The New York Times

A student of decaying institutions, Ms. Hill drew a parallel between Durham and the idled coal mines that ring this city. She pointed to the shuttered textile mills not far from Harvard’s campus in Cambridge, Mass., as the equivalent. Even an elite institution like Harvard, now under attack by the White House, is not immune, she said.

“My whole intellectual journey is about trying to understand the rise and fall of great powers,” Ms. Hill said, crediting the British historian Paul Kennedy, whose 1987 book resonated with her as a young woman trying to make sense of the England of miners’ strikes and Margaret Thatcher.

“Why did the northeast of England go from being the Silicon Valley of its age to being a forgotten backwater?” she said. Later, at St. Andrews, she recalled asking herself, “Why did the Soviet Union collapse?” Searching for an answer took her to language studies in Moscow and a fellowship at Harvard.

With Mr. Trump’s return to office, Ms. Hill sees parallels between the United States and fallen empires. The president, she said, could end up playing a role like that of Boris Yeltsin, who brought on the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. “Trump is deconstructing the United States, just as Yeltsin deconstructed the Soviet Union,” she said.

Ms. Hill evinces little interest in psychoanalyzing Mr. Trump (“It’s all about him,” she said briskly). She is more interested in what a wave of Trump-like populism rolling around the world means for the great powers.

“What Putin has tried to do in retaking Ukraine is a massive blunder, a massive error,” she said, arguing that Russia would not recapture imperial glory and would ruin its economy in the process. “It’s going to be harder this time around to demilitarize the economy,” she said, “than it was with a collapse of the Soviet Union.”

And yet Ms. Hill predicted that Russia would survive this misadventure, as it has many others in its history. Ditto for Britain, which faces the rise of its own populist leader, Nigel Farage, and his anti-immigrant party, Reform U.K. She acknowledged that Reform was appealing to voters at a time when the Labour government seemed paralyzed.

“Trump and Reform give a sense of action,” she said. “But they’re not fixing things. In fact, in some sense, they’re breaking things. That sense of inability to act is the real challenge for all democratic systems,” she continued. “Populism offers quick fixes for extraordinarily difficult problems.”

For all its problems, however, she said Britain had ample human capacity and the glue of cherished customs. She marveled at the miners’ gala in Durham this month, an annual parade still held decades after the mines closed.

After the self-inflicted damage of Brexit, Ms. Hill said, she was hopeful that Britain had “pretty much bottomed out.” Of course, she couldn’t help adding, with a mordant laugh, “there’s always a subbasement.”

Mark Landler is the London bureau chief of The Times, covering the United Kingdom, as well as American foreign policy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has been a journalist for more than three decades.

A version of this article appears in print on July 23, 2025, Section A, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: Working in U.K., Ex-Trump Adviser Returns to Roots. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

18. Exclusive | Inside the elite Ukrainian combat unit revolutionizing modern drone warfare — and its offer to the US

Exclusive | Inside the elite Ukrainian combat unit revolutionizing modern drone warfare — and its offer to the US

New York Post · by Caitlin Doornbos · July 22, 2025

KYIV, Ukraine — An elite Ukrainian combat unit is defining the future of warfare by battle-testing new drone technology in real-time — which will provide invaluable insight and opportunity for the US, according to the unit’s commander.

As the more than three-year war turns to the skies, The Post visited a Ukrainian assault unit, which falls under the elite 3rd Assault Brigade, pioneering land and air drones to use in battle.

From ground units that lay mines and fire assault rifles to flying drones that drop grenades, Ukrainian Armed Forces are constantly deploying new technologies — and making regular tweaks to perfect them — on the battlefield.

The Post visited a Ukrainian assault unit using advanced land and air drones that are defining the future of warfare. Caitlin Doornbos/NY Post

“This brigade systematically uses assault drones in its operations,” a UAF drone unit commander who goes by the callsign “Makar” told The Post. “They close the distance between Russian and Ukrainian troops because they can go farther than is safe for troops.”

All of the drones used by Makar’s unit are designed and produced in Ukraine, where developers have instant access to troop feedback on how to perfect their products.

Explore More

New York realtor gets banned from Colombia for 10 years after violent airport tirade

Video shows naked porn star dancing and singing while covered in blood from couple he had just murdered

American father of three who joined Russian army to escape 'woke' US has been sent to the frontlines, wife says

“These are the most modern weapons because we’re doing it in close collaboration with the developers,” Makar said.

“Today, if we are doing some mission and a problem arises, we can send a note to them and they can start rebuilding instantly to address the problem.”

It is a prime example of Albert Einstein’s classic adage, “necessity is the mother of invention,” Makar said.

All of the drones used by Makar’s unit are designed and produced in Ukraine. Caitlin Doornbos/NY Post

The country also had to shift away from foreign weapons as a result of the pipeline of Western military aid drying up.

Kyiv is now making roughly 40% of its own weapons, with a goal to boost that to 50% by next year.

As a result, Ukraine has outpaced American drone production and know-how — but they are eager to share their knowledge with the US.

“The main thing is that developers abroad have no way to get their systems battle experience on their own shores,” Makar said.

Kyiv is now making roughly 40% of its own weapons. Caitlin Doornbos/NY Post

“They can have a great idea, but they won’t know it won’t work in modern warfare until they come here,” he continued.

“If they come to Ukraine, they can have close contact directly with troops, so changes can be made overnight instead of wasting time.”

Makar said his unit is open to partnerships with weapons producers of all nations, calling it a win-win situation.

Ukraine could use new technologies in its fight and defense companies could receive regular feedback to improve their weapons, which can then be certified as “battle-tested.”

Makar said his unit is open to partnerships with weapons producers of all nations. Caitlin Doornbos/NY Post

Here is the latest on the Russia-Ukraine conflict

• Russia seeks ‘destruction’ of Ukraine and ‘victory’ — not compromise — in latest talks: top politician
• Ukraine strike decimates only bridge connecting Russia and Crimea, cutting crucial supply line
• Nearly 1 million Russian troops killed or injured in meat grinder Ukraine war: study
• Trump speaks with Putin, says ‘not a conversation that will lead to immediate Peace’ with Ukraine
• Russian strike kills 5 in Ukraine, including baby, hours after Trump-Putin call

It comes as the Pentagon has begun stepping its foot into the world of drone warfare.

On Tuesday, the US Army posted to X that it had just conducted its first test of a drone that drops grenades.

Ukraine has outpaced American drone production so far. Caitlin Doornbos/NY Post

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, these same tactics and technologies are used hundreds of times per day.

“We want to share,” said another Ukrainian soldier known as “Acrobat.”

“Because even if our country is killed, Russia will not stop. It will take these tactics and battlefield knowledge with them as they invade other countries.”

Ukraine had to shift away from foreign weapons as a result of the pipeline of Western military aid drying up. Caitlin Doornbos/NY Post

Oleksandr Biletskyi, vice president of Ukraine’s League of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, said Ukraine’s drone developments are also key examples of the country’s advanced engineering — which has long been native to this region.

“The tank industries, the rocket industry of the Soviet Union, were always done by Ukrainians,” he said.

Now, with the conflict becoming the first example of modern warfare, the Ukrainian defense industry is further revolutionizing defense engineering by working hand-in-hand with frontline troops.

New York Post · by Caitlin Doornbos · July 22, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com