Quotes of the Day:

"Why is propaganda so much more successful when it stirs up hatred than when it tries to stir up friendly feeling?"

– Bertrand Russell

"We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark; the real tragedy of life is when men are afraid of the light."

–Plato

"Do you know the difference between education and experience? Education is when you read the fine print; experience is what you get when you don't."

– Pete Seeger

1. Korea faces new US demands in overhaul of military alliance

2. It’s Groundhog Day... again… South Korea's endless summit cycle

3. How South Korea gave $9.4M to US think tanks while evading foreign agent laws

4. Kim Jong Un tests ‘combat deployment’ readiness at artillery drills

5. North Korea’s Kim urges troops to prepare ‘for real war’

6. Seoul not currently planning to invite Kim Jong Un to APEC summit in South

7. A New York church is set to become a platform for pro-North Korea propaganda

8. S. Korea to propose over US$100 bln in investment as part of tariff deal with U.S.: sources

9. Lee's top security aide meets U.S. officials ahead of tariff deadline

10. FM Cho eyes visit to U.S. next week for talks with Rubio after '2+2' tariff talks falter

11. Seoul, Tokyo top diplomats vow to strengthen ties in 1st phone call

12. S. Korea not to resume anti-N.K. propaganda broadcasts unless Pyongyang does first: official

13. Korea faces pressure amid U.S.-Japan tariff pact

14. US cancels high-level tariff talks with Korea at last moment

15. Jim Heller set to be deputy chief at US Embassy in Seoul

16. South Korea’s Strategic Gamble With A Trump-Led US – Analysis

17.  Diplomacy At A Crossroads: Ending The Korean Peninsula Standoff

1. Korea faces new US demands in overhaul of military alliance

As we think through "overhauling the alliance," We should ask some fundamental questions, among them are these.

1. What do we want to achieve in Korea?

2. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

3. Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)

4. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?

5. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?

The answers to these questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government with respect for individual liberty, the rule of law, and human rights, determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or, in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK)

Then we need to ask the broader questions such as: How does the alliance contribute to a free and open Asia-Indo-Pacific? 

Ultimately we need to seek the optimal way for our combined forces to meet US and alliance mutual interests.

Korea faces new US demands in overhaul of military alliance

By Lee Hyo-jin

Published Jul 24, 2025 4:24 pm KST

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250724/korea-faces-new-us-demands-in-overhaul-of-military-alliance

FM Cho Hyun expected to visit Washington next week

As a crucial Aug. 1 deadline looms, Korea and the United States are racing to finalize a sprawling package deal encompassing tariffs and security. The high-stakes negotiations are intensifying scrutiny on how Washington's far-reaching demands concerning defense and regional stability will ultimately shape the agreement.

The negotiations may include pressure on Seoul to increase its defense spending and take on a larger role in countering China, both of which align with U.S. President Donald Trump's explicit demands of American allies in Asia.

Since President Lee Jae Myung took office on June 4, U.S. officials have repeatedly emphasized the need to modernize the bilateral alliance on defense and security cooperation.

The term was notably used by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a congratulatory message on Lee’s inauguration, when he said, "We are also modernizing the alliance to meet the demands of today’s strategic environment and address new economic challenges."

The idea was highlighted again during a visit to Seoul by Kevin Kim, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan, on July 10. Alliance modernization was a key item on the agenda in his meeting with his counterpart, Hong Ji-pyo, director-general for North American affairs at Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

When asked to clarify what the term specifically entails, a foreign ministry official said the government will "continue to consult and cooperate closely with the U.S. to develop the alliance into a future-oriented, comprehensive strategic partnership capable of responding to the evolving economic and security environment," but declined to offer further details.

The exact scope of modernization remains unclear, but many see it as a demand for allies to take on a bigger share of the security burden, a policy priority for Trump.

That could include raising Korea's defense spending, potentially up to 5 percent of gross domesic product, and expanding the role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in potential military conflict involving Taiwan.

Recent developments in U.S.-Philippines ties may offer a preview of Washington's expectations.

On Monday, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth hosted Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. at the Pentagon, just days before the U.S. and Philippines finalized a tariff agreement.

During the meeting, Hegseth said the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty now "extends to armed attacks on our armed forces, aircraft or public vessels, including our Coast Guard, anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea."

He also emphasized the strategic importance of Manila’s geographic position, signaling a broader U.S. effort to strengthen security partnerships in Asia.

 Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo, right, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, left, and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takehiro Funakoshi hold a three-way meeting in Tokyo, July 18. Yonhap

Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo, right, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, left, and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takehiro Funakoshi hold a three-way meeting in Tokyo, July 18. Yonhap

It is widely anticipated that similar demands will be directed at Korea, in line with Trump’s regional strategy in Asia.

The Chosun Ilbo reported Thursday that Washington has already urged Seoul to expand the scope of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty to align more closely with Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy. According to the report, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau made the request during a meeting with First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo in Tokyo last Friday.

The foreign ministry denied that the request was made during the meeting.

These issues are expected to be among the top priorities for Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, who officially took office on Monday. According to diplomatic sources, he is seeking to visit Washington as early as next week. Cho has yet to hold a phone call with his U.S. counterpart and is widely expected to travel without prior contact.

The top diplomat's potential visit comes as allies gear up for last-minute tariff negotiations, though progress seems to be stalled.

A high-level trade dialogue scheduled for Friday was abruptly postponed after the U.S. canceled the meeting, citing Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's urgent schedule.

The meeting was set to bring together Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol and Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo with Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.

2. It’s Groundhog Day... again… South Korea's endless summit cycle

Excertps:

The tragedy of Groundhog Day was not just the repetition, but how long it took Phil to see the problem wasn’t the world around him—it was himself. For South Korea, the tragedy would be repeating yet another empty summit cycle, knowing full well how it ends.

Lee Jae-myung has the opportunity to do things differently. He can resist the lure of cinematic diplomacy and focus on the quiet, unglamorous work of long-term policy. He can escape the loop.

But if he doesn’t, if he chases the same illusions, we’ll all wake up one morning to the same song on the radio, the same handshake on the DMZ, probably the same guy on CNN saying how great and long-lasting it all is, followed by the same inevitable disappointment. Just another Groundhog Day on the peninsula.

Junotane Korea

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Commentary

It’s Groundhog Day... again… South Korea's endless summit cycle

The lesson of Groundhog Day is how long it takes to see the problem isn’t the world around you—it's yourself. Are South Korea's summits the same?

https://www.junotane.com/p/its-groundhog-day-again-south-koreas-endless-summer-cycle

Jul 22, 2025

∙ Paid

In the 1993 film Groundhog Day, Bill Murray plays Phil Connors, a cynical TV weatherman trapped in a time loop, doomed to relive the same day—February 2nd—over and over again. At first, Phil exploits his situation for personal gain. Then he falls into despair. But only after confronting his flaws and changing his behavior does he finally escape the cycle. What begins as a comedy becomes a fable about transformation: real change doesn’t come from replaying the same script; it comes from breaking the script entirely.

South Korea’s North Korea policy feels eerily similar. Every few years, especially under progressive administrations, a new president takes office, declares a fresh start, and launches another round of summit diplomacy with the North. The setting changes—Pyongyang, Panmunjom, Singapore—but the script is always the same: early gestures of goodwill, grand promises, photo ops, and then… collapse. The loop resets.

Now, with the election of President Lee Jae-myung, the country stands once again on the edge of a familiar cliff, peering down into another cycle of performative engagement. The question is whether Lee will break the loop or become its next prisoner.

From Kim Dae-jung to Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s progressive leaders have embraced the belief that engagement—dialogue, economic cooperation, and summitry—can transform inter-Korean relations. And for a while, that belief seemed to bear fruit. The first inter-Korean summit in 2000 won Kim a Nobel Peace Prize. Roh Moo-hyun continued the “Sunshine Policy,” and Moon Jae-in took it to new theatrical heights with three summits with Kim Jong Un in 2018. There were handshakes at the DMZ, pledges of peace, and choreographed expressions of unity.

And yet, all of it unraveled.

By 2019, the momentum from Moon’s diplomacy had fizzled. The Hanoi summit between Kim and Trump collapsed without a deal. North Korea resumed missile tests. Joint economic projects stalled. The vision of peace evaporated. Moon left office with none of the fundamental issues resolved: not denuclearization, not normalization, not even basic communication channels.

This isn’t to say these efforts were made in bad faith. But like Phil Connors repeatedly trying to charm his way out of the loop, successive administrations have approached North Korea with the same tools, expecting a different result. They tweak the language, adjust the timeline, add new intermediaries—but the architecture remains the same. Symbolism substitutes for substance. Hope stands in for strategy.

President Lee Jae-myung now signals he may do the same. His early gestures echo past patterns: talk of reopening dialogue, resuming humanitarian cooperation, and halting loudspeaker broadcasts along the border. His advisers speak of finding “creative solutions” to engage Pyongyang while balancing relations with the U.S. and China. Yet creative solutions quickly start to look like recycled scripts. A “reset” becomes a retread. And already, the signs are clear that North Korea isn’t playing along.

In 2024, Pyongyang declared South Korea a hostile state in its constitution, explicitly renouncing the long-standing goal of peaceful reunification. It has deepened military ties with Russia, stepped up its missile tests, and closed virtually every channel of inter-Korean communication. It does not want a summit. It wants leverage.

Summit diplomacy, at this stage, is no longer about building peace—it’s about optics. Kim Jong Un uses summits to extract concessions and legitimacy. South Korean presidents use them to project statesmanship and placate domestic audiences. But without enforceable agreements or mutual accountability, these summits become expensive photo shoots—acts of political theater with no enduring impact.

And yet, Lee’s administration seems drawn to the same trap.

It doesn’t have to be this way. Groundhog Day wasn’t just about repetition—it was about the necessity of internal change. Phil Connors only escapes the loop when he stops manipulating others and starts improving himself. He learns piano. He reads poetry. He saves a man’s life. The loop breaks not because the day changes, but because he does.

South Korea’s North Korea policy needs the same reckoning. If the Lee administration wants to avoid becoming yet another rerun, it must stop mistaking motion for progress. Instead of racing toward another summit, it should:

First, anchor diplomacy in measurable steps. A summit should be the culmination of sustained, reciprocal progress—not its starting point. That means reestablishing hotlines, verifying compliance on missile moratoriums, and restoring small-scale humanitarian projects first.

Second, maintain a balance between engagement and deterrence. Lee has rightly indicated that he will not undo the U.S.–ROK–Japan security cooperation that his predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol helped strengthen. That’s essential. Dialogue without credibility is just wishful thinking. North Korea must understand that engagement doesn’t preclude pressure.

Third, confront the new strategic reality. North Korea’s behavior is no longer transactional—it’s systemic. It has aligned itself with China and Russia in an emerging authoritarian bloc. It has declared denuclearization a non-starter. Seoul must adjust to this—not by giving up, but by avoiding self-delusion.

And finally, South Korea must accept that the North Korea question may not have a clean resolution in the near future. Diplomacy is still necessary—but not all diplomacy needs to end in a summit. There is value in low-level talks, in backchannels, in coordination with allies. Peace is not always built in a day—or with a handshake.

The tragedy of Groundhog Day was not just the repetition, but how long it took Phil to see the problem wasn’t the world around him—it was himself. For South Korea, the tragedy would be repeating yet another empty summit cycle, knowing full well how it ends.

Lee Jae-myung has the opportunity to do things differently. He can resist the lure of cinematic diplomacy and focus on the quiet, unglamorous work of long-term policy. He can escape the loop.

But if he doesn’t, if he chases the same illusions, we’ll all wake up one morning to the same song on the radio, the same handshake on the DMZ, probably the same guy on CNN saying how great and long-lasting it all is, followed by the same inevitable disappointment. Just another Groundhog Day on the peninsula.

.

3. How South Korea gave $9.4M to US think tanks while evading foreign agent laws

Follow the money. Graphics and charts at the link.

How South Korea gave $9.4M to US think tanks while evading foreign agent laws

Investigation reveals Korea Foundation coordinates closely with Seoul to promote ROK interests, despite nonprofit status

https://koreapro.org/2025/07/how-south-korea-gave-9-4m-to-us-think-tanks-while-evading-foreign-agent-laws/

Chad O'Carroll | Ifang BremerJuly 23, 2025

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An illustration of a person at a podium weighed against stacks of money on a justice scale | Image: Korea Pro

A South Korean nonprofit affiliated with Seoul’s foreign ministry has funneled at least $9.4 million to U.S. think tanks in recent years, a Korea Pro investigation has found, making it one of the top global funders of American policy research despite avoiding registration under foreign agent laws.

The findings show that the Korea Foundation (KF), which maintains offices in Washington and Los Angeles, provided grants to at least 31 different organizations from 2019 to 2023.

But while KF claims to be a non-governmental body and a “nonprofit public institution,” Korea Pro’s findings show that the foundation is closely tied to the South Korean government and explicitly seeks to advance Seoul’s interests, at times pressuring scholars to promote the positions of the administration in power.

KF’s activities reportedly caught the attention of U.S. authorities before, and last year’s indictment of Korea expert Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst accused of failing to register as a foreign agent for Seoul, has exacerbated KF’s fears of being seen as a foreign agent itself, Korea Pro’s investigation found.

However, multiple experts assessed that KF meets the legal threshold for mandatory registration as a foreign agent — a step that they said would clarify its role and allow U.S. audiences to better assess its influence on policymaking.

GOVERNMENT IN ALL BUT NAME

$9.4 million might not sound like much in comparison to multi-trillion dollar U.S. budgets and defense projects that cost hundreds of billions. But in the world of think tanks, even this conservative Korea Pro estimate places the Korea Foundation (KF) in rare company.

KF comes in at number three in the ranks of foreign government funders of American think tanks and policy institutions from 2019 to 2023, above nations like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Canada, Japan, Sweden and Taiwan, according to data published by the Think Tank Funding Tracker.

The real number is almost certainly much higher than $9.4 million: Korea Pro could only obtain donation data from 19 of the 31 policy research organizations mentioned in KF annual reports, relying on direct queries to recipient organizations and numbers published in their annual reports.

KF itself declined to provide any figures in response to specific inquiries about the level of support it provides U.S.-based think tanks and research organizations.

Despite ranking alongside some of the world’s highest spending nations, a KF spokesperson told Korea Pro that the foundation is “not a government entity.”

“[We are a] ‘non-classified public institution’ that provides academic, cultural and policy research grant programs,” the spokesperson said.

Established by South Korean law in 1991, KF is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organization’s funding comes primarily from government appropriations and passport taxes, with an annual budget exceeding $145 million. 

Notably, six of KF’s eight international offices operate from within South Korean embassies, though its two U.S. offices are located in separate addresses.

Most tellingly, KF’s leadership is appointed directly by South Korea’s political establishment. Its board is selected by the foreign ministry, while its president requires ROK presidential approval.

Importantly, KF’s annual reports make clear its intention to influence policy in South Korea’s national favor.

Through its support of “prominent policy research institutes,” KF hopes to “create a more supportive environment for Korea and its primary interests,” the organization stated in 2015. Its annual report the previous year indicated that KF seeks to “reinforce the base of support for Korea’s interests and create a supportive atmosphere for the foreign policy measures of the Korean government.”

A former KF staffer, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed that there is “tight” coordination in Washington between the ROK Embassy and KF operations, stating that “most of the guidelines … (come) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” 

For example, when high-level Korean political figures visit Washington, KF coordinates with the embassy to schedule meetings with U.S. government and senate officials, as well as local think tank experts, the former staffer said.

Multiple sources described how this structure enables top-down political influence. 

“If the office of president (of South Korea) initiates certain kinds of public diplomacy… (they) can mobilize the foreign ministry, National Intelligence Service and Korea Foundation … to support certain events,” explained a former high-level ROK government insider familiar with KF processes, speaking on condition of anonymity.

While KF is one of several global public diplomacy organizations affiliated with a foreign ministry, most of which are not registered as foreign agents, the organization’s close ties to its host government and financing of policy work set it apart from its peers, which largely focus on language and cultural exchange.

The practical result is an organization that sets its priorities based on Seoul’s political goals, despite not identifying as a foreign agent lobbying for ROK interests.

During the Moon Jae-in administration, KF funded projects promoting inter-Korean “peace” and “reconciliation.” One 2020 project, for example, received funding to promote “sovereign equality” as a solution to the “Korean Security Crisis,” with the stated goal of publishing articles in outlets like The National Interest and The Atlantic to “help revitalize the stalled policy debate in the United States and South Korea.”

Under the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol government, such initiatives almost completely disappeared.

“I know that, if needed, [KF] could be used as a tool to influence some scholars,” a former South Korean presidential office staffer told Korea Pro, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Sometimes, the link between Seoul’s objectives and KF’s work is crystal clear.

In April 2023, Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs’ Korea Project hosted then-President Yoon for a speech during his state visit to the U.S. The Belfer Center was one of the largest recipients of KF funding at the time, and the foundation’s 2023 Management Evaluation report obtained by Korea Pro explicitly stated that its support for the Belfer Center “enabled the President of the Republic of Korea to deliver a speech at Harvard University for the first time.”

Asked about government connections to policy-related programming, KF President Kim Gee-hwan told Korea Pro, “We don’t have anything further to add.”

A screenshot from Belfer Center’s Korea Project website celebrating former South Korean President Yoon Seok-yul’s speech at Harvard University | Image: Belfer Center

KF stated in 2023 that its support for the Belfer Center “enabled the President of the Republic of Korea to deliver a speech at Harvard University for the first time.” | Image: Screenshot of KF’s 2023 Management Evaluation report

FOLLOW THE MONEY

KF’s influence in Washington operates through grants and relationships that shift with South Korean electoral cycles, which the evidence suggests it uses to shape policy. By contrast, the foundation is more hands-off about its support for academic programs at U.S. universities, according to sources.

At least 31 U.S. think tanks and research organizations received KF support from 2019 to 2023, annual reports analyzed by Korea Pro show, effectively representing a “whos-who” of the Korea policy community.

But these figures represent the very low-end estimates of actual funding. 

On the one hand, public disclosures by the above think tanks almost never detail specific figures, instead framing support within bands such as $250,000-499,999. Korea Pro calculated all figures using the lowest possible numbers in these ranges, meaning the figures could be much higher.

Anonymous donors add another layer to KF support. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) alone has received $1.1 million from unnamed donors since 2016 via KF, annual reports show. CSIS Korea Chair Victor Cha told Korea Pro that the center knows the “identity of all donors,” but that he didn’t know why KF annual reports list some donors as from anonymous sources.

Compared to the Japan Foundation, a public diplomacy organization linked to Japan’s foreign ministry, the KF’s observable funding of the U.S. think-tank ecosystem is also dramatically higher.

Korea Pro could find only $731,592 of Japan Foundation donations recorded for U.S.-based think tanks and research organizations between 2019-2023, compared to the over $9.4 million provided by KF.

“The purpose of our activities is to advance Japanese studies, rather than to exert influence on policy decisions in the United States,” the Japan Foundation told Korea Pro.

Joshua Stanton, a lawyer who specializes in Korea-related affairs, said he was not surprised by the wide-range of organizations that KF funds.

“If you are working in the Korea space on any policy issues, the probability that your employer or your paycheck somehow depends on Korean government funding … is probably approaching 90 (percent),” he told Korea Pro.

Nick Cleveland-Stout, who worked on the Quincy Institute’s Think Tank Tracker project, said the numbers showcase “South Korea’s immense influence in Washington” when compared to other nations.

“From basing issues and arms sales to trade issues, the South Korean government has a number of interests in influencing U.S. policy and is using all of the tools of influence at its disposal,” he said. “The Korea Foundation, as an affiliate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, appears to be one such tool — and an influential one at that.”

STRINGS ATTACHED?

While some recipients of KF funding reported complete independence, others described various forms of pressure to align think tank work with Seoul’s diplomatic messaging, raising concerns about KF efforts to shape U.S. policy at the direction of the ROK government.

One long-time grantee told Korea Pro that, in their experience, KF program officers won’t tell grant applicants what to write but will suggest topics “that might be attractive or that might be more likely to be funded.”

According to the former high-level ROK government familiar with KF processes, ROK embassies sometimes approach local think tanks or policy centers abroad with suggestions for program themes, hinting that support may be available via KF. After helping draft the funding proposal — often with embassy contacts copied on email — the embassy may then lobby KF to approve it. “That’s the pattern,” the source said.

In some cases, relationships between think tanks and the embassy can grow especially close. 

“I had to engage with the embassy much more actively when I worked [at a major think tank with KF funding] because we did much more public-facing events,” a source who worked at a regular recipient of KF funds in Washington recalled.

These connections can become problematic, another long-term KF recipient working outside of the U.S. said, referring to cases where South Korean embassies suggest what grant recipients should write in op-eds or complain when published articles don’t fit the desired narrative.

“It seems like the Presidential Office has applied pressure on them to take certain actions,” the source said.

A second source who worked in a KF-funded role said they had also received complaints from ROK embassy personnel after publishing an op-ed that the Seoul didn’t agree with, despite KF providing funds on the promise of research independence.

Not everyone reported experiencing such pressure, however.

“Our experience has been that they’ve been very hands-off,” Karl Friedhoff of the Chicago Council told Korea Pro.

And Victor Cha of CSIS said that legal safeguards ensure independence and “final determination of all aspects” of KF-funded projects.

While CSIS consults with partners on conferences, “the agenda, speakers and topics are ultimately CSIS’s decision and responsibility as per our MOUs,” he said. “The MOU also states that CSIS will never pre-determine the outcome of a research project or conference.”

David C. Kang of the University of Southern California — who has helped operate a young scholar program with CSIS — also told Korea Pro that KF has never interfered with projects such as by trying to “influence what scholars we choose or what the content of the program is.”

Despite such testimony, Cleveland-Stout of the Quincy Institute said KF’s own Annual Report language about promoting “accurate perceptions of Korea” and fostering favorable public opinion makes clear its goals.

“This is a foreign government-affiliated donor saying their intent is to influence the work of a think tank in its favor, even as most think tanks deny that their foreign government donors influence their work.”

Friedhoff acknowledged that KF support could discourage some larger programs from taking stances critical of the South Korean administration in power.

“I can see why people might not want to cross them … if you have jobs on the line,” he said.

CROSSING A LINE

Korea Pro’s investigation revealed several problematic cases illustrate how KF has actively intervened to influence U.S. policy at Seoul’s apparent behest, possibly crossing a line into activity that requires FARA registration.

In 2024, ahead of a public speaking engagement, the long-time grantee received a phone call from a KF representative, who allegedly suggested they “say something positive” about a recent speech by President Yoon during the event. The grantee declined.

“If the Korea Foundation wants to do those sorts of things, then yes, they would have to register under FARA,” the individual said. “But my understanding is that they know that they’re not supposed to do that.”

In another case, a former South Korean official was removed from a KF-funded conference after a change in the foundation’s leadership. The event organizer told the official that the newly appointed KF leader objected to their participation.

“It’s not [KF leadership’s] role to pick who is being invited, who is supposed to speak at a conference,” the official said. A second source who has received KF funding independently confirmed the account. 

KF did not respond to Korea Pro questions about the alleged incident.

Perhaps the clearest example of political retaliation came in 2005, when KF withdrew funding from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) after scholar Nicholas Eberstadt published articles questioning U.S. military subsidies to South Korea and suggested that staff in the Roh Moo-hyun administration viewed George W. Bush’s re-election as an “emergency.”

“I did become aware rather quickly that some of the critiques I had been writing hadn’t necessarily made me [the] favorite of the year in certain circles in Seoul,” Eberstadt told Korea Pro. 

Korean media reported that then-foreign minister Ban Ki-moon confirmed KF would no longer fund AEI or Eberstadt specifically — a decision allegedly made at the behest of the ruling party.

KF declined to answer questions about whether or not protocols have changed since the decision to defund AEI.

FARA OR FOUL?

The key question when examining KF’s activities is whether they fall under the scope of the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), with multiple experts telling Korea Pro that they believe the foundation should register as a foreign agent.

FARA, enacted in 1938 to combat Nazi propaganda, requires individuals or entities acting “at the order, request or under the direction or control” of a foreign principal to register with the Justice Department if they engage in political activities within the U.S.

Registration is required not just for paid lobbyists but for anyone engaging in “political activities” on behalf of a foreign principal, which is defined as including foreign governments and government-funded entities. 

Crucially, there need not be a written contract, payment or even a foreign government client. A mere “request” from a foreign entity for help setting up meetings with U.S. officials can trigger registration requirements, according to the international law firm Covington & Burling LLP.

The law specifically covers those who intend to influence U.S. government officials or American public opinion regarding domestic or foreign policy. It also applies to those who act as political consultants, informing foreign governments about U.S. policies, if they engage in “political activities.”

And while there’s an “academic exemption” that think tanks often use to avoid registration, it doesn’t apply if recipients are engaged in political activities, which can include actions that would influence the U.S. public to view the foreign government “in a positive light,” according to Covington.

In 2021, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Security Division allegedly wrote to KF, recommending that it consider FARA registration for work in the U.S. But the Foundation reportedly objected on the grounds that it is an “independent organization … engaged in cultural and academic exchanges exempt from FARA.” 

The DOJ’s FARA unit and KF declined to comment when contacted by Korea Pro, but several experts indicated that they agreed with the DOJ’s reported recommendation.

“A foreign foundation with ties to a government that advocates for creating ‘a supportive atmosphere for the foreign policy measures of the Korean government’… It seems pretty clear that the Korea Foundation is the agent of the Korean government,” a former DOJ lawyer specializing on FARA issues told Korea Pro, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The expert added that, as a foreign agent operating in the U.S., KF’s meetings and donations are reportable “even if you don’t think that they’re doing political activity, just giving money.”

The lawyer Joshua Stanton echoed this point.

“I have long felt that the Korea Foundation falls within the spirit, if not not necessarily the letter, of the FARA,” he said.

“When you set up a [foundation] and you fund it indirectly with government funds, and then that entity then disperses funds, both through other non-governmental entities and then directly to people who have influence on policy, that does suggest that they’re doing something indirectly that would be wrong or they think would look wrong if they did it directly.”

Ben Freeman of the Quincy Institute, which tracks foreign funding of think tanks, emphasized that KF has given millions of dollars to U.S. think tanks that have produced “quite favorable research related to South Korea.”

“That at the very least begs the question of whether or not its grantees should be registered under FARA.”

Eberstadt of the AEI argued that it would be “better safe than sorry” for KF to register under FARA. “I don’t think there would be anything sinister or shocking about that,” he said.

A screenshot from a Korea Foundation annual report, 2023

FARA SENSITIVITIES

Despite KF’s insistence that it is “not a government entity,” Korea Pro’s investigation suggests the foundation is aware that its activities could be interpreted as violating FARA rules, and that it is keen to avoid the stigma of registering as a foreign agent.

Last July, U.S. federal prosecutors accused prominent Korea expert Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst and White House official, of working for ROK spies in exchange for luxury goods and expensive dinners, charging her with refusing to register as a foreign agent under FARA.

The case, which is still ongoing, stunned Beltway insiders and prompted soul searching about the extent of South Korean influence.

It also allegedly sent KF into crisis mode.

“Everyone was freaking out because we were worried that it might impact what we do in public diplomacy in Washington, D.C. because they might be thinking that we’re doing lobbying,” a former KF staffer told Korea Pro.

The source said KF canceled meetings and “tried to erase our name in certain events even though the event was funded by the Korea Foundation. We tried to go silent.”

According to the former staffer, KF is sensitive about FARA because registering as a foreign agent would require the foundation to report “every single meeting or every money or budget to the U.S. government.” FARA registration requires semiannual filings to the DOJ about many activities within the U.S.

KF’s reluctance to register may stem from more than legal caution, Freeman of the Quincy Institute explained.

“There can also be a stigma associated with registering under FARA in that you are then officially labeled a ‘foreign agent,’ which can negatively impact things like fundraising, press work and Congressional relations.”

The lawyer Stanton suggested that think tanks “may fear embarrassment” from working with FARA-registered organizations, but he suggested that is the “price you pay” for receiving resources from a foreign government.

In at least one case, a recipient of KF funding voluntarily registered under FARA.

Citing an “an abundance of caution,” Center for International Policy for a peace advocacy project said it did not believe its work for a peace advocacy project constituted political activity but that it chose to do so due to recent DOJ interpretations about what requires registration.

AT A CROSSROADS

For over three decades, KF has been at the center of South Korean public diplomacy in the U.S. and beyond, funding cultural programs that supporters say have enriched American understanding of a crucial ally.

“I like the fact that there are entities in Washington trying to contribute to ideas. That’s a productive and healthy conversation,” a think tank insider told Korea Pro. 

Karl Friedhoff of the Chicago Council agreed that KF’s role is “overall positive” and warned that reduced funding would mean “much less work being done overall on Korea.”

Yet KF’s funding for policy research and coordination with South Korean embassies, often in response to the political winds in Seoul, appears to take it into territory that U.S. transparency laws were designed to illuminate.

Critics of KF’s activities told Korea Pro that the question is not whether South Korea should refrain from public diplomacy, something every major nation does, but how it should carry out its work.

Joshua Stanton said the Korea Economic Institute, which is FARA-registered, “writes a lot of really good, objective and useful information.” Registration, he emphasized, need not compromise credibility but only increase transparency.

Eberstadt concurred: “Much more damaging to South Korea’s national interest would be the sort of lack of confidence that would come from suspicions or unfounded suspicions that there was some sort of nefarious hidden hand here.”

The former DOJ lawyer specializing in FARA issues acknowledged that registering could impact how think tanks work with KF.

“Maybe they (would) make different decisions, maybe they make the same decisions,” they said. “But it would certainly, as someone who consumes their programming, be a relevant fact.”

Daniel Auble, director of the Foreign Lobby Watch program at OpenSecrets.org, called it “essential” for KF to make FARA disclosures: “Getting a full account of the scope of their spending and who their lobbying targeted is important to hold them accountable.”

Going forward, KF could find it harder to avoid registering as a foreign agent amid intensifying scrutiny of influence operations — from Russian election interference and Chinese academic programs to fears about foreign contractors working for the U.S. government.

And as the Sue Mi Terry case showed, not even U.S. allies can count on being exempt from democratic expectations of transparency.

“If you’re a scholar and you are receiving a significant amount of funding or direction or control from a foreign government, you really owe that to the people who work with you, to your employer, to your colleagues, to your friends,” Stanton said. 

“I wish for a day when we will really reassert the independence of our commentary.”

Edited by Bryan Betts

Editor’s note: Korea Risk Group, the publisher of Korea Pro, previously applied unsuccessfully for a Korea Foundation grant. This report was produced independently, without input or influence from the Korea Foundation or other organizations.

4. Kim Jong Un tests ‘combat deployment’ readiness at artillery drills

north Korea loves its artillerymen. Artillery is the King of Battle. The question is can we determine if the nKPA is integrating lessons learned from Ukraine into its readiness training for preparation for invasion of the South.

News

Kim Jong Un tests ‘combat deployment’ readiness at artillery drills

Drills feature anti-South Korea war tactics but come amid North’s deployment to help Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/kim-jong-un-tests-combat-deployment-readiness-at-artillery-drills/

Colin Zwirko July 24, 2025

Kim Jong Un attends an artillery live-fire training competition on July 23 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (July 24, 2025)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw artillery drills on Wednesday to test the “combat deployment” readiness of soldiers, according to state media, amid the army’s active participation in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published a brief report Thursday on an “artillery live-fire training competition,” stating the event prepared soldiers for “night marching and combat deployment” as well as “surprise attacks on unexpected enemy targets in summer coastal environments and conditions.”

Troops were also tested on “conducting surprise attacks on maritime targets” with their tasks “presented unexpectedly” by superiors in the field. Soldiers were expected to become familiar with the conditions of “rapidly changing modern battlefields.”

Kim reportedly said attending the drills was a “good opportunity to directly observe the practical and fundamental changes occurring in our military’s combat readiness since the Seventh Conference of Korean People’s Army (KPA) Training Officers” held in May — an event that appeared largely related to distributing lessons from fighting in Russia’s war.

He emphasized the need for maintaining an “army that can immediately engage in war at any time.”

The bottom-right image shows Kim shaking hands with Pak Kwang Ju, commander of the KPA 4th Corps which reportedly won the artillery competition | Image: Rodong Sinmun (July 24, 2025)

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Photos showed soldiers in desert camo uniforms firing indigenous 152mm D-20 towed gun-howitzers, an artillery system with a maximum range of around 15 miles (24 km), from a coastal installation and targeting an offshore island. 

NK News analysis of additional images shown on state TV on Thursday suggests the competition took place at a salt farm near Nampho on the west coast, the same spot as artillery drills in March 2024. The island may have been one named Hachuira located around 6 miles (9 km) to the south, which has been prepped with a large circular target on it for months and is next to another common target island.

North Korea has reportedly been exporting the D-20 to Russian forces in recent years for use against Ukraine. However, while DPRK soldiers in Russia have reportedly used smaller caliber mortar systems, they haven’t been confirmed to use larger gun-howitzers such as those featured in this week’s drills. 

KCNA’s mention of tactics like coastal attacks also suggest the drills were aimed at preparing for battle against South Korea and not Ukraine, though the prospect of training troops for more intense fighting against Kyiv after possible additional deployments can’t be ruled out.

Toggle between these two photos to compare Kim Jong Un’s arrival location at his observation stand for the March 2024 drills and those held this week. A tree circled in yellow appears identical in both images. | Image: KCTV (July 24, 2025), edited by NK News

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State TV aired one image of the target island | Image: KCTV (July 24, 2025)

Winners of the artillery competition were invited to attend “celebratory events” scheduled for July 27, the 72nd anniversary of the Korean War Armistice. 

The holiday typically features large-scale events celebrating war veterans and mourning the deaths of soldiers in the 1950-53 war with the U.S and South Korea. It is possible that this year it will focus on veterans and casualties of the war against Ukraine as well.

Kim Jong Un attended similar artillery drills but further down the west coast near Nampho just after the KPA conference in late May. 

South Korea also recently held live-fire drills near the inter-Korean border last month.

Joining Kim Jong Un for Wednesday’s drills were various KPA corps commanders, as well as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission Pak Jong Chon, defense minister No Kwang Chol and chief of the KPA General Staff Ri Yong Gil.

KCNA said the winning soldiers were part of the “2nd Battery of the 3rd Artillery Battalion of the 16th Artillery Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division of the 4th Corps of the KPA.” Photos showed Kim congratulating 4th Corps commander Pak Kwang Ju after the drills.

Edited by Kristen Talman

Updated on July 24 at 11:42 a.m. KST with details about the weapons used during the drills and top officials attending, and at 4:45 p.m. with details about the location of the drills

5. North Korea’s Kim urges troops to prepare ‘for real war’

Kim needs to keep the nKPA on at least a mental war footing.

North Korea’s Kim urges troops to prepare ‘for real war’

straitstimes.com · July 24, 2025

SEOUL - North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has urged his military to be ready “for real war” as he observed a firing contest of artillery units, Pyongyang state media said on July 24.

Mr Kim’s remarks follow the

North’s deployment of troops

and weapons to help Russia during its more than three-year-long offensive in Ukraine.Video footage aired by state-run Korea Central Television on July 24 showed soldiers from artillery units firing shells towards the sea.

Mr Kim is seen looking through binoculars at an observation post, flanked by two military officials, but the location for July 23’s contest was not disclosed.

He urged the soldiers to be ready “for real war” at “anytime” and be capable of “destroying the enemy in every battle”, the Korean Central News Agency reported in an English dispatch.

South Korean and Western intelligence agencies have reported Pyongyang sent more than 10,000 soldiers to Russia’s Kursk region in 2024, along with artillery shells, missiles and long-range rocket systems.

Around 600 North Korean soldiers have been killed and thousands more wounded fighting for Russia, Seoul has said.

Mr Kim

offered Moscow his full support

for its war in Ukraine during recent talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, state media reported previously.The two heavily sanctioned nations signed a military deal in 2024, including a mutual defence clause, during a rare visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang. AFP

straitstimes.com · July 24, 2025

6. Seoul not currently planning to invite Kim Jong Un to APEC summit in South

I would invite him just to get his "no" on record. Of course he would never come to such a meeting. He will never be part of a group meeting or event. For Kim he must be the featured one - "There can be only one" with Kim.

Seoul not currently planning to invite Kim Jong Un to APEC summit in South

But foreign ministry says host country is allowed to invite a non-member like the DPRK to the annual regional forum

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/seoul-not-currently-planning-to-invite-kim-jong-un-to-apec-summit-in-south/

Joon Ha Park July 24, 2025

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and the official logo for the APEC 2025 summit in Gyeongju | Image: Rodong Sinmun (June 24, 2025) and APEC 2025 KOREA, edited by NK News

Seoul is not currently planning to invite North Korea to participate in the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea, though the ROK foreign ministry said it remains possible for Pyongyang to join.

“North Korea is not a member of APEC and, in principle, is not eligible to attend the APEC summit,” the ministry said in a statement to NK News on Thursday. “However, in recent years, the host country has occasionally invited non-members to participate in informal discussions on the sidelines of the summit.”

The ministry told NK News that South Korea is reviewing potential invitations to non-members “based on various factors, including APEC’s founding principles, the summit’s theme and priorities, and bilateral relations with potential invitees.”

“In the case of North Korea, consultation with APEC members would also be required,” they said, adding that no such discussions are in progress at this time.  

South Korea’s unification ministry also confirmed to NK News that no discussions are currently underway regarding inviting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to the annual regional forum.

The APEC summit is scheduled to take place from Oct. 31 to Nov. 1 in Gyeongju, a historic city in the country’s southeast. President Lee Jae-myung’s office has already sent formal invitations to leaders of the 20 APEC member economies, including U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Lee’s nominee for unification minister, Chung Dong-young, previously sought to invite then-North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to the 2005 APEC summit in Busan while serving in the same role under President Roh Moo-hyun. 

At his confirmation hearing on July 11, Chung signaled support for a possible invitation to Kim Jong Un, telling lawmakers that “if APEC could become a table for peace on the Korean Peninsula, it would be a momentous and meaningful development.”

Despite Chung’s APEC hopes, the likelihood of Kim attending the summit in Gyeongju appears slim, even if invited. The collapse of U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean dialogue since 2019, DPRK troop deployments to the ongoing war in Ukraine and Kim’s general avoidance of multilateral diplomacy all weigh against the possibility. 

The Koreas discussed the possibility of Kim making a reciprocal visit to Seoul after then-President Moon Jae-in’s 2018 trip to Pyongyang, but that visit never materialized.

Edited by Bryan Betts

7. A New York church is set to become a platform for pro-North Korea propaganda

Will anyone other than nK News expose this?

A New York church is set to become a platform for pro-North Korea propaganda

People’s Summit for Korea is backed by groups sympathetic to Kim regime, including supporters of Venezuelan government

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/a-new-york-church-is-set-to-become-a-platform-for-pro-north-korea-propaganda/

Carlos Egaña July 24, 2025

Image: Alex Azabache via Pexels, edited by NK News

Editor’s note: The following article is an opinion piece by Carlos Egaña, a Brooklyn-based Venezuelan writer. Views expressed in opinion articles are exclusively the author’s own and do not represent those of NK News.

A curious yet troubling event is scheduled to take place at a church in New York City on Friday. 

Called the People’s Summit for Korea, the conference appears to target a young, left-wing audience supportive of progressive causes, advertising workshops with titles like “Controlling the Narrative” and “Policy and People Power.” Blazoned across the homepage is the event slogan “Towards a National Liberation.”

But while the event’s promotional material mostly refers to “Korea” without specifying “North” or “South,” a quick look suggests it won’t be a space for exchanging progressive ideas, but rather a platform for pro-North Korea propaganda.

“For decades, U.S. imperialism has blocked Korea’s path to peace, reunification and self-determination,” the event’s website declares.

Backed by known supporters of the Venezuelan government, the People’s Summit appears to be part of a broader strategy of harnessing anger over U.S. policy on Palestine toward opposition to the American military presence on the peninsula, and is likely to regurgitate the positions of Kim Jong Un’s regime.

The People’s Summit for Korea is scheduled to take place in New York City from July 25-27, 2025. | Image: Screenshot from People’s Summit for Korea

SYMPATHIZING WITH PYONGYANG

The People’s Summit is organized mainly by Nodutdol, a nonprofit calling for “Korea’s re/unification and national liberation.” While the group abstains from supporting North Korea’s government explicitly, their Instagram makes clear where their sympathies lie.

One post titled “A People’s Timeline of the Korean War” claims the conflict began with America’s occupation of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, not North Korea’s invasion of the South in 1950. The post makes no mention of the Soviet occupation of the north and Moscow’s installment of Kim Il Sung.

Another post glorifies Kim Chaek, a key DPRK icon. There’s also a post expressing dismay over Kamala Harris and Donald Trump’s comments about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s purported support for Trump, accusing them of “warmongering” in Korea.

According to Nodutdol’s U.S. Out of Korea Campaign, military tensions between North and South Korea are solely America’s fault. They demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula and the end to the U.S.-ROK alliance as necessary conditions for peace. Notably, the organization makes no demands for North Korea to stop tests of missile systems targeting the South or abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction.

First on the People’s Summit’s speaker list is Betsy Yoon, who has led delegations to the DPRK through Nodutdol’s Korea Education and Exposure Program. Since 2003, the program has flown Americans to North Korea so that they can “share with the North American public what they have learned upon their return.” It’s hard to imagine what that could be given that the DPRK propagandists are careful to present only a highly sanitized version of the country.

Another speaker from Nodutdol is Ju-Hyun Park. He’s the group’s most unabashed defender of the North Korean government, which he has called “a moral leader on the international stage,” and he has been the most eager to capitalize on distrust of the American government over the Israel-Palestine conflict.

At the People’s Conference for Palestine last year, he said true Korean patriots refer to the Korean War as the “Great Fatherland Liberation War” and called the “Republic of Korea, or so-called South Korea,” a U.S. “puppet regime” — in both cases echoing Pyongyang messaging.

He also cited the example of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine founder George Habash undergoing military training in North Korea to present the Palestine movement and the DPRK as a united front.

The People’s Summit for Korea is scheduled to take place in New York City from July 25-27, 2025. | Image: Screenshot from People’s Summit for Korea

EXPANDING ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Another layer to the People’s Summit event is how it betrays support for not just North Korea but other authoritarian regimes around the world, reframing them as victims of the U.S.

This perspective is evident in the Nodutdol zine titled “Sanctions of Empire.” The publication seeks to blame the suffering of DPRK citizens on U.S. economic restrictions, rather than the well-documented human rights abuses of the Kim government, but it also attributes crises in Iran, Venezuela and Zimbabwe to U.S. economic measures. There is, of course, no mention of the crimes these countries’ governments have committed against their own citizens.

Many of the event’s speakers and backers are linked through a network of organizations that promote opposition to U.S. foreign policy, while downplaying the abuses of authoritarian regimes.

For instance, Code Pink, one of the sponsors of this week’s New York event, has maintained direct contact with Nicolás Maduro’s government. They’re best known to my fellow countrymen for occupying the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington in 2019 after the U.S. government kicked out Maduro’s diplomats, actions that flabbergasted Venezuelan immigrants and exiles well-acquainted with Maduro’s political crimes.

Carlos Ron is also listed as a speaker. From 2020 to 2025, he was Nicolás Maduro’s Deputy Minister for North America and is now a fellow of the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research. The director of that institute, Vijay Prashad, parroted Caracas’ lines defending the legitimacy of the elections that the Carter Center said “cannot be considered democratic.” 

Ron and Prashad co-edited a selection of Hugo Chávez’s speeches in English with Manolo de los Santos, another speaker at the conference who has hosted talks by Venezuelan government officials and organized demonstrations in support of Maduro.

His group The People’s Forum is a sponsor of the People’s Summit and is in turn funded by Shanghai-based businessman Neville Roy Singham, who has demonstrated a commitment to whitewash brutal nominally leftwing governments and link their propaganda machines through networks of so-called activists.

EXPLOITING CRISIS

While I strongly support freedom of political speech, it’s both upsetting and illuminating to see how these groups frame their mission to capture a politically curious yet naive audience. 

From photos of keffiyeh-wearing youth on the Summit’s website and the use of popular progressive buzzwords, to a lack of clarity about the conference’s goal, their strategy involves exploiting indignation about the deaths of thousands in the Levant to foster support for authoritarianism in Asia and Latin America.

If the People’s Summit leaves any lasting lesson, it’s that authoritarian regimes facing international isolation can still count on ideological allies abroad — often in democratic societies — to help reframe repression as resistance.

8. Korea to propose over US$100 bln in investment as part of tariff deal with U.S.: sources

S. Korea to propose over US$100 bln in investment as part of tariff deal with U.S.: sources | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 24, 2025

SEJONG, July 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is expected to propose investing at least US$100 billion in the United States as part of its ongoing tariff negotiations with Washington, informed local industry sources said Thursday.

According to the sources, the Korean trade delegation, currently visiting Washington, had intended to make the proposal during "2+2" high-level trade consultations, which had been scheduled for Friday (U.S. time) but was canceled earlier in the day.

The proposed investment package, according to the sources, includes potential commitments from major South Korean conglomerates, including Samsung Group, SK Group, Hyundai Motor Group and LG Group.

The high-level meeting was called off due to an unspecified urgent schedule of U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, according to the finance ministry. The meeting was set to bring together Bessent, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer and their South Korean counterparts -- Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol and Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo.

Despite the cancellation, Yeo plans to meet with his U.S. counterpart in Washington as planned, his office said.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, which is leading the tariff negotiations with the U.S. administration, declined to confirm such an investment plan, requesting discretion in media reporting due to the sensitivity of the talks.

South Korean Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo (R) arrives at Washington Dulles International Airport on July 22, 2025, for trade talks with U.S. officials. (Yonhap)

Earlier Thursday, Bloomberg also reported Seoul and Washington have discussed creating an investment fund as part of their trade deal, mirroring a recent trade agreement between the U.S. and Japan.

On Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump said he had reached a trade deal with Japan to lower the reciprocal tariffs for the country to 15 percent from the previously announced 25 percent.

In return, Tokyo pledged to invest $550 billion in the U.S. to help rebuild and expand core industries there, while also agreeing to further open its automobile and agricultural markets.

In response to the Trump administration's sweeping tariff policies, many South Korean companies have also been exploring additional investment opportunities in the U.S.

In March, Hyundai Motor Group announced its plan to invest $21 billion in the U.S. through 2028, including an investment of $8.6 billion for the automotive sector and $6.1 billion for the steel industry.

Samsung Electronics Co. and SK hynix Inc. are also reviewing an investment plan worth at least $37 billion and $3.87 billion, respectively, according to the sources.

"Japan's large-scale investment pledge played a key role in lowering the reciprocal tariff rate, which shows that South Korea also needs to present an investment amount commensurate with the size of its economy," an official familiar with the matter said anonymously.

"As far as I know, the government coordinated the matter with domestic companies as their cooperation is essential," the official added.

Hyundai Motor Group Executive Chairman Euisun Chung (L) looks on as Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp (C) autographs a vehicle during a ceremony in Ellaville, in the U.S. state of Georgia, on March 26, 2025, to open the South Korean carmaker's first dedicated EV factory, Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America, in this file photo released by Hyundai. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 24, 2025

9. Lee's top security aide meets U.S. officials ahead of tariff deadline

(LEAD) Lee's top security aide meets U.S. officials ahead of tariff deadline | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · July 24, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with new photo)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 24 (Yonhap) -- National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Thursday he has met with senior officials of the Donald Trump administration during his recent visit to the United States to support ongoing trade negotiations as the tariff deadline looms.

In a press notice, Wi said he accompanied Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo for talks with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer during his stay in Washington earlier this week.

He also held a phone consultation with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and met with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker during the visit.

"The visit to the U.S. was part of a broader strategic dialogue encompassing both security and economic issues between South Korea and the U.S., with the aim of supporting follow-up discussions on specific economic matters," Wi said in the notice, without elaborating.

His second trip to Washington this month comes at a critical time, as Seoul faces mounting pressure to strike a deal with the U.S. to stave off the imposition of 25 percent tariffs on Korean exports before the Aug. 1 deadline, through a comprehensive trade and investment package.

The finance and trade chiefs of the two countries had been scheduled to hold "2+2" high-level talks in Washington on Friday. But Seoul announced earlier in the day that the meeting was postponed due to U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's urgent schedule.

National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac arrives at Incheon International Airport in Incheon, west of Seoul, on July 24, 2025, after visiting the United States. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · July 24, 2025

10. FM Cho eyes visit to U.S. next week for talks with Rubio after '2+2' tariff talks falter

Full. Court. Press.

FM Cho eyes visit to U.S. next week for talks with Rubio after '2+2' tariff talks falter | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 24, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, July 24 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun may visit the United States next week for talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, diplomatic sources said Thursday, after the two-plus-two trade dialogue between the two countries was abruptly postponed.

The envisioned visit, if realized, would come just about a week after Cho took office, as South Korea is striving to work out a deal with the U.S. to lower the 25 percent reciprocal tariff and sectoral tariffs on South Korean goods, set by the Donald Trump administration. The levies will take effect Aug. 1 unless an agreement is reached.

The allies were scheduled to hold high-level talks among the finance and trade chiefs in Washington later this week, but Seoul announced earlier in the day that the meeting was postponed due to an unspecified "urgent schedule" of U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun makes a speech during his inauguration ceremony at the foreign ministry on July 21, 2025. (Yonhap)

"Arrangements are being made for (the minister's) visit to the U.S.," a source said. "In light of the timing and circumstances, it's expected that if the minister-level meeting takes place, possibly next week, it will allow for discussions on all relevant issues."

Cho's likely visit would be seen as unconventional as it is common diplomatic practice that a new foreign minister usually speaks to his foreign counterparts over the phone before meeting them in person.

Cho has yet to hold a phone conversation with Rubio.

"We are in communication with the U.S. side to facilitate high-level exchanges as soon as possible, irrespective of formalities," foreign ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a press briefing. He was responding to a reporter's question about plans for Cho's U.S. visit.

In Washington, Cho may use the trip to discuss with Rubio the timing of President Lee Jae Myung's visit to the U.S. for a summit with Trump.

Lee's national security adviser, Wi Sung-lac, was set to return from his trip to Washington later in the day, amid speculation that his meeting with Rubio may not have taken place. Rubio also serves as the top security official at the White House.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 24, 2025

11. Seoul, Tokyo top diplomats vow to strengthen ties in 1st phone call

Seoul, Tokyo top diplomats vow to strengthen ties in 1st phone call | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · July 24, 2025

SEOUL, July 24 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun on Thursday held his first phone call with his Japanese counterpart, Takeshi Iwaya, discussing regional issues and bilateral relations, the foreign ministry said.

During the conversation, Cho stressed the importance of Seoul-Tokyo relations, describing them as a key axis of the South Korean government's pragmatic diplomacy, alongside trilateral cooperation with Washington.

Cho, who took office on Monday, suggested the two countries work to build a more solid, future-oriented relationship based on mutual trust and understanding.

The Japanese foreign minister congratulated Cho on his appointment and expressed his desire to continue and strengthen their close cooperation, according to the ministry.

The ministry added both ministers agreed on the need to deepen mutual understanding and work closely together across various sectors, especially in light of complex global challenges.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun speaks during a phone call with his Japanese counterpart, Takeshi Iwaya, on July 24, 2025, in this photo provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

jaeyeon.woo@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · July 24, 2025

12. S. Korea not to resume anti-N.K. propaganda broadcasts unless Pyongyang does first: official

This should not be about tit-for-tat. Rather than anti-north propaganda why doesn't the SOuth and international community simply broadcast the news with facts. No one has to say a single negative =word about KJU. Just let the facts speak for themselves.

S. Korea not to resume anti-N.K. propaganda broadcasts unless Pyongyang does first: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 24, 2025

SEOUL, July 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will not resume its propaganda radio and television broadcasts targeting North Korea unless Pyongyang resumes such broadcasts toward the Seoul first, a senior government official has said.

The comments came after the National Intelligence Service, South Korea's spy agency, suspended all of its decades-old propaganda broadcasts targeting the North Korean regime earlier this month, including channels such as Voice of the People and Echo of Hope.

Those channels, which had operated for decades, transmitted propaganda messages to North Koreans, promoting the values of South Korea's free society, criticizing the North Korean regime and serving as a rare source of outside information for the highly restricted country.

The government official said the suspensions were a response to North Korea's halt of its own propaganda broadcasts toward Seoul early last year, adding the government won't resume such operations unless North Korea does so first.

"If the North side resumes (its broadcasts), we will respond, but we won't be the first to do so," the official said in a meeting with reporters the previous day.

After declaring in late 2023 that the two Koreas are two separate "hostile" countries, the North moved to dismantle inter-Korean concepts such as unification and suspended its broadcasting channels aimed at the South.

The North also used to operate about 10 radio signals to jam broadcasts from the South, but most had been suspended as of late Tuesday, except for two or three of them, according to the official.

North Korea appeared to have suspended those jamming signals in response to Seoul's halt of its anti-North broadcasts, the official noted, adding, "It demonstrates that (the North) is closely monitoring us."

Seoul assesses there's a possibility North Korea may respond to the South's offer for dialogue, although it is unlikely to happen easily or in the near future.

"The government will not rush it," the official said, adding the North also appears to be waiting for a "clear message" from the United States before engaging in dialogue.

The Lee Jae Myung government is working to ease military tensions and revive dialogue with North Korea. Shortly after taking office last month, the administration suspended the military's loudspeaker broadcast campaigns targeting North Korea along the inter-Korean border and urged a halt to propaganda leaflet campaigns by civic groups.

In this file photo, a person looks into a telescope toward North Korea at an observation point just south of the inter-Korean border on June 12, 2025. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 24, 2025

13. Korea faces pressure amid U.S.-Japan tariff pact

Excerpt:

Japan’s agreement has become the de facto benchmark that Korea must meet or exceed. If Seoul cannot lower the proposed 25 percent tariff, Korean automakers, with a smaller U.S. production presence than their Japanese competitors, could face significant disadvantages. As the deadline approaches, some business leaders warn that Korea may need to make short-term sacrifices to safeguard long-term national interests. With time running out, the government must determine which core interests are worth defending to the very end.

Korea faces pressure amid U.S.-Japan tariff pact

Posted July. 24, 2025 08:10,   

Updated July. 24, 2025 08:10

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250724/5742958/1

The United States and Japan have unexpectedly agreed to set tariffs on Japanese exports to the U.S. at 15 percent, lowering the rate by 10 percentage points from the 25 percent initially proposed by Washington. This rate is now the second-lowest among countries that have reached tariff agreements with the U.S., following the United Kingdom’s 10 percent. Tariffs on Japanese cars and auto parts will also be reduced to 15 percent. In exchange, Japan committed to further opening its agricultural markets, including rice, and boosting investment in the United States.

With South Korea’s tariff suspension agreement with the U.S. set to expire on August 1, Seoul is now in the final stages of negotiations. To compete with Japan in the U.S. market, Korea faces pressure to secure terms that are either more favorable or at least on par with Japan’s deal.

U.S. President Donald Trump on July 22 hailed the deal as “the largest agreement ever concluded with Japan,” while Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba confirmed the agreement includes tariff cuts on cars and auto parts without import quotas. The final 15 percent rate consists of a 12.5 percent tariff added to the existing 2.5 percent.

Though full details were not disclosed, Japan is expected to significantly raise its annual tariff-free import quota for U.S. rice, currently set at 340,000 tons. Tokyo also agreed to participate in joint ventures for developing Alaskan liquefied natural gas and to create a $550 billion investment fund for the U.S. These concessions demonstrate Japan’s readiness to offer politically sensitive agricultural products to safeguard its key export sectors.

Attention now turns to South Korea. Like Japan, about one-third of South Korea’s exports to the U.S. are cars and auto parts. Seoul also faces pressure to increase imports of American agricultural products such as rice and fruit and to join U.S. liquefied natural gas projects. Additionally, Washington is urging Korea to ease restrictions on U.S. beef over 30 months old and to relax rules on the overseas transfer of high-precision maps.

With final negotiations between the two countries set for July 25 in the U.S., Seoul has yet to clarify which concessions it is willing to make if necessary. It also has not outlined a strategy to capitalize on Korea’s strengths, such as its shipbuilding and defense industries, to counterbalance pressure in other sectors.

Japan’s agreement has become the de facto benchmark that Korea must meet or exceed. If Seoul cannot lower the proposed 25 percent tariff, Korean automakers, with a smaller U.S. production presence than their Japanese competitors, could face significant disadvantages. As the deadline approaches, some business leaders warn that Korea may need to make short-term sacrifices to safeguard long-term national interests. With time running out, the government must determine which core interests are worth defending to the very end.

14. US cancels high-level tariff talks with Korea at last moment

Oh no.

US cancels high-level tariff talks with Korea at last moment

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20250724/us-cancels-high-level-tariff-talks-with-korea-at-last-moment

By Park Jae-hyuk

• Published Jul 24, 2025 9:49 am KST
• Updated Jul 24, 2025 5:09 pm KST

Seoul likely to propose investments in US by major Korean companies

The so-called "two-plus-two" high-level tariff discussions between Korea and the United States scheduled for Friday were canceled just one day before the meeting was to take place in Washington, with the U.S. citing Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's urgent schedule.

The abrupt change is sparking fears of more complications in the negotiations over the 25-percent "reciprocal" tariff which the U.S. plans to levy on Korean products. It also makes the chance of reaching a deal before the planned implementation of the tariffs on Aug. 1 slimmer.

The Ministry of Economy and Finance said Thursday morning that the meetings between finance and trade ministers of the two nations were postponed.

The U.S. notified Korea of the cancellation by email about an hour before Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol's scheduled departure, causing him to return to his office from Incheon International Airport. Koo had originally planned to attend a meeting with Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo to talk with Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.

"The U.S. side asked to hold the meeting in the near future, so both sides will arrange the meeting as soon as possible," a finance ministry spokesperson said.

The ministry said the U.S. side did not give details about the secretary's schedule.

While speculation grew about the cancellation, the Korean Embassy in Washington ruled out any hidden U.S. intentions behind it.

The two-plus-two meetings have not been held since April, when negotiators from the previous Korean administration planned to pursue a "July package." An agreement was not reached before the U.S. announced that Korea would be subject to a 25 percent tariff starting Aug. 1.

Although Koo is not joining the negotiations, Yeo arrived in the U.S. capital, Tuesday (local time). Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan is also in Washington to meet his counterparts, including U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

"Both Kim and Yeo are meeting U.S. government officials as planned," the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said in a press release.

Read More

Japan's tariff deal with US puts pressure on Korea over agriculture imports, Alaska gas project

The setback in the talks came after Japan, one of Korea's chief rivals in the U.S. automotive and industrial markets, succeeded the previous day in lowering reciprocal and auto tariffs to 15 percent in return for increasing U.S. rice imports and investing $550 billion in U.S. industries, including an Alaska gas development project.

Korean carmakers still subject to the 25 percent item-specific tariff are now fearing they will lose U.S. market share to Japanese competitors unless Seoul strikes a deal with Washington before Aug. 1.

Prior to the cancellation of Friday's high-level talks, however, rumors circulated that Seoul had decided not to discuss larger-scale purchases of U.S. rice or imports of U.S. beef from cattle over 30 months of age, despite Washington's demands.

President Lee Jae Myung shakes hands with Hyundai Motor Group Executive Chair Chung Euisun during a dinner at the presidential residence in Seoul, July 14. Courtesy of presidential office

President Lee Jae Myung shakes hands with Hyundai Motor Group Executive Chair Chung Euisun during a dinner at the presidential residence in Seoul, July 14. Courtesy of presidential office

Instead, the government reportedly plans to propose more than $100 billion in combined U.S. investments by Korean companies. President Lee Jae Myung has also been holding a series of private meetings this month with leaders of major conglomerates, including Samsung, SK, Hyundai Motor, LG and Hanwha, in apparent attempts to ask them to make larger investments in the U.S.

Bloomberg, citing sources familiar with the issue, reported that Lutnick suggested a $400 billion investment target in talks with Korea, presenting it as a way to secure a reduction in U.S. tariffs on Korean automobiles.

However, Trump said Wednesday that he will only lower tariffs if a country agrees to open its markets, warning of "much higher tariffs" on countries that refuse.

National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, tasked with arranging a summit between Lee and Trump, returned to Seoul on Thursday after a three-day stay in Washington to discuss a "package deal" covering tariffs and defense costs.

In a statement, Wi confirmed that he was unable to have a face-to-face meeting with his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State and acting National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, as Trump abruptly summoned his key aide before the meeting. Wi said he had a phone conversation with Rubio instead, and met several other U.S. government officials, including Lutnick and Greer, to discuss security and economic affairs.

The main opposition People Power Party expressed concern about Korea lagging behind Japan in trade talks.

"While pressuring companies to invest in the U.S. in order to secure a tariff deal, the government is discouraging them with tougher labor rules and higher taxes just to fulfill its populist pledges," the conservative party said in a statement.

15. Jim Heller set to be deputy chief at US Embassy in Seoul

Jim Heller set to be deputy chief at US Embassy in Seoul

By Kim Hyun-bin

Published Jul 24, 2025 3:10 pm KST

Updated Jul 24, 2025 5:08 pm KST

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250724/jim-heller-set-to-be-deputy-chief-at-us-embassy-in-seoul

Jim Heller, who reports say will be appointed deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Courtesy of U.S. State Department website

Jim Heller, a veteran U.S. diplomat with extensive experience in East Asia and multilateral affairs, is set to be named the new deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, according to sources Thursday. He will replace Joy Sakurai and is expected to take up the post by the end of the month.

Heller, a career member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, currently serves as acting deputy assistant secretary for Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands at the U.S. State Department.

In Washington, Heller has held key roles across a broad range of regional and functional offices, including the Office of Japanese Affairs; Office of Taiwan Coordination; Office of Korean Affairs; State Department Operations Center; Office of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus Affairs; and Office of Multilateral Trade Affairs.

His overseas postings include two tours at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and assignments at the U.S. Embassies in Seoul and Kyiv, as well as service with the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Erbil, Iraq. Known as a seasoned "Asia hand," Heller brings decades of institutional knowledge and regional expertise to the Seoul mission.

He holds both a Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts from the University of Michigan and is a graduate of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.

The U.S. Embassy in Seoul has been led by Charge d’Affaires ad interim Joseph Yun since January. Yun, appointed under the Biden administration, is expected to step down in the second half of the year.

Observers say Heller’s appointment reflects an effort by Washington to ensure continuity in diplomatic leadership and avoid a vacuum at a key U.S. post while the Trump administration’s nominee for ambassador to Korea remains pending. His arrival is also viewed as part of preparations to support the incoming ambassador, once appointed.

When contacted by The Korea Times, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul said it does not comment on personnel matters.

16. South Korea’s Strategic Gamble With A Trump-Led US – Analysis

South Korea’s Strategic Gamble With A Trump-Led US – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Observer Research Foundation · July 24, 2025

By Abhishek Sharma

On 7 July 2025, the United States (US) President Donald Trump sent an official letter to the South Korean President, Lee Jae Myung, declaring his intention to impose 25 percent tariffs on all Korean products entering the US market. The letter’s release caused significant unease for President Lee Jae Myung, who faced a serious challenge on the trade front in the second month since assuming office. Given the trade challenge, the Lee administration aims to secure a deal with the Trump administration before the deadline—1 August 2025.

Unlike the previous progressive Moon Jae-in administration’s negotiation strategy, this administration has opted for a different route. The approach is based on securing a ‘positive-sum’ deal along with a package that seeks to secure South Korea’s security interests. However, considering the Trump administration’s unpredictability and arbitrariness, uncertainty looms over the success/outcome of said package deal, posing a serious challenge for the US-Korea strategic alliance.

Korea’s Hedging Strategy: Moving from a Zero-Sum to a Positive-Sum Deal

Since the announcement of the 1 August 2025 deadline, the Lee administration has been vigorously attempting to fast-track the negotiations, sending its top diplomat to the US to seal a deal. The administration fears that in addition to the 25 percent tariffs, an additional 25 percent and 50 percent tariffs on automobiles, steel, and aluminium, as well as the semiconductor sector (although the rates have not been announced for this), will worsen South Korea’s economic situation.

This is especially crucial considering these sectors make up the top three exports from Korea to the US. It is estimated that if tariffs persist, Korean exports will decline by 7.1 percent, 7.2 percent, 6.5 percent, and 3.8 percent respectively in automobiles, steel, automotive parts, and machinery during the July to December period. This means the impact on the economy will be significant, considering that in 2024 Korea exported US$127.8 billion to the US. Hence, to resolve the trade issue, Korea has adopted a pragmatic approach to address the ongoing uncertainties prompted because of the tariffs, which seriously harm its exports.

Through the negotiations, South Korea aims to secure a landing zone and sort out significant points of agreement, much like the US did with the United Kingdom (UK) and Vietnam before the deadline, and continue detailed negotiations later. For Seoul, the detailed negotiations pertain to the three sectors: steel, aluminium, and automotive. Furthermore, Seoul has also proposed a ‘manufacturing renaissance partnership’ to address these sectors, promising more US procurement and strengthening corporate investments.

In addition to the trade deal, Korea will also look at opportunities for more defence and energy purchases from the US and greater investment in projects such as the Alaska liquefied natural gas project. Irrespective of convergences, some sectors have stood out, including agriculture, which has become a sensitive dispute between the two. Concerning this challenge, Yeo Han-koo—South Korean trade minister—iterated his concerns, emphasising that while trade barriers can be addressed on some issues, the US must respect sensitivity on domestic problems [agriculture].

On the other hand, in the face of the increasing US trade restrictions, domestic traders have advocated for a strategic trade policy to maximise national interests, strengthen competitiveness, expand and upgrade Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and diversify export items and markets. This emphasises a depleting trust towards the US and its impact on the industry’s perception. Beyond trade tensions, Seoul is also grappling with the challenge of maintaining a robust security alliance, especially taking into account the recent controversial statements by Trump and his cabinet officials.

Looming Security Issues: 5 Percent Rule, SMA, and OPCON

Another contention many US allies—including South Korea—experience is the replication of the NATO model, a ‘5 percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) standard’, in the Indo-Pacific, which implies earmarking 5 percent of the GDP on defence expenditure. The US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, reiterated the Trump administration’s position at the Shangri-La Dialogue, imploring Indo-Pacific allies to increase their defence spending. However, much like other US allies such as Japan, Korea has also pushed back and expressed its disagreement. In a press release, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, ‘[w]e seek to make our own decisions on defense spending based on a comprehensive assessment of the security situation and the government’s fiscal circumstances.’

Furthermore, old issues are again taking centre stage under the Trump administration. Speaking on the special measures agreement (SMA) issue, the Chargé d’Affairs at the US Embassy in Seoul said there ‘needs to be discussion about how to share expenses beyond those three categories [construction costs, logistical support, and labor expenses], and whether Korea is spending enough on defense.’ The message signals to Seoul that tensions between the two countries will reach a high when the agreement is re-negotiated in 2026.

With China’s rising threat profile, the issue of reducing the number of US Forces Korea (USFK) soldiers deployed in South Korea and the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) is expected to further strain the security ties between the two, in light of their dissenting approaches. This is because with US Forces becoming more structured in the Indo-Pacific region, the focus of USFK will shift from North Korea to Taiwan and the Philippines, leading to a substantial decrease in its numbers. Additionally, the OPCON transfer will result in a systematic downgrade of the US military leadership in the peninsula. These issues will place South Korea at a lower priority in the US strategic calculus. Hence, the security issues regarding the SMA, 5 percent rule, and OPCON are expected to reignite the tension between the alliance, much like the last Trump-Moon administration.

Be Pragmatic, Not Shortsighted

South Korea has proposed a package deal to the US to escape the problematic situation, combining economic and security issues. Wi Sung-lac—South Korea’s National Security Advisor—during his visit to the US, proposed expanding the scope of negotiations and discussions with the US. Talking about the issue, Wi said that ‘[w]e raised a range of issues spanning trade, investment, procurement and security, and suggested moving forward with negotiations by taking this comprehensive package into account.’

The package deal approach adopted by the Lee administration aims to stabilise Korea’s bilateral ties with the US, even considering the recurring security and SMA’s defence issues, and the US Force Posture under the Trump administration. The Korean administration’s tactical objective is to reduce the US$55.6 billion trade surplus with the US by forfeiting even critical sectors such as agriculture. Nevertheless, there are no short or long-term guarantees that the US will reciprocate through concrete economic and security returns. Seoul is likely to end up with a lopsided deal, instead of a mutually beneficial one. Therefore, a short-sighted strategy (focused on bartering short-term stability with long-term uncertainty) will likely backfire considering the Trump administration’s growing irrational economic and security demands to its allies.

Instead of yielding to Trump’s demands for short-term gains and looking at securing an odd deal, South Korea should leverage its position as the leader in critical sectors such as shipbuilding, battery technology, semiconductor, and a reliable defence exporter, offering Trump a deal to build the US’s industrial capacity in these sectors. This will not only consolidate Korea’s position as a dependable ally, dismantling the Trump administration’s rhetoric of a ‘free-rider ally’, but also showcase the strategic benefit of having a strong defence partnership with Korea in the Indo-Pacific. While this approach may require extra effort and time, it will be a win-win deal that will sustain itself in the long run.

• About the author: Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

eurasiareview.com · by Observer Research Foundation · July 24, 2025

17. Diplomacy At A Crossroads: Ending The Korean Peninsula Standoff

4 words: "Solve the Korea Question." (i.e., the unnatural division of the peninsula per apra 60 of the 1953 Armistice).

And 12 words:

"Unificaiton first, then dencuelarization; the path to undeificaiton is through human rights."

Diplomacy At A Crossroads: Ending The Korean Peninsula Standoff – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · July 23, 2025

The Korean Peninsula stands at a precarious juncture that threatens both regional stability and the broader international order. Despite repeated diplomatic overtures over the past seven decades, the absence of a formal peace treaty since July 27 1953, the armistice has allowed geopolitical rivalries and nuclear brinkmanship to fester without resolution.

In Pyongyang 2025’s accelerated missile tests medium six‐range launches between January and May, compared with two during the same period in 2024, and its high‐profile troop deployments in support of Russia’s campaign in Ukraine underscore the regime’s strategic emphasis on military deterrence. Meanwhile, Seoul and Washington’s combined military exercises expanded in scale by 15 per cent in the spring drills of 2025. April 2025 continues to reinforce mutual yet defence exacerbates North Korea’s insecurity. At this diplomatic crossroads, it is imperative to adopt a dual-track strategy that first establishes formal diplomatic relations between South and North Korea as a confidence-building facilitator and second lays the groundwork for a long‐term peaceful reunification predicated on incremental and mutual integration recognition.

Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and advanced conventional capabilities has been driven by a regime calculus that equates deterrence with survival. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tested its Hwasong-16 solid-missile fuel on March 18, 2025, achieving a range of 4500 kilometres; this technical advance not only places Seoul and Tokyo within its strike envelope but also signals to Beijing and Washington that any coercive measures will be met with equal force. Sanctions, too, have lost their coercive edge: despite United Nations resolutions that curtail nearly 90 per cent of DPRK’s conventional imports, arms enforcement gaps facilitated by illicit ship-to-ship transfers and cryptocurrency laundering allow the regime to procure critical missile components. The fallout of these dynamics is evident in the peninsula’s humanitarian toll: a 2025 report by the World Food Programme that estimates 40 per cent of North Korea’s rural population remains undernourished, yet the leadership diverts roughly 25 per cent of its GDP to defence spending. This stark divergence between military investment and human welfare underscores the urgency of redirecting both dialogue and assistance toward the North Korean people.

Conversely, South Korea and the United States have oscillated between pressure and engagement. Since January 2025, Seoul’s exports to Pyongyang via the Industrial Kaesong Region and proposals to re-open that joint zone have remained stalled amid gridlock in legislative proceedings in the National Assembly, where public opinion is split: a December 2024 Yonhap poll showed 47 per cent of South supporting Koreans inter-economic Korean projects while 42 percent opposed them without verifiable denuclearization. Washington’s strategic pivot toward the Taiwan Strait and Eastern Europe has strained the U.S.-South Korea alliance’s bandwidth for Korean Peninsula diplomacy. In late June 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Elaine Chao acknowledged, “the Korean issue cannot be sidelined indefinitely”. Concrete scheduling for new Six-Party Talks remains elusive. As inter-Korean relations are governed by ad hoc‐building measures such as the February 2025 hotline re-establishment that lasted three weeks, rather than sustained institutionalised engagement.

Establishing formal diplomatic relations between Seoul and Pyongyang must therefore become the short‐term centrepiece of any peace strategy. A mutually recognised liaison office in both capitals, staffed by career diplomats and subject‐matter experts, would provide a permanent channel for crisis communication and policy coordination. Such an office could oversee expanded family reunions, as only 1,200 separated families have met since 2018. It could also manage cultural exchanges, which in 2025 alone could involve up to 10,000 South Korean university students and 5,000 North Korean artists participating in joint symposium performances. These initiatives not only humanise the “other” but create constituencies layered for peace on both sides. In addition, resuming inter‐rail Korean and road connectivity projects initially budgeted at USD 150 million in Seoul by March 2025 would foster economic interdependence, provide tangible incentives for the North to maintain cooperation.

Yet the vision of reunification must not be discounted. A phased roadmap can reconcile the peninsula’s profound political and economic asymmetries. In Phase 1, the two Koreas would coexist as sovereign states with fully normalised diplomatic ties and institutionalised consultations on security matters, including arms‐control verification conducted by a neutral third party such as ASEAN. Phase II emphasises economic convergence through joint special economic zones, cross‐border infrastructure, and shared energy grids; experts estimate that integrating South Korea’s USD 1.8 trillion economy with even 10 per cent of the North’s labour force could yield a 1.5 per cent boost to combined GDP over five years. Phase III, underpinned by widespread public dialogue, constitutional reform would pursue political federation or confederation, allowing for dual citizenship and shared governance structures in areas such as environmental policy and disaster relief. Although such a trajectory faces deep obstacles, distrust, ideological income disparity, and the competing interests of China, the United States, Japan and Russia, the incremental approach mitigates risk by preserving each state’s core identity while steadily weaving institutional bonds.

This dual‐track strategy faces significant challenges. Domestic backlash in both countries could derail liaison office staffing, and a hardline faction in Pyongyang’s Politburo may view binding economic commitments as an existential threat. External powers, especially China, may resist any framework that diminishes the DPRK’s strategic utility as a buffer state. Furthermore, sanctions regimes must be delicately recalibrated to prevent humanitarian crises without collapsing leverage, undercutting Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Finally, the international community must guard against “fatigue engagement”, ensuring that each diplomatic concession by the North is met with calibrated reciprocation, whether in humanitarian aid, phased sanctions relief or security guarantees ratified by the UN Security Council.

In conclusion, the historical impasse on the Korean Peninsula cannot be overcome by military deterrence or unilateral pressure alone. A bold two-tiered approach that first enshrines formal diplomatic relations and then pursues reunification through measured, mutually reinforcing steps offers the most viable path forward. By institutionalising inter-Korean dialogue and creating shared economic linkages, stakeholders’ social can generate the trust necessary to tackle the formidable challenges of political federation. At this critical crossroads, the international community and especially Seoul and Pyongyang must choose the arduous, indispensable yet difficult path of confrontation to cooperation lest the peninsula remain mired in perpetual tension rather than embracing its full potential for peace.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

References

• Reuters. “South Korea Reviewing Various Options to Improve North Korea Ties.” Reuters, July 21, 2025.
• Youngjun Kim. “A Civilizational Vision for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.” UPI, July 8, 2025.
• Kim Ji-soo. “An Impassioned Call for Korean Unification.” The Korea Times, May 8, 2025.

eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · July 23, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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