Quotes of the Day:

"Live as if you were to die tomorrow. Learn as if you were to live forever." 

– Mahatma Gandhi

"Moral certainty is always a sign of cultural inferiority. The more uncivilized the man, the surer he is that he knows precisely what is right and what is wrong. All human progress, even in morals, has been the work of men who have doubted the current moral values, not of men who have whooped them up and tried to enforce them. The truly civilized man is always skeptical and tolerant, in this field as in all others. His culture is based on 'I am not too sure.' " 

– H.L. Mencken

"I hope I shall possess firmness and virtue enough to maintain what I consider the most enviable of all titles, the character of an honest man." 

– George Washington

1. Pentagon suspends participation in think tank events

2. Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression

3. Fan Yun tells US hearing about Chinese threats

4. Why China Won’t Stop the Fentanyl Trade

5. Gazans Are Finished With Hamas

6. Trump’s Tariffs Are Being Picked Up by Corporate America

7. State Dept. cuts China experts as administration says countering Beijing top priority

8. Forecasting the Fifth Wave: Emerging Terrorist Threats in a Changing World

9. Book Review | Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan

10. Brains, Bluntness, and the Battle for US Foreign Policy: The Legacy of Zbig Brzezinski (Review Essay)

11. Beijing’s South China Sea Campaign of Intimidation Has Run Aground

12. China’s Overlooked AI Strategy – Beijing Is Using Soft Power to Gain Global Dominance

13. ‘Innovation Corps’ tech execs are in training, but don’t have assignments yet

14. Meet the ‘cobots’ that could lower the cost of building submarines

15. The Real Meaning of Putin’s Middle East Failure

16. The Coming Pax Geriatrica – Aging Societies and Depopulation Will Lead to Fewer Wars

17. By cutting science, the Defense Department is eating its seed corn

18. US Army envisions a common launcher to fit allies’ weapons

19. How the Pentagon plays into Trump's sprawling artificial intelligence 'Action Plan'

20. War with China ‘would result in large-scale casualties,’ Army general says

21. Advancing Diplomacy and Approaching Deadlines (WOTR – The Adversarial)

22. Space and Ice: Envisioning Special Operations Forces’ Role in Future Operational Environments

23. The precious 'white gold' fuel buried in the Earth

24. Hackers breach intelligence website used by CIA

25. Pentagon lags behind China in realizing strategies for cognitive warfare, Senate report finds

26. Achieved Overmatch – A Potential Future for AI in the Army

27. Israel’s 12-Day War Revealed Alarming Gap in America’s Missile Stockpile

28. US Army to Add Four New Patriot Missile Battalions, Including Guam Unit

29. Are We About to Lose the Massive Ordnance Penetrator?

30. How China’s new Information Support Force gears military up for PLA modernisation

31. Taiwan recall: shock waves likely no matter who prevails on ballots, analysts say

1. Pentagon suspends participation in think tank events

Oh how the pendulum has swung.  

I will miss my DOD friends at events.

I wonder what this means for events like AUSA?

Excerpt:

It also appears to apply to gatherings hosted by nonprofit military associations, such as Sea Air Space, which is led by the Navy League, the military service’s largest veteran organization, and Modern Day Marine, a similar trade show for the Marine Corps, although public affairs offices inside the military were still seeking guidance on the directive.

Alas....

"The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards."

– Sir William Francis Butler

Exclusive

Pentagon suspends participation in think tank events

The move comes a week after the Defense Department pulled out of the Aspen Security Forum due to “the evil of globalism.”

https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/24/pentagon-think-tank-events-ban-00473621

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth attends a meeting with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. at the Pentagon on July 21, 2025. | Mark Schiefelbein/AP

By Jack Detsch

07/24/2025 11:37 AM EDT

Updated: 07/24/2025 08:24 PM EDT

The Pentagon has suspended participation in all think tank and research events until further notice, according to an email sent Thursday to staff and obtained by POLITICO, a major shift in engagement from the country’s largest federal agency.

The decision comes a week after the Defense Department pulled out of the high-profile Aspen Security Forum citing “the evil of globalism” and indicating the event did not align with the Trump administration’s defense policies.

The Pentagon’s public affairs office is also reviewing the agency’s participation in other top security conferences, according to the email. It specifically banned attendance at the Halifax International Security Forum, which takes place in Nova Scotia each winter and where the Pentagon chief is usually a top guest. It was not immediately clear why that forum had been singled out.

The move would sideline the Pentagon from national security dialogues that it has used for decades to advance its policy and explain the department’s rationale. Former Defense Secretaries Jim Mattis, Mark Esper and Lloyd Austin have also used think tank events, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue and the Reagan National Defense Forum, to give major policy speeches and hold sideline meetings with both allies and adversaries.

The Pentagon’s public affairs, general counsel and policy teams will review all requests for participation at events and will ask for officials’ remarks and talking points in advance, according to the email. The directive, which took effect Tuesday, applies to all DOD military officers, civil servants and senior enlisted leaders. The Pentagon’s public affairs team must approve any future events.

“In order to ensure the Department of Defense is not lending its name and credibility to organizations, forums, and events that run counter to the values of this administration, the Department’s Office of Public Affairs will be conducting a thorough vetting of every event where Defense officials are invited to participate,” chief Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said in an emailed response.

It also appears to apply to gatherings hosted by nonprofit military associations, such as Sea Air Space, which is led by the Navy League, the military service’s largest veteran organization, and Modern Day Marine, a similar trade show for the Marine Corps, although public affairs offices inside the military were still seeking guidance on the directive.

The effort to drastically cut the Defense Department’s public presence on Washington’s think tank circuit comes after the Pentagon said senior leaders would no longer be allowed to attend the Aspen summit, just a day before the gathering began. Navy Secretary John Phelan, Emil Michael, the Defense undersecretary for research and engineering, Defense Innovation Unit chief Doug Beck and several top military officials had been scheduled to speak.

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this report misstated the hosts of two conferences. They are led by nonprofit military associations.

• Filed Under: 
• Department Of Defense, 
• Pentagon, 
• Pete Hegseth

2. Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression

It is good to see national leaders talking about China's political warfare.

Opening Remarks of Congressman Smith

Opening statement of Co-Chairman Smith at hearing on Taiwan

Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression

https://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=414897

f t #

Washington, Jul 23, 2025

• Co-Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ) speaks at Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing on Taiwan and CCP transnational repression

The following are excerpts of remarks by Rep. Chris Smith, Co-Chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, at the commission’s July 23, 2025 hearing on Taiwan and CCP transnational repression, with witnesses Fan Yun, Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, USN (Ret.), Peter Mattis, and Audrye Wong:

       "In 1999, two People’s Liberation Army colonels, Colonel Qiao and Wang, published a book entitled Unrestricted Warfare. It is a fascinating book, and one which sees everything short of kinetic as a battlefield.

        How is it that we have so many fentanyl overdoses in the United States? Read Unrestricted Warfare and understand.

        What is lawfare, and how is open access to our court system weaponized against us? Read Unrestricted Warfare and understand.

        Simply put, it is a primer on what we may term political warfare, aimed squarely at the United States.

        But standing in the way, is the de facto island nation of Taiwan, the de jure Republic of China.

        I think we sometimes fail to appreciate how much vitriolic attention Taiwan, as a frontline state, absorbs from mainland China that otherwise would be directed at the United States. As the vital center of the first island chain, Taiwan is a buffer and our first line of defense against the People’s Republic of China, which is bent upon seeking hegemony and dominating the entire world, supplanting the United States as the world’s preeminent power.

        In many ways, Taiwan is similar to Israel, another frontline state, which absorbs much of the concentrated attention—from terror bombs to propaganda—that would otherwise be directed at the United States by jihadist groups and state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran.

        In this regard, both Taiwan and Israel are too often overlooked or taken for granted by too many in the United States. We should keep in mind throughout today’s hearing that Taiwan’s security is America’s security, and the political warfare and transnational repression campaigns that are waged against Taiwan in an amplified manner are also being waged here in a less evident way, though it is often very evident among Chinese diaspora communities in the United States who are targeted by the Chinese Communist Party.

        It is because of this need to protect American citizens and those that are here lawfully who are targeted by CCP transnational repression—in particular, those of ethnic Chinese, Tibetan or Uyghur descent—that Senate Ranking member Merkley and I, joined by Ranking Member McGovern on the House side, introduced the Transnational Repression Policy Act last Congress, and why we will be reintroducing it again soon.

        But, again, it is the example of Taiwan that is instructive. We saw Taiwan’s Vice President, Bi-khim Hsiao—a friend to many of us here in Washington from her time as ambassador—being targeted during a trip she made to the Czech Republic for a “demonstrative kinetic action,” according to a Czech military intelligence spokesman, said to be a staged vehicle accident while she was being driven in her car.

        We have seen similar methods deployed, here, in the United States, against famed Democracy Wall dissident Wei Jingsheng. Wei was in his car driving home when two cars attempted to force him off the road.

        There is also much we can learn from how Taiwan counters CCP political warfare. The CCP bombards Taiwan with propaganda and false narratives, seeking to manipulate the information space, including through the use of “deep fake” video clips created using artificial intelligence. 

        Rather than silencing “influencers” and others who parrot pro-Beijing messages under the guise of combatting “disinformation,” groups such as Taiwan FactCheck Center provide context to rebut such messages. Chat group users of the messaging app Line, which is prevalent in Taiwan, are able to flag statements that appear problematic, and Taiwan FactCheck Center will provide context so as to allow the user to become a more informed consumer of information.

        The Taiwanese experience, whereby democracy rose out from an authoritarian and martial law past, has a lot to teach us regarding the importance of freedom and free speech. The key to combatting wrong speech is not censorship, but more speech. These are lessons we can learn and take to heart from Asia’s most vibrant democracy.

        Finally, I would like to note that Taiwan has a story to tell, not only to its own people or to the West, but also to the people of China, bypassing the Chinese Communist Party, and overcoming the Great Firewall they have built. 

        Taiwan’s President, William Lai Ching-te, has recently been giving speeches on Ten Topics, ranging from discussions of sovereignty to democracy to constitutionalism and the rule of law. Of course, his principal audience is the people of Taiwan. But judging from the way the CCP mouthpiece, the Global Times, has been responding, his message is also penetrating the ears of people in China, who live under communist oppression.

        The Chinese Communist Party, in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre, made a bargain with the Chinese people: you acknowledge our total political control, and we will make you economically prosperous.

        For much of the so-called Reform Era, China did grow economically, despite political repression. Under Xi Jinping, however, due to his ridiculous economic policies, not only did he double down on repression, but he also destroyed the Chinese economy. Thus, the Chinese people have neither prosperity nor freedom.

        The message of Taiwan to China is, you can have both prosperity and freedom. So long as Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party remain in power, however, the Chinese people will enjoy neither, and the people of Taiwan will always be under threat.

        I hope for a free Taiwan, forever independent of communist control. I also hope for a free China, independent of communist control."

###

Contact:

Teagan Gambert (202) 225-3765

http://chrissmith.house.gov

3. Fan Yun tells US hearing about Chinese threats

While we need to help Taiwan prepare for the long term and worst case, (i.e., prepare for a whole of society resistance to PLA occupation) we must all collectively fight China's ongoing political warfare.

Perhaps it is counterintuitive to some, the more effectively we fight China's political warfare the less likely China will be able to create the conditions to either coerce Taiwan into unification by political action or compel unification by invasion and force. Our (collectively, the US, Taiwan, and friends, partners, and allies) ability to conduct political warfare may be the most important contribution to detering war (in combination with the demonstrated military capability and will to fight the PLA).

Fri, Jul 25, 2025 page1

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/07/25/2003840881

Fan Yun tells US hearing about Chinese threats

• By Hollie Younger / Staff writer
• 
  
•  
•  
• Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Fan Yun (范雲) on Wednesday testified at a US congressional hearing about Chinese threats and coercion, while a former US naval intelligence chief called on Washington to help Taiwan upgrade its classified clearance system.
• The US Congress established the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) to monitor human rights and the development of rule of law in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and submit annual reports to the US president and Congress.
• Wednesday’s hearing was titled “Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression.”
• 
  

Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Fan Yun in Taipei on Wednesday testifies at a hearing in Washington via video link.

• Photo: Fang Wei-li, Taipei Times
• “In addition to growing military threats and economic coercion, the PRC’s political warfare against Taiwan has also escalated,” Fan told the hearing via video link.
• China has misinterpreted UN Resolution 2758 for “political propaganda in the international arena” and “seeks to legitimize the use of force to annex Taiwan,” she said.
• A planned collision targeting Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim’s (蕭美琴) vehicle in the Czech Republic last year was part of a series of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) activities aimed at intimidating Taiwanese, warning of the cost of resisting China, Fan said.
• 
  

Mike Studeman (speaker), former commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a retired rear admiral.

• Photo: CNA
• “According to our National Security Bureau, the number of spying activity indictments in 2024 was four times higher than in 2021, rising from 16 to 64,” she said.
• Regarding disinformation, the bureau reported that “messages with China’s influence” increased to 2.2 million last year from 1.3 million in 2023, spread via newspapers, TV stations and social media, Fan said, adding that the Global Taiwan Institute found that some media firms received direct instructions from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office.
• Moreover, a recent poll found that Taiwanese TikTok users are more likely to view China favorably and believe that if Taipei favors the US government, war is more likely, she said.
• “United front” organizations in Taiwan, operated by the CCP, invite religious groups, village wardens and college students on heavily subsidized trips to China, Fan said.
• The activities “aim to integrate [college students] into China’s economy” so that they “eventually come to view China’s politics and culture in a positive light,” she said.
• The PRC has also recruited criminals in Taiwan to create a nationwide network to import arms, while it funds Taiwanese influencers to produce content in China that aligns with its political agenda, she said.
• Following last year’s presidential election, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) led 17 legislators, almost one-third of the caucus, on a trip to Beijing to meet with Chinese officials, Fan said.
• Shortly thereafter, the KMT, along with the Taiwan People’s Party, “rushed to push through a series of unconstitutional bills, prevented the national security legal amendments from proceeding to a first reading, and froze or slashed the national defense budget without proper justification,” she said.
• China’s political warfare against Taiwan aims to “distort the world’s understanding of Taiwan by framing cross-strait conflicts as a domestic issue to isolate Taiwan,” erode the confidence of Taiwanese in the US and reduce their confidence in their own government, leading them to ultimately disengage from politics, Fan said.
• Taiwan is countering PRC interference through government-civil society cooperation, raising the national defense budget to a record high and implementing a whole-of-society defense resilience strategy, Fan said, adding that the Ministry of Education is promoting educational material related to those areas.
• However, “Taiwan alone will not be enough to deter China’s aggression,” she said.
• “Standing with Taiwan, we can work together to protect our shared values, prosperity and the rules-based global order,” Fan said.
• In the hearing’s second panel, Mike Studeman, a former US Office of Naval Intelligence commander and retired rear admiral, warned that the CCP’s political warfare efforts are relentless, pervasive and all encompassing.
• “Taiwan wouldn’t survive if it only focused on an outside-in strategy of hardening its outer shell with military forces,” Studeman said, adding that equal effort must also be made to bolster core defenses to guard against internal threats.
• He proposed a number of ideas that the US could assist Taiwan in dealing with those dangers, such as helping Taiwan to strategically reduce its international isolation.
• “Further, encouraging Taiwan to spend more of its GDP on defense, while giving due regard to their political and industrial realities, developing deeper Taiwan and US cooperation on cybersecurity, and helping Taiwan upgrade its classified clearance system and adopt more advanced insider threat technologies,” Studeman said.
• By clearance system, he was referring to the framework for managing and reviewing who is authorized to access sensitive intelligence.
• Studeman called for coordination between the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the US Cyber Command and the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to increase resilience of Taiwan’s critical infrastructure.
• The CECC hearing was also attended by Jamestown Foundation president Peter Mattis and Audrye Wong, assistant professor of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California.
• Additional reporting by Fion Khan and CNA

4. Why China Won’t Stop the Fentanyl Trade

This is political and unrestricted warfare.

I have to give the author a lot of credit as he is based in Beijing.

Excerpt:

From one standpoint, China’s actions are easy to understand. Its leadership is behaving as many other rational state actors would—exploiting the power it possesses over a strategic competitor. But the grisly truth is that, in this case, China’s power derives from mass death. Chinese leaders continue to use American lives to forward their political aims, rather than taking the small steps necessary to save them. That choice is one of the starkest demonstrations that the regime’s priority of narrow self-interest over the global good won’t be changing anytime soon.

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/07/china-fentanyl-trump-tariffs/683642/

Why China Won’t Stop the Fentanyl Trade

The opioid that kills tens of thousands of Americans every year has become a source of political leverage that Beijing won’t easily give up.

By Michael Schuman

The Atlantic · by Michael Schuman · July 24, 2025

The United States won’t be able to solve the fentanyl crisis without help from its greatest rival. China is the world’s largest supplier of the chemicals that drug smugglers use to produce the opioid, and the country’s regulators have proved that they can stem its spread on the black market—when they’re so inclined. But despite pressure from Washington, Chinese leaders have not done nearly as much as they could to crack down on the illicit-fentanyl trade. For Beijing, the opioid that kills tens of thousands of Americans every year is a source of political leverage that it won’t easily give up.

Chinese officials still decry the opium crisis that foreign traders seeded two centuries ago. The country’s long memory informs the regime’s regulation of domestic drug dealing and use, which it polices and prosecutes severely. But Beijing denies its role in the drug trade beyond its borders. As a spokesperson for the foreign ministry said in May, “Fentanyl is the U.S.’s problem, not China’s.”

Now President Donald Trump is making a renewed effort to hold China accountable. Earlier this year, he imposed tariffs in retaliation for the country’s refusal to act firmly to rein in the trade. At least for now, Beijing appears willing to strengthen controls. In late June, regulators announced new restrictions on two chemicals used in fentanyl production. But China’s record of cooperation has been erratic, fluctuating from moment to moment depending on the state of U.S.-China relations. And any further assistance likely won’t come cheap. Chinese leaders are well aware that fentanyl is a bigger problem for the United States than it is for China. Before entering any new agreement, they will withhold “cooperation as a piece of leverage” until they can extract “certain guarantees or the right price,” Amanda Hsiao, a director in the China practice at the political-risk consultancy Eurasia Group, told me.

In his first term, Trump had some success with getting Beijing to acquiesce. At the start of the fentanyl crisis, more than a decade ago, China was a major source of the finished drug entering the American black market. Then, in 2018, Trump imposed his first round of tariffs and threatened future ones, which probably influenced China’s decision the following year to restrict the production and export of fentanyl. The step effectively eradicated the import of Chinese-made fentanyl into the U.S., and showed that Beijing can suppress the illicit trade when it wants to.

Sam Quinones: America’s approach to addiction has gone off the rails

After the restrictions were in place, however, China’s criminal networks switched to shipping out precursors—the chemicals needed to make the opioid—instead of finished fentanyl. They sell the precursors to Mexican cartels, which mix them and smuggle the resulting fentanyl into America. Some of the Chinese syndicates are considerate enough to provide the recipe.

During Joe Biden’s presidency, as U.S.-China relations deteriorated, Beijing allowed the precursor trade to go largely unchecked. Nancy Pelosi, then House speaker, visited Taiwan over Beijing’s objections in 2022, which led Chinese leaders to refuse even discussing fentanyl with Washington. The next year, Biden ramped up pressure by adding China to an official list of the world’s most egregious purveyors of illicit drugs. In an apparent effort to reduce tensions, Beijing resumed talks with Washington on the issue, and last year the regime imposed restrictions on some fentanyl precursors. These steps may have contributed to the decline in fentanyl deaths in America since 2023.

Still, ensuring that China enforces its latest fentanyl restrictions will be no easy task for Washington. Beijing never received the benefits it had expected after previous cooperation, such as tariff relief, so it will likely demand concessions from Washington before provisioning any more help. “China in general extends law-enforcement cooperation to countries with whom it wants to have positive relations and denies it to countries with whom its relations have deteriorated,” Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who has studied the fentanyl issue, told me. “This is not China’s policy just toward the U.S., but it’s systematic policy.”

China’s intransigence has led some in Washington to suggest that Beijing might be trying to destabilize American society. “They could stop it if they wanted to,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in February. “You have to wonder in some cases, is this a deliberate thing, like are they flooding us with fentanyl?”

That accusation probably goes too far, but China certainly has levers to regulate fentanyl that it’s refusing to pull. Eliminating the trade would be extremely difficult: China’s chemical-manufacturing sector is massive, and smugglers need only tiny amounts of precursors. Still, Beijing doesn’t require local chemical manufacturers to verify the identities of their customers, which would help prevent precursors from falling into the hands of cartels. Nor have Chinese authorities aggressively prosecuted the traders who sell the precursors to illicit-drug networks.

Listen: The drug that could help end the opioid epidemic

If “China wanted to be perceived as a compassionate, caring global patron, they would be doing more about this, and they’re not,” David Luckey, a senior researcher at the Rand Corporation who specializes in the opioid trade, told me.

From one standpoint, China’s actions are easy to understand. Its leadership is behaving as many other rational state actors would—exploiting the power it possesses over a strategic competitor. But the grisly truth is that, in this case, China’s power derives from mass death. Chinese leaders continue to use American lives to forward their political aims, rather than taking the small steps necessary to save them. That choice is one of the starkest demonstrations that the regime’s priority of narrow self-interest over the global good won’t be changing anytime soon.

About the Author

Michael Schuman

Michael Schuman is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, based in Beijing, China.

The Atlantic · by Michael Schuman · July 24, 2025

5. Gazans Are Finished With Hamas

A powerful essay.

A legitimate view? Or will this be dismissed as propaganda?

Excerpts:

For the past seven weeks, our neighborhood has become the only area in Gaza governed by a Palestinian administration not affiliated with Hamas since 2007. Our armed patrols have successfully kept Hamas and other militant groups out. As a result, life here no longer feels like life in Gaza. In eastern Rafah, people have access to shelter, food, water, and basic medical supplies—all without fear of Hamas stealing aid or being caught in the crossfire with the Israeli military.

The effect has been tremendous: no more airstrike casualties, no chaotic aid lines, no evacuation orders, and no fear of booby-trapped homes or children being used as human shields by Hamas. While there is still much to improve, people now sleep at night without fear of death.

This should not be the exception in Gaza—it can be the model, the new norm. The vast majority of Gazans reject Hamas. They don’t want it to remain in power after the war ends. But though they hate Hamas, they still fear it. Since protests began earlier this year calling for the group’s removal, demonstrators have been killed, tortured or forced into hiding.

My own family didn’t take part in those protests, but when Hamas killed my brother, Fathi Abu Shabab, and my cousin, Ibrahim Abu Shabab, for trying to secure aid for our family—and when 52 civilians under our care were murdered in their homes—I realized that silence is no longer an option. If we remain quiet now, we will never be free, cease-fire or not.

Gazans Are Finished With Hamas

My Popular Forces control significant parts of eastern Rafah and we are ready to build a new future.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/gazans-are-finished-with-hamas-commander-popular-forces-5d9a6345

By Yasser Abu Shabab

July 24, 2025 5:13 pm ET

Mr. Shabab, center, poses with members of his Popular Forces militia in Rafah. Photo: Courtesy of the Popular Forces

Rafah, Gaza Strip

While most of Gaza continues to suffer under the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel, things are very different for thousands living in eastern Rafah—for us, the war is already over.

The Popular Forces, an independent Palestinian group under my leadership, have secured several square kilometers of land that have been home to my Bedouin tribe, the Tarabin, for generations. We aren’t an ideological movement, but a pragmatic one. Our primary goal is to separate Palestinians who have nothing to do with Hamas from the fire of war.

For the past seven weeks, our neighborhood has become the only area in Gaza governed by a Palestinian administration not affiliated with Hamas since 2007. Our armed patrols have successfully kept Hamas and other militant groups out. As a result, life here no longer feels like life in Gaza. In eastern Rafah, people have access to shelter, food, water, and basic medical supplies—all without fear of Hamas stealing aid or being caught in the crossfire with the Israeli military.

The effect has been tremendous: no more airstrike casualties, no chaotic aid lines, no evacuation orders, and no fear of booby-trapped homes or children being used as human shields by Hamas. While there is still much to improve, people now sleep at night without fear of death.

This should not be the exception in Gaza—it can be the model, the new norm. The vast majority of Gazans reject Hamas. They don’t want it to remain in power after the war ends. But though they hate Hamas, they still fear it. Since protests began earlier this year calling for the group’s removal, demonstrators have been killed, tortured or forced into hiding.

My own family didn’t take part in those protests, but when Hamas killed my brother, Fathi Abu Shabab, and my cousin, Ibrahim Abu Shabab, for trying to secure aid for our family—and when 52 civilians under our care were murdered in their homes—I realized that silence is no longer an option. If we remain quiet now, we will never be free, cease-fire or not.

This may be our only chance to secure a future that rejects violence and embraces reason. What has prevented most Gazans from expressing their true anger at Hamas is the lack of a viable alternative. Hamas still controls aid access and dominates institutions like the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, or Unrwa. Hamas still turns aid centers into hubs for its own operations. In some areas, the only thing preventing people from fleeing is the presence of Israeli troops, which might withdraw as part of a cease-fire.

No one else has been willing to step up and risk publicly breaking with Hamas. Those fears lost their meaning for me after my brother and cousin were murdered. Hamas has labeled me a criminal and collaborator, but I am not intimidated by them. I won’t surrender.

Through our efforts, we have shown a glimpse of what a new Gaza could look like. We have already received requests from many families to relocate to eastern Rafah. With proper support, we are ready to take responsibility for the rest of Rafah. Within months, more than 600,000 people—nearly a third of Gaza’s population—could be living outside the cycle of war.

We need only three things to make this vision a reality: financial support to prevent Hamas’s return, humanitarian aid to meet the population’s immediate needs for food and shelter, and safe corridors so people can move around. In a short time, we could transform most of Gaza from a war zone into functioning communities. When the rebuilding has begun, Hamas can negotiate with Israel for the release of hostages in exchange for safe passage out of Gaza. Let them go to Qatar, Turkey or wherever their enablers will have them. We don’t want them among us.

What comes next for Gaza must be determined by the people themselves, a choice we have been denied for nearly two decades. For now, our focus remains on saving as many lives as possible and laying the foundations for a better future. On behalf of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians in Gaza, the Popular Forces call on the U.S. and Arab countries formally to recognize and support an independent Palestinian administration under our leadership.

From eastern Rafah—where families now sleep safely under civil protection—I can see Gaza’s future. The question is: Will the world help build it with us, free from the ideologies of violence and terror?

Mr. Shabab is commander of the Popular Forces in Gaza.

6. Trump’s Tariffs Are Being Picked Up by Corporate America

How can that be sustainable?

Is this the new "cost of doing business?"

Trump’s Tariffs Are Being Picked Up by Corporate America

Neither consumers nor foreign countries are assuming much of the tariff burden. At least not yet.

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trumps-tariffs-are-being-picked-up-by-corporate-america-0befd9bd

By Jeanne Whalen

Follow and Sarah Nassauer

Follow

July 24, 2025 11:30 pm ET

Illustration: Rachel Mendelson/WSJ, Bloomberg (3), Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

• The U.S. has collected an additional $55 billion in tariffs this year, with Corporate America bearing much of the cost.
• U.S. businesses are absorbing tariff costs, but some plan price hikes, as inflation starts ticking up for some tariffed goods such as toys.
• Some foreign suppliers have trimmed some prices, but nowhere near the levels Trump promised when he said foreign countries would foot the bill.

The U.S. has collected an additional $55 billion in tariffs this year. Corporate America has largely shouldered the bill.

President Trump’s new levies, which have pushed the country’s tariffs to their highest levels in decades, are typically paid by importers when goods reach U.S. ports. So there is little mystery about who makes that first payment. It is often a manufacturer, a logistics or customs broker, or in some cases a retailer itself that ordered the shipment.

But economists and others have been watching for signs of who will ultimately bear the cost. Would it be foreign suppliers, by cutting prices on the front end, or consumers, by paying higher prices at the checkout stand? Or would the U.S. businesses that sit in between shoulder the burden?

It is becoming increasingly clear that U.S. businesses, from General Motors and Nike to the local florist, are absorbing much of the costs for now. In a competitive market, a company that hikes prices could lose market share to a rival that keeps its prices steady. Many are reluctant to raise prices until they absolutely must, and until they know the ever-changing tariffs are sticking around. In some cases companies have said they plan to raise prices in the months to come.

Some stability could be on the horizon. This week, the U.S. struck a deal with Japan for 15% tariffs on imported goods, and a possible deal with the European Union for 15% on its goods is in the works.

That would offer some much-needed clarity, but could also trigger broader price increases on thousands of imports.

There are signs that some foreign suppliers, particularly of Chinese goods now carrying an extra 30% tariff, have trimmed some prices to help out. That support isn’t anywhere near the levels Trump promised when he said foreign countries would be footing the bill.

Inflation has begun to tick up for some tariffed goods, including furniture, toys and clothes. So far those increases have been relatively mild. The June inflation reading moved to 2.7% from a year earlier, versus a 2.4% increase in May. The increase has been slower than expected partly because many companies pulled back on buying or stocked up on inventory before tariffs took effect, and partly because companies are choosing to absorb the hit for now.

“U.S. firms are still footing most of the tariff bill, having yet to pass more than a fraction of the tariff cost on to consumers,” said Preston Caldwell, chief U.S. economist at Morningstar.

Signs of the profit hit are appearing in earnings reports.

General Motors said this week it paid more than $1 billion in tariffs on automotive imports in the second quarter. The company hasn’t implemented wide-scale price increases in response to tariffs but hasn’t ruled out price hikes, Chief Executive Officer Mary Barra said Tuesday. Stellantis, the Netherlands-based parent of the U.S. brands Ram and Jeep, this week said tariffs on automotive imports cut $350 million from its bottom line.

Tariffs clipped the profit of RTX, the aerospace and defense company said. The toy maker Hasbro said Wednesday that the financial impact of tariffs was less than expected in the most recent quarter, but that some of the effects could still be coming. Tariffs will likely create a $60 million expense for the full fiscal year, the company said.

GM reported that net income shrank in the second quarter as automotive tariffs weighed on the company. Photo: Scott Olson/Getty Images

Toy prices are likely to go higher later this year, Hasbro Chief Executive Chris Cocks said. “Usually it takes five to eight months for a toy to go from the factory to the shelf,” he said. For now some retailers are delaying their purchases, and Hasbro is compensating for higher tariff costs through cost cuts, working with new suppliers, introducing new products and increasing prices, he said.

Last month, Nike executives said tariffs would trim the company’s profit by around $1 billion this fiscal year, with most of the hit in the first half, before their mitigation efforts can take effect. “Surgical” product price increase will flow to shelves later this year, said Matthew Friend, Nike’s chief financial officer.

Economists estimate the effective average tariff rate on all imported goods is now nearing 17%, up from 2.3% last year.

The import price index, which tracks what importers pay for many foreign-produced goods before tariffs are levied, has held steady in recent months, in what some economists call a sign foreign suppliers aren’t broadly slashing their prices to offset costs for their U.S. customers. 

Goldman Sachs conducted what it called a more granular analysis of import prices and concluded that foreign companies, particularly those in China, appear to be absorbing around 20% of tariff costs through price cuts.

Broader hits to consumers could be on the way. In May, Walmart said that it had started raising some product prices to offset the cost of tariffs and that more price increases would come this summer. For example, in May, Walmart executives said tariffs on goods from South and Central America had lifted the price of bananas, one of the most frequently purchased items at Walmart, to 54 cents a pound, from 50 cents.

Unlike smaller companies, Walmart can use its buying power and global supply chain to offer prices that are lower than many competitors. Walmart’s largest suppliers are China, Mexico, Canada, Vietnam and India, according to executives.

“We’ll continue to be price leaders,” Walmart Chief Financial Officer John David Rainey said in June when asked about tariffs at an investor conference. For higher-priced items such as imported barbeque pits, Walmart has purchased less inventory to offset an expected slowdown in sales because of tariff-related price increases, he said.

Many large companies have been hesitant to link price increases directly to tariffs lest they draw Trump’s ire. Days after Walmart said some prices would rise in May, Trump posted online that Walmart and China should “eat the tariffs,” not raise prices. When several other large retailers reported earnings the following week, including Home Depot and Target, they emphasized their efforts to resist price increases.

Walmart’s produce is a draw for customers. Photo: Desiree Rios for WSJ

Shayai Lucero, a florist near Albuquerque, N.M., is swallowing some of the extra cost of tariffs, while also raising prices. The imported long-stem roses from South America she buys from U.S. wholesalers used to cost $1.15 to $1.35 each but are now running $1.95 to $2.15 apiece. That has forced her to raise her price for a vase of a dozen roses to $69 from $60, she said.

The floral wreaths and foam she imports from China have also climbed in price since Trump added 30% tariffs on those imports. A heart-shaped wreath from China that used to cost $24 recently jumped to $38. That and higher flower prices cut the profit on an arrangement she recently made for a funeral to $6 from $30, she said.

She worries that higher prices could lead to lost business. “It’s that real fine line of do I lose customers or do I stay in business?” she said. To cut costs she is eliminating some expensive wreaths from her lineup, including ones in the shape of the words Mom and Dad, and is asking community members to donate vases to her business. 

Some footwear companies have announced plans to increase prices in the coming weeks, said Matt Priest, CEO of the Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America, a trade association.

“A lot of the impact has so far been absorbed by the brand and the retailer, but they can only hold on for so long,” Priest said of his member companies. About 99% of shoes sold in the U.S. are imported from China, Vietnam, Italy and other countries.

Write to Jeanne Whalen at Jeanne.Whalen@wsj.com and Sarah Nassauer at Sarah.Nassauer@wsj.com

Appeared in the July 25, 2025, print edition as 'Trump’s Tariffs Are Being Picked Up by Corporate America'.

7. State Dept. cuts China experts as administration says countering Beijing top priority

Cutting off our nose to spite our face?

WHere will Chinese expertise come from?

State Dept. cuts China experts as administration says countering Beijing top priority

Updated July 24, 20255:21 PM ET 

By 

Kat Lonsdorf

, 

Tom Bowman

NPR · by By · July 24, 2025

President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio listen during an Oval Office meeting at the White House on July 16. Alex Brandon/AP

The State Department fired its top experts on the South China Sea and shuttered the office with a key focus on Indo-Pacific security amid a sweeping reorganization earlier this month, leaving gaps in knowledge and experience that are critical to U.S. interests in the region.

The cut comes as members of President Trump's administration, as well as both Democratic and Republican lawmakers, continue to say security and free navigation of the South China Sea — a busy shipping passage for global trade — remain a priority.

For years, China has been aggressively asserting its territorial claims, from building artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea, while also harassing fishing and oil exploration ships from the Philippines, Vietnam and other Pacific nations. And for years, the U.S. has worked with other countries in the region to push back.

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"China's actions undermine peace and stability in the region. The evidence for this is their growing willingness to use force to achieve their objectives--as seen in the South China Sea and around Taiwan while also undertaking a massive and unprecedented military buildup," Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top policy official said in June. He has made countering China his top priority, arguing that the U.S. should refocus its military in the Western Pacific.

The Office of Multilateral Affairs within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs managed U.S. engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), coordinated diplomatic response to China's aggression in the South China Sea and oversaw the Mekong River region, according to current and former officers. The office was cut along with dozens of others in the recent reduction in force that left more than 1,300 government workers without a job.

It was also the office that helped prepare Secretary of State Marco Rubio for his trip to Malaysia earlier this month for ASEAN-related meetings. The layoffs were announced while Rubio was traveling home from that trip.

"After he used us, he fired us," one fired foreign affairs officer who focused on the South China Sea said. "It's mind-boggling."

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NPR spoke to several members of the office who had been fired, who voiced concerns that their elimination would harm U.S. interests, and instead give China the upper hand. Many thought that even if the office was eliminated, they would be moved to other offices to continue their work. There was no indication in any of the termination letters employees received that performance was a factor; in fact, NPR verified that many of them recently received outstanding performance reviews. All spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid reprisal.

All of those fired from the office were civil service employees with years of expertise in the region. Civil servants tend to stay in positions for longer periods and over many administrations, while foreign service officers change position every two or three years.

One of the officers who was fired put it this way: "We are the consistency. We keep the train running while everyone rotates."

In a statement to NPR, the State Department maintained that there are still teams covering needed issues, but in different offices, saying that mission-critical functions from any office eliminated will be integrated elsewhere.

But particularly as it relates to the South China Sea, it's unclear who will perform some of these functions, with the top experts now gone.

"You have people that are going to be making decisions that are poorly informed. They're not going to know the potential risks of some of the options that they have," said one fired officer.

Another fired State Department officer said that, despite a congressional notification in May that the office was planning to be cut, nothing was done to transfer information or expertise to another team: "What's baffling to me is that no one was preparing for this. There was no planning, there was no coordination, and there was no preparation to hand over any of our office duties."

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The Trump administration has long said that containing Chinese aggression and maintaining free navigation of the South China Sea is a priority — a stance generally shared by both hawkish Republicans and Democrats alike. Just this week, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., traveled to Washington to meet with Trump and Rubio, underscoring the importance of the alliance between the two countries, particularly as it relates to the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, China has maintained an increasingly aggressive stance in the region. As recently as this week, Chinese aircraft carriers pushed further into waters that had long been dominated by the U.S. military, in a series of drills reported by the Japanese military's joint staff. And China has continued to increase its illegal claim to more and more waters, something the U.S. firmly rejected during the first Trump administration under then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

A narrative of American withdrawal

All of this has security and diplomacy experts who closely watch the region confused as to why the State Department would fire its experts on the topic, even if the office was slated for reorganization.

Gregory Poling, director of the Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, calls the move "really harmful" for U.S. efforts in the region.

"You're not going to pluck somebody else out of an unrelated bureau who knows the ins and outs of one of the most complicated issues in the world," he says.

Poling says he also worries about the signal it sends to our allies in the region.

"It reinforces a narrative in the region of U.S. strategic withdrawal. Sure, we might still be sending the Navy out, but we're not really interested in the diplomatic or the economic leadership that the region wants to see," he says.

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Piper Campbell, former diplomat and now chair of the Department of Foreign Policy and Global Security at American University, says she was "really disappointed" to hear about the decision to close the Office of Multilateral Affairs, and particularly to fire the experts. She worries it puts the U.S. at a disadvantage, especially since that office specialized in working across several countries.

"It reduces our influence. It reduces our understanding of what's happening in this important region, and it reduces both our security and our economic heft in the region," Campbell says.

Others expressed concern that the move, especially in the context of recent tariffs imposed on many countries in the region along with the gutting of aid programs, might leave U.S. allies turning to China for help instead.

"If our chief goal is pushing back against Chinese expansionism — how does this help? I would argue it hurts," says James Caruso, a former diplomat with many years focused in Southeast Asia.

Henrietta Levin, former deputy China coordinator for global affairs at the State department in the Biden administration, echoes those worries, saying she was "surprised and somewhat concerned" by these specific cuts.

"I think these cuts eliminate tools that have been powerful in the United States," she says. "At a time when China is doubling down on its own commitment to this competition and trying to win over countries in the Indo-Pacific, I would hope the United States would use every tool available."

NPR · by By · July 24, 2025

8. Forecasting the Fifth Wave: Emerging Terrorist Threats in a Changing World

As General Fenton said in his congressional testimony this year, we may think we are done with terroristm but terrorism is not done with us.

Charts at the link below.

Excerpts:

In conclusion, the global community has not only operationally failed to prevent several major terrorist attacks over the past two decades—such as those in the United States and various European countries, as well as the recent October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel—but has also struggled academically to accurately identify and anticipate evolving terrorism trends. As a result, scholarly and policy debates have centered on various categories of terrorist threats, including Salafi-jihadist organizations, Iran-backed militant groups, and right-wing extremist actors, alongside thematic concerns such as cyberterrorism and the potential for nuclear terrorism. These discussions often seek to determine which among them represents the most likely candidate for the so-called “fifth wave” of terrorism.

Data from the GTTAC database indicates that Salafi-jihadist groups—particularly those affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS—remain the most operationally active, especially across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, where they are responsible for thousands of fatalities annually. While the Western world has often perceived these threats as geographically contained, the growing capabilities and transnational ambitions of such groups pose a rising threat to global security, including that of Western nations themselves.

Simultaneously, the GTTAC data shows an increasing number of attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed groups. The October 7 Hamas attack has served as a significant turning point, drawing heightened attention to the operational reach and strategic ambitions of Iran-aligned actors across the Middle East. However, the recent decimation of Hezbollah, Hamas, and IRGC-QF leadership and infrastructure raises questions about the long-term viability of Iran-backed groups as central actors in the evolving landscape of global terrorism.

Other potential drivers of the fifth wave of terrorism include cyberterrorism, nuclear terrorism, and right-wing extremism. Although terrorist organizations have so far lacked the capacity to conduct large-scale cyberattacks or acquire nuclear materials, the potential impact of such capabilities—should they be obtained—would be significant. However, the likelihood of these developments occurring in the near term remains low. In contrast, right-wing extremist violence, while geographically limited primarily to Western contexts, poses a significant and growing challenge due to its decentralized structure, lone-actor tactics, and the difficulty of early detection. Thus, while its scope may be narrower, its unpredictability and ideological resonance warrant ongoing scholarly and policy attention. Based on the current operational data and ideological trends, Salafi-jihadist groups remain the most likely drivers of the fifth wave of terrorism globally, particularly in non-Western regions, while right-wing extremism may represent a parallel but regionally concentrated wave within the West.

Forecasting the Fifth Wave: Emerging Terrorist Threats in a Changing World

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/25/forecasting-the-fifth-wave-emerging-terrorist-threats-in-a-changing-world/

by Mahmut Cengiz

|

07.25.2025 at 06:00am

The international defense community consistently struggles to predict the changing landscape of global terrorism. Counterterrorism practitioners have frequently been reactive rather than proactive, while the academic community has faced challenges in developing models that reflect terrorism’s complex and dynamic nature. These deficiencies led to the failure to anticipate and prevent major terrorist incidents such as the September 11 attacks in 2001, the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2015 Paris attacks, and most recently, Hamas’s coordinated attacks on October 7, 2023. This article builds on David Rapoport’s theory of the “four waves” of terrorism to explore a potential “fifth wave.” Analysis of data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) indicates that the strongest candidates for this fifth wave are the continuation of the religious wave—especially the Salafi-jihadist interpretation, and the activities of Iran-backed terrorist groups.

Four Waves of Terrorism

David Rapoport’s theory of the four waves of modern terrorism presents a typology grounded in political orientation and influenced by the historical, cultural, and ideological conditions of distinct periods characterized by heightened terrorist activity. A “wave” denotes a generational cycle of terrorism unified by a shared ideological drive, with revolutionary change serving as the central objective in each phase. Rapoport identifies four major waves: the Anarchist (1880–1920), Anti-Colonial (1920–1960), New Left (1960–1980), and Religious (1980–ongoing).

The first, the Anarchist Wave began in Russia and is widely recognized as the starting point of modern terrorism. It emerged from deep dissatisfaction with the slow pace of political reform, particularly frustration with entrenched authoritarian systems and the persistence of state power, which anarchists sought to dismantle in favor of stateless, egalitarian alternatives, and was characterized by the tactical use of dynamite and the assassination of high-ranking officials, including heads of state. This period became known as the “Golden Age of Assassinations,” during which a major political figure was killed approximately every 18 months. Notably, women played an active and significant role in this wave. Examples include the assassination of U.S. President William McKinley in 1901 by Leon Czolgosz, King Umberto I of Italy in 1900 by Gaetano Bresci, and Russian Tsar Alexander II in 1881 by members of the anarchist group Narodnaya Volya.

The second wave of modern terrorism, known as the Anti-Colonial Wave, spanned from the 1920s to the 1960s and emerged in the aftermath of World War I with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty’s emphasis on the principle of self-determination, which facilitated the breakup of defeated empires, provided the ideological foundation for a new form of terrorism centered on national liberation. Unlike the preceding Anarchist Wave, anti-colonial groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, and the Jewish Irgun in Mandatory Palestine relied less on targeted assassinations and focused more on eliminating police officers and military personnel as part of their strategy. Diaspora communities in Europe and in the United States often provided strong support to these movements, offering financial resources and political backing. During this period, many such actors gained recognition as “freedom fighters,” reflecting the relative international sympathy for anti-colonial struggles.

The third wave of modern terrorism, known as the New Left Wave, emerged between the 1960s and 1980s, heavily influenced by the Vietnam War and a broader anti-imperialist sentiment. This period revealed the vulnerability of modern states to relatively unsophisticated weapons and tactics, which various militant groups used effectively. A dramatic increase in international terrorist activity marked this wave, and high-profile individuals once again became frequent targets. Between 1968 and 1982, there were approximately 700 hijackings and 409 international kidnapping incidents involving 951 hostages. A key objective of many groups was to provoke a disproportionate response from governments, thereby gaining attention and support for their causes. Notably, one-third of all targets during this wave were associated with the United States. Unlike the Anti-Colonial Wave, where many militants were labeled “freedom fighters,” this terminology fell out of favor, particularly within the United Nations. In response to the rise in transnational attacks, international cooperation in counterterrorism efforts increased significantly.

The fourth wave of modern terrorism, known as the Religious Wave, began in 1979 and continues to the present day. Two pivotal events sparked this wave: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These developments intensified the role of religion in political violence and created fertile ground for the rise of militant religious movements. Groups associated with this wave draw upon sacred texts and religious revelations to legitimize their actions, often framing their violence as divinely mandated. A defining characteristic of this era has been the widespread use of suicide bombings and attacks aimed at causing mass casualties.

While much of the focus has been on Islamist groups, this wave is not confined to one religion. For example, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo employed chemical weapons in the 1995 Tokyo subway attack. Similarly, white supremacist groups such as the Christian Identity movement have invoked distorted interpretations of Christianity, claiming that God is white, and used select biblical passages to justify acts of violence like hate crimes and domestic terrorism. A central figure in this wave was Usama Bin Laden, who viewed the presence of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia as intolerable, helping catalyze the formation of al-Qaeda. The emergence of Salafi-jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) further exemplifies the global spread and ideological intensity of religiously motivated terrorism in this ongoing wave.

Building on this historical foundation, scholarly analyses often failed to anticipate the long-term consequences of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, particularly its role in facilitating the mobilization of mujahideen fighters and the eventual formation of al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the emergence of ISIS as an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq, following the U.S.-led invasion, caught many analysts by surprise. Together, these critical turning points catalyzed the transnational spread of jihadist movements across the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa.

In this broader context of unintended consequences and evolving threats, the Arab Spring, initially seen as a democratizing force across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, inadvertently created political vacuums in several states. Instead of leading to stable democratic transitions in countries like Syria, these power vacuums offered fertile ground for extremist groups to gain influence and territorial control. This transformation further illustrates the resilience and adaptability of the Religious Wave. Compounding these developments, Western countries have faced an increasing threat from self-radicalized individuals and lone-actor terrorism, fueled by online propaganda and decentralized extremist networks.

Although the fourth wave of terrorism continues, questions remain about what form the fifth wave might take—whether it will be driven by resilient Salafi-jihadist movements, Iran-backed terrorist groups, or emerging ideological currents such as right-wing extremism. While nuclear terrorism and cyberterrorism are often discussed in this context, they represent methods rather than the type of unifying ideology that defines a wave in Rapoport’s model.

Salafi-Jihadist Terrorism

Salafism, described by Joas Wagemakers as a diverse and multifaceted movement, is rooted in the belief that the first three generations of Muslims—known as al-salaf al-salih—represent the purest form of Islamic practice. Citing a hadith from Sahih al-Bukhari (8:76:437), Salafists view these early followers as exemplary and aim to closely replicate their way of life. This commitment leads to a strict, literal interpretation of the Quran and sunnah, which are seen as fully sufficient for guiding Muslim life. Salafists reject later religious innovations (bid‘ah) and contemporary interpretations of Islam. Central to their doctrine is the oneness of God (tawheed) and the belief in God’s exclusive authority to legislate (hakimiyya), which results in the rejection of secular law and democratic systems. More broadly, Salafism positions itself in opposition to Western secular values.

Salafi-jihadism is a radical ideological movement that claims to represent only “true” Muslims, often labeling other Muslims who reject its strict interpretations as heretics or apostates. Adherents insist on severing all ties with individuals or groups who question or deviate from their narrow theological views, which are based on a rigid Salafi interpretation of Islamic law. Their vision of governance is rooted in enforcing this interpretation, and any resistance is considered apostasy, punishable by death. Salafi-jihadists justify the killing of Shi’ites on the grounds that they are apostates and actively target groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, whom they see as traitors for compromising with non-Muslims. Moreover, they advocate for offensive jihad against what they define as idolatry—a category that extends beyond religious polytheism to include all non-Salafi cultures, practices, and belief systems.

Al-Qaeda and its former Iraqi branch, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—which later evolved into ISIS—are prominent examples of Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks triggered a global war on terrorism, prompting significant shifts in the operational strategies of both ISIS and Al-Qaeda. In response to heightened counterterrorism efforts, Al-Qaeda adopted an umbrella model, bringing various jihadist groups under its regional networks. For instance, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel formed through the merger of four jihadist factions, while Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria emerged from the unification of six groups. In contrast, ISIS has maintained a centralized core in Syria while simultaneously attempting to establish a presence in Somalia. It has permitted other jihadist groups to adopt the ISIS brand, provided they meet specific criteria—namely, possessing a substantial number of militants and exercising territorial control. These affiliates, however, remain only loosely connected to the central ISIS organization.

The GTTAC categorizes incidents according to twelve ideological frameworks, including jihadist, anarchist, left-wing, right-wing extremist, ethnonationalist, and Iran-backed, among others. In response to emerging security threats, the GTTAC recently expanded its classification system by adding two new categories, cartels and gangs, to monitor violence perpetrated by six newly designated transnational criminal cartels and four gangs operating primarily in Haiti, Venezuela, and El Salvador. Within the jihadist category, the GTTAC includes attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, their affiliates, and local groups influenced by Salafi-jihadist ideology. Since 2022, the GTTAC has documented a rising number of jihadist attacks. These accounted for 39.4 percent of all recorded terrorist incidents in 2021, 36.7 percent in 2022, 41.3 percent in 2023, and 40.3 percent in 2024.

Figure 1: Total Terrorist Incidents and Religious-Jihadist Terrorist Incidents (2021–2024)

The persistence and proportion of jihadist attacks over consecutive years, as illustrated in Figure 1, indicate the enduring resilience of jihadist groups. Several structural and geopolitical factors contribute to this sustained threat. The transnational spread and financial support of Salafi-jihadist ideology—particularly through funding from certain Gulf States—has facilitated the growth of extremist movements in regions such as Africa and Asia. Additionally, political instability following military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has created power vacuums that groups such as al-Qaeda’s JNIM and ISIS–Greater Sahara rapidly exploited. Compounding these issues are chronic deficits in state capacity, including limited government resources, pervasive corruption, and porous borders, all of which undermine effective governance and provide fertile ground for jihadist entrenchment and expansion.

An additional key indicator of jihadist group activity is the number of casualties they have inflicted. As depicted in Figure 2, ISIS-Core—primarily active in Syria and Iraq—was responsible for 17,924 deaths and injuries between 2018 and 2024. This was followed by al-Qaeda’s affiliate, al-Shabaab, which accounted for 16,318 casualties during the same period. The top eight most lethal groups during this timeframe also include other ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, underscoring the continued operational capacity and persistent threat posed by these transnational jihadist networks.

Furthermore, these organizations are among the most frequent users of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rockets, mortars, and small arms. An analysis conducted by the GTTAC of explosive weapon usage by Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS-Core, and al-Shabaab from 2018 to 2024 reveals that ISIS-Core was particularly active in deploying grenades and landmines. The group carried out 177 grenade attacks, resulting in 356 fatalities, and 239 landmine-related incidents, which caused 530 deaths. Al-Shabaab followed closely, with 131 grenade attacks that led to 396 fatalities. In terms of mortar attacks, al-Shabaab was the most active, conducting 138 operations that resulted in 438 deaths.

Figure 2: Top Eight Groups with the Most Casualties (Killed and Wounded) (2018-2024)

Jihadist groups also remain the primary perpetrators of suicide bombing attacks, as illustrated in Figure 3. Between 2018 and 2024, al-Shabaab carried out 170 suicide attacks, resulting in 1,764 fatalities. ISIS-Core followed, causing 970 deaths through such operations. The list of major actors also includes the Taliban, which deployed suicide bombers until its takeover in 2021, along with various other affiliates of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Notably, ISIS’s affiliate in Afghanistan, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), conducted 77 suicide bombings during this period but was responsible for the highest number of fatalities, with 1,952 deaths—underscoring the group’s high lethality per attack and strategic emphasis on mass-casualty operations.

Figure 3: Top 10 Groups with the Highest Number of Suicide Bombing Attacks (2018–2024)

Iran-backed Terror Groups

Iran’s involvement in regional terrorism and destabilizing activities is rooted in its strategic doctrines of “extended deterrence” and “forward defense,” which aim to counter threats beyond its borders by projecting influence through asymmetric means. Central to this approach is the concept of velayet-e faqih, which grants the Supreme Leader overarching religious and political authority, including a perceived obligation of obedience that extends to ideological allies and proxy groups outside Iran. This doctrine is grounded in Twelver Shiism, the dominant branch of Shi’a Islam in Iran, which emphasizes clerical authority and the role of religious leaders in guiding the political order—an interpretation that has shaped the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology. At the core of this strategy is the so-called “Axis of Resistance” (mehvar-e moqavemat), a network of state and non-state actors aligned with Iran, through which Tehran seeks to deter adversaries, project influence, and defend its interests across the region.

Through this network of proxies and non-state actors—such as Hezbollah, various Iraqi Shi’a militias, and the Houthis in Yemen—Iran exerts influence across the Middle East while minimizing direct confrontation. This strategy also involves systematic interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states, exploiting sectarian divisions and fragile political institutions to shape outcomes in its favor. Beyond its traditional areas of influence, Iran has also sought to expand its reach into countries such as Turkiye, utilizing ideological networks, intelligence operations, and the cultivation of covert structures. A notable example is the formation of the group Salam Tawhid Quds Force, which was the subject of a Turkish police investigation in the early 2010s due to its suspected links to Iranian intelligence and its involvement in espionage and subversive activities.

Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism is characterized by strategic pragmatism rather than strict ideological alignment, as the regime supports both Sunni and Shi’a groups based primarily on shared geopolitical objectives. Tehran has consistently provided financial, logistical, and operational support to any group that aligns with its broader goal of countering the United States, Israel, and their regional allies. This pragmatic approach explains Iran’s historical sheltering of al-Qaeda operatives, including the group’s second-in-command, as well as its support for the Taliban during its insurgency against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Similarly, Iran has extended material and logistical assistance to a range of Palestinian factions—including both Sunni and Shi’a elements—that engage in armed resistance against Israel. At the same time, Tehran has taken a hostile stance toward Sunni extremist groups that target Shi’a communities across the Middle East, viewing them as direct threats to its regional influence and sectarian interests. Iran’s long-term investment in proxy groups and militant networks was starkly demonstrated during the Hamas-led attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, which revealed the depth of Iranian backing and the strategic patience with which the regime builds and maintains its regional alliances.

According to GTTAC’s group categorization, Iran-backed terrorist activity encompasses both Shi’a militant organizations and various Palestinian factions, illustrating Tehran’s strategic use of a diverse network of proxies to project influence and further its geopolitical objectives across the region. As depicted in Figure 4, the number of terrorist attacks attributed to Iran-backed actors reached a significant peak in 2024. In 2021, GTTAC recorded 364 such attacks, a figure that remained relatively stable through 2022. However, there was a dramatic escalation following the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, attacks, which marked a turning point in the operational tempo of Iran-aligned groups. Under strategic direction from Tehran, these groups launched coordinated attacks targeting U.S. and Israeli interests across the Middle East, contributing to a sharp increase to 936 attacks in 2023. This trend intensified further in 2024, culminating in 2,266 recorded incidents. The share of Iran-backed attacks relative to global terrorist activity also rose substantially, increasing from 4 percent in both 2021 and 2022 to 12 percent in 2023 and ultimately making up 26 percent of all recorded attacks in 2024. These figures highlight Iran’s expanding role in orchestrating and sustaining regional militancy through proxy warfare.

Figure 4: Number of Terrorist Incidents Attributed to Iran’s Backing (2021–2024)

Figure 5 presents the distribution of terrorist attacks carried out by Iran-backed groups. In 2024, Hezbollah emerged as the most active among these groups, with 1,409 recorded attacks, reflecting a significant escalation in its operational tempo. This was followed by the Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, which was responsible for 391 attacks during the same period. Hamas also demonstrated a marked increase in its activities across 2023 and 2024, coinciding with the broader surge in Iran-aligned militancy. A particularly noteworthy development is the emergence of the group known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which gained prominence following the Hamas-led October 7 attacks. Despite its recent formation, the group conducted 181 attacks across various Middle Eastern countries in 2024, signaling its rapid integration into Iran’s proxy network.

Figure 5: The Number of Incidents by Iran-backed terror groups (2018-2024)

In addition to the alarming number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed groups, these actors are also responsible for the highest volume of rocket and missile attacks, indicating a level of sophistication and access to military-grade weaponry that strongly suggests state sponsorship. Between 2018 and 2024, Hezbollah and Hamas were the primary perpetrators of rocket attacks, with Hezbollah conducting 953 such incidents resulting in 46 fatalities, and Hamas launching 499 attacks that caused 20 deaths. Missile attacks during the same period totaled 315 incidents, primarily attributed to Hezbollah, and resulted in 60 fatalities. The increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) represents a notable evolution in the operational capabilities of these groups. Iran-backed actors have emerged as dominant users of UAVs in the region, reflecting both technological transfer from the Iranian state and a strategic shift toward more advanced forms of asymmetric warfare.

Despite the significant number of terrorist attacks by Iran-backed groups over this data set, recent Israeli military operations have significantly degraded the capabilities of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the IRGC-Quds Force through targeted strikes on leadership, weapons infrastructure, and logistics networks. These setbacks raise important questions about the long-term viability of Iran-backed groups as the core of a potential ‘fifth wave’ of terrorism. While Iran may adapt by strengthening remaining proxies or cultivating new ones, continued pressure could undermine the strategic coherence of its transnational militant network.

Other Threats for the Fifth Wave of Terrorism

The debates on the fifth wave of terrorism also have listed cyberterrorism, nuclear terrorism, and right-wing extremism.

Cyberterrorism

Cyberattacks have been conducted by a range of actors, including hacktivists, criminal organizations, state entities, and terrorist groups. Among these, the first three—hacktivists, criminals, and states—are the most active, and their operations have elevated cyberattacks to a top priority on global security agendas. In contrast, cyberterrorism is only minimally represented in terrorism databases, largely due to definitional ambiguities and methodological challenges in classification and data collection.

Cyberterrorism can be classified based on methods, targets, outcomes, perpetrators, and motivations. Common techniques include malware, viruses, and Trojan horses, often delivered via infected devices or software. While such attacks may qualify as cyberterrorism, social engineering tactics like phishing do not necessarily meet this definition. Typical targets include critical infrastructure—military sites, government offices, power stations, and commercial centers. Attacks causing physical harm, such as explosions, are generally considered cyberterrorism, whereas data theft or financial crimes are not.

Perpetrators range from non-state actors, including lone hackers, extremist groups (e.g., far-right or Salafi-jihadists), and ideologically motivated individuals. Not all cyber operations by terrorist groups constitute cyberterrorism; activities like propaganda or recruitment fall under information warfare. Motivations are often political, religious, or social, aiming to coerce governments or alter policies.

The literature distinguishes between cyber-enabled terrorism and direct cyberterrorism targeting information and communication systems. Cyber-enabled terrorism involves the use of digital tools to support traditional terrorist activities, such as propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, and operational coordination. These actions exploit cyberspace but do not constitute attacks on digital infrastructure.

In contrast, direct cyberterrorism refers to deliberate attacks on information and communication systems themselves. Such operations target critical infrastructure—government networks, financial systems, energy grids—with the intent to cause disruption, fear, or economic harm. In this form, cyberspace becomes the primary domain of attack rather than a supporting tool.

It is essential to acknowledge that, while cyber threats remain a top global security concern, the capacity of terrorist groups and ongoing definitional challenges will likely limit the extent to which theoretical security frameworks account for cyberterrorism as a significant threat.

Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism represents a potential candidate for the theorized fifth wave of terrorism, reflecting growing concerns about the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by non-state actors. One of the enduring consequences of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was the intensified discourse surrounding the hypothetical scenario in which such attacks were carried out using nuclear materials—an outcome that would have been significantly more catastrophic and deadly. For years, both practitioners and scholars have engaged in extensive debates regarding the likelihood of terrorist groups employing WMDs, which broadly encompass nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons. These discussions continue to shape counterterrorism strategies and underscore the need for vigilance in monitoring and preventing WMD proliferation.

Scholars have explored scenarios in which terrorist organizations might gain access to nuclear materials through illicit networks involving nuclear smugglers, corrupt officials willing to overlook or facilitate trafficking, and complicit scientists who may be coerced or incentivized to collaborate. While it is a matter of considerable concern that terrorist groups have made multiple attempts to acquire or deploy nuclear weapons, it is notable that these efforts have thus far been unsuccessful. In contrast, the post–September 11 era has witnessed the confirmed use of chemical and biological weapons by non-state actors, underscoring the continued relevance of non-conventional threats despite the relative inaccessibility of nuclear capabilities.

Several critical factors constrain terrorist organizations from acquiring and using WMDs. Among these, organizational capabilities play a central role, as complex planning and coordination are required to execute WMD-related operations. Financial and logistical resources are also significant limitations, as WMD development and deployment demand substantial funding and infrastructure. Furthermore, access to specialized knowledge and skills, as well as the ability to acquire necessary materials and technology, present additional barriers. Even if materials are obtained, challenges in production, weaponization, and the development of reliable delivery mechanisms further hinder terrorist efforts. Finally, the absence or withdrawal of state sponsorship can severely restrict access to expertise, materials, and safe havens, making it even more difficult for non-state actors to pursue WMD ambitions.

Despite the persistent failure of terrorist groups to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons, the continued incidents of theft and smuggling involving small quantities of radioactive and nuclear materials ensure that the threat of nuclear terrorism remains a subject of concern. Nevertheless, given the significant technical, logistical, and organizational barriers associated with nuclear weaponization and delivery, it is unlikely that nuclear terrorism will emerge as the dominant threat characterizing the fifth wave of terrorism.

Right-wing Extremism

A sense of ethnic and national superiority has driven various extremist groups to mobilize under right-wing ideologies and movements. This emerging trend has fueled the rise of anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiment across Europe, while in the United States, Canada, and Australia, it has been associated with misogynistic, neo-Nazi, anti-government, and white supremacist groups. Although the number of right-wing extremist attacks recorded in the GTTAC database remains significantly lower compared to jihadist or Iran-backed terrorist incidents, the operational characteristics of these groups place them among the most dangerous terrorist threats today.

Often leaderless and decentralized in structure, these individuals tend to act as lone offenders, having been self-radicalized—primarily through online far-right platforms—and driven by extremist ideologies. This absence of a formal hierarchy or traceable network complicates detection and prevention, thereby elevating the threat level associated with such actors.

Recent developments have shown that right-wing extremist groups are adopting tactics, naming conventions, and networking strategies similar to those used by jihadist organizations. For instance, one such group operates under the name The Base, a direct translation of al-Qaeda. These groups are increasingly transnational, forming global networks with training activities previously identified in locations such as Ukraine (prior to the war) and Thailand.

While Western governments have been largely effective in countering global jihadist terrorism and are well-prepared to respond to conventional threats, right-wing extremist attacks present a different kind of challenge due to their decentralized nature, ideological diversity, and growing presence in online spaces. Although these attacks occur less frequently, they are often highly unpredictable, difficult to detect in advance, and capable of causing disproportionate societal and political disruption—making them a critical issue on current security agendas.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the global community has not only operationally failed to prevent several major terrorist attacks over the past two decades—such as those in the United States and various European countries, as well as the recent October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel—but has also struggled academically to accurately identify and anticipate evolving terrorism trends. As a result, scholarly and policy debates have centered on various categories of terrorist threats, including Salafi-jihadist organizations, Iran-backed militant groups, and right-wing extremist actors, alongside thematic concerns such as cyberterrorism and the potential for nuclear terrorism. These discussions often seek to determine which among them represents the most likely candidate for the so-called “fifth wave” of terrorism.

Data from the GTTAC database indicates that Salafi-jihadist groups—particularly those affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS—remain the most operationally active, especially across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, where they are responsible for thousands of fatalities annually. While the Western world has often perceived these threats as geographically contained, the growing capabilities and transnational ambitions of such groups pose a rising threat to global security, including that of Western nations themselves.

Simultaneously, the GTTAC data shows an increasing number of attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed groups. The October 7 Hamas attack has served as a significant turning point, drawing heightened attention to the operational reach and strategic ambitions of Iran-aligned actors across the Middle East. However, the recent decimation of Hezbollah, Hamas, and IRGC-QF leadership and infrastructure raises questions about the long-term viability of Iran-backed groups as central actors in the evolving landscape of global terrorism.

Other potential drivers of the fifth wave of terrorism include cyberterrorism, nuclear terrorism, and right-wing extremism. Although terrorist organizations have so far lacked the capacity to conduct large-scale cyberattacks or acquire nuclear materials, the potential impact of such capabilities—should they be obtained—would be significant. However, the likelihood of these developments occurring in the near term remains low. In contrast, right-wing extremist violence, while geographically limited primarily to Western contexts, poses a significant and growing challenge due to its decentralized structure, lone-actor tactics, and the difficulty of early detection. Thus, while its scope may be narrower, its unpredictability and ideological resonance warrant ongoing scholarly and policy attention. Based on the current operational data and ideological trends, Salafi-jihadist groups remain the most likely drivers of the fifth wave of terrorism globally, particularly in non-Western regions, while right-wing extremism may represent a parallel but regionally concentrated wave within the West.

Tags: Al-Qaeda, Cyber Terrorism, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, ISIS, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), right wing extremism, Salafi-jihadism, terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction

About The Author

• 
  
• Mahmut Cengiz
• Dr. Mahmut Cengiz is an Associate Professor and faculty member at the Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University (GMU). He has extensive international field experience, having provided capacity-building and training assistance to both governmental and non-governmental partners across the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Dr. Cengiz is the author of seven books and numerous scholarly articles and book chapters that critically address issues related to terrorism, transnational crime, terrorist financing, and human trafficking. His 2024 book, Murder by Mail, co-authored with Mitchel P. Roth, offers an historical analysis of weaponized mail, tracing its development over two centuries. He contributes regularly to Small Wars Journal and <iHomeland Security Today. Since 2018, Dr. Cengiz has been a key figure in the establishment and continued development of the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC). In addition to his research and policy contributions, Dr. Cengiz teaches graduate-level courses on Terrorism, American Security Policy, and Narco-Terrorism at George Mason University. He is a Fellow at Small Wars Journal–El Centro.

9. Book Review | Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan

It is good to see Frank Sobchak's book getting a lot of press.

As General Fenton also said in his recent testimony that we need to shift from "burden sharing" to "burden owning."

Excerpts:

Stakeholders at different levels will find that Training for Victory provides broad utility. For the practitioner, and especially the Special Forces noncommissioned officers tasked with building effective partners, this book offers a historical view that opens the professional aperture beyond one’s regional experience at a given moment in time. Critically, our community has few opportunities to learn deeply from one another’s capacity-building experiences across geographic commands outside of informal exchange at Professional Military Education or advanced schools. Connecting in this way is invaluable, but it leaves a lot of insight on the cutting room floor, has limited reach, and no record. This book addresses those shortcomings by drawing insights from data and capturing the perspectives of critical members of the Special Forces regiment as they age out of our formations. Training for Victory is an important reference to assist in structuring the discussions around designing a new advising effort and, perhaps more importantly, how to sustain it effectively.

For the planners and policymakers, this book is a powerful counterpoint to arguments for large-scale disengagement from our military relationships abroad. Rather than illustrating broad-based failure, the cases selected show that SFA missions can be effective when consistently resourced at modest levels. As the United States seeks to increase burden sharing among allies and partners, Special Forces advising missions represent a small-footprint approach to ensure these states develop the capability to defend themselves and the ability to integrate with US forces if needed. In contrast to large conventional overseas deployments, small teams with a persistent presence have a demonstrated history of success when thoughtfully implemented. More than a canary in the coal mine, these relationships increase American influence, provide a “ground truth” feedback loop to senior policy officials, and, perhaps most importantly, are never large enough to do the work for our partners.

This book provides timely insights as the Department of Defense considers changes to force structure. A renewed focus on large-scale combat operations as both a capability and deterrent may suggest a decreased need for small advising missions. This is a potential oversight. Clear American conventional overmatch will likely incentivize nations to seek asymmetric means of achieving policy objectives, similar to the proliferation of small wars throughout the Cold War. By working with allies committed to improving their SOF capabilities, we can frustrate adversary operations away from our homeland and leverage deep relationships as a powerful diplomatic tool. If the United States intends to maximize the benefits from the increase in allied defense spending, we should look at sustainable Security Force Assistance missions as a way to ensure that the dollars and euros spent will result in real lethality. Fortunately, Training for Victory helps identify the key planning considerations that our Special Forces soldiers apply when turning dollars into deterrence.

Book Review | Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/25/book-review-training-for-victory-u-s-special-forces-advisory-operations-from-el-salvador-to-afghanistan/

by Wyatt Thielen

|

07.25.2025 at 06:00am

Training for Victory: U.S. Special Forces Advisory Operations from El Salvador to Afghanistan. By Frank Sobchak. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2024. ISBN: 978168247133. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. 1-352. $39.95.

The closeout of the Global War on Terror and the contentious politics over the withdrawal from Afghanistan gave the Army every opportunity to avoid deliberate introspection about institutional performance in fulfilling the various missions assigned to it. In particular, Security Force Assistance – the training and development of foreign military forces and institutions – was widely viewed as a mission that failed writ large. This training, designed to develop the recipient nation’s forces to provide for their own security, was a hallmark of the last twenty years of American military activity abroad. After the collapse of conventional Iraqi forces during the rise of ISIS, and the near entirety of the Afghan National Army during the American withdrawal, American citizens can reasonably ask, “Does this ever work?”

A casual observer may conclude that these efforts are wasted, doomed to fail for myriad reasons, and a distraction from the pursuit of unilateral combat power. This perspective misses critical outliers, and Training for Victory by Dr. Frank Sobchak uses a comparative analysis of five cases to illuminate these exceptions. This research sheds light on the space between the binary distinction of success and failure. By examining five factors that shape advising efforts and evaluating the resultant combat effectiveness of the recipient units across four core competencies, this book identifies which relationships resulted in durable combat power, and what, if any, factors were the most critical to those assistance efforts.

Forty Years of Advising

To ensure the comparisons were appropriate, Dr. Sobchak selected cases where the US Army Special Forces (SF) established and sustained support for an elite force during that nation’s ongoing conflict. This avoided episodic training engagements and ensured that the cases represented instances where United States policy makers were invested in success. The choice of dependent variables, or the inputs that just might hold a key to the combat effectiveness of the trainees, is critical. This book goes to the heart of the way Special Forces thinks of its own best practices and evaluates language training and cultural competency, consistency in advisor pairing, partner-to-advisor ratio, ability of the advisor to structure the host nation unit, and the authority to accompany the trainees into combat. Dr. Sobchak measures the quality of each input using historic deployment data, language proficiency scores, combat authorities or the lack thereof, and extended interviews with participants from every case study.

Measuring the impact of a tactical unit on the course of a war is difficult, however, especially when insurgencies often resemble social movements and violent political struggles for legitimacy more so than organized military campaigning. To avoid coloring the analysis of the foreign Special Operations Force (SOF) units by the success or failure of their government’s strategic efforts, the book focuses on the ability of the SOF units to achieve their tactical tasks. In this instance, combat effectiveness is measured by a qualitative evaluation of fighting without advisors, at night, for up to three days, and winning while doing so. While this bar seems relatively low for professional soldiers, depending on the adversary, it leaves considerable room for applying clever tactics and operational art, something the Colombian case demonstrates in spades.

The cases begin with US support to the Guatemalan military in the 1980s and the establishment of the Batallones de Infanteria de Reacción Inmediata (BIRIs) to combat a communist-inspired insurgency. The next case study illuminates a largely understudied portion of the Global War on Terror in the Philippines when SF developed the Light Reaction Regiment to fight Islamic insurgents in Mindanao and surrounding islands. In the third case study, the Colombian SOF operations against the FARC insurgency diversify the case selection away from Islamic insurgencies and represent the most capable partners evaluated. Finally, the performance of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces and the Afghan Commandos is analyzed with starkly differing results. By taking five cases covering forty years of history, with distinct adversaries and geographies, Training for Victory avoids cases that are too similar to travel to other contexts.

The results of the study confirm that routine training with consistent mentorship over a long period of time is effective. That is an expected result. Additionally, the authority to make structural choices and guide the partner force, especially by removing particularly ineffective leaders, is critical. The greater the emphasis on the practice of leadership, the more effective the units examined were in combat. While some may make an argument that these actions limit the partners’ sovereignty, both parties should remember that capacity building is a two-way street. Additionally, not all nations actively insulate their militaries from domestic partisanship or attempt to promote through a generalized meritocracy. If partner nations are wholly unresponsive to the recommendations of the advisors, it may signal a desire to increase US direct involvement or slow-roll progress for additional aid. At the very least, consistent advising relationships can identify this behavior and trigger a policy review process in Washington to ensure valuable SOF resources are not wasted on recalcitrant partners.

Surprisingly, Dr. Sobchak’s work found that the impact of language skills and the ability to fight with the partner nation was less essential. The book distinguishes language proficiency and the type of cultural rapport that soldiers build at a professional level. Servicemembers with joint experience will recognize this. The mixed communication of professional soldiery, delivered through instruction and demonstration, is facilitated with caffeine, nicotine, and jokes more often than precise technical jargon. Part of this disconnect is likely inherent to the challenge of designing a force with the right language capabilities at the right time, and the other half is that current defense language program testing objectives are ripe for reform to bring the subjects tested into the ballpark of being relevant.

Perhaps most controversially, Training for Victory concluded that accompanying the partner force on operations was not essential. This result, and the data around it, is worth close examination as “skin in the game” is an almost unquestioned truism within Special Forces. The Colombian case was the most instructive in this regard, where the political realities of US support precluded direct combat against the FARC. In this conflict, the Colombians could not rely on the United States to fight on their behalf and were, therefore, unable to shift the combat burden to their American advisors. At the same time, they developed robust training regimes through their Lancero school and succeeded in the field. In contrast, the Afghan Commandos, who operated almost wholly alongside US forces, were the least effective partner force surveyed and almost wholly dependent on the Americans. This juxtaposition of expected outcomes should remind both policymakers and practitioners that there are many paths to success and no silver bullets in the world of capacity building.

One potential shortcoming in Training for Victory is the lack of cost comparison between the evaluated programs. Bureaucracies fight over budgets, and in the current fiscal and political climate, scrutiny over defense spending remains elevated. While building partner capacity is cheap in defense budget terms, train and equip programs from fiscal year 2018 to 2022 spent a little over one billion dollars annually. While this spending is related, it is not a direct mirror of SF peculiar missions, and the available data does not shed light on the specific programs in the book. The cost and scope of divested materiel, in addition to the cost of the forces employed in the case studies presented, would have been an interesting component to identify where the advising missions were the most spendthrift per unit of combat capability. Given the author’s access and understanding of the authorities used during the periods examined, further data on the financial cost of success could have improved the overall perspective created in Training for Victory.

Implications for Policy and Operations

Stakeholders at different levels will find that Training for Victory provides broad utility. For the practitioner, and especially the Special Forces noncommissioned officers tasked with building effective partners, this book offers a historical view that opens the professional aperture beyond one’s regional experience at a given moment in time. Critically, our community has few opportunities to learn deeply from one another’s capacity-building experiences across geographic commands outside of informal exchange at Professional Military Education or advanced schools. Connecting in this way is invaluable, but it leaves a lot of insight on the cutting room floor, has limited reach, and no record. This book addresses those shortcomings by drawing insights from data and capturing the perspectives of critical members of the Special Forces regiment as they age out of our formations. Training for Victory is an important reference to assist in structuring the discussions around designing a new advising effort and, perhaps more importantly, how to sustain it effectively.

For the planners and policymakers, this book is a powerful counterpoint to arguments for large-scale disengagement from our military relationships abroad. Rather than illustrating broad-based failure, the cases selected show that SFA missions can be effective when consistently resourced at modest levels. As the United States seeks to increase burden sharing among allies and partners, Special Forces advising missions represent a small-footprint approach to ensure these states develop the capability to defend themselves and the ability to integrate with US forces if needed. In contrast to large conventional overseas deployments, small teams with a persistent presence have a demonstrated history of success when thoughtfully implemented. More than a canary in the coal mine, these relationships increase American influence, provide a “ground truth” feedback loop to senior policy officials, and, perhaps most importantly, are never large enough to do the work for our partners.

Future Considerations

This book provides timely insights as the Department of Defense considers changes to force structure. A renewed focus on large-scale combat operations as both a capability and deterrent may suggest a decreased need for small advising missions. This is a potential oversight. Clear American conventional overmatch will likely incentivize nations to seek asymmetric means of achieving policy objectives, similar to the proliferation of small wars throughout the Cold War. By working with allies committed to improving their SOF capabilities, we can frustrate adversary operations away from our homeland and leverage deep relationships as a powerful diplomatic tool. If the United States intends to maximize the benefits from the increase in allied defense spending, we should look at sustainable Security Force Assistance missions as a way to ensure that the dollars and euros spent will result in real lethality. Fortunately, Training for Victory helps identify the key planning considerations that our Special Forces soldiers apply when turning dollars into deterrence.

Tags: military advising, SOF, Special Operations, Special Operations Forces, strategy

About The Author

• 
  
• Wyatt Thielen
• Wyatt Thielen is a Special Forces NCO with over a decade of service implementing American policy abroad, and a current graduate student at Johns Hopkins SAIS focused on Special Operations policy, employment, and force management.

10. Brains, Bluntness, and the Battle for US Foreign Policy: The Legacy of Zbig Brzezinski (Review Essay)

Excerpt:

An American Above All

Brzezinski’s was an American story. Luce aptly highlights how Zbig believed in the attraction and potential of American ideals. Zbig’s Polish roots gave him an appreciation for America’s unique place—and role—in the world. Kissinger noted after Brzezinski’s passing, “As immigrants we knew about the fragility of societies and we had an instinct for the transitoriness of human perceptions.” Brzezinski knew the brutality, ugliness, and ultimate fragility of Soviet rule. In times of domestic turmoil—like the 1970s or today—it’s easy to exaggerate rivals’ power and doubt the capacity of our own democracy. However, Brzezinski never lost faith in America’s messy but enduring advantages in its “long twilight struggle” with authoritarian empires. We would be wise to heed his example. After all, “when one is right, victory is a matter of time.”

Brains, Bluntness, and the Battle for US Foreign Policy: The Legacy of Zbig Brzezinski - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Sam Wilkins · July 25, 2025

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Edward Luce, Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, America’s Great Power Prophet (Avid Reader, 2025)

A 1957 Polish Communist secret police file described Zbigniew Brzezinski as “definitely an enemy—ideologist, very active, gifted, and very clever. . . . He’s also a Besserwisser [know-it-all], driven by the eternal need to show off.” That assessment, bitter and begrudgingly admiring, captures something real about Brzezinski’s relentless drive and unapologetic intellect. Ed Luce, the lead American commentator at the Financial Times, offers us a fascinating and flattering portrait of President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor in Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, America’s Great Power Prophet. Luce’s Zbig depicts both the prophet and the human. Brzezinski’s story, which took him from refugee during the combined Nazi-Soviet invasion and occupation of his home country, Poland, to the height of power in Washington as President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, is uniquely American. This triumph of expertise, grit, and wisdom reflects the best of America—values we will need to remember as we embark on a new great power competition with China and Russia.

Exile’s Insight: The Soviet Achilles’ Heel

Luce’s Zbig builds upon previous biographies of the subject, including Justin Vaisse’s 2018 Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand Strategist and Charles Gati’s 2016 edited volume on Brzezinski’s statecraft. Luce’s highly readable contribution adds humanity to his subject, befitting the author’s journalistic background. Using personal diaries, Luce captures the unique geopolitical and familial circumstances that shaped Brzezinski’s unique outlook. Brzezinski’s father, Tadeusz, fought in the newly formed Polish Army that repelled Lenin’s invading Red Army in the 1920 “miracle on the Vistula.” His father’s subsequent experience as a diplomat in Soviet-occupied Ukraine, where he witnessed the aftermath of Stalin’s man-made famine, was passed down in tableside stories to his son. As storm clouds descended over Europe in October 1938, Tadeusz and ten-year-old Zbigniew travelled to their next diplomatic posting in Canada.

Young Zbigniew remained fascinated with the world they left behind. In Newman House School’s 1939–1940 yearbook, children were asked to write one subject in which they were experts. While other boys listed whimsical topics like “eating,” “Hollywood,” and “yawning,” the precocious Zbigniew wrote “Europe (foreign affairs).” Later in life, critics, especially those from the WASP (white Anglo-Saxon protestant) foreign policy establishment, charged that Zbig’s Polishness gave him a hatred of the Soviet Union that was incompatible with directing American foreign policy. Robert Lovett, President Harry Truman’s secretary of defense, went further, charging that “we shouldn’t have a national security advisor like that who’s not really an American.”

Zbig’s Polish background provided him with a clarity of purpose that drove his relentless journey, but Luce rejects the WASPs’ claims of dual loyalty. Zbig’s personal experiences illuminated the Soviet Union’s brutal imperial character. They also germinated his most important ideas about the Achilles’ heel of the Soviet Union: captive nationalities like the Poles. Young Zbig saw Moscow’s behavior for what it was—Russian imperialism disguised in the universalist rhetoric of communism. Brzezinski’s early insights into Soviet weaknesses were captured in his master’s thesis at McGill University. His McGill yearbook entry reads, “When one is right, victory is only a matter of time.” That confidence powered both his scholarship and his policymaking.

Scholar-Strategists: Brzezinski, Kissinger, and the Geopolitics of Ambition

Brzezinski’s star rose quickly at the intersection of policy and academia. He completed his PhD at Harvard in three years, published to national acclaim, and earned a prestigious tenured position at Columbia University (after a disappointing rejection from Harvard). From the outset, Brzezinski proved unwilling to confine his contributions to the academy. He wanted to be more than an academic: “I said to myself that I don’t want to be crossing the Harvard Yard year after year carrying a folder, lecture number 7, ‘joke used last year,’ ‘class reaction,’ tweed jacket.”

Henry Kissinger, another European-émigré scholar at Harvard, held similar policy ambitions. Luce paints a nuanced picture of the relationship between these two intellectual giants. Despite their shared academic pedigree, ambition, and European accents, Kissinger and Brzezinski were a study of contrasts. Zbig was cutting and combative—including with the media. Kissinger, by contrast, was charming, agreeable, and flattering. Luce portrays their greatest difference of all as an intellectual disagreement about the relative trajectories of Soviet and American power. Kissinger’s Spenglerian pessimism about America’s decline led him to pursue policies, like détente with Moscow, designed to make the most of a weakening hand. Brzezinski, in contrast, sensed that it was in fact the Soviet Union whose power had peaked. Zbig’s policymaking flowed from this confident foundation.

While the Kissinger-Brzezinski relationship represents an interesting subplot of the work, Luce downplays Kissinger’s immense contributions during his time in government in favor of his protagonist. Indeed, while senior members of the Carter administration sought rhetorical distance from what they called the “Nixon-Kissinger-Ford” years, much of their initial approach represented a continuation of Kissinger’s policies. As Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis noted, many of these initiatives, such as the 1979 diplomatic recognition of Communist China, simply represented the “logical conclusions” of “Kissinger’s strategies.”

The Prophet’s Power Struggles

Like Kissinger, Brzezinski was a centralizing and directive national security advisor. He took little interest in being an honest broker of various ideas to the president in the model of his immediate predecessor, Brent Scowcroft. A young Richard Holbrooke, who as Carter’s assistant secretary of state for East Asia frequently found himself an active belligerent in the State Department’s struggle against Brzezinski, accurately predicted these issues prior to Zbig’s appointment. “I think Brzezinski is too combative and has too strong a personal agenda for that job,” he advised.

Holbrooke wasn’t the only Democrat in the foreign policy establishment with hesitation over Zbig’s appointment. Averell Harriman, the éminence grise of the old WASP establishment, thought Brzezinski was too opinionated for the duty. To Harriman, the ideal national security advisor should be somebody who could quietly facilitate the interagency process and “should behave like a child at a formal dinner, seen but not heard.”

Brzezinski was certainly heard. Over time, President Carter came to concur with his combative perspective on the Soviet Union. While Carter began his term asking Americans to see beyond “an inordinate fear of communism,” by 1980, following Soviet aggression in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, he charged that Soviets needed to “pay a concrete price for their aggression.”

Much has been made over the vicious bureaucratic infighting between Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on this account. Like other recent historical observers of the Carter presidency, Luce accurately diagnoses Carter’s own leadership style and two-mindedness as the taproot of this disfunction. However, Luce underestimates Brzezinski’s own agency in the debilitating rivalries and incoherence that came to define Carter’s foreign policy. As national security advisor, Zbig himself bore responsibility to harmonize the various chords of Carter’s agenda into a coherent grand strategy.

Nevertheless, Luce makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing reconsideration of the Carter foreign policy. While overly sympathetic in some areas, Luce deservedly highlights Brzezinski’s contributions to America’s eventual Cold War triumph. Brzezinski’s long-held ideas, finally translated into policy, hastened the demise of the Soviet Union. The administration’s emphasis on human rights behind the Iron Curtain, engagement with Solidarity in Poland, investments to rebuild the military after Vietnam, and early efforts to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan get their deserved moment of recognition in Zbig. Indeed, these actions represented the kernels of the strategy that saw the United States finally overcome the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

After departing the White House, Brzezinski continued to earn Luce’s moniker of “prophet.” Days after 9/11, he faxed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, warning him to get in and out of Afghanistan quickly to avoid a quagmire. Unlike Kissinger, he opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq—earning him the enduring scorn of the George W. Bush administration. His written prognostications, meanwhile, of the impending arrival of a great power competition for the Eurasian landmass proved astute. In his 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Brzezinski warned of the dangers of a new coalition of Eurasian autocracies opposed to Western power and ideals. He foretold a “grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an ‘antihegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.” As Iran and China offer material support to Russia’s brutal war of conquest in Ukraine, this warning appears unfortunately accurate.

An American Above All

Brzezinski’s was an American story. Luce aptly highlights how Zbig believed in the attraction and potential of American ideals. Zbig’s Polish roots gave him an appreciation for America’s unique place—and role—in the world. Kissinger noted after Brzezinski’s passing, “As immigrants we knew about the fragility of societies and we had an instinct for the transitoriness of human perceptions.” Brzezinski knew the brutality, ugliness, and ultimate fragility of Soviet rule. In times of domestic turmoil—like the 1970s or today—it’s easy to exaggerate rivals’ power and doubt the capacity of our own democracy. However, Brzezinski never lost faith in America’s messy but enduring advantages in its “long twilight struggle” with authoritarian empires. We would be wise to heed his example. After all, “when one is right, victory is a matter of time.”

Sam Wilkins is an active duty US Army Special Forces officer. Sam is currently a US Army Goodpaster Scholar and PhD student in Yale’s History Department, where his research focuses on how American elites shaped Cold War competition with the Soviet Union in Africa in the 1970s.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Sam Wilkins · July 25, 2025

11. Beijing’s South China Sea Campaign of Intimidation Has Run Aground

Excerpts:

China is in no greater control of the South China Sea today than it was four years ago. In some areas, it has even lost ground to other claimants. The disputes are now focused on locations of particular symbolic, strategic, or economic value to Southeast Asian governments, and at which they are willing to accept some degree of risk to stand up to China. And they have discovered that they can, in fact, stand up to gray zone pressure. China, at least so far, remains unwilling to escalate to lethal force despite its setbacks in the gray zone. The result has been a cycle of escalations, in which Chinese commanders ordered to avoid military force confront Southeast Asian counterparts with ever-more dangerous and supposedly non-lethal tactics, including ramming, high-pressure water cannons, dazzlers (military-grade lasers), and acoustic devices. Upon failure, they partially de-escalate only to have the cycle begin anew elsewhere.

...

China is unlikely to adjust its strategy so long as Xi is in power. He has embedded a maximalist interpretation of maritime claims — that all the South China Sea belongs to China by historical right — and made (re)claiming that supposedly “lost” territory a key component of his China Dream. That makes compromise unlikely, which is particularly dangerous because as he has consolidated power, Chinese government decision making has grown increasingly inflexible. No one in the Chinese government has any incentive to give honest feedback to the center if things go south. And unless Xi himself realizes that and orders a shift in strategy, the most likely path for China in the South China Sea is one of inertia. That will mean an ongoing cycle of gray zone escalations that will, eventually, lead to mounting risks of the loss of life, as avoided only narrowly at Second Thomas last June. Should that happen to a Filipino, Manila might call on Washington to act to “meet the common danger” as required by their alliance. While this need not entail immediate armed conflict between China and the United States, it would require some American response. This could involve naval patrols near the Spratlys or increased deployments to the Philippines, potentially provoking a counter-response by China.

Even worse would be for China to determine that gray zone coercion had failed and that escalating to military force would be an acceptable risk. That is only likely if Beijing deems U.S. involvement unlikely or infeasible. So in the short and medium term, it will be incumbent upon the United States and Philippines to strengthen the credibility of their alliance. The U.S. government should continue to reiterate that the treaty applies to any attack on Filipino forces, including the coast guard, in the South China Sea. It should follow through on plans to upgrade Philippine military facilities and rotate U.S. forces, including intermediate range fires, through the archipelago. And it should enhance bilateral patrols with the Philippines and multilateral patrols alongside Australian, Japanese, and other allied forces in the South China Sea, while providing ongoing support for the modernization of the Philippine armed forces. That is the best hope of maintaining the fragile status quo until Xi or, more likely his successor, sees the writing on the wall and seeks compromise.

Beijing’s South China Sea Campaign of Intimidation Has Run Aground - War on the Rocks

Gregory Poling

July 25, 2025

warontherocks.com · July 25, 2025

During a June 17 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Steve Koehler declared that despite an ongoing campaign of intimidation against its smaller neighbors in the South China Sea, “China’s pressure is not working well. It has failed to intimidate Southeast Asian claimants and make them surrender their sovereign rights.”

Koehler detailed examples of Chinese harassment and violence over the last year against Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and especially the Philippines, but noted that in each case, the Southeast Asian states have refused to back down. The admiral echoed this assessment the following month in a speech in Manila on the anniversary of the Philippines’ 2016 arbitral victory in The Hague, which ruled most of Beijing’s maritime claims in the South China Sea illegal.

That China is faltering might surprise casual observers of the South China Sea disputes, but it matches the available evidence. China’s efforts to establish control over the sea have plateaued over the last four years. That came after nearly a decade of steady gains. The strategy that won Beijing control over much of the body of water, despite the illegality of its claims, was centered on a campaign of intimidation and non-lethal force, often dubbed “gray zone” coercion. That campaign is no longer working but the Xi Jinping regime is unwilling, and likely unable, to accept that reality and seek compromise with its Southeast Asian neighbors. The result is a dangerous cycle of brinksmanship, but one that is not delivering results for Beijing. To help Southeast Asian partners, especially the Philippines, remain resilient and deter Beijing from military escalation, the United States should follow through with plans to strengthen force posture and support the military modernization of partners in the region.

BECOME A MEMBER

Successes in the Gray Zone

Shortly after his ascension in 2013, Xi laid out his strategic vision to attain the “China Dream,” or “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” In that speech, he emphasized China’s rise as a maritime power and the importance of recovering what he and other Chinese leaders deemed “lost” territories in the East and South China Seas. A year prior, Chinese law enforcement and militia vessels seized control of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll that had been under Philippine control for decades. As vice president at the time, Xi had a major hand in that effort. In hindsight, these two moments — Xi’s speech and the seizure of Scarborough — signaled important shifts in Beijing’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime ambitions. Under Xi, the Chinese Communist Party would intentionally elevate the political salience of the South China Sea disputes, making compromise an ever more distant prospect, and pursue its claims with a much greater appetite for risk.

The People’s Republic of China has claimed sovereignty over all the islands, rocks, and reefs of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal, since inheriting that claim from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government at the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War more than seven decades ago. But Beijing’s claim to “historic rights” over all the waters, seabed, and airspace of the South China Sea in clear contravention of international law is newer, having developed in stages since the 1980s. Currently, the Chinese government demands that it be allowed to govern all economic, military, and law enforcement activity across the South China Sea to a distance of roughly 1,000 nautical miles from its southern coast.

Since 2012, China’s law enforcement, naval, and militia forces have worked hand in glove to extend Beijing’s control over much of the waters, seabed, and airspace in the South China Sea. These successes were made possible by China’s island building campaign from late 2013 through 2016. Before then, Chinese vessels were a rare sight in the southern reaches of the sea. But by 2017, the naval, air, and sensor infrastructure on the island bases allowed the China Coast Guard and militia to sustain operations 800 or more nautical miles from the Chinese coast.

The China Coast Guard has been the most visible arm of Beijing’s campaign of coercion against its neighbors, maintaining an almost daily presence at reefs that China deems strategically or symbolically important within the exclusive economic zones of Southeast Asian claimants. The coast guard uses two of these reefs — Luconia Shoals and Vanguard Bank — as staging grounds to harass nearby oil and gas drilling by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Its other preferred patrol locations — Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, and Thitu Island — focus on harassing the Philippines. It has blocked Filipino access to Scarborough since 2012, harassed and sometimes blockaded Filipino troops stationed at Second Thomas since 2014, and has maintained a constant presence around Philippine-occupied Thitu since 2018.

The coast guard is supported in these efforts by what China calls “maritime militia fishing vessels” (haishang minbing yuchuan). These ships, numbering in the hundreds, are purpose built, mostly state-owned, and fully funded by local, provincial, and central governments. They harass foreign government and civilian ships, intentionally creating risks of collision and occasionally shouldering and ramming Southeast Asian law enforcement vessels, while operating alongside the Chinese coast guard and navy. They are a component of China’s national militia, which China’s Military Service Law defines as a reserve component of the armed forces. China’s other maritime service, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, typically lingers behind the coast guard and militia as an implicit threat.

Beijing has so far restricted its Coast Guard and militia vessels to the “gray zone” below the use of lethal force. China assesses that it can achieve control of the South China Sea through pressure and non-lethal coercion alone. This would avoid the unpredictable escalation dynamics and international condemnation likely to follow any intentional use of lethal force against another claimant. And for nearly a decade this strategy worked: Southeast Asian claimants buckled under pressure over and over.

The China Coast Guard expelled Southeast Asians from traditional fishing grounds, especially in the case of Filipino commercial fishers around Scarborough Shoal, while state-backed Chinese fishers freely operated as far south as Indonesia. Threats of force compelled the Philippines to forego offshore oil and gas exploration while most of the foreign operators in Vietnam’s offshore energy industry abandoned their projects or saw them canceled by Hanoi. Chinese government survey ships, meanwhile, mapped the seabed belonging to its neighbors with impunity thanks to coast guard and militia protection.

Despite all this activity, China’s pattern of gray zone success in the South China Sea has stalled, and in some cases reversed, since 2021.

A Faltering Strategy

China is in no greater control of the South China Sea today than it was four years ago. In some areas, it has even lost ground to other claimants. The disputes are now focused on locations of particular symbolic, strategic, or economic value to Southeast Asian governments, and at which they are willing to accept some degree of risk to stand up to China. And they have discovered that they can, in fact, stand up to gray zone pressure. China, at least so far, remains unwilling to escalate to lethal force despite its setbacks in the gray zone. The result has been a cycle of escalations, in which Chinese commanders ordered to avoid military force confront Southeast Asian counterparts with ever-more dangerous and supposedly non-lethal tactics, including ramming, high-pressure water cannons, dazzlers (military-grade lasers), and acoustic devices. Upon failure, they partially de-escalate only to have the cycle begin anew elsewhere.

Oil and gas exploration is an important but overlooked example of Southeast Asia’s recent successes, as Koehler highlighted. In the latter half of 2021, Indonesia conducted exploratory drilling in the Tuna block, an oil and gas concession at the southern edges of the South China Sea. Beijing responded by deploying coast guard vessels to stymie the operation, the first time Chinese forces had physically harassed Indonesian oil and gas activities. Jakarta deployed its own law enforcement and naval ships to protect the drilling. The standoff lasted three months but Indonesia completed the operation as scheduled.

Also in 2021, Vietnam began to push back more forcefully on the oil and gas front. It greenlit new drilling in the Nam Con Son field near Vanguard Bank, which provides a substantial amount of electricity for Ho Chi Minh City. As with Indonesia, the China Coast Guard deployed to harass the operations. Vietnam sent its own vessels to protect the drilling, which proceeded as scheduled. The continued operations at Nam Con Son and the Tuna block are why the China Coast Guard now maintains an almost daily presence at Vanguard Bank. However, China has nothing to show for that effort. In October 2024, Indonesia began exploratory drilling at another nearby field with the same result: the China Coast Guard deployed, Indonesian ships sailed out to protect the operation, and the drilling went ahead.

Malaysia has by far the largest and most profitable offshore oil and gas industry in the South China Sea. China Coast Guard vessels have been patrolling Luconia Shoals to harass these operations since late 2013. That had some successes, for instance in disrupting drilling operations on the Malaysian extended continental shelf in 2020. But Malaysia’s state-owned Petronas has since embarked on an ambitious expansion of its offshore operations, most importantly at a gas field called Kasawari. Along with daily coast guard patrols, a diplomatic letter leaked in September 2024 revealed that China has been putting considerable political pressure on Kuala Lumpur to halt this work. Malaysia nevertheless drilled a record 25 offshore wells in 2023 and another 15 in 2024.

Recent Chinese-Philippine tensions show Beijing’s strategy failing in a more spectacular, and dangerous, fashion. After years of accommodating Chinese demands, the Philippine navy and coast guard are patrolling disputed waters more and the government is speaking up publicly when faced with Chinese harassment. The administration of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., which took power in July 2022, has reestablished coast guard patrols near Scarborough Shoal for the first time since 2012. The Philippines has also bolstered its military posture in the Spratlys, especially around Thitu, by upgrading infrastructure both in the islands and at bases in Palawan and Luzon that facilitate surveillance, patrol, and resupply missions. This military modernization and political willingness to step up patrols has prompted pushback from the China Coast Guard and militia, including more frequent ramming, unsafe air intercepts, and non-lethal force measures such as water sprayings and dazzlers. Despite this, the Philippines has been undeterred.

From February 2023 to August 2024, the China Coast Guard and militia tried to blockade Second Thomas Shoal where the Philippines maintains a tenuous military presence aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre. The Philippines had determined that the ship was in desperate need of repair and began bringing in construction supplies, giving an excuse for the blockade. The number of Chinese ships around the shoal grew to around 50 by December 2023 and their tactics grew progressively more violent. Coast guard and militia vessels have a track record of navigating recklessly around foreign fishing, law enforcement, naval, and oil and gas vessels in the South China Sea, intentionally creating risks of collision. At Second Thomas, that escalated to intentional shouldering and ramming on a monthly basis in 2023 and early 2024, at times by several Chinese vessels at once, and it targeted both Philippine government and civilian ships. The coast guard also employed deck-mounted high pressure water cannons. Positioning two coast guard ships to hit a Philippine vessel from both sides simultaneously became a favorite tactic, often shattering windows, injuring crew (including, in one case, an admiral) and drowning the targeted vessel’s engines. The coast guard and militia also made occasional use of dazzlers and acoustic devices to blind and disorient Filipino sailors. But despite the intimidation, every monthly Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre made it through the blockade.

In June 2024, this experimentation with gray zone tactics came to a head. The Philippine navy deployed rigid hulled inflatable boats to maneuver around China’s vessels and deliver supplies to the Sierra Madre. The China Coast Guard dispatched its own rigid hulled inflatable boats to intentionally ram the Philippine vessels and then threatened the Filipinos with knives and other weapons. During the incident, a Filipino sailor became pinned between two boats and lost his thumb. Discussions with senior U.S. and Philippine officials indicate that China realized how close its supposedly “non-lethal” gray zone tactics had come to triggering potential U.S. intervention under its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. Soon after, China and the Philippines agreed to a provisional arrangement to deescalate tensions around the shoal. Manila agreed, having accomplished its primary goal of repairing the Sierra Madre. Beijing accomplished nothing.

Its behavior at Second Thomas also worsened the strategic environment for China. It accelerated the once-in-a-generation modernization of the U.S.-Philippine alliance, which has been underway since late 2021. The standoff facilitated greater Philippine integration into an emerging regional security architecture. Manila and Tokyo concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement in July 2023 to allow joint training and exercises. Similar agreements were completed in early 2025 with New Zealand and Canada. And another with France will soon follow. A new trilateral framework among the United States, Japan, and the Philippines has emerged alongside a quadrilateral arrangement, sometimes dubbed the “Squad,” including Australia. And at the diplomatic level, Manila has leveraged the aggression it endured to persuade 28 countries and counting to publicly demand Beijing comply with the 2016 arbitral award that threw out most of China’s maritime claims.

Rough Seas Ahead?

China is unlikely to adjust its strategy so long as Xi is in power. He has embedded a maximalist interpretation of maritime claims — that all the South China Sea belongs to China by historical right — and made (re)claiming that supposedly “lost” territory a key component of his China Dream. That makes compromise unlikely, which is particularly dangerous because as he has consolidated power, Chinese government decision making has grown increasingly inflexible. No one in the Chinese government has any incentive to give honest feedback to the center if things go south. And unless Xi himself realizes that and orders a shift in strategy, the most likely path for China in the South China Sea is one of inertia. That will mean an ongoing cycle of gray zone escalations that will, eventually, lead to mounting risks of the loss of life, as avoided only narrowly at Second Thomas last June. Should that happen to a Filipino, Manila might call on Washington to act to “meet the common danger” as required by their alliance. While this need not entail immediate armed conflict between China and the United States, it would require some American response. This could involve naval patrols near the Spratlys or increased deployments to the Philippines, potentially provoking a counter-response by China.

Even worse would be for China to determine that gray zone coercion had failed and that escalating to military force would be an acceptable risk. That is only likely if Beijing deems U.S. involvement unlikely or infeasible. So in the short and medium term, it will be incumbent upon the United States and Philippines to strengthen the credibility of their alliance. The U.S. government should continue to reiterate that the treaty applies to any attack on Filipino forces, including the coast guard, in the South China Sea. It should follow through on plans to upgrade Philippine military facilities and rotate U.S. forces, including intermediate range fires, through the archipelago. And it should enhance bilateral patrols with the Philippines and multilateral patrols alongside Australian, Japanese, and other allied forces in the South China Sea, while providing ongoing support for the modernization of the Philippine armed forces. That is the best hope of maintaining the fragile status quo until Xi or, more likely his successor, sees the writing on the wall and seeks compromise.

BECOME A MEMBER

Gregory Poling directs the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is the author of On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea.

Image: Philippine Coast Guard via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · July 25, 2025

12. China’s Overlooked AI Strategy – Beijing Is Using Soft Power to Gain Global Dominance

Has the US given up on soft power? Can we still compete in that "domain." (can soft power be considered a domain?)

Excerpts:

The United States still has a chance to win the contest for global AI diffusion. China’s bid to become AI’s leading distributor already faces several hurdles. By preventing China from obtaining the tools needed to fabricate advanced chips for AI and by blocking Chinese firms’ access to U.S.-designed AI chips, American-led export controls likely will hinder China’s ability to spread its models widely. Moreover, demand for the chips needed for model inference—the deployment and use of trained models—will likely further outpace supply as inference-hungry models become widely integrated into applications.

These limits present a narrow window for the United States to offer better alternatives, but it must act quickly. Promoting the growth of an open-model AI ecosystem should be a first order priority for U.S. policymakers. The Trump administration’s newly released AI Action Plan appears to recognize the geostrategic significance of open models, recommending that “We need to ensure America has leading open models founded on American values.” Meta is the leading U.S. open-model player, but others exist, and OpenAI’s plans for its own powerful open model reflect an emerging trend. U.S. policymakers should further encourage this shift by encouraging collaboration between model developers and research institutions and helping provide additional resources to researchers and educators. Moreover, the U.S. government should offer more support to American AI researchers through programs such as the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource, which allows small and underresourced open-model developers to better compete with larger tech developers. The AI Action plan nods toward these solutions, but they will require further fleshing out in the months ahead. A more diverse AI ecosystem would broaden the base for potential innovations that could benefit society and the economy.

At the same time, the United States should recalibrate its AI export control strategy. The recent successes of DeepSeek and Moonshot AI show that export controls cannot prevent Chinese companies from producing advanced open models. Nevertheless, the increasing importance of inference-based computing underscores the need for the United States to realign its export controls with the current direction of AI development. The controversy surrounding the Trump administration’s decision in mid-July to resume exports of Nvidia’s H20—a chip suitable for inference—underscores the need for a recalibration of the strategy. Washington’s reversal appears to have been more a concession aimed at trade negotiations with Beijing than a strategic pivot toward loosening advanced chip restrictions over the long-term. The administration will ultimately need to establish clear performance-based guidelines for chip exports as Nvidia and competitors release new chips. Controlling the semiconductors most suitable for inference could become a more central point of a future U.S. export control strategy, particularly as Chinese companies incorporate models like DeepSeek’s into new real-world applications.

By promoting open-model development and more carefully tailored export restrictions, Washington can also advance American soft power. A stronger open model ecosystem in the United States, for example, could provide U.S. allies and partners with attractive and affordable alternatives to Chinese models, fostering innovation abroad and reinforcing U.S. global influence. By taking steps to share AI’s benefits, the United States can enhance its global image, even if this must be carefully balanced with security concerns. If it fails to address China’s growing soft-power lead quickly, however, the cost may be high: Chinese diffusion of cheap, powerful AI capabilities—and the global clout that will accompany it—could ultimately prove too hard to displace.

China’s Overlooked AI Strategy

Foreign Affairs · by More by Owen J. Daniels · July 25, 2025

Beijing Is Using Soft Power to Gain Global Dominance

July 25, 2025

A DeepSeek AI sign at the company’s office in Beijing, February 2025 Florence Lo / Reuters

OWEN J. DANIELS is Associate Director of Analysis and Andrew W. Marshall Fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

HANNA DOHMEN is a Senior Research Analyst at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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In early 2025, the Chinese company DeepSeek released its R1 artificial intelligence model, sending shock waves throughout policy circles in the United States. Despite U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors, the company had managed to develop a customizable open technology that could compete with some of the most advanced proprietary American AI models, and many feared that U.S. leadership in AI might soon be eclipsed. Now, another Chinese company, Moonshot AI, has released a state-of-the-art open model, Kimi K2, that is capable of autonomously achieving complex tasks, prompting some commentators to call it another DeepSeek moment.

But the threat posed by Chinese open models is not simply about China catching up to the United States in the AI race. It is also about the broader global adoption of AI. For the month of January 2025, the DeepSeek R1 app had 33 million active users across the world; by April, that number had nearly tripled to 97 million. Moreover, the CEO of the open-model repository Hugging Face noted that over 500 derivative versions of the original R1 model had been downloaded a combined total of 2.5 million times in January. In other words, derivative versions of R1, which are customized and tailored specifically from the original model to meet users’ needs, were downloaded five times as often as R1 itself, underscoring the value users saw in R1’s adaptability. Given this extraordinary interest, it has become clear that the low-cost, open-model approach favored by DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, and other Chinese companies could offer China an overwhelming advantage in meeting researcher demand for cutting-edge models, particularly in developing countries that are eager to access AI’s benefits.

The question of which country’s AI models achieve global preeminence has policy implications that extend beyond market competition or military applications. Open models such as R1 and Kimi K2 offer users around the world a chance to develop AI systems that can be customized for local needs, including in areas such as health care, education, and the workforce, at a lower cost than their American counterparts. In this sense, the greatest advantage open models could offer China may be in the realm of soft power. By enabling AI’s benefits to be broadly shared, Chinese open models could win international goodwill and position China as an AI benefactor to countries across the developing world, including in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Moreover, Chinese government policy has embraced open-innovation ecosystems; in the United States, where companies have primarily focused on closed AI models, government policies have emphasized maintaining security and minimizing the risk that other countries, particularly China, could adapt U.S. technologies for military or economic advantage.

If Washington’s new AI strategy does not adequately account for open models, American AI companies, despite their world-leading models, will risk ceding international AI influence to China. The larger danger is that the United States will lose strategic leverage in emerging technology diplomacy in key regions of the world. Whether the country’s leading producers of AI are perceived as sharing or guarding their technologies thus has crucial ramifications that policymakers need to recognize. In striving for global AI leadership, the United States must carefully balance the need to mitigate national security risks with the imperative to bring innovative U.S. technology to other parts of the world. At present, China’s soft-power push in AI is limited by its access to computing power. With a recalibrated strategy, the United States and American AI companies have a chance to promote their own attractive, open models and prevent China’s rise as the leading purveyor of AI to the world.

MOST FAVORED NATION

It is crucial to understand that part of DeepSeek’s global success stems from its particular approach to AI. As with several other Chinese labs, DeepSeek has focused on developing smaller, more efficient models than their American counterparts that are far cheaper to train and deploy. Generally speaking, the Chinese approach has been shaped by U.S.-led export controls on advanced semiconductors, cost efficiency goals, and a drive for viable, real-world AI applications as opposed to building the most powerful general-purpose models. Moreover, China’s open models lag only slightly behind leading closed models produced by U.S. companies such as OpenAI, and their performance could persuade many countries to begin using Chinese models as the foundations of their AI infrastructure. At the core of this approach is Beijing’s broader push to gain more soft-power influence, especially in the global South, by sharing and promoting China’s advanced technologies and infrastructure—a state policy goal that has been articulated by senior government officials and reinforced in large-scale Chinese initiatives. Speaking about DeepSeek in February, for example, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun made a point of stressing that China wants to share the benefits of open AI with other countries.

As it has been formulated in international relations theory, soft power is the ability to influence the preference of other actors through perceived shared values, cultural attractiveness, and persuasive ideas. Whereas hard power depends on military strength and the ability to credibly threaten the use of force to achieve strategic goals, soft power draws on such disparate sources as technology, education, and commerce to extend a country’s influence. Throughout and after the Cold War, for example, the global appeal of American culture and the U.S. economy prompted many countries to collaborate with Washington, creating trade and political interdependence among states and attracting highly skilled immigrants to the United States, who in turn helped fuel further U.S. technological breakthroughs.

Today, AI’s dual-use potential makes it a complicated asset in the soft-power portfolio. It is well documented that China and the United States are competing to develop game-changing, hard-power applications for AI, such as autonomous drones, advanced data integration, and command and control systems. In recent years, concerns about these security issues have had an outsize influence on Washington’s AI strategy. As U.S. companies introduced powerful generative AI models in late 2022, the Biden administration began to fear that China could find military applications for the new technology. As a result, its policies focused mostly on restricting access to the hardware needed to develop powerful AI models.

But that security focus has overshadowed AI’s extraordinary potential for transforming the global economy, workforce, health care, and society at large in beneficial ways—including in many developing countries. For example, if American AI models can be used to develop new cancer treatments or novel agricultural practices in countries with few resources, it would enhance the United States’ image and influence in a similar way to programs previously run by development and assistance agencies like USAID. It is precisely this potential for beneficial AI that Beijing is focused on developing and sharing—positioning itself to gain a powerful edge in global AI influence as a result.

The United States still has a chance to win the contest for global AI diffusion.

At the heart of AI’s role in the United States’ soft-power competition with China is the difference between open- and closed-model ecosystems. Open models such as DeepSeek’s R1 or Meta’s Llama family, one of the few existing big U.S. models to adopt this approach, feature open weights—the numerical parameters that determine the model’s predictions—that any user can adjust to tailor the model for a specific task. In contrast, the closed models used by most leading U.S. companies, including the models underlying OpenAI’s ChatGPT releases, require more computing resources to train, are closed off to users behind tightly controlled interfaces, and are generally more expensive to develop. Although closed models are usually more powerful, these attributes have made them in some ways less attractive to global AI developers than their open-model counterparts. Moreover, as DeepSeek’s R1 and Moonshot AI’s Kimi K2 have demonstrated, the performance gap between closed and open models appears to be shrinking.

Meanwhile, China’s government and some of its major firms are betting that open models—available for developers to access and adapt freely—can win over users and thus gain influence around the world. The release of R1 and Kimi K2 has already underscored the huge potential of China’s AI models. If successful, this strategy could entrench Chinese technology in global AI stacks, the digital infrastructure underlying AI, including the models, chips, and data centers.

Such a strategy may also cater to popular and consumer sentiment. Survey research suggests that the populations of developing countries are more optimistic about the economic and social benefits of AI than their counterparts in advanced countries. For instance, the 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer found that popular trust in AI was highest in China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Thailand, and the developing world generally; the proportion of Indians who indicated that they trusted AI—77 percent—was more than twice as large as the proportion of Americans who did. Similarly, in 2024, Google and Ipsos found that more than 70 percent of respondents in emerging markets such as Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates believed AI would positively affect work, learning, the treatment of disease, and information access, compared with around 50 percent of respondents who believed so in the United States.

Seeking to capitalize on this AI optimism, Beijing has embraced openness as a selling point. In May 2025, at an AI capacity-building conference in China, Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu emphasized the key advantages of Chinese AI models—open source, low cost, and high performance. Leveraging their models’ adaptability, China’s open-model developers could thus position China as a primary technological partner for countries that are looking to make a major AI push but that do not have the financial or computational resources to develop their own powerful models from scratch. For example, a local health department in a developing country might fine-tune an open model by retraining it on data sets of local disease statistics in remote regions to provide better medical services. This kind of deep customization is generally not possible with closed models.

DIGITAL EMPIRE

China’s soft-power AI push is not happening in a vacuum. It should be understood as part of Beijing’s broader effort to promote domestic self-sufficiency and expand its digital influence abroad. Since the 2010s, Beijing policy documents, including the AI Development Plan, announced in 2017, and the 14th Five-Year Plan, released in 2021, have underscored the Chinese government’s desire to leverage open-source technologies to push domestic innovation and reduce China’s reliance on the West. China’s promotion of its open AI models fits in lockstep with its aim of serving as the developing world’s leading provider of digital infrastructure through, for instance, the Digital Silk Road initiative. Over the last decade, Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in digital infrastructure projects globally, including telecom networks, undersea cables, and surveillance equipment. Now, Alibaba Cloud and Huawei Cloud are ramping up overseas data center development for cloud computing in countries such as Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand. These investments provide a strong foundation to help China deploy its AI applications around the world, particularly if it can access more high-end chips in the future than it has been able to under recent U.S. export controls.

Already, China is taking steps to solidify its global influence over the AI sector. Since 2023, Beijing has led a multilateral effort called the Global AI Governance Initiative to create responsible AI development and regulation. Although the initiative has rightfully trumpeted the importance of including developing countries in AI policy formulation, it is also light on specifics and emphasizes China’s willingness to develop others’ infrastructure. Some global AI industry leaders are concerned that Chinese open generative models could spread Chinese Communist Party propaganda to users by censoring or distorting information on Chinese history, global politics, and human rights issues.

The rapid advances of Chinese open models suggest that existing U.S. policy assumptions and private-sector AI strategy need to evolve. By prioritizing closed models, many U.S. firms have made a bet on AI as an exclusive product. At the same time, some U.S. firms appear to be giving more emphasis to cutting-edge innovation, including the goal of creating artificial general intelligence, than to developing reliable applications for existing generative models. Meanwhile, Chinese application developers are already exploring practical uses for DeepSeek’s and Alibaba’s models in automobiles, home appliances, health care, and other areas. Success in these applications is not guaranteed, but China’s push for finding practical uses for powerful AI models is notable.

To a degree, U.S. firms have begun to respond. In the aftermath of the DeepSeek R1 release, Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, admitted that he felt the company was “on the wrong side of history” and would be rethinking its open-source strategy. Shortly thereafter, OpenAI announced it would be releasing an open-source model, which is expected in the late summer of 2025. Google, too, has since released a family of open-source models called Gemma, although its performance lags significantly behind the company’s closed models. What’s more, in June 2025, OpenAI dropped the price of its o3 model by 80 percent to make it more accessible to developers, researchers, and startups—and likely to be more competitive with some of the Chinese models.

OPEN OPPORTUNITY

The United States still has a chance to win the contest for global AI diffusion. China’s bid to become AI’s leading distributor already faces several hurdles. By preventing China from obtaining the tools needed to fabricate advanced chips for AI and by blocking Chinese firms’ access to U.S.-designed AI chips, American-led export controls likely will hinder China’s ability to spread its models widely. Moreover, demand for the chips needed for model inference—the deployment and use of trained models—will likely further outpace supply as inference-hungry models become widely integrated into applications.

These limits present a narrow window for the United States to offer better alternatives, but it must act quickly. Promoting the growth of an open-model AI ecosystem should be a first order priority for U.S. policymakers. The Trump administration’s newly released AI Action Plan appears to recognize the geostrategic significance of open models, recommending that “We need to ensure America has leading open models founded on American values.” Meta is the leading U.S. open-model player, but others exist, and OpenAI’s plans for its own powerful open model reflect an emerging trend. U.S. policymakers should further encourage this shift by encouraging collaboration between model developers and research institutions and helping provide additional resources to researchers and educators. Moreover, the U.S. government should offer more support to American AI researchers through programs such as the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource, which allows small and underresourced open-model developers to better compete with larger tech developers. The AI Action plan nods toward these solutions, but they will require further fleshing out in the months ahead. A more diverse AI ecosystem would broaden the base for potential innovations that could benefit society and the economy.

At the same time, the United States should recalibrate its AI export control strategy. The recent successes of DeepSeek and Moonshot AI show that export controls cannot prevent Chinese companies from producing advanced open models. Nevertheless, the increasing importance of inference-based computing underscores the need for the United States to realign its export controls with the current direction of AI development. The controversy surrounding the Trump administration’s decision in mid-July to resume exports of Nvidia’s H20—a chip suitable for inference—underscores the need for a recalibration of the strategy. Washington’s reversal appears to have been more a concession aimed at trade negotiations with Beijing than a strategic pivot toward loosening advanced chip restrictions over the long-term. The administration will ultimately need to establish clear performance-based guidelines for chip exports as Nvidia and competitors release new chips. Controlling the semiconductors most suitable for inference could become a more central point of a future U.S. export control strategy, particularly as Chinese companies incorporate models like DeepSeek’s into new real-world applications.

By promoting open-model development and more carefully tailored export restrictions, Washington can also advance American soft power. A stronger open model ecosystem in the United States, for example, could provide U.S. allies and partners with attractive and affordable alternatives to Chinese models, fostering innovation abroad and reinforcing U.S. global influence. By taking steps to share AI’s benefits, the United States can enhance its global image, even if this must be carefully balanced with security concerns. If it fails to address China’s growing soft-power lead quickly, however, the cost may be high: Chinese diffusion of cheap, powerful AI capabilities—and the global clout that will accompany it—could ultimately prove too hard to displace.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Owen J. Daniels · July 25, 2025

13. ‘Innovation Corps’ tech execs are in training, but don’t have assignments yet

‘Innovation Corps’ tech execs are in training, but don’t have assignments yet

The Army is touting the program, but still has few details on how it will actually work.

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

July 24, 2025 04:07 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

Four of the Army’s newest Reserve lieutenant colonels are a few weeks out from finishing training, after which they’ll put on the uniform for one weekend a month and dedicate their time to advising the Army on “rapid and scalable tech solutions to complex problems,” according to a June news release.

In theory, anyway.

Though four recently commissioned Silicon Valley leaders are set to graduate from Fort Benning’s direct commission course and join Detachment 201, the Executive Innovation Corps, an Army official told Defense One, there is little detail available about what they'll be working on or how they’ll be expected to conduct themselves while they represent the Army.

“There isn’t an answer yet,” the official said when asked which projects members will work on.

The first round of detachment members include Shyam Shankar, Palantir’s chief technology officer; Andrew Bosworth, Meta’s CTO; Kevin Weil, OpenAI’s chief product officer; and Bob McGrew, an advisor at Thinking Machines Lab and OpenAI’s former chief research officer.

They’ve joined the Army as Individual Mobilization Augmentees, which means they go through a four-week training and they go active one weekend a month, but they don’t report to a specific unit on a local post like other reservists.

“The overall objective of the IMA program is to facilitate the rapid expansion of the Active Army wartime structure of the department of defense and/or other departments or agencies of the U.S. government to meet military manpower requirements in the event of military contingency, pre-mobilization, mobilization, sustainment, and / or demobilization operations,” according to the service’s website.

In this case, the innovation corps tapped leaders from companies the Defense Department has contracted with in the past.

“They're not making acquisition decisions. They're not senior decision-makers, they're not senior leaders—they're lieutenant colonels,” Army spokesman Steve Warren said last month. “It's not in our interest to show any favoritism to a company—that would be the exact opposite of what we're trying to do, right? What we want is competition. What we want is the best to emerge. That's what we're looking for. These guys will help us think about that.”

The service’s lawyers will hammer out what’s a conflict of interest, Warren said.

Once projects are assigned, the official said, members of the detachment will individually figure out what their work days will look like and how they’ll be supervised.

IMAs are required to adhere to Army height-weight standards, pass a physical fitness exam, and complete required annual training.

The original four members could soon be joined by more recruits, as the applications come in from the public website.

But specifics about how many applications have come in and how many civilians are under consideration to join the innovation corps aren’t available, the official said.

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

14. Meet the ‘cobots’ that could lower the cost of building submarines

I grew up watching Electric Boat in Groton as my father worked there. I recall going to the submarine launches in the 1960s. I had these cool submarine photos hangin on my wall as a kid. But after numerous school visits to the submarine base in New London, I knew I could not live on a submarine and that Is why I joined the Army.

Meet the ‘cobots’ that could lower the cost of building submarines

A rare peek at Electric Boat’s production line finds robots cutting steel—and even welding.

By Lauren C. Williams

Senior Editor

July 24, 2025 11:39 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

NORTH KINGSTOWN, R.I.—Could “collaborative robots” get Navy submarine projects back on cost and schedule? General Dynamics Electric Boat is seeing results using programmable devices that cut and weld steel.

“You’re about to see a show!” a supervisor said, shouting over a soundtrack of whirs and clanging on a manufacturing floor almost the width of a football field.

Moments later, bright white sparks flew overhead. A white-and-black robotic arm, assisted by a team of welders, began cutting steel for a module for a Virginia-class attack submarine.

It’s a big, time-consuming task. But using robotics can speed up the process of cutting and joining steel.

“Big welds take a lot of energy,” said Raymond Gabriel, the vice president of strategic operations for Electric Boat, who led reporters through the Quonset Point facility as part of a tour arranged by Rhode Island’s Commerce Department.

The shipbuilder has been using collaborative robots, or cobots, for cutting since 2023. Welding cobots were implemented in 2024. Cobots are designed to work alongside humans.

“Every robot has a human that is operating it,” whether it's a scan or a weld, Gabriel said.

The Quonset Point facility is where submarines get their start. Electric Boat is exploring more automation in early fabrication, but doesn’t expect robots to build submarines on their own. Welders still do things by hand but use cobots largely to cut and bevel large plates of curved steel. Some welds have to be ground by hand to meet specifications, Gabriel said.

The young welders “love it,” Gabriel said, because they can program the cobots and “go.” Plus, using them is safer and can save hundreds of labor hours.

The results are “night and day,” according to a facility director of outfitting, who said an entire outfitting process for the new Columbia class of ballistic missile submarines dropped to 65 days from 180 days after adopting cobots.

Electric Boat brings in about 50 to 100 welders a month and the facility is currently working to speed up production, Gabriel said. The company has about 24,000 employees across its locations in Rhode Island and Connecticut with about 6,800 in Quonset Point. Earlier this year, the company vowed to hire more than 3,000 workers at both locations, the Providence Journal reported. The company’s annual attrition rate is around 10 percent.

The Navy’s submarine-construction efforts—and naval shipbuilding in general—have fallen behind cost and schedule estimates in recent years, thanks to a confluence of a skilled workforce shortage, pay challenges, an anemic supply chain, and increased production demands. For example, the first Columbia-class sub is at least a year behind schedule, according to a Government Accountability Office report published in April, and is now slated to arrive in 2029, USNI News reported.

The White House has also increased its focus on shipbuilding, with a proposed $20.8 billion in the Pentagon’s 2026 budget request and $26.5 billion in budget reconciliation funds.

Navy Secretary John Phelan recently called on shipbuilders to use new tech, including robotics and automation, to help boost workers’ training.

“A lot of people are afraid of automation and robotics. I think it just enhances and makes the workers' jobs easier. I've seen that at a number of yards. It's not to replace jobs, it's to make [them] more efficient,” he said.

But robots alone aren’t going to erase delays. Besides waiting for parts or components from suppliers, shipyard space is the biggest challenge. The company has made several real estate purchases this year in Connecticut, including a former Macy’s department store that will eventually support engineering, training, and laboratory work.

“There’s an increasing demand for submarines, so we are always looking at ways to maximize the use of our space on the water,” said Myra Lee, Electric Boat’s spokesperson. For example, the company is looking for off-site warehousing so inventory doesn’t have to be held at the waterfront facility.

At Quonset Point, the company is using every bit of available space to meet demand.

“You start to get jammed up,” Gabriel said. Plates of curved steel standby waiting to be welded and shaped for missile-tube cylinders.

But that’s on purpose so there’s always something to do, he said.

“It’s like Noah’s Ark,” he said, “There should be two of everything” as parts and components of multiple boats are worked on simultaneously in a space.

There’s a lot of steel throughout the 400-acre facility— some pieces that can fit in your palm, and others that require massive cranes and lifts to maneuver. That means there’s a lot of cutting and welding—thousands of connections—to get things just right.

Production takes longer at the final outfitting stage, where wires and tubing are integrated into the submarine's structure. Delays that occur earlier in the process, such as getting parts from suppliers, affect those last stages before final assembly. Modules are turned horizontally, into the position the ship will be in. This is also where physical space is the most valuable—and quickly disappears.

Reporters got to see that space challenge in action as a module was carefully turned around on a transporter so it could be attached to a supermodule. Once complete, that supermodule will be loaded onto a barge and shipped to Electric Boat’s facility in Groton, Conn., for final assembly.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

15. The Real Meaning of Putin’s Middle East Failure

Excerpts:

Putin’s decisions not to help Russia’s partners in the Middle East should also send a message to leaders in Beijing about Russia’s value as an ally in the event of war between China and the United States over Taiwan.

If its refusal to support the Iranian regime in its time of greatest vulnerability is any indication, Russia will offer little help to Beijing should it face its own moment of need. Likewise, Moscow’s abandonment of the Assad regime suggests that the Russian armed forces would not join a war against the United States. If a conflict in Asia were to occur, Putin’s support would be limited to continuing to supply China with oil and gas. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi bluntly stated during a meeting with European leaders, Russia will remain valuable to China so long as it continues to fight in Ukraine, thereby diverting U.S. resources and attention away from Asia. But it cannot be counted on for anything more.

The Trump administration should draw the same conclusion. In the administration’s first months, some analysts argued that the United States needed to peel Russia away from China to help contain Beijing —a “reverse Kissinger” policy. Such a move would have been a bad mistake then, and would be even worse today. Putin has shown Russia to be unreliable even to dictatorships with long-standing relations with Moscow. It would be an even less effective partner for Washington against China. Putin would provide the United States and the democratic world the same resources that he provided the theocrats in Tehran: nothing. So whatever approach Trump ultimately decides to take with Putin, he should set aside the goal of trying to peel Moscow away from Beijing.

The initial success of Moscow’s Middle East strategy once suggested that Russia could be a valuable geopolitical partner. That it eventually failed so completely should dissuade Trump and others from courting its architect.

The Real Meaning of Putin’s Middle East Failure

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael McFaul · July 25, 2025

Russia’s Allies in the Region Couldn’t Count on Moscow—and Neither Should China

July 25, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow, June 2025 Alexander Kazakov / Reuters

MICHAEL MCFAUL is Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute, Professor of Political Science, and a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University. From 2012 to 2014, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia. He is the author of the forthcoming book Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder.

ABBAS MILANI is Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author of Simorgh: Portraits on my Mind.

• More by Abbas Milani

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Just a few years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin seemed to have reasserted Moscow’s influence in the Middle East after decades in which it had waned. As Putin deepened ties with longstanding Russian allies Iran and Syria while nurturing more cordial relationships with Israel and the Arab monarchies, his pragmatic realism seemed to represent a more comfortable alternative to what many countries in the region perceived as the United States’ naïve and destabilizing commitment to promoting democracy.

This strategy allowed Russia to become an important counterweight to the United States in the region, but it also paid dividends closer to home. Leaders in the Middle East were notably quiet in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not even Israel, a close U.S. ally, criticized Russia, let alone took part in sanctioning it.

But over the past 20 months, Russia’s standing in the Middle East has cratered. Israel’s response to Hamas’s October 7 attacks has devastated the so-called axis of resistance, the Iranian-backed network with which Russia had forged close ties. The Assad regime in Syria, long a valuable Russian client, collapsed spectacularly. U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities severely weakened Russia’s most important regional ally. As a result, Russia’s reputation as a patron and guarantor of security in the region lies in tatters. In the new Middle East now taking shape, Moscow is no longer needed.

Moscow’s failures will resound beyond the Middle East. Whether the result of Putin’s conscious decision not to intervene or of the Kremlin’s inability to do so, Russia’s abandonment of partners in the region should be a sobering lesson for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party: that in times of crisis, Russia will not be a reliable ally.

For the United States, Russia’s declining influence in the Middle East should also prompt further reflection. For years, policymakers and scholars have debated the strength of the Russian-Chinese bond and whether it made sense to try to drive a wedge between them or encourage their codependence while raising the costs and risks it poses to both countries. But Moscow’s recent setbacks in the Middle East have clarified a basic fact obscured by Chinese and Russian talk of a special relationship. Russia is a fair-weather friend. In the event of a U.S.-Chinese conflict—for example, a fight over Taiwan—Washington can expect Moscow to remain on the sidelines, just as it did its partners in the Middle East.

THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS

After the Soviet Union collapsed, in 1991, Russia ceased to be a major international actor, including in the Middle East. Focused instead on integrating a democratizing Russia into the West, Russian President Boris Yeltsin aspired to join Western institutions such as the G7, the World Trade Organization, and NATO, devoting little effort or resources to maintaining Soviet-era relationships with autocratic adversaries of the United States, such as Iran and Syria. A decade of economic depression further prevented Russia from engaging countries in the region.

Putin, who won the presidency in 2000, gradually ended Moscow’s neglect of the Middle East. After the 9/11 attacks, he quickly embraced U.S. President George W. Bush’s “global war on terror.” To assist the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, Russia helped the United States open military bases in what Putin considered his sphere of influence, the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Even as Putin broke with Bush over the invasion of Iraq in 2003 because of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s close ties with Russia, the Russian president continued to work with Washington in the Middle East on issues of mutual interest, most important among them a joint effort to deny Iran a nuclear weapon. In 2010, Russia voted alongside the United States on UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed what were at the time the most comprehensive multilateral sanctions against Tehran. Five years later, Russia joined the United States, along with China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union in signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Throughout this period, Russia also cooperated with the United States to fight various terrorist organizations in the region, some of which had close ties with jihadis inside Russia.

The Arab Spring, in 2011, proved to be a turning point for Putin’s Middle East policy. As leaders in the United States and Europe celebrated the fall of dictatorships in the region, Putin, Russia’s prime minister at the time, took a different view of the protests. In meetings with Western leaders, including U.S. President Barack Obama, he warned that the breakdown of autocracy in the Arab world would spark civil wars, empower extremists, and embolden terrorists. He even publicly criticized his protégé, President Dmitry Medvedev, for abstaining from a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi’s army, then threatening to commit mass atrocities in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city. Putin lambasted the resolution as “defective and flawed,” saying that it “[allowed] everything” and “[resembled] medieval calls for crusades.”

Putin’s worries about stability resonated with monarchs in the Middle East.

That year, another mass movement against autocracy erupted—in Russia. In December 2011, hundreds of thousands of Russians took to the streets to protest a falsified parliamentary election. Just as he had accused Washington of fomenting revolutions against dictatorships in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, Putin blamed the United States for the demonstrations against his regime. Threats to his rule at home, which Putin genuinely believed were supported by the Obama administration, led the Russian leader to turn away from cooperation with the United States, with significant implications for Russian foreign policy in the Middle East.

Putin’s worries about stability resonated with monarchs in the Middle East, who agreed that regime change in the region would bring to power radical jihadis. Saudi Arabia even intervened militarily in Bahrain to quell antigovernment protests. Putin used the moment to deepen ties with Israel and the Arab monarchies, at a time when their relations with the United States were strained because of U.S. support for political change in the Arab world and perceived rapprochement with Iran. Putin also cultivated a closer relationship with autocratic Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi after he seized power through a coup, in 2013. In addition, Russia filled the void left by the American disengagement in Libya, providing rhetorical and financial support for Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the powerful warlord who now controls the eastern part of the country. And when many Western leaders denounced Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after the 2018 assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, a writer who was critical of the Saudi regime, Putin publicly embraced the Saudi ruler.

During this period, Putin also nurtured his personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who also feared state breakdown and the rise of Islamist governments and movements in the Arab world. So too, did many conservative Jews who had emigrated from the former Soviet Union to Israel, with whom Russian media channels engaged directly. For them, Putin was a respected, pragmatic leader supporting stability in their neighborhood.

After he won a third term as president in 2012, Putin’s heightened hostility toward the United States as the source of regional and global instability found a particularly sympathetic ear in Iran’s theocratic dictator, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Since becoming supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei had moved methodically the regime’s foreign policy toward Russia and China. As Iranian proxy Hezbollah fought alongside Russia’s air force to support Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in a brutal civil war, Tehran and Moscow grew still closer. Hamas, which initially took a critical position of Assad regime, ultimately aligned with Iran and Russia. For their part, Putin and the Kremlin never labeled Hamas as a terrorist group, describing them instead as a national liberation movement akin to groups in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and southern Africa that the Soviet Union had supported during the Cold War. That Putin could simultaneously pursue relationships with Israel and Hamas was remarkable, a testament to his successful diplomacy in the Middle East at the time.

A FRIEND TO ALL AUTOCRATS

Putin’s push to expand Russia’s influence in the Middle East initially yielded results. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran provided thousands of deadly Shahed drones to support the effort. Arab monarchies have abstained from UN votes criticizing Russia for the invasion and have not joined the international sanctions coalition. In October 2022, Putin and MBS signed an agreement to reduce oil exports, thereby increasing oil prices and funding Russia’s war machine.Even Israel split with most of the democratic world in refraining from criticizing the invasion, voting against a United Nations resolution that condemned Russia’s aggression.

When Assad’s regime in Syria was faltering in 2015, Putin’s deployment of the Russian air force to support Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah ground forces bought the Syrian dictator another nine years in power. In exchange for this support, Assad gave Russia continued access to the Tartus naval base and the Khmeimim Air Base (near Latakia), which enhanced Russia’s maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea, and served as a durable symbol of Russia’s military presence in the Arab Middle East.

Putin’s military intervention in Syria buoyed Russia’s image as a decisive and reliable partner. Unlike the United States, Russia never chastised the region’s autocrats with speeches about democracy and human rights. And Moscow also kept the weapons flowing. In the years after the Arab Spring, Russian arms exports to the Middle East increased, including to Sisi’s Egypt, but also to Turkey, a NATO ally that nonetheless agreed to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense system.

EVERYTHING EVERYWHERE ALL AT ONCE

After Hamas launched its attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, however, Putin’s strategy began to unravel. Israel launched major military operations in response, first against Hamas in Gaza and then against Hezbollah in Lebanon, devastating both groups’ leadership and command structures. Putin tried to avoid taking a side in the conflict, instead offering to mediate between Hamas and Israel, a gesture that neither Netanyahu nor Israeli society was willing to entertain. But he also offered no significant assistance to Hamas or Hezbollah.

Then, in December 2024, the Assad regime collapsed. Russia’s decades-long investment in supporting the dictatorship crumbled in the span of days. Putin gave Assad and his family asylum in Russia but did nothing to repel rebel forces as they took Damascus. His failure to intervene reverberated throughout the region. Hezbollah was further weakened. Media outlets aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran publicly complained about Russia’s inability to save their mutual partner.

Russia suffered an even more serious reputational blow in the Middle East when Israeli and U.S. armed forces bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities in June. Just days after the U.S. attack on the Fordow site, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi flew to Moscow seeking support. Putin offered his trademark rhetorical condemnation of the United States but provided no new military aid to Russia’s most stalwart ally in the Middle East, despite Iran’s continued willingness to provide direct military assistance for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Internally, Khamenei and his regime are today weaker than ever, but Putin has offered little to bolster the supreme leader’s position.

FEAR AND LOATHING

Leaders and societies in the Middle East have taken note of Russia’s inaction and indifference in the region. The reaction inside Iran has been particularly pronounced. Khamenei has always been loyal to Moscow, but with his position now weakened, criticism of his embrace of Russia is growing louder. Iranian commentators, once careful and circumspect about questioning Tehran’s relationship with Moscow, now openly lambaste Putin for refusing to include a mutual defense clause in the Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed by Tehran and Moscow in January (similar Russian agreements with Belarus and North Korea contain such clauses). Other voices, including former Iranian Parliament Deputy Speaker Ali Motahari, have criticized Russian delays in providing Iran the S-400 missile defense system that could have helped defend against the Israeli strikes. After the Israeli and U.S. strikes, a lead editorial in an influential newspaper founded by three clerics (including Khamenei) decades ago chastised leaders who steered Iran toward closer ties to Moscow—an unmistakable reference to Khamenei.

So dismayed were some even within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, often assumed to be a bastion of pro-Russian sympathies, that when Putin offered to mediate between Iran and the United States, a newspaper aligned with the IRGC suggested that the Russian president was really attempting to use Iran to get a better deal with the United States, supporting constraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for U.S. concessions on Ukraine. Commentators on Iranian social media sites now openly discuss the history of Russia’s colonial ambitions in Iran in the tsarist and Soviet eras. The voices of pro-democratic opposition memberslong critical of deepening ties with autocratic Russia have now gained new resonance, both inside Iran and in the diaspora.

Israeli attitudes toward Russia have changed, as well. Neither Netanyahu nor Israeli society appears interested in Putin’s mediating services with Iran. When ties between the United States and Israel have been strained, Netanyahu has leaned toward Moscow. But with Trump back in the White House, Netanyahu’s imperative to remain close to Putin and a weakened Russia has waned.

The official Saudi reaction to Russia’s inaction has been muted. Behind closed doors, MBS is pleased that Iran’s nuclear program has been set back, and that Tehran’s military—especially its missile arsenal—has proved so incapable of inflicting severe damage on Israel or the U.S. military base in Qatar. Putin’s inability or indifference to influence events through either diplomacy or military assistance in the region should compel MBS to rethink his carefully calibrated courtship of the United States, China, and Russia. Before the Israeli strikes, Saudi Arabia and Russia had already clashed over increasing oil output. Riyadh triumphed, and OPEC+ is set to up production in August, to the delight of Washington and the frustration of Moscow.

YOU CAN’T COUNT ON ME

Putin’s decisions not to help Russia’s partners in the Middle East should also send a message to leaders in Beijing about Russia’s value as an ally in the event of war between China and the United States over Taiwan.

If its refusal to support the Iranian regime in its time of greatest vulnerability is any indication, Russia will offer little help to Beijing should it face its own moment of need. Likewise, Moscow’s abandonment of the Assad regime suggests that the Russian armed forces would not join a war against the United States. If a conflict in Asia were to occur, Putin’s support would be limited to continuing to supply China with oil and gas. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi bluntly stated during a meeting with European leaders, Russia will remain valuable to China so long as it continues to fight in Ukraine, thereby diverting U.S. resources and attention away from Asia. But it cannot be counted on for anything more.

The Trump administration should draw the same conclusion. In the administration’s first months, some analysts argued that the United States needed to peel Russia away from China to help contain Beijing —a “reverse Kissinger” policy. Such a move would have been a bad mistake then, and would be even worse today. Putin has shown Russia to be unreliable even to dictatorships with long-standing relations with Moscow. It would be an even less effective partner for Washington against China. Putin would provide the United States and the democratic world the same resources that he provided the theocrats in Tehran: nothing. So whatever approach Trump ultimately decides to take with Putin, he should set aside the goal of trying to peel Moscow away from Beijing.

The initial success of Moscow’s Middle East strategy once suggested that Russia could be a valuable geopolitical partner. That it eventually failed so completely should dissuade Trump and others from courting its architect.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Michael McFaul · July 25, 2025

16. The Coming Pax Geriatrica – Aging Societies and Depopulation Will Lead to Fewer Wars

I am reminded of Narman Angell and the Grand Illusion. Is this another theory along the line's of Angell's that said the economic interconnectedness and interdependence would prevent war?

At least the author has a caveat in his conclusion (but demographics will always matter):

Population aging will not completely eradicate war, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates. But it will reduce the ability of governments to fight or widespread support for them. All aging states, regardless of their revisionist ambitions or reliance on military aggression, will have no choice but to face squarely the effects of this demographic revolution. Demography goes a long way in determining the economically and militarily possible. Aging, then, is likely to become a powerful force for peace that has never before existed.

The Coming Pax Geriatrica

Foreign Affairs · by More by Mark L. Haas · July 24, 2025

Aging Societies and Depopulation Will Lead to Fewer Wars

Mark L. Haas

July 24, 2025

Riding bikes in Shanghai, September 2024 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

MARK L. HAAS is Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University. He is the author of The Geriatric Peace: Population Aging and the Decline of War, from which this essay is adapted.

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The vast majority of the world’s countries are experiencing a demographic revolution: dramatic, sustained, and likely irreversible population aging. A combination of low fertility levels and high life expectancies has led to a significant increase in the percentage of people 65 and older and with it, a steady rise in the median age of their populations. In 1950, around five percent of the world’s population was 65 or older. By 2021, that number had nearly doubled. Even if fertility rates stop declining and remain where they were in 2022—an unlikely development—the United Nations forecasts that by 2050 that percentage will have more than tripled. Many of these states are not just aging; they are becoming smaller as a result. More than 40 countries have shrinking populations because of low fertility levels. By 2050, nearly 90 countries will have fewer citizens at the end of each year than they did at the beginning

As many analysts have pointed out, the aging of a population slows economic growth and necessitates new and greater public spending on the welfare of elderly citizens. But it also has an important unrecognized international benefit: aging significantly reduces the likelihood of war between states. The twenty-first century, widely predicted to be an “age of depopulation,” may also turn out to be a more peaceful one.

The idea that international conflict will in future decades ebb may appear counterintuitive, given the large number of wars in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East during the first quarter of the century. But as countries grow older, governments will be forced to attend to their aging populations and contend with a shrinking pool of resources. All the while, as leaders and citizens age, studies indicate that they will be more likely to express a preference for peace. These factors will combine to create societies less capable and tolerant of waging war.

Although there are certainly exceptions, the tendency to fight wars, in other words, is stronger in countries with younger populations. The coming wave of old and shrinking populations will fundamentally reshape geopolitics. In at least one way, that transformation will be for the better.

WORLD AT WAR?

In 2023, Emma Beals and Peter Salisbury wrote in Foreign Affairs about the “global explosion of violent conflict” since 2012. Indeed, according to data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the number of state-led military conflicts nearly doubled in the decade between 2012 and 2022.

But these statistics fail to show that interstate violence is largely restricted to demographically young countries. In every year from 2012 to 2023, the average percentage of people ages 65 and older for all of the principal states initiating violent conflict stood at five, roughly half the average of that of all the countries in the world in 2024.

Demographically older states have thus already demonstrated a reduced tendency to engage in violent conflict. Statistical analyses show that these countries are significantly less likely to initiate military hostilities than are younger ones. What appears to be a universal trend toward war is in reality predominantly powered by the aggressiveness of demographically youthful states.This could help explain the high prevalence of war and conflict across the African continent, which has some of the youngest populations in the world.

MAKE LESS, NOT WAR

A central way that an aging population reduces resources potentially available for war is by significantly slowing economic growth. By shrinking the number of workers in a society, slowing productivity, and reducing domestic consumption, aging makes countries less economically dynamic—and less capable of funding wars.

Reductions in working-age populations (defined as people between the ages of 15 and 64) will transform the composition of societies across the globe. Europe’s working-age population will shrink by roughly 17 percent by 2050 from 2020 levels; East Asia’s will shrink by 24 percent. Between 2020 and 2050, Japan’s working-age population is expected to shrink by 28 percent, China’s by 23 percent, Russia’s by 19 percent, and Germany’s by 17 percent.

Population aging hinders productivity growth by increasing the median age of the labor force. An old workforce is a less productive one. People tend to be most productive in their 40s, when they have more knowledge, experience, and resources than younger workers and more energy and better health than older workers. People in this age cohort are also more willing than older individuals to acquire new skills and knowledge, to engage in high-risk but high-reward ventures, and to relocate for job opportunities. As many cross-national studies have found, the size of this cohort relative to older and younger workers is a key determinant of countries’ overall productivity growth. When the share of 40-to-49-year-olds rises, overall productivity gets a boost. When it falls, overall productivity suffers.

This is bad news for the economic prospects of aging countries. Among workers, the share of 40-to-49-year-olds relative to 30-to-39-year-olds and those 50 and older will plummet in many countries over the course of the twenty-first century. In Russia, this crucial share for productivity growth will shrink by ten percent from 2020 to 2050; in Japan by 15 percent; and in China by 18 percent.

An old workforce is a less productive one.

A major technological advance, such as the widespread adoption of artificial intelligence, could potentially help reverse these trends. But even the AI revolution is not guaranteed to arrest the economic slowdown. Japan’s so-called Lost Decade illustrates this point. The information technology boom of the mid-1990s gave some countries a major productivity gain, one that was similar in scale to what some economists predict for the AI revolution. Yet Japan was not among the beneficiaries. Its total factor productivity, a measure of the economic value of innovation and technological advancement, grew by only one percent from 1995 to 2005, one-quarter as much as it did in the preceding decade. The acceleration of Japan’s aging crisis during this period was central to this slowing productivity growth. Compared to the number of people ages 30 to 39 and 50 to 64, Japan’s highly productive 40-to-49-year-old cohort peaked in 1991, then plummeted by 29 percent between 1995 and 2005. The information technology revolution thus may have helped Japan’s productivity tread water in the face of rapid population aging, but because the country’s workforce lacked the optimal age structure, the IT boom did not result in a significant increase in overall economic dynamism. There is reason to expect that countries with similarly aging populations will face comparable problems in the AI revolution.

Population aging will hinder economic expansion on the demand side, as well. Robust domestic consumption accounts for roughly two-thirds of economic activity in most high-income countries. The problem for aging states is that the size of the population that tends to spend the most (people in or close to their 40s) is shrinking, while the proportion of the population that tends to spend significantly less (those 65 years and older) is ballooning.

Weak consumption due to the effects of aging has, for example, contributed to China’s slumping housing market. The cohort most likely to purchase homes (people around 30 years of age) has plummeted by 30 percent since 2020. As a result, demand has crashed, straining household wealth, the government’s ability to finance itself through taxation, and China’s economy at large.

Slowdowns in economic growth will likely lead to disputes over increasingly scarce resources in aging countries. But they will also reduce the ability of those countries to engage in war with another country. According to the economists Mark Harrison and Nikolaus Wolf, the number of militarized disputes that states have initiated has historically risen apace with GDP and GDP per capita expansion. As a country’s economic power increases, the relative cost of its achieving its international goals decreases. Consequently, as the economic power of a state grows, it may be more willing to seek costly change, even by waging war. If increased growth tends to make state aggression more likely, lower growth caused by aging will tend to make such aggression less likely.

GUNS OR CANES?

As the number of seniors skyrockets, government obligations for the welfare of the elderly, chiefly pensions and health care, have ballooned. Analysts predict that many developed countries’ public spending on pensions, health care, and long-term care for the elderly is on track to hit roughly 25 percent of GDP by 2050. These trends are already affecting aging democracies with deep social safety nets and historically less generous authoritarian regimes alike. In 2009, China spent 4.4 percent of its GDP on pensions and health care. This figure grew to 8 percent in 2020 and is projected to climb to over ten percent in 2030 and to roughly 20 percent in 2050.

Governments spend billions to deal with not only with the consequences of aging populations but also with their causes. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s member states spend an average of 2.3 percent of GDP on child and family programs, many of which are designed to boost fertility (although few meaningfully do so).

The rapid-aging demographics are also indirectly responsible for government spending on domestic security and welfare programs for the non-elderly because they powerfully contribute to many of the key sources of rising discontent in the developed world, including slowing economic growth, austerity, and growing ethnic and anti-immigrant tensions, as dominant groups fear their demographic demise. In response to rising unrest, many governments attempt to repress disgruntled groups or appease them through social programs. China, for example, quadrupled its spending on policing and domestic surveillance between 2007 and 2020; by 2020, these expenditures exceeded military spending. Japan’s spending on labor and employment support, poverty relief, and social protection (excluding old age and health-care spending) increased from 0.5 to 3.7 percent of GDP between 1990 and 2020.

As countries spend more to address the causes and consequences of aging, other spending, including on the military, will likely be crowded out as budgets come under increasing strain. Although governments need not necessarily cut military expenditures to help pay for rising elderly welfare costs, they will have strong incentives to do so. Although military spending can increase economic growth by employing underutilized labor, stimulating aggregate demand, and funding research that ultimately helps civilian industries, as research by J. Paul Dunne and Nan Tian has shown, it is more likely to harm long-run growth by reducing expenditures on more productive investments and by contributing to higher levels of debt. Coupled with slow economic growth rates and tight budgetary constraints created by high levels of elderly welfare expenditures, military spending may emerge as an attractive pool of resources to reallocate.

Statistical analysis of democratic and authoritarian countries indicates that once government spending on social welfare, including for the elderly, crosses 25 percent as a proportion of a country’s budget, the likelihood that the country will initiate a militarized dispute declines significantly. Many aged countries are either on the verge of or have already crossed this threshold. Spending on old age, unemployment, and income maintenance (and related expenditures) as a share of general government spending averaged nearly 21 percent in OECD countries in 2021. Given that these expenditures will only grow, these countries will have strong budgetary incentives to avoid initiating military hostilities.

A FEW GOOD MEN

A final way in which aging will make the world more peaceful is by shrinking the size of the prime military-age cohort. In 2050, East Asia will have nearly 48 million fewer 18- to 23-year-olds than in 2020, a 42 percent reduction; Latin America will have nearly nine million fewer, a 13 percent reduction; and Europe will have over eight million fewer, a 17 percent reduction. Put simply, aging countries will find it harder to marshal the manpower needed to fight protracted, bloody wars.

With fewer prime-age recruits available, militaries will be forced to make difficult decisions about the size and quality of their fighting forces. If they do not boost recruitment rates when the number of potential soldiers is greatly reduced, they are unlikely to meet their personnel targets. However, if militaries increase recruitment rates by relaxing the requirements for age, health, and physical and mental abilities, they will sacrifice quality for quantity. They may also try to increase recruitment rates by increasing salaries and benefits, as Russia has in its war in Ukraine. But unless total military budgets increase, rising per-soldier labor costs will crowd out other areas of military spending, including for weapons development, procurement, and maintenance. If states are less likely to win wars because they are worse at fighting them, they are likely to be less inclined to start them.

Aging states with shrinking recruitment pools have consistently had trouble meeting their military personnel goals despite frequently relaxing standards and increasing compensation. From 2000 to 2021, Japan on average filled just 93 percent of its authorized personnel positions. Despite lowering standards for service and dramatically increasing soldier compensation after the country’s 18-to-23-year-old male cohort began declining in 2009, China’s military continues to experience a shortage of skilled soldiers. Russia in the 2010s consistently failed to meet its recruitment targets for both conscripted and contracted soldiers. Although these personnel problems did not prevent Russia from invading Ukraine in 2022, a shortage of high-quality soldiers has hampered the country’s fighting abilities, making it harder to win the war. Russia continues to fight in Ukraine, but its manpower struggles could help deter other aged states from waging wars in the future.

Militaries could try to work around shrinking military-age cohorts by substituting technology for personnel. The revolution in artificial intelligence, the recent successes of unmanned drone swarms, and the possibility of “killer robots” may make the large-scale substitution of technology for military labor increasingly attractive. But because many military missions will continue to be labor-intensive, there are limits to militaries’ ability to substitute technology for labor. Counter-insurgency and wars that require holding enemy territory will continue to require well-staffed militaries. Falling fertility rates make it harder to meet this need.

Moreover, shifting to capital-intensive warfare to offset diminishing prime-age soldier populations will likely require the recruitment of higher-quality personnel to service, use, and complement the more sophisticated equipment. A 2022 report issued by the Congressional Research Service, for example, concluded that unmanned aircraft systems in the U.S. military are likely to require an equal or greater number of military personnel than their crewed counterparts. Finding these highly capable soldiers will be difficult in a world of aging populations.

PROTEST GENERATION

Although a slower pace of economic growth and a decline in available military resources are likely to lead to less capable militaries in aging countries and, as a result, more peaceful international relations, the opposite is possible. Shrinking military capabilities could encourage leaders who see a closing window of opportunity to use force to achieve national objectives. But they are likely to face countervailing pressure because aging populations tend to prefer peace. Decades of survey data show that people tend to become more pacific and opposed to the use of force as they age. A 2006 Pew Research Center analysis of surveys conducted in the United States from the early 1960s to the mid-2000s concludes that “there is a generation gap over U.S. military interventions,” with elderly Americans consistently exhibiting “the greatest wariness about using military force.” Jessica Chen Weiss has similarly concluded, based on surveys from the 2010s, that older Chinese citizens were significantly less likely than younger ones both to believe that China relies “too little” on military power and to view the U.S. military presence in East Asia as a “major threat.” They were also less willing than younger individuals to “send troops and not shirk a fight.”

Aging populations are also likely to have a greater aversion to their country’s soldiers’ dying in war. Military casualties and the deaths of young people who have not yet had children may heighten fears that war will permanently weaken an already depopulating country.

Mounting public opposition to military deaths and casualties is particularly important in democracies because it can jeopardize leaders’ electoral support. But as populations age, it will also matter to authoritarian regimes, which may worry that wartime losses could incite domestic backlash. By 2030, for example, close to half of China’s prime military-age cohort will be only children. Low fertility in China has already resulted in the existence of hundreds of thousands of shidu (bereavement) parents, who lost the only child the government permitted them to have under the old one-child system. Throughout the 2010s, these parents demonstrated annually in front of the headquarters of the National Health and Family Planning Commission in Beijing to demand that the government provide some of the support that they would have expected to receive from their deceased offspring. The more Chinese leaders have reason to believe that bereaved single-child parents are likely to protest, the more cautious they may be about initiating a war.

PEACE THROUGH AGE

Population aging will not completely eradicate war, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates. But it will reduce the ability of governments to fight or widespread support for them. All aging states, regardless of their revisionist ambitions or reliance on military aggression, will have no choice but to face squarely the effects of this demographic revolution. Demography goes a long way in determining the economically and militarily possible. Aging, then, is likely to become a powerful force for peace that has never before existed.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Mark L. Haas · July 24, 2025

17. By cutting science, the Defense Department is eating its seed corn

Isn't this obvious? Why would we make such a decision?

By cutting science, the Defense Department is eating its seed corn

Defense News · by Frank Kendall · July 24, 2025

The foundation of the military superiority of the United States, and therefore of our national security, rests on our investments in science and technology. As the Trump administration has set about slashing federal funding for science, the cuts to the Defense Departments core science and technology accounts are particularly troubling.

We are in a long-term strategic competition with China that has diplomatic, economic, and military components. To be effective, diplomacy must be backed up by economic and military strength. In our era of rapidly advancing technology, both economic and military strength are directly dependent on investments in early-stage, enabling technologies.

This competition is a marathon, not a sprint, and to prevail we have to invest with that in mind. While the Trump administration’s cuts to science in general have been noted, less attention has been paid to the Defense Department’s proposed science and technology funding levels.

China is a formidable technological competitor and has been aggressively challenging America’s military superiority for decades. I first became alarmed about China’s pursuit of military superiority in 2010.

That year I returned to the Department of Defense after a fifteen-year absence. The intelligence that I saw then made it clear to me, and it has only become more so since, that China is committed to achieving military superiority over the United States.

During the Obama administration I led the Department of Defense’s acquisition, technology, and logistics efforts. During the Biden administration I led the Air Force and Space Force. Over these years my priorities never wavered – China, China, China.

China has built a military designed for the purpose of deterring and if required defeating the United States, especially in the Western Pacific. As part of this campaign, China is sending its best young minds to learn in our graduate schools, buying or stealing our intellectual property, and investing heavily and strategically in military and dual-use technology.

We cannot afford to be complacent about our technological superiority. We are well past the point where China can be thought of as a future or emerging challenge.

In the face of this challenge, the Trump administration has proposed a Fiscal Year 2026 budget that reduces funding for enabling technologies – the mix of basic, applied, and advanced technology budget accounts – by over 10% from Fiscal Year 2025 levels, which themselves are roughly flat relative to 2024.

The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) reports that the cuts are even deeper when one looks at just basic and applied research, the two earliest stages of research, 15% and 18% respectively. (These AAAS numbers all take into account the over $100 billion added to the Defense Department as part of Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill.”)

When I served in the Obama and Biden administrations, we fought hard to protect our science and technology investments and kept them constant or increasing as a percentage of the defense budget.

This was strategic guidance provided to each of the military departments and rigorously enforced by each of the several secretaries of defense that I worked for, going back all the way to the Reagan administration.

Much of the Department of Defense’s early-stage science and technology funding supports work at our exceptional colleges and universities.

Innovation often comes in two distinct phases. Our graduate schools provide the bulk of the innovation in the first phase. This phase involves basic research into deep technical subjects and requires highly specialized and exquisite knowledge. This is the world of PhD candidates and their advisors. It includes work in material science, microelectronics, and quantum physics, just to name a few areas.

This work is high-risk and can require many years of expensive and tedious investment without a high probability of return. Our incredible free enterprise system does not prioritize investing in these areas. The business case just isn’t there.

The second phase of innovation is the application of the new science to new products. This is where our free enterprise system excels. Once a basic new technology is discovered and understood, a much wider range of engineering and business innovation kicks in as applications and new products explode.

A good example of this is the spectacular growth taking place in AI today. That growth was enabled by the successful development over many years of several technologies, including advanced mathematics and the material science achievements that underpin advanced data processors.

For reasons that I cannot explain, the Trump administration does not seem to appreciate the value these institutions, and the cutting-edge scientific work they offer to the United States.

Overall, these accounts are the equivalent of the seed corn that must be preserved to ensure a viable future for a farm.

Diverting these resources or simply underfunding them is setting us up for future failure just as a farmer who will have no seeds to plant for the next harvest is setting himself up for starvation.

In this case, unless Congress intervenes and adequately funds science and technology, we are risking strategic failure.

Frank Kendall, a former secretary of the Air Force, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

18. US Army envisions a common launcher to fit allies’ weapons

The buried lede is that allies are important to the Army and to future warfighting. I think this is a wise concept.

US Army envisions a common launcher to fit allies’ weapons

Defense News · by Jen Judson · July 24, 2025

WIESBADEN, Germany − The U.S. Army is prioritizing a common launcher that could be used across the European alliance from which a wide variety of weapons could be fired, the service’s chief in charge of the European and African theaters, said last week.

As part of a newly announced Eastern Flank Deterrence Line, a regional plan focused on the Baltic states, the U.S. Army and its allies and partners plan to pursue key ground-based capabilities.

“Everyone loves to talk about long-range fires and air defense,” Gen. Christopher Donahue, U.S. Army Europe and Africa’s commander, said at the Association of the U.S. Army’s inaugural LandEuro conference in Wiesbaden, Germany.

“So specifically, what we want to develop is a common launcher … that is both offensive and defensive capable. We want a common fire control system so that any nation can use that fire control system,” he said. “Then obviously, we want everything to be optionally manned. If we look out for an air defense system or a long-range fire system, we want it to be one system, optionally manned, where we’ll be able to take munitions from any country and shoot through them.”

Donahue acknowledged the existence of the bureaucracy that has bogged down previous weapons development and the foreign military sales process.

Even so, he said, “The United States has taken on reform of foreign military sales, and you’re already seeing the changes that are coming. We already know that we’re now having actual things that will be allowed to move at a higher rate of speed and getting them to move faster.”

In the past, the Army has struggled to develop a multi-mission launcher that can take on a wide variety of missiles; particularly ones that focused on something that could fire interceptors that can defeat anything from drones, cruise missiles and rockets, artillery and mortars.

The service canceled a MML program in 2019 and has yet to select and qualify a second interceptor for its Indirect Fires Protection Capability system designed to provide fixed or semi-fixed site protection against RAM, drone and cruise missile threats. The first IFPC prototypes are headed to South Korea this summer.

Donahue said the operational environment in Ukraine and the Middle East has accelerated the development of capabilities that can rapidly configure systems to fire different munitions.

“You look at where technology is, we are at the point where we can actually do it now in all of these conflicts,” Donahue stated. “We look at what’s at play out there and what we’re learning from it and then, because we are watching in Ukraine, you know, with the Middle East, this is forcing technology to mature to the point where we can do that.”

Donahue described the common launcher as something like a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS — that is used in Ukraine and either owned or on tap to be purchased by nearly 20 countries worldwide — but could be adapted by countries to suit their own industrial investment and operational needs.

“HIMARS is a great long-range system,” Donahue said, “so I’m confident most nations would want that, but they may want to put it on something common with their military.

“You would be able to take that common launcher and if Norway wants to put it onto a wheeled vehicle, they can put that common launcher on the wheeled vehicle,” he continued. We want to make sure that no matter who buys what type of variant of HIMARS rockets or missiles, just using that example, it can be fired through any fire system. Right now, there is not that interoperability so we have to make sure that happens.”

To address the dire need to deepen the magazine depth for global deterrence, Donahue added, “we want to get to the point where you can fire other people’s rockets through these common platforms.”

Here comes CAML

The Army released a “request for solutions” to industry late last month through its Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, or RCCTO, for a Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher (CAML).

“CAML is an autonomous/optionally crewed, highly mobile, air transportable, cross-domain fires launcher with the potential to augment or replace existing Army launchers. CAML will be capable of worldwide deployment and operations,” Sam.gov states.

The solicitation, which limits responses to U.S. companies capable of processing and storing secret information and hardware, asks for two separate solutions: A CAML Heavy on an M1075 Palletized Loading System tactical vehicle or similar 15-ton chassis tactical vehicle and a CAML Medium that could fit on Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles.

For CAML-H, the Army is looking for something that could integrate a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) used in the recently fielded ground-launched Typhon Mid-Range capability missile system or the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors used in Patriot air and missile defense systems.

The CAML-M would be able to fire Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MRLS) family of munitions used in HIMARS or AIM-9X interceptors used in the IFPC system.

Both systems would be supported by an Autonomous Resupply Vehicle “capable of autonomously reloading pods/canisters of missiles,” the request states, “with minimal to no human intervention.”

RCCTO plans to rapidly prototype 1 CAML-M with MLRS family of munitions within 18 months and another with IFPC-capable missiles within 24 months and an ARV within 36 months from date of the contract award, the solicitation lays out.

Within 24 months, the Army will produce four TLAM-capable CAML-H prototypes within 18 months and one MSE-capable prototype within 24 months.

The tech is there

Lockheed has ownership over a variety of systems that could be involved in the CAML effort — from MLRS to Typhon to PAC-3 MSE.

HIMARS would be tuned to fire not just offensive weapons but defensive ones as well, Jason Reynolds, Lockheed Martin’s vice president for integrated air and missile defense in its missiles and fire control sector, told Defense News in an interview at LandEuro. The systems would also all be mobile as opposed to the current configuration of defensive systems, which are typically trailer-based like Patriots are today.

“What we’re learning in the real world is, if you’re mobile, you’re more survivable,” Reynolds stated.

Technologically, the prototypes could be done relatively quickly if investment from the government puts the program in the HOV lane, he noted.

“I don’t think there’s anything technically that would prohibit that because these are existing systems today,” Reynolds said. “You might have to combine some of the electronics, you might have to redesign some of the circuit cards, you might have to repackage some of these items to put it onto that vehicle, whatever the new vehicle is, but it’s not like you’re inventing something, you’re just repackaging.”

For Lockheed, its ship-based Mark 41 launcher, which was adapted for the ground-launched Typhon system for the U.S. Army, already has missile load-out flexibility.

“It really provides the ability to bring and load out any mix of defensive- and strike-based capability missiles that anybody that’s a Mark 41 user wants to employ,” Edward Dobeck, company program director for launching systems within its rotary and mission systems division, told Defense News in an interview this week.

Typhon successfully sank a ship off the coast of Australia last week during U.S.-Australia-led exercise Talisman Sabre.

HIMARS have also demonstrated autonomous capability during the most recent capstone event as part of the Army’s experimentation campaign known as Project Convergence.

“Those are some of the technologies we’ve demonstrated that we think are the sorts of things that could be leveraged on CAML,” Paula Hartley, Lockheed’s vice president of tactical missile within the MFC business, told Defense News in the same interview.

“It’s not a new missile system or munitions, it’s just putting it all together and the government moved pretty briskly in this and I think that we have responded extremely well in helping them do that,” she said.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

19. How the Pentagon plays into Trump's sprawling artificial intelligence 'Action Plan'

Also a buried lede. Aer our war colleges prepared for this task?

Excerpt:

The DoD is also tasked to make its war colleges “hubs of AI research,” to upskill its workforce, and identify “workflows” — a term used for both bureaucratic processes and military war planning — that can be automated with AI. Perhaps most somberly, the Action Plan also wants DoD to get priority access with cloud providers and other computing services so it can continue to use them in wartime.

How the Pentagon plays into Trump's sprawling artificial intelligence 'Action Plan' - Breaking Defense

America's AI Action Plan features 19 recommendations that involve the DoD, including the creation of a "virtual proving ground."

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · July 23, 2025

An 149th Intelligence Squadron airman conducts training in a computer training lab at Mather Field, California Dec. 2, 2023. The December 2023 UTA focus was on the readiness of the airmen by embracing their unit’s stated mission to “Organize, train, and equip Cyber-ISR leaders to provide intelligence in support of federal and state mission priorities.

WASHINGTON — “The United States is in a race to achieve global dominance in artificial intelligence,” begins the introduction to America’s AI Action Plan, released this morning by the White House. The prime adversary in that race, other passages make clear, is China.

Overall, the Action Plan unambiguously frames AI as a winner-take-all competition between great powers.

“Whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set global AI standards and reap broad economic and military benefits,” the introduction continues. “Just like we won the space race, it is imperative that the United States and its allies win this race.”

While most of the specific items in the Action Plan relate to domestic R&D, the economy, or international trade, it also includes a long to-do list for the Department of Defense. Of about 19 “recommended policy actions” explicitly citing DoD (the “Action Plan” is not an Executive Order and only “recommends” actions rather than directing them), five relate to the Department’s own internal workings. The others all give the Pentagon a prominent or even leading role in setting standards and coordinating efforts across the executive branch.

Particularly interesting is a call for DARPA, the Pentagon’s dedicated unit for high-risk, high-payoff R&D, to lead an interagency “technology development program” to address a fundamental problem with cutting-edge AI: Even the people who build it don’t really know how it works.

That’s particularly true for generative AIs such as Large Language Models, which can summarize masses of data and even generate surprising insights but also frequently “hallucinate” and output falsehoods in unpredictable ways.

“Technologists know how LLMs work at a high level, but often cannot explain why a model produced a specific output,” the Action Plan notes. “This lack of predictability … can make it challenging to use advanced AI in defense, national security, or other applications where lives are at stake.” (Arguably, it makes GenAI a tricky tool to trust even when the stakes are lower, as a recent Marine Corps field manual warns).

In addition to the DARPA-led program, this basket of actions — under the heading “AI Interpretability, Control, & Robustness” — also asks DoD to coordinate with Energy, Commerce, Homeland Security, and other agencies on “AI Hackathons,” basically open invitations to outside experts to stage (non-destructive) attacks on their systems and report what they find. The Defense Department began embracing this approach with its “Hack the Pentagon” competition back in the last year of the Obama administration.

Another Pentagon initiative promoted in today’s Trump plan embraces a Biden-era catchphrase, “Responsible AI.” It was one of Trump’s previous Secretaries of Defense, Mark Esper, who officially directed DoD to follow a set list of ethical principles, but it was under Biden that Pentagon officials built on those broad strokes and created highly specific interactive online checklists for officials running AI programs.

And while Trump annulled many of Biden’s AI directives within weeks of taking office in January, the “RAI” initiative has not only survived but apparently won White House approval. Federal agencies, “led by DoD,” should “continue to refine DOD’s Responsible AI and Generative AI Frameworks, Roadmaps, and Toolkits,” the AI Action Plan recommends.

The Action Plan also gives DoD a leading or prominent role in multiple AI security initiatives. DoD should lead interagency efforts to “create new technical standards for high-security AI centers” and to assess adversary progress in AI.

DoD should support the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in creating a “Standard on AI Assurance” for the Intelligence Community, most of whose personnel work at DoD. And it should work with other agencies on a host of issues, from stimulating domestic high-tech manufacturing to improving export controls.

As for the five recommendations about upgrading DoD itself, perhaps the most intriguing — albeit vague — recommendation calls for “establish[ing] an AI & Autonomous Systems Virtual Proving Ground.

It’s unclear even whether this is to be a real-world test facility or some kind of Matrix-style super-simulation: The word “virtual” in the name implies it’s all online, while the call to assess “geographic … requirements necessary for such a facility” suggests there might be a physical site. The White House did not immediately respond to a request for clarification.

The DoD is also tasked to make its war colleges “hubs of AI research,” to upskill its workforce, and identify “workflows” — a term used for both bureaucratic processes and military war planning — that can be automated with AI. Perhaps most somberly, the Action Plan also wants DoD to get priority access with cloud providers and other computing services so it can continue to use them in wartime.

20. War with China ‘would result in large-scale casualties,’ Army general says

While a snarky comment would be that this is a BFO (blinding flash of the obvious), I think it is very important we have these discussions both for internal military purposes as well as for public knowledge and understanding. War ain't gonna be easy.

The question I have is (and I do not mean this in any derogatory way), where are the front lines that we envision in a war with China?

War with China ‘would result in large-scale casualties,’ Army general says

The U.S. military would face immense challenges treating the volume of casualties and moving them to medical centers far from the front lines in a conflict with China.

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol, Patty Nieberg

The number of casualties the U.S. military would suffer in a war against China could be unlike anything it has experienced during the post-9/11 wars, said Lt. Gen. Joel “JB” Vowell, deputy commanding general for U.S. Army Pacific.

“Our assumptions for planning is that casualty estimates will be much higher than you might have seen or witnessed as part of the Global War on Terror between Iraq and Afghanistan and other places where there are very small numbers, relatively in contacts who were who were killed and injured, as compared to large-scale combat operations,” Vowell recently told reporters. “A potential conflict with the People’s Republic of China likely would result in large-scale casualties.”

China has a growing arsenal of hypersonic missiles and other advanced weapons that could pose a major threat to U.S. ships, including aircraft carriers, which can have a crew of up to 5,000 sailors and Marines.

“Those potential casualties are there, so we have to calculate that mass casualty event,” Vowell told reporters at a July 22 Defense Writers Group event, which is based at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

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The Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, has conducted 50 war games in recent years looking at a possible Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan that estimated between 9,500 to 21,000 U.S. troops would be killed and wounded, and that the American military would lose dozens of ships and hundreds of planes, said retired Marine Corps Col. Mark Cancian, a senior advisor with the think tank.

The reason the casualty numbers are not higher is the scenarios did not envision U.S. troops being involved in ground combat, Cancian told Task & Purpose. Taiwanese ground forces fought Chinese troops in these wargames.

U.S. casualties would likely run higher if American ground troops were tasked with defending Taiwan or recapturing lost allied territories, such as Matsu and Kinmen islands, which are governed by Taiwan, he said.

While tens of thousands of U.S. troops were injured in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, they frequently received life-saving care quickly. Air superiority often allowed U.S. military helicopters to evacuate service members to Combat Support Hospitals and Forward Surgical Teams with the “golden hour” — or 60 minutes from being wounded.

Far more service members would be wounded and need to be medically evacuated in a conflict with China than the U.S. military has had to deal with during the Global War on Terrorism, Vowell said.

“It’s not a simple problem of the golden hour,” he said, adding that instead of the U.S. military having to transport one or two service members wounded by an improvised explosive device to surgical teams,”It’ll be hundreds.”

To treat the casualties from a war with China, the U.S. military would likely need to partner with other countries, deploy updated versions of Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals in forward areas, and transport patients out of the region for surgical care, Vowell said.

U.S. and Australian soldiers simulate medical evacuation during a hoist training class in preparation for the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Exportable exercise at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines, May 24, 2025. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Brian Argamaso.

But evacuating casualties from the Western Pacific to advanced trauma centers far from the front lines would be a “huge challenge” given the vastness of the Indo-Pacific region, Vowell said.

“And I’ll be honest, I don’t know if we have the full answer on it,” he added.

Manila in the Philippines is about 7,400 miles from San Diego. That’s more than twice the distance between New York and London, Vowell said. It is even further to get from the Arctic Circle to New Zealand.

Exacerbating the problems of transporting wounded troops such long distances, China can keep combat zones under persistent surveillance and strike U.S. ships and airfields, he said.

In addition to evacuating wounded troops, bringing fallen service members home could also prove to be difficult, said Vowell, who noted that more than 17,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who were killed in World War II are interred at Manila American Cemetery in the Philippines.

“That’s why we have overseas cemeteries,” Vowell said. “We don’t want to have to do that again.”

All these challenges underscore the scale of how destructive a conflict with China would be, he said.

“And so, the ultimate goal here, ladies and gentlemen, is no war,” Vowell said. “It would be catastrophic on a humanitarian scale, civilians, military alike. It’d be catastrophic on a global economic scale. And so medically, we practice what to do to protect and to triage and to evacuate our soldiers, I think we’ve got work to do there.”

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Jeff Schogol

Senior Pentagon Reporter

Jeff Schogol is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for nearly 20 years. Email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com; direct message @JSchogol73030 on Twitter; or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488.

Patty Nieberg

Senior Staff Writer

Patty is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. She’s reported on the military for six years, embedding with the National Guard during a hurricane and covering Guantanamo Bay legal proceedings for an alleged al Qaeda commander. Her previous bylines can be found at the Associated Press, Bloomberg Government, Washington Post, The New York Times, and ABC. You can reach Patty by email at Patty.Nieberg@taskandpurpose.com.

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol, Patty Nieberg

21. Advancing Diplomacy and Approaching Deadlines (WOTR – The Adversarial)

Advancing Diplomacy and Approaching Deadlines

WOTR Staff

July 24, 2025

Welcome to The Adversarial. Every other week, we’ll provide you with expert analysis on America’s greatest challengers: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and jihadists. Read more below.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/advancing-diplomacy-and-approaching-deadlines/

***

Iran

As the dust settles on last month’s war between Iran and Israel — supported in a cameo role with U.S. strikes against three Iranian nuclear sites — a diplomatic flashpoint is rapidly approaching. October sees the expiration of a “snapback” mechanism built into the 2015 U.N. Security Council resolution that endorsed the now largely defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This allows the parties to that agreement the ability to restore the provisions of six resolutions against Iran passed between 2006 and 2010, without the possibility of veto by a permanent U.N. Security Council member. These measures include an arms embargo, a prohibition of uranium enrichment, asset freezes of Iranian officials, and heightened scrutiny of Iranian banks and shipping.

The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have all warned Iran in recent days that they could trigger the snapback mechanism by the end of August if it fails to cooperate over its nuclear activity. Timing is key if the month-long procedure is to be completed before Russia takes the U.N. Security Council gavel in October. Senior diplomats from the major European powers and Iran are due to meet in Istanbul on Friday for what is likely to be a scoping exercise for both sides to see if a showdown in New York can be avoided.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi meets with the British, French, and German foreign ministers in Geneva in June. Image: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office via Wikimedia Commons.

China

Multilateral diplomacy has been China’s recent priority. On July 9, Chinese Premier Li Qiang attended the BRICS Summit in Brazil and met with the United Nations secretary general and the director-general of the World Trade Organization to reaffirm China’s support of multilateralism, free trade, and the “central position of the United Nations in global governance.” On July 15, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Foreign Ministers Council in Tianjin, where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit will also be hosted in late August.

The timing for the summit is deliberate, as Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders can now also attend China’s most high-profile military parade in recent years on Sept. 3. The summit will mark the most important multilateral diplomatic event for China this year. Russian President Vladimir Putin has already committed to an unusual four-day visit to China to attend both events.

The “great recall” in Taiwan is scheduled for July 26, and more than two dozen legislators from the main opposition party, Kuomintang, face a recall vote. Chinese government agencies and state media have become increasingly vocal in their criticism of the recall as the date draws near. If the result of the vote significantly undermines the position of the opposition, Beijing could react in a hostile manner.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang poses for a family photograph with BRICS member state representatives. Image: Indian Prime Minister’s Office via Wikimedia Commons.

Russia

Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan have continued to deteriorate over the last two weeks. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev announced that his government is preparing to sue Russia over the Azerbaijani aircraft crash in December 2024, arguing that there is incontrovertible evidence the crash resulted from a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system as the plane was approaching Grozny, Russia. Aliev also recently praised Ukraine for its resistance to Russia’s invasion and argued that friendly relations with Russia are only possible if they shed their imperial attitude.

Meanwhile, Russia shows no sign of shifting its military strategy in Ukraine, despite increasingly loud expressions of frustration by U.S. President Donald Trump and other members of his administration. It’s clear that Putin has no plans to engage in serious peace talks. In fact, Trump’s announcement that Russia has 50 days to show progress on a peace deal or face sanctions has been taken by Russian commentators as a pass to conduct whatever military operations it desires during that period with no consequences. That view has been reconfirmed by announcements by U.S. congressional leaders that they will defer consideration of a serious bipartisan sanctions package until the end of the 50-day “waiting period.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in 2022. Image: Press Service of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan via Wikimedia Commons.

North Korea

North Korean state media announced that a third 5,000-ton destroyer will be built by October 2026, providing another platform for nuclear and non-nuclear missiles. Two destroyers of the same class were unveiled earlier this year, including one that temporarily capsized at launch.

The North Korean military warned of “grave consequences” and its “sovereign right to take countermeasures against provocative military actions” after the United States, South Korea, and Japan coordinated on a joint flight of two B-52H Stratofortress bombers and two fighter jets.

North Korea continues to tighten relations with Moscow. Pyongyang recently welcomed Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who called for strengthening bilateral strategic and tactical cooperation. A Russian airline also opened a new route linking Moscow with Pyongyang. North Korea is also sending researchers and students to Russia to learn about artificial intelligence, despite sanctions that prescribe restrictions on technological cooperation between the two countries.

Simultaneously, Pyongyang continues to improve relations with Beijing. An agreement was announced on the resumption of a rail line between the capitals after a five-year suspension. State media voiced support for the bilateral relationship on the 64th anniversary of their defense treaty, and senior officials attended a banquet hosted by the Chinese ambassador to mark the anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un meet in North Korea. Image: KCNA Watch

Jihadists

In recent weeks, al-Shabaab has taken over Moqokori and Tardo in central Somalia, finalizing their reclamation of all the territory they lost following a 2022 offensive by the Somali government. In the aftermath of the takeover, the group shared propaganda photos online to prove both that they had reclaimed those towns and to claim that locals were supportive of this change.

This highlights the continued failure of the Somali counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaigns implemented since al-Shabaab first took over parts of southern and central Somalia in 2006. There has been a repeated pattern of the central government losing the territory it regains after conducting an offensive against the group, not helped by the fact that the autonomous Puntland region of Somalia has also been dealing with the Islamic State since the beginning of the year.

Additionally, al-Shabaab is positioning itself to threaten the Somali capital of Mogadishu. With more space to plan and train, they might begin to revitalize planning of external operations, given their recent involvement in aviation plots. Therefore, while the overall health of al-Qaeda’s central leadership is weak, its branches in Somalia and Mali continue to make advances across East and West Africa.

Al-Shabaab fighters patrolling the Afgooye-Mogadishu road. Image: Shahada News Agency via Wikimedia Commons.

Image: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office via Wikimedia Commons

22. Space and Ice: Envisioning Special Operations Forces’ Role in Future Operational Environments

New acronym and terminology for me SJTAC: Space Joint Terminal Attack Controller and "reverse" Security Force Assistance.

Excerpts:

Special operations forces are in a transformative period requiring new force structures, roles, and missions to support combined multi-domain warfighting. This article posits two points: the need to develop a U.S. Space Force-directed SJTAC function to increase Triad lethality and bolster allied SOF with space-based capabilities, and emphasis on select SOF Arctic allies to provide “reverse” SFA to ensure incoming allied reinforcements possess the polar capabilities to operate effectively in the High North. Such refinements are necessary to overcome organizational inertia and bureaucracy which could jeopardize SOF’s ability to achieve national, alliance, and coalition objectives.

Space and Ice: Envisioning Special Operations Forces’ Role in Future Operational Environments

irregularwarfare.org · by Marius Kristiansen, Kevin D. Stringer · July 24, 2025

New frontiers of strategic competition beckon for immediate special operations forces (SOF) transformation to prevail in the space domain and the polar regions. Aligned with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Colby Jenkins’ call to think differently and work together, this article proposes two enhanced roles for combined SOF in the competition sphere—a Space Joint Terminal Attack Controller(SJTAC) function and an emphasis on “reverse” security force assistance (SFA) for selected NATO Arctic allies who rely on the principle of “collective defense” for national security. While numerous efforts across the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command and U.S. Space Force aim to meet the “all-domain fires” demand, and Allied Arctic-focused trainingand exercises have been in place for decades, this essay offers refined proposals in both areas for SOF. While seemingly distinct, both converge in the Arctic, where NATO SOF will require on-call space-based capabilities coupled with SFA essential for High North survivability and success.

SOF as a Space Enabler

First, an SJTAC function would bring significant value to U.S. SOF implementing its role within the “space-cyber-SOF triad,” while providing access to space capabilities in combined operations for allies and partners who lack them organically. This step would particularly align with European military interests to share and pool space assets for enhanced defense and greater burden sharing. In recent years, the United States has pioneered the Triad concept, which combines elements of space, cyber, and special operations to compete with China and Russia across warfighting domains.

Special operations forces play a crucial role in supporting the Triad by securing access and placement to enhance conventional force effectiveness, attaining greater precision in cyber targeting, integrating joint functions across warfighting domains, and leveraging different effects for maximal informational and psychological impact on the opposing force. As U.S. Special Operations Commander General Bryan Fenton noted: “the nexus of USSOCOM, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Space Command, and U.S. Strategic Command creates synergy which enhances kill webs—the integration of sensors from seabed to space and the options to eliminate targets—with SOF providing the physical access to targets to deliver effects for cyberspace and space operations within the Joint Force targeting context.” Put another way, special operators serve as the essential node linking a suite of sophisticated technical capabilities that enable the Joint Force to disrupt, degrade, and destroy an adversary via cyber, space, or kinetic means.

Beyond SOF’s main value proposition for the Triad to provide proximate, physical access to sensitive and strategic targets, SOF are exceptionally well-equipped for operating in politically sensitive conditions and denied areas, where their mobility, adaptability, and low visibility enable them to perform strategic tasks like securing critical infrastructure, gathering intelligence, and conducting targeted strikes. Combined with space and cyber capabilities, SOF can access satellite communications, space-based reconnaissance, and cyber tools to disrupt enemy activities while maintaining a low signature. This blend enhances the effectiveness of multi-domain operations, providing strategic and tactical advantages against competitors in contested regions worldwide. A missing element to this concept is a capability, such as a joint terminal attack controller, to execute such operations.

The increased importance of cyber and space calls for a similarly capable joint terminal attack controller to integrate cross-domain capabilities, much like the traditional joint terminal attack controller demonstrates how SOF links the air and land domains. A JTAC is “a qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations”—the link between ground forces and air support. The JTAC designation derives from a certification, available to service members from all branches, granted through the five-week Army-run Special Operations Terminal Attack Control Course (SOTACC). JTAC-certified personnel work at the lowest SOF level—within a Special Forces operational detachment, an Army Ranger platoon, a Naval SEAL platoon, or a Marine Corps Special Operations team. In a related fashion, the space JTAC would connect tactical, on-the-ground SOF units with space assets for targeting adversary military airbases, critical infrastructure, and more complex targets, such as Russian floating nuclear power plants.

This element would differ from space personnel already assigned at the theater special operations command (TSOC) level in that it would embed within the SOF tactical unit of action. This space connection would enable the assessment of vulnerabilities, ensuring precision in any potential attack, as well as monitoring target activities, tracking movements, and providing real-time situational awareness for preemptive strikes or future sabotage missions. Furthermore, as space capabilities develop from science fiction to reality, the SJTAC could access future space weaponry ranging from lasers, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, to the currently theoretical “Rods from God” kinetic bombardment concept.

Given that not all NATO countries have space assets, and the planning assumption is that NATO SOF formations will operate in a combined fashion, a space JTAC becomes a critical linkage for allied interoperability. This expertise would be beyond current multi-domain SOF capabilities, but would be essential for SOF formations, especially those from smaller states, to access allied space assets from remote and austere locations, and coordinate fires or maneuver among their conventional forces. This development could also serve as an integral element of the emerging, but controversial concept of a U.S. Space Force special operations component command. Here, the Space Force, as an independent service, would provide its own SOF component command to SOCOM just like the Army does with U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The SJTACs, individuals and units, would be assets provided by this component

Critics may argue that an “SJTAC” capability could be more effective and fiscally realistic by expanding the SOTACC qualification to integrate the space domain—or, alternatively, placing it within existing Air Force specialties, such as the Combat Controller (CCT). Indeed, the U.S. Air Force has already transformed its legacy Special Operations Weather career field into the new all-domain Special Reconnaissance Airman. But detractors of the SJTAC approach overlook the fact that with space defined as a separate warfighting domain from the air, and with the creation of U.S. Space Force as a separate service, organizational logic and the development of deep space expertise necessitate a division of labor that would place the SJTAC function firmly within the Space Force sphere of responsibility. This placement would also avoid the inefficiency of having SOF from each service—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—develop their own SJTAC capabilities. This proposal is amplified by the assessment that space capabilities will rapidly evolve and emerge in the coming years, requiring a deeper knowledge and applicatory understanding of space-to-ground integration for special operations.

Similarly, just as SOF through the SJATC can serve a natural bridging function for the SOF-space-cyber triad, so also can selected allied SOF enable greater effectiveness in the austere Arctic operating environment through “reverse” security force assistance provision—connecting local, niche polar expertise with that of incoming and reinforcing allied SOF formations.

“Reverse” Security Force Assistance Provider

The overarching concept of “collective defense” among allies rests on several layers of liberal world-order principles, and it aims to generate a wide range of effects for the different actors involved. The most obvious differences are easiest to point out by comparing a great, or global power—like the U.S., and a smaller state—like Norway. Simply stated, when Norway commits to collective defense on behalf of allies, it does so as an insurance, for a “seat at the table,” for burden-sharing, as an escalatory control measure, and to generate regional deterrence. In contrast, the U.S. supports collective defense for regional access and placement, strategic communication, regional and global deterrence, and for re-assuring trust among other allies around the globe.

These different perspectives generate two distinctive requirements—the ability to generate a contextual situational understanding of the operating environment, and the capability to operate effectively within that environment. Logically, the Norwegians are better equipped, trained, and organized for operating in the High North, and possess a greater appreciation for regional considerations, compared to most other allies – including Americans, British, Canadians, and the French. The latter, however, need an adequate capability standard for successful operations. This dynamic means the local forces possess subject matter expertise and niche capabilities which surpass those of other allies. If these resources are utilized correctly, the allies can benefit from both the indigenous expertise and the niche capabilities.

The SOF of smaller allies, such as the Nordic countries—including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden—could take on a reverse SFA provider function, which would facilitate the reception, staging, onwards movement and integration (RSOI) of NATO SOF reinforcements in the High North in event of conflict with Russia, particularly from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France. This reverse SFA function would also help bolster allies’ effectiveness with all-domain operations in the unforgiving Arctic climate and landscape.

The Arctic and its unique environment create an unusual situation for the classical SFA relationship between Allied providers and Arctic partners, especially in the European High North. The polar regions in Europe and North America are characterized by eight months of winter with continuous darkness, summers with continuous daylight, and temperatures dropping as far as -40 °C (-40 °F) and unlikely to rise above 10 °C (50 °F). With storms and inclement weather present in all seasons, the harsh environment and its volatile weather patterns present unique challenges for planning and sustaining all-domain military operations in the High North. These conditions require specialized expertise, including Arctic-trained and equipped formations to help Allied forces survive and maximize their combat effectiveness.

Defense requirements of the European NATO Arctic states rely heavily on Allied reinforcements and support to be realistic and effective. However, those reinforcements are unlikely to possess all the necessary skills and expertise to thrive in the harsh Arctic climate on their own. Close cooperation and integration within the NATO framework are essential for success, and forces not originating from the European High North will likely require specific training to be effective within this Arctic operational environment. European High North SOF, then, are naturally suited to serve the role of providing “reverse” SFA.

To illustrate the point, a British, Dutch or French SOF formation deploying to the European High North must have specific training from its SOF hosts if the detachments are to be effective and survive outdoors. The same prerequisite applies for U.S. and Canadian SOF elements, even though both originate from Arctic states. This seemingly odd situation arises from the fact that the environmental, climatic, and weather conditions in the North American Arctic differ significantly from those in the European High North. More importantly, the SOF from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have deep, lifelong Arctic experience that equivalent units in U.S. SOF and Canadian SOF lack. This markedly different situation often results in SOF Allies arriving to the European High North unfit and incorrectly equipped, and therefore only partially interoperable and with limited operational effectiveness. A few RSOI experiences in Norway at the NATO exercises Trident Juncture 2018, Cold Response 2020, Cold Response 2022 and Nordic Response 2024 confirm this latter point, however, there still remains no institutional solution to address this challenge.

Equally important for SOF Arctic employment is Admiral (retired) William McRaven’s assessment that what represents a special operation differs from one NATO nation to another, even though all operate in accordance with NATO SOF doctrine. American and Canadian SOF formations might not be specialized in the tasks these units will face when they rush to their “European brothers in arms” to provide essential allied support in the polar region.

A relevant specific example is the U.S. SOF deployment into the European High North in support of NORSOF. U.S. SOF possess the generic hardware, software, niche capabilities, and personnel needed to augment Norwegian defense in the polar regions. Nevertheless, both U.S. conventional forces and SOF do not possess true all-season Arctic capability. As Barrett, Tovo and Kirkwood noted:

[The U.S.] military’s recent execution of training and operations—such as Arctic Edge, Vigilant Shield, and Arctic Warrior—might best be classified as Arctic tourism. Military units deploy for a few weeks to train but do not really build true Arctic capabilities… military Arctic tourism does little to build the capabilities needed for military forces to survive, thrive, and effectively operate in the harsh Arctic environment, especially for prolonged durations.

Partners like Norway are not engaged in Arctic tourism. They are comprised of personnel raised in Arctic or subarctic environments and have units explicitly designed for Arctic warfare. NATO SOF organizations like Norwegian Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) should be prepared to conduct a “reverse” SFA mission to re-train, adapt tactics, techniques and procedures, and innovate on behalf of the incoming SFA provider to make the allied SFA effective when it arrives in the Arctic. This situation can be expected to occur also in Sweden, Finland, Canada, and Greenland (Denmark).

Thoughts on the Future

Special operations forces are in a transformative period requiring new force structures, roles, and missions to support combined multi-domain warfighting. This article posits two points: the need to develop a U.S. Space Force-directed SJTAC function to increase Triad lethality and bolster allied SOF with space-based capabilities, and emphasis on select SOF Arctic allies to provide “reverse” SFA to ensure incoming allied reinforcements possess the polar capabilities to operate effectively in the High North. Such refinements are necessary to overcome organizational inertia and bureaucracy which could jeopardize SOF’s ability to achieve national, alliance, and coalition objectives.

Kevin D. Stringer, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is a Lecturer at the University of Northwestern Switzerland and Visiting Associate Professor at the Military Academy of Lithuania. Stringer earned a PhD from the University of Zurich, an MA from Boston University, an MSS from the U.S. Army War College, and a BSc from the U.S. Military Academy.

Marius Kristiansen is an active-duty Norwegian army officer. Kristiansen holds a PhD in Political Science and Strategy, an MSc in Defence Analysis—Irregular Warfare, a BA in Land Warfare and Military Leadership and an Advanced Certificate in Terrorism Studies. Earlier he was a non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative and the Joint Special Operations University.

Views expressed in this article solely reflect those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Image generated by ChatGPT using DALL·E, OpenAI (July 22, 2025).

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23. The precious 'white gold' fuel buried in the Earth

Photos and graphic at the link: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20250723-the-worlds-race-to-drill-for-natural-white-hydrogen?ocid=global_future_rss

The precious 'white gold' fuel buried in the Earth

BBC

1 day ago

Chloe Farand

Alain Prinzhofer

Sometimes called 'fairy circles', circles such as these in Brazil can form when high-pressure hydrogen causes land to rise then sink (Credit: Alain Prinzhofer)

Naturally occurring "white hydrogen" lies in vast reservoirs beneath our feet – now the gold rush of the clean energy era is beginning.

Investors had lost faith in Edwin Drake's obsessive hunt for oil when the American entrepreneur finally struck black gold in an underground reservoir in Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859. The discovery spurred an exploration frenzy that launched the modern oil age.

Now, a new generation of wildcatters are racing to replicate that Titusville moment, hoping to bring about the dawn of a major new energy resource. However, it's not fossil fuels they are looking for, but a commercially viable source of natural – and low-carbon – hydrogen.

Hydrogen, the smallest, simplest and lightest molecule on Earth, is currently used mainly for refining and chemical industries, such as producing ammonia for fertilisers. The vast majority of this hydrogen is made from polluting methane gas or coal gasification.

But there are already other, lower-carbon ways to produce hydrogen. And hydrogen's ability to store three times more energy than oil, while only producing water when burnt, has made some view it as an attractive clean fuel option, especially for industries which are hard to decarbonise by electrification, such as aviation, shipping or steel production.

"Green" hydrogen, for example, is a cleaner alternative made by splitting water between hydrogen and oxygen molecules in a process powered by renewable energy. "Blue" hydrogen, made from fossil fuels using carbon capture and storage to reduce the emissions, is another alternative.

If just 2% of estimated levels of natural hydrogen was recoverable, it could meet projected global hydrogen demand for around 200 years, according to the USGS

Green and blue hydrogen have received huge attention as potential low-carbon fuels in recent years, but they also have significant downsides. Both are expensive and faced challenges and delays in their rollout. And while their use is slowly growing, together they still only make up around 1% of global hydrogen production. Some researchers have also raised doubts over how low-carbon blue hydrogen really is due to associated leaks of methane – a potent greenhouse gas which is 80 times more powerful than carbon dioxide (CO2) over a 20-year time span.

Meanwhile, in recent years scientists have found that naturally occurring hydrogen is actually much more widespread than previously thought, leading some to believe it could be tapped as a cheap and carbon-free fuel.

This "geologic" hydrogen, also called natural or white hydrogen, is produced naturally when underground water encounters iron-rich rocks in a process known as serpentinisation. Because hydrogen is so light, it usually seeps through porous rocks and cracks, eventually rising to the atmosphere. That's if it isn't first consumed in underground reactions or eaten by subterranean microbes.

But in some geological settings, hydrogen can become trapped under rocks with low permeability, such as salt or shale rocks, which create a seal under which the gas can accumulate. It's these hydrogen accumulations in the Earth's subsurface that prospectors hope may be viable for commercial exploitation.

According to a 2024 study from the US Geological Survey (USGS), there could be anywhere between one billion and 10 trillion tonnes of hydrogen in the subsurface, with a best guess of around 5.6 trillion tonnes trapped in geological formations.

Mantle8

A Mantle8 geologist tests if there is hydrogen seeping from an underground reservoir in the French Pyrenees (Credit: Mantle8)

Most of this hydrogen is likely to be "in accumulations that are too deep, too far offshore, or too small to be economically recovered", the study's authors, USGS geologists Geoffrey Ellis and Sarah Gelman, wrote. However, if just 2% of this white hydrogen was recoverable, it could meet projected global hydrogen demand for around 200 years, they found. It would also, they added, contain roughly twice as much energy as is stored in all the proven natural gas reserves on Earth.

The idea has sparked huge interest in what could be lying under our feet. At least 60 companies have publicly said they are exploring for white hydrogen, with investment estimated to have reached $1bn (£740m), says Eric Gaucher, a French geochemist who co-leads a white hydrogen expert group convened by the International Energy Agency (IEA).

The hope is to make a big discovery in the next three or four years. My dream is that this natural hydrogen can play a role, maybe as oil played in the past – Eric Gaucher

"That's more or less a rush," he says. Gaucher left a job at oil giant Total four years ago and now runs an independent consultancy advising companies "who want to win the race for natural hydrogen". Exploratory drilling, he notes, has already taken place in Australia and the US.

Prospectors like Gaucher argue the discovery of a commercially viable hydrogen reservoir could usher in a new age of exploration in the same way that Drake's 1859 find fired the starting gun for the oil economy. "The hope is to make a big discovery in the next three or four years," he says. "My dream is that this natural hydrogen can play a role, maybe as oil played in the past."

Still, Gaucher admits prospectors should currently remain "modest" about white hydrogen's potential role in the energy transition. Not least because huge uncertainties remain about how much of it could actually be recoverable from the Earth's mantle.

"Currently, we really have no idea," says Ellis, of the USGS. "That's the big question. From what we know today, there's just too much uncertainty to really make any predictions about how impactful [natural hydrogen] might be."

The only place where white hydrogen extracted from the Earth is currently used is in the village of Bourakebougou in western Mali. The local community’s fate changed in 1987 when the cigarette of a worker digging a water well sparked a small explosion as he leaned over the edge. Nearly pure hydrogen was later found at the bottom of the borehole. It is now used to produce electricity for the village.

Odourless, colourless and tasteless, hydrogen is difficult to detect without specifically looking for it. But in early 2025, a team of geologists announced they found a clue for where to start looking.

Using simulations of plate tectonic processes, they showed that rocks that had been pushed closer to the surface during the formation of mountains could be hotspots for white hydrogen. The researchers identified mountain ranges stretching from the Alps to the Himalayas as possible targets for exploration.

Other researchers in the UK and Canada recently published a list of key ingredients needed to find hydrogen-producing underground systems. "We know for example that underground microbes readily feast on hydrogen," study co-author Barbara Sherwood Lollar, a professor of geology at the University of Toronto, said in a release. "Avoiding environments that bring them into contact with the hydrogen is important in preserving hydrogen in economic accumulations."

USGS

A geologic hydrogen prospectivity assessment shows US areas with good geological conditions (such as hydrogen sources and reservoir rocks) for hydrogen accumulation (Credit: USGS)

Although exploration of white hydrogen has been gathering steam, no commercially viable wells have yet been found. In its 2024 global hydrogen review, the IEA described white hydrogen production technology as scoring five out of nine on its technology readiness scale.

There is also still insufficient evidence to prove white hydrogen is even a renewable resource for use at scale, says Laurent Truche, a professor of geochemistry at Grenoble Alpes University in France who researches natural hydrogen. That's because it's not clear whether or not hydrogen is generated quickly enough to replace any that might be extracted from reservoirs. Truche says the rate of hydrogen generation is "several orders of magnitude too slow compared to what we would expect to produce".

He worries about the hype, noting that "natural hydrogen production is currently tiny, the hydrogen that is found is rarely pure, [and] many discoveries are of dissolved gas, which is difficult to produce".

Even if a large discovery was made in the next few years, it would take at least another decade to develop an industry at scale – Laurent Truche

Naturally produced hydrogen is also unlikely to be located where it is needed and hydrogen is difficult to transport and store, although proponents told the BBC it could support fuel sovereignty by powering local industries.

But extracting white hydrogen could also come with unintended consequences, including impacts on the climate that could undo some of the benefits of replacing fossil fuels.

Hydrogen reservoirs can contain methane, which could offset the benefits of white hydrogen unless it were captured. What's more, once in the atmosphere, hydrogen competes with methane for hydroxyl, a compound which breaks down methane molecules. This means that any hydrogen that escapes during extraction would also make methane in the atmosphere last longer and cause even more warming.

These methane emissions, alongside the emissions embedded in drilling infrastructure, mean white hydrogen production wouldn't be totally carbon free.

One initial estimate suggests that, in cases where reservoirs have a high percentage of hydrogen and low amounts of methane, 0.4kg of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) would be emitted for every kilogram of hydrogen produced. That's less than the average 1.6kg CO2e generated with each kilogram of green hydrogen, which requires the construction of vast renewable energy infrastructure.

However, emissions associated with white hydrogen production would increase the more methane is in the reservoir and the less productive the well becomes. A well with 75% hydrogen and 22.5% methane would emit 1.5 kg CO2e per kg of hydrogen, according to the same study.

White hydrogen proponents tell the BBC that methane emissions can be filtered, while extracting and burning hydrogen as a fuel would reduce the amount that naturally leaks to the surface and reaches the atmosphere.

But Truche disagrees. Large-scale white hydrogen production would lead to increased hydrogen leakage into the atmosphere, he says. It could also impact underground ecosystems and the microbial life that rely on hydrogen as an energy source, he adds. These microbes play an important role in the cycle of the Earth's chemical elements and compounds – yet relatively little is known about the deep terrestrial subsurface, according to a scientific review by Rachel Beaver and Josh Neufeld at the University of Waterloo in Canada.

Getty Images

A team from Indonesia's energy ministry take samples of natural hydrogen found at a bathing location in the Central Sulawesi Province, Indonesia (Credit: Getty Images)

Even if a large discovery was made in the next few years, it would take at least another decade to develop an industry at scale, says Truche, meaning white hydrogen will not have an impact on the energy system anytime soon.

Other experts have also argued white hydrogen extraction "simply won’t be available" to replace the fossil fuel-produced hydrogen currently in use within the timeframe needed to meet global climate goals.

For Emmanuel Masini, founder and chief executive of Mantle8, a French hydrogen exploration start-up backed by Bill Gates' Breakthrough Energy, however, the urgent need for decarbonisation is exactly the reason for accelerating white hydrogen exploration.

"We are convinced there could be really significant [hydrogen] reserves, we need to go ahead and deliver them," Masini says.

To do this, Mantle8 has developed a technology which uses geology, geophysics and geochemistry data and sensors to create 4D images (in three dimensions and across time) of the Earth's mantle to pinpoint the specific location of white hydrogen reservoirs and quantify and monitor the volume of hydrogen in each.

The technology could be used to map the entire planet and take out the guesswork in exploration by identifying replenishing reservoirs, saving both time and money, says the start-up. Masini says it has already identified 12 promising locations across Europe and aims to identify 10 million tonnes of hydrogen reserves by 2030 – a goal he is confident it can meet.

More like this:

• Why we may soon need to eat 'resurrection' plants

• Are China's swap stations the future of electric cars?

• The controversial machine sending CO2 to the ocean and making hydrogen

In February 2025, Mantle8 secured financing to pilot the technology in the Pyrenees mountains in southwest France. The company aims to begin exploratory drilling in 2028 and produce its first kilogram of hydrogen by 2030 at around $0.80 (£0.60) per kg. That would make it cheaper than any other hydrogen form and at least five times less than the cost of green hydrogen. Researchers at Stanford University have also estimated that white hydrogen could be produced below $1 (£0.74) per kg under optimal conditions.

Tools and expertise developed by the oil and gas industry could be adapted to extract the gas, argues Viacheslav Zgonnik, a pioneer in natural hydrogen exploration and chief executive of HyReveal, a start-up developing ways to detect and monitor hydrogen underground. "It presents an amazing opportunity for the hydrocarbon industry to make the pivot" to cleaner energy sources, he argues.

Oil companies are indeed showing growing interest. In Brazil, Petrobras is researching the possibility of natural hydrogen extraction. Oil giants BP and Chevron have joined a consortium studying natural hydrogen, and BP recently invested in UK-based natural hydrogen start-up Snowfox Discovery.

Others are considering stimulating hydrogen production by injecting water into underground iron-rich rocks to produce "orange" hydrogen, a process which could theoretically be coupled with carbon sequestration but remains more complicated and uncertain.

Zgonnik is optimistic white hydrogen can provide "the missing link" to decarbonise hard-to-abate sectors, starting with the fertiliser industry. Still, even under a best-case scenario, he estimates it could replace "only a few percent" of global fossil fuel use by 2050.

But others, like Truche, argue it is too early to determine what role, if any, white hydrogen could play in the energy transition. Whether replenishing reservoirs of extractable hydrogen exist underground "is a genuine scientific question", he says. "But it remains to be proven."

--

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24. Hackers breach intelligence website used by CIA

Oh no...

Excerpts:

“This wasn’t a breach of opportunity,” said Mr. Eads, founder of Data Abyss. “Given the sensitivity and exclusivity of the Digital Hammer program, this compromise almost certainly points to a state-sponsored actor, likely China.

“When proprietary innovations intended for CIA-backed programs are exfiltrated, it’s not just a vendor issue but a serious national security breach,” he said.

The National Reconnaissance Office recently uncovered that the unclassified portion of the Acquisition Research Center was compromised and sent notices to several companies affected. The security breach impacts a number of acquisitions supported by the center among several government agencies.

The office’s notice said the compromise so far does not appear to involve classified information but rather losses as a result of unauthorized access to proprietary and personally identifiable information.

Hackers breach intelligence website used by CIA

Compromise of unclassified site latest digital breach

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

Exclusive

By - The Washington Times - Thursday, July 24, 2025

Unidentified hackers recently compromised a major intelligence website used by the CIA and other agencies to submit details of sensitive contracts, according to the National Reconnaissance Office, the spy satellite service that runs the site.

The breach targeted proprietary intellectual property and personal information submitted on the Acquisition Research Center website in support of several innovative CIA spying programs.

In addition to the intelligence website hack, Microsoft revealed this week that Chinese state hackers compromised the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, a central nuclear weapons agency.

A National Reconnaissance Office spokesman told The Washington Times: “We can confirm that an incident involving our unclassified Acquisition Research Center website is currently being investigated by federal law enforcement. We do not comment on ongoing investigations.”

The extent of the breach is not fully known, but people familiar with the activity said hackers likely obtained information on key technologies for CIA operations.

Other potential areas of compromise could include the Space Force, its efforts to build surveillance satellites and space weapons, and the Golden Dome missile defense program.

Data from one highly sensitive program, Digital Hammer, was compromised, said people familiar with the hacking.

Digital Hammer compiles cutting-edge technologies for human intelligence gathering, surveillance and counterintelligence operations. The program focuses on the threat of Chinese intelligence and information operations.

Portions of many Digital Hammer programs are unclassified. However, others submitted to the National Reconnaissance Office acquisition center are classified and involve capabilities essential to covert operations and strategic intelligence collection.

Digital Hammer is a closely guarded program working to develop open-source intelligence platforms, analytics, and items such as miniaturized sensors and hidden surveillance tools.

Other programs seek to develop acoustic and communications systems, artificial-intelligence-powered data collection, analysis and behavior prediction tools.

Countersurveillance and signature reduction technologies also are part of the program.

Lori Ann Duvall-Jones, CIA deputy director of the Office of Acquisition Management, said in a 2023 speech that Digital Hammer is a contracting vehicle that allows vendors to present offerings “within a CIA space.”

The program allows the CIA to assess new capabilities and consider how to apply them in an innovative way to a mission set, she said.

Critics say using the unclassified Acquisition Research Center for contracts created security vulnerabilities that hackers exploited.

The CIA states on its website that the center is “the industry’s unclassified and classified access point for acquisition information, new business opportunities, and outreach activity involvement.”

The CIA uses the center as an access point for market research, identifying business solutions and communicating with industry.

Companies seeking to do business with the CIA register with the acquisition center and then explain their core competencies.

Once registered, companies can use the center for solicitations, capabilities briefings, sharing innovative ideas and “identifying sub-prime opportunities.”

A CIA spokesman referred questions about the incident to the National Reconnaissance Office.

L.J. Eads, a former Air Force intelligence officer, said China would gain much from obtaining intellectual property on Digital Hammer, especially technologies designed in partnership with or directly for the intelligence community.

“This wasn’t a breach of opportunity,” said Mr. Eads, founder of Data Abyss. “Given the sensitivity and exclusivity of the Digital Hammer program, this compromise almost certainly points to a state-sponsored actor, likely China.

“When proprietary innovations intended for CIA-backed programs are exfiltrated, it’s not just a vendor issue but a serious national security breach,” he said.

The National Reconnaissance Office recently uncovered that the unclassified portion of the Acquisition Research Center was compromised and sent notices to several companies affected. The security breach impacts a number of acquisitions supported by the center among several government agencies.

The office’s notice said the compromise so far does not appear to involve classified information but rather losses as a result of unauthorized access to proprietary and personally identifiable information.

The agency is working to ensure that the full details of the compromise are identified and appropriate countermeasures are taken to prevent further losses.

During a speech last summer, National Reconnaissance Office Director Christopher Scolese said his agency was expanding its satellite capabilities and building innovative capabilities to counter China and Russia.

Mr. Scolese said Russia poses a very focused and capable space threat to U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

However, the threat from China is more diversified, he said.

“Russia is pushing into more disruptive capabilities of space,” he told a security conference.

U.S. officials said Moscow is developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite weapon.

“China, however, represents a different threat,” Mr. Scolese said. “They are a very capable country, technologically smart, and they’re economically strong. They’re developing capabilities across the spectrum of systems, and they are competing with us. We have right now the strongest capability and we have the best ISR, but China is coming on strong. It represents an additional threat to what we’re doing.”

The National Reconnaissance Office is working to advance its capabilities in space and on the ground to become faster, more agile and more resilient, he said.

“That complicates the calculus of anybody who wants to do us harm,” Mr. Scolese said.

On the National Nuclear Security Administration breach, Microsoft said the large-scale cyberattack involved Chinese hackers who exploited a Microsoft SharePoint zero-day vulnerability on Friday. The hackers were able to penetrate the agency’s network.

So far, the agency has been unable to determine whether the hackers stole sensitive or classified information from that network.

The National Nuclear Security Administration is the agency in charge of maintaining and building U.S. nuclear weapons for the Pentagon.

“As of this writing, Microsoft has observed two named Chinese nation-state actors, Linen Typhoon and Violet Typhoon exploiting these vulnerabilities targeting internet-facing SharePoint servers,” the company said in a security blog post Tuesday.

“In addition, we have observed another China-based threat actor, tracked as Storm-2603, exploiting these vulnerabilities to deploy ransomware.”

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

25. Pentagon lags behind China in realizing strategies for cognitive warfare, Senate report finds

Pentagon lags behind China in realizing strategies for cognitive warfare, Senate report finds

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, July 23, 2025

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

NEWS AND ANALYSIS:

The Pentagon lacks “strategic clarity” when it comes to conducting the cognitive warfare that analysts see as necessary for confronting China, according to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The committee’s report on the fiscal 2026 defense authorization bill warns that despite congressional action, the Pentagon and military services remain unclear in defining this new domain of nonkinetic warfare, which is a major focus of China’s People’s Liberation Army.

The panel wants the Pentagon to produce a report for Congress on cognitive warfare.

Chinese cognitive warfare involves an array of weaponry ranging from “brain control” arms, to sophisticated information warfare operations. The goal, according to the Pentagon’s annual report on the Chinese military, is to manipulate information to attack an adversary’s decision-making abilities.

“The PLA is exploring a range of ‘neurocognitive warfare’ capabilities that exploit adversaries using neuroscience and psychology,” the latest report said.

Examples include plans to use artificial intelligence-powered deepfake videos to mislead and confuse military and political leaders during conflicts, and psychological warfare to demoralize U.S. troops and polarize society.

PLA researchers are working on advanced voice synthesis tools that will be used for low-cost, high-impact disinformation campaigns to defeat enemies without conventional conflict.

The committee report said the global security landscape is rapidly evolving with the increasing sophistication of information-centric, strategic threats.

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China, for example, “is actively engaged in developing what it terms ‘informatized warfare’ and ‘intelligentized warfare,’ with a strong emphasis on cognitive domain operations, involving the integration of information warfare across military and civilian sectors and viewing information as a critical domain for achieving strategic advantage in great power competition,” the report said.

“The committee believes there is an urgent need for a coherent understanding of and investment in cognitive warfare to address these challenges,” the report said.

Noting “ambiguities and challenges” in core definitions regarding information warfare, the committee is directing Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to produce a report for Congress on cognitive warfare, as well as “narrative intelligence.”

“The committee notes that despite multiple congressional actions, there remain ambiguities and challenges in core definitions relating to information warfare, with frequent conflation of terms such as information warfare, information operations, cyberwarfare, cognitive warfare, and influence operations,” the report said.

“The committee believes this definitional ambiguity contributes to a lack of strategic clarity,” according to the report.

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The cognitive warfare report, if contained in final legislation, would be due to Congress before March 31 and must “define cognitive warfare as it relates to the Department of Defense and assess how this definition aligns with or relates to existing doctrinal elements, including information warfare, psychological operations, and military information support operations.”

The committee also wants the report to include an assessment of which Pentagon organizations are responsible for waging cognitive warfare.

The defense policy bill passed the committee July 16 and next goes to the full Senate. The final bill also must be reconciled with a House version during a House-Senate conference later.

Chinese man guilty of espionage

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A Southern California engineer for three U.S. high-technology companies pleaded guilty on Monday to stealing sensitive trade secrets used to detect nuclear missile launches, track ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and to help American warplanes detect and evade heat-seeking missiles, the Justice Department said.

Chenguang Gong, 59, a dual U.S.-China citizen from San Jose, offered the trade secrets for sale in China to help Beijing’s military develop similar unique technology, according to court papers in the case.

A plea agreement in the case states that Gong transferred more than 3,600 files from a Los Angeles-area research and development company where he worked to personal flash drives last year.

“The files Gong transferred include blueprints for sophisticated infrared sensors designed for use in space-based systems to detect nuclear missile launches and track ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as blueprints for sensors designed to enable U.S. military aircraft to detect incoming heat-seeking missiles and take countermeasures, including by jamming the missiles’ infrared tracking ability,” the department said in announcing the plea.

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The plea agreement stopped short of stating that Gong sold or gave the documents to China.

However, the plea deal states that he traveled to China and gave presentations discussing the sensitive radar technologies in a bid to join a Chinese government “talent” program designed to obtain western military know-how, including details of advanced U.S. infrared sensors.

Much of the information was related to the design of integrated circuits that allow space-based sensors to detect missile launches and track enemy ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

Other information would help Chinese aircraft track missile threats in low visibility conditions.

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The trade secrets were obtained from a U.S. defense contractor and two other American companies that were not identified by name in court papers.

The data also included next-generation sensors that could be used to detect radar-evading stealth targets.

China state media reports have said the PLA is working on technology that would allow its integrated air-defense networks to detect U.S. stealth bombers.

Gong sought employment in Chinese talent programs from 2014 to 2022 that are used to obtain advanced technologies for building up the Chinese economy and military.

In one application, Gong stated that he proposed to build a high-performance analog-to-digital converter in China that had military applications. The application stated that the converters “directly determine the accuracy and range of radar systems” and that “missile navigation systems also often use radar front-end systems.”

The plea agreement states that the economic loss from the trade secrets theft exceeds $3.5 million.

An FBI complaint in the case stated that the loss of the trade secrets was worth “hundreds of millions of dollars” and would damage U.S. security if provided to China.

One of the companies that Gong worked for was identified as HRL Laboratories, which works on space-based infrared sensor technology, according to a spokeswoman.

Sentencing is set for Sept. 29 in federal court in Los Angeles. He could receive a maximum of 10 years in prison.

A federal prosecutor in the case and a lawyer for Gong declined to comment on the plea deal.

“We know that foreign actors, including the PRC, are actively seeking to steal our technology, but we will remain vigilant against this threat by safeguarding the innovations of American businesses and researchers,” Martin Estrada, U.S. attorney for the Central District of California, said in a statement at the time of Gong’s arrest.

China, Russia coordination fears

NATO is facing the likelihood of simultaneous attacks in both Europe and Asia by Russian and Chinese military forces, the commander of the alliance said recently.

Air Force Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, who is also U.S. European Command commander, said the alliance needs to prepare for such a two-front conflict, with 2027 a potential year for such attacks.

“We’re going to need every bit of kit and equipment and munitions that we can in order to beat that,” Gen. Grynkewich said during a July 17 meeting of military and defense industrial leaders in Wiesbaden, Germany.

The four-star commander said that if Chinese President Xi Jinping were to move against Taiwan militarily, this likely would be coordinated with Russian President Vladimir Putin, leading to a potential global war.

“That, to me, means that both of these things could happen together,” he said.

Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin concluded an agreement in February 2022 dubbed the “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow. The agreement came days before Russian forces invaded Ukraine.

The general’s warning was echoed by two other European defense leaders, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and European Union Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius.

Mr. Rutte said World War III will be set off if Mr. Xi invades Taiwan and gets Mr. Putin to launch attacks on NATO nations to prevent European military intervention in the Pacific.

“There’s an increasing realization, and let’s not be naive about this: If Xi Jinping would attack Taiwan, he would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, residing in Moscow, and telling him, ‘Hey, I’m going to do this, and I need you to keep them busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory,’” Mr. Rutte told The New York Times.

The NATO chief said it would be naive to think a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be limited to those two nations and predicted any war would be waged on two fronts.

Mr. Kubilius told reporters in Washington that “the most dangerous moment can be in 2027, when both Russia and China will make these aggressive moves in a coordinated way.”

Mr. Rutte said to avoid a global war NATO must bolster its forces to deter Moscow from expanding its Ukraine invasion deeper into Europe.

Western nations also must unite to curb Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, he said, as China has been stepping up aggressive and provocative military maneuvers throughout the region.

• Contact Bill Gertz on X @BillGertz.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

26. Achieved Overmatch – A Potential Future for AI in the Army

Graphics at the link.

Excerpts:

We need a deliberate strategy to not only codify our ends, ways, and means but also to align the Army’s efforts with the rest of government and industry while also creating dilemmas for adversaries through lawfare, export controls, and other measures. AI is clearly an extraordinary federal priority, as seen in the table, which samples just a few recent federal actions.11 AI is also vividly important to industry, as seen in the stock price of chipmaker Nvidia, the world’s third most valuable public company as of 28 April 2025.12 How to create an Army strategy for AI that reaps synergistic effects from alignment with wider federal strategy and trends in industry will require its own research effort. Part of this strategy must deliberately focus on creating dilemmas for adversaries: What capabilities do we want to delay or deny adversaries, and how can we align that disruption with federal strategy and industry desires? Creating dilemmas is essential since overmatch is a state of advantage, and advantage comes from both speeding ourselves up and slowing down adversaries.

Alignment of Army and federal AI strategies and industry efforts is also essential to solve the myriad technical, legal, and procedural issues. For instance, AI voraciously consumes power, produces tremendous heat and EMS emissions, and tends to be centralized in data centers (as opposed to edge computing at the end devices).13 The Army cannot solve these problems, but industry can and already is, and federal strategy is essential to guiding industry to solve military problems. Similarly, there is a natural tendency for model creators to develop proprietary systems that do not seamlessly work with those of rivals. Lack of alignment with federal strategy and interaction with industry could see the Army, Navy, and Air Force hitch themselves to incompatible providers, erasing our advantage over time to the cost of billions of dollars and years of wasted effort. Lastly, the examples and overall vision here for AI in the Army is quite optimistic for each time horizon. If we fight trends, we will certainly not afford future overmatch or achieve it in time; if we harness trends, it may speed up use cases, especially those with dual military and civilian application.

AI has recently reached an inflection point where it can provide real, if still limited, functional value; this value will rapidly change as AI unifies more capabilities and AGI becomes a reality. Across all the horizons of continuous transformation, AI can enhance our Army to provide evolutionary advantages. But the Army clearly cannot achieve this on its own, hence the need to build concepts now while creating and aligning an Army strategy for AI with federal strategy and industry efforts, simultaneously determining how to create dilemmas for adversary development so we grow our advantage. An AI revolution is happening in society at large, and now is the time to plant the seeds of military revolution. A revolution that provides the Army overmatch in the ability to act faster, make superior decisions, be more lethal, and better protect the force, than every adversary (see figure 8).

Achieved Overmatch

A Potential Future for AI in the Army

Maj. Thomas Haydock, U.S. Army

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2025/Achieved-Overmatch/mc_cid/36e98d3a27/

A portrait of a futuristic soldier showcases a blend of human strength and technological prowess. (AI image from Adobe Stock)

It’s very clear that AI is going to impact every industry. I think that every nation needs to make sure that AI is a part of their national strategy. Every country will be impacted.

—Jensen Huang, Nvidia CEO

Eastern Europe, 2045

Observing an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced wet-gap crossing (WGX) was like watching a colony of bees at work. The V Corps’ masterAI system effortlessly controlled everything from the initial reconnaissance, the planning, 3D printing the bridging segments and driving them to the water, and even linking the segments into a complete bridge. The AI even controlled the vehicle movement across the modular bridge. Because of the sensors that continuously measured the current, torsion between bridge sections, weight of each vehicle, and other factors, crossing was amazingly rapid. The abundance of sensor data meant the AI could comfortably cross many vehicles at once, all at higher speeds. But the masterAI did far more, from planning to preparation, through execution and assessment.

In planning, it created the nucleus of the plan for the staff, generated and then answered information requirements and synchronized the plans vertically and horizontally across echelons. In seconds, it performed the work of a hundred human minds by analyzing the terrain and weather, including accessing information from historical records and live imagery. It rapidly created courses of action (COA) that accounted for the enemy’s doctrine and recent observations, capabilities, composition, and disposition. As instructed, it integrated deception into each COA, arranging large and small actions to build an image of a very different reality.

With COAs built, the AI segregated the friendly plan into one persona and war-gamed the COAs against a separate persona that played the enemy. Through hundreds of war-game iterations, which combined took only seconds, the masterAI improved the three requested COAs and lowered risk. Further, it seamlessly integrated the often-neglected aspects of traffic control, nonlethal fires, command post jumps, and more, all while building the right signals and noise for the deception plan. The generation of all these staff planning products, which combined military decision-making process steps 2 to 5, took the commander and operations officer about seven minutes and a few prompts to the AI.1

The masterAI’s output included the collection plan for tasking human and autonomous systems to answer information requirements. With a few minutes of human review, that collection plan was approved, and the crossing plan was ready for continued refinement as new information was fed into the COAs and their war games.

Within five hours, the minimum information required for decision-making was available. The commander and staff donned their virtual reality goggles as the masterAI presented each COA in an immersive movie-like format. Interacting with each other and the AI in the simulated world, the plan was adjusted and approved. V Corps’ masterAI seamlessly coordinated with similar AI enterprises from sister services, subordinate divisions, and allies/partners. Within twenty-four hours, the orders process was complete across all echelons, and plans were synchronized and rehearsed vertically and horizontally across echelons. Rehearsals mimicked the COA briefs, with formations rehearsing on the virtual version of the actual terrain.

AI had a similarly transformative impact on execution. For the actual crossing, the masterAI synchronized efforts, reduced inefficiency, and directed autonomous systems. Following the plan it helped develop and disseminate, it positioned maneuver, protection, sustainment, and more. For example, with human help, the industrial 3D printers in the rear printed the autonomous bridging sections that drove themselves onto trailers for trucking to the crossing site. Once delivered, the sections drove off the trucks, swam into the water, and linked themselves, with humans verifying connections.

All around, a cornucopia of manned and unmanned, autonomous and remote controlled, and expendable and treasured systems combined as individual tiles into a mosaic. In the mosaic, 3D-printed modular systems scanned the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for enemy usage and dynamically adjusted jamming, overwatched the crossing or looked further out, or retransmitted friendly communications. In the river, modular swimming drones, scaled-down versions of the bridging type, monitored current, looked for mines, and waited for enemy boats or swimmers. On the ground, soldiers marked positions for autonomous excavators to converge on and swiftly produce vehicle fighting positions. A few kilometers down and a few hours before, a brigade, augmented by all-terrain vehicles with 3D-printed slip-on covers to mimic supply trucks and mortar carriers, performed a demonstration that mimicked a division. The demonstration was complete with human-impersonating AI chatbots running a dynamic conversation on the EMS to add realism. The masterAI harmonized efforts and delegated as much as it could to lower-level platform AI when it could, still embracing the philosophy of mission command. From overhead to below surface, each warfighting function (WfF) was enhanced for the better, producing overmatch for the U.S. Army.

The masterAI’s effect on protection was particularly remarkable. By integrating a plethora of cameras and other sensors around the crossing and empowering them with machine vision, defensive weapons truly became a layered protection system. Machine guns, microwave emitters, defensive drones, acoustic weapons, lasers, missile launchers, and decoys were seamlessly integrated. Simultaneously, various sensors recorded every engagement, allowing the masterAI to furiously determine enemy locations and strength. Using that information, the masterAI recommended options and supporting taskings to decision-makers to deal with problems.

AI similarly transformed the final step in the operations process, assessment. Assessment was transformed by the combination of machine analysis, near instantaneous conversion of observations into lessons, and easing of human friction. For instance, recording engagements allowed the masterAI to better analyze each success and failure of protection. When bridging sections had issues properly connecting due to bad 3D printing, the problem was noted and a remedy instantly implemented. Human friction, including not sharing lessons with adjacent units, became a relic of previous generations, as each echelon’s AI ceaselessly interacted vertically and horizontally. The entire operations process, from planning to preparation, execution, and assessment, was still conceptually the same but now heightened by machine speed.

AI systems like masterAI were revolutionary, but each step of the revolution was itself a small evolution rather than a giant break with the past. It was the aggregate of years of development, the proliferation of sensors, and the integration of AI with other systems like 3D printing that was revolutionary compared to the generation prior.

How to Think About AI

The U.S. Army Futures Command is currently producing the forthcoming Army warfighting concept, continuous transformation (CT). As so far laid out by Gen. James Rainey in a Military Review article, CT looks across three time horizons (see figure 1).2 This article explores how we in the U.S. Army can use AI to gain battlefield advantages across all three horizons. Specifically, we will examine how harnessing current trends in the first two horizons can build evolutionary advantages, generating overmatch against all adversaries in the third horizon. An overmatch representing a revolution compared to militaries that have not harnessed AI. In that light, the vignette above is a preview of our concept-driven future: an AI-boosted U.S. Army that acts faster, makes superior decisions, is more lethal, and better protects the force than every adversary. This article also discusses expected challenges, potential mitigations, and why the Army needs to integrate this approach as part of a national strategy for AI superiority in national defense.

Figure 1. Continuous Transformation, the Army’s Forthcoming Warfighting Concept

(Figure by Army Futures Command)

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Transformation in Contact

Transformation in contact (TiC) looks forward two years to enable “solving problems and seizing opportunities today.”3 With that short horizon, TiC revolves around using capabilities that are already or imminently available. The tension for TiC is how AI can create advantages in the existing force while incorporating evolutionary change to build up revolutionary overmatch in the later concept-driven transformation (CDT) horizon. Resolving that tension requires understanding the current and impending state of AI.

Currently, AI is highly narrow (known as artificial narrow intelligence, or ANI), with available products offering very-limited-use cases. Anyone that has used large language model (LLM) chatbots like ChatGPT knows they excel at understanding text. Indeed, they provide great responses to prompts like, “Tell me about the use of operational art in the American Revolution,” or “Summarize this attached article.” Experiences vary between products and how the prompt is worded, but the responses can typically illustrate a very good understanding of nuance (which operational art has much of), facts, and more. Other well-known forms of AI include self-driving vehicles like Alphabet’s Waymo and facial recognition systems. But those applications are very narrow, performing a particular task quite well, at machine speed: text-based interaction, driving, or identifying criminals in our examples.

Figure 2. The Spectrum of AI

(Figure by author; AI image generated with Google Gemini)

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Humans, then, are a form of general intelligence because we can do all these tasks, apply lessons between different types of tasks, and at least make reasonable attempts at things we have not been trained to do (see figure 2).4 In short, while we are slower, we know how to adapt for things we have not specifically trained for, like unusual traffic situations. Given this state of narrow AIs, what then does evolutionary advantage in the TiC horizon look like?

Figure 3. AI’s Potential Across Warfighting Functions During Transformation in Contact

(Figure by author)

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It looks like a variety of artificial narrow intelligence systems performing limited functions that humans are capable of but at machine speed to generate advantages. Figure 3 illustrates examples of evolutionary change that AI can bring to the Army. Two areas particularly ripe for AI advantages are active protection systems (APS) for vehicles (included in figure 3), and orders production (not included in figure 3), which primarily align with the protection and command-and-control WfFs.5

Figure 4. Model of Current Self-Driving Car Systems

(Figure by author; AI image generated with Google Gemini)

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APS can build on concepts already in place in hundreds of thousands of self-driving vehicles. Those vehicles take inputs from sensors like cameras, radar, sonar, and Global Position System signals and feed it into a dedicated AI inside the platform (see figure 4). That platform AI makes decisions about how to react to road hazards, other vehicles, icy roads, and more, all while keeping the vehicle on route. These platform systems are updated as higher-level enterprise AI is trained in new scenarios. APS on armored vehicles can follow a similar model.

Like self-driving vehicles, APS can integrate a variety of sensors, be taught new threats, and make decisions about threats (or at least enable human decision-makers). APS sensors can include passive sensors like cameras and acoustic sensors, and emitters like LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) or radar. AI-powered APS can learn about new situations, like how to recognize and then defeat new types of enemy missiles or drones. Importantly, they can also be taught to ignore friendly systems to prevent fratricide. If allowed, they can also be empowered to defeat those threats with defensive weapons, countermeasures, maneuvering, etc.

Further, recorded engagements, with supporting sensor data and possible hypothetical situations, can enable AI systems to create and disseminate lessons learned throughout the force, as in our vignette. Imagine the Maneuver Center of Excellence with an enterprise-level AI system that continuously analyzes successful and failed APS engagements and learns how to defeat a spectrum of threats. Perhaps the defeat for a particular situation is a tank using organic defenses (probably TiC horizon) and another involves the tank platoon collaboratively defeating the threat (deliberate transformation horizon). A powerful AI system running countless iterations and learning to win and then disseminating new techniques to less robust vehicle-mounted AI systems would be an incredible protection advantage. Looking at warfare now in Ukraine, where drones, mines, and missiles have severely reduced the freedom of movement and maneuver by both sides, and a transformation of APS is called for.

Orders production as a command-and-control function is similarly fertile ground for AI empowerment. Analyzing orders and annexes, imagery, friendly and enemy situations and capabilities, etc., are human tasks that machines can perform now. Simplistic tasks like reading an order and pulling out specified and implied tasks can be done by AI in seconds. More complex tasks like digesting enemy doctrine, equipment capabilities, and analyzing terrain and weather to create possible enemy courses of action, devour hundreds of staff labor hours. AI can produce the same output in almost no time. This capability can be built now with our thousands of real-world and training operations orders as training data. Admittedly, using AI in orders production has an opportunity cost (as all decisions do): putting human staffs through the orders process creates a deep understanding to guide decision-making. But imagine a staff that can complete mission analysis, generate an information collection plan, initiate it, and find and then target its opponent’s command post that is still highlighting their order and formatting slides! Which side would you choose?

In all these examples, the technology is either currently available or can be adapted from existing systems. However, the challenge for the TiC horizon is harnessing or creating unified AI systems, or combining narrow AI systems that can handle an entire process without having to involve other AI for subtasks. For instance, we do not want to use an LLM to analyze written orders and produce some outputs for orders production while using a different AI to analyze military graphics, maps, and imagery. AI in the TiC window will perform tasks that humans are capable of, but it will perform them much more efficiently and effectively. But central to harnessing that advantage is employing unified AI system. The deliberate transformation (DT) horizon will expand the unification of systems and the progression from narrow to general AI, generating cumulative advantage.

Deliberate Transformation

Where TiC is about “solving problems and seizing opportunities today,” DT is “efforts managed through Army-level processes to deliver the Army we need within the time horizon for defense programming.”6 Building on advancements during TiC, AI in the DT period will become increasingly unified while approaching, but possibly short of, general AI (see figure 5). Crucially for our Army, this will include the transition from tasks humans can do (but faster) into the initial emergence of tasks that humans cannot. Importantly, AI’s evolution will intersect with other burgeoning technologies like 3D printing and autonomous vehicles (which need AI). Deliberately managing the integration of these related technologies will enable the later emergence of revolutionary advantages.

Figure 5. AI’s Potential Across Warfighting Functions During Deliberate Transformation

(Figure by author; AI images generated with Google Gemini)

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The example of printing bridging sections in the opening vignette previewed how narrow AI systems will become more unified and provide potential advantages from integrating emerging trends. Printing material as large and complicated as bridging sections may realistically belong in the CDT horizon, but its earlier version will emerge during DT. In this horizon, AI’s ability to provide route and platform optimization will merge with the ability to manage 3D printers and robotic warehousing duties (figure 5). This will look like sustainment AI receiving an inventory alert for network cables or lug nuts and executing a decision-making process. That process will be another optimization problem to determine whether the AI prints the items itself or resources from elsewhere. Included in the distribution assets may well be autonomous vehicles. In short, AI in sustainment will grow increasingly unified, expanding from narrow uses like inventory management and route/platform optimization into management and optimization of entire supply chains.

Figure 5 highlights additional changes to expect during the DT horizon. Among those, the fires WfF offers a superb illustration of the evolution that will incorporate more systems and processes into unified AI. For example, fires will build on the TiC advantages to grow more robust counterfire (sensing and strike) capabilities and integrate more strike assets and effects.

AI enabled by sensors will change counterfire sensing by spreading the capability across the battlefield while introducing passive sensors that do not have to reveal themselves. Counterfire sensing is the ability to detect munitions and predict the launcher’s point of origin using ballistic calculations; it currently relies on specialty radar emitters. However, APS, which will already be using cameras and other sensors to scan for drones and antitank weapons, can serve as counterfire sensing nodes for mortars, rockets, and ballistic missiles. These platforms can either predict the launcher’s location or send raw data for fires cell action. Additionally, passive sensing (not emitting signals) like cameras avoids the dilemma of current counterfire radars announcing themselves as high payoff targets when turned on. In short, AI-enabled APS will proliferate counterfire sensing across the battlefield with the potential for passive sensing.

Figure 6. Dynamic Jamming

(Figure by author; AI images generated from Google Gemini and electromagnetic spectrum image from NASA)

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Concurrently, AI fires decision-making will evolve from TiC to unify lethal and nonlethal effects, from mortars and drones to electronic warfare and obscuration, and across echelons. In TiC, images will enable fires AI at a given echelon, say division, to weaponeer for its rockets, artillery, and mortars. In DT, data like target images (including thermal and infrared), detection of jamming sources, and APS counterfire sensing will grow the optimization provided by fires AI. Optimization will include near-instantaneous decisions on potentially sending targets for lower echelon prosecution or if a strike by loitering drones or cannon artillery (or multiple effects together) is better. Nonlethal optimization can include AI overseeing frequency scanning and the dynamic adjustment to jammers to match the speed of enemy transition (see figure 6). These enhancements will be part of the evolution of fires AI as additional systems and capabilities are unified into the enterprise.

In the DT horizon, the combination of increasingly unified AI systems in each WfF and their intersection with other emerging trends will generate advantages by beginning to do what humans cannot. In our sustainment example, AI expanded into managing and optimizing an entire supply chain and did so in a dynamic operational environment. That type of task, precisely managing inventory and determining optimal delivery to customers, is something that massive companies like Amazon can do now but only in a static environment. For Amazon, the consequences of failure are low compared to large-scale combat operations, and its optimization is the product of years in a world where no enemy is attempting to destroy delivery assets, warehouses, headquarters, or bridges. Presently, in military sustainment, we willingly sacrifice utility (providing as much sustainment as possible to every customer possible), for simplicity. We designate priority of support because it makes planning and execution simple but not optimized. This unification of AI, that increasingly does what humans cannot, will build the revolutionary advantages to come from CDT.

Concept-Driven Transformation

CDT “is the longer-term vision described in the Army’s emerging warfighting concept.”7 Returning to figure 1, CDT focuses on seven-to-fifteen years out; our goal for the CDT horizon is achieving overmatch against all adversaries, an overmatch that represents a revolutionary advantage in decision-making speed and quality, protection, and lethality over ground forces that have not unlocked AI’s potential (like our Army was around 2020). Figure 7 illustrates a version of that overmatch, following examples in the opening vignette.

Figure 7. AI’s Potential Across Warfighting Functions Concept-Driven Transformation Horizon

(Figure by author; Abrams tank image by Staff Sgt. Steven Colvin)

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I believe AI’s greatest value for our Army will be realizing the potential of mosaic warfare (MW). MW focuses on creating “adaptability and flexibility for U.S. forces and complexity or uncertainty for an enemy through the rapid composition and recomposition of more disaggregated U.S. forces using human command and machine control.”8 MW is form of combined arms that envisions fitting different pieces (tiles) together to create a coherent friendly system (the mosaic); figure 7 provides additional insight. The contrast is a puzzle, in which there is only one arrangement of the pieces, and alternatives produce failure.

The central advantage MW seeks is presenting a greater variety of dilemmas to adversaries through tailored force packages that couple robust and exquisite platforms with many small, highly specific partners that may be autonomous and/or expendable. Essentially, it means supplementing a few large, powerful mosaic pieces with a variety of small tiles. Mosaics and puzzles can produce the same system, but one is robust and the other is fragile. Consider the following examples:

A frigate and several unmanned surface vessels could replace a surface action group of three destroyers, or a section of strike-fighters could be replaced by a strike-fighter acting as a C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] platform for a group of standoff missiles and sensor- and EW-equipped [electronic warfare] UAVs [unmanned aerial systems]. In a ground force, rather than relying on large formations, smaller units and subunits could be augmented with small and medium-sized UGVs [unmanned ground vehicles] and/or UAVs to improve their self-defense, ISR, and logistics capability.9

The opening vignette’s WGX is a model for MW synergistically combined with AI and 3D printing. The bridge was printed in segments that moved to the river and assembled autonomously. In the air, drones retransmitted friendly communication, provided observation and attack, and located and chased the enemy across the EMS with jamming. In the water, drones measured current and scanned for mines. On the ground, autonomous excavators massed to rapidly prepare survivability positions for far-side security. Decoys made the demonstration force of a brigade look like a real division, mimicking tanks, ambulances, and more, including details like chatbot-run EMS activity to impersonate friendly patterns. This is the potential of MW with AI harmonizing the tiles, assisting human staffs and commanders envision new arrangements of the tiles that enhance our capabilities while creating dilemmas for adversaries.

In the CDT horizon, we can also harmonize deception, intelligence, and operations, a feat that today is a herculean mental effort and cannot be done quickly. The point of deception is to cause enemy action or inaction that provides advantages for friendly forces. As history has proved repeatedly, deception can be decisive, as in a handful of Greek troops hidden inside a wooden horse infiltrating inside Troy to enable the victory that years of siege could not. But deception requires meticulously synchronizing real and false activities with observations of the enemy. Deception is not thought of as a mosaic, but it could be; the right arrangement of tiles into a lenticular image to create one mosaic from a friendly perspective and a different mosaic from the enemy’s, but while watching the enemy to see if they interpret the image as friendly forces want them to. However, deception is about providing the right breadcrumbs (or tiles) to create a believable story.

In the WGX scenario, synchronizing deception, intelligence, and operations might look like painting the picture (or arranging the tiles) that the decoy is the real crossing while the real crossing is in fact a demonstration. In other words, arranging events and monitoring enemy activity to see if they believe the fake is real and the real is fake. With the thousands of friendly actions, how can we orchestrate this lie? The U.S. Army has done this masterfully in instances such as the 1944 Normandy landings and the 1991 Gulf War, but it takes months of practice to properly arrange the tiles without giving away the truth.10 With AI, this can become drastically easier as synchronizing efforts and resources among deception, intelligence, and operations can be addressed as an optimization problem, and then war-gamed at machine speed as described in figure 7.

Conclusion and Future Steps

AI can produce overmatch for our Army, but the road to overmatch requires continual evolution and an accompanying national strategy for AI superiority. Overmatch will be the product of the continual evolution in AI that unifies more capabilities. During the TiC horizon, AI will be able to do many human tasks but at machine speed. However, the lack of artificial general intelligence (AGI) may mean a variety of specialized AI products, such as an LLM AI for digesting orders from higher with a machine-vision AI for understanding maps, imagery, and military graphics. The DT window will see increasingly unified AI, and perhaps even the emergence of true AGI. This includes a potential command post AI like our vignette’s masterAI, performing a complete orders process, identifying information requirements, building and war-gaming a collection plan, and then supervising the collection via manned and unmanned systems. These evolutionary advances can build up to an overmatch in the CDT horizon.

Our potential CDT future is the vignette’s WGX that harmonized human and autonomous efforts, producing overmatch in decision-making speed and quality, protection, and lethality over ground forces that have not unlocked AI’s potential. The increasingly unified AI, if not full AGI, will enhance the speed of planning and synchronization, as in the example of the synchronization of deception, intelligence, and operations. Particularly important will be the leaps for protection as the APS of individual platforms unifies into collaboration between APS to protect entire formations. As seen in the Russia-Ukraine War, protection has not kept pace with threats, hence the abundant videos showing drones preying on platforms and forcing tanks to add homemade cages. Protection’s advancement will not stop there. APS can grow into collaborating systems across sister services while also adding in passive measures like autonomous excavators and AI-managed emission control. Lethality will similarly advance as MW becomes a possibility and collaborative AI between sister services eases the burden of joint operations and fires. However, achieving this CDT future is far from certain.

Table. Recent Significant Federal Policies on AI

(Table by author)

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We need a deliberate strategy to not only codify our ends, ways, and means but also to align the Army’s efforts with the rest of government and industry while also creating dilemmas for adversaries through lawfare, export controls, and other measures. AI is clearly an extraordinary federal priority, as seen in the table, which samples just a few recent federal actions.11 AI is also vividly important to industry, as seen in the stock price of chipmaker Nvidia, the world’s third most valuable public company as of 28 April 2025.12 How to create an Army strategy for AI that reaps synergistic effects from alignment with wider federal strategy and trends in industry will require its own research effort. Part of this strategy must deliberately focus on creating dilemmas for adversaries: What capabilities do we want to delay or deny adversaries, and how can we align that disruption with federal strategy and industry desires? Creating dilemmas is essential since overmatch is a state of advantage, and advantage comes from both speeding ourselves up and slowing down adversaries.

Alignment of Army and federal AI strategies and industry efforts is also essential to solve the myriad technical, legal, and procedural issues. For instance, AI voraciously consumes power, produces tremendous heat and EMS emissions, and tends to be centralized in data centers (as opposed to edge computing at the end devices).13 The Army cannot solve these problems, but industry can and already is, and federal strategy is essential to guiding industry to solve military problems. Similarly, there is a natural tendency for model creators to develop proprietary systems that do not seamlessly work with those of rivals. Lack of alignment with federal strategy and interaction with industry could see the Army, Navy, and Air Force hitch themselves to incompatible providers, erasing our advantage over time to the cost of billions of dollars and years of wasted effort. Lastly, the examples and overall vision here for AI in the Army is quite optimistic for each time horizon. If we fight trends, we will certainly not afford future overmatch or achieve it in time; if we harness trends, it may speed up use cases, especially those with dual military and civilian application.

Figure 8. The Army’s Road to Achieving Overmatch

(Figure by Army Futures Command, adapted by author)

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AI has recently reached an inflection point where it can provide real, if still limited, functional value; this value will rapidly change as AI unifies more capabilities and AGI becomes a reality. Across all the horizons of continuous transformation, AI can enhance our Army to provide evolutionary advantages. But the Army clearly cannot achieve this on its own, hence the need to build concepts now while creating and aligning an Army strategy for AI with federal strategy and industry efforts, simultaneously determining how to create dilemmas for adversary development so we grow our advantage. An AI revolution is happening in society at large, and now is the time to plant the seeds of military revolution. A revolution that provides the Army overmatch in the ability to act faster, make superior decisions, be more lethal, and better protect the force, than every adversary (see figure 8).

Notes 

• Epigraph. Jensen Huang, “Nvidia’s Jensen Huang on the White House’s AI Initiative,” interview posted by Dean Takahashi, Venture Beat, 13 May 2018, https://venturebeat.com/ai/nvidias-jensen-huang-on-the-white-houses-ai-initiative/.

1. Field Manual 5-0, Planning and Orders Production (U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2024), 77. The steps to the military decision-making process are (1) receipt of mission; (2) mission analysis; (3) course of action (COA) development; (4) COA analysis; (5) COA comparison; (6) COA approval; and (7) orders production, dissemination, and transition.
2. James E. Rainey, “Continuous Transformation,” Military Review 104, no. 5 (September-October 2024): 10–26, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/SO-24/SO-24-Continuous-Transformation/.
3. Rainey, “Continuous Transformation,”12.
4. Unification definition in figure 2 from “Unification in AI,” accessed 15 January 2025, https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/unification-in-ai/.
5. Screenshots in fires pane from “HIMARS Accurately Hits a Convoy of Russian Military Vehicles,” YouTube video, posted 29 September 2024 by My Global Issues, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfReyUUESb0.
6. Rainey, “Continuous Transformation,”12.
7. Rainey, “Continuous Transformation,”12.
8. Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), 27, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/mosaic-warfare-exploiting-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-to-implement-decision-centric-operations.
9. Clark, Patt, and Schramm, Mosaic Warfare, 28.
10. Scott C. Farquhar, “Deceive, Divert, and Delay: Operation FORTITUDE in Support of D-Day,” in Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations, ed. Christopher M. Rein (Army University Press, 2018), 137–53; Donald P. Wright, “Deception in the Desert: Deceiving Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM,” in Rein, Weaving the Tangled Web, 215–30.
11. Donald J. Trump, “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Leadership,” White House, 23 January 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/removing-barriers-to-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence/; Russell T. Vought, memorandum, “Accelerating Federal Use of AI through Innovation, Governance, and Public Trust,” Office of Management and Budget, 3 April 2025, https://webdevelopmentgroup.us20.list-manage.com/track/click?u=6821469cd180710d53bfc94d1&id=70ff037017&e=f395826b19; Russell T. Vought, memorandum, “Driving Efficient Acquisition of Artificial Intelligence in Government,” Office of Management and Budget, 3 April 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/M-25-22-Driving-Efficient-Acquisition-of-Artificial-Intelligence-in-Government.pdf; “DOE Identifies 16 Federal Sites Across the Country for Data Center and AI Infrastructure Development,” U.S. Department of Energy, 3 April 2025, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-identifies-16-federal-sites-across-country-data-center-and-ai-infrastructure.
12. Measured by total market capitalization as of market closing 28 April 2025 from “Largest Companies by MarketCap,” CompaniesMarketCap, accessed 28 April 2025, https://companiesmarketcap.com/.
13. Promising potential solutions to reduce AI’s voracious appetite for power include photonic chips. See Jim Cramer, host, Mad Money with Jim Cramer, podcast, interview with Simona Jankowski, 18 November 2024. Information on impacts to the national power grid can vary widely. For an introduction, see Andrew Schwartz, host, The Truth of the Matter with Andrew Schwartz, podcast, interview with Joseph Majkut, 21 November 2024.

Maj. Thomas Haydock, U.S. Army, is an infantry officer assigned as the G-5 strategic plans and policy officer for the Washington Army National Guard. He is a 2024 graduate of the Advanced Military Studies Program at the School of Advanced Military Studies. His career aspirations are to help the future Army Transformation and Training Command develop warfighting concepts so that the U.S. Army remains the world standard, command a division, and continually enhance the profession.

27. Israel’s 12-Day War Revealed Alarming Gap in America’s Missile Stockpile

The stoplight charts should be flashing red.

Israel’s 12-Day War Revealed Alarming Gap in America’s Missile Stockpile

During conflict, Thaad operators burned through nearly a quarter of interceptors ever purchased by Pentagon

https://www.wsj.com/world/israel-iran-us-missile-stockpile-08a65396

By Shelby Holliday

Follow, Anat Peled

Follow and Drew FitzGerald

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July 24, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Thaad systems deployed in Israel augment the country’s homegrown air defense. Photo: Cory Payne/DVIDS/AFP/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

• During the 12-day war with Iran, two U.S. Thaad systems were deployed in Israel, but the U.S. and Israel quickly depleted missile interceptor stockpiles.
• The conflict exposed a shortage of U.S. missile-defense systems and interceptors, prompting calls for increased production and procurement.
• U.S. Navy ships had to leave the area to reload, highlighting the need for at-sea reloading capabilities and more interceptors.

TEL AVIV—The U.S. has seven high-end Thaad missile-defense systems. During the 12-day war with Iran in June, two were deployed to Israel—and it wasn’t enough.

Operating alongside Israeli systems, Thaad operators burned through munitions at a furious clip, firing more than 150 missiles to shoot down the waves of Iranian ballistic missiles, according to U.S. officials. That is nearly a quarter of the interceptors ever purchased by the Pentagon.

The demand was so staggering that at one point, the Pentagon considered a plan to divert interceptors purchased by Saudi Arabia to the systems in Israel, one official said. The discussions were sensitive, because the kingdom’s cities and oil installations were also considered at risk during the conflict. 

It wasn’t just the Thaad. The U.S. ran through large numbers of shipborne interceptors as well, and Israel quickly drained stockpiles for its own systems. Dozens of Iranian missiles got through anyway.

Israel’s capacity to intercept aerial threats has been tested by barrages of Iranian ballistic missiles. Here’s how the U.S.-supplied Thaad system has fit into its layered air-defense strategy. Photo Illustration: WSJ

While Israeli officials credited the American systems for saving thousands of lives, the war revealed an alarming gap in U.S. supplies. The U.S. also discovered inefficiencies in the way it fired its antimissile systems and is scrutinizing the performance of some interceptors.

Some Pentagon planners say America’s missile defenses—designed to protect U.S. troops and assets from targeted attacks by Russia, China or North Korea—are inadequate for a world where cheap, voluminous ballistic missiles have become the aerial weapon of choice.

The U.S. Navy fought this spring with Yemen’s Houthi militants, who have made missiles a centerpiece of their arsenal. Ukraine has been repeatedly bombarded by Russia, which is using missiles and drones rather than putting its pilots at risk. China has made heavy investments in missile development and is rapidly building weapons it could use to keep the U.S. at bay in any future conflict over Taiwan.

“We are at long last waking up to the need for massive defensive munitions procurement,” said Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, soon to take the helm of the U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, told Congress in June that officials need to move with a sense of urgency.

“I’m concerned about everything, but one of the concerns would be munitions and magazine depth,” Cooper said.

Each Thaad—which stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense—can hold 48 interceptors between six launchers and needs about 100 U.S. soldiers to reload, analyze data, perform maintenance and shoot interceptors around the clock.

“To my knowledge the U.S. has never deployed two Thaads in one country before,” said Dan Shapiro, who led Middle East policy at the Pentagon in the Biden administration and is now a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank. “It’s an extraordinary commitment of U.S. technology and personnel to Israel’s security.”

The Pentagon sent a replenishment of interceptors during the war, but supplies were tight.

Each Thaad interceptor costs about $13 million, according to budget documents, and the Pentagon has purchased around 650 since 2010. Officials have sought to buy 37 in the next fiscal year.

Lockheed Martin, which makes the systems, says it can make about 100 interceptors this year and is working with the government on options to increase production for new orders.

It would likely take more than a year and cost between $1.5 billion and $2 billion to replenish the Thaad interceptors fired during the 12-day war, according to Wes Rumbaugh, a CSIS fellow who researches Pentagon missile procurement and budget details. 

How the THAAD* system works

RADAR

Detects incoming threats

1

Fire Control and Communications

Identifies target and oversees operations for fire control information

2

LAUNCHER VEHICLE

Carries up to eight interceptors and each launcher takes 30 minutes to reload.

3

Kill vehicle

Booster

Interceptor

After launch, target is destroyed using kinetic energy by the interceptor

Length: 6.2m (20 feet)

Weight: 662kg (1,460lbs) at launch

4

Interceptor missile canister

*Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

Sources: Army Recognition (Image reference); Missile Threat (Specifications)

Jemal R. Brinson and Rosie Ettenheim/WSJ

The deployment to the Middle East has strained U.S. readiness and signaled a growing need not just for interceptors, but also for more launchers, analysts say.

Army officers say that in a perfect world, two Thaads should be in the U.S. for every one deployed. Under this concept, one system is deployed, another is returning for maintenance and upgrades, and a third is involved in training for the next deployment. 

Of the U.S.’s seven operational Thaads, two are currently on the front lines in Israel. Two others are pledged long term to Guam and South Korea, another is deployed to Saudi Arabia, and two are in the continental U.S. An eighth system has been manufactured but isn’t fully operational.

With five of seven Thaads deployed, the U.S. will likely run into “dwell” issues where units don’t get needed downtime between deployments, according to an Army officer who helps train air defenders.

Although Israel has its own sophisticated, multilayered defense, which includes systems like Arrow, David’s Sling and Iron Dome, the country was running low on its own interceptors and was husbanding resources by the time the conflict ended. Had Iran fired a few more large volleys of missiles, Israel could have exhausted its supply of top-tier Arrow 3 munitions, one of the U.S. officials said. 

The Israeli military said it doesn’t disclose the number of interceptors or operational details related to its air-defense systems. However, it added that “throughout the war, the IDF had had the necessary means to defend its sovereignty and protect its civilians.”

As the war progressed and Iranian barrages continued, the U.S. rushed Navy destroyers equipped to shoot down ballistic missiles toward Israel, sending seven into the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea.

Most of America’s Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers are armed with a range of Standard Missile interceptors, known as SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6, which can shoot down ballistic missiles and other aerial threats. 

Those warships also went through interceptors at an alarming rate, the acting chief of naval operations, Adm. James Kilby, said on Capitol Hill in June. During the 12-day war, the ships shot about 80 SM-3s at Iranian threats, according to a U.S. official.

SM-3s, which are made by defense contractor RTX, cost between $8 million and $25 million depending on the variant.

Thaad equipment on display during a 2019 showcase at the White House. Photo: Alex Brandon/Associated Press

There also are concerns in the Pentagon that the SM-3s, first used in combat last year, also to counter an Iranian attack, didn’t destroy as many targets as expected, according to two defense officials.

The military now is carefully looking through each launch to better understand what happened. A Navy officer involved in the process said it is premature to judge SM-3 engagements.

“Testing and operational data from combat use consistently demonstrates that SM-3 are highly effective interceptors that have demonstrated the ability to defeat complex threats in the most stressing environments,” an RTX spokesman said.

Two Navy officers who have operated in the Middle East said sailors likely struggled with deconfliction, because the U.S. and Israel rely heavily on voice communications to sort out which systems will take out which missiles. In the fog of war, it is possible several ships fired at the same threats.

Along with dozens of warheads, operators can also see debris, decoys and rocket boosters flying through the air. While sailors are trained to pick up on the differences, the airspace in the war was so saturated that they may have struggled to identify the correct target, the officers said. 

“Achieving successful lethal object kills in dense raid environments becomes significantly more complicated as the number of ballistic missiles increases,” said Tri Freed, a chief engineer in the air and missile defense sector of Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory.

Adding to the challenges posed by the heavy volumes of attacking missiles, U.S. ships had to head to port in the Mediterranean or the Red Sea after shooting all of their interceptors, because the Navy doesn’t yet have a reliable way to reload at sea.

The tight fit for a 30-foot-long missile canister to slide into a vertical launch tube means sailors can’t have a ship rocking back and forth during reloading—which could be a major problem for the U.S. in the event of a potential conflict with China.

“Reloading missiles at sea is a challenging task due to the sheer weight and size of the encanistered missiles,” Freed said. 

But the biggest problem is still quantity. Karako, the missile-defense analyst, said the war and the possibility of other conflicts showed the U.S. needs huge numbers of additional interceptors.

“The other worry is that the Iranians are going to do this again,” he said. “And we can’t afford to do it again.”

Write to Shelby Holliday at shelby.holliday@wsj.com, Anat Peled at anat.peled@wsj.com and Drew FitzGerald at andrew.fitzgerald@wsj.com

28. US Army to Add Four New Patriot Missile Battalions, Including Guam Unit

High demand, low density.

Can we produce enough missiles fast enough?

US Army to Add Four New Patriot Missile Battalions, Including Guam Unit

https://thedefensepost.com/2025/07/25/us-army-adds-patriot-battalions/

 July 25, 2025

 1 minute read

The US Army is planning to add up to four new Patriot battalions, with one of them assigned to support the Guam unit in the Western Pacific.

The upcoming battalions will use the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS), with 360-degree coverage and a range of around 85 kilometers (53 miles). It is an upgrade over the older AN/MPQ-65 radar. 

Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James J. Mingus called the Patriot the service’s “most stressed force element.” Only 14 out of 15 Patriot battalions are available, as one is undergoing a re-do. Three are in the Indo-Pacific, one at the US European Command, and the rest are with the service.

He also highlighted one that was deployed to the US Central Command for nearly 500 days, which was able to defend Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar against Iranian missiles in June.

Given this situation, expanding battalions can help ease operational strain while increasing Washington’s defense capabilities worldwide. 

Mingus first announced this development at the Strategic Landpower Dialogue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Patriot and LTAMDS

The MIM-104 Patriot is a mobile, surface-to-air missile defense system designed to detect, track, and intercept enemy aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles at medium to high altitudes and ranges.

Amid increasingly evolving aerial threats, the system is being modernized with the next-generation LTAMDS, which detects and tracks low-altitude cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, short-range ballistic missiles, and drones.

The RTX-manufactured radar is part of the US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, which includes the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) developed by Northrop Grumman.

“You could take those same 15 Patriot battalions we have today, give it [IBCS] and LTAM[D]s, and fundamentally when you operationally employ it, it’s immediately doubling that capability,” Mingus said. 

“You would have the equivalent of about 30 Patriot battalions because instead of having to deploy as batteries, you can break them up and disperse them in a much more tactical way,” he added.

29. Are We About to Lose the Massive Ordnance Penetrator?

Excerpts:

Even if the B-21s were able to carry the MOP, they certainly would be unable to carry more than one compared to two on the B-2. The MOP was originally designed to be used two at a time to maximize the probability of target destruction. Hard and very deeply buried facilities are very difficult to destroy. During the attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility at Fordow, six MOPs each were used against two aim points. Twice as many B-21s would have been necessary to carry out the Fordow attack. In addition, there would be a greater problem in coordinating the drop times.

The B-2/MOP combination played a critical role in the destruction of Iran’s nuclear weapons potential. The clerical dictatorship that runs Iran is not going to give up its efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. It will try to rebuild. An Iran with nuclear weapons is very dangerous.

Nuclear weapons can be used to destroy facilities like Fordow. Indeed, they are much better for the task but there is little or no political willingness to use them for this purpose. Moreover, ideological correctness has prevented the United States from developing the type of very low-yield, low-collateral damage (low-fission content) penetrating nuclear weapons that Russia has apparently already developed. The only U.S. penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61-11, is not in the Biden Administration’s legacy program of record. Moreover, it is not a robust rock penetrator. Hence, there is a vital need to assure that at least the current U.S. capability to destroy targets such as Fordow is not be allowed to erode. If the retirement of the B-2 bomber in 2030 erodes this capability, the recent Air Force decision should be reversed. It is driven by budget limitations not military requirements.

According to a Mitchell Institute assessment, the “…B-2 has enough structural life to fly into the 2050s, and that it could be retrofitted with many of the technologies in the B-21, as manufacturing spools up and components become less expensive.” It concluded that the premature retirement of the B-2 bomber is “an unnecessary risk.” A 2021 assessment by Air Force Colonel (ret.) Mark Gunzinger and Lukas Autenreid, a former Mitchell Institute analyst, concluded that there would be a shortage of 208 bombers in 2030 for a simultaneous European and Asian war and for the necessary nuclear deterrence.

Are We About to Lose the Massive Ordnance Penetrator?

By Mark B. Schneider

July 25, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/07/25/are_we_about_to_lose_the_massive_ordnance_penetrator_1124939.html

The Air Force has just announced an earlier retirement of the B-2 bomber by 2030. This is the second time that this has happened. This budget driven decision means that “…new B-21 must replace—and not be additive to—much of the existing bomber fleet. The Air Force had previously planned to operate the B-1 and B-52 until 2040, and the B-2 to 2058.” In addition, the Air Force has almost zeroed B-2 modernization. This may eliminate the U.S. ability to deliver the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (GBU-57/B or MOP) which is by far the most effective U.S. conventional weapon against hard and very deeply buried targets. The B-2 bomber is the only U.S. bomber cleared to deliver the MOP. It is also the only current U.S. bomber that can penetrate advanced air defenses. At about the same time, the Air Force accelerated the development of the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP) which would be carried by the new B-21. The NGP will be significantly lighter (no more 22,000 pounds) compared to the MOP’s (30,000 pounds). It will be superior to the MOP in some important respects. It will have a standoff capability, which is very important against advanced air defenses and substantially greater accuracy. However, it is unclear that it will be equal much less superior to the MOP in attacking and destroying large, hard and very deeply buried facilities such as Fordow in Iran. Moreover, at this point the NGP is untested. Hence, there is technical risk concerning its capabilities and availability date.

The two main factors driving the effectiveness of conventional weapons against large, hard and very deeply buried facilities are: 1) how deep the penetrator can reach; and 2) the destructive power of the warhead. A penetrator has to be able to go deep enough to reach the target and have enough destructive power to destroy it. Hence, conventional cruise missiles cannot effectively attack hard and very deeply buried targets. In all probability, the same will be true for hypersonic missiles. They probably will not have the required payload. Destruction of these facilities requires advanced penetrating bombers with very large penetrator weapons.

The NGP has 8,000 pounds less weight available for high explosives which is only about 20% of the weight of the MOP. This is usual for penetrators which have to be built very heavy and strong to survive rock and reinforced concrete penetration. In addition, a significant part of the NGP weight will be the rocket motor which will further reduce the weight available for high explosives. Thus, it is possible that the NGP will be less effective than the MOP against large, hard and very deeply buried targets such as Fordow.

The B-21 bomber, the world’s first sixth generation aircraft, is an enormous improvement over the B-2 in most respects. It clearly has much greater stealth. The Air Force has characterized its stealth level as “extremely low observable.” Reportedly, its radar cross section has been reduced from .1 square meter in the B-2 to either .0001 or .0004 in the B-21. This would greatly increase its ability to penetrate advanced air defenses. Its stealth is much more robust than the much older technology which was used in the B-2. This will substantially increase bomber combat availability. The aircraft carries advanced sensors and electronic warfare capabilities. The B-21 has an open systems architecture which will facilitate future upgrades. Northrop Gruman has done an incredibly good job in bringing the B-21 into existence actually under budget. When the contract award was announced in 2015, many doubted whether this was possible.

However, the B-21 was designed in a period of defense budget starvation under the Obama Administration. It was deliberately made less capable than it could have been. Retired Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz, wrote in his memoires that the Next Generation Bomber (NGB, sometimes called the 2018 bomber) “‘…had grown too big’ and was carrying too many missions and requirements. It was to have an air-to-air missile capability for self defense.” This original concept for the NGB was de facto terminated in 2008 although it was described as a delay. The need to minimize B-21 costs (no more than $550 million per aircraft in 2010 dollars) resulted in an adoption of a low technical risk strategy, a smaller bomber, no possibility of it ever having a supersonic capability and a production equipment limitation on the possible production rate. Some analysts believe that stealth must be combined with supersonic speed to deal with the long-term projected threat environment and that the number of penetrating bombers must be doubled.

The size and weight of a bomber has a significant impact on its costs. For most missions the B-21s bombload is sufficient. However, good capabilities against hard and very deeply buried facilities require the maximum practical bombload. In 2010, then-Lieutenant General Philip Breedlove said the “new long range strike aircraft now being mulled will be smaller than the NGB would have been—NGB was to have had a payload of 27,000 pounds….” In 2011, then-Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Breedlove said:

“If we try to drive a future bomber to carry weapons the size of the MOP,” it would require a huge and cost-prohibitive aircraft. He asked industry to explore weapons “smaller, lighter, but [with] the same tactical effect” as the MOP.

General Breedlove wanted a weapon that was “‘about a third” of the size of the MOP, so that “it can be carried in an aircraft we can afford to build.” The Air Force selection of the 22,000 pound NGP appears to indicate that this turned out to be technically impossible.

It is clear that the B-21 is significantly smaller and lighter than the B-2. (The B-2 itself is also substantially lighter and smaller than the other U.S. heavy bombers, the B-52s and B-1s). According to noted aviation journalist Bill Sweetman, “The B-21’s resemblance to the original B-2 bomber design is close, but it is a smaller aircraft, with a wingspan estimated at 132 ft. compared with the B-2’s 172 ft., and is approximately half the empty weight.” If so, this would make it an advanced medium bomber with intercontinental range. The payload of the B-21 is clearly limited compared to the bombers it is replacing. Sweetman and a number of other aerospace journalists have reported that the bombload of the B-21 is about 20,000 pounds. Christian Orr, editor of the National Security Journal, writes, “If Mr. Sweetman’s estimates are accurate, that would cast serious doubt upon the newer warbird’s ability to carry the 30,000-lb. (14,000 kg) GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bomb immortalized by its usage in the Midnight Hammer strikes.”

There are many reports that the B-21 can carry a single MOP, but this appears to largely be speculation. There is no official confirmation of this and it appears unlikely. If the weapons load is limited to about 20,000 pounds, it cannot carry even a single MOP. There are reports of higher bombload numbers for the B-21 but the limitation of the weight of the NGP to 22,000 pounds suggests that the lower estimates of the B-2 bombload are more accurate.

Even if the B-21s were able to carry the MOP, they certainly would be unable to carry more than one compared to two on the B-2. The MOP was originally designed to be used two at a time to maximize the probability of target destruction. Hard and very deeply buried facilities are very difficult to destroy. During the attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility at Fordow, six MOPs each were used against two aim points. Twice as many B-21s would have been necessary to carry out the Fordow attack. In addition, there would be a greater problem in coordinating the drop times.

The B-2/MOP combination played a critical role in the destruction of Iran’s nuclear weapons potential. The clerical dictatorship that runs Iran is not going to give up its efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. It will try to rebuild. An Iran with nuclear weapons is very dangerous.

Nuclear weapons can be used to destroy facilities like Fordow. Indeed, they are much better for the task but there is little or no political willingness to use them for this purpose. Moreover, ideological correctness has prevented the United States from developing the type of very low-yield, low-collateral damage (low-fission content) penetrating nuclear weapons that Russia has apparently already developed. The only U.S. penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61-11, is not in the Biden Administration’s legacy program of record. Moreover, it is not a robust rock penetrator. Hence, there is a vital need to assure that at least the current U.S. capability to destroy targets such as Fordow is not be allowed to erode. If the retirement of the B-2 bomber in 2030 erodes this capability, the recent Air Force decision should be reversed. It is driven by budget limitations not military requirements.

According to a Mitchell Institute assessment, the “…B-2 has enough structural life to fly into the 2050s, and that it could be retrofitted with many of the technologies in the B-21, as manufacturing spools up and components become less expensive.” It concluded that the premature retirement of the B-2 bomber is “an unnecessary risk.” A 2021 assessment by Air Force Colonel (ret.) Mark Gunzinger and Lukas Autenreid, a former Mitchell Institute analyst, concluded that there would be a shortage of 208 bombers in 2030 for a simultaneous European and Asian war and for the necessary nuclear deterrence.

Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Dr. Schneider previously served in DoD as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

30. How China’s new Information Support Force gears military up for PLA modernisation

Excerpts:

Reflecting the ISF’s emphasis on technology integration into the military, China is also reorganising its military education system to expand the talent pool for the new force.

This includes establishing academies for three new service branches in May, notably the PLA Information Support Force Engineering University, which is specifically designed to support the ISF.

Thursday’s PLA Daily edition also dedicated a full page to how advanced technology, including large AI models, could support military decision-making.

Another article the same day introduced the concept of “edge warfare” – a combat approach that leverages hi-tech capabilities such as AI to empower combat units at the system’s periphery.

According to the article, this model adopts smaller, more agile combat units and promotes real-time information sharing across all military services and branches.

How China’s new Information Support Force gears military up for PLA modernisation

PLA Daily articles offer glimpse into how force established last year fits into President Xi Jinping’s vision of a futuristic military

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3319592/how-chinas-new-information-support-force-gears-military-pla-modernisation?utm

Amber Wangin Beijing

Published: 7:00pm, 25 Jul 2025

China’s new Information Support Force (ISF) has stepped up joint training with other military branches, showcasing an integrated combat system and increased mobile and decentralised deployment capabilities, according to the official paper of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

This includes a new training approach featuring the “embedding” of small ISF teams into the PLA’s air, naval and ground forces to offer real-time information support.

Established in April 2024 as part of the PLA’s modernisation push, the force is tasked with coordinating the application of network information systems within the Chinese military.

While official information has been limited, recent PLA Daily reports have offered a rare glimpse into the operations of the force – which also plays a pivotal role in incorporating advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) into the military’s decision-making and combat systems.

China stages drone and counter-drone warfare demonstration

In the 15 months since the force’s establishment, restructuring measures such as setting up a new ISF base had been implemented down to the frontline levels, the PLA Daily said.

A report published on Thursday highlighted a multi-branch joint training exercise carried out in central China, during which the ISF base set up in June last year was swiftly deployed to create a coordinated network to support other combat units.

The base had already carried out mobile training across the country, boosting its all-domain support and integrated combat capabilities, the report said, without offering details.

The rapid establishment of the base is especially significant as the ISF has taken over some roles previously held by the Strategic Support Force, which was disbanded after just over eight years.

Established in December 2015 to expand the PLA’s aerospace, cyberspace, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities, the SSF was disbanded at the same event where the ISF was launched, with President Xi Jinping hosting the ceremony.

The ISF is central to Xi’s ambition to build an intelligent military with updated skills suited to modern warfare by 2027, when the PLA celebrates its centenary.

The force is expected to make its public debut at a military parade in Beijing on September 3 to mark the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japanese aggression in World War II. This year’s parade is expected to feature the PLA’s latest combat forces, including uncrewed intelligent systems and cyber and electronic warfare units, technologies central to the ISF’s mission.

The guard of honour of the three PLA services at a parade in Beijing on September 3, 2015, the 70th anniversary of China’s victory over Japanese aggression in World War II. Photo: Xinhua

As highlighted in a PLA Daily article published last week, the ISF has strategically shifted from traditional stationary headquarters support to embedding teams directly with frontline units, such as those in helicopter, naval and ground transport operations.

An ISF brigade had established a novel communications support model based on the concept of “embedding information warfare teams at the front line, supported by rear-based platform systems”, the article said.

For example, during a training exercise where task groups advanced into “enemy” territory, an ISF information support unit deployed drones to establish local signal coverage. These then transmitted real-time battlefield data using new portable systems, which enabled training objectives to be met seamlessly by all groups taking part.

Reflecting the ISF’s emphasis on technology integration into the military, China is also reorganising its military education system to expand the talent pool for the new force.

This includes establishing academies for three new service branches in May, notably the PLA Information Support Force Engineering University, which is specifically designed to support the ISF.

Thursday’s PLA Daily edition also dedicated a full page to how advanced technology, including large AI models, could support military decision-making.

Another article the same day introduced the concept of “edge warfare” – a combat approach that leverages hi-tech capabilities such as AI to empower combat units at the system’s periphery.

According to the article, this model adopts smaller, more agile combat units and promotes real-time information sharing across all military services and branches.

Amber Wang

Amber Wang is a reporter for the China desk, and focuses on Chinese politics and diplomacy. She joined the Post in 2021, and previously worked for The New York Times and Southern Metropolis Daily.

31. Taiwan recall: shock waves likely no matter who prevails on ballots, analysts say

Note the subtitle. Will this provide us with a potential resistance indicator for a whole of society resistance to a possible PLA attack and occupation?

Taiwan recall: shock waves likely no matter who prevails on ballots, analysts say

Saturday’s democratic showdown will test whether anti-Beijing sentiment remains defining force in island’s polarised politics

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3319487/taiwan-recall-shock-waves-likely-no-matter-who-prevails-ballots-analysts-say?utm

Lawrence Chungin Taipei

Published: 4:08pm, 25 Jul 2025Updated: 5:09pm, 25 Jul 2025

Polling stations in Taiwan are set to open on Saturday as the island holds a landmark vote in a sweeping recall campaign that could tilt control of its legislature back to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and test whether anti-Beijing sentiment remains the defining force in Taiwanese politics.

The unprecedented mass recall vote – set to begin at 8am Saturday, mainly targeting lawmakers from the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) – has triggered intense political debate and could shape the island’s trajectory ahead of next year’s local government polls as well as the election of the island’s leader in 2028.

Twenty-four legislators – all members of the Beijing-friendly KMT – face recall votes organised by pro-DPP civic groups with strong backing from the ruling party. Another seven KMT lawmakers will face recall votes on August 23. All have been accused by recall organisers of “selling out Taiwan to China”.

Supporters of the recall campaign gather on Tuesday outside a Taipei metro station shouting “Great recall, great success”. Photo: AFP

“The vote on Saturday is not just about legislative control. It is a litmus test for how far the ‘resist China, protect Taiwan’ campaign can go,” said Max Lo, executive director of the Taiwan International Strategic Study Society, a Taipei-based think tank.

Beijing has denounced the recall campaign as political manipulation. Zhu Fenglian, a spokeswoman for Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te was “using democracy as a cover for dictatorship” and “suppressing the opposition by any means”.

Those remarks have been seized upon by DPP supporters as proof of the KMT’s alleged closeness to mainland China. Beijing, which regards Taiwan as a part of China to be reunited by force if necessary, has intensified military pressure on the island since Lai took office in May last year and provoked Beijing with “separatist” and pro-independence remarks.

The United States, like most other countries, does not recognise self-governed Taiwan as independent. However, it is opposed to any unilateral change to the status quo and is committed to supplying the island with weapons for defence.

The DPP lost its majority in the legislature last year when it secured only 51 of the 113 seats. To regain control, it would need to win at least six additional seats in follow-up by-elections – which would require at least 12 successful recalls of KMT lawmakers.

“If fewer than five KMT lawmakers are recalled, it would be seen as a major setback for the DPP,” Lo said. “But if 12 are recalled and the DPP wins those seats, it could flip the legislature.”

Taiwanese lawmakers brawl in parliament over controversial bills

The KMT holds 52 seats and is supported by two independents. It also maintains an informal alliance with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which holds eight at-large seats and is not subject to recall under the law. If the KMT loses 12 seats and fails to win them back in by-elections to be held in three months, it would lose its legislative majority – even with TPP support.

Analysts said local politics had combined with geopolitical tensions to fuel the recall effort.

In recent months, the opposition-controlled legislature has passed controversial bills expanding parliamentary oversight and cutting what it viewed as excessive government spending. Some of the budget cuts affected defence programmes, prompting DPP lawmakers to accuse the opposition of weakening Taiwan’s national security amid rising military pressure from mainland China.

“Internally, it is a struggle over defining responsible governance,” Lo said. “Externally, Beijing’s increasing military activity makes anti-China messaging more resonant with voters.”

As the campaign headed into its final days, analysts said the conduct of candidates could be decisive factors.

“The fewer mistakes a candidate makes, the better their chances of surviving,” said Niu Tze-hsun, a professor at Chinese Culture University in Taipei. “Any inflammatory rhetoric or missteps could backfire – energising the opponent’s base or alienating undecided voters.”

Signs against the recall movement and Taiwanese flags are laid out for a rally in Taoyuan, Taiwan, on Sunday. Photo: Reuters

Niu cited a recent incident in which KMT legislator Yeh Yuan-chih was spat on by a recall supporter during a campaign stop. “That was seen by many as excessive and may have actually helped the KMT portray itself as a victim,” Niu said, warning of a possible “sympathy backlash”.

Other recent events have also weighed on public sentiment. The government’s handling of Typhoon Danas as well as growing anxiety over potential US tariffs have dented confidence in the DPP administration, according to analysts.

“There is rising public frustration over the government’s lack of transparency, especially on the tariff issue,” said Ho Chih-yung, a professor of general education at Taiwan’s National Tsing Hua University.

In April, US President Donald Trump announced sweeping tariffs on major trading partners. While the US has set new tariffs ranging from 15 to 50 per cent on 25 countries starting on August 1, Taiwan is still awaiting confirmation of its specific rate – a lingering uncertainty that has added pressure on the Lai administration.

Lai’s approval rating dipped to 42.9 per cent this month, one of his lowest marks since taking office. His apparently “tone-deaf” response during a visit to flood-hit Tainan – his hometown – drew sharp criticism after he told elderly residents who had asked for help clearing debris that “not everything can rely on the military”.

“Many neutral voters see this recall vote as a chance to send a message to the government,” Ho said.

The KMT’s early attempts to launch its own recall campaigns against DPP lawmakers floundered. The effort was marred by scandal after authorities discovered more than 1,000 forged signatures, including names of deceased individuals. Dozens of KMT staffers and civilian organisers have been arrested and face criminal charges.

Despite the controversy, the KMT has mounted a full-throttle campaign urging its supporters to vote “disagree” in the recall votes. Party leaders argue that the DPP is using recalls to reverse last year’s electoral results.

“If election results can just be overturned by recalls, we will be trapped in an endless cycle of revenge voting,” KMT chairman Eric Chu Li-luan warned at a rally in Taipei on the eve of the recalls. “We are seeing civic activism being weaponised for political retaliation. That is dangerous for a democracy like Taiwan’s.”

“The biggest threat to Taiwan right now isn’t the Communist Party. It is the DPP trying to silence dissent,” said one anti-recall protester, surnamed Chen.

While polls have suggested more voters opposed the recalls than supported them, recall backers appeared to be more motivated to turn out.

People against the recall movement gather in Taoyuan, Taiwan on Sunday. Photo: Reuters

“Turnout will be the key,” said a senior KMT official who requested anonymity. “To defeat the recalls, we need to get more voters to show up and vote ‘disagree’.”

The DPP and its allies have framed the recall campaign as necessary to root out lawmakers they have claimed are aligned with Beijing.

But KMT lawmaker Hsu Chiao-hsin, one of the recall targets, pushed back. “We are not red. We stand for the blue sky, white sun and red earth. We defend the Republic of China – not the People’s Republic of China,” she said, referring to Taiwan’s official title and its flag.

Her comments came after retired tech tycoon Robert Tsao Hsing-cheng – blacklisted by Beijing as a pro-independence separatist – accused the KMT of deliberately stirring unrest to benefit the Communist Party.

“When Taiwan descends into chaos, Beijing can use ‘restoring order’ as an excuse to attack,” Tsao said at a rally. “The recalls are about restoring peace, trust and stability.”

Some scholars warn that the political discourse has become dangerously polarised.

“This sweeping recall lacks legitimacy,” said Liao Da-chi, a retired political science professor at Taiwan’s National Sun Yat-sen University. “Recalls were meant for misconduct – not for labelling every KMT lawmaker a communist sympathiser without evidence.”

Japanese political scientist Yoshiyuki Ogasawara described the vote as a clash between two potent but polarising narratives. “The message of ‘removing pro-China lawmakers’ helps the recall side, but the argument about respecting 2024’s election results resonates with voters concerned about democratic integrity,” he said in a recent social media post.

Ogasawara said Taiwan’s political mood was increasingly fractured. “It is an M-shaped landscape – two dominant camps locked in a stalemate, neither with a clear upper hand.”

No matter the result, Saturday’s vote was expected to send shock waves through Taiwan’s political landscape, analysts said.

“This vote could shape the August recalls, the 2026 local elections, and even the 2028 race” to elect a new island leader, said Lo, with the Taiwan International Strategic Study Society.

“It will also reveal whether the ‘resist China, protect Taiwan’ narrative still has traction – especially as more people begin to tire of the rhetoric and question its effectiveness.”

Since 2016, the DPP has repeatedly invoked that message to win elections. Lo said Saturday’s vote might determine whether it still worked – or whether voters were ready for a new political conversation.

Lawrence Chung

Lawrence Chung covers major news in Taiwan, ranging from presidential and parliament elections to killer earthquakes and typhoons. Most of his reports focus on Taiwan’s relations with China, specifically on the impact and possible developments of cross-strait relations under

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