Quotes of the Day:

"Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.”

– Thomas Jefferson

"Success is not fain, failure is not fatal; it is the courage to continue that counts."

– Winston Churchill

"Beware of being too rational. In the country of the insane, the integrated man doesn't become king. He gets lynched."

– Aldous Huxley

1. North Korea Rejects New South Korean Leader’s Peace Overtures

2. North Korea will ‘never’ reconcile with South, calls Lee’s overtures futile

3. Bridging the Ambiguity-Explicitness Gap in the U.S.-South Korean Alliance

4. Lee stresses importance of restoring trust with N. Korea after Pyongyang snubs dialogue overture

5. Unification minister says to propose adjusting joint military drills with U.S. to President Lee

6. USFK says decisions regarding joint drills will be made via 'established consultation'

7. Samsung Signs $16.5 Billion Chip-Supply Contract With Tesla

8. US offers $15 million reward for info on North Korean nationals involved in global criminal network

9. Taiwan and South Korea: Bridging the Cybersecurity Gap

10. FM Cho to visit Japan, U.S. this week for talks with counterparts: Seoul

11. S. Korea says U.S. pressing Seoul's expanded market opening to farm, livestock products

12. Seoul confirms defense, arms deals part of US trade talks

13. S. Korean industry minister heads to Europe as U.S. tariff deadline nears: sources

14. New memorial project brings Britain's bloodiest Korean War battle to life

15. Film unveils North Korean troops' involvement in Kursk

16. Finance minister to hold talks with U.S. treasury secretary Thursday

17. Korea pitches multibillion-dollar shipbuilding plan to US: reports

1. North Korea Rejects New South Korean Leader’s Peace Overtures

The bad cop. The most evil woman in the world.

It is not 1997 or 2003. The conditions are no longer conducive to a Sunshine Policy on steroids.  

Read the room. Kim is getting nearly everything he needs from Putin and Xi. And this emboldens him. Ironically he has no need for appeasement from South Korea. No matter what the South offers he will not accept it. And make no mistake, his eye remains on the prize: domination of the entire Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gluing State which is his long term guarantee of survival.

North Korea Rejects New South Korean Leader’s Peace Overtures

In its first comment on President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea, North Korea dismissed a call for dialogue, dampening hopes of a new chapter in relations.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/28/world/asia/north-korea-rejects-peace-gestures.html

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A photograph provided by North Korean state media shows Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, speaking in Pyongyang in 2022. North Korea has no interest in pursuing dialogue with the South, she said on Monday.Credit...Korean Central News Agency, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Choe Sang-Hun

Choe Sang-Hun has reported on inter-Korean relations from Seoul since the early 1990s.

July 28, 2025, 

2:06 a.m. ET

North Korea on Monday rejected the new South Korean president’s proposal for talks, saying that his policy toward the North was no different than that of his ousted predecessor, under whom relations had plunged to the lowest point in years.

Since taking office on June 4, President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea has repeatedly said that he wanted to ease tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula by improving ties that deteriorated under his conservative predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol.

As gestures of good will, Mr. Lee banned anti-North Korean activists from sending leaflets into the North by balloon. He also stopped the loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts along the border that had long angered Pyongyang. Earlier this month, South Korea even switched off shortwave radio broadcasts that had carried similar propaganda for over a half century.

But such efforts by Mr. Lee were “not the work worthy of appreciation,” said Kim Yo-jong, who speaks for her brother, Kim Jong-un, the top leader of North Korea, in a statement carried in North Korean state media on Monday.

“No matter what policy is adopted and whatever proposal is made in Seoul, we have no interest in it and there is neither the reason to meet nor the issue to be discussed with the ROK,” Ms. Kim said, using the acronym for the South’s official name, Republic of Korea.

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She cited the South Korean government’s ongoing alliance with the United States and the countries’ plans to continue holding annual joint military drills as evidence of little change under the new administration.

Ms. Kim’s remarks on Monday was North Korea’s first official comment on how it perceived the new government in the South.

South Korea sought to downplay the significance of the statement by Ms. Kim, saying that the government would continue its efforts to promote reconciliation and cooperation. A South Korean government spokesman, Koo Byoung-sam, said that the remarks from the North “showed how high the wall of distrust has become in South-North Korean relations.”

Analysts have warned that the growing military and economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia has made Mr. Kim less interested in engaging with Seoul or Washington than seven years ago, when Mr. Kim met both the South Korean leader and President Donald J. Trump. Last year, Mr. Kim and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia revived a Cold War-era alliance, and under that pact, the North has sent troops and more weapons to help Russia in its war against Ukraine.

But since Mr. Lee took office, some in South Korea have voiced cautious optimism that Mr. Kim might return to the negotiating table.

Ms. Kim’s statement on Monday dampened any such hopes.

In her statement, Ms. Kim also accused South Korean officials of “spinning a daydream” after some of them raised the possibility that Mr. Kim might be able to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit to be held in Gyeongju, South Korea, in late October. South Korea hopes that both President Trump and President Xi Jinping of China will attend the gathering.

During his first term in the White House, Mr. Trump became the first American president to meet the North Korean leader, exchanging what he called “love letters” with Mr. Kim. But their diplomacy collapsed in 2019 when their second summit meeting ended without an agreement over how quickly North Korea should roll back its nuclear weapons program and when Washington should lift international sanctions imposed on the country.

Mr. Kim has since shifted his approach, shunning all talks with Washington and doubling down on increasing his nuclear arsenal. North Korea has also turned cold toward South Korea, which had helped mediate meetings between Mr. Kim and Mr. Trump.

In 2020, North Korea blew up an inter-Korean liaison office in the North Korean city of Kaesong in a dramatic gesture of cutting dialogue with the South. After Mr. Yoon, a hawk on North Korea, took office in 2022, relations worsened. Mr. Kim said he would no longer consider South Korea a potential partner for reunification but treat it as an enemy that must be subjugated — with nuclear weapons, if necessary — should war break out.

On Monday, Ms. Kim reaffirmed that policy. But she did not comment directly on Mr. Trump or the United States.

Since his return to the White House, Mr. Trump has expressed interest in engaging with Mr. Kim. But neither Mr. Kim nor his government has responded, raising speculation among some analysts that Mr. Kim might eventually meet Mr. Trump again only if Washington offered the right incentives.

Mr. Lee, for his part, has vowed to strengthen Seoul’s alliance with Washington and promised to continue working with the United States and Japan to help counter China and North Korea.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea.

2. North Korea will ‘never’ reconcile with South, calls Lee’s overtures futile

We must be under no illusion. KIm (Yo Jong and Jong Un) seeks domination of the South.

Excerpts:

The statement mentioned various pro-engagement initiatives by Lee and his top officials, like turning off radio broadcasts aimed at the North, stopping activists from sending leaflet balloons over the border, proposing to allow ROK tourists to travel to the DPRK and suggesting Kim Jong Un may be able to attend an international conference this year in the South.

Lee even attempted to assure North Korea his efforts were not part of a “unification by absorption” policy earlier this month, saying “we must acknowledge the other’s existence, seek mutually beneficial paths and gradually restore a sense of shared identity.”

But according to Kim, all South Korean politicians are indeed “mentally captive to the specter of absorption unification [and] can never change.”

She called the DPRK’s anti-ROK position “irreversible” and explicitly rejected that the people of the two Koreas are “of the same race.”

Kim Yo Jong frequently releases statements in state media representing the position of her brother, DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. However, the statement was not published on Monday in the domestic-facing Rodong Sinmun, raising questions over whether it was hidden from domestic readers, possibly due to lingering pro-unification sentiment among the public.

Like South Korea, North Korea also officially maintained a policy of working toward unification for decades until just last year, when Kim Jong Un announced he would permanently abandon the idea.

Since then, North Korea has destroyed bridges and built large blockades to cut off the few transportation routes that crossed the inter-Korean border, while building up new walls and fences along the border. 

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un has declared intentions to manufacture hundreds of nuclear missiles capable of striking South Korea and develop other weapons like drones to prepare for war with the South. 

North Korea will ‘never’ reconcile with South, calls Lee’s overtures futile

DPRK leader's sister Kim Yo Jong unleashes tirade against ROK President Lee, calling efforts deceptive and blaming US

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/north-korea-will-never-reconcile-with-south-says-lees-overtures-futile/

Colin Zwirko July 28, 2025

Kim Yo Jong delivering a speech at a National Meeting on August 11, 2022 | Image: KCTV

North Korea rejects all efforts by current South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to improve inter-Korean relations and will “never” resume dialogue, according to a statement by the DPRK leader’s sister on Monday, marking Pyongyang’s first official comments on the new ROK administration since it took office last month.

Kim Yo Jong dismissed Lee’s recent overtures as deceptive, saying “there can be no change in our state’s perception of South Korea as the enemy, and the hands of history’s clock that fundamentally changed the nature of inter-Korean relations cannot be turned back.”

“We clearly state once again our official position that we have no interest in whatever policies are established or proposals come out of Seoul, and there is nothing to sit down with South Korea about or discuss,” she stated, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Kim said Lee’s “sweet-sounding rhetoric” on improving relations was meaningless due to “his blind faith in the U.S.-South Korea alliance and intention to confront us [being] no different from his predecessor,” blaming joint military drills Pyongyang perceives as practice for an “invasion.”

The statement mentioned various pro-engagement initiatives by Lee and his top officials, like turning off radio broadcasts aimed at the North, stopping activists from sending leaflet balloons over the border, proposing to allow ROK tourists to travel to the DPRK and suggesting Kim Jong Un may be able to attend an international conference this year in the South.

Lee even attempted to assure North Korea his efforts were not part of a “unification by absorption” policy earlier this month, saying “we must acknowledge the other’s existence, seek mutually beneficial paths and gradually restore a sense of shared identity.”

But according to Kim, all South Korean politicians are indeed “mentally captive to the specter of absorption unification [and] can never change.”

She called the DPRK’s anti-ROK position “irreversible” and explicitly rejected that the people of the two Koreas are “of the same race.”

Kim Yo Jong frequently releases statements in state media representing the position of her brother, DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. However, the statement was not published on Monday in the domestic-facing Rodong Sinmun, raising questions over whether it was hidden from domestic readers, possibly due to lingering pro-unification sentiment among the public.

Like South Korea, North Korea also officially maintained a policy of working toward unification for decades until just last year, when Kim Jong Un announced he would permanently abandon the idea.

Since then, North Korea has destroyed bridges and built large blockades to cut off the few transportation routes that crossed the inter-Korean border, while building up new walls and fences along the border. 

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un has declared intentions to manufacture hundreds of nuclear missiles capable of striking South Korea and develop other weapons like drones to prepare for war with the South. 

Pyongyang is also sending soldiers to foreign wars to gain combat experience, and actively encouraging them at home with propaganda depicting bloody stabbings of ROK people and nuclear attacks destroying the entire southern half of the peninsula.

Kim Yo Jong’s statement comes just days after her brother oversaw artillery drills framed as training for battle with South Korea.

Edited by Kristen Talman

Updated on July 28 at 8:25 a.m. KST with additional background and details from state media

3. Bridging the Ambiguity-Explicitness Gap in the U.S.-South Korean Alliance

​Excerpts:

South Korean policymakers should avoid becoming fixated on the assumption that greater explicitness will necessarily lead to greater effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence. The Lee administration should adopt a transparent, public-facing approach by issuing official statements and conducting public briefings to explain the inherent constraints on the level of clarity Washington can provide. Such an approach could help reduce public distrust in U.S. extended deterrence and alleviate political pressure for indigenous nuclearization. Seoul could then focus on strengthening existing joint initiatives established during the Biden-Yoon era.

For the United States, it is crucial to communicate candidly with the Lee administration that it cannot offer the level of specificity that Seoul seeks — and to clearly explain the reasons for this limitation. The Trump administration should emphasize that this does not signal a lack of resolve, but rather that a measure of ambiguity can be strategically advantageous in deterring a North Korean nuclear attack by inducing caution in its behavior.

Two institutional measures may help to narrow the explicitness-ambiguity gap. The first is creating a joint deterrence simulation center in South Korea, co-managed by U.S. and South Korean military officials. This center would utilize advanced simulation technologies to model real-time scenarios of North Korea’s potential nuclear and conventional attacks. By leveraging both countries’ advanced AI capabilities, the center could accurately estimate scenario-specific damage levels, North Korean attack methods and movement routes, as well as optimal allied response strategies and force configurations. Such realistic and detailed simulations would enhance South Korea’s confidence in the credibility of the U.S. commitment.

The second measure is establishing within the existing Nuclear Consultative Group a formal, service-specific consultation mechanism between corresponding branches of the U.S. and South Korean militaries (e.g., army-army, navy-navy, and air force-air force). Such detailed, service-level interaction would help South Korean forces gain a clearer understanding of U.S. extended deterrence policies, including the degree of strategic commitment and likely courses of action in a crisis. It would also support more informed bilateral coordination on the conventional-nuclear integration initiative by aligning operational concepts and expectations across corresponding branches.

South Korea faces an intractable, nuclear-armed adversary in North Korea and while the United States may feel that it has worked hard to reassure its ally, these efforts should evolve in line with further changes in Pyongyang’s nuclear posture. Although the United States is unlikely to alter the inherent ambiguity in its declaratory and action policies, a failure to continuously reinforce the alliance relationship in this strategic context will only lead to increased internal pressure for South Korea to go nuclear.

Bridging the Ambiguity-Explicitness Gap in the U.S.-South Korean Alliance - War on the Rocks

Do Young Lee and Ian Bowers

July 28, 2025

warontherocks.com · July 28, 2025

One side wants more explicitness in the level of commitment to the relationship, while the other wants to remain ambiguous.

While this tug-of-war could describe what some romantic couples experience, it can also describe the tension in the U.S.-South Korean alliance over the issue of Seoul’s confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Today, a crucial difference in perspective persists between Washington and Seoul regarding the ideal degree of explicitness in U.S. nuclear security commitments and the specific means of achieving them. This divergence, stemming from differing policy preferences and rooted in a disparity of trust between a non-nuclear ally and a nuclear-armed security guarantor, will likely remain despite some improvements over the previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration. However, furthering mutual understanding of each other’s position and establishing supplementary institutional mechanisms would likely strengthen trust, tamper calls for South Korean nuclearization, and mitigate the destabilizing consequences of nuclear disagreements between the two longtime allies.

BECOME A MEMBER

The Sources of Divergence

Over the past few years, the United States and South Korea have held divergent views on how specific U.S. extended deterrence commitments should be. Washington’s position can be summarized as “more explicitness may be worse.” The core reason behind this view is the concern that overly explicit commitments could constrain its freedom of action and increase the risk of entrapment in a nuclear war. An automatic nuclear retaliation pledge in response to a North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea could preclude the United States from exercising other options, such as large-scale conventional retaliation or decapitation strikes against the Kim regime leadership.

On the other side, Seoul believes “more explicitness will be better.” South Korea views clear and specific U.S. nuclear commitments as essential to precluding North Korean misjudgment and demonstrating Washington’s unwavering willingness to protect South Korea. In fact, Seoul’s insistence on explicitness is more pronounced than that of other U.S. allies. This is primarily because South Korea faces a direct and explicit nuclear threat from a neighboring country. As part of its five-year nuclear modernization plan, which began in 2021, North Korea has accelerated the development of nuclear forces aimed at South Korea, including non-strategic nuclear warheads, nuclear-capable cruise missiles, and tactical nuclear attack submarines. These developments have amplified concerns within South Korea that North Korea would employ nuclear weapons preemptively, offensively, and actively as a warfighting tool.

Diverging Preferences for Declaratory Policy and Action Policy

To understand the emergence of the structural divergence between two treaty allies, it is worth considering, as Paul H. Nitze contends, how U.S. nuclear extended deterrence policy has two connected components. The first is the declaratory policy, which refers to official statements or doctrines that articulate intentions, principles, or conditions regarding the use or non-use of nuclear weapons for defending allies. The second is the action policy, also referred to as operational policy, which translates declaratory policy into concrete operational measures. This policy governs the actual planning, deployment, and potential employment of nuclear forces to safeguard allied security.

Regarding the declaratory policy, Seoul worries that Pyongyang may perceive U.S. ambiguity about when it would use nuclear retaliation as a lack of resolve. From Seoul’s point of view, the best way to prevent North Korean miscalculation is a clear declaration: “Any nuclear attack will be met with nuclear retaliation.” Strategic elites in South Korea frequently insist the United States must pledge retaliation regardless of the nature of the North Korean strike — whether it targets only South Korea or includes the U.S. homeland, whether it is a warning shot or full-scale attack, and whether it precedes or follows conventional conflict. They argue only an explicit and specific nuclear pledge can credibly deter nuclear and conventional threats backed by a nuclear shield.

In contrast, the United States consistently avoids specifying the exact conditions under which it would carry out nuclear retaliation. From Washington’s perspective, this calculated ambiguity bolsters deterrence by forcing Pyongyang to weigh the risk of nuclear conflict across various scenarios — even in cases where the United States is not actually considering nuclear use. Accordingly, while reaffirming nuclear guarantees, the Biden administration maintained the traditional U.S. ambiguity. For example, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states that any North Korean use of nuclear weapons against U.S. allies is “unacceptable” and will result in “the end of that regime,” but it stops short of explicitly committing to nuclear retaliation.

Regarding the action policy, the Yoon administration feared that undisclosed extended deterrence plans would not only lead North Korea to doubt American willingness to uphold its nuclear commitments, but would also cause operational cleavages within the alliance itself. This latter point was particularly important given Seoul’s sustained investment in conventional counterforce capabilities. Such divergences, according to South Korea, would not only weaken the alliance’s combined defense and deterrence posture but could also incentivize North Korea to test this posture during a crisis.

However, the United States resists making detailed commitments, fearing that such specificity would enable North Korea to anticipate and prepare effectively for its responses. Instead, U.S. ambiguity increases Pyongyang’s uncertainty about how retaliation would unfold — where, when, and by what means — forcing it to grapple with multiple scenarios. This “operational unpredictability” can make Pyongyang more cautious about attacking South Korea or, if it decides to invade, compel the Kim regime to disperse forces in rear areas to guard against unpredictable U.S. counterattacks, thereby weakening its offensive punch.

An Unbridgeable Gap?

Uncertainty over the U.S. extended deterrence commitment emerged as a central topic in U.S.-South Korean relations under the Yoon administration from May 2022 to April 2025. The Yoon government considered the level of U.S. explicitness inadequate and sought more concrete and tangible measures by the United States to shore up South Korean confidence. Park Jin, Yoon’s first foreign minister, clearly articulated this concern in a February 2023 media interview, stating, “We need to discuss with the U.S. the execution of extended deterrence in the event of an emergency in more detail.”

In response, the Biden administration acknowledged Seoul’s concerns and initiated changes to U.S. declaratory and action policies through close cooperation with the Yoon government.

Regarding declaratory policy, in 2023 President Joe Biden made an unprecedented public statement in a joint press conference with Yoon, that a North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea would result in the end of the North Korean regime. In terms of action policy, the two governments established the Nuclear Consultative Group as part of the Washington Declaration endorsed in April 2023. They also advanced conventional-nuclear integration efforts and adopted joint guidelines on nuclear deterrence and nuclear operations. Finally, the nuclear ballistic missile submarine USS Kentucky made a port visit to South Korea in July 2023. All these moves aimed at reassuring Seoul and the South Korean public by clarifying the substance of U.S. nuclear commitments.

Nevertheless, many South Korean politicians, experts, and the general public remained dissatisfied with such measures, calling for more decisive steps to address what they considered continued U.S. ambiguity. Two steps were proposed. The first was the removal of any uncertainty in U.S. declaratory policy by the adoption of a “nuclear attack protection clause” in the alliance treaty, stipulating automatic U.S. nuclear retaliation if North Korea carried out a nuclear strike on South Korea. The second — on the action policy side — was the introduction of a NATO-style nuclear sharing arrangement, potentially involving the permanent (re)deployment of U.S. nuclear assets to or near the Korean Peninsula, such as in Guam.

Both current and former U.S. officials have called these proposals excessive. Regarding Seoul’s call for a “nuclear-for-nuclear” retaliation clause, a former senior State Department official referenced Biden’s public warning about regime-ending consequences for Pyongyang as an unprecedented move, asking pointedly, “If this isn’t an example of strategic clarity, then what is?” Washington’s overriding concern is that such a bold declaratory policy could reduce its flexibility for making future moves and increase the likelihood of entrapment in a conflict with a nuclear-armed state.

In addition, Washington views the submarine visit and the regular deployments of nuclear-capable bombers as clear demonstrations of U.S. extended deterrence. U.S. officials are disinclined to permanently station nuclear forces on or near the Korean peninsula. They argue that such deployments could unnecessarily escalate tensions and undermine the “operational flexibility” of the U.S. nuclear posture. As Vipin Narang, then acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy and co-chair of the Nuclear Consultative Group, noted in an interview, the United States doesn’t “assign specific weapons to specific missions or targets. If you pre-assign anything, then you’re reducing flexibility.”

An Enduring Challenge for the Trump-Lee Era

The ambiguity-explicitness gap will likely remain a source of tension between the two allies in the Trump-Lee era. During his successful June 2025 campaign for the South Korean presidency, Lee Jae Myung acknowledged the rapid expansion and growing sophistication of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. In his inaugural address, Lee reaffirmed that his government would “maintain strong deterrence against nuclear threats and provocations” based on the alliance. This suggests an effort to make the U.S. commitment and its implementation measures more concrete while simultaneously taking a pragmatic approach toward inter-Korean relations.

Strong public support for an independent nuclear capability and persistent skepticism of the U.S. nuclear umbrella are likely to provide a powerful incentive for the Lee administration to push for more explicit commitments from Washington — not only to bolster deterrence against North Korea but also to address domestic political pressures. These pressures will only increase should North Korea reveal further developments in its nuclear program. Moreover, while South Korean strategic elites broadly oppose indigenous nuclearization, many, especially conservatives, still advocate the necessity of introducing a NATO-style nuclear sharing arrangement and redeploying non-strategic nuclear weapons to South Korea, arguing that these measures would resolve U.S. ambiguity and restore the credibility of its extended deterrence. The uncertainty surrounding the U.S. commitment is likely to remain a key theme in South Korean strategic discourse under the Lee administration, as it was under his predecessor.

The Way Forward

It is essential for both countries to manage the persistent challenge of explicitness versus ambiguity prudently to reduce unnecessary tensions. South Korea should acknowledge the limit to which it can coerce the United States into being less vague. A failure to do so will likely result in deeper resentment of the United States and louder calls in South Korea for developing an indigenous nuclear capability.

South Korean policymakers should avoid becoming fixated on the assumption that greater explicitness will necessarily lead to greater effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence. The Lee administration should adopt a transparent, public-facing approach by issuing official statements and conducting public briefings to explain the inherent constraints on the level of clarity Washington can provide. Such an approach could help reduce public distrust in U.S. extended deterrence and alleviate political pressure for indigenous nuclearization. Seoul could then focus on strengthening existing joint initiatives established during the Biden-Yoon era.

For the United States, it is crucial to communicate candidly with the Lee administration that it cannot offer the level of specificity that Seoul seeks — and to clearly explain the reasons for this limitation. The Trump administration should emphasize that this does not signal a lack of resolve, but rather that a measure of ambiguity can be strategically advantageous in deterring a North Korean nuclear attack by inducing caution in its behavior.

Two institutional measures may help to narrow the explicitness-ambiguity gap. The first is creating a joint deterrence simulation center in South Korea, co-managed by U.S. and South Korean military officials. This center would utilize advanced simulation technologies to model real-time scenarios of North Korea’s potential nuclear and conventional attacks. By leveraging both countries’ advanced AI capabilities, the center could accurately estimate scenario-specific damage levels, North Korean attack methods and movement routes, as well as optimal allied response strategies and force configurations. Such realistic and detailed simulations would enhance South Korea’s confidence in the credibility of the U.S. commitment.

The second measure is establishing within the existing Nuclear Consultative Group a formal, service-specific consultation mechanism between corresponding branches of the U.S. and South Korean militaries (e.g., army-army, navy-navy, and air force-air force). Such detailed, service-level interaction would help South Korean forces gain a clearer understanding of U.S. extended deterrence policies, including the degree of strategic commitment and likely courses of action in a crisis. It would also support more informed bilateral coordination on the conventional-nuclear integration initiative by aligning operational concepts and expectations across corresponding branches.

South Korea faces an intractable, nuclear-armed adversary in North Korea and while the United States may feel that it has worked hard to reassure its ally, these efforts should evolve in line with further changes in Pyongyang’s nuclear posture. Although the United States is unlikely to alter the inherent ambiguity in its declaratory and action policies, a failure to continuously reinforce the alliance relationship in this strategic context will only lead to increased internal pressure for South Korea to go nuclear.

BECOME A MEMBER

Do Young Lee is a postdoctoral fellow (assistant professor) in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo and a fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project.

Ian Bowers is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and an adjunct researcher for the Oslo Nuclear Project.

Image: U.S. Department of State via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · July 28, 2025

4. Lee stresses importance of restoring trust with N. Korea after Pyongyang snubs dialogue overture

​Trust? restoring trust? When was there ever trust between north and South?

Lee stresses importance of restoring trust with N. Korea after Pyongyang snubs dialogue overture | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 28, 2025

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Monday stressed the importance of restoring trust with North Korea by fostering a peaceful atmosphere, hours after Pyongyang flatly rejected his offer for dialogue with the North.

Lee made the remark while presenting a letter of appointment to the new Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, according to presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung.

The ceremony was held hours after Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, issued the North's first official statement on the Lee administration, declaring that Pyongyang has no interest in any policy or proposal from South Korea.

"It is important to restore trust between South and North Korea while making efforts to build peace," Lee was quoted as saying by Kang.

In response, Chung pledged to work toward establishing peace, noting "a high wall of distrust has formed between the two Koreas due to years of hostile policies," according to Kang.

Since taking office in early June, the Lee administration has suspended loudspeaker broadcasts along the border and urged civic groups to halt anti-Pyongyang leaflet campaigns as part of efforts to mend frayed ties and resume dialogue.

President Lee Jae Myung (L) and Unification Minister Chung Dong-young pose for a photo after a ceremony held at the presidential office in Seoul on July 28, 2025. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 28, 2025

5. Unification minister says to propose adjusting joint military drills with U.S. to President Lee

​With all due respect, the minister of Unification should stay out of military matters. His advice and recommendations will weaken alliance readiness and such weakness will invite north Korean aggression. One of the conditions KJU seeks is a weakened alliance and specifically weakened military capabilities. The Minister's recommendations fully support KJU's political warfare strategy. They are dangerous for the alliance and for South Korea.

(LEAD) Unification minister says to propose adjusting joint military drills with U.S. to President Lee | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 28, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more info; REPLACES photo)

SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- New Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Monday he will propose adjusting South Korea-U.S. military exercises to President Lee Jae Myung, hours after Pyongyang denounced such joint drills and accused Seoul of "blindly adhering" to its alliance with Washington.

Chung revealed the plan to reporters, saying, "Yes, I have such an intent," in response to a question about whether he plans to propose adjusting South Korea-U.S. military exercises to Lee.

In mid-August, South Korea and the U.S. are set to kick off their annual large-scale Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise.

The minister's response came hours after Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, accused the Lee administration of "blindly adhering" to the South Korea-U.S. alliance, declaring that Pyongyang will never engage in talks with Seoul.

Citing continuing military drills with the United States, Kim argued that Lee is no different from his predecessor, referring to former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who pursued hard-line policies toward North Korea.

"It is clear that the policy line of the Lee Jae Myung administration is different from that of Yoon. The policy approach to South Korea-U.S. military exercises under Yoon will not be continued," Chung noted.

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young (front) signs a guest book after visiting the Seoul National Cemetery in Seoul on July 28, 2025. (Yonhap)

The envisioned adjustment will be discussed as a key agenda item during a working-level meeting of the National Security Council scheduled for Tuesday, the ministry said, adding that details will be disclosed after the session.

"I think that adjustment is quite possible, depending on the will of our government," Chung noted, saying "the joint military exercise in August may become a barometer" of the Lee administration's North Korea policies.

Later in the day, the presidential office said in a press notice that a decision on the issue will be made after consulting with relevant ministries, including the unification and defense ministries.

On his first day in office Monday, Chung also instructed ministry officials to allow South Koreans to freely engage in exchanges with North Koreans, provided they legally declare such plans in advance.

Currently, those wishing to do so are required to obtain prior permission from the ministry, a requirement that has partly contributed to the near-freeze in private-level inter-Korean exchanges in recent years.

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · July 28, 2025

6. USFK says decisions regarding joint drills will be made via 'established consultation'

The USFK statement is exactly correct. Consultation will take place.

Please keep in mind that the regime's attacks on military exercises are not about any perceived threat against the north. The attacks on exercises are part of the political warfare strategy to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance and the Unification Minister is playing right into KJU's hands. Even a blind man can see this.

The sad irony is that whatever "adjustments" are made will not stop KJU's political warfare strategy. I can see the ROK proposing to halt any field training during UFS and only conduct a computer simulation. But that will in no way create "trust" or in any way change regime behavior or influence KJU to negotiate. It will only result in weekend combined military readiness.

USFK says decisions regarding joint drills will be made via 'established consultation' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 28, 2025

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said Monday that decisions regarding potential changes in combined South Korea-U.S. drills "will be made through established consultation processes," after Seoul's unification minister said he will propose adjusting such drills to President Lee Jae Myung.

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young made the remarks earlier in the day, hours after Pyongyang denounced the Lee administration of "blindly adhering" to the South Korea-U.S. alliance, declaring it will never engage in talks with Seoul.

"As always, any decisions regarding alliance training and exercises will be made through established consultation processes," the USFK said in a statement.

While noting that the USFK is "aware" of Chung's remarks, the armed service said it has yet to receive details of his proposal from the South Korean government.

Chung's remarks came as South Korea and the U.S. are set to kick off their annual large-scale Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise next month.

North Korea has long denounced the allies' joint military drills as rehearsals for an invasion and uses them as a pretext for provocations. South Korea and the U.S. have said their exercises are defensive in nature.

Seoul's defense ministry reiterated that the allies have conducted regular joint drills to maintain their combined defense posture, saying there are "no changes so far" regarding the upcoming exercise.

In this file photo, South Korean and U.S. soldiers are on their guard against simulated enemy forces as they search a building during an urban area operation drill of South Korea and the United States' joint annual military exercise Freedom Shield in the South Korean border city of Paju, north of Seoul, on March 19, 2025. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 28, 2025

7. Samsung Signs $16.5 Billion Chip-Supply Contract With Tesla

Samsung Signs $16.5 Billion Chip-Supply Contract With Tesla

Shares in South Korean tech giant surge

https://www.wsj.com/tech/samsung-signs-16-5-billion-chip-supply-contract-with-tesla-a0d61216

By Kwanwoo Jun

Follow

Updated July 28, 2025 4:48 am ET

Tesla Chief Executive Elon Musk confirmed the deal with Samsung in a post on X. Photo: Brandon Bell/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

• Samsung will manufacture AI chips for Tesla in Texas under a multiyear $16.5 billion deal.
• Tesla’s AI6 chip will be used in humanoid robots, self-driving cars and AI data centers.
• Samsung shares rose 6.8% following the news, closing at the highest level since last September.

Samsung 005930 6.83%increase; green up pointing triangle Electronics will manufacture artificial-intelligence chips for Tesla TSLA 3.52%increase; green up pointing triangle in Texas under a $16.5 billion multiyear deal, a major win for its U.S. foundry business that sent shares of South Korea’s largest company sharply higher.

Tesla Chief Executive Elon Musk confirmed the deal on X, saying Samsung’s new facilities in Texas will be dedicated to making the U.S. electric-vehicle company’s next-generation AI6 chip. “The strategic importance of this is hard to overstate,” he wrote.

The contract win comes as Samsung, the world’s largest memory-chip maker, struggles to catch up with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing in the foundry business—making chips on a contract basis for customers such as Nvidia, Qualcomm and Apple, which design chips but don’t have their own factories to produce them.

Samsung currently makes the AI4 chip, and TSMC will make the AI5 chip, Musk said. The AI6 chip is intended to be used in humanoid robots, self-driving cars and AI data centers.

“Samsung agreed to allow Tesla to assist in maximizing manufacturing efficiency. This is a critical point, as I will walk the line personally to accelerate the pace of progress,” Musk said in a subsequent post.

Shares in Samsung rose 6.8% on Monday, closing at the highest level since last September. The advance outperformed the benchmark Kospi’s 0.4% gain and was the stock’s sharpest daily increase in more than eight months.

Samsung said the contract—equivalent to 7.6% of its overall 2024 revenue from businesses including smartphones, televisions and home appliances—will run until the end of 2033. It didn’t identify the client, citing a confidentiality agreement that also kept other details under wraps.

Despite years of investment, the gap between Samsung and TSMC has only widened. Industry tracker TrendForce, a research firm, estimates that TSMC’s share of global foundry revenue increased to 67.6% in the first quarter of 2025 from 67.1% in the previous quarter. Samsung’s share fell to 7.7% from 8.1% over the same period.

Some analysts say that relative to TSMC, Samsung’s foundry business is suffering from lower yields, broadly referring to the number of chips that can be harvested from a wafer. Samsung is also seen to be struggling with slower-than-expected progress in its advanced manufacturing processes and insufficient demand from major customers.

The deal with Tesla will likely enable Samsung’s new fabrication plant in Taylor, Texas, which is scheduled to begin operating in 2028, to focus on producing chips largely used in AI data centers and robots, according to Samsung Securities analysts led by Lee Jong-wook.

Samsung’s U.S. foundry business is expected to secure a sizable and sustainable revenue contribution from the deal, the analysts said. “The existing smartphone-centered customer base can be diversified into applications such as data centers and robots,” they wrote in a note.

Write to Kwanwoo Jun at Kwanwoo.Jun@wsj.com

8. US offers $15 million reward for info on North Korean nationals involved in global criminal network

Will this entice cyber sleuths and hackers?

US offers $15 million reward for info on North Korean nationals involved in global criminal network

The announcement comes as an Arizona woman was sentenced to more than eight years in jail for her role in running a laptop farm.

By

Greg Otto

July 25, 2025

cyberscoop.com · by Greg Otto · July 25, 2025

The State Department announced Thursday it will pay up to $15 million for information leading to the arrest of seven North Korean nationals accused of operating criminal schemes that generate revenue for Pyongyang’s weapons programs, marking the latest effort to disrupt financing networks that have funneled money around sanctions.

The coordinated action that also involved the Justice and Treasury departments targets what officials describe as an extensive network involving cryptocurrency theft, fraudulent remote IT work, tobacco smuggling and other illicit activities that primarily target U.S. companies and citizens.

The largest reward, $7 million, is offered for Sim Hyon-sop, who prosecutors say led tobacco smuggling operations designed to generate U.S. dollars for North Korea. Six co-conspirators carry bounties ranging from $500,000 to $3 million each.

The announcement comes as U.S. officials increasingly focus on North Korea’s ability to circumvent international sanctions through criminal enterprises that have grown more sophisticated in recent years. Intelligence assessments indicate revenue from these schemes directly funds North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, which have expanded significantly under Kim Jong Un’s leadership.

One of the most lucrative schemes involves dispatching thousands of North Korean IT workers abroad, primarily to Russia and China, where they assume false identities to secure remote positions with U.S. companies. These workers often target high-paying technology jobs, with earnings sent back to North Korea to support government programs.

In a related case, a U.S. citizen, Christina Marie Chapman, was sentenced to more than eight years in prison Thursday for facilitating a scheme that defrauded more than 300 U.S. companies, by helping North Korean IT workers obtain remote positions under false pretenses.

The Treasury Department simultaneously sanctioned Korea Sobaeksu Trading Company, which officials say has deployed IT workers to Vietnam, along with three additional North Korean nationals involved in similar schemes.

Research has indicated these operations generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually, providing North Korea with hard currency needed to purchase materials and technology for weapons development.

The use of criminal revenue to fund state weapons programs represents what analysts describe as a hybrid model where traditional organized crime intersects with state-sponsored activities to achieve strategic objectives.

Written by Greg Otto

Greg Otto is Editor-in-Chief of CyberScoop, overseeing all editorial content for the website. Greg has led cybersecurity coverage that has won various awards, including accolades from the Society of Professional Journalists and the American Society of Business Publication Editors. Prior to joining Scoop News Group, Greg worked for the Washington Business Journal, U.S. News & World Report and WTOP Radio. He has a degree in broadcast journalism from Temple University.

cyberscoop.com · by Greg Otto · July 25, 2025

9. Taiwan and South Korea: Bridging the Cybersecurity Gap

Taiwan and South Korea: Bridging the Cybersecurity Gap

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/taiwan-and-south-korea-bridging-the-cybersecurity-gap/

Opinion - July 24, 2025

By Davide Campagnola

In 2024, Taiwan’s Government Service Network faced an average of 2.4 million daily cyberattacks. Meanwhile, South Korean public institutions dealt with 1.62 million daily cyberattacks in 2023. These numbers, driven in large part by North Korean and Chinese state actors, have made Taiwan and South Korea the first and second most targeted geographies in the Asia-Pacific.

And the toll is increasing. South Korea reported a 48% rise in cyber incidents in 2024 compared to 2023, jumping from 1,277 to 1,887 cases. Taiwan likewise experienced a steep rise, from around 990 incidents in 2023 to over 1,400 in 2024. Government networks, critical infrastructure, and the high-tech sector are all primary targets.

Yet, despite facing similar digital threats, Taiwan and South Korea remain largely disconnected in the cybersecurity sphere. In June 2023, Taiwan’s Minister of Digital Affairs Audrey Tang met with South Korea’s newly appointed representative in Taipei to explore opportunities for collaboration on digital resilience and cybersecurity defense. At the Summit for Democracy in Seoul in 2024, Tang emphasized Taiwan’s experience countering AI-enabled threats to democratic integrity. These moments signal emerging but still insufficient cooperation.

That deficiency is no longer just a missed opportunity—it is a strategic vulnerability. The logic for cooperation is clear. The costs of non-cooperation, however, remain overlooked. Without coordinated resilience, an attacker can exploit the weakest link, ricochet across sectors, and destabilize entire systems.

The Case for Taiwan-ROK Cybersecurity Collaboration

• Securing the Semiconductor Industry. South Korea and Taiwan are two pillars of the global semiconductor industry. Advanced semiconductor production is geographically concentrated in these two countries, creating a chokepoint in global supply chains. This level of technological dominance makes both countries tempting targets for espionage and data theft. A coordinated cyberattack on either country’s tech infrastructure could trigger a chain reaction across the global supply chain, disrupting economic security far beyond East Asia. That vulnerability, coupled with an increasingly hostile digital environment, demands a joint response. This is not simply about common values or regional identity; it is about shared exposure, shared risk, and a shared stake in future stability.
• Responding to a New Era of Hybrid Warfare. The digital threat environment is evolving. Cyberattacks are increasingly coupled with disinformation campaigns and AI techniques—part of a broader strategy of cognitive warfare aimed at weakening trust in democratic institutions and stability, as the current political situation in Taiwan shows. By enhancing cooperation, they can better prepare for the next wave of hybrid threats, especially during electoral cycles and crisis moments. In this context, cybersecurity becomes a matter of democratic resilience.
• Closing the Regional Security Gap. While South Korea has deepened cyber collaboration with the United States, Taiwan remains isolated due to its unique diplomatic status. This gap is not only detrimental to Taipei but represents a breach in regional digital stability. Given Taiwan’s cyber resilience, Taipei has the capacity, experience, and institutional commitment to contribute to regional cybersecurity, yet its isolation prevents information sharing, global engagement, and broader strategic alignment. As cyber threats increasingly transcend borders, this fragmentation makes the entire region more vulnerable. Without cooperation between Taiwan and partners like South Korea, regional cybersecurity is left with exploitable seams in what should be a coordinated defense. A more connected Taiwan strengthens not just its own security posture but that of its neighbors as well.

Areas of Strategic Synergy

Both Seoul and Taipei have recognized the need to enhance their digital resilience. South Korea’s 2024 cybersecurity strategy outlines a multidimensional approach: strengthening information system security, implementing minimum-security requirements for infrastructure operators, deploying rapid response teams, and introducing an incident classification framework. Taiwan, for its part, has pushed, through the sixth (2021-2024) and seventh (2025-2028) phases of the National Cybersecurity Development Program, to improve critical infrastructure cyber security defense measures, promote cyber security awareness, and develop its domestic cybersecurity industry.

Both strategies stress public–private collaboration and seek to reinforce cybersecurity postures described as offensive—though their substance is more proactive than aggressive. Yet, instead of building parallel defenses in isolation, Taiwan and South Korea should exchange good practices and identify shared priorities, common weaknesses, and complementary strengths.

The potential for cooperation is broad, but in light of their current cybersecurity strategies, a few areas stand out as particularly relevant:

1. Critical infrastructure protection remains a shared imperative. Cyberattacks have the potential to paralyze essential services and disrupt economic activity. Both countries acknowledge this vulnerability. South Korea’s 2024 strategy and Taiwan’s Cybersecurity Management Act of 2018 both emphasize resilience and strict safeguards. These complementary efforts reflect common ground where lessons and good practices could be quietly exchanged.
2. Both governments are grappling with the rapid evolution of AI-powered cyber threats and potential. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has taken a proactive lead, unveiling the seventh phase of the National Cybersecurity Development Program to strengthen resilience in the age of AI. For South Korea, observing Taiwan’s experience could offer useful insights.
3. Existing multilateral frameworks offer potential low-profile avenues for engagement. As chair of the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT), South Korea is in a position to support broader technical exchanges, such as CERT to CERT exchanges. Taiwan is already a participating member of APCERT. Expanding cooperation through such venues, even informally, would align with Seoul’s 2024 strategy explicitly prioritizing cooperation with like-minded nations to establish a secure digital environment. There is no clearer case than Taipei.
4. Both nations are moving toward more assertive postures in cyberspace. South Korea’s 2024 strategy openly refers to developing offensive cyber capabilities in line with its alliances. Taiwan, for its part, has established the Information Communication Electronic Force Command (ICEF) to centralize its cybersecurity offensive capabilities. Sharing strategic thinking on deterrence, origins of threats or technological innovation could help both countries adapt to a rapidly changing cyber landscape.

Cybersecurity as Non-Traditional Diplomacy

Because of Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, formal cooperation will remain politically delicate. But that should not prevent Taipei and Seoul from finding practical, if informal, ways to work together. South Korea’s caution in articulating a Taiwan policy is understandable given its strategic need to balance ties with Beijing and its US alliance. However, Taipei’s strategic relevance to Seoul’s own national security is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.

This does not mean the two governments must sign a formal cybersecurity pact overnight. But structured, informal cooperation is well within reach. Cybersecurity offers a rare window for pragmatic engagement outside of traditional diplomatic structures. Governments, civil society actors, and the private sector can foster cooperation through track 1.5 or track 2 diplomacy, academic partnerships, and industry-led information sharing. Quiet coordination today could prevent a dangerous vacuum tomorrow.

A Role for Washington

Washington also has a stake in fostering this cooperation. US defense systems, communications networks, and strategic industries all rely on the uninterrupted flow of semiconductors from South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, the United States already supports Taiwan’s cybersecurity development and works closely with Seoul on cybersecurity as part of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

Washington could help facilitate trilateral exchanges, or simply backchannel support for a Taiwan–South Korea cyber dialogue. Encouraging Taipei and Seoul to converge, even informally, would enhance regional resilience and serve US strategic interests at once.

Building the Firewall Together

The threats are real. The capabilities exist. The logic is sound. What is missing is political imagination. Cyberattacks are not slowing down. They are growing bolder, faster, and more sophisticated. Taiwan and South Korea have the tools and the experience to push back. But they will be stronger together. A Taiwan–South Korea cybersecurity partnership does not need to be loud—it needs to be smart, structured, and quietly effective.

In an era of increasingly sophisticated cyber threats and geopolitical tensions, building that firewall together may be the most strategic move either can make. With advanced cyber capabilities and a shared threat landscape, Taiwan and South Korea have both the means and the motive to make cooperation work.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

10. FM Cho to visit Japan, U.S. this week for talks with counterparts: Seoul

​I hope Secretary Rubio can get the Foreign Minister to keep the minister of Unification in check with his alliance damaging recommendations but I think they will likely only be discussing trade.

(2nd LD) FM Cho to visit Japan, U.S. this week for talks with counterparts: Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 28, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS lead, headline; ADDS details; TRIMS)

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun plans to visit Japan and the United States later this week to hold talks with his counterparts of the two countries, Seoul's foreign ministry said Monday.

Cho will make a two-day trip to Tokyo starting Tuesday and meet one-on-one with Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, before flying to Washington for talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday (U.S. time), the ministry said.

The talks with Iwaya will be followed by a working dinner, it added.

They will mark Cho's first bilateral talks with his respective Japanese and U.S. counterparts since taking office early last week.

Cho's two-nation swing comes as South Korea's tariff negotiations with the U.S. are at a critical juncture this week amid the looming Aug. 1 deadline set by the Donald Trump administration. Unless a trade deal is reached, South Korean goods will be subject to a 25 percent U.S. reciprocal tariff and sectoral duties.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun makes remarks during his inauguration ceremony at the foreign ministry in Seoul on July 21, 2025. (Yonhap)

Top Seoul officials have been racing to strike an agreement to reduce the steep tariffs and minimize the impact on its export-dependent economy.

In Tokyo, Cho is expected to use the talks with Iwaya to exchange opinions on the U.S. tariffs, as Japan reached an agreement with the Trump administration just last week.

Under the deal, the U.S. will impose the 15 percent reciprocal rate on Japanese products, 10 percentage points lower than what was previously announced. The deal also includes Japan's pledge to invest US$550 billion to build and expand core American industries.

Besides the tariffs, Cho and Iwaya are expected to discuss shared bilateral issues, including North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, and reaffirm their commitment to advancing bilateral ties, as well as trilateral cooperation with the U.S.

During their first phone call Thursday, the two ministers agreed that their countries should continue bilateral cooperation to address shared regional and global challenges, and pledged to maintain close high-level communication, including at the leaders' level.

Cho has yet to hold a phone conversation with Rubio. His decision to visit Japan before the U.S. is seen as atypical, as newly appointed foreign ministers have generally chosen Washington as their first stop for diplomatic talks.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 28, 2025

11. S. Korea says U.S. pressing Seoul's expanded market opening to farm, livestock products

(LEAD) S. Korea says U.S. pressing Seoul's expanded market opening to farm, livestock products | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 28, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with presidential spokesperson's remark, background in last 5 paras; ADDS photo)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office said Monday the United States has been pressing South Korea to further open its agricultural and livestock markets in trade negotiations ahead of the tariff deadline, while Seoul is working to minimize concessions.

Woo Sang-ho, senior presidential secretary for political affairs, made the remarks as South Korea continues talks with Washington to avert the 25 percent reciprocal tariffs before the Aug. 1 deadline set by the Donald Trump administration.

"It is true that the U.S. side is exerting very strong pressure in the tariff negotiations, particularly in the agricultural and livestock sectors," Woo said in a briefing. "The government is striving to minimize concessions in order to protect domestic industries as much as possible."

Asked about a possible increase in South Korea's defense spending and purchases of U.S.-made weapons, Woo acknowledged the issues are part of the negotiations but declined to provide details on their progress.

South Korea had initially ruled out using further openings of its beef and rice markets as bargaining chips in tariff negotiations due to strong opposition from farmers' groups.

But the government appears to have shifted the stance amid growing pressure to strike a deal as Washington's major trading partners, including Japan and the European Union, reach trade agreements with Washington.

Japan, one of South Korea's key export competitors, recently concluded a trade pact with the U.S. that reduced reciprocal tariffs to 15 percent in exchange for greater market access for automobiles and agricultural products, along with a US$550 billion investment pledge.

President Lee Jae Myung (R) receives a weekly briefing from Prime Minister Kim Min-seok at the presidential office in Seoul on July 28, 2025, in this photo provided by the office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

As the tariff deadline nears, top Seoul officials are racing to hammer out a deal through a comprehensive package that reportedly includes a multibillion-dollar shipbuilding investment in the U.S. as well as expanded security cooperation.

President Lee Jae Myung received a briefing Monday from Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan and Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo, who recently held talks with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnik and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said in a written briefing.

The South Korean team proposed industrial cooperation in the shipbuilding sector during the two-day meetings and will continue talks with their U.S. counterparts during their stay abroad, according to Kang.

Industry Minister Kim has headed to Europe in what appears to be an effort to continue trade negotiations with Lutnik, who accompanied Trump on his trip to Scotland, sources familiar with the matter said

Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol is scheduled to meet U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Thursday, while Foreign Minister Cho Hyun is set to hold talks with Secretary of State Marco Rubio the same day, on the eve of the tariff deadline, according to their offices.

Woo Sang-ho, senior presidential secretary for political affairs, speaks during a press briefing at the presidential office in Seoul on July 28. 2025. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 28, 2025

12. Seoul confirms defense, arms deals part of US trade talks

Seoul confirms defense, arms deals part of US trade talks

Top aide cites "very strong pressure" as Washington pushes for access to Korean farm markets

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/07/28/3LEFZZ6BFZDF5LZPWXGQK3VCFU/

By Park Sang-ki,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2025.07.28. 17:25

In an unusually candid briefing on July 28, Woo Sang-ho, senior presidential secretary for political affairs, acknowledged that tariff negotiations between South Korea and the United States have grown increasingly fraught.

“It is true that the U.S. side is applying very strong pressure,” Woo said, confirming that Washington is pressing for greater access to South Korea’s agricultural and livestock markets.

Despite the mounting pressure, Woo emphasized Seoul’s resolve to protect its domestic industries. “We are doing our utmost to limit the scale of compromise,” he said, “in order to protect domestic industries.”

Woo Sang-ho, senior presidential secretary for political affairs, speaks during a briefing at the presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul, on July 28, 2025./Newsis

His remarks come amid growing scrutiny over whether the Trump administration is using trade talks to extract parallel commitments on defense. Asked directly whether the negotiations include discussion of increased defense spending or further purchases of U.S.-made weapons, Woo replied, “To my knowledge, those matters are indeed on the negotiation list.” He declined to offer details, saying only: “It is difficult to comment on the specific status of those talks.”

As of now, South Korea remains subject to a looming 25% tariff, with the Aug. 1 deadline for a deal fast approaching. With most of its competitors—Japan, the European Union, and others—having already reached agreements with Washington, Seoul finds itself increasingly isolated at the negotiating table.

The South Korean government has drawn a clear line: the terms secured by Japan and the EU—roughly a 15% tariff level—constitute the minimum acceptable benchmark. Accepting steeper tariffs, officials argue, would severely undermine the competitiveness of key exports, particularly in sectors such as automobiles, where Korean firms already face stiff competition in the U.S. market.

Time is running short. U.S. officials are expected to hold their third high-level trade meeting with China on July 28–29 in Sweden, further narrowing the window for substantive talks with Seoul. As a result, Korean negotiators will likely have only July 30 and 31 to reach an agreement. U.S. Trade Representative Scott Bessent is scheduled to meet Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Koo Yoon-cheol on July 31—one day before the tariff deadline—raising the stakes for a last-minute breakthrough.

13. S. Korean industry minister heads to Europe as U.S. tariff deadline nears: sources

(LEAD) S. Korean industry minister heads to Europe as U.S. tariff deadline nears: sources | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 28, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more details; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korean Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan has departed for Europe to continue trade negotiations with the United States, as the Aug. 1 deadline for potential U.S. tariff measures approaches, sources said Monday.

Kim and Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo left for Scotland from Washington, where they held two days of tariff discussions with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick through Friday (U.S. time), according to the sources familiar with the matter.

Their departure came as a U.S. delegation led by President Donald Trump arrived in Scotland for trade talks with the European Union.

The move is being interpreted as a last-ditch diplomatic push to reach a final agreement, with the looming U.S. tariff imposition deadline now just four days away.

Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (L) shakes hands with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick (R) at the Department of Commerce's office in Washington, D.C., on July 24, 2025, in this photo provided by Kim's office the next day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The two South Korean officials are said to have held additional negotiations in Scotland after undergoing consultations with U.S. officials.

Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said in a written briefing Monday that President Lee Jae Myung was briefed by South Korean negotiators on the ground, but did not specify their location.

As other major economies have reached agreements with Washington, Seoul has been racing to stay at the negotiating table to finalize a trade agreement with Washington before the Aug. 1 deadline to reduce the 25 percent reciprocal tariff and sector-specific duties imposed on South Korean goods under the Trump administration.

Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol will visit the U.S. later this week and hold talks with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Thursday (local time).

The reciprocal tariffs were initially implemented April 9 but were immediately suspended by President Trump for 90 days to allow for negotiations. The suspension has since been extended, but Washington indicated plans to resume enforcement Aug. 1 unless a deal is reached.

South Korean Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (R) shakes hands with U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick during their meeting in Washington, D.C., on July 24, 2025, in this photo released by the South Korean industry ministry.

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 28, 2025

14. New memorial project brings Britain's bloodiest Korean War battle to life

Have walked this ground many times when I was in 2d ID. This is a great initiative.

World News July 25, 2025 / 12:52 PM

New memorial project brings Britain's bloodiest Korean War battle to life

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/07/25/korea-Korean-War-Britain-Battle-of-Imjin-River-memorial-project-QR-code/1441753447205/

By Thomas Maresca

1 of 5 | "Stand in the Bootprints of Heroes," a hybrid online/offline tour was launched Friday to commemorate the British army's stand at the Battle of the Imjin River. Screenshot: British Korean War Memorial Committee/YouTube

SEOUL, July 25 (UPI) -- On the site of one of the Korean War's most ferocious battles, a pioneering hybrid online/offline tour was launched Friday to commemorate the British army's stand at the Battle of the Imjin River.

"Stand in the Bootprints of Heroes," produced by the Seoul-based non-profit British Korean War Memorial Committee, features 11 QR-coded signs located at key sites around the battlefield in Paju, some 25 miles north of Seoul. The codes link to a series of 19 video episodes detailing the events of the three-day battle with narration, music, photographs, paintings and maps.

The project's combination of real-world location markers with multimedia storytelling "brings history to life in a way that is immersive, respectful and accessible to all," Commodore Andy Lamb, Britain's defense attache in Seoul, said at a launch event held at the British Embassy in Seoul on Friday.

"It is helping people connect with the past without altering the landscape itself," Lamb, who serves as the president of the BKWMC, said.

The April 1951 battle came during the largest Chinese offensive of the Korean War and is remembered for the heroism of the British 29th Infantry Brigade, particularly the last stand of the Gloster Battalion.

British and U.N. forces held off the Chinese 63rd Army in an effort to delay their advance toward Seoul. On April 25, the heavily outnumbered U.N. troops were forced to withdraw from their positions, but the Gloster Battalion was surrounded and fought valiantly until being overrun.

The British held the key breakthrough point long enough to blunt the Chinese offensive and help U.N. forces maintain control of Seoul. With over 1,000 casualties, the Battle of the Imjin River remains Britain's bloodiest action since World War II.

The 1950-53 Korean War left millions dead, including some 160,000 South Korean soldiers and more than 36,000 U.S. soldiers. Britain provided the second-largest contingent to the combined United Nations Command -- over 81,000 troops -- and saw 1,078 killed and 2,674 wounded.

Despite the scope of the devastation, the Korean conflict has long been overshadowed in the West's historical memory, lost between World War II and the Vietnam War -- a situation the team behind the Imjin River project is hoping to help rectify.

"It is widely recognized as the 'Forgotten War,' and this work tries to address that," Lamb told UPI. "We're trying to bridge together commemoration and education. As the number of veterans reduces and many of them come to the end of their lives, it's important that we find new ways to commemorate and inform."

Younger Koreans also have much to learn about the history of the battles fought right in the backyard, said Lee Myung Hee, a Paju city official who attended the opening ceremony.

Lee told UPI that the city is planning to promote the Imjin River project and is organizing a tour for students in October.

"This project is a good opportunity for the younger generations, not only in Paju, but nationwide, to understand and remember what the veterans did during the Korean War," she said.

"Standing in the Bootprints of Heroes" is the second project by the British Korean War Memorial Committee, which receives its funding from local business sponsors and private donations.

The group installed a series of informative panels last year at Paju's Gloster Hill Memorial Park and is considering future expansions for the Imjin River site, including augmented-reality features and physical installations. A new project commemorating the 1951 Battle of Happy Valley in Goyang is also being discussed, organizers said.

British Ambassador to South Korea Colin Crooks said in remarks at the launch event that the Imjin River tour is an innovative way to keep the stories of Korean War veterans alive.

"One of the great privileges of being ambassador is helping to mark the British contribution to the Korean War," Crooks said. "As the number of living veterans declines, our duty to preserve their legacy becomes more urgent."

15. Film unveils North Korean troops' involvement in Kursk

Film unveils North Korean troops' involvement in Kursk

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/07/28/MWB2WEKKS5F5XMXFVKMFZNLLAQ/

By Kim Ja-a ,

Yu Jung-in

Published 2025.07.28. 15:54

A photo of a North Korean troop stationed in Kursk, Russia. /Facebook

A film, depicting the North Korean troops’ involvement in recapturing Kursk, Russia, is set to release soon.

On July 27, the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the DPRK announced through social network services (SNS) that the film in production is based on footage shot by Russian journalist Marina Kim, a fifth-generation Koryo-saram (ethnic Koreans of the former Soviet Union). The footage was taken when she visited North Korean military units stationed in the Kursk region. The embassy also previewed a snippet of the film.

A North Korean troop's military pack in Kursk, Russia./Facebook

The teaser clip showed North Korea soldiers carrying military packs full of towels, soap cases, razors, toothpaste, disinfectant, spare buttons, emergency medicine, and bandages as they carried out the operation.

According to Kim, the soldiers carried an entrenching tool on their backs during combat, which were used to quickly dig trenches for cover from enemy fire.

A North Korean troop holds firearm in Kursk, Russia. /Facebook

Kim also observed a combat training session the North Korean troops were deployed to. Reportedly, the deployed North Korean troops belonged to the Storm Crops, a unit specializing in surprise attacks against South Korea. Training was done with specialized gear, including AK-12 assault rifles, 12 spare magazines, and bulletproof vests.

New soldiers held a sheet of paper that aided communication with Russian forces on the battlefield./ Facebook

Since October of 2024, 10,000 to 12,000 North Korea troops have been deployed in phases. Several thousands more were sent earlier this year to make up for the casualty numbers. New soldiers were sent with printed reference materials that aided communication with Russian forces on the battlefield. These would become handy when issuing warnings or reporting combat situations.

Meal times for breakfast, lunch, and dinner are posted in Korean at the unit's dining hall. /Facebook

Kim’s reports went beyond the battlefield, covering North Korean troops’ daily lives.

In the unit’s dining hall, meal times for breakfast, lunch, and dinner are posted in Korean.

The soldiers are provided daily rations composed mainly of salted pork fat (lard), bread, and sweet snacks. Among these options, pork fat is heavily favored by North Korean troops. Known for its high calorie content, it’s considered an essential food for soldiers who sweat heavily and expend large amounts of energy each day.

North Korean troops always had soy sauce and red pepper powder beside their main dishes. /Facebook

Kim noted that unlike Russian soldiers, who typically have tomato sauce and mustard on the side, North Korean troops always had soy sauce and red pepper powder.

The Kursk region experiences sharp temperature drops between day and night, so stoves are a necessity after sunset. According to Kim, cast-iron stoves burn inside the barracks, with duty officers feeding firewood continuously throughout the night.

North Korean troops displayed slogans in their unit housing. /Facebook

In their unit housing, North Korean troops displayed slogans such as “Training is also combat” and “Avenge our comrades!”

Kim emphasized, “North Korea’s special forces have top-tier training,” adding, “Not only have they mastered the complex tactics of modern warfare, but they are also ready to share their experience with younger comrades who have yet to face real combat.”

North Korea

Russia

16.  Finance minister to hold talks with U.S. treasury secretary Thursday

​Last ditch effort?

Finance minister to hold talks with U.S. treasury secretary Thursday | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 28, 2025

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol will hold high-level trade talks with his U.S. counterpart in Washington later this week, the finance ministry said Monday, as the Aug. 1 deadline for tariff negotiations approaches.

Koo will depart Tuesday for the U.S. capital, where he will hold talks with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Thursday (local time), just one day before the United States is expected to resume hefty tariff enforcement on South Korean goods.

The minister had originally been slated to attend a "2+2" meeting last week with Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo, along with Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. However, the talks were postponed due to scheduling conflicts of Bessent.

As other major economies have reached agreements with Washington, Seoul has been racing to stay at the negotiating table to finalize a trade agreement with Washington before the Aug. 1 deadline to reduce the 25 percent reciprocal tariff and sector-specific duties imposed on South Korean goods under the Trump administration.

The reciprocal tariffs were initially implemented April 9 but were immediately suspended by President Trump for 90 days to allow for negotiations. The suspension has since been extended, but Washington indicated plans to resume enforcement Aug. 1 unless a deal is reached.

Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol, who doubles as the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, is seen at Incheon airport, west of Seoul, on July 24, 2025, as he canceled his trip to Washington following reports from the finance ministry that high-level trade talks between South Korea and the United States scheduled for later in the week were postponed due to U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's scheduling conflict. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 28, 2025

17. Korea pitches multibillion-dollar shipbuilding plan to US: reports

Korea pitches multibillion-dollar shipbuilding plan to US: reports

koreaherald.com · by Kan Hyeong-woo · July 28, 2025

Seoul says MASGA details unconfirmed as talks with Washington continue

Export-bound vehicles are seen parked at a port in Ulsan on Monday. (Yonhap)

Korea has proposed a multibillion-dollar project reportedly named Make American Shipbuilding Great Again, or MASGA, to the United States as Seoul makes an all-out effort to cut a better tariff deal with Washington ahead of the US-set deadline for tariff talks on Thursday, according to media reports on Monday.

Citing multiple unnamed sources, the reports said Kim Jung-kwan, Korea’s minister of trade, industry and energy, presented the MASGA project and Korea’s vision for shipbuilding cooperation with the US during ministerial-level talks with US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in New York on Friday.

According to the reports, the MASGA proposal, named after US President Donald Trump’s campaign slogan "Make America Great Again," offers a comprehensive package deal that includes large-scale investments in the US by Korean shipbuilders and financial support measures from the government such as loans and guarantees.

The reports said the Korean government is considering participation in the MASGA project by state-run financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of Korea and the Korea Trade Insurance Corporation.

They added that Lutnick, who is considered a key figure in finalizing the US tariff deal with Korea, responded positively to the proposal.

However, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy later said in a press release that the reported details of the MASGA proposal have not been confirmed as the negotiations are still ongoing, advising media outlets to take a careful approach when reporting on the trade talks between Seoul and Washington.

In a press release on Saturday following the ministerial-level trade talks, Seoul’s presidential office said it had reconfirmed strong US interest in shipbuilding cooperation, explaining that the two sides committed to working together on an agreement in the tariff negotiations.

Korea’s shipbuilding sector has been regarded as the country’s unique leverage in the tariff talks with the US as its world-class capabilities can contribute to the Trump administration’s goal of reviving American shipbuilding.

Two of Korea’s leading shipbuilding conglomerates -- HD Hyundai and Hanwha Group -- have already been ramping up their investments in the US and bolstering partnerships with American companies in the shipbuilding sector.

HD Hyundai joined hands with US shipyard operator Edison Chouest Offshore to build medium-sized container vessels at the American company's shipyard by 2028.

Hanwha Philly Shipyard, which was acquired by Hanwha Ocean and Hanwha System for $100 million last year, secured a contract to build a liquefied natural gas carrier, marking the first US-ordered, export-market-viable LNG carrier in nearly 50 years.

hwkan@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Kan Hyeong-woo · July 28, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com