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Quotes of the Day:
"The evil was not in bread and circuses, per se, but in the willingness of the people to sell their rights as free men for full bellies and the excitement of games which would serve to distract them from the other human hungers which bread and circuses can enver appease."
- Cicero
"I am persuaded myself that the good sense of the people will always be found to be the best army. They may be led astray for a moment, but will soon correct themselves."
- Thomas Jefferson
"They won't listen. Do you know why? Because they have certain fixed notions about the past. Any change would be blasphemy in their eyes, even it were the truth. They don't want the truth, they want their traditions."
- Isaac Asimov
1. Biden to host trilateral summit with S. Korean, Japanese leaders at Camp David next month: White House
2. Satellite photos reveal N. Korea discharged dam water without notice: report
3. N.K. leader meets with Chinese delegation after armistice anniv.
4. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint anti-submarine drills involving nuclear-powered sub
5. N.K. unveils nuclear torpedoes in the nighttime military parade
6. Exploring Joint Opportunities: Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit Meeting Agenda
7. Korea protests Japanese white paper laying claim to Dokdo
8. A dangerous trade between Kim and Putin
9. Putin thanks North Korea for supporting Ukraine war as Pyongyang displays its nukes in parade
10. US Submarines Are Irritating North Korea
11. How Should South Korea View Its Current US Relationship?
12. How the US SSBN Port Call in Busan Bolsters Extended Deterrence
13. THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE: A BATTLEFIELD NEGOTIATION
14. Divided peninsula, divided commemorations for Korean War’s 70th anniversary
15. It's all the same forest, say Korean firefighters battling blazes in Northern Quebec
1. Biden to host trilateral summit with S. Korean, Japanese leaders at Camp David next month: White House
I wonder what will be the outcome or major deliverable? Of course the meeting itself is significant to demonstrate the strength of trilateral cooperation. But there will be expectations of some kind of deliverable. I just cannot imagine what that will be. But I am sure the action officers of the three countries are working on that now.
It sure has been a long time since a Camp David visit by a foreign leader.
Excerpt:
John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, said the summit will also mark the first visit to Camp David by a foreign leader since 2015.
(2nd LD) Biden to host trilateral summit with S. Korean, Japanese leaders at Camp David next month: White House | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · July 29, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with announcement from South Korea's presidential office in paras 4-7; ADDS Seoul in dateline)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON/ SEOUL, July 28 (Yonhap) -- President Joe Biden will host a three-way summit with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida here in Washington next month, the White House said Friday.
The trilateral summit will be held at Camp David on Aug. 18.
"At the summit, the leaders will celebrate a new chapter in their trilateral relationship as they reaffirm their strong bonds of friendship and the ironclad alliances between the United States and Japan, and the United States and the Republic of Korea," White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said in a press release, referring to South Korea by its official name.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) speaks with U.S. President Joe Biden (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida ahead of their three-way talks in Hiroshima, Japan, in this May 21, 2023, file photo. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
South Korea's presidential office also confirmed the trilateral summit will be held at Camp David on Aug. 18.
"This summit will be an important opportunity to elevate the cooperation among the three countries that share core values to a new level," presidential spokesperson Lee Do-woon said in a written press briefing.
"We expect the three nations to enhance the rules-based international order together and to make more active contributions to regional and global security and economic prosperity."
As for the summit's agenda, the spokesperson said the three leaders will hold in-depth discussions on policy coordination regarding the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as cooperation on economic security and other major regional and global issues.
The proposed summit will be the first stand-alone trilateral summit to be held as the leaders of the U.S., South Korea and Japan have only held trilateral summits on the sidelines of other gatherings, such as regional meetings, in the past, Seoul officials have noted.
John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, said the summit will also mark the first visit to Camp David by a foreign leader since 2015.
"At the summit, the leaders will celebrate a new chapter in their trilateral relationship, and they will reaffirm strong bonds of friendship," Kirby told a telephonic press briefing.
Particularly, the leaders will discuss threats posed by North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile programs, according to Jean-Pierre.
"The three leaders will discuss expanding trilateral cooperation across the Indo-Pacific and beyond -- including to address the continued threat posed by the DPRK and to strengthen ties with ASEAN and the Pacific Islands," the White House spokesperson said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"The summit will advance a shared trilateral vision for addressing global and regional security challenges, promoting a rules-based international order, and bolstering economic prosperity," she added.
North Korea staged an unprecedented 69 ballistic missile launches in 2022, marking a new record for the number of ballistic missiles fired in a year.
Pyongyang also launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in late May, marking its 12th ICBM test since the start of last year.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · July 29, 2023
2. Satellite photos reveal N. Korea discharged dam water without notice: report
Not very responsible Mr. Kim. Or perhaps they technicians knew exactly how much water to release so it would not impact the South.
Excerpts:
But the latest water discharges appear to have been made to control the water level and were not enough to cause a flood in the lower region of the Imjin River in South Korea, the radio company reported, citing a researcher at the Korea Institute for Security Strategy.
The discharges were made a few days after the South Korean government made repeated requests to Pyongyang to give prior notice if it releases water from the dam.
Satellite photos reveal N. Korea discharged dam water without notice: report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 29, 2023
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- Satellite photos have detected signs of North Korea releasing water from a dam in the border area despite South Korea's request to give prior notice, a U.S.-based radio company reported Saturday.
The release of water from North Korea's Hwanggang Dam has raised concerns about potential flooding in areas located south of the border every summer in recent years. The dam is located in the upper region of the Imjin River, which flows through the Korean Peninsula from the north to the south.
Radio Free Asia (RFA) said satellite photos from Planet Labs, a U.S. commercial satellite imaging company, showed some of the dam's floodgates were wide open to discharge water on July 20. They also showed visible water turbulence caused by the surging water.
This July 5, 2023, file photo shows water being discharged from a dam in the border county of Yeoncheon, 60 kilometers north of Seoul. (Yonhap)
The dam continued to discharge water Monday, and more floodgates were seen open Thursday, the media reported.
But the latest water discharges appear to have been made to control the water level and were not enough to cause a flood in the lower region of the Imjin River in South Korea, the radio company reported, citing a researcher at the Korea Institute for Security Strategy.
The discharges were made a few days after the South Korean government made repeated requests to Pyongyang to give prior notice if it releases water from the dam.
Under an inter-Korean agreement signed in October 2009, the North agreed to notify the South in advance of its plan to release water, following an accident that killed six South Koreans after the North discharged water from the dam without notice.
Pyongyang, however, has not implemented the agreement since 2011.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 29, 2023
3. N.K. leader meets with Chinese delegation after armistice anniv.
The alliance that is "closer than lips and teeth." (but actually dentures and bleeding gums).
Are China and Russia competing for north Korean affection? Or is Kim courting both suitors? Or is this the new Northeast Asian Axis? (China, Russia, nK)
(LEAD) N.K. leader meets with Chinese delegation after armistice anniv. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 29, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS more info in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has met with a Chinese delegation, a day after commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, the North's state media reported Saturday.
During Friday's meeting, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing their bilateral relations, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The Chinese party-government delegation arrived in Pyongyang on Wednesday to attend anniversary celebrations held the following day.
Led by Li Hongzhong, a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo, the delegation was one of the first foreign groups to visit Pyongyang since North Korea implemented border lockdowns due to COVID-19 in early 2020, alongside a Russian delegation.
Kim met with the Russian delegation Wednesday.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) poses for a photo with North Korean officials and a Chinese delegation after their meeting on July 28, 2023, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
On Friday, Kim expressed gratitude to China for its help during the Korean War and said North Korea will always remember the significant contributions made during its "most difficult period," according to the KCNA.
Kim also voiced his appreciation to Chinese leader Xi Jinping for sending a delegation and a personal letter, hailing that China would achieve "the dream of great prosperity" under Xi's leadership, the report added. However, the content of the letter was not disclosed.
According to the Chinese Communist Party's flagship paper, the People's Daily, Xi wrote in the letter that China and North Korea shared a "comradeship written with blood" during the Korean War and that Beijing will strengthen and develop its relationship with Pyongyang "no matter how the international situation changes."
The daily said the letter was delivered to Kim through Li.
The KCNA said Pyongyang and Beijing reaffirmed their commitment to improve bilateral cooperation and strengthen their "strategic and tactical collaboration" to cope with the "complicated international situation" through the meeting.
After the meeting, Kim also held a reception with the Chinese delegation, where his powerful sister Yo-jong and Li made speeches, according to the report. The details of the speeches were not disclosed.
It appears to be the first time Yo-jong has spoken in front of foreign officials.
The KCNA said the reception was held in a "friendly" atmosphere.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · July 29, 2023
4. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint anti-submarine drills involving nuclear-powered sub
The new normal. Sustaining the highest level of readiness through deliberately planned interoperability training to be prepared to defend the ROK and deter war from the north.
S. Korea, U.S. stage joint anti-submarine drills involving nuclear-powered sub | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 29, 2023
SEOUL, July 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States staged combined anti-submarine drills, involving a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine, in waters south of the Korean Peninsula on Saturday, Seoul's Navy said, amid joint efforts to reinforce readiness against North Korean military threats.
The exercise took place in waters south of the southern island of Jeju, mobilizing the South's ROKS Yulgok Yi I Aegis-equipped destroyer, the ROKS Yi Sun-sin submarine and the U.S.' USS Annapolis submarine, according to the armed service.
The drills focused on training response procedures against a simulated North Korean submarine, such as searching for, tracking and identifying the target, the Navy said.
"This exercise was prepared to strengthen the South Korean and U.S. navies' response capabilities and enhance interoperability in preparation against North Korean submarine infiltrations amid growing threats from North Korea's missile provocations," the armed service said.
North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea on Monday, after the U.S.' Los Angeles-class submarine's arrival at a naval base on Jeju earlier in the day.
This photo, provided by the South Korean Navy on July 24, 2023, shows the U.S.' USS Annapolis submarine entering a naval base on the southern island of Jeju. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 29, 2023
5. N.K. unveils nuclear torpedoes in the nighttime military parade
Photos at the link (to include an apparent drone in flight): https://www.donga.com/en/home/article/all/20230729/4321387/1
N.K. unveils nuclear torpedoes in the nighttime military parade
donga.com
Posted July. 29, 2023 08:13,
Updated July. 29, 2023 08:13
N.K. unveils nuclear torpedoes in the nighttime military parade. July. 29, 2023 08:13. yea@donga.com.
In a nighttime military parade commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Victory Day, marking the armistice agreement of the Korean War, North Korea displayed an array of nuclear weaponry, including its nuclear torpedoes and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The parade was held in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square on the night of Thursday and lasted over two hours from 8 p.m. Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs of North Korea, was present alongside delegations from China and Russia, underlining the enduring ties among the three nations. This event continues the trend of North Korea's 'nighttime parades’ for the sixth time since the 75th anniversary of the Party's founding in October 2020.
On Friday, North Korean state-run media outlets, including the Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun, reported that four nuclear torpedoes, referred to as 'Haeil,' made their debut at the parade, mounted on large vehicles. This year, North Korea publicly conducted underwater explosion tests for these Haeil torpedoes three times in March and April.
The parade concluded with the display of 'Monster ICBMs,' namely the liquid-fueled Mars-17 type and the solid-fueled Mars-18 type, as has been the tradition. About four to five units of each type were believed to be showcased. Upon the appearance of the Mars-18 type, photographs published by Rodong Sinmun showed Chairman Kim and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu offering salutes. This act was interpreted as a symbolic gesture signaling China and Russia's acquiescence to North Korea's illicit nuclear missile development. Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification, suggested that "this appears to be a tactic by China and Russia, members of the UN Security Council, to make a staged scene aimed at weakening the North Korean sanctions resolution mechanism.
Earlier this year, a record number of ICBMs were deployed during the nighttime parade for the 75th anniversary of Armed Forces Day in February, including 11 units of Mars-17 type and 4-5 units of Mars-18 type. "Currently, it seems to fall short of the scale of the February parade," a military source observed. "We are analyzing the specific details of the weaponry and equipment mobilized for the parade."
한국어
donga.com
6. Exploring Joint Opportunities: Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit Meeting Agenda
Exploring Joint Opportunities: Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit Meeting Agenda
donga.com
Posted July. 29, 2023 08:12,
Updated July. 29, 2023 08:12
Exploring Joint Opportunities: Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit Meeting Agenda. July. 29, 2023 08:12. weappon@donga.com.
U.S. Representative Ami Bera stated in a panel discussion on Thursday that he expects concrete economic outcomes from the upcoming Republic of Korea-U.S.-Japan summit on August 18 in Washington. He holds a prominent position as a ranking member of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific.
Representative Bera, speaking in an online panel by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a notable U.S. think tank, revealed that the trilateral summit meeting at Camp David is scheduled in a few weeks. He highlighted the potential for tangible economic cooperation results for President Yoon Suk Yeol. Furthermore, he mentioned ongoing discussions about joint exploration in the East China Sea among the three nations, with U.S. energy companies exploring collaboration opportunities in areas shared by Korea and Japan for cooperative exploration.
Tracing back to a 1974 agreement between Korea and Japan on joint development of the continental shelf, the East China Sea's joint exploration might have been mentioned. With a focus on derisking mainly via reducing dependence on resources from China, the three countries consider a trilateral joint exploration in the East China Sea, where China doubles its expedition efforts. Korea and Japan initiated joint probe projects, including one in the 7th mining concession, which allegedly contained oil, but had to halt due to funding problems.
Regarding China's restrictions on domestic sales for U.S. chipmaker Micron Technology, the U.S. lawmaker emphasized the need for allied cooperation, warning that China can change its target for economic retaliation anytime. He also assured that the ROK-U.S. alliance remains solid without signs of a rift. The U.S. Congress has been pressuring Korean semiconductor companies against exploiting the Micron situation to expand their market shares in China. Rep. Bera's comments suggest they are, so far, not concerned about such attempts.
U.S. Representative Mike Gallagher, heading the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, highlighted the shared interest of Korea, the U.S., and Japan in creating a framework to counter Chinese economic pressure. He emphasized that the economic partnership is just as important as the military one and called for addressing responsive measures to Chinese economic retaliation during the trilateral summit meeting in August.
한국어
donga.com
7. Korea protests Japanese white paper laying claim to Dokdo
So will the Liancourt Rocks be an agenda item at Camp David? (IYKYK)
Friday
July 28, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Published: 28 Jul. 2023, 18:17
Updated: 28 Jul. 2023, 20:32
Korea protests Japanese white paper laying claim to Dokdo
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/28/national/diplomacy/Korea-Japan-Dokdo/20230728181754934.html
An aerial photo of Dokdo that was taken in September 2021. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Seoul’s Foreign Ministry on Friday criticized Tokyo’s claim to Korea’s easternmost islets in a new annual defense white paper adopted by the Japanese cabinet on Friday.
In a Friday statement, Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Lim Soo-suk said the islets, called Dokdo, are “clearly an integral part” of Korean territory “historically, geographically and under international law” and called on Tokyo to “immediately withdraw” its claim.
He added that Japan’s claim to Dokdo would not have any impact on Korean sovereignty over the islets, but could negatively affect bilateral relations.
“The Japanese government should be clearly aware that repeatedly making unjust claims to Dokdo is in no way conducive to our efforts to establish a future-oriented relationship between the ROK and Japan,” he said, referring to South Korea by the acronym for its official name, Republic of Korea.
Both Korea’s Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry also summoned officials from the Japanese Embassy in Seoul on Friday to protest Japan’s claim.
Mondo Yamamoto, the acting deputy charge d'affaires at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, arrives at the Korean Foreign Ministry's headquarters in Jongno District, central Seoul, on Friday. [YONHAP]
Seo Min-jeong, the Foreign Ministry’s director-general for Asia and Pacific affairs, summoned Mondo Yamamoto, the Japanese Embassy’s acting deputy charge d’affaires, to lodge a protest.
Yamamoto did not respond to reporters’ questions as he entered the Foreign Ministry’s headquarters in central Seoul.
Seoul’s Defense Ministry also summoned Japanese defense attache Kotaro Hyodo to express its displeasure with the territorial claim to Dokdo made by Tokyo in the new defense white paper.
The document referred to the islets, which Japan calls Takeshima, as one of Japan’s “unresolved” territorial issues alongside the four southernmost islands in the Russian-controlled Kuril Island chain, which Tokyo claims as its Northern Territories.
A map included in the new defense white paper that was adopted by the Japanese cabinet on Friday characterizes a Russian military flight in 2019 over Dokdo as an incursion into Japanese airspace. [YONHAP]
In a map that was included in the white paper, Japan also characterized a flight by Russian military aircraft in 2019 in the skies above Dokdo as an incursion into its territorial airspace.
Dokdo has long been a thorn in relations between Korea and Japan, which lays claim to the islets in policy documents, public statements and school textbooks.
Korea argues its sovereignty over Dokdo is rooted in centuries-old records and maps, which often show the islets and neighboring Ulleung Island as Korean territory.
Seoul’s Foreign Ministry and Korean historians also say Japan recognized Dokdo as Korean territory during most of the 18th and 19th centuries following an altercation between Japanese and Korean fishermen in 1696.
But in 1905, the Japanese cabinet issued an order annexing the islets based on the view that they were terra nullius, or unclaimed territory.
The decision was protested by Korean officials before the country itself was annexed by Japan in 1910.
After Japan’s defeat in World War II, Tokyo’s administration over Dokdo was suspended by order of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), who restricted Japanese access to within 12 miles of the islets.
In the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, which officially concluded the state of war between Japan and the Allies, Tokyo formally renounced its claim to the Korean Peninsula as well as Jeju, Geomun and Ulleung islands.
Although the treaty did not define sovereignty over Dokdo, it mentioned in a memorandum that Japan’s “administrative separation” from the islets remained active.
Meanwhile, SCAP transferred control over Dokdo in 1946 to the U.S. military administration in southern Korea, which then handed control over the islets to the Korean government when it launched in 1948.
Korea has since maintained a small police detachment on the islets to enforce its title to Dokdo.
Although Japan proposed to bring the issue before the International Court of Justice on multiple occasions, Korea has refused, arguing there is no dispute to settle with regard to sovereignty over Dokdo.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
8. A dangerous trade between Kim and Putin
The three countries, or the new Axis of Northeast Asia, have quite the spin on the Great Fatherland Liberation War:
Excerpts;
Attracting particular attention is the movement of Russia. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang for three days as head of the Russian delegation even amid the Ukraine war. In a meeting with North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam on Wednesday, Shoigu praised North Korea for being “an important partner to Russia.” In return, Kang expressed his “unreserved support for the Russian forces and people fighting against the tyranny of the imperialists.”
The remarkable development raises suspicion over an arms trading deal between North Korea and Russia. Because Russia is running short of troops and weapons as the war continues, it can receive conventional ammunition and drones from North Korea in return for providing sophisticated technology on weapons like miniaturization of nuclear warheads, atmospheric reentry and space launch vehicles.
...
But strangely, North Korea, China and Russia gathered in Pyongyang and championed justice and peace. The Korean War began with Stalin’s endorsement of Kim Il Sung’s surprise attack on the South and cost millions of lives after China’s intervention. Nevertheless, China calls it a war for justice while Russia still supports North Korea behind the curtain. They must realize that such behavior cannot earn sympathy from the international community.
Thursday
July 27, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Published: 27 Jul. 2023, 20:16
A dangerous trade between Kim and Putin
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/27/opinion/editorials/North-Korea-China-Russia/20230727201657607.html
On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the armistice, China and Russia sent a large-scale delegation to Pyongyang for the first time since the Covid-19 outbreak in 2020. North Korea has been celebrating July 27 as the Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War. It held a massive military parade showing off diverse weapons in the capital on Thursday.
China sent representatives of the Communist Party and government, led by Li Hongzhong, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, to the celebration. Earlier Tuesday, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un laid flowers on the grave of Mao Anying — Chairman Mao’s son who died from U.S. bombing — during his visit to the graveyard for the fallen Chinese soldiers. Kim’s move suggests his intention to highlight the blood alliance between North Korea and China.
Attracting particular attention is the movement of Russia. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang for three days as head of the Russian delegation even amid the Ukraine war. In a meeting with North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam on Wednesday, Shoigu praised North Korea for being “an important partner to Russia.” In return, Kang expressed his “unreserved support for the Russian forces and people fighting against the tyranny of the imperialists.”
The remarkable development raises suspicion over an arms trading deal between North Korea and Russia. Because Russia is running short of troops and weapons as the war continues, it can receive conventional ammunition and drones from North Korea in return for providing sophisticated technology on weapons like miniaturization of nuclear warheads, atmospheric reentry and space launch vehicles.
In fact, Kim Jong-un visited an event for weapons together with Shoigu, who delivered Russian President Vladimir Putin’s letter to the North Korean leader. Kim showed the Russian defense minister various types of North Korean weapons mimicking U.S. drones like Global Hawk, an unmanned reconnaissance vehicle, and Reaper, an unmanned attack drone. Russia is reportedly running out of stock of unmanned drones.
But strangely, North Korea, China and Russia gathered in Pyongyang and championed justice and peace. The Korean War began with Stalin’s endorsement of Kim Il Sung’s surprise attack on the South and cost millions of lives after China’s intervention. Nevertheless, China calls it a war for justice while Russia still supports North Korea behind the curtain. They must realize that such behavior cannot earn sympathy from the international community.
9. Putin thanks North Korea for supporting Ukraine war as Pyongyang displays its nukes in parade
Putin thanks North Korea for supporting Ukraine war as Pyongyang displays its nukes in parade | CNN
CNN · by Gawon Bae,Brad Lendon · July 28, 2023
Seoul, South Korea CNN —
North Korea’s “firm support” for Russia’s war in Ukraine emboldens the two countries’ determination to cope with Western nations, Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a speech to North Korean officials on Thursday, according to a report in North Korean state media.
Putin did not go into detail of the nature of Pyongyang’s support in what he called Russia’s “special military operation.” But US officials said last year that North Korea was selling millions of rockets and artillery shells to Russia for use on the battlefield in Ukraine.
“Solidarity with Russia on key international issues highlight our common interests,” Putin said in the speech, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The Russian leader’s remarks on his invasion of Ukraine were contained within a message of congratulations to North Korea on the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, known as Victory Day in the North, even though the grueling conflict ended in stalemate and the peninsula divided.
Putin specifically cited Soviet pilots, whom he claimed “carried out tens of thousands of combat flights” for contributing to “annihilating the enemy,” KCNA said.
“The historic experience of combative friendship has noble values, and is serving as a reliable foundation to further develop the connection between Russia and North Korea in the field of politics, economy and safety,” Putin said, according to KCNA, which shared a written version of Putin’s speech, but did not say whether it was addressed via a video recording or in writing to the North Korean officials.
The 1950-1953 Korean War was one of the first international conflicts of the Cold War era.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un meets with Russia's Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in Pyongyang, North Korea, on July 28, 2023.
KCNA/Reuters
ICBMs at military parade
Putin’s speech came as Pyongyang held a large military parade featuring two models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) as part of its armistice commemorations.
Hwasong-18 missiles, Pyongyang’s newest solid-fueled ICBMs, were wheeled into Kim Il Sung Square in the capital followed by the Hwasong-17, a liquid-fueled ICBM.
This is not the first time North Korea has showcased the Hwasong-18, which was last claimed to have been launched on July 12 with a flight time of 74 minutes, the longest ever for a North Korean ICBM.
Analysts say the missile likely has the range to target all of the mainland United States.
A missile displayed during a military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice in Pyongyang, on July 27, 2023.
KCNA/Reuters
As the parade went on below, North Korea flew versions of a new “strategic reconnaissance drone and the multi-purpose attack drone” overhead, according to KCNA.
North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun Nam declared it a “huge glory” for the North Korean Army Forces and a “great celebration” for all of its people to hold a military parade on the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, KCNA reported.
The parade also capped off visits to Pyongyang by high-level delegations from Russia and China.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Li Hongzhong, a Chinese Communist Party Politburo member, joined North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on a reviewing stand, KCNA reported.
Kim on Wednesday gave Shoigu – an architect of Moscow’s assault on Ukraine – a tour of a defense exposition in Pyongyang, with images from North Korean media showing them walking past an array of weaponry, from Pyongyang’s nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to its newest drones.
Also Wednesday, at a reception for the Chinese delegation, senior North Korean official Kim Song Nam thanked Chinese forces for joining in the Korean War, saying North Korea “would not forget forever the heroic feats and merits of the bravery soldiers who recorded a brilliant page in the history.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Li Hongzhong and Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu greet people as they attend a military parade in Pyongyang.
KCNA/Reuters
Analysts said the presence of the Chinese and Russian delegations in Pyongyang should raise concerns among world leaders.
“China’s representation at North Korea’s parading of nuclear-capable missiles raises serious questions about Beijing enabling Pyongyang’s threats to global security,” said Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
And Kim’s meeting with Shoigu should set off alarms too, he said.
“Given Russia’s need for ammunition for its illegal war in Ukraine and Kim Jong Un’s willingness to personally give the Russian defense minister a tour of North Korea’s arms exhibition, UN member states should increase vigilance for observing and penalizing sanctions violations, Easley said.
CNN · by Gawon Bae,Brad Lendon · July 28, 2023
10. US Submarines Are Irritating North Korea
Commentary from "adults in the room" at the Stimson Center.
Is appeasement the answer? Is weakening our defensive and deterrence capabilities? Can we assume that by making concessions that weaken the alliance Kim will come to the negotiating table and act in good faith as a responsible member of the international community?
Excerpt:
In many ways, the Washington Declaration demonstrates the nature of the problem at hand. While these measures advance alliance cooperation in the military realm, they address only one side of the equation. Being better prepared for potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula is important, but what is being done to reduce threats and lower tensions in the region?
How we proceed with policy and strategy must depend on the answer to these two questions:
1. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
2. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
US Submarines Are Irritating North Korea
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US Submarines Are Irritating North Korea - Inkstick
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What exactly is the Biden administration’s policy toward the Korean peninsula?
Words: Jenny Town, Jennifer Lind, and Robert Manning
Pictures: Youngje Park
Date: July 24, 2023
“Adults in a Room” is a series in collaboration with The Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy program. The series stems from the group’s monthly networking events that call on analysts to gather virtually and hash out a salient topic. It aims to give you a peek into their Zoom room and a deep understanding of the issue at hand in less than the time it takes to sip your morning coffee without the jargon, acronyms, and stuffiness that often come with expertise.
North Korea has proven to be a persistent challenge for US administrations over the past two decades, steadily developing its nuclear program in the face of US efforts to curtail it. At the same time, the relationship between the United States and South Korea has continued to grow.
The economic, cultural, and military relationships between the United States and South Korea were celebrated in April 2023 with a state dinner for South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at the White House, but the topic of North Korea remained central to the visit. The Biden administration faces a test in how it balances its important relationship with South Korea, the threat posed by North Korea’s now-established nuclear program, and the US desire to focus its East Asia policy on addressing China’s growing geopolitical influence.
The Reimagining US Grand Strategy’s May 2023 roundtable focused on the question of what the Biden administration’s policy toward the Korean peninsula appears to be and whether that approach is likely to yield success. Three participants shared their views. In the meantime, the USS Michigan, one of the largest submarines in the world, docked in Busan, South Korea in June. And last week, the USS Kentucky, a US ballistic missile submarine or SSBN arrived at the same port, followed by the USS Annapolis (powdered by a nuclear reactor but equipped with conventional weapons) that docked this morning.
Jenny Town, Senior Fellow and Director, 38 North
Yoon’s state visit in April 2023 marked the 70-year anniversary of the US-ROK alliance with great fanfare, emphasizing the growth and expansion of that cooperation into a “global comprehensive strategic alliance.”
One of the achievements of this second summit between President Joe Biden and Yoon was the announcement of the Washington Declaration, which opens the door to a new level of bilateral consultation and cooperation on nuclear weapons policy, planning, and conventional support of nuclear operations. The declaration announced the establishment of a bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group, a mechanism to facilitate greater information sharing and dialogue on nuclear and strategic planning. This was a significant measure to enhance trust and understanding of US nuclear decision-making, should the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula ever have to be considered.
Being better prepared for potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula is important, but what is being done to reduce threats and lower tensions in the region?
However, the Washington Declaration is just the latest of several efforts in recent years to bolster US extended deterrence and address a growing assurance challenge in South Korea amid rapidly advancing North Korean weapons of mass destruction capabilities and an increasingly dangerous geopolitical landscape. The announcement was also framed as a way to quiet the debate in South Korea about its own nuclear future spurred by growing domestic support for a South Korean nuclear deterrent and comments by Yoon earlier this year that seemed to put the nuclear option on the table.
In many ways, the Washington Declaration demonstrates the nature of the problem at hand. While these measures advance alliance cooperation in the military realm, they address only one side of the equation. Being better prepared for potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula is important, but what is being done to reduce threats and lower tensions in the region?
The Biden administration appears to have a negotiation strategy, should North Korea ever be willing to talk about its nuclear program again. But the prospects of Pyongyang voluntarily making that choice in the near term are bleak. The high-profile failure to secure a breakthrough agreement in 2019 has left scars in the relationship that was already filled with deep mistrust on both sides. Moreover, increased US-China rivalry is fueling an arms race in northeast Asia, and the growing emphasis on ideological blocs is creating a scenario in which insecurity is rising, solidarity is growing within these blocs, and the prospects for cooperation across them seem less and less likely.
In this kind of environment, rebuilding diplomacy with North Korea is no doubt a difficult task, but given the stakes is necessary to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict on the peninsula. This will take more deliberate efforts than simply offering unconditional talks about denuclearization. Finding issues of common security, making more specific proposals to manage expectations, and demonstrating that results are possible in order to rebuild confidence that there is a reason for Pyongyang to re-engage in diplomacy with the United States on any topic are all important goals to consider.
The stakes are high as North Korea hones its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and South Korea contemplates its own nuclear future. As much as efforts are being made to try to create diplomatic openings and restore channels of communication between the United States and China, similar and perhaps parallel efforts are needed for North Korea as well to try to move perilous trends in regional security dynamics in a more positive and productive direction.
Jennifer Lind, Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth University
North Korea’s advances in its nuclear program — particularly its development of intercontinental ballistic missiles — have created uncertainty about the US nuclear umbrella. War on the peninsula would create serious escalation risks. Previously, the United States promised to retaliate against a North Korean nuclear strike on the south with the knowledge that Pyongyang could not then strike the United States. But increasingly, North Korea’s intercontinental reach would enable it to retaliate against US cities.
If the Washington Declaration fails to reassure South Korea, the NATO experience highlights a set of possible options for South Korea and the United States today.
This weakens the deterrent threat vis-à-vis North Korea and reduces US credibility in the eyes of South Koreans. They understand that any rational US leader would hesitate to give an order that could lead to the deaths of millions of Americans — the greatest foreign policy catastrophe in US history. Thus South Koreans are increasingly discussing acquiring an independent nuclear arsenal.
At their summit in Washington DC in April 2023, the Biden and Yoon governments issued the Washington Declaration in which they affirmed that the United States would retaliate against a North Korean nuclear attack against the ROK. The declaration also committed to joint wargaming and created a Nuclear Consultative Group. Biden also announced port visits by US nuclear submarines to South Korean ports and pledged to consult with Seoul regarding any nuclear weapons use on the peninsula. In turn, Yoon reaffirmed South Korea’s obligations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although these are all thoughtful policies, they do not address the fundamental issue of US willingness to risk a nuclear attack on the United States.
A deterrence crisis in NATO in the 1960s is revealing. The Soviet Union’s development of intercontinental nuclear capabilities touched off a crisis in NATO about US credibility. US leaders were unable to mollify allied fears with gestures akin to those in the Washington Declaration. The allies solved the problem through the United States stationing its nuclear weapons at allied bases, and through a nuclear sharing program. Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, and West Germany all accepted this solution. France, however, chose to develop an independent nuclear arsenal. If the Washington Declaration fails to reassure South Korea, the NATO experience highlights a set of possible options for South Korea and the United States today.
Robert Manning, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program
There are some wicked problems that defy solutions and can only be managed. North Korea is at the top of the list. After three decades of failed diplomacy, North Korea’s breakneck effort to develop a full spectrum of modern ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons — intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the continental United States, tactical nuclear weapons, and nuclear-capable submarines — has changed the strategic equation.
To date, its leader, Kim Jong Un, has made it clear that he has no interest in talking to either the United States or South Korea. While the United States’ aspiration remains a denuclearized North Korea, it is difficult to envision a circumstance under which Pyongyang would verifiably give up its nuclear weapons so long as the Kim dynasty is in power.
While the United States retains the aspiration of denuclearization and a UN sanctions regime denies legitimacy to Pyongyang’s nuclear status, the de facto reality is that interim steps may be the least bad option.
This reflects three decades of failed diplomacy. The 2005 Agreed Statement, the result of the China-hosted Six-Party talks that includes the United States, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, and Japan, offered a comprehensive solution but unraveled as Pyongyang refused the necessary transparency for verification. Previous efforts, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework, also collapsed for the same reason. The most recent effort, the Trump-Kim summit, failed when then President Donald Trump rejected Kim’s offer and walked out of a meeting in Hanoi rather than put a counter-offer on the table.
Kim appears to have been shocked and angry by Trump’s exit. Since then, Pyongyang’s views have hardened. But Kim drew conclusions from the fate of Iraq, absent nukes, and of Libya and Ukraine abandoning them. Nuclear weapons have become essential to the identity of the Pyongyang regime, embodied in its constitution. North Korea has a vested bureaucratic interest in its nuclear endeavor. For Kim, it is an easy choice: trust US assurances or nuclear weapons.
Given this predicament, the Biden administration, while repeatedly offering unconditional meetings, has focused on strengthening extended deterrence in this new security environment. US-ROK-Japan security trilateral intelligence and security cooperation has deepened. While the United States retains the aspiration of denuclearization and a UN sanctions regime denies legitimacy to Pyongyang’s nuclear status, the de facto reality is that interim steps may be the least bad option.
The idea of a cap-and-freeze in Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear weapons programs is occasionally floated by outside analysts. Yet, such an arms control accord would likely be an end state even though it is presented as an interim step. Kim would have to signal interest in such an idea, and the United States would have to weigh the price, legitimizing North Korea as a nuclear state, undermining the nonproliferation regime, and likely sanctions relief. US politics and Pyongyang’s resistance to necessary International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring and verification would make such an accord problematic but worth exploring.
Author bio
Jenny Town, Jennifer Lind, and Robert Manning
inkstickmedia.com
11. How Should South Korea View Its Current US Relationship?
Excerpts:
Ultimately, the capacity and strategy of South Korean politics and diplomacy have become crucial. Let’s first examine the temptations and practices that need to be overcome.
First, both the political and public spheres should refrain from the temptation to pursue political interests by engaging in polarized domestic politics that exclude opposing parties when handling diplomatic issues. Instead, South Korea should consider how to maintain the elevated status of the Republic of Korea and what the content of a diplomatically unifying policy should be. It should also contemplate how to reach a domestic consensus on the costs associated with diplomatic policy choices.
Second, South Korea must break away from the prevailing practice of excessive focus and obsession with specific countries such as the US or China in its diplomacy. The historical events and strategies witnessed during the late Joseon Dynasty, such as Agwan Pacheon (King Gojong’s internal exile to the Russian legation) or the Joseon Strategy, were the outcome of politicians considering only which specific country to align with.
Even today, there is a tendency to view either the US or China as the only possible answers. First and foremost, South Korea needs to discuss and reach a consensus on what it needs to do and what it is capable of doing. Through this, it can strengthen its defense and diplomatic capabilities, leading to a more mature South Korea-US alliance and proactive engagement in future-oriented relations with China. Heaven helps those who help themselves. May South Korea learn from this proverb and establish a sophisticated strategy for its politics and diplomacy.
How Should South Korea View Its Current US Relationship?
The mood swings between US presidential administrations
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/how-south-korea-view-current-us-relationship?r=7i07&utm
JUL 29, 2023
∙ PAID
By: Jungkun Seo
In examining the current relationship between South Korea and the US, it is important to reaffirm how unprecedented US diplomacy was during Donald Trump’s presidency. Trump was different from previous American presidents, who took the lead in attacking Japan or China during presidential elections over trade issues, only to return to a polite free trade stance when they entered the White House.
Trump differed from earlier presidents who turned a blind eye to North Korea’s dictator while noting that if they met him in person on the international stage, they would be recognizing human rights oppression and nuclear development in North Korea. In particular, President Dwight Eisenhower’s “I shall go to Korea” remarks during the 1952 presidential election, President Jimmy Carter’s pledge to withdraw US troops from South Korea in 1976, and presidential candidate Senator Richard Gephardt’s attack on Hyundai Motor for protectionist trade activities during the 1988 Democratic presidential election are a few examples where South Korea directly featured in US presidential elections.
Trump was different. He mentioned South Korea throughout his term, including the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, defense cost sharing, the costs of the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system, and remarks on South Korea-US joint drills.
The current South Korea-US relationship also differs depending on the administration in office in South Korea. When Joe Biden won the 2020 US presidential election, the Democratic Party of Korea at the time expected that the same “Democratic” regime would exist in both Seoul and Washington in matters relating to foreign policy. However, Biden represents the centrist wing of the Democratic Party, which has been classified as so-called “Cold War Liberals” and hardliners in foreign policy, including on the North Korean issue.
That Biden eventually returned to a North Korea policy similar to the strategic patience of the Barack Obama era, despite criticism in the early days of the administration, supports this view. It is also the background of the Biden administration’s consistent lukewarm support for the end-of-war declaration, which the Moon Jae-in administration was obsessed with until the end of its term. In contrast, the current Yoon Suk Yeol government’s US First approach and its support of Japanese reconciliation policies have full support in the US. This indicates that South Korea’s policy towards the US varies more with changes in US administrations than does US policy with changes in South Korea’s administrations.
The current cooperation between South Korea and the US on preventing North Korea’s nuclear threat and China’s hegemonic threat has also bred controversy.
First, the focus of South Korea and the US is on deterring North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons, because the North is unlikely to easily give up its nuclear weapons. This focus is captured in the Washington Declaration of April 2023, and in the newly created Nuclear Consultative Group. According to the South Korean government, US willingness to use and share nuclear weapons around the Korean Peninsula goes beyond existing US commitment to European countries.
Of course, there are objections to this. First, there is skepticism about the substance of the Washington Declaration. Others argue that it’s now time to announce a detailed and substantive agreement on the operation of nuclear weapons between South Korea and the US, rather than forming another nuclear consultation group. In particular, some conservative groups criticized the Yoon administration, saying that the Washington Declaration eliminated South Korea’s opportunity for nuclear armament.
Second, a trilateral approach was agreed between South Korea, the US and Japan to prevent China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific region. The current South Korean administration has pursued diplomacy with Japan in a fundamentally different way than its predecessor, with policy decisions such as the agreement to normalize relations between South Korea and Japan in March, Yoon's state visit to the US in April, and the South Korea-US-Japan summit at the G-7 meeting in Hiroshima in May were greatly welcomed in the US. In the case of Japan, the South Korean government’s 180-degree change in attitude and the joint response to North Korean threats through the South Korea-US-Japan trilateral cooperation system have been positively received.
However, from Seoul’s perspective, as well as that of the US and Japan, there are also various issues surrounding trilateral cooperation. In South Korea, criticism has not subsided over the lack of domestic consensus about Yoon’s policy drive regarding Japan. In the case of Japan, it cannot hide its anxiety over how sustainable South Korea's new Japan policy is, because the policy could change with a new administration every five years. It is unclear whether US support for trilateral cooperation has been established at the level of the American grand strategy, beyond the Biden administration alone. If Trump or other Republican candidates take power, trilateral cooperation is likely to be pushed to the bottom of foreign policy priorities.
In the end, the sustainability of foreign policy in South Korea and the US, where domestic politics are severely polarized, has emerged as a new international relations variable, whereas in Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party continues to rule, this variable is considered a constant.
Biden’s Nationalism and Economic Security
South Korea-US relations in the area of economic security, where Biden’s nationalism is prominent, are not smooth compared to cooperation and collaboration over deterrence policies. Let’s look at the situation in the US first. Compared to Trump, who focused on trade issues throughout his administration and engaged in a trade war with China, Biden is focusing on protecting US hegemony in science and technology. Through the pandemic and supply chain crisis, there has been a growing consensus in the US on the need to produce semiconductors domestically; that Democrats have traditionally maintained close ties with the science and technology community also played a role in this shift.
For example, Republicans have always opposed allocating resources to the National Science Foundation, because most of academia is liberal and therefore a stronghold of the Democratic Party. The US Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), a reduced version of the Build Back Better bill, under the leadership of the Democratic Party in the summer of 2022, in the wake of Democratic Senator Joe Manchin’s unexpected cooperation ahead of the mid-term elections.
In the case of the IRA, which was not approved by a single Republican senator or representative, there was a strange phenomenon where it attracted more attention among its allies than the American people. In particular, the “finally assembled in North America” mentioned in Chapter 4 severely damaged sales of South Korean electric vehicles in the US market. In South Korea, it was an opportunity to feel the change in the US, a significant shift following Trump, and to feel betrayed.
In the case of the CHIPS and Science Act, which includes US$52 billion in subsidies, the bill promotes domestic production of semiconductors through constraints such as guardrail provisions. In other words, it has presented another dilemma for South Korean companies that have already invested heavily in China.
These two bills represent the Biden administration’s new economic security policy. They also carry a new lesson for South Korea in its alliance with the US, namely that it does not automatically guarantee South Korea’s economic interests.
The recent situation where competition between the US and China has intensified also provides an environment that can only be understood by integrating both the economy and security. In terms of military security, China is under pressure, but in terms of economy and trade, previous US policy that prioritized cooperation with China has reached the end of its life. Peter Navarro, Trump's protectionist trade strategist, first raised the claim that “economic security is national security.” Biden is also seeking re-election in 2024 with the slogan “Make Things in America Again,” in contrast to Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again.”
However, the correlation between the economy and security in the US varies depending on the domestic political alliances supporting the Republican and Democratic parties. In the case of the Republican Party, it has an ultra-hardline stance on security issues with China, a reflection of the party’s traditional position as a party close to the military-industrial complex. At the same time, the export of agricultural products to China cannot be ignored, since the agricultural sector (farm states) is a major support base for the party. This is also why Trump, who criticized China throughout his term, concluded a rapid mini-trade deal with China in early 2020 when he ran for re-election.
In contrast, the Democratic Party, having upheld a protectionist trade stance for a long time, has little resistance to a trade war with China. However, within the party, the so-called New Democrats, who favor free trade, have introduced confusion into previous party unity. Conversely, progressive groups within the Democratic Party are paying attention to the common interests of the US and China, pursuing normalization of relations with China through policies such as preventing a sharp increase in defense budgets and working to jointly address the climate crisis.
Furthermore, among Asian Americans, a traditional support base of the Democratic Party, there are concerns that Biden's tough stance on China may trigger a backlash in the form of Asian hate crimes in the US.
Recently, the Biden administration has shifted from decoupling to de-risking, partly because Asian American support in next year’s presidential election is absolutely necessary. Biden and Democrats are well aware of the fact that Asian Americans, who have traditionally favored Democrats, have increased their Republican support in both the 2020 presidential and 2022 midterm elections. In addition, there is a significant portion of Asian Americans in two swing states, Georgia and Arizona.
South Korea’s Strategy
The cases of President Trump demanding US$1 billion for the deployment costs of THAAD and President Biden's promotion of the IRA, which perplexed South Korean companies that made large-scale investments in the US, suggest that the US is not the same country we once knew. Or, on the other hand, it may well be the same country, having exercised nationalistic foreign policy for a long period, through policies such as the sudden suspension of the dollar’s link to the gold standard in 1971, known as the Nixon Shock, the Plaza Accord in 1985, which unilaterally devalued the dollar, and through the fair trade norms pushed by US Trade Representative Laura Tyson in the 1990s; South Korea may have resisted recognizing this truth, citing its alliance with the US as an excuse.
It is hard to deny the US-led liberal internationalism based on domestic anti-communism during the Cold War. However, after the Cold War, as US-China competition began and as the US suffered failure in the Iraq war and the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the US has come to prioritize its own interests in its foreign relations.
In the history of relations between any countries, there has never been a perfect harmony of interests, nor is this possible. In other words, despite the significant congruence in values and security issues, differences can still arise in terms of strategy and the economy in the relationship between South Korea and the US. The problem is in how we understand and respond to the unavoidable situation where South Korea and the US find themselves in different positions. Does voicing a different opinion from the US immediately mean taking China’s side in the era of US-China competition? With the current reality where the US seems to have demonstrated that security and the economy cannot be separated, can South Korea manage to separate them?
Ultimately, the capacity and strategy of South Korean politics and diplomacy have become crucial. Let’s first examine the temptations and practices that need to be overcome.
First, both the political and public spheres should refrain from the temptation to pursue political interests by engaging in polarized domestic politics that exclude opposing parties when handling diplomatic issues. Instead, South Korea should consider how to maintain the elevated status of the Republic of Korea and what the content of a diplomatically unifying policy should be. It should also contemplate how to reach a domestic consensus on the costs associated with diplomatic policy choices.
Second, South Korea must break away from the prevailing practice of excessive focus and obsession with specific countries such as the US or China in its diplomacy. The historical events and strategies witnessed during the late Joseon Dynasty, such as Agwan Pacheon (King Gojong’s internal exile to the Russian legation) or the Joseon Strategy, were the outcome of politicians considering only which specific country to align with.
Even today, there is a tendency to view either the US or China as the only possible answers. First and foremost, South Korea needs to discuss and reach a consensus on what it needs to do and what it is capable of doing. Through this, it can strengthen its defense and diplomatic capabilities, leading to a more mature South Korea-US alliance and proactive engagement in future-oriented relations with China. Heaven helps those who help themselves. May South Korea learn from this proverb and establish a sophisticated strategy for its politics and diplomacy.
Jungkun Seo is a Professor, Dept. of Political Science at Kyung Hee University. The views expressed are his own. This is reprinted with permission of the East Asia Foundation, a Seoul-based think tank.
12. How the US SSBN Port Call in Busan Bolsters Extended Deterrence
Excerpts:
The recent port call serves as a costly signal in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, the visit shows that the U.S. is willing to expose, if ever-so-briefly, the location of a remarkably sensitive asset in order to affirm its extended deterrent. The U.S. has previously been reluctant to indicate where its SSBNs are deployed at any given time due to their strategic importance as the most survivable component of the U.S. nuclear triad. Indeed, in recent history U.S. SSBNs have made only a few public port visits, and these visits have been largely limited to U.S. territory and the facilities of its closest ally, the United Kingdom. By announcing the USS Kentucky’s visit to Busan, the U.S. temporarily rendered one of its key assets more vulnerable, showing it is willing to run this risk on behalf of the ROK.
The visit serves as a costly signal for other reasons as well. While the U.S. maintains a fleet of 14 SSBNs, it can only deploy four to five of these assets on deterrence patrols at any given time, with the remainder engaged in training or maintenance. The Kentucky’s trip to Busan therefore carries opportunity costs given the scarcity of U.S. SSBNs on deterrence patrols. As such, this recent port call should bolster the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the ROK.
Ultimately, the USS Kentucky’s port call ultimately serves to reinforce the strength of the U.S. extended deterrent on the Korean Peninsula. As the DPRK works tirelessly to upgrade its growing nuclear arsenal, the U.S. will need to continue to prioritize the increased visibility of U.S. strategic assets to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
How the US SSBN Port Call in Busan Bolsters Extended Deterrence
By announcing the USS Kentucky’s visit to Busan, the U.S. temporarily rendered one of its key assets more vulnerable, showing that it is willing to run risks on behalf of South Korea.
By Jihoon Yu and Erik French
July 28, 2023
thediplomat.com · by Jihoon Yu · July 28, 2023
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From July 18 to 21, the USS Kentucky, a U.S. nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), visited the port of Busan in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The move provoked a characteristically exaggerated response from North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), whose defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, suggested that the visit could prompt nuclear retaliation.
Coming amidst the first meeting of the new allied U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group, the Kentucky’s visit is part of an ongoing effort by the U.S. to “enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula,” first laid out in the U.S.-ROK Washington Declaration in April. The U.S. Navy emphasized that the port call reflects Washington’s “extended deterrence guarantee” to Seoul. In other words, the visit serves to reinforce the U.S. commitment to defend the ROK with the full range of U.S. capabilities in the event of a DPRK attack. This effort comes amidst growing concerns in the ROK about the viability of the U.S. deterrent given the DPRK’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal.
But how exactly does an SSBN port call serve to reinforce the U.S. extended deterrent?
Deterrence theorists emphasize that an effective extended deterrent hinges on perceptions of a defender’s capabilities and credibility. Capabilities refer to a defender’s capacity to impose costs on an adversary should it attack the defender’s ally. Allies and adversaries alike pay close attention to a defender’s capabilities; if they seem lacking, allies may seek protection elsewhere while adversaries may see opportunities for aggression. To shape perceptions of its capabilities, a defender can develop new military assets and forces, reposition its forces, or reveal pertinent information about its forces’ potential.
The USS Kentucky port call obviously does not demonstrate a new military capability; the ROK and DPRK are already both well aware that the U.S. fields a sizeable fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs each carrying a formidable complement of 20 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Instead, the visit showcases the potential of the U.S. strategic force, highlighting its combat readiness. In particular, it evidences that the U.S. has SSBNs active and prepared to “fight tonight” in the event of a DPRK attack. Highlighting the readiness of the SSBN fleet is particularly important at the moment given recent reports that as many as 40 percent of U.S. attack submarines are under or waiting for repair.
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Additionally, the visit indicates that the U.S. has deployed some of its strategic submarine force to Northeast Asia. While the long-range Trident II is capable of striking the DPRK from a great distance, U.S. SSBNs can respond far more rapidly from nearby in the waters of the Western Pacific. As such, the Kentucky’s port visit should serve to bolster perceptions of U.S. capability in both the DPRK and the ROK.
In addition to capabilities, successful deterrence hinges on credibility. Credibility refers to a defender’s willingness to retaliate against an aggressor even though upholding this commitment may prove difficult and costly. To showcase its willingness to uphold its commitments, a defender can send what deterrence theorists refer to as “costly signals” to friends and adversaries alike. These signals show that the defender is willing to accept considerable costs on behalf of its ally’s defense, costs than an uncommitted state would be unwilling to bear.
The recent port call serves as a costly signal in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, the visit shows that the U.S. is willing to expose, if ever-so-briefly, the location of a remarkably sensitive asset in order to affirm its extended deterrent. The U.S. has previously been reluctant to indicate where its SSBNs are deployed at any given time due to their strategic importance as the most survivable component of the U.S. nuclear triad. Indeed, in recent history U.S. SSBNs have made only a few public port visits, and these visits have been largely limited to U.S. territory and the facilities of its closest ally, the United Kingdom. By announcing the USS Kentucky’s visit to Busan, the U.S. temporarily rendered one of its key assets more vulnerable, showing it is willing to run this risk on behalf of the ROK.
The visit serves as a costly signal for other reasons as well. While the U.S. maintains a fleet of 14 SSBNs, it can only deploy four to five of these assets on deterrence patrols at any given time, with the remainder engaged in training or maintenance. The Kentucky’s trip to Busan therefore carries opportunity costs given the scarcity of U.S. SSBNs on deterrence patrols. As such, this recent port call should bolster the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the ROK.
Ultimately, the USS Kentucky’s port call ultimately serves to reinforce the strength of the U.S. extended deterrent on the Korean Peninsula. As the DPRK works tirelessly to upgrade its growing nuclear arsenal, the U.S. will need to continue to prioritize the increased visibility of U.S. strategic assets to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
The authors’ views are theirs alone and do not represent those of the ROK government.
GUEST AUTHOR
Jihoon Yu
Jihoon Yu is a commander in the ROK Navy and a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
GUEST AUTHOR
Erik French
Erik French is an assistant professor of international studies at SUNY Brockport and an affiliated scholar with the America in the World Consortium.
thediplomat.com · by Jihoon Yu · July 28, 2023
13. THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE: A BATTLEFIELD NEGOTIATION
THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE: A BATTLEFIELD NEGOTIATION
FRANK JONES JULY 27, 2023 8 MIN READ
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/armistice/
U.S. senior military officers rarely find themselves negotiating with their enemy counterparts regarding an armistice.
A strong wind buffeted Panmunjom, Korea, the morning of July 27, 1953, carrying the sound of artillery firing from miles away, a reminder of ongoing hostilities. The Korean War that had raged for three years was not yet over. At 10:00, the two senior delegates representing the belligerents, U.S. Army Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, United Nations Command (UNC), and General Nam Il on behalf of the Korea’s People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers coalition, walked into a specially constructed building. They did not acknowledge each other but immediately started signing the armistice agreement. Minutes later, they rose from their seats and wordlessly left the building. That afternoon, the Commander in Chief, UNC, U.S. Army General Mark Clark, countersigned the documents at Munsan in the Republic of Korea. His communist coalition counterparts would do the same in North Korean territory. The ceasefire would go into effect at 10:00 p.m. and with it the guns fell silent after nearly 200 negotiating sessions and 400 hours of discussions over the span of two years and 17 days. The armistice still holds 70 years after its military signatories agreed to it.
U.S. senior military officers rarely find themselves negotiating with their enemy counterparts regarding an armistice. Nonetheless, such negotiations can be a critically important step toward conflict resolution. As historian Jeremi Suri has observed, “Wars are indeed won and lost at the negotiating table.” Even 70 years later, the Korean truce talks serve as a significant model for today’s senior leaders who may find themselves involved in military battlefield negotiations, a distinct and understudied subject.
It was evident to the U.S.-led United Nations Command and the Chinese-North Korean coalition by the summer of 1951 that neither side could attain a military victory. Although the UNC established a battle line north of the 38th parallel, the prewar boundary between the two Koreas, the United States concluded that the solution to the conflict could not be accomplished through military efforts alone. Chinese and North Korean leaders deduced the same. Consequently, the two sides agreed to truce talks to achieve an armistice.
The United States took full responsibility for the negotiations and had three objectives: limit the armistice to military matters in Korea only; achieve complete cessation of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement in Korea until a final peaceful settlement; and establish a commission to supervise implementation of the armistice agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations. The Chinese government established policy for the Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s Volunteers’ delegation. Its objectives were to restore the status quo ante, attain a truce at the 38th parallel, and settle the Korean question at a postwar international conference.
The two delegations, headed by five senior military delegates (general/flag officers for the UNC), none of whom were professional negotiators, and their staffs, met for the first time on July 10, 1951. The two sides agreed to an agenda in seventeen days and on four substantive issues for further negotiation: the location and demarcation of a truce line and demilitarized zone; arrangements of a ceasefire and armistice, including a Military Armistice Commission to implement the cease-fire and a supervisory organization to carry out the terms of the truce and armistice; release and repatriation of prisoners of war; and recommendations to the concerned governments regarding translating the truce into a peace settlement. The United States policymakers believed the negotiations would bring a swift end to the conflict, but the talks proved more contentious than they had presumed, often leading to a venomous environment filled with acrimonious arguments, ridicule, arrogance and accusations of bad faith based on “ideological differences, cultural misperceptions,” and the astringent character of war. Moreover, U.S. General Matthew Ridgway, Commander-in Chief, UNC, who was not present at the truce talks, held firm to ethnocentric beliefs that the communist negotiators were practiced in the “ancient oriental custom of doggedness in negotiations.” It was up to the UNC delegates to remain firm and patient. As the journalist Clay Blair was to write in The Forgotten War, “Washington would find it necessary to negotiate with not merely one stubborn adversary, but two,” the Communists and Ridgway. “The emergence of Ridgway as a strong ‘third party’ greatly complicated and prolonged the negotiations and on some occasions, very nearly led to their collapse.”
Nonetheless, the two sides made progress, agreeing to a provisional demarcation line in November 1951, to terms on the political conference in February 1952, and by April 1952, the supervisory commission issue was largely resolved. In October 1952, the UNC negotiators broke off negotiations over a lack of progress regarding the repatriation of prisoners, which the United States insisted, as a matter of principle, be voluntary. It took until April 1, 1953, for the Chinese-Korean coalition to agree to voluntary repatriation of POWs. From that point, events moved quickly but intensely, with final disposition of that issue in June, and on July 27, 1953, the two sides signed the armistice agreement. It was the longest negotiated armistice in history.
In international law, an armistice is a military agreement suspending active hostilities between the belligerents. It does not terminate the state of war existing between the belligerents, either de jure or de facto.
The Korean War truce talks illustrate five points about military battlefield negotiation that commanders and their staffs should keep in mind. First, it is decidedly different from those occurring in business and legal venues. In those settings, negotiation theory offers two predominant frameworks. The first, distributive bargaining, views negotiation situations as a win-lose: an adversarial situation where one side’s gain is the other side’s loss. The second is integrative bargaining, designed to advance a win-win approach wherein both parties benefit. These binary outcomes are overly simplistic in battlefield negotiations. In this instance, negotiations are a dialectical relationship, seesawing between what anthropologists call “competitive antagonism” and “cooperative coordination.” To reach an agreement, cooperative coordination is needed. If competitive antagonism is persistent, the result will likely be deadlock and failure. However, if a party emphasizes cooperative coordination, it may neglect its own national interests or policy objectives.
Second, because battlefield negotiations are driven by the military mission, they occur within an unstable and hostile setting that sometimes even includes “duress, physical threat, and armed intervention.” Thus, it is tied directly to the dynamic military operational environment, which can expand or limit the options available to the negotiators. The truce talks paused occasionally so the sides could use the time to perform a military strategy review, consider offensive operations, or strengthen defensive positions. Additionally, the two sides conducted combat operations to gain negotiation leverage, which retired U.S. Army Colonel Donald Boose calls “fighting while talking.” However, by the beginning of 1953, the situation was one of an enduring military stalemate, with little change to the battlefront, mirroring the impasse in the truce talks that had resulted in the UN delegation to walkout in October 1952.
Third, delays in the negotiating process can lead to lasting costs: a considerable loss of life, ecological devastation and reinforcement of hostile attitudes for generations. UNC bombing raids devastated North Korea. Every major city was destroyed along with severe damage to major infrastructure; Pyongyang was deemed militarily worthless as a result of air attacks, and as many as two million North Korean civilians died in the war. South Korean losses were substantial, some 1.3 million casualties. U.S. casualties during the war numbered approximately 136,000 killed, wounded and missing in action. Further, because the loss of human life is a potential outcome of failed negotiations, neither side wants to be accused of negotiating in bad faith, or worse, walking away from the negotiating table. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were particularly sensitive to this issue during the Korean truce talks. They warned the U.S. negotiators that if the talks failed the “enemy must be clearly responsible.” It would not be sufficient to blame the communists because of mere disagreement. Instead, it had to be “abundantly clear that we have used persistence and patience to obtain agreement on terms which will appeal to world opinion as reasonable and just.”
Fourth, battlefield negotiation seeks to transform conflict, that is, a temporary change in the situation on the ground in an ongoing war, not war termination. In international law, an armistice is a military agreement suspending active hostilities between the belligerents. It does not terminate the state of war existing between the belligerents, either de jure or de facto. The Korean Armistice Agreement states that it shall remain in effect until superseded by “an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.” Nonetheless, an armistice is a war convention or agreement that has political significance.
Therefore, battlefield negotiation of an armistice is not solely a military matter despite what U.S. policymakers hoped to gain during the Korean War. Equally, it is more than an event recording the cessation of hostilities. It is also a product of the complex social phenomenon of warfare that documents and explains the politics of war (foreign policy of the warring parties in a limited war and their cultures and ideologies), a legal agreement between warring parties (international law and ethical responsibilities), and an artifact of military, cultural, international and intellectual activities. As political scientists James Foster and Garry Brewer note, the cessation of armed hostilities is a political choice.
Lastly, because of these weighty elements, battlefield negotiation entails a unique skill set of cognitive complexity, emotional intelligence, creative thinking, and cultural understanding as well as technical expertise. As one scholar points out, battlefield negotiation requires the actors to “consider and manage emotions, history and hatred.” It necessitates what Hill and Douds call strategic imagination: in war, conditions are complex and outcomes are not simply binary. It is, in sum, a skill set required of senior military leaders and their staffs acting as soldier-diplomats in today’s increasingly complicated operational environment.
The five points underscore that battlefield negotiation requires unique knowledge, skills, and analytical abilities practiced in a hostile environment with the potential for fostering conflict resolution, but possibly resulting in dire consequences if the negotiation collapses. The Korean War truce talks emphasize as well that these essential leader competencies are not ones that commanders alone need to acquire. U.S. Army, Air Force and Marine Corps colonels led staff negotiations for the UNC and settled disputes with their enemy counterparts regarding such crucial issues as the line of demarcation, the repatriation of prisoners and the functions of the Military Armistice Commission. As one expert noted, ultimately, military leaders “assume responsibility for defining military negotiation in a battlefield setting” as their mission and through their efforts achieve either success or failure.
Frank Jones is a Distinguished Fellow of the U.S. Army War College where he taught in the Department of National Security and Strategy. Previously, he had retired from the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a senior executive. He is the author or editor of three books and numerous articles on U.S. national security.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: General Mark W. Clark, Far East commander at the signing of the Korean War Armistice, 27 July 1953.
Photo Credit: From the Larry L. Dylina Collection (COLL/675), Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections, Official USMC Photograph
14. Divided peninsula, divided commemorations for Korean War’s 70th anniversary
Excerpts:
Since the 1953 armistice that cemented the division on the peninsula, the two Koreas have taken radically different paths. South Korea, a top 10 global economy, has achieved prosperity and evolved into democratic rule. An industrial powerhouse, it is home to major global brands and is a benchmark for high-technology usage, infrastructure efficiency and pop-culture exports.
“I would never dare to put words in the mouths of vets, but everyone who I have spoken to is staggered by the progress [South Korea] has made in 70 years,” Gen. Harrison said.
North Korea, by contrast, is a de facto, third-generation monarchy run by the family that unleashed the war. Arguably the world’s most self-isolated nation, it is plagued by poverty and malnutrition, and is notorious for its lack of basic human rights and freedoms. Its most significant post-war national achievement has been the creation of a nuclear arms program that has made it a disruptive force in the region and the world.
Divided peninsula, divided commemorations for Korean War’s 70th anniversary
North, South Korea take different tacks marking end of conflict
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
Subscriber-only
By - The Washington Times - Thursday, July 27, 2023
SEOUL — The 70th anniversary of the armistice that ended the Korean War was commemorated on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone on Thursday, but the deep divisions on the peninsula were evident in the very different ways North and South Korea marked the milestone.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, whose grandfather Kim Il-Sung initiated the epic Cold War conflict in 1950, met Thursday with visiting Chinese officials and with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, as the regime staged another of its signature military parades through the center of Pyongyang.
Mr. Kim and Mr. Shoigu visited an arms expo where North Korean weaponry, including intercontinental ballistic missiles on launchers and predator drones, were displayed. Russia’s Defense Ministry said in a statement that Mr. Shoigu had met earlier with North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun-Nam for talks aimed at “strengthening cooperation between our defense departments.”
Meanwhile, in the southern port city of Busan, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol led a somber commemoration ceremony that included elderly South Korean and foreign veterans who fought in the war. Busan, one of only two major South Korean cities that did not fall to North Korea in the war’s initial stage, hosts a memorial cemetery where many of those who fought for the United Nations Command are buried.
Mr. Shoigu’s visit, the first by a Russian defense minister to Pyongyang since the end of the Cold War, comes as the Kim regime has emerged as a possible arms supplier as the Kremlin’s munitions arsenal is being drained by the war in Ukraine. Russia’s tactical artillery, formerly far outstripping that of Ukraine, is now reportedly only at near parity with Kyiv.
Another reason for Mr. Shoigu’s trip to North Korea could be a response to Mr. Yoon’s surprise visit to Kyiv earlier this month, where he pledged more non-lethal military and humanitarian aid for Ukraine. “Russia likes to mirror,” a Russian colleague told The Washington Times.
SEE ALSO: Seventy years on, North Korea tells its own story of a war and its aftermath
White House national security spokesman John Kirby did not directly respond to reporters’ questions on possible Russian-North Korean arms deals, but said the visit was just another indication of the problems Russia’s military is facing.
“Mr. Putin knows he’s having his own defense procurement problems, his own inventory problems, that his military remains on the back foot, and he’s trying to shore that up,” Mr. Kirby said, according to the Associated Press.
China’s relatively low-level delegation was headed by Li Hongzhong, a member of China’s ruling Communist Party politburo. Mr. Li, who came bearing a letter from President Xi Jinping, said in an address to North Korean officials that Beijing sought to promote the “sound and stable” development of relations with Pyongyang.
In Busan, Mr. Yoon said in an address that South Korea’s foundation rested on “the blood-stained military uniforms” of the troops who fought in the U.S.-led U.N. Command. He promised to never forget the sacrifices of those 1.95 million servicemen who served.
Sixteen nations joined the UNC, ranging from traditional allies such as Australia, Canada and the UK and regional states the Philippines and Thailand to distant nations including Colombia, Ethiopia and Turkey.
Though U.S. GIs bore the brunt of the fighting — over 36,000 dead — relatively few are buried in Busan as most were repatriated.
SEE ALSO: History As It Happens: Korea’s forever war
A day earlier, Mr. Yoon received, in the presence of U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. John Aquilano, the remains of seven South Korean soldiers killed in action. They had been identified, via DNA, in U.S. labs in Hawaii.
“There are some salutary lessons that the world needs to learn about Korea,” British General Andrew Harrison, deputy commander of the current U.N. Command, told reporters. “The commemorations are the perfect opportunity to remind people how constantly close we are to war.”
The July 27, 1953 armistice is imperfect — it was never replaced by a permanent peace agreement — but has held for seven decades. A new war between North and South Korea is, as one foreign general described it Thursday, is “low probability, high impact.”
Since the 1953 armistice that cemented the division on the peninsula, the two Koreas have taken radically different paths. South Korea, a top 10 global economy, has achieved prosperity and evolved into democratic rule. An industrial powerhouse, it is home to major global brands and is a benchmark for high-technology usage, infrastructure efficiency and pop-culture exports.
“I would never dare to put words in the mouths of vets, but everyone who I have spoken to is staggered by the progress [South Korea] has made in 70 years,” Gen. Harrison said.
North Korea, by contrast, is a de facto, third-generation monarchy run by the family that unleashed the war. Arguably the world’s most self-isolated nation, it is plagued by poverty and malnutrition, and is notorious for its lack of basic human rights and freedoms. Its most significant post-war national achievement has been the creation of a nuclear arms program that has made it a disruptive force in the region and the world.
Hear Andrew Salmon and Guy Taylor on the marking of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice:
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
15. It's all the same forest, say Korean firefighters battling blazes in Northern Quebec
Kudos to these Korean firefighters. They are representing the Global Pivotal State of the Republic of Korea. Note their many excellent talking points (from one forest to Kroean war - working together and paying back).
I wonder how many Koreans from the north the Kim family regime has sent to help? Just saying.
Photos and video at the link: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/wildfires-quebec-south-korea-firefighter-1.6921380
It's all the same forest, say Korean firefighters battling blazes in Northern Quebec | CBC News
Responsibility to help extends beyond borders, say firefighters far from home
Jennifer Yoon · CBC News · Posted: Jul 29, 2023 4:00 AM EDT | Last Updated: 6 hours ago
CBC · by Jennifer Yoon
Dressed in their red uniforms, the men of the Korea Forest Service move as one, stretching and chanting along with the staccato instructions of the drill instructor. Next to where they're warming up is their base camp, where boxes of ramen noodles, instant rice and sweet Korean snacks are scattered all around.
At first glance, you could mistakenly believe you are somewhere in South Korea.
But these firefighters are in Lebel-sur-Quévillon, a small city in the north of Quebec that's been evacuated twice already this summer due to the threat of wildfires.
The Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre (CIFFC) told CBC News over 3,700 foreign firefighters have travelled to Canada to help battle the historic forest fires this summer — including 140 South Koreans, the first-ever team sent from there to help battle the blazes.
CIFFC says Costa Rica, Spain, Portugal, France, Brazil and Chile have all sent firefighters to Canada for the first time, too.
The South Korean foreign ministry told CBC News their team was selected after a competitive process, and those who made the cut are the best of the best. The team includes former spies sent to infiltrate North Korea, special army forces and Navy SEALS.
They've been camping next to a golf course in the small town that's about 625 kilometres northwest of Montreal, with a population of 2,000 people.
They've spent their days here since the beginning of July, waking up around 5 a.m., travelling an hour or two on yellow school buses to the fires, then coming back to the campsite, exhausted and covered in bug bites.
One of their tasks is digging up the earth still smoldering below ground, and extinguishing it. It's a kind of firefighting none of them are used to.
WATCH | Inside the base camp:
A day with the Korean team fighting Canada’s wildfires
1 day ago
Duration 5:45
Thousands of firefighters from around the world have been helping fight Canada’s wildfires. CBC got special access to an elite team of South Korean firefighters in Northern Quebec where they’re adapting to different techniques and foods, and making friends along the way.
"None of us believed it at first. But putting out fires here, we saw how the fires are burning through the roots of the trees," said Jang Puruensol, a 28-year-old firefighter from Gwangju, in the country's southwest, who left behind his fiance to fight fires in Quebec.
"We're used to going several kilometres, putting out fires as we go," he continued in Korean.
When the team got to Quebec, Jang says Quebec's forest fire prevention agency told them they would only be able to advance around 600 metres in a day.
Jang Puruensol, 28, with the Korea Forest Service, says none of the Korean firefighters believed at first that they could only advance several hundred metres at a time. He's pictured at base camp in Lebel-sur-Quévillon on July 20. (Jennifer Yoon/CBC)
Working together
The team has had to get used to more than a new style of firefighting. Some said it took some time to get used to the food, too. But the Korean community in Montreal sent some familiar items up their way, the South Korean foreign ministry told CBC News. Now, the Koreans are fighting fires with canned kimchi in their pockets.
Canadian wildfires are burning at an unprecedented pace this year. There were 1,004 fires across Canada as of Friday, according to the CIFFC, burning 12.3 million hectares – a total area larger than South Korea, itself.
The team is working closely with U.S. firefighters, who have also been deployed to the area. Each day at a morning briefing, the teams go over the situation on the ground, and come up with a plan for how to fight the blazes.
It's not the first time Canadians, Americans and South Koreans have worked together – they're old allies from the Korean War over 70 years ago. Now, they're again working across languages to come up with a battle plan.
Kim Dae Hyun, with Korea's National Fire Agency, says his fiance worries about him fighting fires so far away, but he knows how important it is to be here. (Jennifer Yoon/CBC)
Kim Dae Hyun, 36, is getting married next month. He says his fiance has been worrying about him. He, too, worries about loved ones back home, as heavy torrential rains have claimed dozens of lives there.
"The situation in Korea right now is quite bad, and on that point I want to go back and help, too, but I also know that it's important for me to be here and help out," said Kim.
Kim Man Ju, 54, who has over 15 years of experience fighting fires, says the heavy rains back home and the historic wildfire season in Canada show the global scale of climate change. The responsibility to help, he feels, extends past borders.
"In my mind, it's the same forest. We should keep the forest. That means a promise to the future, a promise to the globe."
Kweon Ki Hwan, who is leading the South Korean disaster relief effort, says it's what friends do.
"We remember Canada sent 26,000 troops to Korea during the Korean War to defend the freedom and democracy of Korea, and you paid a heavy price," Kweon said.
"We Koreans never forgot your sacrifice."
WATCH | July likely to be the hottest month yet:
July will be the hottest month ever recorded, scientists warn
1 day ago
Duration 2:31
Climate scientists say July is poised to be the hottest month on record 'by a considerable margin.' The United Nations is warning an 'era of global boiling' has now replaced the era of global warming.
Wildfires likely to get worse
It's possible Canada will need their help again. Scientists say wildfire seasons are likely to get more intense in the future.
And even with the thousands for international firefighters already here, CIFFC says more will certainly be needed before the summer's finished.
The Canadian government says it recognizes all the help it's getting from other countries, and is working to bolster domestic firefighting capacities. In a statement, a spokesperson for the office of the Minister for Emergency Preparedness said Canada is hiring more than 300 Indigneous firefighters and buying more specialized equipment.
The South Korean team is seen is digging up the earth still smoldering below ground, and extinguishing it, in July. (Submitted by the Korean Disaster Relief Team)
"While we don't know what the next wildfire season has in store, we'll continue to build our capacity to respond to these events and work to mitigate the risks facing Canadians," said Annie Cullinan, a spokesperson at the Office of the Minister of Emergency Preparedness, in a statement.
The Koreans CBC News spoke with in Lebel-sur-Quévillon say they'd be happy to come back if the need should ever arise again.
They add they also hope Canadians will also step in to help out if they ever need the help, too.
CBC · by Jennifer Yoon
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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