Quotes of the Day:

“The task is, not so much to see what no one else has seen yet; but you think what nobody has thought yet, about that which everybody sees.” 

- Arthur Schopenhauer, German philosopher.

"Virtue is more to be feared than vice because its excesses are not subject to the regulation of conscience." 

~ Adam Smith

"There are four questions of value in life, Don Octavio. What is sacred? Of what is the spirit made? What is worth living for and what is worth dying for? The answer to each is the same. Only love." 

~ Lord Byron

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2023

2. What Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán Understand About Your Brain

3. Special Operations News Update - July 31, 2023 | SOF News

4. Amid the Counterattack’s Deadly Slog, a Glimmer of Success for Ukraine

5. Opinion | Why the Niger coup matters — and what the U.S. should do about it

6. Confidence in U.S. Military Lowest in Over Two Decades

7. CCP funneled $17 MILLION into more than 143 K-12 schools

8. The BBC and the Decline of British Soft Power

9. Starlink has become the 'blood' of Ukraine's communication infrastructure, but officials are reportedly growing concerned about relying on Elon Musk's tech

10. Wang Yi, the return of China’s tough foreign minister

11. US unveils island launchers for China containment

12. Hunter Biden, FARA and Unequal Justice

13. Joining China's Belt and Road Was an 'Atrocious' Decision -Italy Minister

14. Dean Cheng on “China and Space: The Next Frontier of Lawfare”

15. Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-year Horizons in Defense Planning

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2023

Key Takeaways:

• The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kremina and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and did not make any confirmed gains in these areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations southwest and northwest of Bakhmut and made claimed gains in this direction.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed marginal advances.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and regained lost positions in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 30, 2023

Jul 30, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2023

 Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 30, 2023, 4:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics. The Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on July 29 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Chonhar bridge on the M-18 (Dzhankoi-Melitopol) highway between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast.[1] ISW has not observed any Russian milblogger discussion about the Ukrainian strike or Russian milbloggers promoting Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo’s claim that Russian forces intercepted 12 Ukrainian Strom Shadow cruise missiles targeting the bridge.[2] The only other Russian source to comment on the strikes was a local Russian news Telegram channel, which amplified alleged claims from Russian tourists in the area about the bridge being closed to traffic.[3] Russian milbloggers responded to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge on June 22 with widespread outrage and concern, and Russian milbloggers routinely comment on both successful and allegedly unsuccessful Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics.[4] The Chonhar bridge is a notable bottleneck along a critical Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), and it is highly unlikely that Russian milbloggers would voluntarily ignore a successful or unsuccessful Ukrainian strike on the bridge. ISW has previously assessed that select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their coverage of the war in Ukraine in ways more favorable to Kremlin narratives out of fear of Kremlin punishment following the removal of prominent critical voices in the Russian information space, particularly pro-war critic Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[5] General fear of Kremlin punishment would not likely result in such near-universal lack of coverage of a dramatic event, however, and it is more likely that a specific Kremlin directive not to cover disruptions to critical GLOCs caused this lack of reporting.

Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations. During a press conference at the Russia-Africa Summit on July 29, Putin accused Ukraine of launching a large-scale offensive so that Russia cannot discuss a ceasefire while its troops are defending against Ukrainian attacks.[6] Russian officials have previously weaponized the mention of negotiations in order to accuse Ukraine of being the party unwilling to enter into negotiations discussions, and Putin is likely using discussions of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to undermine reports of Ukrainian battlefield successes and accuse Ukraine of continued lack of interest in a potential negotiations process.[7] Russian forces have been conducting their own attacks in Luhansk and around Donetsk City almost continuously since before the Ukrainian counter-offensive began, moreover, a fact that Putin did not, naturally, mention. Putin also notably lauded the work of Central Military district Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev for repelling Ukrainian attacks and securing advances, likely in Luhansk Oblast.[8]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces are achieving small successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (in western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9]  

Key Takeaways:

• The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kremina and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and did not make any confirmed gains in these areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations southwest and northwest of Bakhmut and made claimed gains in this direction.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed marginal advances.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and regained lost positions in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on July 30 but did not make confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations east of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) and near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[10] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were seven combat engagements along the Svatove-Kreminna line and that Russian forces are trying to gain the initiative in the area.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and advanced 300m into Ukrainian defenses.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have established a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River near Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove) and advanced along a front 8km wide and 7km in depth in the area in the past week.[13] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are degrading Ukrainian defenses in the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna and near Torske (14km west of Kreminna), although he acknowledged that Russian forces are currently not able to launch significant attempts to capture Torske.[14] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) are participating in ongoing Russian offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[15]

A Ukrainian official suggested that the increased Russian offensive activity along the Svatove-Kreminna line is a part of a prepared major offensive operation. Cherevaty stated on July 29 that Russian forces planned to conduct a “strategic” operation in the Kupyansk direction this summer and consider it a “major offensive.”[16] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces deployed a considerable amount of poorly trained personnel to the area for this effort.[17] Cherevaty added that Russian forces are relying on available infantry, Russian Airborne (VDV), and BARS (Russian Combat Reserves) formations and units as well as paramilitary companies (PMCs) like ”Veterany” and ”Tigr“ and unspecified Chechen ”Akhmat“ forces to conduct this offensive effort.[18] Russian forces have only made limited gains since increasing offensive activity in the area, and ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent Russian claims of extensive advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[19]  Russian forces may have recently increased offensive activity on this axis to take advantage of Ukraine’s operational focus on more critical areas of the front, but are unlikely to make significant offensive progress.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks near Kovalivka (10km southwest of Svatvoe) and in the Serebryanske forest area.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on July 30 and did not make any confirmed gains. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian troops are achieving small but continued successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and that Russian forces continue pulling reserves to the area.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops continued ground attacks southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (6km southwest), and one milblogger reported that Russian forces have retreated east of the railway line in the Klishchiivka area.[22] Several Russian sources amplified footage reportedly showing elements of the ”Pryzrak” Battalion of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade attacking Ukrainian positions on the outskirts of Klishchiivka.[23] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking Russian positions northwest of Bakhmut near Minkivka (15km northwest), Berkhivka (1km northwest), Bohdanivka (6km northwest), Yahidne (1km northwest), and Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest).[24]

Russian forces did not make any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 30. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian troops are continuing efforts to hold back Ukrainian advances southwest and northwest of Bakhmut.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not confirm any Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut throughout the day.[26]

Russian forces continued ground attacks on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on July 30 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka and Pobieda (both on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[27] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen noted on July 30 that Russian forces have increased assault operations in Marinka and are more intensely using ”Storm-Z” assault detachments.[28] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces have increased the use of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in assaults on Marinka.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in the western outskirts of Marinka but that Russian forces were unable to advance.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make confirmed advances on July 30. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area).[31] The Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov and another Russian source claimed on July 30 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[32]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and made claimed advances on July 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), and “Storm-Z” units of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) counterattacked near Staromayorske and pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions in the settlement.[33] The milbloggers claimed that elements of the 247th Airborne Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), also conducted assault operations near Staromayorske, but withdrew after the attack to restore combat capabilities, while another milblogger claimed that the formation is still in Staromayorske.[34] Differing Russian claims about the whereabouts of the 247th VDV Regiment may suggest that the unit suffered significant losses while trying to restore lost positions in Staromayorske.

A Russian source erroneously likened Ukrainian efforts to liberate Staromayorske to Ukrainian control over Pyatykhatky.[35] The source claimed that Russian forces shell Ukrainian positions in Staromayorske every day, but Ukrainian forces refuse to withdraw.[36] The milblogger is drawing an inaccurate comparison between the situations in Staromayorske and Pyatykhatky, as Russian forces have much deeper and more complex lines of defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast than they do in western Donetsk Oblast, and the terrain and general Russian and Ukrainian force composition differ significantly.

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances on July 30. Malyar reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing in the Melitopol direction (in western Zaporizhia Oblast).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have advanced northeast of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in the Verbove direction (17km southeast of Orikhiv) in the past week.[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne.[39]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed advances on July 30. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Robotyne and regained previously lost positions northeast of Robotyne.[40] Footage amplified on July 29 and 30 purportedly shows elements of the “Osman” Spetsnaz formation operating in the Zaporizhia direction and elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating near Robotyne.[41]

Russian forces appear to be unwilling or unable to forcibly stop and search neutral vessels headed to Ukraine through the Black Sea despite ostensibly setting conditions to do so. Naval tracking imagery published on July 30 shows three civilian ships advertising their destination of Ukraine over their ships’ automatic identification system (AIS) and sailing to Ukraine without the Russian Black Sea Fleet stopping and searching the vessels.[42] ISW previously forecast that Russian naval elements in the Black Sea appeared to be setting conditions to stop and search neutral vessels at will, and Russian media has reported several such instances over the past week.[43] Reports of three civilian ships sailing to Ukraine unhindered may suggest that Russia is either unwilling or unable to enforce such searches at this time.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) 

Russian opposition news outlet Mobilization News claimed on July 29 that Russian military registration and enlistment officials are calling men under the guise of needing their updated personal information and asking the men to come into their offices, only to give the men summons for military training when they arrive.[44] Mobilization News claimed that Russian authorities called one man to the military enlistment office to verify his personal information and handed him a summons upon his arrival.[45] Mobilization News claimed that the enlistment office official did not specify what would happen to the man during or after the training and only told the man that he would receive a military rank.[46]

Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities plan to implement regulations for volunteers in September 2023 that include requiring volunteers to submit letters from the units they supply with a list of exactly what the units received and requiring volunteers to pay taxes on any money they save purchasing supplies at a lower price than anticipated.[47] A prominent Russian milblogger noted that most civilian volunteers have Telegram channels with millions of followers and typically present a different narrative of the war in Ukraine from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[48] The milblogger suggested that Russian authorities, Russian MoD leadership, and Russian state media would benefit from the regulation of civilian volunteers and their subversive narratives regarding the war in Ukraine.[49] This initiative, if real, is consistent with the Russian MoD’s efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space.[50]

A Russian insider source claimed to have posted floor plans of the Shahed drone assembly factory in Tatarstan, Russia.[51] The source claimed that the plant is offering to pay local Alabuga Polytech students up to 70,000 rubles (approximately $760) per month to assemble drones at the plant. The source also claimed that local students must participate in physical and psychological tests to qualify for jobs at the plant and claimed that Russian officials will fine the students up to two million rubles ($21,700) and expel them from school if the students reveal information about the plant and their work.[52]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)  

Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Ukrainian partisans damaged three military vehicles and a Russian engineering unit’s deployment point on the western outskirts of Mariupol.[53]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on July 30 that at least several thousand Wagner troops have likely arrived at a military camp in Tsel, Belarus, since mid-July 2023.[54]  The UK MoD reported that satellite imagery indicates that hundreds of vehicles, mostly trucks and minibuses, have arrived at the previously empty camp, but that Wagner forces appear to have a few armored combat vehicles, which is consistent with the satellite imagery ISW observed on July 23.[55] The UK MoD stated that it is possible that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forced Wagner to return its heavy equipment that was used in Ukraine, which is consistent with the Russian MoD’s announcement on July 12 that Wagner had almost completely handed over its weapons and military equipment.[56] The UK MoD reported that Wagner’s future combat effectiveness will depend on its ability to secure heavy equipment and enablers such as air transport.[57] ISW maintains that Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland or Ukraine, for that matter, until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment. They pose no meaningful threat to NATO even then.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. What Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán Understand About Your Brain

Not sent with any partisan intention. All PSYOP professionals should read this.

This is possibly useful for understanding the manipulation of public opinion if you accept the science. For me it is necessary to recognize the strategy of these authoritarian (or authoritarian like) leaders, to understand their strategy, to expose their strategy (with the intent to attempt to inoculate the public against it), and then attack their strategy with a superior information strategy. Even if you do not accept the science in this it seems logical to my brain - though I think I am emotionally predisposed to this kind of analysis and to not believe the kind of conspiracy theories in this article.

What the article does not address is how those who have a visceral fear of these types of leaders are manipulated the same way. Specifically, are those who fear Trump and MAGA prone to believe any negative report about Trump and are in fact “brainwashed” in the same way as outlined in this report? 

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/07/30/the-connection-between-political-lies-and-conspiracy-theories-00108378?amp

What Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán Understand About Your Brain

Politico

Why do some people who support Trump also wind up believing conspiracy theories? There’s a scientific explanation for that.

POLITICO Illustration/Photos by Getty Images, iStock

By Marcel Danesi

07/30/2023 07:00 AM EDT

Marcel Danesi is a professor of semiotics and linguistic anthropology at the University of Toronto. He is the author of the recent book, Politics, Lies and Conspiracy Theories: A Cognitive Linguistic Perspective.

Why do people believe some politicians’ lies even when they have been proven false? And why do so many of the same people peddle conspiracy theories?

Lying and conspiratorical thinking might seem to be two different problems, but they turn out to be related. I study political rhetoric and have tried to understand how populist politicians use language to develop a cult-like following, divide nations, create culture wars and instill hatred. This pattern goes back to antiquity and is seen today in leaders including former President Donald Trump, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. These leaders are capable of using words and speeches to whip people into such an emotional tempest that they will do things like march on the seat of Congress or invade a neighboring country.

What makes this kind of speech worrying is that it is not just emotions like aggression they can manipulate; politicians can also use rhetoric to influence the public’s thoughts and beliefs, and spread lies and conspiracy theories. Those lies and conspiracy theories are stubbornly resistant to countervailing facts and can sow divisions that destabilize their own societies.

My research analyzes real speeches made by politicians past and present, including those of Trump, Orbán and Putin, using cognitive linguistics — a branch of linguistics that examines the relationship between language and the mind. What I have found is that throughout history, speeches by dictators and autocrats have one thing in common: they use 

dehumanizing metaphors to instill and propagate hatred of others.

It is well-documented that for example words like “reptiles” and “parasites” were used by the Nazi regime to compare outsiders and minorities to animals. Strongmen throughout history have referred to targeted social groups as “rats” or “pests” or “a plague.” And it’s effective regardless of whether the people who hear this language are predisposed to jump to extreme conclusions. Once someone is tuned into these metaphors, their brain actually changes in ways that make them more likely to believe bigger lies, even conspiracy theories.

These metaphors are part of a cognitive process that entraps some people in this kind of thinking while others are unaffected. Here’s how it works.

The first step to manipulating the minds of the public, or really the precondition, is that listeners need to be in the right emotional state.

In order to hack into the minds of the public, people need to feel fear or uncertainty. That could be caused by economic instability or pre-existing cultural prejudices, but the emotional basis is fear. The brain is designed to respond to fear in various ways, with its own in-built defense mechanisms which produce chemicals in the response pattern, such as cortisol and adrenaline. These chemical responses, which zip straight past our logical brains to our fight-or-flight reactions, are also activated by forms of language that instill fear, either directly (as in a vocal threat) or, more insidiously, by twisted facts which allay fears through lies and deceptive statements.

In this state, dehumanizing metaphors are very effective. My research shows that this language taps into and “switches on” existing circuits in the brain that link together important and salient images and ideas. In effect, metaphors bypass higher cognitive reasoning centers to make linkages that may not have a basis in reality. And when that happens, a person is less likely to notice the lie, because it “feels” right.

This pattern becomes more effective the more it is used. According to studies, the more these circuits are activated the more hardwired they become, until it becomes almost impossible to turn them off. What this means is these repetitive uses of dehumanizing metaphors are incredibly powerful to those brains already willing to hear them, because they direct their thoughts, making it easy to focus on certain things and ignore others.

The same is true of conspiracy theories. The neuroscientific research shows that people who believe them develop more rigid neural pathways, meaning they find it difficult to rethink situations once this pattern of thinking is established.

This also means that if someone is already more susceptible to believing lies in the form of dehumanizing metaphors and this same person comes across a big lie or a conspiracy theory that fits into that well-trodden neural pathway, they are more likely to believe it and be influenced by it.

This is how language that might seem like harmless hyperbole winds up literally changing the way people think. And once they think differently, they can act in ways that they might not have before.

With the rise of populist and far-right political movements in the 2010s, the use of dehumanizing metaphors to engender hatred of foreigners or of those who are different in some way has spread worldwide.

In 2016, during a state-orchestrated public campaign against refugees and migrants in Hungary, Orbán characterized them as a “poison.” In August 2017, when groups of white supremacists arrived in the college town of Charlottesville, Va., to participate in a “Unite the Right” rally, the protesters used both animal and dirt metaphors when they claimed they were fighting against the “parasitic class of anti-white vermin” and the “anti-white, anti-American filth.”

Putin’s labeling of the Ukrainian leadership as “Nazi” falls into this category, a powerful slur against the Jewish leader Zelensky, whom Putin called a “disgrace to the Jewish people.” Significantly, he uses this alongside dehumanizing language to justify the invasion of Ukraine, claiming it as a mission in “denazification,” eliminating Ukraine of its “Nazi filth” by innuendo. The use of the “dirt” and “filth” metaphor, coupled with the historically loaded terminology, is a persuasive linguistic tool.

These dehumanizing metaphors have been used consistently to tap into the neural pathways of fearful or anxious people ready and waiting to believe. This helps explain why so many Trump supporters were influenced by the QAnon conspiracy hoax in the lead-up to the 2020 presidential election. Trump’s “Big Lie” refers to the 

false claim that the election was “rigged” and “stolen” from him through massive electoral fraud — even though that assertion has been repeatedly debunked.

Significantly, Trump also supported his Big Lie with the same pattern of conspiracy theories and fake news reported in far-right social media, such as QAnon, that spurred Trump supporters to attack the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. This sustained use of the central metaphor of a cabal of satanic, cannibalistic abusers of children conspiring against Trump will easily fit into the entrenched neural pathways of someone who is already willing to believe.

The tricky thing about all this is that some people are more susceptible to this type of rhetorical manipulation than others. This comes down to critical thinking and brain training. If one wants to or needs to believe then the language works manipulatively and the neural pathways are built up. If we aren’t fearful or primed to believe, our brain has mechanisms to alert us to the deceit. Simply put — if we are constantly critical of lies, our brains are more trained to notice them.

Unfortunately, research into this brain wiring also shows that once people begin to believe lies, they are unlikely to change their minds even when confronted with evidence that contradicts their beliefs. It is a form of brainwashing. Once the brain has carved out a well-worn path of believing deceit, it is even harder to step out of that path — which is how fanatics are born. Instead, these people will seek out information that confirms their beliefs, avoid anything that is in conflict with them, or even turn the contrasting information on its head, so as to make it fit their beliefs.

People with strong convictions will have a hard time changing their minds, given how embedded a lie becomes in the mind. In fact, there are scientists and scholars still studying the best tools and tricks to combat lies with some combination of brain training and linguistic awareness.

Not all hope is lost, however. History has shown that disruptive events — such as the toppling of a regime or the loss of a war — can force a new perspective and the brain is able to recalibrate. So it is at least possible to change this pattern. Once the critical mind is engaged, away from the frenzy of fear and manipulation, the lie can become clear. This is the uplifting moral tale that can be gleaned from history — all the great liars, from dictators to autocrats, were eventually defeated by truth, which eventually will win out.

But the bad news is that you need that kind of disruption. Without these jarring events to bring a dose of reality, it is unlikely that people with strong convictions will ever change their minds — something that benefits the autocrat and endangers their society.

POLITICO

Politico

3. Special Operations News Update - July 31, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - July 31, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · July 31, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: An East-coast-based U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operator (SEAL) prepares to descend below the surface during dive training with Polish special forces, June 27, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Katie Cox)

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SOF News

New Cdr of 10th SFG(A). Col. Lucas VanAntwerp passed his command of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) on to Col. Justin Hufnagel on July 19, 2023 at Fort Carson, Colorado.

Navy Retires SOF Helicopter Squadron. The U.S. Navy’s only helicopter squadron dedicated to support of special operations forces has made its final flight. Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 85 (HC-85) of Naval Air Station North Island, California was deactivated during a ceremony on June 30, 2023. The HSC-85 was equipped with MH-60S Seahawk helicopters to support Naval Special Warfare forces. “Navy Retires Its Last Special Operations Helicopter Squadron”, Seapower Magazine, July 19, 2023.

Col (Ret.) Lujan Now at Howard University. A retired Green Beret will be teaching politics at Howard University. Colonel (Ret.) Fernando Lujan will be in the teaching assignment for one year as a Chamberlain fellow and visiting professor. (The Dig, Jul 26, 2023).

Navy’s New Mini-Sub. The US Navy has unveiled the Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) mini submarine. This new underwater vehicle will allow its occupants to travel submerged without being immersed in freezing water – a capability the Navy has pursued for years. “US Navy’s Newest Special Operations Mini-Submarine Officially Enters Service”, Marine Insight, July 27, 2023.

USSOCOM and Biomedical Tools. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is seeking new technology for CBRNE mass casualty respons, natural disaster emergency medicine, and other triage and diagnostic tools. “SOCOM Seeks Development of Lightwieght, Ruggedized Biomedical Tools”, Global Biodefense, July 29, 2023.

26th MEU (SOC) in UK. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unite (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) is in the United Kingdom aboard Navy ships conducting a port visit. The MEU is in the beginning of a long deployment in the EUCOM area of operations. (U.S. Navy, July 29, 2023).

Moving AFSOC Off Hurlburt? Over the past several days Florida politicians were demanding to know if the U.S. Air Force had plans to move Air Force Special Operations Command from Floriday to another state. Senators Marco Rubio and Rick Scott expressed their concerns that the Air Force had not been more responsive to their questions on this topic. Apparently the Air Force finally came clean; AFSOC will remain at Hurlburt but some personnel will be transferred to Arizona to stand up an AFSOC unit at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. (Penascola News Journal, Jul 28, 2023).

International SOF

Indian SOF and Women. As of yet no woman in the Indian Armed Forces has been able to qualify for induction into its elite special forces. (Indian Express, July 2023).

Ukrainian SOF in UK for Training. It has been reported by the Sunday Express (a British tabloid) that over 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers have arrived in England to take part in special training. Some of the Ukrainians are said to be special operators. The training is being carried out at Battle Camp in Devon. “Ukrainian special forces training in UK prepare to liberate Crimea this year”, Yahoo! News, July 30, 2023.

Spain’s Police Tactical Unit. Learn about the history, organization, training, equipment, and notable operations of the Spanish GEO. “Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GEO): Spain’s Police Tactical Unit”, Grey Dynamics, July 24, 2023.

French Sub for SOF. A new submarine officially commissioned in June 2022 is currently undergoing testing. The sub features a mobile deck hanger (dry dock shelter) that enables the deployment of combat swimmers. “France will use its Suffren nuclear sub for special operations”, by Boyko Nikolov, Bulgarian Military, July 30, 2023.

New Croatian Commandos Graduate. Following the completion of their basic special forces training a new generation of Croatian commandos are entering the service of the HV Special Forces Command. They will now move on to parachute training, survival training, as well as advanced skills training. “New Generation of Croatian Commandos Complete Training”, Total Croatia News, July 29, 2023.

SOF History

SOF and ‘Kit Flags’. Among some special operations units – at least during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) ere – it was sometimes a practice to carry a ‘kit flag’ into combat. “What is a ‘Kit Flag’ and Why Do Service Members Carry Them?”, by Luke Ryan, Coffee or Die Magazine, July 26, 2023.

SEALs and the P226. In the 1980s the U.S. military forces adopted the M9 Bereta as the standard side arm. The favorite pistol of the U.S. Navy SEALs was first the Sig Sauer P226 and later the Glock 19. “Why teh Navy SEALs chose the Sig Sauer P226 over the M9”, We Are the Mighty, July 25, 2023. See also “Navy SEALs & Marines Acquire Weapons, Pistols & Guns That Operate Underwater”, Warrior Maven, July 30, 2023.

The Legendary SEALs. Matt Fratus provides a brief description of the mission, training, organization, and history of the Navy SEALs. “The Only Easy Day Was Yesterday – The Legendary Navy SEALs”, Coffee or Die Magazine, July 27, 2023.

Ukraine Conflict

Offensive and Counteroffensive. The Ukrainians have a major push ongoing in the southeast of Ukraine while Russia has mounted attacks in the northeast region of the country. While this is going on President Putin is looking to raise the top age for military conscription from 27 to 30 years of age (The Guardian), have measures to reduce draft dodging; and prevent conscripts from leaving the country.

Lessons From Russia’s Invasion Playbook. There has been a long established ‘playbook’ utilized by the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation for past foreign interventions and the current conflict in Ukraine. The use of Russian special operations forces is a key component of the playbook. This article traces the history of Russian foreign interventions beginning with Czechoslavkia in 1968 up to the present day. There are nations that could be future Russian targets . . . and they should devise countermeasures to ensure Russia has difficulty in executing its invasion playbook. “Disrupting Moscow’s Invasion Playbook: Lessons From Prague to Kyiv”, by Kevin Stringer and Heather Gregg, Modern War Institute at West Point, July 21, 2023.

Wagner in Belarus. Following the aborted mutiny, the Wagner Group has moved several thousand troops into Belarus. In time, there could be as many as ten thousand there. There are reports that the Russian paramilitary group is training up Belarusian special forces as well as mechanized units (RFE/RL) of Belarus. Some of the training is taking place close to the Polish border. The countries of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have taken not of this and are expressing their concern. “IntelBrief: The Wagner Group Finds a New Home in Belarus”, The Soufan Center, July 31, 2023.

Black Sea Update. The Russians may soon be stepping up the pressure in the Black Sea. Some observers of the Ukraine conflict believe that the West – with or without the US Navy – needs to return to the Black Sea to break Russian blockades, ensure grain export from Ukraine, and uphold Freedom of Navigation. (Euromaiden, Jul 29, 2023). NATO has strongly objected to Russia’s cancellation of the Black Sea grain deal and its stepped up actions in the Black Sea. (NATO, Jul 26, 2023).

CRS Report – Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Related CRS Products. The Congressional Research Service has updated a report that a large number of CRS publications about Russia’s war in Ukraine. CRS R47054, updated July 28, 2023, PDF, 6 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47054

DoS OIG Report on Aid to Ukraine. The U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General has issued a report entitled Review of Ukraine Foreign Assistance Coordination and Oversight. PDF, 29 pages. https://www.stateoig.gov/report/isp-i-23-18-0

National Security

NDAA. On Thursday, (28 July) the U.S. Senate passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (2024) by a wide margin (86-11). It did not contain many of the culture issues (diversity, transgender, etc.) included in the House version. When Congress returns from its summer vacation the two versions of the bill will be worked out in a joint Congress conference committee before the October 1 deadline.

U.S. Embassy in Haiti Evacuated. On Thursday the U.S. State Department ordered non-emergency government personnel and family members to leave Haiti. The country has struggled to contain violence and chaos due to heavily armed gangs conducting various crimes, murders, kidnappings, and more. News reports indicate that Kenya has volunteered to head up an international force that will train Haitian police.

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

Afghanistan

AAA and NDAA. Veteran organizations supporting inclusion of the Afghan Adjustment Act in the National Defense Authorization Act were disappointed that the U.S. Senate did not include the AAA admendment.

Afghan Relocation Flights. Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants in Afghanistan are waiting for flights to U.S. immigration processing centers in Qatar and other countries to resume. The relocation flights have been suspended for more than a month and it is unclear when they will resume. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) hs been relocating SIV-eligible Afghans by air and overland routes. “Afghan Relocation Flights Paused, Activists Call For Resumption”, by Akmal Dawi, Voice of America, July 26, 2023.

Nurturing an Opposition. David Loyn, a Senior Visiting Research Fellow of the War Studies Department of King’s College London, argues that the international community must stop allowing the Taliban to dictate terms and nurture an opposition if Afghanistan is ever to progress. “The Scattered Forces Opposing the Taliban Need Support”, Chatham House, July 28, 2023.

Africa

Niger Coup Attempt. On Wednesday, July 26, 2023, an attempted military coup took place. Some government troops remained loyal to the President. On Friday, the head of the presidential guards unit General Abdourahmane Tchiani declared himself Niger’s new leader. Brig. Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, the chief of Niger’s Special Operations Forces, was one of the leaders of the coup. (The Intercept). The United States has about 1,100 troops in the country and has conducted extensive training of the government forces to increase their counterterror and counterinsurgency capabilities. For the past several years Niger has been a strong U.S. security partner in the Sahel region of West Africa. There are concerns that the Wagner Group and variouis jihadist organizations will move to increase their power and influence in Niger. The US Embassy in Niger has issued a security alert advising US nationals to shelter in place. Borders and the airport are currently closed until August 5.

Read more:

• “Niger’s Coup is a West African Disaster in the Making”, Hudson Institute, July 28, 2023.
• DoS Security Alert (Jul 28, 2023)
• “Niger Coup: EU suspends security coorperation and budgetary aid”, BBC News, July 29, 2023.

CRS Report Somalia. The Congressional Research Service has updated its “In Focus” publication about Somalia. CRS IF10155, PDF, 3 pages, updated July 27, 2023. Covers the transition from ‘failed state’ to ‘fragile state’, nation building challenges, security concerns, U.S. policy, operations, and foreign aid. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155

Old Salt Coffee is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. The company offers a wide range of coffee flavors to include Green Eyes Coffee, a tribute to those Navy special operations personnel who operate in the night.

Upcoming Events

August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida

Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion

CDF

August 12, 2023

11th Special Forces Group Reunion

Fort Meade, MD

September 18-23, 2023

5th Special Forces Group Reunion

October 3, 2023

2023 Virtual MOG Mile

Three Rangers Foundation

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

Books, Pubs, and Reports

Report – Erosion of U.S. Power. RAND Corporation has published a new report entitled Inflection Point: How to reverse the erosion of U.S. and Allied military power and influence”, July 2022, PDF, 240 pages.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html

Report – The National Cybersecurity Strategy – Going Where No Strategy Has Gone Before. The Congressional Research Service has updated this report on the national cybersecurity strategy. Updated July 17, 2023, PDF, 4 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12123

Tip of the Spear. The June 2023 issue of Tip of the Spear has been published by the U.S. Special Operations Command. This issue has news of the various special operations components and the TSOCs. June 2023, PDF, 40 pages. https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/67076

Podcasts Channels

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Initiative

https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

sof.news · by SOF News · July 31, 2023

4. Amid the Counterattack’s Deadly Slog, a Glimmer of Success for Ukraine

Excerpts:

The recapture of Staromaiorske, a small village that is nonetheless critical to Ukraine’s southern strategy, was such a welcome development for Ukraine that President Volodymyr Zelensky announced it himself.

The counteroffensive has largely been a brutal lesson for Ukrainian troops, who have struggled to seize back territory across the southern region of Zaporizhzhia. In two months, Ukrainian troops have advanced less than 10 miles at any point along the region’s 100-mile front.

Victories, like the one at Staromaiorske, represent a potential breakthrough in the fighting, Ukrainian officials said, perhaps opening the way for a broader push by their country’s forces.

Amid the Counterattack’s Deadly Slog, a Glimmer of Success for Ukraine

By Carlotta Gall

Carlotta Gall has spent 12 days reporting from the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine.

Published July 30, 2023

Updated July 31, 2023, 7:03 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · July 31, 2023

Recapturing the village of Staromaiorske was such welcome news for the country that President Volodymyr Zelensky announced it himself. But formidable Russian defenses have stymied progress elsewhere.

The body of a Russian soldier outside a village in the Zaporizhzhia region of southern Ukraine this month.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

By

Carlotta Gall has spent 12 days reporting from the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine.

Published July 30, 2023Updated July 31, 2023, 7:03 a.m. ET

For 10 days, Ukrainian marines fought street by street and house by house to recapture the southeastern village of Staromaiorske, navigating artillery fire, airstrikes and hundreds of Russian troops.

The Russians put up a ferocious defense but that ended on Thursday when they folded and the Ukrainians claimed victory. “Some ran away, some were left behind,” said an assault commander from Ukraine’s 35th Marine Brigade, who uses the call sign Dikyi, which means Wild. “We were taking captives,” he added.

The recapture of Staromaiorske, a small village that is nonetheless critical to Ukraine’s southern strategy, was such a welcome development for Ukraine that President Volodymyr Zelensky announced it himself.

The counteroffensive has largely been a brutal lesson for Ukrainian troops, who have struggled to seize back territory across the southern region of Zaporizhzhia. In two months, Ukrainian troops have advanced less than 10 miles at any point along the region’s 100-mile front.

Victories, like the one at Staromaiorske, represent a potential breakthrough in the fighting, Ukrainian officials said, perhaps opening the way for a broader push by their country’s forces.

A Ukrainian soldier with the 35th Marine Brigade driving a Humvee in the Zaporizhzhia region.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Ukraine is focused on two main southward thrusts, with the aim of cutting off Russian resupply routes. One line of attack goes through Staromaiorske toward the city of Berdiansk on the Azov Sea, and another, farther west, toward the city of Melitopol.

Both cities command strategic transit routes for Russian forces occupying southern Ukraine and Crimea.

For weeks, Ukrainian artillery and long-range missiles have been pounding Russian supply lines and rear bases in an effort to break their operational capability and undermine Russian morale.

Rockets fired from an American-made HIMARS mobile launcher surprise drivers on country roads near the front line as Ukrainian units attack targets deep behind Russian lines.

As the Ukrainian forces deploy Western-supplied weapons, the Russian troops are making use of deadly new tactics and weapons of their own, including attack drones and remote-detonated mines.

In Staromaiorske, Russian soldiers dug bunkers underneath the village’s houses with multiple exits so a house would erupt like an anthill when under attack, said Dikyi, the Ukrainian commander. He lost one of his best men, a 27-year-old called Vyacheslav, who used the call sign Bandit, in an assault on such a house, he said.

The key to the Ukrainian success in the village, he said, was wearing down the Russian soldiers’ will to fight. The first sign of the Russian collapse was when 20 soldiers abandoned their position after complaining that reinforcements had failed to arrive, he said.

Ukrainian marines on patrol this month. Ukraine is focused on two main southward thrusts, with the aim of cutting off Russian resupply routes.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

From intercepts of Russian communications and interrogations of prisoners, the Ukrainian forces knew that their opponents were taking casualties and that some were refusing to fight.

“They were panicking,” Dikyi said. The Ukrainians redoubled their attack with a frontal assault with two battalions along four streets.

As officials celebrated Ukraine’s progress in Staromaiorske, troops elsewhere on the ground said that Russian defenses and firepower remained formidable and in places impassable.

A soldier at a medical post, awaiting evacuation for a concussion, recently described how his battalion had been decimated when it came under Russian artillery and tank fire. His brigade, the 23rd, was one of nine newly formed, Western-trained units prepared and equipped for the counteroffensive. But the brigade, he said, had been thrown into the fight without sufficient artillery support and had been unable to defend themselves against Russian firepower.

In one battle in which his unit took part, Ukrainian soldiers attacked in 10 American-made MaxxPro armored vehicles, but only one came back, he said. He showed photographs of the damaged vehicles, ripped open and burned out, which he said had been hauled back to a repair base. The soldier declined to give his name for fear of getting into trouble with his superiors.

“They were hit by anti-tank fire,” he said. “They hit them and they kept hitting. They were burned out. The guys did not survive.”

Later, as they sheltered in a captured Russian bunker, his unit came under attack by mortar fire and grenade launchers, he said. Moments before the bunker was destroyed by a Russian tank, he added, his unit escaped.

“If we had stayed 10 minutes longer, we would not be alive,” he said.

Doctors with Ukrainian forces treating the wounded in the Zaporizhzhia region this month.Credit...Emile Ducke for The New York Times

The soldier lost a 22-year-old friend, Stas, in the shelling the day before, he said, adding that in just over a month, his battalion had suffered so many dead and wounded that only 10 men remained at the front line.

Another soldier, who joined up last year and asked to be identified only by his first name, Oleksiy, said that his unit had taken heavy losses as Russian troops directed artillery fire and aerial bombs onto their positions.

“We were shot like on a shooting range,” he said. “A drone was flying above us and correcting the artillery fire.” Their positions were in former Russian positions, hemmed in by minefields, he said, and the Russian forces were able to keep them pinned down and under constant drone surveillance.

Soldiers were running out of ammunition and water but could only sneak in and out of their positions in ones or twos, on foot, when the light was poor just before dawn and at dusk, he said.

The Ukrainian troops, Oleksiy added, were unable to suppress the Russian firepower. “At first we had artillery support, and then we ran out,” he said. “We need more weapons,” he added.

“If the troops knew we had a good supply and coordinated support from behind, we would take more territory.”

A Ukrainian soldier at a former Russian position in the Zaporizhzhia region.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Interviews with Ukrainian soldiers and a review of military surveillance footage from a recent attack indicate that many Ukrainian units are sustaining heavy losses.

A group with special operations training, deployed last month to storm Russian positions in a village on the western part of the front, took such heavy casualties in four days of assaults that they had to pull out without success.

After their armored vehicles were largely destroyed by artillery strikes on the first day, they revised their plan to approach the village on foot through a tree line that had been mined. The Ukrainians cleared a narrow path with demining explosives and the first soldiers reached the Russian positions and dropped down into a trench.

Drone footage of the event showed what happened next. Explosions suddenly detonated inside the trenches and other strikes hit soldiers on the edge of the tree line. The video footage has been verified by The New York Times.

“The trenches were mined,” said the assault commander, who uses the call sign Voskres, short for Resurrection. “Our guys started jumping in the trenches and blowing up,” he added. The Russian forces were watching, and they remotely detonated the mines, he said.

Those who managed to avoid the mines came under attack from multiple Russian kamikaze drones. “It seemed like they had a drone for each person,” he said. “The amount of equipment the Russians have, had we known, it was like mission impossible.”

Several weeks later, the village remains in Russian hands.

As Ukraine continues its counteroffensive, Russian defenses and firepower remain formidable and in places impassable.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Oleksandr Chubko contributed reporting.

Carlotta Gall is a senior correspondent currently covering the war in Ukraine. She previously was Istanbul bureau chief, covered the aftershocks of the Arab Spring from Tunisia, and reported from the Balkans during the war in Kosovo and Serbia, and from Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2001. She was on a team that won a 2009 Pulitzer Prize for reporting from Afghanistan and Pakistan. More about Carlotta Gall

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Grinding Counteroffensive Hands Ukraine a Flash of Success

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · July 31, 2023

5. Opinion | Why the Niger coup matters — and what the U.S. should do about it

Excerpts:

U.S. law requires aid cutoffs to recipient countries that have military coups, but exceptions are made in cases in which U.S. national security is considered to be at stake, as with Egypt and Thailand. Niger should not get one. Ignoring the law would likely embolden potential coup plotters in other places.

Gen. Tchiani and his associates need to realize that Mr. Blinken is not making an empty threat, and the United States needs to make good on its word. Cutting off assistance, especially humanitarian aid, can be a difficult decision, since ordinary people will suffer most. But the United States should stand up for its principle that democratic leaders cannot be ousted by force. There can be no business as usual with Niger until Mr. Bazoum is returned to full control.

Opinion | Why the Niger coup matters — and what the U.S. should do about it

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · July 29, 2023

In April 2021, Niger’s Mohamed Bazoum made history by becoming the first democratically elected president to take power from a popularly elected predecessor since the country’s independence. Now, Mr. Bazoum is said to be holed up in the presidential palace, thankfully still able to communicate by telephone, while his leading military man and erstwhile protector, Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani, has proclaimed himself the new head of state. This follows yet another coup in this landlocked, strategically important country and continues a disturbing pattern in coup-prone West Africa.

This outrageous power grab cannot be allowed to stand. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was correct in giving his “unflagging support” for Mr. Bazoum and condemning this illegal and unconstitutional military takeover. The United States has about 1,100 troops in Niger, including a drone base, helping the country’s military battle Islamist insurgents linked to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. The United States also provides hundreds of millions of dollars in nonmilitary foreign assistance. The coup-makers need to know that U.S. support will be withdrawn unless Mr. Bazoum is restored to the presidency.

Few Americans have likely heard of Niger, a country larger in size than Texas and rich in uranium but whose people are among the world’s poorest. It shares with many of its African neighbors a history of military men meddling in politics, having suffered through four previous coups and many other attempts since its independence from France in 1960.

The country also sits in the middle of the unstable semiarid Sahel region south of the Sahara desert that unfortunately has become known as Africa’s “coup belt.” Neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso recently also saw democratic governments toppled in coups, ostensibly for the same reason cited by Niger’s generals in their power grab — the supposed failure of civilian leaders to crack down hard enough on the Islamist insurgents and bring security to the population. Niger’s newest would-be military leader specifically blamed the deposed president for failing to cooperate more fully with Mali’s military regime.

There is also wariness among populations in the region about perceived Western interference in their internal affairs, with much of the ire directed toward France, the former colonial power. That’s one reason French troops were forced to withdraw from Mali.

It is worrisome to see reports that many in Niger appear to be supporting this coup. Even more worrying are reports that some pro-coup members of the public were displaying Russian flags and calling for assistance from the Russian mercenary group Wagner, which has been active in Mali — where they have supplanted French troops and have been credibly accused of human rights abuses, including massacres of noncombatants. Niger should avoid the same fate.

In a report last year, the State Department called Niger “a linchpin for stability in the Sahel” and “a more open and active partner with the United States.” The countries cooperate not only in battling the insurgents but also in strengthening democracy and human rights in a largely unstable region, and tackling problems that fuel instability and unrest. These include weak institutions, poor health care and education infrastructure, and the growing threat of climate catastrophe through desertification as the Sahara desert spreads southward.

That U.S.-Niger partnership, and all the benefits to the country, are at risk now, if the generals who claim to have seized power don’t immediately retreat to their barracks and allow Mr. Bazoum, who was popularly elected after a runoff vote, to reclaim full authority.

The European Union has already suspended financial and security assistance to Niger, and Mr. Blinken has warned that the United States will do the same. “Our economic and security partnership with Niger, which is significant, hundreds of millions of dollars, depends on the continuation of the democratic governance and constitutional order that has been disrupted by the actions in the last few days,” he said in Australia.

U.S. law requires aid cutoffs to recipient countries that have military coups, but exceptions are made in cases in which U.S. national security is considered to be at stake, as with Egypt and Thailand. Niger should not get one. Ignoring the law would likely embolden potential coup plotters in other places.

Gen. Tchiani and his associates need to realize that Mr. Blinken is not making an empty threat, and the United States needs to make good on its word. Cutting off assistance, especially humanitarian aid, can be a difficult decision, since ordinary people will suffer most. But the United States should stand up for its principle that democratic leaders cannot be ousted by force. There can be no business as usual with Niger until Mr. Bazoum is returned to full control.

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · July 29, 2023

6. Confidence in U.S. Military Lowest in Over Two Decades

Graphics at the link: https://news.gallup.com/poll/509189/confidence-military-lowest-two-decades.aspx?utm

Confidence in U.S. Military Lowest in Over Two Decades

news.gallup.com · by Gallup, Inc. · July 31, 2023

Politics

July 31, 2023

Story Highlights

• Public confidence in the U.S. military continues to decline
• Drops seen across party groups, but Republicans remain most confident
• Independents least likely to express confidence this year

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Americans are now less likely to express “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. military, with a noticeable decline that has persisted for the past five years. The latest numbers are from a June 1-22 Gallup poll that also captured record lows in public confidence in several public institutions.

###Embeddable###

At 60%, confidence in the military was last this low in 1997, and it hasn’t been lower since 1988, when 58% were confident. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s -- during the Cold War and amid threats to U.S. power, including the Iran hostage crisis -- between 50% and 58% of Americans were confident in the military. Confidence generally improved during Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the 1980s. It then surged after the Gulf War victory (to a record-high 85% in 1991) and again after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Confidence generally held above 70% for the next two decades, until dipping to 69% in 2021 and declining further since then, following the poorly executed exit from Afghanistan.

Republican Confidence in Military Slumps

Throughout nearly all of the past 48 years, Republicans have been the most likely to express confidence in the military, and they remain so today -- but the rate has declined by over 20 percentage points in three years, from 91% to 68%.

Independents’ confidence has dropped nearly as much -- by 13 points, from 68% to 55% -- and now independents have less confidence than Democrats do. While Democrats’ confidence rating did rise after President Joe Biden assumed office, those gains have disappeared in the past year.

###Embeddable###

Bottom Line

Public perceptions of the U.S. military have fluctuated dramatically over the past five decades. The aftermaths of the Gulf War and 9/11 were followed by resounding upticks in confidence in the military. The latter of these surges ushered in an era of elevated confidence lasting nearly two decades.

Now that the U.S. has completely withdrawn from both Iraq and Afghanistan, the two most significant military legacies of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., confidence in the military has continued to decline among the public. The declines this year were across all party identification groups, with Republicans remaining the most likely to express confidence and independents becoming the least likely.

To stay up to date with the latest Gallup News insights and updates, follow us on Twitter.

Learn more about how the Gallup Poll Social Series works.

###Embeddable###

Results for this Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-22, 2023, with a random sample of 1,013 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is ±4 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.

Each sample of national adults includes a minimum quota of 80% cellphone respondents and 20% landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using random-digit-dial methods.

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

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news.gallup.com · by Gallup, Inc. · July 31, 2023

7. CCP funneled $17 MILLION into more than 143 K-12 schools

Now China is funding America's PUBLIC SCHOOLS: Communist nation has channeled $17M into more than 143 K-12 districts - sparking GOP probe

• The money is funneled through Confucius Institutes and other cultural and language programs
• Rep. Jim Banks is demanding the Education Department take action with 'urgency'
• The CCP is targeting schools to close to military bases

By KELLY LACO, EXECUTIVE EDITOR OF POLITICS FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

PUBLISHED: 14:42 EDT, 30 July 2023 | UPDATED: 17:23 EDT, 30 July 2023

Daily Mail · by Kelly Laco, Executive Editor Of Politics For Dailymail.Com · July 30, 2023

China is funding America's public schools to the tune of $17 million dollars, it has been revealed, with Republicans now probing the disturbing donations.

The report by Parents Defending Education states that the close coordination between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and U.S. schools to establish Confucius Classrooms has historically included 143 school districts in 34 states and Washington, D.C.

In addition, at least seven contracts are still active in Texas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington.

The report called 'Little Red Classrooms' reveals that $17 million has been funneled from CCP-connected financial institutions into U.S. K-12 schools, through Confucius Institutes and other cultural and language programs.

At least seven contracts are still active in Texas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington

It also states that the CCP has 'ties to school districts near 20 U.S. military bases' and three of the nation's top science and technology high schools have been infiltrated.

'While the United States is not officially part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese state media has touted the work done by Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms to further the Chinese Communist Party’s global influence,' the report continues.

China has facilitated these relationships through grants and sister school partnerships going back to 2009. Programming and funding has varied between school districts, the report adds.

PDE President Nicki Neily said in a statement that the 'alarming evidence' uncovered by the investigation should 'concern parents, educators, and policymakers alike.'

The report has been given to state and federal lawmakers in the hopes that it will spur action.

China's President Xi Jinping is pictured. Concerns are growing over his country's funding of America's public schools

Rep. Jim Banks is demanding the Education Department take action with 'urgency' in in order to terminate these 'disturbing' partnerships, he says in a letter to Sec. Miguel Cardona on Wednesday obtained by DailyMail.com.

'The Chinese Communist Party is not a trustworthy partner. Accepting funding and influence from our greatest adversary is a threat to America’s children and national security,' Banks told DailyMail.com.

He wrote in the letter that the U.S. must 'take every measure' to strengthen its defenses against China including by 'blocking their ability to propagandize in America's K-12 schools.'

The congressman - who sits on the newly-established House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party - is asking for immediate action from the Biden administration.

He also noted that under former President Donald Trump, the State Department in designated Confucius Institutes a 'foreign mission,' which helped shut down some of these 'dangerous programs.'

Rep. Mike Waltz, R-Fla., told DailyMail.com the report is 'alarming' because 'we truly don't understand the full extent of Communist China's meddling in our education system.'

'Not only is the CCP trying to promote their propaganda through education programs but are using Chinese shell companies to outright buy American private schools around the country.'

He is urging state governments, along with federal assistance, to start 'cracking down on the targeting of our children.'

Waltz has also sounded the alarm on Chinese-owned schools in the U.S. with Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) programs.

He has asked the Pentagon to survey those schools because he views it as a grave national security threat.

Sen. Roger Marshall told DailyMail.com that the Parents Defending Education report should 'alarm' every American parent, especially because the CCP is targeting schools to close to military bases.

The Kansas senator introduced a new bill Tuesday that would prohibit federal agencies from funding research in China or 'any entity' owned by China.

'From buying our farmland to setting up CCP police stations here on U.S. soil, stealing our intellectual property, spying on our military bases, and now buying their way into our children's K-12 schools, it is past time for this administration to wake up and realize what we are up against,' he told DailyMail.com.

According to the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Pentagon is prohibited from providing money to 'institution[s] of higher education that hosts a Confucius Institute' after October 1, 2023.

As a result, since the 2021 NDAA passage, over 100 U.S. universities shut down their Confucius Institutes.

As of March 2023, the National Association of Scholars counts a total of 13 Confucius Institutes in the U.S. - with over 108 closing or in the process of closing.

House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mike Gallagher worked to have Alfred University in New York's Confucius Institute closed in recent weeks.

The university obtained a five-year $13.5 million taxpayer-funded research grant in 2022 to by the Pentagon to conduct hypersonic weapons research.

Gallagher took issue with national security concerns he had about millions in Pentagon funds going to a CCP-linked university.

In a June 13 letter obtained by DailyMail.com, university attorney Robert Fisher responded to Gallagher saying Alfred University has decided to close the Confucius Institute 'as of June 30, 2023.'

Gallagher told DailyMail.com regarding PDE's report that the CCP cannot be allowed to 'influence the American education system,' adding 'America’s children deserve better.'

There are four additional universities who host a Confucius Institute and have been awarded a DOD grant - University of Toledo, University of Utah, St. Cloud State University and Wesleyan College.

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, R-Texas, told DailyMail.com that it's 'ridiculous' there aren't measures 'protecting our children from CCP influence.'

'Learning languages and cultures critical to national security, like Chinese, is essential, but it shouldn’t come with Communist propaganda and influence,' he added.

In 2019, the FBI found that 'foreign state adversaries seek to illicitly or illegitimately acquire U.S. academic research and information to advance their scientific, economic, and military development goals.

FBI Director Chris Wray outlined the threat in a 2020 speech, saying China pays scientists at U.S. universities to 'secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China—including valuable, federally funded research.'

Daily Mail · by Kelly Laco, Executive Editor Of Politics For Dailymail.Com · July 30, 2023

8. The BBC and the Decline of British Soft Power

.

Excerpts:

The World Service is vulnerable to such cuts because, crucially, it is run not by the British government or a state broadcaster but by the BBC, the same organization that supplies British domestic audiences with much of their news and entertainment. This gives the World Service access to huge technical resources and reserves of talent and to the BBC’s reputation for broadcasting truthful, trustworthy news. The entanglement of international and domestic broadcasting, however, also leaves the World Service exposed. Hostility to the BBC among certain groups in British public life, especially the Conservatives who have governed the country for over a decade, has placed major constraints on the funding of public service broadcasting. Because the BBC itself currently pays much of the bill for the World Service, attempts to reduce the BBC’s overall funding have had the knock-on effect of hurting the World Service. Seemingly oblivious to the international consequences of their campaign against the broadcaster, the BBC’s domestic opponents are putting at risk what is one of the United Kingdom’s key tools of global soft power.

...

It seems likely that, in the short term, the World Service will continue to operate in its current guise, reliant on ad hoc funding extracted from a government unconvinced of the sustainability or desirability of public service broadcasting. Eventually, the government may implement root-and-branch reform of British broadcasting, with profound consequences for the World Service. Or perhaps the current muddle will continue, to the further detriment of British soft power and global influence, already dwindling after the country’s departure from the European Union.

Thanks to the World Service, and to the BBC’s wider global commercial distribution of content, the United Kingdom continues to punch above its weight in the world’s media arena. The soft power that this generates is surely more important than ever before, at a time when the United Kingdom’s allies and rivals alike are pumping resources into winning hearts and minds. It would be an act of self-sabotage if British policymakers were to destroy, inadvertently or on purpose, the assets of trust and goodwill that have been key to maintaining their country’s voice on the international stage since World War II.

The BBC and the Decline of British Soft Power

How Domestic Politics Muffled the Country’s Voice

By Simon J. Potter

July 31, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Simon J. Potter · July 31, 2023

During a civil war, sometimes the most reliable news comes from very far away. As Sudan became a conflict zone last April, the BBC World Service launched an emergency “pop-up” news outlet to keep local listeners informed about the deteriorating situation in the country, providing bulletins in Arabic from London, Amman, and Cairo. The global news channel deployed old and new technologies side by side: shortwave radio, the medium of choice for international broadcasters since the 1920s, was combined with feeds on digital and social media channels. The aim, according to the director of the World Service, was to bring “clear, independent information and advice at a time of critical need.” Such language, perhaps unconsciously, built on a conceit that dates to the eve of World War II: that the BBC altruistically and impartially presents its global audience with truthful, trustworthy news. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the World Service in 1999 as “perhaps Britain’s greatest gift to the world this century.”

The World Service currently broadcasts in more than 40 languages, reaching an estimated 365 million people each week through radio and digital outlets. It is operated by the United Kingdom’s biggest public service broadcaster. The BBC is, in theory at least, independent from day-to-day government intervention, protected by a royal charter that makes it responsible to the British Parliament rather than to government ministers or officials. It is funded mainly by a television license fee, which everyone in the United Kingdom who watches BBC programs, broadcast or online, is legally obligated to pay.

Today, the BBC claims that an unprecedented number of people around the world consume its news, with some estimates placing its global audience upward of 500 million. The World Service brings in the lion’s share of this audience and can claim with some justification to be one of the ways the United Kingdom still maintains an outsized role in the lives of people around the world. And yet, despite its obvious importance at a time of rising international tensions, the World Service has recently found itself in financial peril. In September 2022, the BBC announced a major retrenchment at the World Service, with the projected loss of almost 400 jobs and the winding down of broadcast radio services (digital offerings would continue) in a range of Asian languages. In January, the World Service ended its Arabic-language broadcasts, which had been in operation for 85 years. Seen in this light, the creation of a pop-up service for Sudan seems less a mark of the World Service’s strength and more a recognition of the damage caused by recent cuts.

The World Service is vulnerable to such cuts because, crucially, it is run not by the British government or a state broadcaster but by the BBC, the same organization that supplies British domestic audiences with much of their news and entertainment. This gives the World Service access to huge technical resources and reserves of talent and to the BBC’s reputation for broadcasting truthful, trustworthy news. The entanglement of international and domestic broadcasting, however, also leaves the World Service exposed. Hostility to the BBC among certain groups in British public life, especially the Conservatives who have governed the country for over a decade, has placed major constraints on the funding of public service broadcasting. Because the BBC itself currently pays much of the bill for the World Service, attempts to reduce the BBC’s overall funding have had the knock-on effect of hurting the World Service. Seemingly oblivious to the international consequences of their campaign against the broadcaster, the BBC’s domestic opponents are putting at risk what is one of the United Kingdom’s key tools of global soft power.

SERVING THE WORLD

The relationship between the BBC and the British government has always been a complex and ambiguous one, with the broadcaster notionally independent from the state but often cooperating with it. The BBC was established just over a century ago with a state-sanctioned monopoly of all broadcasting in the United Kingdom. The monopoly, which lasted until 1955, was granted for domestic reasons, including a desire to avoid both competition with the newspaper press and unregulated, U.S.-style clutter and chaos on the airwaves. The creation of such a powerful broadcaster at home subsequently allowed the country to punch above its weight in the global radio arena. From 1932, when it established its first regular international transmissions in the form of the Empire Service, the BBC became the sole voice of the United Kingdom as far as overseas radio listeners were concerned.

In the arena of international broadcasting, there was often close behind-the-scenes consultation between the BBC and the government. For instance, the Foreign Office enlisted the BBC to broadcast in Arabic to listeners in the Middle East in early 1938 to combat Arabic-language propaganda produced by fascist Italy. That same year, the BBC began broadcasting in a range of European languages, again in close consultation with the Foreign Office, in response to Nazi radio propaganda and Hitler’s territorial ambitions. The outbreak of war in Europe saw a massive expansion of the BBC’s foreign-language services, directly funded by the British state. These developed significant audiences across occupied and enemy territories: by 1944, the Gestapo estimated that the BBC had 15 million listeners in Nazi Germany. Into the Cold War, the BBC continued to act as subcontractor for the British government, broadcasting in 19 different languages by 1946, including a new Russian service. By this point, the Empire Service was no more, and the BBC was running a broad range of so-called External Services, which together employed over a quarter of the BBC’s staff.

Listeners in the Eastern bloc must have known, on some level, that the BBC’s various foreign-language services were tools of British international influence. Nevertheless, many regarded them as the best source of news available: even if the BBC was not entirely independent of the British government, many other international broadcasters were under direct state control, and the effect of state involvement on the content of their news services was often obvious. The BBC’s nominal independence helped buttress its claims to impartiality and rigor. So, too, did the fact that the BBC also broadcast to, and generally enjoyed the trust of, domestic listeners in the United Kingdom. Few other countries established a single broadcaster to carry out all their domestic and global radio work. In the United States, for example, state-funded bodies such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe did the job of attempting to reach across the Iron Curtain, rather than entities affiliated with domestic radio and television networks. The U.S. equivalents never enjoyed the same level of trust among their audiences as the BBC did.

Throughout the Cold War, and in the decades that followed, those running the World Service balanced their desire to serve British foreign policy interests and agendas with the need to retain audience trust. They emphasized the importance of the BBC’s editorial independence: in the last resort, BBC staff had to be the ones who determined what went out on air, even if government officials provided them with information and advice. The BBC’s External Services were used to inform listeners in the Eastern bloc about the dynamism of democracy and debate in the West while also subtly questioning communist policies and driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The BBC played a key role in keeping Eastern bloc listeners informed at moments of Cold War crisis, such as the Hungarian Rising of 1956, when news issued from London became more reliable than that of any local media. In 1988, External Services were rebranded as the World Service and in that guise played a significant part in covering the end of communism in Europe. During the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in 1991, when Mikhail Gorbachev was imprisoned in his Crimean dacha, he kept up with unfolding events in Moscow by using a shortwave radio to listen to the World Service.

DOMESTIC ENTANGLEMENTS

It has not always been smooth sailing for the World Service. Housing British domestic public service broadcasting and international radio in a single organization has had its drawbacks. Crucially, this arrangement has left the World Service vulnerable at key moments to British politicians seeking to wage war on the BBC. Outraged at the BBC’s coverage of the Suez crisis in 1956, Prime Minister Anthony Eden famously threatened to cut funding and take the World Service under direct government control. Subsequently, other prime ministers went ahead and reduced the Foreign Office grant to the BBC, even in the midst of the Cold War, forcing it to close down or scale back some of its foreign-language services. The collapse of communism brought further cuts, as one of the main reasons for funding international broadcasting disappeared.

The World Service nevertheless did a good job of reorienting itself to serve British international agendas after the Cold War. It provided expertise and programming to support a range of local democratic media and educational and community building initiatives across the former Eastern bloc and in the global South. It created global television channels and, later, online services to reach new audiences and exploit new media platforms. After the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the World Service focused much of its energies on reaching audiences across the Middle East and in Afghanistan, reflecting the changing priorities of the British government.

Yet the World Service could not insulate itself from a fresh wave of domestic hostility to the BBC. In recent decades, private media conglomerates have sought to weaken the position of public service broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Some figures on the right wing of British politics believe that the BBC has limited the space for private enterprise in the British media industry while also displaying an inherent left-wing political bias in its domestic programming. These attacks intensified from 2010 onward, driven by a range of political and commercial groups that wanted to see the BBC cut down to size or eliminated entirely and that seemed to care little about how this might affect the World Service and British soft power. That year, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government led by Prime Minister David Cameron imposed a tough new financial settlement on the BBC. As part of the austerity measures designed to reduce public expenditure, the government grant that had funded BBC international broadcasting since World War II was withdrawn with effect from April 2014. Many observers believed this move was politically motivated and reflected deep-rooted Conservative hostility to the BBC at home. The result was a round of savage cuts at the World Service, which was even obliged to move out of its historic home in London’s Bush House and squeeze into the BBC’s domestic news base in Broadcasting House. To insiders and outsiders alike, this seemed to mark the end of an era and a significant loss of prestige.

Since then, the World Service has been financed on a hand-to-mouth basis through occasional installments of state funding. Managers cannot rely on this to continue, and the BBC’s dependence on these injections of money threatens to reduce its day-to-day autonomy from the government. In 2015, money was hastily diverted to the World Service from the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office’s Official Development Assistance fund to prop up services in Arabic and Russian, and to target areas of crucial geostrategic interest in Africa and Asia.

RELINQUISHING SOFT POWER

The British government seems torn between its hostility to the BBC at home and its realization that the World Service offers a key tool of global soft power, one that keeps the United Kingdom central to how many listeners imagine the world and helps to subtly promote British perspectives on international affairs. The result has been sporadic doles of grudging emergency funding to meet periodic crises, leaving little certainty about the future. For instance, in the interest of supporting the BBC’s goal of offering global audiences truthful and trusted news—crucial in an era of “fake news” and Russian and Chinese propaganda—in 2021, the government provided the World Service a one-off payment of eight million pounds (around $10 million) to fund initiatives to combat disinformation. In 2022, the government released another 4.2 million pounds (around $5 million) in emergency funding to enhance BBC services aimed at audiences in Russia and Ukraine. The BBC reactivated shortwave radio services to ensure that news from British sources reached listeners in Russia and Ukraine at a time when local independent media might be shut down, broadcasting and Internet infrastructure attacked, and firewalls erected to block foreign digital news. In March, the World Service secured another one-off government payment of 20 million pounds (around $26 million) to keep at-risk foreign-language services going for two more years.

At the beginning of this year, the BBC’s chairman (who has since resigned following a controversy about his links to former Prime Minister Boris Johnson) argued that the state should resume its historic role of providing full funding for the World Service. He claimed that only this would allow the BBC to compete in the new “information cold war” and “battle for global influence” in the face of massive Russian and Chinese propaganda and disinformation campaigns. This seems a forlorn hope in light of continuing government hostility to the BBC and the wider attack on public service broadcasting in the United Kingdom.

The BBC’s opponents have imperiled one of the United Kingdom’s key tools of global soft power.

One solution might lie in cutting the cords that bind British domestic and international broadcasting together, splitting the World Service into a separate organization funded directly by the state. Such a separation could make international broadcasting less vulnerable to domestic political pressures. But it would also almost certainly dilute the appeal of those services to global listeners. The BBC’s brand name and reputation for truthfulness remain major assets. Keeping the World Service under the umbrella of the BBC protects its status as an independent voice reflecting the plurality of British democracy. Under direct government control, it might instead appear to be simply an organ of state propaganda, merely a British iteration of Voice of America. Its global reach and influence would surely decline.

It seems likely that, in the short term, the World Service will continue to operate in its current guise, reliant on ad hoc funding extracted from a government unconvinced of the sustainability or desirability of public service broadcasting. Eventually, the government may implement root-and-branch reform of British broadcasting, with profound consequences for the World Service. Or perhaps the current muddle will continue, to the further detriment of British soft power and global influence, already dwindling after the country’s departure from the European Union.

Thanks to the World Service, and to the BBC’s wider global commercial distribution of content, the United Kingdom continues to punch above its weight in the world’s media arena. The soft power that this generates is surely more important than ever before, at a time when the United Kingdom’s allies and rivals alike are pumping resources into winning hearts and minds. It would be an act of self-sabotage if British policymakers were to destroy, inadvertently or on purpose, the assets of trust and goodwill that have been key to maintaining their country’s voice on the international stage since World War II.

• SIMON J. POTTER is Professor of Modern History at the University of Bristol. He is the author of This is the BBC: Entertaining the Nation, Speaking for Britain, 1922-2022.

Foreign Affairs · by Simon J. Potter · July 31, 2023

9. Starlink has become the 'blood' of Ukraine's communication infrastructure, but officials are reportedly growing concerned about relying on Elon Musk's tech

I would be concerned. I would not trust Musk with something this important..

Starlink has become the 'blood' of Ukraine's communication infrastructure, but officials are reportedly growing concerned about relying on Elon Musk's tech

Business Insider · by Katie Hawkinson

Residents of Kherson, Ukraine gather to use Starlink internet in November 2022.

Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters

• A Ukrainian official told The New York Times that Starlink satellites are vital to their communication systems.
• But he also voiced concerns about Ukraine's overdependence on Musk's global satellite system.
• His fears stem from several months of back-and-forth with Musk about the use of Starlink internet in the war against Russia.

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Ukraine's digital minister has reported concerns about the country's overreliance on Elon Musk's Starlink satellite internet system amid the war with Russia, The New York Times reports.

Mykhailo Fedorov told The Times that Starlink has become the "blood" of Ukrainian communication infrastructure. Starlink satellites make up the majority of satellites orbiting Earth, and the network is often useful for accessing the internet in war zones or regions struck by extreme weather disasters, The Times reports.

Starlink satellites, then, are invaluable resources — but also ones that Fedorov told The Times he's worried Ukraine has become overdependent on.

Starlink internet has not always been available to aid Ukraine in the war effort. In September 2022, Ukrainian officials revealed Musk had blocked Starlink internet access in Russian-occupied Crimea, citing concerns about escalating the conflict. Around the same time, Musk also asked the US Pentagon to fund for their internet services to Ukraine because they could no longer afford to foot the bill, Insider reported.

In February, Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak said SpaceX — Musk's company that houses Starlink — needed to pick a side in the war with Russia after Musk announced Kyiv could no longer use Starlink to control military drones.

SpaceX did not respond to Insider's request for comment ahead of publication.

Business Insider · by Katie Hawkinson

10. Wang Yi, the return of China’s tough foreign minister

Wang Yi, the return of China’s tough foreign minister

Financial Times · by Joe Leahy · July 28, 2023

Australia’s foreign minister Julie Bishop thought everything was going well at a meeting with Wang Yi in 2013, as her Chinese counterpart launched into an animated opening speech in Mandarin. But then the Australian ambassador pushed over a note saying: “This is going terribly badly.”

Wang was publicly haranguing Bishop after Australia questioned Beijing’s establishment of an air defence identification zone in the East China Sea. The pair then sat through a frosty diplomatic dinner, silently staring across the table.

That episode, recounted by Bishop in later interviews, helped define Wang as the tough point man of a new, more assertive Chinese foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. Now, just months after leaving the foreign minister job, the 69-year-old Wang, a staunch nationalist described as a “trusted old hand”, has been called back. This time he faces an even tougher task.

Wang was reappointed foreign minister after the once high-flying Xi favourite Qin Gang was suddenly removed from his post this week without explanation. Even by the opaque standards of China’s Communist party, the Qin episode stands out. After a month-long absence, first ascribed to “health reasons” but later left unexplained, he was ousted by an emergency meeting of China’s rubber-stamp parliament in one of the highest profile disappearances of a senior cabinet member during Xi’s presidency.

For Wang, who outranked Qin in the less high-profile role of the party’s head of foreign policy, the challenge now is to restore credibility to China’s diplomacy while juggling a hectic workload without his former colleague’s help.

Aside from handling rising geopolitical tensions, Wang will have to prepare for Xi’s possible attendance at several important gatherings including November’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit in San Francisco where he might meet US president Joe Biden.

“His real headache is how to manage some of these burning problems,” said Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, listing China’s strained ties with the US, Europe, Japan and others. “And to deal with those big summits.”

Known as the “silver fox” because, unlike many older party cadres, he does not dye his hair, Wang first took over as foreign minister a decade ago, just after Xi took office. “Wang is a known quantity and not a political interloper like Qin Gang,” said Danny Russel, vice-president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute think-tank. “But he has over time become much less the personable and open-minded diplomat who I and others could talk with candidly . . . and now appears as a more politically correct champion of the China Dream and Xi Jinping thought”.

Born in Beijing in 1953, Wang was forced to labour on a farm during Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. Afterwards, he entered the foreign ministry, spent time at Washington’s Georgetown University and became ambassador to Japan. Although from a modest background, he married into elite diplomatic circles. His father-in-law, Qian Jiadong, was aide to the late leader Zhou Enlai. Zhou is famous for his dictum that “diplomatic personnel are the People’s Liberation Army in civilian clothing”, a message Wang seems to have absorbed.

In his book China’s Civilian Army, Peter Martin describes a speech given by Wang in 2013 to fresh foreign ministry recruits. “Zhou Enlai will always be a model for diplomats,” he told the group. “A civilian army not only needs to maintain strict discipline and obedience to commands, but also needs . . . to serve the people like the PLA.”

In recent years, as the Trump administration stepped up moves to counter China, the foreign ministry under Wang responded with “wolf warrior” diplomacy — known for its brash and combative rhetoric. One former journalist who dealt with Wang said he practised “a somewhat more refined form of wolf warrior . . . a biting acerbic kind”.

“Wang Yi is a man of many faces. He has the ability for a serious and sustained discussion of regional and global affairs, but he is a very political animal too,” says Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University who dealt with him during his time as top China adviser to former US president Barack Obama.

“Europeans and Americans can’t distinguish between Chinese, Japanese and South Koreans,” Wang told a trilateral meeting between the three countries this month. “No matter how yellow our hair is dyed or how sharp we change our nose, we can’t become westerners. We should know where our roots are.”

Beyond the rhetoric, he now has his work cut out. China is trying to mend fences with Europe, which is suspicious of Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Beijing and Washington are trying to revive dialogue. Wang was already the main interlocutor with US national security adviser Jake Sullivan. “It is a very important channel but both of them are super busy and Wang twice as busy as before Qin was purged,” says Russel.

Wang will also have to work with Xi to find himself a successor. He is already well past retirement age.

Still, his appointment sends a positive message, analysts say. “He’s very experienced and very professional,” said John McKinnon, who has twice served as New Zealand’s ambassador to China.

As for Bishop, who is no longer in government, she said this week that Wang’s return was welcome. “I always had very professional dealings with him,” she told Australia’s National Press Club, before joking: “Although there is one occasion, but we won’t go into it.”

Additional reporting by James Kynge in London and Edward White in Seoul

Financial Times · by Joe Leahy · July 28, 2023

11. US unveils island launchers for China containment

I like these names:

Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary-Fires (ROGUE-Fires)

 USMC’s first Long Range Missile (LMSL) battery

Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)

Ground-Based Intermediate-Range Missiles (GBIRM)

Excerpts:

However, a 2022 RAND study notes that the strategy may fail since the US may need help finding an ideal partner for these Ground-Based Intermediate-Range Missiles (GBIRM). It states that as long as Thailand has a military-backed government that pursues closer ties with China, Thailand will not want to host US GBIRMs.

While the Philippines’ alliance with the US has undergone a significant reset under the Marcos Jr. administration, that has not alleviated the former’s reluctance to host permanent US bases, weak territorial defense capability, and vulnerability to naval blockade. Such makes US deployments of GBIRMs unlikely in the Philippines.

The RAND study notes that South Korea is not an ideal base for US ground-based long-range missiles due to its vulnerability to Chinese economic pressure, disagreements with the US over operational control of South Korea’s military, and South Korea’s doubts over US security guarantees.

While the study notes Australia and the US’ strong alliance, the former’s distance from Taiwan and the South China Sea, coupled with its reluctance to host permanent US bases, rules it out as an ideal GBIRM basing location.

The study notes that Japan may be an ideal partner for US GBIRM deployments, citing its strong alliance with the US and willingness to bolster its defense capabilities. Although it says that Japan may be reluctant to host US GBIRMs, as they could be nuclear-armed, Japan may be willing to host conventionally-armed missiles. It also says that the US approach to Japan that would most likely succeed would be to help the latter have its arsenal of ground-based anti-ship missiles.

US unveils island launchers for China containment

Part of initiative placing long-range weapons in the First Island Chain to create air and maritime superiority

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 31, 2023

“US Long-Range Fires Launcher complements OpFires and Typhon in implementing its missile wall strategy versus China.”

The US Marine Corps (USMC) has just unveiled its new land-based cruise missile launcher, the latest addition to several similar systems promising dispersed, survivable firepower in its “missile wall” containment strategy against China.

This month, The Warzone reported that the USMC had unveiled the Long-Range Fires Launcher, an uncrewed 4×4 launch vehicle based on the Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary-Fires (ROGUE-Fires) vehicle for the land-based Tomahawk cruise missile that the service aims to field.

The source notes that the USMC’s first Long Range Missile (LMSL) battery had already been formally activated this year, with the service hoping to have a multi-battery LMSL battalion with an unspecified number of launchers by 2030.

The Warzone notes that the Long-Range Fires Launcher can hold just one Tomahawk missile at a time, unlike the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which can fit two Naval Strike Missiles. The source notes both are mounted on the ROGUE-Fires uncrewed Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) operated remotely by ground personnel.

The USMC’s development of the Long-Range Fires launcher may address a mobility gap associated with the truck-towed OpFires and Typhon. Naval News notes that the latter two launchers cannot fit in a C-130 cargo plane, whereas they could if mounted on the USMC’s smaller Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). That could make their rapid deployment possible on remote Pacific islands.

In July 2022, Asia Times reported about the USMC Operational Fires (OpFires) hypersonic weapon test that month. OpFires features a high degree of interoperability with US Army systems, with the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) noting that a USMC logistics truck with the Palletized Load System (PLS) launched the OpFires missile, making any vehicle in the US inventory with the system a potential launcher.

DARPA also said the OpFires test used US Army artillery and fire control systems for launch, enabling inter-service joint operations, reinforcing systems capability and simplifying logistics.

In terms of system components, Naval News notes that the OpFires can carry various payloads, with the system consisting of missiles, canisters, and launchers sized to fit on the US Army’s PLS and USMC’s Logistic Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) units. The source also says three OpFires missiles can fit on a US military 10×10 truck and that the US Marine Corps is experimenting with the Tactical Tomahawk fired from a trailer-mounted Mk 41 VLS.

Previously, in December 2022, Asia Times reported about the US Army’s acquisition of its first four Typhon missile launchers as part of its mid-range capability (MRC) program to fill in its requirement for long-range fires in the Pacific theater. The Typhon is designed to fire Standard SM-6 or Tomahawk missiles between 500 and 1,800 kilometers, which are between the US Army’s Precision Strike Missile (PSM) and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), which have respective ranges of 482 and 2,776 kilometers.

The latest Standard SM-6 Block IB features a redesigned body and larger rocket motor, giving it improved anti-air and anti-missile capabilities, and a possible secondary land attack function, while the latest Tomahawk Block V features new communications, anti-ship capability, and multi-effect warheads. Each Typhon unit consists of an operations center, four Mk 41-derived vertical launch system (VLS) launchers towed by M983A4 tractor trucks, and associated reloading and ground equipment.

Land-based missile launchers may have advantages over their ship-based counterparts, including increased survivability and effectiveness for less cost. They can also constantly present in contested areas, providing tactical and operational cover for US and allied forces. Also, attacking ISland-based missile launchers on its allies’ territories can significantly escalate hostilities.

Those advantages may tie into the 2021 US Marine Corps Concept for Stand-In Forces (SIF), which defines SIFs as “small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth to disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary intentionally.” The document also states that SIFs conduct sea denial operations to support fleet operations near maritime chokepoints, using organic sensors and weapons to complete kill webs.

Those systems also tie in with the US New Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which USNI News notes will involve ground forces with long-range weapons in the First Island Chain to create temporary bubbles of localized air and maritime superiority, enabling maneuver by amphibious forces to create temporal and geographic uncertainty to impose costs and conduct forcible entry operations.

Island chain strategy map: Researchgate

At the strategic level, the US Long-Range Fires, OpFires, and Typhon programs may be part of a larger “missile wall” containment strategy against China. The simultaneous deployment of US and Chinese anti-access/area denial capabilities near contested waterways and airspace can result in neither side enjoying the freedom of maneuver over those areas, maintaining a tense but stable military balance in the Pacific.

However, a 2022 RAND study notes that the strategy may fail since the US may need help finding an ideal partner for these Ground-Based Intermediate-Range Missiles (GBIRM). It states that as long as Thailand has a military-backed government that pursues closer ties with China, Thailand will not want to host US GBIRMs.

While the Philippines’ alliance with the US has undergone a significant reset under the Marcos Jr. administration, that has not alleviated the former’s reluctance to host permanent US bases, weak territorial defense capability, and vulnerability to naval blockade. Such makes US deployments of GBIRMs unlikely in the Philippines.

The RAND study notes that South Korea is not an ideal base for US ground-based long-range missiles due to its vulnerability to Chinese economic pressure, disagreements with the US over operational control of South Korea’s military, and South Korea’s doubts over US security guarantees.

While the study notes Australia and the US’ strong alliance, the former’s distance from Taiwan and the South China Sea, coupled with its reluctance to host permanent US bases, rules it out as an ideal GBIRM basing location.

The study notes that Japan may be an ideal partner for US GBIRM deployments, citing its strong alliance with the US and willingness to bolster its defense capabilities. Although it says that Japan may be reluctant to host US GBIRMs, as they could be nuclear-armed, Japan may be willing to host conventionally-armed missiles. It also says that the US approach to Japan that would most likely succeed would be to help the latter have its arsenal of ground-based anti-ship missiles.

Related

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 31, 2023

12.  Hunter Biden, FARA and Unequal Justice

Not sent for partisanship. I think this is an interesting perspective on FARA.

Hunter Biden, FARA and Unequal Justice

A bad law used against Trump associates now haunts President Biden’s son.

By The Editorial Board

Follow

July 30, 2023 4:35 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/hunter-biden-foreign-agents-registration-act-robert-mueller-donald-trump-26596b5a?utm_source=pocket_saves

Unequal justice has emerged as a theme in the Hunter Biden plea deal, and one example came last week when Judge Maryellen Noreika asked the prosecution and defense in court if their agreement meant the President’s son could still be prosecuted for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Hunter’s lawyers said no, but the prosecutor said yes, and Hunter can thank Robert Mueller if he is prosecuted under that statute.

FARA is a long-ignored law dating to 1938 that special counsel Mueller brought out of mothballs in an attempt to pry information out of Donald Trump’s associates. It requires Americans acting as an “agent of a foreign principal” under most circumstances to register with the U.S. government. As we noted at the time, in the nearly half-century up to 2016 the Justice Department brought only seven criminal FARA cases and won three convictions. The rarity of prosecutions created much confusion about how and when the law applies.

That didn’t stop Mr. Mueller. As special counsel investigating nonexistent Russia collusion, he used FARA to prosecute Trump associates who were mostly accused of lying about their work on behalf of foreign governments.

This is how he nailed Paul Manafort, who took money from the Ukrainians. Michael Flynn admitted to making false statements in documents filed pursuant to FARA regarding his work on behalf of the Turkish government. FARA also ensnared Greg Craig—a high-powered Democratic lawyer and former White House counsel to President Obama—who was prosecuted as an offshoot of the Mueller investigation into Mr. Manafort’s deals with Ukraine.

As long as FARA was targeting people in the Trump orbit, Democrats cheered these prosecutions. They weren’t even fazed when a federal jury acquitted Mr. Craig on FARA-related charges that we and others believe should never have been brought.

They may regret that legal standard now that federal prosecutors have confirmed to Judge Noreika that FARA charges could still be lodged against the President’s son. Based on Mr. Mueller’s prosecutions, Hunter is vulnerable.

We know Hunter set up a shell company to do business with CEFC China Energy, and that he didn’t register as a foreign agent. Shell companies are a common strategy for disguising ownership, and accepting money from a foreign entity would normally require FARA registration. Similar questions remain about Hunter’s dealings in Ukraine.

A FARA prosecution has political implications for President Biden. To have his son acting as a foreign agent while they were travelling to the relevant foreign countries together on Air Force Two would make the President’s claims of ignorance about Hunter’s business even harder to believe. This is guaranteed to be an issue in his 2024 bid for re-election—not least because staffers in the Obama Administration sent up red flags about Hunter’s lucrative work on the board of Burisma, the Ukrainian energy company.

FARA has never been clearly defined and is used selectively. That is the definition of a bad law that is too easy for prosecutors to exploit against their political enemies.

Democrats have reason to say that if everyone in Washington who violates FARA were prosecuted for it, half the lobbyists would be out of business. But this would be a more persuasive argument if they had made it when Robert Mueller was busy using it against their political enemies.

Appeared in the July 31, 2023, print edition as 'Hunter, FARA and Unequal Justice'.

​13. Joining China's Belt and Road Was an 'Atrocious' Decision -Italy Minister

Joining China's Belt and Road Was an 'Atrocious' Decision -Italy Minister

U.S. News & World Report2 min

July 30, 2023

View Original

Italian Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto arrives to take part in the European Air Defence Conference gathering 18 Defence ministers, at Les Invalides in Paris on June 19, 2023. GEOFFROY VAN DER HASSELT/Pool via REUTERS/File PhotoReuters

ROME (Reuters) - Italy made an "improvised and atrocious" decision when it joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) four years ago as it did little to boost exports, Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said in an interview published on Sunday.

Italy signed up to the BRI under a previous government, becoming the only major Western country to have taken such a step. Crosetto is part of an administration that is considering how to break free of the agreement.

The BRI scheme envisions rebuilding the old Silk Road to connect China with Asia, Europe and beyond with large infrastructure spending. Critics see it as a tool for China to spread its geopolitical and economic influence.

"The decision to join the (new) Silk Road was an improvised and atrocious act" that multiplied China's exports to Italy but did not have the same effect on Italian exports to China, Crosetto told the Corriere della Sera newspaper.

"The issue today is: how to walk back (from the BRI) without damaging relations (with Beijing). Because it is true that China is a competitor, but it is also a partner," the defence minister added.

After a White House meeting U.S. President Joe Biden on Thursday, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said her government had until December to make a decision on the BRI, and also announced she would soon travel to Beijing.

In an interview on Saturday with the TG5 Italian news programme, Meloni said it was a "paradox" that even if Italy is part of the BRI, it is not the G7 country with the strongest trading links to China.

"This shows that you can have good relations and trading partnerships" even outside of the BRI, she added.

(Reporting by Alvise Armellini, editing by David Evans)

Copyright 2023 Thomson Reuters.

Tags: United States, Italy, European Union, international trade, Europe

14. Dean Cheng on “China and Space: The Next Frontier of Lawfare”

Excerpts:

What the PRC is pursuing in the space law realm at this time is not “legal warfare” per se. That is, it is not trying to exploit treaties, national laws, regulations, or using law enforcement agencies and legal education to somehow prevent other nations from conducting space operations. Indeed, its efforts to understand and shape legal and industrial regimes are not necessarily different from that of other space powers.

But precisely because the PRC does have a specific doctrine for legal warfare (and political warfare in general), its actions need to be assessed in that light. Moreover, just as the PRC conceives of legal warfare as another form of warfare, albeit using legal methods, the kinds of activities that the PRC is pursuing is akin to preparation of the battlefield.

Much as fortifications, minefields, and other obstacles can be used to channel enemy forces and influence adversary actions and assessments, the PRC’s efforts to establish itself as a dominant player in terms of STM rules and industrial standards are likely intended to shape future legal developments in directions that will favor the PRC—and disadvantage its rivals.

Dean Cheng on “China and Space: The Next Frontier of Lawfare”

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · July 30, 2023

Today we are very pleased to have China expert Dean Cheng share with us his latest thinking on the relationship of three fascinating (and timely!) topics: China, space, and lawfare.

As Dean explains, the Chinese are sophisticated lawfare or “legal warfare” practitioners. Reading how China is utilizing legal techniques at the same time it is making rapid advances in space technology is an eye opener. I learned a lot, and I bet you will too. Here’s Dean:

China and Space: The Next Frontier of Lawfare

by Dean Cheng

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the most thoughtful practitioners of legal warfare or “lawfare.” For PRC planners, especially those in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), legal warfare is an integral part of the larger effort of “political warfare.” Indeed, legal warfare is embedded in the Chinese conception of political warfare.

From the Chinese perspective, political warfare, including legal warfare, is seen as a form of combat. Military combat preparations include the development and innovation of military political work, alongside more kinetic forms of operations.

Indeed, political warfare is seen as a vital complement for more traditional forms of military operations. While they may not be decisive in their own right, political warfare tactics nonetheless may allow their practitioner to seize the initiative and otherwise multiply the effects of military power.

Political warfare, in Chinese writings, is comprised of a number of different types of activities. These include what are termed “the three warfares” of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.

Public opinion warfare is aimed at broadly shaping and influencing domestic and international views of the PRC and other states, while psychological warfare (at the strategic level) tries to influence various economic, political, and other societal leaders to not oppose Chinese actions and even to support them. These complement legal warfare.

The instruments of legal warfare include not only international treaties, but national laws as well as the full range of legal instruments: legislation, judicial law, legal pronouncements, law enforcement, and legal education.

Like more conventional forms of warfare, legal warfare is conducted under a unified command organization. It will include the use of the law in implementing offensive actions, defensive actions, counterattacking actions, and other forms of combat. Legal warfare includes such operations as legal deterrence (falu weishe; 法律威慑) and the imposition of sanctions (zhicai；制裁).

In order to influence domestic and foreign populations and leaders, legal warfare is most commonly employed before the outbreak of physical hostilities. Furthermore, such a preemptive legal strike can weaken opposing coalitions while building support for one’s own side.

Legal warfare is not solely applied in time of war, however. Just as political warfare is ongoing whether there is a formal outbreak of hostilities or not, legal warfare can be used even in peacetime, whether to harass political adversaries or to influence third countries and parties.

Chinese Views of Space

Even as the PRC is developing its political warfare capabilities, it is also developing its space capabilities. Space plays a vital role in the broad Chinese efforts at modernization and international competition.

From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, space touches on just about every aspect of “comprehensive national power,” the range of elements that contribute to a nation’s status.

Not only do space capabilities contribute to a nation’s military capacity, but it can also generate significant economic benefits, by promoting development of various advanced technologies including telecommunications, advanced materials, precision manufacturing, and systems integration.

These advances can also help elevate a nation’s technological levels. As important, space capabilities can contribute to a nation’s international standing, thereby enhancing both domestic and international prestige of the CCP, as well as international influence.

In this regard, the CCP can draw a parallel with telecommunications, and especially the success of Huawei. Early and persistent Chinese investment in Huawei has allowed the company to dominate 5G markets around the world.

Huawei has a firm grip on much of the 5G infrastructure built across Africa and South America, and until the Trump administration pressured US allies, it was also establishing a significant if not dominant position in many American allies in Europe and in the United States itself.

The company did so in part because it could provide inexpensive but reliable equipment, and in part because it has consistently remained at the forefront of technological development.

The benefit of being recognized as a global technological leader is also linked to the concept of “cultural security,” a consideration that has been explicitly noted by various Chinese leaders, including Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

It is no accident that China has featured prominently in various space-related movies of the last two decades. Both Sandra Bullock and Matt Damon relied upon Chinese space systems to get home, in “Gravity” and “The Martian” respectively. PRC opinion makers understand the importance of presenting the PRC as a space power, both in reality and in media.

Here, Chinese leaders may see a cautionary tale in Chinese history. Admiral Zheng He led seven expeditions, the famed “treasure fleets,” to the Indian Ocean and east Africa between 1405 and 1433, during China’s Ming Dynasty. His ships were some of the most advanced in the world, featuring waterproof bulkheads.

Internal politics, however, led Chinese leaders to halt the expeditions, and subsequently demolish the shipyards, scuttle the treasure ships, and destroy the blueprints for the various vessels.

 The PRC turned away from the sea—just as the European powers were beginning their own age of exploration and imperial expansion.Chinese leaders are unlikely to repeat this mistake as they set out to explore and exploit outer space.

Legal Structures Governing Space Activities

In terms of legal warfare, space presents a significant opportunity for the PRC. At present, there is a limited body of international law governing space activities. The most important, the Outer Space Treaty (OST), came into force in 1967, over half a decade ago. The OST lays out some of the most important principles governing space activities, including

• The right of all nations to engage in space exploration and space activity.
• The prohibition of deployment of weapons of mass destruction
• The rejection of claims of sovereignty against any celestial bodies, including planets, asteroids, and moons.
• All astronauts, regardless of nation of origin, are considered an “envoy of mankind,” and all members of the OST are obligated to provide help to astronauts in distress, including in event of emergency landings on land or at sea.
• Nation-states are responsible for their space activities, including those by commercial space entities, and nation-states are the final word in providing authorization and maintaining supervision over spacecraft.
• Nation-states are responsible for the damage caused by space objects. Given that nation-states are responsible for the actions of commercial space actors, this would presumably extend to damage caused by private commercial space activities.

These last three elements were further codified by additional agreements which expanded upon the associated obligations, passed by the UN General Assembly. These are

• The Rescue Agreement (1968) governing the rescue and return of astronauts and space probes;
• The Liability Convention (1972) governing liability for damages and adjudicating claims; and

In addition, the so-called Moon Treaty was passed in 1984, which called for only peaceful use of celestial bodies and which sought to govern how lunar resources were to be obtained and used. The United States has not signed the Moon Treaty.

Because space was largely dominated by the two superpowers during the Cold War, and space remains an expensive and difficult domain to exploit, this limited range of treaties was sufficient to manage most international space activities for much of the early Space Age.

Rarely was the Liability Convention invoked, and never was the Rescue Agreement. States have registered many of their craft with the UN Organization for Outer Space Activities (UNOOSA), but few details are typically included for what the spacecraft actually do.

This paucity of international agreements is paralleled by the limited number of national laws governing space activities. While the United States, Japan, and Europe have each developed a body of space-related laws, many other nations, especially in the less developed world, have only begun to establish legal codes governing space laws in the last two decades.

Indeed, even in the more developed space powers, important elements such as communications satellites are not managed as space enterprises, but as a part of electromagnetic frequency management.

Thus, international governance of satellite communications partly resides with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as well as national entities such as the Federal Communications Commission in the United States.

While commercial space ventures now encompass commercial space launch and earth imaging (a realm formerly dominated by national intelligence services), what legal structures will manage companies such as SpaceX, Planetlabs, LEOLabs, and Maxar is unclear.

In particular, the ability of companies to provide significant strategic support in time of crisis or conflict has moved from theory to actual practice, as seen in various Western space companies’ support for Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia.

A similar vacuum exists with regards to legal infrastructure governing lunar and cis-lunar activities. This becomes especially salient as the United States and PRC enter into a new Moon race. After the last of the Apollo lunar landings in the 1970s, there was no follow-up on lunar development or even exploration.

Consequ

This situation is likely to change, however, as the United States and the PRC each lead rival groups to establish longer term presences on the Moon, especially at key areas such as the lunar poles (where there is believed to be significant amounts of frozen water).

For the PRC, this is a rare moment where it can play a role in establishing the very foundations of the legal infrastructure that will govern what they see as a key strategic venue.

Indeed, there are relatively few industrial standards, behavior norms, or standard operating procedures governing space operations at the international level. For the PRC, this presents a potential opportunity to create the legal regime that will govern space activities in the decades ahead.

To this end, the PRC can exploit its position as one of the leading space powers. The PRC is one of the few countries that can launch its own astronauts into space, a feat only Russia and the United States can rival.

The PRC fields one of the four global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Its Beidou system places the PRC on an equal footing with the United States (GPS), Russia (GLONASS), and Europe (Galileo), and ahead of any other Asian nation.

China is the second nation to land on Mars (the first to do so successfully on its first try), and one of only three countries to retrieve samples from the Moon.

It has been first or second in terms of space launches in a calendar year for the last several years, closely rivaling the United States and far outpacing Russia, Europe, Japan, and other space powers. By these metrics, the PRC clearly deserves a seat at the table for any effort to establish the rules governing future space operations.

This is even more likely to be true in the context of cis-lunar and lunar surface activities. The PRC is currently planning a series of robotic landings on the Moon over the rest of the decade.

• Chang’e-6 (2024). The backup for the Chang’e-5 mission, the Chang’e-6 will be another lunar sample retrieval mission. It will likely land at the lunar south pole, although it is unclear whether it will be on the lunar near side or far side. (The Chang’e-5 was on the lunar far side.)
• Chang’e-7 (2026). This mission is intended to survey more areas of the lunar south pole, looking for accumulations of water ice. It is believed it will pay special attention to some of the craters where it is believed that ice is most likely (due to parts of those craters being in permanent shadow).

In addition, Beijing has announced that it plans on landing a human mission on the Moon by 2030. Notably, this effort is explicitly international, unlike most other aspects of China’s space program.

That the ILRS is an international endeavor, and involves establishing a long-term research station, signals that Beijing, unlike the United States, intends to stay on the Moon, rather than simply plant its flag and not return. That, in turn, means there will be a need for a routinized amount of traffic, if only to keep any lunar station supplied, which in turn will require space traffic management for the volume of space between the Earth and the Moon.

Within this volume of space, and given the expectations of growing traffic within it, the challenge will be determining the behavior norms, industrial standards, and standard operating procedures. What language, spoken and data, will be used? Who will set the safe behavior parameters? Who will certify spacecraft and spaceline operations?

The PRC has already expressed interest in the governance and management of cis-lunar activities, precisely because it expects to have a role in STM, and recognizes that STM in turn will influence lunar development.

Similarly, determining the norms and standards for cis-lunar activity will influence long-term industrial production and economic activity, much as Huawei’s domination of the global 5G market has affected both national infrastructure development in a range of countries as well as generated enormous income for the PRC.

This is also a fundamental form of soft power. Global air traffic employs English as the common, mandatory language for international air travel. For the PRC, the potential ability to make Chinese the common language for space travel would make clear its dominant role in the new Space Age.

Implications for Legal Warfare

What the PRC is pursuing in the space law realm at this time is not “legal warfare” per se. That is, it is not trying to exploit treaties, national laws, regulations, or using law enforcement agencies and legal education to somehow prevent other nations from conducting space operations. Indeed, its efforts to understand and shape legal and industrial regimes are not necessarily different from that of other space powers.

But precisely because the PRC does have a specific doctrine for legal warfare (and political warfare in general), its actions need to be assessed in that light. Moreover, just as the PRC conceives of legal warfare as another form of warfare, albeit using legal methods, the kinds of activities that the PRC is pursuing is akin to preparation of the battlefield.

Much as fortifications, minefields, and other obstacles can be used to channel enemy forces and influence adversary actions and assessments, the PRC’s efforts to establish itself as a dominant player in terms of STM rules and industrial standards are likely intended to shape future legal developments in directions that will favor the PRC—and disadvantage its rivals.

The new space race is not yet a military race, but as Chinese writings note, “Even before the trumpets sound and the horses move, political warfare is already underway.” And for the PRC, that includes legal warfare measures.

Notes

About the author

Dean Cheng is a (non-resident) Senior Fellow with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and a Senior Advisor to the United States Institute of Peace. He recently retired from the Heritage Foundation after 13 years as a Senior Research Fellow.

The views expressed by guest authors do not necessarily reflect my views or those of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, or Duke University. See also here.

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

1. [1] Han Yanrong, “Legal Warfare: Military Legal Work’s High Ground: An Interview with Chinese Politics and Law University Military Legal Research Center Special Researcher Xun Dandong,” Legal Daily (PRC), February 12, 2006.
2. [2] Major General Liu Jiaxin, “General’s Views: Legal Warfare—Modern Warfare’s Second Battlefield,” Guangming Ribao, November 3, 2004. At the time, MG Liu was commandant of the Xian Political Academy of the PLA General Political Department.
3. [5] Space Foundation Editorial Team, “International Space Law,” Space Briefing Book, https://www.spacefoundation.org/space_brief/international-space-law/
4. [6] Mao Weihao and Liu Wangding, “U.S. ‘Starlink’ Plan Threatens Peace in Space,” PLA Daily (June 11, 2020) http://m.xinhuanet.com/mil/2020-06/11/c_1210656282.htm
5. * “Cis-lunar space” is defined under US law as “the region of space from the Earth out to and including the region around the surface of the Moon.” 42 USC § 18302(3) https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:42%20section:18302%20edition:prelim). Others define it to include “the spherical volume that extends outward from Earth’s geosynchronous region to encapsulate the moon’s orbit and its Lagrange points, or “L points”—defined as the locations where the combined gravitational acceleration due to the Earth and moon allow a small object, such as a spacecraft, to orbit the Earth at the same rate as the moon.” Michael Byers and Aaron Boley, “Cis-Lunar Space and the Security Dilemma,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 17, 2022) https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-01/cis-lunar-space-and-the-security-dilemma/
6. [7] Dr. David Williams, “Future Chinese Lunar Missions,” https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/cnsa_moon_future.html
7. [8] https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/2023/TPs/ILRS_presentation20230529_.pdf
8. [9] Wang Wenbin, Yang Gao, et. al., “Method for Achieving Space-Based Autonomous Navigation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Satellites,” Patent Number: US 11,442,178 B2 (September 13, 2022)
9. weifa; 违法), and making arguments for one’s own side in cases where there are also violations of the law.”[1]
10. [2]
11. [5]
12. [6] Such support by private companies could be seen as the responsibility of the launching nation; it certainly raises questions about the neutrality of the companies and their host nations.
13. *
14. [7]
15. [8]
16. [9] That the scientists in question filed their patent with the United States Patent Office ensures that it has international recognition. Does this mean that the PRC will be able to charge any other nation who tries to deploy a satellite navigation system for cis-lunar operations?

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · July 30, 2023

15. Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-year Horizons in Defense Planning

​Read the entire article at this link: https://cimsec.org/future-visions-and-planned-obsolescence-implementing-30-year-horizons-in-defense-planning/

Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-year Horizons in Defense Planning

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

By Travis Reese and Dylan Phillips-Levine

This is the third and final part of Travis Reese’s CIMSEC Readiness Series. Read Part 1 on properly defining joint readiness, Read Part 2 on how Defense Department planning horizons can better avoid strategic surprise.

The False Dilemma

“Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false reasonings, and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous.” —Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 35, 1788.

“Innovation is [sic] an exercise in risk management, a balancing act between the promises of a new capability and the perils of losing older ones.”—Kendrick Kuo of the Naval War College.

Current readiness and future requirements can be synchronized in DoD, reconciling the tension between contemporary force employment and future force design with the proper framework. The debate on how to balance the paradigms and viewpoints of what are often termed “traditionalists” and “futurists” is something which many national security practitioners appreciate, but little has been done to rectify. Both paradigms of traditionalists and futurists are equally unhelpful to delivering a clear-eyed assessment of the security environment when looked through that singular lens. The misunderstanding between these diametrically opposed paradigms has been historically regarded as an “either-or” statement: the choice is adaptation of existing and legacy means or developing future-minded innovation which may be at the root of this phenomenon. Both camps staunchly dig their heels into the sand and are either reticent to change existing solutions to answered problems or overly enthusiastic about advocating for solutions to potential problems based on the allure of technological promise.

The whole concept of traditionalists and futurists is a little comical given the fact that what is tradition now was once future and what is future assumes that older solutions are merely inadequate because they are old. People in one camp or the other are either reticent to change by disposition or overly enthusiastic about the future sometimes suppressing discussion of risk by overvaluing opportunity.

Despite the entrenched viewpoints between both camps, two complementary models will be detailed in this article that define how to apply the principles of the Horizons of Innovation. These models bridge the gap from traditionalists to futurists and provide a framework to develop the transition from “as is” into the “to be.” These models are designed to help overcome the temptation to remain fixated on the static logic of a traditionalist or futurist point of view. They provide clear criteria to frame objective discussion within the two camps as they assess the implications of the future horizons model on preserving legacy capability or shifting to future means. Horizons of Innovation models create an objective framework to reconcile the current environment with the future before making the risky decision between sustaining the “old” or adopting the “new.”

The First Horizons Application Model shows the level of detail that should populate appropriate timeframes depicted in the Horizons of Innovation. The Second Horizons Application Model accounts for the dynamic response by adversaries to potential innovations and how DoD can gain the most utility from a range of potential capability investments before adversaries respond with effective countermeasures. The Second Model is a framework that minimizes the institutional shock to capability replacement and succession.

Horizons of Innovation Recap

The Three Horizons model introduced by business strategists around the turn of this millennia serves as the inspiration to develop the Horizons of Innovation Model. The operating definitions in this article for innovation and adaptation are derived from remarks by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford: Innovation is doing new things in new ways with new means and concepts. Adaptation is using current means and applying them to new or emerging challenges.

Figure 1: The Horizons of Innovation Model.

Horizons of Innovation Model is represented in Figure 1. The Horizon Innovation model provides a framework for three horizons. The Y-axis, labeled “solutions” spans the spectrum from unsuitable to perfect. The X-axis, labeled “time” spans from the present into the future. Solutions are constrained by the positively sloped “innovation” line and negatively sloped “adaptation.” All solutions constrained in the angle formed between adaptation and innovation are acceptable where the bisecting dashed line represents the best performance. Solutions that exist below the adaptation line are unacceptable while solutions that exist above the innovation line are unattainable. DoD force planners should look at the limiting lines of innovation and adaptation across the three different horizons of 10, 20, and 30 years to develop the framework to address future challenges.

The historical length of time required to develop technological innovations or adopt new concepts informed the 30 years timeline. This timeline of 30-years from conception to adoption of innovative solutions is a consistent trend (opposed amphibious assault for example) for modern military capability development and precedes many modern bureaucracies. The misguided belief that modern information and manufacturing compresses technology advancement and is only stifled by institutional processes or bureaucratic hinderances to develop or adopt new capabilities is not reflected reality. Recent analysis by the GAO identified the necessity to improve and secure the defense industrial base and confirmed that synchronizing capability development with the needed modifications to industrial capacity to meet future demands is a matter of extreme forethought. Famed futurist Bran Ferren said it best: “We don’t do strategic or long-term thinking anymore. If anything, we may do long-term tactical thinking and call it strategic, but it’s really just a spreadsheet exercise…That’s not a survivable model.”

The issue is not process improvement or increasing efficiencies. The issue is the need to adopt strategic horizons that correspond to the realities of technology development and concept adoption. Defense “professionals” constantly surprise themselves every time a new institutional horizon is established for consideration under a national defense strategy only to discover that industrial base and resources are not prepared for the new problem set. This phenomenon tends to exacerbate the tension between traditionalists – who reflexively hedge by advocating for “tried and true” capabilities – and the frustrated futurists who don’t understand why their certain vision of the future isn’t accepted and quickly translated into physical reality.

First Model: Framework for detailed future projections and reconciling emergent challenges

​Continued at the link:  https://cimsec.org/future-visions-and-planned-obsolescence-implementing-30-year-horizons-in-defense-planning/

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com