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Quotes of the Day:
“Let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America law is King. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King and there ought to be no other.”
– Thomas Paine
“The deepest sin against the human mind is to believe things without evidence.”
– Aldous Huxley
"Whatever can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence."
– Christopher Hitchens
1. How to Prevent a Fiasco in the Far East
2. NATO’s North Korea Blindspot Is a Security Nightmare
3. S. Korea to begin cash handouts to all citizens July 21
4. Top security adviser to visit U.S. this week for alliance talks: presidential office
5. The Yellow Sea Is the New Flashpoint for China’s Regional Power Play
6. ‘Birds of a Feather’ Shaped East Asia’s Development ‘Miracles’
7. South Korea’s Sovereign AI Gambit: A High-Stakes Experiment in Autonomy
8. N. Korea blames factory defects on loyalty issues
9. N. Korea targets farm corruption as legal violations surge
10. Presumed defector took methodical route through DMZ, military says
11. Why do we need the Ministry of Unification?
12. S. Korean, US, Japanese military chiefs to meet in Seoul
13. South Korean president likens inter-Korean ties to troubled marriage
14. Lawmaker advocates S. Korea for US ship repairs, citing strategic gains
15. South Koreans’ Perceptions of Blocs between ROK-US-Japan and DPRK-China-Russia and Support for Nuclear Armament: 2025
16. Why Google Maps Can’t Guide You Through Seoul
1. How to Prevent a Fiasco in the Far East
On this day 75 years ago was the Battle of Osan.
I hope Bridge Colby thinks about Task Force Smith the way we do - e.g., no more Task Force Smiths - yes we had readiness issues with the occupation Army of Japan, but the cause of the failure was a result of policy and strategy which is the purview of the USD(P).
How to Prevent a Fiasco in the Far East
The legacy and lessons of Task Force Smith
https://freebeacon.com/columns/how-to-prevent-a-fiasco-in-the-far-east/
An F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter aircraft takes off from the flight deck of the USS Nimitz (Mario Tama/Getty Images)
Mike Watson
July 5, 2025
The Fourth of July is usually a time of celebration for Americans, and rightly so. But amid the fireworks and hoopla, a discordant note sounds in the background for some members of the armed forces. Today marks the 75th anniversary of one of the great debacles in this country’s military history, and it is only through constant vigilance that America can avoid another Task Force Smith.
On June 25, 1950, with the blessing and support of its Chinese and Soviet allies, North Korea sneak attacked South Korea. As the Communists drove southward relentlessly, the underequipped and poorly trained American garrison in Japan rushed across the sea to slow them down. Task Force Smith, the first American unit to encounter the North Koreans, watched in horror as most of its shells bounced harmlessly off the sides of enemy tanks. The unit was routed on July 5 at the Battle of Osan.
Failures of that magnitude stem from many causes. The American public had little appetite for big defense budgets, so the Truman administration had to prioritize. Much of the nation’s best equipment flowed across the Atlantic, not the Pacific.
There was not much to go around. Paul Nitze and the State Department’s policy planning team reviewed the strategic situation after the Communists conquered China and the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb. They found in April 1950 that "the military weaknesses of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, however, include its numerical inferiority in forces in being … and munitions power in being and readily available" before warning ominously, "there exists a sharp disparity between our actual military strength and our commitments." President Truman referred their review, NSC-68, to his budget experts and otherwise ignored it.
Clever diplomacy failed to paper over the problem. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson sketched out an American "defensive perimeter" in Asia that notably excluded South Korea. He pined for a Sino-Soviet split, stating "we must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop."
Public opinion favored the prioritizers until Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin backed Pyongyang’s war of aggression. Then, the American people demanded a firm response. American forces surged into Korea and defense spending shot up from 5 percent of the U.S. economy in 1950 to nearly 14 percent in 1953. The war cost 36,574 American lives, and U.S. troops are still defending South Korea today.
"No more Task Force Smiths" is one of the U.S. Army’s unofficial mantras, but it is not clear that Washington is adequately preparing its forces for future conflicts. To be sure, our military is a highly professional force, and the Israelis and Ukrainians are demonstrating just how effective much of the U.S. arsenal is. But the Pentagon may not be moving fast enough. For example, the Army intends to equip each division with about 1,000 drones over the next two years, but Ukraine acquired more than 1.5 million just in 2024.
One option, which today’s prioritizers favor, is to sharply reduce or even cut off support for partners and allies in theaters they think are not vital. Many of them also lamented American support for Israel’s air campaign over Iran. They lost that argument, but halting deliveries to Ukraine of air defense missiles, artillery shells, and other munitions even as Russia ramps up its air attacks on Ukrainian cities was an important victory for this camp. Evidently, they think the risks of tolerating Iran’s nuclear program or inviting further Russian aggression are acceptable.
Another is to try to engineer a new Sino-Soviet split. Acheson was not wrong in January 1950: Beijing and Moscow eventually fell out. But it took another decade and a half before the wrath, hatred, and anger—righteous or otherwise—of the Chinese people developed toward Moscow. There is no indication today that the Russians are close to breaking with the Middle Kingdom.
Communist China studies the Korean War obsessively, largely because its forces have not otherwise squared off with Americans. Hopefully, Beijing learned that while the American people can grow uninterested in global affairs for a time, they will respond in fury when attacked. Permitting aggression in one theater can also set back Beijing’s other goals: Taiwan looked vulnerable before the North Koreans attacked, but once the United States surged forces to the western Pacific, attacking the island became impossible.
But just as many Americans learn the wrong lessons from history, our adversaries can too. Better to keep the military ready, just in case.
Published under: China , Cold War , Foreign Policy , North Korea , Russia , South Korea
2. NATO’s North Korea Blindspot Is a Security Nightmare
While in London this past week in meeting members of the Foreign Office and MOD I learned that they do not neglect the north Korean threat. I was pleased to learn how seriously they take the threats not only on the peninsula but also of north Korea's threats around the world.
NATO’s North Korea Blindspot Is a Security Nightmare
Ignoring the threat posed by North Korea, as happened at this year’s summit, undermines Euro-Atlantic security.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/natos-north-korea-blindspot-is-a-security-nightmare/
By Hans Horan
July 03, 2025
A North Atlantic Council Plenary Session at the 2025 NATO Summit at the World Forum in The Hague, Netherlands, June 25, 2025.
Credit: Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok
On June 24-25, the 32 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gathered in The Hague, Netherlands, to discuss the most pressing geopolitical threats facing the alliance. During this latest summit, the world’s most prominent security organization agreed to a non-binding spending agreement that will ramp up defense spending, with each member state aiming for 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035. On top of this, NATO members will allocate 1.5 percent of GDP to upgrading “infrastructure – roads, bridges, ports, airfields – needed to deploy armies to the front.”
This non-binding agreement, coupled with Washington’s reaffirmation of its commitment to NATO’s collective defense clause, Article 5, led NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to express positivity about the summit during his closing remarks. Despite this, the summit’s focus on appeasing U.S. President Donald Trump came at the expense of collective action against NATO’s most pressing security concerns. On the list of issues that were not discussed in any significant detail at the NATO summit, the most notable entry is the growing threat posed by North Korea vis-à-vis the Ukraine conflict.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 initiated Europe’s biggest land conflict since World War II, and Pyongyang’s military and logistical support of Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine has brought the conflict to a global scale. However, North Korea was scarcely mentioned by attending world leaders or the event’s experts, despite its presence on the agenda at the previous summit. Those watching this year’s summit would, therefore, be excused for thinking that the threat posed by Pyongyang in Ukraine had retreated. However, the reality is far from this: North Korea is expected to send more troops to Russia in July or August to aid its efforts against Ukraine, according to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service.
The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia was first reported in late 2024, with an estimated 10,000-14,000 soldiers believed to have been sent to Russia’s Kursk region to help deter Ukrainian incursions. Over 6,000 North Korean soldiers have died or been injured since the deployment began. Beyond sending soldiers, Pyongyang’s supply of defense equipment to Moscow has had a significant impact on the conflict. For example, a 2025 investigation by Reuters found that Pyongyang was providing Russia with more than half of all artillery shells used in Ukraine.
Moreover, North Korea is believed to be supplying Russia with “significant quantities of ballistic missiles” according to a Multilateral Sanctions Team’s May 2025 report. This aid, coupled with North Korean troops’ pivotal role in pushing back Ukrainian operations in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, has allowed Moscow to counter any momentum that Ukrainian forces were building against Russia in 2023-2024.
In the lead up to the latest summit, some NATO countries likely perceived the Russia-Ukraine war of attrition as a “constant variable” that can be deprioritized. Instead, Trump’s allusions to a potential withdrawal from the alliance in the weeks leading up to the summit took the main focus. However, deprioritizing the conflict underestimates the multidimensional threats that North Korea poses to NATO vis-à-vis its presence in Russia and Ukraine.
Chief among these is the underdiscussed threat posed by North Korean IT workers. These operatives have infiltrated North American and European organizations critical to NATO’s security supply chain and support to Ukraine. An April 2025 report from Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (TAG) highlighted the pervasive nature of this threat. TAG disclosed that North Korean operatives were discovered digitally “gaining and maintaining employment” as IT professionals in Europe and the United States across a variety of industries, including aerospace and defense.
The few comments made at the NATO summit about North Korea’s cyber activity focused on the regime’s overt focus on gathering cryptocurrency to fund its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. This narrow perspective of North Korea’s cyber capabilities and activities leaves NATO vulnerable to more serious and pervasive threats in light of NATO members’ ongoing defense build-up efforts. The most prominent of these would be North Korea’s intelligence gathering activities, either via cyber means or its IT workers embedded in NATO countries’ defense-related organizations.
Indeed, NATO’s European member states’ plans to rearm must be garnering great interest from the North Korean and Russian intelligence agencies. These initiatives are likely raising questions among these agencies about how they will impact Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and/or NATO Europe’s security posture toward the two nation-states. As such, North Korean IT workers embedded within critical supply chains present a significant security risk to NATO’s rearmament efforts.
IT workers, depending on their seniority, typically have access to information across entire organizations, given their role in managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of information within an IT infrastructure. As such, these North Korean workers could use their unfettered access to the IT infrastructure of organizations critical to NATO’s supply chains – such as those in defense, technology, or critical raw materials. This access would be used to gather timely and actionable intelligence on matters such as the state of NATO’s defense rearmament efforts or its current operations against Russo-North Korean military activities in Ukraine.
Similarly, they could use this access to recruit malicious insiders – either through bribery or threats – to try and sabotage the operations of organizations along NATO’s defense supply chain – by deleting or leaking sensitive data, uploading malware onto devices, or impairing equipment meant for Kyiv. This would be in service of Pyongyang and its allies’ geopolitical objectives of weakening Western alliances.
Another notable threat is the high likelihood and high impact scenario of the access gained by malicious insiders or North Korean IT workers being used for intelligence gathering purposes that is then passed on to their Russian counterparts. Such a scenario would be especially problematic if it took place at companies that provide logistical support to Kyiv, such as European defense firms providing weaponry, or third-party suppliers of interoperability-related technology. Such information, especially delivery data like shipment times, could be used by Russian or North Korean forces to launch targeted artillery or missile strikes at critical weaponry shipments and/or destroy Ukrainian supply chains. This would likely deal a crucial blow to Kyiv’s defensive posture toward Russia and allow for a less inhibited Russian offensive in the Donbas region and beyond.
NATO’s failure to meaningfully address the threat posed by North Korea during this year’s summit reflects a dangerous blind spot that risks undermining the alliance’s rearmament and collective defense ambitions. As Pyongyang deepens its military and cyber partnership with Moscow, NATO must go beyond viewing North Korea as a regional nuisance and instead recognize it as a transcontinental enabler of conflict and key threat actor in not only the Indo-Pacific theater but the European one as well.
Pyongyang’s military support for Russia and the potential for deepening cyber infiltration efforts should not be viewed as far off possibilities but instead current coordinated challenges to NATO’s cohesion and operational effectiveness. To ensure its future relevance and effectiveness, NATO must integrate strategic intelligence collection on North Korean military, cyber, and industrial activities into its broader security framework. Otherwise, it risks building a defense architecture vulnerable to subversion from within.
Indeed, the alliance’s rearmament effort creates a new front line within supply chains and IT systems that adversaries like North Korea will be readily able to exploit for their, or their partners’, broader geopolitical ambitions. NATO must therefore view Pyongyang’s hybrid warfare activities not as an optional area of research but as a core requirement of any future defense strategies.
A key to ensuring this would be to deepen cross-regional cooperation with allies such as South Korea, which have more expertise with regard to North Korea. However, NATO should move quickly on this front as proactively fostering this cooperation will be particularly important in the coming months following the recent election of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung.
Lee’s absence from the NATO summit indicates he may be adopting a “pragmatic” foreign policy approach that could be placing priority on fostering deeper dialogue with traditional geopolitical rivals such as China, Russia, and North Korea by placing some distance between itself and Western allies in NATO.
Such a decision would likely be counterproductive to NATO’s efforts to rearm, given Seoul’s growing role as an arms exporter to Europe. Moreover, it will also undermine NATO’s narrative that the security threats that impact the Indo-Pacific also affect the Euro-Atlantic, likely lowering the alliance’s success in convincing its Indo-Pacific partners to jointly aid it in dealing with its evolving threat landscape.
Authors
Guest Author
Hans Horan
Hans Horan is a strategic analyst at the Dutch think tank the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), specializing in the Indo-Pacific, cyber threat intelligence, and security and defense affairs. Prior to joining HCSS, Hans worked for over seven years in the intelligence and security industry for both private and public sector organizations across the globe, where he served as their lead cyber intelligence and principal Asia-Pacific analyst.
3. S. Korea to begin cash handouts to all citizens July 21
????
(LEAD) S. Korea to begin cash handouts to all citizens July 21 | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · July 5, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details of handout plan in paras 7-9)
SEOUL, July 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will begin distributing cash handouts to all citizens July 21 as part of a government initiative aimed at stimulating domestic consumption, officials said Saturday.
The move follows the Cabinet's approval of a 31.8 trillion-won ($23.3 billion) supplementary budget, passed by the National Assembly on Friday. The handout program is a key part of the first supplementary budget of the Lee Jae Myung administration.
Under the plan, all South Korean citizens residing in the country as of June 18, the day before the plan was announced, will receive a one-time payment of 150,000 won.
Shoppers walk around Namdaemun Market in central Seoul, in this June 22, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)
Additional targeted assistance will be provided based on income levels.
Individuals in near-poverty households and single-parent families will receive 300,000 won, while recipients of the basic living allowance will get 400,000 won.
To promote balanced regional development, residents outside the greater Seoul area, including Gyeonggi Province and Incheon, will receive an extra 30,000 won. Those living in 84 designated rural and fishing communities facing population decline nationwide will be granted an additional 50,000 won.
Foreigners are excluded from the program, in principle, while permanent residents, marriage immigrants and individuals recognized as refugees are included among the eligible recipients.
The application and distribution of the handouts, called "consumption coupons," will be carried out over an eight-week period till Sept. 12.
Citizens can choose to receive the payment through one of several methods: credit or debit cards, prepaid cards or local government-issued gift certificates.
A second round of payments, scheduled between Sept. 22 and Oct. 31, will provide an additional 100,000 won to the bottom 90 percent of income earners.
Eligibility will be determined by a detailed income screening based on national health insurance premiums, with criteria to be announced in September.
"We will ensure thorough preparations for the rollout of these payments so that they can serve as a catalyst for economic recovery by boosting consumption and supporting those in need," said Vice Interior Minister Kim Min-jae, who heads the interagency task force overseeing the program.
sshim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · July 5, 2025
4. Top security adviser to visit U.S. this week for alliance talks: presidential office
Top security adviser to visit U.S. this week for alliance talks: presidential office | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 5, 2025
SEOUL, July 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac will travel to the United States early this week for "in-depth" talks with officials of the Donald Trump administration on various bilateral issues, the presidential office said Saturday.
Wi's three-day trip to Washington, starting Sunday, comes after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio scrapped plans for a visit to South Korea, initially set for later this week, citing various circumstances on his side.
The cancelled visit by the top U.S. diplomat sparked concerns over the lack of high-level exchanges between the allies since the political crisis triggered by former President Yoon Suk Yeol's failed imposition of martial law, which ultimately removed him from office.
Wi will have "in-depth discussions" with U.S. officials on a wide range of bilateral issues during his visit to Washington, his office said.
Wi's planned trip comes just days before Trump's 90-day pause on tariff hikes on South Korea will expire on July 8.
President Lee Mae-myung (L) presents a letter of appointment to National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac at the presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul, in this photo taken July 4, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 5, 2025
5. The Yellow Sea Is the New Flashpoint for China’s Regional Power Play
Or the West Sea to Korea.
China's Unrestricted Warfare and its Three Warfares (psychological warfare, legal warfare or "lawfare," and media or public opinion warfare).
South Korea must be vigilant in defense of its interests and territory.
Excerpts:
The Yellow Sea is emerging as the newest flashpoint in a broader campaign by Beijing as it asserts its intention to prevent its neighbors, as well as the U.S., from challenging its influence over the region.
The provocations also come as China claims all of the South China Sea, a vital waterway for global trade. Chinese jet fighters have increased sorties near Taiwan and last month they tailed Japanese air patrols during exercises. Beijing also launched live-fire drills off the coast of Australia earlier this year.
But friction in the Yellow Sea is especially alarming because of its strategic importance in any future U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. Beijing would likely need free access to the waterway to deploy its naval and missile firepower during any attempt to seize control of the island.
The largest overseas U.S. military base, home to 28,500 service personnel, sits 10 miles inland from the Yellow Sea in South Korea. Tens of thousands of U.S. troops are also stationed around 500 miles away in Japan.
The Yellow Sea Is the New Flashpoint for China’s Regional Power Play
Installation of buoys, a warship exercise and no-sail zones rattle South Korea and illustrate China’s growing force
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/the-yellow-sea-is-the-new-flashpoint-for-chinas-regional-power-play-5af7e8b5?st=9Xzx3e&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Dasl Yoon
Follow and Joyu Wang
Follow
July 3, 2025 11:00 pm ET
Members of the Korean Veterans Association protest near the Chinese Embassy in Seoul. Photo: Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/Zuma Press
Key Points
What's This?
- China is increasing provocations in the Yellow Sea, including incursions and the placement of structures.
- The Yellow Sea is a potential flashpoint due to its strategic importance in a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan.
- China’s actions are pressuring U.S. allies and limiting U.S. maneuverability in the region, experts say.
SEOUL—One day in February, a South Korean research vessel approached a set of unusual structures planted by China in the middle of the Yellow Sea, the narrow body of water that separates the two countries.
Two large Chinese Coast Guard ships and three Chinese boats quickly blocked the South Korean ship’s path. The passengers on the small Chinese boats wielded knives to force the Koreans back.
After two hours, the South Korean ship turned back, unable to learn more about the mysterious installation that sat about 230 miles from the country’s coast: a yellow aquaculture cage placed next to a refurbished multistory oil rig, complete with lifeboats and a helipad.
It was the latest of a series of Chinese provocations in the Yellow Sea, including incursions into South Korean territorial waters and airspace, and the placing of 13 buoys that some experts say could be used to gather intelligence.
Disputed maritime areas in the Yellow Sea
N.Korea
China’s claimed
economic boundary
Japan
Beijing
S.Korea
Yellow
Sea
Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ)
South Korea’s claimed
economic boundary
China
Shanghai
East China
Sea
Chinese buoys
discovered since 2018
Taiwan
100 miles
Phillippine Sea
100 km
Sources: South Korea's navy / Eom Tae-young office (buoy locations); Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project (economic zones)
Andrew Barnett/WSJ
The Yellow Sea is emerging as the newest flashpoint in a broader campaign by Beijing as it asserts its intention to prevent its neighbors, as well as the U.S., from challenging its influence over the region.
The provocations also come as China claims all of the South China Sea, a vital waterway for global trade. Chinese jet fighters have increased sorties near Taiwan and last month they tailed Japanese air patrols during exercises. Beijing also launched live-fire drills off the coast of Australia earlier this year.
But friction in the Yellow Sea is especially alarming because of its strategic importance in any future U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. Beijing would likely need free access to the waterway to deploy its naval and missile firepower during any attempt to seize control of the island.
The largest overseas U.S. military base, home to 28,500 service personnel, sits 10 miles inland from the Yellow Sea in South Korea. Tens of thousands of U.S. troops are also stationed around 500 miles away in Japan.
The Trump administration has signaled that U.S. troops from both countries could be deployed in a clash with China over Taiwan. A stepped-up Chinese presence in the Yellow Sea could limit the ability of the U.S. to maneuver in such a conflict.
A large portion of Beijing’s naval capabilities, as well as key missile launch sites, sit on China’s side of the Yellow Sea, making them vulnerable to attack from U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Chinese aircraft carrier Fujian. Photo: Pu Haiyang/Xinhua/AP
Over the last couple of years, China has steadily escalated pressure on Asian countries with close ties to the U.S. Incursions into South Korean waters by Chinese warships have tripled since 2017, South Korea’s military says, while aircraft intrusions have surged.
In March, Beijing issued a directive calling for more assertive behavior in South Korea’s territorial waters, according to a senior Taiwan security official, citing local intelligence. Beijing is also seeking to build more maritime structures there, the official said.
“China is putting pressure on yet another U.S. ally, hoping to weigh down the allied ability to push back,” said Brian Hart, deputy director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.
A buoy in the Yellow Sea that China says is for meteorological observation. Photo: South Korean Navy
The Yellow Sea is so narrow that China and South Korea’s exclusive economic zones overlap. More than 20 years ago, Beijing and Seoul created the so-called Provisional Measures Zone, which created rules for policing illegal fishing and conducting marine-conservation activities.
Fast forward two decades and the PMZ is the site for near-daily provocations by China, according to the South Korean military. It says Chinese warships intruded in South Korea’s territorial waters some 330 times in 2024, tripling from 2017, according to the military. Recent South Korean data shows 130 Chinese aircraft entered its airspace in 2023, more than double the number from the previous year. Many of the Chinese flights were over the Yellow Sea, prompting South Korea to scramble its jets in response.
In May, Beijing jolted Seoul by declaring a no-sail zone in the PMZ. It then carried out unprecedented drills in the Yellow Sea with the Fujian, the country’s most advanced aircraft carrier. In response, South Korea deployed its navy to observe and gather intelligence on the exercises.
The cluster of Chinese structures dotting the sea has rattled officials in Seoul. The fishing cage and the oil rig at the center of February’s incident are located on the western side of the shared PMZ, close to Chinese land. Beijing has repeatedly said they are for maritime research.
The Chinese multistory oil rig in the Yellow Sea, complete with lifeboats and a helipad. Photo: CSIS/Beyond Parallel/Maxar 2025
Analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found the rig could have military as well as scientific uses. “Concerns that the platforms may be dual-use for purposes of advancing China’s creeping jurisdictional presence aren’t unfounded,” it said.
As for the buoys, which China asserts are for meteorological observation, South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-weon has suggested that they are clustered close together in order for China to control the area rather than collect scientific data.
China has a history of building maritime structures that are used to assert its territorial claims. It has turned reefs in the South China Sea into artificial islands, equipping them with radar systems and air strips.
“China always has a dual purpose for everything,” said Derek Grossman, a former Pentagon official who worked on Indo-Pacific security issues.
Chinese and South Korean officials met Tuesday for bilateral talks. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry, in a brief reference, said the two sides had discussed the situation in the Yellow Sea. China made no mention of the sea and said it exchanged views with South Korea on issues of common concern.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com and Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com
6. ‘Birds of a Feather’ Shaped East Asia’s Development ‘Miracles’
Excerpts:
It is striking that this pattern of studying law (or in practice, public management) at the elite domestic university was not replicated across the developmental states that followed, especially because research suggests that they purposefully adopted other aspects of the Japanese model.
Understanding the human side of policy is crucial for countries looking to replicate East Asia’s success. It is not just about having the right institutions or policies on paper. It is also about ensuring the cohesion of the people in charge: their training, experiences, and networks.
Countries hoping to develop strong innovation strategies, for example, might focus not just on building pilot agencies or adopting “the right” policies, but on facilitating shared training for cohorts of future leaders with shared missions. That could mean investing in education at home, creating exchange programs, or fostering ties between government, academia, and business in intentional ways. In practical terms, this could look like the Singaporean government’s “public service commission” scholarship program, which helps the country recruit and retain outstanding talent with similar experiences studying overseas.
In short, East Asia’s success was not just about what policies were chosen, the architecture of the developmental state, geopolitics. The effectiveness of the region’s developmental states also rested on a high degree of similarity (“homophily”) in the elite officials who led the national innovation effort, giving them shared objectives across many generations such that they internalized national development objectives as their own personal objectives. The reason so few countries have escaped the middle income trap may partly be that this lesson has, until now, not been one of the standard “East Asian miracle” lessons.
‘Birds of a Feather’ Shaped East Asia’s Development ‘Miracles’
How shared backgrounds among policy elites powered the economic rise of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/birds-of-a-feather-shaped-east-asias-development-miracles/
By Robyn Klingler-Vidra, Adam Chalmers, and Robert Wade
July 05, 2025
Credit: Depositphotos
Strangely enough, the literature on “state capacity” – including that on industrial policy and on the entrepreneurial state – says very little about the people who staff the higher ranks of the state. Attention may be given to the top-most leaders, but not to the officials responsible for formulating and implementing the key economic development policies. This includes the decades of studies on the “East Asian miracle” economies and the lauded developmental state bureaucracy epitomized by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, South Korea’s Economic Planning Board, and Taiwan’s National Development Council.
Behind every successful policy, reform or effective agency is a group of people making judgment calls, managing trade-offs, and shaping the direction of development. Yet most accounts treat these policymakers as faceless parts of bureaucracies.
If governments elsewhere are to learn the lessons from the East Asian miracle so that more countries can escape the “middle-income trap” (only about a dozen economies have managed to do so), a closer look at the individuals behind East Asia’s economic miracle is warranted. Whom have these governments recruited (and maintained) to lead high-impact innovation strategies?
We tackle this lacuna in our study, “Who’s governing the market?” We compiled a data set of the 1,110 individuals who led innovation policy in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China from 1945 to 2021. We then analyzed who these people were in terms of where and what they studied and where they worked before taking the leading positions.
Our primary finding is that there are strong national patterns, meaning high degrees of similarity, in terms of where and what policy leaders studied and where they worked before taking on leadership roles. For example, in Japan the large majority studied in the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo, and then worked in government. In Taiwan and China, they tended to study natural sciences and engineering, in Taiwan coming mostly from National Taiwan University and in China from a wider mix of universities. In South Korea they came from a more mixed distribution between law, business studies, engineering, and most studied at the three elite universities. This suggest that in East Asia, similarity of background as both student and professional may have mattered more than subscribing to a particular discipline or ideology.
The Power of “Birds of a Feather Flock Together”
This raises questions about the implications of two established ideas. First, that groups that are diverse in terms of cognitive and demographic traits outperform more homogeneous groups. We find that in East Asia it may have been the fact that “birds of a feather were flocking together” (technically called “homophily”) that enabled their effective pursuit of innovation strategies in line with national development objectives.
Second, research on the “Chicago Boys” in Latin America argues that exposure to particular schools of economic thought (like neoliberalism) shaped reform agendas. According to this argument, the time spent together in Chicago fostered tight social networks and a coherent world view that then translated into “Pinochet’s economists” pursuing neoliberal reforms. In East Asia we find that each country had distinct patterns in terms of the subjects studied and the institutions attended. This leads us to suggest that it may be less the content of what they studied and more the tightness of the shared worldview and social networks that enabled the strong performance. The latter factors have helped to generate a critical condition of an effective developmental state: namely that officials internalize national objectives as their own personal objectives.
The quintessential economic miracle, Japan, has the greatest degree of consistency among its policymaking elite, with its innovation policy leaders being six times more likely to have the same educational and professional background than their equivalent cohorts in China, South Korea, or Taiwan. As noted earlier, most Japanese policy leaders studied in the Faculty of Law at University of Tokyo, where the curriculum has long emphasized “public management” more than “law” in the English sense. Another common factor: they spent nearly their entire careers within government. Few moved between government and other sectors such as academia or business. This high level of similarity may help explain the strong commitment to the national development vision Japan pursued after World War II.
Similarity of background can mean that leaders are more likely to agree on strategies, and more likely to reinforce one another’s choices. That can foster coherence and efficiency. On the other hand, it can also limit creativity, because the bureaucracy becomes prone to group think.
Similar But Different National Patterns
We have four more specific findings about these similar but different patterns across the individuals leading innovation policy for East Asia’s miracle economies.
First, there are clear national patterns with respect to studying abroad – or not. Japanese officials were the least likely to study abroad. In contrast, many South Korean and Taiwanese leaders studied in the United States, often earning advanced degrees at top U.S. universities. Chinese policymakers were more likely to have studied in Russia or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, although this trend shifted in later decades. Over time, we found a growing reliance on domestic university education across all four countries. National universities have increasingly become training grounds for policy elites, especially for undergraduate degrees. But in South Korea, Taiwan, and China, international postgraduate education still plays a significant role in who gets recruited to top positions.
Second, in terms of universities, Japanese policy leaders studied overwhelmingly at just one domestic university: University of Tokyo. Their Korean and Taiwanese counterparts also came from a tiny number of elite national universities – South Korea’s “SKY” universities of Seoul National University, Korea University, and Yonsei University, and National Taiwan University in Taipei, respectively. In contrast, there is more variation among Chinese innovation policy leaders. The two elite universities, Peking and Tsinghua, comprised a much smaller share of Chinese leaders’ educational backgrounds than elite universities in the other cases, suggesting a national pattern in which networks in Beijing form as leaders emerge from provincial clusters.
Third, in terms of degree subjects, Japanese policy leaders overwhelmingly studied law (at Tokyo University). Japan’s approach to teaching law comprises training in public administration and policy, more than the legal studies one would cover in a Western law school. In contrast to Japan’s law focus, Chinese and Taiwanese policy leaders mostly have natural science and engineering backgrounds, while South Korea’s lead cohort was more disbursed across law, business, social science, and engineering. Again, rather than similarly trained bureaucrats across the four governments, we see nationally coherent and distinct patterns.
Fourth, the three prior roles that policy leaders were most likely to hold before taking on their roles were all in government. Among the four countries, Japanese policy leaders had the fewest movements, while Korean policy leaders had more private sector posts, and Chinese and Taiwanese policy leaders moved across academic or think tank positions before leading innovation policy.
Perhaps surprisingly, these national patterns have held relatively steady over time. Despite dramatic changes in the global economy and in each country’s domestic politics, the preferred universities and degree subjects of policy elites have remained largely the same.
East Asia’s Flying Geese
For too long, the individuals behind the East Asian miracle have been missing from the narrative. The “lessons drawn” point to structures and strategies, not to the people. Our research suggests that the shared backgrounds of national innovation policy elites in East Asia helped to align goals, smooth coordination, and sustain long-term development strategies.
Japan’s case is especially striking. Its policymakers’ common education, career paths, and institutional loyalty contributed to a shared sense of purpose. That model helped launch the developmental state, and inspired emulators across the region. But even among those “flying geese” who tried to copy Japan, few matched its level of coherence. It is striking that this pattern of studying law (or in practice, public management) at the elite domestic university was not replicated across the developmental states that followed, especially because research suggests that they purposefully adopted other aspects of the Japanese model.
Understanding the human side of policy is crucial for countries looking to replicate East Asia’s success. It is not just about having the right institutions or policies on paper. It is also about ensuring the cohesion of the people in charge: their training, experiences, and networks.
Countries hoping to develop strong innovation strategies, for example, might focus not just on building pilot agencies or adopting “the right” policies, but on facilitating shared training for cohorts of future leaders with shared missions. That could mean investing in education at home, creating exchange programs, or fostering ties between government, academia, and business in intentional ways. In practical terms, this could look like the Singaporean government’s “public service commission” scholarship program, which helps the country recruit and retain outstanding talent with similar experiences studying overseas.
In short, East Asia’s success was not just about what policies were chosen, the architecture of the developmental state, geopolitics. The effectiveness of the region’s developmental states also rested on a high degree of similarity (“homophily”) in the elite officials who led the national innovation effort, giving them shared objectives across many generations such that they internalized national development objectives as their own personal objectives. The reason so few countries have escaped the middle income trap may partly be that this lesson has, until now, not been one of the standard “East Asian miracle” lessons.
This is a summary of a research paper that was originally published in World Development. Read the full paper here.
Authors
Guest Author
Robyn Klingler-Vidra
Robyn Klingler-Vidra is vice dean (Global Engagement) of King's Business School at King’s College of London.
Guest Author
Adam Chalmers
Adam Chalmers is senior lecturer of Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh.
Guest Author
Robert Wade
Robert Wade is professor of Political Economy and Development at London School of Economics and Political Science.
7. South Korea’s Sovereign AI Gambit: A High-Stakes Experiment in Autonomy
Excerpts:
Conclusion: A Grand Experiment of Opportunity and Risk
South Korea’s sovereign AI strategy has become a fascinating experiment of a nation navigating the turbulent waters of the 21st century tech race. It is a situation where a grand, state-led geopolitical vision is in stark confrontation with a pragmatic reality that follows market logic. Despite these internal debates, the true stage for this experiment is already global, and its success depends on how it manages the opportunities and risks inherent in its “Third Way” vision.
The opportunity is clear. For nations in the Global South wary of both U.S. technological hegemony and Chinese influence, the partnership proposal from a middle power like South Korea is a viable card to play. The strategy of approaching them as a reliable partner rather than a tech hegemon can yield new markets and diplomatic assets. However, the strategy carries inherent risks as it relies heavily on the intangible asset of trust. At the same time, potential partner nations question the competitiveness of South Korea’s AI models, and some skeptics suggest that the country could merely be used as a negotiation lever against the United States and China.
Ultimately, the success of this grand experiment hinges on whether South Korea can solve a dual challenge: winning the support of the domestic tech ecosystem internally, while proving its technological credibility externally. Can Seoul bridge this gap? Can the state-backed national champions create a platform for coexistence instead of competing with domestic innovators, and persuade their own ecosystem to endure short-term pain and perceptions of unfairness for long-term strategic gain? The world’s middle powers, seeking a path between the U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence, are watching this process closely. Whatever the outcome of Seoul’s high-stakes gambit, the journey will offer important lessons on the price of and challenges to pursuing autonomy in the age of AI.
South Korea’s Sovereign AI Gambit: A High-Stakes Experiment in Autonomy
Amid China-U.S. rivalry, South Korea is betting its future on a risky, state-led “sovereign AI” strategy to forge its own path.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/south-koreas-sovereign-ai-gambit-a-high-stakes-experiment-in-autonomy/
By Rajiv Kumar and Yihwan Cho
July 04, 2025
Credit: Depositphotos
South Korea’s new Lee Jae-myung administration made establishing the country as a global AI leader one of its top priorities and took immediate action upon assuming office in June. Lee appointed Ha Jung-woo, the former AI chief of Korean tech giant NAVER and the nation’s most vocal advocate for the so-called “sovereign AI” discourse, as South Korea’s first-ever presidential chief AI adviser. Days later, Bae Kyung-hoon, who led another massive AI foundation model development project at LG, was nominated as the new minister of science and ICT.
The appointments were unconventional in several respects. Instead of the politicians or senior academics who typically rise to high administrative posts, two 40-something industry experts – considered young blood in South Korea’s political scene – were brought to the forefront. More importantly, they were the very executives who had led South Korea’s two largest large language model (LLM) projects. Their appointments are backed by a 100 trillion won (approximately $75 billion) national investment plan that Lee had pledged since his campaign. This was a clear message: Seoul has bet its future on building sovereign AI and is prioritizing practical execution over mere symbolism.
In South Korea, sovereign AI is defined as more than just developing a single proprietary language model. It refers to a country securing capabilities and initiative across the entire AI industry value chain and ecosystem – from semiconductors, power, and computing infrastructure to data centers, cloud, and AI deployment services. So why is South Korea, a key U.S. ally and a tech powerhouse in its own right, now taking this risky and expensive path toward AI autonomy? The answer lies in a high-stakes experiment to carve out a “Third Way” in an age of China-U.S. AI rivalry.
The Geopolitical Imperative: The Two Waves
The entrenchment of this shift was preceded by a pair of immense shockwaves.
The first wave began in late 2022, when OpenAI’s ChatGPT swept the globe. South Korea’s tech giants at the time responded swiftly, with NAVER unveiling “HyperCLOVA X” and LG launching “EXAONE” to jump into the race to develop their own LLMs. It was at this point that pioneers like Ha began to champion the concept of “sovereign AI.” Ha, in particular, stressed that to protect national sovereignty, critical infrastructure for diplomacy or defense could not be entrusted to foreign firms. He also argued that it is essential to preserve the nation’s cultural and historical context – highlighting cases where early U.S. models referred to the “East Sea” as the “Sea of Japan,” a highly sensitive issue in South Korea.
However, this initial push for sovereignty faced three major obstacles. First, the dominant global AI discourse at the time – from the 2023 AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park in the U.K. to the 2024 AI Seoul Summit – was framed around cooperation over competition. Second, the Korean public’s skepticism toward nationalism meant such arguments were often met with domestic derision as “guk-ppong (국뽕),” a slang term for jingoistic fervor.
Critically, there was widespread skepticism that the concept of sovereign AI itself represented specific corporate interests. As Ha was the AI chief of NAVER at the time, critics dismissed the argument as “marketing jargon” aligned with the company’s commercial interests. This perception was reinforced when global business leaders like Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang also endorsed sovereign AI, due to the pragmatic calculation that chipmakers stood to gain the most as nations rushed to purchase GPUs for their sovereign projects.
What shattered this stalemate and elevated the sovereign AI discourse to the forefront of the nation agenda was the second shockwave: the “DeepSeek Moment.” The V3 model from the Chinese startup DeepSeek, which gained attention around the Lunar New Year in February 2025, shocked the world with its claim of having lowered training costs to $6 million through algorithmic optimization (though experts point out this claim is debatable).
The key takeaway was that a geopolitical rival, China, could create a frontier AI in a “very cost-effective” manner. This signaled to South Korean decision-makers that sovereign AI was no longer a game only for the capital-rich United States, but had now become a viable and essential mission for South Korea as well.
The Chief AI Officer’s Doctrine: A Vision of “Full-Stack” Sovereignty
To understand Seoul’s strategy, one must first understand the blueprint of its new architect, Chief AI Officer (CAIO) Ha Jung-woo. His argument for sovereign AI goes beyond simple technological nationalism; it is a comprehensive vision rooted in South Korea’s significant tech capabilities and the geopolitical realities of the 21st century.
At the core of Ha’s argument is the belief that South Korea is one of the few nations with the capacity to even attempt such a feat. He has frequently emphasized that the country possesses nearly all the components of the AI “full-stack”: world-leading memory semiconductors and burgeoning AI chip (NPU) development, established cloud infrastructure, vast high-quality datasets from a hyper-digitalized society, and a significant pool of AI talent. For South Korea, therefore, sovereign AI is not just a vague dream but a viable national strategy.
Ha defines sovereign AI as liberation from technological dependency. According to him, this is not a call for isolationism, but for securing AI systems that deeply understand and align with the nation’s own language, culture, laws, and social values. The argument is that no matter how advanced a foreign model may be, it cannot, by definition, internalize this nuanced context.
Ultimately, his vision is geopolitical. He warns that AI is poised to become the primary tool of 21st-century “neo-imperialism.” Just as past empires used guns and ships to colonize territories, he argues, future powers will use AI to dominate the digital territories and data of other nations, subordinating their industrial ecosystems. From this perspective, sovereign AI is a defensive shield against this tide.
Moreover, this defensive logic leads to a proactive global strategy: the Third Way. He argues that South Korea must make a unique proposal to nations in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and beyond that are wary of the technological hegemony of both superpowers, the U.S. and China. This goes beyond mere product sales to a partnership that includes co-development, technology transfer, and a commitment to data sovereignty to help those nations build their own sovereign AI. Given its position as a middle power, this would allow Seoul to establish itself not as a tech hegemon like Washington or Beijing, but as a reliable and non-threatening partner for the digital age.
The Blueprint: A State-Led Push
The shockwaves from DeepSeek were so powerful that they prompted immediate action from Seoul, even amid the political vacuum following the martial law crisis of the former Yoon Suk-yeol administration. In January, the government – then under an acting president – officially unveiled its blueprint for AI by announcing two flagship projects: the Independent AI Foundation Model initiative and the establishment of a National AI Computing Center.
The 2.5 trillion won (approximately $1.84 billion) computing center plan, in particular, drew attention as it was announced shortly after the Trump administration’s reported $500 billion “Stargate” data center plan in January. It was an ambitious vision for the state to directly provide the core infrastructure for AI, but it soon collided with the cold realities of the market. Due to uncertainty over profitability and corporate reluctance regarding the government’s demand for a 51 percent controlling stake, the National AI Computing Center failed to attract a private partner in two consecutive bidding rounds. The government is now completely re-evaluating its approach to revive this massive project.
In contrast, the Independent AI Foundation Model project, which had been designed throughout the first half of the year under the tentative name “World Best LLM (WBL),” was officially launched in June. This project, reflecting lessons from the initial setbacks of initiatives like the National AI Computing Center, was designed with more market-oriented criteria and aims to select a national open-source foundation model. With nearly all of South Korea’s LLM developers participating, the final output, born from a fierce competitive evaluation, is scheduled to be released as open-source to the entire domestic AI ecosystem.
The Internal Debate: A Pragmatic Clash of Visions
While few in Seoul oppose the core values of AI sovereignty itself, the government’s method has ignited a fierce and complex debate, pitting national ambition against market pragmatism. The most vocal critics come from the country’s dynamic startup and vertical AI scene.
Their primary concern is the fear of a new tech chaebol. With former top executives from the nation’s two largest tech companies now at the helm of national AI policy, many startup founders worry the strategy will inevitably favor the two giants they hail from. A prominent Korean AI startup CEO wrote on social media, that “it will create a very strange structure where foreign AI giants, domestic MSPs, and countless B2B software partners will have to band together to compete against the government’s AI.” His sentiment was echoed by others who fear a tilted playing field where national resources are funneled to large corporations.
This fear is rooted in a fundamentally different business reality. For most startups, the race to build the biggest foundation models is already a lost cause – a money pit that they believe South Korea cannot afford. The real market, they argue, is in “vertical AI”: creating specialized applications for industries like medicine, law, and finance. For them, U.S.-based Application Programming Interface (APIs) from OpenAI or Anthropic “are not a threat,” but a vital, cost-effective tool for innovation and survival.
From this perspective, the government’s focus on creating a national LLM is a misguided use of taxpayer money. It diverts resources away from South Korea’s most vibrant and profitable AI sector – the application layer – to chase a goal that is both commercially unviable and potentially harmful to the broader ecosystem. While the government counters that a national LLM is a public good – an “AI highway” for all startups to use – this explanation has done little to assuage the market’s skepticism so far.
Conclusion: A Grand Experiment of Opportunity and Risk
South Korea’s sovereign AI strategy has become a fascinating experiment of a nation navigating the turbulent waters of the 21st century tech race. It is a situation where a grand, state-led geopolitical vision is in stark confrontation with a pragmatic reality that follows market logic. Despite these internal debates, the true stage for this experiment is already global, and its success depends on how it manages the opportunities and risks inherent in its “Third Way” vision.
The opportunity is clear. For nations in the Global South wary of both U.S. technological hegemony and Chinese influence, the partnership proposal from a middle power like South Korea is a viable card to play. The strategy of approaching them as a reliable partner rather than a tech hegemon can yield new markets and diplomatic assets. However, the strategy carries inherent risks as it relies heavily on the intangible asset of trust. At the same time, potential partner nations question the competitiveness of South Korea’s AI models, and some skeptics suggest that the country could merely be used as a negotiation lever against the United States and China.
Ultimately, the success of this grand experiment hinges on whether South Korea can solve a dual challenge: winning the support of the domestic tech ecosystem internally, while proving its technological credibility externally. Can Seoul bridge this gap? Can the state-backed national champions create a platform for coexistence instead of competing with domestic innovators, and persuade their own ecosystem to endure short-term pain and perceptions of unfairness for long-term strategic gain? The world’s middle powers, seeking a path between the U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence, are watching this process closely. Whatever the outcome of Seoul’s high-stakes gambit, the journey will offer important lessons on the price of and challenges to pursuing autonomy in the age of AI.
Authors
Guest Author
Rajiv Kumar
Dr. Rajiv Kumar is a lecturer at Sungkyunkwan University and a researcher at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, South Korea. Previously, he served as an affiliate scholar at the East-West Center in the United States. He earned his B.A. from Delhi University and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Sungkyunkwan University.
Guest Author
Yihwan Cho
Yihwan Cho is a reporter for ZDNET Korea based in Seoul, where he covers AI, data, and governance. He is a former intelligence officer in the Republic of Korea Army and holds a Master's degree in the Theory and History of International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
8. N. Korea blames factory defects on loyalty issues
Loyalty is the only criteria for success in north Korea. And that is personal loyalty to the dear, Great, Supreme Leader of Kim Jong Un.
And of course Kim Joing Un's bankrupt policies can never be blamed for regime failures.
N. Korea blames factory defects on loyalty issues
Workers themselves cite chronic material shortages as a major production obstacle that frequently causes delays
By Eun Seol - July 4, 2025
dailynk.com
N. Korea blames factory defects on loyalty issues - Daily NK English
North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Oct. 15 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “convened a consultative meeting on National Defence and Security,” where he heard several reports, including a report from the director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau on the general analysis of the case of enemy's serious provocation that violated the sovereignty of the DPRK and a report from the chief of the KPA General Staff on the military counteraction plan. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)
North Korea is conducting lectures urging factory workers to emulate the patriotic dedication of weapons manufacturers, but employees are frustrated with the regime’s focus on ideology while ignoring chronic shortages of electricity and materials that actually cause production problems.
A source in South Pyongan province told Daily NK recently that a factory in Songchon county held a mandatory lecture for all workers on June 19, using materials distributed by the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Agitation Department.
The lecture, titled “Imbue Each Daily Necessity with the Highest Level of Patriotism Just like Munitions Producers,” demanded that workers draw upon their patriotism and revolutionary spirit to achieve the party’s quality standards in every aspect of manufacturing, from appearance to durability to packaging.
“Faulty packaging and defects are the result of ideological lassitude and irresponsibility, rather than issues with voltage or materials,” the lecturer emphasized. “You must make your love of the fatherland tangible in every bar of soap and your unchanging devotion to the Party perceptible in every shoelace, just like munitions producers in wartime.”
The lecturer added that “both engineers and producers must painstakingly check every stage — including design, packaging and distribution — as an expression of their loyalty” to improve living standards in the provinces.
Workers cite practical problems
While the lecture addressed the high rate of defects in factory output, workers on the factory floor point to very different causes for quality issues.
“Factory workers say that malfunctions are caused by the low voltage, rather than deliberate sabotage,” the source explained. “They say that while patriotism and revolutionary spirit are fine and good, the priority should be on guaranteeing standard voltage. Some are even saying voltage should be the first target of our revolutionary zeal.”
Workers also cite chronic material shortages as a major production obstacle that frequently causes delays. The constant emphasis on ideological shortcomings demoralizes employees when production problems stem from these poor working conditions.
“Workers at the Songchon factory take great pride in the fact that Kim Jong Un personally attended both the groundbreaking and the ribbon-cutting there. As such, they’re very responsible about their work,” the source said. “Blaming defects and other issues with product quality on insufficient loyalty is lowering their morale.”
One employee reportedly complained that despite always taking work seriously, product defects are now being attributed to insufficient loyalty rather than systemic problems. “That kind of political attack is apparently making it harder to stay on task,” the source noted.
Flagship factory struggles
The Songchon county factory represents a showcase project for Kim Jong Un’s “20×10 regional development policy” announced in January 2024. Construction was completed in just ten months by December, making it the first factory built under the new initiative.
Kim Jong Un personally attended both the groundbreaking and opening ceremonies, emphasizing that “the primary effort should be placed on raising product quality.” He called for making “full use of the modern factories we’ve built to produce a large volume of popular products and delicacies that capture the characteristics of each region.”
Despite the leader’s personal involvement and workers’ reported dedication, the factory continues to struggle with the same infrastructure problems plaguing North Korean industry nationwide — unreliable electricity and insufficient raw materials that no amount of revolutionary fervor can overcome.
Read in Korean
Eun Seol
Eun Seol is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
9. N. Korea targets farm corruption as legal violations surge
Rule BY law is the north Korean way.
Of course in order to survive, Koreans in the north must be able to lie, cheat, and steal - again this is a survival mechanism and not meant to pejoratively describe the character of the Korean people in the north. We should put ourselves in their shoes and ask how we would survive?
N. Korea targets farm corruption as legal violations surge
North Korean farms are widely known to engage in practices such as inflating production reports, embezzling goods, and manipulating accounting records
By Eun Seol - July 4, 2025
dailynk.com
N. Korea targets farm corruption as legal violations surge - Daily NK English
In this photo published in May 2022, North Korean farm workers are seen watering a field. (Rodong Sinmun - News1)
The justice department of Ryanggang province’s people committee has launched intensive inspections of farms throughout the province. While officials claim their goal is to root out corruption, many remain skeptical about whether these efforts can meaningfully address the agricultural sector’s deeply entrenched problems.
According to a Daily NK source in Ryanggang province recently, the provincial justice department notified the province’s rural economic committee of its inspection plans on June 18 and began conducting on-site farm inspections on June 23.
Initial inspection results reveal that legal violations at farms occur at more than three times the rate seen at factories and enterprises.
Unlike previous efforts that merely involved issuing instructions to city and county-level people’s committee justice divisions, this inspection campaign features direct visits by provincial justice officials who are combining inspections with on-site legal education.
Authorities say they aim to eliminate legal blind spots and correct administrative practices that violate legal standards.
North Korean farms are widely known to engage in practices such as inflating production reports, embezzling goods, and manipulating accounting records.
“The falsification of farm ledgers has been standard practice for a long time,” the source explained. “Since farms hold their own general meetings and manage operations and distribution themselves, they adjust the books to suit their interests.”
The source provided a specific example: “When higher-level officials visit, farms prepare hospitality meals and falsify the related expenses. They might claim they used five kilograms of corn when they only used one kilogram, then pocket the difference for personal use.”
Fake education sessions
The inspection also uncovered that legal education sessions by designated lecturers are largely ceremonial, with many cases where no actual lecture took place despite reports claiming otherwise.
“In the past, officials would occasionally give lectures urging residents to follow the law consciously, but nowadays it’s routine to skip the lecture entirely and simply submit a report claiming it happened,” the source said.
To combat this formalism, the justice department has compiled and distributed three new audiovisual materials to farms:
- An educational video on legal violations by farmworkers
- A casebook documenting punishments for infractions
- A guide to basic legal documentation
Unlike previous materials that simply outlined legal provisions, these new resources include actual violation cases and voice recordings. Examples reportedly include a sub-work team leader at a farm in Taehongdan county who failed to maintain material inventory logs, and a work team leader in Kapsan county who falsified workday records to help a worker earn private income in exchange for bribes.
Farm officials are nervous about the inspections, concerned that serious violations could lead to prosecution. However, ordinary farmworkers express doubt about the campaign’s effectiveness.
“Farmworkers question whether ‘socialist legal life’ even exists,” the source said. “They complain that no matter what the law says, officials with money and connections always escape consequences.”
Translated by Kyungmin Kim.
Read in Korean
Eun Seol
Eun Seol is one of Daily NK's full-time reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish(at)uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
10. Presumed defector took methodical route through DMZ, military says
It can be done.
Are their cracks in the regime? Are their breakdowns within the military? Are we paying sufficient attention to indications of internal instability and resistance?
Excerpts:
If this was indeed an intentional defection, it exposes a glaring hole in North Korea’s border security. During the operation, the South Korean military observed no unusual movements from the North Korean side, indicating Pyongyang’s forces were likely unaware of the crossing and failed to dispatch a pursuit team.
Officials are also watching to see whether widespread public discontent in North Korea played a role. Between August and September last year, three separate defections occurred along the MDL and the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea.
Many of those defectors cited severe economic hardship and growing disillusionment with the North Korean regime.
Friday
July 4, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Presumed defector took methodical route through DMZ, military says
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-07-04/national/northKorea/Presumed-defector-took-methodical-route-through-DMZ-military-says/2345680
Published: 04 Jul. 2025, 15:32
South Korean soldiers patrol along a barbed-wire fence inside the demilitarized zone in Yeoncheon County, Gyeonggi, near the midwestern front, on July 25, 2022. [YONHAP]
A North Korean man crossed into South Korea on Thursday in what appears to be a carefully planned defection, exploiting gaps in Pyongyang's ongoing construction aimed at severing inter-Korean links within the demilitarized zone (DMZ).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff said Friday that South Korean troops “took custody of one North Korean individual who crossed the military demarcation line [MDL] on the midwestern front late Thursday night.”
Related Article
The military detected the man in a stream near the MDL — a line marking the boundary between the two Koreas — and tracked him before apprehending him through a controlled operation.
Surveillance systems first picked up the man at around 3 or 4 a.m. Thursday, according to the military.
He waded across a roughly one-meter-deep (3.3-foot-deep) stream that runs between Gyeonggi’s Yeoncheon County and Paju, which serves as a de facto MDL boundary. He then hid in nearby undergrowth, barely moving during daylight hours before continuing south after nightfall.
A South Korean operations team approached within about 100 meters of the man and tried to communicate with him directly.
“Our team called out, ‘We are the Republic of Korea Army. We will guide you safely,’ and proceeded with a guiding operation,” a military official said.
“Around 11 p.m., we escorted him out of the DMZ to a secure location.”
The individual reportedly identified himself as a civilian, not a soldier.
Authorities, including intelligence agencies, have begun additional investigations. But because he complied readily with military instructions, officials believe he likely intended to defect.
Military sources said the crossing was probably premeditated, noting that the man picked an area of the border where North Korea had not yet carried out severance work.
North Korean soldiers carry tools and a sign reading “Blockade” as they move near a guard post along the western front on March 27. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]
Since April last year, North Korea has been busy fortifying several frontline regions — laying land mines, reinforcing tactical roads and erecting unidentified structures resembling anti-tank barriers.
These projects follow North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s orders to sever inter-Korean ties, but the South Korean military believes they also aim to tighten internal controls and prevent defections.
However, such work has generally avoided natural obstacles like streams. This suggests the man calculated that the shallow water and exposed soil would make it easier to evade mines and slip through.
“There are some unconfirmed mines in the area,” a South Korean defense official noted, “but because of the stream’s nature, with exposed earth, avoiding them isn’t particularly difficult.”
If this was indeed an intentional defection, it exposes a glaring hole in North Korea’s border security. During the operation, the South Korean military observed no unusual movements from the North Korean side, indicating Pyongyang’s forces were likely unaware of the crossing and failed to dispatch a pursuit team.
Officials are also watching to see whether widespread public discontent in North Korea played a role. Between August and September last year, three separate defections occurred along the MDL and the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea.
Many of those defectors cited severe economic hardship and growing disillusionment with the North Korean regime.
A quiet stretch of the demilitarized zone along the western front is seen from Paju, South Korea, on May 2, showing barriers North Korea installed on the Gyeongui Line road. [YONHAP]
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY LEE KEUN-PYUNG [kim.juyeon2@joongang.co.kr]
11. Why do we need the Ministry of Unification?
Thank you Professor Wang.
Conclusion:
This is not merely about preserving a name; it is about maintaining a national aspiration and the moral compass that keeps it alive. The Ministry of Unification stands as a testament to the unfinished work of healing a divided people. Its name is a promise to those who still believe that we can become family members again, especially those who still wait for a knock from a long-lost sibling across the DMZ. We simply must not give up on that promise.
This is from my forthcoming essay: “Keep the Name, Focus the Mission: Why the Ministry of Unification Must Lead Korea’s Grand Strategy”
South Korea does not need a new name for its Ministry of Unification. It needs strategic clarity and institutional discipline. The Ministry must become what it was meant to be: the brain trust and planning staff for the Republic of Korea’s historic mission to achieve peaceful unification under liberal democratic principles. Anything less is an abdication of responsibility, not just to South Korea, but to all Korean people, North and South, who yearn for a free and unified future.
The name should remain. The mission must be sharpened. Unification is not a taboo, it is a strategy. Let the Ministry lead it and help the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ establish a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).
[Wang Son-taek] Why do we need the Ministry of Unification?
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · July 3, 2025
Few policy debates in recent memory have struck such a sensitive nerve as the question now emerging in South Korean political discourse: Should the Ministry of Unification be renamed? The idea, once considered fringe, is now circulating more seriously in the early stages of the Lee Jae Myung administration. Supporters argue that the word “Unification” has lost relevance in today's geopolitical climate and that a more pragmatic label is needed. But for many Koreans, including myself, this is not simply a matter of nomenclature. It is about who we are as a people, what we have endured and what we still dream of becoming.
The debate is emotional because it touches something deep in our collective consciousness: the pain of division, the hope of reunification and the identity of a nation that has, for centuries, understood itself as one people sharing one destiny. To casually rename a ministry that bears the title “Unification” feels like giving up. In times of growing cynicism, it is tempting to cast off symbols and slogans as empty. But not all names are mere words. Some carry the weight of generations. Some bear witness to wounds still unhealed. I am clearly opposed to the renaming. My opposition is based on six interlocking reasons — constitutional, historical, diplomatic, strategic, political and, above all, human.
First, such a move would run directly counter to the spirit and text of the Constitution, which mentions unification seven times as a national objective. Article 4, in particular, states that "The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy." Erasing the name "Unification" from a core ministry would not only weaken institutional memory but could also be construed as an abandonment of this constitutional mandate. It would be akin to erasing a promise etched into the founding law of the republic.
Second, the name is not just a legal obligation — it reflects a historical yearning that has defined the Korean people for more than a millennium. Since the unification of the Three Kingdoms under Silla and the reunification of the Later Three Kingdoms by Goryeo, Korea has known itself as a singular entity. The division of the peninsula for 80 years is a wound still fresh when measured against over 1,100 years of unity. Some argue that division fatigue is understandable and that the younger generation lacks an emotional connection to the North. However, historical responsibility should not diminish with time. The Ministry of Unification represents the hope, grief, and sacrifice of generations who believed that someday, the divided land and people would be reunited. To rename it would be to dishonor that belief — and those who carried it through more challenging times than these.
Third, we must never forget that Korea's division was not born of domestic will but imposed through foreign calculation. In 1945, Korea emerged from decades of Japanese colonial rule only to be divided by an arbitrary separation agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union. Korean voices were excluded from the process; national sovereignty was sacrificed for Cold War convenience. While we lacked the power to resist then, we possess it now. South Korea is a global economic and cultural power. To surrender our claim to unification now would be to legitimize a historical injustice — and to signal that sovereign rights can be obliterated if the world waits long enough. That message would not only betray our past but also imperil our future.
Fourth, changing the name could send a damaging message to the international community. South and North Korea are recognized as separate entities by the United Nations. Should a crisis occur in the North, it might not be assumed that the South has any natural claim to leadership unless we have demonstrated, consistently and openly, that peaceful unification is a core interest. If the Ministry of Unification were to disappear, that message would become muddled. Our diplomatic position weakens. Other global powers, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, may assert control, sidelining South Korea from its national destiny. Maintaining the name is a form of diplomatic signaling. To remove it would be an unforced error with high strategic costs.
Fifth, renaming the ministry will not ease tensions with North Korea. Chairman Kim Jong-un's grudge toward the South is not rooted in semantics. It is rooted in frustration that it is impossible for the North to catch up with the South and to unite the two Koreas under his authoritarian leadership. Renaming the ministry will not change that reality. If anything, it emboldens Pyongyang by suggesting that South Korea's commitment to reunification is fading. We must instead show that our door remains open — not because we are weak, but because we are patient and principled. Keeping the Ministry of Unification is part of that message.
Finally, on the domestic front, renaming the ministry would only inflame political divisions and complicate the administration’s early governance. Conservative factions have long accused progressive leaders of being soft on North Korea. Renaming the Ministry of Unification would play directly into these narratives, providing ammunition to political opponents. South Korea has urgent work to do — restoring economic dynamism, investing in innovation, strengthening national security and enhancing global competitiveness. We do not need an unproductive controversy that will consume political assets. Practical governance demands focus, not distractions.
This is not merely about preserving a name; it is about maintaining a national aspiration and the moral compass that keeps it alive. The Ministry of Unification stands as a testament to the unfinished work of healing a divided people. Its name is a promise to those who still believe that we can become family members again, especially those who still wait for a knock from a long-lost sibling across the DMZ. We simply must not give up on that promise.
Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
koreaherald@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · July 3, 2025
12. S. Korean, US, Japanese military chiefs to meet in Seoul
Good news for trilateral cooperation.
S. Korean, US, Japanese military chiefs to meet in Seoul - The Korea Herald
Hwang Joo-young
koreaherald.com
S. Korean, US, Japanese military chiefs to meet in Seoul
Published : July 3, 2025 - 14:46:46 Updated : July 3, 2025 - 17:00:07
Kim Myung-soo, chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks via video call with his US counterpart Gen. Dan Caine on May 20. (South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Top military commanders from South Korea, the United States and Japan are expected to meet in Seoul next week to discuss issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear weapons program and recent missile provocations.
According to South Korea’s military on Thursday, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Kim Myung-soo will host his US counterpart, Gen. Dan Caine, and Japan’s Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Gen. Yoshihide Yoshida, for a trilateral meeting in Seoul on July 10 and 11.
Gen. Caine, who assumed his position in April, is visiting Seoul for the first time since the start of the Lee Jae Myung administration. The last visit by a US Joint Chiefs chairman took place in November 2023.
The previous trilateral meeting among the military chiefs of South Korea, the US, and Japan was in Tokyo on July 18, 2024.
The gathering comes amid growing speculation that Washington may ask Seoul to increase its contribution to the cost of stationing US forces on the Korean Peninsula or propose adjustments to the role of US troops — similar to how NATO allies have recently expanded their defense budgets in response to calls from US President Donald Trump.
Reflecting these concerns, Caine said during his confirmation hearing in April that, if confirmed, he would review the scale of US forces deployed in South Korea and Japan and submit recommendations to the secretary of defense and the president.
South Korea’s military, meanwhile, has dismissed such speculation, stating, “The agenda of the meeting is strictly limited to trilateral military cooperation and responses to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.” As of press time, there are no confirmed plans for Caine to meet with South Korean officials outside the military leadership.
The meeting also comes as Seoul and Washington are reportedly exploring the possibility of holding a bilateral summit later this month.
flylikekite@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com
13. South Korean president likens inter-Korean ties to troubled marriage
I am sorry Mr. President. I have to disagree with your analogy.
Please take time to thoroughly study and understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime for the security of your nation.
The marriage analogy is not helpful and I believe harmful unless you understand that your "marriage partner" is a sociopath who is hell bent on ending your life.
South Korean president likens inter-Korean ties to troubled marriage
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · July 4, 2025
Lee uses couples therapy as metaphor to stress the need for ‘mutual understanding’ as path to peace
This photo collage shows President Lee Jae Myung speaking during the news conference at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Thursday. (Yonhap)
In response to a question about achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung offered an unconventional metaphor — comparing inter-Korean relations to a troubled marriage in need of counseling.
Addressing reporters Thursday at his first press conference to mark his 30th day in office, Lee recalled his time as a lawyer handling divorces. He shared that some couples reconsidered splitting up after he encouraged them to see the situation from each other’s perspective.
“I asked them to put themselves in the other’s shoes. Once they did, they stopped coming back to my office,” Lee said. “They began to understand each other when they imagined what life looked like from their partner’s side.”
The president, who practiced law for nearly 20 years before entering politics in the late 2000s, extended the analogy to broader conflicts between individuals, political rivals and even nations.
“The same principle applies to relations between people, between rival parties, between the two Koreas, and between global blocs,” he said, emphasizing dialogue and empathy over confrontation.
Lee maintained a conversational tone throughout the two-hour press conference, adding moments of humor as he addressed a range of tough questions. In front of an audience of about 147 reporters, including members of the foreign press, he appeared more engaged in dialogue than confrontation. His office said the setup was deliberately arranged to foster a sense of closeness, reducing the distance between the president and the press in the front row to just 1.5 meters.
When asked if he planned to take summer vacation — typically taken by South Korean presidents in early August — Lee responded with characteristic wit, recalling his time as mayor of Seongnam.
"The mystery was that floods always broke out whenever I went on leave," he said. "After that, I started thinking, 'How can an elected official take a break?' I figured I was working whenever my eyes were open and resting when they were closed."
Lee said he later realized that his refusal to take time off prevented his staff from taking their own holidays. "This time, I really should take a vacation," he added. "But just when I'm planning it, the ruling party is set to begin its primary."
To ensure fairness in selecting questions, the presidential office used a drawing box system, prompting Lee to quip that the scene resembled a “housing lottery.”
As Lee took his first question — about his first month in office — he joked, “Is it Friday again?” He explained that Fridays had become significant for him because weekends often meant confinement inside the presidential residence in Yongsan, Seoul.
"I usually get stuck there, feeling like I’m walking on eggshells," he said, noting how dozens of bodyguards, police officers and staff follow him wherever he goes. “That’s why Fridays matter. They mark the start of another weekend of being cooped up inside.”
consnow@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · July 4, 2025
14. Lawmaker advocates S. Korea for US ship repairs, citing strategic gains
Some fascinating comments from Representative Lee.
Excerpts:
“Korea is not just a trade partner, but also a strategic manufacturing ally of the U.S. — from AI (artificial intelligence) and energy to semiconductors and shipbuilding,” she said. However, she added that “unless Korea’s industrial ecosystem survives, this alliance cannot thrive.”
Lee warned that the collapse of Korea’s manufacturing ecosystem will damage its own economy and undercut its role in global supply chains and defense cooperation with the U.S.
“In the field of AI, for example, the U.S. leads in software and foundational research, while Korea leads in applied technologies such as autonomous manufacturing and smart medical devices,” she said. “Without Korean manufacturing, those innovations risk never moving beyond the conceptual stage.”
Lee called on the Korean government to recognize that global economic competition is no longer about individual corporations, but national capacity.
“It’s no longer one company against another — it’s country against country in terms of industrial strength.”
She pointed to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act as an example of a sophisticated industrial strategy, praising its clear focus and policy coherence.
“That’s not just protectionism. It’s precision policymaking. Korea needs to respond with the same level of sophistication.”
Lawmaker advocates S. Korea for US ship repairs, citing strategic gains
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20250705/lawmaker-advocates-s-korea-for-us-ship-repairs-citing-strategic-gains
Rep. Lee Un-ju, Supreme Council member of the Democratic Party of Korea, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the National Assembly Members’ Office Building in Seoul, June 30. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul.
By Bahk Eun-ji
- Published Jul 5, 2025 7:00 am KST
- Updated Jul 5, 2025 3:37 pm KST
Rep. Lee Un-ju seeks to combat industrial 'hollowing out' with new revitalization bill
The Korea-U.S. alliance should move beyond its traditional military framework and develop into a broader economic and maritime partnership, according to a recent vision laid out by Rep. Lee Un-ju of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK).
In an interview with The Korea Times, she emphasized the need to link naval cooperation with efforts to reinforce Korea’s industrial resilience.
“The Korea-U.S. alliance must expand beyond military defense to include shipbuilding, defense industries and maritime cooperation,” she said. “But none of that will work if we don’t have the manufacturing base to support it.”
The shift reflects a growing recognition that national security in the 21st century is no longer defined solely by troop levels, but also by economic resilience and industrial capacity. By linking military cooperation to the revitalization of strategic industries, the proposal seeks to strengthen the alliance while bolstering Korea’s ability to sustain advanced defense capabilities and drive long-term economic growth.
The strategy she outlined rests on three pillars: a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Navy to service warships in Korea, a legislative initiative aimed at safeguarding Korea’s industrial base, and a 1,000-page growth blueprint intended to chart its next phase of development. A three-term lawmaker and one of her party’s leading voices on economic policy, Lee emphasized that the strength of the U.S.-Korea alliance must ultimately be grounded in the Asian country’s domestic capabilities.
“You can’t talk about long-term cooperation if you’ve lost your design capacity, engineering workforce, certification labs and factories,” she said.
Ready to repair US warships
At the center of her proposal is Korea’s world-class shipbuilding industry, anchored in the southeastern cities of Busan, Ulsan, Geoje, and across South Gyeongsang Province. Lee argued that these shipyards are uniquely equipped to support U.S. naval maintenance, particularly as the Pentagon faces growing delays tied to labor shortages and legal restrictions, including the Jones Act.
The Jones Act, a century-old U.S. maritime law, restricts foreign-built and foreign-operated vessels from transporting goods between American ports and places limits on overseas maintenance of U.S. military ships.
“The U.S. Navy has faced maintenance bottlenecks, with limited capacity and manpower,” said Lee. “Meanwhile, Korea has the engineers and the shipyards — what we lack is a security framework to make it happen.”
To overcome this, Lee proposes a new administrative agreement modeled on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which would enable the designation of secure repair zones in Korea.
“If we can establish secure zones through a special administrative agreement, there’s room for flexibility,” she said.
For Lee, however, the opportunity to strengthen the alliance hinges on one crucial condition: protecting Korea’s manufacturing base.
“Technology, experts and production capacity must remain in the country,” she said. “Without a domestic ecosystem, even the strongest alliance won’t be sustainable.”
Rep. Lee Un-ju, third from left in the front row, visits an industrial site in South Gyeongsang Province, March 5. Courtesy of Lee Un-ju’s office
Rep. Lee Un-ju, third from left in the front row, visits an industrial site in South Gyeongsang Province, March 5. Courtesy of Lee Un-ju’s office
Industry's role in alliance
Speaking at The Korea Times-AMCHAM Forum on “Strategic Proposals for the Korea-U.S. Partnership,” which was held on June 24, Lee emphasized that Korea’s strategic industries are crucial to national security, especially given the country’s mounting external threats and increased trade disputes with the U.S.
“Korea is not just a trade partner, but also a strategic manufacturing ally of the U.S. — from AI (artificial intelligence) and energy to semiconductors and shipbuilding,” she said. However, she added that “unless Korea’s industrial ecosystem survives, this alliance cannot thrive.”
Lee warned that the collapse of Korea’s manufacturing ecosystem will damage its own economy and undercut its role in global supply chains and defense cooperation with the U.S.
“In the field of AI, for example, the U.S. leads in software and foundational research, while Korea leads in applied technologies such as autonomous manufacturing and smart medical devices,” she said. “Without Korean manufacturing, those innovations risk never moving beyond the conceptual stage.”
Lee called on the Korean government to recognize that global economic competition is no longer about individual corporations, but national capacity.
“It’s no longer one company against another — it’s country against country in terms of industrial strength.”
She pointed to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act as an example of a sophisticated industrial strategy, praising its clear focus and policy coherence.
“That’s not just protectionism. It’s precision policymaking. Korea needs to respond with the same level of sophistication.”
Lee emphasized that Korea must move away from the outdated belief that markets alone can ensure industrial balance.
“If left to the market, only the giants will survive. The rest, including our upstream suppliers and regional SMEs (small and medium-size businesses), will be wiped out,” she said.
Instead, she advocated a government-led roadmap tailored to each industry in order to provide policy clarity, ensure fair competition and guide restructuring.
“It’s not about bailing out struggling firms. It’s about safeguarding the fundamental capabilities that support national security and our international alliances,” she said.
Rep. Lee Un-ju, Supreme Council member of the Democratic Party of Korea, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the National Assembly Members’ Office Building in Seoul, June 30. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul.
Rep. Lee Un-ju, Supreme Council member of the Democratic Party of Korea, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the National Assembly Members’ Office Building in Seoul, June 30. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul.
Bill aims to halt 'hollowing out'
In May, Lee introduced legislation aimed at preventing the hollowing out of critical industries, targeting sectors such as steel, petrochemicals and shipbuilding. The bill calls for the creation of a task force charged with advancing these key industries over the long term.
Key measures include expanded research and development tax credits, targeted financial support for restructuring, along with the vertical integration of supply chains for materials, parts and equipment.
“This isn’t about saving a single factory,” Lee said. “It’s about rebooting the ecosystem with practical financial tools and hands-on consultancy.”
1,000-page plan
Beyond her legislative efforts, Lee heads the DPK’s future economic growth strategy committee, which has produced a comprehensive 1,000-page development roadmap. The report lays out reform agendas spanning a broad range of sectors, including AI-driven autonomous manufacturing, small modular reactors, green shipping, defense technology, education reform and smart logistics.
“We are at a turning point that demands a complete transition towards AI-driven digitalization, smart manufacturing and green industries,” Lee said. “Even small and medium-size enterprises must embrace autonomous, AI-based innovation, but this will not happen without strategic guidance from the government.”
Who is Lee Un-ju?
Lee is a three-term DPK lawmaker. She currently serves as a member of the Supreme Council, as chair of the Future Economic Growth Strategy Committee and as head of the AI AX Subcommittee under the party’s AI Superpower Initiative. Prior to entering politics, she worked in the private sector as a corporate legal expert and is widely recognized as one of the party’s leading economic strategists.
15. South Koreans’ Perceptions of Blocs between ROK-US-Japan and DPRK-China-Russia and Support for Nuclear Armament: 2025
Read the entire paper and view the graphics at the link below or donwload in PDF at this link: https://eai.or.kr/avanplus/filedownload.asp?o_file=20250627104730777206122.pdf&uppath=/data/bbs/eng_issuebriefing/&u_file=KimandOh_SouthKoreansPerceptionsofBlocsandSupportforNuclearArmament_250627_EAIIssueBriefing.pdf
[EAI Issue Briefing] South Koreans’ Perceptions of Blocs between ROK-US-Japan and DPRK-China-Russia and Support for Nuclear Armament: 2025
EAI Public Opinion Poll on East Asia
Commentary·Issue Briefing | 2025-06-27
https://eai.or.kr/new/en/pub/view.asp?intSeq=23344&board=eng_issuebriefing%27,%27eng_workingpaper%27,%27eng_special%27,%27eng_multimedia&keyword_option=&keyword=&more=
Editor's Note
Professor Yang Gyu Kim of Korea National Defense University and EAI Senior Research Fellow Inhwan Oh analyze the correlation between public perceptions of blocs between ROK-US-Japan and DPRK-China-Russia and South Koreans` support for nuclear armament, drawing on the results of the 2025 EAI Public Opinion Poll on East Asia. Kim and Oh find that perceptions of growing U.S.-China rivalry have a significant impact on South Koreans` support for nuclear armament, which reached a new high this year. Based on their analysis, the authors suggest that the Lee administration should use more sophisticated policy language to explain the U.S.-China rivalry, which is unfolding in a different form than the Cold War, and be careful not to further provoke public support for nuclear armament.
I. South Koreans’ all-time high support for nuclear armament amidst President Lee Jae-myung’s inauguration
On June 4, 2025, President Lee Jae-myung was elected the new President with the highest number of votes count in history and a final vote share of 49.42%. With the Democratic Party of Korea securing a majority of 171 seats in the National Assembly, a so-called "supermajority" that controls both the legislative and executive branches was formed (Yonhap News 2025a; Yonhap News 2025b). Backed by a strong momentum for governance, the Lee Jae-myung administration took proactive measures to improve inter-Korean relations from the outset. Notably, South Korea halted its loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea, and the North responded positively by stopping its noise broadcasts toward the South (Yonhap News 2025c; Yonhap News 2025d). These developments may serve as an opportunity to raise public expectations for improved inter-Korean relations. Because these optimistic expectations can also affect perceptions of North Korean nuclear threat, the beginning of the Lee Jae-myung administration was expected to mark an important shift in South Korea’s support for nuclear armament. For example, during the inter-Korean rapprochement following the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics, support for nuclear armament among South Koreans dropped to 43.3%. It was the first and only time since 2013—when the East Asia Institute (EAI) began polling on foreign policy—that opposition (50.3%) exceeded support.
16. Why Google Maps Can’t Guide You Through Seoul
Excerpts:
Defense experts argue that exporting the 1:5,000 base map would hand adversaries a precision targeting aid. They often cite Ukraine’s 2022 experience: when Google Earth refreshed satellite tiles, bloggers scraped the imagery and geolocated newly built military facilities, forcing Kyiv to ask Google to blur sensitive areas after the fact. Thus, some lawmakers and security experts counter that a low-resolution satellite photo shows a roofline, but an engineering-grade 1:5,000 high-resolution map pinpoints doors, guard posts, and buried cables. South Korean officers worry that once data leaves their jurisdiction they cannot compel immediate edits.
The peninsula remains technically at war, and key installations lie within range of North Korean artillery.
Seoul’s security ministries also cite international precedents. Until July 2020 Israel persuaded Washington to keep imagery of the Dimona reactor deliberately coarse under the Kyl–Bingaman Amendment, a curb only relaxed once foreign satellites matched U.S. resolution. Beijing goes further: under its revised 2017 Mapping Law, foreign cartographers must enter joint ventures, store raw data onshore, and publish it with the GCJ-02 “offset” grid to frustrate unauthorized reuse. India’s February 2021 Geospatial Guidelines likewise require submeter files to be processed and hosted on servers located in India, with fines for unlicensed exports or publication of sensitive layers.
Seoul describes its rule as a middle path – less restrictive than Beijing’s, more protective than Washington’s – but one justified by the presence of the Armistice line only 40 kilometers north of the capital.
Why Google Maps Can’t Guide You Through Seoul
Few realize that South Korea bars foreign companies from exporting the mapping data necessary for digital map services. That may soon change.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/why-google-maps-cant-guide-you-through-seoul/
By Tae Yeon Eom
July 03, 2025
Credit: Depositphotos
Every day hundreds of visitors step off the AREX train at Seoul Station, tap Google Maps, and discover that the blue-dot app they use everywhere from Berlin to Bangkok will not provide walking or driving directions in South Korea. Few realize that the country – alongside China, Iran, Syria, and only a handful of others – bars foreign companies from exporting centimeter-level mapping data. Even many South Koreans find out only when a friend messages, “Why won’t my phone show the route to your café?”
That blind spot sits at the center of a policy battle now in its third round. Google petitioned Seoul in 2007 and 2016 for permission to copy 1:5,000-scale digital maps to its offshore servers; regulators said no both times. In June of this year, Apple filed its own request, promising to accept Korean storage and masking rules, while Google renewed its application without making the same commitments. South Korea’s “map export panel” must deliver a verdict by August. Whether it loosens, tightens, or again postpones the ban will reverberate through national security planning, the domestic tech ecosystem, tourism earnings, and South Korea-U.S. trade diplomacy.
Security Shadows of an Unfinished War
South Korea’s map restrictions date to the 1970s, when the military government classified detailed cartography as a strategic asset. Today Article 16 of the Geospatial Information Management Act still states that government-produced survey data “shall not cross national borders” without unanimous Cabinet-level approval.
Critics argue that export bans are redundant because firms like Maxar and Airbus already market 30-centimeter commercial imagery of the Korean Peninsula, meaning that blacking-out road centerlines adds only a sliver of additional secrecy.
Defense experts argue that exporting the 1:5,000 base map would hand adversaries a precision targeting aid. They often cite Ukraine’s 2022 experience: when Google Earth refreshed satellite tiles, bloggers scraped the imagery and geolocated newly built military facilities, forcing Kyiv to ask Google to blur sensitive areas after the fact. Thus, some lawmakers and security experts counter that a low-resolution satellite photo shows a roofline, but an engineering-grade 1:5,000 high-resolution map pinpoints doors, guard posts, and buried cables. South Korean officers worry that once data leaves their jurisdiction they cannot compel immediate edits.
The peninsula remains technically at war, and key installations lie within range of North Korean artillery.
Seoul’s security ministries also cite international precedents. Until July 2020 Israel persuaded Washington to keep imagery of the Dimona reactor deliberately coarse under the Kyl–Bingaman Amendment, a curb only relaxed once foreign satellites matched U.S. resolution. Beijing goes further: under its revised 2017 Mapping Law, foreign cartographers must enter joint ventures, store raw data onshore, and publish it with the GCJ-02 “offset” grid to frustrate unauthorized reuse. India’s February 2021 Geospatial Guidelines likewise require submeter files to be processed and hosted on servers located in India, with fines for unlicensed exports or publication of sensitive layers.
Seoul describes its rule as a middle path – less restrictive than Beijing’s, more protective than Washington’s – but one justified by the presence of the Armistice line only 40 kilometers north of the capital.
Digital Sovereignty and Domestic Platforms
Security is only half the debate. Detailed maps underpin thriving Korean services: Naver Map, KakaoMap, and SKT’s T Map together cover almost 90 percent of local navigation traffic. Their success rests partly on Google’s handicap: once the U.S. tech giant gains equal data, domestic market share could collapse. Some South Korean experts warn that the platform economy “behaves like a winner-take-all contest. If Google raises accuracy to world standard, Naver and Kakao may shrink to boutique scale.”
Local innovators fear an uneven playing field if that asymmetry continues. Industry groups instead highlight a broader risk: South Korea’s $8 billion geospatial sector – about 6,000 mostly small firms that depend on state map layers – could be squeezed out if Google enters, recalling how a 2018 hike in Google Maps fees drove some South Korean start-ups offline.
Industry associations echo that concern. A survey of 235 spatial-data companies by the Korea Geospatial Information Industry Association found 90 percent oppose any blanket export approval, fearing that Google would fold South Korean content into its global cloud and resell it abroad. Many of those firms build indoor mapping, drone delivery grids, and digital-twin city models from the government base layer. Losing sole access could turn them from lead contractors into subcontractors overnight.
The fight has sharpened around server location. Google’s public list of hyperscale facilities names clusters in Tokyo, Osaka, Taiwan, and Singapore but still none in South Korea – so any bulk processing of 1:5,000 vectors would happen offshore. In 2016, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport told Google it could run full navigation if it stored the map on Korean soil and accepted the same masking regime as domestic apps. Google declined, arguing that its global infrastructure demands distributed storage.
Apple, by contrast, already maintains local server infrastructure. Apple signaled that it would mirror the map on local servers and blur, pixelate, or downgrade imagery around designated defense sites. That divergence lets South Korean regulators say the rule is conditional rather than protectionist. “The door is open; the companies choose whether to walk through,” one anonymous senior official said.
Yet Google’s most recent filing went further: the firm offered to blur sensitive areas but requested precise coordinates for every facility the government wants hidden. The episode has stiffened opposition inside the inter-agency panel.
Tourist Friction and the Promise of Bigger Crowds
Caught in the middle are ordinary people flummoxed by the sudden – and unexpected – inability to use Google Maps. A Canadian exchange student said she missed the airport limousine bus because “Google simply wouldn’t plot a walking route from the guesthouse.” In Daegu, taxi drivers reported that foreign backpackers often hand them Google Maps screenshots riddled with mistranslations and misplaced pins, slowing service. Street vendors in Myeong-dong added that although they have registered on Google Business, diners still cannot get turn-by-turn directions to their stalls.
Business groups on the other side highlight missed opportunities. A Yonsei University study projected that full Google Maps functionality – complete with 79-language support, offline downloads, and seamless ride-hail links – could attract an additional 6.8 million foreign visitors and $22.6 billion in tourism revenue by 2027.
Domestic apps are improving. Naver now offers English, Japanese, and Chinese interfaces; Kakao auto-translates user reviews into English. But they still require a Korean phone number for one-time PIN codes, and their payment links rarely integrate foreign credit cards. Industry consultants caution that the friction can deter repeat visits – vital for a country still chasing its pre-pandemic record of 17.5 million annual tourists.
Skeptics of the Google-led campaign counter that Apple has delivered basic navigation with only 1:25,000 data, proving that turn-by-turn service is technically feasible within current rules. For that camp, Google’s insistence on 1:5,000 files looks less like engineering necessity and more like corporate convenience.
Trade Diplomacy: A New Item on the Bilateral Menu
The map ban is no longer a strictly domestic matter. In March, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative labeled South Korea’s mapping rule a “digital trade barrier” in its annual National Trade Estimate report, grouping it with rice quotas and automotive tariffs. U.S. tech lobbies claim U.S. map providers lose roughly $130 million a year in South Korea because they cannot compete on equal footing.
Trade negotiations have presented Seoul with a dilemma. President Lee Jae-myung’s administration wants tariff relief on steel and auto exports; Washington, in turn, wants freer data flows. Reuters quoted Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo as saying the government is “studying all options” to create momentum in talks – remarks widely read as signaling flexibility on the map ban.
Still, any concession will draw backlash at home. Opposition lawmakers argue that yielding under U.S. pressure would set a precedent: if Seoul allows Google and Apple, Beijing could demand the same under China’s Data Security Law. To blunt such criticism, officials are weighing middle-ground options – releasing 1:5,000 vectors only for metropolitan areas while keeping border districts off limits, and letting foreign firms process the data on domestic servers while storing encrypted backups overseas – alongside a performance-bond mechanism that would penalize companies if they fail to blur newly designated security sites promptly.
Such calibrated terms could satisfy Washington’s market-access demands while preserving Seoul’s oversight, yet it remains unclear whether Google will invest in the infrastructure – and accept the liability – that those safeguards require.
Choosing a Path Forward
By early August, the inter-agency panel must either grant, deny, or extend Google’s and Apple’s petitions. Officials face four broad options: maintain a full ban, provide conditional approval, allow partial exports (for urban areas only), or approve unconditional exports. Each path has its pros and cons.
Keeping the full ban entails the lowest security risk and the highest protection for domestic platforms. However, it would invite possible U.S. retaliation in trade talks, while doing nothing to address tourist frustrations.
Giving conditional approval – pegged to the use of local servers and commitments to mask sensitive locations – would entail moderate risks to both national security and South Korean firms’ market share. It would, however, help ease U.S. pressure and remove a hurdle for foreign tourists – assuming firms like Google and Apple are willing to meet South Korea’s conditions.
Allowing the partial export of mapping data would similarly limit the security and economic risks to South Korea, while also limiting the benefits: USTR may still criticize the policy, and tourists would face obstacles in traveling outside of urban areas.
The final option is removing all barriers and allowing unconditional exports of the data. This involves the highest security risk, and would bring unbridled foreign competition to a previously protected sector. However, it would fully meet U.S. demands and maximize convenience for tourists.
Some experts hint that a conditional approval is most likely – especially if Apple accepts the onshore-storage formula. That would let Seoul claim it protected national interests while improving services for visitors and smoothing trade talks.
The Bottom Line
Whichever route South Korea chooses, other countries are watching closely. India mandates local storage for detailed maps; Indonesia and Vietnam are drafting similar regulations. A Seoul compromise could become a reference model: security clauses plus cloud flexibility. If South Korea instead holds the line, it will stand as proof that a democracy deeply tied to U.S. technology can still assert hard sovereignty over critical data. Either scenario will shape the next round of digital-trade norm-setting in the Indo-Pacific.
Google Maps’ silence on a Seoul street corner is not a simple technical glitch; it reflects a collision of defense realities, data-ownership philosophy, economic ambitions, and diplomatic bargaining. South Korea must decide whether the benefits of seamless global navigation outweigh the strategic comfort of keeping its most detailed map inside the peninsula.
When the map export panel votes later this summer, it will determine whether the fastest way to Gyeongbok Palace will appear on a tourists’ phone screen – or remain a mystery solved only by a local app and a crash course in Hangul.
Authors
Guest Author
Tae Yeon Eom
Tae Yeon Eom is a research scholar at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and a Ph.D. candidate in Asian Studies at the University of British Columbia (UBC), where he also serves as a sessional lecturer. Eom holds an MA in Asian Studies from UBC and an Honors BA in Political Science and East Asian Studies from the University of Toronto.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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