Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“I believe that every right implies a responsibility; every opportunity an obligation; every possession a duty.“

- John D. Rockefeller

“True ignorance is not the absence of knowledge, but the refusal to acquire it.”

- Karl Popper

“If you were going down the road, and don't like what's in front of you, and look behind you, and don't like what you see, get off the road. Create a new path!”

- Maya Angelou

1. The West Again Learns That War Needs Industry

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2023

3. SF Critical Threats Advisory Company (CTAC) Trains in Europe | SOF News

4. U.S. and China Look to Repair Ties, Again

5. Opinion | America Is Living on Borrowed Money

6. Austin Directs DOD Components to Reinforce Classified Safeguards Following Security Review

7. China’s Focus on the Brain Gives it an Edge in Cognitive Warfare

8. Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized

9. It's Time to Revise Guidance On Political Activities For Members of the U.S. Military

10. Putin’s Security Crisis

11. Belarus leader Lukashenko says Prigozhin back in Russia, Wagner deployment unclear

12. It’s Not the Plane, It’s the Pilot

13. Brig. Gen. Ryan Assumes Command of CSOJTF-L

14. The Surprising Bipartisanship of U.S. Foreign Policy

15. US in mad dash to get Sweden into NATO over opposition by Turkey, Hungary

16. China simulates ‘Z-day’ total sea war with the US

17. Exclusive: The CIA's blind spot about the Ukraine war

18. China Has Run a Spy Base in Cuba for Decades, Says Former Intelligence Officer

19. Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

20. What’s Special About Ukraine’s Frontline Information Warfare?

21. Vietnam bans 'Barbie' movie over South China Sea map

22. Former U.S. officials have held secret Ukraine talks with Russians

23. Opinion | Xi Jinping May Be Souring on His ‘Best, Most Intimate Friend’

24. Taiwan’s Will to Fight May Be Stronger Than You Think

25. James Dobbins, Diplomat and Nation-Building Expert, Dies at 81; Directed RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center

1. The West Again Learns That War Needs Industry

It has never been enough to outfight our enemies. The great strength of America has been that we can out produce, out equip, and "out-logistics" our adversaries. Have we lost that capability? Can the US defense industry support future US wars? Can we sustain our role as the Arsenal of democracy?

The West Again Learns That War Needs Industry

Biden and NATO leaders, fearing a war of attrition with Russia or China, will focus on rebuilding militaries and their supplies at coming summit

By Daniel MichaelsFollow

July 6, 2023 12:01 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-again-learns-that-war-needs-industry-33c8ca88?mod=hp_lead_pos7

Behind the deadly front lines where Ukrainian and Russian soldiers are locked in combat, a less-noticed life-or-death battle is raging to keep troops supplied with arms and ammunition. The side that loses that fight is the one that will lose the war. It is a lesson Washington is relearning.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed huge shortfalls in Western defense-industry capacity and organization. The U.S. and its allies aren’t prepared to fight a protracted war in the Pacific, and would struggle with a long European conflict.

As Adm. Rob Bauer, a top military officer at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, puts it: “Every war, after about five or six days, becomes about logistics.”

NATO’s Adm. Rob Bauer, right, says the defense industry needs more private-sector support. PHOTO: OLIVIER HOSLET/SHUTTERSTOCK

If the U.S. clashed head-on with Russia or China, stocks of precision weaponry could be used up in hours or days. Other vital supplies would run out soon after.

Many governments are starting to respond. The U.S. is increasing arms production after decades of focus on terrorism and homeland security. French President Emmanuel Macron has pledged a “war economy” to boost military supplies. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has shed Berlin’s longstanding disdain for military spending.

It is a pivot with echoes of the last century, when the U.S. repeatedly swung its economy to fight wars and face down enemies. Woodrow Wilson nationalized America’s railroads in 1917, and in 1942 Detroit lurched from making cars to churning out tanks and bombers. The Cold War spawned the military-industrial complex.

Nobody’s ready to test those extremes today. To handle newly aggressive adversaries without commandeering industries or exploding national budgets, Washington and its allies will need to try fresh approaches to developing, buying and maintaining military supplies.

“The defense-industrial base that served us after World War II and helped us prevail in the Cold War isn’t the one that is going to help us prevail against China,” says Joseph Votel, a retired four-star Army general who led Special Operations Command and now heads Business Executives for National Security, a nonprofit started in 1982 to bring private-sector know-how to the Pentagon.

The first step will be spending more on defense across the West. In 2014, after Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine and fomented rebellion in the country’s east, NATO members pledged to spend at least 2% of their gross domestic product on defense by 2024.

Washington and its allies need to try fresh approaches to developing, buying and maintaining military supplies. PHOTO: VALDA KALNINA/SHUTTERSTOCK

The military needs huge quantities of some items, such as artillery shells and rifles. PHOTO: VADIM GHIRDA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Only the U.S. and a handful of other members do that so far, though war in Ukraine may finally have broken the logjam. Around half of NATO’s 31 members could hit 2% next year, alliance diplomats say.

Ambitions are increasing, too. When NATO leaders meet in Lithuania next week for their annual summit, they expect to cement 2% of GDP as the spending minimum, not an aspiration. Over the past year, NATO and the European Union have also assumed new roles coordinating and consolidating arms procurement to boost efficiency and accelerate rearmament.

But more is needed, say Votel and his colleagues, starting with a new postindustrial mind-set. Many see a model in how Ukraine is drawing expertise from across society to develop defensive systems that bridge advanced digital savvy and grease-covered Soviet hardware.

First, say advocates of a new approach, the Pentagon should acknowledge it no longer owns the cutting edge of technology—even though it once launched transformative innovations, such as the internet and GPS.

“Our nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond,” a panel of former top Defense Department officials said in a recent report for the Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank. “But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate and field these technologies into military applications.”

The commission, led by former Defense Secretary Mark Esper, offered 10 recommendations that ranged from encouraging tech companies to do business with the Pentagon to modernizing its budgeting documents.

Others say that rather than conceiving multidecade moonshots, as in the Cold War, the Pentagon should learn to quickly draw on existing innovations, as smaller allies have done, and Ukraine is doing.

“The Defense Department set itself up to export technology,” says James “Hondo” Geurts, a former assistant secretary of the Navy and Air Force officer with extensive acquisitions experience. “Now it needs to become a smart importer of technology.”

On the Florida panhandle, a gaggle of military brainstorming centers are working to test what is possible outside a war zone. Defensewerx, a nonprofit organization closely tied to the Pentagon, links the defense establishment with small businesses and academia, working to bring innovation and a disrupter mentality to arms development and contracting.

A challenge, say skeptics, is that projects launched in a military “Monster Garage” often founder at industrial scale.

Defense is massively expensive, and not just for cutting-edge equipment. PHOTO: MUSTAFA YALCIN/ANADOLU AGENCY/GETTY IMAGES

Defense planners must also get more entrepreneurial, say advocates of change—and some are already. NATO’s Bauer recently flew to the Pacific coast in Los Angeles, not for naval maneuvers but to address a finance-oriented conference.

“We need private investors to support the defense industry,” the Dutch officer told the Milken Institute’s global gathering in May.

Defense is massively expensive, and not just Top Gun equipment such as F-35 jet fighters costing around $100 million apiece. The Navy has estimated that a 20-year modernization of four major shipyards, which maintain aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines and average a century old, will cost $21 billion—and a senior Government Accountability Office official last year called those estimates “wildly off point.”

The protracted refurbishment limits repair capacity, leaving warships at pier awaiting work and reducing America’s active fleet available for threat response. Multibillion-dollar assets idly aging in saltwater cost taxpayers, warn critics.

Rather than drag out shipyard renovations over two decades, says Sam Cole, a finance-sector professional who serves on the BENS board under Votel, it would make more sense to get the work done quickly so the yards are fully functional sooner.

The Pentagon could struggle to fund all that, given government budgeting rules, Cole acknowledged. Instead, it could take a more private-sector approach to financing by turning to debt markets, raising around $50 billion and completing the work in about four years.

“Being able to tap capital markets would enable you to put the project on steroids,” says Cole.

Funding defense outside the Pentagon’s budget would break tradition, but advocates note that other parts of the government already do it. The Commerce and Agriculture departments are leveraging capital markets to finance investments in necessities from microchips to fertilizer.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin last December took a step in that direction, launching the Office of Strategic Capital, an in-house tech incubator empowered to partner with private financiers. The Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or Darpa, has gained legendary status for its role helping fund Silicon Valley’s rise, but its financial firepower is limited.

The OSC is unusual for the Pentagon because it can employ loans, guarantees and other financial tools not typically used by the U.S. military, which relies mainly on contracts and grants. It aims to help startups grow and work with the Pentagon, and to nurture new technologies that may support defense. At its launch, officials noted that while the Defense Department has rich programs to foster innovation, Pentagon contracting and legal rules pose daunting hurdles for startups.

The U.S. Navy has estimated that a 20-year modernization of four major shipyards will cost $21 billion. PHOTO: SPENCER PLATT/GETTY IMAGES

In rebuilding military industries, small business also needs attention. Defense giants once tapped supply chains that extended to thousands of workshops supplying basic components. Industry consolidation, globalization and shrinking demand after the Cold War eroded that base. Today, subcontractors are as likely to be independent software developers as metal-bashers, but they face similar headaches with business fundamentals such as financing research and development.

Defense giants handling massive arms projects generally work on a cost basis, meaning they can usually hand the Pentagon a bill for their R&D spending, says Frank Finelli, another finance professional on the BENS board. But almost all midsize companies in the defense industry are subcontractors, so are unable to pass along development costs.

“You’re asking me to invest my own money in R&D” for the Pentagon, Finelli says he hears from smaller companies. The U.S., the world’s financial-markets leader, should be able to find a solution, he says. “This is about having access to financial agility at scale.”

Agility is increasingly vital in manufacturing, too. The F-35, America’s newest jet fighter, is a marvel of networked computers that can hover and fly supersonic. But much of it is still built by hand in a Texas factory where each plane steps along an assembly line from one production station to the next, notes Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security.

The Pentagon’s next generation of equipment will need to rely on commercial industries’ advances in production technologies, from 3-D printing to factory automation, says Pettyjohn. “New manufacturing systems for new defense systems will be critical.”

Equally ripe for an overhaul is how the Pentagon turns ideas into equipment. The military needs eye-popping quantities of some items, such as artillery shells and rifles, but a lot of equipment is needed in versions customized for specific tasks, which can vary widely across services and in elite units such as special forces.

How to combine mass production and variety has long plagued defense planners. The F-35 was envisioned 30 years ago as a single low-cost plane with different options for the Air Force, Navy and Marines. But in traditional fashion, costs and complexity ballooned as delays mounted.

“The Defense Department has a poor track record in rapid development and production,” says Pettyjohn. “They’ve shot for the moon on everything.”

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2023

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of missile strikes targeting Russian rear positions along the entire front overnight and during the day on July 5.
Ukrainian and Russian officials maintained their heightened rhetoric regarding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5 following significant claims of a possible attack against the plant overnight on July 4-5. Russia likely continues setting informational conditions for a possible false flag attack against the ZNPP, but remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at this time.
Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to procure Iranian-made Shahed drones and is setting conditions to manufacture these drones in Russia with Iran’s assistance.
The Kremlin continues to show concern over the risk of a potential armed rebellion in Russia after Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.
The Financial Times (FT) reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping personally warned Russian President Vladimir Putin against threatening to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during his visit to Moscow in late March.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin dismissed Sergei Mikhailov from his position as General Director of TASS state newswire and replaced him with Andrey Kondrashov.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Russian and Ukrainian forces continued skirmishing around Kreminna.
Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces liberated an important height near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk Oblast-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
A Ukrainian official confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s hybrid cryptomobilization and contract service recruitment campaigns have failed to produce large numbers of recruits, contrary to Russian claims.
Russian officials are setting information conditions to postpone regional elections in occupied Ukraine likely out of concerns for successful Ukrainian counteroffensives.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 5, 2023

Jul 5, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 5, 2023, 8:25pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on July 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage posted on July 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southwest of Bakhmut.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in an unspecified area on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[2] Ukrainian MP Yuriy Mysyagin stated that Ukrainian forces established a new position north of Opytne (6km northwest of the outskirts of Donetsk City) along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults in the Lyman direction, the Bakhmut direction, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, on the border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff General Oleksii Hromov reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces have advanced 7.5km into Russian-controlled territory in western Zaporizhia Oblast and along the administrative border between the Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.[5] Hromov stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated nine settlements and 160 square kilometers of territory since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4.[6]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of missile strikes targeting Russian rear positions along the entire front overnight and during the day on July 5. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast (6km northeast of Donetsk City).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot in Makiivka and that Ukrainian forces are regularly launching missile strikes against rear Russian targets in Ukraine.[8] Geolocated images published on July 5 also show apparent Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions near Debaltseve (52km northeast of Donetsk City).[9] Geolocated footage published on July 5 also shows the aftermath of an alleged Ukrainian strike on a railway station in Yasynuvata (6km northeast of Donetsk City).[10] Geolocated images published on July 5 shows the aftermath of an alleged HIMARS rocket strike on a Russian occupation administration building in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast (35km southwest of Donetsk City).[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Yakymivka (16km southwest of Melitopol) and attempted to strike Berdyansk in Zaporizhia Oblast with Storm Shadow Cruise missiles.[12] Russian sources claimed that Russian air defense systems shot down a Ukrainian missile in the vicinity of Berdyansk.[13] A local Kherson Oblast Telegram channel also claimed that Russian air defenses were activated near Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast (60km southeast of Kherson City).[14]

The footage and claims of these Ukrainian strikes suggest that Ukrainian forces launched a coordinated series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian logistics and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) throughout the theater. United Kingdom Chief of the Defense Staff Admiral Sir Antony David Radakin stated on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are conducting an operation to “starve, stretch, and strike” Russian forces to break down Russian defensive lines.[15] A widespread strike series targeting Russian GLOCs and logistics would be an appropriate element of such a strategy and is partially reminiscent of the interdiction campaign that Ukrainian forces conducted as a part of the Kherson counteroffensive.[16] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.[17] A possible Ukrainian interdiction campaign supporting this effort would have cumulative effects, and its results would not be immediately evident.

Ukrainian and Russian officials maintained their heightened rhetoric regarding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5 following significant claims of a possible attack against the plant overnight on July 4-5.[18] Russia likely continues setting informational conditions for a possible false flag attack against the ZNPP but remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at this time. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russia may attack the ZNPP to either accomplish its military goals in the area — presumably deterring any possible Ukrainian counteroffensive near the Kakhovka Reservoir — or to intimidate and blame Ukrainian forces for any attacks against the ZNPP.[19] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the General Staff’s Main Operational Department, Oleksii Hromov stated that the situation at the ZNPP is not new and that Ukrainian forces have the necessary equipment to handle radiological incidents.[20] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that there is a “great threat” that Ukraine may sabotage the ZNPP with “catastrophic consequences.”[21] ISW continues to assess that Russian statements accusing Ukraine of imminent sabotage against the ZNPP are likely part of a broader information operation aimed at undermining support for Ukraine ahead of the upcoming NATO summit and dissuading Ukrainian forces from counteroffensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[22]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on July 5 that IAEA experts at the ZNPP have requested access to nuclear reactors no. 3 and 4 and other areas at the ZNPP following Ukrainian statements that Russian forces placed explosives on the reactors’ outer roofs.[23] Grossi’s statement on the importance of accessing certain areas of the ZNPP — along with consistent prior statements to the same effect — indicates that Russian authorities are denying the IAEA contingent access to various critical areas at the ZNPP and are unlikely to allow access in the future.[24] Russian authorities may refuse access to reactors no 3. and 4 to prevent the IAEA from investigating the Ukrainian reports on these reactors. Satellite imagery published on July 5 shows unknown objects on the roofs of one of the ZNPP reactor containment units, reportedly reactor no. 4, placed there after July 3.[25] Though the exact nature of these objects is unknown, their presence on the reactor containment unit roof, recent Ukrainian reports, and significant alarm over the ZNPP underscore the importance of Russia’s refusal to give the IAEA access to critical ZNPP areas to investigate possible threats to the plant.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to procure Iranian-made Shahed drones and is setting conditions to manufacture these drones in Russia with Iran’s assistance. Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff General Oleksii Hromov stated that Russia received up to 1,800 drones from Iran - of which 1,600 are of the Shahed-type and 200 of unspecified types.[26] Hromov added that Iran consistently replenishes Russian stocks of Iranian drones, and that Russia reached an agreement with Iran to produce drones in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian and Iranian officials are planning to set up the production of Iranian Shahed drones on the territory of Yelabuga in the Republic of Tatarstan given that this settlement is the provisional headquarters of the Yelabuga Free Economic Zone.[27] Russia previously used Yelabuga Free Economic Zone exclusively for civilian industrial and economic projects before turning the project into a key focus of Russia’s military industry. The Resistance Center reported that Iran will provide Russia with necessary components that will then be assembled in Russia. The Resistance Center, citing open-source intelligence, reported that Russian leadership intends to train Yelabuga specialists in Iran to assemble Shaheds and transfer the production of some Shahed components to the territory of the Yelabuga Free Economic Zone. The Resistance Center added that Russia wants to establish an automated production line.

The Kremlin continues to show concern over the risk of a potential armed rebellion in Russia after Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24. A pro-Kremlin online outlet reported that the Moscow Oblast police will train in urban combat tactics, light machine gun shooting, grenade throwing, and tactical medicine to improve skills in the aftermath of Wagner’s armed rebellion.[28] Such training indicates that the Kremlin is attempting to improve the ability of security forces in Moscow to defend the regime against potential future threats. Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs is unlikely to adequately prepare the Moscow Oblast police for urban combat given that some police elements are already expressing disinterest with the new training plans among many other problems with this plan. The outlet stated that Moscow Oblast’s female police officers are also trying to avoid the training.

The Financial Times (FT) reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping personally warned Russian President Vladimir Putin against threatening to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during his visit to Moscow in late March.[29] FT reported, citing unnamed former Chinese government officials, that Xi told Putin not to use nuclear weapons and noted that China’s stance against the use of nuclear weapons was included in its position paper on peace in Ukraine. FT reported that Xi’s warning to Putin was likely part of China’s efforts to bolster its relationships with the European Union. Western security officials also noted that Putin was disappointed after Xi’s visit to Moscow did not secure any important gains for Russia such as the approval of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline. ISW previously assessed that Xi may have played a role in pressuring the Kremlin to reduce its nuclear threats in November 2022 and that Putin was unable to secure the desired no-limits bilateral partnership with China during Xi’s visit to Moscow.[30]

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin dismissed Sergei Mikhailov from his position as General Director of TASS state newswire and replaced him with Andrey Kondrashov.[31] Mikhailov took over TASS in 2012 and rebranded the news agency into the modern publication it is today.[32] Kondrashov has previously made documentaries about the annexation of Crimea and Putin’s life and was the press secretary for Putin’s campaign headquarters in 2018.[33] Ukrainian sources suggested that Kondrashov’s appointment might indicate that the Kremlin is unhappy with the media coverage of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion and highlights the continued importance of loyalty to Putin over professional achievement.[34]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of missile strikes targeting Russian rear positions along the entire front overnight and during the day on July 5.
Ukrainian and Russian officials maintained their heightened rhetoric regarding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5 following significant claims of a possible attack against the plant overnight on July 4-5. Russia likely continues setting informational conditions for a possible false flag attack against the ZNPP, but remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at this time.
Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to procure Iranian-made Shahed drones and is setting conditions to manufacture these drones in Russia with Iran’s assistance.
The Kremlin continues to show concern over the risk of a potential armed rebellion in Russia after Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.
The Financial Times (FT) reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping personally warned Russian President Vladimir Putin against threatening to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during his visit to Moscow in late March.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin dismissed Sergei Mikhailov from his position as General Director of TASS state newswire and replaced him with Andrey Kondrashov.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Russian and Ukrainian forces continued skirmishing around Kreminna.
Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces liberated an important height near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk Oblast-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
A Ukrainian official confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s hybrid cryptomobilization and contract service recruitment campaigns have failed to produce large numbers of recruits, contrary to Russian claims.
Russian officials are setting information conditions to postpone regional elections in occupied Ukraine likely out of concerns for successful Ukrainian counteroffensives.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on July 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults south of Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), west of Novovodyane (17km southwest of Svatove), and on Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[36] A Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian forces cleared a depot and an industrial zone in the southwestern part of Novoselivske and established positions on two unspecified streets in the settlement.[37] The source claimed that Russian forces are continuing to fight for control over Novoselivske. Geolocated footage published on July 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces just north of Novoselivske along the N26 highway.[38] Another Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian forces attacked the Novoselivske and Novovodyane areas.[39]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in combat around Kreminna on July 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions south of Dibrova (4km southwest of Kreminna).[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Russian Central Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian advances on Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) and Dibrova, and that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Serebryanka (11km southwest of Kreminna and likely referring to the Serebryanske forest area) and Torske (13km west of Kreminna).[41] A Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian forces attacked the Serebryanske forest area towards Hryhorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and in the direction of Yampil (18km southwest of Kreminna).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted two unsuccessful breakthroughs near Makiivka and that Russian artillery units repelled a Ukrainian advance on Russian positions near Dibrova.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian Airborne Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults on the Torske salient.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on July 5. Geolocated footage posted on July 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southwest of Bakhmut.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), and south of Berkhivka.[46] The General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct offensive operations to the north and south of Bakhmut City and have entrenched themselves in new positions.[47] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are storming Russian positions on the northern approaches of Bakhmut and have recaptured unspecified areas.[48] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in an unspecified area on Bakhmut‘s southern flank and that it is difficult for Russian forces to maneuver within Bakhmut.[49]

Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces liberated an important height near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) but have not liberated the settlement itself.[50] One milblogger claimed that the settlement of Klishchiivka, which is still under Russian control, is not as important as the heights in and around the settlement.[51] Another milblogger claimed that it is pointless to hold Klishchiivka and additional territory up to the Bakhmutka River without control of the heights that surround it.[52] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov claimed that Ukrainian forces have conducted an average of 20 unsuccessful attacks against Russian positions per day over the course of four days in the Klishchiivka area.[53] A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger refuted another Russian report that Russian forces had withdrawn from Klishchiivka, instead claiming that some Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups only gained a foothold in Klishchiivka.[54] Several milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps) and “Storm-Z” detachments are operating in the Klishchiivka area.[55] ISW previously reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin accused the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of abandoning a strategic position in Bakhmut which resulted in 500 Wagner casualties and that Storm-Z detachments received a remarkably short amount of time for training before being deployed.[56]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 5. Geolocated footage posted on July 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced west of Vesele (6km north of Avdiivka).[57] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian forces defended against Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka and Marinka areas.[58] Malyar also stated that Russian forces attacked in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions but did not advance.[59] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Valery Shershen stated that Russian forces carried out 17 unsuccessful assaults in the Marinka direction.[60] Shershen noted that Russian forces previously used ”meat grinder” assaults but have recently started using small groups of 8-10 people to attack.[61] Shershen suggested that Russian forces are starting to run out of personnel to expend in larger attacks and are also trying to protect equipment.[62] Ukrainian MP Yuriy Mysyagin claimed that Ukrainian forces established a new position north of Opytne (6km northwest of the outskirts of Donetsk City) after pushing Russian forces from these positions.[63] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Southern Group of Forces repelled nine Ukrainian attacks near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka), and Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka) in Donetsk Oblast.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Chechen “Sever-Akhmat” Regiment (part of the 78th Special Purpose Motorized Rifle Regiment, 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating in Marinka.[65]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on July 5. Footage posted on July 4 shows elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) storming Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[66] ISW has recently observed artillery elements of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operating on the western outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[67]

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk Oblast-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 5. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled small Ukrainian ground attacks near Staromaiorske and Urozhaine (both about 8km south of Velyka Novosilka).[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Russian forces attacked near Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[69] Ukrainian officials acknowledged continued Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area.[70] Geolocated footage dated July 3 shows burning Russian armor north of Pryyutne; it is unclear whether Ukrainian forces hold the village, however.[71]

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 5. The Russian MoD claimed on July 5 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack near Zherebyanky (26km southwest of Orikhiv).[72] Russian sources continued to claim that small Ukrainian assault groups attacked Robotyne, Nesteryanka, and Kopani (all within 7-12km south of Orikhiv).[73] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks but did not advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[74] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have advanced to positions immediately south of Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) as of July 4.[75]

A Ukrainian official confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Natalya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces conduct reconnaissance against existing Ukrainian positions in an unspecified area of the east bank of Kherson Oblast using small sabotage and reconnaissance groups on boats.[76] Humenyuk also stated that Russian forces recaptured former positions in the east bank of Kherson Oblast that Russian forces lost due to flooding from the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam destruction. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their positions on the east bank near the Antonivsky Bridge.[77] The milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to transfer two small groups of reinforcements from the west (right) bank to the east bank and that Russian forces are increasingly using airstrikes against the Ukrainian positions.[78] Some milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian military command for continuing to impale Russian infantry against Ukrainian east bank positions despite sustaining high losses and despite the lack of threat to broader Russian positions in east bank Kherson Oblast posed by limited Ukrainian positions on the east bank.[79] Russian sources indicated that elements of the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet) and 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are conducting reconnaissance against and striking Ukrainian forces in the area.[80]

Russian occupation authorities claimed to have resolved the severe traffic jams to the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 5 following four days of severe issues.[81] Crimean Occupation Transportation Minister Mikhail Lukashenko claimed that there were no traffic jams at either the Kerch or Taman entrance to the Kerch Strait Bridge as of midday on July 5.[82] Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian authorities on July 4 to increase the use of ferry crossings and even allocate Russian MoD resources to resolving the Kerch Strait Bridge traffic issues.[83] It is unclear to what extent the Russian occupation authorities will be able to mitigate traffic issues along this critical logistics line given the continued promotion of occupied Crimea as a tourist destination for Russian civilians.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s hybrid crypto-mobilization and contract service recruitment campaigns have failed to produce large numbers of recruits contrary to Russian claims. Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff General Oleksii Hromov reported on July 5 that since the beginning of the spring conscription cycle in April 2023 Russian officials have recruited only 6,000 to 15,000 people for contract service – significantly short of a reported Russian recruitment target for 500,000 people in an unspecified time period.[84] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously claimed on June 13 that the Russian military recruited 150,000 contract servicemembers as well as over 6,000 volunteers since January 2023, although Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev previously claimed on May 19 that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel into volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.[85] It is unclear if Putin conflated the number of contract servicemen with the total number of Russian personnel who have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) since January given Medvedev’s and Hromov’s contrary reporting. Hromov also reported that Russian officials have yet to conduct a convict recruitment campaign on the scale that the Wagner Group did in the fall of 2022, which reportedly produced 27,000 Wagner convict recruits.[86] Bloomberg reported on July 4 that the MoD has recruited 15,000 convict recruits since taking over prison recruitment from the Wagner Group in February 2023, with 2,000 convict recruits currently serving in specialized “Storm-Z” assault detachments.[87] Hromov reported that Russian officials are attempting to quickly improve the results of their force generation efforts by formally integrating all Russian private military companies (PMC), which Hromov reported had an estimated strength of 40,000 personnel, into the Russian Armed Forces.[88] Hromov added that this formalized subordination of PMCs into the Russian military will not include the Wagner Group.[89]

Ukrainian officials reported that newly formed Russian formations will not be combat-ready until at least 2024 and that they may not be adhering to normal Russian echelon structures.[90] Hromov stated that Russian forces have formed the 25th Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District and the 40th Army Corps of the Southern Military District as part of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s proposal to create 20 new divisions.[91] ISW previously observed residents of the Russian Far East receiving messages inviting men to join the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army and Russian officials actively trying to staff motorized rifle battalions of the newly formed 40th Army Corps.[92] Hromov stated that the 25th Combined Arms Army will include a motorized rifle division with two motorized rifle brigades and a tank brigade and that the 40th Army Corps will include a motorized rifle division and a brigade.[93] Russian combined arms armies and corps typically adhere to a structure in which divisions have organic subordinated regiments that operate with the support of their parent division while Russian brigades are not subordinate to divisions and are structured to operate more independently. The Russian military previously formed the 3rd Army Corps (Western Military District) in the summer of 2022 mainly with volunteer units and a division of the 3rd Army Corps appeared to operate with at least one subordinated brigade.[94] Shoigu previously stated that the MoD would form a “reserve army,” likely in reference to the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army and the 40th Army Corps, by the end of June and that five regiments of the “reserve army“ were already 60 percent staffed as of June 22.[95] The lack of visibility on these formations’ force structure prevents assessing their actual adherence to Russian doctrinal echelon structures impossible at this time.

Hromov also reported that the Wagner Group is continuing to recruit personnel in Russia.[96] Hromov stated that Wagner personnel are still deploying to regular collection points and then redeploying to the Wagner training center in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai.[97] Hromov added that Russian mobilized recruits are attempting to sign contracts with Wagner instead of the MoD.[98] Hromov also reported that Wagner will likely train some personnel in Belarus before sending them to operations abroad.[99]

Russia may be prioritizing the production of certain armaments and equipment due to constraints on Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Hromov reported that Russia can produce 100 missiles in a month, including up to 10 Iskander missiles, 30 sea-based Kalibr missiles, and up to 60 cruise missiles.[100] Hromov stated that Russia is able to maintain this production pace for certain weapons systems thanks to intensified round-the-clock operations at military industrial enterprises and sanctions evasion schemes.[101] Hromov stated that the Kalashnikov Group’s Izhevsk Mechanical Plant joint-stock company in Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic, has mass-produced 900 Lancet drones in an unspecified period of time, 850 of which Russian forces have already used in Ukraine.[102] United Kingdom Chief of the Defense Staff Admiral Sir Antony David Radakin stated on July 4 that Russia can only produce 200 tanks per year after suffering up to 2,500 tank losses in Ukraine and can produce only a million artillery shells per year after firing 10 million shells in Ukraine in 2022 alone.[103] This rate of production would allow Russia to replenish likely tank losses within roughly 12 years and allow Russian forces to fire roughly 2,700 artillery shells a day not counting existing stocks. Russian forces reportedly were firing 20,000 shells per day in late December 2022, already 40,000 fewer than during the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[104] Russian milbloggers have once again started to claim that Russian forces are currently facing shortages of artillery ammunition in certain sectors of the front in Ukraine.[105] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service also reported that the Motovilikha Plant public joint stock company in Perm Oblast, which produces Grad, Smerch, and Tornado-G MLRS systems recently sold land and property worth 59.5 million rubles ($650,000) as part of its ongoing bankruptcy.[106] It is unclear why Russia is able to maintain the production of more complex systems that require components more heavily targeted by Western sanctions like missiles while it struggles to produce simpler types of equipment and ammunition. Russian officials may be prioritizing the production of missiles and loitering munitions over armored vehicles and artillery shells, although such a prioritization should not immediately constrain the production of those other systems and ammunition under normal conditions. It is possible that bottlenecks or organizational or human capital constraints within Russia’s DIB are forcing Russian officials to choose which systems and armaments to produce at a rate near what Russian operations in Ukraine require.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials are setting information conditions to postpone regional elections in occupied Ukraine likely out of concern for successful Ukrainian counteroffensives. The Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration announced that regional elections will take place from September 8 to September 10 in occupied Kherson Oblast and noted that the Russian Central Election Committee can postpone elections if there are “safety” threats in the region.[107]

Russia adopted a five-year development plan to construct a federal highway to occupied Ukrainian territories. Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin announced in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials that occupation administrations signed a memorandum for the development of road networks and adopted a resolution on the creation of a network of federal highways.[108]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Ukrainian officials’ assessment of the number of Russian servicemen training in Belarus increased between early June and early July. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksii Hromov, stated that 3,000 to 5,000 Russian mobilized servicemen are training at Belarusian training centers as of July 5.[109] Ukrainian officials stated that there were approximately 1,000 Russian military personnel in Belarus as of early June 2023.[110] Geolocated footage posted on July 5 shows Russian troops at the Polonka Train Station in Albinki, Brest Oblast, Belarus (within six kilometers of the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground).[111]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Russia likely has not deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus as of July 5. Hromov stated that Russia likely has not yet deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus and noted that the construction of special hardened storage facilities necessary to store tactical nuclear weapons is a complex process.[112] Hromov presumably meant that Ukrainian officials have not yet seen evidence of the construction of the storage sites necessary to store Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. ISW has not observed any imagery of the construction of such facilities in Belarus. Hromov’s statement directly contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s claims that Russia already deployed some tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus in June 2023.[113] Any confirmable construction of a special hardened storage facility necessary to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus would be more significant than the construction of the suspected Wagner Group basecamp in Asipovichy which has received much media attention.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. SF Critical Threats Advisory Company (CTAC) Trains in Europe | SOF News

SF Critical Threats Advisory Company (CTAC) Trains in Europe | SOF News

sof.news · by DVIDS · July 6, 2023

By Anthony Bryant.

SARAJEVO, Bosnia-Herzegovina – Forty miles southwest of Sarajevo, enemies are holed up in an underground government facility built inside a mountain during the Cold War to protect a former Yugoslav president against nuclear attack.

From a Sarajevo compound, U.S. Army Green Berets assigned to the Critical Threats Advisory Company (CTAC) take off to raid the 70,000-square-foot protective bunker alongside Bosnia-Herzegovina State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) officials May 8, 2023.

Three nondescript houses disguise each entrance to the facility. Through the houses and inside the labyrinthine structure, intermittent volleys of gunfire with the enemy reverberate through tunnel corridors. Room by room, the combined force of assaulters systematically clear the protective bunker.

This raid was the culmination exercise of a six-week-long Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) focused on close-quarters battle (CQB) and small unit tactics.

“It was a time-sensitive target so the planning cycle was condensed,” said the troop leader assigned to CTAC, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) – a highly lethal force capable of collaborating with elite Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements worldwide. “The bunker has small hallways and small rooms…I wanted to raid the bunker to see how the team would react; to see how I would command and control.”

The 100-room structure was selected as a target to test the force’s methods due to its complexity and extensive size.

Providing solutions for the most sensitive problems and succeeding is paramount, said the Special Support Unit (SSU) Executive Officer, a SIPA official with over thirty years of police experience. The mission’s challenging location, time constraints and finite resources presented a nightmare scenario that compelled partners to combine efforts, overcome adversity and get results.

The mission succeeded, shortfalls and gaps were identified, and both sides provided recommendations for future reference, said the SSU executive officer. Experience and lessons learned from the CTAC are valuable resources that will align the SSU in solving complex problems.

“I do truly believe that the systems were tested that day,” said the CTAC troop leader. “We definitely learned lessons working with a new partner force which is key in refining troop standards. It’s the Green Beret way.”

**********

This story by Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant of U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) was first published on June 28, 2023 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Photo: Green Berets with Critical Threats Advisory Company (CTAC), 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), access a tunnel inside a protective bunker near Konjic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 8, 2023. U.S. Special Forces teamed up with the Bosnia-Herzegovina State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) to strengthen close-quarters battle alongside the country’s premier counterterrorism force in the event of real-world crisis response. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant) (This photo has been altered for security purposes.)

sof.news · by DVIDS · July 6, 2023

4. U.S. and China Look to Repair Ties, Again

Can ties be repaired? Does China want ties "repaired?"

U.S. and China Look to Repair Ties, Again

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen arrives in Beijing as Washington and Beijing trade new export restrictions

By Chun Han Wong

July 6, 2023 4:44 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-and-china-look-to-repair-ties-again-9e200b10?mod=hp_lead_pos4

SINGAPORE—U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing last month was billed as an effort to put a floor under fast-deteriorating ties between the world’s two biggest economies.

In the weeks that followed, if anything, the U.S.-China relationship has gotten rockier.

On Thursday, as a fresh emissary from the Biden administration, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, arrives in Beijing, some Chinese observers have struck a cautiously optimistic tone, saying her meetings could help establish more avenues for dialogue between two governments that have struggled to maintain high-level talks in recent years.

From Beijing’s perspective, “Yellen is a more rational voice on China issues within the Biden administration,” said Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Shanghai’s Fudan University.

Opinion | America Is Living on Borrowed Money

The New York Times · by The Editorial Board · July 5, 2023

The Editorial Board

America Is Living on Borrowed Money

July 5, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Illustration by Rebecca Chew/The New York Times

The editorial board is a group of opinion journalists whose views are informed by expertise, research, debate and certain longstanding values. It is separate from the newsroom.

The federal debt is as old as the nation, and adding to it is sometimes prudent. For governments confronting “existential crises” like wars or pandemics, borrowing makes sense as a way to mobilize national resources, as the economist Barry Eichengreen wrote in the 2021 book, “In Defense of Public Debt.” Government borrowing and spending are necessary to stimulate the economy during recessions. And Treasuries, safe and liquid, play a critical role in the global financial system — so much so that in the late 1990s, when a period of economic growth and reduced military spending allowed the government to sharply reduce borrowing, economists and bankers raised alarms about the consequences of too little federal debt.

The United States, however, now borrows heavily during periods of economic growth to meet basic and ongoing obligations. It’s increasingly unsustainable. Over the next decade, the Congressional Budget Office projects that annual federal budget deficits will average around $2 trillion per year, adding to the $25.4 trillion in debt the government already owes to investors.

Borrowing is expensive. A mounting share of federal revenue, money that could be used for the benefit of the American people, goes right back out the door in the form of interest payments to investors who purchase government bonds. Rather than collecting taxes from the wealthy, the government is paying the wealthy to borrow their money.

By 2029, the government is on pace to spend more each year on interest than on national defense, according to the Congressional Budget Office. By 2033, interest payments will consume an amount equal to 3.6 percent of the nation’s economic output.

Before the pandemic, a decade of very low interest rates meant that even as the federal debt swelled, interest payments remained relatively modest. Measured as a share of the national economy, the federal debt was roughly twice as large at the beginning of 2020 as it was at the beginning of 1990, but the burden of interest payments was barely half as large.

The era of low interest rates has ended, however. The cost of living on borrowed money is rising. It is imperative for the nation’s leaders to chart a new course.

Although one wouldn’t know it from the celebrations in Washington last month, the deal reached to raise the debt ceiling does not amount to a meaningful start. Democrats agreed to modest spending cuts; Republicans refused to consider any measures to increase revenue. The result? Before the deal, the C.B.O. projected the debt would reach roughly $46.7 trillion in 2033. After the deal, it projected the total would be only marginally smaller, at $45.2 trillion. That would equal 115 percent of the nation’s annual economic output, the highest level on record.

Both parties say they understand the need for larger changes.

“We’re going to do even more to reduce the deficit,” President Biden declared in a speech from the Oval Office after Congress voted to raise the debt ceiling.

House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, acknowledging that the legislation didn’t amount to much, said after the vote that he intended to form a bipartisan commission “so we can find the waste and we can make the real decisions to really take care of this debt.”

The talk, however, is hard to take seriously. Republicans evidently are not concerned about the debt. Every time they have had the opportunity in recent decades, they have passed tax cuts that force the government to borrow more money. They’ve already got a new tax cut package in their sights. Democrats, for their part, have grown wary of calls to curtail spending because predictions of dire consequences have not come to pass, and because they have learned the bitter lesson that agreeing to spending cuts simply creates room for Republicans to justify another round of tax cuts.

The debt ceiling is part of the problem. It was never intended to limit the federal debt. It was actually created to facilitate borrowing. During World War I, Congress got tired of authorizing each new round of bonds, so it gave the Treasury permission to borrow up to a specific limit. Its current use, as a means for Republicans to extort spending cuts from Democrats by threatening to push the nation into default, is even less productive. Larger changes are going to happen only if both political parties are willing participants.

A first step in resetting the conversation is to eliminate the debt ceiling before its next scheduled appearance in 2025. President Biden has brushed aside calls for his administration to pursue a legal ruling that the ceiling is unconstitutional. In doing so, he is repeating the mistake he made last fall, when he failed to press for legislation to repeal the ceiling. A case pending in federal court in Boston, brought by federal workers concerned that a default would come at the expense of their pensions, offers a potential vehicle. Other legal avenues also should be explored. It makes sense to pursue a ruling while there is no imminent danger of hitting the ceiling. If courts reject the legal challenges, that would also be clarifying.

Any substantive deal will eventually require a combination of increased revenue and reduced spending, not least because any politically viable deal will require a combination of those options. Both parties will have to compromise: Republicans must accept the necessity of collecting what the government is owed, and of imposing taxes on the wealthy. Democrats must recognize that changes to Social Security and Medicare, the major drivers of federal spending growth going forward, should be on the table. Anything less will prove fiscally sustainable.

That will require painful choices. But the failure to make those choices also has a price — and the price tag is increasing rapidly.

Source photograph by jonathansloane, via Getty Images.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

The editorial board is a group of opinion journalists whose views are informed by expertise, research, debate and certain longstanding values. It is separate from the newsroom.

The New York Times · by The Editorial Board · July 5, 2023

6. Austin Directs DOD Components to Reinforce Classified Safeguards Following Security Review

Austin Directs DOD Components to Reinforce Classified Safeguards Following Security Review

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III has tasked Defense Department components with implementing a series of recommendations aimed at improving classified information safeguards. This action follows the Pentagon’s review of departmentwide security programs and policies undertaken after the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information discovered online in the spring.

At the Lectern

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III briefs reporters at the Pentagon, Feb. 19, 2021.

Download: Full Size (1.72 MB)

Photo By: Air Force Staff Sgt. Jack Sanders, DOD

VIRIN: 210219-D-XI929-1002Y

The secretary's directive follows his approval of the initial findings of the 45-day review led by the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security and the DOD chief information officer and director of administration and management.

"While the review found that a majority of DOD personnel with access to classified national security information, or as we call it CNSI, comply with security policies, procedures and processes, and recognize the importance of that information and maintaining our national security, the review also identified a number of areas where the department should seek to improve its security posture and accountability measures," a senior defense department official said today.

"These areas include improving individual and collective accountability for CNSI, the security posture at facilities used to develop, process and store CNSI and information sharing to ensure both appropriate security clearance eligibility determinations by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and appropriate access management by unit commanders, supervisors and their personnel," the official said.

The Pentagon initiated its review following the alleged unauthorized removal and transmission of classified documents by an airman in the Massachusetts National Guard. The classified documents were discovered in April after being shared in an online messaging platform.

As part of the review, the Defense Department components completed detailed questionnaires to self-assess their personnel security, information safeguarding and accountability, physical security and education and training posture.

Integrated Cyber Center

U.S. Cyber Command members work in the Integrated Cyber Center, Joint Operations Center at Fort George G. Meade, Md., April. 2, 2021.

Download: Full Size (1.41 MB)

Photo By: Josef Cole, DOD

VIRIN: 210402-D-LA132-0024Y

Based on the findings from the review, Austin has directed DOD components to reinforce their existing policies and practices surrounding the security of classified information, update processes and procedures to ensure consistency throughout the department and implement new policies to address any gaps found during the review.

Austin has also tasked components with examining opportunities to tailor training and education to address security needs, implement improvements to data management and information sharing practices and to review and assess policies and procedures surrounding the accreditation and management of DOD facilities used to process and store classified information.

The secretary issued the new guidance in a memorandum to all DOD personnel on June 30.

Officials behind the review say they remain mindful of the need to "balance information security with the requirement to get the right information to the right people at the right time to enhance our national security."

"As [Defense Department] implements the recommendations and associated actions from this review, careful consideration will be given to guard against any 'overcorrection' which may impede progress on information sharing and operating models that better enable DOD to execute the National Defense Strategy and its overall mission," the Pentagon said in a release outlining the findings and recommendations.

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

7. China’s Focus on the Brain Gives it an Edge in Cognitive Warfare

Note also the author's bio. Dr. Mantua has some very interesting credentials.

Tables/graphics at the link: https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chinas-focus-on-the-brain-gives-it-an-edge-in-cognitive-warfare/

Excerpts:

As noted, the DoD has been working to create opportunities for both offensive and defensive operations in the OIE. Still, the DoD has a lot of ground to cover in the information space. It will need to be more flexible in its approach to conducting and countering OIE, and it will also need to be creative in its approaches. For instance, the DoD should consider leveraging irregular online assets such as “influencers” and grassroots cyber-insurgents (e.g., North Atlantic Fellas Organization, or NAFO) to counter OIE. As noted, the PRC is using state-funded and grassroots influencers to promote PRC-friendly messaging. To remain competitive, the US will need to identify and utilize its own online influencers without violating the sensitivities that US citizens have about state-sponsored coercion.

The DoD must also create a working definition and framework for CW that incorporates activities outside of OIE. The development of a coherent framework for CW will enable the identification of threats and capability gaps. Without this, the DoD will not be coherent and comprehensive in its approach to achieve dominance in this space.

Lastly, the DoD will need to dedicate additional funding for research and development focused on CW. It is imperative for DoD scientists and industry partners to be innovative and push the boundaries of cognitive science and neuroscience while also remaining within the ethical boundaries of human subject research. At the same time, the DoD must be aware that other nation states may not be adhering to the same ethical guidelines; we must be prepared to defend against potentially superior technologies that are achieved through unethical means.

China’s Focus on the Brain Gives it an Edge in Cognitive Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Janna Mantua · July 6, 2023

Janna Mantua

In 2016, US diplomats and CIA officers in Cuba abruptly began reporting symptoms of dizziness, nausea, and cognitive difficulties. Individuals suffering from this ailment – termed “Anomalous Health Incidents” by the US government, but more commonly known as “Havana Syndrome” – believed they had been victims of a coordinated attack. Scientists gathered information and performed calculations suggesting the symptoms may have been caused by a concentrated microwave weapon. Follow-up studies using MRI scans found Havana Syndrome sufferers exhibited evidence of traumatic brain injuries, suggesting their brains may have been physically damaged by the incident. Though the true cause of these injuries remains unknown, and though intelligence assessments have suggested there was no coordinated attack against these individuals, the attention these reports received ushered an important new question into the US national security zeitgeist: do our adversaries have a weapon that can cause brain damage from a distance?

The concept of attacking the thought processes and emotions of an adversary is as old as war itself. Generations ago, commanders sought ways to attack the adversary’s morale and will to fight. Today’s military leaders seek to do the same while using different terminology: achieving cognitive overmatch, controlling the information space, pursuing decision dominance, and, of course, winning the hearts and minds of specific populations. Though the concept is not new, the ways by which we create effects on cognition and emotion have changed due to new technologies and the pervasiveness of information.

The DoD does not have a definition for Cognitive Warfare (CW), though NATO’s Allied Command Transformation defines it as “the activities conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power, to affect attitudes and behaviors by influencing, protecting, and/or disrupting individual and group cognitions to gain an advantage.” On the surface, this definition may look similar to the definition for Information Operations (now known as Operations in the Information Environment [OIE]), but a side-by-side comparison (Table 1) suggests CW is in fact a broader concept that contains a reference to “activities” outside of the information domain. Still, CW and OIE are often conflated. As recent as April of 2023, a NATO working group (the same group that created the definition for CW) published an article on CW that exclusively described threats from OIE without mentioning other CW-related adversarial activities.

Thus, it’s worthwhile to review the activities making up CW to promote a clearer understanding of this critical concept; and that is what this piece aims to do.

Table 1

China’s Cognitive Warfare Activities

To understand what CW entails, we must look no further than the activities of our adversaries. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a broad, coherent Cognitive Warfare doctrine (often described as their Cognitive Domain Operations doctrine) that includes several elements outside of the information domain. Table 2 provides an overview of their framework, which includes technologies and capabilities in two categories: Cognition and Subliminal Cognition.

The Cognition category’s first focus is Cognitive Survey Technology, which includes the collection and analysis of physiological brain signals. Why might this be useful? In theory, if cognitive processes can be distilled into quantifiable events or signals, they can be tracked and more easily modulated. The proper quantification of brain signals could allow for better internal or external control over cognitive processes. Additionally, properly quantifying brain signals is critical for human-machine teaming. In the non-military domain, effective human-machine teaming is already in use for some individuals with artificial limbs. Certain types of artificial limbs can be controlled by brain signals, just like an organic limb. On the battlefield, effective human-machine teaming could entail linking warfighters directly to weapons systems, which may then enable quick and seamless control of weapons through the mind.

Table 2

The second focus of PRC’s Cognition category is Cognitive Interference Technology. This includes technology that is intended to cause physical interference or damage to the brain, including (you guessed it) microwave technology. The development of technologies to cause physical disruption to the brain, particularly from a distance, could be a game-changer: US decision-makers could be targeted just prior to the onset of a conflict, or a large group of decision-makers could be targeted broadly to degrade the effectiveness of the DoD and intelligence community.

On the flip side, an additional focus for PRC is Cognitive Strengthening Technology, or technologies that enhance cognition and emotion. These technologies may include new medications for increasing focus or mood, brain implants that “read your thoughts” (similar to Elon Musk’s proposed Neuralink device), or training environments that increase the cognitive ability of warfighters. Enhancing cognition in this manner could increase warfighter decision-making speed and increase cognitive resilience under stressors (e.g., sleep loss). These bio-enhancements could keep soldiers fighting harder, for longer, in more austere conditions.

The Subliminal Cognition Arm of PRC’s Cognitive Warfare Doctrine appears simply to be an OIE playbook. It includes the development of technology and methodologies that prepare and disseminate content that is in favor of their narrative. It also includes defensive technologies that can detect adversarial information threats. The PRC is already conducting visible activities in line with their OIE doctrine. For instance, they employ internet commentators, or “wumao,” to spread propaganda online that is consistent with the state’s interests. They also selectively amplify the voices of influencers, including Westerners, who are promoting China of their own volition.

Taking these elements together, we can begin to envision how PRC could leverage CW during a hybrid-warfare scenario against the US. In a hypothetical future scenario in which PRC invades Taiwan, PRC could begin their campaign by using IOE to soften their targets. First, a misinformation campaign could be conducted to affect Taiwanese citizens psychologically with the intent of degrading their morale (in fact, this is reportedly already happening today). Next, deepfake videos of a false-flag operation could be used to divide the American public and lawmakers over US involvement in the Pacific. Brain-damaging weapons could be used against senior leaders of INDOPACOM, CYBERCOM, SOCOM, and SPACECOM to decrease readiness and sow discord within each critical Combatant Command. Soon after, upon the initiation of conflict, the PRC’s human-machine teaming capabilities could enable seamless Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, or OODA, loops that support PRC’s anti-ship campaign, thereby denying the US entry into the operational theater. PRC’s bio-engineered “super soldiers” may be able to fight harder and longer than US warfighters already in theater, reducing remaining opportunities that the US has to protect Taiwan.

How will the DoD counter these capabilities?

DoD Cognitive Warfare Activities

Fortunately, the US is not turning a blind eye to this threat. The DoD is also focused on CW, albeit in a less coherent manner.

Since the early 2010s, the US has largely focused CW efforts on countering adversarial cyber OIE. There is good reason for this. Information threats in the cyber domain are currently the most blatant and damaging form of CW, and these threats will likely be amplified by the advent of widely available artificial intelligence technologies (e.g., deepfakes, ChatGPT). In response to cyber OIE threats, the DoD has made great strides in incorporating OIE into doctrine. For instance, the DoD approved the Global Integrated Operations in the Information Environment EXORD in 2018, and it recently made updates to Joint Publication 3-04 (Information in Joint Operations). These documents provide guidance and authorities that allow the DoD to prepare for offensive and defensive OIE.

The DoD also has several ongoing research and development efforts focused on human-machine teaming and cognitive strengthening. Army Futures Command (AFC) has outlined several initiatives along this line, including the development of “automated battle management tools [that] minimize the human cognitive overload through a ‘human on the loop’ interface where sensors, shooters, and firing solutions converged from multiple networks across domains.” Additional efforts from AFC focus on developing technologies and capabilities that will allow soldiers to sustain cognitive alertness and performance under stressors through the use of “wearable medical sensors” that can detect cognitive fatigue. Similar efforts to enhance cognition are being conducted by the Air Force Research Lab and the Naval Health Research Center.

However, for one particular reason, our adversaries may develop CW capabilities where the DoD cannot. DoD technologies and capabilities will inherently be limited by the collective ethical standards of the US. The US biomedical research community follows ethical guidelines described in the Declaration of Helsinki. The declaration states, among other things, that human research requires informed consent, and there should be no undue risk to research participants during experimentation. These ethical guidelines are intended to protect against the repeat of biomedical atrocities conducted by German military scientists during WWII. Biomedical researchers in countries that do not adhere to these principles may be willing and able to push ethical boundaries in order to develop game-changing CW capabilities. In fact, PRC is reportedly already doing so through non-consensual genetic modification and biomedical alterations. Adversaries that are willing to allow this type of research may surpass US capabilities in the CW domain.

The Way Ahead

As noted, the DoD has been working to create opportunities for both offensive and defensive operations in the OIE. Still, the DoD has a lot of ground to cover in the information space. It will need to be more flexible in its approach to conducting and countering OIE, and it will also need to be creative in its approaches. For instance, the DoD should consider leveraging irregular online assets such as “influencers” and grassroots cyber-insurgents (e.g., North Atlantic Fellas Organization, or NAFO) to counter OIE. As noted, the PRC is using state-funded and grassroots influencers to promote PRC-friendly messaging. To remain competitive, the US will need to identify and utilize its own online influencers without violating the sensitivities that US citizens have about state-sponsored coercion.

The DoD must also create a working definition and framework for CW that incorporates activities outside of OIE. The development of a coherent framework for CW will enable the identification of threats and capability gaps. Without this, the DoD will not be coherent and comprehensive in its approach to achieve dominance in this space.

Lastly, the DoD will need to dedicate additional funding for research and development focused on CW. It is imperative for DoD scientists and industry partners to be innovative and push the boundaries of cognitive science and neuroscience while also remaining within the ethical boundaries of human subject research. At the same time, the DoD must be aware that other nation states may not be adhering to the same ethical guidelines; we must be prepared to defend against potentially superior technologies that are achieved through unethical means.

Janna Mantua has a PhD in Behavioral Neuroscience and is completing a Master’s degree in Military Strategic Studies with a concentration in Irregular Warfare. She is a member of the research staff at a defense think tank in the Washington, D.C. area where she contributes to projects focusing on offensive and defensive influence operations and is co-chair of the Influence Operations Working Group.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Political Warfare and the Road to Invasion: Irregular Warfare in Ukraine Since 2014
Laura Jones and Kyle Atwell In Episode 56 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, we conclude our two-part series focused on irregular warfare in Ukraine. In the previous episode, our guests discussed Russia’s…
The Next Variant Of Russia's Political Warfare Virus
by Joshua C. Huminski Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provoked a belated immune response to Moscow’s political warfare campaign to subvert democracy and exploit systemic weaknesses in Europe and the…
The Great Equalizer: Irregular Warfare In The City
Kyle Atwell and Benjamin Jebb Episode 64 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores the interplay between urban spaces and irregular warfare. Our guests begin by examining how demographic and economic shifts are…

0 Shares

irregularwarfare.org · by Janna Mantua · July 6, 2023

8. Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized

Excerpts:

But although historians will argue about whether NATO could have done more to deter Russia, it is already clear that NATO did much more to help Ukraine than Putin expected once the war began. Putin not only underestimated Ukraine; he also underestimated Multilateral Men—the officials who, like Jens Stoltenberg and his counterparts at the European Union, helped the White House put together the military, political, and diplomatic response. Putin believed his own propaganda, the same propaganda used by the transatlantic far right: Democracies are weak, autocrats are strong, and people who use polite, diplomatic language won’t defend themselves. This turned out to be wrong. “Democracies have proven much more resilient, much stronger than our adversaries believe,” Stoltenberg told me. And autocracies are more fragile: “As we’ve just seen, authoritarian systems can just, suddenly, break down.”

Here is a prediction: Over the next year—and this one, everyone swears, really is his last—Stoltenberg won’t be making any charismatic speeches about Ukraine or NATO. He won’t join the fray, start arguments, or appear on television unless he has too. Instead, he will keep talking about a “multiyear program of moving Ukraine from Soviet standards and equipment doctrines to NATO standards and doctrines,” keep meeting with prime ministers and foreign ministers, keep working on the integration of Ukraine into Europe. And then, one day, it will have happened.

Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized

Unelected bureaucrats get a bad rap. But some do an essential job.

By Anne Applebaum

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · July 4, 2023

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced today that Jens Stoltenberg, its secretary-general for the past nine years, will stay on for an almost unprecedented tenth year. Last week, after that development had already been predicted by The Times of London, the Financial Times, Politico, and who knows how many defense-industry newsletters, I met Stoltenberg in his clean, functional, almost featureless office—white walls, gray carpet—deep inside NATO’s shiny Brussels headquarters. I asked him about it.

“I have one plan, and that is to go back to Norway,” he replied, deadpan. I raised an eyebrow. Yes, he conceded, there are “some requests for me to stay on.” Beyond that, he would not comment. Not hypothetically. Not under embargo. When the inevitable announcement was finally made this morning, he said in a statement that he was “honored,” because “in a more dangerous world, our great Alliance is more important than ever.”

It would be hard to find a better illustration of the qualities that make Stoltenberg so popular. NATO is a defensive alliance representing a wide variety of countries and regions—Eastern Europe and Southern Europe, Scandinavia and Turkey, Britain and France. It makes decisions by consensus. To achieve that consensus, the NATO secretary-general does not personally need to fight battles or win wars. That’s the job of the supreme allied commander, who is always an American, as well as the 31 NATO heads of state and their 31 armies. Instead, the secretary-general, who is always a European, succeeds if he talks to everybody, finds common ground, negotiates compromises, never leaks, and never puts himself at the center of the story, even when the story is about him.

In recent years, this sort of person—call him Multilateral Man (though of course some of them are women)—has had a bad rap. Enemies of the European Union, NATO, and the alphabet soup of organizations run out of Washington, Geneva, and Brussels have taken to calling their employees “unelected bureaucrats.” Multilateral Man is said to be lazy, or wasteful, or powerless. In an age that celebrates “sovereignty,” “national interest,” and the achievements of his chief opponents (usually called “strongmen”), critics disparage Multilateral Man as parasitic or pointless. Sometimes the critics have a point.

But Stoltenberg is where he is precisely because he actually believes in multilateral organizations, NATO in particular. More than that, he thinks they are force multipliers that function better than the autocracies run by strongmen. He has argued that point rather passionately with NATO’s critics, among them Donald Trump, whom he famously won over by showing him bar charts illustrating increases in allied military spending. (“I love graphs,” Stoltenberg told me.)

Read: ‘It’s extremely important that we don’t forget the brutality’

He also thinks that endless rounds of negotiation over alliance policy are worthwhile, because ultimately the result is a stronger sense of commitment. To those who say NATO is less efficient, he asks: “Less efficient than what? Compared to what?” True, if you don’t have NATO, “you don’t have a slow-moving decision process.” But that’s because if you don’t have NATO, you don’t have any decision process at all, at least not a collective decision process. “I believe in collective defense; I believe in one for all and all for one, that attack on one ally will trigger a response from the others.” And this, he says, is not just “good for small nations”; it’s “good for big nations too.” Everybody needs friends, even Americans.

Strictly speaking, Stoltenberg is not an unelected bureaucrat in any case, given that he has now been “elected” four times by NATO heads of state, twice for regular terms in office and twice for extensions. He also spent many years as an elected politician. As prime minister of Norway (from 2000 to 2001 and again from 2005 to 2013), he regularly ran coalition governments, and so he got used to forging compromises. As the son of another Norwegian politician (his father was both defense minister and foreign minister), he grew up eating breakfast with world leaders, among them Nelson Mandela, and thus learned the value of personal contacts. He once told a radio station that he hadn’t realized until many years later that it is not actually normal for foreign ministers to invite foreign leaders into their kitchen.

Breakfast isn’t always practical, nowadays, and so, according to those around him, he makes up for it with flurries of text messages and a constant round of visits to NATO capitals. He attended the inauguration of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last month, spent extra time in Istanbul, brought his wife and squeezed in some conversations about Swedish accession. In the 48 hours before I saw him, he had met with the prime ministers of Denmark and Bulgaria, as well as the president of France. He had attended a training exercise in Lithuania the previous weekend, and a meeting of the European Council, which includes all European Union heads of state, that morning. If he was tired of this endless carousel, he didn’t say so.

But at this particular moment, what really qualifies Stoltenberg for this job is his clarity about the dangers posed by Russia and a special affinity for Ukraine. Here I am treading delicately, because we don’t yet know the full details of the package NATO will offer Ukraine at a summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, next week. The Ukrainians are asking for full NATO membership, which is nothing new: This subject was first seriously discussed at a NATO summit back in 2008. The decision taken at the time, to deny Ukraine a path to admission but to imply that it might be granted in the future, was the worst one possible, because it left Ukraine in a gray zone, aspiring to join the West but without any Western security guarantees. The world has shifted since then, and many more countries are now open to the idea of Ukrainian membership. Although the U.S. government is reluctant to support that while the war continues, for fear that American soldiers would immediately be drawn into the conflict, the Biden administration might eventually consider it too.

From the June 2023 issue: The counteroffensive

For the moment, NATO will offer a series of proposals for longer-term military integration and aid. Ukraine will shift from Soviet to Western weapons systems and will be offered new institutional arrangements, including the creation of a NATO-Ukraine council, which don’t sound like much outside the Brussels bubble but mean a lot to people inside. Plans for eventually speeding up the process—Ukraine, like Finland and Sweden, may eventually be allowed to join without an extensive “membership action plan”—are also under consideration. Some countries may ultimately offer bilateral assurances as well.

Naturally, Stoltenberg didn’t tell me which countries hold which positions, even though these are widely reported. “My main task,” he said, “is not to give interesting answers, but it is to ensure that we make progress on the issue of membership for Ukraine.” Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, told me that Stoltenberg hasn’t been looking for “the least common denominator” in his negotiations, but is rather seeking to forge the best deal possible for Ukraine. Maybe this is American spin in advance of the summit, but if so, it has a broader point. Because Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that time is on his side, one of NATO’s central tasks is to convince him that time is not on his side, that the Western alliance will go on backing Ukraine, indefinitely. The expression long term comes up in a lot of transatlantic conversations about Ukraine. So does the word permanent. Stoltenberg’s durability is part of that message too.

But why should a former leader of the Norwegian Labor Party (and youthful anti-war activist) be so dedicated to this task? I saw Stoltenberg speak with great emotion about Ukraine at a private event a few months ago, and last week I asked him about that too. He told me that this was the result of personal experience. He visited then-Communist Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and saw stark contrasts between its inhabitants and their counterparts in the West. “I thought these were totally different people,” he recalled. “They have different clothing, everything smells different … and it was really dark, and it was so far away. But now I go to Riga or to Tallinn—I was just in Vilnius—and these are very trendy, modern cities; if anything, they are more trendy, more modern, and more creative than in Scandinavia.” The people were not different after all: “This was about politics, the rules that they lived under, and I am ashamed that I didn’t realize that earlier. And to some extent, I also made the same mistake about Ukraine.”

For Stoltenberg, as for so many Europeans, the current war stirred some even older memories. Turning to his office wall, Stoltenberg pointed to a photograph (black and white, in keeping with the austere aesthetic) of his grandfather at age 100, a former Norwegian army captain who was at one point in German captivity. Both his parents and grandparents used to walk around Oslo and point out locations of wartime events—“There was an explosion there, a sabotage attack here; the resistance used to hide in that flat”—and he knows this tour so well that he can do it with his own children. The Ukrainians, he told me, “are fighting the same fight that we fought against Nazism.”

Alex Zeldin: The other history of the Holocaust

This dual realization—that Ukrainians aren’t so different from Westerners, and that they are fighting a familiar kind of war—isn’t unique to Stoltenberg. On the contrary, quite a few European leaders, and for that matter ordinary Europeans, have traveled the same journey, which is why he and others in and around NATO seem so confident in their “long term” and “permanent” commitment to Ukraine. He insists that this transformation began not last year but at the start of his term in 2014, when NATO had just been surprised and confused by the Russian invasion of Crimea and Donbas. After that, spending rose, and strategic plans shifted. In 2016, the alliance agreed to set up battle groups—led by Americans in Poland, Germans in Lithuania, Brits in Estonia, and Canadians in Latvia. By February 24, 2022, “NATO was prepared. We had all of the increased readiness, we had all of the increased defense spending, we had deployed forces to the eastern border, and we had agreed defense plans—new defense plans—that we activated that morning.”

Not everybody had taken this shift seriously. In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron described NATO as “brain dead.” The Russian president’s disregard for NATO and its leaders had far greater consequences. Putin claimed to be offended by NATO’s presence on his western border, but in practice he was not bothered by it, and certainly not deterred by it. Had he really believed in the transatlantic commitment to Ukraine, or had he really feared NATO aggression, he surely would not have invaded at all.

But although historians will argue about whether NATO could have done more to deter Russia, it is already clear that NATO did much more to help Ukraine than Putin expected once the war began. Putin not only underestimated Ukraine; he also underestimated Multilateral Men—the officials who, like Jens Stoltenberg and his counterparts at the European Union, helped the White House put together the military, political, and diplomatic response. Putin believed his own propaganda, the same propaganda used by the transatlantic far right: Democracies are weak, autocrats are strong, and people who use polite, diplomatic language won’t defend themselves. This turned out to be wrong. “Democracies have proven much more resilient, much stronger than our adversaries believe,” Stoltenberg told me. And autocracies are more fragile: “As we’ve just seen, authoritarian systems can just, suddenly, break down.”

Here is a prediction: Over the next year—and this one, everyone swears, really is his last—Stoltenberg won’t be making any charismatic speeches about Ukraine or NATO. He won’t join the fray, start arguments, or appear on television unless he has too. Instead, he will keep talking about a “multiyear program of moving Ukraine from Soviet standards and equipment doctrines to NATO standards and doctrines,” keep meeting with prime ministers and foreign ministers, keep working on the integration of Ukraine into Europe. And then, one day, it will have happened.

The Atlantic · by Anne Applebaum · July 4, 2023

9. It's Time to Revise Guidance On Political Activities For Members of the U.S. Military

Excerpts:

Certainly, there are some incentives against updating Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 by the end of the calendar year. Some critics might label this as an attempt by the current administration to infringe upon servicemembers’ right to free speech or argue that placing increased restrictions on servicemembers’ political activities is a partisan act in and of itself. While it is true that these new changes to the regulations may limit and revise servicemembers’ speech on social media, it is equally true that servicemembers have already given up specific rights to partisan speech in the public domain that no one disputes based on existing regulations. The basis of these suggested revisions is simply to clearly outline how existing norms and rules apply to social media — an area currently unregulated to the detriment of the nonpartisan military ethic.

Similarly, the secretary of defense may wish to tread carefully and avoid such perceptions, given the already strained relationship with some in Congress. However, revisions to Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 do not favor one party over the other and should be something both parties can rally around. Regardless of one’s political predispositions, providing the military services greater clarity on what constitutes prohibited partisan activity is a prudent step toward thwarting politicization.

Additionally, some will be concerned that any social media regulations will be outdated before they are officially approved. If, for example, the regulations stipulated specific guidance about using Facebook’s “like” feature, a reader may interpret the absence of guidance relating to yet-to-be-developed tools as license for their use. In addition, it is not clear how evolving technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Metaverse will impact social and political experience. These concerns should provide useful cautions about an update to Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 that focuses too closely on the specific features or any technology. Likewise, these concerns should only serve to further encourage the Department of Defense to include a short introduction in the revised directive that provides context and at least some thoughtful discussion about the importance of both rules and norms in the maintenance of the nonpartisan ethic that is currently under attack.

While concerns about taking action immediately and before the next election cycle are understandable, the risks of inaction are too great to dismiss. The words to all members of the military from then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen at the time of the 2008 presidential election cycle when the directive was last updated resonate even more today: As the Nation prepares to elect a new President, we would all do well to remember the promises we made: to obey civilian authority, to support and defend the Constitution, and to do our duty at all times. Keeping our politics private is a good first step. The only things we should be wearing on our sleeves are our military insignia.

It's Time to Revise Guidance On Political Activities For Members of the U.S. Military - War on the Rocks

JOHN CHILDRESS, DAVE RICHARDSON, AND HEIDI URBEN

warontherocks.com · by John Childress · July 6, 2023

When the Department of Defense last updated its directive that regulates the political activities of servicemembers, the social media platforms TikTok, Instagram, and WhatsApp had not yet been created. Twitter was two years old, and Facebook had only been open to the public for 18 months. The current directive was published exactly two weeks after Super Tuesday in the 2008 presidential primaries, a time when political polarization was starting to gain more attention on the national landscape. As the Department of Defense wrestles with how to preserve the military’s nonpartisanship in what is clearly now an exceptional period of polarization, it relies on an outdated directive that fails to address the contemporary challenges the military services face regarding partisan political speech and behavior by those in uniform.

It is critical that the Department of Defense develop and publish a significant revision to the outdated directive that currently guides the political activities of U.S. military members before the November 2024 presidential election. However, a new and updated directive is not enough. The U.S. military should also commit to training the force on both the content of the new directive and the reasons why norms and rules surrounding political activities are so important to the health of U.S. democratic norms.

Military Personnel and Rules of Political Behavior

The military’s status as a trusted servant of the state certainly faces external pressures. The military’s nonpartisan ethic depends on a combination of healthy norms — informal practices that guide behavior in a profession — and applicable, enforceable rules for its members to abide by. In general, professionsprofessions prefer to regulate their members’ behavior through norms, as rules typically outline the bare minimum requirements or standards of conduct. Norms speak to a deeper professional commitment, while rules often signify basic compliance. However, norms work best when backstopped by complementary rules.

Become a Member

The contemporary rules for political behavior have their roots in the 1939 Hatch Act, which codified the limits of political activities for federal employees and remains in effect today. Of note, the Hatch Act applies to civilian Department of Defense employees but not to the uniformed members of the military. The nonpartisan ethic in the military was maintained in the early decades of the Cold War by the strength of norms — not a set of codified rules that all servicemembers had to follow. George C. Marshall represented the quintessential nonpartisan military officer in this era, carrying on a tradition established by William Tecumseh Sherman and other senior military leaders after the Civil War.

Three decades after the adoption of the Hatch Act, detailed guidance to members of the military finally emerged in 1969 with the issuance of the first version of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, titled “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces.” Minor revisions of the directive were issued in 1986, 1990, 2004, and 2008, notably all timed in election years. These minor updates over four decades did little to alter the substance of the document first signed at the height of the Vietnam War. If anything, the 1969 version of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 is more direct and easier to digest than the current version. The 2008 directive is longer due to the inclusion of four modifications, and it is written in a multilayered subparagraph structure, a format with little consideration for the U.S. military members expected to read, digest, and ultimately follow the nuanced guidance.

In broad terms, the directive details three things. The first is a list of definitions for a few basic terms (including the meanings of partisan and nonpartisan political activity, active duty, and civil office). Second, there is a short list of permitted political activities. And, third, there is a much longer list of political activities that are not permitted. Nowhere in the directive is even a brief explanation for why the nature of political activities by those who wear the cloth of the nation is important, or even why the nonpartisan ethic of the U.S. military exists in the first place. A policy document that focuses on such a critical and nuanced topic that fails to give this brief context is arguably deficient. The same policy document that also fails to provide updated guidance on something so ubiquitous in the current world of political activity as the use of social media is woefully inadequate.

This points to the most glaring issue with adhering to a 2008 directive — its silence on social media during an age in which servicemembers tweet, post updates on Facebook, maintain LinkedIn profiles, upload videos to TikTok, and play online games. The Department of Defense’s formal ambiguity about social media behavior diminishes its ability to both educate the force and enforce a nonpartisan ethic. In the past three years, servicemembers have used social media to disparage politicians and elected leaders and trumpet their personal political opinions. Stronger, enforceable guidelines could have arguably deterred some of these behaviors or even prevented partisan comments on some anonymous accounts claiming military affiliation. Even general officers have been caught up in the uncertainty about how to use and interpret social media posts. As the United States enters another presidential election season, the pressures and temptations to use social media will only increase.

What Changes Need to Be Made?

The Department of Defense should not let another election cycle pass without updating Department of Defense Directive 1344.10. It should do so by the end of this calendar year in order to sensitize servicemembers to key tenets of nonpartisanship before the 2024 election. Revisions to Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 should address the following gaps.

First, the directive should open with a very brief section that provides context for members of the military on the importance of maintaining healthy norms of nonpartisanship. This introduction should touch on the reasons behind servicemembers properly exercising permitted political activities and the damage that can occur if activities that are not permitted are not avoided. While this sort of context is arguably not the norm for directives in the Department of Defense, it would serve to remind servicemembers that these rules establish a baseline level of compliance only in a very complex, nuanced topic. The commitment to professional norms, including the norm of nonpartisanship, requires servicemembers to reflect upon whether certain political activities are appropriate, even when they are allowable. This sort of brief introduction providing context would also serve to frame the associated training for members of the military that we outline below.

Second, Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 must be updated to address the particular harm associated with servicemembers’ unregulated partisan speech on social media. Each service maintains its own social media guide but refers to Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 when addressing political speech. However, the current version of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 has no references to social media whatsoever, leaving unit commanders to interpret what constitutes partisan political activity on social media. In August 2022, the Department of Defense issued its first instruction on the use of social media, aimed at providing guidelines for the use of official social media accounts. Unfortunately, its discussion of political activity is cursory, including the obvious restriction that official social media accounts are prohibited from engaging in political activity and that Department of Defense personnel may not use their personal accounts for political purposes while on duty and while in the workplace. The instruction says little else on the matter and provides a link to the website for the Department of Defense Standards of Conduct Office of Defense Standards of Conduct Office, an ethics website with no straightforward guidance about political activity, while also failing to mention Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 at all.

Third, Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 should be updated to require servicemembers to post a disclaimer on all of their personal social media accounts that their views do not reflect those of the U.S. military or Department of Defense. The department should also consider a prohibition on active-duty servicemembers liking, sharing, retweeting, or posting partisan content on their personal social media accounts. By its very nature, social media is today’s public town square, where content has a written, lasting record and exponential reach. Posting on social media is an inherently public act. Therefore, partisan commentary on social media should be prohibited in the same way the current version of the directive precludes servicemembers from speaking before a partisan political gathering or participating in partisan discussion on the radio, television, or other program.

Posting on social media is not akin to writing an op-ed, which is an allowable form of non–social media expression under the current guidelines. An op-ed must meet certain publication and editorial standards, and military organizations often require servicemembers to submit them for a public affairs and operational security review prior to publication, even when they include the department’s standard disclaimer. Tweets or posts face no such scrutiny or review and can be unlimited in their volume. We realize that this injunction against all partisan related social media activity will strike some as too strong, but given the public nature of this form of political expression, it is necessary for reinforcing the military’s nonpartisan ethic.

Fourth, the directive should expand the section that refers to Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which prohibits officers from using contemptuous words against certain elected and appointed officials. Survey research has shown that a sizable portion of active-duty officers have observed their peers make rude and disdainful comments about the president and other elected officials on social media — during both the Obama and Trump administrations — so the directive should make it clear that Article 88 applies to social media as well. Not only should Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 list which officials are protected by Article 88, but it should also include the reminder that enlisted servicemembers who use contemptuous words against elected and appointed officials can be punished under Article 134 as a violation of good order and discipline.

Fifth, any new revision to the current directives must be accompanied by purposeful training and education efforts across the military, both at the unit level and across professional military education to better sensitize servicemembers to the importance of nonpartisanship and reversing the perception that the U.S. military has become politicized. One of us has authored a guide on how to teach and instill the nonpartisan ethic at the unit level, which includes guided discussion questions, prompts, and recommended readings that can be adopted by unit commanders at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels. Absent such a framework, discussions at the small unit level on how the military should avoid politicization run the risk of uneven implementation, as some critics characterized the Department of Defense’s extremism stand-down in 2021.

Finally, the department should better enforce the provisions already contained in Department of Defense Directive 1344.10. Retired servicemembers and currently serving members of the Reserves and National Guard running for elected office have come under increased criticism for appearing to violate the directive in their campaign advertisements. Some have failed to include a disclaimer that use of military photographs does not imply endorsement by the U.S. military or Defense Department, while other ads appear to misrepresent the candidate’s military service and imply official endorsement. While many ads do contain disclaimers, several push the envelope on the prohibition that photographs of them in uniform cannot be the “primary graphic representation” in an advertisement. While the department lacks jurisdiction over veterans, it should not hesitate to take action to curb ads that violate the spirit and intent of Department of Defense Directive 1344.10.

The Risks of Inaction

Certainly, there are some incentives against updating Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 by the end of the calendar year. Some critics might label this as an attempt by the current administration to infringe upon servicemembers’ right to free speech or argue that placing increased restrictions on servicemembers’ political activities is a partisan act in and of itself. While it is true that these new changes to the regulations may limit and revise servicemembers’ speech on social media, it is equally true that servicemembers have already given up specific rights to partisan speech in the public domain that no one disputes based on existing regulations. The basis of these suggested revisions is simply to clearly outline how existing norms and rules apply to social media — an area currently unregulated to the detriment of the nonpartisan military ethic.

Similarly, the secretary of defense may wish to tread carefully and avoid such perceptions, given the already strained relationship with some in Congress. However, revisions to Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 do not favor one party over the other and should be something both parties can rally around. Regardless of one’s political predispositions, providing the military services greater clarity on what constitutes prohibited partisan activity is a prudent step toward thwarting politicization.

Additionally, some will be concerned that any social media regulations will be outdated before they are officially approved. If, for example, the regulations stipulated specific guidance about using Facebook’s “like” feature, a reader may interpret the absence of guidance relating to yet-to-be-developed tools as license for their use. In addition, it is not clear how evolving technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Metaverse will impact social and political experience. These concerns should provide useful cautions about an update to Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 that focuses too closely on the specific features or any technology. Likewise, these concerns should only serve to further encourage the Department of Defense to include a short introduction in the revised directive that provides context and at least some thoughtful discussion about the importance of both rules and norms in the maintenance of the nonpartisan ethic that is currently under attack.

While concerns about taking action immediately and before the next election cycle are understandable, the risks of inaction are too great to dismiss. The words to all members of the military from then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen at the time of the 2008 presidential election cycle when the directive was last updated resonate even more today: As the Nation prepares to elect a new President, we would all do well to remember the promises we made: to obey civilian authority, to support and defend the Constitution, and to do our duty at all times. Keeping our politics private is a good first step. The only things we should be wearing on our sleeves are our military insignia.

Become a Member

John Childress is an active-duty U.S. Army Colonel currently assigned as the House Affairs Director on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. Dr. Dave Richardson is an active-duty U.S. Navy Captain currently assigned as the chair of the Political Science Department at the U.S. Naval Academy. Dr. Heidi Urben is professor of the practice and director of external education and outreach in the security studies program at Georgetown University and a retired U.S. Army Colonel. The views here are those of the authors and do not represent the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, or U.S. Naval Academy.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by John Childress · July 6, 2023

10. Putin’s Security Crisis

Excerpts:

For the first time during more than 20 years in power, Putin’s KGB background might not serve him well. As an officer of the KGB who also did nothing to protect the political regime he swore to protect, he seems willing to let slide the excuses made by today’s FSB generals. Of course, there could still be purges in the time to come, but in past crises, when Putin decided to make a change, it has usually happened swiftly: in 2004, for example, when Chechen militants briefly seized control of Ingushetia, heads rolled at the FSB almost overnight.

For now, it is not just Prigozhin who seems to have gone unpunished but also the security services who supposedly were protecting Putin from precisely such a threat. For any autocrat, this is a strange way to reassert control. In the short term, Putin may see it as the best way to downplay the crisis and move on. But his security services will be unable to save him from the new reality that has taken shape in which the military itself is open to criticism and even challenges to its rule. If such challenges continue, they may not be limited to the military. They could extend to Putin’s own hold on power.

Putin’s Security Crisis

The Real Lesson of the Wagner Rebellion Is the FSB’s Failure

By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

July 6, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan · July 6, 2023

Among the many lingering questions about Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion is why Russia’s vast security apparatus was so poorly prepared for it. The FSB, the Kremlin’s main internal security service, has long placed a heavy emphasis on “prevention” and taking aggressive steps to preempt any threats to the state before they occur. The security agency even had informants within the Wagner organization. Yet it seems to have taken no action to stop the mutiny before it started or to warn the Kremlin about Prigozhin’s plans.

Then, as Wagner forces made their move, both the FSB and Russia’s National Guard, the main body assigned to maintain internal security and suppress unrest in Russia, failed as rapid response forces. The National Guard made every effort to avoid a direct confrontation with Wagner; for its part, the FSB—which also has several elite special forces groups—did not appear to take any action at all. Instead, the most powerful security agency in the country issued a press release calling on Wagner’s rank and file to stay out of the uprising and to go arrest Prigozhin—on their own.

Equally startling was the reaction of Russia’s military intelligence, GRU, to the Wagner escapade. Consider that moment when Wagner forces marched into Rostov-on-Don, Russia’s main command center for the war in Ukraine. As Prigozhin sat together with Yunus-bek Yevkurov, deputy minister of defense, and Vladimir Alekseyev, first deputy head of the GRU, Alekseyev seemed to agree with Prigozhin that there was a problem with Russia’s military leadership. When Prigozhin said he wanted to get Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov, the head of Russian forces in Ukraine, apparently to make them answer for their mistakes, Alekseyev laughed and replied, “You can have them!” Shortly after these comments were aired, a member of Russian special forces told us, “Alekseyev is right.”

In the wake of the Prigozhin crisis, Russian President Vladimir Putin faces a dilemma. It has become clear that the larger threat to his regime may not have been Prigozhin’s mutiny itself but the reaction of the military and the security services to that mutiny. Now, he needs to find a way to deal with that intelligence and security failure without creating new uncertainty about his grip on power. And unlike in previous crises, he may no longer be able to rely on the security agencies he has long used to ensure political stability.

WHERE SYMPATHIES LIE

The threat posed by Prigozhin’s rebellion had little to do with the relative strength of Wagner forces. When Wagner forces declared victory in Bakhmut in May, Prigozhin touted it as a major triumph in a battle that had lasted for months, and it inflated his ambitions to a dangerous degree. In reality, however, Bakhmut was little more than a local success, and its value was questionable. In the weeks since the Ukrainian counteroffensive began, that victory has become a distant memory. Wagner has not had a significant role in deterring the counteroffensive, and Prigozhin’s mercenaries—despite their much-hyped capabilities—seem much less relevant to the war than they were in the spring.

In fact, the rebellion came precisely at a moment when Wagner’s influence was weakening and Russia’s military command was gaining renewed confidence. With the Ukrainian counteroffensive off to a slow start, there was a growing perception that Ukraine’s tanks and other advanced weapons supplied by the West were more vulnerable than anticipated, and Russian officers reported that army morale was growing. No longer were Wagner fighters seen as the only capable forces on the Russian side.

These shifting perceptions should not come as a surprise. Ever since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian army has existed in a state of continual and sudden mood swings. Enthusiasm at the start of the war, for example, was almost immediately followed by deep embarrassment from the abject failure of the initial campaign. Then, in the summer of 2022, the army gained more confidence again in the east, only to be met with the shock of the first major Ukrainian counteroffensive and the loss of Kherson. Still later, there was renewed confidence as the army regrouped amid expectations of a big Russian offensive in the winter—only to meet with more disillusionment at no progress. This was followed by the drawn-out victory at Bakhmut, and then again, deep anxiety as Russia awaited the big Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The rebellion opened the door to criticism from within.

Even before Prigozhin’s mutiny, Russia’s seesawing fortunes in Ukraine had led to a growing mysticism among army rank and file. Battalions have been named after saints; icons and prayers are increasingly shared on Telegram by soldiers; and pro-war priests have gained growing popular followings. But the instability had also eroded trust in the military leadership. In fact, this has been an age-old problem for the Russian army, which faced terrible morale toward the end of the Crimean War in 1856, in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5, in World War I, following Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, and more recently, in the Afghan and Chechen wars.

The significance of Prigozhin’s rebellion, then, was in opening the door to criticism of Russia’s military leadership. And as Prigozhin did it as head of Wagner, Alekseyev, as deputy head of military intelligence, showed that this criticism could come from within. In fact, Alekseyev’s comments carry more than a little weight—and they show how complicated the Wagner situation is. Alekseyev is one of the most powerful generals in military intelligence. But he was also one of the founders of Wagner, and he has long experience supervising Russian special forces and is well respected by those units, as our own reporting makes clear.

Alekseyev’s comments were a signal to those in the military who share Prigozhin’s views that there could be room for a serious conversation about the military leadership. Although they were not ready to support Wagner in action, this faction within the military saw an opening to start talking about what was going wrong in the war. In short, Alekseyev had broken the official silence around Russia’s military leadership and made the impossible possible.

It was in this context that Putin addressed the public when the mutiny ended. He appeared to be concerned not so much with Prigozhin but with the military itself. His strongly worded speech was aimed at sending a clear message to the armed forces: in effect, Putin said, I will call Prigozhin a traitor so that you, as the army, have no choice but to distance yourselves from him and his message. In doing so, Putin didn't miscalculate—he wanted to cut off Wagner from the military and security services, and for the time being, it seems that he did.

But in the long term, Putin has allowed for a new challenge to his cherished political stability to emerge. He successfully ended the mutiny, but such criticism of the generals at the top will remain and is likely to grow. The fact that 13 Russian military pilots were shot down by Wagner forces, and that Shoigu and Gerasimov were entirely absent during the crisis, has only given more fuel to dissatisfaction within the infantry. And what will happen when Russia suffers new setbacks in the war and the mood in the military swings back in a negative direction?

INSECURITY STATE

Military morale is only one of the things Putin needs to worry about. His handling of the security services following the crisis could put his hold on power at even greater risk. For the moment, he has simply stood by. Although there has been widespread chatter in Moscow about post-rebellion repressions, these rumors only concern the military; Putin has left the FSB and the National Guard untouched. Instead of attacking the leaders of the FSB and the National Guard for failing him in the crisis, he seems to have decided either to do nothing or give these agencies expanded authority. In fact, the national guard hopes to strengthen its position by getting permission to have tanks in its service.

This lack of repercussions for the security services is particularly startling in view of the FSB’s performance in the crisis. When Prigozhin captured the headquarters of the Southern Military District—where he spoke to Yevkurov and Alekseyev—it looked almost like a hostage-taking of several of Russia’s top military commanders. Yet according to sources in the FSB, in response to the arrival of Wagner forces, the FSB agents in Rostov-on-Don simply barricaded themselves in their local headquarters. Also absent during the crisis were several of Putin’s top security officials, including the head of the Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, and FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov. While a column of Wagner mercenaries marched toward Moscow, taking down helicopters and shooting into the houses of civilians on the way, these brave generals failed to show up—not at the scene or in front of the public at all.

The security services were paralyzed at a moment of national crisis.

It appears shocking, but this was not the first time that Russia’s security services have been paralyzed at a moment of national crisis. Take the 1991 coup attempt, in which a group of communist top officials headed by a KGB leader put President Mikhail Gorbachev under house arrest at his summer villa in Crimea. Although their plan to seize power failed and tens of thousands of people went to the streets to defend their freedom, KGB officers chose not to participate in the events and stayed at home. The officers who were at KGB headquarters on Lubyanka that night barricaded themselves in the building and watched the events from their windows.

In 2004, when terrorists took hostage more than 1,000 children and teachers at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia’s top generals seemed to respond with fear and helplessness. At the time, Patrushev, who was then FSB director, accompanied then interior minister Rashid Nurgaliyev to the city airport, conferred in secret, and then hurried back to Moscow. The officials got so scared that they left the situation to be sorted out by the local FSB branch, which by all standards was not in a position to tackle a terrorist crisis of this scale. In the end, more than 300 people were killed, including many children. Putin never punished these officials, and all these years later, Patrushev and Nurgaliyev are on Russia’s Security Council.

GETTING AWAY WITH IT?

For the first time during more than 20 years in power, Putin’s KGB background might not serve him well. As an officer of the KGB who also did nothing to protect the political regime he swore to protect, he seems willing to let slide the excuses made by today’s FSB generals. Of course, there could still be purges in the time to come, but in past crises, when Putin decided to make a change, it has usually happened swiftly: in 2004, for example, when Chechen militants briefly seized control of Ingushetia, heads rolled at the FSB almost overnight.

For now, it is not just Prigozhin who seems to have gone unpunished but also the security services who supposedly were protecting Putin from precisely such a threat. For any autocrat, this is a strange way to reassert control. In the short term, Putin may see it as the best way to downplay the crisis and move on. But his security services will be unable to save him from the new reality that has taken shape in which the military itself is open to criticism and even challenges to its rule. If such challenges continue, they may not be limited to the military. They could extend to Putin’s own hold on power.

ANDREI SOLDATOV is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Co-Founder and Editor of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of the Russian secret services’ activities.
IRINA BOROGAN is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Co-Founder and Deputy Editor of Agentura.ru.
They are the co-authors of The Compatriots: The Russian Exiles Who Fought Against the Kremlin.

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan · July 6, 2023

11. Belarus leader Lukashenko says Prigozhin back in Russia, Wagner deployment unclear

"Curiouser and curiouser."

Belarus leader Lukashenko says Prigozhin back in Russia, Wagner deployment unclear

Reuters · by Guy Faulconbridge

Summary
Lukashenko says Wagner boss Prigozhin no longer in Belarus
Terms of Wagner relocation to Belarus unresolved
Uncertainty surrounds deal that ended armed mutiny in Russia

MINSK, July 6 (Reuters) - The mutinous head of Russia's Wagner group is no longer in Belarus and it is not clear if his fighters will move there, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said on Thursday, raising questions about the deal that ended last month's revolt.

Lukashenko said on June 27 that Yevgeny Prigozhin had arrived in Belarus as part of the deal that defused the crisis, which had seen the Wagner fighters briefly capture the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don and then march towards Moscow.

But Lukashenko, who brokered the deal, said on Thursday that Prigozhin was now in St Petersburg, Russia's second city, or may have moved on to Moscow.

"He is not on the territory of Belarus," Lukashenko told a news conference in Minsk.

Lukashenko also said the question of Wagner units relocating to Belarus had not been resolved, and would depend on decisions by Russia and by Wagner.

"Whether they will be in Belarus or not, in what quantity, we will figure it out in the near future," he said.

His comments highlighted the huge uncertainties surrounding the terms and implementation of the deal that ended the mutiny, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has said could have plunged the country into civil war.

Prigozhin's men have spearheaded much of the fighting in Ukraine but he has also accused Russia's top brass of corruption and incompetence. Prigozhin cast the June 24 "march of justice" on Moscow as a protest against the military leadership.

INVESTIGATION

Russian state TV on Wednesday launched a fierce attack on Prigozhin and said an investigation into what had happened was still being vigorously pursued.

A business jet linked to Prigozhin left St Petersburg for Moscow on Wednesday and was heading for southern Russia on Thursday, according to flight tracking data, but it was not clear if the mercenary chief was on board.

Lukashenko said he had agreed to meet Putin in the near future and would discuss the Prigozhin situation with him.

Prigozhin is "absolutely free" and Putin will not "wipe him out", Lukashenko added.

Lukashenko said an offer for Wagner to station some of its fighters in Belarus - a prospect that has alarmed neighbouring NATO countries - still stands.

"We are not building camps. We offered them several former military camps that were used in Soviet times, including near Osipovichi. If they agree. But Wagner has a different vision for deployment, of course, I won’t tell you about this vision," the Belarusian leader told reporters.

Lukashenko also said he did not see a Wagner presence in Belarus as a risk to his country and did not believe Wagner would ever take up arms against Belarus. He said the Belarusian army could benefit from Wagner's expertise.

Belarus is a close ally of Russia and last month began taking delivery of Russian tactical nuclear weapons that Putin has said are intended to deter the West from attempts to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia.

In comments addressed to the West, Lukashenko said: "We are not going to attack anyone with nuclear weapons. (As long as) you don't touch us, forget nuclear weapons. But if you commit aggression, the response will be instantaneous. The targets have been defined."

Additional reporting by Vladimir Soldatkin, writing by Mark Trevelyan Editing by Gareth Jones

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Guy Faulconbridge

Thomson Reuters

As Moscow bureau chief, Guy runs coverage of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Before Moscow, Guy ran Brexit coverage as London bureau chief (2012-2022). On the night of Brexit, his team delivered one of Reuters historic wins - reporting news of Brexit first to the world and the financial markets. Guy graduated from the London School of Economics and started his career as an intern at Bloomberg. He has spent over 14 years covering the former Soviet Union. He speaks fluent Russian. Contact: +447825218698

Reuters · by Guy Faulconbridge

12. It’s Not the Plane, It’s the Pilot

A "movie review" with some more substantive "perspective."

Excerpts:

To be clear, recognizing perspective does not mean abandoning objectivity or a search for a singular “truth.” Scholars vigorously try to uncover missing evidence, square contested facts, and cohere competing interpretations. Sometimes, however, what happened and why is unclear or disputed, with little chance that there will be a final resolution accepted by all. More often, the meaning of what happened is contested. Consensus on difficult questions can be hard to achieve, especially when viewed through different political, social, or cultural lenses. Scholars of foreign policy and international relations are at their best when they successfully balance two difficult, seemingly contradictory tasks: seeking to describe and evaluate an objective reality, while recognizing that finding it may be elusive.

There is another reason to mention perspective. The emergence of ChatGPT and generative artificial intelligence has generated reactions from excitement to alarm, with some even questioning whether teachers and even scholars could be, in time, replaced. This issue, perhaps inadvertently, should put at least some of those fears to rest. These articles demonstrate that no machine can fully capture the complex, interactive, human elements of perspective, or how people in different places and at different times saw the world, and how that perspective continues to evolve. To understand these issues of competing temporal and spatial perspectives, while assessing complexity, chance, contingency, and radical uncertainty, requires analysts and scholars of great insight and sensitivity, such as those highlighted in this issue. As Maverick correctly points out, “It’s not the plane, it’s the pilot.”

As for my own perspective: As a scholar, my focus will be on seeking objectivity, while retaining strategic empathy when I encounter views at odds with my own. As a sappy American of a certain age and history, however, I will continue to like my version of Top Gun far better than the version of myself in China enjoys (and yes, there is one, translated as “Born to Fly”).

It’s Not the Plane, It’s the Pilot - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Francis J. Gavin · July 6, 2023

In his introduction to Volume 6, Issue 3, the chair of TNSR’s editorial board, Francis J. Gavin, considers how time, space, and other factors shape perspectives — and why Top Gun’s Maverick was right when he said, “It’s not the plane, it’s the pilot.”

I am not always the best person with whom to watch movies. I love previews, and often feel like the two-minute highlight reel satisfies my need to watch a film any further. The annoying professor side of me likes to point out every inaccuracy and ridiculous plot device. Science fiction, epic fantasy, action, and adventure movies strain my sense of credibility and quickly lose my interest. Movie night can be a place of contestation, even conflict, in my household, especially when I recommend an old black-and-white classic or European movie my daughters find insufferably pretentious. I don’t think I’ve made it through one Marvel movie.

Which makes my guilty secret all the more surprising — I love Top Gun: Maverick. Every long-haul flight, I say to myself, “watch something different,” yet every time I settle into my seat, enjoy an adult beverage, and gleefully watch Capt. Pete “Maverick” Mitchell defy gravity and common sense.

Become a Member

The plot of the movie is, at best, moronic. Who is this enemy country with fifth generation fighters but no nuclear weapons, that must be attacked from the sea, and has the weirdest plan ever to store enriched uranium? Is it possible that someone can stay in the U.S. Navy as a fighter pilot for 36 years and not be promoted above captain? What possible use is a Mach 10 plane, and who survives crashing it unharmed? Carrying out a dangerous mission in both films — shooting down Soviet MiGs in the 1986 original, destroying a nascent nuclear program in the second — seems more likely to escalate to World War III, than be the calm, satisfying conclusion the movies portray. And are we to believe that Penny — Mitchell’s girlfriend four decades earlier and who in the interim seems to have acquired a seaside bar, a beautiful San Diego beach home, and high-end sailing yacht as a single mother — would fall back in love with him?

None of that matters. I love that Maverick has the perfect response to Ed Harris’s crusty, drone warrior character — Adm. Chester “Hammer” Cain — telling him that pilots like him are heading for extinction. “Maybe so, sir. But not today.” I subconsciously pump my fist when Maverick starts the training session with his young pilots by splitting them in two from below, while The Who’s “Won’t Get Fooled Again” blares. The scene where a dying Iceman types out for Maverick, “The Navy needs Maverick. The kid needs Maverick. That’s why I fought for you,” gets me choked up every time. Henrik Ibsen or Eric Rohmer it is not, but I love every last cheesy part of the film.

Why do I like such a ridiculous movie? If I am honest with myself, it’s simple (and yes, simplistic) patriotism. I love America, both as a place and a concept, and Top Gun is about America, for better and worse, warts and all. As a scholar, whose vocation aspires to de-nationalized, Archimedean objectivity, I am aware that this affection can be problematic. The first Top Gun, while still entertaining, is in retrospect an adolescent panegyric for a Reagan-era United States that celebrated arrogant straight white males, technological determinism, and American hubris. Four decades later, the original Top Gun is embarrassing. The 2022 film reveals a far more diverse but frayed America. The U.S. Navy now better reflects the racial melting pot that is the United States, and women get to compete to be Top Gun, while shirtless, homoerotic volleyball is replaced by the mixed gender — if nonsensical — postmodern game of dogfight football. Since the first film, Mitchell has aged and been humbled, his previous cocksure attitude and joy diminished. He is lost, personally and professionally, and this mission is a chance for redemption. Draw your own parallels.

I don’t mention my love of Maverick to highlight my limited skills as a film critic. Instead, I offer it to reflect on the idea of perspective.

Perspective has two dimensions — spatial and temporal. My hunch is that the version of myself from Beijing, Moscow, Rio, or even Paris would not enjoy Top Gun: Maverick as much I do, nor would I revel in whatever films that generate a similar limbic brain response in my overseas doppelgangers. Temporal perspective is a reminder that, in a few decades, my grandchildren will likely find Top Gun: Maverick as ridiculous as I now see the original Top Gun to be. Which is an obvious but important thing to remember. As scholars, we often focus on identifying universal insights and timeless lessons that explain big issues like grand strategy, world order, and international relations, looking for truths that persist over space and time. But as we know, reality resists such easy definition.

In 1950, a much better movie was released. Rashomon, directed by the legendary Japanese filmmaker Akira Kurosawa, portrays four distinctive characters who provide four alternative, contradictory recountings of the same event: the murder of a samurai. The film is often mentioned to describe when different parties offer plausible but divergent accounts of the same occurrence, shaped by factors ranging from their own self-interest, subjective perspectives, cognitive biases, or ambiguous evidence. Scholars regularly encounter and have to make sense of contested chronologies and events, which develops skills that can be useful to decision-makers facing similar dilemmas.

Understandably, we hope that the events or phenomena we care about and analyze can be easily apprehended, measured, and understood objectively. In other words, we know something has happened and that we should be able to discover what it was and what it means. Much of social science assumes this objectivity, both in the collection of data and evidence and in its analysis. A deep familiarity with history, however, reminds us that for many complex social and political occurrences, the question and answer to “what happened and why” — and why and how it mattered — can be understood differently by others. Scholars should be sensitive to perspective, or the idea that things can look different depending on who is perceiving the issue in question and when they are trying to understand it.

Consider an example I often reflect upon: the contrasting interpretations of the earthquake in world politics beginning in 1989 that led to the end of the Cold War, the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and eventually the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I believe it is possible to understand at least some part of how contemporary states and leaders understand and act in global affairs today by recognizing and interrogating their interpretation — or perspective — of why and how the Cold War ended and what it meant for their country and international relations more broadly.

In Washington, the end of the Cold War was seen by many as validating the so-called policies of containment. The decisions to compete and even pressure the Soviet Union — sometimes with economic and political means, other times through proxy and covert coercions, and other times through military buildups and arms races — controversial when they were made, were seen, in retrospect, by many as wise. Even those who might dismiss the focus on arms racing and competitive strategies, and believed the Soviet Union collapsed due to its own inherent weaknesses and flaws, would likely concede that those pathologies were best exposed through other forms of competition — economic, political, socio-cultural — with the West. It would be natural for an American analyst or policymaker in the decades after the Cold War to embrace and import these lessons to deal with contemporary and future challenges. How Americans understand the Cold War often shapes how they think about current challenges from China.

A different history and diverging lessons, however, likely emerged from Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. From the perspective of Europe, perhaps the Cold War ended peacefully, not because of competition and arms racing, but due to de-escalation, cooperation, and institution building that emerged on the continent in years prior. The European project, by focusing on integration, union, and turning “swords into plowshares,” suggested that the Soviet Union had nothing to fear — and much to gain — from orienting towards Western Europe. If France and Germany, bitter enemies, could bury their enmity and reconcile, and if Europe, the scene of murderous violence in the first half of the 20th century, had been pacified, then perhaps the armed camps of Europe could relax and demobilize. This lesson — which is currently being fiercely contested and in many places overturned as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — may have led European policymakers to emphasize trade and economic integration over security in the decades after the Cold War, as countries like Germany and Italy dramatically decreased their defense expenditures. It may have also shaped their views towards China and Russia in ways that, until recently, contrasted sharply with the United States.

In the decades that followed the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s historical perspective on 1989-1991 largely consists of a narrative marked by the tragic incompetence of their leaders while being betrayed by broken promises from the West. While the United States and its allies celebrated the demise of the Soviet Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin has labelled it the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. The historical lesson that Russian leaders gleaned from the Cold War might be that efforts to mirror the reforms of the West were doomed, that to embrace the liberal international order was folly, and that the promise of a peaceful Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals always excluded Russia. Russia might look to a different history — its imperial history and past glories — to shape its future policies. This perspective has clearly fed into Moscow’s recent catastrophic blunders.

Beijing, on the other hand, might have accepted part of Moscow’s historical lesson but with a different spin. Yes, how the Cold War unfolded demonstrated that the West, and, in particular, the United States, could never be trusted. Yes, liberal, democratic political reforms like those undertaken by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev were reckless and unwise — the near success of the Tiananmen Square protests proved that to the regime. But this did not exclude dramatic and thorough-going economic reforms to generate a dynamic, technologically advanced economy to compete with and ultimately supplant the United States and its allies as the shaper of world order.

The question of perspective shifts once again if, after looking to the past, your analytical frame shifts from the Cold War to another historical stream. From the view of New Delhi, Lagos, Amman, Johannesburg, or Brasilia, 1989 may have a different meaning altogether. The lens shifts further if you concentrate on forces outside of the narrow confines of statecraft — perhaps Silicon Valley or Hollywood or Wall Street or the City in London? How we see the world today, in other words, often depends on our perspective of how we got to where we are now and what matters most to us. Both the scholar and statesman benefit from recognizing that the same events are often understood differently when viewed from different places and times, even (especially?) when that contrasting view is held by an adversary.

The challenges and opportunities that an awareness of perspective provides is a feature of this excellent issue. It comes out clearly in Bob Work’s defense of contested plans to reform the U.S. Marines and Henrik Larsen’s ruminations on the best ways to rebuild postwar Ukraine. The three scholarly articles in this issue wrestle with the challenges of both spatial and temporal perspective in especially impressive ways. Historian Daniel Chardell’s article impressively mines original sources in “The Origins of the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait Reconsidered.” Analysts long puzzled by Saddam’s reckless 1990 invasion of Kuwait have not understood how the Iraqi leader understood the dramatic changes the end of the Cold War wrought. “Understanding Saddam’s interpretation of the end of the Cold War and, relatedly, his decision to invade Kuwait requires taking seriously his worldview.”

Divergent interpretations on how America’s decision to invade Iraq a decade later similarly engage the issue of perspective. As Joseph Stieb highlights in his analysis of the “security school” versus the “hegemony school” arguments for the war’s origins, it is perspective rather than known facts that explain much of the differences. “In sum, competing interpretations of the war’s origins are entwined with debates about its lessons. It is proper that scholars contest how this war should inform the future of U.S. foreign policy. Nonetheless, partisans in this debate risk filtering history through ideological prisms and using it to win arguments.” The very idea of uncertainty, of things that cannot, ex ante, be known, lies at the heart of the strategic challenge faced by the Biden administration as it seeks to support Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion without inciting a nuclear war. As Janice Stein agues in an important piece, “This contest between a strategy to manipulate uncertainty and a strategy to reduce uncertainty sets the framework for an analysis of escalation management and raises important issues of theory and policy.” Uncertainty in a complex, dangerous, multiplayer competition only elevates the importance of understanding perspective, or how each side understands the world.

To be clear, recognizing perspective does not mean abandoning objectivity or a search for a singular “truth.” Scholars vigorously try to uncover missing evidence, square contested facts, and cohere competing interpretations. Sometimes, however, what happened and why is unclear or disputed, with little chance that there will be a final resolution accepted by all. More often, the meaning of what happened is contested. Consensus on difficult questions can be hard to achieve, especially when viewed through different political, social, or cultural lenses. Scholars of foreign policy and international relations are at their best when they successfully balance two difficult, seemingly contradictory tasks: seeking to describe and evaluate an objective reality, while recognizing that finding it may be elusive.

There is another reason to mention perspective. The emergence of ChatGPT and generative artificial intelligence has generated reactions from excitement to alarm, with some even questioning whether teachers and even scholars could be, in time, replaced. This issue, perhaps inadvertently, should put at least some of those fears to rest. These articles demonstrate that no machine can fully capture the complex, interactive, human elements of perspective, or how people in different places and at different times saw the world, and how that perspective continues to evolve. To understand these issues of competing temporal and spatial perspectives, while assessing complexity, chance, contingency, and radical uncertainty, requires analysts and scholars of great insight and sensitivity, such as those highlighted in this issue. As Maverick correctly points out, “It’s not the plane, it’s the pilot.”

As for my own perspective: As a scholar, my focus will be on seeking objectivity, while retaining strategic empathy when I encounter views at odds with my own. As a sappy American of a certain age and history, however, I will continue to like my version of Top Gun far better than the version of myself in China enjoys (and yes, there is one, translated as “Born to Fly”).

Become a Member

Francis J. Gavin is the Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and the director of the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He serves as chair of the editorial board of the Texas National Security Review.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Francis J. Gavin · July 6, 2023

13. Brig. Gen. Ryan Assumes Command of CSOJTF-L

Based on my reading of BG Ryan's bio he likely spent nearly his entire special operations time in JSOC (and subordinate units).

Brig. Gen. Ryan Assumes Command of CSOJTF-L

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/448529/brig-gen-ryan-assumes-command-csojtf-l

Photo By Capt. Jonathan Ferrer | U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Philip Ryan, center, shakes hands with Maj. Gen. Kevin Leahy,... read more

JORDAN

06.14.2023

Story by Sgt. 1st Class Nicholas J. De La Pena and Capt. Jonathan Ferrer

Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force - Levant

Brig. Gen. Philip J. Ryan assumed command of the Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force-Levant (CSOJTF-L) from U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Claude K. Tudor Jr. during a Transfer of Authority ceremony held June 14.

Maj. Gen. Kevin C. Leahy, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Central presided over the ceremony and highlighted the continued partnership that makes CSOJTF-L an effective warfighting task force.

“The magic of Special Operations Forces are units of action - our MSOTs, ODAs, Combat Controllers, air crews, SEAL platoons, Civil Affairs and PSYOP Teams on the ground in harm's way,” said Leahy. “Operation Inherent Resolve is the tip of the spear in the fight against ISIS. The teams that we collectively support are getting the job done every day, under risk of enemy attack.”

During his speech, Leahy spoke about the power of the Combined and Joint Force, comprised of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians that support a task force dedicated to the defeat of ISIS and has accomplished some of the hardest missions.

“The respect and value Tudor places on partnerships says a lot about his [Tudor] combined emphasis approach. Emphasizing the criticality of a partnership of nations has made ISIS a shell of its former self, still dangerous, but a shell due to the combined work,” said Leahy. “Tudor and Command Sgt. Maj. Frank Wilson leave the Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force better than they found it.”

Leahy welcomed Ryan, a Special Operations Forces Aviator, who led the United States Army Special Operations Aviation Command prior to commanding CSOJTF-L.

At the podium and addressing the command for the first time, Ryan spoke of his readiness to take on CSOJTF-L’s mission.

“Command Sgt. Maj. Fields and I are honored and eager to take on the challenge ahead with all of you.” said Ryan. “Maj. Gen. Leahy, thank you for your kind words and entrusting us with this huge responsibility. Brig. Gen. Tudor, thanks for your great handoff, Command Sgt. Maj. Fields and I have certainly benefited from you and Command Sgt. Maj. Wilson’s guidance and support during this transition.”

Ryan earned his Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy in 1992, where he received his commission. He served in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky and in the 2nd Infantry Division, in the Republic of Korea before joining Special Operations Forces in 1999. Then Ryan served and held leadership assignments at all levels of the Special Operations community, which represents his full range of tactical and strategic Special Operations expertise that will provide great value at CSOJTF-L.

CSOJTF-L is a Joint Task Force composed of Special Operations Forces from the United States and multiple partner nations. The Task Force is responsible for conducting special operations in the Levant region in support of U.S. Central Command's mission.

14. The Surprising Bipartisanship of U.S. Foreign Policy

I do think we forget that vigorous internal debate has always been a strength of the US political system.

Excerpts:

Inconsistent U.S. bipartisanship brings both disadvantages and less obvious advantages. On the one hand, the prevalence of domestic divisions over foreign policy prevents the United States from acting effectively to address many key global challenges, diminishes the credibility of U.S. overseas commitments, and reduces the incentive for other countries to cooperate. On the other hand, vigorous internal debate has long been a strength of the U.S. system, facilitating greater deliberation before important decisions and providing much-needed course corrections when things go awry.

During the Cold War, the father of the containment doctrine, George Kennan, often lamented that freewheeling U.S. democracy prevented Washington from carrying out as coherent and consistent a grand strategy as the authoritarian Soviet Union. Yet the United States made numerous adjustments during the Cold War that enabled it to outlast its communist rival. Going forward, the key imperative for whichever party is in office will be to marshal the country’s vigorous internal debates into policy innovations and refinements that strengthen, rather than weaken, continued U.S. leadership on the most critical issues of our time.

The Surprising Bipartisanship of U.S. Foreign Policy

Even in Times of Polarization, Consensus Has Prevailed

By Jordan Tama

July 6, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Jordan Tama · July 6, 2023

In an article in The Atlantic in 2020, shortly before he became CIA Director, William Burns observed that “in the past, a sense of common domestic purpose gave ballast to U.S. diplomacy; now its absence enfeebles it.” Burns is not alone in bemoaning the decline of bipartisan agreement on foreign policy. Writing in Foreign Affairs a year later, Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz argued that the “domestic consensus that long supported U.S. engagement abroad has come apart in the face of mounting partisan discord and a deepening rift between urban and rural Americans.” Indeed, this has become a common refrain, with the stark contrast in approaches between U.S. President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump on such issues as NATO, Russia, and climate change often cited to demonstrate the precipitous decline of consensus politics.

Yet a deeper look at the political dynamics that have shaped U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II reveals that such sharp differences are hardly new. Ever since the rise of the United States as a great power, bipartisan cooperation, partisan bickering, and intraparty disagreement have coexisted in shaping the country’s foreign policy. These tensions were present even during the early years of the Cold War, a period usually regarded as a golden age for bipartisanship. Today, Democrats and Republicans are generally aligned on China and industrial reshoring but are polarized on climate change and immigration. At the same time, the Republican Party is split over aid to Ukraine, reflecting a GOP divide between nationalists and internationalists that dates back to World War II. In short, the politics of U.S. foreign policy has always been more complicated than images of past unity or current polarization suggest.

A NOT SO GOLDEN AGE

Vociferous disagreement over foreign policy marked the United States’ earliest days, when the Founding Fathers argued bitterly over whether the country should intervene in support of revolutionary-era France during its war with Great Britain. A century later, U.S. hawks and progressives fiercely debated the questions of hostilities with Spain and the occupation of Cuba and the Philippines in the Spanish-American War. After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson was unable to persuade Republicans in Congress to vote for the treaty establishing the League of Nations, preventing the United States from joining the first multilateral institution designed to preserve peace.

The United States’ victory in World War II and the onset of the Cold War produced a new bipartisanship in both foreign policy rhetoric and action during Harry Truman’s first term as president. Capturing the mood of the time, Senator Arthur Vandenberg famously stated that partisan politics should stop “at the water’s edge.” Such bipartisan cooperation has always been essential for the United States to address major international challenges by giving allies and enemies alike a sense of the consistency of the country’s policies. Working together, President Truman, who was a Democrat, and Senator Vandenberg, a Republican who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, marshaled strong support from both parties for such landmark initiatives as the NATO treaty and the Marshall Plan.

Yet it did not take long for interparty divisions to reemerge. During Truman’s second term, Vandenberg developed lung cancer and was away from the Senate for 19 months before dying in 1951. During his absence, Republican voices became sharply critical of the president’s policies. As the 1940s ended, the Communist Party took over China, the Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb, and North Korea invaded South Korea. Republican members of Congress blamed Truman for allowing each of these setbacks to happen. Around the same time, Senator Joseph McCarthy and other Republicans alleged that the Truman administration was allowing communists to infiltrate the U.S. government.

Divisions within the parties themselves also resurfaced during the early years of the Cold War. In 1950, conservative Democrats lined up with Republicans to approve legislation establishing a Subversive Activities Control Board to investigate communist infiltration. This coalition also authorized the Justice Department to deport non-U.S. citizens who were deemed to pose a threat to national security. Although Truman argued that this legislation restricted civil liberties, Congress overrode his veto. The same congressional coalition blocked approval of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which Truman had negotiated. It would take four decades before the Senate finally ratified this treaty criminalizing the world’s most heinous atrocity. Republicans, for their part, were split between internationalists who favored expansive foreign policy commitments and nationalists who wanted to limit U.S. involvement overseas. When U.S. forces became bogged down fighting North Korean and Chinese forces on the Korean Peninsula, some Republicans called for taking the war directly to China, whereas others argued that the United States should never have gotten involved in the first place.

A new wave of bipartisanship took hold following the inauguration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, facilitated by a growing consensus in Washington that the United States needed to take strong steps to limit and counter Soviet power. Yet members of Congress remained divided on important international issues and partisan rhetoric was common. In 1957, when Eisenhower sought to increase foreign aid as a tool for fighting communism, conservative Democrats aligned with inward-looking Republicans to block him. Conversely, when Eisenhower sought to rein in a ballooning defense budget, hawkish Democratic senators attacked him for supporting spending restrictions that they claimed would allow the Soviet Union to gain a military edge over the United States. Senator John F. Kennedy, when announcing his presidential campaign in 1960, charged that under Eisenhower, “our security has declined more rapidly than over any comparable period in our history.”

New fault lines emerged following U.S. failures in the Vietnam War and presidential abuses of power. During the 1970s, Democratic and Republican lawmakers banded together to enact legislation—opposed by Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford—to limit presidential authority in areas including the use of military force, intelligence operations, and human rights. Meanwhile, hard-line conservatives sharply criticized the policy of détente that Nixon and Ford pursued toward the Soviet Union, laying the foundation for the more aggressive anticommunist policies instituted by President Ronald Reagan. Some of those Reagan policies, in turn, generated strong pushback from many Democrats and some Republicans on Capitol Hill. Most notably, Congress enacted laws from 1982 to 1984 prohibiting administration-backed aid to Nicaraguan contra rebels fighting to overthrow the communist-aligned Sandinista government. The Reagan administration’s decision to provide covert aid to the contras in violation of those laws prompted congressional investigations that nearly led to the president’s impeachment.

WASHINGTON WRANGLING

Since the end of the Cold War, disagreement on foreign policy has waxed and waned. The Senate has approved six waves of NATO enlargement since the 1990s with near-unanimous support, enabling the addition of 15 countries to the alliance, with Sweden now only needing Hungary and Turkey’s approval to become the sixteenth new member. Democrats and Republicans have also voted together to impose sanctions on Russia, North Korea, and other nations in response to human rights violations, military aggression, and other threatening behavior. In addition, broad bipartisan coalitions have approved more than $100 billion to combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and greenlighted the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Despite the deep divisions of the post-Trump era, Democrats and Republicans have also come together during the Biden administration to support actions countering the rise of China. These include major investments in domestic semiconductor manufacturing, an expanded military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and displays of support for Taiwan.

But the post–Cold War era has also been marked by vigorous disagreements. Although some Democrats initially supported the war in Iraq, positions on the conflict split largely along partisan lines once no weapons of mass destruction were found there. During the Obama administration, Republicans universally assailed the 2015 agreement negotiated by President Barack Obama under which Iran agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions. Just three years later, Trump exited the agreement, which he called “the worst deal ever.” Republicans attacked the Obama administration for failing to avert a 2012 terrorist attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, and the Biden administration for its handling of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. In one typical comment on the Afghanistan withdrawal, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy called Biden’s “lack of leadership” during the crisis “shameful.” Although it is unsurprising that the opposition party would try to score political points when overseas events make the president politically vulnerable, such scathing rhetoric can have real consequences in eroding the country’s international standing. Debates over climate change and immigration have also been characterized by strong polarization, making it very difficult for the United States to address those critical challenges.

At the same time, both parties have continued to face strong internal divisions over foreign policy during the last 30 years. Within the Democratic Party, debates over the North American Free Trade Agreement in the 1990s and the Trans-Pacific Partnership proposed by the Obama administration, which the United States did not join, pitted free traders against protectionists, while debates over military intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria pitted liberal hawks against progressive doves. Internal disagreement is especially visible today within the Republican Party, as the “America first” agenda of Trump’s wing of the party clashes with the hawkish internationalism of Republicans such as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and former Vice President Mike Pence. For example, although most Republicans in Congress joined with Democrats to appropriate more than $75 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine during 2022, nationalists and isolationists such as Senator Josh Hawley and Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene have grown increasingly critical of the scale of this support, and it remains uncertain whether a majority of Republicans will continue to support Ukraine if the war becomes prolonged.

For all of these tensions and divisions, both within and between the two parties, however, the current environment in which U.S. foreign policy is shaped is not that different from what it was in past decades. Consider a new study of congressional voting data, which shows the continued coexistence of bipartisanship and division over U.S. foreign policy. Of 424 important foreign policy roll call votes from 1991 to 2020, majorities of House Democrats and Republicans voted together 49 percent of the time, and the figure in the Senate was 53 percent. Strikingly, these rates of bipartisan voting on foreign policy remained rather steady, at 48 and 43 percent, respectively, during Trump’s presidency. In short, bipartisanship is still common in U.S. foreign policy.

CREATIVE TENSION

Certainly, there is much cause for concern about the effects of today’s political landscape on U.S. foreign policy. Trump and many of his political allies propound a highly nationalistic and xenophobic vision of the United States’ role in the world. If Trump is elected president again, his foreign policy decisions and behavior could significantly erode the rules-based international order. At the same time, dramatic swings in policy from one president to the next have reduced the willingness of the United States’ allies and partners to trust its commitments. The magnitude of this problem is greater than it has ever been before.

Yet many Republican presidential candidates, including former Governor Nikki Haley and Senator Tim Scott, as well as such influential members of Congress as Senator Lindsey Graham and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul, reject much of Trump’s foreign policy agenda, and continue to favor a brand of conservative internationalism that owes more to Reagan. Despite being the Republican standard-bearer for seven years, Trump has not succeeded in forging a consensus between inward- and outward-looking Republicans. This divide is likely to persist.

Inconsistent U.S. bipartisanship brings both disadvantages and less obvious advantages. On the one hand, the prevalence of domestic divisions over foreign policy prevents the United States from acting effectively to address many key global challenges, diminishes the credibility of U.S. overseas commitments, and reduces the incentive for other countries to cooperate. On the other hand, vigorous internal debate has long been a strength of the U.S. system, facilitating greater deliberation before important decisions and providing much-needed course corrections when things go awry.

During the Cold War, the father of the containment doctrine, George Kennan, often lamented that freewheeling U.S. democracy prevented Washington from carrying out as coherent and consistent a grand strategy as the authoritarian Soviet Union. Yet the United States made numerous adjustments during the Cold War that enabled it to outlast its communist rival. Going forward, the key imperative for whichever party is in office will be to marshal the country’s vigorous internal debates into policy innovations and refinements that strengthen, rather than weaken, continued U.S. leadership on the most critical issues of our time.

JORDAN TAMA is Provost Associate Professor at the School of International Service at American University and the author of the forthcoming book Bipartisanship and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cooperation in a Polarized Age.

Foreign Affairs · by Jordan Tama · July 6, 2023

15. US in mad dash to get Sweden into NATO over opposition by Turkey, Hungary

Will there be a quid pro quo with Turkey?

Excerpts:

Biden administration officials have engaged intensively with Turkey to negotiate the lifting of its objections. The White House has positioned the sale of F-16 fighter jets and upgrades to Turkey’s existing fleet as propositions contingent on Ankara moving forward with Sweden’s accession.

“This is a top priority of the United States, that Sweden become a NATO ally by Vilnius, and we are actively and persistently raising this with Turkey and with Hungary at all levels,” Douglas Jones, deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department, told House lawmakers during a hearing last month.

He added that the U.S. has made clear to Turkey that ratifying Sweden’s accession to NATO “would help in many of these weapons transfers.”

US in mad dash to get Sweden into NATO over opposition by Turkey, Hungary

BY LAURA KELLY - 07/06/23 6:00 AM ET

The Hill · · July 6, 2023

The Biden administration is in a mad dash to get Turkey and Hungary to ratify Sweden’s accession to NATO when leaders meet next week in Lithuania.

Turkey has held back on approving Sweden’s accession over criticisms that Stockholm harbors Kurdish groups that Ankara views as a threat. The public burning of a Quran, the Islamic holy book, by a protester outside a mosque in Stockholm last week has drawn further condemnation from Turkey.

In another complication, Hungary’s foreign minister said Tuesday that Budapest will not ratify Sweden’s accession until it gets the green light from Turkey.

Adding Sweden is viewed as a major boon to NATO, with Stockholm’s supporters pointing to its experienced military capabilities, its geographic location shoring up the northern front of Europe, and funds that will see it contribute 2 percent of its GDP to NATO’s budget.

“Sweden has fantastic armed forces, it has a particularly strong navy and air force and really, extraordinary capabilities that are an asset to NATO. So this is not just, ‘oh it’s nice to have another member,’” said Elisabeth Braw, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

“Sweden, we should remember, also has lots of expertise — not just in territorial defense but expeditionary warfare and in peacekeeping. It’s really a dream member state.”

Sweden also holds enormous symbolic importance, as a key signal of member-states’ stability and solidarity in supporting Ukraine against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, and as the Kremlin is grappling with the fallout of the Wagner mutiny attempt.

“If we can’t get Turkey on board with the rest of the alliance, I worry that it’s a crack in the solidarity and an issue of credibility for the alliance,” Christopher Skaluba, director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative with the Atlantic Council, said during a panel event last week.

President Biden met with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at the White House Wednesday in a show of support for Stockholm joining the alliance by the deadline of the NATO summit on July 11 and 12 in Vilnius.

Biden called Sweden a “valued friend and partner” and said he is “anxiously looking forward to [their] membership” in NATO.

Braw, of AEI, called it “extraordinary” that Biden is hosting Kristersson, and said it points to the political capital the president is putting forward to bring Sweden into NATO.

Biden administration officials have engaged intensively with Turkey to negotiate the lifting of its objections. The White House has positioned the sale of F-16 fighter jets and upgrades to Turkey’s existing fleet as propositions contingent on Ankara moving forward with Sweden’s accession.

“This is a top priority of the United States, that Sweden become a NATO ally by Vilnius, and we are actively and persistently raising this with Turkey and with Hungary at all levels,” Douglas Jones, deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department, told House lawmakers during a hearing last month.

He added that the U.S. has made clear to Turkey that ratifying Sweden’s accession to NATO “would help in many of these weapons transfers.”

The top four lawmakers on the foreign affairs committees in the House and Senate have opposed the administration moving forward on the F-16 sales, largely related to Turkey’s stonewalling Sweden’s accession to NATO.

While the president holds power to override congressional objections for weapons sales on national security concerns, the Biden administration has committed to lawmakers to go through the regular process of notification and congressional approval.

Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has held the hardest line on opposing F-16 sales to Ankara. Menendez says Turkey holding up Sweden’s accession to NATO is only one bullet point in a long list of problematic behaviors — pointing to Turkey’s jailing of journalists and political opposition figures, its military incursions and intimidation into Greek and Cyprus territorial air and seas, and Ankara’s close ties with Moscow.

“I’m not sure that [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan is willing to do what is necessary,” Menendez told The Hill in March.

“Does he want to be a true NATO ally or does he want to play all sides? And if you want to play all sides, then you can’t get the best of what we have.”

Asked late last month if Menendez was open to negotiations on his hold on F-16’s for Turkey, the chairman pointed to Erdoğan needing to address his criticisms.

“All he has to do is what I’ve said all along,” Menendez said.

But other lawmakers are more open to finding a workaround to allow F-16 sales to Turkey if Sweden’s accession to NATO is prioritized.

“Chairman McCaul has been clear that with Turkey’s acceptance of Sweden’s accession into NATO, he would approve the F-16 case,” a Republican aide with the House Foreign Affairs Committee told The Hill regarding Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas).

“As part of NATO solidarity, it’s not helpful for us to be singling out one of the NATO members and trying to hold them out. I think that’s where he stands, NATO solidarity is critical. He sees Turkey as part of that and then also the addition of Sweden at this time is crucial just as we saw with Finland.”

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg is working to break the impasse by hosting Turkey, Sweden and Finland for a meeting Thursday.

The meeting is being held under the auspices of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that was signed by Turkey, Sweden and Finland in June 2022 when Ankara first raised objections to these countries joining the alliance, largely calling for Stockholm to crack down on Kurdish groups that Turkey labels as terrorist organizations.

Finland joined the alliance in April.

U.S. officials and analysts acknowledge that Turkey has legitimate security concerns related to terrorist threats but say Sweden has fulfilled its duties under the MOA to address Ankara’s demands — to include broadening its anti-terrorism laws and allowing the extradition of at least one Turkish citizen that Ankara has accused of having links to a Kurdish terrorist group.

“Our belief is that … Sweden has taken Turkey’s counterterrorism concerns into account … They have implemented the MOA,” Jones, of the State Department, said in the hearing with House lawmakers.

But Erdoğan is doubling down on criticisms against Sweden, pointing to the burning of a Quran by a protester last week as an act of terrorism being shielded by free speech.

Swedish authorities reportedly granted a demonstration permit with the knowledge that the Quran would be torn up and burned, an act that a Swedish court had earlier ruled fell under the protections of free speech.

The protester who burned the book — on one of the holiest days in Islam, Eid al-Adha — was later charged by police with agitation against an ethnic or national group, Reuters reported.

“The nefarious attack against our sacred book, the Holy Quran, in the Swedish capital city of Stockholm has infuriated all of us … That this hate crime has been committed under the protection of the police is even graver,” Erdoğan said Monday following a cabinet meeting.

“Everyone should acknowledge that [Turkey’s] friendship cannot be won by supporting terror, opening up space for terrorists, and allocating streets and the most central squares of cities to terrorists.”

Justice Department releases slightly less redacted Trump warrant affidavit Biden to tout $500 billion invested in manufacturing and clean energy during his presidency

Turkey has long frustrated the U.S. as a problematic NATO ally, with Erdoğan holding enormous personal power over affairs of state.

“I think everybody’s biting their nails, simply because it’s so unclear,” Braw said of whether Turkey will allow Sweden to join NATO.

“The way Erdoğan makes decisions is not the way everybody else makes decisions.”

The Hill · by Lauren Sforza · July 6, 2023

16. China simulates ‘Z-day’ total sea war with the US

How do we come by this type of information from China? Just because it is in a "peer reviewed" Chinese journal do we dismiss the notion that China is likely only releasing information that it wants us to know?

China simulates ‘Z-day’ total sea war with the US

PLA simulation highlights new weapon capabilities while tracking devastating results of earlier test runs of a Taiwan war

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 5, 2023

China has just simulated a total war scenario at sea with the United States, an exercise that highlighted the People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s formidable challenges in a potential high-intensity conflict with an advanced, determined and highly-capable adversary.

South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that researchers from the PLA’s Unit 91404 recently added a “total war” scenario when testing and evaluating the performance of new weapons. Unit 91404 is responsible for the sea tests of some of China’s latest and most potent naval weapons.

The SCMP report notes that the researchers published their “Z-day” total war scenario in the peer-reviewed Chinese Journal of Ship Research last month. The report mentions that the researchers assumed that the Chinese military was under all-out attack by a hypothetical “blue alliance” with Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

In the simulation, the PLA-N had nearly 50 destroyers, with each attacked with 11 missiles and more than three torpedoes coming from multiple directions.

The report also mentions the blue alliance generated jamming noises 30 times stronger than the signal PLA-N warships use for communication and that the detection range of Chinese radar was reduced to 60% below normal.

Those conditions destroyed almost a third of the Chinese destroyer’s air defense capabilities, with only half of their surface-to-air (SAM) missiles hitting their targets. Chinese naval experts who independently assessed the simulation results were quoted as saying the figures are “realistic.”

By highlighting weapon capabilities in doomsday scenarios, military forces can showcase readiness and deter potential adversaries from engaging in conflicts, researchers in the SCMP report said, with one saying that their paper is not intended to be viewed as a “horror movie.”

A Chinese Type 055 cruiser firing a YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship missile. Photo: Sina News

The Unit 91404 simulation follows on another conducted by a Chinese university wherein China had the upper hand over the US in a starkly different outcome.

In May 2023, Asia Times reported that researchers from the North University of China ran a war game simulating a Chinese hypersonic missile attack on a US carrier battlegroup, marking the first publicized simulation of its type.

The war game reportedly simulated a situation where the USS Gerald Ford supercarrier and its escorts continued approaching a China-held island in the South China Sea despite repeated warnings to turn back.

In that simulation, China used 24 hypersonic missiles in a three-wave attack to sink the USS Gerald Ford, the USS San Jacinto Ticonderoga-class cruiser, and four Arleigh Burke Flight IIA guided missile destroyers.

The first missile wave depleted the US fleet’s 264 interceptor missiles and sank the USS San Jacinto, while the second wave sank the USS Gerald Ford. The last wave finished off the surviving Arleigh Burke destroyers.

The North University of China simulation highlighted the importance of sea-based surveillance, patrol missions and lure tactics to identify targets, conserve limited missiles and reduce the number of interceptor missiles.

The US has also conducted simulations of a Taiwan Strait war with China, which unsurprisingly ended in its favor while projecting the potentially enormous costs of such a conflict.

In January 2023, Asia Times reported that Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank had conducted a simulation of the US and its allies repelling a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, showing that while the US could potentially repel China a victory would come at a staggering cost.

Even in the most optimistic scenario, the US and Japan combined lost 449 combat aircraft and 43 ships, including two aircraft carriers, with the US losing 6,960 personnel and 3,200 killed in action. Taiwan lost half its air force, 22 ships, and 3,500 ground troops, with a third killed in action in the simulation.

China fared the worst in the simulation, losing 138 ships, 155 combat aircraft and 52,000 ground troops. China’s ground troop losses included 7,000 battle casualties with a third killed in action, 15,000 troops lost at sea with half assumed killed and 30,000 prisoners of war from Taiwan-landing force survivors.

The simulation mentions four critical assumptions for a US victory in Taiwan. First, as China’s logistics weaken, Taiwan must hold the line to contain China’s beachhead and counterattack in force.

Second, the US and its allies must accept that there is no “Ukraine model” for Taiwan since China can blockade the self-governing island for weeks or months to prevent resupply.

Third, the US must be able to use its bases in Japan, which would be the critical linchpin for US operations around Taiwan. Fourth, the US must be able to strike China’s warships from outside its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble.

Emerging technologies would likely play a decisive role in defending Taiwan, although they may not be enough to avert a Pyrrhic outcome for either side.

In May 2022, Asia Times reported that the US Air Force’s Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC) office and RAND think tank conducted a Taiwan conflict simulation that demonstrated the decisive effect drone swarms would have in such a contingency.

Artist’s concept of a drone swarm. Credit: C4ISRNET

Using a line-of-sight laser “mesh” network to transmit and receive data, drone swarms deployed in the simulation were effectively autonomous, sharing flight and targeting data instantaneously and constantly between individual drones.

Drone swarms could form a decoy screen for manned US aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35, extending the latter’s onboard sensor range and enabling them to observe electronic silence.

They could also significantly increase the situational awareness and target acquisition capabilities of manned platforms while flooding enemy radar scopes with multiple targets, forcing the enemy to waste limited missiles and ammunition while manned platforms later move in for the kill.

Technologies such as machine learning and artificial intelligence would allow drone swarms to look at targets from multiple angles, cross-check various targeting data streams and suggest the best way to attack a target.

While revolutionary from a war-fighting perspective, drone swarms may not be enough to prevent a Pyrrhic outcome for the US and its allies in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict with China.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 5, 2023

17. Exclusive: The CIA's blind spot about the Ukraine war

Relatively long read.

Ukraine provides an opportunity for William Arkin to criticize the CIA.

Exclusive: The CIA's blind spot about the Ukraine war

Newsweek · by William M. Arkin On 07/05/23 at 5:00 AM EDT · July 5, 2023

World Ukraine CIA Vladimir Putin Volodymyr Zelensky

One of the biggest secrets of the Ukraine war is how much the CIA doesn't know. The Agency is as uncertain about Volodymyr Zelensky's thinking and intentions as it is about Vladimir Putin's. And as the Russian leader faces his biggest challenge in the aftermath of a failed mutiny, the Agency is straining to understand what the two sides will do—because President Joe Biden has determined that the United States (and Kyiv) will not undertake any actions that might threaten Russia itself or the survival of the Russian state, lest Putin escalate the conflict and engulf all of Europe in a new World War. In exchange, it expects that the Kremlin won't escalate the war beyond Ukraine or resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

America's stance is under threat because the near-mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, raises the question as to whether Moscow has run out of options.

"Putin's back is really against the wall" a senior defense intelligence official tells Newsweek, warning that while the CIA fully grasps how much Russia is stuck in Ukraine, it is very much in the dark with regard to what Putin might do about it. With talk of Russian nuclear weapons possibly being deployed to Belarus, and in light of Prigozhin's public exposure of the terrible costs of fighting, something that Moscow has suppressed, the official says that it is a particularly delicate moment. "What is happening off the battlefield is now most important," says the official, who was granted anonymity in order to speak candidly. "Both sides pledge to limit their actions, but it falls to the United States to enforce those pledges. This all hinges on the quality of our intelligence."

Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelensky. Carl Court/Getty

"There is a clandestine war, with clandestine rules, underlying all of what is going on in Ukraine," says a Biden administration senior intelligence official who also spoke with Newsweek. The official, who is directly involved in Ukraine policy planning, requested anonymity to discuss highly classified matters. The official (and numerous other national security officials who spoke to Newsweek) say that Washington and Moscow have decades of experience crafting these clandestine rules, necessitating that the CIA play an outsize role: as primary spy, as negotiator, as supplier of intelligence, as logistician, as wrangler of a network of sensitive NATO relations and perhaps most important of all, as the agency trying to ensure the war does not further spin out of control.

"Don't underestimate the Biden administration's priority to keep Americans out of harm's way and reassure Russia that it doesn't need to escalate," the senior intelligence officer says. "Is the CIA on the ground inside Ukraine?" he asks rhetorically. "Yes, but it's also not nefarious."

Newsweek has examined in depth the scale and scope of the CIA's activities in Ukraine, especially in light of growing Congressional questions about the extent of U.S. aid and whether President Biden is keeping his pledge not to have "boots on the ground." Neither the CIA nor the White House would give specific responses for confirmation, but they asked that Newsweek not reveal the specific locations of CIA operations inside Ukraine or Poland, that it not name other countries involved in the clandestine CIA efforts and that it not name the air service that is supporting the clandestine U.S. logistics effort. After repeated requests for an on-the-record comment, the CIA declined. Neither the Ukrainian nor Russian governments responded to requests for comment.

Over the course of its three-month investigation, Newsweek spoke to over a dozen intelligence experts and officials. Newsweek also sought out contrary views. All of the credible experts and officials Newsweek spoke to agreed that the CIA has been successful in discreetly playing its part in dealing with Kyiv and Moscow, in moving mountains of information and materiel and in dealing with a diverse set of other countries, some of whom are quietly helping while also trying to stay out of Russia's crosshairs. And they didn't dispute that on the CIA's main task—knowing what's going on in the minds of the leaders of Russia and Ukraine—the Agency has had to struggle.

Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky with soldiers in Kharkiv last year. Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency/Getty

Intelligence experts say this war is unique in that the United States is aligned with Ukraine, yet the two countries are not allies. And though the United States is helping Ukraine against Russia, it is not formally at war with that country. Thus, much of what Washington does to aid Ukraine is kept secret–and much of what is normally in the realm of the U.S. military is being carried out by the Agency. Everything that is done, including work inside Ukraine itself, must comply with limits established by Biden.

"It's a tricky balancing act—the CIA being very active in the war while not contradicting the Biden administration's central pledge, which is that there are no American boots on the ground," says a second senior intelligence official who was granted anonymity to speak with Newsweek.

For the CIA, its major role in the war in Ukraine has provided a boost in morale after the sour relationship between former President Donald Trump and his spy chiefs. The second official says that while some in the Agency want to speak more openly about its renewed significance, that is not likely to happen. "The corporate CIA worries that too much bravado about its role could provoke Putin," the intelligence official says.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin meeting remotely with his government in April. Gavriil Grigorov/AFP/Getty

That is partly why the CIA is also keen to distance itself from anything that suggests a direct attack on Russia and any role in actual combat—something Kyiv has repeatedly done, from the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline and the Kerch Strait bridge to drone and special operations attacks across the border. These attacks seem contrary to pledges by Zelensky that Ukraine would not take actions that might expand the scope of the war.

"The view advanced by many that the CIA is central to the fighting—say, for instance, in killing Russian generals on the battlefield or in important strikes outside Ukraine, such as the sinking of the Moskva flagship–doesn't play well in Kyiv," says one retired senior military intelligence official granted anonymity to speak with Newsweek. "If we want Kyiv to listen to us, we need to remind ourselves that the Ukrainians are winning the war, not us."

Washington has quietly expressed its displeasure to the Zelensky government with regard to the Nord Stream attack last September, but that act of sabotage was followed by other strikes, including the recent drone attack on the Kremlin itself. Those have raised questions over one of the CIA's main intelligence responsibilities—knowing enough of what the Ukrainians are planning to both influence them and to adhere to their secret agreement with Moscow.

Trouble Shooting

The CIA was central to the war even before it started. At the beginning of his administration, Biden tapped director William Burns as his global trouble shooter—a clandestine operator able to communicate with foreign leaders outside normal channels, someone who could occupy important geopolitical space between overt and covert, and an official who could organize work in the arena that exists between what is strictly military and what is strictly civilian.

CIA Director William Burns Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty

As former Ambassador to Russia, Burns has been particularly influential with regard to Ukraine. The CIA had been monitoring Russia's buildup and in November 2021, three months before the invasion, Biden dispatched Burns to Moscow to warn the Kremlin of the consequences of any attack. Though the Russian president snubbed Biden's emissary by staying at his retreat in Sochi on the Black Sea, 800 miles away, he did agree to speak with Burns via a Kremlin secure phone.

"In some ironic ways though, the meeting was highly successful," says the second senior intelligence official, who was briefed on it. Even though Russia invaded, the two countries were able to accept tried and true rules of the road. The United States would not fight directly nor seek regime change, the Biden administration pledged. Russia would limit its assault to Ukraine and act in accordance with unstated but well-understood guidelines for secret operations.

"There are clandestine rules of the road," says the senior defense intelligence official, "even if they are not codified on paper, particularly when one isn't engaged in a war of annihilation." This includes staying within day-to-day boundaries of spying, not crossing certain borders and not attacking each other's leadership or diplomats. "Generally the Russians have respected these global red lines, even if those lines are invisible," the official says.

Once Russian forces poured into Ukraine, the United States had to quickly shift gears. The CIA, like the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, had misread Russia's military capacity and Ukraine's resilience as Russia failed to take Kyiv and withdrew from the north.

By last July, both sides settled in for a long war. As the war shifted, Washington's focus changed from very public and symbolic troop deployments to Europe to "deter" further Russian moves, to providing weapons to sustain Ukraine's ability to fight. In the face of Zelensky's masterful public lobbying, the United States slowly and reluctantly agreed to supply better and longer-range weapons, weapons that in theory could threaten Russian territory and thus flirt with the feared escalation.

"Zelensky has certainly outdone everyone else in getting what he wants, but Kyiv has had to agree to obey certain invisible lines as well," says the senior defense intelligence official. In secret diplomacy largely led by the CIA, Kyiv pledged not to use the weapons to attack Russia itself. Zelensky has said openly that Ukraine will not attack Russia.

Artwork in Bristol, England depicts former actor Zelensky in what many see as his latest role: political super hero. Matt Cardy/Getty

Behind the scenes, dozens of countries also had to be persuaded to accept the Biden administration's limits. Some of these countries, including Britain and Poland, are willing to take more risk than the White House is comfortable with. Others—including some of Ukraine's neighbors—do not entirely share American and Ukrainian zeal for the conflict, do not enjoy unanimous public support in their anti-Russian efforts and do not want to antagonize Putin.

It fell to the CIA to manage this underworld, working through its foreign intelligence counterparts and secret police rather than public politicians and diplomats. The Agency established its own operating bases and staging areas. The CIA sought help from Ukraine's neighbors in better understanding Putin as well as Zelensky and his administration. Agency personnel went into and out of Ukraine on secret missions, to assist with the operations of new weapons and systems, some of which were not publicly divulged. But the CIA operations were always conducted with an eye to avoid direct confrontation with Russian troops.

"The CIA has been operating inside Ukraine, under strict rules, and with a cap on how many personnel can be in country at any one time," says another senior military intelligence official. "Black special operators are restricted from conducting clandestine missions, and when they do, it is within a very narrow scope." (Black special operations refers to those that are conducted clandestinely.)

Simply, CIA personnel can routinely go—and can do—what U.S. military personnel can't. That includes inside Ukraine. The military, on the other hand, is restricted from entering Ukraine, except under strict guidelines that have to be approved by the White House. This limits the Pentagon to a small number of Embassy personnel in Kyiv. Newsweek was unable to establish the exact number of CIA personnel in Ukraine, but sources suggest it is less than 100 at any one time.

After all the members of the U.S. military were publicly withdrawn from Ukraine in February 2022 including special operations forces that had been behind the scenes, the White House established the roles that different agencies could play in the U.S. response. President Biden signed national security directives and a "presidential finding" authorizing certain covert operations against Russia. "Lanes of the road" were established between the Pentagon and the CIA, just as they had been established in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11. Burns and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin work closely together; the relations of the two agencies, according to the CIA, have never been better.

U.S. President and First Lady Joe and Jill Biden host Zelensky during his visit to the White House last December. Ukrainian Presidency/Anadolu Agency/Getty

Now, more than a year after the invasion, the United States sustains two massive networks, one public and the other clandestine. Ships deliver goods to ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Poland, and those supplies are moved by truck, train and air to Ukraine. Clandestinely though, a fleet of commercial aircraft (the "grey fleet") crisscrosses Central and Eastern Europe, moving arms and supporting CIA operations. The CIA asked Newsweek not to identify specific bases where this network is operating, nor to name the contractor operating the planes. The senior administration official said much of the network had been successfully kept under wraps, and that it was wrong to assume that Russian intelligence knows the details of the CIA's efforts. Washington believes that If the supply route were known, Russia would attack the hubs and routes, the official said.

None of this can be sustained without a major counter-intelligence effort to thwart Russia's own spying, the bread-and-butter work of the Agency. Russian intelligence is very active in Ukraine, intelligence experts say, and almost anything the U.S. shares with Ukraine is assumed to also make it to Russian intelligence. Other Eastern European countries are equally riddled with Russian spies and sympathizers, particularly the frontline countries.

"A good part of our time is taken up hunting down Russian penetrations of foreign governments and intelligence services," says a military counterintelligence official working on the Ukraine war. "We have been successful in identifying Russian spies inside the Ukrainian government and military, and at various other points in the supply chain. But Russian penetration of Eastern European countries, even those who are members of NATO, is deep, and Russian influence operations are of direct concern."

As billions of dollars worth of arms started flowing through Eastern Europe, another issue that the CIA is working on is the task of fighting corruption, which turned out to be a major problem. This involves not only accounting for where weapons are going but also quashing the pilfering and kickbacks involved in the movement of so much materiel to Ukraine.

U.S. HIMARS rocket launchers land in Poland. Jakub Porzycki/Anadolu Agency/Getty

The Poland Connection

Less than a month after Russian tanks crossed the border on their way to Kyiv, CIA Director Burns landed in Warsaw, visiting with the directors of Poland's intelligence agencies and putting together the final agreements that would allow the CIA to use Ukraine's neighbor as its clandestine hub.

Since the end of the Cold War, Poland and the United States, through the CIA, have established particularly warm relations. Poland hosted a CIA torture "black site" in the village of Stare Kiejkuty during 2002-2003. And after the initial Russian invasion of Donbas and Crimea in 2014, CIA activity expanded to make Poland its third-largest station in Europe.

Read the leaked secret intelligence documents on Ukraine and Vladimir Putin

Poland officially became the center of NATO's response, first in handling hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the battle, and then as the logistical hub for arms flowing back into Ukraine. The country also became the center of the overt military response. A forward headquarters for the Army V Corps (5th Corps) has been established in Poland. Additional supplies and ammunition for U.S. use are stored in Poland. A permanent Army garrison has been activated, the first ever to be located on NATO's eastern flank, and today there are now about 10,000 American troops in Poland.

But Poland's real value is its role in the CIA's secret war. Burns returned to Warsaw last April, meeting again with Minister of the Interior and "special services" coordinator Mariusz Kaminski, his Polish counterpart, to discuss the scope of cooperation between the two countries, especially in collecting intelligence. From Poland, CIA case officers are able to connect with their many agents, including Ukrainian and Russian spies. CIA ground branch personnel of the Special Activities Center handle security and interact with their Ukrainian partners and the special operations forces of 20 nations, almost all of whom also operate from Polish bases. CIA cyber operators work closely with their Polish partners.

The closeness of U.S.-Polish relations particularly paid off over 24 hours last November. Burns was at Turkish intelligence headquarters in Ankara meeting with Sergei Naryshkin, his Russian counterpart. There he stressed "strategic stability," according to a senior U.S. government official, and he delivered a new backchannel warning that the United States would not tolerate nuclear threats or escalation. From Turkey he flew on to Ukraine to brief Zelensky on the talks.

Zelensky with Polish President Andrzej Duda. Wojtek Radwanski/AFP/Getty

While he was in transit, a missile landed in the Polish town of Przewodow, less than 20 miles from the Ukraine border, setting off a diplomatic and press frenzy. A Russian attack on a NATO country would trigger Article 5 of the NATO charter, the principle that an attack on one was an attack on all. But U.S. intelligence, through monitoring thermal signatures that track every missile launch, immediately knew the missile originated from inside Ukraine and not from Russia. (It turned out to be a Ukrainian surface-to-air missile that had gone awry.) Burns got the intelligence from Washington and immediately transmitted it to Polish president Andrzej Duda.

One crisis was averted. But a new one was brewing. Strikes inside Russia were continuing and even increasing, contrary to the fundamental U.S. condition for supporting Ukraine. There was a mysterious spate of assassinations and acts of sabotage inside Russia, some occurring in and around Moscow. Some of the attacks, the CIA concluded, were domestic in origin, undertaken by a nascent Russian opposition. But others were the work of Ukraine—even if analysts were unsure of the extent of Zelensky's direction or involvement.

'Karma Is a Cruel Thing'

Early in the war, Kyiv made its own "non-agreement" with Washington to accept the Biden administration's limitations on attacking Russia, even though that put it at a military disadvantage as Russian forces launched air and missile attacks from their own territory. In exchange, the U.S. promised arms and intelligence that came in ever greater quantities and firepower as Zelensky pushed harder.

The "non-agreement held up for quite some time. There were occasional cross-border artillery attacks and some errant weapons that landed in Russia; in each case Ukraine denied any involvement.

Then came the attack on the Nord Stream gas pipelines on September 26. Although not in Russia, they were majority-owned by Russian state gas firm Gazprom. Again, Ukraine denied involvement despite the suspicions of the CIA. We have "nothing to do with the Baltic Sea mishap and have no information about...sabotage groups," Zelensky's top aide said, calling any speculation to the contrary "amusing conspiracy theories."

Next came the truck bomb attack on the Kerch Strait bridge on October 8. Ukraine had threatened to attack the 12-mile bridge that links Russia and the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow had annexed in 2014 in a move condemned as illegal by much of the world. Though it wasn't clear who carried out the attack, Putin blamed Ukrainian "special services." Meeting with his Security Council, Putin said, "If attempts continue to carry out terrorist acts on our territory, Russia's responses will be harsh and in their scale will correspond to the level of threats created for the Russian Federation." And indeed Russia did respond with multiple attacks on targets in Ukrainian cities.

A fire at the Kerch Bridge in Crimea last year. Vera Katkova/Anadolu Agency/Getty

"These attacks only further reinforce our commitment to stand with the people of Ukraine for as long as it takes," the White House said of the Russian retaliatory strike. Behind the scenes, though, the CIA was scrambling to determine the origins.

"The CIA learned with the attack on the Crimea bridge that Zelensky either didn't have complete control over his own military or didn't want to know of certain actions," says the military intelligence official.

The Kerch bridge attack was followed by an even longer-range strike on the Engels Russian bomber base, almost 700 miles from Kyiv. The CIA did not know about any of these attacks beforehand, according to a senior U.S. official, but rumors started to circulate that the Agency was, through some mysterious third party, directing others to strike Russia. The Agency delivered a strong and unusual on-the-record denial. "The allegation that CIA is somehow supporting saboteur networks in Russia is categorically false," CIA spokesperson Tammy Thorp said.

In January this year, Burns was back in Kyiv to meet with Zelensky and his Ukrainian counterparts, discussing the clandestine war and the need to preserve strategic stability. "Kyiv was beginning to taste a potential victory and was therefore more willing to take risks," says the second senior intelligence official. "But Russian sabotage groups also had emerged by the end of the year." The January talks had little impact. As for the sabotage strikes themselves, the senior U.S. government official tells Newsweek that the CIA has had no prior knowledge of any Ukrainian operations.

All of this culminated in the May 3 drone attack inside the Kremlin walls in Moscow. Russia's Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev blamed the United States and Britain, saying that "the terrorist attacks committed in Russia are...designed to destabilize the socio-political situation, and to undermine the constitutional foundations and sovereignty of Russia." Ukrainian officials implicitly admitted culpability. "Karma is a cruel thing," Zelensky advisor Mykhailo Podolyak responded, adding fuel to the fire.

A senior Polish government official told Newsweek that it might be impossible to convince Kyiv to abide by the non-agreement it made to keep the war limited. "In my humble opinion, the CIA fails to understand the nature of the Ukrainian state and the reckless factions that exist there," says the Polish official, who requested anonymity in order to speak candidly.

In response, the senior U.S. defense intelligence official stressed the delicate balance the Agency must maintain in its many roles, saying: "I hesitate to say that the CIA has failed." But the official said sabotage attacks and cross border fighting created a whole new complication and continuing Ukrainian sabotage "could have disastrous consequences."

Newsweek · by William M. Arkin On 07/05/23 at 5:00 AM EDT · July 5, 2023

18. China Has Run a Spy Base in Cuba for Decades, Says Former Intelligence Officer

Wouldn't we be surprised if they did not?

China Has Run a Spy Base in Cuba for Decades, Says Former Intelligence Officer

'China’s not going to kick Cuba to the curb. They are too valuable of an intelligence partner'

Published 07/06/23 12:39 AM ET|Updated 7 hr ago

Scott McDonald

themessenger.com · July 6, 2023

A retired U.S. army intelligence agent said Wednesday that China has been spying on the United States from a rural spot in Cuba since the 1990s.

American intelligence agencies spent nine years cautiously watching renovations of the remote locale in Cuba before they figured out who was behind it.

U.S. officials observed it from 1992 until 2001, when they discovered the Chinese were behind the makeover of a “signals intelligence facility” in Bejucal, which is located in western Cuba and about 45 minutes south of Cuba, according to the Miami Herald.

Chris Simmons, a former chief of a counterintelligence research branch on the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, said Cuba was the top country on its radar for espionage.

“We saw the enhancements over a decade, a steady evolution; clearly something was going on, but we didn’t know what,” Simmons said.

“And then, in 2001, we discovered that the Chinese had been there already for nine years. We were told at that time that when the Chinese arrived in 1992, they were embedded in a single building within Bejucal, and there were 50 officers in this facility," he added.

China wasn’t considered a formidable threat to the U.S., but more of a regional power to keep an eye on during the early 90s, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Herald report states.

But China moved forward to acquire land and facilities in Cuba for possibly building a spy base and to train its own troops in exchange for perhaps billions of dollars. The coastline of northern Cuba is just 90 miles from Key West, Florida. The U.S. has several military bases in Florida, including a Naval air station in Key West.

“Washington knew the Chinese were engaged,” Simmons said. “But the conventional wisdom was that China just seized the political opportunity because of the collapse of the Soviet Union."

That was the "simplified logic," he added. "We could see the ships going in and the weapons coming off. But for the most part, Washington didn’t want to ask the hard questions.”

News of Chinese espionage in Cuba was surprising news to some in Congress who recently expressed concerns about the facility, including Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Rep. Michael McCau (R-Texas).

“It comes as no surprise to us that the Cuban regime — which has historically opened its doors to foreign adversaries of the United States — and the [People’s Republic of China] are working together to undermine U.S. national security," Menendez and McCaul wrote last week to request an intelligence briefing.

However, the establishment of intelligence facilities and expansion of military ties this close to U.S. territory is a significant, escalatory step,” they added.

The relationship is likely to continue, said Simmons.

"China’s not going to kick Cuba to the curb. They are too valuable of an intelligence partner," he noted.

themessenger.com · July 6, 2023

19. Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia

I have stories from my time at Georgetown. Since the Security Studies Program was the number one graduate program for a path to the IC it was a top foreign intelligence target. Fortunately I had a very good FBI liaison from the Washington office on speed dial.

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia | Air & Space Forces Magazine

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · July 5, 2023

July 5, 2023 | By John A. Tirpak

The Pentagon is moving to block Chinese and Russian organizations from obtaining U.S. technology secrets through academia, according to a Department of Defense memo made public on June 30.

The memo, signed by Heidi Shyu, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, lists more than 80 Chinese and Russian academic, scientific, engineering, or cultural institutions that have engaged in “problematic activity” geared at improperly gaining access to classified U.S. research or influencing teaching staff or students. The memo is a response to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, which sought a Pentagon response to foreign intelligence exploitation of U.S. academic institutions.

The memo requires a review of new research contracts and prohibits Pentagon money going to projects that involve one of the blacklisted entities, based on their previous track record in harvesting U.S. technology secrets, or simply having suspect relationships with Chinese and Russian intelligence organizations.

Those on the list have “been confirmed as engaging in problematic activity as described in Section 1286 of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended,” the Pentagon said. “These include practices and behaviors that increase the likelihood that DOD-funded research and development efforts will be misappropriated to the detriment of national or economic security or be subject to violations of research integrity or foreign government interference.”

The listing of “these foreign entities underscores our commitment to ensuring the responsible use of federal research funding and safeguarding our critical technologies from exploitation or compromise,” said Shyu in releasing the memo.

The goal of the memo and policy is three-fold, Shyu said:

To ensure the security of DOD-funded fundamental research
To ensure that participants in sensitive research “fully disclose information that can reveal potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment”
To provide “clear messaging” to those doing fundamental research about what constitutes “acceptable and encouraged behaviors” as well as activities “that may lead to challenges in securing DOD research funding.”

Along with the suspect “foreign entities” list, the Pentagon posted a “Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research,” which now requires that any basic research funded by the Defense Department “go through a review for potential conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment rising from foreign influence.” The policy includes a template for DOD program managers to follow in awarding contracts for research, to help them spot “signs of potential foreign influence and appropriately mitigate risk.”

The Pentagon “encourages academic institutions, industry partners, and the public to review the list and exercise caution when engaging with entities listed,” Shyu said.

China and Russia have both engaged in long-term cyber espionage, stealing technology secrets from U.S. companies, and the new effort is aimed at thwarting similar efforts through colleges and universities.

Not all of the targeted institutions are focused solely on direct espionage. One, the “Confucius Institutes,” awards scholarships to students in a variety of academic fields and offers free Chinese language lessons, along with free trips to China to students with desirable knowledge. The Heritage Foundation described the Confucius Institute as a “Trojan Horse,” seeking to convince American students and professors that China is a benign actor and a potentially constructive partner in research, when actually, Heritage said, it is part of a “soft power” campaign to encourage research organizations to share sensitive knowledge with China.

The Confucius Institute has satellite locations on scores of U.S. university campuses, but the new guidelines say that from 2024 forward, no American college or university with a Confucius Institute presence can receive Pentagon research money without a detailed waiver.

Other organizations on the list have lent or granted money to research organizations and universities, in exchange for access to the results of defense-oriented research.

The Government Accountability Office identified the practices of these suspect entities in a 2020 report and urged the Pentagon to put policies in place that would protect U.S. research and researchers from hostile entities posing as scientific benefactors.

Shyu and her recent predecessors have pushed for greater Pentagon-academic partnerships to address technology challenges that could have commercial benefit to the U.S. economy, as well as military-only challenges that could make headway with funding or resources supplied by the DOD. Hypersonics testing capabilities are among those the Pentagon is setting up at academic institutions.

The FBI has reported an uptick in recent years of Chinese and Russian research organizations attempting to recruit agents in the scientific community, or inducing them to sell or share their work, or research to which they have access.

Technology

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · July 5, 2023

20. What’s Special About Ukraine’s Frontline Information Warfare?

The subtitle says it all.

Excerpts:

Western militaries are probably not ready to adapt similar tactics. First, calls for stronger tactical-level information warfare focus on training. Our soldiers and sailors probably don’t need training in how to use social media – I’m thinking back to a junior cryptologist I worked with, an influencer, but more lethal for her digital nativism than for her NSA training – but empowerment and trust. I’m not arguing that ship captains tweet for help when they run low on parts (the USS Theodore Roosevelt saga showed us how that ends). But I am saying that the US military approach to information warfare and propaganda is the exact opposite of the most successful information campaign in recent decades.

These observations lead me to argue that the Ukrainians are onto something. Their methods of information warfare, though distinct from the western military approach, are worth studying. Regardless of the next battleground, it's clear that maintaining dominance in the information environment is critical for democracies hoping to leverage their societies’ deep resources and stay close with their allies.

What’s Special About Ukraine’s Frontline Information Warfare?

By Austin Gray

July 06, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/07/06/whats_special_about_ukraines_frontline_information_warfare_964099.html?mc_cid=2c2f2c7e88&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Tactics in Ukraine That Might Surprise U.S. Generals, Admirals, and Politicians but Reveal Exactly the Soldier They’re Looking For

“Keep your mouth open,” recommends a towering soldier as he strolls past “it helps your ears with the blast.” Behind him, downhill, more explosions hit a tree line. They echo back through our small valley, punctuating the steadier fire. Occasionally, men in camo jog across the field, crouching with guns to reach a position and lay fire on the target from a new angle. Behind Bakhmut, Ukraine’s eastern front, we are observing a combined arms warm-up for the counteroffensive.

This grey-bearded soldier, soon-to-be grandfather, is a seasoned fighter. His life took a sudden turn on the first day of the war when Russia’s VDV airborne troops landed at Hostomel airport near Kyiv, where he ran his businesses, one dealing with hydrogen-powered cars and another in cryptocurrency. He wants us to join the gunplay, just to try target practice with the guys.

Despite his enthusiasm, we abstain from shooting. We’ve come to help. I, an ex-Navy officer, and Jake, a US Army veteran, have our experiences with guns. “Save the ammo,” we say, politely turning down the invitation, “…for the Russians.” Everywhere we go, men complain of ammo shortages. The soldier's disappointment, however, leaves us questioning our role and the impact we can have in this environment.

We came to the front to deliver vital supplies and to understand the frontline troops' needs. Yet, it feels strange, almost tourist-like, as we watch the preparations for a counteroffensive against the Russian lines.

Our journey takes us through command posts, equipment inspections, and interactions with the frontline soldiers. At one unit, holding an especially dangerous position on the Bakhmut line, a six-month-pregnant soldier has become a local celebrity. When we stop by, we record a video with her, explaining her unit’s need for more night vision equipment. We discover the power of social media in this war – sergeants and company commanders have turned to these platforms, conducting a charm offensive to secure more resources.

This public relations effort by soldiers seems unusual from a US military perspective, where information sharing is strictly controlled. The US approach can be best captured in the OPSEC-focused guidance passed to junior sailors: “loose lips sink ships” and its echo in admiral-filled conference rooms “loose tweets sink fleets.”

Even with President Zelensky leading the strategic-level information warfare, securing $69 billion in military aid, we observe that Ukraine has managed to harness the power of information warfare at the lowest-echelon of troops. This whole-of-society information warfare approach involves everyone – from politicians to foot soldiers – and seems to yield impressive results.

The Ukrainians appear to have unearthed the "strategic corporal" concept long desired by western military leaders. These junior soldiers adeptly leverage the internet and social media platforms, transforming them into a potent tool for information warfare.

The tactics used by the Ukrainian soldiers, though counterintuitive to US generals, present an intriguing lesson for future conflicts. They may not comply with traditional western military doctrines, yet the success of their information warfare on both strategic and tactical levels indicates there might be room for adaptation.

Despite the high-tech equipment flooding Ukraine, frontline troops still express their need for night vision gear, drones, and expendable vehicles. The supply and demand dynamics of this conflict go beyond the government-to-government mil-tech which most press coverage discusses. More, the mass provisioning of informal aid is driven almost exclusively by these unit-level social media campaigns about front-line need.

Western militaries are probably not ready to adapt similar tactics. First, calls for stronger tactical-level information warfare focus on training. Our soldiers and sailors probably don’t need training in how to use social media – I’m thinking back to a junior cryptologist I worked with, an influencer, but more lethal for her digital nativism than for her NSA training – but empowerment and trust. I’m not arguing that ship captains tweet for help when they run low on parts (the USS Theodore Roosevelt saga showed us how that ends). But I am saying that the US military approach to information warfare and propaganda is the exact opposite of the most successful information campaign in recent decades.

These observations lead me to argue that the Ukrainians are onto something. Their methods of information warfare, though distinct from the western military approach, are worth studying. Regardless of the next battleground, it's clear that maintaining dominance in the information environment is critical for democracies hoping to leverage their societies’ deep resources and stay close with their allies.

Austin Gray, an ex-US Navy intelligence officer and current Masters in Public Administration candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School, shares insights from his time in Ukraine working with the NGO, Zero Line, and the Kyiv Engineering Corps. His unique perspective on modern warfare tactics highlights the importance of information warfare in current and future conflicts.

21. Vietnam bans 'Barbie' movie over South China Sea map

Unintended soft power effects? Is the 9 dash line important to the movie plot? Now I have to go see this film to look for the national security implicaitons. At least I have an excuse to see it. (the trailer was pretty funny - the premise of the movie seems to be pretty good satire)

Vietnam bans 'Barbie' movie over South China Sea map

Reuters · by Reuters

HANOI, July 3 (Reuters) - Vietnam has banned Warner Bros' highly-anticipated film "Barbie" from domestic distribution over a scene featuring a map that shows China's unilaterally claimed territory in the South China Sea, state media reported on Monday.

The U-shaped "nine-dash line" is used on Chinese maps to illustrate its claims over vast areas of the South China Sea, including swathes of what Vietnam considers its continental shelf, where it has awarded oil concessions.

"Barbie" is the latest movie to be banned in Vietnam for depicting China's controversial nine-dash line, which was repudiated in an international arbitration ruling by a court in The Hague in 2016. China refuses to recognise the ruling.

In 2019 the Vietnamese government pulled DreamWorks' animated film "Abominable" and last year it banned Sony's action movie "Unchartered" for the same reason. Netflix also removed an Australian spy drama "Pine Gap" in 2021.

[1/2]Actor Margot Robbie is photographed during a photocall for the upcoming Warner Bros. film "Barbie" in Los Angeles, California, U.S., June 25, 2023. REUTERS/Mike Blake

"Barbie", starring Margot Robbie and Ryan Gosling, was originally slated to open in Vietnam on July 21, the same date as in the United States, according to state-run Tuoi Tre newspaper.

"We do not grant license for the American movie 'Barbie' to release in Vietnam because it contains the offending image of the nine-dash line," the paper reported, citing Vi Kien Thanh, head of the Department of Cinema, a government body in charge of licensing and censoring foreign films.

Warner Bros did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Vietnam and China have long had overlapping territorial claims to a potentially energy-rich stretch in the South China Sea. The Southeast Asian country has repeatedly accused Chinese vessels of violating its sovereignty.

Reporting by Phuong Nguyen; Editing by Kanupriya Kapoor

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

22. Former U.S. officials have held secret Ukraine talks with Russians

Former U.S. officials have held secret Ukraine talks with Russians

The aim of the discussions is to lay the groundwork for potential negotiations to end the war, people briefed on the talks tell NBC News.

NBC News · by Josh Lederman

July 6, 2023, 10:02 AM UTC

LONDON — A group of former senior U.S. national security officials have held secret talks with prominent Russians believed to be close to the Kremlin — and, in at least one case, with the country’s top diplomat — with the aim of laying the groundwork for potential negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, half a dozen people briefed on the discussions told NBC News.

In a high-level example of the back-channel diplomacy taking place behind the scenes, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with members of the group for several hours in April in New York, four former officials and two current officials told NBC News.

On the agenda of the April meeting were some of the thorniest issues in the war in Ukraine, like the fate of Russian-held territory that Ukraine may never be able to liberate, and the search for an elusive diplomatic off-ramp that could be tolerable to both sides.

Sitting down with Lavrov were Richard Haass, a former diplomat and the outgoing president of the Council on Foreign Relations, current and former officials said. The group was joined by Europe expert Charles Kupchan and Russia expert Thomas Graham, both former White House and State Department officials who are Council on Foreign Relations fellows.

Sergei Lavrov.Pavel Bednyakov / AFP - Getty Images

The former U.S. officials involved either did not respond to requests for comment from NBC News or declined to comment on the record. All of the sources declined to be named in order to confirm talks that were intended to be kept confidential.

Among the goals, they said, is to keep channels of communication with Russia open where possible and to feel out where there might be room for future negotiation, compromise and diplomacy over ending the war.

The discussions have taken place with the knowledge of the Biden administration, but not at its direction, with the former officials involved in the Lavrov meeting briefing the White House National Security Council afterward about what transpired, two of the sources said.

The discussions are known in diplomatic parlance as “Track Two diplomacy,” a form of unofficial engagement involving private citizens not currently in government — or in the case of the Lavrov meeting, “Track 1.5,” meaning current officials are involved on one end of the conversation. They come as formal, high-level diplomatic engagements between the U.S. and Russian governments over Ukraine have been few and far between.

It is not clear how frequently the backchannel discussions have taken place, nor whether they’re part of a single, organized effort.

But on the American side, the discussions have involved some former Pentagon officials, including Mary Beth Long, a former U.S. assistant defense secretary with deep experience in NATO issues, according to two people briefed on the talks.

As part of the effort, at least one former U.S. official has traveled to Russia for discussions involving the Ukraine war, two of the individuals said.

Aside from Lavrov on the Russian side, the discussions have involved academics, leaders from major think tanks or research institutes and others in the Russian foreign policy sphere perceived as having President Vladimir Putin’s ear or being in regular touch with Kremlin decision-makers, the sources said. The individuals declined to identify the Russian participants by name, citing concerns for their safety.

A spokesman for the White House National Security Council declined to comment.

Russia’s Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.

An official in the office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said they would not comment on specific news reports based on unnamed sources, but their overall position remained the same.

“Our position is unchanged — the fate of Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine. Many times the president and all our official speakers spoke about it. Not anonymously, but quite specifically and publicly,” they said.

The talks come amid mounting signs that the U.S. and its allies are eager to see Moscow and Kyiv move toward peace talks in the fall, after the completion of Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive.

Ukrainian soldiers fire toward Russian positions on the front line near Zaporizhzhia on June 24. Efrem Lukatsky / AP

During a secret trip to Kyiv in May, CIA Director William Burns heard from Ukrainian officials about the prospect of pushing Moscow into peace talks by year’s end, officials told The Washington Post. Next week, President Joe Biden will meet in Lithuania with fellow NATO leaders, who are signaling they’re still not ready to admit Ukraine into the alliance. And the approaching U.S. presidential election has raised the urgency around the war’s endgame amid concerns Republicans will reduce support for Ukraine.

The Lavrov meeting in April took place during a rare and brief visit by the Russian diplomat to the U.S. to chair the U.N. Security Council, which has a rotating presidency.

Around the same time Haass and Kupchin wrote a lengthy article in Foreign Affairs, which is published by the Council on Foreign Relations, laying out what they described as “a plan for getting from the battlefield to the negotiating table.”

In the piece, titled “The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine,” Haass and Kupchin predicted a likely stalemate would emerge following Ukraine’s counteroffensive, and recommended that the U.S. start laying the groundwork to propose a cease-fire in which both Russia and Ukraine would pull forces back from the front line, “effectively creating a demilitarized zone.”

“A neutral organization — either the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — would send in observers to monitor and enforce the cease-fire and pullback,” the former U.S. officials wrote. “Assuming a cease-fire holds, peace talks should follow.”

A key question is whether the former U.S. officials will continue talks following last month’s armed rebellion against Putin’s government by Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, which muddied the picture of how power and influence are flowing in Moscow. The discussions have also been occurring in parallel with direct U.S.-Russian conversations about detained American journalist Evan Gershkovich that were revealed by Putin’s spokesman this week.

Wagner mercenary group fighters shocked the Russian elite when they crossed into Russia from Ukraine and marched toward Moscow. Roman Romokhov / AFP - Getty Images

Track Two talks have long played an important role in U.S. diplomacy, including on arms control, often providing a less formal opportunity to test out ideas and responses in parallel to official talks between governments.

In 1994, former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang, North Korea, as a private citizen aimed at halting North Korea’s nuclear program — a trip that became a major headache for the Clinton administration. Track Two talks between Israelis and Palestinians were also credited with creating the conditions that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords .

Yet in the context of the Ukraine war, the notion of former U.S. officials engaging informally with Russians has caused a divide within the community of American diplomats, foreign policy scholars and national security professionals.

“I worry about what messages might be conveyed with that and the implicit signal that we’re desperate for a deal,” said Bradley Bowman, a former U.S. Army officer and Senate aide who studies political-military issues at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “Right now what we really want to do is isolate and put pressure on Putin.”

Michael McFaul, who was U.S. ambassador to Russia in the Obama administration, said he was skeptical that there are any suitable Track Two surrogates in Russia these days who have direct access to Putin and could serve as informal intermediaries.

And discussing solutions to the war without Ukrainians at the table could undercut the Biden administration’s insistence that Ukraine’s future won’t be decided by backroom deals between major powers, he said.

“If you’re having Track Two negotiations about how to end the war, Ukrainians have to be there,” said McFaul, who said he is not involved in the Track Two discussions.

Matt Dimmick, a former Russia and Eastern Europe director at the National Security Council, said that even discussing potential deals with Russia without Ukraine taking the lead could ultimately undercut Kyiv’s leverage.

“Ukraine doesn’t need and want intermediaries to start coming in and crafting cease-fire solutions and then enticing Europe and the U.S. to elbow Ukraine in that direction,” Dimmick said. “Ukraine realizes their path to a secure future is driving right through Russian defenses and leaving Russia no choice but to come up with their own way out of Ukraine.”

Josh Lederman and Yuliya Talmazan reported from London, Carol E. Lee reported from Washington, and Daryna Mayer reported from Kyiv.

Josh Lederman

Josh Lederman is an NBC News correspondent.

Carol E. Lee, Yuliya Talmazan and Daryna Mayer contributed.

NBC News · by Josh Lederman

23. Opinion | Xi Jinping May Be Souring on His ‘Best, Most Intimate Friend’

Excerpts:

The Chinese president still needs his “intimate friend.” Russia remains the only other country in the world with the means and motivation to partner with China in diluting the role of human rights and democratic governance in the international system. Steady relations also ensure stability along their long land border and keep China supplied with discounted Russian energy, as well as imports of food and military equipment. Both sides can be expected to maintain the appearance of business as usual.

But Mr. Xi has little to gain from doubling down on Mr. Putin, whose troubles are not helpful for China’s grand plans.

Many unresolved questions about the impact of Mr. Putin’s weakening grip in Russia remain. How well Mr. Xi can navigate the fallout, with his partner now diminished, is one of them.

Opinion | Xi Jinping May Be Souring on His ‘Best, Most Intimate Friend’

The New York Times · by Ryan Hass · July 6, 2023

Guest Essay

Xi Jinping May Be Souring on His ‘Best, Most Intimate Friend’

July 6, 2023

Mr. Hass was an adviser to President Barack Obama on China policy.

When Xi Jinping ascended to the pinnacle of Chinese power a decade ago, he saw Vladimir Putin as a strong leader who shared his hostility to the Western-dominated international system. They bonded over mutual paranoia about threats to their rule and exchanged best practices for imposing control at home and making the world more accommodating of their authoritarian impulses. Mr. Xi referred to Mr. Putin as his “best, most intimate friend.”

In the wake of the Wagner affair, Mr. Xi’s big bet on the Russian leader isn’t looking so safe.

The disastrous Russian war effort, culminating in last month’s aborted insurrection by the Wagner group’s paramilitary chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has exposed Mr. Putin’s Russia for what it is: a weakened, unpredictable nuclear state on China’s border, with a wounded leader whose long-term hold on power is not assured.

Mr. Xi cannot afford to abandon Mr. Putin altogether. He has invested too much in the relationship, and Russia remains useful to China. But the bromance that has caused so much concern in the West has probably peaked.

If Mr. Xi is to achieve his strategic goal of surpassing U.S. strength around the world, he will need to rebalance his foreign policy to account for Mr. Putin’s vulnerabilities. That may mean stronger Chinese support for ending a war that has backfired so severely on the Russian leader and a potentially less confrontational Chinese approach toward the United States and Taiwan.

There are signs the Xi-Putin bonhomie may already be cooling. Beijing offered only a muted response to the Wagner episode, calling it an “internal affair,” but hints of alarm over the failed mutiny have appeared in Chinese state-run media. Mr. Xi would not benefit by giving a blank check of support to Mr. Putin now. Doing so could invite questioning at home about Mr. Xi’s foreign policy judgment, which might only worsen if Mr. Putin were to suffer further setbacks.

China may be compelled to adjust its posture on the Ukraine war. So far, while issuing halfhearted calls for peace, Beijing has lent Moscow crucial diplomatic cover by portraying the war as justified in thwarting NATO expansion or as provoked by the West. Beijing also has provided Moscow an economic lifeline, offsetting Western sanctions with a significant expansion in Sino-Russian trade.

While there have long been signs that Chinese leaders are not fully supportive of Mr. Putin’s war, the conflict initially offered China hope that it would divert America’s focus away from Asia, where Beijing has sought to expand its sway. That hasn’t happened. Instead, Washington and its Asian allies have established a stronger military presence along China’s periphery since the Ukraine war began and are more united today in limiting China’s access to critical technologies.

Mr. Putin marches to his own tune. But China is now aware that a prolonged war in Ukraine could further threaten its Russian partner and compromise its own foreign policy agenda. It has a motive to move beyond vague expressions of principle regarding the war and to exercise its unique leverage over Moscow to urge an end to the fighting.

One key reason for this is Europe, where China’s image has been battered by its support of Russia. European business sentiment toward China has soured, foreign direct investment has slowed, and trans-Atlantic coordination on China has tightened.

Mr. Xi is determined to undercut American efforts to constrain Beijing. A hostile Europe will make that difficult. Russia’s isolation puts pressure on China to seek better relations with Europe to prevent its lining up with the United States against China. One of the best ways for China to achieve that would be to more strongly reposition itself as peacemaker in a conflict on Europe’s doorstep.

The problems in Russia also complicate Mr. Xi’s calculations regarding Taiwan. The Ukraine war has made two things clear: Pure military strength does not ensure battlefield success; and anything short of victory may invite leadership challenges. In that light, triggering a war in the Taiwan Strait through increasingly bellicose actions could be disastrous for the Chinese leader.

The self-ruled island will hold a presidential election in January to choose a successor to Tsai Ing-wen, who has angered Beijing by cultivating closer relations with the United States. China has a range of tools that it is suspected of having used before against Taiwan to apply economic pressure or sow misinformation in support of candidates who prioritize improved relations with Beijing.

But aggressive Chinese rhetoric and threatening military exercises around Taiwan could undercut that goal by boosting candidates who oppose accommodation with China, not to mention provoking stronger and more visible American and international support for Taiwan. For Mr. Xi, the sweet spot will be to appear strong and determined while not triggering an escalatory spiral.

Given these changed dynamics, leaders in Beijing probably also now realize that they must lower the temperature in relations with the United States. The deep chill cast over China-U.S. relations by the spy balloon incident in February has recently shown signs of thawing, with last month’s trip to Beijing by Secretary of State Antony Blinken — which included an audience with Mr. Xi — and this week’s visit by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen.

The Chinese president still needs his “intimate friend.” Russia remains the only other country in the world with the means and motivation to partner with China in diluting the role of human rights and democratic governance in the international system. Steady relations also ensure stability along their long land border and keep China supplied with discounted Russian energy, as well as imports of food and military equipment. Both sides can be expected to maintain the appearance of business as usual.

But Mr. Xi has little to gain from doubling down on Mr. Putin, whose troubles are not helpful for China’s grand plans.

Many unresolved questions about the impact of Mr. Putin’s weakening grip in Russia remain. How well Mr. Xi can navigate the fallout, with his partner now diminished, is one of them.

Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former China director at the National Security Council under President Obama. He is the author of “Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence.”

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

The New York Times · by Ryan Hass · July 6, 2023

24. Taiwan’s Will to Fight May Be Stronger Than You Think

I certainly hope so.

But is the possible "yin yang effect" ( promise of US intervention influences the will to fight while the perception of Taiwanese will to flight will influence a US decision to intervene) something on which we should base national security decisions?

Excerpts:

The promise of U.S. intervention offers an additional important resource for infusing determination and resolve, but the effects of promised intervention will depend both on the state of the island’s political leadership and military capabilities and on the nature and scope of promised U.S. aid. In general, the weaker that Taiwan’s political leadership and its military are, the earlier and more robust the U.S. intervention must be to maximize the prospect that Taiwan will avoid defeat.

Our study raises several implications for U.S. planners and policymakers. First, analysts should pay particularly close attention to the quality and strength of the island’s political leadership and degree of social cohesion in the lead up to a crisis and conflict for insight into the island’s ability to withstand a large-scale Chinese attack. All other variables, to include the state of its military and the island’s enduring vulnerabilities, should be regarded as of secondary importance.

Paradoxically, an evaluation of the island’s political leadership in peacetime sheds little insight into how it will perform at war. In Ukraine, this point has been underscored by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership, which appeared unremarkable in peace but bold and inspiring in war. This is because the circumstances of how and why a conflict begins can significantly impact a leadership’s resolve and the population’s cohesiveness. Since we cannot predict what circumstances will be, it is thus extremely difficult if not impossible to estimate how Taiwan’s leadership may perform in war.

Taiwan’s Will to Fight May Be Stronger Than You Think

Should China mount an invasion, Taiwan’s political leadership and degree of social cohesion will be the most important factors in its defense.

thediplomat.com · by Timothy R. Heath · June 27, 2023

Ukraine’s dogged resistance to Russian aggression surprised many experts who anticipated a rapid Russian victory. It also elevated the importance of understanding a nation’s resolve to resist aggression as a critical determinant of war outcomes. Ukraine’s example naturally raises questions about Taiwan, which faces a similar potential threat of aggression from a powerful neighbor.

Taiwan’s capacity to resist high end attack is an issue of top importance to the United States. Any U.S. military intervention in a China-Taiwan clash carries a high risk of escalation to major war. Washington and the U.S. public might opt against intervention if Taiwan’s military rapidly collapsed or if the conflict appeared to be a lost cause. Conversely, a resolute and dogged Taiwanese defense could garner international sympathy and increase the likelihood of U.S. government and public support for intervention.

Taiwan’s resolve also plays a critical role in enabling even the possibility of a U.S. intervention. Because the Pacific Ocean is so vast, it could require considerable time – potentially several months – for the United States to mobilize sufficient U.S.-based combat power to augment forward-deployed military forces and fight a major contingency in East Asia.

In a recently released report, RAND researchers evaluated Taiwan’s capacity to resist high end attack. We considered four factors: political leadership and society, military effectiveness, durability (ability to withstand punishment), and allied military intervention. We concluded that political leadership and society was the most important factor by far. A strong political leadership (in the form of respected national leaders capable of commanding and enforcing the public’s loyalty), a largely unified and cohesive public, and strong public support for a compelling national cause or ideology offer the most durable foundation for a resolute defense.

A prepared and capable military can bolster the effects of political leadership by denying the adversary an easy conquest. By staving off imminent defeat, Taiwan’s military could prolong the conflict and allow time for foreign intervention to arrive and for international sympathy to strengthen. Severe disruption to the economy and infrastructure of the island – along with mounting civilian and military casualties – may bolster public resolve in the initial phases of the conflict, but over the longer term, those disruptions are likely to erode public support for the war.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

The promise of U.S. intervention offers an additional important resource for infusing determination and resolve, but the effects of promised intervention will depend both on the state of the island’s political leadership and military capabilities and on the nature and scope of promised U.S. aid. In general, the weaker that Taiwan’s political leadership and its military are, the earlier and more robust the U.S. intervention must be to maximize the prospect that Taiwan will avoid defeat.

Our study raises several implications for U.S. planners and policymakers. First, analysts should pay particularly close attention to the quality and strength of the island’s political leadership and degree of social cohesion in the lead up to a crisis and conflict for insight into the island’s ability to withstand a large-scale Chinese attack. All other variables, to include the state of its military and the island’s enduring vulnerabilities, should be regarded as of secondary importance.

Paradoxically, an evaluation of the island’s political leadership in peacetime sheds little insight into how it will perform at war. In Ukraine, this point has been underscored by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership, which appeared unremarkable in peace but bold and inspiring in war. This is because the circumstances of how and why a conflict begins can significantly impact a leadership’s resolve and the population’s cohesiveness. Since we cannot predict what circumstances will be, it is thus extremely difficult if not impossible to estimate how Taiwan’s leadership may perform in war.

Second, Taiwan’s disadvantage in the quantity of armaments and troops does not necessarily doom it to defeat. Taiwan can take important steps to improve the effectiveness of its military. However, even if Taiwan’s military dramatically improved its combat effectiveness, China’s military advantage will likely continue to grow owing to the enormous resource imbalance. Given these trends, Taiwan’s ability to withstand a major Chinese attack will increasingly hinge on the strength of its political leadership and social cohesion above all other factors.

Third, the impact of severe casualties and economic loss likely would cut two ways in a major war. Initially, Taiwan’s public likely would rally around the national leadership in favor of resistance to an aggressive China. However, over the long term, heavy costs of conflict likely would erode public support for continuing the war. Public backing for a war to defend against a Chinese attack could fade after an initial surge of support. How public support changes over time could vary, depending on the strength of the island’s political leadership and degree of social cohesion, however.

Finally, U.S. military intervention will continue to remain important for Taiwan’s ability to withstand a large-scale Chinese attack, owing to the island’s vulnerability and military disadvantages. A well led and socially cohesive Taiwan might be able to mount a determined resistance for perhaps many months, but over time the island’s vulnerability and the military’s inferiority would likely take a severe toll. Absent a robust U.S. military intervention, Taiwan’s government would be severely challenged to withstand a determined all-out Chinese attack indefinitely.

GUEST AUTHOR

Timothy R. Heath

Dr. Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher at the nonpartisan, nonprofit RAND Corporation.

thediplomat.com · by Timothy R. Heath · June 27, 2023

25. James Dobbins, Diplomat and Nation-Building Expert, Dies at 81; Directed RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center

May he rest in peace. I had the good fortune and honor to work on a number of projects with him over the years.

James Dobbins, Diplomat and Nation-Building Expert, Dies at 81; Directed RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center

rand.org

For Release

Wednesday

July 5, 2023

James Dobbins

RAND Corporation photo

James Dobbins, a veteran diplomat called “one of the leading practitioners of the art” of nation-building by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, and who directed RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center for more than a decade, died July 3. He was 81.

“Ambassador Dobbins had decades of experience as a diplomatic troubleshooter that greatly benefited RAND and the institutions we serve,” said Jason Matheny, president and CEO of nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND. “He was a scholar of foreign affairs who wrote cogently about some of the most critical situations the world has faced in modern times. And he was tireless: Just last month he coauthored a new analysis of how to rebuild a post-war Ukraine.”

Indeed, Dobbins saw that Ukraine's post-war reform and reconstruction was part of the 75-year story of Europe's recovery and reintegration starting in western Europe after World War II, then central and eastern Europe after the Cold War, then the western Balkans after the Yugoslavia wars. “His was a life spent working to make the world a safer, more peaceful place,” his son Christian Dobbins said.

Dobbins took on difficult assignments managing international crises for four presidents.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, he became the Bush administration's envoy to the Afghan opposition, played a key role at the 2001 Bonn conference from which Hamid Karzai emerged as the consensus candidate for Afghanistan's first president, and reopened the American embassy in Kabul on December 16, 2001.

Dobbins directed RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center from 2002 to 2013, when he became President Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He spent a challenging year in the post, holding negotiations over such issues as whether to keep American troops in Afghanistan after 2014 and the controversial swap of five Taliban detainees for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl.

Dobbins returned to RAND as a senior fellow and Distinguished Chair in Diplomacy and Security. His RAND books included 2007's The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, a handbook based on 24 case studies on rebuilding a nation after a conflict, coauthored with Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane and Beth Cole DeGrasse. In 2017 he published a memoir, Foreign Service: Five Decades on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy.

“Jim's role as a policymaker—and as a senior U.S. representative in societies in conflict—is worth special note,” Robert B. Zoellick, a former deputy secretary of state, wrote in the foreword to the memoir. “When Jim helped solve problems, he offered breadth and insight by analyzing and presenting issues within the context of history and wider considerations. A discussion with Jim was also seasoned with his sharp wit.”

Dobbins was born in New York City on May 31, 1942. He was 10 when his family moved to the Philippines for the work of his father, a lawyer with the Veterans Administration. They returned to the United States, and the Maryland suburbs, in time for Dobbins' senior year in high school.

He earned a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in 1963 and spent the next three years as a lieutenant in the Navy.

Dobbins then entered diplomatic work, including serving as a U.S. staff delegate at the Paris peace talks that opened in 1968. He worked in Paris, London, Bonn, and Brussels, and twice headed the State Department's European bureau.

His career took a different trajectory in 1993 with an assignment to manage the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. He was then given important roles as American troops went to Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. “I became associated with each of these enterprises as the Washington-based troubleshooter responsible for overseeing these interventions' stabilization and reconstruction phases,” he wrote. By the end of the Clinton administration, Dobbins was assistant secretary of state for Europe.

Under the Bush administration, Dobbins became special envoy to the Afghan opposition and later wrote After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (2008), a book about helping the Afghans form a new government. Other RAND publications include America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, Ending Afghanistan's Civil War and Choices for America in a Turbulent World.

After joining RAND, “I was occupied with an agreeable mix of thinking, reading, writing, and helping guide others' work on national security policy,” Dobbins wrote in his memoir. “RAND provided the opportunity for reflection and dozens of super smart colleagues to help.”

His wife, Toril, whom he married in 1969, died in 2012. Besides Christian Dobbins, he is survived by his son Colin Dobbins, Colin's wife Elizabeth Dobbins and their daughters Catherine and Evelyn.

About the RAND Corporation

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous.

rand.org

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

The West Again Learns That War Needs Industry

Biden and NATO leaders, fearing a war of attrition with Russia or China, will focus on rebuilding militaries and their supplies at coming summit

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 5, 2023

SF Critical Threats Advisory Company (CTAC) Trains in Europe | SOF News

**********

U.S. and China Look to Repair Ties, Again

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen arrives in Beijing as Washington and Beijing trade new export restrictions

Opinion | America Is Living on Borrowed Money

America Is Living on Borrowed Money

Austin Directs DOD Components to Reinforce Classified Safeguards Following Security Review

China’s Focus on the Brain Gives it an Edge in Cognitive Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative

China’s Cognitive Warfare Activities

DoD Cognitive Warfare Activities

The Way Ahead

Related Posts

Multilateral Man Is More Powerful Than Putin Realized

Unelected bureaucrats get a bad rap. But some do an essential job.

By Anne Applebaum

It's Time to Revise Guidance On Political Activities For Members of the U.S. Military - War on the Rocks

Putin’s Security Crisis

The Real Lesson of the Wagner Rebellion Is the FSB’s Failure

By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

WHERE SYMPATHIES LIE

INSECURITY STATE

GETTING AWAY WITH IT?

Belarus leader Lukashenko says Prigozhin back in Russia, Wagner deployment unclear

INVESTIGATION

It’s Not the Plane, It’s the Pilot - War on the Rocks

Brig. Gen. Ryan Assumes Command of CSOJTF-L

JORDAN

06.14.2023

Story by Sgt. 1st Class Nicholas J. De La Pena and Capt. Jonathan Ferrer

Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force - Levant

The Surprising Bipartisanship of U.S. Foreign Policy

Even in Times of Polarization, Consensus Has Prevailed

By Jordan Tama

A NOT SO GOLDEN AGE

WASHINGTON WRANGLING

CREATIVE TENSION

US in mad dash to get Sweden into NATO over opposition by Turkey, Hungary

China simulates ‘Z-day’ total sea war with the US

Related

Exclusive: The CIA's blind spot about the Ukraine war

Trouble Shooting

The Poland Connection

'Karma Is a Cruel Thing'

China Has Run a Spy Base in Cuba for Decades, Says Former Intelligence Officer

'China’s not going to kick Cuba to the curb. They are too valuable of an intelligence partner'

Pentagon Aims to Stop China and Russia from Spying on Academia | Air & Space Forces Magazine

What’s Special About Ukraine’s Frontline Information Warfare?

Tactics in Ukraine That Might Surprise U.S. Generals, Admirals, and Politicians but Reveal Exactly the Soldier They’re Looking For

Vietnam bans 'Barbie' movie over South China Sea map

Former U.S. officials have held secret Ukraine talks with Russians

Opinion | Xi Jinping May Be Souring on His ‘Best, Most Intimate Friend’

Xi Jinping May Be Souring on His ‘Best, Most Intimate Friend’

Taiwan’s Will to Fight May Be Stronger Than You Think

James Dobbins, Diplomat and Nation-Building Expert, Dies at 81; Directed RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center

About the RAND Corporation