​Quotes of the Day:

"To learn which questions are unanswerable, and not to answer them: this skull is most needful in times of stress and darkness."

– Ursula K. Le Guin

"A man on a thousand mile walk has to forget his goal and say to himself every morning, "Today I'm going to cover twenty-five miles and then rest up and sleep."

– Leo Tolstoy

“Partnership is our greatest weapon, turning allies into brothers and chaos into order.”

– Russell Volckmann, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces

1. Last Out: Elegy of a Green Beret: Tally Ho Theater in Leesburg, VA July 8th & 9th

2. For the first time, Xi is missing a China-backed BRICS summit. Why?

3. New Communist Party rules hint China’s Xi Jinping is delegating more power to deputies

4. China and Russia Keep Their Distance From Iran During Crisis

5. Taiwan Under Siege: How China’s Shadow War Is Penetrating Taiwan’s Military, Politics & Identity Without Firing A Single Shot: OPED

6. Russia seeks to involve Laos in war against Ukraine, military intelligence claims

7. Israeli spies ‘in Iran for years’ before war on nuclear sites

8. Putin’s Narrative Power: Just because he is stubborn doesn’t mean he’ll win by Sir Lawrence Freedman

9. The Big Five - 6 July edition by Mick Ryan

10. Xi Jinping’s surprise no-show at BRICS Summit fuels speculation about China's global standing

11. A Defiant Iran Draws on the Lessons of an Earlier War

12. American bombs in Iran also reverberate in China and North Korea

13. China may ask Russia to attack NATO if Taiwan is invaded, Rutte says

14. The US Army's done with Humvees and the Robotic Combat Vehicles. Here's what leaders want instead.

15. Hegseth halted weapons for Ukraine despite military analysis that the aid wouldn’t jeopardize U.S. readiness

16. Just the Facts, Mr. President: Why Exaggeration Undermines Credibility—Even When You’re Right

17. Things Worth Remembering: Lady Liberty’s Open Arms

18. Think James Bond's pure fantasy? His creator's real WW2 missions were more outrageous than you'd believe

1. Last Out: Elegy of a Green Beret: Tally Ho Theater in Leesburg, VA July 8th & 9th

​I am attending on the 8th. Hope to see you there for this critically acclaimed work.

Tally Ho Theater in Leesburg, VA, for Last Out: Elegy of a Green Beret

R​SVP for tickets here: https://tfpineapple.org/event/july-8th-9th-7-pm-last-out-leesburg-va/

July 8th & 9th, 7 PM. Last Out Leesburg, VA

July 8 - July 9

$34.22

Purchase your Tickets here:

July 8th: Tickets

July 9th: Tickets

Donate Tickets Here

Reserve a Donated Ticket Here or scroll down and sign up below! 

These complimentary tickets are limited and will be distributed on a first-come, first-served basis.

Leesburg, VA

Tally Ho Theater | July 8 & 9 at 7:00 PM

Bearing Witness to the Invisible Wounds of War

Join us at the historic Tally Ho Theater in Leesburg, VA, for Last Out: Elegy of a Green Beret—a powerful stage production written by Ret. Green Beret Lt. Col. Scott Mann and performed by a cast of combat veterans and military family members.

This unforgettable performance takes audiences deep into the heart of what it means to serve—and what is lost along the way. Told through the eyes of Danny Patton, a dying Green Beret caught between this world and the next, Last Out is a raw and emotional journey through the true cost of war.

More than a play, Last Out is a mission to honor the legacy of our nation’s defenders, educate civilians and policymakers, and help veterans and first responders heal through storytelling.

Don’t miss this immersive theatrical experience that has moved audiences across the country. Join us in honoring the fallen, supporting the living, and bridging the divide between those who serve and the communities they protect.

2. For the first time, Xi is missing a China-backed BRICS summit. Why?

​Enquiring minds want to know.

For the first time, Xi is missing a China-backed BRICS summit. Why?

https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/05/china/brics-summit-china-xi-absence-intl-hnk

By Simone McCarthy, CNN

 6 minute read 

Published 7:43 PM EDT, Sat July 5, 2025

Chinese leader Xi Jinping visits Moscow in May. Evgenia Novozhenina/Pool/AFP/Getty Images/File

Hong KongCNN — 

A summit of leaders from the BRICS group of major emerging economies kicks off in Brazil Sunday – but without the top leader of its most powerful member.

For the first time in more than one decade of rule, Chinese leader Xi Jinping – who has made BRICS a centerpiece of his push to reshape the global balance of power – will not attend the annual leaders’ gathering.

Xi’s absence from the two-day summit in Rio de Janeiro comes at a critical moment for BRICS, which owes its acronym to early members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and since 2024 has expanded to include Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran.

Some members are up against a July 9 deadline to negotiate US tariffs set to be imposed by US President Donald Trump, and all face the global economic uncertainty brought on by his upending of American trade relations – putting the club under more pressure show solidarity.

Xi’s absence means the Chinese leader is missing a key opportunity to showcase China as a stable alternative leader to the US. That’s an image Beijing has long looked to project to the Global South, and one recently elevated by Trump’s shift to an “America First” policy and the US decision last month to join Israel in bombing Iranian nuclear facilities.

But the Chinese leader’s decision not to attend – sending his No. 2 official Li Qiang instead – doesn’t mean Beijing has downgraded the significance it places on BRICS, observers say, or that it’s less important to Beijing’s bid to build out groups to counterbalance Western power.

China's Premier Li Qiang waves during a visit to Jakarta, Indonesia, in May. Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP/Getty Images/File

“(BRICS) is part and parcel of Beijing’s effort to make sure it isn’t hemmed in by the US allies,” said Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

But that pressure may have lessened with Trump in office, Chong added, referencing the US president’s shake-up of relations even with key partners, and for Xi, BRICS may just not be “his greatest priority” as he focuses on steering China’s domestic economy. Beijing may also have low expectations for major breakthroughs at this year’s summit, he said.

BRICS attendance sheet

Xi is not the only head of state expected to be absent in Rio.

The Chinese leader’s closest ally in the group, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, will only attend via video link, for the same reason he also joined a 2023 BRICS gathering in South Africa remotely. Brazil, like South Africa, is a signatory to the International Criminal Court and so would be obligated to arrest Putin on a court charge alleging war crimes in Ukraine.

The absence of two global heavy hitters leaves ample limelight for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who will visit Brazil both for the summit and a state visit. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa is also expected to attend.

Some new club members have yet to announce their plans, though Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto is expected in Rio after Southeast Asia’s largest economy officially joined BRICS earlier this year. BRICS partner countries, including some who aspire to join the group, will also send delegations. Uncertainty remains over whether Saudi Arabia has accepted an invitation to become a full member.

Related article

This could be the summer of economic hell

The sting of Xi’s absence for Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva may be blunted by the fact that the Chinese leader visited Brazil in November for the G20 summit and a state visit, when he and Lula inked a raft of cooperation agreements. The Brazilian leader also visited China in May, after attending a military parade in Moscow alongside Xi.

That recent diplomacy, low expectations for major breakthroughs at this year’s summit, and a heightened focus on domestic issues all likely factored into Xi’s decision to send Li, a trusted second-in-command, observers say.

China is facing steep economic challenges in the face of trade frictions with the US – and its leaders are busy charting a course for the five years ahead of a key political conclave expected this year.

In Rio, Li will likely be charged with advancing priorities like shoring up energy ties between Beijing and BRICS’ major oil-exporting members, while pushing for the expanded use of China’s offshore and digital currency for trade within the group, according to Brian Wong, an assistant professor at the University of Hong Kong, who added that Xi’s absence shouldn’t be interpreted as a snub to BRICS.

“Whether it be the Sino-Russian partnership or Beijing’s desire to project its purported leadership of the Global South, there is much in BRICS+ that resonates with Xi’s foreign policy worldview,” said Wong, using a term for the extended group.

De-dollarization?

Launched in 2009 as an economic coalition of Brazil, Russia, India and China before South Africa joined a year later, BRICS roughly positions itself as the Global South’s answer to the Group of Seven (G7) major developed economies.

It’s taken on greater significance as countries have increasingly pushed for a “multipolar world” where power is more distributed – and as Beijing and Moscow have looked to bolster their international clout alongside deepening tensions with the West.

But BRICS’ composition – a mix of countries with vastly different political and economic systems, and with occasional friction between each other – and its recent expansion have also drawn criticism as leaving the group too unwieldy to be effective.

Officials, including Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, attend the at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024. Maxim Shemetov/Pool/AFP/Getty Images/File

The disparate group’s efforts to speak with one voice distinct from that of the West often become mired in opposing views. A statement last month expressed “grave concern” over the military strikes against BRICS member Iran, but stopped short of specifically naming the US or Israel, the two countries that carried out the strikes.

Related article

US lifts chip design software curbs against China following London trade talks

Nonetheless, the US will be watching how the countries talk about one issue that has typically united them: moving their trade and finance to national currencies – and away from the dollar. Such de-dollarization is particularly attractive to member countries such as Russia and Iran, which are heavily sanctioned by the US.

Earlier this year, among the goals of Brazil’s host term, Lula included “increasing payment options” to reduce “vulnerabilities and costs.” Russia last year pushed for the development of a unique cross-border payments system, when it hosted the club.

What’s unlikely to be on the negotiating table, however, is the lofty goal of a “BRICS currency” – an idea suggested by Lula in 2023 that has drawn ire from Trump even as other BRICS leaders have not signaled it’s a group priority.

The US president in January threatened to place “100% tariffs” on “seemingly hostile” BRICS countries if they supported a BRICS currency, or backed another currency to replace “the mighty U.S. Dollar.”

As countries convene in Rio, observers will be tracking how strident their leaders are in promoting the use of national currencies at a meeting of a group where China is the leading member, but US global economic clout still looms large.

3. New Communist Party rules hint China’s Xi Jinping is delegating more power to deputies

Rebalancing priorities or succession plan? Both would seem to indicate that Xi is fully in charge at least for now.

New Communist Party rules hint China’s Xi Jinping is delegating more power to deputies

Some analysts say the regulations signal Chinese leader’s succession plan, while others say he is rebalancing priorities

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3317101/new-communist-party-rules-hint-chinas-xi-jinping-delegating-more-power-deputies

Vanessa Caiin ShanghaiandXinlu Liangin Beijing

Published: 10:00am, 6 Jul 2025

New rules on certain Communist Party organs suggest China’s ruling party is aiming to standardise its decision-making process and that President Xi Jinping might be delegating more of his power, according to observers.

One analyst said the move could hint at his plan for succession.

The 24-member Politburo, the party’s top echelon, on Monday reviewed new rules that would apply to the various “party coordinative institutes” – organisations aimed at coordinating cross-agency policies in a specific area.

Specifically, these refer to party “central commissions” and “party leading groups”, many of which were either founded or given expanded power during Xi’s tenure.

The new regulations aim to standardise the policy coordination and review process at the top, according to state news agency Xinhua.

According to Xinhua, the Politburo meeting noted that these organs should focus on “planning, discussing and checking on major matters”.

According to experts, this underscored a trend, first reported on by the South China Morning Post, of Xi delegating more authority to his deputies on day-to-day issues.

Dali Yang, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, said the new measures reflected Xi’s efforts to formalise and institutionalise governance procedures through regulations and laws to bring “more regularity” to operations.

“Especially because he remains himself the chairman of so many of these coordination organs, in addition to his party [and] state titles, all of which need his time and attention, which is not limitless,” Yang said.

Victor Shih, a specialist in Chinese elite politics and finance at the University of California San Diego, said the latest effort to formalise high-level coordination bodies itself “doesn’t suggest a large degree of delegation”.

“However, it does seem that Xi might pay less attention to day-to-day details, which necessitates a policing mechanism to ensure that his policy priorities are still being carried out by lower-level officials.”

Since 2012, Beijing has revitalised decades-old party coordination bodies, founded some new party bodies, and absorbed entire government offices into these bodies, most of which have been chaired by Xi. These moves align with Xi’s slogan of “strengthening the comprehensive leadership of the party” and aim to reinforce party control over key policy areas.

Changes of this kind have been seen in policy areas including economic affairs, national security, key reform issues and cybersecurity.

Most of the new bodies were established as “leading small groups”. Later, the more important ones were elevated to “central commissions” that are believed to play bigger decision-making roles and act as coordination hubs across key agencies.

For example, “the party leading group” on Hong Kong and Macau affairs was established in 2020, after a major elevation from its precursor. It is made up of regional chiefs as well as officials who oversee nationwide security and foreign affairs.

In a subsequent overhaul in 2023, this party group absorbed all power from the original Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office under the State Council system.

Similar consolidations have taken place on financial stabilisation, religious policies, and liaison with overseas Chinese.

Since 2023, the party groups have become a vehicle for power-sharing among Xi’s deputies.

Two commissions established in March 2023 – the Central Financial Commission and the Central Science and Technology Commission – are led by Premier Li Qiang and Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang, respectively.

Xi’s chief of staff, Cai Qi, heads the party’s Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, which oversees cybersecurity and the internet, a role previously held by the president.

Xi has also delegated some diplomatic functions. He is not attending the Brics summit beginning in Rio de Janeiro on Sunday, marking his first absence from the gathering of leaders of the emerging economies group. Li will lead the Chinese delegation, as he did during the Group of 20 summit in India in 2023 – the only time Xi was absent from that event.

According to a China-based political analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity, the regulations on these party bodies could hint at preparations for Xi’s retirement.

“The rules may be set up to regulate the bodies because it’s a key time for power transition,” the analyst said.

The next five-yearly national party congress is set to be held in 2027, when Xi’s current term as the party’s leader will end.

But other observers dismissed the idea that the latest rules were preparations for Xi’s retirement, suggesting instead that the Chinese leader might pass down his power in phases, especially his three most important titles: party general secretary, the military’s top commander, and president. None of the titles carry term limits.

Shih raised the possibility that Xi might adopt a phased approach to succession. He said this was “equivalent to deferring the succession issue by five to 10 more years while Xi delegates one of the three key positions, such as the position of state president, to a [Politburo Standing Committee] member of similar age”.

There is no obvious successor in the party’s leadership team. Unlike his predecessors, Xi did not promote an obvious successor at the end of his first term in 2017, and he has yet to do so since.

Neil Thomas, a fellow on Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Centre for China Analysis, said the recent regulatory reforms were primarily driven by Xi’s desire to strengthen party leadership and to better monitor important issues by decentralising some authority.

“They appear aimed at improving the administration and effectiveness of the party commissions and leading groups that have taken on an increasingly central role in Chinese governance under Xi,” he said.

According to Thomas, while Xi has delegated some responsibilities to trusted aides, “this is more about conserving his energy for long-term strategic priorities than preparing for retirement”.

Vanessa Cai

Vanessa Cai is a reporter for the China desk, based in Shanghai. Previously she worked for Caixin Global in Beijing and Shanghai-based news outlet Sixth Tone.

Xinlu Liang

Xinlu Liang joined the Post as a Graduate Trainee in 2021. Previously, she wrote obituaries for lives lost in California as a Covid-19 reporting intern at the Los Angeles Times and interned at Reuters Shenzhen Newsroom. She graduated with a Master’s in journalism from Universi

4. China and Russia Keep Their Distance From Iran During Crisis

​Cracks in the CRInK?

From the IC's ANnual Threat Assessment:

ADVERSARIAL COOPERATION

Cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has been growing more rapidly in recent years, reinforcing threats from each of them individually while also posing new challenges to U.S. strength and power globally. These primarily bilateral relationships, largely in security and defense fields, have strengthened their individual and collective capabilities to threaten and harm the United States, as well as improved their resilience against U.S. and Western efforts to constrain or deter their activities. Russia’s war in Ukraine has accelerated these ties, but the trend is likely to continue regardless of the war’s outcome. This alignment increases the chances of U.S. tensions or conflict with any one of these adversaries drawing in another. China is critical to this alignment and its global significance, given the PRC’s particularly ambitious goals, and powerful capabilities and influence in the world.

U.S. adversaries’ cooperation has nevertheless been uneven and driven mostly by a shared interest in circumventing or undermining U.S. power, whether it be economic, diplomatic, or military. Concerns over escalation control and directly confronting the United States, as well as some divergent political interests, have tempered the pace and scope of these relationships. The leaders, though, are likely to continue to look for opportunities to collaborate, especially in areas in which there are mutual advantages and they lack other ways of achieving their aims toward or resisting the United States alone.

Russia has been a catalyst for the evolving ties, especially as it grows more reliant on other countries for its objectives and requirements including in but not limited to Ukraine. Moscow has strengthened its military cooperation with other states, especially Pyongyang and Tehran. Russia also has expanded its trade and financial ties, particularly with China and Iran, to mitigate the impact of sanctions and export controls.

• The PRC is providing economic and security assistance to Russia’s war in Ukraine through support to Moscow’s defense industrial base, including by providing dual-use material and components for weapons. China’s support has improved Russia’s ability to overcome material losses in the war and launch strikes into Ukraine. Trade between China and Russia has been increasing since the start of the war in Ukraine, helping Moscow to withstand U.S. sanctions.
• Iran has become a key military supplier to Russia, especially of UAVs, and in exchange, Moscow has offered Tehran military and technical support to advance Iranian weapons, intelligence, and cyber capabilities.
• North Korea has sent munitions, missiles, and thousands of combat troops to Russia to support the latter’s war against Ukraine, justified as fulfilling commitments made in the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that Pyongyang and Moscow announced in June 2024.

Cooperation between China and Russia has the greatest potential to pose enduring risks to U.S. interests. Their leaders probably believe they are more capable of countering perceived U.S. aggression together than alone, given a shared belief that the United States is seeking to constrain each adversary.

• For at least a decade, Beijing and Moscow have used high-profile, combined military activities primarily to signal the strength of the China–Russia defense ties. This relationship has deepened during the Russia-Ukraine war, with China providing Russia dual-use equipment and weapons components to sustain combat operations.
• Russia has increased its oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to China in an effort to maintain revenues in the face of sanctions by Western states.
• China is using its increased cooperation with Russia to attain a stronger presence in the Arctic and legitimize its influence there. One area of cooperation is China’s production of icebreaker ships that enable safe passage through Arctic waters.
• The two countries probably will expand combined bomber patrols and naval operations in the Arctic theater to signal their cooperation and make it more concrete. In November, they also agreed to expand their cooperation on developing the NSR for its economic potential and as an alternative to Western dominated routes.

https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf

From my remarks last week in London at the Asia-Pacific Policy Strategy Dialogue, House of Lords:

The real threat might be what the US intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment describes as “adversarial cooperation.” Although the US considers China as the “pacing threat,” I argue that US alliances and partnerships must recognize and address the larger threat of cooperation, collaboration, and collusion among the so-called “CRInK.” At the heart of this strategic competition between the “CRInK” and the modern nation-states is an ideological contest. This requires deft use of the diplomatic and informational instruments of power and not only the military and economic tools. The permanent crises Kaplan describes are a result of the conflict between open and closed societies.

We should ask ourselves what brings the “CRInK” together and how is it like our alliances? There are four reasons for their cooperation: Fear, weakness, desperation, and envy. They fear the strength of our alliances as despite our current frictions time and again we have demonstrated the power of alliances. They have inherent weaknesses within their political systems that make them vulnerable – Putin’s weakness is highly visible in his war in Ukraine, his inability to keep Assad in power, and the support he is currently unable to provide to Iran. They are desperate for support, particularly Russia and north Korea as seen in their current military cooperation. Lastly, they envy our alliances. However, they will never share the values and trust that we do, and their relationships can never be more than transactional. This is playing out with Iran who is receiving very little support if any from the members of the “CRInK.” There are already cracks in the “CRInK” that we should exploit.

China and Russia Keep Their Distance From Iran During Crisis

Some U.S. officials talked about an “axis” of authoritarian nations, but the American and Israeli war with Iran has exposed the limits of that idea.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/06/us/politics/axis-china-russia-iran-north-korea.html

Listen to this article · 9:21 min Learn more

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An ambulance burned in an Israeli attack in Tehran last month. Despite the appearance of unity, Russia, China and North Korea did not rush to Iran’s aid during its war with Israel or when U.S. forces bombed Iranian nuclear sites.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

By Edward Wong

Edward Wong is a diplomatic correspondent in Washington and former Beijing bureau chief who has written a new book on China.

July 6, 2025, 5:01 a.m. ET

When Russia enlisted the aid of China, North Korea and Iran in its war against Ukraine, some American and British officials began talking about a new “axis.”

It appeared that the four countries were united by anger, authoritarianism and animus against the United States and its allies.

But Iran’s sales of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia for its war and oil shipped to China did not pay off when it mattered, raising doubts about unity among the nations.

None of the other three states rushed to aid Iran during its war with Israel or when U.S. forces bombed Iranian nuclear sites. China and Russia, by far the two most powerful countries among the four, issued pro forma denunciations of the American actions but did not lift a finger to materially help Iran.

“The reality of this conflict turned out to be that Russia and China didn’t run to Iran’s rescue,” said Alexander Gabuev, the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “That just exposes the limitations of the whole ‘axis’ idea.”

“Each of them is pretty selfish and doesn’t want to get embroiled in the wars of others,” he added. “These are very different wars and different sets of conflicts. The countries are not necessarily sharing the same structures and values and institutional links the same way the U.S. and its allies do.”

The four nations all have autocratic systems and harbor hostility toward the United States, which traditionally has aimed to weaken them and challenge their legitimacy. The countries also have some strategic ties and have undermined U.S.-led economic sanctions by doing commerce and sharing weapons technology with one another.

“Yes, there is probably a very modest amount of coordination among China, North Korea, Iran and Russia — in the sense that they talk with each other and have some of the same frustrations with the United States or with the West,” said Michael Kimmage, a history professor at Catholic University of America and a former State Department official who has written a book on the war in Ukraine.

“But it’s not particularly meaningful,” he added.

Among the nations, only Russia and North Korea have a mutual defense treaty. Besides providing weapons to Russia, North Korea has sent more than 14,000 troops to fight alongside the Russians against Ukrainian forces.

Their bond is rooted in a shared Communist past and the anti-American war on the Korean Peninsula from 1950 to 1953, in which Mao’s China also took part.

Image

A news broadcast in April showing President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia with Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader. In addition to providing Russia with weapons, North Korea has sent more than 14,000 troops to help the Russians fight Ukrainian forces.Credit...Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press

That history also accounts for the close ties between China and Russia, one of the most consequential bilateral relationships for the U.S. government and much of the world. The leaders of the two nations have forged a personal bond over many years, and their governments announced that they had a “no limits” partnership just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

China still sees value in abiding by some of the international norms promoted by a pre-Trump America and democratic nations, and it has refrained from sending substantial arms aid to Russia during the war. But it has helped to rebuild Russia’s defense industrial base, U.S. officials said, and it continues to be one of the biggest buyers of Russian oil.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Russia and Iran have never had that type of relationship.

One issue is religion. Iran is a theocracy with the type of ruling body that the other three secular, socialist governments regard with suspicion. Both Russia and China view the spread of Islamic fundamentalism with alarm. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, has taken extreme measures against even moderate Muslims, suppressing some Islamic practices among ethnic Uyghurs and Kazakhs in his country’s northwest.

“There are no shared values beyond vague platitudes about the ‘multipolar world order,’ and there are quite a few contradictions,” said Sergey Radchenko, a Cold War historian at Johns Hopkins University. “Putin indicated what they are: His relationships with Iran’s neighbors, including Israel and the Arab states, are too important to sacrifice on the altar of Russian-Iranian friendship.”

“He is a cynical manipulator interested only in his strategic interests, and if this means throwing Iran under the bus, then he is prepared to do this,” Mr. Radchenko added. “To be sure, the feeling is fully reciprocated in Tehran.”

Mr. Putin and President Trump spoke about the Israel-Iran war on June 14, and Mr. Putin offered to mediate. Afterward, Mr. Putin said publicly that Russia had helped Iran build a nuclear power plant and was assisting with two more reactors.

While he spoke of Russia’s partnership with Iran, he signaled a reluctance to commit to aiding the country in the war.

“We are not imposing anything on anyone — we are simply talking about how we see a possible way out of the situation,” Mr. Putin said. “But the decision, of course, is up to the political leadership of all these countries, primarily Iran and Israel.”

Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, met with Mr. Putin in Moscow on June 23, a day after the U.S. airstrikes on Iran, but the Russian summary of the meeting had little beyond the usual expressions of diplomatic support. That day, Iran carried out a symbolic missile attack on a U.S. military base in Qatar and then agreed to a cease-fire with Israel and the United States.

Image

A photograph released by Russian state media showing Mr. Putin meeting with Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, a day after the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.Credit...Alexander Kazakov/Sputnik

China also watched from the stands as the crisis unfolded.

Mr. Xi said that all sides “should work to de-escalate the conflict.” And when Mr. Trump ordered the American strikes on Iran, China said it strongly condemned the attacks and accused the United States of violating the United Nations Charter.

But like Russia, China did not send material support to Iran. Although China does sometimes take an official position on conflicts in the region, it also often tries to appear noncommittal in order to balance interests. For years, it has been building up its ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two rivals of Iran. Saudi Arabia, like Iran, is a big oil exporter to China.

An extended regional war would jeopardize China’s oil imports from those countries, so it seeks to quell hostilities rather than stoke them.

China’s aim of being a neutral broker in the Middle East became evident in March 2023, when it helped finalize a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

China also used that opportunity to develop closer ties with Iran’s partner in the region, Syria, ruled then by Bashar al-Assad.

That was a period when China’s influence in the Middle East was at a peak, said Enrico Fardella, a professor at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” who has taught at Peking University and studies China’s foreign policy. Now, with Iran weakened by the war and Mr. Assad overthrown by rebels, China is treading carefully around the Iran-Israel conflict to see which governments and political groups or militias in the region emerge as the most powerful.

“While Beijing has a vested interest in promoting a cease-fire and post-conflict stabilization, its current low-profile diplomacy suggests limited confidence in its ability to influence events,” Mr. Fardella said in a text message. “As in post-Assad Syria, China may once again adopt a wait-and-see strategy, carefully repositioning itself to salvage influence in a rapidly shifting post-conflict landscape.”

Yun Sun, a scholar of China’s foreign policy at the Stimson Center, a research institute in Washington, argued that the “axis” formulation for China, Russia, Iran and North Korea was still valid. Although the four countries do not have a mutual defense agreement binding all of them, she said, they share an “anti-U.S., anti-West and anti-liberal democracy” outlook.

“An alignment short of mutual defense is an alignment after all,” Ms. Sun added. “The fact they won’t fight for each other in a war does not make their cooperation and collective positioning less of a challenge. China has provided nuclear and missile technologies to Iran. It has bankrolled Russia’s war and kept North Korea on life support.”

But there are limits to China’s support for Iran, Ms. Sun said, adding that Chinese officials lack confidence in Iran’s theocratic leadership, and that they see Iran as having “been too naïve, opportunistic, indecisive and wavering in its external relations.”

Chinese officials are also aware that Iran, like North Korea, is an isolated country and needs China, despite occasional ebbs in the relationship.

On June 26, after Iran agreed to a cease-fire with Israel, Iran’s defense minister, Aziz Nasirzadeh, made his first trip abroad since the war began — to the Chinese city of Qingdao for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian security group led by China and Russia.

Edward Wong reports on global affairs, U.S. foreign policy and the State Department for The Times.

5. Taiwan Under Siege: How China’s Shadow War Is Penetrating Taiwan’s Military, Politics & Identity Without Firing A Single Shot: OPED

Is this a failure to understand and defend against Unrestricted Warfare and the three warfares of psychological warfare, legal warfare or lawfare, and media or public opinion warfare.

This is Chinese irregular warfare. It may be successful alone or it can assist in setting the conditions for successful large scale combat operations.  It contributes to providing options for the CCP/PLA.

Excerpts:

Taiwan’s defenders are preparing for a Chinese invasion. But in many ways, the battle is already underway. It is being fought in courtrooms, in briefing rooms, and on encrypted chat servers. It’s being waged by insiders—some unwitting, others willfully complicit.

The CCP’s aim is not simply conquest but collapse—from within. And if Taiwan fails to recognize that this silent war is already unfolding, it may find itself outmaneuvered not by brute force but by the very tools of deception and division that Mao Zedong once championed.

Taiwan Under Siege: How China’s Shadow War Is Penetrating Taiwan’s Military, Politics & Identity Without Firing A Single Shot: OPED

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/taiwan-under-siege-how-chinas-shadow/

By Shubhangi Palve -

July 5, 2025

Mao Zedong once said, “If we want to destroy the enemy, we must have two kinds of wars: one is an open war, and the other is a covert war.” 

It’s the second kind—the shadowy, silent battle waged through deception, infiltration, and manipulation—that has become a cornerstone of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic playbook.

Known as the “covert front,” this form of warfare is not fought on battlefields but within the institutions, alliances, and societies of adversary states.

Its purpose is to create internal chaos, erode trust, and weaken nations from within.

Nowhere is this tactic more evident than in Taiwan.

A Silent Offensive 

Over the past year, Taiwan has witnessed a troubling rise in espionage cases implicating not just rogue actors on the fringe but sitting legislators, political aides, and retired military officials, including figures from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

The CCP is no longer merely watching from across the Strait; it’s already inside the house.

The CCP has moved well beyond traditional intelligence gathering. Its agents have reportedly funded and guided armed proxy groups tasked with preparing for “wartime internal support” operations—essentially sabotage and subversion from within if China ever launches an invasion.

Beijing, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province to be brought under its control—by force if necessary—has ramped up military pressure alongside its covert operations.

But the growing wave of espionage cases suggests that China’s most immediate threat to Taiwan may not come from across the Strait but from within its own institutions.

Meanwhile, surveillance drones hover in the skies, monitoring Taiwan’s troop movements and feeding Beijing’s war planners a constant stream of battlefield intelligence.

This isn’t just intelligence gathering—it’s battlespace preparation. It’s a combination of political warfare, psychological warfare, and asymmetric warfare. The aim is to break a nation’s spine from within, using its own people, institutions, and divisions against it.

A Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldier stands guard in front of the National Museum of China in Beijing on March 3, 2025, ahead of the country’s annual legislative meetings known as the “Two Sessions”. (Photo by Pedro Pardo / AFP)

Espionage On The Rise

Chinese espionage operations in Taiwan are not only intensifying—they’re evolving. A recent surge in cases has alarmed security officials and revealed a worrying shift in Beijing’s tactics.

In January, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) released a revealing document titled “Analysis on the Infiltration Tactics Concerning China’s Espionage Cases,” shedding light on how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting deep-rooted networks—especially within Taiwan’s military.

The numbers speak volumes. In 2021, Taiwan recorded just three prosecuted espionage cases. That number rose to five in 2022 before jumping sharply to 14 in 2023 and 15 in 2024. Over the past two years alone, 112 individuals were indicted—nearly triple the total of the two years prior.

What’s more alarming is the profile of those accused: in 2024, two-thirds of the defendants were either serving in the military or were retired personnel.

The data points to a clear pattern—the CCP is zeroing in on Taiwan’s defense establishment, treating it as a primary target for infiltration.

The CCP is targeting the armed forces with surgical precision, not only to extract secrets but to flip allegiances. Intelligence officials say Chinese handlers now demand ideological commitment—pressuring their Taiwanese assets to declare loyalty to Beijing and even support China in a future war.

This form of “cognitive warfare” is designed to fracture loyalties, dissolve identity, and embed sleeper agents deep within the ranks of Taiwan’s institutions.

Infiltration Beyond The Military

The CCP’s influence operations go far beyond military infiltration. Beijing’s networks are operating through criminal syndicates, shell companies, religious groups, underground banks, and diaspora community organizations.

Each plays a role in recruiting, grooming, and activating assets—often targeting those with previous security clearances or government access.

In response to a sharp escalation in espionage cases over the past two years, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te unveiled a sweeping 17-point national security initiative in March—an urgent countermeasure to what he described as a rising tide of infiltration by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which Taiwan officially designates as a “hostile external force.”

The initiative outlines a comprehensive strategy to defend against five major national security threats currently confronting Taiwan.

These include: China’s persistent challenge to Taiwan’s sovereignty, mounting infiltration and espionage activities targeting the island’s military, campaigns aimed at eroding the national identity of the Taiwanese people, united front operations disguised as cross-strait exchanges, and Beijing’s efforts to lure Taiwanese youth and business elites through the narrative of “integrated development.”

“China is not only bribing retired and active military officers to leak intelligence,” President Lai warned, “but even supporting the creation of armed cells willing to turn against their own nation. More alarmingly, Beijing is attempting to blur the very identity of our people—offering Chinese passports, residence permits, and identity cards to sow confusion and divide our sense of self.”

Lai’s remarks came in the wake of a string of criminal cases that have exposed how the CCP is working methodically to subvert Taiwan’s internal cohesion. These operations—spanning espionage, disinformation, economic enticement, and identity manipulation—are not isolated incidents but part of a broader playbook.

Together, they complement the more visible coercive tools of Chinese strategy, such as military drills and airspace violations, which have intensified since Lai took office in May.

Breaching The Political Core

Recent cases suggest that Taiwan’s most sensitive political circles are now within Beijing’s reach. At least five individuals linked to President Lai and National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu are under investigation for allegedly leaking classified material to China.

One of them, Huang Chu-jung, used a military-grade encrypted messaging app to send travel schedules and campaign strategies to Chinese handlers, exposing not just information but also the vulnerability of Taiwan’s highest offices.

Military penetration has also deepened. In March, the Supreme Court upheld prison sentences for two ex-Air Force officers convicted of spying. Just a month earlier, eight other individuals, including active-duty officers, received sentences ranging from 18 months to 13 years for serving as Chinese informants.

What these cases reveal is chilling: the CCP’s campaign is not an external nuisance—it is a systemic infection reaching the top echelons of Taiwan’s defense and political leadership.

Security analysts warn that these revelations point to a long-term espionage network carefully cultivated by Beijing, one capable not only of collecting intelligence but also of compromising Taiwan’s command structure and critical infrastructure in a crisis.

A Warning From The Middle East

The shadow war is evolving. In Taipei, recent Israeli covert operations against Iran have sparked alarm—not for what they achieved, but for what they might inspire. Could China be watching and learning?

Israel’s sabotage missions and assassinations have showcased the power of covert action in weakening a rival without full-scale war. Experts in Taiwan now fear that Beijing could emulate these tactics—targeting infrastructure, key individuals, or communication systems with precision strikes masked as “accidents” or internal failures.

“What Israel has done to Iran—through a combination of precision, infiltration, and intelligence dominance—is something Beijing could try to replicate,” said Max Lo, executive director of the Taiwan International Strategic Study Society, in an interview with SCMP.

The implications are chilling. If Beijing were to adopt similar playbooks, future conflict scenarios might not begin with missile strikes or naval blockades but with targeted disruptions, sudden leadership decapitation attempts, or sabotage of key infrastructure—all carried out covertly before a formal war even begins.

A War That Has Already Begun

Taiwan’s defenders are preparing for a Chinese invasion. But in many ways, the battle is already underway. It is being fought in courtrooms, in briefing rooms, and on encrypted chat servers. It’s being waged by insiders—some unwitting, others willfully complicit.

The CCP’s aim is not simply conquest but collapse—from within. And if Taiwan fails to recognize that this silent war is already unfolding, it may find itself outmaneuvered not by brute force but by the very tools of deception and division that Mao Zedong once championed.

• Shubhangi Palve is a defense and aerospace journalist. Before joining the EurAsian Times, she worked for ET Prime. She has over 15 years of extensive experience in the media industry, spanning print, electronic, and online domains.
• Contact the author at shubhapalve (at) gmail.com

6. Russia seeks to involve Laos in war against Ukraine, military intelligence claims

​I did not see this coming. But I guess I should not be surprised by Russian desperation.

Excerpts:

Laotian authorities have reportedly agreed to send up to 50 engineers to support Russian efforts. In addition, Laos is said to be offering free rehabilitation services to wounded Russian soldiers.

"Russia, under the guise of humanitarian rhetoric, is trying to legalize the presence of foreign military contingents on its territory, effectively using them to wage war against Ukraine," HUR said.

This comes amid broader efforts by the Kremlin to recruit foreign personnel. Russia has drawn heavily on fighters from Asia and Africa, as well as North Korea.

Russia seeks to involve Laos in war against Ukraine, military intelligence claims​

https://kyivindependent.com/russia-seeks-to-involve-laos-in-war-against-ukraine-military-intelligence-claims-06-2025/

July 5, 2025 1:03 pm

• 1 min read

by Tim Zadorozhnyy

The flag of the Laos People's Democratic Republic seen in the gallery of flags of the participating countries in St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2024 (Maksim Konstantinov / LightRocket via Getty Images)

This audio is created with AI assistance

Russia is seeking to involve Laos in its war against Ukraine under the pretense of humanitarian cooperation, Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) claimed on July 5.

According to the agency, Moscow is organizing the deployment of a combined unit of military engineers from the Lao People's Armed Forces to Russia's Kursk Oblast, allegedly to help with demining operations.

Ukraine initially captured 1,300 square kilometers (500 square miles) of Russian territory during a cross-border offensive to Kursk Oblast but lost most of it during a Russian counteroffensive this year, which was supported by North Korean troops.

Laotian authorities have reportedly agreed to send up to 50 engineers to support Russian efforts. In addition, Laos is said to be offering free rehabilitation services to wounded Russian soldiers.

"Russia, under the guise of humanitarian rhetoric, is trying to legalize the presence of foreign military contingents on its territory, effectively using them to wage war against Ukraine," HUR said.

This comes amid broader efforts by the Kremlin to recruit foreign personnel. Russia has drawn heavily on fighters from Asia and Africa, as well as North Korea.

Ukraine has captured multiple foreigners fighting for Russian forces. an April investigation by Russian independent outlet Important Stories identified more than 1,500 foreign fighters from 48 countries who had joined Russia's war.

Laos, a landlocked Southeast Asian country bordering China, Vietnam, and Thailand, has not commented on HUR's claim. The country maintains close ties with both Moscow and its ally Beijing.

RussiaWarUkraineHURForeign mercenariesAsiaRussia's allies

Tim Zadorozhnyy

News Editor

Tim Zadorozhnyy is a news editor at The Kyiv Independent. Based in Warsaw, he is pursuing studies in International Relations, focusing on European Studies. Tim began his career at a local television channel in Odesa. After moving to Warsaw, he joined the Belarusian opposition media outlet NEXTA, starting as a news anchor and later advancing to the position of managing editor.Read more

7. Israeli spies ‘in Iran for years’ before war on nuclear sites

​This should not be a surprise to anyone who follows intelligence issues. Nuclear weapons in Iran are an existential threat to Israel. Wouldn't any country try to penetrate their enemy's hostile programs?

Israeli spies ‘in Iran for years’ before war on nuclear sites

exclusive

New documents seen by The Times reveal Mossad has been gathering intelligence from within the enemy state — and could still be doing so

https://www.thetimes.com/article/f82580db-34ba-494f-aa78-ae2f403af6cd?shareToken=18d777f4217c8a07f84762c5966e75f5

A satellite image shows the damage to the entrance of a nuclear site in Isfahan, Iran, after US airstrikes. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, left, an Iranian nuclear physicist, was assassinated in 2020

Gabrielle Weiniger

, Israel Correspondent

Friday June 27 2025, 9.00pm BST, The Times

Share

I

srael’s spies infiltrated the heart of Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes to wage years of covert intelligence-gathering and assess that Tehran’s weapons-building infrastructure was far more extensive than previously thought.

Leaked intelligence documents shared with western allies, including the US and Britain, and seen by The Times, appeared to reveal the full extent of Iran’s nuclear and missile ambitions. The conclusion of Israel’s spy agency, Mossad, as well as other military intelligence arms, was that the capability, knowledge and components of the regime’s development was racing ahead and it was far more extensive than just the main sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.

An intelligence source told The Times on Friday that Israel had been monitoring multiple locations through intelligence agents for years, with each location having “boots on the ground beforehand”. Israel began readying its attack on Iran from as early as 2010, based on intelligence about its accelerating weapons programme.

The documents were leaked amid conflicting reports over the damage to nuclear sites after the 12-day war. While President Trump said the Fordow site had been obliterated by so-called “bunker buster” bombs, some experts suggest that residual stocks of enriched uranium and manufactured centrifuges may still be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the future. America also mounted attacks on Natanz and Isfahan nuclear sites.

Images of the Fordow fuel enrichment plant before and after US strikes on the site. Craters can be seen on the left of the bottom image

SATELLITE IMAGE ©2025 MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Israel’s military operation was based on intelligence that identified the production of centrifuges, instruments used to enrich uranium, at three sites in Tehran and Isfahan. All were attacked and destroyed by Israel during the conflict.

The attacks also focused on seven separate components in the Natanz facility, Iran’s main enrichment site. Intelligence officers used spies on the ground to map the layout of Natanz, identifying overground and underground buildings which included piping, feeding and solidification of uranium. Israel also attacked the electricity infrastructure, a research and development building, the transformer station, and the generator structure to back up the electric grid. The attack also hit ventilation and cooling ducts.

As well as Natanz, Israel’s reconnaissance infiltrated, attacked and destroyed a facility in Isfahan, the Nur and Mogdeh sites for calculation and labs, the Shariati military site, and the large hangar at Shahid Meisami which manufactured the plastic explosives used for testing nuclear weapons, as well as other advanced materials and chemicals. Many of these sites were set up by the SPND, an umbrella organisation led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an Iranian nuclear physicist who was assassinated in 2020 with a satellite-controlled machine gun — allegedly by Israel.

A satellite image shows an airstrike crater, right, at the Natanz nuclear facility

MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/HANDOUT

The documents also pointed to the infiltration of the headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which was attacked in the later days of the war, and of nuclear sites such as the Sanjarian, which developed components involved in the creation of nuclear weapons, according to Israel. By the end of 2024, Iran had moved from the research stage of weaponisation to creating an advanced explosive and radiation system, running experiments and leading to nuclear capability “within weeks”, according to the report.

The scale and detail of the assessment points to years of intelligence gathering which may still be going on. “You know they have guys that go in there after the hit, and they said it was total obliteration,” Trump told reporters at the Nato summit in the Hague — suggesting that spies may yet remain on Iranian soil.

• Inside the B-2 raid: Pick-up pills, 18 hours flying, then bombs away

The depth of Israel’s infiltration was revealed as early as 2010, when an Iranian nuclear scientist was assassinated in broad daylight. Four others have since been assassinated. However, it was brought to the fore more recently with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas political chief, in July last year, when Mossad hired Iranian security agents to place explosive devices in several rooms of a guesthouse in Tehran.

Israeli intelligence also reportedly raised the prospect a few weeks ago of assassinating Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — something Trump made clear he was against.

Posting on Truth Social on Friday, Trump responded to Khamenei’s recent claims Iran had given the US a “big slap in the face”, with the US leader saying he “saved” the Supreme Leader from “a very ugly and Ignominious death”.

“Why would the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei… say so blatantly and foolishly that he won the War with Israel, when he knows his statement is a lie,” Trump said, adding he has “dropped” work around sanctions relief in negotiations with Tehran as a result.

Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, respond on X, posting: “If President Trump is genuine about wanting a [nuclear deal with Iran], he should put aside the disrespectful and unacceptable tone towards Iran’s Supreme Leader.”

The intelligence documents seen by The Times show that Iran was aiming to produce dozens of long-range, surface-to-surface missiles a month, leading to up to 1,000 a year with a reported aim of a stock of 8,000 missiles. Experts estimate Iran began the war with some 2,000 to 2,500 ballistic missiles.

Agents in Iran visited every workshop and factory that were later attacked, enabling Israel to target “the entire industry that supported the manufacturing of large amounts of missiles”, according to an intelligence source cited in the documents, which added that the sites were both military and civilian in nature.

One such site was Muad Tarkivi Noyad in Rasht, located on the coast of the Caspian Sea, which operated under the auspices of the Iranian Aerospace Industry Organisation. According to Israeli intelligence, this produced all the carbon fibre needed to produce missiles. It too was destroyed by Israeli bombs.

A close-up view of buildings at Isfahan nuclear technology centre, before it was hit. After the strikes, below

MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/HANDOUT

MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/AP

The dozens of locations and sites attacked in the last two weeks, including the Parchin military complex 30km southeast of Tehran, as well as sites for guidance, navigation and control of missiles and the production of warheads and engines needed to fly the missiles, reveal a complex production system that took decades to establish.

The scale of the infiltration of the Iranian regime has only served to increase paranoia in Tehran. Over the course of the 12 days of hostility, Iran arrested dozens of people suspected of spying. Efforts to hunt moles began after the assassination of Haniyeh, with IRGC members suspecting one another of security breaches. That was illustrated on Friday when Mossad, in a post on X, warned Iranians to stay away from IRGC officials and vehicles belonging to the regime.

Israel’s methods of recruitment, including that of Iranian insiders, is a guarded secret, but has even prompted a popular spy thriller series, Tehran. One of Mossad’s most famous heists within Iran was the seizure of Iranian nuclear archives from a giant safe in 2018. The top-secret documents were were later used as a basis to convince Trump to pull out of the 2015 nuclear deal. Within the agreement, Iran would limit its nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief.

• How badly damaged are Iran’s nuclear sites and missiles?

Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, admitted on Thursday evening that the Israeli and American campaigns had done “excessive and serious” damage to the country’s nuclear facilities, without giving further details. Araghchi added that there had been “no agreement” on upcoming nuclear talks with Washington.

“For decades, Israel has been observing activities inside Iran,” said Dr Efrat Sopher, an Iranian-Israeli analyst who chairs the Ezri Centre for Iran and Gulf States Research at the University of Haifa UK.

“Mossad has played a pivotal role in the success in thwarting the Iranian threat, where its successful operations vis-à-vis Iran and its proxies will be chronicled in the history books.”

8. Putin’s Narrative Power: Just because he is stubborn doesn’t mean he’ll win by Sir Lawrence Freedman

​"Functional defeats?"

Excerpts:

Zagorodnyuk argues for imposing ‘functional defeats’ on Russia, ‘paralyzing key capabilities without fully destroying them’. The best example is the Black Sea Fleet which still exists yet is unable to stop Ukrainian grain exports. In the land battle the key question is not to aim for maximum attrition for that carries its own risks to Ukrainian forces. Better to extend the ‘kill zone’ that Russian forces must traverse before they reach the front line. Work on defences against Russia’s long-range drones may blunt their impact, although defending against Russia’s ballistic missiles will be more of a struggle. The idea is to:

‘shift the war from a contest of exhaustion to a contest of operational irrelevance in which Russia may still fight but cannot win. This, in turn, forms the basis of a viable theory of victory under conditions where an acceptable armistice may never formally arrive.’

This is a prudent and practical approach, and to a degree provides a way of conceptualising the current state of the war. It is deliberately not the sort of theory of victory that identifies a set of moves geared towards a decisive outcome. It leaves uncertain at what point, if any, the Kremlin’s confidence in its own war strategy begins to wane.

Putin’s narrative power is to leave us doubting that this moment will ever come. But just because we struggle, with our limited knowledge of Kremlin debates, to construct scenarios in which Russia does want to look for a way out, does not mean that it will never happen. I suspect that if the moment does come it will be because of a crisis of some sort, perhaps if Ukraine finds a way to counter-attack at some place where Russian troops are thinly spread, or, more likely because of the economy.

Moscow has confounded Western expectations that severe sanctions would wreck the country’s economy and has instead enjoyed a couple of years of high growth. This was the result of a combination of shrewd macroeconomic management, high energy prices, the support of China and other Russian energy clients in circumventing sanctions, and the war boom triggered by enormous defence production. But beginning in late 2024, there were signs that Russia’s militarized economy was overheatING, with labour shortages, high inflation, and high interest rates discouraging investment. The trend in oil prices is down, putting further pressure on Russian coffers. There is a famous observation from an economist that if something cannot go on forever, it will stop. In principle that should apply to some key aspects of the Russian war effort.

The value of Zagorodnyuk’s analysis is that it does not depend on such possibilities and releases us from getting hung up on such questions. It accepts that this could be a long haul, made longer by Putin’s obduracy and Russia’s capacity. Most importantly, however, it challenges Putin’s narrative power. The question to ask is not whether Russia can keep going but whether it can meet its political objectives. And for now, and for the foreseeable future, it can’t.

Comment is Freed

36

Putin’s Narrative Power

Just because he is stubborn doesn’t mean he’ll win

https://samf.substack.com/p/putins-narrative-power?

Lawrence Freedman

Jul 06, 2025

∙ Paid

In a recent piece published on the Foreign Affairs website I considered Russia’s war in Ukraine as a textbook example of the problem of forever wars (about which I had previously written in the same journal, republished here).

How do countries cope when wars meant to be short and decisive turn out to be protracted and inconclusive? In such situations strategy needs to rethought to bring military means and political objectives into a new alignment – more appropriate means and more realistic objectives. The more a war drags on the harder this becomes for added to the original objectives comes an additional one, the need to avoid the humiliation of defeat.

This additional factor helps explain why Vladimir Putin persists with a war that he is not winning and cannot win. Limited territorial acquisitions do not mean that Putin is winning. Victory depends on achieving his political objectives and here he is not even close.

Putin has made no secret of his objectives. They were first set out as the full-scale invasion was launched in February 2022. Then he focused on the ‘denazification’ and ‘demilitarisation’ of Ukraine, along with constitutional changes to protect Russian speakers. In September 2022 he added to these the claimed annexation of four oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kerson, and Zaporizhzhia) in addition to Crimea, taken in 2014.

These objectives have been reaffirmed regularly, and since December in every statement describing what Russia wants from peace negotiations. The demand is for a subjugated, neutralised, disarmed Ukraine, not only resigned to some of its territory being under Russian occupation but also obliged to hand over extra that Russia has thus far failed to obtain through military action.

For Russia this is what winning means. That is why Russia would not accept Trump’s offer –Russia keeping what it holds and no NATO membership for Ukraine. Trump made his offer under the misapprehension that this would satisfy Putin sufficiently for him to agree a ceasefire. This was despite Putin and his foreign minister Sergey Lavrov insisting that they had no interest in a ceasefire until all their political objectives had been met.

Yet while Trump should not have been surprised by Russia’s stance he could be forgiven for being puzzled. Why was the Russian president being so stubborn? After all, approaching three and a half years into an intensive war none of Putin’s war aims are close to being achieved. Russia occupies significantly less territory than it did a couple of weeks into the invasion. When it advances it only does so at a glacial pace and enormous cost. Ukraine is now one of the most militarised states in Europe with a thriving defence industry. It has developed a network of partnerships that do not quite add up to a full alliance but can still play an important role in its future security. If Putin wanted a way to ease his country out of this calamitous war with minimal humiliation, Trump’s offer was as generous as any that a US president was likely to make.

Why Putin Persists

Here are the reasons I gave in my Foreign Affairs piece for Putin’s persistence.

First, no issue is more important to Putin. Ensuring that Ukraine can never be truly independent of Russia is essential to his legacy. Preferably it should be incorporated back into the Federation, but at the very least it must be prevented from becoming an open, liberal society and part of the West, not least because the values of such societies can be contagious.

Second, he does not believe the war to be unwinnable. Despite the grindingly slow progress of Russian forces he calculates that Russia’s superior strength will eventually prove decisive, and that, in the end, Ukraine will simply be overwhelmed by Russian power.

Third, he also likely views a cease-fire along the current line of contact as inherently unstable. If Russia retained only the territories it currently holds, it would be left occupying an economically inactive, depopulated, damaged chunk of Ukraine that would need to be policed intensely. The long border with the rump Ukraine would need to be defended.

For Putin, ending the war without meeting his core political objectives would be tantamount to a defeat and would leave the patriotic, ultranationalist bloc that he has cultivated and nurtured during the war deeply angered. The more moderate Russian elite might be relieved by such an outcome, but with so little to show for such a costly effort, there would still be a dangerous reckoning. The obvious question would be ‘Was it worth it?’ The answer would be uncomfortable. Thus, the perils of losing loom as large as the gains of victory.

He would also lose face among his most important partners in China, Iran, and North Korea, as well as in those countries of the ‘global majority’ that he has been seeking to impress and even lead. Furthermore, he has committed Russia to the idea that it is engaged in a long-term struggle with the West; accepting even a temporary Ukrainian truce could embolden his NATO adversaries. They might try to take advantage of any sign of weakness.

Moreover, Putin knows that any sanctions relief that comes with a cease-fire will be limited and contingent. Even if Trump were inclined to be more generous, the European Union and the United Kingdom would likely resist. Finally, Putin has reason to doubt the great economic deals that Trump promised. Having pulled out of Russia’s unstable and slowing economy, many Western companies and investors will be hesitant to return.

Then there is the Trump factor. If he thought that Trump was adding to the risk of Russia losing, by toughening sanctions or extending military support to Ukraine, he might have taken his proposals more seriously. Trump pronounced himself disappointed after his most recent call to Putin. ‘I don’t think he’s looking to stop, and that’s too bad.’ Yet the call came after the Pentagon had halted shipments of many weapons to Ukraine. It was followed by yet another massive missile and drone attack on Kyiv. By failing to add to the pressure, Trump fortifies Putin in his hopes of an eventual victory. ‘The fewer weapons Kyiv receives’, observed Kremlin spokesman Peskov, ‘the closer the end of the “special operation”.’

Why Ukraine Persists

The question of why Ukraine persists is less perplexing which is perhaps why it is asked less often. Ukraine is the aggrieved party. It did not start this war and has been defending its territory against constant Russian offensives. When it liberated territory the cruelty and brutality of the Russian occupation was made apparent. Ukrainians know exactly why they are fighting.

Moreover, from scrambling around at the start of the war to hold the Russian invasion and then relying on Western assistance to push it back, it has now begun to innovate in technology, production, and tactics to the point that it has been able to compensate for many of the inherent weaknesses of its position.

Since 2022 it has also, far more than Russia, kept its military means and political objectives in a realistic alignment. Until its disappointing offensive in the summer of 2023 its prime objective was to liberate all territory. After that it had to accept that there was no quick route to a decisive military victory. It would not concede its territory to Russia but could accept that for now it would be hard to recover what had been lost. A ceasefire risked a frozen conflict along Korean lines. While hardly desirable it could still be preferable to continual fighting. It would have the added advantage of relief from regular missile and drone attacks and a chance to regroup and recuperate. This was why Trump’s starting position in his push for a ceasefire - that somehow Putin wanted one while Zelenskyy didn’t - was so curious.

For Ukraine the distinction between not winning and losing is also less sharp. Ukraine has not prevented all Russian gains nor shot down all incoming Russian missiles and drones but it has done far better than expected in early 2022. Its losses can be measured in ruined lives and in territory, but on the core issue on which the outcome of this war will eventually be judged – can Ukraine survive as a viable, independent state – it is well ahead.

This core issue is not much discussed at the moment but that does not mean that it is secondary. The daily fighting focuses attention on the line of contact between the two armies. It is because this has moved marginally in Russia’s favour over the past eighteen months that one hears claims of Russian ‘winning.’ It is also why Ukraine appears to be caught in a defensive posture. It lacks a sufficiently strong offensive capability to follow a liberation strategy. With this out of reach it has opted instead for an attritional strategy, hoping that Putin might be persuaded to abandon the war by imposing the highest possible costs. Yet though high costs have been imposed and only limited Russian gains recorded no evident impression has been made on Putin’s confidence or stubbornness.

Narrative Power

Putin’s stubbornness means that the only safe assumption is that he will keep the war going long after other political leaders would have moved to cut their losses. This assessment now shapes the way we think about this war. It is what might be called Putin’s ‘narrative power’ because it shapes the way that discussions of the war are framed in ways that encourage fatalism and defeatism in the West.

The framing presents this as a battle of wills in which Putin succeeds because of his indomitability. It goes with the assumption that because Putin wills it, Russia has the resources to outlast Ukraine, that Putin has, as Trump told Zelenskyy, all the ‘cards’. This view is widespread in Washington, especially in the Trump administration, and helps explain why some believe that sending more weapons to Ukraine would be a case of throwing good money after bad.

Yet Putin does not hold all the cards. Despite regular claims about Russian advances these have been small scale. They have had more military ‘success’ with the attacks on Ukraine’s cities, especially Kyiv, and these may cause even more pain if the latest US move means there are fewer Patriot air defence missiles. But as with so much that Russia does, hurting Ukraine does not get Putin any closer to achieving his political objectives. Meanwhile, Ukraine is hurting Russia – some reports put Russian casualties for the first half of this year (killed and wounded) at over 200,000 - and while its attacks into Russia have avoided civilian targets those strikes have had an impact on military capacity and the oil industry.

Putin’s narrative power means that no doubt is entertained about his determination to continue with the war, whatever the costs, and Russia’s ability to continue the fight. almost indefinitely. The first proposition, for all the reasons given above, seems to be correct. We do not know how well-informed Putin is about the actual state of the war or whether he wonders why some promised gains have yet to materialise. His circle of close advisors remains small and sycophantic. If there is any anxiety about this state of affairs among Moscow’s elite they keep it suppressed. There is no place for any active discussion of the merits of the war in Russia’s media. These are the advantages of autocracy.

The second proposition, however, is far from certain for the cost of continuing with the war is going up and not down. The question therefore is if, when, and how the irresistible logic of a failed and expensive campaign will meet the immovable object of Putin’s will. Because we don’t know the answer, and lots of unexpected things can happen in war, we are left giving Putin’s will the benefit of the doubt.

I can see this narrative power as it affects my own commentary on the war. When I talk about the land war, I feel obliged to caution that one can never preclude some significant Russian breakthrough, or when talking about the problems with the Russian economy I hasten to add that it is not about to collapse. And these caveats are correct.

Yet when talking about how things might go badly for the Ukrainians the caveats rarely appear – despite an impressive Ukrainian record in resisting Russian advances. Many targets identified a year ago as essential to Russian progress, such as Pokrovsk, have yet to be taken. Nonetheless positivity about the Ukrainian positions risks warnings about undue optimism, complacency and wishful thinking. Indeed, while being cautious when it comes to any hint of Russian weakness, it still seems to be both realistic and prudent to speculate about Ukrainian weakness.

This was apparent in a recent article in the Financial Times reporting on official views about Ukraine’s prospects garnered at the June NATO summit. It reflected concerns that are widely expressed, often with a view to getting the allies to do more to support Ukraine, and in the light of the familiar concerns about Trump’s policy.

Here are some quotes: ‘Some Nato leaders fear that the situation on the frontline could deteriorate seriously by this autumn.’ Though both militaries are ‘nearing the point of exhaustion’ Russia can keep going for maybe another year while ‘Ukraine may reach a breaking point within six months — if it does not receive significant new military support’ (an important caveat). The ‘Russian missile attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities is also damaging Ukrainian morale. Without a clear vision of victory — or at least of an end to the war — a sense of hopelessness risks descending over the country.’ And then to cap it all a

‘well-placed official thinks that Russia’s central goal now is to capture Odesa — which Vladimir Putin regards as a historically Russian city. Without Odesa, Ukraine would lose access to its main port.’

Well yes it would. But this is not a plausible scenario. Eve are warnings that everything could deteriorate by the autumn, but then again it might not and if anything Russia’s advance has slowed down after a recent spurt. If Ukraine lacks a theory of victory then indeed it might be overcome by hopelessness, but what is Russia’s theory? And are we sure that Ukraine lacks one?

To be fair the counter arguments are also noted – how little territory has actually been captured over the past year, how drones have made it hard for the Russians to gather en masse, or the lack of mechanised divisions to capitalise on any breakthrough. Starting with these points would have allowed a completely different narrative. An article in the Washington Post provided some supporting evidence, including a Russian blogger’s complaints about an army ‘incapable of conducting complex operations in Ukraine because of weaknesses in intelligence, shortages, corruption, logistical failures and poor training.’

Challenging the Narrative

In another recent piece on the Foreign Affairs website, Michael Carpenter, a former senior official in the Biden Administration, writes about the ‘defeatism’ about Ukraine’s chances as supported by the ‘pernicious assumption’ that Putin’s ‘commitment to subjugating Ukraine cannot be deterred.’ He continues:

‘Such a narrative holds a kernel of truth, but it also dovetails too neatly with Russian propaganda. By assigning no agency to Ukraine or its foreign partners, it presumes that Ukrainian victory is a fantasy born of Western delusion, and it is a view that risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.’

He argues that Ukraine’s war effort has been hindered not by ‘Kyiv’s lack of manpower or weak resolve compared with Putin, but rather an insufficient supply of advanced military capabilities’ from the West combined with a ‘half-baked’ approach to ‘punitive economic measures against Russia.’ He points to new possibilities in employing the ‘approximately $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, held largely by EU countries, to pay for the war, by boosting Ukraine’s own defence production and purchasing capabilities from Europe and the US. He also urges moves against Russia’s energy exports and to further isolate Russia financially. The aim must be to create a situation in which ‘the Kremlin has to ask difficult questions about Russia’s ability to defend itself against other hostile actors, it will be compelled to reassess its approach.’

Much of this makes sense although the potential is dimmed by the reluctance of the Trump administration to move in this direction. Carpenter does make another important point, reflecting the need to challenge the narrative about the inevitability of Russian victory.

‘Indeed, from a strategic vantage point, Russia has already lost this war. Regardless of how much additional territory changes hands, the Ukrainian nation is lost to Russia forever. No matter how many billions of dollars Moscow spends on propaganda and “reeducation,” filtration camps and torture chambers, it will never convince Ukrainians to accept its rule as legitimate.’

Another recent article, looking more on what Ukraine can do for itself, is by Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defence minister, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He also accepts that a sense of frustration and futility must be injected into the Kremlin. But conceptually he makes an important shift. There is always a problem with developing a strategy by identifying an end point and then working backwards to see how it might be achieved. There are many theories about how this war might reach closure, whether militarily or diplomatically, but for now nobody can know for sure. In these circumstances good strategy depends on preparing for the long haul and challenging this narrative of inevitable Russian victory:

‘the objective should not be to defeat Russia outright or expect its regime to end the war because of economic or diplomatic pressure but to systematically deny it the ability to achieve its military goals.’

Zagorodnyuk argues for imposing ‘functional defeats’ on Russia, ‘paralyzing key capabilities without fully destroying them’. The best example is the Black Sea Fleet which still exists yet is unable to stop Ukrainian grain exports. In the land battle the key question is not to aim for maximum attrition for that carries its own risks to Ukrainian forces. Better to extend the ‘kill zone’ that Russian forces must traverse before they reach the front line. Work on defences against Russia’s long-range drones may blunt their impact, although defending against Russia’s ballistic missiles will be more of a struggle. The idea is to:

‘shift the war from a contest of exhaustion to a contest of operational irrelevance in which Russia may still fight but cannot win. This, in turn, forms the basis of a viable theory of victory under conditions where an acceptable armistice may never formally arrive.’

This is a prudent and practical approach, and to a degree provides a way of conceptualising the current state of the war. It is deliberately not the sort of theory of victory that identifies a set of moves geared towards a decisive outcome. It leaves uncertain at what point, if any, the Kremlin’s confidence in its own war strategy begins to wane.

Putin’s narrative power is to leave us doubting that this moment will ever come. But just because we struggle, with our limited knowledge of Kremlin debates, to construct scenarios in which Russia does want to look for a way out, does not mean that it will never happen. I suspect that if the moment does come it will be because of a crisis of some sort, perhaps if Ukraine finds a way to counter-attack at some place where Russian troops are thinly spread, or, more likely because of the economy.

Moscow has confounded Western expectations that severe sanctions would wreck the country’s economy and has instead enjoyed a couple of years of high growth. This was the result of a combination of shrewd macroeconomic management, high energy prices, the support of China and other Russian energy clients in circumventing sanctions, and the war boom triggered by enormous defence production. But beginning in late 2024, there were signs that Russia’s militarized economy was overheatING, with labour shortages, high inflation, and high interest rates discouraging investment. The trend in oil prices is down, putting further pressure on Russian coffers. There is a famous observation from an economist that if something cannot go on forever, it will stop. In principle that should apply to some key aspects of the Russian war effort.

The value of Zagorodnyuk’s analysis is that it does not depend on such possibilities and releases us from getting hung up on such questions. It accepts that this could be a long haul, made longer by Putin’s obduracy and Russia’s capacity. Most importantly, however, it challenges Putin’s narrative power. The question to ask is not whether Russia can keep going but whether it can meet its political objectives. And for now, and for the foreseeable future, it can’t.

9. The Big Five - 6 July edition by Mick Ryan

​And before the Big 5:

Ukraine

Trump’s Futile Phone Call.

Hegseth’s War Against Ukraine

1000 Drones and Missiles in Four Nights.

Russia’s Paltry Gains.

A New SACEUR.

The Pacific

Taiwan’s 2025 Han Kuang joint military exercise. 

Chinese Operations Around Taiwan.

T​he big 5 this week:

1. The Next National Defense Strategy​ (Frank Hoffman's AWC essay)

2. Russia prepares a strategic missile plant for ‘eternal war’

3. The Drone Wall

4. Decoding Xi

5. Russia’s Foreign Legion

The Big Five

The Big Five - 6 July edition

My regular update on global conflict. This week: 1000 drones and missiles target Ukraine in a 4-day period, Hegseth's personal war against Ukraine, and Trump's futile phone call with Putin.

Mick Ryan

Jul 06, 2025

Image: @DefenceU

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

First, my apologies for not putting out a Big Five for the last couple of weeks. I was on a plane quite a bit, and then getting over some jet lag while also getting back to work at home on two major reports as well as putting the finishing touches on my PhD (more on that topic at some point in the future).

In this edition of The Big Five, I explore issues concerning the war in Ukraine from the past week, as well as news from the Pacific region. As always, I have included my top five national security and war reads.

Ukraine

Image: United24

Trump’s Futile Phone Call. This week, President Trump held another phone call with the Russian president.

Speaking with reporters afterwards about his phone call with Putin, Trump stated that "I'm very disappointed with the conversation I had today with President Putin because I don't think he's there. I didn't make any progress with him today at all."

Trump also spoke to the Ukrainian president after his call with Putin. Zelenskyy described how he and Trump "spoke about opportunities in air defense and agreed that we will work together to strengthen protection of our skies" and that they had "agreed to a meeting between our teams."

Zelenskyy also posted on his social media that:

We had an extremely fruitful conversation with the President of the United States yesterday, during which we discussed air defense. I’m grateful for the readiness to assist. Patriot systems are the key to defending against ballistic threats.

In the past 24 hours, President Trump had this to say about his discussion with Putin during the week:

I told you I was very unhappy with my call with Putin. It just seems like he wants to go all the way and just keep killing people. No good. It's not good. I wasn't happy with him.

OK. So do something about it.

In the meantime, Putin keeps slaughtering Ukrainians while kicking sand in the face of Trump.

Breaking News: Trump has (again) stated that he doesn’t like Putin killing people, and might send more Patriot batteries and missiles to Ukraine.

Hegseth’s War Against Ukraine. What has U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth got against Ukraine?

For the third time in six months, the U.S. Secretary of Defense has unilaterally suspended military aid to Ukraine. Apparently, despite advice that the shipments to Ukraine would not impact on U.S. military readiness, he went ahead with the halt anyway. While the previous decisions, which occurred in February and May this year, were quickly reversed, it provides further evidence of the disfunction currently surrounding policy decision-making inside the Pentagon. It also demonstrates a profound and worrying disconnect between the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, and his chief defence advisor.

The halt in aid occurred just before Trump’s latest call with the Russian dictator. Take from that what you will. In a more competent and strategic administration, I would propose the two were linked. In this instance, who knows?

In remarks in February, Hegseth noted that “everything was on the table” in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. So far, these ‘negotiations’ with Russia have led to absolutely nothing except more dead Ukrainians, and a growing confidence among authoritarian powers that they have the measure of the U.S. President and his TACO impulses.

Hegseth has steadfastly resisted any discussion about Ukraine joining NATO, and claimed it is unrealistic for Ukraine to return to its 2014 borders. Can you imagine Churchill or Roosevelt in 1941 stating that it was unrealistic for France to return to its 1939 borders?

In an April 2025 op-ed, Max Boot wrote that: “It’s time for Hegseth to go. The job should be given to someone who has the right experience and qualifications to lead one of the world’s largest and most complex organizations in these increasingly dangerous times.”

This week again proved why this is the case.

1000 Drones and Missiles in Four Nights. This week, Russian hit Ukraine with its largest ever drone and missile strikes. The 550 drone and missile strike of 4 July occured just after the most recent Trump-Putin phone call (see coverage of that above) and as the United States was about to celebrate its Independence Day. I am sure this was just a coincidence.

Source: Ukrainian Air Force

The 4 July attacks set a new, brutal record for Putin’s largest drone and missile attack on Ukraine. It caused significant civilian injuries and extensive damage. Not only does it demonstrate that Putin now believes that American intervention on behalf of Ukraine is almost unthinkable, it also provides yet another demonstration of how unprepared western nations are for the potential threats inherent in modern war.

As I wrote earlier this week, confronting this threat is not just about improved drone and missile defences. Civil defence, infrastructure resilience and societal cohesion are all part of Ukraine’s defence against such Russian assault. These are areas western nations (especially my own) have under-funded or avoided for over three decades.

With their growing production of missiles and drones, and their confidence that Trump will sit on his hands while Russia conducts its attacks, the Russians have escalated their aerial assault on Ukraine in the last few months. The graph below from The Institute for the Study of the War paints a very grim picture of what Ukraine is now enduring on a nightly basis. It also provides an insight into the kinds of support that western governments need to provide Ukraine so that it can not only weather these attacks, but convince Putin that his theory of victory - wait until the West loses patience with Ukraine - cannot succeed.

Source: ISW

This issue was the topic of a recent article written by Ukrainian analyst, Mykola Bielieskov. He writes that “Russia’s increasingly deadly drone campaign is having a demoralising impact on the population throughout Ukraine. Addressing this challenge is now one of the most urgent and complex tasks facing the Ukrainian military.”

But, there is much that might be done to redress this situation. Ukrainian innovation is part of the challenge, and as Bielieskov notes, “it is clear that the Ukrainian military needs to adopt new approaches to address the growing drone menace. The most cost-effective solution would be to produce interceptor drones capable of protecting Ukrainian cities. This process is already underway but must be urgently scaled up to reflect the size of the task ahead.”

But it will also take a concerted effort by Europe, America and other countries like Australia, Canada and Japan, to step up now, provide more interceptors and also provide cash injections into Ukrainian defence industry so that it can increase production of counter-drone technologies.

Russia’s Paltry Gains. The figures are in for Russia’s ‘progress’ in its ground offensives against Ukraine in the month of June. In that month, the Russians managed to gain just over 600 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory. They ‘achieved’ this at the loss of over 32,000 casualties as well as hundreds of vehicles and thousands of drones.

Source: @DefenceU

While the Sumy area has seen some of the most intensive fighting in recent weeks, the Russian main effort is still centred on the Pokrovsk and Lyman areas. As the maps below show, Russian ‘progress’ remains halting and limited.

Source: ISW

For those who are still tempted to believe that Russia is winning in Ukraine, I would ask you to undertake a quick thought experiment.

Imagine it is July 2006. It is three and a half years since American, British and Australian troops crossed into Iraq in order to find weapons of mass destruction and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. Currently these forces have occupied just 19% of Iraq (the same percentage of Ukraine currently illegally occupied by Russia). Over the period since the invasion of Iraq commenced, the coalition forces have lost one million casualties.

Would we say the coalition forces are winning?

Putin knows he is not, and cannot, win his personal crusade against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people through military force. This is why he invests so much in misinformation and coercion against Western politicians and citizens to convince them of Russia’s (fake) interests and (also fake) inevitable victory. This endeavour has been far more successful so far than his hapless military forces have been.

And it has been more successful because we have allowed it to be so.

Image: NATO

A New SACEUR. This week, General Chris Cavoli completed his tour as the Supreme Allied Commander at NATO. He has handed over the reigns to U.S. Air Force General Alexus G. Grynkewich. General Cavoli has presided over a reinvigoration of NATO war plans and the coordination of military aid to Ukraine. Congratulations to General Cavoli on completing with distinction a very tough assignment.

The Pacific

Image: Ministry of National Defence, Taiwan

Taiwan’s 2025 Han Kuang joint military exercise. The Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo announced this week that military-civilian coordination operations and civil defence drills will take place during the forthcoming Han Kuang joint military exercise in order to provide greater realism. This 41st version of the exercise is due to commence on 9 July.

The exercise scenario will include a Chinese blockade and invasion of Taiwan. The 2025 iteration of Han Kuang will run double the length of previous exercises, at ten days, and will incorporate what is reported to be the largest-ever mobilization of military reservists. This should provide important lessons about the current state of readiness of reservists as well as allow training in the integration of Taiwan’s regular and reserve forces.

Alongside the military component of the exercise, the Taiwanese government will coordinate nation-wide civil defence drills.

Newsweek has also reported that Taiwan “is expected to stage another test of its newly acquired HIMARS rocket launchers alongside indigenous anti-air, anti-ship and ground-attack missiles.”

A report by Focus Taiwan describes how:

Regarding the key focuses of the Han Kuang drills…they are based on lessons from last year's exercises, including a continued emphasis on decentralized operations, comprehensive logistical support, rules of engagement, strengthening rapid decision-making, improving synchronization of joint operations, boosting civilian-military coordination and clarifying military action authorization mechanisms.

To provide context for this year’s exercise, I have also included a link to a report about the 2024 Han Kuang exercise by John Dotson, director of the Global Taiwan Institute. You can read his report in full at this link.

Chinese Operations Around Taiwan. The latest data for Chinese military activity around Taiwan shows that June was a very busy month. June saw the second highest level of Chinese military operations around Taiwan for 2025. This year, as the graph below demonstrates, it turning out to be the busiest one so far for Chinese military aggression towards Taiwan.

Source: @IanEllisJones

What does all this mean?

It probably does not mean an invasion is imminent. But it does mean that the PLA is gaining confidence in its ability to conduct sophisticated joint operations further from home. The Chinese have worked to uplift their joint planning capabilities and their normal operational readiness, and the sortie generation rate for their aircraft is indicative of this.

This is obviously assisted by the growing size of the Chinese military. The figures below, taken from the annual Pentagon reports on China’s military capacity between 2022 and 2024, are part of the story of the increasing level of Chinese military activity around Taiwan. In short, China has more stuff to do more things with.

Source: Annual Reports to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC, 2022-2024.

It is also worth noting that besides the military hardware used on a daily basis against Taiwan, the Chinese have also been building the military means to coerce different behaviours from Taiwan and those that might support Taiwan during a war. The principle coercive instrument is the Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). It has slowly built its arsenal, which the figures from the last couple of years show.

Source: Annual Reports to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC, 2022-2024.

Given the shortfalls in drone and missile defence, as well as civil defence capabilities that I discussed above, many nations in the Pacific are quite vulnerable to this Chinese missile ‘diplomacy’.

*******

It’s time to cover this week’s recommended readings.

I have included an excellent assessment of the challenges facing those who are preparing the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, written by Frank Hoffman. There is also an examination of how Russia has stepped up missile production, and the Ukrainian drone wall. I have also included a piece that explores secrecy in Chinese political decision-making, and the Big Five is rounded out with a report on Russia’s recruitment of foreigners to fight in its war in Ukraine.

As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The Next National Defense Strategy

In this article for Parameters, Frank Hoffman examines the challenges facing those charged with producing the next U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), due in 2026. As Hoffman notes, the strategic environment has changed considerably since the first Trump administration, and the national security policies of the second Trump administration have upended some of the strategies put in place by the Biden administration. Coupled with an increasing national debt, the new NDS faces multiple different issues to resolve. As the author notes, “the wars of the future are here—ready or not.” You can read the full analysis at this link.

2. Russia prepares a strategic missile plant for ‘eternal war’

The Kyiv Independent has been one of the essential sources for information about the war in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. In the last couple of years, it has also published excellent in-depth analysis of various aspects of the war. Recently, it published a report on Russia’s expansion of its munition production capacity, and in particular, the acceleration of missile production at the Votkinsk missile plant. This is an important topic, as it permits insights on the mobilisation of industry for modern war. You can read the full report here.

3. The Drone Wall

David Kirichenko has been an astute observer of the war in Ukraine, and in particular, developments in uncrewed systems. Recently, the Ukrainian government announced the development of a Drone Wall for western Ukraine, something I examined in a recent article here. Kirinchenko has provided a timely update into this major Ukrainian undertaking, and its implications and lessons for the defence of the rest of Europe against Russian aggression. You can read the article at this link.

4. Decoding Xi

This article from the Lowy Institute, where I am a Senior Fellow for Military Studies, provides a good look at how the Chinese Communist Party has become increasingly secretive during the reign of President Xi. As the author notes, “despite unprecedented access to information, the inner workings of China’s political elite remain strikingly opaque” and that we are seeing a “return of Pekingology” to divine Chinese political decision-making. You can read the article here.

5. Russia’s Foreign Legion

If you are following the war in Ukraine, Tatarigami and Frontelligence Insight are essential sources of analysis about the conflict. In this report, the Frontelligence team examines the Russian military and how it recruits and employs foreigners to serve in its forces in Ukraine. The report also provides an estimate of how many foreigners have joined Russia’s military. You can read the report at this link.

10. Xi Jinping’s surprise no-show at BRICS Summit fuels speculation about China's global standing

Xi Jinping’s surprise no-show at BRICS Summit fuels speculation about China's global standing

The first-ever absence by Xi from the key emerging economies gathering raises questions about China's dominance in the fractious alliance

By Morgan Phillips Fox News

Published July 5, 2025 10:00am EDT

foxnews.com · by Morgan Phillips Fox News

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Chinese President Xi Jinping will not attend this week’s BRICS Summit in Brazil, marking the first time the Chinese leader has missed the gathering of major emerging economies. The abrupt decision has triggered widespread speculation about internal political dynamics within China and the fraying cohesion of BRICS itself.

China’s official explanation — a "scheduling conflict" and the fact that Xi already met with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva earlier this year, according to the South China Morning Post — has been met with skepticism. Premier Li Qiang will attend the summit in Xi’s place, continuing a recent trend of Xi scaling back his appearances on the global stage.

"That doesn’t make sense," said Gordon Chang, an expert on U.S.-China relations. "There are many other countries at the BRICS summit, not just Brazil. To me, it’s extremely significant that Xi Jinping is not going. It suggests turbulence at home — there are signs he’s lost control of the military and that civilian rivals are reasserting power. This is a symptom of that."

RUSSIA'S PUTIN HOSTS CHINA'S XI AT MASSIVE MOSCOW MILITARY PARADE ON RED SQUARE

Chinese President Xi Jinping listens as Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, not pictured, speaks during their meeting at the Office of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi, Vietnam, on Monday, Apr. 14. (AP/Minh Hoang)

Bryan Burack of the Heritage Foundation agrees that Xi’s absence underscores deeper issues: "It’s another indication that BRICS is not going to be China’s vassalization of the Global South." He noted that countries like Brazil and Indonesia have recently imposed tariffs on China over industrial overcapacity and dumping, moves that suggest widening rifts within the group.

"China is actively harming all those countries for the most part, maybe with some exceptions, through its malign trade policies and dumping and overcapacity."

Tensions with India and global trade pressure may also be factors

Some analysts point to rising China-India friction as a contributing factor in Xi’s decision to skip the summit.

"China has been at war with India for decades, essentially," Burack said. "These are fundamentally opposing interests. It’s difficult to see China changing its behavior in the near term, and that will keep tensions high."

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to take a leading role at the gathering, potentially another deterrent for Xi’s attendance.

Another key leader — Russian President Vladimir Putin — is only expected to address the group by video.

AFTER TRUMP'S DEPARTURE, G7 LEADERS FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENTS ON KEY ISSUES

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, are two key leaders of the BRICS alliance. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

BRICS: United in name, divided in decades-long tensions

Formed by Brazil, Russia, India and China and later joined by South Africa, BRICS was envisioned as a non-Western counterweight to G7 dominance. It has expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE and, most recently, Indonesia, strengthening its economic footprint.

Economist Christian Briggs highlighted BRICS’s massive scale: "BRICS now comprises 12 full members and up to 23 when counting partners. Collectively, they account for over 60% of the world’s GDP and around 75% of the global population. They control vast natural resources and a growing share of global trade flows."

Yet despite its scale, the bloc remains ideologically and strategically fragmented. "It’s a group of countries that hate each other," Burack said bluntly. "China is harming many of them through unfair trade practices. There’s not a lot of incentive for real unity."

Currency ambitions and strategic divergences

The alliance’s aspirations to challenge the U.S. dollar through alternative payment systems and a potential BRICS currency have gained media traction — but experts caution against overestimating this threat.

"There’s been a lot of fearmongering about a BRICS currency," said Burack. "But the interests of these countries are completely divergent. There’s more smoke than fire when it comes to a currency challenge to the dollar."

Chang echoed this skepticism: "The only country that can challenge the dollar is the United States. Weakness in the dollar is due to what we are doing domestically, not what the BRICS are doing."

Still, Briggs offered a counterpoint, arguing that BRICS members are already reshaping global currency flows.

"They’re moving away from the dollar into digital yuan, rupees, rubles. China has launched a SWIFT alternative already adopted by the Caribbean banking sector — trillions of dollars are shifting."

MACRON CHIDES TRUMP, CHINA OVER TRADE, UKRAINE, GAZA: POLICIES 'WILL KILL GLOBAL ORDER'

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a family photo during the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23, 2024. (Alexander ZemlianichenkoPool/AFP via Getty Images)

Is BRICS still a threat to U.S. influence?

While its cohesion remains questionable, BRICS poses a long-term challenge to U.S. influence — particularly in regions where Washington has retreated diplomatically and economically.

"China filled the void left by the U.S. in places like Africa," said Briggs. "Now it controls about 38% of the world’s minerals. Meanwhile, Russia’s economy has doubled despite sanctions, because they preemptively reduced reliance on the dollar."

Yet Chang sees India as a brake on any aggressive anti-Western tilt. "BRICS has an ‘I’ in it—and that’s India. Modi doesn’t want to be part of an anti-Western bloc. As long as India’s in BRICS, the rest of the world is safe."

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India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to take a leading role at the summit, potentially another deterrent for Xi’s attendance. (Sipa USA via AP)

A missed opportunity — or a calculated power move?

To some, Xi's no-show signals instability in Beijing. To others, the opposite: it demonstrates confidence in China's dominance over the other BRICS members.

"He doesn’t have to be there," Briggs contended. "Xi’s power allows him to delegate. China is trading with nearly 80% of the world now. He’s moving the agenda forward even in absentia."

What’s clear is that BRICS continues to evolve — its internal contradictions as visible as its geopolitical ambitions. Whether Xi's absence marks a retreat or a recalibration remains one of the key questions hovering over the summit in Brazil.

foxnews.com · by Morgan Phillips Fox News

11. A Defiant Iran Draws on the Lessons of an Earlier War

A Defiant Iran Draws on the Lessons of an Earlier War

The brutal fight against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq four decades ago shaped the recent war and guides Iran’s next steps

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-iraq-war-lessons-israel-244acefe

Men sat by graves of those killed in the Iran-Iraq war, during a mourning ceremony in Tehran on Thursday. Photo: Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto/Getty Images

By Sudarsan Raghavan

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 and Sune Engel Rasmussen

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Updated July 6, 2025 12:01 am ET

Key Points

What's This?

• Iran’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War shaped its strategies, emphasizing self-reliance and regional influence.
• Despite recent setbacks, Iran views itself as resilient, vowing to continue its nuclear program and resist foreign pressure.

Israel’s 12-day campaign of airstrikes on Iran killed a number of top military leaders, wiped out its air defenses and pummeled symbols of its rulers’ power. It wasn’t the first time Tehran’s theocratic leaders had been pushed to the brink.

Across the country, schools and streets are named for soldiers and pilots killed in the brutal war fought four decades ago between Iran and Iraq. Then, as now, the conflict pitted the regime against a superior, U.S.-backed adversary. As now, Iran perceived itself as alone and cornered. 

Yet the regime refused to cave and outlasted Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and withstood U.S. pressure. It ultimately grew into a far more potent regional power after the Iraqi leader ended up in America’s sights.

That experience shaped generations of Iranian leaders and laid the groundwork for strategies that culminated in the most recent war. It also offers guidance as strategists try to game Iran’s next moves and its adversaries push to complete the job of winding up its nuclear program.

“That war really looms large in terms of the entire way in which they see themselves under siege, permanently under threat,” said Vali Nasr, an Iran expert at Johns Hopkins University and author of “Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History.” “The mindset of the country now is that it dodged a bullet and that it still has to contend with a long term danger.”

The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s bolstered the confidence of Iran’s modern leaders in their ability to hold out against foreign threats.

AP, Hossein Beris/Middle East Images/AFP/Getty Images

While battered, Iran has remained defiant, most recently by ending cooperation with international nuclear inspectors, a move that closes the world’s window on of its program.

After the U.S. bombed Iran’s core nuclear facilities, the regime vowed to keep its nuclear program going. Abdolrahim Mousavi, the new chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, said Iran “won’t back down.” Israel had killed his predecessor days earlier. 

The pronouncements reflect wartime bravado. Israel’s campaign, in which it quickly established dominance in Iran’s skies and simultaneously hit many nuclear scientists and military leaders, demonstrated its overwhelming military superiority and the extensive penetration of the regime by its spies. Iran launched a major crackdown once the shooting stopped to reassert its domestic control.

But Iran’s leaders also have a genuine confidence in their ability to hold out against foreign threats. “They know that they can survive a total war that lasts a long time,” said Afshon Ostovar, an Iran military expert and associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. “They know they can tolerate a lot more than maybe the Israelis can tolerate.”

As the cease-fire was about to take effect, Iran launched a salvo of missiles that killed several Israelis. Israeli planes were on the way to retaliate when President Trump demanded that they turn around.

“[Iran’s leaders] know if the war ends with Iran in a position of weakness, then they’re going to be bullied at the negotiating table,” said Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group. “This is one key factor in their calculations, informed by their experience in the Iran-Iraq war.”

The Iran-Iraq war began a year after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when Saddam sent his troops into Iran seeking to exploit its political disorder and seize territory, including oil-rich areas. Over the ensuing nearly eight-year conflict, Iranians and Iraqis fought one of the deadliest global conflicts of the 20th century, with hundreds of thousands killed on both sides. Saddam used chemical weapons against Iran, and his troops targeted Iran’s oil infrastructure but never seized any major oil fields.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was the country’s president for the duration of the war. In 1982, Iran’s darkest moment came after it launched a failed operation to seize the southern Iraqi city of Basra. It resulted in tens of thousands of Iranian casualties and exposed the country’s military weakness. 

The war prompted Iran to reimagine its defensive strategy in ways that steered it toward a fight with Israel.

When Iraq invaded, Iran’s rulers tried to compete in the air by freeing jailed U.S.-trained fighter pilots who had fought for the ousted Shah. But they soon ran out of spare parts for their U.S.-made F-14 jet fighters. America, now their enemy, refused to resupply them, and some jets were grounded, gifting Iraq a military advantage.

After the war—which Iran claimed as a victory but ended largely inconclusively—Tehran vowed never again to rely on foreign powers to supply weapons for its defense systems. It began to build its own ballistic missiles and drones, ramped up its nuclear program and nurtured a regional network of allied militias to protect its borders and deter its enemies.

“The Islamic Revolution gave the ideology, but the national security establishment, the national security mindset, came out of the Iran-Iraq war,” Nasr, of Johns Hopkins, said.

The embrace of missiles and other asymmetric weaponry was designed to head off the sort of war of attrition Iran faced against Iraq, which quickly sapped Iran’s military resources and manpower, analysts said.

“Iran became very sensitive to losses after the Iran-Iraq war,” said Ostovar from the Naval Postgraduate School. “Politically, it was a huge deal. So they built up this deterrence matrix.”

Damage to buildings in Tehran in April 1988 and June 2025, respectively.

Greg English/AP, Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

But that strategy also brought them into conflict with Israel. Iran’s regional allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah frequently confronted Israel, and Israel viewed Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat.

Iran’s perceived triumph in holding back Iraq also made its leadership complacent, said Ali Ansari, professor of Iranian history at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

While Iran built a missile arsenal, it failed to acquire sufficient air defenses to protect its citizens. As Israeli missiles rained on Tehran, there were no air sirens to warn residents or shelters for them to seek cover in. 

“They’ve come away with an overinflated view of what the achievement in the Iran-Iraq war means for the future,” Ansari said. “They haven’t really understood what the impact of a proper air war would be.” 

Moreover, the regime’s other key vehicle of deterrence, its allied regional militias, have been degraded by Israeli attacks and remained on the sidelines, leaving it more vulnerable.

“Iran is left with no deterrence and with a military that was not designed to really fight a conventional war,” Ostovar said. “The only thing that Iran really has left to fight with is its missiles and drones.”

In 1988, after sustained chemical attacks, a renewed Iraqi offensive and the U.S. accidentally shooting down an Iranian passenger plane, killing 290 civilians, Iran signed a cease-fire agreement, forgoing war reparations or even an Iraqi admission of guilt. 

A tombstone in Tehran for a man killed during the Iran-Iraq war. Photo: Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images

A funeral in Tehran earlier this month for those killed by Israeli strikes. Photo: Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

Iran, despite its global isolation during the war, ended the conflict with Iraq without ceding any territory. Iran’s leaders declared their successful resistance a victory. 

They have done the same today, declaring victory over Israel and the U.S. and vowing to continue enriching uranium and rebuild their nuclear program.

“This strategic loneliness of Iran affects them today,” said Arash Azizi, an Iranian historian and author. “It’s not a far cry to see why some people would advocate for nuclear weapons and why Iran would need to have its own defense industry.”

Write to Sudarsan Raghavan at sudarsan.raghavan@wsj.com and Sune Engel Rasmussen at sune.rasmussen@wsj.com

12. American bombs in Iran also reverberate in China and North Korea

But do they really?

We demonstrated capability and will, two key components of deterrence. But pundits undermine it when they say north Korea and China are different cases.

American bombs in Iran also reverberate in China and North Korea

By  DAVID RISING

Updated 6:47 AM EDT, July 4, 2025

AP · July 4, 2025

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — President Donald Trump campaigned on keeping the United States out of foreign wars, but it didn’t take long to convince him to come to the direct aid of Israel, hitting Iranian nuclear targets with bunker-buster bombs dropped by B-2 stealth bombers and Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a submarine.

Beyond the attack’s immediate impact on helping bring the 12-day war to a close, experts say Trump’s decision to use force against another country also will certainly be reverberating in the Asia-Pacific, Washington’s priority theater.

“Trump’s strikes on Iran show that he’s not afraid to use military force — this would send a clear message to North Korea, and even to China and Russia, about Trump’s style,” said Duyeon Kim, a senior analyst at the Center for a New American Security based in Seoul, South Korea.

“Before the strikes, Pyongyang and Beijing might have assumed that Trump is risk averse, particularly based on his behavior his first presidency despite some tough talk,” Kim said.

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China, North Korea and Russia all condemn US strike

Ten days into the war between Israel and Iran, Trump made the risky decision to step in, hitting three nuclear sites with American firepower on June 22 in a bid to destroy the country’s nuclear program at a time while negotiations between Washington and Tehran were still ongoing.

The attacks prompted a pro forma Iranian retaliatory strike the following day on a U.S. base in nearby Qatar, which caused no casualties, and both Iran and Israel then agreed to a ceasefire on June 24.

North Korea, China and Russia all were quick to condemn the American attack, with Russian President Vladimir Putin calling it “unprovoked aggression,” China’s Foreign Ministry saying it violated international law and “exacerbated tensions in the Middle East,” and North Korea’s Foreign Ministry maintaining it “trampled down the territorial integrity and security interests of a sovereign state.”

While the strikes were a clear tactical success, the jury is still out on whether they will have a more broad strategic benefit to Washington’s goals in the Middle East or convince Iran it needs to work harder than ever to develop a nuclear deterrent, possibly pulling the U.S. back into a longer-term conflict.

US allies could see attack as positive sign for deterrence

If the attack remains a one-off strike, U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region likely will see the decision to become involved as a positive sign from Trump’s administration, said Euan Graham, a senior defense analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

“The U.S. strike on Iran will be regarded as net plus by Pacific allies if it is seen to reinforce red lines, restore deterrence and is of limited duration, so as not to pull the administration off-course from its stated priorities in the Indo-Pacific,” he said. “China will take note that Trump is prepared to use force, at least opportunistically.”

In China, many who have seen Trump as having a “no-war mentality” will reassess that in the wake of the attacks, which were partially aimed at forcing Iran’s hand in nuclear program negotiations, said Zhao Minghao, an international relations professor at China’s Fudan University in Shanghai.

“The way the U.S. used power with its air attacks against Iran is something China needs to pay attention to,” he said. “How Trump used power to force negotiations has a significance for how China and the U.S. will interact in the future.”

But, he said, Washington should not think it can employ the same strategy with Beijing.

“If a conflict breaks out between China and the U.S., it may be difficult for the U.S. to withdraw as soon as possible, let alone withdraw unscathed,” he said.

China and North Korea present different challenges

Indeed, China and North Korea present very different challenges than Iran.

First and foremost, both already have nuclear weapons, raising the stakes of possible retaliation considerably in the event of any attack.

There also is no Asian equivalent of Israel, whose relentless attacks on Iranian missile defenses in the opening days of the war paved the way for the B-2 bombers to fly in and out without a shot being fired at them.

Still, the possibility of the U.S. becoming involved in a conflict involving either China or North Korea is a very real one, and Beijing and Pyongyang will almost certainly try to assess what the notoriously unpredictable Trump would do.

North Korea will likely be “quite alarmed” at what Israel, with a relatively small but high-quality force, has been able to achieve over Iran, said Joseph Dempsey, a defense expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

At the same time, it likely will be seen internally as justification for its own nuclear weapons program,

“If Iran did have deployable nuclear weapons would this have occurred?” Dempsey said. “Probably not.”

The U.S. decision to attack while still in talks with Iran will also not go unnoticed, said Hong Min, a senior analyst at South Korea’s Institute for National Unification.

“North Korea may conclude that dialogue, if done carelessly, could backfire by giving the United States a pretext for possible aggression,” he said.

“Instead of provoking the Trump administration, North Korea is more likely to take an even more passive stance toward negotiations with Washington, instead focusing on strengthening its internal military buildup and pursuing closer ties with Russia, narrowing the prospects for future talks,” he said.

China and Taiwan will draw lessons

China will look at the attacks through the visor of Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island off its coast that China claims as its own territory and President Xi Jinping has not ruled out taking by force.

The U.S. supplies Taiwan with weapons and is one of its most important allies, though Washington’s official policy on whether it would come to Taiwan’s aid in the case of a conflict with China is known as “strategic ambiguity,” meaning not committing to how it would respond.

Militarily, the strike on Iran raises the question of whether the U.S. might show less restraint than has been expected by China in its response and hit targets on the Chinese mainland in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, said Drew Thompson, senior fellow with the Singapore-based think tank RSIS Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

It will also certainly underscore for Beijing the “difficulty of predicting Trump’s actions,” he said.

“The U.S. airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities caught many by surprise,” Thompson said. “I think it demonstrated a tolerance and acceptance of risk in the Trump administration that is perhaps surprising.”

It also gives rise to a concern that Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, who in recent speeches has increased warnings about the threat from China, may be further emboldened in his rhetoric, said Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia Program at the Washington-based foreign policy think tank Defense Priorities.

Already, Lai’s words have prompted China to accuse him of pursuing Taiwanese independence, which is a red line for Beijing. Goldstein said he worried Taiwan may try to take advantage of the American “use of force against Iran to increase its deterrent situation versus the mainland.”

“President Lai’s series of recent speeches appear almost designed to set up a new cross-strait crisis, perhaps in the hopes of building more support in Washington and elsewhere around the Pacific,” said Goldstein, who also is director of the China Initiative at Brown University’s Watson Institute.

“I think that is an exceedingly risky gambit, to put it mildly,” he said.

___

Tong-hyung Kim in Seoul, South Korea, and Didi Tang and Albee Zhang in Washington contributed to this report.

AP · July 4, 2025

13. China may ask Russia to attack NATO if Taiwan is invaded, Rutte says

​CRInK collusion?

China may ask Russia to attack NATO if Taiwan is invaded, Rutte says

https://kyivindependent.com/china-may-enlist-russia-against-nato-if-taiwan-conflict-erupts-rutte-says-06-2025/

July 6, 2025 2:25 pm

• 2 min read

by Kateryna Hodunova

Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) interact during a welcoming ceremony at the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, China, on Oct. 17, 2023. (Sergei Savostyanov/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

Listen to this article2 min

This audio is created with AI assistance

If China attacks Taiwan, Beijing may ask Moscow to open a second front against NATO states, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said in an interview with The New York Times (NYT) published on July 5.

Fears of escalating Chinese military intervention in Taiwan have risen sharply since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The war has served as a possible model of how both Taipei and the international community might respond if Beijing decides to invade.

"There's an increasing realization, and let's not be naive about this: If Xi Jinping would attack Taiwan, he would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, residing in Moscow, and telling him, 'Hey, I'm going to do this, and I need you to keep them busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory,'" Rutte said.

"That is most likely the way this will progress. And to deter them, we need to do two things. One is that NATO, collectively, being so strong that the Russians will never do this. And second, working together with the Indo-Pacific — something President (Donald) Trump is very much promoting," Rutte added.

Western officials and analysts point to Russia's surging military expenditures amid its ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In 2024, Russia's defense budget reportedly rose 42% in real terms, reaching $462 billion, surpassing the combined spending of all European nations, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

NATO allies have cited Russia's military buildup, sabotage campaigns, and continued aggression against Ukraine as reasons to accelerate defense investments.

Rutte previously warned that Russia could rebuild its military capacity to threaten NATO territory within five years, urging members to act with urgency.

Taiwan’s FM: ‘If Russia can do that to Ukraine, China might do the same to Taiwan’

Kateryna Hodunova

News Editor

Kateryna Hodunova is a News Editor at the Kyiv Independent. She previously worked as a sports journalist in several Ukrainian outlets and was the deputy chief editor at Suspilne Sport. Kateryna covered the 2022 Olympics in Beijing and was included in the Special Mentions list at the AIPS Sport Media Awards. She holds a bachelor's degree in political journalism from Taras Shevchenko University and a master's degree in political science from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.Read more

​14. The US Army's done with Humvees and the Robotic Combat Vehicles. Here's what leaders want instead.

​In Korea in 1986 I remember the pain of turning in 121 old M151 Jeeps to receive 82 new HMMWVs in 1-9 Infantry at Camp Greaves (which followed my experience in 1984 of turning in 13 old M113s for 13 new M2 Bradleys in D/1-30 Infantry in Schweinfurt, Germany).

The US Army's done with Humvees and the Robotic Combat Vehicles. Here's what leaders want instead.

Business Insider · by Chris Panella

US Army leaders say Humvees and Robotic Combat Vehicles aren't useful for future fights, but the Infantry Squad Vehicle is.

Ongoing decisions about what stays and what goes are part of a larger transformation initiative that has the Army reviewing its force structure and cutting certain programs it deems no longer necessary for the kinds of wars the US military wants to be ready to fight should worse come to worst.

Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll and Gen. James Rainey, the commanding general overseeing Army Futures Command, talked to Business Insider about some of what is getting axed and why.

Driscoll pointed to the Robotic Combat Vehicle, or RCV, program, which launched in 2019 with the goal of integrating autonomous and remotely operated capabilities into the Army's ground systems. Three versions were initially planned — an expendable light variant, a durable medium variant, and a lethal heavy variant designed for combat against an enemy armored vehicle.

But the development of the RCV hit snags. "We know we need autonomy, we know that we need the ability to move things in a way that is not controlled by human beings," Driscoll said.

But the requirements the Army put together for it ended up making it just this "incredibly large, incredibly heavy, incredibly expensive, relatively exquisite tool," he said. By the time the Army went to purchase them, the threats to the RCV, like small, hostile drones, had grown substantially. In Ukraine, slow, heavy, expensive vehicles have been prime targets for cheap exploding drones.

Savannah Baldwin/PEO Ground Combat Systems

"It might have been there in the beginning and we got it wrong from the very beginning," he said, "but at a minimum, by the time it came due for us actually purchase a lot of these and get them into formations, it just no longer made sense anymore."

Related stories

He called the move to end the program "a hard decision."

The Humvee, or High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, is also being phased out. "It's 40 years old. It was useful in its time," Rainey said. "If you look at the ubiquitous sensing drones just in Ukraine and Russia, the survivability of a wheeled vehicle is very low."

The Army also recently ended the M10 Booker Mobile Protected Firepower program just before it was set to go into full-rate production and after spending well over a billion dollars on the project. The decision was made in response to ongoing global conflicts "and in support of the strategic objectives outlined in the Army Transformation Initiative," according to a memo issued by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth earlier this year.

The memo outlined the focal points, timelines, and priorities of the Army going forward, including reducing and restructuring attack helicopter formations and augmenting them with unmanned aircraft, putting thousands of drones into the hands of soldiers, and focusing on the Indo-Pacific theater and China.

The efforts in the directive are estimated to cost around $36 billion over the next five years and represent one of the largest Army overhauls since the end of the Cold War. Army officials have said it's designed to increase lethality and readiness in the service and is focused on the needs of individual warfighters.

In the interview with BI, Driscoll and Rainey identified one platform that represents what it wants more of. "We have a requirements and acquisitions success story with the Infantry Squad Vehicles," Rainey said.

Cheryl Ravelo / Reuters

The relatively new M1301 Infantry Squad Vehicle entered service in 2020. Rainey said that the platform was designed well and requirements were useful and thoughtful. "We went fast, but we iterated with soldiers continually through the process. We ended up with a very useful vehicle," he said.

Driscoll said that in conversations with soldiers, the Army learned that they wanted a vehicle to prioritize speed and all-terrain driving over protection.

It speaks to, the service secretary said, the Army "trying to build a menu of offensive and defensive solutions." For some missions, something like the Infantry Squad Vehicle will be more effective. And for others, a heavier, more armored platform could still be valuable and available.

Much of what Driscoll and others say they're focused on comes out of efforts to be smarter and more cost-effective in Army purchases.

"We feel a large enough existential threat, and it is important enough that we can no longer make decisions simply based off where jobs might exist or what private companies may benefit from our decisions," he said. "Instead, we have to optimize for soldier lethality in the fight ahead."

Lethality is a guiding principle for the US Department of Defense under Hegseth and the Trump administration. It was a core objective for the Biden administration and first Trump one, as well as past administrations, though the interpretations were different. Generally, it serves as a subjective measuring stick for DoD programs and projects, the aim being to be able to effectively defeat an enemy.

Right now, that long-standing Pentagon buzzword is the deciding factor for what the Army and other services prioritize.

Business Insider · by Chris Panella

​15. Hegseth halted weapons for Ukraine despite military analysis that the aid wouldn’t jeopardize U.S. readiness

​What are the facts?

Hegseth halted weapons for Ukraine despite military analysis that the aid wouldn’t jeopardize U.S. readiness

The move blindsided the State Department, Ukraine, European allies and members of Congress, who demanded an explanation from the Pentagon.

NBC News · by Gordon Lubold, Dan De Luce, Courtney Kube and Katherine Doyle · July 4, 2025

The Defense Department held up a shipment of U.S. weapons for Ukraine this week over what officials said were concerns about its low stockpiles. But an analysis by senior military officers found that the aid package would not jeopardize the American military’s own ammunition supplies, according to three U.S. officials.

The move to halt the weapons shipment blindsided the State Department, members of Congress, officials in Kyiv and European allies, according to multiple sources with knowledge of the matter.

Critics of the decision included Republicans and Democrats who support aiding Ukraine’s fight against Russia. A leading House Democrat, Adam Smith of Washington, said it was disingenuous of the Pentagon to use military readiness to justify halting aid when the real reason appears to be simply to pursue an agenda of cutting off American aid to Ukraine.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth following a bilateral meeting with Netherlands' prime minister on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague on June 25, 2025. Brendan Smialowski / AFP - Getty Images

“We are not at any lower point, stockpile-wise, than we’ve been in the 3½ years of the Ukraine conflict,” Smith, the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, told NBC News.

Smith said that his staff has “seen the numbers” and, without going into detail, that there was no indication of a shortage that would justify suspending aid to Ukraine.

Suspending the shipment of military aid to Ukraine was a unilateral step by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, according to three congressional aides and a former U.S. official familiar with the matter. It was the third time Hegseth on his own has stopped shipments of aid to Ukraine, the sources said. In the two previous cases, in February and in May, his actions were reversed days later.

A senior Pentagon official, Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy, has backed the moves, the sources said. Colby has long advocated scaling back the U.S. commitment in Ukraine and shifting weapons and resources to the Pacific region to counter China.

Lawmakers from both parties were frustrated that they were not notified in advance and were examining whether the delayed shipment violated legislation mandating security assistance for Ukraine, according to congressional aides. Those lawmakers and some European allies were trying to determine just why the Pentagon ordered the suspension and were scrambling to get it reversed.

The White House has defended the decision, saying it followed an ongoing review by the Defense Department of U.S. assistance to allies and partners abroad that began last month.

The review began after Hegseth issued a memo ordering the Pentagon’s Joint Staff to review stockpiles of all munitions. According to three officials familiar with the matter, the assessment found that some stockpiles of high-precision munitions were at lower levels but not yet beyond critical minimums.

The Joint Staff concluded that providing continued assistance to Ukraine would not drain U.S. supplies below a required threshold needed to ensure military readiness, the officials said.

The Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment Thursday.

Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell called the assessment a “capability review" at a briefing Wednesday.

“We can’t give weapons to everybody all around the world,” Parnell said. “Part of our job is to give the president a framework that he can use to evaluate how many munitions we have where we’re sending them. And that review process is happening right now and is ongoing.”

Ukraine has issued urgent appeals to Washington for more air defense systems as Russia has stepped up its bombardment of Ukrainian cities. Over the weekend, Russia launched its biggest aerial attack of the three-year-old conflict, firing 60 missiles and 477 drones across the country.

The delayed shipment included dozens of Patriot interceptors, coveted weapons for Ukraine to knock out incoming missiles, as well as 155 mm artillery rounds, Hellfire missiles, precision-guided missile systems known as GMLRS, grenade launchers, Stinger surface-to-air missiles and AIM air-to-air missiles for Ukraine’s small fleet of F-16 fighter jets.

In Poland and other European countries, some of the U.S. weapons had already been loaded onto trucks, ready to be delivered to Kyiv to help its government fend off Russian missile attacks and hold the line against ground forces in the country’s east. Then, military officers and officials handling the shipment got word that the delivery had been called off, said two sources with knowledge of the matter.

The weapons shipment was approved during the Biden administration, three U.S. officials said. Some of the weapons were pulled from U.S. stockpiles, with the Pentagon receiving funds to replenish them. Other munitions fall under a program that provides money to buy new weapons for Ukraine from American defense companies, the officials said. Those weapons are not drawn from U.S. supplies.

‘Rookie mistake’

Since the United States began sending large shipments of weapons to Kyiv after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, U.S. officials and commanders have grown concerned about the state of American stockpiles of munitions and other equipment.

The aid effort has laid bare the inadequacy of the defense industrial base to replenish those weapons stocks. That has, in some cases, put the Pentagon at dangerously low levels of some munitions, including 155 mm artillery rounds, according to multiple U.S. officials and former military officers.

In a letter to President Donald Trump, Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, R-Pa., requested an emergency briefing from the White House and the Defense Department to review the decision “to withhold urgent, lifesaving military assistance to Ukraine.”

He argued that it was possible to both maintain adequate weapons supplies for the U.S. military and send arms badly needed by Kyiv.

Dan Caldwell, a former senior Pentagon official, defended the pause by Hegseth and Colby.

"They are prioritizing the safety and readiness of our own military over pleasing the foreign policy establishment, who often seem in denial about the real constraints the United States military is facing," Caldwell said.

Hegseth has twice before suspended aid to Ukraine without apparent coordination with lawmakers on Capitol Hill or even within the administration. The first time, in February, drew a prickly response from the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker, R-Miss., who called the move “a rookie mistake.”

The next time was in early May, according to a Senate aide. In both cases, the suspensions of aid were reversed within days.

Rep. Michael McCaul, R- Texas, a staunch supporter of military aid to Ukraine, said it was crucial to show Russia that the United States would stand behind Ukraine.

“We can’t let Putin prevail now. President Trump knows that too and it’s why he’s been advocating for peace,” McCaul wrote on social media. “Now is the time to show Putin we mean business. And that starts with ensuring Ukraine has the weapons Congress authorized to pressure Putin to the negotiating table.”

NBC News · by Gordon Lubold, Dan De Luce, Courtney Kube and Katherine Doyle · July 4, 2025

1​6. Just the Facts, Mr. President: Why Exaggeration Undermines Credibility—Even When You’re Right

​Some may not like the critique but there are some important points.

Excerpts:

First the author's ending counterpoint to the critics:

Yes, I fully expect to hear the familiar refrain: “It’s Trump Derangement Syndrome!”

But I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again—there are many things the Trump administration identifies as priorities that I genuinely agree with. Strategic competition with China. Border enforcement. Rebuilding defense capabilities. Even rethinking our economic dependence on adversaries. These are serious issues, and they deserve serious solutions.

The problem is, unless you’re blind to the puffery, you’re left wondering if he’s actually doing them—or just talking about them.

So if you’re diagnosing “TDS,” maybe pause for a moment and ask: Is the critique unfounded? Or are you just unwilling to hold your guy to the standard you’d demand of anyone else in that seat?

Now the key points:

1. 

Years ago, as a young anti-armor platoon leader in 2/19 Infantry, I served under COL Robert “Bobby” Brashears, commander of 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division. He had a habit of listening directly to patrol reports from junior leaders like me. It didn’t matter how green you were—if you were out on the line, he expected you to report. But there was one hard rule: no embellishment. If you started to inflate your story or pad the details, he’d cut you off immediately. His message was always the same: “You are my eyes and ears. The first time I can’t trust EVERY word out of your mouth, I won’t trust ANY word out of your mouth.”

Later in my career, I heard General James Mattis say it even more bluntly: “If you lie in a combat report, you’re going to get people killed.”

In war, truth isn’t optional. It’s not a matter of style or politics. It’s a prerequisite for survival.

2. 

The administration’s use of inflated language actively distorted public understanding. And as the truth surfaces the strategic credibility of the mission becomes collateral damage. As anyone in uniform knows, exaggerate once, and your enemy doubts your next threat. Lie twice, and your allies do too.

3. 

Credibility isn’t just a soft power virtue. It’s a hard power asset. It deters enemies. It reassures allies. It holds coalitions together. And once it’s gone, no amount of aircraft carriers or soundbites can get it back.

​4.

I don’t care whether you like Donald Trump or despise him. That’s not the point. The point is that the presidency is not a place for fiction. Whether you’re announcing a military operation or installing a flagpole, your words carry weight. In international affairs, words can provoke wars, shift markets, and upend alliances. At home, they shape public perception, drive policy decisions, and determine whether Americans trust their government.

Just the Facts, Mr. President

Why Exaggeration Undermines Credibility—Even When You’re Right

https://vaberet.substack.com/p/just-the-facts-mr-president?r=7i07&triedRedirect=true

The Old and Bold

Jul 04, 2025

Operation Midnight Hammer was a strategic success. Full stop. But when the Commander-in-Chief wraps a legitimate military victory in a fog of hyperbole—and when the Secretary of Defense attacks the press for reporting the truth—credibility takes the hit. What happens when we need to launch Midnight Hammer II, and no one believes the warning? In national security, truth isn’t a virtue—it’s a weapon. And right now, we’re disarming ourselves.

In the world I came from—combat arms, asymmetric warfare, and national-level strategy—there’s no room for puffery. Facts aren't just useful; they’re essential. They guide decisions, protect people, and underpin trust between leaders and those they lead. Which is why, when the President of the United States starts operating like a carnival barker rather than a commander-in-chief, I start paying very close attention.

So let’s start small—with a flagpole.

Recently, the current administration unveiled two new flagpoles on the White House grounds. Perfectly ordinary acts of ceremonial patriotism, except the President couldn't resist describing them as “the tallest, most beautiful, most unique poles in the country—no, the world.” They were said to be “tall, tapered, rust-proof, rope inside the pole, and of the highest quality…the best poles anywhere in the country—in the world actually…about the largest you’ll ever see.” The problem? Not a single word of that was true.

The manufacturer, U.S. Flag & Flagpole Supply out of Plano, Texas, is the leading producer of Monster Flagpoles™, with models reaching over 400 feet tall—including a 430-foot pole in Jordan and a 400-footer in Sheboygan, Wisconsin. The White House poles don’t even crack the top 50. Which makes the President’s embellishment not just unnecessary, but bizarre.

You might ask: Who cares? It’s just a flagpole. But that’s precisely the point.

Why the Lie Matters

This isn’t about flagpoles. It’s about a deeper pattern of exaggeration, theatricality, and fantasy that’s infected the most consequential office in the world. Donald Trump has long exhibited a tendency toward braggadocio—some would call it puffery—that plays well in campaign rallies and Reality TV. But in the Situation Room, in a classified briefing, or standing at the podium in front of the American people, that same habit becomes dangerous.

We’ve seen this before. The “largest inauguration crowd in history.” The “perfect” phone call that triggered an impeachment. The “fully built border wall” paid for by Mexico. The “best COVID response in the world.” Again and again, the pattern is clear: assert, exaggerate, deny, distract.

But in this new term—Trump’s second—those habits haven’t just returned. They’ve hardened.

He now claims we’re in the midst of “the greatest economic boom in U.S. history,” while inflation remains volatile. He lauds supposed “foreign policy masterstrokes” with no accompanying strategy or verifiable gains. He talks about mass deportation raids and “historic” NATO breakthroughs while offering little more than slogans and vague promises. All style. No substance.

Operation Midnight Hammer: A Case Study in Credibility Erosion

Let’s take a recent example with real-world stakes: Operation Midnight Hammer—a major U.S. military strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

President Trump touted it as a defining moment in global deterrence. According to him, it “neutralized threats the public will never know existed” and “redefined global deterrence overnight.” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth doubled down, claiming the media underreported the operation's overwhelming success. And yet Sean Parnell’s assessment at a press conference on 2 July tells a different story, and it comes at a moment of confusion about the effect America’s massive airstrikes had on Iran’s nuclear program. Parnell stated that U.S. military strikes on Iran’s three main nuclear facilities in June likely set that program back by 1-2 years. Yes, the mission was tactically impressive and dealt a blow to Iran’s nuclear ambitions—but they weren’t “obliterated.” They weren’t “wiped off the map.” They were damaged—and now we wait and wonder if they are being rebuilt.

The administration’s use of inflated language actively distorted public understanding. And as the truth surfaces the strategic credibility of the mission becomes collateral damage. As anyone in uniform knows, exaggerate once, and your enemy doubts your next threat. Lie twice, and your allies do too.

The Russia-Ukraine Problem: Distortion Meets Strategic Abandonment

This isn’t limited to the Middle East. The same pattern is now playing out—arguably with even graver consequences—in Europe.

Over the years, Trump has repeatedly dismissed Ukraine’s existential fight against Russian aggression. He’s openly praised Vladimir Putin as a “strong leader,” mocked NATO allies, and described Ukraine as “not our problem” despite bipartisan consensus that stopping Putin in Eastern Europe is a core national security interest. During his campaign, he claimed that if re-elected he would “end the war in 24 hours”—but never explained how, except to suggest that Ukraine might need to surrender territory.

That rhetoric has now turned into action.

Just this past week, the Trump administration suspended some U.S. military aid to Ukraine, citing “strategic recalibration” and “lack of progress.” [Note: As mentioned by a reader, it is not ALL aid. I’ve edited this to reflect that reality.] What it really signals is abandonment. And the world knows it. Our European allies are scrambling to fill the gap. Ukraine is being told to fight a 21st-century war without 21st-century tools. And Russia? They’re watching. They know the bluster is empty.

By consistently minimizing the stakes, exaggerating his influence, and refusing to engage honestly with the threat posed by Russia, Trump has once again eroded the U.S. deterrent—not through weakness, but through fantasy. The Ukrainians now fight not just for their sovereignty, but in the shadow of America’s fading credibility.

Bravado vs. Battlefield Discipline

Years ago, as a young anti-armor platoon leader in 2/19 Infantry, I served under COL Robert “Bobby” Brashears, commander of 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division. He had a habit of listening directly to patrol reports from junior leaders like me. It didn’t matter how green you were—if you were out on the line, he expected you to report. But there was one hard rule: no embellishment. If you started to inflate your story or pad the details, he’d cut you off immediately. His message was always the same: “You are my eyes and ears. The first time I can’t trust EVERY word out of your mouth, I won’t trust ANY word out of your mouth.”

Later in my career, I heard General James Mattis say it even more bluntly: “If you lie in a combat report, you’re going to get people killed.”

In war, truth isn’t optional. It’s not a matter of style or politics. It’s a prerequisite for survival.

The Strategic Cost of Untruth

So why do I care if the President is a braggart? Because in the world of high-stakes governance, misstatements aren’t harmless—they’re strategic liabilities. Here are five key areas where that liability could cost us dearly:

1. Operation Midnight Hammer & U.S. Strategy Toward Iran

Overselling success creates the illusion that the threat has been eliminated, not merely delayed. That can lull policymakers into complacency, mislead allies, and embolden adversaries like Tehran to escalate.

2. China Policy & Economic Decoupling

Trump's hardline stance on China includes decoupling supply chains and banning tech transfers. But if he minimizes the economic disruption or overstates U.S. leverage, he risks triggering instability—both domestically and across global markets.

3. Mass Deportation & Immigration Raids

Trump promises the largest deportation operation in U.S. history. But if the scope is exaggerated or feasibility downplayed, the result could be chaos: legal challenges, humanitarian crises, and fractured relations between immigrant communities and law enforcement.

4. NATO Commitments & U.S. Alliance Posture

Undermining NATO by threatening to “pull out” unless allies “pay up” sends mixed signals. If Trump isn’t honest about our obligations—or worse, gives private reassurances to adversaries—he risks destabilizing Europe and inviting Russian aggression.

5. Federal Budget, National Debt & Tariff Revenues

Trump often claims tariffs are “paid by China” and are reducing our deficit. In reality, tariffs are paid by U.S. importers—and the national debt exploded with the passing of his “big, beautiful bill”. Misrepresenting these facts hides fiscal risks that will haunt future generations.

The Bottom Line

I don’t care whether you like Donald Trump or despise him. That’s not the point. The point is that the presidency is not a place for fiction. Whether you’re announcing a military operation or installing a flagpole, your words carry weight. In international affairs, words can provoke wars, shift markets, and upend alliances. At home, they shape public perception, drive policy decisions, and determine whether Americans trust their government.

And here’s the thing: if the President lies about the small stuff, why should we believe him on the big stuff?

As the old saying goes, “Just the facts, ma’am.” Maybe it’s time the White House brought Sergeant Joe Friday into the West Wing.

So let’s circle back—to Operation Midnight Hammer.

An operation I personally applaud. It was warranted, long overdue, and tactically brilliant. It sent an unmistakable message to Tehran that the U.S. retains both the will and the capability to reach deep into the heart of a hardened nuclear infrastructure and knock it offline. The strike set Iran’s program back by one to two years, bought us precious time, and demonstrated American resolve in a region where resolve is often the only real currency. Midnight Hammer was a success. Period.

But because of the President’s reckless exaggerations—claiming total annihilation instead of acknowledging a measured, smartly executed disruption—and because the Secretary of Defense chose to publicly accuse the press of lying when, in fact, the press reported the operation exactly as the facts became available… we now face a credibility gap.

So what happens when we need to execute Midnight Hammer II?

What happens when the intelligence again points to imminent breakout? When diplomatic channels are exhausted, and kinetic action is back on the table? Will our allies believe us when we brief them? Will Congress trust the intelligence behind the decision? Will the American people? More critically: will Iran take the threat seriously—or assume it’s another exaggeration, another bluff, another campaign slogan wrapped in military jargon?

When the President overhypes real success, he diminishes its deterrent effect. When the Secretary of Defense politicizes a precision strike, he undermines future operational credibility. And when the American people are misled—even with good news—they become numb to truth and cynical about leadership.

Credibility isn’t just a soft power virtue. It’s a hard power asset. It deters enemies. It reassures allies. It holds coalitions together. And once it’s gone, no amount of aircraft carriers or soundbites can get it back.

So yes—Midnight Hammer was a success. But if the administration can’t discipline its message, the next Midnight Hammer might be strategically necessary… and strategically useless.

And that’s the danger.

Postscript: Cue the Chorus

Yes, I fully expect to hear the familiar refrain: “It’s Trump Derangement Syndrome!”

But I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again—there are many things the Trump administration identifies as priorities that I genuinely agree with. Strategic competition with China. Border enforcement. Rebuilding defense capabilities. Even rethinking our economic dependence on adversaries. These are serious issues, and they deserve serious solutions.

The problem is, unless you’re blind to the puffery, you’re left wondering if he’s actually doing them—or just talking about them.

So if you’re diagnosing “TDS,” maybe pause for a moment and ask: Is the critique unfounded? Or are you just unwilling to hold your guy to the standard you’d demand of anyone else in that seat?

As the old saying goes: Physician, heal thyself.

17. Things Worth Remembering: Lady Liberty’s Open Arms

​Reflect on this excerpt:

To me, the anti-immigrant fervor seems like a mirror image of a century ago: We are demonizing “the other.”

Things Worth Remembering: Lady Liberty’s Open Arms

It was a poet who transformed America’s favorite statue from a celebration of independence to a symbol of welcome.

By Joe Nocera

07.06.25 — Things Worth Remembering

https://www.thefp.com/p/things-worth-remembering-lady-liberty-immigration

Immigrants to the U.S. landing at Ellis Island, New York, circa 1900. (Universal History Archive via Getty Images)

0:00

Welcome to Things Worth Remembering, in which writers share a poem or a paragraph that all of us should commit to heart. This week, Joe Nocera reflects on his Italian ancestors and the poem that lies on the pedestal of our Statue of Liberty.

My grandfather, Lorenzo Nocera, immigrated to America in 1904 from a small town south of Naples, Italy. Like most European immigrants in the early part of the last century, he came through Ellis Island. He was 16 years old. Three years later, Carmela Tartaglia also arrived on a ship that docked at Ellis Island. Another 45 years later, she became my grandmother.

What was Ellis Island like when my grandparents were herded through it? It consisted, writes Daniel Okrent in The Guarded Gate, his great book about immigration in the early twentieth century, of “27 acres of inspection centers, detention areas, and hospitals. Built to process 5,000 people a day, at times it had to handle twice that number. Many of them were exhausted and frightened, most of them impoverished.”

Ellis Island was a harsh entry to the U.S. But it’s also where the Statue of Liberty stood, which even then told these weary immigrants, with no idea what the future held, that America was a country that welcomed them with open arms.

In 1903, the year before Lorenzo arrived, a plaque was attached to the statue’s pedestal on which a short, 14-line sonnet was inscribed. Its title is “The New Colossus,” and it imagines that the Statue of Liberty—“a mighty woman with a torch”—is speaking directly to the immigrants as they are processed at Ellis Island, all of them desperately praying for a better life than the one they had in the Old World. Listen to how it closes:

“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she

With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,

Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,

The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.

Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,

I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”

As the grandchild of Lorenzo and Carmela, I’ve thought about those lines often during the course of my life.

The sonnet was written in 1883. Its author was a 34-year-old poet named Emma Lazarus, a quiet, introverted woman who grew up in relative luxury. “Her winters were passed in New York, and her summers by the sea,” explains an anonymous biographer, writing in The Century Magazine shortly after Lazarus’s premature death in 1887.

Immigrants may come to this country with nothing, but they come because they want to make something of themselves—and create a better life for their children and grandchildren.

Lazarus was descended from Sephardic Jews who had come from Portugal to escape the Inquisition, but for most of her life she was indifferent to her Jewish roots. That changed in the early 1880s, when the pogroms in Russia and elsewhere left tens of thousands of Jews homeless and destitute. The antisemitic violence moved her to become, in the words of that same anonymous biographer, a Jewish crusader, whose poetry “rang out as it had never rung before—a clarion note calling a people to heroic action and unity.” Her poems had titles like “The Banner of the Jew,” “The New Ezekiel,” and “In Exile.”

Lazarus also became an activist, working to help Eastern European Jews settle in the U.S. and, for instance, helping to found a technical institute in New York where recent Jewish immigrants could learn a trade and make a living.

Her experience with those “huddled masses yearning to breathe free” is obviously what gave rise to the poem, which was commissioned while Lady Liberty was still languishing in France because America had nowhere to put her. The hope was that Lazarus’s poem could be auctioned off to help raise money for a pedestal for the statue—which had been a gift from the French people on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of America’s independence.

Lazarus was given no instructions about what sentiment her poem should convey. Thus it’s fair to say that it was Lazarus’s words that were responsible for turning the Statue of Liberty from a gift in celebration of America into a symbol of the country’s willingness to embrace immigrants, even when those immigrants were “the wretched refuse” of other countries.

And yet, Emma Lazarus notwithstanding, can we really say that America willingly embraced immigrants? We cannot. As millions of Eastern European migrants poured into America, not only Jews but Italians, Poles, Greeks, and many others from non-Nordic nations, they were, in fact, reviled. Jews were kikes. Italians were wops or dagos. Poles were Polacks. The Irish were micks. They were viewed by the Anglo-Saxon majority as a lower species of human who would bring about “white race suicide” by overwhelming the majority white society with their sheer numbers, especially once they started “multiplying,” as the critics often put it.

Read

Things Worth Remembering: How Warriors Prepare

According to Okrent, it was my people, the Italians—two million of whom had come to America between 1900 and 1910—who were most despised. Elihu Root, who was Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of state from 1905 to 1909, once compared Italian immigrants to “a barbarian invasion.” One anti-immigrant leader said that “there is not one in a thousand from Naples or Sicily that is not a burden on America.” A Washington Post editorial writer said that 90 percent of the Italians coming to the U.S. were “the degenerate spawn of the Asiatic hordes” who were coming to America “to cut throats, throw dynamite, and conduct labor riots and assassination.”

The leaders of the anti-immigrant movement—most of whom were eugenicists—pushed hard to limit or stop the migrant influx. In 1924, they finally succeeded with the passage of the Immigration Act, which severely limited the number of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, and banned Asian immigration almost entirely. After it became law, Mary Harriman, a eugenics enthusiast and widow of the railroad baron E.H. Harriman, described the new legislation as a “wise, deliberate, well-informed action” that resulted in “the exclusion of citizens we cannot welcome into our country.” (Her speech was given while she was being honored by The National Institute of Social Sciences.)

Can you see now why Emma Lazarus’s poem means so much to me? As the grandson of immigrants, it’s impossible for me to reflect on that ugly history without thinking about my grandparents. Lorenzo and Carmela came to America as part of the huddled masses, found each other, and got married in Providence, Rhode Island, in the 1910s. By the early 1930s, they had opened a small grocery store. A liquor store followed once Prohibition ended in 1933. They had six children, three of them boys who fought in World War II, with one of my uncles seriously injured during the invasion of Normandy. My father, a Navy lieutenant, saw Japanese kamikaze pilots trying to destroy his aircraft carrier.

He and his siblings never completely shed their Italian heritage; they spoke Italian to my grandmother, who never learned to speak English, and like most Italian Americans of their era, they worshipped Frank Sinatra and Joe DiMaggio. We grandchildren, though, have always thought of ourselves as Americans, not Italian Americans, and the fact that someone famous has an Italian last name is damn close to meaningless. There are 14 of us, so yes, the Noceras have multiplied. And we all have good jobs, and we all pay taxes, and we all love America.

To me, the anti-immigrant fervor seems like a mirror image of a century ago: We are demonizing “the other.”

Immigrants may come to this country with nothing, but they come because they want to make something of themselves—and create a better life for their children and grandchildren. That was true in the early 1900s, and it’s true today. In recent years, I have watched as Donald Trump has vilified immigrants, characterizing them as murderers, gang members, and rapists, and preventing them, as much as possible, from becoming what my grandparents became: Americans. To me, the anti-immigrant fervor seems like a mirror image of a century ago: We are demonizing “the other.” The only difference is that 100 years ago “the other” were people like my grandparents; now the “wretched refuse” are Latin and South Americans.

During Trump’s first term, I remember being struck by the fact that one of his top immigration officials was a man with a distinctly Italian name, Ken Cuccinelli. Among his goals was to keep undocumented migrants from going to college; put an end to birthright citizenship; and force workers to speak only English in their workplace. In 2019, the progressive magazine Mother Jones did a search of Cuccinelli’s family tree and discovered that his great-grandfather Dominic had immigrated from Italy in 1896; by the time of the 1930 census, he owned a home in New Jersey and worked as a laborer. Cuccinelli’s grandfather was conceived in Italy but born in the U.S.—meaning that he was an American citizen thanks to birthright citizenship.

I wondered then—and wonder now—doesn’t that history mean anything to Cuccinelli? His great-grandfather, like my grandfather, came to America with very little, and three generations later, his descendant was in the Trump administration. How is that not the story of America? How can people like Cuccinelli turn away from their own past?

I’ll never understand it. I will forever remain with Emma Lazarus, and her soaring, inspiring, unforgettable poem. Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free. She was writing about my grandparents—and probably yours; they’re the people who have always made America great.

Two and a half centuries later, we still hold these truths to be self-evident.

Which is why this week we’re launching the America at 250 project.

Join us for a yearlong celebration of America’s 250th birthday: where we’ve come from, where we are, and where we’re going. Expect big events, small gatherings, performances, podcasts, videos, and essays from your favorite Free Press contributors.

18. Think James Bond's pure fantasy? His creator's real WW2 missions were more outrageous than you'd believe

Think James Bond's pure fantasy? His creator's real WW2 missions were more outrageous than you'd believe

From exploding tinned food to covert assaults and code-breaking schemes, Ian Fleming’s real-life wartime exploits were just as wild – and arguably even more outlandish – than anything dreamed up in his Bond novels

History Extra · by James Osborne

Speaking on the HistoryExtra podcast, author Edward Abel Smith lifts the lid on those inspirations and paints a portrait of Fleming not just as a master of fiction, but as someone whose secret wartime work helped shape the modern spy thriller.

“Ian Fleming is a real enigma of an individual,” Smith explains. “From early on, I was interested in him because he created this franchise – one of the largest in the world – yet lived his whole life feeling like he wasn’t a success.”

Fleming’s early failures

Born in 1908 into wealth and political influence (his father, Valentine Fleming, was a Conservative MP), Ian Fleming was educated at Eton and Sandhurst before drifting through careers in journalism, stockbroking and intelligence.

But despite his background, Fleming’s early adulthood was marked by frustration and a sense of failure. He never matched the expectations placed on him by his powerful family or his older brother, Peter, a successful writer and adventurer.

“By the age of 20, he had failed pretty much in everything that he had attempted,” Smith notes.

In May 1939, just months before war broke out, Fleming, then in his early thirties, finally saw a window of unconventional opportunity. Rather than fighting on the frontlines, this opportunity came in the form of a discreet but influential role in the Admiralty, where he would find himself working under one of Britain’s top intelligence officials.

James Bond author Ian Fleming, photographed in his study in April 1960. (Photo by Getty Images)

From misfit to master planner

Fleming was appointed personal assistant to Admiral John Godfrey, Director of Naval Intelligence. His title was unassuming and ambiguous, but the post offered immense flexibility and access.

“The role didn’t really have much of a remit,” Smith explains. “It was very much Fleming’s to shape.”

Godfrey, whose personality reportedly inspired the fictional ‘M’ in the Bond novels, gave Fleming remarkably free rein. The result was that Fleming flourished, using his time to devise and design devious strategies, imaginative deception plans and daring sabotage operations – often with a flair for the dramatic.

• Read more | The secrets and lies of Cold War spies

“Admiral Godfrey gave him such a long leash that he was really able to let his imagination go wild during the time of the Second World War,” Smith says. “And really, a lot of his books are based on some of those eccentric ideas that he came up with during the war.”

One of his first contributions was The Trout Memo, a 1939 brainstorming document modelled like a fishing guide, offering more than 50 tricks intended to “bamboozle” the enemy. It reads today like a script for a Bond prequel, and while under Godfrey’s name, Fleming’s fingerprints are all over it.

Among its more surreal suggestions was an idea to plant booby-trapped tinned sausages, complete with German labels, into the sea in the hope that they’d be retrieved, heated and detonated aboard U-boats.

The birth of Bond-style sabotage

The wartime operations that followed show just how far Fleming’s imagination – and nerve – stretched.

One aborted plan, Operation Ruthless, called for British agents to crash-land a captured German bomber in the English Channel, kill the rescue crew, and steal their naval codebooks, potentially unlocking the keys to enemy communication.

“The plan was met with a huge amount of optimism,” Smith recalls. “But it was scrapped at the last minute when Turing and his team intercepted a message saying the boats needed to be relocated.”

Another Fleming-supported venture, Operation Postmaster, was more successful. British agents, using disguised tugs and a clever ruse involving parties, sex workers and copious amounts of alcohol, snuck into the Spanish-controlled island of Fernando Po (off modern-day Equatorial Guinea) and stole three Axis ships from under the Nazis’ noses.

“It’s right out of a spy novel,” Smith remarks. “There was only one injury and that came from a charging pig that knocked one of the men off his feet.”

Yet another scheme, Operation Tracer, proposed bricking British agents inside a secret chamber in the Rock of Gibraltar, equipped with food, water and radio equipment, where they would remain, potentially for a year or more, to spy on German naval movements.

“They would be cemented in, and their spying would commence,” Smith says. Though never activated, the concept would echo years later in Fleming’s short story From a View to a Kill.

Ian Fleming, creator of the James Bond novels, pictured at his typewriter. A former naval intelligence officer, Fleming drew on his wartime experiences to craft the world of the iconic British spy. (Photo by Getty Images)

The real-life Bond unit

Fleming didn’t stop at ideas. He also helped create and operationalise his own intelligence-gathering unit: 30 Assault Unit (30AU), a special-operations commando force tasked with capturing enemy intelligence ahead of advancing Allied troops.

“It was very much Fleming’s creation, and off the back of the success of Operation Postmaster, he wanted to create something that was more permanent,” Smith explains.

The unit’s missions were high-risk and highly classified. Members of 30AU were embedded with combat troops during major advances, including the Normandy landings, but focused on gathering sensitive documents, technology and codebooks from German headquarters, research centres and factories.

WW2 | The Big Questions

Member exclusive | Historian and broadcaster Laurence Rees explains major moments of the global conflict in this five-part series.

Listen to all episodes now

One of their primary objectives was to gather intelligence on Germany’s V1 and V2 weapons programmes, which caused widespread devastation during the final two years of the war.

Yet the rocket technology behind these weapons – seen as the forerunners of modern ballistic missiles – would go on to serve a very different purpose.

“A lot of the V1 and V2 technology was eventually sent to the US and used in part during the Apollo space programme,” Smith notes. “It helped to put the first man on the moon.”

30AU was, in essence, a wartime MI6 field force – part spy network, part elite military unit – and a direct inspiration for Bond’s globe-trotting missions.

Was Bond Fleming’s wish fulfilment?

For all his involvement in espionage, Fleming never saw active combat himself. His lack of physical fitness, along with his intelligence value, meant he was tasked with orchestrating operations rather than executing them.

“James Bond as a character was an amalgamation of lots of people that Fleming met during the war,” Smith says. “But really, he was the person that Fleming always wanted to be. He wanted to live this lifestyle where he was smoking cigarettes, drinking martinis and spending lots of time with beautiful women.

“At the same time, he wanted to then be able to trek through the desert or be able to jump out of planes. Of course, the reality is you can’t have the two together. But in the fictional character of James Bond, he was able to do that.”

In that sense, Bond was both homage and wish fulfilment for Fleming. He combined the courage of the agents Fleming admired, the tactics he devised and the charisma he aspired to.

“But he made huge contributions to the war, and they should never be underestimated,” Smith concludes.

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Claire Bubb was speaking to Spencer Mizen on the HistoryExtra podcast. Listen to the full conversation.

History Extra · by James Osborne

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com