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Quotes of the Day:
"I am so small. I am so insignificant but the force that flows through me is so powerful that I must go forward."
– Hilma af Klint
“A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: We did it ourselves.”
– Lao Tzu
“If we want to destroy the enemy, we must have two kinds of wars: one is an open war, and the other is a covert war.”
– Mao Zedong
1. Special Operations News – Monday, July 7, 2025
2. Defense reconciliation bill begins rebuild and transformation of our military By Sen. Roger Wicker and Rep. Mike Rogers
3. What Is America’s Long-Term Ukraine Plan, Anyway?
4. Understanding Russia’s Grand Strategy in Ukraine—and Ukraine’s Plan to Survive
5. Houthis Launch First Red Sea Attack On Shipping Since December
6. Next Army: Envisioning the U.S. Army at 250 and Beyond - Projects
7. Former Mossad officer explains how Iranian spies are recruited - report
8. OPINION: Australia’s Role in Ukraine Is Almost Invisible, but It Should Be Proud
9. How Many Patriot Missile Systems Are In The US Army's Arsenal?
10. Attacking Iran isn't enough: Only regime change will end the nuclear threat - opinion
11. Kremlin gloats about US weapons pause to Ukraine
12. The Army just turned 4 Big Tech execs into instant officers. What an insult
13. A text, a Telegram link, then an offer of money: how Iran sought to recruit spies in Israel
14. Pentagon sets up interservice counter-drone task force
15. The CIA’s most unlikely Cold War weapon? A secret smuggling operation that terrified Soviet censors
16. Ukraine’s Drone Revolution – And What America Should Learn From It
17. AI and the Trust Revolution – How Technology Is Transforming Human Connections
18. Drones Aren’t the Solution to Africa’s Security Crises
19. 2024 Was Another Great Year for the U.S. in IW
20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2025
21. Iran Update, July 6, 2025
22. Knowledge as National Power on Independence Day, 1828
23. Some Elements of the American Character
1. Special Operations News – Monday, July 7, 2025
Special Operations News – Monday, July 7, 2025
July 7, 2025 SOF News Update 0
https://sof.news/update/20250707/
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo / Image: Special Unit 333, photo courtesy of Resolute Support, 11 August 2017.
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SOF News
Field Manual 3-05, Army Special Operations, June 2025 has been updated.
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44116-FM_3-05-000-WEB-1.pdf
SOF and Moral Injury. Many SOF warriors are unfamiliar with the term or concept of moral injury. This fact sheet provides an overview of the definition, categories, causes, and symptoms of moral injury and explains how it is different from post-traumatic stress disorder. Special Operations Forces Moral Injury Fact Sheet, by John E. Caterson, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), April 21, 2025. https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/273
Navy Parachutist Dies. A Navy Special Warfare Boat Operator died on Tuesday during a training parachute jump in Porterville, California. He was assigned to Special Boat Team 20 and was attending the Naval Parachute Course. “Navy identifies special warfare sailor killed while parachuting”, Task and Purpose, July 3, 2025.
New SOCPAC Commander. Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. VanAntwerp assumed command of Special Operations Command Pacific from Rear Adm. Jeromy B. Williams during a change of command ceremony at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, July 3, 2025. https://dod.hawaii.gov/jstaff/files/2024/08/MG-Jeffrey-A.-VanAntwerps-BiographyV2.pdf
Camp Chapman – CIA Outpost. Located near Khost in southeastern Afghanistan, Camp Chapman was established in the early days of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. It served as a regional base for the U.S. Army, a contingent of Special Forces, and as a forward operating location for the Central Intelligence Agency. The base was named after a Green Beret, SFC Nathan Chapman, the first American soldier to be killed in combat in the Afghan War. In 2009, a double agent working for the CIA blew himself and killed seven CIA officers at the same time. Six other CIA officers were injured. It was one of the deadliest attacks on the CIA. “Camp Chapman: The CIA’s Frontline in Afghanistan”, by Betselot Dejene, Grey Dynamics, July 3, 2025.
SOAA 2024 Annual Report. The Special Operations Association of America has published its annual report for last year. (PDF, 13 pages)
https://soaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-SOAA-Annual-Report.pdf
Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.
Strategic Triad – SOF, Cyber, and IO. “Special Operations, space, and cyber forces share responsibility for conducting and supporting kinetic and non-kinetic operations in all domains, operating in contested or denied areas, and conducting or supporting IO.” Read more in “Converging Special Operations Forces, space, cyber, and information operations”, Booz Allen, 2025.
Belarus SF and Gyroplanes. Belarusian special operations forces are training with gyroplanes for air reconnaissance, cargo drops, and personal transport. The two-seat gyroplanes would be used for situations where the use of large helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft is not feasible. The aircraft was jointly developed by Belarus and China. The top speed is 200 km/hr and can fly up to six hours with dual tanks. “Belarus special forces train with new gyroplanes”, Defence-Blog, June 30, 2025.
Spy Talk. The special operations community has its own vocabulary and buzz words (specialforcestraining.info) that are sometimes unfamiliar to the conventional Army and the civilian population. The intelligence community (IC) also has their slang. “The SPYSCAPE Glossary of Spy Terms”, Spyscape, June 2025.
SOF History
OSS Team Cardinal’s Mission in China. At the conclusion of World War II, eight OSS teams dropped into China to conduct the Mercy Mission operation. The task was to gather intelligence and get to POW camps before the Russians did or the Japanese executed prisoners. On August 16th, Team Cardinal (six men) dropped into Japanese-held Manchuria. Included in the team membership were a doctor, a Russian linguist, a Japanese linguist, a Chinese linguist, and a radio operator. The team was led by a major. Read the story of Team Cardinal in “Drop, Improvise, Win: The OSS in China”, by Lt. Col. Zachary Griffiths, Special Warfare Journal, June 20, 2025.
On July 9, 1941, the First Special Service Force was officially activated.
https://armyhistory.org/first-special-service-force/
On July 11, 1941 the Coordinator of Information (COI) was established. President Franklin Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to head a new civilian office attached to the White House. The office was an intelligence and propaganda agency of the U.S. government. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Coordinator_of_Information
On July 8, 1961, the 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated in Birmingham, Alabama.
On July 9, 1961, teams of Green Berets began organizing and training tribesmen in the Central Highlands of Vietnam into the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG).
Ukraine Conflict
U.S. Halts Weapons to Ukraine. The stockpiles of some types of weapons being sent to Ukraine is getting low enough that the U.S. is scaling back or halting the flow of weapons. (AP News, July 2, 2025) Shortly after this news broke President Trump had a phone call with President Zelensky where he reassured the Ukrainian leader that the halt was temporary and some weapons shipments would still be ongoing. Anti-aircraft defenses are critical in light of Russia’s ability to mass produce missiles and drones to the extent that hundreds of missiles and drones are attacking Ukraine’s cities each night.
Patriots for Ukraine? Zelensky and Trump discussed Ukraine’s need for air defense systems during a recent phone call that may have spurred Trump to decide more Patriot systems should go to Ukraine. “Trump says Ukraine will need Patriot missiles for its defense, chides Putin”, Reuters, July 5, 2025.
Drone Wall. David Kirichenko says that Ukraine is heavily dependent on drones to prevent a breakthrough by Russian forces during their summer offensive. A ‘drone wall’ is the best way for creating a layered defense that can halt a Russian advance. The drones are used both for surveillance and to conduct airstrikes. Ukraine is expecting to produce four million drones this year. NATO countries are now looking at putting up their own drone wall to protect their borders from a Russian incursion. “Ukraine’s drone wall is Europe’s first line of defense against Russia”, Atlantic Council, July 2, 2025.
The Digital Battlefield of Ukraine. Military innovation has been at the centerpiece of the Russian invasion of Ukraine – now entering its fourth summer fighting season. There is much to learn from the Ukrainian military that western militaries can benefit from. The threat from Russia, if Putin stays in power, will remain long after the Ukraine-Russian conflict is resolved. “Ukraine: Masters of the digital battlefield”, by Peter Caddick-Adams, The Critic, July 4, 2025.
National Security
White House Nominates Jim Caggy. A GWOT veteran, James Caggy, has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense. Jim is an Army veteran and has worked in civilian life on numerous projects related to national defense. He was a volunteer assisting in the evacuation of Afghan allies during the Kabul NEO of August 2021 with Team America Relief. An acquaintance has described him as a “brainiac with common sense”.
M-10 Booker – Going Away? The Army’s M-10 Booker Infantry Assault Vehicle was formerly known as the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) System. Over 500 systems were programmed to be fielded to the 10th Mountain Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division. However, on May 1, 2025, the Army cancelled the program citing it as a failed program. (CRS report, 13 May 2025)
U.S. to Buy Six Arctic Icebreakers. Over $9 billion will be spent to expand the Coast Guard’s Arctic icebreaker fleet. Both Polar Security Cutters and Arctic Security Cutters are to be funded. The majority of the world’s ice breakers are produced by Finland. (gCaptain, July 4, 2025)
U.S. Southern Border. Compared to the previous administration the border would appear almost locked down. Certainly there is a huge drop in the number of illegal aliens crossing the border. There are approximately 8,500 military personnel (DOD News, July 2, 2025) attached to Joint Task Force Southern Border that enhance the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s ability to identify, track, and disrupt threats to security at the southern border. In the next few months, there will be four ‘national defense areas’ along the border. This will give more ‘legal’ cover for the U.S. military to conduct operations along the border.
Commentary
Military Advising. Alexandra Chinchilla provides insight on the successes and failures of U.S. advising over time. “Influence by Design: Reassessing U.S. Military Advising”, Irregular Warfare, June 5, 2025.
Dysfunction at NSC. Fewer meetings, more top-down demands, and worries some officials may go rogue are upending the system. The national policymaking process under Trump and Rubio is hindered by a staff that is half the size it used to be. It has been described as the “Game of Thrones” with loyal Trump supporters seeing the NSC staffers as representative of an untrustworthy government bureaucracy. “Inside the Dysfunction at Rubio’s Shrunken National Security Council”, Politico, July 2, 2025.
How to Complicate the IW Planning Process. Two Army officers present their vision of how DoD can connect, integrate, and globally synchronize irregular warfare across combatant commands and the interagency. They believe that DoD’s traditional planning methods need to be replaced with new ways that can prepare and synchronize transregional irregular warfare effects. “The Algebra of Irregular Warfare: A Planning Methodology for Transregional Operations”, Special Warfare, July 1, 2025.
Drone Warfare
Report on Drones. The Battlefield AI Revolution Is Not Here Yet: The Status of Current Russian and Ukrainian AI Drone Efforts, by Kateryna Stepanenko, Institute for the Study of War, June 2, 2025, PDF, 10 pages. Link to report.
Learning About Drones from Ukraine and Israel. Two countries have recently executed a couple of extraordinary missions deep inside their respective adversaries homelands using drones and commando teams. Operation Spider’s Web and Operation Rising Lion both used drones that cost no more than a few thousand dollars each but that were able to wipe out tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of advanced weapons systems. Both operations point for the need for the United States to rely less of high-cost, crewed served weapons systems and more on numerous cheap drones. “What Drones Can – and Cannot – Do on the Battlefield”, Foreign Affairs, July 4, 2025.
“Sky Fortress” – Tracking Russian Drones in Ukraine. Acoustic detection systems are reshaping air defense against drones. Built from scratch, these systems are tracking Russian drones as they enter Ukrainian airspace as they fly to their targets. “Sky Fortress – Ukraine’s Acoustic Detection System That Tracks Drones Cheap and Fast”, by Lucile Brizard, United24, July 1, 2025.
Information Operations
Russia, AI, and IO. This 23 page (PDF) report explores how Russian actors are discussing, conceptualizing, and framing artificial intelligence within their online communications. Russia, AI and the Future of Disinformation Warfare, Royal United Services Institute, June 2025. https://static.rusi.org/russia-ai-and-the-future-of-disinformation-warfare.pdf
Russian Cognitive Warfare. Nataliya Bugayova and Kateryna Stepanenko argue that understanding cognitive warfare is a national security requirement for the United States. This type of warfare focuses on influencing an opponent’s reasoning, decisions, and actions – below the threshold of war. A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare, Institute for the Study of War, June 30, 2025, PDF, 34 pages. Link to report.
Propaganda & Psychological Warfare Collection. The Hoover Institution Library & Archives has a collection of propaganda from societies and governments from around the world and through time. There are large holdings from the Communist Parties (Soviet, Chinese, and others), World War II, and more. https://www.hoover.org/library-archives/collections/propaganda-psychological-warfare
China’s Shadow War. A “shadowy, silent battle waged through deception, infiltration, and manipulation” has become a cornerstone of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic playbook. This covert war is not fought on battlefields but within the institutions and society of adversary states. China is using a combination of political warfare, psychological warfare, and asymmetric warfare to break the spine of Taiwan. “Taiwan Under Siege”, by Shubhangi Palve, The EurAsian Times, July 5, 2025.
Fighting Disinformation. Jacob Ware prescribes methods to combat disinformation in social media. “To Fight Disinformation, Treat it as an Insurgency”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 4, 2025.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.
Europe
Baltic and Arctic Regions Contested. Since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the northern region of Europe has been on watch for a repeat of Ukraine but along their borders. Russia has been provoking and probing its neighbors’ defenses in the Baltic and Arctic regions. Read more in “The Coming Northern Showdown”, Defining Ideas, by Thomas H. Henrikson, July 2, 2025.
Sabotage in the Mediterranean? Since January 2025, five oil tankers have had unexplained explosions that have caused significant damage. A common theme is that they have visited ports in Russia, Libya, and Malta. While there is lots of speculation most bets seem to be placed on Ukraine special operators causing havoc. The most recent ship suffering ‘an explosion’ of some sorts is currently being towed by tug to a port in Greece for repairs. Limpet mines anyone?
Afghanistan
Afghan Zero Units of the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency used specially trained units in the fight against the Taliban and terrorist targets in Afghanistan. The Zero Units – named 01, 02, and 03 – were cloaked in secrecy. Many of the Zero Units fell in on the Kabul airport during the August 2021 fall of the Afghan government and helped secure the airport while U.S. military and diplomatic personnel, U.S. citizens, “Green Card” holders, and Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders were evacuated by U.S. military aircraft. The U.S. government promised that if the Zero Units secured HKIA then they and their families would be allowed on the last of the flights to safety. Kevin Maurer provides some insight on these CIA paramilitary forces during the long war and the aftermath. “Inside the CIA’s Secret Afghan Army”, Rolling Stone, July 4, 2025.
Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/
Middle East
ISIS Gaining Strength in Syria. The new Syrian regime that took power in December 2024 may soon find that it has some challenges ahead from the Islamic State (IS). Renewed militant activity signals a calculated attempt by IS to reposition itself during the establishment of the new Syrian government. It is currently recruiting among Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) members. It is directly appealing to foreign fighters in Syria as well. “IS looks poised to exploit security vacuums in Syria”, Al Majalla, May 26, 2025.
Iranian Missiles Were Intercepted by U.S. Navy Destroyers. The U.S. 6th Fleet had five guided-missile destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to disrupt Iranian missile attacks against Israel. The Aegis Weapon System was instrumental in the defensive action. Military Times, June 30, 2025.
Africa
Ukraine’s Charm Offensive in Africa. Russia has deep roots in Africa stemming from as far back as the Cold War when there was an ideological struggle between western democracies and the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. In the past decade, Russia’s influence and presence has grown with diplomatic overtures, aid, military arms sales, and the presence of first Wagner Group and now the Africa Corps. Ukraine, locked in a long struggle of survival against invading Russian forces, is seeking ways to diminish Russia’s influence on the Africa continent. There were rumors of Ukrainian operatives participating or aiding the attack on Russian paramilitary operatives in Mali. It has been distributing food aid to North African and sub-Saharan countries. It’s most recent endeavor is in Mauritania. “Ukraine turns to Africa in its struggle against Russia”, by Jessica Donati and Olena Harmash, Reuters, June 26, 2025.
IW and Africa. This article provides four key points about irregular warfare in Africa. “Exploring African Perspectives on Irregular Warfare”, by Sandor Fabian and Matthew Heidel, Insider, July 1, 2025.
Executive Outcomes – PMC. One of the more well-known private military companies operating in Africa is Executive Outcomes (EO), formed in 1989. For over a decade its activities were widely known. Read up on the history, organization, equipment, and controversies of EO. “Executive Outcomes: The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth”, by Nicola Barbesino, Grey Dynamics, July 2, 2025.
Background on the DRC – Rwanda Conflict. The eastern portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been the scene of fighting between DRC government troops and the M23 rebel movement (backed by Rwanda). At stake is a mineral rich area of the DRC that both the government and M23 wish to control for the wealth that it generates. Currently, the Trump administration is attempting to broker a peace agreement – the likelihood of that working is unknown. Read up on some history of the DRC and an update on the current conflict in “The Trump Administration’s Peace Initiative for the Great Lakes Region of Africa: History and the Drivers of Conflict”, by H.R. McMaster, History We Don’t Know, July 1, 2025.
Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies
The Guerrilla Trilogy. Author Jim Morris (bio) was one of the first writers to pen books about the Vietnam War. As a Green Beret, he served three tours in Vietnam with U.S. Army Special Forces. He experienced the war up close and put those experiences into print. In addition to his experiences as a SF soldier in combat he also worked as a combat journalist covering numerous guerrilla wars and conflicts in the 1980s. Three of his published books include War Story, The Devil’s Secret Name, and Fighting Men and they are available as an eBook entitled The Guerilla Trilogy.
Military Review. The July-August 2025 issue by Army University Press is now online.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2025/
Infantry. The summer issue of Infantry is now available online. (76 pages)
https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2025/Summer/PDF/20250702 InfMag_Summer25.pdf
Sentinel. The July 2025 edition of Sentinel has been posted online. Topics include a tribute to Clyde Sincere, a well-known Special Forces officer who recently passed away; a book review of Bobbie the Weather Girl: AFVN Saigon’s Weathergirl Shares Letters From Vietnam; a book review of Across the Fence: The Secret War in Vietnam, and more.
https://www.specialforces78.com/chapter-78-newsletter-for-july-2025/
Podcast – CIA at Risk. Former senior CIA ops manager Luis Rueda talks about an imperiled spy agency. SpyTalk, July 2, 2025, 45 minutes.
Podcast – Gen. Donahue on Deterring Russia in Europe, War on the Rocks, July 3, 2025, 26 minutes.
https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/gen-donahue-on-deterring-russia-in-europe/
Book Review – House of Huawei. Eva Dou’s book provides insight into the Chinese telecommunications firm that was established in 1987. The firm has gone global and is closely aligned with China’s party-state. Its ‘Safe City’ facial recognition technology is used not only in China but has been bought by countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. This is a concern for western governments – for two reasons. One is the control of a sector of technology around the globe and the other is the use of technology by China’s intelligence services. Read more in “The Secret History of China’s Most Powerful Company”, Real Clear Defense, July 3, 2025.
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October 14-17, 2025
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November 17-20, 2025
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2. Defense reconciliation bill begins rebuild and transformation of our military By Sen. Roger Wicker and Rep. Mike Rogers
Defense reconciliation bill begins rebuild and transformation of our military - Defense One
The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.
defenseone.com
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By Sen. Roger Wicker and Rep. Mike Rogers
July 2, 2025
Over the past few weeks, House and Senate leadership have been able to advance President Trump’s “one big, beautiful reconciliation bill” and brought us closer to delivering the reforms we promised the American people. Amid the negotiations, Republicans have not lost sight of what this bill is: a once-in-a-generation chance to lock in pro-growth tax rates, secure the border, and rebuild the military. It is icing on the cake that we will roll back Green New Deal spending and repeal much of the misleadingly named Inflation Reduction Act.
Many of the 2017 tax cuts expire at the end of this year. That has created a shot clock for the entire legislative effort, compelling quick action on the equally urgent defense portions. Last month, we met with the president in the Oval Office, and the three of us agreed: This reconciliation bill’s military investments are a crucial down payment on President Trump’s ambitious peace through strength agenda.
Shortly after our meeting, the president announced the next steps of his transformative $175 billion Golden Dome initiative. Our bill contains $25 billion to jump-start this missile defense system, which will shield our homeland and troops against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles.
Similarly, our defense industrial base needs a wholesale rebuilding. Our bill contains more than $25 billion to refill our munitions stockpiles, adopt advanced manufacturing techniques, and fully implement the president’s executive order to rebuild our critical minerals supply chain. Weapons of war are changing rapidly, so we directed $16 billion to adopt commercial technology at scale and field the low-cost, expendable systems and artificial intelligence that characterize the modern battlefield.
The nation’s nuclear arsenal and Air Force fleet are in urgent need of long-overdue upgrades. This bill devotes $14 and $9 billion, respectively, to help modernize them. We also will build on President Trump’s border security wins, sending an immediate $1 billion to grow the Pentagon’s logistics and personnel support mission along the border.
In his address to a Joint Session of Congress, the president promised a shipbuilding revival. The American maritime enterprise will take time to spring to life, and we have set aside $29 billion to help jumpstart the industrial base. The funds will boost production of traditional ships and submarines while making a historic investment to start mass-production of unmanned vessels. That naval power will increase American muscle in the Pacific. Our bill will complement that by devoting $12 billion to the capabilities and infrastructure Adm. Samuel Paparo, our commander in the Pacific, desperately needs.
Service members also will directly benefit from this bill. An infusion of $10 billion dollars will go to paychecks and allowances as well as improving housing, healthcare, and assistance to military families. The reconciliation bill will also provide $14 billion for basic readiness, improving infrastructure at depots and shipyards, and expanding the military’s inventory of spare parts for repairs and maintenance.
Savvy readers will have already summed these figures and arrived at the defense investment of $150 billion. That is the cost of years of neglect. It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances. Completing the Golden Dome alone will cost another $150 billion. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.
National defense can’t be done on the cheap. But as we spend more, we will spend smarter. Our bill requires Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to audit the way officials use the reconciliation funds, and we will work hand in glove with Pentagon officials to ensure every dollar is spent in the right place. It also injects automation and artificial intelligence into the Pentagon’s accounting process to help achieve a clean audit by 2028.
As the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, we can confirm that there is more reform to come. We are working on legislation, including the FORGED Act and SPEED Act, to initiate a major reform of Pentagon acquisition and innovation processes—the most significant changes in 40 years.
We contend the Biden administration was asleep at the wheel as the world’s worst dictators caused chaos in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and even our southern border. President Trump and Congressional Republicans understand that American hard power can deter these adversaries from growing more aggressive and threatening the United States directly. But we must act now to build that kind of power in time. This bill is the necessary first step toward achieving that peace through strength.
Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
3. What Is America’s Long-Term Ukraine Plan, Anyway?
Conclusion:
America’s strategy has not been without its detractors. Some critics argue that while the US has allowed Ukraine to survive through three years of conflict, the support has not been generous enough to allow Ukraine to decisively win. Conversely, others argue that the United States should not be involved at all, that any involvement is a waste of resources on a conflict that bears little bearing on US strategic interests and has the acute potential to escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Essentially, the United States has developed a grand strategy towards the Ukraine War that makes inherent compromises, leaving few in the United States satisfied.
What Is America’s Long-Term Ukraine Plan, Anyway?
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/americas-long-term-ukraine-plan-hk
July 6, 2025
By: Harrison Kass
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Wisely, the United States has kept its own forces out of direct combat, choosing instead to treat Ukraine as a proxy in a broader strategy to degrade Russia’s conventional military capabilities.
The United States has been an important player throughout the ongoing Ukraine War. Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the United States has pursued a grand strategy designed to support Ukraine’s defense, contain Russia’s aggression, and reinforce the Western-led international order—all without directly engaging in a military confrontation with Russia. The strategy is consistent with longstanding trends in US strategy, with an emphasis on deterrence, alliance building, economic influence, and global balancing.
The United States Wants to Defend Ukraine—and Weaken Russia
One of the United States’ primary strategic objectives in the region is to weaken Russia’s military and political power. To that end, the United States has strengthened Ukraine throughout the current conflict, aiming to prevent its conquest by Russia and strengthen it as the frontline of a future European alliance. Washington has aided Kyiv throughout the war via extensive arms shipments, intelligence sharing, and financial assistance. In fact, without US assistance, Ukraine may well have fallen to Russia earlier in the war. Instead, the United States has enabled Ukraine to hang on, for three-plus years, and even reverse Russian territorial gains.
Wisely, the United States has kept its own forces out of direct combat, choosing instead to treat Ukraine as a proxy in a broader strategy to degrade Russia’s conventional military capabilities. The strategy aims to impose long-term costs on Moscow—roughly comparable to those experienced when the Soviet Union became bogged down in a decade-long conflict in Afghanistan and subsequently suffered regime collapse—without risking US lives or instigating open conflict between NATO and Russia.
In an attempt to avoid an all-out war between the United States and Russia, Washington has committed to a set of escalation management principles. From the opening hours of the conflict, the United States established clear boundaries—including no US troops on the ground, no airstrikes on Russian territory with US weapons, and no overt attempt to overthrow Russian President Vladimir Putin. These principles acted as guardrails, demonstrating America’s wider fear of nuclear escalation. US support has been calibrated accordingly: powerful enough to prop up Ukraine and keep them in the fight, but limited to avoid a greater provocation of Russia.
America Has Options Short of War
A key strategic tools in America’s arsenal has been economic pressure against Russia. The strategy is designed to cripple the Russian economy gradually through the targeting of critical sectors like energy, finance, defense, and technology. Also, the United States has disrupted the global supply chains that contribute to Russia’s ability to make war, and increased its domestic costs, causing Putin’s regime to face political pressure at home over the cost of living. The United States has relied on asset freezes, blocking access to US dollar transactions, and sovereign debt restrictions. It has also banned high-tech exports, placed restrictions on dual-use technologies and banned US imports of Russian energy products.
Lastly, the United States has gone to great lengths to reinforce the NATO alliance. Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine has reinvigorated NATO, which had largely atrophied since the end of the Cold War. The result has been an increase in defense spending among European allies; also, the effect has been to draw previously neutral countries, most notably Sweden and Finland, closer to the alliance.
America’s strategy has not been without its detractors. Some critics argue that while the US has allowed Ukraine to survive through three years of conflict, the support has not been generous enough to allow Ukraine to decisively win. Conversely, others argue that the United States should not be involved at all, that any involvement is a waste of resources on a conflict that bears little bearing on US strategic interests and has the acute potential to escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Essentially, the United States has developed a grand strategy towards the Ukraine War that makes inherent compromises, leaving few in the United States satisfied.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a Senior Defense and National Security Writer at The National Interest. Kass is an attorney and former political candidate who joined the US Air Force as a pilot trainee before being medically discharged. He focuses on military strategy, aerospace, and global security affairs. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global Journalism and International Relations from NYU.
4. Understanding Russia’s Grand Strategy in Ukraine—and Ukraine’s Plan to Survive
Excerpt:
In conclusion, Russia’s grand strategy is based on imperial restoration, maintaining a physical buffer zone along the western border, and preventing NATO expansion. Ukraine’s grand strategy is based on national defense in the face of an immediate existential threat.
Understanding Russia’s Grand Strategy in Ukraine—and Ukraine’s Plan to Survive
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/understanding-russias-grand-strategy-ukraine-hk
July 6, 2025
By: Harrison Kass
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Knowing what overarching strategy guides both nations is essential to acquiring a comprehensive understanding of the war.
The Ukraine War, which was sparked by the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, has been ramping up in intensity since Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. During the conflict’s three-plus years, both Russia and Ukraine have pursued distinct grand strategies centered on their respective political objectives, security concerns, and broader geopolitical ambitions.
What Is Russia’s Grand Strategy?
Russia’s grand strategy—which has been on display throughout the war—centers on reasserting Moscow’s place as a regional hegemon, preventing NATO expansion, and challenging the Western-led international order. Most importantly, Russia views Ukraine as a vital buffer zone whose alignment with Western states, if fully realized, would pose an existential threat to Putin’s regime.
At the start of the invasion, Russia hoped for a rapid regime change in Kyiv, but its efforts failed, forcing Moscow to transition to a strategy of attritional warfare focused on consolidating territory, with an emphasis on the land bridge extending from Russia to Crimea and the Donbas region. Accordingly, Russia has escalated its military effort through mass mobilization and expanded drone and missile strikes on civilian infrastructure. On the home front, Russia has undergone a reorientation of its economy, calibrating it especially for wartime.
Russia has complemented its military campaign by leveraging energy as a geopolitical weapon, restricting gas flows to Europe in an attempt to fracture Western alliances. The effort has only been partially successful, highlighting Moscow’s broader aim to exploit economic and political vulnerabilities in the West. Moscow has also leaned into information warfare—domestically and abroad—aimed at maintaining regime support, eroding Ukrainian morale, and generally delegitimizing NATO. On the diplomatic front, Russia has combated its increased international isolation through cultivating stronger ties with fellow pariah states such as China, Iran, and North Korea.
What Is Ukraine’s Grand Strategy?
The Ukrainian grand strategy throughout the conflict has for obvious reasons been highly defensive in nature. However, it has evolved into a more multidimensional effort as the war progressed—aimed at preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, regaining occupied territories, and further solidifying the country’s ties to its Western benefactors. Put simply, Ukraine’s grand strategy is about survival.
To achieve its stated grand strategy objectives, Ukraine has adopted a military strategy of asymmetric and mobile defense, paired with selective offensive operations such as counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson. Kyiv is heavily dependent on the West for intelligence gathering and the provision of long-range precision weapons. Moreover, as the war has progressed, Ukraine has increasingly focused on deep strikes inside Russia, mainly through the use of drone warfare.
Ukraine has conducted a strategic communications campaign to complement its military efforts. Spearheaded by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine has positioned itself as the frontline defender of democracy against authoritarian aggression. This moral argument has largely proven effective in rallying Western support to the Ukrainian cause, and may have even prevented the collapse of the Ukrainian state in 2022.
In conclusion, Russia’s grand strategy is based on imperial restoration, maintaining a physical buffer zone along the western border, and preventing NATO expansion. Ukraine’s grand strategy is based on national defense in the face of an immediate existential threat.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a Senior Defense and National Security Writer at The National Interest. Kass is an attorney and former political candidate who joined the US Air Force as a pilot trainee before being medically discharged. He focuses on military strategy, aerospace, and global security affairs. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global Journalism and International Relations from NYU.
5. Houthis Launch First Red Sea Attack On Shipping Since December
Excerpts:
The Houthi shipping attacks began in November 2023 in solidarity with Palestinians over the latest war between Israel and Gaza. They have forced some ships to avoid the Suez Canal for a far longer route around Africa, boosting shipping costs by nearly $200 billion. The Houthis’ attacks sank two vessels, damaged many others, caused the death of four mariners, and led to many being held hostage after a ship was seized. The Houthi Red Sea campaign also led to nearly constant military engagements with the U.S. and its allies, including air strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen and repelling the militant group’s frequent missile, aerial drone, and drone boat attacks on commercial and military vessels.
In March, the U.S. launched intensified airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen in response to the shipping attacks. A ceasefire was later reached.
It is unclear whether the U.S. Navy or any other navies have responded to the Magic Seas. We have reached out to the Navy and the European-led Operation Aspides maritime security task force for more information.
At the moment, we do not know whether this is a one-off attack or whether the Houthis have started a new campaign against Red Sea shipping. We will watch this situation and provide updates when warranted.
Houthis Launch First Red Sea Attack On Shipping Since December
The Liberian-registered Magic Seas was hit with multiple explosive-laden drone boats, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire.
Howard Altman
Updated Jul 6, 2025 9:19 PM EDT
twz.com · by Howard Altman
The TWZ Newsletter
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
The Houthis rebels of Yemen launched their first attack on Red Sea shipping since December, striking the Liberian-registered Magic Seas bulk cargo vessel with drone boats, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and small arms fire. The ship is currently ablaze.
The Houthis claimed credit for the attack, saying it was in support of Palestinians in the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas. While official reports do not name the vessel, a maritime security official confirmed that it was the Magic Seas.
The bulk cargo ship was transiting north in the Red Sea about 51 nautical miles southwest of the Yemeni port of Hodiedah when it was attacked by eight skiffs that opened fire with small arms and RPGs, according to an alert from the Ambrey maritime security firm. The ship’s “Armed Security Team (AST) had returned fire. Ambrey assessed the situation as ongoing and will provide updates when available,” the alert stated.
A short while later, “the vessel was subsequently attacked by four Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs),” the Ambrey alert continued. “Two of the USVs impacted the port side of the vessel, damaging the vessel’s cargo. The remaining two USVs were intercepted and destroyed by the AST. Based on AIS data, the vessel was still underway at the time of writing. Ambrey assessed the vessel to meet the established Houthi target profile. Ambrey assessed the situation as ongoing and will provide updates when available.”
Ambrey advised that when a vessel is attacked by USVs, “non-essential crew gather in a safe muster point above the waterline.”
UKMTO_WARNING_INCIDENT_026-25 – ATTACK Update 001https://t.co/EQMqysjld2#MaritimeSecurity #MarSec pic.twitter.com/exw8vxwgkh
— UKMTO Ops Centre (@UK_MTO) July 6, 2025
In a message posted on its Al Ansar Telegram channel, the Houthis also said the Magic Seas fit the profile of ships to be targeted.
“Four naval drones attacked a ship,” the Houthis stated. “Our assessment indicates that the attacked ship meets the Yemeni criteria for targeting ships. Two naval drones collided with the left side of the ship, causing damage to its cargo.”
The Houthi shipping attacks began in November 2023 in solidarity with Palestinians over the latest war between Israel and Gaza. They have forced some ships to avoid the Suez Canal for a far longer route around Africa, boosting shipping costs by nearly $200 billion. The Houthis’ attacks sank two vessels, damaged many others, caused the death of four mariners, and led to many being held hostage after a ship was seized. The Houthi Red Sea campaign also led to nearly constant military engagements with the U.S. and its allies, including air strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen and repelling the militant group’s frequent missile, aerial drone, and drone boat attacks on commercial and military vessels.
In March, the U.S. launched intensified airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen in response to the shipping attacks. A ceasefire was later reached.
It is unclear whether the U.S. Navy or any other navies have responded to the Magic Seas. We have reached out to the Navy and the European-led Operation Aspides maritime security task force for more information.
At the moment, we do not know whether this is a one-off attack or whether the Houthis have started a new campaign against Red Sea shipping. We will watch this situation and provide updates when warranted.
Update: 2:03 PM Eastern –
Ambrey issued a new update:
“Ambrey received information that the vessel was taking on water and that the crew were preparing to abandon ship.”
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com
Senior Staff Writer
Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard's work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.
6. Next Army: Envisioning the U.S. Army at 250 and Beyond - Projects
"Agentic warfare."
Key point:
The Army is on the cusp of its next doctrinal revolution—one that may prove as significant as Emory Upton’s post-Civil War reforms, Donn Starry’s AirLand Battle concept, or Gordon Sullivan’s push into information-age warfare.
Next Army: Envisioning the U.S. Army at 250 and Beyond - Projects
https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/next-army-envisioning-us-army-250-and-beyond#
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Next Army: Envisioning the U.S. Army at 250 and Beyond | Projects | CSIS Skip to main content
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Next Army: Envisioning the U.S. Army at 250 and Beyond
As the U.S. Army nears its 250th birthday, a new revolution in land power is underway. Next Army—a CSIS Futures Lab and Modern War Institute series—explores how AI, drones, and doctrinal shifts are transforming the battlefield for the age of agentic warfare.
As the U.S. Army approaches its 250th anniversary, a generational transformation is underway. Next Army, a CSIS Futures Lab project, examines how technological disruption, evolving threat environments, and a tradition of institutional innovation are reshaping the character of land power. The Army is on the cusp of its next doctrinal revolution—one that may prove as significant as Emory Upton’s post-Civil War reforms, Donn Starry’s AirLand Battle concept, or Gordon Sullivan’s push into information-age warfare.
The Army of tomorrow will wage agentic warfare, powered by ubiquitous sensor networks, AI, and autonomous systems. Uncrewed aerial systems—ranging from nano-drones to loitering munitions—will saturate the battlespace, turning tactical maneuver into a contest of data and deception. Swarming drones will reconnoiter, jam, and strike, while AI-enabled edge computing will help small units localize decision-making at machine speed. Instead of sprawling command posts layered in staff officers, expect lean, mobile teams working through cloud-native kill webs and AI agents to deliver precision effects across domains.
At the center of this future is the land domain—not just terrain to be held or crossed, but a critical connective tissue linking cyber, space, and fires into a unified campaign. The Next Army will be smaller, smarter, and more networked, with humans and machines collaborating in complex adaptive systems to out cycle adversaries.
Yet even amid such radical change, the Army remains grounded in a core principle: it is a learning organization. From George Washington’s pioneering use of vaccines to counter smallpox and Sergeant Clubbin’s hedgerow clippers during the Battle of Normandy to Chief of Staff Randy George’s experimental Transforming in Contact (TiC) brigades, the Army has long adapted through experimentation. Today, initiatives like Project Convergence push this legacy forward—testing new concepts in real-time, high-risk environments.
Next Army brings together warfighters and strategic thinkers to chart the Army’s future force. Through commentaries ranging from insights from wargames and AI-driven scenarios to historical analysis, the project will assess how the Army can harness AI, automation, and human creativity to remain the dominant land power in a new era.
Banner image: Dr. Benjamin Jensen/Created using the Midjourney.
Contact Information
7. Former Mossad officer explains how Iranian spies are recruited - report
Did the author give away any secrets? Things have probably changed since the author was on active service.
I did not realize Iran had border security issues.
Excerpts:
Iran is not a homogeneous country, Ailam explained, as only 40% of its population of 90 million are Persian.
...
Many of these demographics can be recruited, if not to support Israel, or for the money, but because of their dissatisfaction with the regime.
...
"There is also the fact that Iran is a large country with borders that can't always be monitored, making it possible to smuggle 'anything' into the country."
Former Mossad officer explains how Iranian spies are recruited - report
Ailam, 71, served with the Mossad for 24 years, and explained how the agency was able to recruit so many spies in a hostile country.
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-86018
Iranian spy in intelligence agency control room uses military tech to identify threats during Arab Israeli conflict. Mossad secret agent uses software to do war covert operations
(photo credit: SHUTTERSTOCK)
ByJERUSALEM POST STAFF
JULY 6, 2025 22:04
The Mossad has an ‘extensive network’ of spies operating in Iran, former Israeli intelligence officer Oded Ailam told German newspaper Bild in an interview last week.
Ailam, 71, served with the Mossad for 24 years and explained how the agency was able to recruit so many spies in a hostile country, even as Iran’s mullahs continue to call on the population to hunt the defectors down.
Iran is not a homogeneous country, Ailam explained, as only 40% of its population of 90 million are Persian.
"This makes it extremely difficult for the government to control the people. The surveillance system has enormous gaps; it can't be compared to what the Stasi did in the GDR," he said. Kurds, Turkmen, Baluchis, and Azeris can all be recruited to turn on the regime.
Many of these demographics can be recruited, if not to support Israel, or for the money, but because of their dissatisfaction with the regime.
A pro-democracy protest by Iranians in the United States (credit: REUTERS)
"There are many dissatisfied people in Iran. Large parts of society are impoverished. While Iran sits on huge gas reserves, instead of investing this money in their own country, the mullahs have poured billions into terror organizations like Hezbollah," Ailam said.
"There is also the fact that Iran is a large country with borders that can't always be monitored, making it possible to smuggle 'anything' into the country."
The Mossad protects spies in Iran, and their families
The Mossad also promises protection for its spies in Iran, and will bring them and their families to safety if necessary.
"When someone works for us, we take care not only of them but also of their family," he explained.
Despite the fact that Iran has many people with the potential to work for the Mossad, Ailam added that the agency spends a significant amount of time making sure those selected are right for the job.
"For a target, not only one agent’s information is used, but always multiple sources to be sure the right person is hit," Ailam said.
8. OPINION: Australia’s Role in Ukraine Is Almost Invisible, but It Should Be Proud
Cheers to our Aussie allies.
OPINION: Australia’s Role in Ukraine Is Almost Invisible, but It Should Be Proud
Australia’s role in Ukraine has gone largely unrecognized. That must change. It hasn’t featured in our politics, nor was it raised in the last Federal election.
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/55625
By James Baillieu
July 6, 2025, 1:55 pm
Photo: with Zakar, from Superhumans, Kyiv, May 31
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Attending a party for 250 war amputees, each missing one, two or even three limbs, as I did in Kyiv on May 31 is a stark reminder of war’s toll. I’ve gotten to know Max, a platoon leader in Ukraine’s elite 82nd Airborne, who lost a leg to a mine in November 2023. I helped sponsor his rehabilitation. He arranged the invitation.
These men aren’t seen as victims. In Ukraine, they are called Superhumans, a term that reflects a bold psychological and physical rehabilitation effort to help amputees return stronger. With music, laughter and defiance, the term felt accurate.
Australia’s contribution to Ukraine’s defense has quietly surged to A$1.5 billion ($975 million USD), according to government figures, most recently with the commitment of 49 M1 Abrams tanks. On May 19, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that the first Australian tanks had arrived and were already deployed at the front.
While there’s still room to do more, Australia is now the largest non-NATO military donor to Ukraine’s war effort. That’s no small feat. Yet most Australians would struggle to name the figure, let alone explain where the aid is going or who it’s helping.
The gratitude on the ground is real. When I met former Prime Minister Scott Morrison at the Black Sea Security Forum in Odesa on May 30, his first visit to Ukraine, Ukrainians lined up to shake his hand. “More than just for the Bushmasters,” one said, “I want to thank him for how much his leadership mattered at that critical early time.”
Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia, Vasyl Myroshnychenko, told me: “Ukrainians will never forget Australia. I am forever grateful to the Australian Government and its people for their support.”
Many of our fellow Australians are already in the fight. Ignoring them means diminishing ourselves.
And yet back home the efforts barely register.
But a less-told story is that of the estimated 100 Australians in key civilian roles on the ground in Ukraine and the 40 more serving directly in Ukraine’s armed forces.
Despite a “Do Not Travel” directive from the Australian government and the absence of an open embassy from February 2022 until a partial reopening in January 2025, these Australians have stayed or found their way in to do extraordinary work in a grinding, dangerous war.
Rachel Lehmann from Hobart stayed in Kyiv despite a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade directive to leave at the time of invasion. “I don’t like giving in to bullies,” she said. She is head of pastoral care for 150 students at the British International School. She described chaos, martial law, and missile attacks. “When I leave my kids for a trip out of Ukraine, that’s when the stress kicks in.” Her story, like many others, hasn’t made headlines, but it should.
Robert Potter from Adelaide is perhaps the godfather of Australian civilian efforts in Ukraine at the strategic level. Since November 2022, his Australian-led team has trained Ukraine’s intelligence and defense personnel in advanced cyber operations, with measurable battlefield outcomes. “We’ve trained over 500 people in person and thousands online, including wounded veterans whose military experience translates powerfully to cyber,” said a group representative. The initiative, run with veteran training company WithYouWithMe, is entirely self-funded. “Everything we do in Ukraine is out of our own pocket.”
And Francis Farrell from Parramata is a Kyiv-based war reporter. “It’s not only Ukraine,” he told me. “It’s the future of Europe and the entire understanding that large countries cannot simply conquer smaller neighbors and get away with it. Being a journalist, communicating Ukraine to the world, is what I was meant to do.”
Bruce Edwards, Australia’s Ambassador to Ukraine until December 2023, now leads partnerships for HALO Trust, the world’s largest landmine clearance NGO, employing over 1,600 Ukrainians. “I was in Mykolaiv and Kherson three weeks ago and in Kharkiv last week,” he told me. “Witnessing the destruction to property, lands and lives is heartbreaking but brings home the need for our work.”
There are many others: Asher Robinson, organizing volunteer networks over 500 active volunteers; Andy Wilson, developing technology to improve Kharkiv’s air defense; and callsign Dingo, assembling drones near the front.
Photo: with Australian Andy Wilson, Kyiv, May 22
Australian soldiers are spread across the 1,500-kilometer front, not in one unit. All volunteer. Ukrainians say Australians are known for their humor and aggression on attack. I spoke with several of the 40 or so serving in the Ukrainian army. A common reason for joining: desire to kill Russians after witnessing atrocities. “It makes your skin crawl to see what’s been done,” said one. “They come because they are blood hungry, but they stay because they love the country,” said callsign Merlin. “You’re treated really well if you’re a good soldier and an asset to the unit, which most Aussies are, because of how well known we are for fighting and not caring much when someone’s shooting at us,” said callsign Spook. The killed in action number is 10.
These aren’t mercenaries or thrill-seekers, but Australians who believe this war matters and whose sacrifices have gone largely unnoticed at home.
It should concern us that their contribution is invisible in our national story. While we debate foreign headlines, many of our own citizens: unarmed civilians, volunteers and frontline fighters, are already in the fight. Ignoring them means diminishing ourselves.
What’s missing is recognition. These Australians are risking everything for a cause we officially support. They deserve more than quiet admiration. They deserve national honor.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
James Baillieu
James Baillieu is a Chairman and investor in early stage technology companies.
9. How Many Patriot Missile Systems Are In The US Army's Arsenal?
Good to know.
I am sure our adversaries have these numbers up on their tracking boards and know where every system is currently located.
How Many Patriot Missile Systems Are In The US Army's Arsenal?
slashgear.com
By Jonathan H. Kantor July 6, 2025 9:00 am EST
DoD/Wikimedia Commons
Due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the established need for missile defense systems, the MIM-104 Patriot has once again surged into the spotlight. The Patriot Air Defense System is a mobile surface-to-air missile launcher and interceptor designed specifically to counter airborne threats, such as inbound ballistic missiles. It is a medium-range tactical air defense system that has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to take out ballistic missiles in places like Israel, where it's heavily employed by the Israeli Defense Forces.
With an increase in talk about missile defense, following President Donald Trump's declared desire to build a "Golden Dome" around the United States, it's natural to wonder how many Patriots are in the inventory. Since the Patriot's introduction in 1981, around 1,100 have been acquired by the U.S. Army. Approximately 200 of the produced launchers have been exported to countries such as Israel, Japan, Germany, and 16 others. In addition to the launchers, over 10,000 missiles have been produced, and more are on the way.
The Patriot Air Defense System has a 95% intercept success rate with over 250 combat engagements, including the defense of Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in June 2025. Because of its successes in defending against ballistic missiles, the Patriot Air Defense System is expected to remain in service until at least 2040, when it's believed that technology will evolve to require faster and more agile interceptors. In the meantime, the Patriot will continue to operate as the nation's primary terminal-phase anti-ballistic missile system well into the future.
The MIM-104 Patriot Air Defense System
Raytheon
Like most military technology the United States has employed for several decades, the Patriot Air Defense System has undergone upgrades and refits over the years. The current version is the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), developed and produced by Lockheed Martin. The missile range has been extended, and the interceptor has also been made more agile. In addition to working in the M90X Launching Stations, the PAC-3 missiles have been integrated into the THAAD Weapon System and other launchers.
Since its introduction, Lockheed has produced at least 1,700 PAC-3 MSEs and continues to build them for the U.S. Army and other clients. Each PAC-3 missile canister holds four missiles, allowing for 12 to 16 to be placed onto a launcher. The missiles are smaller in diameter, weighing 388 pounds, which is a third of the weight of previous interceptors. It also uses hit-to-kill technology, which differs from previous missiles' method of using a blast-fragmentation warhead to take out targets.
It has the ability to defend an area that is seven times that of the PAC-2. The system is more than the interceptors and their launchers, as it also employs a single AN/MPQ-53, AN/MPQ-65, or AN/MPQ-65A radar set to find potential targets. With this, the Patriot uses the AN/MSQ-4 Engagement Control Station, which is installed on an M927 truck. This is the only crewed part of the Patriot Missile Battery system; though much of the engagement is done autonomously, the crew's responsibility is the decision to launch.
Patriot Missile System's combat performance
Raytheon
One of the reasons Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have been pumping out Patriot missile interceptors and the required launchers is that they have a proven combat history. With 10,000 interceptors produced and more on the way, it's likely Patriots will see more combat in the future as tensions continue to ramp up. Patriots first saw action during the 1991 Gulf War, where they protected Kuwait, Israel, and Saudi Arabia from Iraqi Scud short-range ballistic missiles.
While largely successful, some warheads failed to function as desired, prompting the program to undergo additional development and improvements. Patriot Air Defense Systems have since been used in a variety of conflicts, including the Yemeni Civil War, the Russo-Ukrainian War, and throughout Israel, though it retired the system in 2024 in favor of its native-produced David's Sling system. Patriots have proven quite capable of taking down some types of ballistic missiles, though it's not capable of striking an ICBM, as they are notoriously hard to shoot down.
The largest American use of the Patriot Air Defense System came in response to an Iranian retaliatory attack against the United States in June 2025. Iran fired multiple ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, but they were stopped by Patriot interceptors. Only two batteries and 44 soldiers, the oldest of whom was a 28-year-old captain, defended the entire base. They successfully downed seven over the Persian Gulf, another 11 over Doha, Qatar, and a single missile landed in an uninhabited area of Al Udeid Air Base.
slashgear.com
10. Attacking Iran isn't enough: Only regime change will end the nuclear threat - opinion
Two words that are the modern equivalent of 4 letter words for some: "Regime Change."
Excerpts:
Since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the regime in Tehran has devoted itself to the ideological elimination of Zionism. This conviction is rooted in the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (“guardianship of the jurist”) and expressed through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which serves as both an enforcer of the regime’s ideology and a patron of international terrorism.
The IRGC has fueled violence and destabilization across the Middle East through its operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Gaza, and the West Bank. Its direct support for the October 7 attack against Israel is just one of many examples of the regime’s enduring extremism and hostility toward the Jewish people.
For decades, the regime in Iran has devoted substantial resources to developing a nuclear weapon of mass destruction under the guise of peaceful energy production. This fanatical pursuit has been routinely framed for Western audiences as a defensive measure or an energy initiative, but nothing could be further from the truth.
...
The complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program cannot come without the removal of the regime that pursues it. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are ingrained in an ideological drive to destroy Israel. Limited airstrikes by Israel or the US will not be sufficient to dismantle this threat – a strategy aimed at facilitating regime change in Tehran must be pursued in earnest.
This will require a coordinated and concerted effort by Washington, Jerusalem, and other governments to empower the Iranian people to rise up against the regime that rules. Only with the regime’s removal can lasting regional security be established.
Attacking Iran isn't enough: Only regime change will end the nuclear threat - opinion
Airstrikes alone won’t dismantle Tehran’s nuclear threat. The complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program cannot come without the removal of the regime that pursues it.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-86015
IRANIAN PRESIDENT Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during a meeting in Ilam, Iran, on June 12, just before Israel launched Operation Rising Lion.
(photo credit: Iran presidential website/West Asia News Agency/Reuters)
ByANTHONY AVICE DU BUISSON
JULY 7, 2025 05:24
Updated: JULY 7, 2025 05:25
The latest series of airstrikes targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities may have temporarily disrupted Tehran’s ambitions, but they have not ended them. As with Iraq before 2003, tactical strikes alone cannot neutralize a strategic threat because Tehran remains ideologically committed to acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Preventing this outcome requires more than containment – it demands a serious effort to remove the regime that pursues it.
The destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan by Israel and the United States marks a significant blow to the Islamic regime’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Operation Midnight Hammer, carried out by 120 aircraft, including several US B-2 bombers on June 22, targeted these sites in a coordinated strike.
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This followed Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, which paved the way for aerial dominance by neutralizing Iran’s air defense and striking critical military infrastructure. American and Israeli intelligence assessments confirm substantial damage, indicating the strikes have set Iran’s nuclear program back by a couple of years.However, the damage inflicted by these air campaigns has not entirely eliminated Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Assessments by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials highlight that Iran might have successfully dispersed critical material such as 408 kilograms of enriched uranium to different locations prior to the attacks. This points to a high likelihood that Iran could recover and resume nuclear development in the near future.
People attend the funeral procession of Iranian military commanders, nuclear scientists and others killed in Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2025. (credit: MAJID ASGARIPOUR/WANA (WEST ASIA NEWS AGENCY) VIA REUTERS)
Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to threaten Israel’s national security and broader regional stability.
Since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the regime in Tehran has devoted itself to the ideological elimination of Zionism. This conviction is rooted in the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (“guardianship of the jurist”) and expressed through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which serves as both an enforcer of the regime’s ideology and a patron of international terrorism.
The IRGC has fueled violence and destabilization across the Middle East through its operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Gaza, and the West Bank. Its direct support for the October 7 attack against Israel is just one of many examples of the regime’s enduring extremism and hostility toward the Jewish people.
For decades, the regime in Iran has devoted substantial resources to developing a nuclear weapon of mass destruction under the guise of peaceful energy production. This fanatical pursuit has been routinely framed for Western audiences as a defensive measure or an energy initiative, but nothing could be further from the truth.
Iran has a history of deception
A long history of deception, dating back to the 1990s and predating the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reveals a regime intent on advancing a theocratic doomsday vision. Repeated violations of nonproliferation commitments documented by IAEA inspector reports and corroborated by Western intelligence assessments underscore this agenda. The IAEA’s most recent report from June 12, once again confirms Iran’s failure to comply with peaceful nuclear development requirements.
Recently, the Iranian parliament voted to end cooperation with the IAEA, signaling a decisive departure from the illusion of peaceful cooperation. Intelligence assessments from the European Union and a low-confidence evaluation by the US Defense Intelligence Agency suggest that Iran’s nuclear program remains active and can be quickly reconstituted.
Iran now finds itself in a position strikingly similar to Iraq in 1998. After engaging in a prolonged campaign of deception with the United Nations Special Commission, Saddam Hussein effectively forced the withdrawal of weapons inspectors in December of that year. In response, a joint US and UK four-day aerial campaign, Operation Desert Fox, was launched to force Saddam’s regime back into compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 687 by targeting key weapons of mass destruction sites across the country.
Saddam’s regime had gone so far as to establish an entire ministry dedicated to deceiving weapons inspectors. In the years that followed, Saddam Hussein refused to allow inspectors to return, maintaining strategic ambiguity to deter Iran and suppress internal dissent. This prolonged standoff with the international community continued until the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in 2002.
The lesson is clear: Airstrikes alone failed to bring the regime into compliance and instead emboldened its fanaticism and defiance.
Iran has studied Iraq’s playbook – and improved upon it. With deeper regional proxy networks, more sophisticated propaganda, and greater strategic patience, the regime in Tehran has become more adept at evading international pressure.
Iran needs a unified internal opposition
Confronting this reality is essential to preventing a theocratic regime from acquiring such a capability. Israel has taken substantial steps to weaken Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shiite militias abroad, including targeting senior IRGC officials within Iran through military operations. However, these efforts alone are insufficient to bring about regime change and a coherent strategy that supports internal political transformation must now be actively pursued.
There is currently no unified internal opposition in Iran capable of mounting an effective challenge to the regime – but an opposition with the potential to do so could and should be cultivated in solidarity with the Iranian people. This begins with efforts to weaken the regime’s domestic repression infrastructure, specifically the IRGC’s Basij, which is tasked with crushing dissent.
The Basij plays a central role in suppressing civil liberties and enabling gender-based violence. Undermining this apparatus would help create the space necessary for broader organization and resistance.
Support should also be extended to armed resistance movements in Iran’s ethnic periphery. Kurdish groups such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Free Life Party (PJAK), Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), and Komala remain active in western Iran (Rojhelat), while Baluchi groups in the southeast continue to resist Tehran’s control.
Although these groups possess local organization and arms, they lack the capacity to operate beyond their ethnic enclaves. Strategic outreach and coordination with these movements could serve as a foundation for a more cohesive, nationwide opposition.
While some members of the Iranian diaspora support exiled opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi or Maryam Rajavi, these individuals lack meaningful support within Iran and are unlikely to serve as viable alternatives to the current regime. In the absence of a unified and credible domestic opposition, alternative strategies for facilitating change must be followed.
Coordination between the United States, Israel, European partners, and Iranian reformers is essential to addressing the absence of a viable internal opposition. Just as the United States passed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998 to support dissidents opposing Saddam Hussein, a similar Iranian Liberation Act should be established to assist pro-democracy movements within Iran.
This would involve fostering grassroots activism and helping to form an organized political opposition, akin to the role once played by the Iraqi National Congress. Through financial assistance, logistical support, and diplomatic outreach, the objective would be to identify and empower democratic and secular alternatives to the current regime.
A legitimate domestic opposition capable of assuming power in the event of the regime’s collapse is essential to preventing Iran from descending into chaos. This is not only a strategic imperative but also a moral one, as the current regime has demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice national stability in pursuit of its ideological goals. The urgency of curtailing Tehran’s fanatical domestic and regional ambitions demands coordinated international action.
A renewed nuclear deal will not halt the regime’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon because rewarding Tehran with financial incentives after its military infrastructure has been severely degraded sends the wrong message. The Obama administration-led JCPOA enabled Iran to recover, expand its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, and increase support for proxy forces across the region. The Trump administration should not fall into the same trap, nor should European governments, by repeating a provably failed approach.
The complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program cannot come without the removal of the regime that pursues it. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are ingrained in an ideological drive to destroy Israel. Limited airstrikes by Israel or the US will not be sufficient to dismantle this threat – a strategy aimed at facilitating regime change in Tehran must be pursued in earnest.
This will require a coordinated and concerted effort by Washington, Jerusalem, and other governments to empower the Iranian people to rise up against the regime that rules. Only with the regime’s removal can lasting regional security be established.
11. Kremlin gloats about US weapons pause to Ukraine
Excerpt:
“The respective threat assessments here in Europe versus back in Washington are further apart than they have been in any time, perhaps since the end of the Cold War. And I think that is very disconcerting,” Brian Finlay, the Stimson Center’s president & chief executive officer, said at the GLOBSEC Security Forum in Prague in June. “I think that the new administration has a fundamentally different perception of risk and threat than here in Europe, and throughout the history of the transplanted relationship, again, since the end of the Cold War.”
Kremlin gloats about US weapons pause to Ukraine
The halt in aid speaks to a shifting view of the threat Putin poses.
defenseone.com
Kremlin gloats about US weapons pause to Ukraine - Defense One Skip to Content
By Patrick Tucker
Science & Technology Editor
July 3, 2025
The recent pause in U.S. weapons deliveries to Ukraine, including some 30 Patriot missiles, has Russian officials openly questioning the willingness—and ability—of the United States to support a key ally.
The Kremlin’s top spokesman greeted the recent decision gleefully: “The industry can't make missiles in necessary quantities fast enough, especially as there were obviously many shipments to Israel as well, and deliveries to Ukraine are continuing”, said Dmitry Peskov.
Kirill Dmitriev, the CEO of Russia’s direct investment bank, said on Telegram, “Such a move raises questions about the West’s real ability to continue supporting Ukraine—and about the priorities of American defense policy itself.”
The pause in aid has alarmed not only Ukrainians but also analysts and former U.S. officials. While Peskov has claimed that the fewer interceptors Ukraine has, “the nearer the end of the special military operation is," Russia’s actions point to the contrary.
Moscow has been ramping up its missile attacks on Ukraine—against military and civilian targets. Konrad Muzyka of the Rochan Consulting in Poland told the New York Times at the end of June that Russia would likely exceed 5,000 launches that month.
An assessment from the Institute for the Study of War on Wednesday concluded the pause will work as a gift to Putin. “Reducing U.S. military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory,” they wrote. “Putin's theory of victory posits that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend, and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine.”
The White House and Pentagon say the pause is necessary in order to conduct a review of current U.S. stockpiles. Patriot missiles in particular have been critical to Ukraine’s defense against Russian attacks, but they are in high demand.
Some former officials have questioned the necessity of the move.
In a New York Times op-ed Thursday, former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan blasted the pause and its justification in terms of military readiness. Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative “deliveries—the main target of the pause—are sourced from procurement contracts, not from the Pentagon’s stockpiles, and are distinct from orders for the U.S. military,” he wrote, pointing out that the White House has used “congressional funding to replace what it sends with newer munitions, which actually strengthens the U.S. military.”
Military analyst Colby Badhwar on X supported that point Thursday, calling Ukraine’s needs—which include the 30 Patriots but also GMLRS precision rockets, munitions and Hellfire anti-tank missiles—“modest” compared to overall Defense Department overall readiness goals.
Badhwar goes on to accuse Elbridge Colby—the current under secretary of defense for policy and apparent proponent of the pause—of “deliberately sabotaging both Ukraine and the entire Department of Defense.”
Long before his current role in the Trump administration, Colby spent years distinguishing himself from other foreign and defense policy thinkers by arguing the United States was over-invested in Ukraine’s survival, and not invested enough in deterring Chinese military action against Taiwan.
But even very staunch defenders of Ukraine point out that demand for weapons, particularly Patriots, is growing faster than supply. A RAND analysis from November notes the U.S. could take from “active inventories” to cover shortfalls in production, though such a move is risk. Still, the analysis states, “Increased domestic production combined with a more effective Ukrainian force assuages this risk.”
NATO’s support and procurement agency placed a $5.6 billion order for Patriot missiles and related components in January, but those deliveries will not start until 2027.
And the U.S. Army is also looking to increase its acquisition of Patriots, seeking increased funding not only for the interceptors themselves but also to ramp up the capacity to build them.
Whether the United States can spare 30 Patriot missiles—among other weapons aid—right now depends greatly on how large a threat to Ukraine and Europe Vladimir Putin really is. But there is little agreement on that answer.
“The respective threat assessments here in Europe versus back in Washington are further apart than they have been in any time, perhaps since the end of the Cold War. And I think that is very disconcerting,” Brian Finlay, the Stimson Center’s president & chief executive officer, said at the GLOBSEC Security Forum in Prague in June. “I think that the new administration has a fundamentally different perception of risk and threat than here in Europe, and throughout the history of the transplanted relationship, again, since the end of the Cold War.”
12. The Army just turned 4 Big Tech execs into instant officers. What an insult
Hmmmm.... Just because it took 19 years for this lawyer to be promoted to Colonel should not make this action an insult to him.
The question is in the modern world what does our Army need in terms of talent and how should we acquire it? I am sure a thorough cost benefit analysis was conducted and that these four are going to make substantive contributions either directly or indirectly.
And is this really the equivalent of "purchasing commissions?"
Excerpts:
These four executives are all multimillionaires several times over, and will be commissioned at a rank usually achieved by officers who have served at least 20 years in their military careers. They will reportedly not be required to complete the Army Fitness Test or participate in the military’s six-week-long Direct Commission Course, though they will be given a crash course on military history and take a physical test and marksmanship training.
It is almost as though these four individuals are being awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel because of their wealth and status, much like the British Army used to allow the purchasing of military commissions, or as one is rewarded with an ambassadorship because of a large political donation.
The Army just turned 4 Big Tech execs into instant officers. What an insult | Opinion By Thomas Arnhold Special to The Kansas City Star July 6, 2025 5:07 AM
Read more at: https://www.tri-cityherald.com/opinion/article309955335.html#storylink=cpy
tri-cityherald.com
Insult: US Army made Big Tech executives instant officers | Tri-City Herald
Opinion articles provide independent perspectives on key community issues, separate from our newsroom reporting.
Shyam Sankar of Palantir. Andrew Bosworth of Meta, Kevin Weil of OpenAI and Bob McGrew of Thinking Machines Lab are now all lieutenant colonels with the Army Reserve. LinkedIn/United States Army Reserve
When I was a young attorney in Hutchinson, Kansas, a friend of mine suggested that we join the Army Reserve or National Guard as members of the Judge Advocate General Corps. I had recently opened a private law practice, had one child and another on the way. Once I joined, I would receive a direct commission as a first lieutenant. For weekend drills, I would be paid a little over $100 and around $1,500 for two weeks of annual training. With the offer of a little adventure and some much-needed cash, I joined the Kansas Army National Guard and stayed 24 years.
In order to receive my direct commission, I had to complete a Direct Commission Course in Arkansas. I flew to the course, courtesy of the U.S. Army. I was 29, and it was the first time I had flown in an airplane. At the course there were other lawyers like me, doctors, nurses and future chaplains. After completing the course, chaplains were commissioned as first lieutenants, nurses as second lieutenants and doctors as captains (which at the time, ticked me off).
The direct commission program still exists today. There is such a shortage in the medical field that if a nurse takes a direct commission, the U.S. Army will pay his or her tuition to medical school and up to a $40,000 bonus for joining. A doctor of psychiatry can receive up to a $600,000 bonus.
Just recently, I learned that the U.S. Army Reserve is giving direct commissions to several executives from Big Tech firms Meta, OpenAI and Palantir at the rank of lieutenant colonel to serve in Detachment 201, a new Executive Innovation Corps. When I learned of this, I was not a happy camper, so I dug a little deeper.
In 2019, Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019, which gave the military services the authorization to direct commission officers up to the rank of colonel. That means a civilian can receive a direct commission as a bird colonel (colonels wear an eagle as their rank) if they have the requisite background.
Let me put this in perspective: I was not promoted to colonel until I served 19 years. During those 19 years in the Kansas Army National Guard, I progressed from first lieutenant to captain, major, lieutenant colonel and, finally, colonel. I took years of classes, including the Judge Advocate Basic Course, the Advanced Judge Advocate Course and Command and General Staff College. During the 19 years it took me to reach the rank of colonel, I went to around 200 weekend drills, 19 or more sessions of annual training, deployed to Bosnia, made numerous trips overseas and helped with the recovery from Hurricane Katrina.
The average age of lieutenant colonels is 39, and by the time they have achieve that rank, they have served 16 years in the military. The average age of colonels is 45 and they usually have served around 22 years in the military.
Wealth and status, not experience
These four executives are all multimillionaires several times over, and will be commissioned at a rank usually achieved by officers who have served at least 20 years in their military careers. They will reportedly not be required to complete the Army Fitness Test or participate in the military’s six-week-long Direct Commission Course, though they will be given a crash course on military history and take a physical test and marksmanship training.
It is almost as though these four individuals are being awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel because of their wealth and status, much like the British Army used to allow the purchasing of military commissions, or as one is rewarded with an ambassadorship because of a large political donation.
There is some precedent. During World War II, several famous actors and musicians were given direct commissions. For example, Hollywood filmmaker John Ford was commissioned as a commander in the United States Navy Reserve and served as the head of a photographic unit. Popular bandleader Glenn Miller became a major in the U.S. Army. However, one must keep in mind there was a war on, in which nearly everyone in our nation was mobilized to help the effort in some way.
I find it unfair and unwise that someone can receive a direct commission to lieutenant colonel or colonel. Yes, we need technical experts and other specialists, but taking someone with zero military experience and making them an officer is a bit absurd. Direct commissions above captain are bad for morale. Here you are a major, 15 years into your military career, and a civilian is suddenly your ranking officer, and they have not even been to a single military school and cannot pass the Army Fitness Test. How do they even know how to wear the uniform properly, know when and who to salute, or any other basics about the military? What happens if there is a crisis and a colonel with no military training is in charge and must handle the emergency? Do they know how to fire and clean a weapon?
Direct commissions should be limited to the rank of captain. If the military needs to recruit those with special skills, then let’s do it with bonuses or other enticements (maybe even a little patriotism). At the very minimum, those receiving a direct commission should be required to pass the Army Fitness test, successfully complete the Direct Commission Course, followed by the other U.S. Army courses required to reach the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel.
Tom Arnhold of Olathe is a retired attorney, judge and a 24-year veteran of the Kansas Army National Guard, where he served as a JAG officer.
13. A text, a Telegram link, then an offer of money: how Iran sought to recruit spies in Israel
The tables are turned here. How Iran recruited Israeli spies. But it seems Israeli counterintelligence is better than Iran's.
Spy vs. Spy.
Excerpts:
However, so many Israelis were prepared to carry out modest missions that the spying campaign may have been successful as a way of crowdsourcing data on strategically important sites that would later become targets of Iranian ballistic missiles.
Meanwhile, Israel spied on Iran to devastating effect, allowing the Mossad to locate and assassinate much of Iran’s high command and its nuclear scientists in a single instant in the early hours of Friday 13 June, among many other targets.
A text, a Telegram link, then an offer of money: how Iran sought to recruit spies in Israel
Court documents suggest Israelis were asked to carry out missions that were at first modest but quickly escalated
Julian Borger and Jamal Risheq in Jerusalem
Sun 6 Jul 2025 01.00 EDT
The Guardian · by Julian Borger · July 6, 2025
Before Israel launched its war on Iran last month, its security service uncovered an extensive network of its own citizens spying for Tehran – on a scale that has taken the country by surprise.
Since Iran’s first missile barrage on Israel in April 2024, more than 30 Israelis have been charged with collaboration with Iranian intelligence.
In many cases, the contacts began with anonymous messages offering money for information or for small tasks. The payments were then ratcheted up in line with ever more dangerous demands.
Judging by court documents, the surge in Iranian espionage efforts over the past year achieved little, falling short of Tehran’s aspirations of carrying out high-level assassinations of Israeli officials.
However, so many Israelis were prepared to carry out modest missions that the spying campaign may have been successful as a way of crowdsourcing data on strategically important sites that would later become targets of Iranian ballistic missiles.
Meanwhile, Israel spied on Iran to devastating effect, allowing the Mossad to locate and assassinate much of Iran’s high command and its nuclear scientists in a single instant in the early hours of Friday 13 June, among many other targets.
Since the war began, the Iranian regime has arrested more than 700 people accused of spying for Israel, according to the Fars news agency. But the trials have been secret, and in at least six cases led to summary executions, making it impossible to judge how much of the alleged network is real and how much a figment of official hysteria.
By contrast, in the case of the Israelis accused of spying for Iran, the prosecution has filed detailed indictments. Though there has only been one conviction so far from the recent wave of arrests, leaving individual guilt to be assessed, a clear picture has emerged from court documents of how Iran set about casting a wide net for potential agents.
It typically began with a text message from an anonymous sender. One such message, from the sender “news agency”, asked: “Do you have any information about the war? We are ready to buy it.” Another, sent by “Tehran-Quds” (Tehran-Jerusalem) to a Palestinian Israeli citizen, was more overt, saying: “A free Jerusalem unites Muslims. Send us information about the war.”
The message included a link to the Telegram app, where a new dialogue would begin, sometimes with someone using an Israeli name, with an offer of money for apparently simple errands. If the recipient expressed interest, they would be advised by their new mystery contacts to set up PayPal and an app for receiving funds in cryptocurrencies.
In the case of one suspect arrested on 29 September, the first task was to go to a park and check if a black bag had been buried in a certain spot, for a payment of nearly US$1,000 (£730). There was no bag, and the recruit sent a video to prove it.
He was later assigned other jobs that involved handing out leaflets, hanging up posters or spraying graffiti, most with slogans denigrating Benjamin Netanyahu, such as “We are all together against Bibi” (Netanyahu’s nickname) or “Bibi brought Hezbollah here” or “Bibi = Hitler”.
The next stage entailed taking photos. An Israeli of Azeri heritage was hired to photograph sensitive facilities around the country and seems to have turned it into a family business, getting his relatives to take shots of the port facilities in Haifa (which later would be hit by Iranian missiles in this month’s 12-day war), the Nevatim airbase in the Negev (struck in a salvo in October), as well as Iron Dome missile defence batteries across the country, and the Glilot military intelligence headquarters north of Tel Aviv.
Israel’s Iron Dome system fires to intercept missiles over Tel Aviv. Photograph: Léo Corrêa/AP
The same recruit who went to look for the black bag was asked to photograph the home of a nuclear scientist working at the Weizmann Institute. Israel’s premier scientific centre was the object of keen Iranian interest. Over the 15 years leading up to the war this month, five Iranian nuclear scientists were killed, almost certainly by the Mossad. In a long struggle over whether Israel would maintain its monopoly over nuclear weapons in the Middle East, Tehran wanted to strike back.
Iran struck the Weizmann Institute with ballistic missiles in the 12-day war, and it seems likely that the photos taken by its agents helped with targeting. The attempt to kill its scientists was a failure, however. In fact, neither Iran’s ministry of intelligence and security nor its Revolutionary Guards appear to have succeeded in assassinating any of their targets in the long shadow war.
While the Mossad relied on infiltrating a cadre of highly trained operatives into Iran, the approach taken by Iranian intelligence was to test how far their green recruits would be prepared to go. Yossi Melman, an Israeli intelligence expert, quoted a Shin Bet official as describing it as a “spray-and-pray approach, which seeks to develop a handful of high-quality recruits by making low-stakes investments in many others”.
Once they had carried out simple tasks such as putting up posters and taking pictures, the recruits were asked to do more for more money. Having photographed the home of a nuclear scientist from the Weizmann Institute, one recruit was offered $60,000 to kill the scientist and his family and burn down their house.
According to the indictment, the agent accepted and went about hiring four local toughs, all Palestinian Israeli citizens. On the night of 15 September, this would-be hit squad turned up at the gates of the Weizmann Institute, but they did not get past the security guard and meekly drove away.
Weizmann Institute buildings were left in ruins after the Iranian missile strike. Photograph: Violeta Santos Moura/Reuters
The day after that fiasco, the Iranian handlers told the recruit to go back to the Weizmann and take more photos. With the advantage of being an Israeli Jew arriving in daylight, he managed to talk his way past the security guards and filmed the scientist’s car. He was paid $709 and asked if he would attach a GPS device to the car. He refused.
This would be a pattern that repeats again and again in the indictments. Though the Iranian recruiters proved effective at finding plenty of Israelis ready to take photographs and distribute leaflets for Iranian money, the handlers in Tehran seem to have been in too much of a hurry to cultivate long-term agents.
Several were abruptly asked, only a few days after completing their first tasks, whether they would try to assassinate high officials. The Azeri group were asked to find a hitman but refused. The same recruit who refused to place a GPS tracker on a scientist’s car was asked days later if he might consider throwing a petrol bomb at Netanyahu’s vehicle.
Only one of the suspects has so far been convicted and jailed, after confessing to the charges against him.
Million-dollar demand
When Mordechai “Moti” Maman, 72, was approached by Iranian intelligence in spring last year, he was recently married to a much younger Belarusian woman, and in need of funds after the failure of several business ventures.
Maman had spent some years in Samandağ, in southern Turkey, and in April, he contacted two businessmen brothers he knew there to see if they had any money-making ideas. The brothers said they had a lucrative business partnership with an Iranian acquaintance named Eddie importing dried fruit and spices and suggested Maman should meet him.
In April, Maman flew to Samandağ via Cyprus, but Eddie sent two colleagues in his place, claiming he was not able to leave Iran for bureaucratic reasons. The next month, the Israeli was invited back to Turkey, to the town of Yüksekova in the far south-east, where he stayed in a hotel room paid for by Eddie.
Once more, Eddie said he was unable to cross into Turkey, but he told Maman there was a way to smuggle the Israeli into Iran. He agreed and on 5 May he made the crossing concealed in a truck.
Eddie and a second Iranian official met Maman in a luxury hotel inside Iran and made him an offer of thousands of dollars for three tasks. He was to leave money or guns at designated locations in Israel; he was to take photos of crowded places; and he was to pass on threats to other agents, specifically Israeli Palestinians, who had “received funds from Iran for carrying out hostile missions, but had not actually carried out their missions”.
Maman said he would think about it and was smuggled back into Turkey. Back in Yüksekova, he was handed $1,300 in cash as partial payment for making the trip.
In August, Maman was back in Turkey and was once more smuggled over the border to meet Eddie and his associate. This time the tasks were more daunting. The Iranians offered $150,000 for killing any of Netanyahu, Ronen Bar, the head of the Shin Bet, or Yoav Gallant, then the defence minister.
Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant last October. Photograph: Amir Cohen/Reuters
According to the prosecution, Maman said he had underworld connections who might be able to get the job done, but he wanted $1m. That was too high for the Iranians who suggested a lesser target, the former prime minister Naftali Bennett, for $400,000. Maman allegedly stuck to his million-dollar demand and the talks adjourned without agreement.
He was paid $5,000 and flew back to Cyprus and then, on 29 August, on to Tel Aviv, where Shin Bet officers were waiting for him.
On 29 April, Maman was sentenced to 10 years in prison after pleading guilty to charges of contact with a foreign agent and unauthorised entry into an enemy state. His lawyer, Eyal Besserglick, described the sentence as excessive and has appealed.
Besserglick said Maman believed until the last moment that Eddie was no more than an Iranian businessman dealing in raisins and spices, and he was unaware when he was being smuggled onboard a truck that he was being taken into Iran. He denies Maman asked for $1m, arguing that his client ultimately had to appear to go along with the Iranian plots, out of fear that a sudden refusal would get him killed.
“What would have been better? If he had been kidnapped in a van or maybe been murdered?” Besserglick told the Guardian. He said Maman had been beaten up in prison and kept in a filthy cell with excrement smeared on the walls.
“The mistake he made is serious,” the lawyer said. “But he should not die for that mistake, because in the end there will be no one to punish.”
Bayan Rabee contributed reporting to this article
- This article was amended on 6 July 2025. An earlier version referred to Friday 13 July when Friday 13 June was meant.
The Guardian · by Julian Borger · July 6, 2025
14. Pentagon sets up interservice counter-drone task force
A friend and collegue asked this question:
Wonder if their will be a connection or component with respect to sharing with the FBI, State and Local authorities -- especially in light of the Ukraine and Israeli drone operation/smuggling into Russia and Iran??
Pentagon sets up interservice counter-drone task force
The Army will lead the new group, which will try to coordinate the different service branches' efforts to develop ways to take out enemy uncrewed vehicles.
Nicholas Slayton
Published Jul 6, 2025 11:35 AM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton
The American military’s efforts to speed up defensive tools and tactics against uncrewed aerial systems. Different branches of the armed forces have been working to integrate electromagnetic and kinetic countermeasures into their units and arsenals, with varying stages of progress. Now the Pentagon is setting up a joint interagency task force to try and coordinate the different programs.
The new interagency group is being created in part because the military “cannot move fast enough in this space,” according to Gen. James Mingus, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Mingus revealed the new task force while speaking at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The exact details on the task force and its makeup weren’t specified but Mingus compared the risks that UAS pose to the dangers of improvised explosive devices during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
“We need an organization that is joint, interagency, has authorities, a colorless pot of money and the authorities to go after, from requirements all the way through acquisition in a rapid way to be able to keep pace with that. We are in the process of standing that organization up and get it going,” he said.
Per Mingus, the Army will lead the new task force, but “this will be a joint organization to be able to deal with joint solutions in the future.”
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The growing importance of drones in modern military tactics has been discussed by the U.S. armed forces since the outbreak of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but has taken on greater urgency over the last 18 months due to fighting in the Middle East. U.S. forces have intercepted or been targeted by waves of combined drone and missile attacks in ground bases in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, among other nations, and in the waters around Yemen. The attacks have resulted in dozens of injuries and three deaths, and current air defense options have been costly, from the use of Patriot missile batteries or Navy ships heavily using expensive Standard Missiles to take out relatively cheap UAS.
The military has been after a new strategy for countering aerial drones for more than a year. Last spring William LaPlante, then the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment at the Department of Defense, outlined the need for a reliable and affordable counter-UAS program that could be made at scale, noting that the current options are “getting too expensive.”
Earlier this year a memo outlining a planned transformation in the Army highlighted integrating drones into the service and expanding on ways to counter them. It specified a need for cheaper options, which can be integrated in small maneuver units as early as next year. The Army for its part already asked for more than $800 million for counter-drone initiatives from Congress in its 2026 budget request. Other services are working on their own ways of dealing with the ground threat. The Navy is pursuing several cheaper ways to intercept aerial drones while the Marine Corps is deploying units out with prototype countermeasures meant to work with small-unit tactics.
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15. The CIA’s most unlikely Cold War weapon? A secret smuggling operation that terrified Soviet censors
Books, books, books.
But regardless of the medium it is all about information and influence.
Excerpts:
Did the CIA’s Book Program work?
By the 1980s, conversations were decidedly shifting.
Communist regimes that had once controlled every channel of discourse found themselves outmatched by ideas they no longer had the political power to suppress.
And while the Cold War was largely a conflict defined by arms races, space exploration, proxy wars and nuclear standoffs, a paperback novel hidden in a tin can could still pose a very real threat to a regime that required ideological control.
The CIA’s most unlikely Cold War weapon? A secret smuggling operation that terrified Soviet censors
In the aftermath of the Second World War, as the Soviet Union imposed ideological control across Eastern Europe, the CIA turned to an unexpected tactic: a covert smuggling operation designed to win hearts and minds
https://www.historyextra.com/period/cold-war/cia-unlikely-weapon-against-soviet-censors/
James Osborne
Published: July 6, 2025 at 4:00 PM
At the height of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union vied for any advantage they could find. And between the various proxy wars and games of economic brinkmanship, the CIA unleashed its most unexpected weapon: books.
Their ambitious and unusual plan was to smuggle banned literature into the heart of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe – and by doing so, weaken the grip of Soviet ideology on people’s hearts and minds.
The books chosen (from authors including George Orwell, Agatha Christie, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Albert Camus) were specifically picked for their power to challenge authoritarianism, undermine censorship and question the doctrines of totalitarian ideology.
Speaking on the HistoryExtra podcast, journalist and author Charlie English lifted the lid on the scale and ambition of this extraordinary campaign, which spanned four decades and reached deep behind the Iron Curtain.
“The ‘CIA Book Program’ was a long-running US intelligence operation that ran from the mid 1950s until about 1991,” English explains. “It succeeded in secretly infiltrating around ten million books into the Eastern Bloc over that period in a bid to undermine the draconian censorship regimes that existed in every East European country.”
More like this
A war of words
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had expanded its influence across Central and Eastern Europe, establishing satellite states in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and beyond. With that expansion came rigid political control alongside strict ideological enforcement.
Enabling this control were state censorship offices which policed what could be published, read or discussed. Large swathes of Western literature were suppressed, critical thinkers were silenced and entire philosophical traditions with rich histories (from liberalism to existentialism) were denounced as dangerous.
“Every East European country that was part of the Soviet Bloc had a state censor,” says English. “The aim of it was to stop people thinking thoughts that were beyond the kind of framework of the ideology of the regime at the time.”
For the CIA, this environment created opportunity. Rather than risking direct military confrontation, it decided it could chip away at communist legitimacy by exposing people to forbidden ideas. In this regard, English notes, “books were probably unrivalled at that time. The printed word was the main form of delivery of ideas”.
On 7 November 1957, trucks carrying missiles roll through Moscow during a parade marking the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The display of military power took place beneath a giant image of Lenin — a striking symbol of Soviet strength during the Cold War. (Photo by Getty Images)
The ultimate reading list
At the top of the CIA’s list for covert distribution were George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm, arguably the foremost stories exploring the perils of authoritarian control and propaganda. Alongside Orwell were works by Arthur Koestler, Albert Camus, Milan Kundera and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, whose memoir-novel The Gulag Archipelago was a blistering critique of Soviet labour camps.
But the campaign wasn’t limited to heavy-hitting dissident texts.
Western detective fiction, with its focus on individual agency and the power of creative and rational thinking, risked feeling revolutionary within the Soviet context. “Even Agatha Christie … was read very differently in the East,” English explains. So, unintentionally, “[Christie’s works became] a very strong argument against the communist.”
The CIA’s covert cultural contraband
Choosing the books was one thing, but the actual act of smuggling them into authoritarian states required more than good literary taste.
The CIA worked through front organisations, often operating under the guise of charitable or cultural foundations. No shipments bore the CIA’s name, and funding was laundered through seemingly benign intermediaries. The Agency deliberately obscured its involvement to maintain deniability.
But even with these fronts, a lot of creative licence was often required to get books past Soviet lines. “One book was taken in inside a baby's nappy,” says English.
They also produced miniature books that could fit inside a can of baked beans.
“Someone would presumably get a tin of baked beans and open it up and find that it was a copy of George Orwell, which must have been a bit of a shock,” says English.
Others were hidden in false-bottomed suitcases, secret vehicle compartments or the hollowed-out interiors of seemingly innocuous objects. The CIA even developed portable printing presses, allowing dissidents to reproduce smuggled texts on the ground.
Ultimately, it was a global operation, reliant on willing students, diplomats, missionaries and tourists; anyone who could cross borders and carry hidden cargo. It was also expensive, with English suggesting that the operation probably cost in the region of $4 million a year.
A copy of 1084 being hidden inside a metal tin. (Photo by Getty Images)
Literature as a tool for resistance
Once a book had successfully infiltrated the Soviet Union, the operation transitioned into a new phase. Dissidents copied, translated and distributed the material through underground networks, a system Soviet authorities labelled as samizdat. These illegal, often hand-copied editions passed person-to-person in secret. The risks were enormous.
In Poland, where the Solidarity trade union emerged as a mass movement in the 1980s, literature played a decisive role. Books helped activists formulate ideas, critique the system, and envision democratic alternatives.
Meanwhile, underground publishers, such as Poland’s prolific Mirosław Chojecki (who was imprisoned more than 40 times) became incredible symbols of defiance.
Cumulatively, the impact was enormous.
“It was literature that won the Cold War in Poland,” says English. “Uncensored literature became so pervasive that the regime really lost control of the argument and lost control of the population.”
Did the CIA’s Book Program work?
By the 1980s, conversations were decidedly shifting.
Communist regimes that had once controlled every channel of discourse found themselves outmatched by ideas they no longer had the political power to suppress.
And while the Cold War was largely a conflict defined by arms races, space exploration, proxy wars and nuclear standoffs, a paperback novel hidden in a tin can could still pose a very real threat to a regime that required ideological control.
Charlie English was speaking to Lauren Good on the HistoryExtra podcast. Listen to the full conversation.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: World on the Brink
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James Osborne is a digital content producer at HistoryExtra where he writes, researches, and edits articles, while also conducting the occasional interview
16. Ukraine’s Drone Revolution – And What America Should Learn From It
Excerpts:
The United States could take the same approach with additional Ukrainian technologies, including counterdrone systems, by coproducing these capabilities with Ukraine and acquiring the associated intellectual property. Ukraine’s defense industry has succeeded in part because its manufacturers can engage in rapid iteration based on real-world results. The United States should also take advantage of the opportunity to provide Ukraine with experimental U.S. technologies, assess their performance on the ground, and then make updates accordingly.
The primary risk of this approach is that the United States could become dependent on a foreign partner for some of its defense production, akin to Russian dependency on Iranian drones in the current conflict. But the alternative is worse given Ukraine’s current knowledge and production advantage, and the focus should be on closing this gap. The United States should view its collaboration with Ukraine as a short-term technology accelerator rather than a long-term solution. The Department of Defense, working with U.S. industry, should aim to learn from Ukrainian expertise rapidly, begin to produce these cutting-edge systems, and then transition away from licensed models and toward their own independent designs. Should the United States instead back away from supporting Ukraine, it would risk losing access to proven defense technology, battlefield expertise, and data on Russia’s military performance.
Europe, meanwhile, should look to the United States and Ukraine as complementary models for defense production. As European leaders invest in their own defense industries, the United States can offer guidance on how to build higher-end autonomous systems, as well as conventional capabilities such as artillery, rockets, and strategic air defense at scale. Ukraine can do the same for mass-produced drones and associated technologies.
Ukraine’s fight represents a watershed in modern warfare. Kyiv has shown that it is possible to hold a stronger adversary at bay with advanced, affordable, and adaptable drones and other defense technologies. The United States must continue to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression, and as the Trump administration seeks more in return, Ukraine should help the United States turbocharge its own innovation. Both countries will be better and stronger for it.
Ukraine’s Drone Revolution
Foreign Affairs · by More by Jon Finer · July 7, 2025
And What America Should Learn From It
July 7, 2025
A Ukrainian service member standing next to drones, Kharkiv region, Ukraine, June 2025 Viacheslav Ratynskyi / Reuters
JON FINER was the Principal Deputy National Security Adviser from 2021 to 2025.
DAVID SHIMER served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2025, including as Director for Eastern Europe and Ukraine and Director for Russian Affairs, and is an Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
The war between Russia and Ukraine began with an unprovoked combined air and ground assault, then settled into a mid-twentieth-century-style artillery standoff, and has now evolved into the world’s first conflict waged largely by drones.
Last year, Ukraine launched a series of successful long-range drone strikes against ammunition depots hundreds of miles inside Russian territory. Such strikes have been ongoing ever since. Every day, the Ukrainian military deploys thousands of shorter-range drones to defend against Russian ground assaults, largely replacing the Howitzer shells that were previously the lifeblood of the conflict. Kyiv is locked in a technological and production arms race to ensure that its drones are both sophisticated enough and plentiful enough to overcome Russian jamming and other countermeasures. Ukraine’s innovators are still reaching new heights: in June, Ukrainian drones caused billions of dollars in damage to advanced military aircraft in remote parts of Russia.
The United States has played an important role in this Ukrainian success, seeding the expansion in this key area of the country’s defense industrial base and financing the most promising Ukrainian drone manufacturers, to help Ukraine reach a level of production once unimaginable—millions of autonomous systems per year. Today, the remarkable pace of this innovation, forged by necessity under battlefield conditions found nowhere else on the planet, presents an opportunity for the United States. To seize it, the Department of Defense and U.S. industry must learn from Ukraine’s drones and other defense technology. The war between Russia and Ukraine is not perfectly analogous to contingencies that the United States may face in the future, and not every lesson in Ukraine is applicable to U.S. military planning, but this war is nonetheless full of instructive technological innovations and breakthroughs.
Over the past three and a half years, Ukraine has developed a cutting-edge defense industry. The Ukrainian military still depends on the United States for high-end conventional capabilities such as Patriot air-defense missiles, as well as certain staples, including rockets and associated launchers. But within its own borders, Ukraine is now producing novel and inexpensive short- and long-range drones, counterdrone systems, robotics, and tactical air defenses. While serving in the Biden administration, we toured Ukraine’s drone facilities, met with their manufacturers, and watched Ukrainian businesses, frontline forces, and pilots work together to upgrade those systems, hour by hour, in response to battlefield feedback.
Having never experienced this form of combat, most countries in the world, including the United States, are now far behind the Ukrainians in this regard. Neither the U.S. military nor any European military can produce mass quantities of such low-cost and adaptable capabilities. Nor is it clear that the U.S. military is moving rapidly enough to incorporate battlefield lessons into its own doctrine. Meanwhile, Ukraine and Russia are innovating further as they gradually integrate AI into their drone and other defense technologies. AI promises to remake modern warfare, just as it will remake so many other aspects of society—but unlike with large language models, Kyiv, not San Francisco, is where cutting-edge systems are being developed and deployed first.
This opportunity to learn from Ukraine provides, among other things, a powerful counterargument to those who question the merits of continuing to support Ukraine: the United States can benefit from Ukraine’s unique technological capabilities and knowledge of U.S. adversaries. President Donald Trump’s recent decision to pause critical security assistance deliveries to Ukraine should be reversed for many reasons, including because a sustained pause will make it more challenging to deepen U.S.-Ukrainian technological cooperation.
To its credit, the Trump administration has said it is committed to defense innovation. Ukraine is perhaps the leading laboratory for such innovation today. Russia’s key backers—China, Iran, and North Korea—are surely drawing their own lessons from this war, and from their contributions to Russia’s military campaign. Iran is learning how its drones and missiles perform; North Korea is doing the same with its munitions and soldiers; and China is assessing the efficacy of its inputs into Russia’s defense industrial base. To stay ahead and enhance its readiness for potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and elsewhere, the United States must expand its technological partnership with Ukraine.
That means continuing Washington’s support for Ukraine’s military, with the understanding that Ukraine will, in turn, share its technological know-how and expertise, including the designs for its most effective drones, its strategy for upgrading those designs in response to Russian countermeasures, and data on the strengths and weaknesses of Russia’s defensive and offensive weapons systems. This approach would be mutually beneficial: Ukraine would help the United States build world-class drones and other cutting-edge capabilities, and the United States would continue to help Ukraine defend itself. But the inverse is also true—less support for Ukraine will mean it will be less inclined to share its expertise and data with the United States.
A REVOLUTION FORGED IN FIRE
Ukraine developed its drone industry as part of a national struggle to survive. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian military repelled the Russian assault on Kyiv and went on to retake more than half the territory that Russian forces initially seized. At the same time, in factories and labs far from the frontlines, Ukrainian entrepreneurs and engineers began to pursue another critical mission: to build drones that could be deployed against Russian forces.
These innovators had the same fervor as their countrymen on the battlefield, but they needed financing and materiel. The U.S. government quietly provided this assistance. In the fall of 2022, the Biden administration began efforts to improve Ukraine’s drone manufacturing, which at that time was nascent. A turning point came in the summer of 2023, when Ukraine’s counteroffensive failed to break through Russian lines and exposed the limitations of conventional capabilities in this conflict. Ukraine’s brigades were unable to overcome Russia’s rudimentary but effective minefields and other physical barriers, while Russian drones wreaked havoc on Ukraine’s armored vehicles. In response, the United States decided to turbocharge support for Ukraine’s drone industry. The White House worked with Congress to secure additional funding in the April 2024 national security supplemental for this effort, which was used both to finance select Ukrainian drone manufacturers directly and to provide Ukraine with key components needed for drone production. In all, as we briefed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a visit to Kyiv last fall, the United States directed more than $1.5 billion into Ukraine’s drone industry, and other countries followed suit in supporting Ukraine’s defense industrial base.
Ukrainian partners generated an enormous return on this investment: Ukrainian production of both short- and long-range drones increased exponentially in 2024. According to the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian military’s monthly supply of drones rose from 20,000 at the start of 2024 to 200,000 a year later, a tenfold increase. As Russia improved its counterdrone capabilities, Ukrainian manufacturers learned to update their software and designs to defeat Russian jamming and other countermeasures. By January 2025, Ukraine had scaled its ability to use long-range drones against military targets deep inside Russia and to use shorter-range drones against Russian units across the frontlines. Ukraine was also producing impressive counterdrone, missile, robotic, and tactical air-defense systems.
WHAT UKRAINE CAN TEACH
The opportunity to learn from Ukraine’s cutting-edge capabilities still exists today, although the window is closing. Ukraine’s drones have proved both effective and affordable. Ukraine is building millions of short-range FPV drones this year at a cost of roughly $400 per unit and tens of thousands of long-range drones at a cost of roughly $200,000 per unit. By contrast, shorter-range U.S. drones such as the Switchblade 600 are estimated to cost more than $100,000 per unit, and longer-range U.S. drones can cost millions. Ukrainian drone operators report that U.S.-made drones have been less effective, reliable, and rapidly adaptable to Russian countermeasures than those produced inside Ukraine.
These differences are in part a matter of circumstance. Ukraine is fighting for its survival with limited resources against a larger adversary, while the Pentagon has historically been cautious about investing in emerging technologies and startups, preferring instead to partner with established contractors on legacy systems. Part of the problem is that these contractors have incentives to build more limited numbers of expensive, higher-margin weapons. But the Ukraine conflict has also addressed a legitimate concern for the Pentagon—uncertainty about which technologies will prove effective in the real world—by providing billions of dollars in R & D and weapons testing under unprecedented battlefield conditions.
Although there will remain a role for more advanced and expensive autonomous systems in which the United States retains an edge, the sheer scale of Ukraine’s mass production yields an important and complementary advantage. Ukraine can iterate rapidly—and discard older models with such frequency—precisely because companies are closer to the action and its systems are cheap and disposable. As Ukraine and Russia deploy AI-enabled drone technology, China, Iran, and North Korea will be watching, and learning. As AI-driven swarming technology develops, the advantage of sheer numbers will only deepen.
U.S. allies and partners threatened by stronger adversaries are particularly in need of the kinds of asymmetric capabilities Ukraine is developing. Consider Taiwan, which could use scalable and cheap drones to help defend itself if Beijing were to escalate. Washington should provide such partners with similar capabilities and help them develop their own domestic production. But for the United States, this opportunity is about more than just helping friends. Ukraine’s offensive success against Russia, such as the recent drone attack conducted from trucks positioned deep inside Russian territory, reveals potential shortcomings in U.S. defenses, as well, including in the homeland. Ukrainian expertise could help close the gap.
SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY
Learning the right lessons from Ukraine to strengthen U.S. capabilities should involve a few key steps. As a starting point, the U.S. Defense Department should work with Ukrainian companies to manufacture drones in the United States, with the understanding that those drones would then be provided to both the Ukrainian and the U.S. militaries. This type of partnership, known as coproduction, would be a win-win: the United States would learn from Ukrainian manufacturers firsthand, and both Ukraine and the United States would receive these drones. The Pentagon should also strike a deal with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to license drone technology and designs to the United States. With this intellectual property, the U.S. military could independently build inexpensive and battlefield-tested drones and develop the domestic infrastructure needed to scale production.
The United States could take the same approach with additional Ukrainian technologies, including counterdrone systems, by coproducing these capabilities with Ukraine and acquiring the associated intellectual property. Ukraine’s defense industry has succeeded in part because its manufacturers can engage in rapid iteration based on real-world results. The United States should also take advantage of the opportunity to provide Ukraine with experimental U.S. technologies, assess their performance on the ground, and then make updates accordingly.
The primary risk of this approach is that the United States could become dependent on a foreign partner for some of its defense production, akin to Russian dependency on Iranian drones in the current conflict. But the alternative is worse given Ukraine’s current knowledge and production advantage, and the focus should be on closing this gap. The United States should view its collaboration with Ukraine as a short-term technology accelerator rather than a long-term solution. The Department of Defense, working with U.S. industry, should aim to learn from Ukrainian expertise rapidly, begin to produce these cutting-edge systems, and then transition away from licensed models and toward their own independent designs. Should the United States instead back away from supporting Ukraine, it would risk losing access to proven defense technology, battlefield expertise, and data on Russia’s military performance.
Europe, meanwhile, should look to the United States and Ukraine as complementary models for defense production. As European leaders invest in their own defense industries, the United States can offer guidance on how to build higher-end autonomous systems, as well as conventional capabilities such as artillery, rockets, and strategic air defense at scale. Ukraine can do the same for mass-produced drones and associated technologies.
Ukraine’s fight represents a watershed in modern warfare. Kyiv has shown that it is possible to hold a stronger adversary at bay with advanced, affordable, and adaptable drones and other defense technologies. The United States must continue to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression, and as the Trump administration seeks more in return, Ukraine should help the United States turbocharge its own innovation. Both countries will be better and stronger for it.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Jon Finer · July 7, 2025
17. AI and the Trust Revolution – How Technology Is Transforming Human Connections
Excerpts:
So how can societies reap the benefits of AI without falling prey to its dangers? First, they need to recognize that trust is a multifaceted phenomenon that has shifted before (and will keep shifting) and that technological change is occurring amid (and exacerbating) social flux. That means AI developers need to proceed very cautiously and humbly, discussing and mitigating the risks of the tools they develop. Google, for its part, has tried to do this by publishing an ambitious 300-page collection of recommendations about the ethical labyrinth of advanced AI assistants, exploring how to maintain safeguards that prevent AI from emotionally manipulating users, and what it means to measure human well-being. Other firms, such as Anthropic, are doing the same. But much more attention from the private sector is needed to tackle these uncertainties.
Consumers also need real choice among developers, so that they can select the platforms that offer the most privacy, transparency, and user control. Governments can encourage this by using public policy to promote responsible AI development, as well as open science and open software. This approach can create some safety risks. But it also creates more checks and balances by injecting competition between different systems. Just as customers can “shop around” for banks or telecom services if they dislike how one system treats them, they should be able to switch between AI agents to determine which platform offers them the most control.
Increasing human agency should be the goal when thinking about how people interact with AI platforms. Instead of viewing AI as a despotic, robotic overlord, developers need to present it more as a superintelligent member of people’s existing online crowds. That does not mean people place blind faith in AI or use it to displace human-to-human interactions; that would be disastrous. But it would be equally foolish to reject AI simply because it seems alien. AI, like humans, has the potential to do good and bad and to act in trustworthy and untrustworthy ways. If we want to unlock the full benefits of AI, we need to recognize that we live in a world where trust in leaders is crumbling, even as we put more faith in the wisdom of crowds—and ourselves. The challenge, then, is to use this digital boost to the wisdom of crowds to make us all wiser.
AI and the Trust Revolution
Foreign Affairs · by More by Yasmin Green · July 7, 2025
How Technology Is Transforming Human Connections
July 7, 2025
A robot at an economic conference in St. Petersburg, Russia, June 2025 Anton Vaganov / Reuters
YASMIN GREEN is CEO of Jigsaw, Google’s technology incubator. She is Co-Chair of the Aspen Cybersecurity Group and serves on the board of the Anti-Defamation League.
GILLIAN TETT is Provost of King’s College Cambridge and a columnist at the Financial Times.
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When experts worry about young people’s relationship with information online, they typically assume that young people are not as media literate as their elders. But ethnographic research conducted by Jigsaw—Google’s technology incubator—reveals a more complex and subtle reality: members of Gen Z, typically understood to be people born after 1997 and before 2012, have developed distinctly different strategies for evaluating information online, ones that would bewilder anyone over 30. They do not consume news as their elders would—namely, by first reading a headline and then the story. They do typically read the headlines first, but then they jump to the online comments associated with the article, and only afterward delve into the body of the news story. That peculiar tendency is revealing. Young people do not trust that a story is credible simply because an expert, editorial gatekeeper, or other authority figure endorses it; they prefer to consult a crowd of peers to assess its trustworthiness. Even as young people mistrust institutions and figures of authority, the era of the social web allows them to repose their trust in the anonymous crowd.
A subsequent Jigsaw study in the summer of 2023, following the release of the artificial intelligence program ChatGPT, explored how members of Gen Z in India and the United States use AI chatbots. The study found that young people were quick to consult the chatbots for medical advice, relationship counseling, and stock tips, since they thought that AI was easy to access, would not judge them, and was responsive to their personal needs—and that, in many of these respects, AI advice was better than advice they received from humans. In another study, the consulting firm Oliver Wyman found a similar pattern: as many as 39 percent of Gen Z employees around the world would prefer to have an AI colleague or manager instead of a human one; for Gen Z workers in the United States, that figure is 36 percent. A quarter of all employees in the United States feel the same way, suggesting that these attitudes are not only the province of the young.
Such findings challenge conventional notions about the importance and sanctity of interpersonal interactions. Many older observers lament the rise of chatbots, seeing the new technology as guilty of atomizing people and alienating them from larger society, encouraging a growing distance between individuals and a loss of respect for authority. But seen another way, the behavior and preferences of Gen Z also point to something else: a reconfiguration of trust that carries some seeds of hope.
Analysts are thinking about trust incorrectly. The prevailing view holds that trust in societal institutions is crumbling in Western countries today, a mere two percent of Americans say they trust Congress, for example, compared with 77 percent six decades ago; although 55 percent of Americans trusted the media in 1999, only 32 percent do so today. Indeed, earlier this year, the pollster Kristen Soltis Anderson concluded that “what unites us [Americans], increasingly, is what we distrust.”
But such data tells only half the tale. The picture does seem dire if viewed through the twentieth-century lens of traditional polling that asks people how they feel about institutions and authority figures. But look through an anthropological or ethnographic lens—tracking what people do rather than what they simply tell pollsters—and a very different picture emerges. Trust is not necessarily disappearing in the modern world; it’s migrating. With each new technological innovation, people are turning away from traditional structures of authority and toward the crowd, the amorphous but very real world of people and information just a few taps away.
This shift poses big dangers; the mother of a Florida teenager who committed suicide in 2024 filed a lawsuit accusing an AI company’s chatbots of encouraging her son to take his own life. But the shift could also deliver benefits. Although people who are not digital natives might consider it risky to trust a bot, the fact is that many in Gen Z seem to think that it is as risky (if not riskier) to trust human authority figures. If AI tools are designed carefully, they might potentially help—not harm—interpersonal interactions: they can serve as mediators, helping polarized groups communicate better with one another; they can potentially counter conspiracy theories more effectively than human authority figures; they can also provide a sense of agency to people who are suspicious of human experts. The challenge for policymakers, citizens, and tech companies alike is to recognize how the nature of trust is evolving and then design AI tools and policies in response to this transformation. Younger generations will not act like their elders, and it is unwise to ignore the tremendous change they are ushering in.
TRUST FALL
Trust is a basic human need: it glues people and groups together and is the foundation for democracy, markets, and most aspects of social life today. It operates in several forms. The first and simplest type of trust is that between individuals, the face-to-face knowledge that often binds small groups together through direct personal links. Call this “eye-contact trust.” It is found in most nonindustrialized settings (of the sort often studied by anthropologists) and also in the industrialized world (among groups of friends, colleagues, schoolmates, and family members).
When groups grow big, however, face-to-face interactions become insufficient. As Robin Dunbar, an evolutionary biologist, has noted, the number of people a human brain can genuinely know is limited; Dunbar reckoned the number was around 150. “Vertical trust” was the great innovation of the last few millennia, allowing larger societies to function through institutions such as governments, capital markets, the academy, and organized religion. These rules-based, collective, norm-enforcing, resource-allocating systems shape how and where people direct their trust.
The digitization of society over the past two decades has enabled a new paradigm shift beyond eye-contact and vertical trust to what the social scientist Rachel Botsman calls “distributed trust,” or large-scale, peer-to-peer interactions. That is because the Internet enables interactions between groups without eye contact. For the first time, complete strangers can coordinate with one another for travel through an app such as Airbnb, trade through eBay, entertain one another by playing multiplayer video games such as Fortnite, and even find love through sites such as Match.com.
To some, these connections might seem untrustworthy, since it is easy to create fake digital personas, and no single authority exists to impose and enforce rules online. But many people nevertheless act as if they do trust the crowd, partly because mechanisms have arisen that bolster trust, such as social media profiles, “friending,” crowd affirmation tools, and online peer reviews that provide some version of oversight. Consider the ride-sharing app Uber. Two decades ago, it would have seemed inconceivable to build a taxi service that encourages strangers to get into one another’s private cars; people did not trust strangers in that way. But today, millions do that, not just because people trust Uber, as an institution, but because a peer-to-peer ratings system—the surveillance of the crowd—reassures both passengers and drivers. Over time and with the impetus of new technology, trust patterns can shift.
NO JUDGMENT
AI offers a new twist in this tale, one that could be understood as a novel form of trust. The technology has long been quietly embedded in daily lives, in tools such as spell checkers and spam filters. But the recent emergence of generative AI marks a distinct shift. AI systems now boast sophisticated reasoning and can act as agents, executing complex tasks autonomously. This sounds terrifying to some; indeed, an opinion poll from Pew suggests that only 24 percent of Americans think that AI will benefit them, and 43 percent expect to see it “harm” them.
But American attitudes toward AI are not universally shared. A 2024 Ipsos poll found that although around two-thirds of adults in Australia, Canada, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed that AI “makes them nervous,” a mere 29 percent of Japanese adults shared that view, as did only around 40 percent of adults in Indonesia, Poland, and South Korea. And although only about a third of people in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed that they were excited about AI, almost half of people in Japan and three-quarters in South Korea and Indonesia did.
Meanwhile, although people in Europe and North America tell pollsters that they fear AI, they constantly use it for complex tasks in their lives, such as getting directions with maps, identifying items while shopping, and fine-tuning writing. Convenience is one reason: getting hold of a human doctor can take a long time, but AI bots are always available. Customization is another. In earlier generations, consumers tended to accept “one size fits all” services. But in the twenty-first century, digitization has enabled people to make more personalized choices in the consumer world, whether with music, media, or food. AI bots respond to and encourage this growing desire for customization.
Another, more counterintuitive factor is privacy and neutrality. In recent years, there has been widespread concern in the West that AI tools will “steal” personal data or perform with bias. This may sometimes be justified. Ethnographic research suggests, however, that a cohort of users prefer AI tools precisely because they seem more “neutral,” less controlling, and less intrusive than humans. One of the Gen Zers interviewed by Jigsaw explained her affinity for talking to AI in blunt terms: “The chatbot can’t ‘cancel’ me!”
Another recent study of people who believe conspiracy theories found that they were far more willing to discuss their beliefs with a bot than with family members or traditional authority figures, even when the bots challenged their ideas, which suggests one way that human-machine interactions can trump eye-contact and vertical trust mechanisms. As one person told the researchers: “Now this is the very first time I have gotten a response that made real, logical, sense.” For people who feel marginalized, powerless, or cut off from the elite—like much of Gen Z—bots seem less judgmental than humans and thus give their users more agency. Perhaps perversely, that makes them easier to trust.
FROM HAL TO HABERMAS
This pattern might yet shift again, given the speed of technological change and the rise of “agentic intelligence,” the more sophisticated and autonomous successor to today’s generative AI tools. The major AI developers, including Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI, are all advancing toward new “universal assistants” capable of seeing, hearing, chatting, reasoning, remembering, and taking action across devices. This means that AI tools will be able to make complex decisions without direct human supervision, which will allow them to bolster customer support (with chatbots that can meet customer needs) and coding (with agents who can help engineers with software development tasks).
New generations of AI tools are also gaining stronger persuasive capabilities, and in some contexts they seem to be as persuasive as humans. This invites obvious dangers if these tools are deliberately created and used to manipulate people—or if they simply misfire or hallucinate. Nobody should downplay those risks. Thoughtful design, however, can potentially mitigate this: for example, researchers at Google have shown that it is possible to develop tools and prompts that train the AI to identify and avoid manipulative language. And as with existing apps and digital tools, agentic AI allows users to exercise control. Consider wearable technology, such as a Fitbit or an Apple Watch, that can monitor vital signs, detect concerning patterns, recommend behavioral changes, and even alert health-care providers if necessary. In all these cases, it is the user, not the bot, who decides whether to respond to such prompts and which data will be used in the AI programs; your Fitbit cannot force you to go jogging. So, too, with financial planning bots or those used for dating: technology is not acting like a dictator but like a member of an online crowd of friends, offering tips that can be rejected or accepted.
Having an AI tool act in this way can obviously make people more efficient and also help them better organize their lives. But what is less evident is that these tools can potentially also improve peer-to-peer interaction within and between groups. As trust in authority figures has faded and people have tried to customize their information sources and online “crowd” to their individual tastes, societies have become more polarized, trapped in echo chambers that do not interact or understand each other. Human authority figures cannot easily remedy that, given widespread distrust. But just as AI tools can translate between languages, they are also starting to have the potential to translate between “social languages”: that is, between worldviews. A bot can scan online conversations between different groups and find patterns and points of common interest that can be turned into prompts that potentially enable one “crowd” of people to “hear” and even “understand” others’ worldviews better. For instance, researchers from Google DeepMind and the University of Oxford have developed an AI tool called the “Habermas Machine” (an homage to the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas) that aspires to mediate disputes between groups with opposing political perspectives. It generates statements that reflect both the majority and the minority viewpoints in a group that relate to a political issue and then proposes areas of common ground. In studies involving over 5,000 participants, the AI-generated statements were preferred over those created by human mediators, and using them led to greater agreement about paths forward on divisive issues.
For people who feel marginalized, bots seem less judgmental than humans.
So how can societies reap the benefits of AI without falling prey to its dangers? First, they need to recognize that trust is a multifaceted phenomenon that has shifted before (and will keep shifting) and that technological change is occurring amid (and exacerbating) social flux. That means AI developers need to proceed very cautiously and humbly, discussing and mitigating the risks of the tools they develop. Google, for its part, has tried to do this by publishing an ambitious 300-page collection of recommendations about the ethical labyrinth of advanced AI assistants, exploring how to maintain safeguards that prevent AI from emotionally manipulating users, and what it means to measure human well-being. Other firms, such as Anthropic, are doing the same. But much more attention from the private sector is needed to tackle these uncertainties.
Consumers also need real choice among developers, so that they can select the platforms that offer the most privacy, transparency, and user control. Governments can encourage this by using public policy to promote responsible AI development, as well as open science and open software. This approach can create some safety risks. But it also creates more checks and balances by injecting competition between different systems. Just as customers can “shop around” for banks or telecom services if they dislike how one system treats them, they should be able to switch between AI agents to determine which platform offers them the most control.
Increasing human agency should be the goal when thinking about how people interact with AI platforms. Instead of viewing AI as a despotic, robotic overlord, developers need to present it more as a superintelligent member of people’s existing online crowds. That does not mean people place blind faith in AI or use it to displace human-to-human interactions; that would be disastrous. But it would be equally foolish to reject AI simply because it seems alien. AI, like humans, has the potential to do good and bad and to act in trustworthy and untrustworthy ways. If we want to unlock the full benefits of AI, we need to recognize that we live in a world where trust in leaders is crumbling, even as we put more faith in the wisdom of crowds—and ourselves. The challenge, then, is to use this digital boost to the wisdom of crowds to make us all wiser.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Yasmin Green · July 7, 2025
18. Drones Aren’t the Solution to Africa’s Security Crises
Conclusion:
Despite their limitations, drones have become a symbol of sovereignty and power in Africa, particularly for military regimes and those mired in internal conflicts. While drones may offer symbolic value and even some tactical utility, they cannot substitute for coherent counterterrorism strategies that focus on improved governance and public infrastructure. As insurgents adapt and civil-military tensions mount, African drone proliferation risks becoming more about political optics than real security gains. As the United States weighs its level of security commitment to fight terrorism in Africa, policymakers should ensure that the provision of drones to partners on the continent is understood to be a means, not an end, to counterterrorism operations—means that must be accompanied with more commitment, not less. The lesson for Washington and other external partners is clear: Drones must support African security, not define it.
Drones Aren’t the Solution to Africa’s Security Crises - Modern War Institute
Raphael Parens, Marcel Plichta and Christopher M. Faulkner | 07.07.25
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Raphael Parens · July 7, 2025
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In Mali, rebel Tuareg forces sifted through the wreckage of a Turkish-supplied drone on the night of April 1. The platform, a Bayraktar Akinci surveillance drone operated by Malian armed forces, had plummeted to earth near the Algerian-Malian border. Shortly after the downing, the Algerian Army issued a statement claiming it had shot down the drone because it had entered Algerian airspace, a claim vehemently disputed by the Malian Foreign Ministry. The event showcases the growing tensions between Algiers and Bamako, but it also highlights a larger point—the proliferation of drones in Africa has not gone as smoothly as military leaders might have expected. As the past few years have shown, drones have not dramatically shifted the balance for African militaries. While they may add a modern capability to military arsenals and may even offer some tactical advantages, drones are far from a remedy for the entrenched insecurity that plagues many on the continent.
Regardless of their emerging record of dubious utility in rectifying security threats, African nations have doubled down on their drone acquisitions. This isn’t entirely new. The United States and others have used drones in Africa for years as part of counterterrorism efforts from Somalia to the Sahel, but now African nations are investing in their own independent drone fleets. According to newly compiled data from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, African drone acquisition packages, which often involve the purchase of multiple drones, have steadily increased each year since 2015, with particularly sharp growth after 2020. Nigeria (eighteen), Algeria (fifteen), and Ethiopia (twelve) led the shopping spree. These acquisition numbers generally, though not exclusively, refer to larger and more sophisticated unmanned systems, such as medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) fixed-wing platforms like the Bayraktar TB2 or Akinci, rather than the thousands of cheap, disposable quadcopters or one-way attack drones that have become a fixture in the war in Ukraine. The diversity of threats faced by these top buyers suggests that African nations see drones as flexible tools for managing a wide spectrum of security concerns, from insurgencies to border surveillance, and even as a prime, if not preferred, tool in counterterrorism operations.
External suppliers have capitalized on this surge in demand, dominating Africa’s expanding drone market. Türkiye, whose Bayraktar TB2s have grown in popularity over the past decade, is the largest known supplier of drones to the continent (thirty-two), followed by China (twenty-seven), Israel (eighteen), and the United States (fifteen). However, African nations are also getting involved on the supply side, with Egypt, Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia staking claims as the continent’s leading drone exporters, accounting for roughly 12 percent of drone sales to African governments.
This drone shopping spree has coincided with a massive increase in both drone strikes and fatalities in Africa, from 31 strikes and 69 fatalities in 2020 to 484 strikes and 1,176 fatalities in 2024. Yet, the increased tempo of drone operations has not decisively shifted the balance in any of Africa’s long-running conflicts. In fact, in many cases, an increased reliance on drones correlates with increased instability. Sudan (264) and the Sahelian countries (145) accounted for 84 percent of Africa’s drone strikes in 2024, yet the conflicts in both areas continue to rage. In Burkina Faso, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, launched violent offensives in 2024, killing civilians and soldiers and using bases in the country to launch deadly incursions into Benin and Togo. In Mali, JNIM and Tuareg separatist forces sharply defeated a Wagner and Malian Army force in July 2024, followed by attacks on the capital, Bamako. In Niger, the Islamic State’s Sahelian franchise and JNIM advanced into the country, including an October attack on the capital, Niamey. Meanwhile, across the continent in Sudan, an end to the civil war is unlikely despite recent gains by the Sudanese Armed Forces against the rival Rapid Support Forces.
Deadly [Im]precision
Regardless of their questionable efficacy in stemming the tide of violence, drones remain a seductive addition to African arsenals. This is not all that surprising given the evolution of drones as key features across many militaries—from major powers like the United States and China to smaller states like Bangladesh and Tunisia. For some African states, drones are seen as useful in enhancing the government’s ability to target insurgent leadership without risking the lives of soldiers, at least directly. Malian drone strikes in early December 2024, for instance, killed eight Tuareg separatist leaders in Tinzaouaten, site of an earlier ambush that cost the lives of a dozen Malian soldiers along with their Russian mercenary counterparts.
While Malian officials emphasized the success of the drone attack, research shows that leadership decapitation as a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy has a mixed track record. Some research emphasizes decapitation’s effectiveness in degrading organizations’ attack frequency and intensity, and at times, even their longevity, and studies show that drone strikes can have a chilling effect even on nontargeted groups, deterring their operations for fear of becoming potential targets. But other research paints a more cautious picture of the utility of armed drones, emphasizing the plethora of conditionalities that can render decapitation strategies less effective. Factors like organizational age or internal structuring have been shown to increase the resiliency of organizations to decapitation strategies. At times, targeted killings might actually have unintended effects, leading an organization to behave more aggressively. Leadership decapitation isn’t a sure thing—it is a potentially successful strategy with the capacity to backfire.
Regardless, in order to target leadership, this strategy relies on strong intelligence-gathering capabilities to assess where and when targets will be vulnerable to aerial attacks. Drones may help with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, but they are not an intelligence cure-all. The US drone strike that targeted Iranian Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, for instance, relied on extensive human intelligence and international collaboration prior to the strike.
Even cases where leadership is not the target require robust intelligence operations. Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, a surprise attack on Russian aircraft carried out on June 1, required over a year and a half of intelligence gathering and preparation. Its focus on hard targets like military aircraft differs markedly from African counterterrorism operations mostly targeting individuals. Ironically, overconfidence in drones’ ability to gather intelligence diverts resources that could be used to develop consistent and reliable intelligence capabilities and an intelligence culture that is focused on interagency cooperation rather than suspicion. This dilemma has already led to mistaken killings of civilians. In 2022 Togo issued a public apology for a drone strike that killed seven civilians that they misidentified as jihadists. A review by Drone Wars UK of six conflicts—in Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria—where governments deployed Turkish, Chinese, or Iranian medium-altitude, long-endurance drones between November 2021 and 2024 found that drone strikes were responsible for at least one thousand civilian deaths. To be sure, African militaries have used drone strikes with tactical success, but these are mostly against static targets like enemy-controlled towns, which limits their ability to get the most out of the technology.
A high incidence of civilian casualties in many strikes also suggests that such strikes are often used punitively, which pays little dividends on the battlefield. Instead, it risks provoking backlash and deepening public hostility toward the government, creating fertile ground for terrorist groups to exploit. And enhancing recruitment opportunities is only one potential risk associated with inaccuracy. Drone inaccuracy, willful or otherwise, also diminishes incentives for local populations to cooperate with military and police forces. This erosion of local trust poses an enduring threat to effective counterinsurgency.
Meanwhile, drone reconnaissance failed to detect threats to Sahelian armed forces and cities, such as the defeat at Tinzaouaten and attacks on Bamako and Djibo again reflecting a yawning gap in Sahelian governments’ intelligence gathering. These intelligence failures reflect deeper issues in how drones are being integrated into security strategies. Rather than serving as tools to enhance state effectiveness, drones are sometimes wielded for more political purposes.
Spoils or Solutions?
Some leaders likely see drones as a means of spoiling the armed forces—in effect, giving them new toys that can insulate them from the front lines of violent counterinsurgency campaigns. In fact, some prominent scholarship argues that one of their core advantages for insecure regimes is that “drones can operate from centralized locations where those most loyal to the regime can directly supervise their use.” But such calculations may be misguided. In Burkina Faso, for example, the ruling junta purchased two advanced Turkish-made Akinci drones and five TB2s, investments aligned with projecting force against insurgents and empowering the armed forces. An attempted coup on April 22, however, was allegedly led by members of President Ibrahim Traoré’s own guard and the elite Rapid Intervention Brigade. High-cost drone acquisitions alone, therefore, are insufficient spoils absent addressing other internal grievances and they may actually come at the expense of basic support to key units.
Further, overreliance on drones does not necessarily save money. Arms purchases represent a significant budgetary burden for small militaries, especially those grappling with severe internal security crises. While drones are usually less expensive than traditional manned aircraft, purchasing drones is much costlier than the sticker price of the system itself. Like their manned counterparts, the most capable systems require a steady stream of additional munitions, spare parts, and personnel trained in their operation and maintenance. Militaries might be able to skimp out on costs by hiring contractors to operate their drones, but that comes with a greater dependency on an external firm and potentially a foreign government.
However, African leaders might be after public opinion rather than fielding a war-winning military capability. Evidence from recent scholarship notes that when the government, rather than a foreign power, conducts the successful targeting of militant group leadership, it increases civilian’s perceptions of local government’s capacity—in other words, winning hearts and minds. This appears to be the crux of several drone-based campaigns in Africa—establishing a compelling national security narrative in order to ensure military control of power. In Mali, the government has crafted a brutal counterterrorism strategy that rebrands massacres of civilians as victories against terrorists within the military’s “rise in power” (montée en puissance) against its adversaries. This narrative has been extended to drone warfare, which according to Malian news site Bamada, helps the country in “consolidating its sovereignty, expanding its territorial reach, and neutralizing threats throughout the country.”
Even in countries where the existential risk of terrorism or rebellion is comparatively low, like Djibouti and Tunisia, purchasing and showcasing drones is a quick way to build public perception that the military is on the cutting edge of military technology. In 2022 Djibouti announced it had purchased a TB2 drone by literally parading it during independence day celebrations.
Still, this reliance on drones may be creating the conditions for further instability. Insurgent forces across the region are increasingly developing their own drone capabilities in response. In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces have deployed Chinese-made Sunflower kamikaze one-way attack drones, as well as Serbian Yugoimport mortar drones allegedly supplied by the UAE. Across the Sahel, JNIM reportedly carried out an audacious strike on Burkinabe military positions in February 2025, employing first-person-view drones to drop explosives improvised from plastic water bottles. In June 2025, JNIM publicized the capture of three drones in its monthly communiqué, a development analysts interpret as a signal of the growing strategic value the group places on drone warfare. As African governments embrace drone-centric approaches to counterinsurgency they risk handing insurgents both the tools and the tactics to cultivate their own drone playbooks.
Despite their limitations, drones have become a symbol of sovereignty and power in Africa, particularly for military regimes and those mired in internal conflicts. While drones may offer symbolic value and even some tactical utility, they cannot substitute for coherent counterterrorism strategies that focus on improved governance and public infrastructure. As insurgents adapt and civil-military tensions mount, African drone proliferation risks becoming more about political optics than real security gains. As the United States weighs its level of security commitment to fight terrorism in Africa, policymakers should ensure that the provision of drones to partners on the continent is understood to be a means, not an end, to counterterrorism operations—means that must be accompanied with more commitment, not less. The lesson for Washington and other external partners is clear: Drones must support African security, not define it.
Raphael Parens is an international security researcher focused on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. He is a Templeton Fellow in the Eurasia and Africa programs at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He specializes in African security, paramilitary groups, and Eurasian security. He received his MA in international security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and he is currently based in London. X: @MoreSecurityInt
Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews, former analyst at the US Department of Defense, and an intelligence instructor for Grey Dynamics. His research focuses on the use of force by small states and drones in modern warfare. X: @Plichta_Marcel
Dr. Christopher M. Faulkner is an assistant professor at the US Naval War College and nonresident senior fellow with the Eurasia program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His research focuses on militant recruitment, private military companies, and national/international security. X: @C_Faulkner_UCF
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including the US Naval War College.
Image credit: Boevaya mashina
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Raphael Parens · July 7, 2025
19. 2024 Was Another Great Year for the U.S. in IW
Some interesting analysis of "good news" with a sober concussion wondering about 2025:
Excerpt:
How will the U.S. and its adversaries perform in IW in 2025? Many are already panicking, and the new U.S. administration does have a bias for action that seems to border on hyperactivity. The U.S. may interrupt its enemies and thereby rescue Putin from his Ukraine quagmire and save Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This would be unfortunate, but the dangers must be kept in perspective. The worst-case Iran IW scenario would have the U.S. administration allowing Iran to rebuild its proxy network, but that would take decades, and even then, the new Axis of Resistance would be much weaker than it was in 2023, since Iran will not regain control of Syria. Likewise, rescuing Russia from its Ukraine quagmire will not make Russia as strong as it appeared before the 2022 invasion, or nearly as strong as it was in 2013. Militarily, Russia has destroyed at least a half-million of its soldiers and burned through its old Soviet stockpiles of ammunition and equipment. Economically, it has spent three years doubling down on stupid. Diplomatically, Russia has burned its bridges with Europe, Russia’s natural trading partner. These facts will remain, no matter when or how a ceasefire comes to Ukraine. There is also a glimmer of hope in the fact that the new U.S. administration prides itself on hard bargaining with everyone. If the U.S. rescues Russia and Iran, what will the U.S. receive in return? There is reason to believe the answer will not be “nothing”.
2024 Was Another Great Year for the U.S. in IW
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/07/07/2024-was-another-great-year-for-the-u-s-in-iw/
by Thomas Searle
|
07.07.2025 at 06:00am
TAMPA, FLORIDA - MAY 8: A U.S. Navy Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman (SWCC) wears a U.S. flag patch during a capabilities demonstration at Special Operations Forces (SOF) Week at the Tampa Convention Center on May 8, 2024 in Tampa, Florida. According to the city, the demonstration will feature more than 170 United States Special Operations Command and international service members from 10 nations will take part in mock scenario defending the city of Tampa from ‘hostile invaders.’ (Photo by Luke Sharrett/Getty Images)
A year and a half ago, at the beginning of 2024, a short article appeared under the provocative title “The Future of Irregular Warfare: The United States is Winning, Now What?”. For decades, the prevailing narrative was consistent U.S. failure in irregular warfare (IW) and consistent adversary success. Since both narratives are false, it was long past time for an article like that one to set the record straight. The first months of the second Trump Administration are producing a barrage of dramatic daily news that makes it hard to predict the future of U.S. performance in IW. However, one can still see the past clearly and data is available to assess IW performance in 2024. Did the U.S. continue to outperform its adversaries in IW in 2024?
In ranking the U.S. and its main adversaries, from worst to best, here is how nations performed in IW in 2024.
Iran: The Biggest Loser
In 2024, the IW performance of Iran and its self-proclaimed Axis of Resistance was catastrophic for Iran. One year ago, Iran could claim that it controlled (or at least heavily influenced) four Arab countries: Syria (through the Assad regime), Lebanon (through Hezbollah), Iraq (through the Iraqi militias it sponsors), and Yemen (through the Houthis). Iran could also take pride in the ability of its Palestinian proxies—Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the rest—to shock Israel and the world on October 7, 2023. In 2024, however, Iran lost its two most important assets, Syria and Hezbollah, and Iran now appears to be one of the many victims of the October 7 attack.
Starting with Syria, the conventional wisdom a year ago was that Assad had won the Syrian civil war thanks to assistance from Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia. However, when Turkish-backed anti-Assad forces launched an offensive in late November of 2024, Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia were unwilling or unable to rescue the Assad regime. This was a disaster for Iran in many ways. First, Syria was Iran’s most valuable asset, and it was now gone. Second, the fall of Assad means Iran will never receive any return on its enormous investment in Syria. Third, Iran’s previous success in rescuing Assad made Iran a valuable partner that could and would rescue its friends, but the fall of Assad destroyed that narrative and revealed Iran to be a weak and feckless ally. Fourth, Syrian territory and the Syrian state were enormously helpful for supporting Hezbollah and advancing Iranian interests in Lebanon and elsewhere. That link is broken, and Syrian state resources are no longer available to Iran. The loss of Syria is probably permanent since Iran’s support for Assad leaves Iran with few friends and many enemies in Syria – including Syria’s new rulers. The new regime also enjoys support from Turkey, which has double Iran’s GDP and, unlike Iran, has a long border with Syria. Why would Turkey let Iran elbow its way back into Syria? Going forward, European countries will probably provide significant reconstruction aid to Syria in return for Syria facilitating the return of millions of Syrian refugees, but the refugees fled Assad and hate Iran for supporting him. Taken together, these factors make it hard to imagine how Iran can ever regain the influence it once had over Syria.
Hezbollah made a catastrophic mistake when it decided to support Hamas after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7. Israel took the opportunity to massacre Hezbollah leadership, eviscerate Hezbollah’s rocket, missile, and drone capabilities, and eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to invade northern Israel. Hezbollah is crippled, but unlike the Assad regime, it still exists, and it will eventually regain some of its former strength. Unfortunately for Iran, rebuilding Hezbollah will be much more difficult without Syrian help. Unfortunately for Hezbollah, its performance in 2024 proved that it was much less valuable to Iran than everyone thought. The tunnels under the Lebanese-Israeli border were never used and have now been destroyed, and Hezbollah’s vast arsenal of rockets, drones, and missiles proved to be no more than an inconvenience to Israel – an arsenal that no longer exists. Hezbollah’s claim to protect Lebanon from Israel proved to be a sham when its actions dragged Lebanon into a disastrous and unnecessary war with Israel. Hezbollah’s claim to lead the fight against Israel proved to be a sham when it abandoned Hamas and accepted a humiliating separate ceasefire with Israel. Through its corruption and misrule, Hezbollah made many enemies in Lebanon, who will complicate its recovery. In the future, Iran will provide endless rhetorical support to Hezbollah, as well as some financial and military assistance, but even if Iran could rebuild Hezbollah to its former strength, Iran will probably not bother, given the enormous cost and the lack of return on previous investments in Hezbollah.
Iran’s investment in Palestinian proxies like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad turned out even worse for Iran. With its October 7 attack, Hamas dragged Hezbollah off a cliff and took Assad with it. The Hamas attack also dragged Iran into direct attacks on Israel and Israeli retaliation. The exchange of direct attacks between Iran and Israel exposed Iran’s hopeless inferiority to Israel, left Iran helpless when Israel decided to attack again, and demonstrated that Israel can count on support from Western and Arab nations, whereas Iran will receive no similar assistance from anyone.
At the end of 2024, Iran retained its influence in Iraq and Yemen, but Iran’s Iraqi and Yemeni proxies are trivial threats to Israel, and Iran’s current weakness and failure to support Assad may invite challenges in Iraq and Yemen. Attacks on U.S. interests by Iran’s proxies have been totally ineffective since the Houthi hubbub in the Bab al-Mandab led to zero change in policy by Iran’s adversaries, and the one attack by Iraqi proxies that killed Americans led to immediate backtracking by Iran and its proxies. Overall, Iran’s IW approach of building proxies to threaten Israel and the U.S. was a disaster in 2024, forcing Iran to reconsider its entire strategy.
The destruction of Gaza reminded millions of Arabs that they do not like Israel, but that has not translated into love for Iran, and when Arab nations helped defend Israel against Iranian attacks, it proved that Arab governments like Iran even less than they like Israel. Iran continues to build closer relations with Russia, but Russia did nothing to save the Assad regime in 2024, nothing to protect Iran from Israeli attacks, and will not save Iran if Iran gets in trouble.
Russia: Doubling Down on Stupid
For Russia, 2024 brought another year of Putin’s disastrous war in Ukraine. Russian personnel and equipment losses have been enormous, and territory gained in 2024 was trivial (Russia captured 0.67% of Ukraine in 2024), but the worst part for Russia was that it became even less competitive with the West. Two decades ago, when Putin came to power in Russia, it seemed obvious that Russia needed to shift away from the old Soviet mistakes of ruthless information control and an economy over-reliant on defense spending and oil and gas exports. However, instead of improving the education system, opening information flows, and building a modern and diversified economy, Putin followed the familiar, and doomed, Soviet path. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine radically accelerated these negative trends for Russia, and each day the war continues puts Russia further behind.
As was pointed out in last year’s assessment, Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine proved that thirty years of post-Soviet Russian IW against Ukraine failed, forcing Putin to choose between watching Ukraine join the West or launching the largest and most expensive war in Europe since World War II. Russia’s expensive war effort left it with no resources in 2024 to retain its former position in the Caucasus, where former ally Armenia is pulling out of Russia’s orbit, or in Syria, where Russia failed to save the Assad regime. Russia is receiving useful assistance from Iran and North Korea, but these partners will demand payment for their assistance.
In 2024, Putin responded to his failures in Ukraine by launching more aggressive IW attacks against European nations that supported Ukraine, including cutting undersea cables, assassination plots, and sabotage attacks. In its broad outlines, Russian IW in Europe 2024 resembles the Russian IW campaign that failed in Ukraine. These IW efforts are too small and ineffective to force the targets to change policy in Russia’s favor, but are threatening and aggressive enough to increase hostility to Russia and to force the target countries to take defensive measures to protect vital infrastructure. These new IW attacks in Europe, therefore, seem counterproductive as they harden the anti-Russia positions of European countries. Additionally, they force the potential targets of future Russian attacks to build defenses against such attacks, eliminating that option for Russia in any future conflict.
It is important to remember just how far and how fast Russian influence has fallen in Europe. As recently as 2021 Germany signed the Nord Stream 2 pipeline agreement voluntarily increasing its economic and energy dependence on Russia. That same year French President Emanual Macron was still trying to build a personal relationship with Putin and bring Russia into a “shared security architecture” with Europe. Russia should be trying to build bridges back to the relationships it enjoyed in 2021. Instead, Russia’s new IW efforts in Europe seem guaranteed to lock in the current adversarial relationship for the foreseeable future.
In 2024, Russian IW was more successful in Africa, where Russian influence is increasing, often at the expense of Western nations. Lingering anti-colonial resentments and fond memories of Soviet support to resistance movements during the Cold War make many African nations particularly vulnerable to Russian messaging, and a dramatic recent increase in Russian disinformation in Africa seems to be paying dividends. However, Russia’s gains in a place like Burkina Faso are less important than its losses in a former Soviet Republic like Armenia. It remains to be seen how much Russian gains in Africa will matter and how long they will last. The African countries where Russia is making progress are some of the poorest in the world, and Russian assistance will solve few, if any, of their problems.
China: Turning Friends into Enemies
Compared to the fireworks from Iran and Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been relatively quiet in IW in 2024. China continued to pressure Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, etc., inspiring pushback by the victims of Chinese IW pressure and forcing the targets of PRC aggression into closer relations with each other and with the U.S. In other words, no change from previous trends. The biggest change has been a broader acknowledgement of Chinese support of Russia in its war in Ukraine. For much of Europe, Russia’s war in Ukraine is the most serious security and foreign policy threat in more than thirty years. They are hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees and enduring substantial economic hardship to impose sanctions on Russia. For the Europeans, Chinese support for Russia feels like a direct attack on them and further cools relations that were already strained by the PRC’s predatory economic policies. This is leading to an EU focus on “de-risking” rather than integrating with China, and the de-risking policy will weaken the PRC economically and diplomatically. Since Europe’s GDP is almost ten times that of Russia, the PRC is making a bad bet by choosing Russia over Europe.
The US: Winning By Not Interrupting
Napoleon is credited with saying, “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake,” and this aptly characterizes U.S. IW successes in 2024. The U.S. did not launch many bold, new IW initiatives in 2024. Instead, the U.S. refrained from interrupting Iran, its proxies, and Russia while they made terrible mistakes. This restraint deserves more credit than it receives. For example, the U.S. could have, perhaps, taken initiative and achieved early ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, but that would have rescued Assad, Hezbollah, Iran, and maybe even Hamas. By failing to interrupt, the U.S. benefitted from the destruction of Assad, the crippling of Hezbollah and Hamas, and the weakening of Iran. By the same token, a ceasefire in Ukraine would have stopped Russia’s astronomical losses and left it free to use those resources in places like Syria. The U.S. administration resisted the temptation to pursue a counterproductive ceasefire and instead allowed Russian mistakes to proceed uninterrupted.
The new regime in Syria is not led by friends of the United States, but Syria has been either a Soviet or Iranian proxy since the 1950s. If Syria is now a Turkish proxy, it will still be the best Syrian government in 70 years, from a U.S. perspective. More importantly, the Assad regime and the Syrian Civil War created a refugee crisis that destabilized U.S. allies in Europe. The end of the regime and the end of the Syrian Civil War create an opportunity to decrease refugee pressure on Europe and stabilize European politics.
2025: Storm Clouds on the Horizon?
How will the U.S. and its adversaries perform in IW in 2025? Many are already panicking, and the new U.S. administration does have a bias for action that seems to border on hyperactivity. The U.S. may interrupt its enemies and thereby rescue Putin from his Ukraine quagmire and save Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This would be unfortunate, but the dangers must be kept in perspective. The worst-case Iran IW scenario would have the U.S. administration allowing Iran to rebuild its proxy network, but that would take decades, and even then, the new Axis of Resistance would be much weaker than it was in 2023, since Iran will not regain control of Syria. Likewise, rescuing Russia from its Ukraine quagmire will not make Russia as strong as it appeared before the 2022 invasion, or nearly as strong as it was in 2013. Militarily, Russia has destroyed at least a half-million of its soldiers and burned through its old Soviet stockpiles of ammunition and equipment. Economically, it has spent three years doubling down on stupid. Diplomatically, Russia has burned its bridges with Europe, Russia’s natural trading partner. These facts will remain, no matter when or how a ceasefire comes to Ukraine. There is also a glimmer of hope in the fact that the new U.S. administration prides itself on hard bargaining with everyone. If the U.S. rescues Russia and Iran, what will the U.S. receive in return? There is reason to believe the answer will not be “nothing”.
Tags: Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, irregular warfare, Russia, Russia-Ukraine War, terrorism, Unconventional Warfare
About The Author
- Thomas Searle
- Dr. Thomas Searle is a retired Army Special Forces officer with more than 30 years’ experience in the Special Operations Community. During his military career he deployed to combat with every Active and Reserve Special Forces Group, JSOC, and most AFSOC and NAVSPECWARCOM elements. He earned a Ph.D. in Military History from Duke University and is currently a professor at the Joint Special Operations University. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025
Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
July 6, 2025, 6:15pm ET
Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.
Click here to view our special reports since 2025.
Click here to read the biweekly "Russian Occupation Update."
Click here to read the weekly "Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update."
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such strike since June 30. Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.
Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6. Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets. Russia's recent overnight strikes series have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.
- Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional.
- Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.
21. Iran Update, July 6, 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-6-2025
Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET
Click here to view ISW–CTP's interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.
Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.
ISW–CTP have released two new Special Reports covering more than two weeks of developments in Iraq and Syria between June 13 and July 3 to account for the gap in coverage introduced by ISW–CTP temporarily refocusing the Iran Update on the Israel-Iran War.
Click here to read "Iraq After the Israel-Iran War, June 13 - July 3"
Click here to read "Syria After the Israel-Iran War, June 13 - July 3"
Iran is targeting minorities for perceived disloyalty, which will almost certainly reinforce pre-existing anti-regime sentiment and could spark more unrest over time. British media reported on July 6 that armed Iranian “intelligence agents” have conducted dozens of coordinated raids across Iran targeting Bahai religious minority members. Iranian authorities reportedly seized electronic devices, personal belongings, and religious material that is being treated as contraband. Bahai members have frequently been accused of espionage and anti-regime activities. Iran‘s aggressive targeting of minorities for perceived disloyalty may not act as the proximate trigger for major protests, but it will contribute to frustrations that could explode into mass protests after a salient event, as happened during the Mahsa Amini protests. The death of Mahsa Amini in police custody acted as the proximate cause for protests in Tehran that rapidly expanded to Kurdish areas of Iran in Fall 2022. The regime has long oppressed Iranian Kurds, but Mahsa Amini’s death acted as a salient event that caused unexpected unrest.
Iran has arrested over 700 individuals on espionage accusations since the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12. The arrests include several individuals whom the regime characterized as ”Mossad spies.” Regime authorities, for example, arrested someone they called a Mossad ”associate” on July 6 for collecting information on military sites and attempting to send the information to ”hostile intelligence services.” First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli ”spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities. CTP-ISW assessed on June 27 that Iran’s concern about Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran may be used as justification for broader crackdowns on society.
Key Takeaways:
- Iran is targeting minorities for perceived disloyalty, which will almost certainly reinforce pre-existing anti-regime sentiment and could spark more unrest over time. Iran‘s aggressive targeting of minorities for perceived disloyalty may not act as the proximate trigger for major protests, but it will contribute to frustrations that could explode into mass protests after a salient event, as happened during the Mahsa Amini protests.
- Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since moving to a secure location on June 12 at the start of the Iran-Israel War.
- Likely Houthi fighters attacked a Liberian-flagged ship off the coast of Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 6.
22. Knowledge as National Power on Independence Day, 1828
For reflection.
Knowledge as National Power on Independence Day, 1828
July 7, 2025
https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/frances-wright-on-knowledge-as-national-power-on-independence-day-1828/
Editor’s Note: In 1828, for a woman to deliver a major public address on a political occasion like the Fourth of July was a radical and highly controversial act. That’s what happened that year at New Harmony Hall, where the abolitionist and freethinker Frances Wright delivered a speech that, on its surface, might seem distant from the modern strategist’s concerns. Yet, her impassioned call for a system of national, rational education speaks directly to the foundational pillars of any strong and resilient state.
Wright argues for an education grounded in empirical inquiry and critical thought, liberated from the dogma she saw as shackling human potential. For our readers, her speech is more than a historical artifact. It is a vital reminder that a nation’s intellectual capital is a core component of its strength.
For Wright, “the free and fearless exercise of the mental faculties, and that self-possession which springs our of well-reasoned opinions and consistent practice” was an inseparable part of liberty. She advocated for education for all, including women and emancipated slaves, not only for the sake of equality but as a strategic imperative. She understood that a republic’s vitality is derived from the intellectual capacity of its entire populace.
An uninformed citizenry, she contended, lacks the tools for effective self-governance and the preservation of its own security. Her call for a national commitment to empirical knowledge and universal education, therefore, remains a prescient and powerful message. Wright’s arguments compel us to consider how a nation’s educational foundations directly support its enduring security and stability.
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The custom which commemorates in rejoicing the Anniversary of the national Independence of these States has its origin in a human feeling, amiable in its nature, and beneficial, under proper direction, in its indulgence.
From the era which dates the national existence of the American people, dates also a mighty step in the march of human knowledge. And it is consistent with that principle in our conformation which leads us to rejoice in the good which befalls our species, and to sorrow for the evil, that our hearts should expand on this day. On this day, which calls to memory the conquest achieved by knowledge over ignorance, willing cooperation over blind obedience, opinion over prejudice, new ways over old ways, –when, fifty two years ago, America declared her national Independence, and associated it with her republican federation. Reasonable is it to rejoice on this day, and useful to reflect thereon; so that we rejoice for the real, and not imaginary, good; and reflect on the positive advantages obtained, and on those which it is ours farther to acquire.
Dating, as we justly may, a new era in the history of man from the Fourth of July 1776, it would be well — that is, it would be useful, if on each Anniversary we examined the progress made by our species in just knowledge and just practice. Each Fourth of July would then stand as a tide-mark in the flood of Time, by which to ascertain the advance of the human intellect, by which to note the rise and fall of each successive error, the discovery of each important truth, the gradual melioration in our public institutions, social arrangements, and, above all, in our moral feelings and mental views. Let such a review as this engage annually our attention, and sacred — doubly sacred shall be this day; and that not to one nation only, but to all nations capable of reflection!
The political dismemberment of these once British colonies from the parent island, though involving a valuable principle and many possible results, would scarcely merit a yearly commemoration, even in this country, had it not been accompanied by other occurrences more novel and fare more important. I allude to the seal then set to the system of representative government, till then imperfectly known in Europe, and insecurely practiced in America; and to the crown then placed on this system by the novel experiment of political federation. The frame of federative government that sprung out of the articles signed in ’76 is one of the most beautiful inventions of the human intellect. It has been in government what the steam engine has been in mechanics, and the printing press in the dissemination of human knowledge.
But it needs not that we should now pause to analyze what all must have considered. It is to one particular feature in our political institutions that I would call attention, and this, –because it is at once the most deserving of notice and the least noticed. Are our institutions better than those of other countries? Upon fair examination most men will answer yes. But why will they so answer? Is it because they are republican, instead of monarchical? democratic, rather than aristocratic? In so far as the republican principle shall have been proved more conducive to the general good than the monarchical, and the democratic than the aristocratic — in so far will the reasons be good. But there is another and a better reason than these. There is in the institutions of this country, one principle which, had they no other excellence, would secure to them the preference over those of all other countries. I mean — and some devout patriots will start; I mean, the principle of change.
I have used a word to which is attached an obnoxious meaning. Speak of ‘change’ and the world is in alarm. And yet where do we not see change? What is there in the physical world but change? And what would there be in the moral world without change? The flower blossoms, the fruit ripens, the seed is received and germinates in the earth, and we behold the tree. The aliment we eat to satisfy our hunger, incorporates within our frame, and the atoms composing our existence to day, are exhaled tomorrow. In like manner our feeling and opinions are molded by circumstance, and matured by observation and experience. All is change. Within and about us no one thing is as it was, or will be as it is. Strange then that we should start at a word used to signify a thing so familiar! Stranger yet that we should fail to appreciate a principle which, inherent in all matter, is not less inherent in ourselves; and which as it has tracked our mental progress heretofore so will it track our progress through time to come!
But, will it be said, change has a bad as well as a good sense? It may be for the better and it may be for the worse? In the physical world it can be neither the one nor the other. It can be simply such as it is. But in the moral world — that is, in the thoughts and feelings and inventions of men, change may certainly be either for the better or for the worse; or it may be for neither. Changes that are neither bad nor good can have regard only to trivial matters, and can be as little worthy of observation as of censure. Changes that are from better to worse can originate only in ignorance, and are every amended so soon as experience has substantiated their mischief. Where men then are free to consult experience they will correct their practice, and make changes for the better. It follows, therefore, that the more free men are the more changes they will make. In the beginning, possibly, for the worse; but most certainly in time for the better; until their knowledge enlarging by observation, and their judgment strengthening by exercise, they will find in the straight, broad, fair road of Improvement. Out of change, therefore, springs improvement; and the people who shall have imagined a peaceable mode of changing their institutions, hold a surety for their melioration. This surety is worth all other excellencies. Better were the prospects of a people under the influence of the worst Government who should hold the power of changing it, than those of a people under the best who should hold no such power. Here then is the great beauty of American Government. The simple machinery of representation carried through all its parts, gives facility for its being molded at will to fit with the knowledge of the age. If imperfect in any or all of its parts, it bears within it a perfect principle — the principle of improvement. And, let us observe, that this principle is all that we can ever know of perfection. Knowledge, and all the blessings which spring out of knowledge, can never be more than progressive; and whatsoever sets open the door does all for us–does every thing.
The clearsighted provision in the national constitution, as in the constitutions of the different states, by which the frame of government can be molded at will by the public voice, and so made to keep pace in progress with the public mind, is the master-stroke in constitutional law. Were our institutions far less enlightened and well digested than they are — were every other ordinance defective — nay, even tyrannous — this single provision would be counter-balance all. Let but the door be opened and be fixed open for all Improvement to hold on her unimpeded course, and vices, however flagrant, are but the evils of an hour. Once launch the animal man in the road of enquiry, and he shall — he must — hold a forward career. He may be sometimes checked; he may seem occasionally to retrograde; but his retreat is only that of the receding wave of the inning tide. His master movement is always in advance. By this do we distinguish a man from all other existences within the range of our observation. By this does he stand preeminent over all known animals. By this — by his capability of improvement; by his tendency to improve whenever scope is allowed for the development of his faculties. To hold him still, he must be chained. Snap the chain, and he springs forward.
But will it be said, that the chains which bind him are more than one? That political bonds are much, but not all; and that when broken, we may still be slaves? I know not, my friends. There are distinctions, and these are not difficult to draw. We are told of political liberty — of religious liberty — of moral liberty. Yet, after all, is there more than one liberty; and of those divisions, are they not the more and the less of the same thing? The provision we have referred to in our political institutions, as framed in accordance with the principle inherent in ourselves, insures to us all of free action that statutes can insure. Supposing that our laws, constitutional, civil, or penal, should in any thing cripple us at the present, the power will be with us to amend or annul them so soon (and how might it be sooner?) as our enlarged knowledge shall enable us to see in what they err. All the liberty therefore that we yet lack will gradually spring up — there, where our bondage is — in our minds. To be free we have but to see our chains. Are we disappointed — are we sometimes angry, because the crowd or any part of the crowd around us bows submissively to mischievous usages or unjust laws? Let us remember, that they do so in ignorance of their mischief and injustice, and that when they see these, as in the course of man’s progressive state, they must see them, these and other evils will be corrected.
Inappreciable is this advantage that we hold (unfortunately) above other nations! The great national and political revolution of ’76 set the seal to the liberties of North America. And but for one evil, and that of immense magnitude, which the constitutional provisions we have been considering does not fairly reach, –I allude to negro slavery and the degradation of our colored citizens — we could foresee for the whole of this magnificent country a certain future of uniform and peaceful movement. While other nations have still to win reform at the sword’s point , we have only to will it. While in Europe men have still to fight, we have only to learn. While there they have to cope with ignorance armed cap-a-pee, encircled with armies and powerful with gold, we have only peacefully to collect knowledge and to frame our institutions and actions in accordance with it.
It is true, that we have much knowledge to collect, and consequently much to amend in our opinions and our practice. It is also true that we are often ignorant of what has been done, and quite unaware that there is anything yet to do. The very nature of the national institutions is frequently mistaken, and the devotion exhibited for them is frequently based on the wrong principle. Here, as in other countries, we hear of patriotism; that is, of love of country in an exclusive sense; of love of our countrymen in contradistinction to the love of our fellow-creatures; of love of the constitution, instead of love or appreciation of those principles upon which the constitution is, or ought to be, based, –and upon which, if it should be found not to be based, it would merit no attachment at all. The sentiment here adverted to involves much of importance to us in our double character of men and citizens. That double character it will be also useful that we examine, as much confusion prevails in the vulgar ideas on the subject.
It will be conceded, that we do not cease to be men when we become citizens; and farther, that our happy existence as human beings is of more importance than our artificial existence as members of a nation or subjects of a government. Indeed, the only rational purpose for which we can suppose men congregated into what are called nations, is the increase of happiness — the insuring of some advantage, real or imagined. The only rational purpose for which we can suppose governments organized, the same. If upon examination we should find the object not gained, the experiment, so far as it went, would have failed, and we should then act rationally to break up such national congregations and to change or annul such Governments. Our character as citizens, therefore, must ever depend upon our finding it for our interest as men to stand in that relation. What then is patriotism, or the fulfillment of our duties as citizens, but the acting consistently in that way which we conceive it for our interest that we should act? Or what reason shall be offered for our consulting the interests of a Government, unless its interests are in unison with our own?
The great error of the wisest known nations of antiquity, the Greeks and Romans, was the preference invariably given to the imagined interests of an imaginary existence called the state or country, and the real interests of the real existence, or human beings, upon whom, individually and collectively, their laws alone could operate. Another error was the opposition in which they invariably placed the interests of their own nation to the interests of all other nations; and a third and greater error, was the elevating into a virtue this selfish preference of their own national interests, under the name of patriotism. The moderns are growing a little wiser on these matters, but they are still very ignorant. The least ignorant are the people of this country; but they have much to learn. Americans no longer argue on the propriety of making all men soldiers, in order that their nation may be an object of terror to the rest of the world. They understand that the happiness of a people is the only rational object of a government; and the only object for which a people, free to choose, can have a government at all. They have farther almost excluded war as a profession and reduced it from a system of robbery to on of simple defense. In so doing, they ought to have laid aside all show of military parade, and all ideas of military glory. If they have not don so, it is that their reform in this matter is yet imperfect, and their ideas respecting it, are confused.
Who among us but has heard, and, perhaps, echoed eulogiums on the patriotism of statesmen and soldiers, –not because they have upheld some strict principle of justice, which should rather merit the name of virtue, but because they have flattered the vanity of their countrymen in a public speech, defended their own interests, and the national interests, in some foreign treaty, or their own possessions, and the national possessions, in a siege or a pitched battle? It is not that some of these actions may not be just and proper; but are they justly and properly estimated? Is it virtuous in a man if a pistol be presented to his breast, to knock down the assailant? The action is perfectly warrantable; but does it call forth admiration? Should the attack be made on another, and should he defend the life of that other at the risk of his own, –the action, though not exceedingly meritorious, might excite a moderate admiration, as involving a forgetfulness of self in the service rendered.
Does not the defense of country afford a parallel case to the first supposition? In so much as it be ours, we defend our own. We do what it is fair and proper that we should do, –but we do nothing more. What then is patriotism, of which we hear so much and understand so little? If it means only a proper attention to our own interests, and the interests of the people with whom we stand connected, and of the government instituted for our protection, it is a rational sentiment, and one appertaining to our organization. It is one in short, with the love of self, and the principle of self-defense, and self-preservation. Again — are we to understand by it an attachment to the soil we tread, because we tread it; the language we speak, because we speak it; the government that rules us, merely because it rules us? It means nothing, or it means nonsense. Again, are we to understand by patriotism a preference for the interests of our own nation under all circumstances even to the sacrifice of those of other nations — it is a vice.
In continental Europe, of late years, the words patriotism and patriot have been used in a more enlarged sense than it is usual here to attribute to them, or than is attached to them in Great Britain. Since the political struggles of France, Italy, Spain, and Greece, the word patriotism has been employed, throughout Europe, to express a love of the public good; a preference for the interests of the many to those of a few; a desire for the emancipation of the human race from the thrall of despotism, religious and civil; in short, patriotism there is used rather to express the interest felt in the human race in general, than that felt for any country, or inhabitants of a country, in particular. And patriot in like manner, is employed to signify a lover of human liberty and human improvement, rather than a mere lover of the country in which he lives, or the tribe to which he belongs. Used in this sense, patriotism is a virtue, and a patriot is a virtuous man. With such an interpretation, a patriot is a useful member of society, capable of enlarging all minds and bettering all hearts with which he comes in contact; a useful member of the human family, capable of establishing fundamental principles, and of merging his own interests, those of his associates, and those of his nation, in the interests of the human race. Laurels and statues are vain things, and mischievous as they are childish; but could we imagine them of use, on such a patriot alone could they be with any reason, bestowed.
Is there a thought that can fill the human mind
More pure, more vast, more generous, more refin’d
Than that which guides the enlightened Patriot’s toil
Not He, whose view is bounded by his soil;
Not He, whose narrow heart can only shrine
The land — the people that he calleth mine;
Not He, who to set up that land on high,
Will make whole nations bleed, whole nations die
Not He, who, calling that land’s rights his pride,
Trampleth the rights of all the earth beside’
No! — He it is, the just, the generous soul!
Who owneth brotherhood with either pole,
Stretches from realm to realm his spacious mind,
And guards the weal of all the human-kind,
Holds Freedom’s banner o’er the earth unfurl’d,
And stands the guardian Patriot of a world!
If such a patriotism as we have last considered would seem likely to obtain in any country, it should certainly be in this. In this which is truly the home of all nations, and in the veins of whose citizens flows the blood of every people on the globe. Patriotism, in the exclusive meaning, is sure not made for America. Mischievous every where, it were here both mischievous and absurd. The very origin of the people is opposed to it. The institutions, in their principle, militate against it. The day we are celebrating protests against it. It is for Americans, more especially, to nourish a nobler sentiment; one more consistent with their origin, and more conducive to their future improvement. It is for them more especially to know why they love their country; and to feel that they love it, not because it is their country, but because it is the palladium of human liberty — the favored scene of human improvement. It is for them, more especially, to know, why they honor their institutions; and to feel, that they honor them because they are based on just principles. It is for them, more especially, to examine their institutions, because they have the means of improving them; to examine their laws, because at will they can alter them. It is for them to lay aside luxury, whose wealth is in industry; idle parade, whose strength is in knowledge; ambitious distinctions, whose principle is equality. It is for them not to rest satisfied with words, who can seize upon things; and to remember, that Equality means, not the mere equality of political rights, however valuable, but equality of instruction and equality in virtue; and that Liberty means — not the mere voting at elections, but the free and fearless exercise of the mental faculties, and that self-possession which springs our of well-reasoned opinions and consistent practice. It is for them to honor principles, rather than men, to commemorate events, rather than days: when they rejoice, to know for what they rejoice, –and to rejoice only for what has brought and what brings peace and happiness to men. The event we commemorate this day has procured much of both, and shall procure in the onward course of human improvement more than we can now conceive of. For this — for the good obtained and yet in store for our race, let us rejoice! But let us rejoice as men, not as children — as human beings, rather than as Americans — as reasoning beings, not as ignorants. So shall we rejoice to good purpose, and in good feeling; so shall we improve the victory once on this day achieved, until all mankind hold with us the Jubilee of Independence.
23. Some Elements of the American Character
Some Elements of the American Character - War on the Rocks
John F. Kennedy
July 4, 2025
warontherocks.com · July 4, 2025
Editor’s Note: A pre-presidential John F. Kennedy gave this speech at Faneuil Hall in Boston while running for Congress on July 4, 1946.
Kennedy contends that religion, idealism, patriotism, and individualism are some of the fundamental elements of a distinctively American character. He claimed that America has upheld these elements to advance the principles of human dignity and individual freedom since the founding of the country.
The youthful veteran urged all Americans to draw from these admirable traits that define us to confront the bitter days which lie ahead as the glory of World War II victory gave way to a new era of Cold War danger. Kennedy’s message serves as a reminder that, in our best moments, the American people are bound together by a shared sense of virtue, dignity, progress, and love of country.
***
Mr. Mayor; Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.
We stand today in the shadow of history.
We gather here in the very Cradle of Liberty.
It is an honor and a pleasure to be the speaker of the day – an honor because of the long and distinguished list of noted orators who have preceded me on this platform, a pleasure because one of that honored list who stood here fifty years ago, and who is with us here today, is my grandfather.
It has been the custom for the speaker of the day to link his thoughts across the years to certain classic ideals of the early American tradition. I shall do the same. I propose today to discuss certain elements of the American character which have made this nation great. It is well for us to recall them today, for this is a day of recollection and a day of hope.
A nation’s character, like that of an individual, is elusive. It is produced partly by things we have done and partly by what has been done to us. It is the result of physical factors, intellectual factors, spiritual factors.
It is well for us to consider our American character, for in peace, as in war, we will survive or fail according to its measure.
BECOME A MEMBER
Religious Element
Our deep religious sense is the first element of the American character which I would discuss this morning.
The informing spirit of the American character has always been a deep religious sense.
Throughout the years, down to the present, a devotion to fundamental religious principles has characterized American thought and action.
Our government was founded on the essential religious idea of integrity of the individual. It was this religious sense which inspired the authors of the Declaration of Independence:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.”
Our earliest legislation was inspired by this deep religious sense:
“Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”
Our first leader, Washington, was inspired by this deep religious sense:
“Of all of the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports.”
Lincoln was inspired by this deep religious sense:
“That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish from the earth.”
Our late, lamented President was inspired by this deep religious sense:
“We shall win this war, and in victory we shall seek not vengeance, but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts of men and nations.”
Thus we see that this nation has ever been inspired by essential religious ideas. The doctrine of slavery which challenged these ideas within our own country was destroyed.
Recently, the philosophy of racism, which threatened to overwhelm them by attacks from abroad, was also met and destroyed.
Today these basic religious ideas are challenged by atheism and materialism: at home in the cynical philosophy of many of our intellectuals, abroad in the doctrine of collectivism, which sets up the twin pillars of atheism and materialism as the official philosophical establishment of the State.
Inspired by a deeply religious sense, this country, which has ever been devoted to the dignity of man, which has ever fostered the growth of the human spirit, has always met and hurled back the challenge of those deathly philosophies of hate and despair. We have defeated them in the past; we will always defeat them.
How well, then, has de Tocqueville said: “You may talk of the people and their majesty, but where there is no respect for God can there be much for man? You may talk of the supremacy of the ballot, respect for order, denounce riot, secession – unless religion is the first link, all is vain.”
Idealistic Element
Another element in the American character that I would bring to your attention this morning is the idealism of our native people – stemming from the strong religious beliefs of the first colonists, developed as they worked the land.
This idealism, this fixed regard for principle, has been an element of the American character from the birth of this nation to the present day.
In recent years, the existence of this element in the American character has been challenged by those who seek to give an economic interpretation to American history. They seek to destroy our faith in our past so that they may guide our future. These cynics are wrong, for, while there may be some truth in their interpretation, it does remain a fact, and a most important one, that the motivating force of the American people has been their belief that they have always stood at the barricades by the side of God.
In Revolutionary times, the cry “No taxation without representation” was not an economic complaint. Rather, it was directly traceable to the eminently fair and just principle that no sovereign power has the right to govern without the consent of the governed. Anything short of that was tyranny. It was against this tyranny that the colonists “fired the shot heard ’round the world.”
This belief in principle was expressed most impressively by George Washington at the Constitutional Convention in 1783. “It is probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterwards defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair, the event is in the hands of God.”
This idealism, this conviction that our eyes had seen the glory of the Lord – that right was right and wrong was wrong – finally led to the ultimate clash at Bull Run and the long red years of the war between the States.
Again, the cynics may apply the economic interpretation to this conflict: the industrial North against the agricultural South; the struggle of the two economies. Say what they will, it is an undeniable fact that the Northern Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac were inspired by devotion to principle: on the one hand, the right of secession; on the other, the belief that the “Union must be preserved.”
In 1917, this element of the American character was stimulated by the slogans “War to End War” and “A War to Save Democracy,” and again the American people had as their leader a man, Woodrow Wilson, whose idealism was the traditional idealism of America. To such a degree was this true that he was able to say, “Some people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealistic nation in the world.”
It is perhaps true that the American intervention in 1917 might have been more effective if the case for American intervention had been represented on less moralistic terms. As it was, the American people eventually came to look upon themselves as giving food and guns to a general cause in which all other people had material ends and in which they alone had moral ends.
The idealism with which we had entered the battle made the subsequent disillusionment all the more bitter and revealed a dangerous facet to this element of the American character, for this bitterness, a direct result of our inflated hopes, brought a radical change in our foreign policy and a resulting withdrawal from Europe. We failed to make the adjustment between what we had hoped to win and what we actually could win. Our idealism was too strong. We would not compromise.
And thus we brought to our shoulders much of the burden of the responsibility for World War II – a burden which we would not then acknowledge but for which we have paid full price in recent years on distant shores, on faraway fields and valleys and hills, on pieces of foreign soil which will be forever ours.
It was perhaps because of this failure that the second world war never did become a crusade as did the first.
Our idealism had become tarnished, but extraordinary efforts were made to evoke it, and it is indubitably true that the great majority of Americans had strong convictions as to which side spoke for the right before our entry into the war.
It is now in the postwar world that this idealism – this devotion to principle–this belief in the natural law – this deep religious conviction that this is truly God’s country and we are truly God’s people – will meet its greatest trial.
Our American idealism finds itself faced by the old-world doctrine of power politics. It is meeting with successive rebuffs, and all this may result in a new and even more bitter disillusionment, in another ignominious retreat from our world destiny.
But, if we remain faithful to the American tradition, our idealism will be a steadfast thing, a constant flame, a torch held aloft for the guidance of other nations.
It will take great faith.
Our idealism, the second element of the American character, is being severely tested. Now, only time will tell whether this element of the American character will be true to its historic tradition.
Patriotic Element
The third element of the American character that I would bring to your attention this morning is the great patriotic instinct of our people.
From our pioneer days, perhaps because we were a people who developed from a beachhead on a tremendous continent, this American patriotism has always had as its core a strange and almost mystical love of the land.
Early in our history we acquired, as James Truslow Adams has pointed out, “a sense of unlimited energy face to face with unlimited resources.”
Land, land, land, stretching with incredible richness across half a world. Its sheer vastness has made it a challenge to the American spirit. The endless land stretching to, the western sun caught the imagination of men who founded this nation and awakened the patriotic spirit that has become a characteristic of the American people.
In the words of America’s poet, Walt Whitman, we note this deep sense of the land:
“Land of the pastoral plains, the grass-field of the world, land of those sweet-air’d interminable plateaus!
Land of the herd, the garden, the healthy house of adobe!
Land where the northwest Columbia winds, and where the southwest Colorado winds!
Land of the eastern Chesapeake! Land of the Delaware!
Land of Ontario, Erie, Huron, Michigan! Land of the Old Thirteen! Massachusetts land! Land of Vermont and Connecticut!
Land of the ocean shores! Land of sierras and peaks!
Land of boatmen and sailors! Fishermen’s land!”
This preoccupation with the land records itself in the catalogue of the colonists’ grievances against George III. It has always been reflected in the highest moments of our patriotism, for, throughout the years, in the early days here at home and in recent years abroad, Americans have been ever ready to defend this native land.
From the birth of the nation to the present day, from the Heights of Dorchester to the broad meadows of Virginia, from Bunker Hill to the batteries of Saratoga, from Bergen’s Neck, where Wayne and Maylan’s troops achieved such martial wonders, to Yorktown, where Britain’s troops surrendered, Americans have heroically embraced the soldier’s alternative of victory or the grave. American patriotism was shown at the Halls of Montezuma. It was shown with Meade at Gettysburg, with Sheridan at Winchester, with Phil Carney at Fair Oaks, with Longstreet in the Wilderness, and it was shown by the flower of the Virginia Army when Pickett charged at Gettysburg. It was shown by Captain Rowan, who plunged into the jungles of Cuba and delivered the famous message to Garcia, symbol now of tenacity and determination. It was shown by the Fifth and Sixth Marines at Belleau Wood, by the Yankee Division at Verdun, by Captain Leahy, whose last order as he lay dying was “The command is forward.” And in recent years it was shown by those who stood at Bataan with Wainwright, by those who fought at Wake Island with Devereaux, who flew in the air with Don Gentile. It was shown by those who jumped with Gavin, by those who stormed the bloody beaches at Salerno with Commando Kelly; it was shown by the First Division at Omaha Beach, by the Second Ranger Battalion as it crossed the Purple Heart Valley, by the 101st as it stood at Bastogne; it was shown at the Bulge, at the Rhine, and at victory.
Wherever freedom has been in danger, Americans with a deep sense of patriotism have ever been willing to stand at Armageddon and strike a blow for liberty and the Lord.
Individualistic Element
The American character has been not only religious, idealistic, and patriotic, but because of these it has been essentially individual.
The right of the individual against the State has ever been one of our most cherished political principles.
The American Constitution has set down for all men to see the essentially Christian and American principle that there are certain rights held by every man which no government and no majority, however powerful, can deny.
Conceived in Grecian thought, strengthened by Christian morality, and stamped indelibly into American political philosophy, the right of the individual against the State is the keystone of our Constitution. Each man is free.
He is free in thought.
He is free in expression.
He is free in worship.
To us, who have been reared in the American tradition, these rights have become part of our very being. They have become so much a part of our being that most of us are prone to feel that they are rights universally recognized and universally exercised. But the sad fact is that this is not true. They were dearly won for us only a few short centuries ago and they were dearly preserved for us in the days just past. And there are large sections of the world today where these rights are denied as a matter of philosophy and as a matter of government.
We cannot assume that the struggle is ended. It is never-ending.
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. It was the price yesterday. It is the price today, and it will ever be the price.
The characteristics of the American people have ever been a deep sense of religion, a deep sense of idealism, a deep sense of patriotism, and a deep sense of individualism.
Let us not blink the fact that the days which lie ahead of us are bitter ones.
May God grant that, at some distant date, on this day, and on this platform, the orator may be able to say that these are still the great qualities of the American character and that they have prevailed.
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Image: Wikimedia Commons
warontherocks.com · July 4, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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