Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

"Character, in the long run, is the decisive factor in the life of an individual and of nations alike."
- Theodore Roosevelt

"A boxer derives the greatest advantage from his sparring partner – and my accuser is my sparring partner. He trains me in patience, civility and even temper."
- Marcus Aurelius 

"The primary purpose of the Rolex is not as a timepiece but rather as a life insurance policy. When the situation goes pear-shaped and you've somehow made it to the airport, the Rolex buys you a seat on the last flight out of Heart of Darkness International Airport. As your aircraft circles the city, you look down at the rising columns of black smoke and imagine the scene downtown in the city square where they're chopping the few remaining Westerners up into monkey meat, you look at your wrist where your treasured timepiece used to be and you think 2 things: A) 'Well I guess the Rolex finally paid for itself,' and B) 'I can always buy another watch . . .'"
- Unknown



​1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 7 (Putin's War)
2. Zelensky says Ukraine will not give up territory for peace with Russia: 'This is our land'
3. Ukrainian Navy Special Forces Spearhead Daring Snake Island Mission
4. The Complex Reality of Cyber War and Ukraine
5. Ukraine war tactics reaffirm US Army’s modernization thrust, service chief says
6. Will the war in Ukraine fuel nuclear proliferation?
7. A guy deep in the Defense Department is actually doing something about Chinese theft of US intellectual property
8. FDD | Hezbollah Drones Target Israeli Gas Rigs, Amplify U.S. Pressure on Israel
9. Kremlin’s Never-Ending Thirst For Death And Devastation
10. What the U.S. Still Doesn’t Get About Countering China
11.  Russia Aims to Paralyze NATO Without a Single Shot
12. Taiwanese student receives threats over his map of China’s military facilities
13. After hitting all-time highs, gas prices are finally coming back down
14. Wind and solar produce more electricity than nuclear for the first time in the US
15. The Army is getting leaders ready for a war unlike any the US has ever seen
16. The Marine Corps' latest idea for countering China has major problems
17. These Photos From The B-1B’s Latest Guam Deployment Are Just Ridiculous
18. Putin Has a Problem: Ukraine's Guerrilla War Against Russia Is Now In Full Swing
19. Army pilots expertly land Black Hawk helicopter on knife’s edge ridge to save injured hiker
20. What NATO’s New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong
21. House wants troops to chow down bison meat bought from native tribes
22. How the Pentagon Uses a Secretive Program to Wage Proxy Wars
23. Documents reveal U.S. involved in 23 secret wars around the world
24. Preserve This Early-Stage Bet That Benefits National Security
25. 'Win before firing a shot:' Top Marine explains why the service is focused on information warfare
​



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 7 (Putin's War)



RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 7
Jul 7, 2022 - Press ISW

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 7, 5:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Igor Konashenkov announced on July 7 that Russian forces in Ukraine are pausing to rest and regain their combat capabilities, confirming ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have initiated an operational pause.[1] Konashenkov did not specify the intended length of Russian forces’ operational pause. As ISW previously assessed, Russian forces have not ceased active hostilities during this operational pause and are unlikely to do so.[2] Russian forces still conducted limited ground offensives and air, artillery, and missile strikes across all axes on July 7.[3] Russian forces will likely continue to confine themselves to small-scale offensive actions as they rebuild forces and set conditions for a more significant offensive in the coming weeks or months.
Key Takeaways
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian forces are conducting an operational pause to rest and reconstitute.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to advance toward Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and may be setting conditions to advance from the southeast of Barvinkove—either toward Slovyansk or toward Kramatorsk.
  • Russian forces made marginal gains to the southeast of Siversk and continued offensive operations west of the Lysychansk area.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations to the south and east of Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful attack north of Kharkiv City.
  • Ukrainian partisans are likely continuing to target Russian-controlled railways around Melitopol.
  • Russian oblasts are continuing to create their own ad hoc volunteer units to compensate for personnel losses in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
  • Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
  • Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
  • Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border toward Slovyansk on July 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault on Bohorodychne, about 20 km northwest of Slovyansk.[4] Russian forces also shelled several settlements northwest of Slovyansk, including Sulyhivka, Adamivka, Krasnopillya, Mazanivka, Dibrovne, and Dolyna.[5] Russian forces additionally conducted limited artillery strikes to the south of Barvinkove and fired on Nikopol and Novopavlivka.[6] These strikes may suggest that Russian forces are seeking to bypass Barvinkove to the east and either move toward the E40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway to advance southeast toward Slovyansk or move directly southeast from Barvinkove toward Kramatorsk. Russian forces may be setting conditions for an eventual assault on Kramatorsk—which would run parallel to advances toward Slovyansk. Russian forces conducted a missile strike directly on Kramatorsk on July 7.[7]
Russian forces continued efforts to advance west toward Siversk from the Lysychansk area and made marginal gains near the Luhansk-Donetsk Oblast border on July 7. Geolocated combat footage from July 7 confirmed that forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) entered the eastern outskirts of Spirne, about 10 km southwest of Siversk.[8] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian and Ukrainian troops continued to fight around Verkhnokamyanka, about 15 km directly east of Siversk.[9] Russian forces also unsuccessfully attempted to advance in the direction of Hryhorivka (10 km northeast of Siversk) and Verkhnomayanske (5 km directly east of Siversk).[10] Russian forces shelled several settlements to the south and east of Siversk to continue to set conditions for further advances west of the Luhansk Oblast border.[11]
Russian forces continued offensive operations to the south and east of Bakhmut on July 7. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces attempted to improve their tactical positions in Vershyna, 12 km southeast of Bakhmut.[12] Russian Telegram channel Rybar additionally claimed that Russian troops fought in Pokrovske, directly east of Bakhmut, and prepared for attacks on Ukrainian positions in Novoluhanske and at the Vuhledar Power Plant, 20 km southeast of Bakhmut.[13] Russian forces reportedly shelled settlements to the east and south of Bakhmut to continue to set conditions for advances toward the city.[14]
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and fired on Ukrainian positions along the line of contact on July 7.[15]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces attempted a limited ground assault north of Kharkiv City on July 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian offensive in the direction of Sosnivka, 8 km from the international border.[16] Russian forces otherwise focused on maintaining their positions and repelling Ukrainian counterattacks.[17] Russian forces shelled Slatyne, Mala Danylivka, Ruski Tyshky, Vesele, Kutuzivka, and Kharkiv City.[18]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces attempted limited ground assaults to retake lost positions in Kherson Oblast on July 7. Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled platoon-sized and smaller Russian reconnaissance-in-force operations in Dobryanka, Myrolyubivka, and Potemkyne along the T2207 highway in northern Kherson Oblast on July 6 and 7.[19] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces launched 12 Kalibr high-precision cruise missiles at Mykolaiv City and Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast from positions in occupied Kherson Oblast, likely targeting Ukrainian maritime infrastructure in both cities.[20] Ukrainian jets and air defense forces engaged a Russian Su-35 fighter jet as it launched missiles over Odesa Oblast, successfully intercepting the missile and forcing the jet to withdraw.[21] Russian forces continued to hold their occupied positions and conduct artillery strikes along the entire Southern Axis to constrain Ukrainian counteroffensives.[22]
Ukrainian partisans in and around occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast are increasingly targeting Russian rail lines. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian partisans blew up a railway bridge about 25 km north of Melitopol between Novobohdanivka and Troitske on July 7, likely further obstructing Russian resupply efforts from Crimea to the Zaporizhia Oblast front line.[23] Ukrainian partisans had previously blown up a rail bridge near occupied Lyubimivka between Melitopol and Tokmak on July 3 and derailed a Russian armored train carrying ammunition near Melitopol on July 2.[24] The increase in reported activity supports ISW’s prior assessment that a Ukrainian partisan campaign is targeting Russian rail lines near Melitopol.[25]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian sources confirmed that the Russian military leadership continues to create ad hoc volunteer battalions for deployment in Ukraine. Russian Telegram channel Voennyi Osvedomitel’ reported that Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod Oblast is forming its own volunteer tank battalion as part of a continued trend of Russian oblasts creating so-called “nominal” and volunteer-based units for service in Ukraine.[26] Voennyi Osvedomitel’ stated that the Union of Russian Veterans of Afghanistan is registering volunteers for the Nizhny Novgorod tank battalion and that the campaign was officially confirmed by the Western Military District’s press service, which is consistent with ISW’s previous assessment that Russian authorities are forming ad hoc composite units to make up for continued personnel losses in Ukraine.[27]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities continued to face challenges with effective economic integration of occupied areas of Ukraine. Russian Telegram channel Rybar reported that farmers in occupied Kherson Oblast are experiencing logistical, supply-side, and economic problems with integration into the Russian market—a sign that Russian authorities have not yet developed consistent economic agendas to incorporate Ukrainian agricultural output into the Russian economy.[28] Rybar claimed that the wait times at border areas make perishable goods essentially impossible to import to Russia from Kherson Oblast and devalues products exported from Kherson on the Russian market.[29] According to Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, over 22 million tons of grain remain blocked in Ukrainian warehouses due to the Russian invasion.[30] Taken together, these reports suggest that Russia is failing to institute effective export practices and economic processes for Ukrainian assets—to the detriment of the livelihoods of residents of occupied areas.
[1] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/15150167;
[23] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/07/07/v-okupovanij-zaporizkij-oblasti-pidirvaly-shhe-odyn-mist/


​2. Zelensky says Ukraine will not give up territory for peace with Russia: 'This is our land'

Others may try to do that against Ukrainian wishes.

Zelensky says Ukraine will not give up territory for peace with Russia: 'This is our land'
CNN · by Jeremy Herb, CNN
(CNN)Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told CNN's Wolf Blitzer on Thursday that Ukraine is unwilling to cede any of its land to Russia, standing firm that a concession of Ukrainian territory won't be part of any diplomatic negotiations to end the war.
"Ukrainians are not ready to give away their land, to accept that these territories belong to Russia. This is our land," Zelensky said in an exclusive interview aired Thursday on CNN's "The Situation Room."
"We always talk about that, and we are intending to prove it," he added.
Zelensky spoke to CNN at the same time as one of his top Western allies, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, announced he would be resigning. Speaking in Ukrainian via a translator, Zelensky said he was confident that Britain's policy toward Ukraine "will not be changing" even if the country's leadership is in tumult.
"He resigned not because he was in Ukraine. I think on the contrary, what Johnson has been doing for Ukraine was helping us a great deal. I consider him a friend of Ukraine, but I think his society also supported Ukraine in Europe. That's why I think the UK, it's on the side of good, on the side of Ukraine," Zelensky said.
Read More
"And I'm sure the UK policy toward Ukraine is not ... changing because of Boris Johnson's resignation. Our relations obviously gained a lot from Boris Johnson's understanding of things. We went through a lot of dramatic moments quite quickly. The help we needed was delivered rather quickly ... if (his resignation) will affect this speed of help I don't know. I will pray to God it won't be affecting that help."

Zelensky calls Johnson 'a true friend of Ukraine' 01:42
Russia's war with Ukraine has now lasted for more than four months, with no sign of either side backing down soon. Ukraine's early successes forced Russia to scale back its initial aims of toppling Kyiv, and Moscow's forces have now focused on taking territory in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces have now occupied most of the Luhansk region, outside of a few pockets of resistance, and are pressing toward cities in Donetsk.
CNN reported last week that White House officials are losing confidence Ukraine will ever be able to take back all of the land it has lost to Russia since the war began, even with the aid of heavier and more sophisticated weaponry that the US and its allies plan to provide Kyiv.
Zelensky acknowledged that Russia controls "almost all the Luhansk region," saying that his forces are now "fighting on the outskirts of this region." He said that Kyiv retreated to avoid mass losses of troops.
"I don't even understand what exactly they're controlling there. They ruined towns, school. They are the occupiers of the rubble?" Zelensky said.
Zelensky said that he was happy that Sweden and Finland were being accepted as NATO members, even though the Western military alliance has long resisted accepting Ukraine as a member.
"It's not superficial, but deep understanding of the risks for these countries because of the aggressive attitude of Russia to sovereign countries," Zelensky said. "That's why we fully support their membership. The whole world is helping Ukraine, some doing humanitarian aid, some financial or military aid, both houses in the United States support us.
"The world is doing a lot, but it could have been easier -- Ukraine could have been accepted as a NATO member. It would be much more straightforward than people imagine."

Zelensky: Ukraine not in NATO is wrong decision 03:39
Still, Zelensky expressed gratitude for the military support that Ukraine has received from the United States, which has provided weapons with greater capability as the war has dragged on, while urging the West to continue providing military support to help Ukraine keep up its fight.
"(The) United States are helping Ukraine, helping a lot, but it's not enough in order to win. I hope my trust will speed up this help to Ukraine," Zelensky said. "We want the increment of this help -- we're fighting for our land, we don't want people from different countries fight for our territory. But the US are a world economy and can help us with both arms and finances.
"And also, the US can influence the decisions of the European countries -- this is also the political support. I have to be honest, some countries in Europe want a balance between Russia and Ukraine. But owing to the US help they started supporting us. So, when I talk about the volume and speed of the arms support, I'm not appealing only (to) the United States, I appeal to all the world leaders and saying that the faster help, the increment of help, will save the lives of Ukrainians and help us to regain territories occupied by Russia."
Asked whether the war could be over before the end of the year, Zelensky said, "Our country will stay united and unified. If the powerful weaponry from our partners will be coming to us on-time, and if good luck and God will be on our side, we can achieve a lot of things before the end of the year and we can stop this war. We can stop the military part, at least, of this war."
Zelensky also reiterated his call for US President Joe Biden to visit Kyiv, saying it would send a message to Russia and the world.
"We would love to see President Biden in Ukraine. I heard that he supported the idea. There are some security moments, which stand in the way of his visit, we understand that," Zelensky said. "I truly think this would help the Ukrainians. Ukrainians support (the) United States, the trust of the Ukrainians to the United States is very high, same as to the UK and Poland and the Baltic states.
"So, visits of the world leaders who are not just partners but real friends -- they give a signal, a sign, that the United States support Ukraine because they believe in Ukrainian victory and are not afraid of Russia. They come despite the rockets flying in. They are not afraid of Putin because the world is much bigger than one leader of one country."
CNN · by Jeremy Herb, CNN


3. Ukrainian Navy Special Forces Spearhead Daring Snake Island Mission



Ukrainian Navy Special Forces Spearhead Daring Snake Island Mission - Naval News
navalnews.com · by H I Sutton · July 7, 2022
The sight of the Ukrainian flag flying over Snake Island, just days after the Russians retreated from it, is hugely symbolic. Placing the flag was expected, and naturally it made headlines. But the mission behind it was less clear.
Now details are emerging from Ukrainian sources.
On the night of July 7 2022, Ukraine’s elite 73rd Naval Special Purpose Center approached Snake Island. The combat swimmers were driving underwater vehicles.
The divers covertly surveyed the coastal zone, looking for anti-submarine and anti-landing mines. After establishing a safe passage, they gave the signal to the boats of the main group.
The 73rd Naval Special Purpose Center is the special forces unit of the Naval Infantry (marines). Often referred to as Spetsnaz, they are broadly equivalent of the U.S. Navy SEALs or British SBS.
Details of the underwater vehicles employed has not been reported. The unit is known to operate certain sophisticated Western types. But like many special forces units their inventory is shrouded in secrecy.
These vehicles will be wet submarines, meaning that the crew is exposed to the water around them. Therefore the divers have to wear breathing apparatus while submerged. Some types, termed swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) carry the divers inside. Others, called DPDs (diver propulsion devices) tow the divers behind. Both arrangements have their advantages, and both extend the range and endurance of the divers. They also make it possible to carry additional equipment. Modern Western types in Ukrainian service benefit from relevant navigation and commutations equipment.
The Ukrainian Flag flying over Snake Island, July 7. Photo Ministry of Defence of Ukraine
The SOF (special operations forces) operators were not alone. Combat engineers of the 59th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, and navy personnel from the 801st Separate Detachment also landed. The engineers were the first to land on the island, to deal with any mines or booby traps. They cleared a passage for the rest of the force.
As well as planting several Ukrainian flags, the small force gathered intelligence on the Russian equipment there. The island has been hit repeatedly by both sides, but some equipment remains.
Ukrainian sources report that Russian warships begun approaching the island while the troops were still there. Having completed their mission, the Ukrainian force withdrew. Then the Russian side launched a missile attack on the island, reportedly hitting the pier. It is possible that they were intending to destroy equipment to prevent it falling into Ukrainian hands.
Russia claims that it hit and killed some of the Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian side says that its force returned to base unscathed.
navalnews.com · by H I Sutton · July 7, 2022

4. The Complex Reality of Cyber War and Ukraine

​Excerpts:
We know that our cyber readiness is not yet where it should be, even in the critical national sectors of Western countries. Given the track record of Russia’s cyber operators in burying themselves in the supply chains and infrastructure of the West, it would be prudent to assume that they have accesses that they have not yet exploited.
It remains likely that at some stage, Russia will use these to target particular entities or, if things go badly for them, to lash out indiscriminately. Western economies need to keep following the advice of ‘Shields Up’ and keep preparing for attacks, particularly from within the supply chain.​


The Complex Reality of Cyber War and Ukraine
thecipherbrief.com · by Suzanne Kelly

July 5th, 2022 by Robert Hannigan, |

Robert Hannigan is international Chairman of BlueVoyant, the US cyber security services company. He was previously Director of GCHQ, the UK’s largest intelligence agency and NSA equivalent from 2014-17, and a member of the National Security Council. He established the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre in 2016 and was responsible for the UK’s active cyber defence and offensive cyber programs. www.roberthannigan.com/about
EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — There has been widespread surprise in the media that the ground war in Ukraine has not spilled over into large scale and overt cyber conflict outside the region. A visible campaign of Russian attacks on Western economic sectors and nations, especially those linked most strongly with sanctions, has not materialised yet. Commentators have questioned whether urgent government advice to improve defences, the US ‘Shields Up’ initiative and its equivalents in other countries, was really justified.
The reality is more complex.
First, to anyone watching this within the region, there has been no shortage of offensive cyber activity. Ukraine has of course, been a test bed for low intensity Russian cyber activity for at least ten years; but in the months and weeks before the invasion, there was a clear intensification, culminating in the cyber equivalent of an artillery barrage to ‘soften up’ the country immediately before the ground war.
Massive denial of service attacks and multiple waves of sophisticated new wiper malware were unleashed on the Ukrainian government and private sector organisations. Defacement of websites and other political operations accompanied this, as well as manipulation of social media.
Significantly, much of the wiper malware suggested the attackers had established access to these networks well in advance. Even more significantly, some of the wiper viruses were carefully selective in their destruction, maintaining access to the organisation by avoiding the deletion of key domain information.
This technical detail points to one of the problems for Russia in using offensive cyber capability in Ukraine. While useful in a pre-conflict world of hybrid warfare and political effect, using offensive capabilities to destroy networks of a country you plan to control and run poses a dilemma.
Russia clearly thought that it would install a puppet regime in Kyiv within days and assumed that it would need functioning networks to communicate and exert control. Just as it fundamentally underestimated Ukrainian military and political resistance, Russia also underestimated its cyber defences. It further misunderstood the degree to which Ukrainian civilian hackers would rally to their government’s call to attack Russia. This crowdsourcing of offensive cyber is genuinely new and unpredictable.
By contrast, Russia’s own favoured use of criminal proxies to exert pressure also began to get complicated as ransomware groups split along nationalist lines and international hacktivists piled into the fight. The result is a cyber conflict in Russia and Ukraine which is still hard to quantify but clearly adding further chaos to Russia’s economic problems.
Where does the West fit into this, or why does it appear to be left out?
Join leading experts from the public and private sectors for The Cyber Initiatives Group Summer Summit, Wednesday, August 17th. Reserve your virtual seat today
There has of course been a good deal of collateral damage. For example, the impact of alleged Russian attacks on satellite internet services was felt by German companies earlier in the year. And attacks from Russian-based criminal groups have not stopped, even if their efforts have been diverted or displaced at times. But there are a number of reasons why a wider nation-state campaign against western economies may not have materialized yet.
Although Russia has invested heavily in offensive cyber and has developed impressive capabilities, its capacity is not limitless. Its strategic priority is to make the invasion a success – or at least to rescue it from failure – and that is where offensive cyber skills and resources will be concentrated. Viewed from Moscow, this is the absolute priority, particularly while revenue from oil and gas sales remains buoyant. As sanctions bite further, and if things go very badly for Russia in Eastern Ukraine, or it settles into a ‘frozen conflict’, that calculation may change. At that point, ‘lashing out’ at Western countries may become attractive, whether through cyber or other means.
Second-guessing Russian strategic intent, especially when strategic thinking seems to have been confused throughout, is difficult. But Russia will pause over the impact of a large-scale attack on Western economies, which could backfire and shore up Western resolve at a time when Russia will be hoping to see cracks and fatigue in the Western alliance.
Second, it is certainly true that Western cyber defences have got better. ‘Shields Up’ and the campaigns of recent years, have had some effect and those companies that were not getting the basics of cyber security right, will have had a new incentive to look again. No doubt NATO governments have played their parts overtly and covertly – it would be odd if they had not. But it would be a mistake to be complacent about our defences simply because there has not been a successful major attack yet.
We know that our cyber readiness is not yet where it should be, even in the critical national sectors of Western countries. Given the track record of Russia’s cyber operators in burying themselves in the supply chains and infrastructure of the West, it would be prudent to assume that they have accesses that they have not yet exploited.
It remains likely that at some stage, Russia will use these to target particular entities or, if things go badly for them, to lash out indiscriminately. Western economies need to keep following the advice of ‘Shields Up’ and keep preparing for attacks, particularly from within the supply chain.
Register today for the Cyber Initiatives Group Summer Summit on Wednesday, August 17th. Make this the team meeting that everyone is looking forward to (it’s free).

5. Ukraine war tactics reaffirm US Army’s modernization thrust, service chief says

Ukraine and Putin's War will be studied in depth for a long time to come (by the US and allies as well as adversaries). We should just remember that every concept and tactic, technique, and procedure that is demonstrated in Ukraine will cause our adversaries to develop countermeasures to negate the effects.
Ukraine war tactics reaffirm US Army’s modernization thrust, service chief says
Defense News · by Jen Judson · July 8, 2022
WASHINGTON — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown the U.S. Army that its modernization priorities are properly focused, Gen. James McConville, the service’s chief of staff, told reporters during a July 7 visit to U.S. Army Europe and Africa’s headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany.
McConville was joined by the command’s new leader, Gen. Darryl Williams, who took over the job from Gen. Chris Cavoli, who now serves as the commander of U.S. European Command.
The U.S. Army’s forces in Europe are busy supporting and training Ukrainian troops and are capturing lessons learned from the fight in the country, according to McConville. He said that Ukraine’s deputy land forces commander has provided war insights to the U.S. military as well as to other NATO countries who are seeking to help the country defend itself against Russia’s invasion.
McConville stressed combat leadership skills as key for success in large-scale, combined-arms operations, in addition to logistics, training and the ability to disperse command-and-control across the battlefield and at every echelon.
The fighting has also shown the importance of long-range precision fires, he added.
For the U.S. Army, that is its number one modernization priority. The service is poised to initially field its Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) weapon system and a Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile in fiscal 2023 to take out enemy targets from a safe, stand-off distance.
“Now these are extremely long-range precision fires, but that reaffirms our commitment to developing those capabilities,” McConville said.
The Army set up a four-star command less than five years ago — Army Futures Command — that is focused on developing and fielding capabilities across six major modernization priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next-Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, the Network, Air-and-Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality.
The Army is also focused on countering unmanned aircraft systems on the battlefield, a crucial capability as flying drones continue to show how vulnerable even heavily armored tanks can be to strikes from above.
McConville noted how artillery that is being used in the fight in Ukraine has been targeted by Russian UAS, requiring counter-drone systems to protect the cannons.
The need for armored fighting vehicles is also on display in Ukraine, reaffirming the U.S. Army’s plans to pursue next-generation combat vehicle efforts, according to McConville.
The Army entered the critical design and prototype phases of a competition to develop a new Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, which is expected to be fielded by 2030. Industry has been taking notes from Ukraine as it begins detailed design work on possible vehicle plans.
The Ukrainian military and Eastern European allies also wants more helicopters, and the Army is seeing long-range capabilities as well as greater lethality and stand-off as particularly vital features in a future vertical lift aircraft, McConville said. The service poised to select a winner to build a new Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft in September and is in the midst of a competitive prototyping phase for a Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft — both expected to be fielded in the early 2030s.
Having a robust information network is also proving important, McConville noted. The Army is pursuing a modern, resilient battlefield network as one of its top priorities. Ukraine has struggled with its communications systems.
Also vital to the fight are better air-and-missile defense capabilities, the chief stressed. “The Ukrainians have been very effective with their Stinger [man-portable air defense systems] and their [other] air defense systems,” McConville said.
Bringing all those capabilities together on the battlefield makes the difference, he added. “The notion of speed, range and convergence, the ability to locate targets on the battlefield and quickly service them with lethal means is going to be very, very important now and even more important in the future.”
About Jen Judson
Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts from Kenyon College.

6. Will the war in Ukraine fuel nuclear proliferation?

Excerpts:
Some theorists argue that just as nuclear weapons encouraged prudence among great powers, by giving them a ‘crystal ball’ with which to foresee the devastation that would follow from nuclear war, the spread of nuclear weapons would similarly produce stability among smaller regional rivals. Nuclear porcupines would act like rabbits, not wolves.
But not all regions are equal in terms of escalation risk, and it cannot be assumed that all leaders would have the wisdom to use their crystal balls. Regions differ in terms of the number of civil wars and overthrown governments, civilian control of the military, security of communications, and weapons-control protocols. If new proliferators have a higher risk of using nuclear weapons—even inadvertently—they and their neighbours will become even more insecure in the ‘valley of vulnerability’.
Ultimately, when nuclear weapons proliferate, the chances of inadvertent or accidental use tend to increase, managing potential nuclear crises becomes more complicated and establishing controls that may someday help to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in world politics becomes more difficult. In short, the greater the spread of supposedly defensive weapons, the higher the risks of blowing up the whole neighbourhood. The real lesson from Russia’s war in Ukraine is that we must reinforce the existing non-proliferation treaty and refrain from actions that erode it.

Will the war in Ukraine fuel nuclear proliferation? | The Strategist
aspistrategist.org.au · by Joseph S. Nye · July 8, 2022

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine inherited part of its nuclear arsenal. But in the 1994 Budapest memorandum, Ukraine agreed to return these weapons to Russia in exchange for ‘assurances’ from Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States that its sovereignty and borders would be respected. Russia brazenly violated this promise when it annexed Crimea in 2014 and tore up the memorandum with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. Many observers have concluded that Ukraine made a fateful mistake by agreeing to surrender its nuclear arsenal (once the world’s third largest). Are they right?
In the early 1960s, US President John F. Kennedy predicted that at least 25 states would have nuclear weapons by the following decade. But in 1968, United Nations member states agreed to a non-proliferation treaty that restricted nuclear weapons to the five states that already had them (the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China). Today, just nine states have them—the five named in treaty signatories plus Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea—but there are more ‘threshold states’ (countries with the technological ability to build nuclear weapons quickly) considering the option.
Some analysts suggest that proliferation might be a good thing, because a world of nuclear-armed porcupines would be more stable than a world of nuclear wolves and unarmed rabbits. In their view, Russia would not have dared to invade a nuclear-armed Ukraine. They also question why some states should have a right to nuclear weapons while others do not.
Others advocate the abolition of all nuclear weapons, a goal enshrined in the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in 2021. It currently has 86 signatories and 66 parties (though none of the nine states with nuclear weapons have signed up).
Sceptics of this approach argue that while nuclear abolition may be a worthy long-term aspiration, efforts to get there too quickly could increase instability and the likelihood of conflict. The real ethical challenge, they maintain, is not nuclear weapons’ existence but the probability of their use. It might be better if humanity had not learned to harness the power of a split atom in the 1930s; but that knowledge cannot be abolished, so it is better to focus on reducing the risks of its use in warfare.
Suppose that you live in a neighbourhood that suffers continuous devastating break-ins, burglaries and assaults. One day, some of your neighbours decide to equip their houses with massive explosive devices and trip wires, and post warning signs to deter intruders. The problem is that if these devices are used, your house will be damaged, too. Yet there are also considerable dangers in trying to dismantle the system in the short run.
What would you do? You might ask your neighbours to use the system only to defend against intruders and not to threaten others. You could encourage them to install devices to reduce the risk of accidents, and demand compensation for the risk they impose on you by including your house under their warning signs. And you might persuade them to take steps to dismantle the system sometime in the future, when relatively safe means can be found to do so.
By rough analogy, these are the types of conditions enshrined in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that is why the Russian invasion of Ukraine is so damaging. Russia has not only violated its explicit security guarantee under the Budapest memorandum; it has also hinted at nuclear escalation to deter others from coming to Ukraine’s aid. It is thus weakening the taboo against treating nuclear weapons as normal war-fighting weapons—a convention that the Nobel laureate economist Thomas Schelling called the most important global norm since 1945.
But it would be a mistake to exaggerate the harm that the invasion of Ukraine has done to the non-proliferation regime. For one thing, those who think the invasion will teach other states that they would be more secure if they had nuclear weapons are oversimplifying history. One cannot assume that nothing would have happened if Ukraine had kept its Soviet-era nuclear weapons.
After all, such weapons do not come ready to use ‘off the shelf’. The fissile material in the long-range Soviet missiles stationed in Ukraine would have had to be removed, reshaped and repurposed. Not only would that have taken time and expertise, but it might have accelerated Russia’s intervention. When states approach the nuclear threshold, they enter a ‘valley of vulnerability’ that may reduce their security and increase general instability. Even when stable deterrence is imaginable in a region, it may be highly risky to try to get from here to there.
Some theorists argue that just as nuclear weapons encouraged prudence among great powers, by giving them a ‘crystal ball’ with which to foresee the devastation that would follow from nuclear war, the spread of nuclear weapons would similarly produce stability among smaller regional rivals. Nuclear porcupines would act like rabbits, not wolves.
But not all regions are equal in terms of escalation risk, and it cannot be assumed that all leaders would have the wisdom to use their crystal balls. Regions differ in terms of the number of civil wars and overthrown governments, civilian control of the military, security of communications, and weapons-control protocols. If new proliferators have a higher risk of using nuclear weapons—even inadvertently—they and their neighbours will become even more insecure in the ‘valley of vulnerability’.
Ultimately, when nuclear weapons proliferate, the chances of inadvertent or accidental use tend to increase, managing potential nuclear crises becomes more complicated and establishing controls that may someday help to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in world politics becomes more difficult. In short, the greater the spread of supposedly defensive weapons, the higher the risks of blowing up the whole neighbourhood. The real lesson from Russia’s war in Ukraine is that we must reinforce the existing non-proliferation treaty and refrain from actions that erode it.
aspistrategist.org.au · by Joseph S. Nye · July 8, 2022

7. A guy deep in the Defense Department is actually doing something about Chinese theft of US intellectual property

I missed this a couple of weeks ago.


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A guy deep in the Defense Department is actually doing something about Chinese theft of US intellectual property | Federal News Network
federalnewsnetwork.com · June 30, 2022
Best listening experience is on Chrome, Firefox or Safari. Subscribe to Federal Drive’s daily audio interviews on Apple Podcasts or PodcastOne.
It’s become an unfunny joke. No matter what crucial intellectual property gets developed in the United States, it gets stolen by China or maybe Russia. A special team deep in the Defense Department has been working on one strategy to counteract this. It looks for investments in U.S. companies by suspicious foreigners. For his work collaborating with...
Best listening experience is on Chrome, Firefox or Safari. Subscribe to Federal Drive’s daily audio interviews on Apple Podcasts or PodcastOne.
It’s become an unfunny joke. No matter what crucial intellectual property gets developed in the United States, it gets stolen by China or maybe Russia. A special team deep in the Defense Department has been working on one strategy to counteract this. It looks for investments in U.S. companies by suspicious foreigners. For his work collaborating with many other agencies, the team leader is a finalist in this year’s Service to America Medals program. The deputy director of the Office of Foreign Investment Review at DoD, David Rader joined the Federal Drive with Tom Temin.
Interview transcript:
Tom Temin: Mr. Rader, good to have you on.
David Rader: Hi, thanks so much for having me. Good to be here.
Tom Temin: So tell us about the Office of Foreign Investment Review and what you do on that team how the whole thing works.
David Rader: Yeah, you bet. Foreign Investment Review or FIR as we call it, large part is the CFIUS Office. That’s the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. That’s a very narrow kind of structure, regulatory process. But what we’ve discovered is a lot of things that pose threats to national security fall outside of CFIUS itself. And so I built a team of data scientists and economists, lawyers, former program managers and project officers, if you will, to really look at sticky national security issues in the financial and economic domain, that are kind of non-traditional, but pose a great risk to us.
Tom Temin: And you say financial and economic domain that are non traditional, maybe explain that a little bit more.
David Rader: Yeah, traditionally, the department or national security apparatus is writ large, never look at economics as a function of warfighting or a warfighting domain, or an area of exploitation is generally viewed as something kind of separate. And so taking that approach or using that lens to look at transactions and what that means for national security is a primary focus of ours.
Tom Temin: And do you focus on investments in technology companies or potential suppliers to the Defense Department? Or do you look at the economy in a larger sense?
David Rader: Yeah, it’s an unfair answer, but it’s everything. So we look at macroeconomic data to kind of see where the market’s moving directionally, then we’ll look at specific transactions to your point and emerging critical or disruptive technologies, all the way to core military systems that you’re used to protecting. But the world is shifting and civil and military fusion is occurring around the world, both organically and inorganically. And so semiconductors and thrusters and rockets, and lasers, you know, for cutting in factories, or materials are all playing a role in national security and our defense platforms.
Tom Temin: So you’re looking for transactions, then that would indicate someone that we don’t want investing in one of these companies investing in it?
David Rader: Exactly. And relationships. And you know, some of our adversaries are pretty clever, they use some obfuscated ownership or opaque structures to extract technology and try to replicate it or just take it overseas. So joint ventures, their relationships with academia, there’s a lot of ways to go about it. And so we kind of look at everything.
Tom Temin: Fascinating, and what are your sources of data, you say, transactions and who might be behind them, and so forth? How do you ingest the information you need? And where does it come from to do the analytics?
David Rader: Yeah. And so we’re really an aggregator in that sense. So we use our commercial sources, the typical subscription kind of products, news, open source, or OSINT, the intelligence community is a great ally, and partner, the interagency partners, so other governments, you know, will call and say, hey, we heard about this, or have you seen this. And then lastly, is commercial partners. We even have commercial partners, and we do a lot of industry engagement. And that’s one of the best sources for us to understand where the market is going, who’s creating what and with whom they’re interacting.
Tom Temin: And what happens when you find something suspicious, say someone via a shell company in Great Britain, who’s actually Russian invests in Hypersonics-R-Us, for example, that’s doing work with AFWERX?
David Rader: Yeah, so that’s where the secret sauce is made up of various methods, but we tried to pull them into the CFIUS framework, that’s probably the easiest and most well structured, we have some cool authorities and capabilities elsewhere within government that allow us to really, you know, have a meaningful conversation and address the threat.
Tom Temin: Do you find that sometimes the companies themselves don’t realize that they’ve been invested in by people with bad intent?
David Rader: You know, I’d argue that’s probably 50% of the time, I think, you know, companies are really focused on developing their product making money, they might not understand that to your point that Canadian or British shell is actually something else. And then a lot of them don’t understand how they fit into something like made in China 2025. China does a very good job of telegraphing, or, you know, explaining to its people what it’s going after. And so they might say biotech or hypersonics. And so companies, you understand that, you know, we might make a widget and biotech that we don’t think matters for national security. But if China or Russia is looking for it, you’re in our orbit, you’re part of the game now.
Tom Temin: So basically, you’re looking for people that would take our property from the front door and not the back door.
David Rader: Yeah, I mean, we do look at the whole value chain, if you will, but I think that’s a good way to frame it. I mean, it seems like we’re doing all the work. We’re spending the money. We’re doing the research, development, test evaluation, you know, commercializing the product, and then the bad guy show up the last day, take it and get to steal all of our hard work and we’re getting pretty tired of it, I think.
Tom Temin:
Right. What I’m driving at is that they could become a board member or an investor and just simply have access to the information that way, as opposed to hacking in.
David Rader: Oh, absolutely. Yep, board membership, investor relations, accessing data rooms through what seems like normal business transactions or a joint venture. So yeah, they’ll come through the front door 100%.
Tom Temin: We’re speaking with David Rader. He’s deputy director of the Office of Foreign Investment Review at the Defense Department, and a finalist in this year’s Service to America Medals Program. And the category in which you’re a finalist is emerging leaders, which is to say, younger people coming into government, you’re in your mid-30s. What in your background got you to this point, and what attracted you to federal service?
David Rader: I used to be in the Army in a previous life as an infantry man, and you know, had a great experience, all my best friends remained in the business. And so when I stepped away, I went to investment banking at JP Morgan. And I was a M&A consultant at Ernst and Young. And so I enjoyed learning the commercial skills necessary. But I really missed that mission to service. When the opportunity presented itself, I was quick to jump on it because we’re at a critical time right now, where we need to better understand the commercial side and have better relationships and training. But also the Defense Department and national security in general in the U.S. government need really good dedicated public servants who are trying to bring in that next generation, and I was happy to be part of the team.
Tom Temin: Did you get to the Army via enlistment? Or were you a ROTC? Or what was that path?
David Rader: Enlisted right out of high school.
Tom Temin: I’ll be darned. So you’ve had JP Morgan and Ernst and Young level salaries in your short career, and now you’ve got a decent, but it’s a pentagon salary. What effect is that had?
David Rader: There’s some personal adjustments that had to be made.
Tom Temin: But you’re committed to it, it sounds like?
David Rader: Yeah, absolutely. It’s the best place I’ve ever worked. Seen such a diverse group of people from all over the country, you know, kind of all over the world come here to solve really meaningful problems to watch over, you know, America, or investors or innovators, our people. It’s a cliche, but it’s one it’s like, it gets you out of bed in the morning. I really enjoy it. And I have the best boss in the world and great colleagues. So that even makes it easier.
Tom Temin: Yes. And are there any examples of things you’ve uncovered that you might be able to tell us about?
David Rader: Well, sadly, we weren’t quite on the quiet side of the business. There’s quite a few. But I mean, everything that you can imagine where maybe sometimes deals don’t go through or some of the things you’ll read in the headlines. Some, one of us is around there poking around.
Tom Temin: Got it. By the way, you mentioned some of the other DoD and intelligence community elements that you collaborate with. What about the Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, or some of the civil side of government? Is that also part of the CFIUS apparatus?
David Rader: Yeah, absolutely. We’ve expanded the scope, because we’ve realized, you know, if you’re looking at economics, it’s ridiculous to not involve the Securities Exchange Commission. I mean, they’re their regulators for the markets, if you will, the Federal Aviation Administration, the FCC, communication, I mean, kind of the whole panacea of government. We’ve had just excellent partners every time we pick up the phone and say, we have an issue, you know, we think it kind of fits into your authority bucket. But you know, we’d like to collaborate and find a solution for our country. They’ve always said, yeah, come on over. Or, you know, we’ll be there on Monday, and it’s gone really well.
Tom Temin: David Rader is deputy director of the Office of Foreign Investment Review at the Defense Department, and a finalist in this year’s Service to America Medals Program. Thanks so much for joining me.
David Rader: Hey, thanks for having me. Great to see you, Tom.
federalnewsnetwork.com · June 30, 2022

8. FDD | Hezbollah Drones Target Israeli Gas Rigs, Amplify U.S. Pressure on Israel

Excerpts:
There are many in Washington who proceed under the delusion that there is a meaningful separation politically, economically, or diplomatically between Hezbollah and the Lebanese “state.” For many years, Israel resisted this fiction, which it rightly saw as dangerous. Now it seems that a desperate caretaker government has decided to embrace those DC delusions and specifically the push for a maritime border agreement.
That should not change the calculation for U.S. lawmakers who see things clearly. They should challenge the administration’s efforts to cajole Israel’s pliant caretaker government into a deal that benefits Hezbollah at the expense of both U.S. and Israeli interests.
FDD | Hezbollah Drones Target Israeli Gas Rigs, Amplify U.S. Pressure on Israel
fdd.org · by Tony Badran Research Fellow · July 7, 2022
The Israeli military last week shot down three unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah had launched toward one of Israel’s offshore rigs at the Karish gas field. The purpose of the attack was to pressure Israel into concluding an agreement to delineate its maritime border with Lebanon, thus enabling Beirut to tap its potential offshore natural gas reserves.
The Israeli government portrayed the UAV attack as a Hezbollah gambit aimed at “undermining Lebanon’s ability to reach an agreement on the maritime border” with Israel. This is backwards. Hezbollah has been the principal interlocutor in these negotiations, indirectly, since the beginning. Furthermore, as the dominant actor in the Lebanese system, it stands to benefit from an agreement that lets Beirut start producing gas, thereby turning Hezbollah into a player in Eastern Mediterranean energy.
Neither Republican nor Democratic administrations in Washington recognize a fundamental fact: The distinction between Hezbollah and the so-called Lebanese state is artificial. Thus, the Biden administration, like its predecessor, wants to clinch a maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon, with the explicit purpose of encouraging investment in “southern Lebanon” and allowing Lebanon to generate revenues.
Hezbollah knows the score, so it is playing its cards more effectively. In a statement taking responsibility for the UAV attack, Hezbollah underscored that the drones were unarmed but were intended to deliver a message to Israel. Specifically, the group has threatened to disrupt any commercial activity in the Karish field until the Jewish state concedes to Lebanon all of the so-called “Qana” prospective field, even though it protrudes well into Israel’s exclusive economic zone.
Such threats are designed to assist Washington in pressing for concessions from the Israelis, especially as the Biden administration has taken the posture of a neutral broker between the Israelis and Lebanese. The U.S. energy envoy, Amos Hochstein, reportedly offered in February a serpentine line that would grant Lebanon the majority of the Qana prospect. Supposedly, the remaining section would be exploited jointly, thereby entangling Israel in a de facto partnership with Hezbollah.
The Lebanese made clear they had no interest in such an arrangement, which Hezbollah clarified would be tantamount to normalization with the Jewish state. The border talks stalled. In the meantime, Israel proceeded with plans to begin extraction at the Karish field, where a floating production rig arrived in June and is set to begin operations in September.
Against this backdrop, Hezbollah moved to manufacture a crisis and bring Hochstein back to Beirut by threatening to disrupt operations at Karish. Sure enough, Hochstein rushed back and received Lebanon’s terms.
In Israel, Hochstein leveraged Hezbollah’s threat to push the Israelis toward a deal. Axios reported that Hochstein told the Israelis he is “concerned about a potential escalation” and wanted to take advantage of the “window of opportunity when both sides will have an incentive to get a deal and avoid a flare-up.”
Hezbollah intended its drone attack to reinforce the air of crisis that Hochstein cites as a reason for Israel to come to terms with Beirut by September. Israel’s response — condemning Hezbollah for attempting to disrupt maritime border talks while reaffirming their desire for a deal that would help Lebanon — suggests its leaders misunderstand the group’s motives and its dance with the U.S. administration.
There are many in Washington who proceed under the delusion that there is a meaningful separation politically, economically, or diplomatically between Hezbollah and the Lebanese “state.” For many years, Israel resisted this fiction, which it rightly saw as dangerous. Now it seems that a desperate caretaker government has decided to embrace those DC delusions and specifically the push for a maritime border agreement.
That should not change the calculation for U.S. lawmakers who see things clearly. They should challenge the administration’s efforts to cajole Israel’s pliant caretaker government into a deal that benefits Hezbollah at the expense of both U.S. and Israeli interests.
Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Israel Program. For more analysis from Tony and the Israel Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Tony on Twitter @AcrossTheBay. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Tony Badran Research Fellow · July 7, 2022


9. Kremlin’s Never-Ending Thirst For Death And Devastation

Excerpt:

Pro-Kremlin disinformation outlets continue to call immense human suffering liberation and the ruins temporarily fallen into Russian hands tokens of glorious victory. Similarly, without any hesitation, Kremlin spin-doctors turn a terror strike against a shopping mall with Soviet-era cruise missiles loaded with one-ton warheads a surgical precision attack against a justified military target. Russian mouthpieces in Egypt joined the chorus(opens in a new tab) by attempting to spread disinformation about the arms and ammunition depots having been destroyed in the strike.


JULY 07, 2022
Kremlin’s Never-Ending Thirst For Death And Devastation
A morbid death cult appears to reign in the Kremlin, where death, destruction and immense human suffering is met with rejoicing.
Pro-Kremlin disinformation outlets continue to call immense human suffering liberation and the ruins temporarily fallen into Russian hands tokens of glorious victory. Similarly, without any hesitation, Kremlin spin-doctors turn a terror strike against a shopping mall with Soviet-era cruise missiles loaded with one-ton warheads a surgical precision attack against a justified military target. Russian mouthpieces in Egypt joined the chorus(opens in a new tab) by attempting to spread disinformation about the arms and ammunition depots having been destroyed in the strike.
Meanwhile, the international community calls a spade a spade – Russian air forces attacked a civilian target in Kremenchuk causing vast devastation and the loss of at least 18 lives, potentially a war crime(opens in a new tab).
Just a few days after the Kremenchuk strike, and a day after a humiliating withdrawal(opens in a new tab) from the strategic Snake Island, painted as a gesture of “good-will” in Kremlin propaganda(opens in a new tab), the Russian air force resorted yet again to their terror bombing tactics.
The after midnight cruise missile strike to a coastal community of Serhiivka residing in the Odessa region killed at least 19 people in their beds leaving dozens more wounded(opens in a new tab). Not surprisingly, the Kremlinsplaining machinery was ready to deny the horrific aftermath of the Serhiivka strike and suggest, against the very graphic evidence, that Russian armed forces only engage military targets.
There is no reason to expect this lineage of terror to cease anytime soon, as it seems that the Russian Ministry of Defence is releasing disinformation(opens in a new tab) about Ukrainian “fabrications” to prepare the audiences for more Russian strikes against civilians to come, while attempting to pre-emptively deflect the blame to the Ukrainians. Conveniently, the release took place in the evening following the Russian attack against civilians in Serhiivka.
The fall of the Donbas twin cities of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk into Russian hands as bombed-out ruins did not satisfy the bloodthirst in Kremlin. Negligible gains made with heavy casualties were celebrated as a major victory both in the Kremlin’s corridors(opens in a new tab) and, in a clear violation of the spirit of the space station, also in space(opens in a new tab).
The celebratory mood was cut short by Putin’s order to continue the attack as planned(opens in a new tab) and Patrushev’s regurgitation of war’s maximalist aims(opens in a new tab). This will undoubtedly entail more levelled cities, indiscriminate strikes against civilian targets, and incessant Kremlin propaganda trying to explain away the atrocities awaiting. If Russia is, as according to Naryshkin, fighting for its ‘historical future’(opens in a new tab), the future does not seem to hold much for them apart from death and devastation.

In other disinformation news:


10. What the U.S. Still Doesn’t Get About Countering China

Harsh critique.

Conclusion:

The West is great at generating slogans and names for economic partnerships with acronyms that will be quickly forgotten, but in the meantime, because of its failure to change the way it thinks about the opportunity the global south represents to the West and the world, it risks seeing the future pass it by.


What the U.S. Still Doesn’t Get About Countering China
Foreign Policy · by Howard W. French · July 7, 2022
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Self-interest, not altruism, is driving Beijing to invest in the global south.
Howard W. French
By Howard W. French, a columnist at Foreign Policy.
From left to right, front to back row: South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé, Malawian President Arthur Peter Mutharika, Sierra Leonean President Julius Maada Bio, and Liberian President George Weah attend a group photo session during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2018.

Last week’s NATO summit in Madrid saved its conclusion for the announcement that many would see as its biggest takeaway: The Western military grouping would henceforth explicitly regard China as a “challenge” to an alliance that was founded with the superpower of another age, the Soviet Union, in mind.
A few days earlier in Germany, members of the G-7 announced that the United States and its European partners had decided to mobilize $600 billion to finance infrastructure development in Africa and other parts of the so-called developing world. The new vehicle unveiled for this purpose, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, received less attention than the week’s security news, but it too grew out of concern over China—namely, the West’s perceived need to compete with that country’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is sometimes claimed to be mobilizing trillions of dollars.
“This isn’t aid or charity,” U.S. President Joe Biden said of the West’s still sketchy response, speaking at a resort in the Bavarian Alps. “It’s a chance for us to share our positive vision for the future … because when democracies demonstrate what we can do, all that we have to offer, I have no doubt that we’ll win the competition every time.”
With the political challenge of holding a united position toward Russia as stout as it is, many will view the idea of rolling out a meaningful common Western security response to China’s growing power and influence anytime soon as fanciful. Compared to neighboring Russia, China feels very distant to Europeans. As with most of the world, China’s emergence as a leading trading partner and source of investment makes Europeans wary of antagonizing it. Apart from providing moral and economic support to Russia, as long as Beijing does not directly threaten Europe—and there is little reason to expect it would—there will be little appetite in Europe for standing with the United States to mount a common defense.
Much more urgent yet even more deserving of skepticism is the need to bring rich Western countries in as major players in the financing of infrastructure and the provision of other international public goods to counter China. Here, one need not prognosticate, though, because the recent record is so full of empty promises and inaction.
As many said in expressing their doubt on social media in the wake of the G-7 announcement, the last decade-plus has seen repeated announcements like this one that have amounted to little more than vaporware. The most recent—dubbed “Build Back Better World”—came from Biden himself barely a year ago. Who can recall it today, and why should they? It achieved little more momentum than Biden’s domestic program that bore a variation of that same name.
While China has continued to expand and adapt its Belt and Road project, earlier iterations of the same basic Western idea have borne long-forgotten names, such as the Blue Dot Network—a 2019 initiative by the United States, Australia, and Japan—and the New Silk Road Initiative—a scheme promoted by then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011, anticipating that historical metaphor about ancient trade routes two years before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature geopolitical undertaking saw the light of day.
It is the spirit behind this trail of Western futility that interests me most—and which desperately needs to be overcome—rather than the growing list of defunct names. This was captured well by Kori Schake, director of foreign and defense policy at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, who tweeted about the newest G-7 plan: “We’d get so much more mileage if we even pretended the initiative was to encourage development rather than to counter China.” To accept this would merely be the start of wisdom, though, for it is high time that the United States do more than merely pretend to care about global development.
The reasons for Washington’s inability to do so are given away in Biden’s statement and bound up in a wrongheaded and ahistorical understanding of the relationship between the West and the rest of the world, especially the so-called global south.
Biden’s emphasis on the new plan not being aid or charity was for domestic consumption; these are things the developing world is hardly holding its breath for. This ritualized and distinctly American trope recalls the era of former Sen. Jesse Helms, the segregationist North Carolina Republican who preceded Biden as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1995 to 2001. Helms famously equated assistance to developing countries to pouring money down “foreign ratholes” and did everything he could to block it.
Attitudes like this were hardly the monopoly of old-line southern senators, though, and had been pushing U.S. foreign policy toward the developing world in an increasingly stingy and scornful direction since the years of former U.S. President Ronald Reagan. They forced U.S. politicians of all stripes to disavow the notion of the United States as a provider of global public goods outside of its role as the securer of international order through military strength.
This was not only an undignified posture for the richest society in the history of the world, but it also exerted a slow but surely corrosive effect on U.S. power and influence globally—to the point where countless nations now look to China, still a country far less wealthy on a per capita basis than the United States, as the partner most likely able to help them achieve big things in the economic realm. The problem doesn’t end there though. The rhetorical line passed down to Biden both miscasts the history of the rich world’s relations with the global south and mis-prepares the United States for the world of the near future.
The wealth of the United States, Europe, and even Japan—along with other highly industrialized countries—is predicated on a starkly unequal international economic system and has been built on the poverty and limitation of opportunity for others.
For many decades now, the prosperous West has sourced essential commodities and natural resources from the world’s poor nations while enforcing its privilege through impediments to both trade and migration. These unequal relationships have even older roots in the centurieslong Atlantic slave trade, which took advantage of billions of hours of labor expropriated from people in bondage.
Alongside this, late in the slavery era, the West created corporations like Britain’s famous East India Company, which unloaded industrial goods, such as textiles, on poorer parts of the world while denying colonized people the right to export their products to Western markets—except when Western companies controlled that production and trade.
Today’s enormous global wealth disparities are rooted in these realities that have proven extremely resistant to change and are masked by a Western ideology that pretends that the successes of the rich are the pure result of long sacrifice, virtue, and ingenuity while encouraging fear and resentment of the less fortunate. Here, there is a vital but so far unseized opportunity for Biden and other U.S. politicians to learn something important from China.
Since former U.S. President Barack Obama, if not before, U.S. leaders and diplomats have been warning governments in the developing world not to reach out to the economic hand that Beijing extends to them, invoking supposed debt traps and other snares that will come from accepting the terms that China offers in constructing its own global economic networks.
What is new is that the developing world has more of an alternative to the West than any time in the recent past. Language out of Washington shows that U.S. leaders at least implicitly understand that China is not in the charity game either, but they fail to grasp a more important insight: China has gotten into the global public goods game with both feet during the last three decades for a variety of reasons, but most importantly, out of an understanding that the future of the international economy lies to a great extent in the global south.
This is where future global growth will occur. This is where a huge, coming change in global demographics will take place. This is where the trading partners, talented and energetic labor, and customers of the future will come from. Beijing understands that this is an opportunity for China—not some falsely construed charity operation and certainly not a rathole.
It is self-interest, not altruism, that is driving Beijing in this direction, and capitalists who believe in the wisdom and virtue of the market should understand as well as anyone that this is not a bad thing and should draw the proper conclusions. I write these words from a city called Lomé, the capital of the tiny West African country of Togo. Lomé sits close to the middle of one of the greatest ongoing human projects anywhere: the creation of a coastal region of dense urbanization that will stretch from Lagos, Nigeria, to Abidjan, Ivory Coast.
Tens of millions of people will live, work, and trade in this region by the middle of the century—a blink of an eye by historical standards. Signs of China are everywhere, in small businesses and big factories, road projects and airports, whereas signs of Europe mostly consist of vestiges of colonization and signs of the United States are few. Who will house all these people? Who will help create the power, water, sewage, and communications infrastructure as well as the schools, universities, and jobs?
The West is great at generating slogans and names for economic partnerships with acronyms that will be quickly forgotten, but in the meantime, because of its failure to change the way it thinks about the opportunity the global south represents to the West and the world, it risks seeing the future pass it by.
Howard W. French is a columnist at Foreign Policy, a professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, and a longtime foreign correspondent. His latest book is Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans and the Making of the Modern World, 1471 to the Second World War. Twitter: @hofrench



11. Russia Aims to Paralyze NATO Without a Single Shot


Excerpt:
So what is Putin’s Plan B for NATO?
It is already unfolding in the Balkans. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Ivana Strander has carefully and repeatedly chronicled the Kremlin’s attempts to interfere domestically in various Balkan countries, including NATO members such as Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia. The White House and State Department might compartmentalize their diplomacy, but Putin is taking a more holistic approach. Simply put, his strategy appears to shut down NATO action by the veto of its small members who his forces infiltrate long before it becomes necessary to confront the defense alliance on the battlefield.
The question for Washington and Brussels, then, is what is the American and European response? The tendency in both capitals to sigh with relief when a crisis passes serves NATO poorly when what really transpired with Turkey was a dry run to destroy NATO from within.



Russia Aims to Paralyze NATO Without a Single Shot
19fortyfive.com · by ByMichael Rubin · July 7, 2022
Russia Has a Plan to Weaken NATO: Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan put his diplomatic brinkmanship on full display over the past month. He held up the NATO accession for Sweden and Finland in order to win unrelated concessions: A Swedish and Finnish commitment to rollback its engagement with Syrian and Turkish Kurds, and a push by President Joe Biden to move forward with the sale of advanced F-16s and upgrade kits for Turkey’s existing jets.
Erdogan may be a cynic and Turkey may no longer be deserving of NATO membership, but there is little NATO can do for two reasons: First, there is no mechanism within NATO to expel a wayward member, and, second, the organization governs itself by consensus. There is no difference between the vote of the United States, with 330 million people, Turkey with 85 million, and North Macedonia with 1.8 million.
If Erdogan sympathizes more with Russia than the United States, and all evidence suggests he does, then he and Russian President Vladimir Putin gain more power having Turkey as part of NATO than separate from it because they can use Turkey’s membership to paralyze the alliance from within.
Putin, however, understands just how mercurial and egotistical Erdogan is. When Erdogan looks in the mirror, he sees Putin’s equal, but when Putin looks at Erdoǧan, he sees a Chihuahua. Simply put, Putin will never place Russia’s broader security aims in the power of a man he sees as little more than a yapping dog.
So what is Putin’s Plan B for NATO?
It is already unfolding in the Balkans. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Ivana Strander has carefully and repeatedly chronicled the Kremlin’s attempts to interfere domestically in various Balkan countries, including NATO members such as Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia. The White House and State Department might compartmentalize their diplomacy, but Putin is taking a more holistic approach. Simply put, his strategy appears to shut down NATO action by the veto of its small members who his forces infiltrate long before it becomes necessary to confront the defense alliance on the battlefield.
The question for Washington and Brussels, then, is what is the American and European response? The tendency in both capitals to sigh with relief when a crisis passes serves NATO poorly when what really transpired with Turkey was a dry run to destroy NATO from within.
Expert Biography – Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).
19fortyfive.com · by ByMichael Rubin · July 7, 2022

12. Taiwanese student receives threats over his map of China’s military facilities

Of course the Chinese are upset. Everyone with a computer can be an intelligence analyst today - and we can crowd source analysis (note sarcasm - but only half tongue in cheek).

But this has implications for all nations and militaries with the amount of open source information available online and from commercial imagery. Even in China.

Excerpt:

Wen had initially wanted to post the People's Liberation Army Air Force bases only as he could find their runways easily online, according to a separate report by Taiwan News. But he later expanded the map to include 782 areas of interest, such as China's key military and political organs, army bases, naval bases, rocket force facilities, and important military-industrial facilities, such as the shipyards in Dalian, Jiangnan and Huangpu.
...
In the talk show, Wen explained that he gathered information on the facility locations by looking at publicly available websites, and papers from various military academies.
Wen urged Taiwanese students to improve their ability to assess information by differentiating between useful information and "implanted propaganda".



Taiwanese student receives threats over his map of China’s military facilities
Vernon Lee·Senior Editor
Thu, 7 July 2022 at 8:21 am·2-min read

Taiwanese student speaking in a talk show about his map of China's military facilities. (SCREENSHOTS: Google and YouTube)
A map of China’s military facilities created by a Taiwanese music student has received considerable attention after he appeared in a China Television talk show, according to local media reports.
Wen posted the map online in June last year, but it only went viral after the show’s broadcast last month. As of Thursday afternoon, the map has been viewed more than 1 million times. Wen said his intention to create the map was to “help people better understand the cross-strait situation,” according to a report by the Taipei Times.
Wen had initially wanted to post the People's Liberation Army Air Force bases only as he could find their runways easily online, according to a separate report by Taiwan News. But he later expanded the map to include 782 areas of interest, such as China's key military and political organs, army bases, naval bases, rocket force facilities, and important military-industrial facilities, such as the shipyards in Dalian, Jiangnan and Huangpu.
He was able to pinpoint where the 666 brigade of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force is located following a leaked photo shown on Chinese state-run CCTV as two lighting covers above a building in the photo match a structure in Xinyang.
Most of the facilities in the map are concentrated along the coast of the Fujian and Guangdong provinces, which are located close to Taiwan, and in the northern provinces near the Korean peninsula and Japan. In contrast, the map shows far fewer facilities along China’s border with Russia.
In the talk show, Wen explained that he gathered information on the facility locations by looking at publicly available websites, and papers from various military academies.
Wen urged Taiwanese students to improve their ability to assess information by differentiating between useful information and "implanted propaganda".
While the student plans to continue working on his map, he does not intend to pursue a career in the military or intelligence. He said, “Music is a relatively pure interest that is not shrouded in conflict.”
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13. After hitting all-time highs, gas prices are finally coming back down

Some good news? (of course a potential recession is not)
After hitting all-time highs, gas prices are finally coming back down
Oil prices are tumbling amid fears of a global recession.
NBC News · by Rob Wile · July 7, 2022
Fears of a global economic slowdown have sent oil prices tumbling recently, less than a month after the national average price of gas in the U.S. reached $5 a gallon for the first time.
Since they hit the milestone the week of June 13, average weekly gas prices have fallen to about $4.75, according to AAA.
The price of worldwide benchmark Brent crude oil fell to about $104 a barrel Thursday, down from nearly $115 last week and well off the highs of nearly $140 briefly reached in March.
Central banks around the world, led by the U.S. Federal Reserve, have been seeking to curb inflation by aggressively raising interest rates. Monetary policy officials hope the higher rates will help cool demand by making it more expensive to borrow money — all while avoiding a recession, an outcome observers say is far from guaranteed.

June 11, 202201:52
"All this talk of [higher] interest rates and recession — that's fear, the oil market is reacting on fear," AAA.com spokesperson Andrew Gross said. "It's kind of like the stock market: You have these incredible swings, when it sees rising rates or talk of recession, a global recession, that means an economic slowdown, which means less oil is being consumed. That's bad news for the oil industry. And that’s why prices have been dropping.”
Some analysts expect prices to fall further. Patrick De Haan, a vice president at the gasoline price tracking website GasBuddy.com, tweeted Thursday that recent oil price plunges could bring gasoline prices down to as low as $4.50 per gallon.
Oil industry analyst Andy Lipow said in a note to clients this week that gas prices could go even lower, at the cost of an overall economic slowdown. That's assuming a hurricane doesn’t affect oil markets, he said.
"I have been through six oil price crashes during my career in the oil industry, a recession could trigger a seventh," he wrote.
Because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, oil traders aren’t accessing Russian oil supplies, creating a shortage that has helped push prices higher this year. A recession, Lipow said, could reverse the trend.
"The consumer would get cheaper gasoline at the expense of a slowing economy," Lipow said.
NBC News · by Rob Wile · July 7, 2022


​14.  Wind and solar produce more electricity than nuclear for the first time in the US

We made some major strategic errors in decision making years ago. By now nuclear power should be our primary source of electricity.  

I think there is no other country in the world that fears all things related to "nuclear" than the US (even more than Japan which obviously is the only country that suffered a nuclear attack) . Hopefully the reports that we may return to nuclear energy production are accurate. 



Wind and solar produce more electricity than nuclear for the first time in the US
electrek.co · July 7, 2022

For the first time ever, wind and solar produced 17.96% more electricity in the month of April than nuclear power plants.
Further, electrical generation by clean energy – which included biomass, geothermal, and hydropower and was driven by strong solar and wind growth – accounted for almost 30% of total US electrical generation in the month of April, according to a SUN DAY Campaign analysis of newly released US Energy Information Administration (EIA) data.
And from the period between January and April 2022, clean energy accounted for more than 25% of electricity in the US.
The latest issue of the EIA’s “Electric Power Monthly” report, with data through April 30, 2022, also reflects that solar (including rooftop) saw a year-over-year percentage change growth of 28.9%, while wind grew year-over-year by 24.2%. Combined, solar and wind grew by 25.4% and accounted for more than one-sixth (16.6%) of US electrical generation (wind at 12.2%, solar at 4.4%). The actual figures are measured in net generation, thousand megawatt hours, and can be seen here.
Hydropower increased by 9.99% during the first four months of 2022, but wind alone provided 70.89% more electricity than did hydropower.
And when it came to fossil fuels, renewables outpaced coal and nuclear by 26.13% and 37.8%, respectively, in the first third of 2022. In fact, electrical generation by coal declined by 3.9% compared to the same period in 2021, while nuclear dropped by 1.8%.
SUN DAY Campaign’s executive director Ken Bossong said:
Notwithstanding headwinds such as the Covid pandemic, grid access problems, and disruptions in global supply chains, solar and wind remain on a roll.
Moreover, by surpassing nuclear power by ever greater margins, they illustrate the foolishness of trying to revive the soon-to-retire Diablo Canyon nuclear plant in California and the just-retired Palisades reactor in Michigan rather than focusing on accelerating renewables’ growth.
Photo: Kindel Media on Pexels.com
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​ 
15. The Army is getting leaders ready for a war unlike any the US has ever seen

LSCO.


The Army is getting leaders ready for a war unlike any the US has ever seen
The service is moving away from the past and training for future operations against China and Russia.
BY JOHN DOLAN | PUBLISHED JUL 7, 2022 9:00 AM
taskandpurpose.com · by John Dolan · July 7, 2022
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For several years, the U.S. Army has been considering how to better prepare its leaders and formations for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer and near-peer threats. As an Army officer with over four years in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader Middle East, I appreciate the challenges of transitioning a force well-trained and educated in counter-insurgency operations (COIN) to one capable of fighting and prevailing against threats like Russia and/or China. The Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Army’s premier school for educating its officers in tactics and planning, has made revising its course curriculum to fully teach LSCO and competition with China and Russia its top priority. MCCC is building a fully-aligned LSCO curriculum by redefining our operational environment, focusing on the division (DIV) as the unit of action, and considering expansion opportunities within multi-domain operations (MDO) to develop the Army’s next generation of maneuver leaders to fight and win in LSCO.
Identifying the problem
In January 2021, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Commanding General, Major General Patrick Donahoe, directed MCCC to prioritize revising and reorienting its curriculum to better reflect LSCO and competition with China and Russia. As the proponent for MCCC, my team and I thoroughly analyzed our curriculum and found that while MCCC had certainly made incremental transitions toward teaching LSCO, many vestiges from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan stubbornly remained in the curriculum.
Several of our key scenarios were still geographically located in Iraq or Western Asia, tethering ourselves physically and cognitively to the Middle Eastern region and its arid terrain. Furthermore, we found the adversaries in our training scenarios were outdated and varied considerably, ranging from insurgent and/or hybrid groups, to barely near-peer militaries. Conspicuously missing were belligerents with the capabilities of today’s Russian and Chinese militaries. Finally, MCCC instruction oriented on the brigade combat team (BCT) as the unit of action with an abundance of air assets and enablers operating in a largely uncontested environment – again, not reflecting the real competition with peers and near-peer threats we should expect. For MCCC, our path to adopting a fully LSCO-aligned curriculum would begin with redefining the operational environment our instruction was meant to center on.
U.S. Army Soldiers with 1st Squadron, 98th Cavalry Regiment, 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team, Mississippi Army National Guard, conduct Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) training at Camp Shelby Joint Forces Training Center, Mississippi, April 29, 2022. (Tech. Sgt. Charles Wesley/U.S. Air National Guard)
Redefining the operational environment
  1. Location. Maj. Gen. Donahoe’s consistent guidance when discussing MCoE’s LSCO transition has been “east of the Vistula, north of the Han.” A simple phrase providing clear direction: focus our training scenarios on East Asia and Eastern Europe – those likely places we might confront Chinese and Russian threats. After considerable work over the last year from MCCC instructors and the Army’s Combined Arms Center, the physical terrain of MCCC’s instruction is out of Western Asia and largely east of the Vistula and north of the Han. We retained some local scenarios to allow students the opportunity to walk the ground and appreciate the terrain from a tactical perspective not always gained from a map. However, all other scenarios now take place outside of the deserts of Iraq and focus on how to fight and win in terrain ranging from the dense forests of the Baltics to the mountainous terrain of East Asia.
  2. Threat. In June 2021, Chief of Staff of the Army General McConville stated, “The Army must understand the threat posed by China to the same level that we understood the Soviets.” To my knowledge, MCCC (and MCoE for that matter) had never incorporated a threat based on the Chinese Army into its training and educational scenarios. This is no longer the case. To drive change and educate cadres across the MCoE, MCCC designed a foundational block of instruction derived from ATP 7-100.3 Chinese Tactics that introduces all students to the Chinese Army, its structure, and aspects of how we assess their fighting capabilities at the tactical level. In addition to relocating our scenarios to East Asian and Eastern European battlefields, MCCC rebuilt our scenario threats to reflect the modernizing armies of China and Russia while remaining decisive action training environment (DATE) compliant. Now, over 60% of MCCC’s scenarios feature DATE threat actors resembling the Chinese formations described in ATP 7-100.3 Chinese Tactics. The remaining 40% of our tactical scenarios are based on the current Russian military, and MCCC plans to design a similar foundational block on the Russian Army upon the publication of ATP 7-100.1 Russian Tactics. There is far more work to be done in educating students on Chinese and Russian tactics to a level at which we understood the Soviets, and this represents a considerable area of expansion for MCCC in 2022.
  3. Employing Enablers in a Contested Environment. As a platoon leader in Iraq, I credit two Apache attack helicopters with saving my life, and I knew I could always rely on air support being close by and highly responsive. In an LSCO environment, the days of helicopters loitering over small units, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) soaking targets uncontested for 48 hours, and firing mortars and artillery without regard for their proximity to command posts, assembly areas, and logistics nodes are gone. Similarly, our expectation of complete air supremacy and not worrying about more than a small UAS dropping a 40mm grenade on top of us is unrealistic. This revised operational environment that MCCC is building into its scenarios is intended to teach students to account for a threat with accurate and even overmatched fires, air defense assets at nearly every echelon, aircraft capable of striking friendly units, near-constant observation by enemy UAS, and the capabilities to broadly disrupt our communications systems. We are trying to impart to our students that the resources they will receive are 1) more finite in terms of time allocation and quantity, 2) susceptible to many forms of enemy contact, and 3) must be employed thoughtfully to prevent easy enemy predation and enable preservation for future friendly use.
ZHOUSHAN, April 28, 2020 — Special operation soldiers of the Chinese naval fleet for escort mission wave farewell on the deck at a port in Zhoushan, east China’s Zhejiang Province, April 28, 2020. The 35th fleet of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy on Tuesday left the port city of Zhoushan in east China’s Zhejiang Province for the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia to escort civilian ships. Composed of the guided-missile destroyer Taiyuan, the missile frigate Jingzhou and the supply ship Chaohu, the fleet has more than 690 officers and soldiers, dozens of special operation soldiers and two helicopters on board. (Photo by Jiang Shan/Xinhua via Getty) (Xinhua/Jiang Shan via Getty Images)
  1. Scope, Size, and Intensity. MCCC’s foundational urban attack scenario was an excellent example of why we had to do more than just change locations and threats in our tactical scenarios. We had to reconsider the scope, size and intensity of our exercises to ensure they reflected the realism of combat operations within an LSCO environment. When I peeled back the layers of our urban attack scenario, I found an operation reminiscent of my days in Baghdad – a unit alone and unafraid in a city, retaking a compound (police station) seized by an insurgent group, with U.S. forces providing an outer cordon while host-nation forces entered and cleared the objective. This did not feel like LSCO in an urban environment. We needed to start over and build something more akin to Stalingrad than to Iraq 2009 or Afghanistan 2016.
As an immediate fix, my team completely changed the threat, removed host-nation forces, and allowed for more permissive use of direct and indirect fires. Looking to the future, our new urban scenario being constructed will revolve around a higher density of units fighting with combined arms as part of a larger division operation. The scenario will focus on key terrains like bridges, rail hubs, airfields, and major lines of communication needed to continue the advance — all while facing a very lethal peer threat. The intent is to create a scenario that forces students to think through what makes urban operations so difficult: canalizing terrain that breaks up formations, degraded capabilities of many weapons systems, difficulties in massing combined arms, and higher casualties, resource consumption, and command and control challenges. Considerations and mission variables such as these will push our students beyond COIN tactics and will provide the foundation and framework to apply the proper scope, size, and intensity to our LSCO scenarios.
Orienting on the Division as the unit of action
When students graduate from MCCC, few go directly into company or troop command. Most will find themselves planning tactical operations as part of a BCT or battalion (BN) staff. As such, over a third of MCCC’s 22+ week curriculum aims to fuse the foundational tactics learned in MCCC’s first 11 weeks with planning BCT and BN-level operations using the Army’s military decision-making process (MDMP). As of late 2019, the BCT remained the unit of action for MDMP training and education at MCCC while the rest of the Army was adjusting to LSCO and the DIV as the unit of action. At MCCC, it was time to expose our students to the DIV as the unit of action and also an overall adjustment to our instructional approach for MDMP.
  1. Exposure to the Division. To be clear, the DIV as the Army’s unit of action does not mean young captains should execute DIV-level planning; I still think that is for our majors at the Command and General Staff Officers Course. However, given that nearly all our students will serve on a BCT or BN staff, it is imperative they are exposed to DIV-level operations to gain an understanding of how their BCT or BN is nested within a broader mission. In our 2019 approach, students had little to no exposure to the DIV, let alone a well-developed DIV plan. So we changed. In collaboration with the Logistics and Military Intelligence Captains Career Courses, we built a full DIV operations order and plan to govern MDMP instruction and education at MCCC. In June 2021, CAC even provided MCCC with a DIV-level Baltic scenario as part of their Combined Scenario Exercise Program. As of 2021, 100% of MCCC students now conduct the MDMP as part of a DIV as the unit of action in an LSCO environment.
  2. Adjusting our Training Approach. With a full DIV order in hand, MCCC substantially changed its approach to how student staffs conduct the MDMP and interact with one another. In the past, a student BCT staff would receive a complete BCT order only to digest and reissue that order to student BN staff. The BN staff then conducted the MDMP, leveraging their BCT staff to mainly answer questions and orchestrate BCT-level rehearsals. Many students were not challenged due to a lack of friction between staffs, and no actual BCT-level MDMP occurring (a missed opportunity). Ultimately, there was no meaningful exposure to a synchronized DIV plan. So again, we changed our approach. In short, student BCT staffs now receive a DIV order and start full BCT-level MDMP (developing their own unique plan and thus taking ownership of it) two days ahead of their BN staffs. BNs then initiate the MDMP based on what the BCT staff produces and issues. BCT staffs are exposed to the realistic tensions of their BNs pressing them for information, products, and planning guidance. All staffs gain an appreciation for relationships at echelon, a battle rhythm and sticking to planning timelines, and the benefits of bottom-up refinement during planning. And while this approach is harder and more stressful, it is more realistic. This enhanced approach also produces improved student learning and enables direct exposure to the DIV as the unit of action, all while immersing students in an LSCO environment.
Expansion opportunities in multi-domain operations and cross-domain maneuver
I am more than occasionally asked how MCCC is teaching captains multi-domain operations (MDO) and cross-domain maneuver (CDM). This often leads back to a more fundamental question: what does a young captain need to know about MDO and CDM? It is a good question and I will describe briefly what we teach now and outline some growth opportunities for our curriculum in 2022 to improve our LSCO orientation. In short, MCCC currently focuses on the land and air domains as expected, but it does introduce concepts of the space domain and electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS) in large-group classes and at a surface level in BCT and BN planning.
  1. Land and Air Domains: At MCCC we prioritize teaching students foundational tactics on how to fight using the Army’s three BCT types at the company level, and progress later in the course to fighting at BN and BCT echelons. Within these echelons, we teach students to effectively synchronize and employ a host of combined arms assets and enablers in concert with their ground maneuver formation. This usually translates to mortars and artillery, fixed and rotary-wing aviation, UAS and other intelligence collection platforms, and engineer assets. While not an exhaustive list (we do touch on all warfighting functions), this captures the majority of combined arms elements our students are learning about and employing in their tactical planning.
  2. Space Domain and the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS): Most formal instruction outside of the traditional land and air domains is concentrated on space and the EMS. Students are introduced to broad concepts and planning considerations and are taught how these can influence their operations on the battlefield. As MCCC does not have the resident expertise to provide detailed instruction in these areas, we leverage experts from across the Army to help us deliver very specific topics such as the space domain.
  3. MDO and CDM Growth Opportunities: There are several MDO and CDM-related areas MCCC will expand its instruction into regarding competition with China and Russia and LSCO. First, we plan to introduce the cyber domain and cyber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA) as a concept. While students do not need to be experts in cyberspace, a surface-level knowledge of the domain, how the Army thinks about it, and how cyber affects BCT-level operations and below is useful. Furthermore, as the Army fields CEMA capabilities to its BCTs, there is utility in our students’ understanding of how to effectively plan for and employ such assets on the battlefield. Second, we plan to invest more in understanding our own communications and the EMS. Understanding some of the science behind the EMS and our communications, how our competitors like China and Russia compete in the EMS, and how we should respond and operate in this contested environment are all worthy of greater study. As a third example, MCCC will deliver general instruction on air defense artillery (ADA) employment. In the Army, it has been some time since ADA was commonly seen at the BCT level and below. This branch is a feature of MCCC’s LSCO scenarios, and we must educate our maneuver officers to better understand and effectively employ ADA assets in an LSCO environment.
Conclusions
Competition with China and Russia is here to stay for the foreseeable future, and this requires an institutional shift towards better understanding and training for LSCO. As I write this, Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and the United States continues to push more troops and arms to Eastern Europe to bolster our Allies. While transitioning our Army to a fighting force more capable of prevailing in an LSCO contest will not happen overnight, MCoE and MCCC play a vital role in preparing future generations of Army leaders to fight and win the next war. Our key is to remain agile and dynamic in our curriculum and instructional approach, with our foot on the gas – willing to adjust and adapt for the future fight.
+++
Lieutenant Colonel John Dolan is an active duty Army Officer with 17 years of experience and currently runs the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. LTC Dolan has primarily served in Armor and Cavalry assignments and has deployed extensively to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader Middle East.

taskandpurpose.com · by John Dolan · July 7, 2022

​16. The Marine Corps' latest idea for countering China has major problems

Sustaining operations throughout the INDOPACIFIC will be a huge challenge for all services.

Excerpts:
Arguably the single biggest tactical question about the concept is a stand-in force’s ability to survive and be sustained. Widely distributed stand-in detachments will be vulnerable to attack and will have limited ability to defend themselves or be reinforced. A linchpin of the concept is a stand-in force’s ability to remain undetected through low signature, but this ability is highly questionable in the force described in FD2030. Stand-in forces are meant to be light and unencumbered by signature-heavy equipment, but one look at FD2030’s array of antiship missiles, air-defense missiles, unmanned surface vessels, radars, supporting vehicles and logistical capabilities belies the idea that these forces will be difficult to detect. The area in which stand-in forces will be light is traditional ground combat power, which means those isolated units, with little possibility of rapid reinforcement, will be vulnerable to piecemeal defeat by superior enemy forces.
Moreover, prior to conflict, it is expected that stand-in forces will engage in security cooperation activities with host-nation forces — “standing shoulder-to-shoulder with allies and partners,” in the language of the concept — which likewise will make their presence readily detectable by human intelligence. Finally, how are stand-in forces expected to employ sensors as part of the reconnaissance mission while remaining low signature?
Sustainment and other support to distributed stand-in detachments present a potentially invalidating challenge. Stand-in forces are expected to sustain themselves tactically through the local economy, which might be possible for some necessities but certainly not for ammunition and replacement parts. Casualty treatment and evacuation will be problematic, as will equipment maintenance and repair above the most basic level. Interacting with the local economy will produce a signature all its own — not one detectable by radar but a signature clearly detectable to human intelligence.
Taken together, the above issues call into question SIF’s overall operational utility. Those issues, rather than a specific platform or personnel cuts, are the things we should be discussing.



The Marine Corps' latest idea for countering China has major problems
taskandpurpose.com · by John F. Schmitt · July 7, 2022
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The recent controversy over the future of the Marine Corps has focused on Force Design 2030 (FD2030), a force planning document that dramatically re-imagines the Corps. Much of the criticism revolves around specific numbers of tanks, artillery batteries and aircraft divested and the number and size of infantry battalions. But that misses the broader issue. FD2030 is designed to support how the Marine Corps intends to fight in the future and against whom, and that is the more important issue. That operational vision is contained in future operating concepts, most recently A Concept for Stand-In Forces (SIF, December 2021).
The concept exists within the context of a high-intensity maritime conflict with the People’s Republic of China in the Pacific. One must grant that there is a certain maneuverist impulse in attempting to undermine the logic of the Chinese counter-intervention strategy by starting the conflict already inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone rather than having to penetrate it from the outside. As Sunzi said: “The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans.” But an impulse does not a viable concept make, and that commendable impulse creates a number of significant challenges, ranging from diplomatic to tactical, that render the concept questionable in total.
First, the diplomatic and strategic issues, which are significant and may even prove to be invalidating. This concept is based on an Island Chain Defense strategy, which requires that stand-in forces be in position before the onset of hostilities. The presence of U.S. forces will make those islands likely targets for a Chinese first strike. All those positions are the sovereign territory of some nation, which must give permission for stand-in forces to be present. The effort to maintain basing rights will be a major and ongoing diplomatic challenge for the United States, especially given the intense economic and other pressures China will put on those nations to deny those rights. Moreover, the strategy is of limited relevance to the defense of South Korea or Japan, both priority strategic imperatives for the United States. Finally, the defensive chain can be outflanked, as China’s recent security pact with the Solomon Islands suggests. China’s recent efforts to build a broader Pacific security pact, which would grant China access throughout the Pacific as the guarantor of regional security and stability, have been rebuffed for now, but China will only increase the proffered inducements.
While China clearly is the pacing threat, that does not mean that conflict will take the form of a high-intensity war in the Pacific.
U.S. Marine Corps infantry squad leaders assigned to School of Infantry West, Detachment Hawaii, move to their next position during the Advanced Infantry Course (AIC) aboard Kahuku Training Area, Hawaii, July 18, 2016. (Cpl. Aaron S. Patterson/U.S. Marine Corps)
For China, the main dimension of its contest with the United States is economic, not military, and it would consider the precipitation of direct armed conflict a strategic failure. “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill,” wrote Sunzi, the forefather of Chinese strategic thought. “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” China is investing heavily around the globe to gain influence, outspending the Unites States dramatically in places like Africa and the Caribbean. When it comes to conflict, China is much more likely to attack U.S. interests by encouraging insurgencies, proxy wars and discord generally than it is to initiate a cataclysmic conflict in the Pacific. Barring some unforeseen event that forces its hand, China will move on Taiwan when and only when it has succeeded in maneuvering the United States out of the region beyond the possibility of an effective response. Moreover, there is a steep strategic opportunity cost in having America’s force-in-readiness tied up potentially for years as stand-in forces in anticipation of an unlikely conflict at the expense of the ability to respond to the various crises that history tells us are guaranteed.
A key operational issue is to what extent the Navy, which clearly has other priorities, is committed to supporting stand-in forces. Will the Navy commit the necessary resources to inserting, displacing, extracting, sustaining and protecting stand-in forces? How the Navy will safely access those stand-in forces in an environment deemed too hostile for legacy platforms is unresolved. The identified means of insertion, redeployment and extraction (C-130, CH-53 and Light Amphibious Warship) have no stealth capability, so how are stand-in forces to be inserted or moved without the Chinese becoming aware of their presence? The ability to redeploy rapidly within the theater will require that Navy and Marine Corps transportation assets be kept nearby, increasing the detection and security problem.
Marine Corps Cpl. Christopher Griffith a squad leader with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, conducts a radio check during the Advanced Infantry Course (AIC) aboard Kahuku Training Area, Hawaii, July 18, 2016. (Cpl. Aaron S. Patterson/U.S. Marine Corps)
Arguably the single biggest tactical question about the concept is a stand-in force’s ability to survive and be sustained. Widely distributed stand-in detachments will be vulnerable to attack and will have limited ability to defend themselves or be reinforced. A linchpin of the concept is a stand-in force’s ability to remain undetected through low signature, but this ability is highly questionable in the force described in FD2030. Stand-in forces are meant to be light and unencumbered by signature-heavy equipment, but one look at FD2030’s array of antiship missiles, air-defense missiles, unmanned surface vessels, radars, supporting vehicles and logistical capabilities belies the idea that these forces will be difficult to detect. The area in which stand-in forces will be light is traditional ground combat power, which means those isolated units, with little possibility of rapid reinforcement, will be vulnerable to piecemeal defeat by superior enemy forces.
Moreover, prior to conflict, it is expected that stand-in forces will engage in security cooperation activities with host-nation forces — “standing shoulder-to-shoulder with allies and partners,” in the language of the concept — which likewise will make their presence readily detectable by human intelligence. Finally, how are stand-in forces expected to employ sensors as part of the reconnaissance mission while remaining low signature?
Sustainment and other support to distributed stand-in detachments present a potentially invalidating challenge. Stand-in forces are expected to sustain themselves tactically through the local economy, which might be possible for some necessities but certainly not for ammunition and replacement parts. Casualty treatment and evacuation will be problematic, as will equipment maintenance and repair above the most basic level. Interacting with the local economy will produce a signature all its own — not one detectable by radar but a signature clearly detectable to human intelligence.
Taken together, the above issues call into question SIF’s overall operational utility. Those issues, rather than a specific platform or personnel cuts, are the things we should be discussing.
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John F. Schmitt is a former Marine infantry officer. As a captain, he authored Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting, and FMFM 1-1, Campaigning. He has written numerous joint concepts, including the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Globally Integrated Operations. He is the author of Mastering Tactics: A Tactical Decision Game Workbook.


taskandpurpose.com · by John F. Schmitt · July 7, 2022

17. These Photos From The B-1B’s Latest Guam Deployment Are Just Ridiculous


The Bone is an amazing looking aircraft. I hope Kim Jong Un is seeing these photos. He may only see the underside of them in the future.


These Photos From The B-1B’s Latest Guam Deployment Are Just Ridiculous
The Air Force has been pumping out stunning imagery of the B-1B swing-wing bomber during its Bomber Task Force mission in the Pacific.
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JUL 7, 2022 6:28 PM
thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick · July 7, 2022
The U.S. Air Force’s latest deployment of B-1B Lancers to the highly strategic Andersen Air Force Base on the island of Guam has resulted in no shortage of awe-inspiring official photography of the swing-wing bombers in action. As well as posing for the photographer in the air and on the ground during its current Pacific sojourn, the four ‘Bones’ at Andersen have also taken part in the large-scale Valiant Shield exercise. In addition, the bombers have worked alongside Australian allies, reflecting an increasingly important relationship in the region, part of a trilateral advanced defense agreement that also involves the United Kingdom.
You can read the full background to the current B-1 Bomber Task Force, or BTF, mission at Andersen AFB here, but since our first report it’s become clear that the Air Force has been taking every opportunity to visually document these always impressive-looking aircraft during their time in and around Guam. The following images in the main part of this article are among the best we’ve seen of the Bone, cementing its reputation as one of the Air Force’s most photogenic aircraft.
A B-1B deploys flares during a Bomber Task Force mission over the Pacific Ocean, June 25, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A B-1B flies behind a U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker, assigned to 506th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, during a Bomber Task Force mission over the Pacific Ocean, June 25, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
U.S. Air Force service members, assigned to the 34th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, inspect a B-1B at Andersen, after a Bomber Task Force mission, June 25, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
U.S. Air Force service members prepare to inspect a B-1B at Andersen Air Force Base, June 25, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
Vortices and moisture stream from the wings of a B-1B as it flies behind a U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker, assigned to 506th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, during a Bomber Task Force mission over the Pacific Ocean, June 25, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
Pilots assigned to the 34th Bomb Squadron, normally based at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, prepare their B-1B to take off from Andersen Air Force Base to participate in a Bomber Task Force Mission, June 22, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
B-1Bs from the 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron over the Pacific Ocean during a Bomber Task Force mission, June 20, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
Two B-1Bs in formation behind a KC-135 Stratotanker, assigned to 506th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, over the Pacific Ocean, June 20, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A Lancer positions behind the KC-135 Stratotanker. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A B-1B is lit up as it releases flares during its Bomber Task Force mission, June 20, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
Service members from the 34th Aircraft Maintenance Unit perform post-flight checks on a B-1B of the 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, at Andersen Air Force Base. The Lancer had just returned from a Bomber Task Force mission with the Royal Australian Air Force, June 20, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A B-1B waits to be taxied to a parking spot after returning to Andersen Air Force Base, June 22, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
​​B-1B maintainers assigned to the 34th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron push a Lancer to a parking spot after returning to Andersen Air Force Base, June 22, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A B-1B takes off from Andersen Air Force Base to join the Royal Australian Air Force for a Bomber Task Force mission, June 20, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by 2nd Lt. Michael Caggiano
A B-1B takes off from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, to join the Royal Australian Air Force for a Bomber Task Force mission, June 20, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by 2nd Lt. Michael Caggiano
A B-1B waits on a taxiway at Andersen Air Force Base, after returning from a Bomber Task Force mission with the Royal Australian Air Force, June 20, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by 2nd Lt. Michael Caggiano
A B-1B waits on a taxiway at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam after returning from a Bomber Task Force mission, June 17, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A B-1B flies under the moon at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, June 12, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Chris Hibben
A B-1B sits in a parking spot after returning from a Bomber Task Force (BTF) mission, at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, June 12, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron B-1B flies over another Lancer on the ground at Andersen Air Force Base, June 12, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A dramatic sky over Guam as the 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron supports the Bomber Task Force mission at Andersen Air Force Base, June 12, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A B-1B waits to be guided into a parking spot after returning to Andersen Air Force Base, June 8, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
Two Lancers taxi after receiving a fresh water rinse at Anderson Air Force Base, June 8, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Chris Hibben
A B-1B prepares to park as the sun sets at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, June 8, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Chris Hibben
Two Lancers wait on a taxiway at Andersen Air Force Base, after a Bomber Task Force mission June 8, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Quentin Marx
A B-1B Lancer waits on a taxiway at Andersen Air Force Base, June 8, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Quentin Marx
A B-1B is pushed into a parking spot at Andersen Air Force Base after supporting a Bomber Task Force integration mission in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
Aircrew assigned to the 34th Bomb Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base, discuss their B-1B mission upon returning from a Bomber Task Force integration mission in the Indo-Pacific region at Andersen Air Force Base, June 6, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
Airmen assigned to the 28th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base, perform a post-flight inspection on a B-1B at Andersen Air Force Base, after participating in a Bomber Task Force integration mission, June 6, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
A B-1B blazes down the runway at Andersen Air Force Base, June 6, 2022. U.S. Air Force Photo by Tech. Sgt. Chris Hibben
A B-1B Lancer is inspected after a Bomber Task Force mission at Andersen Air Force Base, June 6, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Chris Hibben
A B-1B waits on a taxiway at Andersen Air Force Base after arriving for the latest Bomber Task Force mission, June 3, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
One of four B-1Bs assigned to the 34th Bomb Squadron taxis on Andersen Air Force Base after arriving there on June 3, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest
While Bomber Task Force missions are no longer conducted at their previous tempo on Guam, the ability to project long-range air power to the Pacific outpost remains a critical one for the Air Force. This is especially the case whenever tensions with North Korea become heightened, which led to some speculation that the latest BTF might be connected to a long-expected nuclear test by Pyongyang. While a seventh North Korean nuclear test remains a distinct possibility, the current BTF posture means that Air Force Global Strike Command bombers are expected to be able to rapidly move out to Guam under a much less predictable deployment plan to respond to such contingencies.
The four B-1Bs at Andersen Air Force Base as photographed on June 4, 2022. PHOTO © 2022 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION
For now, at least, the Bones have been working with allies in the region as well as conducting the major Valiant Shield 22 exercise with other U.S. forces. The ninth iteration of Valiant Shield 22 concluded on June 17, 2022, after 12 days of joint operations at sea, in the air, on land, and in cyberspace. The maneuvers came to an end with a SINKEX, or sink at-sea live-fire training exercises, during which the decommissioned frigate ex-USS Vandegrift (FFG-48) was targeted with a range of munitions, including a Standard Missile 6, or SM-6, in surface-to-surface mode. This was all part of a demonstration of what the service term “coordinated multi-domain, multi-axis, long-range maritime strikes.” B-1Bs from Guam were also involved in the SINKEX, employing undisclosed munitions, perhaps the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) or other precision ordnance.
Aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Nine fly over the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), front left, amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA-7), front center, aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), front right, the cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG-53), middle left, destroyer USS Benfold (DDG-65), middle center, cruiser USS Antietam (CG 54), middle right, destroyer USS Spruance (DDG-111), back left, and destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), back right, as they sail in formation during Valiant Shield 2022. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Thaddeus Berry
The deployment to Guam also allowed the B-1s to participate in Exercise Diamond Storm 22, the culmination of the Royal Australian Air Force’s Air Warfare Instructor Course (AWIC), which took place from May 30 to June 24. AWIC is a six-month course that trains instructor candidates for various different RAAF platforms, with talented aviators being selected to take part before returning to their units as instructors. Overall, the process is broadly similar to the U.S. Air Force’s Weapons School Course or the U.S. Navy’s Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center warfare schools, including TOPGUN.
A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F Super Hornet flies alongside a B-1B during Exercise Diamond Storm 2022. Australian Department of Defense
While the strategic importance of Andersen Air Force Base remains undisputable, the survivability of the facility and other military infrastructure on the island has begun to be seriously questioned as of late, especially as China expands its options for striking targets across the wider Asia Pacific region. This has led to a renewed emphasis on protecting the island against attack, including enhanced defenses to better respond to a missile attack from China, or other potential regional adversaries. To address the cruise missile threat, in particular, the U.S. has also deployed Iron Dome batteries to the island in an experimental initiative capacity. Meanwhile, the ability of aircraft to operate from austere airstrips on Guam to provide a degree of independence from Andersen has also been trialed of late, although this is not an option for bombers like the B-1.
Beyond Guam, the Air Force is also investing in other airfields in the region that B-1s potentially could use. Prominent among these is the expansion of Tinian International Airport to act as a divert airfield for the U.S. military in a crisis. This major project should provide an alternative operating location to Andersen and is located just to the northeast of Guam.
A satellite image showing Tinian International Airport on June 6, 2022. Construction work is clearly visible at the northwestern end of the airport. PHOTO © 2022 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION
Clearly, however, the B-1 remains part of Air Force plans when it comes to power projection in the Asia Pacific theater. This is despite the fact that the Lancer fleet has been significantly reduced of late. In September last year, the service completed the retirement of a group of 17 B-1Bs, giving up the most worn-out examples, to help consolidate the fleet and improve its readiness rates.
In the background, there has been a catalog of issues that have affected the B-1’s already less-than-stellar availability rate. Earlier this year, a B-1B was involved in a flight-line incident at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, when one of its engines caught fire while undergoing maintenance. Among other recent problems faced by the Lancer fleet in recent years was an issue with the augmenter fuel pump filter housing that led to a fleet-wide grounding last year. Another significant grounding came about as the result of a failed ejection and subsequent emergency landing in Midland, Texas, which we wrote about here and here.
Until the final replacement of the B-1 by the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, a reduced fleet of 45 B-1Bs will continue to be available for Bomber Task Force missions, including periodic deployments to Guam. With plans for the B-21 to enter service at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota sometime in the mid-to-late 2020s, followed by Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri and then Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, there will certainly be many more opportunities for photographers to capture the B-1 in its element before it flies its last mission.
Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com
thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick · July 7, 2022

18. Putin Has a Problem: Ukraine's Guerrilla War Against Russia Is Now In Full Swing


An impressive list of partisan activity.


Putin Has a Problem: Ukraine's Guerrilla War Against Russia Is Now In Full Swing
19fortyfive.com · by ByAlexander Motyl · July 6, 2022
Ukraine’s ‘Guerrilla’ War Against the Russian Military Has Begun: The Ukrainian partisan movement appears to be picking up speed in southern Ukraine, with most of the activity being centered on the cities of Kherson, which the Ukrainian armed forces are close to liberating, and of Melitopol and Berdyansk, in Zaporizhzhya province.
According to a recent interview with the partisan leader, Volodymyr Zhemchuhov, many of the fire-bombings of infrastructure and facilities in the Russian Federation may be the handiwork of ethnic Ukrainians living in Russia. If so, that would mean that Ukrainian guerrillas are now active in Russia as well.
Zhemchuhov also revealed two interesting items. Apparently, in February and March of this year, a Roma family living in the village of Vasylkivtsi in Zaporizhzhya province “attacked the Russians, shot them dead, and sabotaged trucks.” But, because the Roma used open telephone lines, they were found and killed.
Zhemchuhov also claims that over 250 people have been arrested for supporting the Ukrainian partisans in Kherson province—evidence perhaps of the underground movement’s consisting of no fewer members as well.
Below is a list I have compiled of the reported recent partisan activity available in open sources:
May 12, Kherson: anti-Russian graffiti appears in the city.
May 30, Melitopol, Zaporizhzhya province: bomb explosion of Mercedes owned by Yevhen Balytsky.
June 2, Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhya province: two explosions in the port area.
June 2, Berdyansk: over 10 explosions in the city.
June 4, Kherson: leaflets appear offering Bitcoins in exchange for photographs of destroyed Russian military vehicles or soldiers.
June 7, Kherson: bomb explosion in café “Nostalgie” near city administration building. Possible Russian provocation.
June 9, Mariupol, Donetsk province: several Russian trucks set on fire.
June 10, Kherson: Russian National Guard vehicle with a Russian officer and three soldiers destroyed.
June 11, Mariupol: Russian official knifed and killed.
June 12, Melitopol: bomb explosion near “Ministry of Internal Affairs” building. Possible Russian provocation.
June 12, Berdyansk: three explosions in the city. The electricity grid was temporarily disabled in part of the city.
June 17, Kherson: anti-Russian graffiti appears in the city.
June 17, Nova Kakhovka, Kherson province: explosion in the city, possibly the latest in a series of recent explosions.
June 18, Kherson: bomb explosion of Audi owned by Yevhen Sobolyev.
June 20, Kherson: two Russian soldiers shot and killed in a café.
June 20, Kherson: anti-Russian leaflets appear in the city.
June 22, Chornobayivka, Kherson province: bomb explosion of car owned by Yuri Turulov.
June 23, Kherson: partisans release video calling on Russian soldiers to save their lives and withdraw.
June 24, Kherson: bomb explosion of Audi owned by Dmytro Savluchenko, who is killed.
June 24, Melitopol: partisans offer $10,000 bounty for Yevhen Balytsky.
June 26, Kakhovka, Kherson province: car owned by Iryna Makhnova torched.
July 2, Mariupol: anti-Russian graffiti appears in the city.
July 2, Kherson: pro-Ukrainian artwork appears in the city.
July 2-3: near Melitopol: train derailed and a railroad bridge destroyed.
July 3, Crimea: report of anti-Russian resistance.
Of the 26 guerrilla events listed above, 14 transpired in Ukraine’s Kherson province—precisely where Ukrainian forces are advancing in preparation for a counter-offensive that, if successful, would return control of water supplies to Crimea to Ukraine and destroy Russia‘s land corridor to the peninsula. That would be a strategic victory for Ukraine’s armed forces and partisans.
Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”
19fortyfive.com · by ByAlexander Motyl · July 6, 2022
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​19. Army pilots expertly land Black Hawk helicopter on knife’s edge ridge to save injured hiker




Army pilots expertly land Black Hawk helicopter on knife’s edge ridge to save injured hiker
An Oregon Army National Guard crew exemplified the high-risk, high-altitude flying that military helicopter aviators often encounter.
BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED JUL 6, 2022 8:00 AM
taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · July 6, 2022
An Oregon Army National Guard helicopter crew took the phrase “cliffhanger” literally this weekend when they landed a 65-foot long Black Hawk helicopter on a snowy ridge line about two-to-three feet wide in order to rescue an injured mountain climber. The precarious landing took place on Saturday and was part of a rescue effort for a 43-year-old man climbing Mt. Hood, a volcano east of Portland, Oregon.
According to a Clackamas County Sheriff’s Office press release, the man lost his ice ax, fell 600 to 700 feet, and sustained serious injuries at around 6:30 that morning. Professional and volunteer searchers combed the mountain before reaching the injured climber about four hours later. At around 1:00 p.m. the Oregon National Guard helicopter arrived and dropped off two medics who packed the patient onto a litter, then later hoisted him into the helicopter, which then flew him to a Portland-area hospital.
News Release: Injured Climber Airlifted by Oregon Army National Guard HelicopterClackamas County Sheriff's Office deputies launched a search-and-rescue mission after a climber fell several hundred feet near the Old Chute area of Mt. Hood. The climber was transported off the mountain with serious injuries to an area hospital.At around 6:30 am on Saturday, July 2 a 43-year-old man from Happy Valley was climbing Mt. Hood, when he fell several hundred feet and sustained serious injuries. Witnesses reported the climber lost his ice axe and fell approximately 600-700 feet from the summit ridge to the rocks above the Hot Rocks fumarole.Clackamas County Sheriff's Office Search & Rescue Coordinators activated a mission and deployed to Mt. Hood, setting up a command center at Timberline Lodge. Volunteer searchers also deployed to the mountain from teams including Portland Mountain Rescue (PMR) and the Crag Rats. Additionally, searchers with American Medical Response's Reach and Treat Team responded and the Oregon Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was notified.Just before 10:30 a.m. rescue crews were able to reach the injured climber and took over patient care from a combat comptroller who was on scene when the incident occurred and was administering medical. Around 1 p.m. a helicopter from the Oregon Army National Guard arrived at the location and dropped off 2 medics. A litter was also lowered. The medics packaged the patient in the litter and the litter was hoisted into the helicopter. The injured climber was flown to a Portland-area hospital where he is receiving medical care.Climbing on Mt. Hood is dangerous during all times of year due to the steep and icy conditions of the mountain and this is the second accident in about a week in the same area of Mt. Hood.On June 24, a 31-year-old woman from Portland was climbing Mt. Hood, when she fell several hundred from the summit ridge down the Old Chute, resulting in critical injuries and a helicopter evacuation.[END] Deputy John WildhaberClackamas County Sheriff’s OfficePublic Information Unit
Posted by Clackamas County Sheriff's Office on Sunday, July 3, 2022
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Newgard, one of the pilots in the Black Hawk that day, said the ridge line landing took place so that the crew could drop off their two medics and let them get to work. The patient was located about 200 feet away from the landing site, he said, “and it would’ve been too dangerous for them to carry the patient uphill and across that ridge to load them.”
After dropping off the medics, the helicopter crew tried to land at a flat spot a few hundred feet below called Devils Kitchen. The plan was to land and save fuel until the medics were ready to call the aircraft back for a hoist pick-up. Turns out, Devils Kitchen was not a great place to land a helicopter.
“As we took power out, we began to sink slowly, so we discontinued that,” Newgard said. “We ended up finding out there’s a small lake or pond underneath the snow we were trying to land on and it would’ve been a horrible idea.”
The view from the Black Hawk cockpit shortly after taking off from a precarious ridgeline landing site to drop off medics to care for a mountain climber in need of treatment. (Photo courtesy Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Newgard)
Instead, the crew took off again and loitered in the air at 63 knots (about 72 miles per hour), which Newgard said was the “max endurance airspeed,” the airspeed that would get them the most time on station based on the temperature, altitude and aircraft weight that day. When the medics were ready, the crew flew back and conducted a hoist, bringing the patient up and flying him to the hospital right in the nick of time.
“It was a very rewarding mission to go on because we just got the patient to the hospital literally just in time as his vitals rapidly deteriorated en route,” Newgard said.
It definitely catches one’s attention to see a large, expensive military helicopter balanced precariously on a razor’s edge while its nose and tail hang over a steep snowy slope. As dangerous as it looks, the photo shows a type of landing that military helicopter crews have to perform somewhat regularly while flying in the mountains. Last July, a CH-47 Chinook crew with the California Army National Guard performed a “pinnacle landing,” where they balanced the helicopter’s back two wheels on some rocks on the slopes of Mt. Whitney while the front of the helicopter remained hovering in the air over a precipice. Unlike most modern cars, Chinooks don’t have backup cameras, so a landing like that requires complete trust between the pilots and the crew directing them. The Mt. Hood mission probably required a similar level of teamwork, one Army Black Hawk pilot told Task & Purpose.
The “X” on the map is where the Oregon Army National Guard helicopter crew dropped off medics to care for an injured mountain climber. (Photo courtesy Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Newgard)
“The crew chief would have played a big role in helping set the main wheels where they are,” said the Black Hawk pilot, who spoke with Task & Purpose on the condition his name not be used as he was not cleared to speak to the media. “The pilots up front have no visual on anything past their 9 and 3 o’clock positions, so the crew chief would have been the one to direct the pilots on the flight control inputs necessary to accomplish a landing like this.”
The Chinook pilot in the incident last July, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Aaron Mello, said the balancing act was like “riding a unicycle and trying to juggle,” at the same time. But the tight landing site is not the only challenge with pinnacle landings. Mountain flying means there is often a lot of wind making it difficult to hold the aircraft steady.
“All landings in high altitudes are challenging all the time,” Chief Warrant Officer 3 Charlie Mock, a Black Hawk pilot from the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, said in 2012. “Throw a gust of wind in during a one or two-wheeled landing at 8,000 feet and things tend to become complicated.”
The high altitude also means that there is not much air to feed the helicopter’s turbine engines, which means the aircraft’s performance takes a hit. It also means the rotor blades have less air to bite into, so they cannot generate as much lift as they can at lower altitudes. The margin of error in those conditions is much lower than usual, according to a 2012 Army press release. Still, some pilots enjoy the challenge.
“The most enjoyable flight portion of flying the Chinook is doing a two-wheel pinnacle, where we land on top of the mountaintop and only put the ramp and the two wheels on the ground and have troops run off the back as the front of my helicopter is hanging off a cliffside,” Chief Warrant Officer 2 Waitman Kapaldo, a tactical operations officer with the 12th Cavalry Division, said in 2018.
U.S. Soldiers with Hotel Company, 1st Battalion, 214th Aviation Regiment, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, “Big Windy,” conduct aft wheel pinnacle landing training in a CH-47F helicopter, June 28, 2016, at the Oberdachstetten Local Training Area (LTA), Germany. (Luis Viegas/U.S. Army)
On the Mt. Hood mission, the Oregon pilots likely would have needed to keep the aircraft at a power setting lower than a hover, but higher than a full landing explained the anonymous Black Hawk pilot.
“This would have had to be done manually because there is no autopilot function for such a maneuver,” he said. “The pilots would also had to have corrected for any wind affecting the aircraft’s position on the ridge.”
Given that many helicopter crews trained in search and rescue have the capability to simply hoist their patients up with a cable and a litter, a pinnacle landing may seem unnecessary, but it’s not. Jeff Nolan, a former Navy helicopter pilot, explained that when it comes to helicopters, it’s always a question of power. It takes a lot of power to keep a helicopter in a hover, he said, especially at altitude like the kind found over Mt. Hood. Hoisting a patient up on a litter takes even more power, which is risky when there is not much left to spare that high up in the air.
“The higher you go, there are less efficiencies, and the margin between power available and power required shrinks,” Nolan said. “When power required is greater than power available, then your bank account is empty.”
You can see the power savings in the photo and Facebook video of the Mt. Hood landing. Nolan pointed out that there is not a lot of snow blowing around the helicopter, which indicates the rotors are not spinning at a high level of power. The reason they are not spinning at high power is that the Black Hawk crew likely found something solid to rest their two belly landing wheels on while the search and rescue teams load the patient, Nolan said.
“You’d rather step out onto terra firma rather than hoist up, which requires a lot of power in a high hover,” he explained.
Landing is comparatively less power-intensive than hovering, even if it’s just on a wheel or two, Nolan said. That’s why military helicopter crews often practice one, two, or three-wheel landings, especially when they are assigned to the Oregon Army National Guard or other units that regularly pluck stranded or injured hikers out of the mountains.
“Any unit that is going to do search and rescue will train to the environment they’re going to be in,” Nolan said. “And those Oregon National Guardsmen fly around Mt. Hood a lot.”
The view of Mount Hood from the Black Hawk cockpit. (Photo courtesy Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Newgard)
That experience builds up so that if search and rescue teams on the ground need an Oregon National Guard helicopter to save the day, the helicopter crews are likely very familiar with the power calculations they need to make in order to fly at the altitude, weather conditions and aircraft weight they are working with that day.
“I would definitely say they are very well-trained,” Nolan said. “They’re going to punch their numbers very thoroughly.”
Newgard, one of the pilots on Mt. Hood that day, said the mountain is always a challenge for flight crews.
“Any mission at that height on Mt. Hood is precarious, even in great conditions that mountain has its own weather system and conditions can change instantly,” he said. “We put together an experienced crew to do the mission, whereas on some of our lower altitude missions we might have newer crew members take part to get experience.”
Even with the most experienced crew members, it takes a lot of teamwork to pull off a mission like that safely. The job was a “total team effort by our pilots, crew chief, and medics and the first responders on the ground to make it all happen,” he said. “Big recognition to Portland Mountain Rescue, the Hood River Crag Rats, and [American Medical Response], who took care of the patient before we could get there.”
A fellow helicopter pilot in the search-and-rescue community saluted the Oregon crew for their great work.
“Outstanding job by the Oregon Army National Guard crew. Mountain flying, and particularly Mt Hood can be treacherous,” said Air Force Lt. Col. Brough McDonald. Winds, high altitude, and having to hover in a pinnacle landing without hard surfaces beneath for rotor downwash to bounce up from and help generate lift, “all contribute to some of the most challenging vertical lift flying in the business,” he said.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration, a pinnacle is an area “from which the surface drops away steeply on all sides,” while a ridgeline is “a long area from which the surface drops away steeply on one or two sides.” The landing at Mt. Hood in Oregon last weekend appears to have been a ridgeline operation, but a ridgeline landing presents similar challenges as a pinnacle landing, and the two are grouped together in the Federal Aviation Administration’s helicopter flying handbook.
“Updrafts, downdrafts, and turbulence, together with unsuitable terrain in which to make a forced landing, may still present extreme hazards,” the FAA wrote.
A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter crew with Company B, TF Mountain Eagle practice a two-wheel pinnacle landing at 12,000 feet. January 28, 2011, Parwan Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Army photo)
The FAA advises pilots to approach such terrain at the speed of “a brisk walk,” and to keep the approach angle steady the whole time. Like with many difficult tasks, slow and steady seem to be the trick. Keep in mind that the stakes are high: if the crew makes a mistake and the aircraft crashes, it could dramatically increase the number of patients in need of evacuation and complicate the rescue mission.
Thankfully, the Oregon National Guardsmen knew what they were doing, and they managed to touch down and take off without incident. That probably speaks to the amount of training Army pilots receive for this sort of thing.
“We do pinnacle landings all the time during training,” said Chief Warrant Officer 4 Stephen Lodge, who flew the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter, in 2012. “At 7,000 feet using [night vision] goggles with limited power to land in a small area is challenging for every aviator. When performing a pinnacle landing, the approach angle is critical with little to no margin of error.”
Correction: This story has been corrected to clarify that the Oregon crew landed on the ridgeline to drop off the medics, then later picked up the patient via hoist. The story has also been updated with comments from Lt. Col. Brough McDonald.


20. What NATO’s New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong

From one of the experts on resistance (and porcupine strategies), Sandor Fabian.

Conclusion:

Where NATO is concerned, this adaptation would be win-win. Small members could employ more affordable, independently sustainable defense approaches, strategies that would enable their success even if left to fight alone. At the same time, instead of having weak, conventional tripwires along its eastern flank, NATO would have multiple layers of credible, independently capable porcupines supported by the conventional might of larger NATO states. A collective resistance-grounded defense concept would present a stronger deterrent, significantly raising the costs of aggression compared to a resurrected Cold War deterrence paradigm. Instead of forcing its small members to attempt the impossible, NATO should incentivize and support local solutions that best exploit the unique strengths of each small country, creating a wicked, costly, and multivariate mosaic of problems for a revanchist Russia. Unfortunately, NATO’s new strategic direction does not point to this outcome.


What NATO’s New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Sandor Fabian · July 7, 2022
For the first time in more than a decade, NATO has announced a new strategic concept. Hailed as a historic action, and adopted after a summit in Madrid, the concept provides much-needed strategic clarity by naming Russia the most important and immediate threat to transatlantic security. But it also reinvigorates misguided and potentially dangerous tendencies for small NATO member countries. The concept renews and strengthens dependence on external security guarantees, requires continued maintenance and development of unsustainable (and, in some local contexts, irrelevant) “mini-US” conventional militaries, and disincentivizes small members from finding alternative, affordable, and independently effective defense solutions.
The Madrid concept revitalizes the Cold War approach to conventional deterrence while ignoring twenty-first-century strategic realities. Other than Poland, every other Eastern European state is in a highly disadvantageous position when it comes to potential Russian aggression. They are in very close proximity to Russian forces, their populations are a fraction the size of the Russian population, they have little operational depth to mount a multilayered conventional defense, and their militaries are small, insufficiently equipped with modern weapons systems, and enjoy limited access to resupply routes. Any defense strategies grounded in these countries’ current conventional capabilities are doomed to fail and leave them wholly reliant on the whims of more powerful allies.
Instead, small countries should develop defensive approaches geared less toward fielding a small hyperconventional, NATO-interoperable force—which would likely be significantly degraded in the initial stages of a Russian invasion—and more toward fielding formations customized to their unique operating environments, rationalized for budgetary and manpower considerations, and sustainable with or without the alliance’s conventional might. NATO membership remains crucial, but small members’ defense strategies must enable them to, at best, defend their sovereignty during a slow, bureaucratic response from the alliance, and, at worst, go it alone. Such plans cannot be built on small members’ current conventional military frameworks. These armies are not fit for purpose in NATO’s collective deterrence model and they never will be.
Outmatched and Outgunned
After the end of the Cold War, with the loss of intellectual and material support from their sponsors, small NATO countries’ militaries underwent an identity crisis. Faced with continuous budget cuts, reductions in numbers, and large-scale retirement of conventional capabilities, they struggled to find relevance. Materiel decayed alongside institutional knowledge in the art and science of conventional warfare. In turn, homeland defense capabilities withered. Post-9/11 NATO pressures and incentives exacerbated the process, with small alliance members developing and fielding expeditionary and special operations capabilities to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency far from home. Organizational tables, weapons development, and equipment acquisition processes adapted to such operations. Military training and educational institutions overhauled curricula to develop the leaders prepared specifically for these missions. Doctrine writers and tacticians redesigned tactics, techniques, and procedures, and training facilities morphed to accommodate effective predeployment training of these expeditionary formations. These and many other changes created highly specialized military establishments in small NATO members that fit the purpose of the day but lacked applicability to homeland defense.
Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, numerous wargames and simulations in the Baltic countries and Poland revealed critical strategic flaws. The Crimean wake-up call forced Western European countries to reckon with the eastern threat, leading them to pledge new defensive capabilities that would protect their sovereignty and ensure national survival. But while the last decade has witnessed major changes in many NATO members’ approach to defense, all of these changes rest on the misguided idea that small countries can build and maintain capable, US-style, conventional forces that present a credible challenge to the Russian war machine. This is far from reality. Small NATO countries lack sufficient materiel, infrastructure, training, and raw human capital to mount a credible, large-scale, conventional deterrent to Russian coercion and aggression. The current conflict in Ukraine should be an eye opener for small NATO countries. If Ukraine, with its large territory, a population of more than forty million people, a conventional military numbering more than two hundred thousand soldiers, and a continuous influx of modern Western weapons struggles to resist Russian aggression, then a country ten to fifteen times smaller is likely to face tough odds in a similar situation.
Small member countries cannot afford to purchase and maintain the most advanced military hardware in sufficient quantity. Net importers of military hardware, they depend on foreign providers for supply and resupply. Their training and education systems, including faculty, curricula, and facilities, remain woefully inadequate, while recent national and European Union laws and regulations prioritize environmental protection and limit several training activities necessary for building professional mass conventional armies. Above all, a lack of available human capital restricts these states. The abolition of conscription in small NATO member countries rendered their militaries dependent on spirited but diminutive formations of volunteers. These limitations may be difficult to accept, but political and military leaders must acknowledge reality and develop national defense strategies that optimize their resources for the fight these states are likely to face with or without NATO support. Small member countries must radically redesign their militaries and NATO must empower and advise them in this endeavor.
Porcupine Strategies
Against a numerically and technologically superior enemy, underdogs only have a chance for victory if the weak side wages an unfamiliar way of war. Given this logic, small countries should develop their own ways of fighting as different from hyperconventional American warfare as possible, thereby presenting a grave dilemma to Russian strategists rather than a meager NATO tripwire. Small countries do not need to reinvent the wheel. Recent history is full of examples of weak state and nonstate actors successfully standing up against the most advanced militaries. Learning from and adapting these approaches to unique local contexts is how small NATO members can create disproportionately costly outcomes, in blood and treasure, for a Russian incursion. Simply put, small NATO members must develop technology-enabled, resistance-based porcupine strategies.
This approach cannot be ad hoc or haphazard, based on loosely defined amateur homeland defense forces. It demands state-owned, purpose-built, professional military organizations and tailored hardware to succeed. Just like prior paradigms, this transformation requires military formations, rank systems, career paths, training and education pipelines, and weapon systems built for a specific type of war. While some foundations will survive, most solutions should radically depart from current approaches. Universally accepted principles that have long shaped conventional militaries should be fundamentally reimagined, if not abandoned entirely. Previously sacred elements of modern military culture should become relics. The time for cautious steps that do nothing to break down orthodox concepts is over. If small NATO states want to ensure their survival they must start harvesting from the edges of strategic thinking instead of blindly emulating Western military conventions. They must develop asymmetric approaches based on systems that are small, numerous, smart, stealthy, fast, mobile, low-cost, survivable, effective, easy to develop, maintain and preserve, and difficult to detect and counter.
Where NATO is concerned, this adaptation would be win-win. Small members could employ more affordable, independently sustainable defense approaches, strategies that would enable their success even if left to fight alone. At the same time, instead of having weak, conventional tripwires along its eastern flank, NATO would have multiple layers of credible, independently capable porcupines supported by the conventional might of larger NATO states. A collective resistance-grounded defense concept would present a stronger deterrent, significantly raising the costs of aggression compared to a resurrected Cold War deterrence paradigm. Instead of forcing its small members to attempt the impossible, NATO should incentivize and support local solutions that best exploit the unique strengths of each small country, creating a wicked, costly, and multivariate mosaic of problems for a revanchist Russia. Unfortunately, NATO’s new strategic direction does not point to this outcome.
Dr. Sandor Fabian is a former Hungarian Special Forces lieutenant colonel with twenty years of military experience. He is also a non-resident fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute and a Curriculum Developer and Advanced Studies Team Leader at LEIDOS supporting the NATO Special Operations School.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
mwi.usma.edu · by Sandor Fabian · July 7, 2022


21. House wants troops to chow down bison meat bought from native tribes

Excerpts:
The amendment was introduced by Rep. Ruben Gallego, an Arizona Democrat and Marine veteran.
“The success of our nation’s armed forces is dependent upon its ability to innovate and use resources efficiently. One possible practice is the procurement and use bison meat in Indian Country,” Gallego said in a statement to Military Times. “As a leader in Congress on Tribal issues, I have seen the success Tribes have had in rehabilitating our country’s bison population, and the military would benefit from this meat to keep troops fed. That’s why my NDAA amendment is a cost-effective win for both our military and Indian Country.”
This unique component to the annual defense legislation serves as an example of how the Pentagon aims to expand its relationship with native communities, as well as how the nutritional value of an otherwise untraditional military food may become a new staple that packs a protein-filled punch for troops.


House wants troops to chow down bison meat bought from native tribes
militarytimes.com · by Jonathan Lehrfeld · July 7, 2022
Want a hot bison sandwich on rye? The uncommon food product may soon be on the table for troops as Congress has proposed in its annual defense bill the Department of Defense purchase bison meat from native tribes and organizations.
House lawmakers passed their $840 billion version of the National Defense Authorization Act out of committee on June 23, incorporating a series of amendments that included, among others, a procurement measure for bison meat. The final annual defense bill must still be passed by the full House, and later agreed to by the Senate, which earlier in June passed its own version out of committee.
If passed, the Pentagon will begin “increasing procurement of bison meat...with the goal of procuring two million pounds of bison meat annually to promote bison as a healthy and sustainable food source and further treaty and trust responsibilities and Native American agriculture,” according to the amendment text.
The amendment would also direct the secretary of defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by Feb. 1, 2023, outlining opportunities to increase the procurement of bison meat and other agricultural products from native tribes and organizations.
The amendment was introduced by Rep. Ruben Gallego, an Arizona Democrat and Marine veteran.
“The success of our nation’s armed forces is dependent upon its ability to innovate and use resources efficiently. One possible practice is the procurement and use bison meat in Indian Country,” Gallego said in a statement to Military Times. “As a leader in Congress on Tribal issues, I have seen the success Tribes have had in rehabilitating our country’s bison population, and the military would benefit from this meat to keep troops fed. That’s why my NDAA amendment is a cost-effective win for both our military and Indian Country.”
This unique component to the annual defense legislation serves as an example of how the Pentagon aims to expand its relationship with native communities, as well as how the nutritional value of an otherwise untraditional military food may become a new staple that packs a protein-filled punch for troops.
The Pentagon and other government agencies already work with tribes to acquire goods and services thanks in part to the Buy Indian Act, which gives the Department of the Interior the authority to create contracts with native businesses. The yearly number of new contracts can range from $20 million to more than $60 million according to DOI.
There are approximately 3,500 bison at Yellowstone, the largest free-roaming bison population in the world, and roughly 400,000 in North America, according to the National Bison Association, a non-profit group for bison producers and consumers.
The National Bison Association has long been advocating for the nutritional value of bison. The U.S. Department of Agriculture finds that per 100 grams of bison meat there are a total of 25.4 grams of protein, compared to 17.2 grams in traditional 80% lean ground beef.
Nearly 30,000 bison have been slaughtered in U.S. federal plants this year and nearly 245,000 pounds of boneless and bone-in chilled bison meat has likewise been imported from Canada, according to the USDA’s most recent monthly bison report.
In 2021, Vox reported that the Army once tried to exterminate bison and also as recently as last year bison have been found to roam around at military installations, as reported by CBS. The USDA is now launching a new study this month that will focus on health and nutrition of bison as well as industry management.
After the NDAA’s passage, Pentagon leaders will be given until next February to come up with a plan to work on this new procurement assignment with federally recognized tribes and tribal organizations.


22. Defending Guam

The 56 page report can be downloaded here: https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Defending%20Guam.pdf

But no mention of defending against it tipping over from too many troops. (note attempt at humor from past congressional testimony)


Defending Guam - by Rebeccah L. Heinrichs Bryan Clark Matthew Costlow Timothy A. Walton Patty-​Jane Geller Peppi DeBiaso Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro Blake Herzinger
Introduction
Guam, “where America’s day begins,” constitutes an indispensable strategic hub for the United States. The largest of the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific, it allows the United States to successfully project power within the Indo-Pacific region and so makes credible US security commitments to key US allies located there. Guam is home to Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), from which F-22 Raptors and strategic bomber rotations project US power from the skies, and to the deep-water port Apra Harbor, which plays a critical role in US Navy missions aimed at keeping trade routes open. Thus, this US territory is essential to the security of the American citizenry.
Guam’s great strategic value to the United States and its proximity to North Korea and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) make it a prime target of missile attack by these US adversaries. Of particular concern, however, is the threat posed by possible Chinese long-range missile strikes, and so, to enable the successful projection of US power within the region and provide credible assurance to key allies, Guam’s defenses must be strengthened. Due to its significance to US security and its status as a US territory, military officials have increased their emphases on the need to speed up the construction of an adequate defense. Then-Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Davidson regularly connected Guam to the US homeland, stating to Congress, “Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific territories are part of our homeland and must be defended.”
The PRC seeks to supplant the United States as the world’s preeminent power, and one key to achieving this ambition is transforming the Indo-Pacific from a free and open region under the current US-led system into one that is Beijing-centric and Beijing controlled. China’s accomplishing this would not only prevent the US from ensuring the safe commerce in international waters that is essential to the health of the US economy but would also compromise the credibility of US security commitments to critical regional allies. Thus, China’s aims pose an unacceptable risk to American sovereignty and to the US ability to engage with sovereign nations freely and safely.
The likely flashpoint of a US-PRC military conflict is the PRC’s at- tempt to conquer democratic Taiwan. Although the United States has neither formal diplomatic relations nor a security agreement with Taiwan, denial of PRC ambitions to push the United States out of the region is strongly tied to the security and self-determination of a democratic Taiwan. Therefore, ensuring Taiwan’s self- rule has had strong bi-partisan support in Congress and across US administrations, as reflected in robust US weapons sales to Taiwan, military training assistance provided to Taiwan by the US, and meaningful symbolic political gestures of US support of and friendship with Taiwan. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated, “It’s our view that (China is) working hard to effectively put themselves into a position in which their military is capable of taking Taiwan over our intervention” and that the threat to Taiwan between now and 2030 is “acute.”
To support its national aims, the PRC has invested in a modern military designed specifically to counter key US military assets and bases located within the Indo-Pacific region. Xi Jinping has directed the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to completely modernize all weapons systems and all capabilities across all military domains by 2027. Of special concern is the PLA’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategic capability, whose purpose is to enable the PRC “to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency.”
In addition to the rapid development of the PLA’s conventional weapons, it is investing heavily in its nuclear weapons force. On September 2021, Commander of US Strategic Command Admiral Charles Richard described the PRC as engaging in a “strategic breakout,” i.e., “a rapid qualitative and quantitative expansion of military capabilities that enables a shift in strategy” necessitating “the DoD to make immediate and significant planning and/or capability shifts.” Recently, Admiral Richard also warned of the “cooperative aggression” posed by Russia and the PRC working in concert.
If deterrence were to fail and the PRC were to attempt to take Taiwan by military force, Guam would constitute a critical forward location for US actions to defend it in collaboration with US allies.
Given Guam’s strategic importance and the threat to its security that the PRC represents, the US has a clear and vital national interest and an obligation to ensure Guam’s protection. Therefore, inspiring and contributing to public consideration of and debate about the importance of Guam’s defense are essential, and this compilation of essays and the associated two-part panel discussions contribute to this endeavor. In them, scholars who have devoted research and analysis to difficult challenges facing policymakers and defense planners and who represent a wide range of knowledge, expertise, and diverse viewpoints address various aspects of the PRC challenge and suggest approaches to address Guam’s vulnerability. These scholars agree on some key aspects of the threat the PRC poses and the consequent challenge facing the United States but at times emphasize vary- ing aspects of the challenge and propose differing orders of priority in meeting these challenges.
The elements of my working thesis concerning Guam’s defense are seven-fold.
One, this defense must cover 360 degrees and incorporate “depth.” PLA threats to Guam will originate from air, sea, and land and come from all directions; therefore, Guam’s defense must include an architecture extending to the sea and to other islands within the Mariana Island chain.
Two, this defensive architecture cannot be held to a “zero-leak” standard. The quantity of missiles the PLA now has renders a zero-leak requirement infeasible, making any at- tempt to adhere to this standard unnecessary. Instead, the aim should be to quickly build out Guam’s 360-degree coverage and enable the integration of various sensors, thereby demonstrating US commitment to fight for and from Guam and so communicating to the Chinese that a quick victory over Guam is impossible.
Additionally, if the United States can intercept and render use- less incoming weapons, it will have the ability to retaliate with a robust counter-offensive. One of the most promising strategies for achieving a high kill rate without attempting to adhere to a zero-leak standard is for military defenders to have a clear picture of the threat so as to mount an effective defense and retaliate appropriately. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Vice Admiral Hill stated that his aim is integrating multiple data streams into a coherent picture for military commanders, the most challenging aspect of Guam’s defense. Thus, the MDA has prioritized construction of an integrated missile defense command and control center on Guam. However, it is imperative that this command center give commanders a full picture of the battlespace across domains and offer management of the fight beyond defense and across services and functions.
Three, while passive defenses including tactics intended to deceive an adversary and fortification of military infrastructure to sustain an attack are important, there is no substitute for a layered active defense. To achieve cost-effectiveness, some bud- get offices may be tempted to over-rely on passive defenses, but that would be a grave mistake. The US military must have the ability to blunt the impact of a fast PRC attack, and that means preventing missiles from hitting key targets.
Four, a distributed defensive architecture is crucial. Complicating the adversary’s calculations about how it might subdue US forces on Guam is key to strengthening deterrence and successfully thwarting the enemy’s attack if deterrence fails. Still, though Guam is the largest of the Mariana islands, it has an area of only 200 square miles. Less than half of it is controlled by the Department of Defense, and thus the number of locations for emplacement of military equipment, both offensive and defensive, that it can provide is limited. During an ongoing barrage of incoming fires, the requirement that defensive systems are mobile might not be operationally practical, even if theoretically desirable; from conversations with operators, the most import- ant attribute required for defensive systems is persistency.
Five, time is not on our side, and immediate development and implementation of a Guam defense strategy is essential. Policymakers and defense planners must not permit bureaucratic inertia or micromanagement by such budget entities as the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office to determine the order and sequence of critical steps in construction of Guam’s defenses. Instead, national policy must drive this strategy and budget.
Six, rapid, regular, and visible tests of Guam’s offensive and defensive systems serve the important purpose of signaling to the PRC that the United States is willing and able to defend its territory and to follow through on its security commitments. There is no evidence that highly visible or frequent testing will “provoke” the PRC to attack. To the contrary, visible and realistic tests of offensive and defensive systems on land and at sea could persuade the PRC not to attack, since the presence and viability of these systems would weaken the PRC’s assessment of its likelihood to succeed. The Pentagon has therefore outlined “campaigning” as one of its three aims for implementing its Defense Strategy. Visible and frequent testing of the capabilities needed in a direct confrontation with the PRC under realistic scenarios is exactly the kind of campaigning required to persuade the PRC that now is not a good time to launch an attack.
Seven, policymakers should educate the American public on the integral role the US territory of Guam plays in the security of the United States and in the American way of life. A lack of support domestically to fight from and for Guam could convey a lack of political will on the part of US government officials. It is wise to make efforts publicly, in rhetoric (for example, Admiral Davidson’s effort to describe Guam’s defense as “Homeland Defense System Guam.”), and in other ways such as senior US official visits to Guam.
In conclusion, maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific theater constitutes a vital US interest and a necessity for the credible provision of US assurances and commitments to key US allies in the region. These US security guarantees, backed by US re- solve and military power, underpin the US-led order regionally and globally. Moreover, not only is Guam a key strategic hub and so vital to American security and prosperity, but it is also a US territory and home to US citizens. Guam’s defense is there- fore imperative. Fighting from and for Guam is challenging but eminently achievable, and its defenses must be strengthened now to dissuade the PRC from initiating aggressions against it in pursuit of one of its national priorities, the conquest of a democratic Taiwan. However, time is not on our side, and we must therefore move quickly.
Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Davidson, Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Congress, February 12, 2020.
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Office of the Department of Defense, 2021), III, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ report/2021/2021-prc-military-security-developments.pdf.
Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar, US cabinet member, visited Taiwan in February 2020. He was the highest- ranking US official to visit Taiwan in 41 years.
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2022), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Annu- al%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf, in statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 117th Congress, May 10, 2022, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-tes- timony-on-worldwide-threats.
“Statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture,” 117th Congress, March 9, 2022, 4-5, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/ AS/AS00/20220309/114487/HHRG-117-AS00-Wstate-Aqui- linoJ-20220309.pdf.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security De- velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, 2021, V, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/re- port/2021/2021-prc-military-security-developments.pdf.
“Statement of Admiral Charles A. Richard, U.S. Navy Com- mander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 117th Congress, March 8, 2022, 2.
Joe Gould, “US Nuclear Forces Chief ‘Very Concerned’ by Rus- sia-China Cooperation,” Defense News, March 8, 2022, https:// www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/03/08/us-nuclear-forc- es-chief-very-concerned-by-russia-china-cooperation/.
Patrick Tucker, “Missile Defense Agency Eyes Command Center for Guam,” Defense One, May 23, 2022, https://www.defense- one.com/threats/2022/05/missile-defense-agency-eyes-com- mand-center-guam/367311/.
Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 Department of De- fense National Defense Strategy,” 2022, https://media.defense. gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF.
Richard Burgess, “Adm. Davidson: 360-degree Air Defense of Guam Is Top Priority,” Seapower, July 22, 2022, https://seapow- ermagazine.org/adm-davidson-360-degree-air-defense-of-guam- is-top-priority/.
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22. How the Pentagon Uses a Secretive Program to Wage Proxy Wars

I missed this one last week. (I actually came across it based on a propaganda piece I saw today).




How the Pentagon Uses a Secretive Program to Wage Proxy Wars
Exclusive documents and interviews reveal the sweeping scope of classified 127e operations.


The Intercept · by Nick Turse · July 1, 2022
Small teams of U.S. Special Operations forces are involved in a low-profile proxy war program on a far greater scale than previously known, according to exclusive documents and interviews with more than a dozen current and former government officials.
While The Intercept and other outlets have previously reported on the Pentagon’s use of the secretive 127e authority in multiple African countries, a new document obtained through the Freedom of Information Act offers the first official confirmation that at least 14 127e programs were also active in the greater Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region as recently as 2020. In total, between 2017 and 2020, U.S. commandos conducted at least 23 separate 127e programs across the world.
Separately, Joseph Votel, a retired four-star Army general who headed both Special Operations Command and Central Command, which oversees U.S. military efforts in the Middle East, confirmed the existence of previously unrevealed 127e “counterterrorism” efforts in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
Another former senior defense official, who requested anonymity to discuss a classified program, confirmed that an earlier version of the 127e program had also been in place in Iraq. A 127e program in Tunisia, code-named Obsidian Tower, which has never been acknowledged by the Pentagon or previously identified as a use of the 127e authority, resulted in combat by U.S. forces alongside local surrogates in 2017, according to another set of documents obtained by The Intercept. A third document, a secret memo that was redacted and declassified for release to The Intercept, sheds light on hallmarks of the program, including use of the authority to provide access to areas of the world otherwise inaccessible even to the most elite U.S. troops.
The documents and interviews provide the most detailed picture yet of an obscure funding authority that allows American commandos to conduct counterterrorism operations “by, with, and through” foreign and irregular partner forces around the world. Basic information about these missions — where they are conducted, their frequency and targets, and the foreign forces the U.S. relies on to carry them out — are unknown even to most members of relevant congressional committees and key State Department personnel.
“If someone were to call a 127-echo program a proxy operation, it would be hard to argue with them.”
Through 127e, the U.S. arms, trains, and provides intelligence to foreign forces. But unlike traditional foreign assistance programs, which are primarily intended to build local capacity, 127e partners are then dispatched on U.S.-directed missions, targeting U.S. enemies to achieve U.S. aims. “The foreign participants in a 127-echo program are filling gaps that we don’t have enough Americans to fill,” a former senior defense official involved with the program told The Intercept. “If someone were to call a 127-echo program a proxy operation, it would be hard to argue with them.”
Retired generals with intimate knowledge of the 127e program — known in military parlance as “127-echo” — say that it is extremely effective in targeting militant groups while reducing risk to U.S. forces. But experts told The Intercept that use of the little-known authority raises grave accountability and oversight concerns and potentially violates the U.S. Constitution.
One of the documents obtained by The Intercept puts the cost of 127e operations between 2017 and 2020 at $310 million, a fraction of U.S. military spending over that time period but a significant increase from the $25 million budget allocated to the program when it was first authorized, under a different name, in 2005.


Source: Pentagon documents and former officials.Graphics: Soohee Cho for The Intercept
While critics contend that, due to a lack of oversight, 127e programs risk involving the United States in human rights abuses and entangling the U.S. in foreign conflicts unbeknownst to Congress and the American people, former commanders say the 127e authority is crucial to combating terrorism.
“I think this is an invaluable authority,” Votel told The Intercept. “It provides the ability to pursue U.S. counterterrorism objectives with local forces that can be tailored to the unique circumstances of the specific area of operations.”
The 127e authority first faced significant scrutiny after four U.S. soldiers were killed by Islamic State militants during a 2017 ambush in Niger and several high-ranking senators claimed to know little about U.S. operations there. Previous reporting, by The Intercept and others, has documented 127e efforts in multiple African countries, including a partnership with a notoriously abusive unit of the Cameroonian military that continued long after its members were connected to mass atrocities.

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For more than a year, the White House has failed to provide The Intercept with substantive comment about operations by U.S. commandos outside conventional war zones and specifically failed to address the use of 127e programs. Asked for a general comment about the utility of the 127e authority and its role in the administration’s counterterrorism strategy, Patrick Evans, a National Security Council spokesperson, replied: “These all fall under the Department of Defense.” The Pentagon and Special Operations Command refuse to comment on the 127e authority. “We do not provide information about 127e programs because they are classified,” SOCOM spokesperson Ken McGraw told The Intercept.
Critics of 127e warn that in addition to the risk of unanticipated military escalation and the potential costs of engaging in up to a dozen conflicts around the world, some operations may amount to an unlawful use of force. Because most members of Congress — including those directly responsible for overseeing foreign affairs — have no input and little visibility into where and how the programs are run, 127e-related hostilities can lack the congressional authorization required by the U.S. Constitution, argued Katherine Ebright, counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice.
“There’s reason to suspect the Department of Defense has used 127e partners to engage in combat beyond the scope of any authorization for use of military force or permissible self-defense,” Ebright told The Intercept, noting substantial confusion at the Pentagon and in Congress over a stipulation that 127e programs support only authorized ongoing military operations. “That kind of unauthorized use of force, even through partners rather than U.S. soldiers themselves, would contravene constitutional principles.”
A U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha team soldier, likely on a 127e mission, according to journalist Wes Morgan, is seen along with Nigerien counterparts at a Nigerien Army range on Sept. 11, 2017.
Photo: Richard Bumgardner, SOCFWD-NWA Public Affairs
Global Proxy War
The origins of the 127e program can be traced back to the earliest days of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, as commandos and CIA personnel sought to support the Afghan Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. Army Special Operations Command soon realized that it lacked the authority to provide direct payments to its new proxies and was forced to rely on CIA funding. This prompted a broader push by SOCOM to secure the ability to support foreign forces in so-called missions, a military corollary to the CIA’s use of militia surrogates. First known as Section 1208, the authority was also deployed in the early years of the Iraq invasion, according to a former senior defense official. It was ultimately enshrined in U.S. law under U.S.C. Title 10 § 127e.
127e is one of several virtually unknown authorities granted to the Defense Department by Congress over the last two decades that allow U.S. commandos to conduct operations on the fringes of war and with minimal outside oversight. While 127e focuses on “counterterrorism,” other authorities allow elite forces — Navy SEALs, Army Green Berets, and Marine Raiders among them — to conduct clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence operations or assist foreign forces in irregular warfare, primarily in the context of so-called great power competition. In April, top Special Operations officials unveiled a new “Vision and Strategy” framework that appears to endorse continued reliance on the 127e concept by leveraging “burden sharing partnerships to achieve objectives within an acceptable level of risk.”
Gen. Richard D. Clarke, the current Special Operations commander, testified before Congress in 2019 that 127e programs “directly resulted in the capture or killing of thousands of terrorists, disrupted terrorist networks and activities, and denied terrorists operating space across a wide range of operating environments, at a fraction of the cost of other programs.”
Clarke’s claims cannot be verified. A SOCOM spokesperson told The Intercept that the command does not have figures on those captured or killed during 127e missions. It is also not known how many foreign forces and civilians have been killed in these operations, but a former defense official confirmed to The Intercept that there have been U.S. casualties, even as U.S. troops are traditionally expected to stay behind “last cover and concealment” during a foreign partner’s operations.
The documents obtained by The Intercept tout the importance of the authority, particularly in providing U.S. special operators a way into difficult-to-access areas. According to a memo, one 127e program provided “the only human physical access to areas,” with local partners “focused on finding, fixing, and finishing” enemy forces. Another 127e program targeting Al Qaeda and its affiliates similarly allowed commandos to project “combat power into previously-inaccessible VEO [violent extremist organization] safe havens.”
General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Central Command Commander, meets members of the Lebanese Armed Forces during his visit to the Amchit military base August 23, 2016.
Photo: U.S. Embassy Beirut
Some documents obtained via FOIA are so heavily redacted that it is difficult to identify the countries where the programs took place and the forces with which the U.S. partnered. The Intercept previously identified the BIR, or Rapid Intervention Battalion, as the notorious Cameroonian military unit with which the U.S. ran a 127e program. The Intercept has now identified another previously unknown partnership with the G2 Strike Force, or G2SF, an elite special unit of the Lebanese military with which the U.S. partnered to target ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliates in Lebanon.
Votel confirmed that the 127e in Lebanon was code-named Lion Hunter. He also acknowledged previously unknown 127e programs in Syria; Yemen, known as Yukon Hunter; and Egypt, code-named Enigma Hunter, where U.S. Special Operations forces partnered with the Egyptian military to target ISIS militants in the Sinai Peninsula. He said that the chief of the Egyptian military intelligence service provided “strong support” for Enigma Hunter and that American troops did not accompany their local partners into combat there, as is common in other African countries.
A heavily redacted memorandum on the 127e program obtained via FOIA.
Screenshot: The Intercept
The U.S. has a long history of assistance to both the Egyptian and Lebanese militaries, but the use of Egyptian and Lebanese forces as proxies for U.S. counterterrorism missions marked a significant development in those relationships, several experts noted.
Two experts on Lebanese security noted that the G2SF is an elite, secretive unit mostly tasked with intelligence work and that it was not surprising that it was the unit chosen for the 127e program by U.S. Special Operations, with which it already enjoyed a strong relationship. One noted that unlike other elements of the country’s security forces, the unit was “far less politicized.”
“There are legitimate issues with the U.S. partnering with some units of the Egyptian military.”
The situation is more complex in Egypt, where the military has for decades relied on billions of dollars in U.S. security assistance but resisted U.S. efforts to track how that assistance is used.
While Sinai is subject to a near-total media blackout, human rights groups have documented widespread abuses by the Egyptian military there, including “arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings, and possibly unlawful air and ground attacks against civilians.”
“There are legitimate issues with the U.S. partnering with some units of the Egyptian military,” said Seth Binder, director of advocacy at the Project on Middle East Democracy. “There has been great documentation, by Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, of numerous human rights abuses in the Sinai by the Egyptian military. Are these the same units we’re partnering with to carry out operations? That’s a real concern.”
The Egyptian Embassy in the United States did not respond to a request for comment, but in a joint statement last fall, U.S. and Egyptian officials committed to “discussing best practices in reducing civilian harm in military operations” — a tacit admission that civilian harm remained an issue. Requests for interviews with the embassies of Iraq, Tunisia, and Yemen, as well as Lebanon’s Ministry of Defense, went unanswered.
U.S. Army Gen. Richard D. Clarke, center, takes command of the U.S. Special Operations Command from U.S. Army Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III, right, during a ceremony in Tampa, Fla., on March 29, 2019.
Photo: Lisa Ferdinando/DoD
No Vetting, No Oversight
While the documents obtained by The Intercept offer clues about the scope and contours of the 127e program, much remains unknown to both the public and members of Congress. Relevant reports required by law are classified at a level that prevents most congressional staffers from accessing them. A government official familiar with the program, who requested anonymity to discuss it, estimated that only a handful of people on Congress’s armed services and intelligence committees read such reports. Congressional foreign affairs and relations committees — even though they have primary responsibility for deciding where the U.S. is at war and can use force — do not receive them. And most congressional representatives and staff with clearance to access the reports do not know to ask for them. “It’s true that any member of Congress could read any of these reports, but I mean, they don’t even know they exist,” the government official added. “It was designed to prevent oversight.”
But it is not just Congress that’s largely kept in the dark about the program: Officials at the State Department with the relevant expertise are also often unaware. While 127e requires signoff by the chief of mission in the country where the program is carried out, detailed information is rarely shared by those diplomats with officials in Washington.
“DOD views this as a small, tiny program that doesn’t have foreign policy implications, so, ‘Let’s just do it. The less people get in our way, the easier.’”
The lack of oversight across levels of the U.S. government is in part the result of the extreme secrecy with which defense officials have shielded their authority over the program — and of the scant pushback they have faced. “It’s State not knowing what they don’t know, so they don’t even know to ask. It’s the ambassadors being sort of wowed by these four-star generals who come in and say, ‘If you don’t let us do this, everyone’s going to die,’” the government official said. “DOD views this as a small, tiny program that doesn’t have foreign policy implications, so, ‘Let’s just do it. The less people get in our way, the easier.’”
Sarah Harrison, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group and formerly associate general counsel at the Defense Department’s Office of General Counsel, International Affairs, echoed that assessment. “HASC and SASC appear opposed to increasing oversight of 127-echo. They are not inclined to change the statute to strengthen State’s oversight, nor are they adequately sharing documents related to the program with personal [congressional] staff,” she said, using the acronyms of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. “This may seem like an arcane, bureaucratic issue, but it really matters for oversight of the 127-echo program and all other programs that are run in secret.”
Those programs include an authority, known as Section 1202, that first appeared in the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act and provides “support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” that are taking part in irregular warfare and are explicitly focused on so-called near-peer competitors. Congress has also authorized the secretary of defense to “expend up to $15,000,000 in any fiscal year for clandestine activities for any purpose the Secretary determines to be proper for preparation of the environment for operations of a confidential nature” under 10 USC § 127f, or “127 foxtrot.” Section 1057 authority similarly allows for intelligence and counterintelligence activities in response to threats of a “confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature.”
“This has been sort of the story for a lot of these DOD-run programs,” said Stephen Semler, co-founder of the Security Policy Reform Institute, a grassroots-funded U.S. foreign policy think tank. “The Special Operations community likes autonomy a lot. They don’t like going through bureaucracy, so they always invent authorities, trying to find ways around having their operations delayed for any reason.”
“The problem is this stuff is so normalized,” he added. “There should be more attention paid to these train-and-equip authorities, whether it’s special forces or DOD regular, because it’s really kind of a PR-friendly way to sell endless war.”
The Intercept · by Nick Turse · July 1, 2022

23. Documents reveal U.S. involved in 23 secret wars around the world

Found in the socialist daily newspaper from the UK.


Documents reveal U.S. involved in 23 secret wars around the world
peoplesworld.org · by Morning Star · July 7, 2022
Helicopters carrying U.S and Moroccan special forces take part in a drill at Tafraout base, near Agadir, Morocco, June 14, 2021. | Mosa'ab Elshamy / AP
United States Special Operational forces have been involved in at least 23 secretive proxy wars across the world on a scale far greater than previously known, new documents indicate.
A report published by The Intercept detailed the secretive 127e Pentagon program, with at least 14 operations across the Middle East and Asia Pacific region as recently as 2020.
In total, U.S. commandos conducted 23 clandestine proxy wars around the world at a total cost of $310 million between 2017 and 2020, according to documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.
Retired U.S. Army General Joseph Votel, who headed both Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Central Command, confirmed the existence of previously unrevealed 127e “counterterrorism” efforts in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
He told The Intercept that the 127e in Lebanon was codenamed Lion Hunter. Votel also acknowledged previously unknown 127e programs in Syria, Yemen (known as Yukon Hunter), and Egypt (codenamed Enigma Hunter).
In Lebanon, the U.S. entered a partnership with the G2 Strike Force, or G2SF, an elite special unit of the Lebanese military, the documents show.
A former senior defense official, who requested anonymity to discuss a classified program, confirmed that an earlier version of the 127e program had also been in place in Iraq.
Another secretive U.S. mission was carried out in Tunisia under the code name Obsidian Tower, which allied with local proxy forces in 2017.
The clandestine program comes from U.S. Code Section 127e and was previously known to have been in operation across Africa, using “surrogate teams” in direct action and reconnaissance missions.
Under its auspices, the Defense Secretary can spend up to $100 million during a fiscal year to support “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” combatting terrorism.
The obscure funding authority allows U.S. commandos to conduct so-called counterterrorism operations “by, with, and through” foreign and irregular partners across the world.
According to The Intercept, basic information about these missions—where they are conducted, their frequency and targets, and the foreign forces the U.S. relies on to carry them out—are unknown even to most members of relevant congressional committees and key State Department personnel.
The Pentagon and Special Operations Command refused to comment on the 127e authority.
“We do not provide information about 127e programs because they are classified,” SOCOM spokesman Ken McGraw said.
Critics of the 127e program have warned that the operations could be unlawful and lack the congressional authorization for overseas military operations required by the U.S. Constitution.
Morning Star
CONTRIBUTOR

Morning StarThe Morning Star is the socialist daily newspaper published in Great Britain.
peoplesworld.org · by Morning Star · July 7, 2022

24. Preserve This Early-Stage Bet That Benefits National Security

Excerpts;

Building a true national security innovation base requires thousands or tens of thousands of new companies and solutions to enter the funnel each year. Phase-1 enables and attracts new entrants. Those companies must be qualified as a fit — both the company and the technology — to develop and deliver a capability that is relevant to multi-domain operations. Phase-1 enables companies to find a technology fit. Once qualified, the company needs to develop a detailed use-case that accounts not only for a lab-based solution, but also for one that could deploy to the user base and integrate with their existing systems and workflows. Phase-1 results in better phase-2s.
Phase-1 SBIRs are a useful filtering tool and ensure maximum participation from dual-use startups. Use them wisely rather than discard them.


Preserve This Early-Stage Bet That Benefits National Security - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Kevin Landtroop · July 8, 2022
The war in Ukraine is proving how critical innovation is to military success. As this war unfolds, the world watches as small commercial drones play an invaluable role on the battlefield. Meanwhile, small-satellite companies pivoted seemingly overnight to provide communications and intelligence infrastructure. Seemingly oblivious to this reality, some members of Congress are calling for an end to the Department of Defense’s longest running and most successful innovation program, while others have advocated for ending its first-stage innovation research grants.
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, active since the 1970s, uses small phase-1 technology discovery and larger phase-2 prototyping efforts to evaluate, qualify, and prove emerging technology for military applications. SBIR’s opponents argue alternatively that the volume of proposals overwhelms reviewers, the contract value is too small to be useful, and a handful of companies gobble up the lion’s share of awards. Such arguments miss the mark as they fail to account for defense innovation’s foundational premises: attract maximum participation from technology startups, test their value in meeting government needs, and move only a select sub-group on to prototyping. The American innovation system will thrive when the SBIR program is structured to rapidly test and validate the maximum number of new technologies against government needs.
The aim of this article is not to deliver a point-by-point critique, but to explain why SBIR phase-1 awards are an essential step to maximizing the potential of dual-use technology. Phase-1 awards are an accessible pathway for a technology startup to discover if they have real potential to be a dual-use company. They encourage and allow maximum participation from technology startups, allowing the U.S. military to benefit from the broadest possible range of venture-capital-funded technology. Phase-1 awards allow a performer to validate and flesh out their use-case so that the resulting phase-2 has technical feasibility to get into the hands of warfighters and impact the mission. It simply cannot be overstated that mission impact for warfighters is the only valid performance indicator for defense innovation, so it should be the primary driver of the innovation pipeline.
When he chaired the Defense Innovation Board, former Google chief executive officer and chairman Eric Schmidt famously quipped that the Department of Defense “does not have an innovation problem; it has an innovation adoption problem.” His comment echoed the now-famous passage from the 2018 National Defense Strategy titled “Deliver performance at the speed of relevance.”
Why am I talking about startups? Because they have the technology, the development budgets, and the drive to find product-market fit and scale as fast as the market will allow. Defense Innovation Unit director Michael Brown has stated that the U.S. military needs commercial technology because it is not developing what it needs organically. By tapping dual-use commercial technology, the Department of Defense can access better solutions in critical areas such as portable power, computer vision, and autonomy while leveraging the scale inherent with venture-funded commercial solutions. The Silicon Valley Defense Group’s Emerging Technology and Venture Capital Working Group data shows that venture capital investment in defense-relevant technologies has increased 300 percent between 2014 and 2018, while defense research and development spending declined by nearly the same margin. Total venture capital investments have been growing on a breakout scale for the last decade.
I recently completed a thesis (publication pending) detailing the materiel innovation pipeline, an eight-step process that an emerging technology startup with minimal or no experience working with the Department of Defense could navigate to rapidly field a solution that creates mission impact for warfighters. To understand why phase-1 awards are necessary, it’s critical to see where they fit in the full process from an AFWERX “Ask Me Anything” event to a program of record.
The pipeline is not complete. In fact, the defense innovation ecosystem has been quite successful with the first five steps but continues to struggle with the last three. Progress over the last five years has been remarkable, including demonstrating that open topic phase-1s bring new companies to the defense market, increase their chances for raising venture capital, and increase their likelihood of winning a non-SBIR government contract. The introduction to a recent research paper co-authored by AFVentures director Jason Rathje provides substantial data and analysis about the early success.
The Materiel Innovation Pipeline rests on a foundational key concept: 20,000 solution providers are better than 20. According to this study by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, the materiel enterprise is dominated by approximately 20 to 25 industry majors, and within that club five companies book nearly as much revenue as the rest of the industry combined. To break this stranglehold, America needs new pathways for thousands or tens of thousands of companies to enter the technology funnel each year.
The Department of Defense awarded nearly 2,000 SBIR awards in Fiscal Year 2019 against nearly 10,000 submissions. Simple logic and my personal experience working with hundreds of technology startups dictates that some companies considered applying and declined, while many others who would have been a great technical fit never even considered SBIR. So how does the Department of Defense get those 10,000 or 20,000 new entrants to engage, test the waters, and qualify themselves as capable of joining the National Security Innovation Base? There are two critical steps: funnel fill and use-case development and validation.
Step 1: Funnel Fill
Admit it — defense innovation is fun! T-shirts and hoodies at work, Star Wars-inspired organizational structures, kombucha (and beer) on tap, tacos for every meal, cool socks, and all the robots! Okay, so you’ve heard the panel on “going faster” and “Other Transaction Agreements” a few dozen times, and yes — it’s repetitive. Boring maybe. But that session isn’t for you. It’s for the thousands of first-time entrants attracted by the promise of non-dilutive capital.
For those who are unfamiliar, the defense innovation ecosystem is the collection of organizations and people that connect U.S. military stakeholders, startup technology, and resources to deliver innovative solutions that create mission impact for warfighters at the speed of relevance. Scores of cells represent every conceivable agency — too many and too ever-changing to count or list, but MITRE’s Acquisition in the Digital Age site maintains a reasonably comprehensive and current reference list. Though their individual business models vary, each entity is organized towards the same seven objectives: to attract non-traditional companies (startups) to the defense market; to make the military community’s problems more open, accessible, and collaborative; to make proposals and submissions shorter, simpler, and easier; to get from solicitation to contract faster and speed payment; to make intellectual property terms more flexible; to enable more and better customer interactions and iterations; and finally to facilitate transition to a fielded system that creates mission impact for warfighters.
They have commonalities: located in startup hubs, using non-standard software tools such as G-Suite, no uniforms in sight, and constantly appearing on panels and hosting webinars. As members of the Army Application Laboratory explained in a recent “Ask Me Anything” event during Capital Factory’s Fed Supernova, they’re not trying to engage companies with GovWin accounts: “we publish about what we do on LinkedIn very extensively, on Twitter extensively, and make sure that we are speaking to our marketplace. Our marketplace is not the primes … it’s the people who know how to use Twitter.”
The government faction of the defense innovation ecosystem is dwarfed by the scores of non-government people, personalities, and organizations: for-profit, non-profit, public-private partnership, and partnership intermediary agreements. They come in every legal designation, and they host events, academies, and accelerators. There are even defense innovation “influencers” on various social media platforms amplifying content and opportunities, attracting even more startups.
While some may chide it as irrelevant innovation theater, funnel-fill activities achieve three key objectives: attract emerging technology startups who have never worked with the Department of Defense in a meaningful way before; give them enough information about military problems, technology priorities, and gateway criteria to make an initial determination whether to pursue further; and introduce startups to resources that can help them submit their first significant proposal. Most significantly from the department’s perspective, the majority of funnel-fill activities are performed by the non-government side of the defense innovation ecosystem at no direct cost to the government.
Step 2: Use-Case Development and Validation
Having made the decision to explore dual-use, the next step for a startup is to develop a use-case. Very rarely will a startup’s commercial technology or product directly translate to a U.S. military customer with no configuration or integration. In particular, technologies that deliver capability in a multi-domain operations context require domain-specific understanding, including the operating and technology environment where the solution will be deployed, and the dependencies and required integrations.
To have a reasonable chance of generating mission impact for warfighters, a use-case needs to address four questions. What problem does the technology solve for a military customer, or what mission-related capability does it provide? What value does it create for what user(s) in what contexts? What data, supplies, commodities (e.g. fuel), etc. does the solution require to function? What hardware or software systems must it integrate with for the user to interact with the solution?
In my interactions with hundreds of entities across the defense innovation ecosystem — startups, investors, program representatives, and enablers — I rarely hear people speaking about use-cases at this level of detail. Further, no matter how many webinars AFWERX or the Army Applications Laboratory hosts, they will never scale the required level of granularity across the full range of problems that they intend to solve. This is unfortunate, because the failure to understand and account for operational factors during product design and development prevents startups (and their customers) from building a solution that integrates. Frequently the effort results in a product that demos well but solves nothing.
Wasn’t This Supposed to be About Phase-1 SBIRs?
The second step was technically called “use-case development and validation,” but a use-case cannot be “validated” without customer and user feedback, no matter how recent your domain experts’ experiences and contacts are. It should be inferred that the level of detail required to fully develop a use-case includes some amount of customer discovery, engagement, and feedback. The “product,” now in a wireframed state, would have incorporated this feedback and overcome feasibility objections.
SBIR jargon calls this process “feasibility study.” In the phase-1 proposal a company describes conceptually how their technology and research approach can accomplish the research and development objectives. During phase-1 performance, they validate that concept and further develop and refine it into a plan. In practice, the phase-1 performance spans the very end of step 1 (qualifying the technology) and all of step 2. The best phase-2 proposals incorporate their discovery relating to the four use-case questions and detail a technology approach to build a solution that not only solves the problem, but can also integrate and scale. Ergo, deliver mission impact.
The phase-1 offers an accessible and funded pathway to develop and validate the use-case. And because it’s accessible and funded, particularly when packaged with streamlined submissions and contracting, lots and lots of companies can do it. And lots and lots of companies are doing it — the high volume of phase-1 submissions is the goal, not a flaw in the system. What happens if the startup fails to validate their use-case, finds that the customer doesn’t really care about their proposed feature of function, or learns that the solution would never integrate? Kill the project at phase-1. Fail fast.
Let’s compare that to the foreseeable result if there is no phase-1 option and companies are required to go straight to phase-2. Proposals for the second phase are much more detailed and difficult to write, making them less accessible. This means fewer new entrants. Startups would still be required to engage stakeholders and users to validate and flesh out their use-case, but without funding or a contracted relationship to facilitate access. Fewer qualified use-cases. The companies most equipped to submit a very detailed technical approach are those specifically organized for business with the Department of Defense. This would mean more SBIR mills. Customers must wait two years for the first opportunity to pivot or offload projects that are not working. Fail slow.
With deeper analysis, this smells a lot like the old way. To deliver continuous innovation at the speed of relevance, the Department of Defense needs a new way. The good news is that there are early indications that it’s working!
Building a true national security innovation base requires thousands or tens of thousands of new companies and solutions to enter the funnel each year. Phase-1 enables and attracts new entrants. Those companies must be qualified as a fit — both the company and the technology — to develop and deliver a capability that is relevant to multi-domain operations. Phase-1 enables companies to find a technology fit. Once qualified, the company needs to develop a detailed use-case that accounts not only for a lab-based solution, but also for one that could deploy to the user base and integrate with their existing systems and workflows. Phase-1 results in better phase-2s.
Phase-1 SBIRs are a useful filtering tool and ensure maximum participation from dual-use startups. Use them wisely rather than discard them.
Kevin Landtroop is a former cavalry officer and attorney in the U.S. Army and currently develops strategies for technology startups to develop use-cases and deliver cutting-edge solutions to the national security community. Kevin founded the Texas Defense Innovation Forum, served as vice president and the inaugural director of the Center for Defense Innovation at the Capital Factory in Austin, Texas, and teaches Hacking for Defense at the University of Texas. Kevin currently works with a portfolio of over 100 dual-use companies helping them to overcome program and contracting challenges to deliver mission impact to warfighters.
warontherocks.com · by Kevin Landtroop · July 8, 2022



25. 'Win before firing a shot:' Top Marine explains why the service is focused on information warfare

A lot of lessons from the strategic to the tactical level. But our (potential) adversaries are learning to.





'Win before firing a shot:' Top Marine explains why the service is focused on information warfare - Breaking Defense
Gen. David Berger says the past four months of war in Ukraine has been a "fantastic case study" in information warfare.
By JUSTIN KATZ
on July 07, 2022 at 4:44 PM
breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 7, 2022
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger at Twentynine Palms. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. Leon Branchaud)
WASHINGTON: How do you win a war before a single bullet is fired? According to the top Marine Corps general, it means striking in a whole different domain: the information space.
“If you can manage information, you can actually gain an advantage,” Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger said today during a Hudson Institute event. “I think some could argue [that advantage] could be decisive. Even more than kinetically perhaps, you can win before firing a shot.”
The service in June published a new doctrine focused on information, formally titled “Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 8, Information.” The document, according to one of its chief authors, Lt. Gen. Matthew Glavy, serves more as a teaching instrument for the service and a place for varying levels of leadership to begin discussions among Marines, he told reporters during a roundtable ahead of its rollout.
But Berger’s comments today highlight more concrete reasons why the service is so focused on information warfare: It’s changing the game of how wars are fought, and if the Marine Corps doesn’t change as well, they’ll lose the next war.
“We have to be actively learning because the world is moving at a velocity where if you think you’re comfortable today or tomorrow, you’ll be left behind,” he said.
The past four months of conflict in Ukraine has been a “fantastic case study” for the value of information warfare, he added. Ukraine has been widely characterized as dominating the information warfare domain, an area in which Russia was previously believed to be far more capable.
“Information is […] pretty much ubiquitous, so it doesn’t matter what your gross domestic product is,” Berger said.
The service chief also offered a great deal of credit to his predecessor, Gen. Robert Neller, who, he said, spent the time and energy organizing the Marine Corps to elevate information warfare as important to the service’s operations, as well as time on Capitol Hill convincing lawmakers to get behind those changes.
“People are scratching their heads [at the time] going, you know, ‘What craziness is this?’ Six years later: prudent,” Berger said.
And it’s not just Berger and Glavy making a push to elevate information warfare. Breaking Defense reported in February the Navy’s information warfare type commander is actively working to install more IW officers on submarines and amphibious ready groups.
breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 7, 2022



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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Phone: 202-573-8647

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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