Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: We did it ourselves.”

– Lao Tzu

“When I think of all the things a police state can do to its citizens, distorting history is the most pernicious..”

– Robert A. Heinlein

“Victory is not won by arms alone, but by the slow weaving of trust with those who fight beside you.”

– T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom

Please note that United Press International (UPI) has initiated a new service: "Focus on Korea." https://www.upi.com/Focus-on-Korea/. As it ramps up I expect that it will become a most trusted, comprehensive, and influential platform for news, analysis, and strategic insight on Korea and Northeast Asia, with a special emphasis on Korean unification, U.S. policy, and regional security.

1. “The Price of Peace Is Not Paid in Coupons” (Korea)

2. U.S.’s Biggest Asian Allies Ready Last-Ditch Trade Appeal to Trump

3. South Korea Keeps Its Chin Up as Trump Wields Tariff Threat

4. Japan, South Korea scramble as Trump threatens to raise tariffs

5. South Korea to step up US trade talks before tariffs kick in on Aug 1

6. Strikes on Iran Validate North Korea’s Nuclear Sprint

7. China’s '100-year opportunity' could be Seoul’s 100-year mistake

8. South Korea's Lee Raises Red Flags Over US Ties

9. President Lee and a late July summit with Donald Trump

10. Diplomacy with North Korea: Necessary, Likely, and Problematic

11. Synthetic Sovereign: How Kim Jong Un Could Rule Forever as a Deepfake

12. Six signs North Korea has embedded agents in your company—and what to do about it

13. Did South Korea's ex-leader try to goad North into conflict?

14. Protecting Undersea Cables and South Korea's Role

15. North Korea’s Second Chance? How Trump Could Bring Kim Back to the Negotiating Table

16. Chinese sellers offer North Korea-sourced goods from across the border

17. UNC chief honors troops for laying foundation of S. Korea's development in 75th anniv. ceremony

18. Abductee family group to suspend leaflet campaigns against N. Korea

19. N. Korea holds Cabinet meeting over economic issues

20. Hanwha Ocean wins U.S. Navy ship maintenance deal

21. New Chinese MP9 device targets N. Korean market with anti-detection featurest

22. North Korean defectors make K-pop debut

23. Convenience store chain CU expands logistics center in Mongolia

24. Opportunistic Aggression in the Past and Lessons for Today: The Korean War

25. Lee vows to foster defense industry as new growth driverAnalysis: Why the Ministry of Unification must lead Korea's grand strategy

26. Analysis: Why the Ministry of Unification must lead Korea's grand strategy

1. “The Price of Peace Is Not Paid in Coupons” (Korea)

From my good friend and colleague who is originally from north Korea and now a UK citizen.

I am going to save this quote from her:

"A country that cuts defense spending and gives out coupons, that will end up being a slave state."

Jihyun Park

14h

Jihyun Park

“The Price of Peace Is Not Paid in Coupons”

https://substack.com/profile/2438826-jihyun-park/note/c-132886067?r=1g9t6

A country that cuts defense spending and gives out coupons, that will end up being a slave state

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula.

The Korean War is not over yet. The gunfire has stopped, but the war continues.

And the beginning and end of that war, and whether it is peace or war, have always been determined by the intentions and goals of politicians.

The conservative governments in Korea know the weight of history. They have thoroughly protected the Republic of Korea by focusing on the nation, national defense, and security.

The reason why the free Republic of Korea did not waver even amidst North Korea’s constant provocations and the tensions of the Cold War was because, at its center was a strong sense of national defence and security, and the conservative government protected it.

But what about now?

The leftist government that calls for peace the most is actually moving toward destroying that peace.

The peace they talk about is cowardly submission, and the unification they talk about is slave unification that has given up freedom.

The current government cuts defense spending and packages the money into coupons and gives them to the people.

The money that should be used to protect the country is being used as a tool to gain immediate popularity and votes.

People who have no guilt while installing security windows and changing passwords to protect their homes to prevent robbers from coming from outside, and leaving the country’s doors wide open to let enemies in

People who turn on the camera every day to thank their pets at home, and who cannot say a word about the politicians who cut the defense budget that monitors and protects the enemies entering the country

Cutting the defense budget is not a simple budget issue. It is a violation of the human rights of soldiers standing on the front lines of national defense.

In this reality of poor equipment, insufficient training, old quarters, and cut supplies, shouting at soldiers to protect the country is nothing more than shifting responsibility.

Cutting the defense budget is like telling soldiers to protect the country with their bare hands.

A society that cuts guns but places responsibility on soldiers, cutting the defense budget that weakens security is violence that sacrifices both the lives and human rights of soldiers on the front lines.

North Korea dictator and China Communist Party are preparing for war even at this moment.

Their missiles are aimed at Seoul, their military is ideologically armed, and invisible spies are roaming the land of Korea.

However, the current government is breaking down the door of national defense.

If the people do not wake up, Korea will soon become an accomplice in selling out freedom under the name of a ‘nation that received coupons’ and will go down in history as a nation that is a shame.

In the end, after freedom collapses, the leftists will say,

You enjoyed receiving coupons instead of defense spending.

Wasn’t this what you wanted?

Now, you must choose.

Will you choose the comfort of a few coupons, or will you endure the inconvenience of protecting freedom?

Everyone knows that peace does not come for free. Complacency is surrender, and cutting defence spending is the very thing that destroys the roots of the country.

If we do not wake up now, the day will soon come when South Korea will kneel before North Korea and China, and it will become a sandwich country that is crushed between North Korea and China and is torn to fit their tastes.

2. U.S.’s Biggest Asian Allies Ready Last-Ditch Trade Appeal to Trump

Yes, I am alliance biased. But frankly I am at a loss to understand the logic behind this.

U.S.’s Biggest Asian Allies Ready Last-Ditch Trade Appeal to Trump

Japan, South Korea and others welcome extra time to hammer out deals that minimize tariff pain

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-s-biggest-asian-allies-ready-last-ditch-trade-appeal-to-trump-d1d61e01

By Timothy W. Martin

and Jason Douglas

July 8, 2025 5:35 am ET

Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, center, said he would strike an agreement that protects Japan’s national interests. Photo: str/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

President Trump gave U.S. allies until August 1 to agree on new trade terms or face steep tariffs on imports into the U.S.
Japan and South Korea, vulnerable due to trade surpluses, can offer investments and expertise to the U.S. in trade negotiations.
The U.S. is also pushing Asian countries to limit economic ties to China, which is a challenge due to existing integration.

President Trump’s latest salvo on trade gives U.S. allies three weeks to achieve what they have failed to do in three months: persuade the U.S. to relax tariffs that would be costly for their export-dependent economies.

Japan, South Korea and a clutch of other countries were told via letters from the White House that they have until Aug. 1 to agree on new trade terms. Otherwise, steep new levies will be imposed on their imports into the U.S.

The longer window for talks buys Asian nations some breathing space to resolve their list of grievances over Trump’s proposed tariffs. The postponement also shows how months of overtures have yet to translate into concessions.

In Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s party faces upper house parliamentary elections on July 20 that could weaken his fragile ruling coalition or potentially cost him his job. Ishiba told reporters on Tuesday that he would strike an agreement that protects Japan’s national interests, but he warned of potential job losses.

“I will do everything I can to lessen this impact,” he said.

South Korea just turned over its government in early June, with the left-leaning Lee Jae Myung emerging as the country’s new president. After an emergency cabinet meeting on Tuesday, his office said South Korea had “avoided the worst-case scenario” of getting slapped with a higher tariff, but it lamented some “regrettable” aspects of Trump’s letter.

Seoul and Tokyo share some of the same vulnerabilities that have put them in Trump’s crosshairs. They both have significant trade surpluses with America and suffer from levies Trump has already imposed on autos, aluminum and steel. At the same time, South Korea and Japan have something to offer Washington—they are home to global companies that are willing to invest in the U.S. and are ready to share their shipbuilding prowess and semiconductor expertise.

Given their ability to provide the U.S. with what Trump covets, Japan and South Korea are closely watched as a proxy for other U.S. trading partners. Both face 25% “reciprocal” tariffs on Aug. 1.

U.S. negotiators initially said they would seek deals first with a group of close allies: Japan, South Korea, the U.K., India and Australia. So far, the only trade deal has been struck with the U.K.

Trump also issued tariff letters to many developing Asian countries on Monday, including Indonesia, Cambodia and Bangladesh. The proposed levies of between 25% to 40% would affect the export of clothes, shoes and furniture to the U.S. Another affected country, Malaysia, is set to receive Secretary of State Marco Rubio during his first official trip to Asia.

A cargo ship arriving at the Port of Tokyo. Photo: kazuhiro nogi/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Last week, the Trump administration reached a trade pact with Vietnam, where the tariff on the country’s goods fell to 20% from an earlier proposed 46%. The outcome could encourage more U.S. companies to shift production there.

Japan and South Korea rank as the biggest car exporters to the U.S. after Mexico. The Trump administration hasn’t shown a willingness to relent on across-the-board 25% tariffs on auto imports enforced since April.

The coming parliamentary elections in Japan have likely reduced Tokyo’s wiggle room in talks due to the political risks, said William Chou, deputy director of the Japan Chair at the Hudson Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. “They don’t want to rock the boat just now,” he said.

A car carrier loaded with vehicles made by Kia Motors in South Korea. Photo: kim hong-ji/Reuters

Cars aren’t the only sensitive topic. The U.S. also wants better market access for rice exports, but such a move would invite backlash from Japanese and South Korean farmers. In other parts of Asia, buying more U.S. soybeans or wheat would hurt local agriculture industries that serve as a huge source of employment.

The Trump administration is also pushing Asian countries to limit their economic ties to China, a tall order given their economic integration. China is the biggest trading partner for Japan and South Korea, while developing nations, such as Bangladesh, rely on raw-material imports from China to produce their finished goods for the U.S.

Lee, the South Korean president, said Seoul should not be placed at a disadvantage to other U.S. trading partners. That is a sign he is willing to bargain with the U.S. and not simply insist on a return to zero tariffs on cars, autos or steel, said Choi Byung-il, a former South Korean trade negotiator.

“If Korea is given the same tariff as Japan, that should be OK for Lee,” said Choi, president of a trade strategy unit at the Bae, Kim & Lee law firm in Seoul.

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com and Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com

3. South Korea Keeps Its Chin Up as Trump Wields Tariff Threat

South Korea Keeps Its Chin Up as Trump Wields Tariff Threat

The country’s new president, in office for a little over a month, had just dispatched his senior deputies to Washington to try to work out a trade deal.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/08/business/trump-tariffs-south-korea.html

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, displaying the letter to South Korea’s president at a briefing on Monday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

July 8, 2025

Updated 4:49 a.m. ET

The DealBook Newsletter Our columnist Andrew Ross Sorkin and his Times colleagues help you make sense of major business and policy headlines — and the power-brokers who shape them. Get it sent to your inbox.

President Trump posted his letter to South Korea’s newly elected president, Lee Jae Myung, on social media just days after Mr. Lee had sent senior aides to Washington to accelerate efforts to work out a trade deal.

Mr. Trump threatened to impose a 25 percent tariff on South Korean exports to the United States starting Aug. 1 unless the longtime American ally lowered what he believes are unfair trade barriers.

Mr. Lee, who took office a little more than a month ago, had grappled with the negotiations over the tariffs, which threatened to complicate his country’s seven-decade alliance with Washington. The talks had stalled after South Korea endured a prolonged political crisis triggered by former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s short-lived imposition of martial law in December and his subsequent impeachment.

Hours after Mr. Trump posted his letter on Truth Social, senior government policymakers called a meeting in Seoul where Mr. Lee’s chief policy coordinator, Kim Yong-beom, said that protecting South Korea’s national interest was more important than reaching a quick deal, according to Mr. Lee’s office.

South Korean officials sounded relieved that they would have the rest of the month to try to work out a compromise with the Trump administration before the tariffs would take effect.

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“We will double our efforts to produce a result mutually beneficial for both sides,” the South Korean trade ministry said in a statement on Tuesday. “We will improve domestic institutions and regulations to help ease the United States’ concern about its trade deficit.”

Mr. Lee sent his top trade negotiator, Yeo Han-koo, to Washington last week to meet with Jamieson Greer, the United States Trade Representative. South Korea’s national security adviser, Wi Sung-lac, met with his counterpart, Marco Rubio, in Washington on Monday.

Before dispatching his senior deputies to Washington, Mr. Lee reported a lack of progress in negotiations.

“We are doing our best to bring about a result mutually beneficial to both sides, but we have been unable to establish what each side exactly wanted from the other side,” Mr. Lee said last Thursday.

He indicated that South Korea was preparing negotiating strategies, such as cooperation in shipbuilding, to help persuade the Trump administration to lower tariffs.

Image

Samsung, South Korea’s largest company, reported a big decline in profits on Tuesday.Credit...Jung Yeon-Je/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Mr. Lee is in a strong position in domestic politics. His party controls the National Assembly, the nation’s legislature, with a large majority. Since he took office, his approval ratings have soared beyond 60 percent. But he has yet to perform one of the most important diplomatic tasks for a newly elected leader of South Korea: a summit meeting with the American president to reaffirm the alliance.

Aides to the South Korean head of state wanted to settle the tariffs dispute to help make the summit a success. South Korea also has to deal with Mr. Trump’s demand that South Korea increase its defense spending and pay more for the U.S. military presence in the country.

The U.S. tariff shock has already weighed heavily on South Korea’s economy.

On Tuesday, Samsung Electronics, the country’s largest business, reported that its profits had plunged 56 percent in the second quarter over a year earlier. On Monday, LG Electronics, another major South Korean exporter, said its profits had tumbled 46.6 percent.

The economic ties between South Korea and the United States are deep. The countries implemented a free-trade agreement, or F.T.A., in 2012. Seoul insists that it has removed most tariffs on U.S. imports under that deal. But as the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea broadened, American businesses have complained about other trade barriers, such as a South Korean ban on American beef imports from cattle 30 months or older.

“As an F.T.A. partner, almost all of Korea’s tariffs are at zero for U.S. imports, leaving them with less to offer the United States than India or Vietnam with high tariffs,” said Wendy Cutler, vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and a former deputy U.S. trade negotiator. “Furthermore, with a new government just taking office, Seoul needed more time to prepare for the talks.”

Ms. Cutler called the development “disappointing,” but said it was possible the two sides can reach a deal in the next few weeks.

“We cannot rule out a breakthrough in negotiations in the lead-up to Aug. 1, when the additional tariff hikes are to take effect,” she said.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea.

4. Japan, South Korea scramble as Trump threatens to raise tariffs

Why?

Japan, South Korea scramble as Trump threatens to raise tariffs

The U.S.’s closest security allies in Asia, along with six Southeast Asian countries, have been given another three weeks to negotiate trade deals — or face higher tariffs.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/08/trump-tariffs-japan-south-korea-asia/?carta-

July 8, 2025 at 5:37 a.m. EDT29 minutes ago

8 min

Summary

A car carrier transporting vehicles made by Kia Motors, part of South Korea's biggest automaker company Hyundai Motor, near Pyeongtaek Port in South Korea on Tuesday. (Kim Hong-Ji/Reuters)

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Rebecca Tan

SEOUL — Japan and South Korea, the United States’ closest security allies in Asia and key partners in its effort to counter China, were sent scrambling Tuesday after the U.S. president renewed his threat to impose steep tariffs on their goods, even as he extended the time frame for doing deals.

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Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba called President Donald Trump’s latest threat “deeply regrettable,” while South Korea’s new administration held emergency meetings — but sounded grateful for the extra negotiating time.

Trump on Monday threatened to impose tariffs of 25 percent on goods from Japan and South Korea, and levies as high as 40 percent on imports from 12 other countries, as the administration continues negotiating trade deals.

But as it becomes increasingly unlikely that the countries will meet the Wednesday deadline to agree trade deals — a date Trump set when he instituted a 90-day pause on his April 2 tariffs — the president has appeared increasingly frustrated, even calling Japan “spoiled” because it wouldn’t agree to his administration’s demands.

In letters posted on Truth Social on Monday, Trump said that if Japan and South Korea did not reach a deal by a new deadline of Aug. 1, they would face a 25 percent tariff rate — up one percentage point for Japan, and the same rate for South Korea as the levies announced in April.

Follow Trump’s second term

Japan and South Korea, which both have broad security agreements with the United States dating back decades, were the first two recipients of the letters.

“The content is entirely unacceptable,” Itsunori Onodera, policy chief for Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, said during a party meeting on tariff negotiations on Tuesday. “To notify a key ally with nothing more than a single letter is extremely disrespectful, and I feel a strong sense of indignation.”

Negotiations with both nations have been moving more slowly than U.S. officials wanted, partly because of domestic political constraints in Tokyo and Seoul. Japan’s July 20 upper house election could threaten Ishiba’s standing as prime minister, constraining his ability to forge deals on politically sensitive issues such as rice.

Ishiba said the government will continue to negotiate with the Trump administration to find a solution, but added that points of disagreement remain between the negotiating teams.

“It is deeply regrettable that the U.S. government has announced a tariff increase in addition to the already imposed tariffs,” Ishiba said during a meeting Tuesday on U.S. tariffs.

Meanwhile, in South Korea — which was going through a presidential election campaign in April and May, when trade negotiations began — a new administration is now settling in.

The three-week extension came as a relief for new President Lee Jae Myung, who acknowledged last week that it would be “difficult” for Seoul to reach a resolution by the original deadline.

The country’s new national security adviser, Wi Sung-lac, on Monday met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss tariffs and a potential summit between the two nations’ leaders, South Korea’s presidential office said Tuesday.

“Negotiations are moving toward a very important phase,” Wi told reporters upon his arrival in Washington. “The United States is trying to make its own judgments, and we also have to respond to that and make our own judgments.”

South Korean Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo, who met U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer over the weekend, told reporters the two sides are intensifying discussions on economics and security in an “all-court press” effort.

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt on Monday holds up a copy of a letter to Japan, signed by President Trump, announcing 25 percent tariffs beginning on Aug. 1. (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

Analysts said that the fact Trump has targeted critical industries in both countries — including auto, steel and aluminum — has made it harder to make major concessions during a politically sensitive time, especially in Japan.

Tariff negotiations are economic deals but could have greater implications for the stability of the alliance, said Tokuko Shironitta, Japan country director at the Asia Group, a consultancy.

“It is also an issue of trust, and all this negotiation process is supposed to be a process of building confidence and trust in each other,” she said.

Trump’s approach is not engendering trust, Shironitta said. “‘Is this how you treat the allies?’ is the question we have.”

Trump’s focus on the U.S.’s two Asian allies may be a move to make an example out of them to pressure other countries, said Heo Yoon, chairman of South Korea’s National Trade Policy Advisory Council and economics professor at the Sogang University Graduate School of International Studies. He noted that the two capitals are critical partners in U.S. efforts to decrease dependence on China.

The letters are “another tactic by Donald Trump to get the most out of his trading partners,” Heo said.

Trump has described the Aug. 1 deadline as “firm, but not 100 percent firm” — a signal that the U.S. president may be flexible on the timeline with countries negotiating in good faith, Heo said. That means South Korea needs to be patient, he said.

“Trump weaponized his unpredictability, but now he’s quite predictable about his unpredictability. We can read his patterns,” Heo said.

Japanese and South Korean stock markets had a muted response, with analysts saying investors were reacting positively to the deadline being extended.

People in Tokyo stand before a stock market indicator board on Tuesday. (Franck Robichon/EPA/Shutterstock)

Countries across Southeast Asia were also in Trump’s sights.

The president threatened to increase tariffs on Indonesia and Malaysia to 32 and 25 percent respectively — roughly the same rates threatened in April, even though both countries are in active negotiations with Washington. Both are hoping to achieve a tariff rate comparable to or better than the 20 percent that Vietnam announced last week.

Indonesian officials said at the weekend they are hoping for a far steeper reduction. It has offered to cut duties on certain American imports to zero and buy $34 billion worth of American goods, its chief negotiator Airlangga Hartarto told reporters.

Cambodia, threatened in April with a 49 percent tariff rate, now faces a comparatively lower 36 percent, but this is still one of the highest rates in the world. Analysts say that if duties this high become permanent, it could devastate Cambodia’s export-reliant economy, and particularly its garment industry.

Kimlong Chheng, a member of Cambodia’s Trade Policy Advisory Board, said that while the reduction in Cambodia’s tariff rate is a positive “sign of understanding” between the two governments, 36 percent would still be painful for the developing country to bear.

He is hopeful for further negotiations, he said, but it’s unclear what precisely Cambodia can offer.

“To be honest, there have not been clear guidelines from the Trump administration on what the Cambodian government can do to achieve an improved tariff rate. What does the Trump administration really want? We don’t know,” said Chheng.

In Malaysia, threatened with a 25 percent tariff unless a deal is done before Aug. 1, the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry said it would “continue discussions with its U.S. counterparts in good faith to address outstanding issues, clarify the scope and impact of the announced tariffs, and pursue avenues for the timely conclusion of our negotiations.”

Thailand’s Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira said Bangkok had sent its latest proposal to Washington on Sunday and that talks remain ongoing.

“I am still confident that in the end, the tariff rate will be set at a level where we can fall into the ‘peer group’ and remain competitive,” he told reporters Tuesday.

Marc Mealy, executive vice president of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, said it does not seem like negotiations are over. “I don’t think this is the end, I think this is just a point on the journey,” he said.

Companies in the region are unlikely to move factories, close outlets or make other long-lasting operational changes in response to this latest announcement because it does not appear as though these tariff rates are set in stone, said Mealy.

Southeast Asia has grown significantly as an alternative manufacturing hub to China in recent years. “For many companies, the most competitive alternatives to China are in ASEAN — that’s something that Americans should appreciate,” Mealy said. “This is still an important relationship. A growing relationship.”

Tan reported from Manila. Chie Tanaka in Tokyo contributed to this report.

7 Comments

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

Michelle Ye Hee Lee is The Washington Post's Tokyo bureau chief, covering Japan and the Korean peninsula. follow on X@myhlee

By Rebecca Tan

Rebecca Tan is the Southeast Asia Bureau Chief, with occasional stints elsewhere. She was a Livingston Award finalist for her reporting on conflict in Myanmar and was previously part of the team that won the Pulitzer Prize in public service for coverage of the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. follow on X@rebtanhs

5. South Korea to step up US trade talks before tariffs kick in on Aug 1

South Korea to step up US trade talks before tariffs kick in on Aug 1

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreas-balloon-crackdown-hits-anti-north-korea-activists?utm

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Exports remain vital to South Korea’s economy, equivalent to more than 40 per cent of GDP in 2024.

PHOTO: REUTERS

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South Korea

Published Jul 08, 2025, 07:45 AMUpdated Jul 08, 2025, 09:18 AM

SEOUL – South Korea said it planned to intensify trade talks with the US and considered President Donald Trump’s plan for a 25 per cent tariff from Aug 1 as effectively extending a grace period on implementing reciprocal tariffs.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the new deadline, as set out by Mr Trump in a letter addressed to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, meant there was still time for countries to work out an agreement, Mr Lee’s office reported later.

Mr Trump said on July 7 that he would impose the tariff on goods from South Korea starting on Aug 1, posting the letter to President Lee on his Truth Social platform, along with one to Japan’s leader.

South Korea’s Industry Ministry said in a statement that the letter effectively extended a grace period on the implementation of reciprocal tariffs by the US.

“We will step up negotiations during the remaining period to reach a mutually beneficial result to quickly resolve the uncertainties from tariffs,” the ministry said.

“We also plan to use it as an opportunity to improve domestic systems and regulations to resolve the trade deficit that is a major interest of the United States and advance key industries through a manufacturing renaissance partnership between the two countries,” it added.

South Korea earned a record surplus of US$55.6 billion (S$71 billion) from trade with the US in 2024, up 25 per cent from 2023, led by rising car exports, according to Korea Customs Service data.

Mr Trump said in the letter to Mr Lee that “our relationship has been, unfortunately, far from reciprocal”, inviting South Korea to present a proposal to open “your heretofore closed trading markets” and eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers.

South Korea’s effective tariff rates stand at near zero under a free trade agreement first signed in 2007, then revised in 2018 under Mr Trump’s first term, according to economists.

South Korea’s top trade envoy and the country’s presidential security adviser have travelled to the United States in recent days for trade and defence talks as Asia’s fourth-largest economy raced to seek an exemption from Mr Trump’s threatened tariffs.

National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac met Mr Rubio in Washington on July 7 to discuss the countries’ alliance and ongoing trade negotiations, and agreed that a summit meeting between Mr Lee and Mr Trump would help advance cooperation, Mr Lee’s office said.

“Tariff letters to major trading partners, including South Korea, were sent out today, but there is still time until tariffs are implemented on Aug 1, so he hopes the two countries can communicate closely to reach an agreement before that,” Mr Lee’s office cited Mr Rubio as saying.

Mr Trump also appeared to indicate that he was open to negotiation.

Strikes on Iran Validate North Korea’s Nuclear Sprint

The United States and Israel are speeding up the collapse of nonproliferation.

By Robert E. Kelly, a professor of political science at Pusan National University.

Foreign Policy · by Robert E. Kelly

Iran
North Korea

July 7, 2025, 3:38 PM

Iran Conflict

Analysis and updates

Since the late 1960s, the United States and its allies have supported a robust nonproliferation regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It has been remarkably successful. Eighty years after the Manhattan Project, just nine countries possess nuclear weapons, despite early Cold War predictions that dozens of states would nuclearize in the coming decades. But that regime is collapsing—ironically because of the behavior of a radically changed West.

In recent years, three incidents have dramatically demonstrated the irreplaceable value of nuclear weapons The first is U.S. President Donald Trump’s failure to follow through on his very public “fire and fury” threat against North Korea in 2017. This was followed by Russia’s successful blunting of Western assistance to Ukraine since 2022 via nuclear threats and the recent Israeli and U.S. airstrikes on Iran.

Countries with nukes command enormous deference and near-immunity from Western intervention, while those without are open to Western coercion. The obvious takeaway for illiberal and anti-Western countries everywhere, especially small rogue states, is to sprint for nukes, as North Korea did, or face airstrikes, as Iran has.

A similar lesson applies, albeit less forcefully, to already nuclearized illiberal states such as Russia, China, and Pakistan: Do not negotiate deep nuclear arms control with the West because nuclear threats work. The West will at least partially back down in the face of nuclear threats, even when they are obviously bluffs. (Russian President Vladimir Putin’s routine nuclear threats are now so lacking in credibility that he must literally say that “this is not a bluff.”)

Nonproliferation sanctions and punishments do not outweigh the unique shield from Western coercion that nuclear weapons provide. Both horizontal proliferation (more states nuclearizing) and vertical proliferation (already nuclearized states building more) are likely prospects in the near future.

North Korea is now a model for rogue states seeking security from Western threats. Its strategy of sprinting for a nuclear weapon regardless of consequence or cost has been validated repeatedly. For years, North Korean negotiators have maintained that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein or Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi would not have been overthrown had they had nuclear weapons. That is likely correct.

North Korea’s instinct—that nuclear weapons constitute uniquely effective insulation from Western intervention—has been confirmed by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Western leaders and analysts have openly worried that NATO assistance to Ukraine might spark Russian nuclear escalation. Consequently, Western help to Ukraine has likely been slower and more halting than it otherwise would have been. Even though Putin is almost certainly bluffing after three years of unfulfilled nuclear threats, Trump is still so fearful that he upbraided Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in February for “gambling with World War III.”

Israel’s recent air war on Iran confirms the implicit North Korean argument yet again. As in Iraq and Libya, Iran likely would not have been struck had it already crossed the nuclear threshold. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly claimed that setting back Iran’s nuclear program was the goal of the strikes.

Given Trump’s refusal to strike North Korea but his willingness to strike Iran, Pyongyang’s heedless sprint for the bomb—coupled to its implacable, 20-year refusal to negotiate it away—looks wise.

By contrast, Iran, which negotiated with the West in good faith, looks foolish. In 2015, Iran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the United States and other world powers. The JCPOA limited Iran’s nuclear industry to nonmilitary purposes in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran abided by the deal, which included inspections—a major concession North Korea has rejected for years.

The JCPOA was probably the best deal that the United States and Israel could have gotten, barring the use of force against Iran with all its inherent risks. And importantly, it signaled to other illiberal but nonnuclear states that they need not do as North Korea did. Washington would negotiate with them in good faith, rather than attack them.

But Trump pulled the United States out of the JCPOA. Sanctions came back. Iran, under pressure, drifted further into Russia and China’s orbit. In time, it violated nonproliferation obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Israel then attacked. Iran now likely wishes it had followed North Korea’s path.

Hawks will insist that the JCPOA was not tough enough and that Iran was violating IAEA protocols (which is true but only after Trump withdrew from the deal). Iran has certainly repeatedly declared its desire to annihilate Israel. An Iranian nuclear weapon would be an existential threat to Israel, itself an undeclared nuclear power, so Israel’s strikes may be justified by current circumstances.

But Iran was open to negotiation—specifically, to nuclear restraint in exchange for Western assurances—a decade ago. Iran did seem dissuadable from full nuclearization. Most experts concur that Iran was in compliance with the JCPOA and was not actively developing a nuclear weapon.

By rejecting a negotiated outcome and insisting on the complete abolition of any Iranian nuclear program—even civilian and by force if necessary—the United States and its partners are powerfully signaling to other illiberal regimes that if they do not yet have nuclear weapons, they should dash for them, and if they do already have them, they should resist arms control. Iran itself will almost certainly recommit to nuclearization once the dust of this conflict settles.

The most obvious candidate for future nuclearization is Iran itself. Early intelligence appeared to show that the U.S.-Israeli air campaign only set back the Iranian program by a few months. Trumpian bad faith in past negotiations will almost certainly empower Iranian hard-liners to push for full nuclearization in the future. This could conceivably pull the United States and Israel into a “mowing the grass” relationship with Iran, whereby they must strike it every few years to pull it back from the nuclearization threshold.

But luckily, beyond Iran, there is no immediate rogue-state candidate that could plausibly follow the North Korean path. Myanmar and Venezuela seem unlikely to take the risk; both face deeply chaotic domestic situations that hamstring their ability to pursue a complex operation such as nuclearization. And several previous Middle Eastern nuclear aspirants—Iraq, Libya, and Syria—experienced regime change and are unlikely to try now.

The bad news, however, is that all sorts of rickety states uncomfortable with the Western order could reconsider nuclear weapons if their regimes decayed or radicalized. Besides Iraq, Libya, and Syria—all of which are tenuously governed at the moment—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or even Turkey might be candidates should their politics backslide. Similarly, as the Sino-U.S. cold war worsens, China may protect clients that nuclearize, as it has with North Korea, as part of that competition. China’s inroads in Africa and Southeast Asia raise this possibility.

The other bad news is that illiberal proliferators with nuclear weapons already—Pakistan and North Korea—will likely reject any real attempt at denuclearization and arms control now. To be sure, this was unlikely anyway, but aggressively prosecuting nonnuclear Iran, while giving nuclear North Korea a pass, tells them both to build more and reject any deals with limits or inspectors.

Finally, as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan double down, they will also push nearby democracies to either nuke up if they are nonnuclear (South Korea) or build up if they are nuclear already (India).

The problem is limited for now. But by abjuring nonproliferation for counterproliferation, the United States has put itself in a semipermanent nuclear policing relationship with much of the global south. Should any of a long list of midsized non-Western economies in the world take a decidedly illiberal governance turn, perhaps in coordination with China in a new cold war, the West could face a new nuclear sprinter because the new regime would not trust the West to negotiate security guarantees. Consider, for example, if the Islamist radicals who have tried to overthrow the Saudi monarchy for decades finally succeeded and sought a “Sunni bomb.”

As nuclear experts Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi argued recently, a new wave of nuclear proliferation seems likely. Ironically, it is motivated by Western action. Slow assistance to Ukraine because of Putin’s empty nuclear threats and Trump’s refusal to act on his widely broadcast threat against North Korea illustrate the enormous deterrent power of nuclear weapons, especially for small, vulnerable rogue states. Conversely, Israel’s airstrikes—like Hussein’s and Qaddafi’s violent deaths—show the great risks of not nuclearizing to countries in contest with the West. We should expect illiberal and anti-Western regimes everywhere to draw the obvious lesson.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.

Foreign Policy · by Robert E. Kelly

7. China’s '100-year opportunity' could be Seoul’s 100-year mistake

Do we acknowledge the strategic competition that is taking place between the PRC and the US over South Korea? WIll Seoul sell or lose its soul to Beijing?

Excerpts:

The Kim Min-seok signal

On July 3, barely a month after taking office, Lee appointed Kim Min-seok as prime minister. Even in politicized Seoul, these are fighting words – and not just because Lee bypassed several more senior candidates.

Kim’s biography reads like a cautionary tale for anyone who believes alliances are carved in stone. He was once denied a US visa over his alleged role in the violent 1985 occupation of the American Cultural Center in Seoul, a student-led protest widely viewed as anti-American.

Although the US embassy later blamed an “administrative error,” the episode lingers as shorthand for leftist suspicion of Washington – and for Washington’s lingering distrust of certain Korean leftists. In the current climate, Lee’s decision looks less like pragmatism and more like provocation.

Washington’s Korea watchers have taken note. Personnel, after all, is policy. Choosing Kim suggests that Lee values ideological affinity at least as much as alliance management – if not more.

Nor is Kim the only eyebrow-raising pick in Lee’s inner circle. A number of new aides built their reputations challenging the US-led bilateral alliance structure, and they now occupy portfolios that will shape trade, technology sharing, and security cooperation.

China’s '100-year opportunity' could be Seoul’s 100-year mistake - Asia Times

As Beijing hails Lee Jae Myung’s rise as a historic opening, Seoul’s tilt risks unraveling decades of alliance-building with US

asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · July 7, 2025

China seems to have a fondness for the number 100. It famously brands the years 1839–1949 as its “century of national humiliation.” That narrative of imposed weakness still fuels nationalist rhetoric at home.

It also finds resonance in Michael Pillsbury’s The Hundred-Year Marathon, which argues that Beijing has spent the past century lying low, only to re-emerge with a plan for global hegemony.

So when China’s foreign ministry used that same phrase to salute Lee Jae Myung’s presidential victory – as “profound changes unseen in a century” – ears perked up in the international community.

Lee’s pragmatic veneer

Lee was elected on June 3 promising “pragmatism” and “balanced diplomacy,” code words for equidistance between the United States and China.

That might sound reasonable for a middle power squeezed between its main security guarantor and its largest trading partner. Yet Beijing’s exuberance suggests it interprets Lee’s promise less as equidistance and more as drift toward China.

If Beijing truly believes Lee’s rise represents a “once-in-a-century chance” to reset the strategic chessboard in Northeast Asia, then his personnel choices matter a great deal.

The Kim Min-seok signal

On July 3, barely a month after taking office, Lee appointed Kim Min-seok as prime minister. Even in politicized Seoul, these are fighting words – and not just because Lee bypassed several more senior candidates.

Kim’s biography reads like a cautionary tale for anyone who believes alliances are carved in stone. He was once denied a US visa over his alleged role in the violent 1985 occupation of the American Cultural Center in Seoul, a student-led protest widely viewed as anti-American.

Although the US embassy later blamed an “administrative error,” the episode lingers as shorthand for leftist suspicion of Washington – and for Washington’s lingering distrust of certain Korean leftists. In the current climate, Lee’s decision looks less like pragmatism and more like provocation.

Washington’s Korea watchers have taken note. Personnel, after all, is policy. Choosing Kim suggests that Lee values ideological affinity at least as much as alliance management – if not more.

Nor is Kim the only eyebrow-raising pick in Lee’s inner circle. A number of new aides built their reputations challenging the US-led bilateral alliance structure, and they now occupy portfolios that will shape trade, technology sharing, and security cooperation.

A slap in the face, or a wake-up call?

Many critics of Lee’s early moves – both conservative voices inside Korea and alliance stalwarts in Washington – point to a growing pattern:

warmer words for Beijing, cooler ones for Washington;
a cabinet peppered with figures who made their names by opposing US military or diplomatic initiatives; and
renewed talk of”‘strategic ambiguity,” a term frequently used to describe Seoul’s foreign policy posture during the late 2010s, particularly under Moon Jae-in.

For those who believe the US-ROK alliance is the region’s strategic backbone, Lee’s pivot feels like a direct challenge.

Beijing’s reaction only amplifies the anxiety. When a congratulatory cable from the Chinese foreign ministry frames Lee’s victory in century-long terms, it signals strategic intent. Beijing is not just welcoming a friendly neighbor – it is seizing what it sees as a historic opening created by political turnover in Seoul.

Rubio’s sudden cancellation

Events in Washington have compounded the unease. On the same day Lee crowned Kim Min-seok, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio abruptly scrapped his visits to South Korea and Japan.

The official explanation cited scheduling pressures and Middle East priorities, yet the symbolism resonated. Korean commentators wondered aloud whether Washington had lost patience with Lee’s balancing act.

Without Rubio’s shuttle diplomacy, Lee’s first face-to-face summit with President Trump is now on ice. That delay could stall negotiations over defense burden-sharing, extended deterrence, and joint supply chain safeguards – issues that cannot wait in a year of North Korean missile tests and intensifying US-China tech wars.

Seoul suddenly looks isolated at precisely the moment when it hoped to triangulate deftly among great powers.

China’s hub-and-spoke headache

Lee insists that strategic ambiguity is the only rational course for a mid-sized economy living next door to China and across the sea from Japan. Yet history suggests that hedging works best when all sides still trust your intentions.

Since the Korean War, Washington’s “hub-and-spokes” alliance structure in Asia has been bilateral by design, giving the US tight control over alliances – and restraining regional partners from freelancing. The worry now is that Seoul’s new leadership may freelance anyway, eroding the spoke that binds the whole wheel together.

Beijing, for its part, understands the material limits of its leverage over Seoul. Yet it also sees opportunity whenever Washington’s grip loosens.

If Lee’s South Korea decouples from US strategic priorities even modestly – on technology bans, chip supply chains, or security cost sharing – Beijing can claim progress in its long game of prying US allies closer to its own orbit.

The risks of miscalculation

Balanced diplomacy is easier to sloganize than to operationalize. A single missile test from Pyongyang can force Seoul back under Washington’s wing; a single punitive trade measure from Beijing can make Korean firms beg for American cover.

Any short-term gains from hedging can evaporate if either great-power partner feels betrayed.

Lee’s challenge is therefore double-edged. He must show Beijing just enough good will to keep economic ties humming, while proving to Washington that Seoul remains a reliable ally.

Kim Min-seok’s appointment, read in Washington as a thumb in the eye, complicates that calculus. Rubio’s canceled trip hints that the Trump administration – or any future US administration – could respond in kind, downgrading or delaying high-level engagement.

Toward a hundred-year hangover?

Beijing may view Lee’s presidency as a “hundred-year opportunity,” but opportunities can sour into hangovers if mismanaged.

Seoul’s core national interest remains deterrence against North Korea and access to US markets and technology. China’s interest in exploiting cracks in the alliance is explicit in its public diplomacy.

That leaves Lee with a narrow path: leverage China’s enthusiasm without alienating the ally whose security guarantee still underwrites South Korea’s prosperity.

Flattery from beijing could cost Seoul its most vital ally

Lee Jae Myung branded himself a pragmatic centrist who could glide between giants. His early personnel choices suggest something starker: a hidden tilt that Beijing welcomes and Washington distrusts.

China’s talk of century-scale opportunities might flatter Seoul’s new leadership, but it also warns of the scale on which Beijing plays its games. If Seoul confuses that flattery with partnership, it risks learning – perhaps within this decade, not the next century – why hub-and-spoke alliances have endured, and why strategic ambiguity in a multipolar world can become strategic isolation.

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asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · July 7, 2025

8. South Korea's Lee Raises Red Flags Over US Ties

Who will be responsible for harm to the alliance?

Those who care about the ROK/US alliance need to do the hard work to ensure it remains strong.

South Korea's Lee Raises Red Flags Over US Ties

https://www.newsmax.com/john-gizzi/south-korea-china-xi-jinping/2025/07/07/id/1217819/

By John Gizzi and Olivia D’Angelo | Monday, 07 July 2025 07:35 AM EDT

Less than a month after he took office as president of South Korea, Lee Jae-myung is causing an uproar among several experts on the longtime U.S. ally that borders Communist North Korea.

In interviews with Newsmax, all voiced concern over what they say are Lee's sympathies for North Korea and his distaste for America.

The country held a snap presidential election on June 3 following the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol. The impeachment came earlier this year after Yoon declared martial law — the first time a South Korean president has done so since strongman President Chun Doo-Hwan in 1980.

Lee has a controversial history — including criminal charges for corruption and violating election laws. These charges, in fact, that nearly stopped his candidacy for president.

He has also been criticized for polarizing statements about conservative opponents, including telling rally attendees in 2016 to "seize her [then President Park Geun-hye] and consign her to history."

This criticism has extended to U.S. missile programs in South Korea.

Although Lee promised in his inaugural address to bolster relationships with the United States and Japan as well as practicing "strong deterrence" with North Korea, many observers are not convinced.

"He doesn't want better relations with America or Japan," Gordon Chang, an analyst and author of "Losing South Korea," told Newsmax.

"If it was up to him, we [the U.S.] wouldn't be in the region," said Chang.

"Everybody knows he's [going to be] a dictator," said veteran Seoul journalist and White House correspondent Jennifer Pak, "The U.S. should be concerned that the elected South Korean president is more pro-China than pro-United States."

Both Pak and Chang expressed concerns about interference from China in the election due to the use of voting machines.

Last month, President Lee voiced his hopes of a closer relationship with China as both countries were facing higher tariffs from the U.S. under President Donald Trump.

Chinese President Xi Jinping held a phone call with Lee and stressed the need for improved bilateral ties and greater regional stability, the Chinese news agency Xinhua reported.

"A healthy, stable, and continuously deepening China-South Korea relationship aligns with the trend of the times," Xi said.

Meanwhile, there is growing concern in South Korea over what appears to be retribution by Lee against his political opponents.

Despite vowing not to target conservatives in his administration, Lee has begun investigations into former President Yoon's enactment of martial law that resulted in his impeachment trial and legal action against fellow colleagues in his administration.

"They didn't need to do this," said Chang, referring to the widespread public distaste of conservatives following Yoon's ouster detailed in various surveys.

"We've survived far-left leaders before in South Korea, and I'm afraid that this [electing Lee] will instill a sort of false confidence," said Chang.

John Gizzi is chief political columnist and White House correspondent for Newsmax. For more of his reports, Go Here Now.

A graduate of the University of North Carolina (Asheville), Olivia D'Angelo's poetry, fiction, and nonfiction have been published in various literary journals, including Carolina Muse and The Penwood Review, and she received an honorable mention in the 2024 A. R. Ammons Poetry Contest.

9. President Lee and a late July summit with Donald Trump

Ugh....

Excerpts:

The only way to “win” with Trump is to stop pretending you're engaged in mutual alliance management and start behaving like a sycophant with a state budget. Feed his ego. Reward his narcissism. Give him things to tweet about. He doesn’t want respect—he wants submission with a smile.

So as Lee prepares for a late July Summit, the best strategy isn’t defense readiness or strategic autonomy. It’s gold, flattery, and televised groveling.

The sad fact is, I’m only half-joking. Diplomacy is dead. Where it stood now sits political grift, ego, and Big Mac burger wrappers.

Commentary

President Lee and a late July summit with Donald Trump

Forget defense readiness or trilateral agreements—place the single largest international order ever recorded on gettrumpfragrances.com—and drench every delegation member liberally.

https://www.junotane.com/p/president-lee-and-a-late-july-summit-with-trump

Jul 06, 2025

∙ Paid

Diplomacy is dead. Where it stood now sits political grift, ego, and Big Mac burger wrappers.

We live in a world where foreign policy is driven by whims; presidential tweets reacting to Fox News and Tucker Carlson sound bites; and whether the leader in question has properly stroked the ego of a septuagenarian game show host with a spray tan problem.

There ain’t nothing nobody can do about the whims. I’ve already given my advice on a content strategy for the Fox News cycle (it’s still unheeded). But what about the third? How can South Korea stroke the orange one’s ego? If South Korea wants to thrive under a future Trump administration, it better act fast—and smart.

My advice? Forget the high-level advisors on deterrence theory, extended nuclear umbrellas, or trilateral cooperation with Japan. Instead, prepare for the real strategic challenge: how to flatter, bribe, stage-manage, and gold-plate your way into Donald Trump’s heart. You don’t need a foreign ministry or an academic who’s written twenty books on nuclear security—you need a casting director and a luxury gift concierge.

So what should Seoul do?

Let’s begin with symbolism. Trump doesn't care too much about treaties. He likes rewriting them and putting his name to them, but they’re still not as good as buildings, airports, and possibly galaxies named after him. So rename something—anything. How about rebranding the entire De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) as the “Trump Unification and Reconciliation District”.

Imagine, the TURD would be 250 kilometers long and around 4 kilometers wide, stretching from the mouth of the Imjin River in the west to near Goseong on the east coast. A TURD stretching from coast to coast with Trump’s name on it. The Trump TURD could be seen from space!

Does it help peace? No. Does it curry favor? Absolutely. The man once proposed buying Greenland. He doesn’t understand geopolitics, but he understands a plaque with his name on it.

And if you really want results, don’t stop there. Commission a ten-meter-tall bronze statue of Trump shaking hands with a generic Korean child—something sufficiently horrifying to be shared worldwide. Trump will retweet it.

The alliance will be safe for another week.

Next, the gifts. Trump loves gifts—especially ones that he doesn’t need to declare or return. Swords encrusted with jewels, gold medallions, hand-painted portraits of himself saving the world. These aren’t diplomatic offerings—they’re tribute.

Korea paid tribute to Chinese emperors for millenia—not always out of subjugation, but often as a pragmatic gesture to preserve autonomy while acknowledging power. Envoys brought fine silks, ginseng, and flattery to Beijing, securing peace through a well-practiced ritual of deference. This wasn’t humiliation—it was strategy dressed as respect.

In that sense, the instinct to flatter a great power runs deep. So when Donald Trump strides onto the stage with the self-image of an emperor and the attention span of a squirrel, South Korea knows what to do. Tribute must be paid

South Korea should prepare a catalogue of gifts tailored to Trump’s vanity. A gold-leafed book titled “The Great Peacemaker of Asia” (empty inside, of course); a gold-plated Hyundai Genesis embossed with the Trump logo; or perhaps a full-size gold mirror engraved with the words: “History’s Greatest Negotiator.” Better yet, offer him exclusive lifetime membership at one of South Korea’s elite golf courses—free helicopter access, his own locker room, and a private chef who only makes Big Macs from Hanwoo beef.

Use your imagination. Qatar did. Kudos to Qatar on the airplane.

Diplomacy under Trump is often a family business. The Trump children are more than accessories—they’re conduits. Power flows through them like bad decisions through a Mar-a-Lago buffet line.

Want influence? Invite Ivanka to co-chair a “U.S.–Korea Women’s Leadership Summit” where nothing is actually discussed, but the lighting is perfect for Instagram. Give her a vague role in innovation. Maybe let her endorse a line of hanbok-inspired wellness accessories. She’ll remember that. Trump will remember that.

As for Jared—pay for him to take a symbolic advisory seat on a “Korea Peace Corridor” project, ideally one with photo ops, but no actual responsibilities. In the Trumpian universe, access is everything. Credibility is optional.

Now President Lee is going to Washington. He’s at a distinct disadvantage.

Summits with Trump must not resemble diplomacy. They must resemble television. If it looks like a State Department meeting or a State visit to the White House, you’ve already lost. If it looks like an episode of The Apprentice filmed on the DMZ, now you’re speaking his language.

Give Trump a stage, a podium, dramatic flags fluttering behind him. Let him walk slowly toward the camera as if descending Mount Sinai. Maybe throw in some Korean children waving American flags. Allow him to declare, “There would have been war if not for me.” Don’t correct him.

The answer? Ask for the meeting to be at Mar-a-Lago. In the new etiquette of post-diplomatic diplomacy, even the venue becomes a bribe. If South Korea really wants to impress, it should skip the sterile symbolism of the White House and request—no, insist—that President Lee’s summit with Trump be held at Mar-a-Lago. Not only does it flatter Trump’s fantasy that his private club is the true seat of American power, but it also conveniently channels foreign taxpayer money into his personal coffers.

The optics? Appalling. The effect? Immediate. Every luxury suite booked, every overpriced canapé ordered, every valet tip handed over—each dollar edges Trump closer to the next monstrosity in his gold-plated throne room: perhaps a solid-gold dunny with his name on it.

This ain’t policy. It’s performance. Your job is to keep the illusion alive long enough for him to believe he did something important—and then get him to sign something vaguely beneficial.

Last, the Lee team has to learn to abandon self-respect.

If South Korea is serious about earning Trump’s favor, forget defense burden-sharing or trilateral agreements—just place the single largest international order ever recorded on gettrumpfragrances.com.

Buy several bottles of “Victory 47 Trump Cologne for Men” and “Victory 47 Trump Perfume for Women” for every member of the South Korean entourage, from foreign ministry staff to security detail to the poor intern holding the umbrella. But don’t stop there: make it a policy that the entire delegation drench themselves in Trump’s signature scents from morning to night, reapplying liberally before each handshake or photo op. The goal isn’t hygiene—it’s olfactory diplomacy.

When Trump catches that heady blend of synthetic masculinity and chemically enhanced patriotism wafting through the room, he’ll know: someone has spent money—real money—and they want to be noticed. If the shipment is big enough—pallets of cologne arriving at Incheon Airport with “TRUMP” stamped on every box—it won’t just be a gesture. It’ll be a message, loud and clear: “We get you. We smell like you. Please be nice to us.”

Let’s be clear. None of this is about South Korea’s national interest. It’s about playing to the appetites of a man who views foreign affairs as a dinner menu—heavy on steak, light on details.

The only way to “win” with Trump is to stop pretending you're engaged in mutual alliance management and start behaving like a sycophant with a state budget. Feed his ego. Reward his narcissism. Give him things to tweet about. He doesn’t want respect—he wants submission with a smile.

So as Lee prepares for a late July Summit, the best strategy isn’t defense readiness or strategic autonomy. It’s gold, flattery, and televised groveling.

The sad fact is, I’m only half-joking. Diplomacy is dead. Where it stood now sits political grift, ego, and Big Mac burger wrappers.

10. Diplomacy with North Korea: Necessary, Likely, and Problematic

A succinct discussion of a number of the key issues on the Korean peninsula.

Conclusion:

In short, while diplomacy may not resolve the core conflicts with North Korea or halt Pyongyang’s nuclear development, its absence or failure could make the Korean flashpoint even more dangerous than it already is.

Jul 4, 2025

Korea on Point

Diplomacy with North Korea: Necessary, Likely, and Problematic

Patrick M. Cronin

hudson.org ·

Diplomatic outreach to Kim Jong Un is poised to expand in the year ahead, with prospects rising for renewed leader-to-leader engagement. President Trump has repeatedly touted how he gets along “very well” with the North Korean Leader, and President Lee Jae-myung made clear in his inaugural remarks that improving inter-Korean relations would be a priority for his administration. Yet while diplomacy with Pyongyang is both necessary and increasingly likely, meaningful progress may remain elusive due to a familiar set of entrenched obstacles and the emergence of new ones.

Diplomacy remains an indispensable instrument of national security. We are on the brink of a new nuclear age. With North Korea accelerating its production of nuclear weapons and the delivery systems capable of targeting the US homeland and the broader Asia-Pacific region, Washington and Seoul would be remiss not to test whether talks might yield greater stability and reduce risk, even if denuclearization or lasting peace remain distant goals.

As suggested by the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessment, North Korea is stoutly committed to its nuclear deterrent. That conviction has only hardened in the wake of US and Israeli airstrikes aimed at crippling Iran’s nuclear capabilities: nuclear weapons were deemed essential for survival long before, but now Kim may be spurred to grander ambitions. He may not unreasonably conclude the buildup cannot afford to slow down or be derailed by arms control.

North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is now sizable and growing: Pyongyang is believed to possess about 50 nuclear warheads, with enough fissile material for perhaps another 40 bombs. Among recent revelations are Kim’s open disclosure of the previously covert enrichment facility at Kangsong, a possible new HEU plant at the Yongbyon nuclear site. He also appears on the cusp of other achievements, possibly the deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon, new military satellite launches, another nuclear test, and the gradual progress of a sea-based nuclear deterrent, among other steps. Allowing Pyongyang to develop a robust second-strike capability and a credible threat to the US mainland could deepen fears of decoupling, undermining the credibility of extended deterrence and emboldening the Kim regime to escalate provocations.

Diplomacy, even if limited in scope, could at least reduce Pyongyang’s perception of being surrounded by hostile powers contemplating a decapitation strike or preventive attack. Such a scenario may seem improbable—but it is hardly unthinkable for Kim Jong Un.

As the 2023 National Intelligence Estimate noted, North Korea continues to see its nuclear arsenal as leverage to coerce South Korea into easing its stance on US strategic asset deployments, scaling back major military exercises, and rolling back sanctions that have driven the regime’s increasing dependence on China, cybercrime, and an expanding defense relationship with Russia.

At present, the complete absence of dialogue and the collapse of confidence-building mechanisms once supported by the Trump administration and Moon Jae-in government have left the peninsula vulnerable. The rebuilding of military fortifications within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) provide tangible evidence of the tenuousness of previous efforts to reduce tensions.

While a sudden military escalation remains unlikely in isolation, the risk of regional conflict cannot be discounted in a world beset by simultaneous crises. A Taiwan contingency, tensions in the South China Sea, renewed confrontation with Russia, or another Iran crisis could overwhelm a US-led order already shifting under the pressures of an “America First” foreign policy.

High-Level Reengagement: Probable and Politically Useful

Channels of communication are already active. President Trump welcomes a new summit, even amid other pressing priorities. Kim, though more cautious after the failed Hanoi meeting, has not ruled out further leader-level diplomacy—especially if it promises face-saving optics without the pressure of immediate concessions. The February 2019 Hanoi summit failed because the two sides could not close the gap between Kim’s desire to retain his nuclear enrichment programs in exchange for significant sanctions relief, and Trump could not be persuaded to give away the leverage of sanctions without at least capping or reducing the North’s nuclear weapons programs.

A summit in the spirit of Singapore could serve a useful function. While the 2018 summit succeeded mainly in breaking the diplomatic ice, the resulting joint statement included a broad four-part framework remains a useful foundation. Unlike during the Moon era when Seoul pursued reconciliation and Washington insisted on denuclearization, the two governments might now entertain a more pragmatic division of labor.

Trump’s desire to reduce US commitments and shift burdens to wealthy allies could dovetail with President Lee Jae-myung’s interest in inter-Korean stability. A tradeoff involving “strategic flexibility” of US forces in exchange for more proactive South Korean engagement with the North may require little more than a handshake and a photo op. A fourth Trump-Kim meeting could easily be framed as a low-risk, high-visibility diplomatic achievement.

Still, longstanding and new challenges remain formidable.

Old Impediment: Denuclearization vs. Ending the War

The core tension between US denuclearization demands and North Korea’s insistence on an end-of-war declaration remains unresolved. Insisting on the improbable goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of Pyongyng’s nuclear weapons is at best seen as a long-term aspirational goal.

Would the West be willing to settle for political normalization without a nuclear agreement? Could an end-of-war declaration be seen in Pyongyang as a first step toward pressuring South Korea to bear the full burden of the North Korean threat—despite lacking its own nuclear deterrent?

President Trump may lean toward drawing down US forces in Korea—whether to realign defense posture, respond to Congressional and Pentagon opposition, or due to dissatisfaction with alliance cost-sharing. Either way, strategic and economic issues in the alliance may be separated or linked depending on high-level negotiations. Trade, tariffs, investment, and defense contributions are increasingly interwoven.

New Impediment: Russia-North Korea Military Alignment

One of the most consequential recent developments is the growing defense partnership between Russia and North Korea.

President Putin, determined to outlast Ukraine and outmaneuver NATO, is leaning more heavily on support from North Korea and China. A 2024 comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang appears to revive their Cold War alliance, committing both sides to mutual support in a crisis. North Korea’s military troops and munitions have become critical to Russia’s war effort, and Russian defense technology is highly coveted by Mr. Kim. Symbolic gestures such as North Korean media highlighting Kim Jong Un honoring flag-draped coffinsof fallen North Korean soldiers who died fighting Russia’s war, underline this tightening bond.

This partnership complicates diplomacy. Pyongyang may now feel emboldened by the backing of a nuclear-armed, veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, and believe that Washington’s ability to diplomatically isolate North Korea is diminishing.

Beyond the bilateral relationship, the deepening alignment among the CRINK countries (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) is forging stronger links between potential flashpoints in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Against this backdrop, Kim Jong Un may choose to feign disinterest in diplomacy with his principal adversaries.

Toward a Flexible and Enduring Alliance

Recent assessments of possible high-level diplomatic reengagement with North Korea raise as many questions as answers. Even in the absence of a breakthrough, diplomacy can ease tensions, lower risks, and reinforce the US-ROK alliance. These benefits, however, depend on both Washington and Seoul adopting a more flexible, holistic, and strategic approach.

Can a framework be forged that trades strategic flexibility for strategic reassurance? Can the alliance remain resilient amid the accelerating transition of wartime operational control (OPCON), a smaller US troop presence, and increasing emphasis on China? Can trust be rebuilt with North Korea without undermining trust with South Korea?

These remain open questions. The best-case outcome might see South Korea assume greater responsibility for stability on the peninsula, while the United States focuses on deterring China. President Lee’s unilateral decision to stop the “audio aggression” of loudspeaker broadcasts at the DMZ was met with a reciprocal move by North Korea, offering a glimmer of hope for improved inter-Korean ties. At the same time, deeper strategic alignment between the United States and South Korea could help recalibrate the alliance. This alignment might include greater economic integration—cooperation in shipbuilding, energy, data centers, semiconductors, biotech, and a defense industrial confederation.

The worst-case scenario is one of alliance drift, North Korean brinkmanship, and the erosion of the global nonproliferation regime. The test of extended deterrence will not only affect stability on the peninsula but could also determine whether the world can uphold any semblance of order or instead slide into a future where nuclear weapons proliferate unchecked in the absence of a credible diplomatic framework.

In short, while diplomacy may not resolve the core conflicts with North Korea or halt Pyongyang’s nuclear development, its absence or failure could make the Korean flashpoint even more dangerous than it already is.

Read in Korea on Point.

hudson.org · by William Schneider

11. Synthetic Sovereign: How Kim Jong Un Could Rule Forever as a Deepfake

Wow. I did not expect this. I cannot tell if this is satire or serious.

Excerpts:

But with today’s synthetic media tools, there is a chilling alternative: even in death, Kim’s likeness could live on — forever. He could appear on screens, issuing carefully crafted messages from beyond the grave. For a regime built on myth, a digitally immortal leader is not only plausible — it is ideologically coherent. Like his grandfather Kim Il Sung, still revered as the “Eternal President,” Kim Jong Un could rule indefinitely through synthetic media.

While this is indeed concerning, there exists yet another danger called the “liar’s dividend.” The liar’s dividend is when someone uses the possibility of fake content to undermine legitimate content in their favor. In a world where nothing can be trusted or believed, even a genuine event– including death — could be called propaganda. If a video emerged showing the death of Kim, Pyongyang could deny it as foreign disinformation. Conversely, a fake video could be passed off as real, manipulating public perception both inside North Korea and abroad.

There is an ironic silver lining, however. Instability in the region is not optimal. If Kim’s Politburo releases a deepfake Kim after his death, this could give the regime more time to pick another figurehead, staving off any unrest — perhaps the rest of the world would prefer that over instability with nuclear weapons. In nuclear diplomacy, ambiguity can be dangerous. If adversaries hesitate, or overreact, based on inauthentic cues, the consequences could be catastrophic.

This fusion of authoritarianism, isolationism, and GenAI creates a new political phenomenon: the synthetic sovereign. In North Korea, where reality has always been more engineered than observed, deepfake technology could complete Kim Jong Un’s transformation from mortal ruler into digital myth — and his isolated people would not be the wiser.

This is not a dystopian future. It is a very real scenario with profound implications for all of us, and the meaning of truth itself. In a world where even the dead can declare war, the greatest threat may not be what Kim does while alive, but what he appears to do after he is gone.

Synthetic Sovereign: How Kim Jong Un Could Rule Forever as a Deepfake

A fusion of authoritarianism, isolationism, and GenAI could create a new political phenomenon: the synthetic sovereign.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/synthetic-sovereign-how-kim-jong-un-could-rule-forever-as-a-deepfake/

By Matthew Fecteau

July 08, 2025

Credit: Depositphotos

In the age of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI), even death may not end the reign of authoritarian leaders. Nowhere is this possibility more plausible — or more dangerous — than in North Korea, where the regime’s legitimacy is built on myth, image, and absolute control. Using GenAI, Kim Jong Un could effectively “live forever” as a deity, projecting power and command even from beyond the grave.

Much of Kim Il Sung’s rise was built on controlling narratives and distorting the reality of those he ruled. He would go on to call himself the “Supreme Leader” and tell people he had been chosen by a higher power — essentially divine.

After Kim Il Sung’s death, the myth of his immortality was reimagined as a divine transition from father to son. In its preamble, the 1998 North Korean Constitution referred to itself as the “Kim Il Sung Constitution,” which legally embodies Kim Il Sung’s juche state ideology. Kim Il Sung was deified as “the Eternal President of the Republic.” Essentially, this means that only Kim Il Sung was, is, and shall ever be worthy of the role of president which is enshrined in the preface of the new constitution. This leadership-affirmed truth thus justified the abolishment of the presidency.

The Kims used systemic disinformation campaigns to fortify their roles as eternal leaders long before the advent of GenAI and deepfake technology. Today, GenAI systems, such as transformer-based architectures and voice-cloning models, can generate ultra-realistic video, audio, and text. Trained on extensive datasets of Kim Jong Un’s appearances, gestures, and vocal patterns, GenAI systems could now construct a disturbingly convincing simulacrum that would keep Kim alive with no one the wiser.

In the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned the world that Russia’s digital disinformation machinery would create a deepfake of him admitting defeat and surrendering. By mid-March 2022, a deepfake of Zelenskyy appeared with just this message. The video was debunked due to its rather crude audio and video, but not before it spread across social media and briefly appeared on Ukrainian television. Months later, the mayors of Berlin, Madrid, and Vienna each held extended video-based conversations with a deepfake version of Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko.

Why not a deepfake Kim?

Whenever Kim disappears from public view, rumors begin to circulate quickly. Deaths of long-time leaders such as Kim often spark intense political infighting or public unrest that could plunge their countries into chaos. Considering North Korea has nuclear warheads, that is chaos the global community cannot afford. Any sudden reappearance may catch some by surprise, including prominent defectors and analysts who had publicly predicted his demise. Now imagine if those images had not been genuine but instead generated by artificial intelligence.

North Korea largely exists in a digital void, and everything is closely monitored. Average citizens do not have open access to the internet, and things like TV and radio are locked to state-run content. Phones cannot call outside the country, and foreign broadcasts are blocked or jammed. The government has taken modern technology and twisted it into a tool for deeper control. Even smartphones, which are approved by the regime, cannot go online in any real sense. They are only hooked up to a heavily controlled national network — basically a censored version of the internet. If someone wants to install an app, they cannot just download it. They must visit a government-approved store in person.

Such synthetic media could be used to produce televised addresses, battlefield inspections, or policy announcements. In a place as secretive and tightly managed as North Korea, it is entirely possible that even top officials would not know for sure whether Kim was still alive. A convincingly faked version of him — broadcasting messages, holding meetings, making appearances — would not just be a ghost of the past. It could serve as a mechanism for maintaining order, monitoring dissent, and keeping the illusion of leadership intact.

During armed conflict, a fabricated Kim could show up on screens, seemingly directing military operations or giving the green light for attacks, including a nuclear attack. A state-run broadcast might convince foreign governments that the chain of command was still intact. Would the United States, its partners, or allies have time to verify a video’s authenticity before choosing whether, or how, to respond if an attack occurred? In this context, GenAI becomes more than propaganda, it becomes a weapon of mass deception.

Kim remains a critical part of stability in North Korea due to his cult-figure status. North Korean political leaders are deified and worshipped as gods. Any potential death could trigger unrest, creating a power struggle behind closed doors with consequences throughout the region.

But with today’s synthetic media tools, there is a chilling alternative: even in death, Kim’s likeness could live on — forever. He could appear on screens, issuing carefully crafted messages from beyond the grave. For a regime built on myth, a digitally immortal leader is not only plausible — it is ideologically coherent. Like his grandfather Kim Il Sung, still revered as the “Eternal President,” Kim Jong Un could rule indefinitely through synthetic media.

While this is indeed concerning, there exists yet another danger called the “liar’s dividend.” The liar’s dividend is when someone uses the possibility of fake content to undermine legitimate content in their favor. In a world where nothing can be trusted or believed, even a genuine event– including death — could be called propaganda. If a video emerged showing the death of Kim, Pyongyang could deny it as foreign disinformation. Conversely, a fake video could be passed off as real, manipulating public perception both inside North Korea and abroad.

There is an ironic silver lining, however. Instability in the region is not optimal. If Kim’s Politburo releases a deepfake Kim after his death, this could give the regime more time to pick another figurehead, staving off any unrest — perhaps the rest of the world would prefer that over instability with nuclear weapons. In nuclear diplomacy, ambiguity can be dangerous. If adversaries hesitate, or overreact, based on inauthentic cues, the consequences could be catastrophic.

This fusion of authoritarianism, isolationism, and GenAI creates a new political phenomenon: the synthetic sovereign. In North Korea, where reality has always been more engineered than observed, deepfake technology could complete Kim Jong Un’s transformation from mortal ruler into digital myth — and his isolated people would not be the wiser.

This is not a dystopian future. It is a very real scenario with profound implications for all of us, and the meaning of truth itself. In a world where even the dead can declare war, the greatest threat may not be what Kim does while alive, but what he appears to do after he is gone.

Authors

Guest Author

Matthew Fecteau

Matthew Fecteau is pursuing a PhD investigating whether generative AI is a Revolution in Military Affairs at King's College London, further deepening his expertise in transformative AI applications.

12. Six signs North Korea has embedded agents in your company—and what to do about it

We must crush the regime's all-purpose sword of cyber.

Some useful advice here.

Six signs North Korea has embedded agents in your company—and what to do about it

Fortune · by Michael Barnhart

They showed up on time, crushed deadlines, asked no questions.

It was a bit weird they never turned their camera on, but not a deal breaker.

Then they were gone.

No notice. No forwarding details. Just silence.

Across industries, some of the highest-performing remote workers are vanishing without a trace. For many companies, it’s not a burnout issue—it’s a breach of trust. And in more cases than you’d think, the root cause traces back to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

On June 30, the FBI and Department of Justice announced one of the largest crackdowns yet on North Korea’s remote IT worker scheme, designed to covertly fund the regime. Nearly 30 “laptop farms” across 16 U.S. states were raided for their suspected role. The coordinated action included three indictments, one arrest, the seizure of 29 financial accounts, and the takedown of 21 websites, part of a sweeping effort to disrupt covert operations and stop sanctioned workers from infiltrating global companies under false identities.

The bust marks a rare and direct strike against one of the world’s most evasive cyber adversaries.

North Korea’s shadow IT workforce isn’t just a sanctions workaround. It’s a global, for-profit operation embedding operatives inside major companies under false identities funneling money, access, and opportunity back to the regime. And if you think you’d spot it, you probably won’t. These workers are quiet by design, skilled by necessity, and trained to exploit the blind spots in modern remote work.

The scale of this infiltration is greater than many realize—and the indictments are unlikely to be the last. For now, every company should be asking: Could this be us?

Six red flags you hired a North Korean IT worker

Evading detection and blending into the background is DPRK tradecraft 101. But with the right behavioral analytics and cross-functional vigilance, patterns emerge. Here’s what to watch for:

Run known DPRK-linked IOCs against your systems
Start with what’s public. Known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) tied to DPRK operations are readily available. Cross-reference them with your email logs, ticketing systems, and access records. If you find a hit, you might already be compromised.
Odd working hours for alleged U.S.-based staff
A remote dev claiming to be in Austin but pushing commits at 3 a.m. local time? That’s not hustle—that’s a time zone mismatch. DPRK operatives often work from China or Russia and adjust their hours to avoid detection. Look for strange bursts of late-week activity or unnatural work cadences.
Use of remote access tools and anonymizers
IP-KVM switches. Mouse automation tools. Anonymizing VPNs and remote desktop protocols. These aren’t just IT oddities—they’re DPRK staples. If you’re seeing remote access patterns that don’t match declared user behavior, or tooling that simulates presence, investigate.
Unusually low communication engagement
Camera always off. Silent in Slack. No questions, no friction. In many organizations, that’s seen as a plus. But low engagement, especially from critical roles, is a tell. DPRK operatives play invisible. That silence is often the signal. DPRK operatives are trained to stay invisible. In some cases, that quiet isn’t just disengagement—it’s operational cover. Several fake workers recently vanished not because they quit, but because their devices were seized in international stings. When someone goes dark, it may not be ghosting—law enforcement might be calling next about your company’s compromised systems.
Resume or referral patterns that feel too familiar
Look closer at your hiring pipeline. Reused resumes. Recycled phrasing. Overlapping career timelines. These are signs of templated personas. DPRK operatives often enter via fake recruiters or refer other DPRK workers in their group. When candidates start to blur together, it’s time to dig deeper.
Discrepancy between interview and on-the-job performance
Crushed the interview. Fell flat on day one. It happens, but when the person in the job doesn’t match the person who interviewed, that’s a problem. Voice changers, stand-ins, and deepfakes have all been used to slip through screenings. Even a quick follow-up can surface inconsistencies.

I hired a DPRK worker. Now what?

Step one: Don’t panic. Step two: Move fast.

When sensitive customer data or intellectual property may have been exposed, your response must be immediate, coordinated, and comprehensive.

Here’s what to do next:

Immediate containment and isolation
Suspend all access immediately—VPNs, cloud platforms, code repos, and email. Quarantine devices and preserve them for forensic analysis; don’t wipe or reset anything. Reset all related credentials to prevent further access. Fast action here matters. Every minute counts in preventing data theft or sabotage.
Comprehensive forensic investigation
Bring in experts experienced with insider threats and DPRK tactics. Analyze logs from networks, cloud, endpoints, and code repositories to uncover unusual access or data exfiltration. What did they touch? Where did the data flow? Look for covert data transfers or attempts to hide activity.
Assess the scope of exposure
Did they access customer data, IP, source code, or regulated content? Evaluate compliance exposure under GDPR, HIPAA, or CCPA. Risk isn’t limited to theft—think extortion, ransomware, or deeper compromise.
Coordinate cross-functional response
Bring in legal, PR, and HR. Legal advises on disclosure; PR preps messaging; HR manages internal fallout. The faster you coordinate, the more control you maintain.
Engage external authorities
Loop in law enforcement, including the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3). These aren’t just corporate risks; they’re geopolitical ones. Sharing intelligence strengthens your position and may help prevent future breaches.

Prevention beyond cyber and HR

Running known IOCs is a start—and a clean report is good news. But DPRK ops move fast. Prevention requires behavior-based visibility and tight cross-team alignment.

Pre-hire protective measures:

Conduct live, on-camera interviews with IP/geolocation validation
Independently verify references and past employment
Use unscripted, technical Q&A to gauge real expertise
Involve HR and legal early in security awareness and hiring processes

Post-hire protective measures:

Flag re-applications using recycled data or aliases
Monitor for unusual access times, remote tool use, and VPN spikes
Track engagement levels—silence is a signal
Watch for early signs of extortion, evasion, or data misuse

By fostering close collaboration across internal and external security, HR, risk, and legal teams, organizations can build a resilient insider risk program that detects and mitigates threats before they escalate. Prevention is a team effort, and behavior is the strongest signal.

North Korea—what’s next

The latest and ongoing government actions have pushed the DPRK’s shadow workforce into the spotlight. But exposure isn’t elimination. The playbook will evolve—new names, new tools, new countries.

The modern insider won’t always look suspicious. They’ll look perfect. Until they disappear.

Knowing what to look for is step one. Shutting it down for good is the mission ahead.

The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.

North Korean operative reveals the inner workings of the IT scam infiltrating the Fortune 500—‘They had no idea that we were from North Korea’
North Korean operatives and American accomplices accused in massive fraud that infiltrated the Fortune 500 and stole millions
The North Korean IT worker scheme infiltrated an American election campaign website
North Korean hackers have stolen up to $1 billion in virtual assets according to the UN: ‘A record-breaking year’

Fortune · by Michael Barnhart

13. Did South Korea's ex-leader try to goad North into conflict?

An incredible allegation that I would take with a grain of salt.

Did South Korea's ex-leader try to goad North into conflict?

Julian Ryall

12 hours ago12 hours ago

Prosecutors have reportedly found evidence that former president Yoon Suk Yeol deployed drones over Pyongyang. Experts say it may have been a bid to provoke a response that would have justified his martial law decree.

https://www.dw.com/en/did-south-koreas-ex-leader-try-to-goad-north-into-conflict/a-73184967

https://p.dw.com/p/4x4kh

Treason could be added to Yoon's charges, which include insurrection and abuse of power

Image: Hwawon Ceci Lee/Anadolu Agency/IMAGO

South Korean prosecutors investigating impeached ex-President Yoon Suk Yeol have reportedly found evidence that the disgraced former leader ordered military drones to be sent over Pyongyang.

According to reports in South Korea this week, investigators have obtained audio recordings of communication between the then-president and the military over the alleged drone deployments.

Analysts say the incursions, which reportedly occurred in October 2024, were likely intended to provoke North Korea into a reaction.

That scenario would have provided Yoon with the justification to declare a national emergency and impose martial law, which he eventually did in December.

Yoon, who has since been impeached, is now facing criminal charges for insurrection over his short-lived declaration of martial law.

Why did Yoon allegedly send drones over Pyongyang?

Choo Jae-woo, a foreign policy professor at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, explained that there are "only two reasons" that a president can declare martial law, one of which is "external aggression or an invasion."

"It appears that after provoking the North, Yoon expected a retaliation that he could then use to justify declaring martial law," he told DW.

"But that plan backfired when the North did not respond militarily," he said. Pyongyang protested the incursions but stopped short of responding militarily.

How South Korean president's arrest could cause more turmoil

01:42

Yoon declared martial law on December 3, saying he needed to protect the nation from "North Korean communist" and "anti-state" forces. He did not provide any evidence for his claims.

Fallout from Yoon's martial law decree

His controversial attempt to use the military to seize control of the government lasted only a few hours.

He was impeached and suspended 10 days later and then arrested in January.

The former leader's charge of insurrection is punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty, although South Korea has not executed anyone in decades.

Yoon, who was released on bail in March, has denied the charges, saying "martial law is not a coup d'etat" and that his declaration was designed as a "peaceful message" to the nation to highlight the opposition's intentions against the government.

He was questioned again in Seoul on Saturday, and a day later, special prosecutors filed a request for a new arrest warrant for alleged abuse of power, falsification of official documents, violation of the presidential security act and obstruction of official duties.

According to South Korean media, a hearing to confirm that arrest warrant has been scheduled for Wednesday. Yoon is expected to appear in person to present his arguments before the court.

Authorities say that allegations of treason, which include the dispatch of drones into North Korea, were not included in the charges as they are still being investigated, but they could still be added later.

How did we get to this stage?

In October 2024, there were reports of drones over the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, which is 210 kilometers (130 miles) north of the Demilitarized Zone that divides the Korean Peninsula, on three occasions.

North Korea published purported images of the drones and later claimed to have found the remains of one of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that had been shot down after dropping propaganda leaflets.

In South Korea, the Defense Ministry quickly rejected Pyongyang's claims. But the ministry backtracked a few hours later, saying it could not confirm or deny the reports.

North Korea threatened to carry out retaliatory strikes against the South in response to the propaganda leaflets filled with "inflammatory rumors and rubbish."

North Korea claims South sent drones to Pyongyang

04:55

While Pyongyang condemned Seoul and said the incident "could be considered a military attack," it did not launch a cross-border retaliation.

The special investigation team set up to look into Yoon's actions in office obtained a recording in which a senior officer of the Drone Operations Command said that his commander had received the order for the operation from "V," the South Korean military's term for the sitting president, the Korea JoongAng Daily reported on July 3.

Further investigations have revealed that two reconnaissance drones were reported missing near the border in October, with a Defense Ministry report saying the reasons for the loss of the vehicles were "unknown."

Yoon's risky gamble

"It is clear that the situation could have been very serious," said Choo, the Kyung Hee University professor. "The exchanges that could have followed may not have been just localized skirmishes close to the border but could have escalated. We were very fortunate that the North decided not to respond."

Dan Pinkston, a professor of international relations at the Seoul campus of Troy University, pointed out that the South's alleged drone intrusion was part of a series of tit-for-tat cross-border exchanges during Yoon's administration, which helped heighten tensions with Pyongyang.

North Korea had been sending surveillance drones into the South and "was jamming GPS signals" close to the border, affecting flights going in and out of Incheon airport, he said.

"There were also groups in the South sending balloons over the border carrying propaganda leaflets, small amounts of food, money and medicine, with the North replying with balloons carrying trash," Pinkston added.

But Yoon's order for military drones to penetrate North Korea's airspace was more serious, Pinkston said, as this was "a clear violation of the armistice that ended hostilities in the Korean War" (1950-1953). Officially, the two neighboring countries have been at war ever since.

In addition, "it appears it was done without informing the US or the United Nations Command on the border," the professor said.

Yoon's impeachment and arrest revealed a deep divide in South Korean politics

Image: Lee Jin-man/AP Photo/picture alliance

Drone incursions threatened 'devastating war'

Yoon ordering the incursions could very easily have backfired, Pinkston said.

"It is hard to understand the thinking behind this decision, but it put the country at the risk of a devastating war," he said.

"This was an extreme move that endangered the territory of South Korea, the people and the nation's assets, all so Yoon could take a tighter authoritarian rule on the reins of government," Pinkston said.

"There is no logical explanation for doing what he did," he added.

Edited by: Karl Sexton

14. Protecting Undersea Cables and South Korea's Role

A global pivotal state must contribute to the defense of these cables.

The PDF of the entire 16 page essay can be downloaded here: https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/2025/07/Paik_TWQ_48_2.pdf

Protecting Undersea Cables and South Korea's Role

by Amy Paik

https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/

The growing frequency of high-profile undersea cable disruptions have exposed the extent to which global connectivity hinges on their integrity and vulnerabilities. Despite their strategic significance, these cables remain insufficiently protected. South Korea, home to one of the world’s largest fiber-optic cable manufacturers and consistent with its vision to become a global pivotal state, is uniquely positioned to spearhead efforts in advancing undersea cable governance.

Download the PDF

15. North Korea’s Second Chance? How Trump Could Bring Kim Back to the Negotiating Table

I still think we must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. We must recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.

Except:

It is worth remembering, of course, that should negotiations resume, North Korea is likely to take a much tougher stance, and the Trump administration will probably have to accept a worse deal than the one it proposed in Hanoi. But North Korea knows that it lucked out the last time around and didn’t end up paying a hefty price for walking away—saved, as it was, by China’s tensions with the United States and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, however, Pyongyang should be interested in a deal that grants it greater economic autonomy as well as distance from potentially dangerous neighbors. It might be interested in a deal, in other words, in case its luck runs out.

North Korea’s Second Chance?

Foreign Affairs · by More by Andrei Lankov · July 8, 2025

How Trump Could Bring Kim Back to the Negotiating Table

Andrei Lankov

July 8, 2025

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting a military factory in North Korea, June 2025 The Korean Central News Agency / Reuters

ANDREI LANKOV is a historian specializing in North Korea at Kookmin University, Seoul. He is the author of The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia.

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Since coming to office in January, U.S. President Donald Trump has waded into several geopolitical crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Israel’s wars in Gaza and Iran. Thus far, however, he has said comparatively little about the growing strength of the Kim regime in North Korea, leading some analysts to suggest the administration is neglecting one of the most critical security issues in Asia.

But Trump has not forgotten about North Korea. Although his administration has been preoccupied with other immediate priorities, there are multiple indications that reviving talks with Pyongyang remains high on the president’s agenda. Soon after his inauguration, for instance, Trump told Fox News that he would “reach out” to North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, whom he described as a “smart guy.” In late March, Trump told reporters he was in “communication” with North Korea and intended to “do something” regarding the country “at some point.” Moreover, Trump’s foreign policy team includes several Korea specialists in key roles at the State Department, such as Allison Hooker and Kevin Kim.

In fact, there are several reasons to think that renewed talks between Washington and Pyongyang might now lead to a deal. For Trump, it would offer an opportunity for a foreign policy success that has proved elusive so far in the cases of Ukraine and the Middle East. It is also worth recalling that Trump has unfinished business with North Korea. During his first administration, Trump met with Kim but was unable to finalize a deal; his return to office gives him a second chance. For its part, the North Korean regime is considerably stronger than it was a few years ago, but it also knows that its position could soon change—most notably with respect to Russia. Furthermore, there already is a template for a plausible “small” deal between North Korea and the United States that, while imperfect, could provide a way forward. It will not be easy, of course, but there are several factors now at play that could draw North Korea back to the negotiating table.

CHANGING FORTUNES

To understand what a Trump deal with North Korea might look like, it is useful to consider the president’s earlier engagement with the Kim regime. In February 2019, Trump met Kim at a summit meeting in Hanoi, during which the two sides tried to achieve a so-called small deal. According to the U.S. proposal, North Korea would dismantle all of its known nuclear facilities in exchange for the UN lifting—or at least significantly relaxing—Security Council sanctions, bringing much-needed relief to the North Korean economy. This was known as a “small” deal because North Korea would still retain some nuclear weapons. It was not, in other words, calling for a “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization,” which is known as the “big deal.”

At the time, Pyongyang was in a tough spot, and it appeared that the Trump administration had real leverage. Kim was facing the Security Council’s newly imposed harsh sanctions regime that was vigorously enforced not only by the United States but also by China and Russia, which were more concerned then about nonproliferation than about maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. For a brief moment, the sanctions deprived North Korea of foreign assistance and pushed the country into a corner: its economy shrank 4.1 percent in 2018. Reaching an agreement with the United States seemed almost to be a matter of survival for North Korea.

Nonetheless, North Korea did not buckle in Hanoi. The two sides were unable to agree on the precise scale of concessions that North Korea would have to make and on the list of facilities to be dismantled. The North Koreans were ready to dismantle all facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, which had been North Korea’s key nuclear research facility for decades, but the U.S. side was aware of additional uranium enrichment plants in other locations and insisted on also including them. The talks collapsed almost immediately.

North Korea has signaled since Trump returned to office that it is ready to play ball.

Since then, North Korea has become far stronger. Following the failed summit, North Korea didn’t crumble under the weight of sanctions but instead ended up benefiting from a series of unforeseen geopolitical shifts as both China and Russia sought to improve relations with Pyongyang.

First, around 2019, Beijing began relaxing its attitude toward Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear program had long been a source of tension between Beijing and Pyongyang, but as China’s conflict with the United States kicked into high gear, Beijing started seeing its shared border with North Korea as a vital buffer zone protecting China’s northeast. Beijing has since seemed determined to keep North Korea afloat, providing it with moderate but essentially unconditional aid.

North Korea’s sudden windfall from Russia was even less anticipated than its renewed ties with China. Once the war in Ukraine began, in February 2022, the Russian military faced a severe shortage of heavy artillery shells. Moscow, however, soon discovered that North Korea not only had massive stockpiles of such ammunition but also was willing to supply them to Russia for an undisclosed, hefty price. By October 2024, North Korea’s accumulated revenues from these sales were estimated at $5.5 billion—and that is a conservative estimate. To put this figure in context, in 2016, before the sanctions hit, North Korea’s total exports were estimated to be $2.5 billion. North Korea and Russia also entered a formal military alliance in 2024, and shortly thereafter, Pyongyang sent some 12,000 North Korean soldiers to Russia to fight against Ukrainian forces—in exchange for further financial payments from Moscow.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has grown rapidly. Since the Hanoi summit, North Korea has developed and successfully tested a number of new long-distance delivery systems, including the solid-fuel Hwasong-19, a new intercontinental ballistic missile that can be prepared for launch in minutes and can hit any target in the continental United States. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has estimated that North Korea currently has an arsenal of about 50 nuclear warheads. And according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea stands in its “strongest strategic position” in decades. As the political scientist Victor Cha recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, should the Trump administration meet the Kim regime again at the negotiating table, “Washington may have to offer Pyongyang big concessions.” But despite Washington’s reduced leverage, there are reasons to believe some version of a small deal might still be within reach.

WRITING ON THE WALL

For starters, North Korea has signaled since Trump returned to office that it is ready to play ball. According to several sources, North Korean officials and diplomats have in recent weeks told their contacts in a number of countries that they would like to resume talks with the United States. This tracks with other signs from Pyongyang, including a softening tone in official North Korean media channels.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, reviving the main contours of a small deal would be attractive for two simple reasons. Most immediately, North Korea’s current level of trade with Russia is unlikely to last after hostilities in Ukraine end. Indeed, Moscow’s financial flows to Pyongyang could wind down almost overnight. Aside from munitions, there isn’t much of a trade opportunity between the two countries; the two economies are fundamentally incompatible. The few items North Korea can sell on the international market, such as minerals and seafood, are of little interest to Russian importers. This economic mismatch has undermined numerous past attempts to boost economic cooperation between the two countries. For decades, trade between North Korea and Russia has followed the same pattern, flourishing only when Moscow is willing to subsidize it—a reality that is not lost on decision-makers in Pyongyang.

If and when Russia’s war in Ukraine ends, China’s support would likely continue—but North Korea is probably not thrilled at the prospect of being overly reliant on its giant neighbor. North Korea’s decision-makers have always viewed China as a threat because it is the only country that might have both the will and the means to meddle with North Korean domestic politics. Indeed, Pyongyang has consistently tried to keep some distance from Beijing. This trend has become even more pronounced under Kim’s leadership. When Jang Song Thaek, Kim’s leading adviser, was purged and executed in 2013, for instance, one of the accusations against him published in North Korean media was his alleged willingness to make concessions to China.

Rather than rely solely on China, Pyongyang would much prefer to diversify its aid sources—something it could do if the Hanoi deal were revived and the UN sanctions were finally relaxed. South Korea’s newly elected president, Lee Jae-myung, for instance, might be willing to bring back the progressive tradition in South Korea of showering North Korea with aid and subsidized trade deals. If sanctions were lifted, the North Korean government could also resume talks with Japan. For years, the two countries have discussed compensation for abuses committed during Japan’s colonial rule of Korea (1910–45), a period that was marked by the use of forced labor, the extraction of mineral resources, and discrimination against the local population.

This freedom to maneuver both geopolitically and economically should be a strong incentive for the Kim regime. Accepting a Trump deal, in other words, would both alleviate some long-standing economic pressures and allow Pyongyang to return to its preferred strategy of exploiting great-power rivalries to its advantage.

THE LEAST BAD OPTION

A small deal has serious shortcomings for both North Korea and the United States, but it still might be the least bad option. Such a deal is not going to bring about North Korea’s denuclearization, of course, and Pyongyang will likely attempt to cheat by hiding some of its nuclear facilities. But a small deal could still slow down—or perhaps even halt—the further advancement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. By dismantling North Korea’s nuclear reactors and most or even all of its centrifuges, such a deal would cause producers to lose most of their R & D and production capacity. This would drastically reduce the number of nuclear devices North Korea could produce and also significantly slow its technological progress regarding weapons of mass destruction. Given the progress North Korea has made since 2019, however, Pyongyang would still retain a nuclear arsenal formidable enough to make any foreign attack unthinkable. Its security, in other words, would not be meaningfully endangered by a small deal.

North Korean decision-makers might also see this particular moment, with the Trump administration in power, as Pyongyang’s best opportunity to find relief from UN sanctions. North Korean officials are generally skeptical that agreements with democratic countries will last. They assume that if the ruling party changes in the next presidential election, any prior agreements will be tossed into the wastebasket, as happened, for example, with the Iran nuclear deal that was painstakingly negotiated by the Obama administration but thrown out by Trump. Still, if the sanctions were lifted now, North Korea could reasonably hope they won’t be reimposed again. Even if, say, a Democrat wins the U.S. presidential election in 2028 and decides to renege on a small deal by pursuing new rounds of sanctions against North Korea, the new administration would have great difficulty getting China and Russia on board, as both countries now believe their interests are better served by maintaining North Korea’s status quo rather than working toward its denuclearization. North Korea’s leadership thus has valid reasons to consider the proposals that may come from a second Trump administration.

It is worth remembering, of course, that should negotiations resume, North Korea is likely to take a much tougher stance, and the Trump administration will probably have to accept a worse deal than the one it proposed in Hanoi. But North Korea knows that it lucked out the last time around and didn’t end up paying a hefty price for walking away—saved, as it was, by China’s tensions with the United States and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, however, Pyongyang should be interested in a deal that grants it greater economic autonomy as well as distance from potentially dangerous neighbors. It might be interested in a deal, in other words, in case its luck runs out.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Andrei Lankov · July 8, 2025

16. Chinese sellers offer North Korea-sourced goods from across the border

Chinese sellers offer North Korea-sourced goods from across the border

Vendors on e-commerce sites offer smuggling services in possible violation of United Nations sanctions

https://www.nknews.org/2025/07/chinese-sellers-offer-north-korea-sourced-goods-from-across-the-border/

Dave Yin July 8, 2025

North Korean currency | Image: Forextime.com via Flickr (June 18, 2019) (CC BY 2.0)

Chinese e-commerce vendors appear to be openly selling North Korean goods and offering to smuggle products on demand as part of what one expert said may constitute a government-sanctioned scheme to violate U.N. sanctions.

NK News found dozens of listings on Chinese e-commerce platforms in which Chinese vendors offered “daigou” or cross-border shopping in North Korea. The practice involves Chinese customers employing a middleman to make purchases in foreign countries on their behalf in order to bypass visa and tax requirements, as well as reduce the likelihood that products are counterfeit. Normally it is associated with high-quality goods such as cosmetics or baby formula from countries such as South Korea, Japan and the United States.

Some of the North Korean goods on offer include DPRK currency, albeit in seemingly small amounts. On Chinese e-commerce platform Taobao, a consumer-to-consumer marketplace featuring both large and small vendors, sets of six to ten commemorative North Korean banknotes feature bills that have values ranging from 50 North Korean won to 5,000.

These banknotes commemorate various North Korean dates, such as the 70th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK in 2018, as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and North Korea. While the vendors stated that the notes are no longer in circulation and cannot be used as legal tender, their sale raises red flags.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 bans the provision of financial services, including bulk cash that could contribute to the DPRK’s prohibited programs, or to the evasion of sanctions.

A full set of six notes, whose face value totaled 8,750 KPW (roughly $0.60 USD based on black-market exchange rates), was offered for just 15.8 yuan, or about $2.21 USD.

Among other goods that Chinese e-commerce merchants offered to buy from across the border were ginseng, alcohol, cigarettes, traditional medicines and various supplements, many of which claim to treat erectile dysfunction.

In one listing, a 600-gram box of Koryo Insam, also known as Korean ginseng, purported to be from Kaesong in southwest North Korea, cost as much as 3,288 yuan or $458.87. Meanwhile, various brands of North Korean cigarettes, sold in cartons of 10 packs, were listed at around 655 Chinese yuan each or $91.41.

Though seemingly small in quantity, the sale of these items raise concerns around sanctions that prohibit North Korea from exporting luxury goods, which typically include alcohol and tobacco.

Chinese vendors on Taobao largely declined to answer NK News’ questions on how the North Korean goods were obtained, although one vendor selling DPRK cigarettes said they had “people on the other side,” likely referring to business partners in North Korea.

Considering these products are widely regarded as state-controlled, there may be involvement of North Korean government authorities or tacit authorization from relevant governmental agencies in their sale across the border that is not part of formal trade, Maiko Takeuchi, who served on the U.N. Security Council as a member of the Panel of Experts for North Korea, told NK News.

“Such practices violate the spirit of the sanctions, which aim to restrict the export of lucrative goods,” she said.

In particular, she pointed to ginseng, a highly prized traditional medicine in China whose export from North Korea is embargoed under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397, as the most likely to generate funds for the DPRK.

It’s unclear whether other products and North Korean souvenirs, including coins, stamps and commemorative stationary, constitute more than a novelty.

Cross-border shopping is the latest in a series of questionable trade trade practices that China conducts with the DPRK.

In May, North Korea imported a station wagon from China for over $38,000, potentially violating U.N. sanctions that prohibit the country from purchasing vehicles. The vehicle, described as a station wagon with a mid-size engine and seating fewer than nine people, may not technically be classified as a luxury item but is nonetheless notable given sanctions restrictions. At the same time, North Korea resumed rice imports from China after a five-month pause, buying over 400,000 kilograms for around $205,000.

Chinese customs data also showed that food items like wheat flour, sugar, sausages, and frozen ducks made up the bulk of North Korea’s May imports, totaling $26.3 million. Though lower than April’s figures, the food imports remain elevated, suggesting either improved domestic food production or external assistance, possibly from Russia. Meanwhile, imports of human hair products and textiles indicate continued participation in sanctioned outsourcing schemes, with North Korea importing over $21 million in hair products and $20 million in fabrics for domestic manufacturing.

In addition to possible luxury goods like watches, perfumes, leather bags and musical instruments, North Korea’s exports to China included wigs and industrial materials like ferro-silicon and carburetants. Some exports, such as coral and mollusk shells, may also violate sanctions.

Bilateral trade between the two countries rose 27% year-on-year in May to $230 million, but the data does not account for illicit exchanges, including smuggling of coal — a reminder that officially reported trade figures likely understate the true scope of DPRK-China economic ties.

Edited by Alannah Hill

17. UNC chief honors troops for laying foundation of S. Korea's development in 75th anniv. ceremony

A reminder of the important contributions of the UN Command.

(LEAD) UNC chief honors troops for laying foundation of S. Korea's development in 75th anniv. ceremony | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr

Lee Minji

All News 16:06 July 08, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS remarks; CHANGES dateline, photos; RECASTS headline, lead)

By Lee Minji

PYEONGTAEK/SEOUL, July 8 (Yonhap) -- The chief of the U.S.-led multinational U.N. Command (UNC) said Tuesday the sacrifice of U.N. troops during the 1950-53 Korean War helped lay the foundation of South Korea's development, as it marked the 75th anniversary of its establishment.

The commemoration ceremony took place at Barker Field in Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul, attended by guests including South Korean veterans who served in the Korean War.

The ceremony, presided over by UNC Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay, also featured a march of the flags of the original sending states that contributed to the three-year conflict and a gun salute.

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the UNC who also serves as the chief of the U.S. Forces Korea and the Combined Forces, noted how the establishment of the UNC laid the foundation for South Korea's development.

"Seventy-five years ago, 22 nations demonstrated unprecedented international solidarity, giving their blood and treasure to secure freedom for millions and lay the foundation for the Republic of Korea's remarkable transformation into a vibrant democracy and economic powerhouse," Brunson said in congratulatory remarks.

A ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the U.S-led multinational U.N. Command takes place at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on July 8, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

The UNC was established in 1950 as a multinational command responsible for maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, as well as facilitating cooperation among allied nations.

As part of such efforts, the UNC conducts communication with North Korea on a daily basis through the so-called pink phone, a rare military telephone line located in the Joint Security Area.

"United Nations Command maintains communications militarily with North Korea on a daily basis, and we pass military messages ... on events for specific issues in which we need to ensure that there is transparency and communication," Macaulay said.

The Canadian deputy commander, however, did not confirm whether the UNC has been in contact with the North over pending issues, such as a North Korean civilian who crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) last week.

In regard to a reported probe launched by the UNC over allegations that Seoul flew drones over Pyongyang last year, Macaulay said such investigations are "ongoing," without providing further details.

U.N. Command Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay (L) presents a plaque of gratitude to Hwang Soo-gon, a Korean War veteran, during a ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the command held at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek on July 8, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

The UNC deputy commander noted how the multinational command has reshaped its role over the past decades and called for efforts to respond to new security challenges in an increasingly interconnected world.

"Over the past 75 years, UNC has evolved from a wartime coalition defending Korean freedom into a U.S.-led multinational force dedicated to preserving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in a region facing complex security challenges," Macaulay said.

More than 1.9 million service members from UNC member states, including the United States, Britain and Australia, provided combat, medical and logistical support during the Korean War, which technically has never ended as a peace treaty was not signed.

U.N. Command Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay speaks to reporters at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on July 8, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

Keywords

#UN Command #anniversary

(LEAD) UNC chief honors troops for laying foundation of S. Korea's development in 75th anniv. ceremony

en.yna.co.kr

18. Abductee family group to suspend leaflet campaigns against N. Korea

It is time to embark on a holistic, sophisticated information effort beyond the launch of balloons and bottles across the water.

Abductee family group to suspend leaflet campaigns against N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · July 8, 2025

PAJU, South Korea, July 8 (Yonhap) -- A South Korean civic group representing families of abductees held in North Korea said Tuesday it will suspend the distribution of anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border.

Choi Seong-ryong, the head of the group, made the announcement in a joint press conference with the Paju municipal government, less than a year after the group resumed leafleting campaigns in the border city.

"I was swayed after I received a call from Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young, Vice Unification Minister Kim Nam-jung and Rep. Yoon Hu-duk," Choi said at the press conference held in Imjingak in Paju. "I promise to the people that we will outright halt sending newsletters on abducted family members from today forward."

Choi also said he asked other groups involved in the leafleting campaigns to halt their activities in order to help President Lee Jae Myung establish dialogue with the North.

Last month, Lee ordered the government to come up with measures to prevent and punish the sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border to lower inter-Korean tensions.

Choi Seong-ryong, head of a civic group representing families of abductees held in North Korea, vows to officially suspend anti-Pyongyang leafleting campaigns during a press conference in the border city of Paju, just north of Seoul, on July 8, 2025. (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · July 8, 2025

19. N. Korea holds Cabinet meeting over economic issues

Kim Jong Un's bankrupt economic policies are responsible for the suffering of the Korean people in the north.

N. Korea holds Cabinet meeting over economic issues | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · July 8, 2025

SEOUL, July 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has convened a plenary meeting of the Cabinet as a follow-up to the latest key party meeting in an effort to inspect the implementation of the country's five-year economic development plan, state media reported Tuesday.

The North held an enlarged plenary meeting of the Cabinet the previous day, attended by Premier Pak Thae-song and other key officials, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The meeting was held to discuss how to implement major tasks laid out at last month's plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea and ways to successfully complete the nation's five-year economic plan, the KCNA noted.

At a key party congress in 2021, North Korea established a five-year economic development plan centered on self-reliance, with leader Kim Jong-un presenting 12 detailed goals in the economic sector later.

The agenda at this week's Cabinet meeting included the issue of completing the last stage of a five-year housing project to build 50,000 homes in Pyongyang, the report said.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 4, 2025, shows the North convening a plenary meeting of the Cabinet the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · July 8, 2025

20. Hanwha Ocean wins U.S. Navy ship maintenance deal

Another example of South Korea as both a Global Pivotal State and a aperner in the Arsenal of democracies.

Hanwha Ocean wins U.S. Navy ship maintenance deal | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · July 8, 2025

SEOUL, July 8 (Yonhap) -- Hanwha Ocean Co., a major South Korean shipbuilder, has secured a contract to provide maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services for the U.S. Navy ship Charles Drew, industry sources said Tuesday.

The company won the U.S. Navy's regular MRO project for the Charles Drew, a dry cargo and ammunition ship assigned to the Navy's 7th Fleet, the sources said.

The non-combat vessel is expected to arrive at Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard, about 330 kilometers southeast of Seoul, later this month and be delivered back to the U.S. Navy by the end of the year.

This marks the third time Hanwha has won an MRO project for a U.S. Navy vessel.

In August last year, it became the first South Korean shipbuilder to secure such a contract, for the Navy's logistics support ship Wally Schirra. In November, it also won an MRO deal for the replenishment oiler Yukon.

This undated file photo, provided by Hanwha Ocean Co., shows the U.S. Navy's logistics support ship Wally Schirra. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

kyongae.choi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · July 8, 2025

21. New Chinese MP9 device targets N. Korean market with anti-detection features

Thank you China. Doing what South Korea and the US would not do?

There is so much we could be doing from an information and influence perspective.

New Chinese MP9 device targets N. Korean market with anti-detection features

“This isn’t just another cheap Chinese device—it was designed from the ground up for North Korean users," a source told Daily NK

By Lee Sang-yong - July 8, 2025

dailynk.com

New Chinese MP9 device targets N. Korean market with anti-detection features - Daily NK English

FILE PHOTO: Chinese-made MP8 device popular among young North Koreans. (Daily NK)

China is developing an MP9 electronic device targeted at North Korean consumers. The next iteration in the MP7/MP8 series, the MP9 is expected to feature improved resolution and new capabilities, including automatic media deletion and viewing history editing.

“A new device called the MP9 is being designed here in China,” a source told Daily NK recently. Developers are considering various form factors, including a foldable design.

The MP9’s automatic media deletion feature stands out as particularly significant—it’s designed to help users evade North Korean authorities’ strict monitoring of foreign media consumption. This planned capability suggests developers understand North Korean users’ needs and want to reduce their risk of being caught with prohibited content.

“The developers are upgrading basic specs like image quality to boost user engagement. But more importantly, they’re adding sophisticated features specifically to encourage North Korean media consumption. They seem determined to make foreign media a regular part of North Koreans’ daily lives,” the source explained.

Purpose-built devices for evading detection

The MP7 and MP8 devices already circulating in North Korea appear purpose-built for that market. The MP8 notably lacks or disables radio and Wi-Fi functions, helping users avoid detection during police sweeps.

“This isn’t just another cheap Chinese device—it was designed from the ground up for North Korean users. It doesn’t have features Chinese consumers would expect and isn’t even sold domestically,” the source noted.

The devices ship with SD cards containing media content. Initial shipments included Chinese TV shows, documentaries, and educational videos with Korean subtitles. Some content was reportedly included at North Korean brokers’ request.

Crucially, the source indicated these devices aren’t simply private sector products. There are signs that groups linked to the Chinese Communist Party or Chinese police are involved in development, and the devices are being shipped into North Korea following unofficial export guidelines.

“While there haven’t been official government orders, there’s talk that exports to sensitive areas like North Korea are being strategically overlooked. People have expressed surprise at how easily these devices enter North Korea without being blocked by the Chinese government,” the source said.

A way to prevent defections into China

Some Chinese observers view the device distribution as more than commercial activity—they see it as an information campaign targeting North Korean citizens.

“The Chinese thinking is that if North Koreans find satisfaction in their lives through Chinese media, they won’t need to risk crossing the river into China. This is a psychological operation designed to build better understanding of China while preventing issues like North Korean defections,” the source explained.

The North Korean government is cracking down on the already widespread MP7 and MP8 devices. However, the Chinese plan to continue developing new devices like the MP9 that can directly influence North Korean lives and attitudes.

“The Chinese have adopted a strategy of quietly introducing devices into North Korea and exposing North Koreans to the culture and messages they contain. They believe this will gradually change North Korean attitudes over time,” the source said.

Read in Korean

Lee Sang-yong

Lee Sang-yong is the head of Daily NK's AND (Archiving North Korea Data) Center and previously spent a number of years working as one of the publication’s foreign correspondents in China. He can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

22. North Korean defectors make K-pop debut

Who is ensuring this news is getting into north Korea?

North Korean defectors make K-pop debut

Posted July. 08, 2025 07:31,

Updated July. 08, 2025 07:31

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250708/5709949/1

As K-pop idols like BTS and BLACKPINK continue to enjoy global fame, a milestone has been reached in the industry. For the first time, North Korean defectors are debuting as K-pop idols.

According to the music industry on Monday, Hakseong (21, real name Kim Hakseong), a member of the six-member boy group B Boyz, which debuted on May 18, is a North Korean defector. B Boyz is the first K-pop group to include a defector in its lineup. Hakseong previously appeared on an audition program last year, where he revealed, “I crossed over from North Korea in 2017 when I was 13.” At a recent debut event, he said, “There was a time when I had no dreams and was going through a dark period, but now I am thrilled to be standing on stage.”

Another boy group, Universe, is set to debut on July 18 and includes two defectors among its five multinational members. Hyuk (25, Yoo Hyuk) and Seok (25, Kim Seok) defected in 2013 and 2019, respectively. The group’s debut album is being produced by Michelle Cho, CEO of Singing Beetle and a former SM Entertainment executive.

Hyuk, originally from Kyongsong in North Hamgyong Province, lived as a kotjebi—a homeless child in North Korea—before defecting. He was introduced to rap through his high school music club and began writing lyrics, nurturing a dream of becoming a musician. After appearing on a broadcast program, he received an offer from his current agency to become a trainee. In a recent interview, Hyuk said, “It’s amazing that someone like me, who once struggled to survive day by day in North Korea, is now making music that can give others courage.”

Seok, who lived in Yanggang Province near the Chinese border before defecting, initially aspired to become a soccer player. After arriving in South Korea, he briefly played in the K3 League. While considering a new career path, he met his current agency. He said he was first exposed to K-pop through smuggled CDs even before his defection.

The stories of Hyuk and Seok, who rebuilt their lives after escaping North Korea, have deeply moved the other members of the Universe. Their journeys have also drawn international attention, including coverage from BBC News. The group’s lineup includes Nathan, a Laotian-Thai American; Kenny, a Chinese American; and Aito, a Japanese member, making it a truly multinational act.

Universe is scheduled to officially debut on July 18 with the release of their album The 1st Verse. According to Singing Beetle, the group had already gained close to one million followers on social media before their debut by showcasing their vocal and dance performances.

23. Convenience store chain CU expands logistics center in Mongolia

It seemed like there was a "Nice to CU" convenience store on almost every corner in Ulaanbaatar when we visited last month.

Convenience store chain CU expands logistics center in Mongolia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · July 8, 2025

SEOUL, July 8 (Yonhap) -- CU, a South Korean convenience store chain operated by BGF Retail Co., said Tuesday it has expanded its logistics center in Mongolia as part of its ongoing business expansion in the East Asian country.

The logistics center, located two hours away from the Mongolian capital Ulaanbaatar, has been enlarged by 3,300 square meters to a total of 8,300 square meters, equipped with a new digital picking system (DPS).

With the expansion, CU Mongolia has secured the logistics capacity to process deliveries for up to 700 stores.

In addition, CU plans to expand its instant food production facility built in Mongolia last year.

CU entered the Mongolian market in 2018 and now leads the local convenience store sector, operating 490 stores across the country.

"CU will continue to establish a professional management system and modern business infrastructure in Mongolia to drive further growth," said Kim Tae-han, head of the overseas business team at BGF Retail.

This photo provided by CU shows its logistics center in Mongolia. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

brk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · July 8, 2025

24. Opportunistic Aggression in the Past and Lessons for Today: The Korean War

Excerpt:

Conclusion

Overall, the U.S. experience in the Korean War illustrates how the threats of opportunistic and coordinated aggression compound the difficulties and costs that U.S. political and military leaders are likely to face in the emerging threat environment. The threat of simultaneous conflicts during the Korean War shaped U.S. political goals, military strategy, resourcing, alliances, and even the adversary’s military strategy. Unlike the Cold War, however, the United States today faces not just one, but two nuclear peer adversaries in China and Russia—partners who describe themselves as in a “friendship without limits”—plus their regional partners North Korea and Iran. Today, U.S. and allied officials should view the unique dangers and costs of opportunistic and coordinated aggression as orders of magnitude beyond those U.S. and allied leaders faced during the Korean War—only then can they begin to appreciate the scale and urgency needed to deter this growing network of threats.

Matthew R. Costlow, Opportunistic Aggression in the Past and Lessons for Today: The Korean War, No. 629, July 7, 2025

Opportunistic Aggression in the Past and Lessons for Today: The Korean War

https://nipp.org/information_series/matthew-r-costlow-opportunistic-aggression-in-the-past-and-lessons-for-today-the-korean-war-no-629-july-7-2025/

Matthew R. Costlow

Matthew R. Costlow is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy and former Special Assistant in the Office of Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense.

Introduction

President Harry Truman led the United States from the conclusion of a globe-spanning conflict, World War II, to the beginning of a limited war under the nuclear shadow, the Korean War.[1] While the Soviet Union’s successful 1949 test of a nuclear device shocked many in the U.S. government, the greater worry was the threat of Soviet opportunistic aggression while the undersized U.S. military was preoccupied on the Korean Peninsula. Although historical parallels are never perfect, U.S. leaders today also face the stark possibility of opportunistic aggression, or even coordinated aggression, under the nuclear shadow and thus will benefit from examining the hard-learned lessons of the past. Historical cases, such as the Korean War, can therefore aid policymakers in gauging the kinds of political and military decisions leaders may face, as well as the military capabilities that may be most relevant.

This Information Series addresses four critical elements of the threat of opportunistic aggression in the nuclear age, and specifically in the Korean War: first, whether political and military leaders were aware before the crisis or conflict of the potential for opportunistic aggression; second, the political and military actions or restraints used during the crisis or conflict to deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere; third, the adequacy of conventional and nuclear forces, and the tradeoffs between them; and fourth, the role of allies in the formation of political objectives throughout the crisis or conflict. While each of these elements are to some extent interdependent, nevertheless, these categories are helpful in highlighting some of the major decisions facing political and military leaders that are engaged in one crisis or conflict while simultaneously seeking to deter further aggression elsewhere.

Threat Perceptions of Opportunistic Aggression

In the years leading up to the Korean War, U.S. political and military leaders generally agreed that the Soviet Union was expansionist by nature and opportunistic, but still hindered by its massive losses from World War II. The 1948 Soviet-backed coup d’état in Czechoslovakia and Berlin Blockade helped convince U.S. and European allied officials of the need to form an alliance that ultimately resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The Soviet Union, also in 1949, successfully tested its first atomic device and ended the U.S. monopoly on that technology. In short, U.S. officials were highly attuned to potential Soviet aggression well before the Korean War, but their focus was predominantly on Europe.

As Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army 1950-1953, explained concerning U.S. views of the Soviet Union at the time, “We believed at that time [immediately post-World War II] that there was a very reasonable chance that this fellow was going to lick his wounds and get all the pieces back together again. The last thing that any of us could imagine was engaging in some kind of war with Russia as early as 1950.”[2] In keeping with that general assessment, before the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were united in their desire to withdraw the “constabulary” force of approximately 50,000 U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula as quickly as possible without provoking Soviet aggression or appearing to abandon a partner.[3] President Truman had made it a top priority post-World War II to shrink the U.S. military budget to better enjoy the peace dividend while the Soviet Union was regrouping.

In Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s January 12, 1950, speech before the National Press Club, he infamously did not include Korea in his description of a “defensive perimeter” that ran from the Aleutian Islands of Alaska, through the Ryukyu Islands of Japan, and down to the Philippines.[4] While Kim-il Sung had expressed his desire to invade South Korea before this speech, it may have affected the timing of the invasion—and in any case was a prominent example of the secondary strategic importance the Truman Administration afforded the Korean Peninsula.[5] It is, therefore, unsurprising that both Gen. MacArthur and Gen. Ridgway understood when they were Commander in Chief of Far East Command that, even in the midst of the Korean War, their first priority mission was to defend Japan from a potential Soviet invasion, with the secondary concern being the achievement of a successful outcome of war in Korea.[6]

When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, with what U.S. and allied leaders assumed was Soviet backing, threat perceptions concerning the Soviet Union began to change rapidly, and concern for the prospect of opportunistic aggression grew.[7] Gen. Hamilton A. Twitchell, Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) HQ, remembered the feeling that since the Soviets had shown themselves to be aggressive in Korea, then they could certainly be aggressive against Europe.[8]

Indeed, U.S. leaders often cast U.S. intervention in the Korean War as an act of deterring opportunistic aggression itself. President Harry Truman laid out his logic for intervention in terms of deterrence, stating:

I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.[9]

His Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, thought similarly: “To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States. By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance.”[10] General Eisenhower, then-President of Columbia University, stated plainly that “We’ll have a dozen Koreas soon if we don’t take a firm stand.”[11]

Political and military threat perceptions thus changed dramatically in the space of only a few months from relatively little concern over Soviet aggression abroad in the near future to an overriding concern over direct Soviet aggression in one area and Soviet-supported aggression in other areas simultaneously. The United States and its allies were ill-equipped militarily to adapt to these rapid changes in the type and scope of the threats. This unpreparedness extracted a significant cost during the Korean War, as is evident in the next section, because U.S. leaders felt compelled to impose restraints on their military operations to avoid a further expansion of war they could not afford, politically or militarily.

Political and Military Actions to Avoid Opportunistic Aggression

The reasons why U.S. political leaders issued specific deterrence signals or imposed restraints on the military varied depending on the course of the conflict and the perceived danger of war expanding beyond the Korean Peninsula. President Truman, for instance, wrote in his diary on June 30, shortly after the beginning of the conflict, about his decision to intervene: “Must be careful not to cause a general Asiatic war.”[12] Truman’s concern was not hyperbolic given that only months earlier in February 1950, the Soviet Union and the newly formed People’s Republic of China had signed a mutual defense treaty.[13] Thus, at the beginning stages of the war, there was an acute awareness of the need to keep China, and thus potentially the Soviet Union, out of the Korean War as active participants, lest it draw in Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan or the nascent Japanese government in defense of the Northern Territories, below the Soviet-claimed Kuril Islands.

The Truman Administration, and later the Eisenhower Administration, sought to confine the Korean War to the Peninsula, a policy that involved a mixture of demonstrations of resolve and restraint. For instance, shortly after the initial North Korean attack against South Korea, the United States sought to demonstrate its resolve, and secondarily to deter opportunistic aggression, by deploying B-29 bombers to Europe and the Pacific that could, at least theoretically with the addition of specialized equipment, reduce the time needed to respond to a Soviet attack if Moscow intervened directly in Korea.[14] Later, in 1951, President Truman publicly addressed Soviet and Chinese leaders and warned them that disregarding the tacit agreement that kept U.S. bombers out of China in exchange for Chinese and Soviet planes staying out of Korean airspace would “escalate” the conflict to their detriment.[15] Beyond these specific demonstrations of force, the Truman Administration generally sought to convey the message that U.S. forces fighting in Korea were a tangible and costly signal of American resolve.[16]

While the Truman Administration’s demonstrations of resolve were noteworthy deterrence signals, it is what the Truman Administration chose not to do that featured more prominently in its strategy to avoid Soviet opportunistic or coordinated aggression with the PRC. Perhaps the most prominent tacit restraint that kept the conflict confined to the Korean Peninsula was the U.S., PRC, and Soviet practice of keeping fighters and bombers out of each others’ airspace. That is, while the United States had complete air superiority over the Korean Peninsula, its pilots were under strict orders not to attack or bomb Chinese mainland targets—a practice that China reciprocated as Mao Zedong did not seek to escalate the conflict more than he already had.[17] This unspoken agreement also benefitted the United States by keeping the Japanese homeland free from Chinese or Soviet attacks—an important consideration as the United States was still occupying Japan itself.[18] As noted, however, the U.S. military was unable to prosecute the war as effectively as it wanted to, such as by striking Chinese bases used to deploy troops into Korea, for fear that it could incentivize Chinese or Soviet formal entry into the war.

During the summer of 1950, the Truman Administration faced two competing priorities that demanded greater levels of U.S. military capabilities: reinforcing allies in Europe as part of the newly-formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, on the other hand, winning the Korean War. President Truman was unwilling to initiate a full-scale mobilization of the United States to meet these simultaneous demands and thus chose to prioritize the European allies, while committing to keeping a steady level of forces in Korea to fight for the best possible outcome.[19] Indeed, the only major increase in U.S. forces in Korea came in response to Gen. MacArthur’s warning in 1950 that a protracted war in Korea would incentivize the Soviet Union to act aggressively elsewhere while the United States was preoccupied.[20]

Put simply, the Truman Administration had to choose between two opposing strategies that sought the same goal: deterring opportunistic or coordinated aggression while achieving its goals in Korea. The first strategy was to significantly increase forces in Korea to seek a short sharp victory, but at the potential cost of minimizing reinforcements to Europe, risking allied dissent, and potentially provoking Soviet opportunistic aggression in Europe. The second strategy was to prioritize reinforcing allies in Europe, but at the potential cost of risking a defeat or stalemate in Korea and the subsequent damage in the eyes of allies and adversaries about U.S. capability and will. President Truman chose the latter—electing to pursue only a limited conflict in Korea with all the political and military restraints that entailed, even if it meant military disadvantages for U.S. forces.

Adequacy of Conventional and Nuclear Forces

One of the key reasons that the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations perceived opportunistic or coordinated aggression as significant threats was the inadequacy of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces to meet the suddenly increasing deterrence and assurance requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Omar Bradley, for instance, warned President Truman that the United States could not commit the necessary military forces to Korea without either mobilization within the United States or failing to meet commitments in other parts of the world.[21] As described earlier, the constabulary force of U.S. soldiers in Korea was ill-equipped for even a limited war while reserves from the United States were inadequately trained and too few in number to have a significant effect on a relevant timescale.

Additionally, there was the matter of U.S. defense priorities. Given the recent formation of NATO and President Truman’s decision to prioritize reinforcing Europe against what was perceived as a newly urgent threat of a Soviet attack, all the new forces that were being drafted and trained in the United States were primarily being sent to Europe. If the United States had sent those new forces to Korea, U.S. military leaders, with the exception of Gen. MacArthur, generally saw “no prospect” of shifting the required divisions in the proper time frame to Europe if the Soviets had invaded.[22] Indeed, the Korean War so altered U.S. and allied threat perceptions that in November 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan to essentially triple the number of personnel and authorized air wings in the U.S. Air Force within less than four years—an incredible influx of resources over time.[23] Even with a series of massive investments across the military, however, the second Supreme Commander of Allied Powers for the Korean War, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, who was later the Secretary of the Army beginning in 1953, believed that in 1952-1953, the military forces available to NATO were “wholly inadequate to meet a sudden, full-scale attack by the Soviets…”[24] Indeed, the calls from U.S. forces in Europe, and Berlin especially, were exceptionally dire. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, then U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB) and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote to the Truman Administration that defense of Berlin “… is now militarily untenable.”[25]

This concern about inadequate forces led to a number of operational restraints and friction within the military. For instance, Gen. Ridgway recounts how Gen. MacArthur had repeatedly requested permission to attack targets in the PRC, across the Yalu River, to improve the U.S. military position, but the Truman Administration opposed this action because it could start “World War III” by incentivizing the Soviets to enter the conflict against ill-prepared U.S. forces. Indeed, then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Vandenberg, also opposed such operations because they would “so weaken us [through attrition and losses] that we will not be able to respond or build up for two years thereafter in case something breaks out in Europe.”[26]

The Truman Administration also sought to signal U.S. resolve and enhance assurance via the movement of nuclear-capable bombers, and even atomic weapons, overseas—actions not without numerous operational difficulties.[27] As Strategic Air Commander (SAC) Commander, Gen. Curtis LeMay during that time was concerned that the bombers needed for missions in the unforeseen Korean War would be unavailable for their original intended mission: deterrence and defeat of the Soviet Union.[28] At that time, the U.S. nuclear arsenal was still not large by any means and U.S. nuclear war plans had practically no hedge to accommodate unforeseen requirements on a finite number of bombers.[29]

The Impact of Allied Perceptions on U.S. Leadership

The risk of opportunistic or coordinated aggression weighed heavily on the minds of allied leaders as the United States committed troops to Korea and tried to stand up NATO simultaneously. Dean Acheson, and the State Department more broadly, feared that Soviet aggression in a distant theater away from the Korean War “would call for the use of more military power than we could then deploy”—a doubly dangerous condition in that it offered a temptation to the Soviets and a quandary for the United States.[30] As U.N. forces successfully drove North Korean forces back toward the 38th Parallel, the British protested vehemently both Gen. MacArthur’s rhetoric about expanding the Korean War to the Chinese mainland and the possibility of advances past the 38th Parallel as both risking general war with the Soviet Union.[31 Thus, in December 1950, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee arrived for a meeting with President Truman to discuss the Korean War generally, but more specifically and privately, to urge President Truman to curtail U.S. involvement in Korea in favor of focusing on the defense of Europe—a major switch of British policy that, up until China’s overt intervention, was staunchly behind U.S. efforts in the Korean War.[32]

These and other allied private protestations led the Truman Administration to prioritize reinforcing Europe militarily while the Eisenhower Administration focused on ending the war quickly, but acceptably, to accomplish the same goal. Both administrations sought to walk the policy tightrope of assuring allies the United States was a reliable security guarantor and was willing to expend blood and treasure in cooperation with them, as evidenced in Korea, but would not commit too much blood and treasure elsewhere such that it risked deterrence failure in their immediate vicinity.

Lessons and Conclusions

As is evident from this case study, the threat of opportunistic or coordinated aggression increases the risks and potential costs of every plausible U.S. course of action. A limited war in Korea, a scenario that the United States was unprepared for, proved difficult in and of itself, but when combined with the real possibility of Chinese direct and formal entry into the Korean War and/or Soviet aggression in Europe, the threats and costs to the United States and its allies became magnified. What summary lessons can U.S. policymakers draw from the Korean War that may be relevant to the emerging two nuclear peer threat environment? Three stand out as especially relevant.

Victory in a limited conflict may be ideal for deterring opportunistic or coordinated aggression, but the cost of victory may be deterrence failure in a second theater.

As Gen. MacArthur stated repeatedly, a quick victory in Korea would be a potent demonstration of U.S. power, potentially deter future aggression, and would allow troops to be redeployed more quickly to other higher priority areas. Yet, as Gen. Ridgway, Gen. MacArthur’s successor, noted in his history of the Korean War, “It is clear that the nation’s top civilian and military leaders… [believed that] the kind of ‘victory’ sought by the Theater Commander, even if it were attained in Korea, would have incurred overbalancing elsewhere.”[33] Victory in the Korean War might have been Pyrrhic if it led to Soviet aggression against a nascent NATO.

How can U.S. policymakers apply this lesson in today’s context? First, they can recognize the importance of forces in being, i.e., those military forces immediately available for unexpected contingencies, and what can realistically be expected of them given other U.S. commitments around the world, potentially with higher priorities. While a decisive victory in one theater may indeed improve the prospects of deterring opportunistic or coordinated aggression in other theaters, the pursuit of victory may also cause the United States to spread its forces too thin and ultimately result in the worst case scenario: failure in all theaters. This is not to say that U.S. policymakers must always eschew lesser priority theaters in the face of threats of opportunistic or coordinated aggression, only that they must understand the nature of the conflict and its purpose, à la Clausewitz.[34] In short, there may be acceptable outcomes short of total victory in a limited war, such as denying the adversary victory, or achieving strategic advantage, that better hedge against the possibility of opportunistic or coordinated aggression in other theaters.

Threat perceptions and military requirements are likely to change far more quickly than nuclear or conventional forces can adapt—potentially leading to accepting riskier strategies.

As noted already, the Truman Administration felt compelled to fight a limited war in Korea because the military simply could not provide enough resources in the relevant time frame necessary to both reinforce NATO and achieve total victory in Korea. Indeed, even after almost three years and nearly a tripling of the U.S. defense budget, President Eisenhower rejected calls to increase the resources devoted to the Korean War to compel a quicker satisfactory conclusion to the conflict; he saw too much risk that such an increase would disrupt the NATO military buildup and anger essential allies in Europe.[35] This dynamic points to the importance of available military forces at the time of conflict, and even more so, the importance of military forces already in theater. If time is of the essence, as it almost certainly will be facing the threat of opportunistic or coordinated aggression, then forces in theater will have an outsized role in determining what political goals the United States can realistically pursue and on what timeframe.

Another important aspect of forces in being is the flexibility of the U.S. nuclear force. Even granting that the U.S. nuclear force was still in its relative infancy during the time of the Korean War and far smaller than it is today, U.S. policymakers can still draw critical lessons from the difficulties that U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) encountered. For example, Gen. LeMay, SAC Commander, wrote in 1949, just before the outbreak of the Korean War, “The size of our [nuclear] striking force is so closely tailored to fit the task with which it is charged that we have little or no margin of safety within which we can absorb the effects of a successful enemy attack. Under these circumstances, it would appear economical and logical to adopt the objective of completely avoiding enemy attack against our strategic force by destroying his atomic force before it can attack ours.”[36] In other words, Gen. LeMay recommended a strategy of preemption because the fragility and inflexibility of his forces meant he could not achieve the political objectives assigned to him in case of an attack on the United States—there simply was not enough of a hedge within the existing force.

What might this insight mean for U.S. policymakers today? In the face of opportunistic or coordinated aggression, especially after an attack on U.S. forces, the United States may be forced to prioritize, adopt riskier strategies, or both, to achieve the same political objectives. That is, if U.S. policymakers believe prioritizing some theaters or allies over others, or adopting riskier strategies like nuclear first use, are unacceptable, then they should invest in procuring sufficiently flexible nuclear and conventional forces that can withstand attacks and still achieve set political objectives. This is, of course, the costlier option financially and politically; but that fact must be weighed against the absence of these investments and the resulting likelihood of deterrence failure, plus those financial costs and the potential domestic and international political costs.

Adversaries are likely to adapt their strategies if they believe that the United States is ill-equipped or unwilling politically to counter opportunistic or coordinated aggression.

If adversaries perceive the United States as either unwilling or unable to engage in one conflict while deterring others, then they may have added incentive to pursue more aggressive strategies at the expense of the United States and its allies or pursue strategies that the United States is less able to counter. An example from the Korean War is how Nie Rongzhen, PLA acting Chief of Staff, stated that the United States was likely unwilling to employ nuclear weapons against China in North Korea because it was “deterred by possible Soviet nuclear retaliation from doing this in the Far East.”[37] This widely held belief among Chinese leaders allowed the PRC to adopt its strategy of concentrating troops to overwhelm better-equipped though outnumbered U.S. units. Similarly, the PRC’s Central Military Commission recommended a strategy of “protracted war” that it believed would favor China over time given the long logistics lines and domestic political pressure in the United States.[38] Chinese leaders recognized and centered their strategy around exploiting perceived U.S. vulnerabilities, part of which included the U.S. fear of Soviet opportunistic aggression elsewhere in the world.

Thus, adversaries will likely adopt strategies aimed at perceived U.S. vulnerabilities—and if one of those perceived vulnerabilities is being susceptible to simultaneous conflict, then the risk of that kind of conflict may grow. And, when combined with the second lesson listed above on the inherent limitations of quickly adapting U.S. military forces, U.S. political leaders may be forced to use inadequate forces to counter an adversary’s military strategy that is tailored to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. This dynamic will likely create pressure to either abandon certain political commitments or adopt a strategy of nuclear escalation, two inherently dangerous options against nuclear-armed adversaries.

Conclusion

Overall, the U.S. experience in the Korean War illustrates how the threats of opportunistic and coordinated aggression compound the difficulties and costs that U.S. political and military leaders are likely to face in the emerging threat environment. The threat of simultaneous conflicts during the Korean War shaped U.S. political goals, military strategy, resourcing, alliances, and even the adversary’s military strategy. Unlike the Cold War, however, the United States today faces not just one, but two nuclear peer adversaries in China and Russia—partners who describe themselves as in a “friendship without limits”—plus their regional partners North Korea and Iran. Today, U.S. and allied officials should view the unique dangers and costs of opportunistic and coordinated aggression as orders of magnitude beyond those U.S. and allied leaders faced during the Korean War—only then can they begin to appreciate the scale and urgency needed to deter this growing network of threats.

[1] This Information Series is an edited version of Chapter 3 in Matthew R. Costlow, Deterring the New Pacing Threats: Opportunistic and Coordinated Aggression (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, March 2025), Occasional Paper, Vol. 5, No. 3, available at https://nipp.org/papers/matthew-r-costlow-deterring-the-new-pacing-threats-opportunistic-and-coordinated-aggression/.

[2] Alfred Goldberg and Harry B. Yoshpe, Interview with Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: OSD Historical Office, May 13, 1974), p. 12, available at https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_PaceFrank5-13-1974.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-135107-660.

[3] James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III: 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part I (Washington, D.C., Office of Joint History, 1998), pp. 7-8.

[4] Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 551 (January 23, 1950), p. 116, available at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32437010893382&seq=122.

[5] Kim had been pressing Stalin for his blessing to invade South Korea well before 1950. See, for example, Sergey Radchenko, To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2024), pp. 134-136.

[6] Maurice Matloff, Oral History Interview with General M. B. Ridgway (Washington, D.C.: OSD Historical Office, April 18, 1984), pp. 6, 7, 14, available at https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_RidgwayMatthew4-18-1984.pdf?ver=2014-09-19-081000-687. See also, Ridgway, The Korean War, op. cit., pp. 164-165.

[7] On Soviet views of North Korea’s invasion plans, see, Radchenko, To Run the World, op. cit., pp. 134-138.

[8] Maurice Matloff, Alfred Goldberg, and Robert Watson, Oral History Interview with General Hamilton A. Twitchell (Washington, D.C.: OSD Historical Office, July 5, 1984), pp. 26-27, available at https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_TwitchellHamilton7-5-1984.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-140052-920.

[9] Harry S. Truman, as quoted in, Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III: 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part I, op. cit., p. 32.

[10] Dean Acheson, as quoted in, Ibid., p. 33.

[11] As quoted in, David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 781.

[12] McCullough, Truman, op. cit., p. 783.

[13] Radchenko, To Run the World, op. cit., p. 134.

[14] Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), pp. 55-60.

[15] Ibid., p. 75.

[16] See, for instance, Harry S. Truman, as quoted in, Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III: 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part I, op. cit., p. 32.

[17] Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1967), p. 146.

[18] Ridgway, as quoted in, Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 651.

[19] Maurice Matloff, Oral History Interview with General M. B. Ridgway, Part II (Washington, D.C.: OSD Historical Office, April 19, 1984), pp. 19-20, available at https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_RidgwayMatthew4-19-1984.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-135246-783.

[20] Ridgway, The Korean War, op. cit., p. 36.

[21] Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III: 1950-1951, The Korean War, Part I, op. cit., p. 39.

[22] Matloff, Oral History Interview with General M. B. Ridgway, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[23] Trevor Albertson, Winning Armageddon: Curtis LeMay and Strategic Air Command, 1948-1957 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019), p. 47.

[24] Matloff, Oral History Interview with General M. B. Ridgway, op. cit., p. 24.

[25] Ingo Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2019), p. 45.

[26] Matloff, Oral History Interview with General M. B. Ridgway, op. cit., p. 15.; See also Ridgway, The Korean War, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

[27] Doris E. Condit, Interview of Robert A. Lovett (Washington, D.C.: OSD Historical Office, June 7, 1976), pp. 26-27, available at https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_LovettRobert6-7-1976.pdf?ver=2014-09-19-080949-827.

[28] Albertson, Winning Armageddon, op. cit., pp. 28-42.

[29] Ibid., pp. 28-34.

[30] Acheson, Present at the Creation, op. cit., p. 421.

[31] Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” op. cit., p. 70.

[32] Acheson, Present at the Creation, op. cit., p. 481.

[33] Ridgway, The Korean War, op. cit., p. 149.

[34] “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Carl von Clausewitz, author, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., On War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 100.

[35] On the defense budget, see, Doris M. Condit, The Test of War: 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1988), p. 500. On Eisenhower’s views, see Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” op. cit., p. 85.

[36] As quoted in, Albertson, Winning Armageddon, op. cit., p. 14.

[37] Nie Rongzhen, as quoted in, Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 234.

[38] Ibid., pp. 76-77.

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife and Smith Richardson Foundations for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy, or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750, Fairfax, VA 22031, (703) 293- 9181, www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.

25. Lee vows to foster defense industry as new growth driver

Arsenal of democracies.

Lee vows to foster defense industry as new growth driver | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 8, 2025

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, July 8 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Tuesday the government will step up support for the defense industry to foster it as a new engine for economic development and elevate South Korea as a global defense powerhouse.

Lee outlined key initiatives to enhance the competitiveness of the arms industry in line with the changing security dynamics during a debate session held to mark the inaugural K-Defense Day.

"On battlefields that are evolving at the speed of light, we must develop and advance competitive weapons systems, such as those involving artificial intelligence and unmanned robots," Lee said.

He also acknowledged the current dominance of a few large conglomerates in the defense sector and pledged to help build a more inclusive ecosystem that enables companies of all sizes to participate.

Noting that defense exports are typically carried out through government-to-government deals, Lee emphasized the importance of strengthening security partnerships to support South Korean contractors in the global defense market.

"The government will do its utmost efforts to strengthen security partnerships so that the individuals and companies engaged in the defense industry have more opportunities," he said.

President Lee Jae Myung (R) presides over a debate session with defense industry officials in Seoul on July 8, 2025, held to commemorate the inaugural K-Defense Day. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 8, 2025

26. Analysis: Why the Ministry of Unification must lead Korea's grand strategy

Voices July 7, 2025 / 4:59 PM

Analysis: Why the Ministry of Unification must lead Korea's grand strategy

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/07/07/korea-analysis-ministry-of-unification-must-lead-korea-grand-strategy-2025/2891751913674/

By David Maxwell

Visitors look at ribbons expressing hopes for Korean Unification on Lunar New Year near the DMZ at Imjingak Park in Paju, South Korea, in February 2021. Recently, amid political shifts and public fatigue over North Korea's provocations, some have suggested rebranding or even abolishing the Ministry of Unification. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo

July 7 (UPI) -- Introduction: A ministry adrift

In recent years, public debate over the future of South Korea's Ministry of Unification (MoU) has intensified. Amidst political shifts and public fatigue over North Korea's provocations, some have suggested rebranding or even abolishing the Ministry. Proposals include renaming it to something like the "Ministry of Inter-Korean Cooperation," reflecting a perceived shift away from long-term unification toward short-term inter-Korean management. But this would be a profound mistake. The Ministry's name is not the problem; its diluted mission is. Instead of changing its name, South Korea should sharpen the Ministry's purpose: strip away functions unrelated to unification and refocus it solely on policy development, long-range strategy, operational planning, and interagency coordination for national unification.

The founding purpose: A ministry for a nation yet whole

The Ministry of Unification was established with a singular strategic purpose: to serve as the Republic of Korea's principal organ for preparing and managing the eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula. In a divided nation, this is not just a bureaucratic necessity, it is a national imperative. The MoU was never intended to be a development agency, a North Korea apologist, an intelligence collector or analytic agency, or a diplomatic arm. It was, and must remain, the Republic's unification general staff, planning and coordinating the long-term vision of a free, unified, and democratic Korea.

Mission creep and the loss of strategic focus

Over time, the Ministry has accumulated responsibilities far outside its core mission:

North Korea human rights assessments and humanitarian aid logistics
Inter-Korean economic and social exchange programs
Quasi-diplomatic engagement and negotiations

While these may seem benign or even necessary, they have distracted the MoU from its essential role: to act as the primary architect of Korea's future. Worse, by engaging in negotiations, aid distribution, and intelligence-adjacent functions, the MoU has stepped into lanes that rightly belong to other ministries, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). These overlaps create confusion, dilute accountability, and, more dangerously, signal strategic incoherence to both domestic and foreign audiences.

Unification planning: The forgotten grand strategy

South Korea urgently needs a whole-of-government, whole-of-society plan for unification. This is not a romantic idea, it is a strategic necessity. The 2024 release of the 8.15 Unification Doctrine was a step in the right direction. It outlined the vision of a free, democratic, and prosperous unified Korea, undergirded by principles of universal human rights and market democracy. But vision alone is insufficient. What is missing is a comprehensive, detailed strategy (and supporting operational plans) that anticipates the complexity of integration: legal harmonization, administrative transition, security stabilization, deliberate and careful military demobilization, economic shock management, infrastructure modernization (to include leap ahead technologically smart cities in the north), and transitional justice.

The MoU is the only agency with the legitimacy and mandate to lead this effort. But it cannot do so if it remains overburdened with peripheral duties. Its role must become singular and strategic: planning for unification in peacetime, managing unification in transition, and stewarding unification in post-conflict integration.

Proposed reforms: Retain the name, redefine the mandate

Rather than rebrand or abolish the MoU, the South Korean government should take the following steps:

1. Preserve the name "Ministry of Unification"

The name itself is a declaration of national intent. Changing it would be interpreted, both domestically and abroad, as a retreat from the long-standing goal and constitutional requirement of peaceful unification. It would lend credence to narratives, particularly from Pyongyang and Beijing, that South Korea is abandoning its constitutional and moral responsibility to unify the peninsula.

2. Narrow the mission to strategic planning and policy development

The Ministry should focus exclusively on unification policy and strategy. This includes:

Strategic scenario development
Civil-military transition planning
Economic integration
Infrastructure development planning
Legal, constitutional, political integration frameworks
Unification cost modeling
Institutional adaptation across the ROK government
Support to information activities to educate the Korean people in the north and South on the unification vision and strategy

3. Divest diplomatic and intelligence-related roles

Negotiation with North Korea should be led by MOFA. The MoU can support through technical policy input, but diplomacy must be unified under one channel.

Threat assessments and information gathering must be the purview of the NIS and ROK military intelligence agencies. The MoU should not duplicate intelligence efforts.

4. Establish a permanent unification strategy cell

This cross-agency planning body, housed within the MoU, should coordinate with the Ministry of National Defense, MOFA, Ministry of Justice, and civil society to ensure interagency continuity in unification planning.

Why this matters: Unification is a national security imperative

As argued in a June 2025 Korea JoongAng Daily column, "Is unification becoming a taboo word in Korea?", the declining public interest in unification, especially among younger South Koreans, is deeply concerning. This apathy is, in part, the result of the government's failure, until only recently in 2024, to articulate a realistic, values-based path to unification. It is also the byproduct of bureaucratic muddling and politicization of the unification discourse.

A reformed and refocused MoU can reverse this trend. By elevating unification as a strategic objective, rooted in freedom, human rights, and Korean identity, the Ministry can revive national consensus, prepare for contingencies, and deter adversaries who would exploit Korean division.

Conclusion: Lead or leave the battlefield of ideas

South Korea does not need a new name for its Ministry of Unification. It needs strategic clarity and institutional discipline. The Ministry must become what it was meant to be: the brain trust and planning staff for the Republic of Korea's historic mission to achieve peaceful unification under liberal democratic principles. Anything less is an abdication of responsibility, not just to South Korea, but to all Korean people, North and South, who yearn for a free and unified future.

The name should remain. The mission must be sharpened. Unification is not a taboo, it is a strategy, and it must be a grand strategy for Korea. Let the Ministry develop and lead it and help the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ establish a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK) and realize the Korean Dream.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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