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Quotes of the Day:
"Reality cannot be ignored, except at a price; and the longer the ignorance is persisted in, the higher and more terrible becomes the price that must be paid."
– Aldous Huxley
He who is intelligent does not seek to impress, but to understand."
– Marcus Aurelius
“At least once every human should have to run for his life, to teach him that milk does not come from supermarkets, that safety does not come from policemen, that “news” is not something that happens to other people. He might learn how his ancestors lived and that he himself is no different – in the crunch his life depends on his agility, alertness, and personal resourcefulness”
– Robert A. Heinlein
1. Putin’s Strategy of Paying Lip Service to Peace Falters as Trump Loses Patience
2. Trump Calls Out the Putin Charade
3. Trump should recommit to Ukraine’s cause
4. U.S. Ports Appeal for Delay to Tariffs on Chinese Cranes
5. The Forgotten American: Can There Be Life After 12 Years in a Chinese Prison?
6. Army aims to quadruple Patriot missile procurement
7. Mysterious Guided Rocket Launcher Disguised In A Shipping Container At Fort Bragg Identified
8. A look at the wish lists for CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM and STRATCOM
9. House committee's NDAA authorizes more money for Ukraine, thwarts troop reductions in Europe
10. What Trump’s order on ‘unleashing American drone dominance’ means for the U.S. military
11. China imposes export ban on companies tied to Taiwan’s military
12. Army will look for false accusations, consider 'credibility' in misconduct cases
13. The Army has realized that horses are no longer good for 'warfighting’
14. For Iranian Regime, War for Survival is Against Citizens at Home
15. Stacey Abrams touts 10 steps to autocracy, says 'do not let the propaganda win'
16. Fired State Dept bureaucrats reportedly using their regime change skills to sabotage Trump
17. USAID review raised ‘critical concerns’ over Gaza aid group days before $30 million US grant
18. New USDA Program Ties Food Security to National Defense
19. Marco Rubio 'impersonator' used AI to mimic top Trump aide's voice
20. What Pete Hegseth Doesn’t Understand About Soldiers
21. No, The Chinese Will Not Invade Taiwan
22. US Army’s HIMARS to Go Hypersonic
23. US Army Cadet Command announces Senior ROTC rebalance and optimization
24. Beijing’s Push for a Sino-Centric Asia is Cracking Southeast Asia’s Hedging Game
25. American Gun Violence Goes Global – How Its Spread Is Distorting and Diminishing U.S. Soft Power
26. The Real AI Race – America Needs More Than Innovation to Compete With China
1. Putin’s Strategy of Paying Lip Service to Peace Falters as Trump Loses Patience
Recognize Putin's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack it with a superior political warfare strategy.
Putin’s Strategy of Paying Lip Service to Peace Falters as Trump Loses Patience
The president’s remarks during a cabinet meeting are the latest sign of his growing displeasure with the Russian leader
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/trump-putin-russia-ukraine-war-peace-416f4b86
By Matthew Luxmoore
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Updated July 9, 2025 4:05 am ET
President Trump in recent weeks has voiced deepening dissatisfaction with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Photo: marcos brindicci/Reuters
Key Points
What's This?
- Russia attempted to sway President Trump’s support using flattery and promises of economic cooperation, in a drive to divide Western backing for Ukraine.
- Trump, displeased with ongoing Russian attacks, plans to resume arms shipments to Ukraine, signaling a shift in stance.
- Despite setbacks, Russia remains committed to its goals in Ukraine, potentially preparing for a prolonged conflict.
KYIV, Ukraine—For months, Russia has courted President Trump, deploying flattery, promises of economic cooperation and protestations of its desire for peace in an effort to splinter Western support for Ukraine—all while intensifying its assault on its smaller neighbor.
The approach appears to be faltering. Trump, critical of continued Russian airstrikes, says he plans to resume arms shipments to Kyiv. He is considering sending an additional Patriot air-defense system to Ukraine, The Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is confronted with a stark choice: Should he press his advantage on the battlefield and risk a bigger U.S. response or retreat from his maximalist positions?
On Tuesday, Trump gave one of his clearest indications yet that his relationship with Putin was deteriorating. “We get a lot of bulls— thrown at us by Putin,” he said during a cabinet meeting, adding that the Russian leader was “nice” but a lot of what he said turned out to be meaningless.
In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to seize more territory in Ukraine’s east and intensified its aerial assaults on Ukrainian cities. Ukraine’s air force said it downed a record 718 drones and rockets overnight into Wednesday. The aim is to undermine morale among Ukrainians while stretching the country’s outnumbered forces thin along the front lines.
Trump, who has pledged to end the war and pushed Kyiv and Moscow to start peace negotiations, has reacted with growing displeasure. He said Monday that the U.S. would supply arms to help Ukraine withstand the Russian attacks.
“We have to, they have to be able to defend themselves,” he said.
On Tuesday, the Kremlin signaled a desire to keep the door open with Washington, saying that it was clarifying what weapons the U.S. was providing to Ukraine and stressing that it appreciated Trump’s efforts to broker peace.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov sought to distinguish between the U.S. and Europe. “It is obvious that the Europeans are also actively participating in pumping Ukraine with weapons,” he said. “These actions are most likely not in line with attempts to promote a peaceful settlement.”
But there were also calls in Moscow to forget about Washington and double down on the war effort.
Ukrainian crews responded to one site of a combined Russian drone and missile attack on Kyiv on June 17. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s hawkish former president and now deputy head of its National Security Council, pointed to a position held by Putin since before Trump’s inauguration: That without a peace agreement giving Moscow what it wants, Russia will continue fighting.
“The hawks in Putin’s entourage are trying to press their point: You can’t rely on Americans,” said Abbas Gallyamov, a former Kremlin speechwriter who is now a Kremlin critic living abroad. “Even if they are pretending to be a certain way, they will ultimately deceive you.”
Russia has so far stuck to a hard line in negotiations, saying that any resolution to the war must address its “root causes,” referring to Moscow’s desire to demilitarize Ukraine and reassert its dominance over its politics.
Putin initially saw Trump as someone he could work with on achieving those goals through diplomacy, analysts say. Even before the U.S. president was re-elected in November, Putin launched a charm offensive. He echoed Trump’s false statements about the 2020 election and praised his response to the attempt on his life last July.
Such efforts, paired with Trump’s willingness to engage with Moscow, appeared to pay dividends initially. The U.S. held its first high-level talks with Russia in Saudi Arabia in February, and Moscow sent officials to Washington to tout potential cooperation between the two countries in energy, critical minerals and space exploration.
When Putin gifted Trump a portrait of the U.S. president in March, Trump administration special envoy Steve Witkoff said Trump was “clearly touched by it.”
Meanwhile, however, Putin’s position on Ukraine didn’t budge. Peace talks have made little progress, and a succession of phone calls between Putin and Trump didn’t yield any breakthroughs.
In recent weeks, Trump’s tone on Russia has shifted. When Putin offered to assist with mediation over the conflict between Israel and Iran, Trump brushed the offer aside: “I said, ‘Do me a favor, mediate your own. Let’s mediate Russia first, OK?’”
A call last week between the two leaders appeared to strengthen Trump’s conviction that Putin had no intention of ending the war. According to the Kremlin, Putin told Trump that Moscow was committed to its goals in Ukraine and it preferred to achieve them through diplomacy. But as long as that wasn’t possible, Russia would continue the war.
Trump later expressed his disappointment. “I don’t think he’s there,” he said of Putin. “I’m just saying, I don’t think he’s looking to stop, and that’s too bad.”
While Trump’s tone on Putin has shifted substantially in recent days, he hasn’t signaled how far he is willing to go in backing Ukraine. On Tuesday, he wouldn’t say how he intended to respond to Putin. “I wouldn’t be telling you,” he said to the press.
Despite the apparent setbacks with the U.S., Russia isn’t giving up on its aims. Far from it, Moscow is likely now settling in for a long war, analysts say.
Putin, who has a quarter-century of experience dealing with American presidents, knows that Trump has a tendency to change his views, said Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Today, Trump might be praising Ukraine’s resolve and pledging more aid to the embattled nation, but soon, he could once again endorse Putin’s narrative.
“Trump is now inclined toward Ukraine, but what will be in two weeks time, no one knows,” she said. “Russia hasn’t changed its position since the very beginning of the war. So why would it change now?”
Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com
2. Trump Calls Out the Putin Charade
Are the "restrainers" at the Pentagon a thing?
It seems to me there was a process foul at the Pentagon. To make a decision of this magnitude (to hold up shipments to Ukraine) it should have been coordinated with the White House. Neither the White House nor the Pentagon should have been blindsided by the actions of either. Do (or did) the "restrainers" think they can act with impunity or where they executing mission type orders and operating on what they interpreted to be the CINC's intent?
Excerpts:
The U.S. last week held up shipments of everything from artillery to air-defense missiles, even though some were awaiting delivery in Poland. The putative reason was worries about low American stockpiles, an argument that comes out of a group getting the reputation as “restrainers” at the Pentagon. They mean restrain the U.S. and Mr. Trump.
Elbridge Colby, the Defense under secretary for policy, has made a career of arguing that the U.S. should limit support to Ukraine so it can deploy weapons for a potential Pacific showdown with China.
Dan Caldwell, until recently an adviser to Secretary Pete Hegseth, explained this argument in our letters page on Monday. “The Pentagon now doesn’t have enough munitions to supply our partners around the world while also preserving its ability to fight and win wars,” Mr. Caldwell writes. “It is natural to feel sympathy for Ukraine’s plight, but our leaders must put aside emotion.”
Trump Calls Out the Putin Charade
The President says he’ll send arms to Ukraine, overruling the Pentagon’s ‘restrainers.’
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-ukraine-weapons-vladimir-putin-benjamin-netanyahu-a6342e9d
By The Editorial Board
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July 8, 2025 5:44 pm ET
President Donald Trump during a dinner with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, not pictured, in the Blue Room of the White House in Washington on Monday Photo: Al Drago/Bloomberg News
The biggest news from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the White House Monday is what Donald Trump said about another part of the world: The U.S. will resume arm shipments to Ukraine in its war for survival against Vladimir Putin. The President is grasping what some of his staffers don’t: Arming Kyiv is realism rooted in America’s security interests.
“We’re going to send some more weapons,” Mr. Trump said to a reporter on Monday. “We have to. They have to be able to defend themselves. They’re getting hit very hard.” The President on Tuesday followed up by unloading on Mr. Putin at a cabinet meeting: “We get a lot of bulls— thrown at us by Putin,” who is “very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.” Yes it does.
The U.S. last week held up shipments of everything from artillery to air-defense missiles, even though some were awaiting delivery in Poland. The putative reason was worries about low American stockpiles, an argument that comes out of a group getting the reputation as “restrainers” at the Pentagon. They mean restrain the U.S. and Mr. Trump.
Elbridge Colby, the Defense under secretary for policy, has made a career of arguing that the U.S. should limit support to Ukraine so it can deploy weapons for a potential Pacific showdown with China.
Dan Caldwell, until recently an adviser to Secretary Pete Hegseth, explained this argument in our letters page on Monday. “The Pentagon now doesn’t have enough munitions to supply our partners around the world while also preserving its ability to fight and win wars,” Mr. Caldwell writes. “It is natural to feel sympathy for Ukraine’s plight, but our leaders must put aside emotion.”
Mull that one over: U.S. arsenals are so depleted that we have to let Ukraine fall. This isn’t what President Trump has been saying about U.S. military strength.
Yet the case for arming Ukraine is a realist one. By the President’s report, Mr. Putin is showing nothing but recalcitrance. The Russian dictator is refusing to end the war he started because he still thinks he can accomplish enough of what he wants on the battlefield. The U.S. has tried moving Mr. Putin off that position through persuasion, flattery and unilateral concessions. It hasn’t worked.
Sending weapons to Ukraine is a new message to Mr. Putin. The Pentagon also used Mr. Trump’s words about sending primarily “defensive” weapons. But as Rebeccah Heinrichs points out, every weapon to Ukraine is defensive as the country defends against an invader. Supplying air defense so Ukraine would lose on the installment plan was the Biden strategy in Ukraine. It’s one reason many GOP voters soured on the war.
What matters is giving Ukraine enough firepower to change Mr. Putin’s cost-benefit calculation about continuing the war. That would include sending long-range fires, artillery shells, as well as the Patriot missiles Ukraine needs urgently to defend civilians and cities.
Republicans in Congress will back the President if he asks for more weapons, and they’ll support a new sanctions bill when it comes to a vote, as it soon should. Another pressure point would be to tell Mr. Putin that if he keeps fighting, he will lose the $300 billion or so in Russian reserves held by Western banks. Mr. Biden refused to play that card too.
Mr. Trump’s pivot on Mr. Putin is also an opportunity to rewrite a weak 2026 U.S. defense budget proposal driven by White House accountants. Mr. Trump said Tuesday the U.S. needs to rev up weapons manufacturing, and he’s right. U.S. Patriot inventories are likely a fraction of what’s needed to defend U.S. interests around the world. Mr. Trump may need more advisers who see the opportunity to reinvigorate U.S. power and leadership.
Review & Outlook: The President reverses a Pentagon decision from last week and says he'll deliver weapons to Ukraine.
Appeared in the July 9, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Calls Out the Putin Charade'.
3. Trump should recommit to Ukraine’s cause
Opinion
Editorial Board
Trump should recommit to Ukraine’s cause
Hegseth’s abortive Ukraine weapons freeze projected weakness to Russia.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/08/trump-ukraine-weapons-pause-hegseth/?utm
July 8, 2025 at 4:22 p.m. EDTYesterday at 4:22 p.m. EDT
President Donald Trump speaks Wednesday during a Cabinet meeting at the White House. (Tom Brenner/For The Washington Post)
For the third time in less than six months, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has moved to suspend munitions shipments to Ukraine, and President Donald Trump has reversed the decision.
Trump announced on Monday night that the United States will resume weapons shipments that the Pentagon paused last week. This previously happened in February and May. In all three cases, the Pentagon’s weapons freeze surprised Trump allies and Congress, and Russia pounded civilian targets in Kyiv before the president changed the administration’s course.
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Hegseth and his team have once again poorly served the nation, embarrassing the president and projecting lack of resolve to Russia. The best corrective would be for Trump to recommit the United States to Ukraine’s cause — ramping up arms shipments to Kyiv, rather than just restoring U.S. support to preexisting levels.
In a phone call on Friday, Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he was not responsible for the pause. The president says he directed the Pentagon to review U.S. munitions stockpiles after American airstrikes on Iran, but he appears not to have realized in advance that defense officials would halt Ukraine shipments. That is why he initially didn’t acknowledge it had happened.
The Editorial Board on the war in Ukraine
Next
Opinion
Editorial Board
Trump’s weapons freeze on Ukraine could bring devastating consequences
July 2, 2025
Opinion
Editorial Board
Abandoning Ukraine would damage U.S. credibility
February 19, 2025
Opinion
Editorial Board
How an emboldened Ukraine caught Russia flat-footed
August 15, 2024
Opinion
Editorial Board
Europe is finally cranking up its creaky defense factories
April 4, 2024
Opinion
Editorial Board
Will the GOP become the party of retreat and surrender?
February 8, 2024
Opinion
Editorial Board
Investing in Ukraine and Israel is in our cold, hard national interest
October 20, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
Biden has done a lot for Ukraine. But not enough.
September 20, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
How to wage the financial war against Russia’s economy
September 17, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
On the debate stage, a fight to save Ukraine — and the GOP
August 24, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
U.S. chips enable Russia’s war drones. It’s time to stanch the flow.
August 23, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
Putin plans for a long struggle in Ukraine. The U.S. needs to do the same.
August 23, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
How to tell if China is trying to stop the war in Ukraine
August 8, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
War is hell. To this, Russia has added torture.
August 7, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
Putin strikes Ukrainian ports — and endangers the world’s food supply
July 25, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
How to ensure Ukraine’s long-term survival
July 24, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
NATO’s baby steps on Ukraine could still be bigfooted by Russia
July 13, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
A slow Ukrainian counteroffensive can’t prompt a Western retreat
June 30, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
Putin’s humiliation means new dangers for Russia — and the world
June 25, 2023
Opinion
Editorial Board
Is there enough money to rebuild Ukraine?
June 24, 2023
During his first term, hawks routinely boxed Trump into positions he wasn’t comfortable with. He sidelined many of them. This time, the doves — who fancy themselves “restrainers” — have sought to manipulate the president to advance their isolationist agenda by overstating the limits of American power. Trump needs to bring them to heel.
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After promising during the 2024 presidential campaign that he would end the Ukraine war on his first day back in office, Trump has become clearer-eyed about Russian President Vladimir Putin, who started this war and is the biggest obstacle to ending it. Sensing leverage in Trump’s desire for peace, Putin strung along the president and issued maximalist demands that Kyiv could never accept. At long last, Trump’s patience appears to be wearing thin. On Tuesday, days after another fruitless conversation with Putin, the president accused his Russian counterpart of “a lot of bulls---” as Russia wages a summer offensive.
The Pentagon, of course, must constantly assess its stockpiles to make sure enough weapons are available in case conflicts break out elsewhere. Trade-offs are required to support Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan. But a Joint Staff analysis found that the materiel headed to Ukraine would not jeopardize America’s own ammunition supplies.
Over the past week, Ukraine has endured some of the worst aerial bombardments since Russia’s full-scale invasion 40 months ago. Zelensky said on Monday that Russia launched 1,270 drones, 39 missiles and almost 1,000 glide bombs during that period. Kyiv needs interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense system, precision-guided artillery shells and missiles for Ukraine’s F-16 fighter jets.
Trump complained on Tuesday that defense contractors make equipment “too slowly” and need to produce necessary armaments faster. He’s correct on that. Fortunately, the U.S. military has already quadrupled its procurement targets for Patriot interceptors, and contractors are moving to speed up intricate supply chains. Lockheed Martin, which makes about 500 Patriot interceptor missiles a year, plans to increase production to 650 a year by 2027. When NATO ordered up to 1,000 Patriot rounds last year, the United States struck a deal allowing some of them to be produced in Germany.
Moreover, the tax and spending bill that Trump signed into law on Independence Day includes $157 billion in additional defense outlays, including $25 billion for munitions and $25 billion for a “Golden Dome” missile shield over the United States.
Over the next several years, the United States needs to stockpile more ammunition and boost capacity to produce it quickly, to ensure America can project power across the globe. But Ukraine needs munitions immediately to survive an ongoing Russian onslaught. Investing in Ukraine’s fight, drawing a large country into the West’s orbit and deterring future Russian aggression, is well worth substantial sacrifice of U.S. materiel — more than the United States is now providing; enough to improve Ukrainian performance on the battlefield. Trump is showing signs that he finally understands all this. He should make sure those who work for him do, too.
4. U.S. Ports Appeal for Delay to Tariffs on Chinese Cranes
What are the second, third, and even fourth order effects of tariffs?
U.S. Ports Appeal for Delay to Tariffs on Chinese Cranes
Trump administration weighs tariffs of up to 100% on ship-to-shore cranes made in China that are widely used at U.S. ports.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ports-appeal-for-delay-to-tariffs-on-chinese-cranes-f71172be
By Paul Berger
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July 9, 2025 5:30 am ET
Cranes made by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries at the Port of Oakland, Calif. Photo: Getty Images
Key Points
What's This?
- Proposed tariffs up to 100% on Chinese cranes could significantly raise port upgrade costs.
- Industry officials say Chinese cranes are cheaper and more readily available than alternatives, with few other options.
- Port operators seek tariff exemptions for existing orders and a delay on new levies.
U.S. port operators are warning that the cost of critical upgrades would balloon by tens of millions of dollars if the Trump administration moves forward with proposed new tariffs on port equipment.
The administration is proposing tariffs of up to 100% on Chinese-made cranes and other cargo-handling equipment as part of broader efforts to counter China’s dominance of the maritime industry. Shipping industry officials say the fees would be stacked on top of 25% tariffs on Chinese-made cranes introduced under the Biden administration, and in addition to China duties being considered by Trump’s trade team.
Ports and the private companies that operate marine terminals say the fees would penalize cargo gateways that ordered cranes long before the tariffs were being considered, and don’t account for the scarcity of cranes made outside of China.
China’s Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries, known as ZPMC, accounts for nearly 80% of ship-to-shore cranes at U.S. ports, dwarfing competitors such as Finland’s Konecranes and Germany’s Liebherr.
Carl Bentzel, president of the National Association of Waterfront Employers, said he has visited the White House several times to urge senior administration officials to give ports more time to find alternative sources for cranes.
“They said, ‘We’re going to put penalties as high as necessary to ensure you don’t buy equipment from China,’” Bentzel said. “But we need some level of transition.”
China produces more than 70% of the world’s ship-to-shore cranes, according to the U.S. government. Administration officials worry China’s control of critical infrastructure is an economic and a national security threat. They also allege some Chinese-made cranes have been fitted with communications equipment that could be used for espionage.
Chinese cranes are popular because they are plentiful and cheap. Shipping industry officials say the average cost of a Chinese ship-to-shore crane is about $15 million, several million dollars less than the lowest-price competitors. They say there are no domestic alternatives and that smaller overseas manufacturers wouldn’t be able to meet demand if U.S. ports pivoted to manufacturers outside of China.
Chinese cranes arrive fully assembled at the Port of Virginia. Photo: L. Todd Spencer/Zuma Press
The tariffs are being considered by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, which under President Joe Biden conducted an investigation into China’s dominance of the maritime industry.
Charlie Jenkins, chief executive of the Port of Houston, testified at a USTR office hearing earlier this year that, based on discussions with crane makers, it would take about a decade to develop sufficient crane manufacturing capacity in the U.S. Jenkins said that over the next six years his port needs to order 22 cranes with a potential tariff liability of $100 million.
It can take up to two years to fulfill a crane order. Port operators are asking the administration to provide tariff exemptions for cranes ordered before the end of 2024. They are also asking the USTR’s office to delay imposing levies on new crane orders for three years to give time for crane manufacturing to develop in the U.S., or for manufacturers in allied countries to expand production.
The USTR’s office decided earlier this year that starting in mid-October the U.S. will impose fees on owners and operators of Chinese-built ships that call at U.S. ports.
The trade representative’s office is also considering imposing fees on foreign-built car-carriers that call at U.S. ports. The proposal is opposed by ocean-shipping trade groups. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce warns the fees could reduce vehicle availability and add $300 to car prices.
Write to Paul Berger at paul.berger@wsj.com
5. The Forgotten American: Can There Be Life After 12 Years in a Chinese Prison?
This is a tragic story. So much to unpack here. The evil nature of the Chinese regime and what it does to prisoners (I see some terrible techniques to be used for "inoculation" at SERE training). Chinese political warfare exploiting Americans. The excellent work of our good friend Roger Carstens but the terrible treatment by some bureaucrats. And the apparent "haves and have nots" among wrongfully detained Americans.
The Forgotten American: Can There Be Life After 12 Years in a Chinese Prison?
Mark Swidan spent more than a decade in a windowless box for a crime he didn’t commit. Now he’s back home in Texas—and living on food stamps.
https://www.thefp.com/p/the-forgotten-american-mark-swidan-chinese-prison-detainee
By Peter Savodnik
07.08.25 — U.S. Politics
Mark Swidan spent 12 years imprisoned in China until he was returned home as a part of a prisoner swap last year. (All photos by Lexi Parra for The Free Press)
One morning last November, at around 4 in the morning, guards at Dongguan Prison, in southern China, entered the cell where Mark Swidan was sleeping and started shaking him and telling him to get up.
He was 49, and he had spent the past 12 years and 14 days behind bars for committing a crime—conspiring to manufacture drugs—that nobody in Washington, D.C., believed he had committed.
For more than a decade, he had been in a windowless box with 31 other men—it was roughly 30 feet by 10 feet, or a little less than 10 square feet per human being—and he had spent at least two additional years in solitary confinement. He was no longer sure exactly how long it had been.
“I’m not good with time anymore,” he told me.
That morning, time moved very fast.
“It was very hurried,” Swidan said. “They didn’t want anybody else in the block to know. I didn’t have time to brush my teeth. They just led me into this van.”
The windows of the van were blacked out, and they started to move through the early morning dark. “There was a long line of police cars, all white, in front of us, behind us,” he said. “It was surreal.”
It was the first time Swidan had spoken to a reporter since coming home from China seven months ago, and when he talked about these things, he had an almost dreamlike, drifting quality, as though he were trying to figure out what had happened to him.
Now we were in a steakhouse in Houston, his hometown, and it was hazy and swampy and overcast outside. He wore a black tuxedo jacket and creased loafers that he hadn’t worn in many years, and he sat next to his girlfriend, Syndi Vo, who, Swidan said, was “an influencer.” His sunglasses were pushed above his forehead. He was focused, he said, on “putting my life back together,” which he had dreamed of doing when he was behind bars but now, in America, seemed nearly impossible.
It all started in late 2012, when Swidan went to China to buy building materials—flooring, bulbs, light fixtures, that kind of thing.
He thought he might be able to find something for a fixer-upper he had just bought in Houston—he planned to move in with his fiancée, Mylene, and his mother—but mostly, he said, it was for work.
He had started a business in 2006 called Radiance Associates that bought cheap supplies overseas—everything from needles and gloves to aluminum siding—and then sold it in the U.S. He had been to Mexico, Costa Rica, the Philippines, Vietnam, and, of course, China. “Most of the stuff was from China,” he said. (This ambiguity about the nature of Swidan’s trip lent it an air of impropriety, as far as the Chinese were concerned, a State Department official told me.)
Read
He Fought for Freedom. Then He Chose Prison.
On his last night in Guangzhou, northwest of Dongguan, he was in his hotel room, talking with his mother, Katherine Swidan, on the phone, and suddenly, there was a bang on the door, and Katherine heard yelling, a commotion. Then, nothing.
“I was frantic,” Katherine told me. “About two weeks after that happened, finally somebody from the State Department called me and said he’s been detained.”
Actually, as State Department officials would conclude, Swidan had been “wrongfully detained.”
He was tried in court in 2013, and then he floated for six years between detention centers and prisons, waiting for the Chinese to tell him what they planned to do with him.
In 2019, they sentenced him to death. Then, in 2023, they upheld his death sentence. It was unclear when or where this would take place; in China, lethal injection and firing squad are the preferred means of execution.
“The Chinese behaved as if they seemed to believe that Mark was actually guilty,” Roger Carstens, the former special presidential envoy for hostage affairs at the State Department, who worked to secure Swidan’s release, told me.
Until six months ago, when they agreed to give up Swidan and two other Americans, and three Uyghurs, in exchange for two Chinese who had been accused of spying and stealing aviation technology and were being held by the Americans.
Swidan poses for a portrait with his mother, Katherine, at her home on June 12, 2025, in Houston, Texas.
That morning, roaring through the dark, he didn’t know about any of that—the Uyghurs or the Chinese spies.
They drove for an hour to a train station in Guangzhou. “By then,” Swidan said, “it was starting to crack dawn.”
No one would tell him where they were going. He thought the guards wanted him to think they were going to execute him.
Over the next 36 hours there would be a kaleidoscope of trains, vans, more guards, more blacked-out windows, a night at a “Gulag prison,” an ice-cold shower, a game of poker with a few of the guards, until finally, they delivered him to a building on the edge of what looked like a huge, empty parking lot. On the inside there were fake marble floors and fake dark-wood paneling—“basically, a deranged copy of what the American judicial system is supposed to look like,” Swidan said. There was a judge in a black robe waiting for him.
“We’ve decided to parole you,” the judge, who was not really a judge but a cog in the Communist Party machine, told him in English.
“Then, the judge said, ‘Your ambassador is across the hallway,’ ” Swidan recalled, “and I go across the hallway, through these doors, and there’s Ambassador Burns”—he meant Nicholas Burns, who was the U.S. ambassador to China from 2022 to 2025—“and there are tons of Americans in there, and they’re cheering and clapping.”
“If this were a politically connected person, he would have been out a long time ago.” —John Kamm, executive director of Dui Ha, a nonprofit fighting for Americans detained in China
The ambassador put an arm on Swidan’s shoulder, and they took photographs. Swidan was wearing his American flag T-shirt—the same T-shirt he’d had with him when they arrested him, the same T-shirt he’d insisted on wearing every time he had to appear in court. Everyone was staring and smiling at him. He didn’t know what he was supposed to say. Then, Burns led him to a door on the far side of the room, and when Burns opened the door, Swidan realized they were on the tarmac of an airport in Beijing. There was a plane a few hundred feet away waiting to take off—an American plane with an American crew, American doctors and nurses, American Air Marshals, American mechanics.
“They never leave the plane, just to make sure there’s no sabotage,” he said.
At the top of the staircase leading up to the plane, Roger Carstens greeted Swidan. “He’s a huge guy,” Swidan said of Carstens, who served in the Special Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, “and he’s hugging me, and then he put me on the phone with my mom.”
As they took off, Swidan remembered the ink drawings he had left behind, and the box of a cell he had shared with 30 other men, and the T-shirt he used to tie around his head to block out the light when it was time to sleep. In prison, they kept the lights on 24-7.
Then the crew served everyone cheeseburgers, fries, brownies, and Cokes, and he devoured everything, and he remembered the crew was very polite and smiled and made small talk, and he watched the orange-silver lights of the capital fade and then disappear.
“That was the last time I saw China,” Swidan said.
Mark Swidan had spent much more time in prison than most Americans who had been “wrongfully detained” overseas.
Brittney Griner, the WNBA star arrested in 2022 for having less than a gram of hashish oil, spent 10 months in prison in Russia. Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich spent more than a year in prison, also in Russia, from 2023 to 2024, for alleged espionage. Then there were the three UCLA basketball players arrested in Hangzhou, in China, in 2017, for shoplifting, which they confessed to—they were released after only eight days. (President Donald Trump intervened on their behalf, prompting him to ask on X whether they would thank him. They did.)
Swidan was rivaled only by writer Paul Overby, who is believed to have been arrested in Afghanistan in 2014, and the freelance journalist Austin Tice, who was arrested in Syria in 2012, and David Lin, the pastor who was arrested in China for contract fraud in 2006 —all of which left the impression that he had been left behind because he was an ordinary American.
Swidan made drawings during his time in prison, sometimes with colored pencils and other times with a ballpoint pen.
When I asked Carstens about this, he said in an email: “This whole thing about how the government only focuses on famous people like Brittney Griner and Evan Gershkovich is just bullshit. The U.S. Government owes every citizen its best—whether they are famous or not famous, poor or rich, connected or not, and regardless of ethnicity or color.”
Diane Foley, the mother of James Foley, the freelance journalist ISIS took hostage in 2012 and executed in 2014, suggested that wasn’t always true.
It “matters how strongly the family can advocate for that individual,” Foley, who now lobbies for the release of Americans held overseas, told me recently. “In the case of Mark, his only advocate for many years was his homebound, elderly mother with very limited finances.” (The actor Mel Gibson—who has long been on the outs with Hollywood, where he was presumed an antisemite—was one of the few voices to stand up for Swidan. When Swidan was released, Gibson posted a video thanking Senator Ted Cruz and others.)
John Kamm, the executive director of Dui Ha, a nonprofit in San Francisco that fights for the rights of Americans who have been detained in China, told me in 2023: “If this were a politically connected person, he would have been out a long time ago. He has really been horribly treated. It is a complete travesty of justice.”
When Swidan landed at an Air Force base outside San Antonio, Texas, greeted by his 75-year-old mother and his older brother, Mitch, a trucker, he wasn’t able to go home immediately.
He spent the next several weeks “in the hospital within a hospital, away from the media, other people, the whole world,” he said. The Air Force doctors hooked him up to an IV, gave him a ton of vaccinations, ran a battery of tests, drew blood, drew more blood, gave him an ultrasound, an MRI, checked his kidneys, his heart, his liver. “They were checking for everything.”
The big problem was malnutrition.
“You sleep on concrete for that long, and you hate it while you’re there, but then, when you get back, you’re not used to it—the bed. I feel like I’m sinking into it.” —Mark Swidan
For more than a decade, he had been served two meals a day, the same meal every meal: a bowl of mushy, yellowish rice with a quarter-size morsel of pork fat. Sometimes, there would be boiled bits of pumpkin or cabbage.
Swidan, who is 6-feet-2, said: “I was 225 pounds when I went in, and then I went down to the 120s, and I was about 140, 145 when I got out.”
In prison, they rarely let him outside. His immune system had taken a hit from the lack of sun. He also got frequent fungal infections—mostly from showering on grimy, concrete floors. “It would go all over your head and face and down your neck,” he said. He would get red and splotchy. It made sleeping for weeks at a time nearly impossible.
The aftereffects were visible: His skin was covered in tiny lines and scars. And his teeth were a mess. His eyesight had been compromised.
Worst of all were his hands—over the years, he’d broken lots of bones in his fingers and wrists and hands from fights with other prisoners but mostly with guards. “I’m not the guy who’s just going to stand there when you threaten me,” Swidan said. “Someone would put his finger in my face, and I’d knock him the fuck out, and there would be four or five of them—I didn’t give a shit. You’ve given me two death penalties already.” He learned how to scrounge for bits of cardboard and tape so he could set his broken fingers. The Air Force doctors in San Antonio said there wasn’t a lot they could do about his hands. “They said it’s worse to rebreak and then fix them,” he said.
They also made sure he saw a psychiatrist.
It wasn’t just that he had threatened to kill himself while he was in prison. “That was more to give them hell,” he explained. He had forgotten when that happened—2016 or maybe 2017. There had been a hunger strike, and he had told U.S. consular officers he was thinking of ending his life. “The only way I would die is by my own hand,” he added.
It was that no one knew for sure who or how he was now—how broken he was and what they could do about it, or if they could do anything at all.
He liked the shrink, he said, but didn’t like the way the State Department guys would talk about how he needed to open up—“let it all out.”
“I felt patronized by it,” he said. “I actually got angry at them—we were having lunch at the base, and they were like, ‘You might think you’re different, but you’re going to have your episode, you might cry,’ and I said, ‘Shut the fuck up.’ ” He kept thinking: I spent 12 years in prison in China. I lost everything. I’m fine. I don’t need to cry.
When it came to motivation, clawing his way out of the dark, he preferred former kickboxer-slash-manosphere influencer Andrew Tate, who has been accused of rape and sexual trafficking in Romania and Britain. “I watch that every morning for motivation,” he texted me a few nights ago, very late. “Not saying I agree with all. But literally the guy is right 80 out of 100. And it gets me motivated.” And then, somewhat confusingly: “You really need to digest what the man says. You lay down with the dogs, you wake up with them. Manifest, make it happen.”
Swidan had been on the base for a week or so when his brother got him a phone.
The first person he texted was his mother, who forwarded him his old contacts—friends, family.
The second person was Syndi Vo.
They had dated, off and on, in 2007 and 2008. Then, Mark moved on and got engaged to a woman named Mylene.
After his arrest, in 2012, Mylene disappeared. (Katherine told me she eventually married a plumber in England.)
But not Syndi. She couldn’t believe it when she saw Mark’s face on the television and heard about what had happened. She called Katherine immediately. “There were a lot of tears,” she told me, when I asked her about her conversation with Mark’s mother.
“I was 225 pounds when I went in, and then I went down to the 120s, and I was about 140, 145 when I got out,” Swidan said.
Over the years, Syndi would call Katherine frequently to check in, see about Mark, see about Katherine. She couldn’t stop thinking about this man she had cared about so much with the nose ring and the tattoos of the kanji characters etched into his chest. The characters meant “Your chain is as strong as the weakest link” and “Unbeatable.”
Anyway, when he was on the Air Force base in San Antonio, he and Syndi started texting. And then Syndi called him.
“I wasn’t expecting anything,” he said. Getting back together, he added, “wasn’t really on my mind, considering all the obstacles ahead.”
Syndi said: “I don’t think we ever really let go of each other. It was just—life happened.”
On January 14, Swidan’s 50th birthday, he saw Syndi for the first time in 14 years.
That night, he and Syndi and a group of friends, including Thien Nguyen, the owner of a sprayed-concrete business, had dinner at a steakhouse in Houston. That was his kind of night out—a New York strip, a glass, or maybe a bottle, of Bordeaux.
He felt like he was returning to himself. “I was with him”—Nguyen—“the day before I left overseas,” Swidan said. “He was the last to see me.”
Now he was home, and he was having a Scotch, a Macallan, at his birthday dinner, and they were all toasting him, “saying they thought they’d never see me again.” After dinner, Swidan said, Nguyen got the bill, and they decamped to the Oak Room, a high-end club that Nguyen belonged to, and he had another Macallan.
“All of it was wonderful,” he added.
And then: “It was a birthday and a rebirth.”
Except the rebirth has been rocky and protracted.
When I asked Swidan how he would describe the six months since his birthday, he said: “Struggles.”
The State Department had issued him a letter signed by Carstens that was supposed to be a get-out-of-jail card and smooth over any issues with the Texas Department of Public Safety, which issues driver’s licenses, and the bank, and whoever when they discovered he had no ID, no credit, not even a social media presence. (His Facebook page, like his email account, had been frozen years ago.) “U.S. citizen Mark Swidan was determined by the U.S. Department of State to have been wrongfully detained by the People’s Republic of China,” the letter, dated January 10, 2025, states. “From November 14, 2012, until November 27, 2024, Mr. Swidan was held in Dongguan Prison in Guongdong as well as other locations throughout China.”
But every time he showed it to anyone, they looked confused.
“I don’t exist,” he said.
He was “disappointed,” he said, in the U.S. government.
There were the people he believed had done everything they could for him, such as Burns and Carstens.
When Burns visited Swidan in prison, “They told him he had to wear his mask, and he refused,” Swidan said, referring to the Chinese guards. “They told him he couldn’t shake my hand, and he refused.”
He added: “Burns is a great guy. Carstens is a great guy.”
But then there was everyone else—the indifferent U.S. consular officers he dealt with in Guangzhou and Beijing; the politicians, “who were mostly useless.” He wondered why there wasn’t anyone to help him get back on his feet now that he was home.
“Someone would put his finger in my face, and I’d knock him the fuck out, and there would be four or five of them—I didn’t give a shit. You’ve given me two death penalties already.” —Mark Swidan
Carstens seemed pained by the idea that any American might feel treated unfairly by the system. He noted that he had missed his kids’ school plays, and come home from work most nights after 9 p.m., “for 63 people”—wrongfully detained Americans Carstens helped bring home—“who were not famous, whose families lived in trailer parks, people barely making their mortgage payments in places like North Dakota, Texas, wherever.”
A senior State Department official told me that it was hard to pull off a prisoner swap, because Chinese and Russian intelligence often arrest innocent Americans whom they can use for leverage while the Americans generally limit themselves to unlawful combatants, spies—or, as a U.S. consular officer in Beijing put it, “legit bad actors.” (Several Americans familiar with hostage negotiations in and out of the government backed this up. A Russian Interior Ministry official in Moscow had told me the same thing years before.)
In Swidan’s case, the senior State Department official said, “I can partially blame the Chinese, because they wanted something that was very hard for us to give”—spies—“or I can partially blame us, because we weren’t willing to trade where we knew that was needed to get it done. It’s a back-and-forth of trying all these permutations. I think we spent too long doing that.”
The Americans and Chinese were close to hammering out a deal, in early 2023, when several high-altitude helium balloons from China were spotted flying over Alaska, Lake Huron, and South Carolina. The Americans feared they were spy balloons; the Chinese were adamant they were not. It created a diplomatic kerfuffle.
“The balloon hits, and I was like, ‘Shit,’ ” the senior State Department official said. He added that, over the years, there had been two or three moments like that, “when we had been busting our asses—and then nothing.”
Swidan didn’t want to talk about “the fucking balloons,” as he put it.
He needed to start making money, he said, but he also had to take care of his mother, who had been declining for years and was unable to walk. Her back was failing her, he said.
“I can barely leave the house,” Swidan said. “I’m using food stamps to eat with, and I’m taking care of Mom.” He added: “She’s got me cooking, cleaning, serving her all day long, and I don’t care—she’s my mom.”
But he didn’t have a lot of time for other things or people. Including Syndi.
Read
Detained Americans Face Another Christmas in the Gulag
They had been back together for the past several months.
She was 43, and she was always juggling her kids and her elderly mother. (Like Swidan, she lived with her mom.)
Also, he was still learning how to sleep. He liked sleeping in the dark again. The issue was the mattress. “You sleep on concrete for that long,” Swidan said, “and you hate it while you’re there, but then, when you get back, you’re not used to it—the bed. I feel like I’m sinking into it.”
Most nights, he said, he would float between the bed and the couch, and when he could no longer sleep, he would wander around the apartment or watch Quentin Tarantino movies.
He sounded unsure of how he was supposed to think about the future. “I’m full of energy,” he said. “I’m not beaten.”
He added: “I always loved America. But it’s like, where do I go from here?” It angered him that “there’s tons of money going to all these people who aren’t paying taxes, who come here illegally.”
He couldn’t believe his mother had been living in a beat-up apartment in the middle of nowhere.
“I come home and see my mom, hunched over, living in that place, and I was furious,” he said. It was dusty and dank, and the carpet had a mildewy smell, and the plumbing was a mess. That was why he had to move her.
I asked if he blamed the government for that, and he said: “Plenty of the people from the government”—members of Congress, State Department officials—“visited her and saw her like that. That’s pathetic.” He added: “No one took care of my mom. No one did anything for her. They left her like that.” It didn’t help that his father, a Jordanian émigré, had died in the early ’90s. (Katherine was unavailable for comment.)
Soon after he returned home, his mother launched a GoFundMe for him.
“I know Christmas is not a time to ask but please share Mark’s story, he is an American PATRIOT and as his mom I want him to be able to move on happily and safe,” Katherine wrote on the website.
She set a goal of $25,000. So far, she’s reeled in 53 donations for a total of $8,555.
In April, Mark and Syndi flew to Washington, D.C., for the James W. Foley Legacy Foundation awards ceremony. The foundation, which Diane Foley created after her son’s death, advocates for the release of American hostages. Andrea Mitchell, the NBC journalist, was the host. Joshua Geltzer, a senior adviser to President Biden, also attended, as did the wife of Brittney Griner. She was there to accept an award on behalf of the basketball star.
When I asked whether he resented Griner for getting out of prison after less than a year, he shook his head. “She didn’t tell the government to jump through hoops”—except, of course, she kind of did, or, at least, her friends at the WNBA and NBA did with their “We Are BG” campaign. He added: The “billionaire owners” weren’t “doing anything wrong. They don’t know the rest of us. They did right for her.”
His job, he said, was not to think about any of that—he meant the feeling of being “unimportant,” “forgotten,” and he meant the prison, the guards, the burning white lights, the hollowed-out faces of the other prisoners, the reek of other people’s urine and shit clogging the hole they used as a toilet in the middle of the cell.
When I asked him about that, the stench, the barrage of pains and insults, he smirked: “Yeah, that.” And stopped. He had adapted to that many years ago. He said that sometimes, when he woke up in his mother’s apartment, he forgot he was no longer in his cell, and then he remembered he was home, and he felt panicky. “I should have been basically retired by now, and now I’ve got to start from scratch,” he said.
He said that sometimes he would go by the house he had bought before he left for China—the house he lost when he stopped paying the mortgage. “I love that place,” he said. Since then, he said, the house has been bought and sold several times.
He was feeling bad, he told me a few days ago, because he had gotten into a fight with Syndi. “I think it’s the stress of me trying to get myself together,” he said. He felt like he wasn’t being the man he was supposed to be; he relied on her for so much—driving him places, cooking for him, propping his spirits up. “She has never made me feel that way,” he texted, “but she does sooo much for everyone. I get it. It’s me, not her.” I told him I hoped things got better soon, and he said he did, too, and then he said she wasn’t picking up her phone. A friend had given him $100 to buy her some black roses, which, he said, she loves.
Did he ever imagine the parallel life that might have been—the one he would have lived if he or Syndi had gotten their head screwed on straight the first time around and gotten married and all that?
He texted me: “Yes very likely with a gang of kids.”
“Is that painful to think about?” I texted back.
He didn’t reply for a few minutes.
Then, he wrote: “I try not to dwell on it.”
6. Army aims to quadruple Patriot missile procurement
Air and missile defense is so important in modern warfare. I remember when it was not and we prioritized for the near term versus the long term. But we need it now and for the future.
Army aims to quadruple Patriot missile procurement
Move comes amid conflict with Iran, questions about aid to Ukraine.
defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers
The U.S. Army has asked for a big boost to its Patriot air defense stockpile in the 2026 budget request, as the service drives to increase its “magazine depth” for various munitions.
The acquisition goal for the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile segment enhancements would quadruple—from 3,376 to 13,773—if Congress grants the Pentagon’s request, according to procurement justification documents released by the Army.
“It's going to be really sporty. It's going to be really interesting,” Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said during an event Tuesday. “It kind of feels like this is a little bit of an ‘oops’ moment where, like, okay, now we actually do need to get serious about munition capacity.”
Karako’s comments came during a discussion about Iran’s attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar as retaliation for June 21 U.S. strikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities. During that attack, two Patriot missile batteries defended the base from the barrage.
“We've been admiring the problem of air and missile defense capacity for years and years,” Karako said. “Now we have in writing that, no kidding, our objective is going to quadruple.”
The Army has been anticipating an increased need for Patriot defense this year, moving two batteries that had been deployed to the Indo-Pacific over to U.S. Central Command amid U.S. strikes on the Houthis in Yemen.
“There is this giant sucking sound in CENTCOM, for all kinds of munitions in recent months,” Karako said.
The investment in Patriots comes as the Pentagon is doing a wider review of its weapons stockpiles, which resulted earlier this month in a temporary pause of promised munitions transfers to Ukraine.
The Pentagon declined to say which munitions it had concerns about.
“We have what we need. That being said, the question of how much do you need is an unanswerable question,” Steven Warren, an Army spokesman, told reporters Tuesday. “We always want more. More is better, but we are confident that we have what we need to meet the threats on the battlefield.”
The Army has been working to beef up its production of 155mm artillery rounds since the war in Ukraine began, with the understanding that it would be sending much of its output to help the Ukrainians beat back Russia’s invasion.
The original goal was to get to 100,000 rounds a month by October of this year, up from 14,500 in early 2022. Today, ammunition plants are moving about 40,000 a month.
“While on one hand we are very pleased with the progress that we've made, we understand that that progress is slow,” Warren said.
defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers
7. Mysterious Guided Rocket Launcher Disguised In A Shipping Container At Fort Bragg Identified
I have heard about this concept and it could be a game changer, especially in the Pacific if employed at scale not just by SOF.
This is a capability that could be very useful for "strategic agility platforms" especially if longer range capabilities are developed for "boxes of rockets." (as well as for missile defense) https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/
Excerpts:
As for the launcher seen at Bragg, it is a prototype launch system developed as part of the Palletized Field Artillery Launcher (PFAL) project that is said to currently belong to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). PFAL presents a harder-to-spot and otherwise flexible strike capability, especially for launching ballistic missiles, which could be of interest to the regular Army if the service is not pursuing something in this vein already.
TWZ was the first to report on the container with the launcher inside at Fort Bragg after spotting it in videos, one of which is seen below, of President Donald Trump’s visit to the base back in June. Bragg is the Army’s main special operations hub, and is also home to the 82nd Airborne Division, among other units.
...
When SOCOM acquired its prototype PFALs, and what its plans for those launchers are currently, are unclear. Explicit mention of the system does not appear to be present in any of the command’s budget documentation. TWZ has reached out for more information.
Generally speaking, as TWZ noted in our initial reporting on what is known to be a PFAL prototype:
“Being able to launch this array of rockets and missiles already gives M270 and M142 immense flexibility. A containerized launcher would open up additional possibilities, including the ability to turn any truck that can carry a standard shipping container into a platform capable of firing long-range guided rockets and missiles. This, in turn, could help the Army more readily expand its available launch capacity as required.”
“The containerized launchers could also be deployed in a fixed mode, offering forward operating bases the ability to hold targets at risk dozens, if not hundreds, of miles away. This can include providing an on-call form of organic air/fire support for troops operating far from the forward base. The launcher inside the container cannot traverse laterally, but an array of them could be positioned in such a way to provide maximum coverage in all directions.”
“Being a container-based design, whether deployed in a truck-mounted or fixed configuration, they would be readily relocatable from one location to another. The containerized launchers could also be loaded on rail cars and/or employed from ships with sufficient open deck space.”
“In any of these modes, the launcher would benefit from its unassuming outward appearance. This would present challenges for opponents when it comes to detection and targeting, since any container could potentially be loaded with rockets or ballistic missiles.”
Mysterious Guided Rocket Launcher Disguised In A Shipping Container At Fort Bragg Identified
The Army's top general in the Pacific recently touted how "boxes of rockets" hiding out in the open creates dilemmas for adversaries.
Joseph Trevithick
Published Jul 8, 2025 9:16 AM EDT
twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick
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Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
An unknown containerized launcher able to fire the same suite of artillery rockets and ballistic missiles as the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) seen at the U.S. Army’s Fort Bragg earlier this year has been identified. This comes as the Army’s top general in the Indo-Pacific region has highlighted the value of “boxes of rockets” hiding in plain sight as part of a broader strategy that “gives our adversary pause.”
As for the launcher seen at Bragg, it is a prototype launch system developed as part of the Palletized Field Artillery Launcher (PFAL) project that is said to currently belong to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). PFAL presents a harder-to-spot and otherwise flexible strike capability, especially for launching ballistic missiles, which could be of interest to the regular Army if the service is not pursuing something in this vein already.
TWZ was the first to report on the container with the launcher inside at Fort Bragg after spotting it in videos, one of which is seen below, of President Donald Trump’s visit to the base back in June. Bragg is the Army’s main special operations hub, and is also home to the 82nd Airborne Division, among other units.
President Trump arrives at the Holland Drop Zone—Fort Bragg… pic.twitter.com/VQrOWoyata
— Dan Scavino (@Scavino47) June 10, 2025
Last year, Military Times also published a very brief video of the PFAL, seen below, but did not name the launcher and provided no further details.
This is “the Palletized Field Artillery Launcher or PFAL. These are prototype launcher platforms owned by SOCOM,” Darrell Ames, an Army spokesperson, told TWZ. “This is not MLRS and the platform in the picture is not fielded to the Army. The prototype does launch the current MLRS family of munitions [MFOM] with the exception of PrSM.”
MFOM currently includes 227mm guided artillery rockets, as well as an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missiles, the latter of which the Army is in the process of fielding now. All the munitions come in standardized ‘pods’ that can each hold six rockets, a single ATACMS, or two PrSMs. The PFAL launcher can accommodate two of these pods at once.
A mock-up of an ATACMS missile next to one of a standardized ammunition ‘pod.’ US Army
Current-generation 227mm artillery rockets in the Army’s inventory have a maximum range of some 50 miles (around 80 kilometers), and extended-range types that can reach out to just over 93 miles (150 kilometers) are now in production. The longest-range variant of the ATACMS short-range ballistic missile in Army service today can fly out to 186 miles (300 kilometers). The baseline version of PrSM has a demonstrated range of 310 miles (500 kilometers), but the Army is already looking at multiple future versions with greater reach.
An M270 MLRS fires a 227mm artillery rocket. Lockheed Martin Lockheed Martin
A US Army HIMARS launcher fires an ATACMS missile. US Army
PFAL dates to at least 2020 and directly evolved from a demonstration program called Strike X, which the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) had run. Strike X also included work on potential upgrades for ATACMS, including a seeker that would enable the missile to hit moving targets on land or at sea, a capability now in development for PrSM.
Since its creation in 2012, SCO has been focused on advanced and otherwise novel development efforts, often leveraging existing platforms and munitions. Prime examples are the Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) effort that led to the B-21 Raider stealth and the transformation of the SM-6 surface-to-air missile into a multi-purpose weapon able to also strike targets on land and at sea. SM-6 has now further evolved into an air-to-air missile, as well.
“PFAL is a palletized erectable launcher that provides alternatives to deliver near-term innovative long-range strike capabilities to improve operational effectiveness for Combatant Commanders,” according to past Army budget documents. “The PFAL launcher is capable of firing from a fixed ground position, Palletized Load System (PLS) trailer, or maritime vessel.”
The budget documents also say the intent, at least, was to eventually certify the PFAL to fire PrSM.
The only funding the Army looks to have requested and received for the PFAL effort was $20.175 million that came in Fiscal Year 2021. Last year, the service said it had leveraged work on PFAL in the development of an uncrewed derivative of the HIMARS launcher vehicle called the Autonomous Multi-domain Launcher (AML). Unlike HIMARS, AML can be loaded with two MFOM pods at once rather than just one. The M270 MLRS is also a two-pod launcher.
The prototype AML. US Army The Autonomous Multi-domain Launcher (AML) prototype. US Army
When SOCOM acquired its prototype PFALs, and what its plans for those launchers are currently, are unclear. Explicit mention of the system does not appear to be present in any of the command’s budget documentation. TWZ has reached out for more information.
Generally speaking, as TWZ noted in our initial reporting on what is known to be a PFAL prototype:
“Being able to launch this array of rockets and missiles already gives M270 and M142 immense flexibility. A containerized launcher would open up additional possibilities, including the ability to turn any truck that can carry a standard shipping container into a platform capable of firing long-range guided rockets and missiles. This, in turn, could help the Army more readily expand its available launch capacity as required.”
“The containerized launchers could also be deployed in a fixed mode, offering forward operating bases the ability to hold targets at risk dozens, if not hundreds, of miles away. This can include providing an on-call form of organic air/fire support for troops operating far from the forward base. The launcher inside the container cannot traverse laterally, but an array of them could be positioned in such a way to provide maximum coverage in all directions.”
“Being a container-based design, whether deployed in a truck-mounted or fixed configuration, they would be readily relocatable from one location to another. The containerized launchers could also be loaded on rail cars and/or employed from ships with sufficient open deck space.”
“In any of these modes, the launcher would benefit from its unassuming outward appearance. This would present challenges for opponents when it comes to detection and targeting, since any container could potentially be loaded with rockets or ballistic missiles.”
A HIMARS launcher fires a Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) during a test. Lockheed Martin
Trump’s visit to Fort Bragg in June, where the PFAL made its appearance, also came just over a week after Ukrainian forces had demonstrated the value of concealed launch capabilities, in general, with the unprecedented covert drone attacks on multiple Russian air bases. Several other countries, including Russia, China, and Iran, have also been developing launchers for artillery rockets and/or missiles concealed inside shipping containers.
All of this underscores the potential interest that SOCOM, specifically, might have in the capabilities that a containerized system like PFAL has to offer, coupled with its discreet appearance. The idea of special operations rocket artillery may appear unusual at first glance. However, regular Army HIMARS units, in particular, have been an important supporting asset for forward-deployed special operations forces for years now, especially in Syria. Special operators are also known to have made use of HIMARS batteries to execute targeted strikes on high-value individuals or groups thereof in Afghanistan.
The explicit mention in the past Army budget documents of potentially employing PFAL from a “maritime vessel” is also especially interesting to consider in the context of special operations missions. Special operations forces regularly operate from sea base ships and other types with open deck space for containerized capabilities. This includes the secretive Ocean Trader, itself designed to have an outwardly civilian-looking appearance to aid in its use as an unassuming launch platform for covert and clandestine operations.
PFALs, or a similar design, could be employed by regular ground units in support of non-special operations missions, as well. It could also give any ship with sufficient deck space an add-on precision strike capability.
While the current status of the PFAL project is unclear, there are clear indications that the Army remains actively interested in a launcher that can be concealed among standard shipping containers for the same general reasons stated earlier in this story. Containerized launchers could be particularly relevant in future expeditionary or distributed operations, especially across the broad expanses of the Pacific during a future major conflict with China, or for trying to deter one.
“I think, again, it aligns to our ability to operate in multiple domains,” Army Gen. Ronald Clark, head of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), said in response to a question about containerized launch capabilities at an event that the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) think tank in Washington, D.C., hosted on June 27. “Our ability to target our adversaries at scale and our ability to be able to be literally ubiquitous with boxes of rockets at different places, that look like boxes of something else, really gives our adversary pause, because it’s in real time providing deterrence.”
That same day, the Army put out a contracting notice outlining a potential family of uncrewed launcher vehicles, building on the prototype AML. The Common AML (CAML) ‘system of systems’ might include a ‘heavy’ type based on the 10×10 M1075 Palletized Loading System (PLS) truck, which in turn could point to plans for a new containerized launcher. The CAML-H would be designed to fire munitions beyond the ones that come in MFOM pods, including Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) surface-to-air missiles.
It is also worth noting here that the Army is already fielding the Typhon missile system, which includes tractor-trailer launchers capable of firing Tomahawks and SM-6s. The Army has been looking at smaller launchers that are easier to deploy as companions to Typhon. Typhon’s existing launchers have a containerized design, but do not have the outward look of an unmodified shipping container like PFAL.
The main components of a US Army Typhon battery: four tractor-trailer launchers and a trailer-based mobile command post. US Army
Other services might be interested in the capabilities that PFAL, or a further development of that design, offers. The Navy does already have its own containerized launchers for firing Tomahawks and SM-6s that are extremely similar, but not identical to the Army’s Typhon design. The U.S. Marine Corps also just recently announced its intention to axe a planned ground-based Tomahawk cruise missile capability in its latest budget request. The Marines made the decision after determining that the complete Long Range Fires (LRF) system, which includes uncrewed launcher vehicles derived from the 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), could not be effectively used as part of its new expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations.
If nothing else, SOCOM still has at least one PFAL in its inventory sitting at Fort Bragg.
Howard Altman contributed to this story.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
Deputy Editor
Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.
twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick
8. A look at the wish lists for CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM and STRATCOM
What is billion (or twelve) when you are talking about a trillion dollar defense budget? Isn't $12 billion the new "budget dust?" (note my attempt at sarcasm).
I am sure Korea is factored into the INDOPACOM request but it was not sufficient to be "mentioned in dispatches" here (again, my bias is showing).
A look at the wish lists for CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM and STRATCOM - Breaking Defense
INDOPACOM had the biggest request of these five COCOMS, asking for nearly $12 billion in additional funding.
breakingdefense.com · by Carley Welch, Aaron Mehta, Valerie Insinna · July 8, 2025
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) steams in formation with 7th Fleet ships, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ships, as U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force aircraft fly over in support of Valiant Shield 2024. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Timothy Dimal)
WASHINGTON — Five US combatant commands have requested $13.15 billion total in their annual Unfunded Priority Lists, according to documents obtained by Breaking Defense.
The heads of US Central Command, Northern Command, Southern Command, Indo-Pacific Command and Strategic Command are required by law to send in what amount to wish lists to Congress after the Pentagon’s budget is formally submitted. In essence, these cover things that the COCOM bosses wanted but didn’t get into the budget.
Here’s what you need to know:
US Indo-Pacific Command
The biggest ask of all the five commands comes from INDOPACOM Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo, who is requesting an additional nearly $12 billion in funding. The majority of the funds are directed toward all-domain unmanned systems ($4.4 billion) and counter command, control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting systems ($2.9 billion).
Last year the command requested $11 billion in additional funding. The nearly $1 billion increase comes as the Defense Department continues to prioritize deterrence in the region, including building its arsenal of unmanned systems, which is part of its larger Replicator initiative aimed at fielding thousands attritable drones in multiple domains to counter threats in the Indo-Pacific.
Among other priorities INDOPACOM asked for:
- $1.2 billion toward military construction including unspecified minor military construction
- $989 million for “Penetrating Platforms,” specifically for the non-traditional find, fix, track, and targeting (F2T2) capability, which uses software ISR solutions to find potential targets
US Central Command
Amid ongoing conflict in the Middle East region, CENTCOM had the second largest request out of the five commands, asking for $732 million. The biggest chunk of this funding — $150 million — is directed toward “accelerated prototyping and operational assessment” capabilities.
According to documentation obtained by Breaking Defense, this line item is targeted at creating acquisition authority, or a “technology development budget,” for combatant commands so they can “directly purchase test articles and assess new emerging technologies that will enhance warfighter capabilities and Service acquisition program analyses.”
“The fact that the Iranian Threat Network and other actors, such as those involved in the Russian-Ukraine conflict, are also leveraging new technology to achieve their objectives suggests that this represents a trend that USCENTCOM must be prepared to address,” the document read.
Among other priorities are:
- $110 million for “denial and deception capabilities” which include funding for “camouflage, concealment, and decoy capabilities for US Central Command Air Force and Army Components”
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$106 million for 188 of Northrop Grumman’s F-16 IVEWS systems, which use an ultra wideband architecture designed to detect, identify and counter radio frequency threats. These will replace three “legacy electronic warfare systems”
US Strategic Command
US Strategic Command is seeking $322.5 million in unfunded priorities, the biggest chunk — $140 million — of which is tapped for a classified program described as a “Convertible Nuclear System Prototype.”
Among the other priorities are:
-
$82.1 million for modernization and sustainment on the E-6B. Since 1998, the Navy has flown the E-6B in support of two missions: retaining communication between the National Command Authority and ballistic missile submarines — a mission known as TACAMO, or “Take Charge And Move Out” — and the ability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles from the air if launch systems on the ground are destroyed, a role historically known as Operation Looking Glass. The Pentagon is considering splitting up that mission set
- $37.1 million for the Minuteman III Flight Test Automatic Flight Safety System, which will support “continued Minuteman III flight test capabilities.” While set to be replaced by the Sentinel ICBM, the Minuteman is still going to be in service for several years
- $33.3 million for something marked “Expeditionary very low frequency,” to fund “prototype and demonstration systems.” The document indicates this is a Navy program, which may mean its related to the sea service’s submarine communications systems
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$30 million for Electromagnetic Battle Management — Joint (EMBM‐J), a joint STRATCOM and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) program first announced in late 2023. This money would help fund the program, which will enable “situational understanding of the electromagnetic operating environment,” according to the STRATCOM unfunded list
US Northern Command
NORTHCOM is seeking $35 million, requested in two pots: $21.5 million for “Accelerating Southern Border Tech Solutions” and $13.5 million for “Rapid AI Prototyping and Deployment for Homeland Defense,” in its wish list delivered by Gen. Gregory Guillot.
The southern border pot includes $10 million to “develop enterprise-level modeling, simulation and analysis of current and proposed surveillance and communications networks along the Southern Border,” which will lead to recommended investments in communications and sensors along the territory with Mexico. It also includes $9 million for “future C2 integration solutions” and $2.5 million for research on the effectiveness of operations, “enabling data-informed decisions to decrease enduring joint force requirements without compromising mission effectiveness.”
The second pot of money, focused on AI, will “enable USNORTHCOM to execute an AI testing and experimentation sprint leveraging agentic AI workflows to increase operational efficiency, enhance decision making, and accelerate warfighting capabilities in direct support of homeland defense.”
As part of that effort, “USNORTHCOM requests $6.5M to deploy a scalable AI platform across all classification networks, securely integrating with our existing intelligence, planning, and operations data so analysts can access AI tools immediately.”
Another $5 million is requested to run a series of three-week sprints to see whether AI can handle more complex operations, “such as drafting operation plans, summarizing intelligence, and integrating data across domains.”
Finally, NORTHCOM seeks $2 million to establish a test and experimentation environment to validate AI outputs.
“Embedding agentic AI in staff workflows accelerates situational awareness and tightens decision timelines. A secure exploration environment allows tools to be validated against real-world scenarios, while ‘AI-fast’ training readies operators in weeks. This pragmatic approach de-risks larger on-premises investments and delivers measurable outcomes,” per the request.
US Southern Command
Meanwhile, SOUTHCOM requested $60 million in additional funding, with its “Ship Special Mission” request of $35 million taking up the bulk of the request. This line item is geared toward bringing together partner nations to intercept the trading of illicit substances between transnational criminal organizations “hundreds of miles” offshore, according to 2024 testimony from then-SOUTHCOM Commander Gen. Laura Richardson.
Among other priorities:
- $8 million for security cooperation for “Ecuador Joint Command Info Sharing”
- $5.8 million for information sharing between Trinidad and Tobago for maritime domain awareness
breakingdefense.com · by Carley Welch, Aaron Mehta, Valerie Insinna · July 8, 2025
9. House committee's NDAA authorizes more money for Ukraine, thwarts troop reductions in Europe
Do Congressional statements on troop levels (or Ukraine support) mean anything into today's world of executive power dominance?
House committee's NDAA authorizes more money for Ukraine, thwarts troop reductions in Europe - Breaking Defense
HASC’s version of the NDAA sticks closely to the Pentagon’s own FY26 budget — a departure from a typical year where lawmakers divert funding to bolster high-priority programs.
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · July 8, 2025
U.S. Army paratroopers assigned 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade and French soldiers conduct joint training in Pabradė, Military Operation Urban Terrain (MOUT), Lithuania, May 21, 2025, during exercise Swift Response 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Jose Lora)
WASHINGTON — The House Armed Services Committee’s version of the fiscal 2026 defense policy bill adheres to the $848 billion topline requested by the Pentagon, with few major changes to the sums requested for big-ticket items like ships, aircraft and vehicles.
One notable exception: The inclusion of $300 million for Ukraine, with the security assistance available at the president’s discretion.
The provision — part of a larger section on Europe — authorizes $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative “contingent on a presidential determination that it serves the U.S. national interest,” extending the initiative without binding the Trump administration’s hands to delegate additional funding for Ukraine.
The funding would be included in a larger pot of money for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, states the bill, which was obtained by Breaking Defense. Politico was the first to report on the proposed legislation. (President Donald Trump said Monday that US must send additional military aid to Ukraine, days after reports said some arms transfers had been halted.)
In addition to the language authorizing additional Ukraine funding, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) also includes numerous oversight mechanisms that would click into place should the administration attempt to shrink the footprint of US forces in Europe, as top US officials have indicated is on the table.
According to the provision, funds authorized by the bill cannot be used to scale back the number of troops deployed to US European Command to less than 76,000 servicemembers unless the defense secretary and EUCOM commander submit a number of requirements, including an explanation of the decision, an assessment of Russian threats to NATO, certifications from both officials indicating that they have consulted with NATO allies, and other analysis documents.
Back home, the cornerstone of HASC’s NDAA is a package of acquisition reform legislation known as the SPEED Act — short for Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery. The SPEED Act provisions center on overhauling the Defense Department’s laborious and time-consuming requirements generation process, and will complement similar acquisition reform legislation set to be released as part of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the bill.
HASC’s version of the NDAA sticks closely to the Pentagon’s own FY26 budget, authorizing the sums requested for most major weapons programs — a departure from a typical year where lawmakers divert funding to bolster high-priority programs.
For example, the chairman’s mark keeps funding steady to purchase a total of 47 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, but adds $500 million for F-35 spares across the three services and decreases F-35 modernization accounts by $200 million due to delays to Block 4.
Other major changes included:
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An added $600 million to continue developing prototypes for the Air Force’s E-7 Wedgetail plane, which was cancelled in the FY26 budget
- A $475 million boost for the Space Force’s Next-Gen OPIR Polar program
- A $400 million increase for the Air Force’s next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile program, known as Sentinel or the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
- A $339 million boost for the Space Force’s GPS III follow on program
- An additional $300 million for two C-40 executive transport planes for the Air Force
- A $300 million decrease in funding for KC-46 procurement, with the legislation citing a “program delay”
- An extra $225 million to continue development of the Navy’s follow on to the Virginia-class attack submarine, known as SSN-X
- An additional $100 million for Army UH-60 Black Hawk modernization
- An additional $90 million for the Army to procure three more remanufactured AH-64E Apaches
- An additional $20 million to develop the Navy’s next generation destroyer, known as DDG-X
Although the House and Senate armed services committees can authorize changes to the Pentagon budget, the purse strings are held by the appropriations committees. House appropriators’ version of the FY26 defense spending bill is slated to move through the Rules Committee this evening, where committee members will determine which amendments will be debated as the bill comes to the floor, likely next week.
Golden Dome Demands And Other Policy Changes
Beyond the funding recommendations, the bill proposes a laundry list of policy requirements affecting key weapons systems.
The NDAA requires the department to submit to a plan for the Golden Dome missile shield as well as consolidated budget materials that would summarize spending for the project, which will likely involve existing and new systems across the US military.
That report should contain a description of the “next-generation air and missile defense architecture, including the identification of each capability, program, and project considered to be part of such architecture; [and] a preliminary description of, cost estimate for, and schedule to achieve initial operational capability and full operational capability.” The language stipulates that annual updates to the plan be sent to Congress through FY30.
For the F-35, the bill includes language that would compel the department to ensure that “sufficient wartime spares, support equipment and depot level capabilities” are available for at least 90 days “in the most stressing operational plan.” It would also force the defense secretary to ensure that F-35 prime contractor Lockheed Martin has validated all the information needed for the Defense Department to conduct an audit, as well as instating reports on F-35 sustainment.
In terms of nuclear capabilities, the bill includes a number of provisions aimed at ensuring the readiness of the existing Minuteman III fleet in the wake of delays with Sentinel, its replacement. It requires the Air Force to submit an annual strategy on Minuteman III sustainment, including a list of sustainment challenges, their potential impact on performance, and any mitigating steps that can prolong the life of the system.
The bill also prohibits the reduction of the ICBM force below 400 missiles, as well as blocking any attempt to lower the level of responsiveness of the nation’s current ICBM fleet.
For the Navy, the HASC’s NDAA includes multiple contractual authorities to enable the efficient procurement of ships, including language permitting the service to contract for two Ford-class aircraft and up to five Columbia-class submarines, with the ability to use incremental funding to purchase those vessels.
The bill also requires the Navy to create and implement an investment strategy for the maritime industrial base to ameliorate cost and schedule problems for shipbuilding programs. That strategy should also involve data collection and consider the use of artificial intelligence to monitor shipbuilders’ supply chains, the bill states.
The NDAA also makes several major demands of the Air Force’s tanker and cargo aircraft inventory. First, it prohibits the service from accepting KC-46 deliveries until the defense secretary certifies that the department is implementing a plan to correct all of the Category 1 deficiencies associated with the Boeing-made plane. The provision requires that the corrective action plan, as well as the funding and projected schedules associated with the plan, be submitted to the congressional defense committees.
The bill mandates that the Air Force maintain at least 504 refueling tankers, keep its retired KC-10s in flyable condition, and restricts KC-135 retirements from the reserves. It also requires the Air Force to submit a plan for recapitalizing its executive aircraft fleet.
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · July 8, 2025
10. What Trump’s order on ‘unleashing American drone dominance’ means for the U.S. military
Here is the link to the executive order POTUS signed last month. I should have sent this out sooner but I overlooked it: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/unleashing-american-drone-dominance/
"Directionally sound."
Excerpts:
“At first glance, the EO is directionally sound — it signals a strategic interest in accelerating the adoption of commercial unmanned aerial systems in the U.S. and reducing barriers to their use, particularly for testing and training,” Lauren Kahn, senior research analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, said. “That’s a positive step.”
David Rothzeid — a venture investor at Shield Capital, Air Force reservist and Defense Innovation Unit alum — echoed that sentiment, saying he views the EO “as a positive and timely move that supports both national security and the U.S. innovation ecosystem.”
“It sends a meaningful demand signal to American entrepreneurs and primes the broader market to accelerate development,” he told DefenseScoop. “That said, although the EO is well-aimed, its long-term impact will depend on execution.”
A longtime procurement official, Rothzeid previously led acquisition pathways at DIU. He argued that the DOD at this point needs to “avoid repeating past mistakes where adversaries seized technological leads due to” slow adoption and over-classification postures at the Pentagon.
What Trump’s order on ‘unleashing American drone dominance’ means for the U.S. military
DefenseScoop asked national security experts to weigh in on the directive.
defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · July 8, 2025
While the Trump administration’s recently-issued executive order on “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” places a sharp focus on civilian use of unmanned aircraft, the new policy also includes multiple provisions that could have implications for Pentagon and military personnel.
“The Department of Defense must be able to procure, integrate, and train using low-cost, high-performing drones manufactured in the United States,” President Donald Trump wrote in the directive.
This new EO comes at a time when autonomous systems are increasingly proving to be game-changing on contemporary battlefields. Yet despite major investments, all of America’s military services are confronting serious challenges in adopting and deploying different-sized and affordable drones for widespread use.
DefenseScoop asked former defense officials and national security experts to share their analyses regarding the order, in separate conversations following its release last month.
“At first glance, the EO is directionally sound — it signals a strategic interest in accelerating the adoption of commercial unmanned aerial systems in the U.S. and reducing barriers to their use, particularly for testing and training,” Lauren Kahn, senior research analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, said. “That’s a positive step.”
David Rothzeid — a venture investor at Shield Capital, Air Force reservist and Defense Innovation Unit alum — echoed that sentiment, saying he views the EO “as a positive and timely move that supports both national security and the U.S. innovation ecosystem.”
“It sends a meaningful demand signal to American entrepreneurs and primes the broader market to accelerate development,” he told DefenseScoop. “That said, although the EO is well-aimed, its long-term impact will depend on execution.”
A longtime procurement official, Rothzeid previously led acquisition pathways at DIU. He argued that the DOD at this point needs to “avoid repeating past mistakes where adversaries seized technological leads due to” slow adoption and over-classification postures at the Pentagon.
“For example, the proliferation of Chinese-created DJI drones in both consumer and defense sectors continues to exacerbate our domestic sourcing. By failing to incubate and scale domestic alternatives earlier, we inadvertently ceded a portion of the Group 1 UAV market to foreign influence,” Rothzeid said, referring to drones on the small end of the spectrum.
Tucked into the new EO is a line that directs the department and military leadership to identify programs that hold potential to be “more cost efficient or lethal” if replaced by drones — and to submit a report to the president on their findings within 90 days of its publication.
“This is included as almost a throwaway because DOD has been doing that during its budget and strategy review,” Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told DefenseScoop.
He pointed to the Army terminating its Apache attack helicopter replacement program, noting that determination was “likely driven by a desire to use drones.”
“Other examples are the large increase in funding for the [Air Force’s] collaborative combat aircraft — a drone that would accompany manned aircraft — and endorsement of the Replicator program, which seeks to develop drone swarms and was started by the Biden administration,” Cancian said.
In Kahn’s view, that specific provision regarding recommendations on drones to replace legacy weapons “risks becoming a box-ticking exercise if services nominate programs they were already planning to retire.”
“However, if taken seriously and used to spur some of the efforts already underway in the department to accelerate the adoption of cheaper, attritable, drones and other precise mass capabilities, it could help rebalance a force still over-invested in costly, vulnerable legacy systems,” she said.
“As Ukraine and Israel have shown in recent days with Operations Spider’s Web and Rising Lion, low-cost UAS can impose asymmetric costs and scale far faster than exquisite platforms — making them strong candidates to replace select ISR, strike, or base defense assets. Still, systems shouldn’t be replaced just for the sake of it; the goal is a high-low mix where attritable drones complement, not supplant, more advanced capabilities,” Kahn told DefenseScoop.
Despite being titled “Delivering Drones to Our Warfighters,” Section 9 of the order spotlights elements that she considers more associated with airspace issues and training — and “less about breaking down challenges the department faces when it comes to acquiring, sustaining, and rapidly scaling UAS, and other emerging capabilities.”
Khan further noted that the EO “entirely overlooks” unmanned surface vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles, and other autonomous and remotely crewed systems.
Meanwhile, “a welcome provision is the push to allow all platforms on the Blue UAS list to operate on military installations without requiring policy exceptions,” she told DefenseScoop.
Managed by DIU, Blue UAS is a Pentagon program that is designed to help the department rapidly pinpoint and approve secure commercial drones for government use.
“That’s the kind of specific change that can have outsized operational impact by enabling more rapid experimentation and deployment. However, it largely emphasizes access to airspace — an essential and persistent issue, particularly when it comes to deconflicting some of the challenges of airspace above military installations that the DOD itself faces,” Khan said, adding that the directive “largely targets known, second-order problems rather than the deeper, more significant structural barriers the DOD faces when adopting UAS at scale.”
Tom Adams, director of public safety at DroneShield, also said the EO marks a step in the right direction, but suggested more needs to be done.
“[There] were some noticeable gaps in the language related to the authorities for public safety, and critical infrastructure, for example, that I believe is meant to be addressed with more formal legislation,” he said. “I’m looking forward to seeing how Congress tackles this issue that is so crucial to the security of the homeland.”
Rothzeid also spotlighted the directive’s Blue UAS provision in his discussion with DefenseScoop. To him, it’s “critical” for DOD to expand that list and update it with newly approved industry-made capabilities more frequently.
“There are new players with innovative UAS platforms popping up in the space all the time — and while it’s important to make sure UAS platforms are secure and compliant — being more flexible to let new vendors in will accelerate the pace of innovation by widening the number of platforms DOD can procure rapidly,” he said.
Rothzeid offered several other suggestions, beyond what was covered in Trump’s order, that could help the military more rapidly field combat-ready drone systems.
He recommended DOD improve companies’ access to testing ranges, particularly for drones that are built or modified to withstand interference from electromagnetic sources for emergency response or other purposes.
“Startups consistently face delays and red tape when trying to test their systems in realistic electromagnetic environments. This is a critical gap, especially considering that several U.S. platforms sent to Ukraine failed due to inadequate battlefield resilience,” Rothzeid said.
He additionally urged the Trump administration to ensure that the demand signal from the new EO is supported by budget allocations in the near term to enable its implementation.
“Ultimately, policy without procurement falls flat. If this EO is to deliver on its promise, DOD will need to match it with funding, contracting pathways, and accountability to ensure real dollars flow to companies building these next-generation systems,” Rothzeid told DefenseScoop.
Written by Brandi Vincent
Brandi Vincent is DefenseScoop’s Pentagon correspondent. She reports on emerging and disruptive technologies, and associated policies, impacting the Defense Department and its personnel. Prior to joining Scoop News Group, Brandi produced a long-form documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. She grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland.
defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · July 8, 2025
11. China imposes export ban on companies tied to Taiwan’s military
Should not be a surprise.
China imposes export ban on companies tied to Taiwan’s military
AP · by SIMINA MISTREANU · July 9, 2025
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — China imposed export controls Wednesday on eight enterprises tied to Taiwan’s military as the self-ruled island started annual military exercises.
China’s Commerce Ministry added eight Taiwan-based organizations including aerospace and shipbuilding companies to an export control list, citing national and regional security concerns.
The banned companies include defense supplier Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC), drone maker Jingwei Aerospace Technology Co., and CSBC Corporation, Taiwan’s largest shipbuilding company.
The new rules, effective immediately, prohibit the export to the listed enterprises of “dual-use items,” which can be used for both civilian and military purposes.
The ban comes as Taiwan begins its annual Han Kuang military drills, which will simulate defenses against a possible invasion by China. The drills are set to be the largest and longest so far, lasting about 10 days, twice as long as last year’s exercises.
China regards self-ruled Taiwan as its own territory, to be annexed by force if necessary. Beijing has branded Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te as a separatist and refuses to speak to him.
A spokesperson for Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office said the export controls were necessary to defend China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
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“It is also a solemn warning to the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces,” said spokesperson Chen Binhua. “‘Taiwan independence’ is an evil path. Enterprises, organizations and individuals who are willing to be the henchmen of the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces participate in splitting the country, and incite splitting the country will be severely punished according to law.”
The United States, like most countries, doesn’t recognize Taiwan as a country, but is bound by its own laws to provide it with the means to defend itself.
AP · by SIMINA MISTREANU · July 9, 2025
12. Army will look for false accusations, consider 'credibility' in misconduct cases
I have heard (but cannot verify this as a fact) that most all general officers have had accusations made against them that required investigation but most allegations are found to be unsubstantiated.
Army will look for false accusations, consider 'credibility' in misconduct cases
New rules will send misconduct complaints to a “credibility assessment” before a full investigation is launched, and removes negative flags from personnel records during investigations.
taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg
The Army has made changes in how it investigates misconduct allegations with new rules that may muddy the waters for soldiers making anonymous reports of misconduct like toxic leadership or hazing, former military lawyers warned. The updated rules also stop the flagging of an accused soldier’s personnel record in advance of an investigation, which could delay career progression, and introduce punishments for soldiers proven to have made false accusations.
The changes came in a June update to the Army’s 15-6 regulation, which governs the process for investigating military-related misconduct like sexual harassment, toxic leadership, adultery, fraternization, cruelty and maltreatment of subordinates, violation of orders and regulations, misuse of government resources, and hazing.
The new regulation introduces several new terms that add new processes or concepts into the framework of a 15-6 investigation. Those investigations can lead to administrative punishments or more serious Uniformed Code of Military Justice proceedings that result in discharges or rank and grade demotions.
An Army official told Task & Purpose that the goal is to reduce the number of 15-6 investigations and “clarify” for commanders, especially for junior officers, that there are other processes — like a memorandum for records — they are encouraged to use for “everyday friction” within their command and when there’s not “sufficient evidence.”
The regulation changes follow an April 23 memo from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, that ordered changes to the investigation process and including new terminology used verbatim in the new Army regulation. Hegseth referred to it as the “No More Walking On Eggshells Policy,” in a video posted to X on April 25.
“Too often at the Defense Department, there are complaints made for certain reasons that can’t be verified that end people’s career, either through [Equal Opportunity] or the [Inspector General]. We need to reform that process completely so commanders can be commanders,” Hegseth said in the video.
‘Credible evidence’
The largest change to the 15-6 investigation process is the addition of a new “credibility” review at the early stage of some complaints. Traditionally, an Army 15-6 investigation had three fact-finding or evidence-gathering phases: preliminary inquiries, administrative investigations and boards of officers.
The new regulation now lays out an additional phase, called a “credibility assessment,” which would precede the three other phases, and possibly short-circuit the full investigation. The regulation states that officials receiving the complaint should initially review “to determine if sufficient credible information exists to warrant further fact-finding or evidence-gathering.”
The assessment is based on language used in Hegseth’s memo, for “credible” evidence or information which is defined as “attributable or corroborated information,” that considers “the original source, the nature of the information, and the totality of the circumstances” to determine if it is “sufficient” for investigators to pursue an inquiry.
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Rachel VanLandingham, a former Air Force lawyer, said information needing to be “corroborated” or “attributed” could mean that an anonymous report will not be sufficient enough to “trigger” a 15-6 investigation. She said this could impact inquiries into hostile work environments because of toxic leaders.
“You need anonymous complaints because people are afraid of their commanders and if their commanders are retributive and hostile and toxic, you’re not going to leave your name,” VanLandingham said. “If you have a bunch of folks in a unit that are really afraid of their commander, they don’t want to say anything so they leave a bunch of anonymous complaints that’s not corroborated and that’s not attributable to anybody. But damn straight, the higher level commander — when he’s got 10 of these — should be investigating.”
The Army official said that not knowing the source prevents investigators from asking follow-up questions and that a “vague anonymous complaint” is “probably not actionable” because investigators cannot ask follow-up questions that would establish credibility.
False accusations
Hegseth’s memo also called for “disciplinary actions against personnel who knowingly submit false complaints,” a topic which now has its own new section in the Army 15-6 manual. According to the new language, soldiers can face punitive measures for “knowingly” or “repeatedly” submitting false and “frivolous” allegations that could trigger investigations. The manual defines frivolous allegations as those “that a reasonable person knows has no merit,” and which were made for “an unreasonable purpose” like harassment.
Military justice lawyers told Task & Purpose the focus on punishing accusations deemed as false could have a chilling effect on victims of sexual harassment coming forward. Under current rules, formal reports of sexual harassment cannot be made anonymously.
Four former military lawyers told Task & Purpose that proving a false allegation would require a high standard of proof, which makes the new rule appear to be more of a message to discourage reports than an actual enforcement mechanism.
Barb Snow, a former active duty and Reserve Army jag officer for 11 years, pointed out that making false official statements is already an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
“Making the AR-15-6 process a quasi-criminal offense investigation process” will dissuade troops from coming forward, she said.
Retired Col. Don Christensen, former chief prosecutor for the Air Force and the former president for Protect Our Defenders, said the new language reflects an ongoing conversation within military circles around sexual harassment. He said he worries that victims will fear punishment, and retaliation for a report that isn’t substantiated with enough evidence to pursue legal or administrative actions.
“My biggest concern isn’t so much that people will be prosecuted for it, but that it will chill people from coming forward,” Christensen said. “There’s always been this, I would say undercurrent, of people in the military who very much want to punish, particularly women who come forward, and if that doesn’t result in a conviction, then they immediately label it a false allegation. There’s a huge difference between being able to get a conviction and something being false.”
No more flagging
Under the new rules, soldiers can still find their personnel records “flagged” during the formal evidence-gathering phase of a 15-6 investigation, which soldiers have long complained can impact promotions or delay base moves. But during a credibility assessment, soldiers will not be flagged.
Daniel Conway, a former Marine staff sergeant and captain who currently represents service members at military trials, said flagging can be “really disruptive” because it can interrupt deployments or assignments.
“If you’re a command sergeant major and you get accused of making inappropriate comments, you wind up with a 15-6,” he said. “It takes four, five, six months. You’ve now been rendered pretty much useless to the Army for half a year.”
Conway said he thinks the changes will cut down the number of 15-6 investigations for more minor issues.
“Being in San Antonio, we have a training command here with drill sergeants, and I’m constantly over the years representing drill sergeants who are being subjected to 15-6 investigations on frivolous complaints from trainees — really the most minor of stuff.”
Robert Capovilla, a former Army lawyer who currently represents troops in military cases, said the changes will be most relevant for sexual harassment cases where “the allegation itself ends that soldier’s career.”
“The dirty secret of military justice is, a lot of these people who are flagged for prolonged periods of time, even if they end up winning their case, the damage to their career is irreversible,” Capovilla said.
The regulation states that the Army will appoint specially trained investigative officers outside the chain of command of the reporter and subject to handle administrative investigations of formal sexual harassment complaints.
Capovilla called it a welcome change.
“We’ve seen untrained investigating officers who do not understand the definition of sexual harassment come back and almost universally conclude that sexual harassment occurred,” he said. “Then those soldiers and airmen and Marines and everything are facing separation boards or boards of inquiry based on nothing but an amateur investigation that was done by somebody who didn’t even understand what they were doing.”
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13. The Army has realized that horses are no longer good for 'warfighting’
But the capability may still be needed in certain areas of the world (though it does not require the Army to sustain the level horse it has been - I am just taking exception to the headline of the article).
Special Forces and Pack Animals – Info and Pubs
https://sof.news/special-forces/pack-animals/
And then there is this interesting video and capability. You will probably still need horses for entry level training before you jump on this "Kawasaki horse." But we can certainly contract with civilian sources for that if necessary and it does not require the Army to maintain horses to provide training.
Will SOF operators be riding robotic ‘horses’ into hot zones? Kawasaki unveils a concept
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHi1tlnFR-w
My point is horses may still be good for some warfighting in certain contexts (but again the Army does not need to maintain them except for select ceremonial duties for which they absolutely should be sustained).
The Army has realized that horses are no longer good for 'warfighting’
Most of the Army’s horses, donkeys and mules are being sold or donated “to align more resources with warfighting capability and readiness.”
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton
Goodbye horses, the Army’s over you.
The Army is drastically scaling back its Military Working Equid program, the Army term for the service’s contingent of horses, donkeys and mules. With a few exceptions for ceremonial horse teams, the equine operations will wind down over the next year at five Army bases, with animals being donated or transferred to private owners, the Army announced last week. Why the drawdown? According to the Army, it’s “to align more resources with warfighting capability and readiness.”
“This initiative will save the Army $2 million annually and will allow the funds and soldiers dedicated to [Military Working Equid] programs to be redirected to readiness and warfighting priorities,” according to the Army’s release. The “warfighting priorities” were not specified.
The Department of Defense currently owns 236 horses, mules and donkeys, which are housed and cared for on Army bases, Army spokesperson Lt. Col. Ruth Castro told Task & Purpose on Monday.
Sgt. Jacob Sanlin, with the Military Funeral Honors Platoon-Caisson Section, guides a horse at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas on Feb. 26, 2025. Army photo by Sgt. Andrea Kent.
The one-year reduction will see the closure of MWE programs at bases in California, Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas: Fort Irwin, Fort Huachuca, Fort Riley, Fort Sill and Fort Hood. The Army will keep horse teams at two locations, including the 3rd Infantry Regiment, or “the Old Guard,” at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia, which restarted its caisson services in June after a two-year pause following the death of two horses. That effort saw the Army invest more than $18 million in new real estate and equipment for the horses.
Though the age of the war horse is long gone, horses have not been totally absent from combat use in the modern Army.
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Army Special Forces soldiers famously used horses with the Northern Alliance during the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 — those horses were provided by Afghan partners. The last time the Army staged an outright cavalry charge was 83 years ago during World War II. The 26th Cavalry Regiment in the Philippines, made up of American and Filipino fighters, resisted Japanese forces with horseback tactics. On Jan. 16, 1942, Lt. Edward Ramsey led a mounted force into the village of Morong. When the cavalry encountered a larger Japanese infantry force, Ramsey ordered them forward, even yelling “charge!” The horse-based assault was so sudden and shocking it pushed the Japanese forces back.
According to the Army, equine veterinarian experts will oversee the drawdown of the MWE animals. They will be sold, donated or adopted by outside parties.
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taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton
14. For Iranian Regime, War for Survival is Against Citizens at Home
Excerpts:
Some critics raise familiar objections, but they do not withstand scrutiny.
They argue that regime change from within is inherently messy. That’s true, but the current order is far bloodier and more dangerous. The Islamic Republic has crushed every peaceful reform effort and turned every grievance into an excuse for violence. There is no viable path to gradual liberalization. The question is no longer whether change is risky; it is whether the regime can sustain itself without continued repression, corruption and nuclear blackmail.
The answer is clear: it cannot.
Another objection insists that the regime is too deeply entrenched to fall. Yet the last five years tell a different story. Several nationwide uprisings, driven largely by women and youth, have shaken the theocracy’s foundations.
For Iranian Regime, War for Survival is Against Citizens at Home
https://defenseopinion.com/for-iranian-regime-war-for-survival-is-against-citizens-at-home/947/?utm
With a fragile ceasefire now holding between Iran and Israel following the June 2025 escalation, headlines have temporarily shifted away from the regional tension. Yet the most consequential struggle involving the Islamic Republic is not in the skies over the Middle East but in the streets of Iran itself and the Iranian people’s fight for liberty.
Since August 2024, Iran’s regime has executed more than 1,350 people-many of them women, youths, and ethnic minorities, according to Amnesty International.
Repression is not a glitch in the system; it is the system. The regime has arrested more than 700 people since the ceasefire. It has established special courts to expedite the trials, and it relocates political prisoners to unknown locations. These signs are stark reminder of what took place in Iran just before the 1988 massacre of political prisoners.
For 45 years, Tehran has ruled through executions, torture, censorship and assassinations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — the regime’s praetorian guard– exports that violence through proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Given this record, the refusal of some Western governments — particularly the European Union — to designate the IRGC as a terrorist entity is indefensible.
A return to monarchy is dangerous fantasy
Even now, with Tehran facing mounting domestic and international pressure, some pundits propose a return to monarchy through the son of the deposed Shah, Reza Pahlavi. This is a dangerous fantasy, reminiscent of Iraq-style regime change imposed from abroad. Iranians have already rendered their verdict on both monarchy and theocracy.
During the 2022 uprising, protesters chanted, “Down with the oppressor–be it Shah or Supreme Leader.” More than 3,600 resistance units, many inspired by a six-decade struggle against two dictatorships, have carried out civil-disobedience actions in nearly every province. Their aim is not to swap one autocracy for another, but to build a democratic, secular and non-nuclear republic, rooted in pluralism and equal rights.
That vision is embodied in the ten-point plan of Maryam Rajavi, president-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) a longstanding, broad-based coalition that functions as a parliament-in-exile for a future free and democratic Iranian republic.
Group’s platform calls for Western-style democracy
The group’s platform calls for free elections, gender equality, judicial independence, separation of religion and state and a foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence. It has enjoyed consistent backing from a bipartisan majority of the U.S. House over the past decade, including in both the 118th and 119th Congresses, as well as support from thousands of parliamentarians and dozens of former heads of state worldwide.
The latest congressional resolution indicates that in November 2024, Rajavi presented a detailed democratic roadmap to the European Parliament, grounded in the demands of Iran’s protesters and charting a peaceful transfer of power.
Some critics raise familiar objections, but they do not withstand scrutiny.
They argue that regime change from within is inherently messy. That’s true, but the current order is far bloodier and more dangerous. The Islamic Republic has crushed every peaceful reform effort and turned every grievance into an excuse for violence. There is no viable path to gradual liberalization. The question is no longer whether change is risky; it is whether the regime can sustain itself without continued repression, corruption and nuclear blackmail.
The answer is clear: it cannot.
Another objection insists that the regime is too deeply entrenched to fall. Yet the last five years tell a different story. Several nationwide uprisings, driven largely by women and youth, have shaken the theocracy’s foundations.
Economic collapse, internal factionalism, growing international pressure and public disillusionment have left the clerical state extremely brittle. What has been missing is not domestic pressure but international clarity on the path forward, including recognition of the Iranian people’s right to determine their own future.
Finally, with the growing question of what can come after this regime, some claim that Maryam Rajavi lacks grassroots support. The regime’s own behavior tells a different story. Tehran reserves its harshest sentences, public executions and mass-arrest sweeps for her supporters, who constitute the single largest bloc of political detainees in Iran, according to UN Special Rapporteur reports.
Growing opposition to theocratic police state
Because scientific polling is impossible under a police state, the best proxy for popularity is the risk people are willing to take. Rajavi’s resistance units operate clandestinely across nearly every province, despite torture and death sentences for even minor acts of affiliation.
Outside Iran, where repression cannot muzzle them, her backers stage the largest, recurring opposition rallies of Iranians in the world, drawing thousands month after month in Paris, Berlin, London, Washington, Toronto and beyond. These are sustained, volunteer-driven demonstrations that swell whenever the regime tightens its grip at home. By any realistic measure, sacrifice inside Iran and mobilization abroad, Rajavi leads the only opposition with both the organizational depth and popular reach to challenge the Islamic Republic as a viable alternative.
Both Democratic and Republican administrations have attempted appeasement of the Tehran regime. It did not halt Tehran’s dash toward nuclear weapons, stop its missiles from striking Israeli cities or deter the public hangings of political prisoners.
If the international community seeks lasting stability, it must back the Iranian people, not the theocracy and not discredited figures like Reza Pahlavi.
Bipartisan support for democratic alternative
U.S. House Resolution 166, now enjoying wide bipartisan support, does exactly that. It affirms the Iranian people’s right to resist and endorses a democratic alternative to clerical rule. It also calls for protecting former political prisoners and dissidents, including the residents of Ashraf 3 in Albania, many of whom are eyewitnesses to the regime’s past crimes.
These individuals remain constant targets of Tehran’s operatives. The Iranian regime has attempted cyberattacks, plotted terrorist bombings and launched a sustained disinformation campaign to delegitimize and threaten Ashraf 3, underscoring how seriously it fears organized resistance. Safeguarding Ashraf 3 is not only a matter of refugee protection. It is a test of the international community’s resolve to stand against transnational repression.
What Iranians seek is simple and just: a free republic where religion does not dictate law; where women, men and minorities share equal rights; and where no child grows up under the shadow of the gallows. That future will not be delivered by missiles or monarchs. It will be forged, despite enormous odds, by the Iranian people themselves.
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Ramesh Sepehrrad, Ph.D.
Ramesh Sepehrrad, Ph.D., is an Iranian-American author and scholar practitioner with advanced degrees from the Carter School of Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. She is professor of practice in cybersecurity at the University of Connecticut and is currently teaching Middle East studies at the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore. She also serves as the chair of advisory board for the Organization of Iranian American Communities (OIAC) that has 40 chapters across the U.S.
15. Stacey Abrams touts 10 steps to autocracy, says 'do not let the propaganda win'
I was surprised to see this on FOX News.
See the video at the link. https://www.foxnews.com/media/stacey-abrams-touts-10-steps-autocracy-says-do-not-let-propaganda-win
Stacey Abrams touts 10 steps to autocracy, says 'do not let the propaganda win'
foxnews.com · by Hanna Panreck Fox News
Video
Stacey Abrams suggests U.S. approaching autocracy, touting 10-step framework, during late-night interview
Stacey Abrams suggested the U.S. was approaching autocracy during a late-night interview, touting a 10-step framework, and urged viewers to fight back.
NEWYou can now listen to Fox News articles!
Former Georgia gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams suggested the U.S. was on its way to becoming an autocracy on Monday, laying out a 10-step framework and urged viewers, "do not let the propaganda win."
The first few steps, Abrams said during "Jimmy Kimmel Live," begin with a president who wants expanded executive power, and appoints "loyalists" to government positions. She added, "step seven, you have to blame someone," suggesting that was when the president went after DEI and the "vulnerable."
Abrams, who lost twice to Gov. Brian Kemp in bids to become Georgia's governor, posted the steps to social media last week, and suggested in the post that the U.S. was at step nine.
JAMES CARVILLE TELLS EX-CNN HOST HE'S WORRIED TRUMP WILL TAMPER WITH 2026 MIDTERM ELECTIONS
Former Georgia Democratic gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams suggested the U.S. was on its way to becoming an autocracy during an interview on late-night TV. (Jimmy Kimmel/ABC)
"Step nine you start to encourage and incentivize private violence. You send the U.S. Marines into spaces they should not be. You send the National Guard in. You kidnap people off of the streets and pretend that’s normal, because that’s how you quiet dissent, because you make everyone afraid that if they don’t do what you want, they might be next. And once you’ve done those nine steps, step 10 is easy. That’s when you decide there won’t be new elections because everyone is either afraid, poor, broken, or complicit," Abrams told guest host Anthony Anderson.
Anderson asked Abrams how people could prevent an autocracy from forming. Abrams gave credit to a professor at Princeton, Kim Scheppele, for the framework of her argument, and said she editorialized it.
JB PRITZKER RIPS TRUMP AS ‘AUTHORITARIAN,’ RESPONDS TO PRESIDENT CALLING OUT HIS WEIGHT
Former Georgia House Rep. Stacey Abrams attends the Fort Valley GOTV Community Fish Fry at the Agricultural Technology Conference Center on October 13, 2024 in Fort Valley, Georgia. (Photo by Julia Beverly/Getty Images)
"We can fight back. We can remember that we do have power. They don’t want dissent, so protest. They want us to forget that before we had power, we had each other. So when they break democracy, when they break the Social Security system, then they slash SNAP benefits and Medicaid, make sure you’re checking on your neighbors. Make sure we’re using mutual aid. But also tell the truth. Do not let the propaganda win," Abrams said.
The failed gubernatorial candidate added, "They will lie so often it sounds like the truth."
"We say the truth one time and when people don’t applaud, we stop talking. We’ve got to keep telling the truth, not only to push back against them, but to remind us that we are entitled to the truth. We have to believe that freedom of assembly means it’s more than just going to protests. It’s the ability to be friends with people who aren’t like you, and we have to stop believing that we are in this alone," Abrams continued.
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Stacey Abrams, Democratic gubernatorial candidate for Georgia, speaks during an election night rally in Atlanta, Georgia, US, on Tuesday, Nov. 8, 2022. (Dustin Chambers/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
She also spoke to Anderson about being a Black woman in politics.
"So as a woman of color, as a Black woman in particular, I have the affirmative responsibility to speak up on behalf of everyone else because they’re coming for me first, and they’re coming for me next. Our responsibility then is to use every tool at our disposal, including politics," Abrams said.
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Abrams is weighing a third run to be Georgia's governor, a source told Fox News Digital in April, despite back-to-back defeats.
Hanna Panreck is an associate editor at Fox News.
foxnews.com · by Hanna Panreck Fox News
16. Fired State Dept bureaucrats reportedly using their regime change skills to sabotage Trump
Sarcasm follows:
This begs the question: Did all these USAID and Statement employees know they were trying to conduct unconventional warfare with their democracy programs? What training in unconventional warfare did they have?
(recall that Unconventional Warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area.)
Perhaps it is good they were let go. How successful have they been in the past few decades? (though Syria has fallen and there many USAID democracy efforts ap;lied there that problems contributed to the eventual fall of the Assad regime).
So given the track record no one would be worried about the alleged efforts outlined below.
Please note my sarcasm in the above comments
Fired State Dept bureaucrats reportedly using their regime change skills to sabotage Trump
The White House said, 'It is inherently undemocratic for unelected bureaucrats to undermine the duly elected President of the United States and the agenda he was given a mandate to implement'
By Alexander Hall Fox News
Published July 8, 2025 6:57am EDT
foxnews.com · by Alexander Hall Fox News
Video
Four plead guilty in $550 million USAID bribery scheme
Chief Washington correspondent Mike Emanuel provides updates on the USAID case and Republican criticism that the agency is 'irresponsible.'
NEWYou can now listen to Fox News articles!
Current and former USAID and State Department officials are using their expertise in undermining authoritarian regimes abroad against President Donald Trump and his agenda at home, according to a new report Monday.
The Trump administration is still in the process of terminating thousands of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) workers by September as the agency restructures to fall in line with the president's "America First" policy.
NOTUS reporter Jose Pagliery reported, however, that "Some of the democracy-building experts President Donald Trump fired this year from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department are now reapplying the skills and knowledge they built up over decades to undermine Trump’s power."
One anonymous current federal official warned to NOTUS, "Take it from those of us who worked in authoritarian countries: We’ve become one." He added, "They were so quick to disband AID, the group that supposedly instigates color revolutions. But they’ve done a very foolish thing. You just released a bunch of well-trained individuals into your population. If you kept our offices going and had us play solitaire in the office, it might have been safer to keep your regime."
RUBIO OFFICIALLY KILLS USAID, REVEALS FUTURE HOME FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
President Trump faces resistance from many of the same bureaucrats he once fired. (REUTERS/Nathan Howard)
"Former officials" reportedly told the news outlet that they are "holding workshops on a tactic called ‘noncooperation.’ They’re building a network of government workers willing to engage in even minor acts of rebellion in the office. And they’re planting the seeds of what they hope could become a nationwide general strike."
"Some in the informal network of Trump opponents are sharing an old CIA pamphlet with allies who still work in the government: It’s called ‘Simple Sabotage,’" the reporter added.
This community, NOTUS reported, "is composed of diplomats and human rights activists who were once on the U.S. government payroll encouraging Latin American dissidents to fight dictators and supporting African independence movements. They were involved to varying degrees with an ultimately successful uprising in the Middle East."
One group that NOTUS cited was "DemocracyAID," which has no formal website or legal entity so far, but is "already hosting invite-only workshops with federal employees who hear about them from friends, vetting each person before they’re allowed into a trusted circle and teaching them case studies, like the Danish underground insurgency against Nazi occupation."
Ro Tucci, the former director of the USAID Center for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance who co-leads DemocracyAID, teaches workshops on what she calls "Authoritarianism 101" and the ways to resist it, starting with small community organization and ideally ending in a massive strike.
BUSH TEAMS UP WITH NOTORIOUS TRUMP FOES TO TRASH 'COLOSSAL MISTAKE' SHUTTERING USAID
President Donald Trump arrives to speak at a rally at the Iowa State Fairgrounds, Thursday, July 3, 2025, in Des Moines, Iowa. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
Deputy White House press secretary Anna Kelly condemned such efforts in a statement to NOTUS, saying, "It is inherently undemocratic for unelected bureaucrats to undermine the duly elected President of the United States and the agenda he was given a mandate to implement."
While supporters within the administration are resolute they will accomplish their agenda despite internal resistance, NOTUS claims that "several" rebellious insiders are making Star Wars references about their attempts to disrupt Trump’s agenda.
"Fascism is not creative," a former government expert in conflict told the outlet. "There’s only so many ways to do it. That’s why it’s almost cliché to the point where we ask, ‘What are we, Darth Vader? The Empire? The Nazis?’ The comparisons draw ridicule because people who don’t know enough about it don’t realize there aren’t too many ways to do it. So, the tactics to counter them will still work, and there’s way more ways to be creative."
A Star Wars movie poster. (Photo by: Universal History Archive/UIG via Getty images)
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A senior State Department official told Fox News Digital, "The State Department is not aware of these reports but always takes our national security seriously. We will continue to take every precaution to protect the State Department from internal and external threats."
Fox News Digital also attempted to reach out to Tucci.
Fox News' Emma Colton contributed to this report.
Alexander Hall is an associate editor for Fox News Digital. Story tips can be sent to Alexander.hall@fox.com.
foxnews.com · by Alexander Hall Fox News
17. USAID review raised ‘critical concerns’ over Gaza aid group days before $30 million US grant
Excerpts:
A USAID official came to a clear conclusion in the report: “I do not concur with moving forward with GHF given operational and reputational risks and lack of oversight.”
“The application was abysmal… it was sorely lacking real content,” a source familiar with the application told CNN on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
...
In an internal memo dated June 24 – four days after the date listed on the assessment – a top political appointee at the State Department, Kenneth Jackson, recommended that Lewin “waive the various criteria given the humanitarian and political urgency of GHF’s operations.” Both Lewin and Jackson were initially installed into government roles by the Elon Musk-backed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE).
The State Department announced the award two days later and sent GHF a document conveying requirements for the funds, including some related to concerns raised by USAID. Tranches of the $30 million award will be released when GHF completes key tasks – including many typically required before funding is approved, like registering in the government system, pre-vetting partners and providing evidence of external audits.
USAID review raised ‘critical concerns’ over Gaza aid group days before $30 million US grant | CNN
CNN · by Yahya Abou-Ghazala, Jennifer Hansler · July 9, 2025
CNN —
An internal government assessment shows USAID officials raised “critical concerns” last month about a key aid group’s ability to protect Palestinians and to deliver them food – just days before the State Department announced $30 million in funding for the organization.
A scathing 14-page document obtained by CNN outlines a litany of problems with a
funding application submitted by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a US-backed group established to provide aid following an 11-week Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. The United Nations human rights office says that hundreds of Palestinians have since been killed around private aid sites, including those operated by GHF.
The assessment flags a range of concerns, from an overall plan missing “even basic details” to a proposal to potentially distribute powdered baby formula in an area that lacks clean water to prepare it.
A USAID official came to a clear conclusion in the report: “I do not concur with moving
forward with GHF given operational and reputational risks and lack of oversight.”
“The application was abysmal… it was sorely lacking real content,” a source familiar with
the application told CNN on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaks in the Treaty Room of the State Department on June 27.
Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images
Trump administration officials have consistently downplayed and rejected criticisms about GHF. Israel has also disputed media reports, eyewitness and doctor accounts, and Palestinian officials blaming the Israeli military for killing aid-seekers near GHF sites.
A State Department spokesperson said in a statement to CNN Tuesday that the funding for GHF will fulfill “President Trump’s commitment to feed the people of Gaza” and accused critics of engaging in “bureaucratic turf wars.”
“The Department provided emergency support to the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation after determining that it was the only viable way to get aid into Gaza without empowering Hamas,” the spokesperson said. “GHF is a results-focused alternative to a broken aid system, delivering more than 66 million meals to the people of Gaza in just weeks.”
A GHF spokesperson defended the organization’s work in Gaza and described the USAID assessment as normal for a funding application.
“As with any U.S. Government procurement process, questions and requests for clarification from USAID/State are routine,” GHF spokesperson Chapin Fay told CNN in a statement. “We are addressing each question as per regulations and normal procedure and will continue to do so as required.”
The 14-page document outlining USAID’s outstanding questions and concerns was not
sent to GHF before the funding was approved, according to another source familiar with the matter who spoke to CNN on the condition of anonymity because they are not officially authorized to speak.
Instead, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the top political appointee for foreign assistance, Jeremy Lewin, pressed for the approval for U.S. funding to be fast-tracked, the two sources said. It is unclear whether top political leadership read the full 14-page document. One of the sources said USAID staff had voiced concerns internally about working with GHF, especially given the humanitarian principle of ‘do no harm.’
As of last week, the funding had not yet been disbursed, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said.
The previously unreported details in the assessment echo international criticism of GHF’s ability to act as the primary aid distributor to thousands of Gazans living in desperate conditions and highlight how the Trump administration greenlit funding for the group despite career staffers’ concerns.
The swift approval of the funding for GHF comes amid mounting international pressure
against the group’s militarized operation, which relies on armed American security
contractors working in coordination with the Israel Defense Forces.
“Today, Palestinians in Gaza face an impossible choice: starve or risk being shot while
trying desperately to reach food to feed their families,” said a joint statement last week from over 240 NGOs calling for an immediate end to GHF’s operation.
Missing requirements
GHF has faced significant controversy since it was established. The group’s head resigned before operations began in late May, citing concerns over the organization’s adherence to humanitarian principles.
Amid ongoing reports of deadly violence outside GHF’s four Gaza aid sites, the group in early June submitted a page-and-a-half long request seeking emergency humanitarian funding, according to one of the sources. USAID officials asked GHF to submit more documentation to support the request.
But a more fulsome proposal sent by the group was still “missing several required elements,” according to the USAID assessment, which included dozens of clarification questions and requests for more details.
A worker removes the signage outside of the USAID headquarters in Washington, DC.
CNN
The internal review found that GHF’s application was missing at least nine elements typically required for an award to be approved.
A three-page long risk planning document lacked detailed explanations on its plans to ensure Palestinians in need would receive aid, the USAID assessment found. The risk management plan “does not provide sufficient information to ensure that aid will reach intended recipients,” it said.
Another brief document meant to detail GHF’s mission did not meet “requirements for Safe and Accountable programming,” the review said.
“GHF must explain how it will Do No Harm,” USAID said in the feedback form, asking the group to provide “specific details” of plans to ensure safety, access, and accountability.
USAID also asked GHF to review its budget to ensure line items correctly added up, and noted “inconsistent” timelines for the project across the application.
According to the proposal, GHF estimated that in the month of June it needed roughly $100 million in operating costs, with the group seeking $30 million of that total from the State Department.
GHF’s proposal also noted a planned expansion from four to eight aid distribution sites across Gaza – but did not include details on where the sites would be located.
“Is GHF able to provide a map indicating where the distribution points will be?” USAID asked in the feedback form. It also questioned how the $30 million in funding would be used for the expansion, noting the budget “does not provide sufficient detail” to assess whether GHF would have adequate staffing for eight sites.
While GHF proposed that it could distribute infant formula, the assessment noted that without following USAID guidelines, formula “is dangerous and can increase infant morbidity and mortality due to contamination from unsafe water and poor preparation practices.”
“Powder milk formula must be prepared with sterilized/boiled water, which is difficult in the current context,” the form said.
It also asked the organization to give details on how it was working to ensure that there were facilities and fuel for people to prepare the food it distributed.
Expedited approval
Under normal procedures, the concerns outlined in the assessment would have been relayed to GHF before the funding was approved, the sources told CNN, and the group would have time to reply before a decision was made.
That did not happen. On June 26, the State Department publicly announced the approval of the $30 million in funding and encouraged other countries to contribute.
A former USAID official who spoke on the condition of anonymity out of fear of retaliation said that there is precedent for a quick approval process, but that is typically reserved for trusted partners. Under normal procedural circumstances, GHF would likely not have been funded, the official said.
In an internal State Department memo on June 30, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee touted the approved award and praised GHF’s operations inside Gaza.
Palestinians carry boxes and bags containing food and humanitarian aid packages delivered by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation on June 6.
Abdel Kareem Hana/AP
“After monitoring the success of GHF, the Department of State announced a $30 million grant to GHF on June 26 that will enable GHF to continue its critical operations and expand to more distribution sites,” Huckabee wrote.
The memo focused on GHF’s “success” in undermining Hamas, alleging the militant group is stealing aid in Gaza and profiting from sales, though Israel hasn’t presented any evidence publicly to back up the claim.
Trump administration officials defended GHF against growing criticism from human rights groups amid mounting death tolls around the aid sites as starving Palestinians clamor for assistance. Officials have blamed Hamas for the deadly violence and suggested publicly and privately that GHF is the only effective way to get aid into the besieged enclave.
“GHF is a decisive break from a status quo that has enabled corruption and complicity in enabling the continued rule of terrorists,” a State Department spokesperson said in a statement to CNN.
Last week, an Associated Press report found American contractors guarding aid distribution sites in Gaza used live ammunition and stun grenades as Palestinians attempted to access food.
An internal State Department memo outlining coverage of GHF, including negative headlines, was recalled and replaced with a memo only containing positive coverage, another source told CNN.
A State Department official last week suggested the US could provide further funding to GHF, saying that if the organization continues to operate “safely and securely and consistent with sort of the principles that we’ve laid out for them, then we’re happy to invest more in them.”
CNN · by Yahya Abou-Ghazala, Jennifer Hansler · July 9, 2025
18. New USDA Program Ties Food Security to National Defense
An interesting map of farmland at the link.
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4236978/new-usda-program-ties-food-security-to-national-defense/
New USDA Program Ties Food Security to National Defense
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez
The Department of Agriculture today announced a new governmentwide, multiprong effort focused on ensuring America's ability to secure its own food supply, in part by eliminating interference from adversarial nations.
But the National Farm Security Action Plan isn't just about food or farms. The Defense Department benefits as well.
Press Briefing
Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins conducts an Agriculture Department press briefing in Washington, July 8, 2025.
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Credit: Air Force Staff Sgt. Madelyn Keech, DOD
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Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins explained the significance of the first action item in the National Farm Security Action Plan, which she said is likely the most important.
"The first of the seven is securing and protecting American farmland ownership, actively engaging at every level of government to take swift legislative and executive action to ban the purchase of American farmland by Chinese nationals and other foreign adversaries," she said.
Part of that, she said, also involves using presidential authorities to reclaim farmland in the U.S. that is now owned by foreign adversaries.
While keeping farmland in the hands of American farmers rather than businesses affiliated with adversarial foreign governments secures the ability of the U.S. to always produce food to feed Americans, it serves a second purpose as well.
In some cases, farmland purchased by investors associated with adversarial foreign governments is situated around U.S. military installations, which means foreign ownership of that land is both a threat to America's ability to ensure its own food supply and also a threat to broader American security because it puts those installations at risk.
Press Briefing
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks during an Agriculture Department press briefing in Washington, July 8, 2025.
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"As someone who's charged with leading the Defense Department, I want to know who owns the land around our bases and strategic bases, and getting an understanding of why foreign entities, foreign companies, foreign individuals, might be buying up land around those bases," Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said. "That's something I should be paying attention to, on behalf of the American people, on behalf of my department and on behalf of the president."
Food security, energy resilience and water resources, Hegseth said, are all part of national security, especially in contingency situations.
"We would be asleep at the wheel if we were not fully a party to an effort like [the National Farm Security Action Plan] to ensure that our nation had the food supply it needs, but specifically our troops have what they need on our bases, so that in those moments, you can rely on us here in the United States to provide that security," Hegseth said. "No longer can foreign adversaries assume we're not watching and we're not paying attention and we're not doing something about it — because we are."
As part of the National Farm Security Action Plan, the USDA will work with state and congressional partners to take needed action to end direct or indirect purchase or control of American farmland by nationals from countries of concern — including China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.
"At the Department of Defense, we care about homeland security," Hegseth said. "Energy security, food security, [and] water security is national security. And so when you look at our bases here in the United States or around the world, we ought to know who owns that land around strategic bases. Where are they from? Are they Americans, and if not, why?"
Farmland
The Chinese own over 265,000 acres of U.S. agricultural land in the United States. Some of that land is near U.S. military bases.
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Hegseth told Rollins that the USDA's National Farm Security Action Plan will help DOD get better security for U.S. bases.
"Your plan helps us address that," Hegseth said. "We're excited to partner with you. Thank you for your leadership. Anything we can do, let us know, and this is all part of securing America and American citizens and putting America first — it's common sense for us."
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez
19. Marco Rubio 'impersonator' used AI to mimic top Trump aide's voice
Wow. AI can do anything. And I thought my conversation with Secretary Rubio went so well when he called yesterday. I wonder why he has not returned my emails (Note sarcasm).
But now I will trust no voice on the telephone anymore (except for those recorded spam calls - at least you know they are "real.")
Marco Rubio 'impersonator' used AI to mimic top Trump aide's voice
By GEOFF EARLE, DEPUTY U.S. POLITICAL EDITOR
Published: 10:17 EDT, 8 July 2025 | Updated: 11:11 EDT, 8 July 2025
Daily Mail · by GEOFF EARLE, DEPUTY U.S. POLITICAL EDITOR · July 8, 2025
An imposter used AI technology to impersonate Secretary of State Marco Rubio and contacted at least a handful of top U.S. and foreign government officials, according to a diplomatic cable warning of the stunning blunder.
U.S. officials are hunting for the culprit, and assess that it is part of a plan to mop up information, the Washington Post reported.
The news comes just weeks after another impersonation plot involving a high-powered figure in the Trump White House, this one involving White House chief of staff Susie Wiles.
That nefarious plot involved stolen data from the personal cellphone of White House chief of staff Susie Wiles that was then used to call some of American's most powerful people.
In the Rubio scam, someone purporting to be the secretary of state who also serves as Trump's national security advisor dialed three foreign secretaries, as well as a governor and a U.S. member of Congress 'with the goal of gaining access to information or accounts,' according to a cable obtained by the Post.
The imposter 'contacted at least five non-Department individuals, including three foreign ministers, a U.S. governor, and a U.S. member of Congress,' according to the July 3 cable.
An impersonator using AI technology has mimicked Secretary of State Marco Rubio and contacted top officials
The imposter used text messages and the encrypted Signal app, the same app that led to the ouster of former National Security Advisor Michael Waltz after he accidentally added a reporter to a Signal group chat where top officials discussed a bombing campaign.
The contacts came in mid-June, during a flurry of high-stakes diplomatic activity amid wars in the Middle East and Ukraine and trade wars set off by President Trump's tariffs.
'The actor likely aimed to manipulate targeted individuals using AI-generated text and voice messages, with the goal of gaining access to information or accounts,' according to the cable.
The Daily Mail reached out to the State Department for a comment on the security breach.
AI tools are becoming increasingly powerful and easy to access, and creating a message in the voice a senior government official like Rubio is not particularly challenging.
Read More
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Israel's Netanyahu surprises Trump with coveted Nobel Peace Prize nomination
There are massive amounts of publicly available clips that would allow AI technology to closely mimic Rubio's speech patterns and even content.
By relying on voice messages, the imposter would be able to fire off believable sounding missives that could potentially be used to collect additional information, with less risk of catching an error through real-time interaction.
The Daily Mail has reached out to the State Department and the White House for comment.
'The actor left voicemails on Signal for at least two targeted individuals and in one instance, sent a text message inviting the individual to communicate on Signal,' according to the cable.
Rubio is the nation's top diplomat who also serves as Trump's national security advisor, making him an obvious target
Head's up: The official pretending to be Rubio contacted three foreign ministers, according to the Post's report
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was also included in the Signal group chat
Donald Trump's closest advisor has fallen victim to a sinister impersonation scheme after her personal cellphone was hacked
Rubio makes for an obvious target because of his influence and his portfolio, which would give him a reason to interact with top officials throughout the government and abroad.
The former U.S. senator and former presidential candidate was seated to Trump's right during Monday night's high-stakes meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, where the Israeli leader handed Trump a letter nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize, and where Trump called for sending arms to Ukraine and said he would meet with Iranian officials on a potential deal next week.
AI has already been used to manipulate public officials in campaign ads or commit deep fakes of Hollywood celebrities like Jennifer Anniston.
The FBI warned in May about an 'ongoing malicious text and voice messaging campaign.'
Daily Mail · by GEOFF EARLE, DEPUTY U.S. POLITICAL EDITOR · July 8, 2025
20. What Pete Hegseth Doesn’t Understand About Soldiers
This could provoke some discussion (hopefully thoughtful, critical discussion).
Conclusion:
Leadership at the Defense Department should not overcorrect for past mistakes. Failure to recognize the brutal truths of combat and to embrace a warrior ethos risks losing future wars. But a cultlike devotion to achieving that ethos without connection to larger values risks losing our way.
What Pete Hegseth Doesn’t Understand About Soldiers
Lethality alone doesn’t win wars.
By Mike Nelson
The Atlantic · by Mike Nelson · July 8, 2025
In the summer of 2014, I was leading a company of Green Berets—from the 5th Special Forces Group—in Afghanistan’s Kunduz province. President Barack Obama had recently promised an end of combat operations in the country, and the Taliban understood the tactical implications of his statement, believing that the drawdown of coalition forces meant they could now operate with impunity. They further believed that during the holy month of Ramadan, our Afghan partners, too tired from fasting during the day, would not conduct large-scale operations against them. My company, along with commandos from Afghanistan’s 5th Special Operations Kandak, decided to surprise them.
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Over the course of a week, we would assault Taliban strongholds, striking enemy forces when and where they believed they were most secure.
During one of these operations, in Dasht-e-Archi district, a combined American and Afghan team had just stepped off the helicopters when Taliban machine-gun crews opened fire. Our soldiers responded without hesitation, killing several enemy fighters and capturing a Taliban machine gunner. At that moment, the team leader radioed me. He was suddenly confronting a scenario that every Green Beret officer prepares for during the Special Forces Qualification Course: His foreign counterpart was about to commit a war crime.
The machine gunner was severely wounded and, in the dark colloquialism of our profession, circling the drain. An Afghan lieutenant argued that the fighter didn’t deserve mercy; his commandos should finish him off. The impulse was understandable in the lieutenant’s heightened post-combat state; the proposal was also illegal and morally reprehensible.
The team leader helped talk the Afghan lieutenant down. The Talib would not be executed. Our medics worked to stabilize the man who had just tried to mow them down with a PKM machine gun. This decision was less about what the fighter deserved and more about the kind of soldiers that my men were, and that we wanted our Afghan partners to be.
That night’s events tell two stories. The first is that my team needed to destroy the enemy, using quick and lethal violence. This imperative is the core rationale for any army’s existence. But my team members also needed to act as professional soldiers: to set aside their emotional impulses, even in moments of fear, and uphold the law and the moral standards of the United States Army. Anger, resentment, and the desire for retribution can never be fully suppressed. Just as saints feel tempted to sin, even the most moral people can find themselves pushed to the limits by the compounding stresses of combat.
I spent 23 years as a paratrooper and Green Beret, most of them during the War on Terror, and I faced many frustrating moments. During the first year of the Iraq War, civilians regularly stopped Americans on the street and hectored us: “You guys are the authority now. When is my electricity coming back? Where can I go to get ice?”
After enough confrontations, even the most idealistic among us started to think, Screw these people. But in our disciplined fighting force, somebody would pipe up: “That Iraqi’s upset because he has no power, and he’s just trying to feed his family.” The malignant impulse to start hating all Iraqis or Afghans was checked before it was allowed to metastasize. Through shared expectations, we held one another accountable. Sometimes, service members would provide calm, steady counsel to someone at risk of lashing out. In other cases, when American soldiers violated our norms and committed crimes, their colleagues would seek justice, as was the case when three Iraqi detainees were killed in 2006 by soldiers from 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division— a unit that had recently included a young lieutenant named Pete Hegseth.
The question of how the U.S. military should conduct itself is under new scrutiny, as Hegseth, now the secretary of defense, has declared that his priorities for the Pentagon will be lethality and returning the military “to the war fighters.” As he said at the Army War College in April, “Everything starts and ends with warriors in training and on the battlefield. We are leaving wokeness and weakness behind.”
Hegseth, who served in Iraq as an infantry platoon leader and in Afghanistan as a staff officer, was not involved in the Iraqi detainees’ deaths, but he knew men whose lives were upended by the investigation. Today, he is tapping into the notion that President Joe Biden and some of his predecessors tied up the American military with overly restrictive rules of engagement, and that the country’s long and disappointing post-9/11 wars might have turned out better had service members been given freer rein. Anything that falls outside Hegseth’s vision of lethality is painted as a woke distraction, and anyone suggesting restraint is a hindrance or a remnant of the previous regime.
Parts of this agenda seem like common sense. Why wouldn’t a department charged with fighting America’s wars encourage a warrior spirit by empowering the people who risk their life in combat? Clearly it should. Still, Hegseth risks creating a false dichotomy—that one must choose between lethality and professionalism. This view comes at a cost to operational effectiveness as well as moral clarity.
Hegseth is positioning himself as the tribune of the common soldier, whom he will protect from ladder-climbing careerists. As a Fox News commentator, Hegseth campaigned on behalf of three American service members accused or convicted of war crimes. Eddie Gallagher had been accused by his fellow SEALs of killing a wounded teenage prisoner; acquitted of murder, he was convicted of posing for photos with the prisoner’s body and demoted. (He later seemed to admit on a podcast to a role in killing the detainee.) Mathew Golsteyn, a former Green Beret officer, was charged with murder for allegedly executing a released Afghan detainee. The paratrooper officer Clint Lorance was convicted of ordering his soldiers to kill Afghan civilians. Golsteyn and Lorance both maintained that they had acted legally.
These suspects were turned in not by woke Pentagon officials but by other “war fighters.” Nevertheless, during Donald Trump’s first term as president, he pardoned Golsteyn and Lorance and reversed Gallagher’s demotion. In effect, Trump and Hegseth have taken an extreme position: that the way to support American troops is to avoid second-guessing anything they do.
The suspicion that senior officers care more about appeasing their superiors than easing the average soldier’s predicament is hardly new. Anton Myrer’s 1968 novel, Once an Eagle, contrasted the Army career of the obsequious Courtney Massengale with that of the muddy-booted warrior Sam Damon. In The Centurions, Jean Lartéguy’s classic 1960 novel about the French campaigns in Indochina and Algeria, one character wishes there could be two distinct armies—one for display in polite society and one engaged in the dirty business of winning battles. These books prefigure the view held by some Iraq and Afghanistan veterans that lawyers, politicians, and the cowardly generals who kowtowed to them prevented American victories.
Hegseth’s perspective reflects what he learned as a platoon leader—when his duty was to maximize his subordinates’ effectiveness at inflicting violence when needed. It also bespeaks his lack of experience at higher levels of military or civilian leadership. The complexities of procuring new weapons systems, making trade-offs among competing priorities, and maintaining relationships with foreign governments were all someone else’s job, as was, of course, providing strategic military advice to the president.
Just as a Fortune 500 company does not hire its CEO directly out of college, the Pentagon does not assign a new lieutenant to command a division. In most cases, the military gives emerging leaders just enough responsibility to help them grow, while senior commanders temper their rougher instincts.
On the morning of June 6, the 81st anniversary of D-Day, Hegseth boasted on X that he was doing physical training on Omaha Beach with soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment. It was only the latest in a series of updates about his workouts with elite units. The posts might be good for morale, but he appears far more eager to present himself as a jacked-up model warrior than to do the less glamorous work of running the Pentagon.
Every branch of the military faces multidimensional problems. Accelerating the construction of Navy vessels—to choose just one of many pressing examples—means dealing with budget and personnel constraints, nuclear-safety laws, and the limited capacity of the American shipbuilding industry. Solving these big, difficult, and often boring strategic challenges is what the troops most need a defense secretary to do.
When I was a junior officer, I bristled at commanders who I felt didn’t understand the realities I was dealing with. Sometimes, my frustration was the product of youthful arrogance divorced from larger realities— a problem remedied by time and experience. In some cases, though, the frustration was legitimate. I watched as decisions at the highest levels wasted initiative, resources, and, in many cases, lives.
I also understand why many soldiers feel hemmed in by Pentagon bureaucracy in more prosaic ways. Anyone who has spent time at Fort Bragg, as I did at the start of my career, knows the elaborate lengths the Army has taken to avoid disturbing the red-cockaded woodpecker. Military personnel are subject to annual training requirements—on avoiding phishing scams, handling classified information—that feel oppressive in the aggregate. When Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell ended in 2011, the exhaustive training sessions in preparation for the policy change were far more disruptive to our work than the change itself was.
But for all the complaints about weakness and wokeness, America’s military remains at its most effective when inspired to maintain both its professionalism and its warrior culture. In 2005, General Erik Kurilla, currently the head of U.S. Central Command, found himself in a close-up fight in the alleys of Mosul—a fight that ended with Kurilla shot multiple times and his sergeant major beating an insurgent in hand-to-hand combat. Kurilla embodied a warrior ethos. But he was also the officer who, after a British aid worker was killed in a failed attempt to rescue her from the Taliban in 2010, insisted on holding SEAL Team 6 members accountable for deceiving higher-ups about the circumstances of her death.
Meanwhile, America’s disciplined armed forces outperform those that have supposedly embraced an unbound warrior mentality. In 2021, Senator Ted Cruz and others bemoaned that U.S. Army recruiting commercials were not sufficiently masculine compared with those for the Russian Airborne Forces, only to see the same Russian forces largely wiped out at Hostomel, in Ukraine, nine months later. Perhaps Cruz could have learned from the 2018 rout of hardened Russian veterans who tried to challenge the U.S. military in Khasham, Syria.
Military historians can point to many examples of cultures—Sparta, the Confederacy, early-20th-century Germany—that counted on their martial spirit to bring them victory, but instead lost to armies that had both a warrior ethos and important strategic advantages. Many soldiers in a losing fight will blame external factors: After World War I, disgruntled Germans refused to acknowledge that their country’s war aims had been dishonorable and unrealistic and that their armaments makers had been too slow to innovate. Instead, they insisted that their army had been stabbed in the back. This mindset leads in dangerous directions, as Germany showed two decades later.
Although most wars have been fought for conquest or plunder, Americans tend to be more comfortable with the use of force when it is seen as virtuous, an extension of the values that we feel make us exceptional. This moral dimension is also a concrete strategic asset. When American forces are perceived as acting immorally, they directly undermine national objectives. Domestic and international support erode, fueling enemy propaganda and complicating cooperation with allies and local populations.
Sometimes, broader strategic goals force high-level commanders to limit what soldiers do. In Afghanistan in 2011, many disliked the constraints our superiors imposed on nighttime raids at the demand of Hamid Karzai, the country’s American-backed president. Yet those constraints reflected the basic premises of the war: Americans were liberators, not occupiers. We had troops in the country at the request of the local government, which meant that, at times, we had to modify our tactics and procedures in deference to the local government.
Leadership at the Defense Department should not overcorrect for past mistakes. Failure to recognize the brutal truths of combat and to embrace a warrior ethos risks losing future wars. But a cultlike devotion to achieving that ethos without connection to larger values risks losing our way.
This article appears in the August 2025 print edition with the headline “The Warrior Myth.” When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.
The Atlantic · by Mike Nelson · July 8, 2025
21. No, The Chinese Will Not Invade Taiwan
Okay, but... In addition to not attacking cities, Sun Tzu also said never assume your enemy will not attack. Make yourself invincible.
Conclusion:
I always have to give this caveat, I take Xi Jinping and generations of Chinese leaders at their word that they want to regain full political control of Taiwan. I get that. I totally believe that they want to do that, but I think they're going to use every means possible other than military means to accomplish that goal. That's the point that we're trying to make with this. The Chinese want to do this, but they're going to use diplomatic, economic, even political means to do this long before they ever load up, or they embark a single Chinese marine to cross the strait and come crash across a beach.
No, The Chinese Will Not Invade Taiwan
https://spoilsofwar.substack.com/p/no-the-chinese-will-not-invade-taiwan?publication
A Marine Veteran Pours Cold Water on the Hype.
Andrew Cockburn
Jul 09, 2025
For years, and with increasing intensity, we have been told that the Chinese government is not only resolved to conquer the island of Taiwan by force, but, thanks to its well advertised build-up of military might, has the means to do so. “The threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” Admiral Phil Davidson, the retiring head of the Indo-Pacific command told congress in 2021. The prediction that China would be ready to invade by 2027 has since become official dogma in Washington, spawning untold billions of dollars in defense spending pegged to this threat. Despite constant invocations of China’s expanding navy, including amphibious capabilities, the Pentagon has studiously avoided telling us exactly how China could manage to move a necessarily enormous force across the stormy seas of the Taiwan strait and subdue the well-armed island.
Fortunately, we now have a clear-eyed examination of the reality behind the much ballyhooed threat. Marine veteran Dan Grazier is Director of the National Security Reform Program at the Stimson Center in Washington D.C. As well as serving tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was specifically trained in amphibious warfare. Grazier has taken the trouble to explore the practical difficulties facing anyone seeking to invade Taiwan. I spoke with him recently to discuss his conclusions, which he and Stimson colleague McKenna Rawlins have now laid out in a report due to bepublished this week.
Cockburn
We have been hearing for many years now that Taiwan is under imminent threat of a Chinese invasion. Can the Chinese in fact invade and occupy the island?
Grazier
Well, they can attempt it.
Any military problem can be overcome, if you're willing to sacrifice enough to achieve it. So if the Chinese were willing to spend years trying to subdue the island and its population and absorb the massive numbers of casualties that would go along with it, then yes, they might be able to do it eventually. The Chinese do want to bring the Chinese majority population on Taiwan back into the greater fold of the Han Chinese on the mainland. But killing massive numbers of people does not really aid that strategic goal. It's not going to foster goodwill on either side of the Taiwan Strait. So I just don't see a situation where the Chinese would be able to conduct a massive amphibious operation and do it in a way that is politically viable for the Chinese Communist Party.
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Cockburn.
Supposing they do decide to go ahead, what are the practical difficulties facing an amphibious invasion of Taiwan?
Grazier
I've identified many major, very practical military challenges that any invader of Taiwan would have to overcome. The first one is just getting to the island. The only way that you can transport the number of people, the amount of equipment, and the massive stockpiles of logistics that it would take to carry out this kind of invasion would require transportation by sea. Surface ships are extremely vulnerable; they're vulnerable to submarines, they're vulnerable to long range precision missiles. And as the Ukrainians have proved, they're now vulnerable to unmanned naval surface vessels. Just getting to the island is a very treacherous proposition. So that's one challenge. The second challenge is establishing a beachhead in Taiwan. That's really complicated because there are very few usable landing beaches on Taiwan because Taiwan is very mountainous. And so in most places around the island, the mountains drop straight into the sea. You can't land forces on a cliff. You have to land them on a beach or a port someplace. So there's only so many places where an invader could land. And all of those landing places present a really big challenge because those landing beaches are either backed inland by miles and miles of rice paddies or by very dense urban development in the cities like in Tainan, Kauhsiung and Talian.
Cockburn
Are there further obstacles?
Grazier
The central mountain range of Taiwan is one. It's impressive. This was something I didn't really understand about Taiwan before I started this project, was just how mountainous the island is. Taiwan has the tallest mountains in East Asia, up to 13,000 feet The central mountain range, covers 60% of the island. It goes from the southern coast all the way to the northern coast. It really shapes life on Taiwan because you have a population of 24 million people that's trying to live and exist on this island, but more than 60% of the island is really unsuitable for any significant development.
And so that means that the vast majority of the population has to live in the flat ground. More than 80% of Taiwan's population lives in cities. The population is grouped in these big, massive mega cities that just go on and on and on. They’re very dense and cover about 20 percent of the island. But Taiwanese also have to eat.So the other 20 percent is farmland. Taiwan is an Asian subtropical island, and so the bulk of agriculture in Taiwan is rice or other water intensive agriculture - there's a bunch of fish farms in the south. So it's all this waterlogged, marshy farmland that just absolutely dominates the landscape. This does make Taiwan a very difficult operating environment for the kind of mass armor protected invasion forces that it would take to capture a place like Taiwan that has big, massive cities like Taipei and Tai Chiang. You need big massive forces that are protected by armor to capture a place like that.
Cockburn
What professional qualifications do you bring to this issue?
Grazier
I was commissioned as a U.S. Marine officer in 2005. I was assigned the role of an armor officer and went through the Fort Knox Basic Armor leader course, late 2005, early 2006. So I have an understanding of the kind of warfare that it would take to capture a city. And then I commanded a tank platoon in the city of Fallujah in 2007. I understand how to operate armor in a city, which is a nerve wracking thing because you lose a lot of the advantages of a tank as soon as you bring it into a city.
Cockburn
Did your combat experience in Iraq teach you anything about fighting in Taiwanese rice paddies?
Grazier
In Iraq, I had to operate through a lot of the irrigated farmland on both sides of the Euphrates River. So there were a lot of narrow canal roads that we had to deal with, and there was a lot of wide open terrain in that, which always made me nervous because if we got ambushed while we were on one of those narrow canal roads, I didn't have any space to maneuver. The way that an armor, like a tank platoon fights, the way that you counter attack is you try to spread out as much as you can and maneuver your tanks to a position of advantage. That's really great when you have wide open landscape that you can move in multiple directions. But when we're stuck in a canal road where we literally have a deep canal, that's enough to sink a tank on one side and marshy farmland on the other side, I'm stuck to that road. I clearly don't want to flip the tank into a canal.
That made me nervous in Iraq, that would make any invader of Taiwan nervous.
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Cockburn.
What about amphibious warfare?
Grazier
A couple years after my deployment in Iraq, I got selected to attend Expeditionary Warfare school. It's the world's premier amphibious warfare training course. It teaches Marine Corps captains how to plan and conduct amphibious operations. And it is a 10 month long course.
Cockburn.
I believe in World War II the U.S. seriously contemplated invading Formosa, as they used to call Taiwan in those days. What happened?
Grazier
You’re talking about Operation Causeway. When I studied that, it really clenched this whole project for me, right? Toward the latter half of 1944, some of the senior commanders in the Pacific initially believed that Formosa could serve as an unsinkable aircraft carrier to stage forces for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. When that idea was put out there, staff planners back in Washington working with their counterparts in the Pacific Theater, started studying the issue and they came up with Operation Causeway, which was supposed to be a nine division invasion of Formosa.
That figure is important because a division, a World War II division, was approximately 20,000 soldiers and Marines. So it was a big invasion force. I think more than 4,000 naval vessels were planned for it, plus all the escort ships that included all the landing craft, along with all the aircraft that would go along with it. It was a significant operation that was being planned. Two interesting parts about this: one, Formosa at the time was occupied by approximately, it was less than 100,000 Japanese personnel, and the vast majority of them were administrative civilians and military staff. Only about a third of the Japanese forces on Formosa in 1944 were actual soldiers to defend the island against invasion. So it wasn't a huge Japanese force that needed to be dislodged, about 30,000 soldiers or so. So the size of the planned invasion force from the American perspective was pretty big compared to the number of defenders there were. Just to paint the proper full picture here, Operation Causeway was planned by people who had very practical experience planning these kind of operations already. This is well into World War II when they were doing this. The mission was supposed to be executed by experienced commanders who had conducted operations just like this throughout the Pacific in the months leading up to it. And a lot of the forces that were supposed to carry this out were veterans of earlier invasions. And at the time, in late 1944 was essentially the peak of American military power. The US military was 12 million people. It had a huge Navy, had a massive air force, had soldiers galore. Marines galore, a massive and experienced force. And even with all of those advantages and a plan in place to invade Formosa, the people in charge of all of this looked at it and said, no, Formosa is too hard. We're going to go someplace else.
What we're meant to believe today is that the Chinese military, which does not have any tradition really whatsoever of overseas military adventurism, has not fought a war since 1979. And when they fought the Vietnamese in 1979, they lost. So there really isn't anybody in the Chinese military today that has any practical military experience. But yet we're paying a trillion dollars a year in the United States to prepare to defend Taiwan against the military that is supposedly able to carry out the most complex single military operation in history.
Cockburn
Wait a minute. A senior American Pacific Commander, Admiral Davidson, said a few years ago that the Chinese would be able to invade Taiwan by 2027. You saying he just didn't know what he was talking about?
Grazier
I’m being as diplomatic as I possibly can. I'm saying he's greatly overstated, or he's greatly simplified, the challenges involved in all of this.
Cockburn
To what degree is our strategic planning posited on the assumption of a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan? How important is this to our overall strategy?
Grazier
At least for the last decade, China has been the pacing threat that American military planners have used to craft policies and institute budgets, with the Taiwan scenario being at the core of this. So it's the dominant planning factor in Washington when it comes to defense policy.
Cockburn
We’re not spending all of our trillion dollar budget on this. Can you narrow it down a bit. How much of our defense dollar is going to defend Taiwan or on the expectation of a Chinese attack on Taiwan?
Grazier
Well, that's an interesting question. I haven't done the math on that, but you can take a look at defense budget since, well, basically 2016, and defense spending has been steadily climbing since then, 2016 is about the timeframe when everyone in Washington really kind of turned their back on the War on Terror. They started focusing on great power competition, which was framed mostly in the context of China and Taiwan. But then if you look at what kind of weapons that we're buying today, because we're talking Ford class aircraft carriers, we're talking the Constellation class frigate, the F 47 [fighter], the B 21 [bomber], all kinds of cyber capabilities and satellites and all of that, and all of these weapons are sold, they're all framed in the context of China and specifically Taiwan, because really a lot of these weapons only make sense in that scenario. And that's what makes the Taiwan scenario such a useful tool for the doyens of the national security establishment here in Washington.
Cockburn
How so?
Grazier
Because we're talking about a massive amphibious operation on the other side of the world, which means that you need a big fleet that can span the Pacific Ocean. You need big fleets of aircraft to be able to bomb targets and shoot down enemy aircraft. Supposedly, we need all kinds of cyber capabilities and un-crewed systems and satellites, and it's the perfect scenario for the usual suspects in Washington. You can justify anything because if the Taiwan scenario were to kick off, it would be the most complex military operation in history. The scale of it is really hard to put into words. And so it is just like the perfect foil for the policy makers here in Washington if their goal is to increase defense spending and buy all kinds of outlandish weapon systems.
Cockburn:
You’ve done extensive research in Taiwan itself. So what's the attitude of the Taiwanese themselves. Do they live in fear of a Chinese invasion?
Grazier
Well, that's probably my favorite question about all of this. Now, I am a military historian, I'm not a sociologist. And so my field research had much more to do with looking at landscapes and stepping on beaches and poking around rice paddies just to see what the landscape looked like. But that being said, I am an American, so I stick out in a place like that. And so the first time I was there I was approached by, I think every single Taiwanese citizen who spoke English, who saw me, came over and talked to me and asked, what brings you to our country? And it was always a very friendly question. And my cover story was always, well, I'm a writer and Taiwan's in the news pretty frequently in the United States, and I just wanted to come and get a better sense of the place and describe it a little bit better for people back in the United States.
And that would usually lead to a follow-up question. “Really? Taiwan's in the news in the United States?” And I said, “well, yeah.” And I remember one of these conversations I had standing on a beach in Tainan right next to the Taiwan Strait, and it was this very lovely woman who offered to take a picture for me. And she said, “why are people talking about Taiwan in the United States?” And I just gestured across the Taiwan Strait, which was right there next to me. And I said, well, all the tensions with mainland China. She kind of rolled her eyes and then she did a dismissive flip of her hand, said, “oh, that. that's not going to happen.”
I've spent 20 days on the ground in Taiwan now, and there are very few signs of anything untoward. In Taipei there are printed letter-size sheets of paper directing people towards air raid shelters in the event that they were needed, but they looked almost cheerful. They were colorful. There was nothing imposing or anything about it. But beyond that, there was nothing in Taipei. And then as we were traveling around the country on the beaches, you don't see pill boxes or fortifications or anything like that.
Cockburn
Maybe the Chinese might not be able to invade today, but what about the future?
Grazier
One of the biggest points I make whenever we talk about this is that the prospect of success in an endeavor like this diminishes by the day. I think if the Chinese were planning on doing this, if they had any intention of actually conducting an armed invasion to capture Taiwan, their best window of opportunity was more than twenty years ago. If I was a Chinese military planner, or if I was a Chinese Communist Party leader and I had this as a goal to do this at some point when the opportunity is right, I would've done this in April of 2003 because at that point, the United States military was fully committed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the run up to Iraq was essentially a year long.
We all knew that it was going to happen, and the Chinese had to have known that too. And they would've had a year essentially to plan and have something ready to go. And then as soon as the United States was committed in Iraq, they could have kicked that off. It would've been the way the Russians invaded Georgia on the opening day of the 2008 summer Olympics. It would've been something like that, but the Chinese didn't. They let that moment pass, and then things have just gotten harder and harder for them ever since. And so I just don't see it happening. And even beyond the contemporary military writing, just go back and look at ancient Chinese writings. Look at Sun Tzu, which still the cornerstone of Chinese military thinking. Sun Tzu is very explicit in the Art of War about how the worst possible strategy to adopt is to attack the enemy's fortified city. So an invasion of Taiwan, it would basically violate every tenet of Chinese military thought.
Cockburn
Are you saying the Chinese have no interest in taking over Taiwan?
Grazier
I always have to give this caveat, I take Xi Jinping and generations of Chinese leaders at their word that they want to regain full political control of Taiwan. I get that. I totally believe that they want to do that, but I think they're going to use every means possible other than military means to accomplish that goal. That's the point that we're trying to make with this. The Chinese want to do this, but they're going to use diplomatic, economic, even political means to do this long before they ever load up, or they embark a single Chinese marine to cross the strait and come crash across a beach.
22. US Army’s HIMARS to Go Hypersonic
US Army’s HIMARS to Go Hypersonic
A new missile system will extend HIMARS’ range and speed, bringing precision hypersonic capability to the US Army’s renowned mobile launcher.
nextgendefense.com · by Ethan M. Encarnacion · July 7, 2025
The US Army is gearing up to give its High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) a hypersonic boost with the development of the Blackbeard Ground Launch (GL) weapon system.
The plan is to integrate the Blackbeard missile into existing HIMARS platforms, combining high-speed precision with the system’s mobility and established infrastructure.
Currently in development by Castelion Corporations, the Blackbeard GL will use self-guiding tech to strike targets at Mach 5 speeds. It is being designed for precision engagement against reinforced and moving enemy assets, even in challenging environments.
It adapts existing pods from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) family of munitions, allowing it to be fired from the HIMARS and tracked M270 launchers with minimal modification.
US Marines load rockets into a HIMARS system. Photo: Cpl. AaronJames B. Vinculado/DVIDS
According to the US Army, the hypersonic missile is “an affordable, mass-produced weapon designed for mid-range precision,” offering around 80 percent of the capability of more advanced weapon systems but at a lower cost.
Blackbeard’s rollout starts with a flight test of an air-launched variant in 2026, followed by a live-fire demo in 2027, and potential battlefield deployment in 2028.
Upgraded Strike Capabilities
HIMARS has played a pivotal role in Ukraine’s fight against invading Russian forces, helping disrupt operations and take out high-value targets with speed and precision.
The truck-mounted system can fire six guided rockets in rapid succession and relocate quickly to avoid detection or counter-fire.
Its standard munitions reach up to 80 kilometers (50 miles), while the platform can also fire a single Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles).
Now, the Blackbeard GL missile aims to take that firepower even further, bringing hypersonic capabilities to HIMARS without sacrificing mobility.
While the unit cost remains unclear, the army has allocated $25 million to advance Blackbeard into full development.
nextgendefense.com · by Ethan M. Encarnacion · July 7, 2025
23. US Army Cadet Command announces Senior ROTC rebalance and optimization
US Army Cadet Command announces Senior ROTC rebalance and optimization
army.mil · June 27, 2025
(Photo Credit: U.S. Army) VIEW ORIGINAL
FORT KNOX, Ky. — In alignment with the principles of the Army Transformation Initiative, U.S. Army Cadet Command is implementing a strategic rebalance and optimization of the Senior ROTC program. These adjustments will optimize resources, improve operational effectiveness, and maintain the Army’s commitment to recruiting, training and commissioning high-quality officers for the Total Army.
Through the Department of Defense’s Deferred Resignation Program, Cadet Command reduced its civilian workforce by 168 positions, or approximately 12 percent of its authorized workforce. These reductions prompted a reassessment of the ROTC footprint to ensure continued mission success while operating with fewer civilian personnel.
The rebalancing effort includes the inactivation of the 1st Brigade headquarters at Fort Knox and the inactivation, reclassification and merger of select ROTC units around the country, starting in the summer of 2026. These changes will improve efficiency by consolidating and restructuring select host and extension units while preserving access to ROTC programs on approximately 900 campuses nationwide. The initiative prioritizes reversibility, allowing the Army to scale officer production as necessary in the future while avoiding hollow units. This improves Army readiness by reallocating senior officers and non-commissioned officers to other Army priorities.
"This rebalance and optimization effort ensures we meet the Army’s requirements for officer commissioning while being good stewards of resources," said Brig. Gen. Maurice Barnett, commanding general of U.S. Army Cadet Command. "Our approach allows us to sustain and strengthen ROTC programs while providing quality training to cadets across the country."
The adjustments reflect a deliberate, phased approach aimed at minimizing disruption to cadets, employees, and partner institutions. Cadet Command will provide affected personnel options aligned with collective bargaining agreements and applicable laws, regulations and policies. Impacted cadets are being offered options to continue their education and training.
"Throughout this process, our commitment remains unchanged — producing high-caliber officers of character to lead our Army," said Barnett. "We are working closely with our workforce, cadets and academic partners to ensure a smooth transition while preserving the quality of our ROTC programs."
U.S. Army Cadet Command will continue to engage stakeholders as we implement the optimization process. The command remains committed to providing future leaders with the training, education
and support necessary for their success in service to the nation.
It is important to note, these changes do not impact Cadet Command’s Junior ROTC programs at high schools around the country.
Definitions of ROTC program types:
- Host unit: A Senior ROTC program located at an institution with a formal agreement with the Secretary of the Army. Cadets attend training and classes on their home campus, and the institution is staffed with full-time ROTC personnel.
- Extension unit: A Senior ROTC program linked to a host institution but located at a separate campus. Cadets take ROTC courses at their own institution with full-time cadre assigned to their campus.
- Crosstown: An institution that allows students to enroll in ROTC courses hosted at a host or extension unit. Cadets travel for their training rather than having full-time ROTC cadre at their home institution.
A full list of the changes, which are expected to be implemented by the start of the 2026-2027 academic year, are listed below:
For questions concerning this announcement, please contact
Mr. Ian Ives, (502) 624-2438, ian.e.ives.civ@army.mil or Rich Patterson, (502) 500-0988, richard.t.patterson2.civ@army.mil.
Inactivation of 1st Brigade Headquarters, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Senior ROTC programs at Senior Military Colleges and Military Junior Colleges will realign to other Cadet Command brigades with no impact to Cadet training.
List of Host Units being Inactivated (10)
These institutions will no longer have an affiliation with Army ROTC.
Institution Name (State)
- California Polytechnic State University - San Luis Obispo (Calif.)
- University of Northern Iowa (Iowa)
- Western Illinois University (Ill.)
- Truman State University (Mo.)
- Elizabeth City State University (N.C.)
- Saint Augustine's University (N.C.)
- Clarkson University (N.Y.)
- John Carroll University (Ohio)
- University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh (Wis.)
- West Virginia State University (W.Va.)
List of Host Units Reclassifying to Extension Units (40)
These institutions will retain cadre members on their campus and Cadets will continue receiving training and education there, but the program will merge administrative and logistical support with a retained host unit.
Institution Name (State)
- Auburn University at Montgomery (Ala.)
- Tuskegee University (Ala.)
- University of South Alabama (Ala.)
- University of Arkansas Pine Bluff (Ark.)
- California State University - San Bernardino (Calif.)
- Howard University (District of Columbia)
- Augusta University (Ga.)
- University of Idaho (Idaho)
- Loyola University - Chicago (Ill.)
- Northern Illinois University (Ill.)
- Tulane University (La.)
- Northeastern University (Mass.)
- Loyola University - Maryland (Md.)
- Lincoln University (Mo.)
- Alcorn State University (Miss.)
- Duke University (N.C.)
- Wake Forest University (N.C.)
- University of North Dakota (N.D.)
- Seton Hall University (N.J.)
- St. John's University (N.Y.)
- University of Akron (Ohio)
- University of Toledo (Ohio)
- Xavier University (Ohio)
- Commonwealth University - Lock Haven (Pa.)
- Dickinson College (Pa.)
- Drexel University (Pa.)
- Slippery Rock University (Pa.)
- Providence College (R.I.)
- Furman University (S.C.)
- Wofford College (S.C.)
- Tennessee Technological University (Tenn.)
- University of Memphis (Tenn.)
- Prairie View A&M University (Texas)
- St. Mary’s University (Texas)
- Stephen F Austin State University (Texas)
- Hampton University (Va.)
- Norfolk State University (Va.)
- Eastern Washington University (Wash.)
- University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point (Wis.)
- Marshall University (W.Va.)
Hosts Reclassifying to Crosstown relationships (6)
These institutions will no longer host cadre members on their campuses, but Cadets will have options to continue an Army ROTC program while receiving training and education at a nearby campus.
Institution Name (State)
- Southern University and A&M College (La.)
- Eastern Michigan University (Mich.)
- Niagara University (N.Y.)
- Central State University (Ohio)
- University of Richmond (Va.)
- Carson-Newman University (Tenn.)
Extension Units being inactivated (9)
These institutions will no longer have an affiliation with Army ROTC.
Institution Name (State)
- University of California at Merced (Calif.)
- Buena Vista University (Iowa)
- University of Dubuque (Iowa)
- Idaho State University (Idaho)
- University of Nebraska - Kearney (Neb.)
- Millersville University (Pa.)
- Pennsylvania Western University - Clarion (Pa.)
- Texas A&M International University (Texas)
- St. Norbert College (Wis.)
Extension Units Reclassifying to Crosstown relationships (19)
These institutions will no longer host cadre members on their campuses, but Cadets will have options to continue in an Army ROTC program while receiving training and education at a nearby campus.
Institution Name (State/Territory)
- California State University - Los Angeles (Calif.)
- University of California – San Diego (Calif.)
- University of Northern Colorado (Colo.)
- University of Miami (Fla.)
- Georgia Southern (Armstrong Campus) (Ga.)
- Northwest Nazarene University (Idaho)
- Bradley University (Ill.)
- University of Chicago (Ill.)
- Chicago State University (Ill.)
- Indiana University Northwest (Ind.)
- Hood College (Md.)
- Winona State University (Minn.)
- Lindenwood University (Mo.)
- Davidson College (N.C.)
- Interamerican University (Metro San Juan) (Puerto Rico)
- Western Oregon University (Ore.)
- Tennessee State University (Tenn.)
- Texas A&M University San Antonio (Texas)
- Longwood University (Va.)
army.mil · June 27, 2025
24. Beijing’s Push for a Sino-Centric Asia is Cracking Southeast Asia’s Hedging Game
Excerpts:
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s May 2025 visit to the region and triumphant tone at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum intended to signal U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific and reassure regional actors. Instead, his emphasis on increased military spending, burden sharing, the “imminent” threat to Taiwan, and black-and-white rhetoric exposed the fundamental problem: U.S. policy rests solely upon its security commitments at the expense of a credible economic strategy. This plays precisely into China’s strategy and advantages in the region.
This does not mean that individual Southeast Asian states simply give up opportunities to buck China. The Philippines under Marcos has taken to confrontation and actively sought cooperation with outside security partners. However, the issue is that this effort is increasingly a daunting task, given the long-standing U.S. security commitments are more in question than ever and none of the other options — Australia, Japan, India, or the European Union — can effectively outweigh China. The fundamental problem is one of scale. Without a competent Washington, and absent an Association of Southeast Asian Nations capable of unified hedging, Southeast Asian countries cannot effectively stand up to Beijing. It is unfortunately safe to say that hedging will likely fail to stop the Middle Kingdom’s return to regional domination.
Beijing’s Push for a Sino-Centric Asia is Cracking Southeast Asia’s Hedging Game - War on the Rocks
Jessica C. Liao and Lucas Myers
warontherocks.com · July 9, 2025
Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s recent visit to three Southeast Asian countries drew widespread headlines — not only for diplomatic pageantry but also for its timing. The visit came on the heels of President Donald Trump’s announcement of a sweeping “reciprocal tariff” policy, which disproportionately affects Southeast Asian economies. Media coverage of Xi’s trip largely focused on Beijing’s attempts to capitalize on Washington’s recent missteps. Mostly undiscussed was the region’s longer-term reality: China has already entrenched itself as the predominant power in Southeast Asia, a region Beijing has long regarded as vital to its political and strategic survival.
This view was reaffirmed during the Chinese Communist Party’s April 8 Politburo Work Conference on Neighboring Relations, occurring just before Xi’s tour. Last held in 2013 shortly after Xi assumed power, the conference aimed to send a clear message that stable, friendly ties with Southeast Asia are not only a foreign policy priority but a prerequisite for China’s long-term development strategy. As the latest conference revealed, Beijing puts a great deal of emphasis on framing deepening ties with neighboring countries — including those in Southeast Asia — over the past decade as one of its greatest foreign policy successes.
For China — flanked by U.S. allies and far removed from Indian Ocean sea lanes critical to its trade and energy flows — all roads lead through Southeast Asia. The region is Beijing’s route to achieving security, economic resilience, and geopolitical influence. This strategic imperative is not new — during the Cold War, the Chinese Communist Party supported communist movements across Southeast Asia to shape the region’s postcolonial order. What’s different in post-Cold War Asia is Beijing’s pursuit of that vision through an adaptive, integrated, and consistent strategy utilizing all aspects of national power.
A powerful China is now an unassailable assumption in the calculations of every Southeast Asian country, influencing decisions ranging from infrastructure and trade to security and governance. Southeast Asia’s long-standing hedging strategy is beginning to falter under the weight of intensifying Chinese influence and an increasingly declining U.S. presence and isolationist Washington. The region’s strategic autonomy is under threat, and its margin for maneuver is rapidly narrowing. The results are stark for the region’s political and economic autonomy.
BECOME A MEMBER
Folding Southeast Asia Into a Sino-Centric Economic Sphere
Since the Reform and Opening Up era accelerated in the 1980s and 90s, Beijing has regarded peaceful and stable relations with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) as essential. China’s 1994 Spratly Islands dispute with the Philippines gave rise to Beijing’s “Good Neighbor” policy. While 2002 is often remembered for the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, it was also the year Beijing signed its first free trade agreement with the bloc, which offered trade concessions to improve bilateral ties and was gradually expanded to cover integration in services and investment.
As China’s assertiveness over maritime territorial disputes in the early 2010s stoked tensions in the region and Washington responded with the “Pivot to Asia,” Xi Jinping convened the 2013 Neighborhood Diplomacy Conference — reaffirming stable relations with neighboring countries were a strategic priority. Xi next announced the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road during a state visit to Indonesia, formally launching the Belt and Road Initiative, and signaling Beijing’s ambition to integrate economic diplomacy into its broader geopolitical strategy.
Granted, China’s economic diplomacy does not always achieve its intended outcomes. Nevertheless, Beijing’s consistent yet adaptive practice of economic statecraft — enabled by its growing economic clout — has been effective in drawing Southeast Asia into its orbit. China became the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ largest trading partner in 2009 and, with the Belt and Road Initiative, quickly rose as the region’s top public financier. Chinese-funded infrastructure projects have boosted bilateral connectivity and moreover, integrated Southeast Asia into China’s domestic transportation networks and subregional development plans, as outlined in the 14th Five-Year Plan. By 2020, Southeast Asia became China’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade reaching $696 billion in 2023. Despite repeated efforts to diversify, the region has been increasingly pulled into an emerging Sino-centric sphere. Intra-regional trade has declined and the share of trade with other major economies has remained largely unchanged over the past decade. Laos epitomizes China’s growing economic dominance: with half of its immense foreign debt owed to Beijing, Vientiane agreed to a debt-for-equity swap that gave China Southern Grid a major stake and control over its national power grid.
Even as its infrastructure investment began to decline, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, China ramped up its economic diplomacy by taking a leadership role in finalizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2020 — the world’s largest free trade agreement including all Association of Southeast Asian Nations members. Last year, China also upgraded its free trade agreement with Southeast Asia to “Version 3.0,” pledging expanded cooperation in digital trade, green technology, and supply chain integration. As the world’s fourth-largest economic bloc with relatively stable ties to Western countries, Southeast Asia has become a strategic destination for Chinese firms seeking both global expansion and a way to circumvent Western tariffs and export controls. With Southeast Asian countries eager to boost domestic industries with foreign capital, Beijing is pushing on an open door, as Chinese cleantech investment surged across the region, including BYD’s $1.4 billion plant in Thailand.
Beijing Making Offers Southeast Asia Cannot Refuse
As Southeast Asia’s economic integration with China deepens, Beijing has become increasingly willing to leverage this economic asymmetry when countries run afoul of Chinese interests. Maritime territorial disputes have rendered agricultural exports from the Philippines vulnerable to Chinese trade embargoes. China’s coercive strategy has also proven adaptable. Even as agricultural embargoes targeting Manila have declined over the past year in part because Philippine agricultural exports to China had already decreased, Beijing has a range of alternative measures, including diplomatic threats, informal boycotts, and tourism bans. Although these actions have limited impact on aggregate Chinese-Southeast Asian trade flows, and China’s economic coercion practice remains somewhat cautious, they serve a broader purpose: reinforcing the risks of crossing Beijing’s red lines.
Moreover, the region faces growing negative impacts of trade with a China burdened by domestic overcapacity and a post-COVID-19 economic slowdown. As Kevin Rudd observes, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan reflects a more explicit embrace of mercantilist trade policy — aimed at reducing reliance on imports, while increasing the world’s dependence on Chinese exports. In this context, Southeast Asia, now China’s largest trading partner, has become essential to sustaining Beijing’s economic growth — and, by extension, its domestic stability.
The effects are stark. Southeast Asia’s trade deficit with China has ballooned from $10.4 billion in 2010 to $140 billion in 2024. Since 2022, Chinese exports to the region have risen 24 percent, while Southeast Asian exports to China have stagnated. In Thailand, a surge of low-cost Chinese goods has hit a wide range of industries and dealt a heavy blow to the country’s manufacturing sector. In Indonesia, the surge in Chinese exports has precipitated mass layoffs in labor-intensive industries, particularly textiles. Despite being a major recipient of Chinese investment, Vietnam has borne the brunt of Beijing’s overcapacity, accounting for 40 percent of the region’s trade deficit with China.
Most Southeast Asian states have introduced new measures to restrict Chinese imports, including tariffs and subsidies. However, these measures — according to the Economist Intelligence Unit — are far less than those enacted by China’s other trade partners. Self-constraint reflects the region’s broader reluctance to directly confront China. The recently concluded free trade agreement upgrade negotiations offered little more than lip service to these concerns without providing remedies for underlying problems.
Growing U.S. protectionism gave Beijing an opening to deflect Southeast Asian complaints of its unfair trade practices and portray itself as a champion of rules-based trade and a reliable development partner. During Xi’s recent visits to Southeast Asia, Beijing pledged economic support for the region and invoked rhetoric of Asian solidarity against external pressure. Meanwhile, Beijing recognized U.S. intentions to pressure Southeast Asian countries into adopting more anti-China policies and to sever the region’s transshipment links with China. In turn, China issued a public statement, implicitly warning the regional countries not to enter bilateral trade deals with Washington that could undermine “China’s interests.” With a more unilateralist Washington, and a hesitant European Union and Japan, Southeast Asia has little choice but to adapt to Beijing’s preferred policies and trade terms.
How Beijing Is Seeping into Southeast Asian Domestic Affairs
The political implications of China’s economic dominance are increasingly clear, as Beijing is now willing to openly disregard its long-professed respect of sovereignty and non-interference. In 2003, China signed the bloc’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, publicly committing to these principles, which accord well with Southeast Asia’s “ASEAN Way.” Two decades later, however, Beijing has increasingly stressed the importance of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations building “mutual political trust” — a phrase used in Chinese official discourse to signal that China’s comprehensive strategic partners should show deference to Beijing’s “core interests.”
Building “mutual political trust” is often intertwined with Beijing’s push for the international campaign, the “Global Security Initiative.” Although framed as non-traditional security cooperation, the initiative is fundamentally an effort by Beijing’s leaders to extend China’s domestic security agenda abroad to safeguard regime security against “color revolutions” and expand its influence. The Global Security Initiative positions China as a provider of law-enforcing tools to enhance the region’s regime security, even for countries with strong ties to Washington. Vietnam showcases a state that goes to Washington for external security but Beijing for internal security. Others like Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei have explicitly endorsed the Global Security Initiative.
However, this initiative also signifies Beijing’s growing expectation that Southeast Asian states internalize and accommodate its own regime security agenda. In fact, several countries are making growing concessions not only in economic policy but also in matters of domestic affairs. Among them, Thailand — the region’s second-largest economy and a long-standing U.S. treaty ally — is a clear example.
Famous for its “bamboo diplomacy,” or hedging between China and the United States, Thailand’s military-monarchy elites, despite concerns over Beijing’s long-term intentions, have come to see China as a convenient internal security partner, one with fewer demands for political reform often associated with the United States. Indeed, U.S.-Thai relations have been on autopilot for quite some time with rather thin alliance collaboration beyond joint annual exercises like Cobra Gold. On the other hand, security cooperation with China began during Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s tenure and accelerated following the 2007 Joint Action Plan, with neither country looking back.
This trend has had consequences. Once a haven for regional non-governmental organizations and political dissidents, Bangkok has increasingly aligned itself with Beijing’s internal security priorities. Most recently, the Thai government drew criticism for deporting 40 Uyghurs at China’s request. Not coincidentally, the deportations coincided with the announcement of two major Chinese investments in electric vehicle manufacturing and cloud data infrastructure. Back in 2015, Thailand already faced international backlash for extraditing a group of Uyghurs and the rendition of Swedish citizen and Chinese dissident Gui Minhai. A 2023 proposal allowing joint Thai-Chinese police patrols in Thailand raised concerns about sovereignty. These developments reflect Bangkok’s growing willingness to accommodate Beijing’s security demands — driven in part by its desperate need for Chinese capital to revitalize Southeast Asia’s most stagnant economy.
Even though Thailand has refrained from explicitly endorsing the Global Security Initiative, the recent trafficking of a Chinese actor into Myanmar through Thailand highlighted the extent of Beijing’s influence in Thailand’s domestic affairs. Under Beijing’s vigorous demands, Thai authorities ceased their quiet tolerance of scam centers along the border between Thailand and Myanmar, and soon rescued the victim. Beijing, however, was unsatisfied. Over the coming weeks, a series of joint operations led to the extradition of hundreds of suspects to China. Chinese police took an active role, with Chinese Public Security Assistant Minister Liu Zhongyi personally overseeing the operations at the Myawaddy-Mae Sot border crossing.
Granted, cracking down on criminal syndicates is a transnational public good and in Thailand’s national interest, but many in Thailand expressed concerns about China’s disregard for Thai sovereignty. Luckily, a robust state like Thailand can still push back. Liu Zhongyi reportedly apologized for perceived violation of Thai sovereignty. However, it is becoming harder to say “no” when Beijing comes calling, especially for lower-capacity governments such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.
In fact, China’s erosion of Myanmar’s sovereignty sends a sharp signal of what unchallenged Chinese dominance looks like. Beijing has long seen Myanmar as a geostrategic priority and has exploited the country’s instability. In the early days of the 2021 coup, many in the pro-democracy resistance movement hoped that Beijing might take a pragmatic stance and pressure the junta to negotiate. However, China has since come to believe that the resistance is under too much U.S. influence, lacks the ability to unify the country, and could threaten Beijing’s interests. It has now pivoted to backing the junta. In May 2025, President Xi Jinping met Myanmar’s dictator Min Aung Hlaing, a move that puts to bed any hopes of a pragmatic Beijing.
China uses the tools at its disposal to prevent the pro-democracy movement from defeating the military junta. After tacitly backing a major resistance offensive in late 2023 — meant to warn the junta for ignoring scam centers — Beijing reversed course and moved to prop up the regime. To pressure the resistance along its border, China shuttered trade routes and slowed the supply of black market arms. It even went so far as to kidnap a resistance leader. This push led to a ceasefire between said group and the military in January 2025, followed by the late April handover of the strategic, resistance-controlled city of Lashio to the junta, overseen by China’s special envoy to Myanmar. Elsewhere in the country, Beijing’s special envoy continues pressuring other resistance groups to cease fighting, including with demands to cede more territory. China also established a “joint security company” with the junta, enabling the deployment of armed private security forces — most being former Chinese military and police — on Myanmar’s soil. According to local sources, these forces are already deployed in Muse and Kyaukphyu, a strategic Belt and Road Initiative port on the Bay of Bengal. Although China still engages the resistance behind closed doors and Chinese arms have reached both sides of the conflict from black markets, Beijing is now the resistance’s grim reaper.
A Region with Diminishing Choices
Today, Southeast Asia is increasingly dependent upon Beijing’s economic largesse and intertwined with it politically. As such, much of the region is deterred from taking actions against China’s core interests.
The Philippines is a case in point of the consequences of going against Beijing. As Manila under President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has taken a firmer stance in the South China Sea and aligned more closely with Washington, it is experiencing growing gray-zone coercion from China’s disproportionately stronger coast guard — targeting Filipino fishermen and maritime forces. Unfortunately for Manila, it has been largely abandoned by its Southeast Asian neighbors. Once a vocal claimant challenging Beijing that even went so far as to file a submission in 2014 backing the Philippines’ International Court of Arbitration case, Hanoi has distanced itself from outward displays of support for Manila, while adopting a low profile approach in its own dispute with China. Yet, it is hard to slow China’s momentum — let alone reverse it — through Hanoi’s bilateral strategy.
Indonesia offers a more subtle illustration of the region’s weakening position on this issue. As the region’s largest economy and de facto leader, Jakarta is ideally placed to rally Southeast Asia to balance against China. Yet, for the past decade, Indonesia has pursued a strategy typical of the region: maintaining security ties with Washington while strengthening economic cooperation with Beijing. Under former President Joko Widodo, Jakarta was focused on attracting Chinese infrastructure investments, exemplified by the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail. With the continued expansion of U.S.-Indonesian defense cooperation, Jakarta also at times pushed back quietly against Beijing over the North Natuna Sea dispute.
China’s economic weight continues to shape Jakarta’s policy orientation under current President Prabowo Subianto, a noted nationalist and American-trained military man. Like his predecessor, Prabowo is heavily reliant on economic delivering for Indonesia and therefore deems Beijing — Jakarta’s largest trade partner and non-bloc foreign investor — vital to this task. During a 2024 state visit to deepen bilateral economic ties, Prabowo signed a joint statement with Beijing that seemingly recognized China’s South China Sea claims. Although Jakarta later walked it back, the episode underscores the risk that Indonesia could well be “sleepwalking into alignment with China,” as well as Southeast Asia’s growing difficulty in striking a delicate economic-security balance. Whether this trade-off is sustainable remains to be seen.
Yet, many in Southeast Asia would argue its economic ties to China are not indicative of choosing Beijing over Washington. They might also argue that the ASEAN Way has created an unparalleled era of Southeast Asian peace by enmeshing China and other great powers into its processes. However, China’s enmeshment with the bloc and each Southeast Asian state has created a region with diminishing choices. Moreover, divergent political and economic interests and the bloc’s consensus-based decision-making further constrain its ability to collectively push back on China’s problematic activities.
China can effectively stymie a unified response so long as it can capture even one member state. Most infamously, during Cambodia’s chairmanship in 2012, the bloc failed to issue a joint statement after Phnom Penh reportedly blocked language on the South China Sea, likely at China’s behest. When the Philippines won its arbitration case against China in 2016, Beijing again leveraged its influence in Cambodia to moderate the grouping’s statement. Today, Manila has largely given up on a united Southeast Asian response, while negotiations over a code of conduct in the South China Sea remain perpetually stalled.
Importantly, even if the bloc’s members could form a unified position, it lacks credible partners to back its position. Australia, the European Union, India, Japan, nor Russia can outweigh China. Above all, Washington’s leadership failures are most stark. Arguably, there was a window about a decade ago to treat the region as a strategic priority. But, with the Trans-Pacific Partnership withdrawal in 2017, neglect of the bloc as an institution, continued unwillingness to consider market access for the region, and now the tariffs, Southeast Asia does not see Washington as reliable. A 2024 survey of Southeast Asian elites reflects this trend: a growing majority now favor alignment with Beijing over Washington. Confidence in Washington as a reliable security partner has declined sharply, while skepticism about its regional role continues to rise.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s May 2025 visit to the region and triumphant tone at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum intended to signal U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific and reassure regional actors. Instead, his emphasis on increased military spending, burden sharing, the “imminent” threat to Taiwan, and black-and-white rhetoric exposed the fundamental problem: U.S. policy rests solely upon its security commitments at the expense of a credible economic strategy. This plays precisely into China’s strategy and advantages in the region.
This does not mean that individual Southeast Asian states simply give up opportunities to buck China. The Philippines under Marcos has taken to confrontation and actively sought cooperation with outside security partners. However, the issue is that this effort is increasingly a daunting task, given the long-standing U.S. security commitments are more in question than ever and none of the other options — Australia, Japan, India, or the European Union — can effectively outweigh China. The fundamental problem is one of scale. Without a competent Washington, and absent an Association of Southeast Asian Nations capable of unified hedging, Southeast Asian countries cannot effectively stand up to Beijing. It is unfortunately safe to say that hedging will likely fail to stop the Middle Kingdom’s return to regional domination.
BECOME A MEMBER
Jessica C. Liao, Ph.D., is an associate professor of political science at North Carolina State University and a 2020–21 Wilson China fellow. In 2022, she served as an economic development specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, where she focused on China’s external engagement with Belt and Road Initiative countries.
Lucas Myers is an affiliate in research at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at The George Washington University. From 2019 to 2025, he served as senior associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center. An expert on strategic competition in Southeast Asia and China, he regularly briefs members of Congress, U.S. executive agencies, allied and partner governments, and private sector stakeholders.
Image: Office of the Press Secretary of the Philippines via Wikimedia Commons
warontherocks.com · July 9, 2025
25. American Gun Violence Goes Global – How Its Spread Is Distorting and Diminishing U.S. Soft Power
Excerpts:
It was an American—the influential political scientist Joseph Nye—who popularized the concept of soft power. He explained the critical role that a culture’s attractiveness plays in drawing other nations into its sphere of influence. The United States was a great practitioner of soft-power politics long before Nye popularized the term: it arguably gained its edge after World War II, and its enormous sway over geopolitics and the global economy, thanks less to its military investments and more to the allure of its commercial, cultural, and ideological exports.
Policymakers eager to protect the United States’ reputation and influence need to seriously consider the impact of its new major export, gun violence. The most effective way for American leaders to address the problem would be to move more seriously to get gun violence under control at home. So far, the persistent murder of American schoolchildren has not prompted such reforms.
But perhaps geopolitical concerns will—and they should. America’s gun violence is driving agony and contempt among its allies and handing easy talking points to its rivals, both of which erode the United States’ advantages. With his cuts to cultural diplomacy, U.S. President Donald Trump shows little overt interest in retaining the United States’ soft-power edge. But his administration remains intensely interested in making U.S. exports successful, both for the sake of American companies’ bottom lines and for the United States’ reputation as a maker and purveyor of cutting-edge goods. Gun violence has become a cutting-edge U.S. export—but one that will harm, not help, its positive balance of power. If U.S. policymakers do not take gun violence more seriously, they will only ensure that this balance goes further off kilter.
American Gun Violence Goes Global
Foreign Affairs · by More by Jacob Ware · July 9, 2025
How Its Spread Is Distorting and Diminishing U.S. Soft Power
July 9, 2025
Guns being displayed at a National Rifle Association meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, April 2025 Jeenah Moon / Reuters
Jacob Ware is a Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a co-author of God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America.
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Gun violence has become a staple of daily life in the United States. According to the Gun Violence Archive, the United States suffered over 600 mass shootings—defined as incidents in which at least four people were killed or injured, not including the gunman—every year between 2020 and 2023, or almost two every day. The physical and emotional toll is carried disproportionately by young people: gun violence is now the leading cause of death for Americans between age one and 17. A 2024 report by Everytown for Gun Safety (where I serve as a Survivor Fellow), the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab, and the Southern Poverty Law Center found that an American young person knows, “on average, at least one person who has been injured or killed by a gun.”
Less understood, however, is the dangerous degree to which the United States is exporting its once-unique form of gun violence to the rest of the world. Last month, for instance, a 21-year-old gunman opened fire at his former school in Graz, Austria, killing 10 students in one of the deadliest days in the country since World War II. It soon emerged that the killer held “a significant passion” for researching U.S. school shootings, an Austrian police chief said; he had been particularly inspired by the 1999 school massacre in Columbine, Colorado.
The Austrian gunman is only one in a growing set of international perpetrators of targeted violence who were inspired by an American. It has long been known that, in the U.S. context, school shootings are an epidemiological phenomenon. And the epidemic is now spreading beyond U.S. borders. In a 2024 report, Jason R. Silva, a leading scholar on gun violence, found that in a set of 35 countries relatively similar to the United States politically and economically, the number of public mass shootings more than doubled from the first to the second decade of the twenty-first century. “The greatest number of incidents,” Silva noted, “occurred in 2019 and 2020.” Research also shows that many of these incidents were directly linked to examples set by U.S. shooters.
Mass shootings now constitute a particularly bloody form of American foreign influence. By destabilizing U.S. allies, they threaten to undermine the United States’ global image—and foil its ability to advance its geopolitical aims.
WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The United States remains the undisputed world leader in gun violence. Although its per capita death rates by firearm have remained relatively steady over the past 50 years, the United States has experienced a significant rise in mass shooting incidents. Between 2009 and 2018, for instance, there were 3,500 percent more school shootings in the United States than there were in Mexico, where there were the second most.
Understandably, foreign governments and media outlets frequently portray the United States as extraordinarily violent and lecture their U.S. counterparts on lax gun-safety laws. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2023, former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas remarked that, when he engaged with non-American politicians, “almost every single time” they posed two questions to him about the United States. The first was about U.S. political polarization, and the second was “about guns and the number of killings in our country.” “Only in the United States,” wrote a Danish foreign correspondent after the 2022 massacre in Uvalde, Texas, “does a seven-year-old attend school to learn about school shootings.” An editorial in France’s Le Monde newspaper read, “If there is any American exceptionalism, it is to tolerate the fact that schools in the United States are regularly transformed into bloody shooting ranges.”
But the perception that the United States remains a complete outlier when it comes to gun violence is increasingly wrong. The digital platform Wisevoter reported in 2023 that in Europe in particular, “the frequency and severity” of mass shootings “have increased dramatically over the last decade.” The uptick in such incidents is not limited to Europe: targeted violence by firearm has become a growing threat worldwide.
The United States remains the world leader in gun violence.
Substantial research suggests that gun violence is contagious. Scholars of gun violence point to the so-called Columbine effect, in which the Columbine shooters created a “cultural script” for future attackers involving particular ideological, tactical, and even sartorial choices. Likewise, there is significant evidence that American perpetrators inspired foreign attackers. Columbine led directly to copycat attacks in Brazil, Canada, Finland, and Russia, claiming dozens of lives. One German criminologist told The Guardian, “The phenomenon of massacres by young people in schools in Germany has only existed since Columbine.”
In 2022, Silva and fellow researcher Adam Lankford found that “fame-seeking mass shooters who attacked outside the United States appeared more likely to have been influenced by American mass shooters than by perpetrators from all other countries combined.” Alexandre Bissonnette, for instance—a white supremacist who killed six people at a mosque in Quebec City in 2017—searched online for a “list of school shootings in the United States” in the runup to his attack. Less ideological shooters have also pointed to American predecessors. In Luton, England, a would-be school shooter who murdered three family members last September had extensively researched shootings and claimed that he hoped to eclipse the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, which killed 32.
In New Zealand, a white supremacist who murdered 51 worshippers at two mosques in Christchurch in 2019 aimed to become notorious in the United States and influence U.S. politics. A so-called accelerationist, he intended his attack to cause a tidal wave of anti-firearm sentiment in the United States that would speed the country’s collapse. “With enough pressure, the left wing within the United States will seek to abolish the second amendment,” he wrote in a manifesto he published shortly before his attack, yielding “a fracturing of the United States along cultural and racial lines.”
The United States exports violence abroad more indirectly, too. U.S. social media platforms, which are less regulated than social media companies in other countries, play a role in glorifying violence, especially to disillusioned young men. In 2023, for instance, plaintiffs brought two cases before the U.S. Supreme Court against Google and X (which at the time was still called Twitter), alleging that the platforms had facilitated terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Istanbul in 2017. After these lawsuits failed, foreign regulators began scrambling to contain this malign form of American influence. In 2024, Australia passed a law banning children under 16 from using social media, in response to concerns about children’s mental health and tech platforms’ role in stoking violent extremism. In 2022, the EU passed the Digital Services Act (DSA), which opened the door to massive fines against companies, including U.S. ones, that “spread illegal content such as hate speech, terrorist content, or child sexual abuse material.” X now faces a multipronged investigation into its compliance with the DSA’s obligation to counter “the dissemination and amplification of illegal content and disinformation” and faces significant fines or even a ban.
FEAR FACTOR
In general, U.S. policymakers tend to interpret the United States’ gun violence problem—if they even believe it is a problem—as a purely domestic issue. But gun violence in the United States represents more than just a set of local tragedies. It has profound implications for U.S. soft power and foreign policy. For starters, the U.S. role in provoking violence abroad is becoming more concrete. In September 2024, for example, U.S. authorities arrested two U.S. citizens and charged them with leading an international online movement called the Terrorgram Collective, which had incited white supremacist attacks that killed and injured people in Slovakia and Turkey, both NATO allies.
And by exporting violence, the United States’ reputation is taking a beating. Governments in countries as varied as Australia, Germany, Uruguay, and Venezuela have, in direct response to U.S. mass shootings, issued warnings to their citizens about traveling to the United States; the Canadian government’s travel advisory warns those planning a U.S. trip to “familiarize yourself on how to respond to an active shooter situation.” One Morning Consult poll conducted in China in August 2022 found that 93 percent of respondents agreed that “fears of violent crime may cause them to reconsider” traveling to the United States.
Some gun-rich countries that chafe at the thought of more stringent gun control have blamed the United States’ gun culture for corrupting their own. After two back-to-back mass shootings in Serbia in 2023, for instance, a Serbian war veteran lambasted the way the United States had rewired his country’s cultural attachment to firearms. According to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, nearly half of the guns found at Mexican crime scenes and submitted for tracing between 2017 and 2022 were manufactured in the United States, and Mexico has sued U.S. weapons manufacturers to stem the flow of trafficked American guns.
The United States’ adversaries have also highlighted the country’s role as an exporter of violence. After a 2018 school shooting in occupied Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin explained that “it all started with the United States and their schools”; in 2022, the Russian Supreme Court even designated the “Columbine movement” of school-shooting worshippers a terrorist organization. Beijing, meanwhile, has repeatedly pointed to U.S. gun violence to criticize the United States writ large. In 2023, a foreign ministry spokesperson claimed that the United States “brings to other countries not democracy or progress of human rights, but . . . instability,” noting that high rates of gun violence in Mexico and Pakistan could be traced to exported U.S. weapons. Crucially, America’s gun violence undermines the legitimacy of its efforts to challenge other countries’ treatment of their own citizens.
MERCHANT OF DEATH
It was an American—the influential political scientist Joseph Nye—who popularized the concept of soft power. He explained the critical role that a culture’s attractiveness plays in drawing other nations into its sphere of influence. The United States was a great practitioner of soft-power politics long before Nye popularized the term: it arguably gained its edge after World War II, and its enormous sway over geopolitics and the global economy, thanks less to its military investments and more to the allure of its commercial, cultural, and ideological exports.
Policymakers eager to protect the United States’ reputation and influence need to seriously consider the impact of its new major export, gun violence. The most effective way for American leaders to address the problem would be to move more seriously to get gun violence under control at home. So far, the persistent murder of American schoolchildren has not prompted such reforms.
But perhaps geopolitical concerns will—and they should. America’s gun violence is driving agony and contempt among its allies and handing easy talking points to its rivals, both of which erode the United States’ advantages. With his cuts to cultural diplomacy, U.S. President Donald Trump shows little overt interest in retaining the United States’ soft-power edge. But his administration remains intensely interested in making U.S. exports successful, both for the sake of American companies’ bottom lines and for the United States’ reputation as a maker and purveyor of cutting-edge goods. Gun violence has become a cutting-edge U.S. export—but one that will harm, not help, its positive balance of power. If U.S. policymakers do not take gun violence more seriously, they will only ensure that this balance goes further off kilter.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Jacob Ware · July 9, 2025
26. The Real AI Race – America Needs More Than Innovation to Compete With China
Excerpts:
If the United States is to lead the global AI technology ecosystem, it will also need to provide advanced AI and data centers to more than just wealthy countries. To compete with China’s “good enough” AI systems across the developing world, the Trump administration should explore public-private partnerships to offer generous access to U.S. cloud computing systems to researchers and entrepreneurs in these countries. It should also scale up government-backed financial tools—such as low-interest loans, loan guarantees, equity investments, political risk insurance, and tax incentives—through agencies such as the International Development Finance Corporation. These incentives should be geared toward building digital infrastructure in important emerging markets, such as in Brazil, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Finally, the Trump administration must take steps to reduce the risk of worst-case scenarios—and prepare for those contingencies should they arise. It should run tabletop exercises and crisis simulations of cases involving catastrophic misuse of AI or rogue superintelligence. Doing so would give senior leaders opportunities to rehearse crisis responses, identify gaps in readiness, and improve their decision-making under pressure.
The United States and China, moreover, have a profound obligation to themselves and the world to collaborate to reduce AI risks. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union built guardrails around their nuclear competition. They cooperated on negotiations for the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, recognizing that an uncontrolled race to the nuclear frontier could send humanity hurtling off a cliff. Washington and Beijing today need to chart a similarly narrow path between AI competition and collaboration. They could start with a bilateral agreement to share AI incident information and exchange best practices on AI safety, control, and alignment with human values. Further talks should focus on how to handle scenarios of misused or uncontrolled AGI.
The notion of a singular AI race between the United States and China fails to capture the true complexity of the rivalry unfolding today. The challenge is to win not one definitive contest but a multifront competition whose outcome will shape the international balance of power. Navigating these deeply intertwined domains of technological and strategic AI competition demands that Washington adopt a holistic strategy. Without it, success in one race could create vulnerabilities in another—and neglecting any of them risks irreparably weakening the United States’ global position.
The Real AI Race
Foreign Affairs · by More by Colin H. Kahl · July 9, 2025
America Needs More Than Innovation to Compete With China
July 9, 2025
Taking a photo of an AI data sign in Taipei, Taiwan, June 2024 Ann Wang / Reuters
COLIN H. KAHL is Steven C. Hazy Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Senior Adviser at RAND.
JIM MITRE is Vice President and Director of RAND Global and Emerging Risks.
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Discussions in Washington about artificial intelligence increasingly turn to how the United States can win the AI race with China. One of President Donald Trump’s first acts upon returning to office was to sign an executive order declaring the need to “sustain and enhance America’s global AI dominance.” At the Paris AI Action Summit in February, Vice President JD Vance emphasized the administration’s commitment to ensuring that “American AI technology continues to be the gold standard worldwide.” And in May, White House AI and Crypto Czar David Sacks cited the need “to win the AI race” to justify exporting advanced AI chips to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Given the prospect that AI could transform the power and prosperity of nations in the decades to come, it is better to win the race than lose it. But determining who is ahead depends on what it means to win. A common definition is being the first to cross the threshold of artificial general intelligence, which in basic terms is an AI model that is as smart or smarter than the top human experts across a wide range of cognitive tasks. AGI could unlock extraordinary breakthroughs in science, technology, and economic productivity—and the first country to develop it could reap disproportionate benefits.
But the race to AGI is not the only critical race in the AI contest. Militaries and intelligence agencies must harness AI’s transformative potential and mitigate its disruptive effects. Similarly, countries stand to gain a competitive edge if they can adopt AI at scale across the economy and society. Governments are also battling to create and own the standards, supply chains, and infrastructure that will undergird the global technological ecosystem. And all must avoid a race to the bottom in AI safety by working—sometimes together—to manage security risks from misused or rogue AI.
Taking these additional AI races into account makes the United States’ position look precarious. Although U.S. companies maintain a meaningful—if narrowing—lead at the frontier of AI research and development, Washington could lose other AI races. China has considerable advantages, and neither superpower seems eager to cooperate to avoid catastrophe. And given AI’s world-changing potential, the stakes are profound: losing risks relegating the United States to economic dependency, military vulnerability, and diminished global leadership. That bleak future can still be avoided. But the United States will need to muster a coherent AI strategy, one that balances innovation, integration, and risk mitigation to translate the country’s immense technological dynamism into enduring strategic advantage.
THE RACE TO INNOVATE
The race to AGI is the most visible and immediate of the AI contests. Private companies such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google DeepMind in the United States and DeepSeek in China are rushing to innovate, supported by their respective governments. No one knows exactly how the technology will evolve. Large language models could be the first signs of emerging AGI, or true AGI could manifest suddenly when AI models pass a certain threshold. Either way, AGI has enough potential to transform the sources of national power and competitiveness that the world’s two AI leaders have a substantial interest in securing a first-mover advantage.
U.S. AI labs currently have a discernible edge, helped along by semiconductor export controls designed to maintain the United States’ computational advantage over China. But this lead is fragile. China’s indigenous innovation, circumvention of export controls, and intellectual property theft have kept the country in a close second place. Its leading AI companies, such as DeepSeek, are developing technologies that trail their U.S. counterparts by mere months. And Beijing’s centralized approach might help it nurture, consolidate, and harness private-sector innovations more quickly than Washington can.
The race to artificial general intelligence is not the only race in the AI contest.
The United States’ open system, meanwhile, fosters innovation but is inherently vulnerable to espionage and the rapid diffusion of algorithmic advances. Breakthroughs in algorithmic design or alternative paradigms for AI development could diminish the importance of U.S. semiconductor dominance, and their spread could enable China’s AI labs to leapfrog American competitors. The Trump administration, driven by other political priorities, is also pulling back investment in basic AI research and development and discouraging talented foreign nationals from working in the United States, potentially setting back U.S. AI efforts over the next several years.
The U.S. private sector, moreover, responds to commercial imperatives that are not always consistent with national priorities. AI firms, for example, will be tempted to build AI computing power wherever there is available energy infrastructure—whether or not it is based in the United States. Favorable regulatory environments and abundant resources in the Middle East are already proving attractive. The world’s first five-gigawatt AI data center cluster will be built in the UAE, not the United States—a development enabled by the Trump administration’s recent decision to export hundreds of thousands of leading-edge AI chips to Abu Dhabi. Washington does benefit from this arrangement, and U.S. firms including OpenAI and Microsoft are slated to operate most of the data centers’ capacity. But moving crucial infrastructure offshore, where security may be lax, could also provide a backdoor for China and other competitors to acquire advanced computing resources and AI models.
Even if the United States can hold on to its lead in the innovation race, that may not be enough. Current market trends suggest that frontier AI models are becoming so widely accessible and undifferentiated that they give no one a clear technological edge. If that trend holds when AGI emerges, victory will depend on effective AI adoption—and there is no guarantee the United States will come out on top.
SECURING THE EDGE
In the realm of national security, effective AI adoption requires both understanding the capabilities enabled (and threats posed) by frontier AI and integrating AI into existing structures in ways that secure a decisive military edge. Integration of AI promises to enhance intelligence processing, accelerate data-driven decision-making, optimize logistics and resource allocation, enable sophisticated autonomous systems, and possibly even lead to the development of a “wonder weapon”—such as a cyberweapon that could cripple an adversary’s critical infrastructure and command and control or, used defensively, make a country invulnerable to cyberattacks.
The U.S. government and private industry need to work together to achieve AI integration, but their current cooperation remains troublingly limited. National security agencies lack early access to the latest AI models, which would speed up the process of incorporating the latest technologies into their workflows. Partnerships between leading AI labs and the Pentagon and other national security agencies are only in nascent stages. And lengthy procurement cycles, operational cultures that are resistant to change, a lack of infrastructure and data, and misunderstandings about what AI can achieve—both underestimating and overestimating its abilities—hamper the government’s ability to take full advantage of innovations coming out of Silicon Valley. Although these problems are widely acknowledged, fixing them has proven difficult.
China’s authoritarian system, meanwhile, eases civil-military integration, providing it with a structural edge in AI adoption. State mandates ensure that technological advances are rapidly translated into military and intelligence capabilities. The People’s Liberation Army has embraced AI and is actively seeking contributions from the commercial and academic sectors. Making use of AI competitions and public purchasing platforms designed to translate civilian AI research to military applications, it plans to field “algorithmic warfare” and “network-centric warfare” capabilities by 2030. More than merely using algorithms in weapons systems, this entails a transition to a new type of warfare in which military superiority depends on the speed, sophistication, and reliability of those algorithms.
Remaining on the cutting edge of innovation is necessary but not sufficient to win the race in the national security space. The United States could produce scientific and technological breakthrough after breakthrough but still fail to recognize the point at which AI opens a new technological pathway to a revolutionary military or intelligence capability. Washington’s bureaucratic structures, designed for incremental improvements to existing systems, often make it difficult to imagine left-field possibilities for emerging technologies. Beijing’s centralized decision-making system, in comparison, could identify and exploit a disruptive pathway much faster, potentially leaving the United States technologically superior but strategically outmaneuvered.
THE INTEGRATION IMPERATIVE
The winner of the AI race will also need to integrate AI into the national economy—to ensure that AI is widely accessible and is diffused across the education, energy, finance, health, logistics, and manufacturing sectors. The U.S. technology companies that drive consumer and business AI applications, a vibrant venture capital ecosystem that funds innovation, relatively high digital literacy, and extensive digital infrastructure all provide the United States notable advantages. Yet success is not guaranteed. If corporate and governmental actors at all levels fail to create the right incentives for integration and build sufficient public trust in AI, the private sector could struggle to adopt AI quickly enough to capitalize on the benefits of enhanced productivity and new value creation. There is also a danger that AI will not simply augment human labor but replace it. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei has recently warned that AI could lead to as much as 20 percent unemployment in the United States within five years—an outcome that could deeply destabilize both the economy and American society.
Meanwhile, China may be poised to perform surprisingly well in the race for economic adoption. Chinese business leaders are already more focused on AI applications than on developing AI models. DeepSeek’s open-source models, for example, are driving down costs for all Chinese AI models, which enables more businesses to experiment with the technology. This could give China an edge in creating game-changing products. The Chinese government is also less exposed to the political consequences of AI replacing labor. Whereas automating jobs raises alarm in Washington, Beijing could even welcome AI adoption as a solution to China’s labor shortages brought by a rapidly aging and shrinking population.
Even if the United States can keep its lead in innovation, that may not be enough.
Even if the United States adopts AI across its economy as aggressively as China does, it may lose the overall race if China is better positioned to capitalize on the manufacturing advances enabled by AI, particularly in the realm of robotics. China leads the world in industrial robot installations: Chinese manufacturers purchased half of the global market share in 2024, and the country’s robots per employee significantly exceeded the global average. Extreme automation is becoming more common in the manufacturing sector with the proliferation of “dark factories,” such as the electronics company Xiaomi’s smartphone facility that operates 24/7 without human workers. As AI makes strides in spatial reasoning and embodied intelligence—AI that enables robots to interact with and learn from their physical environment—factory robots may become able to perform a much wider array of complex physical tasks.
Although U.S. firms excel in software and services—areas that are also expected to make significant productivity gains as a result of AI adoption—the United States has ceded ground to China in recent decades in physical industries, including manufacturing, logistics, energy, and infrastructure. With its state-driven industrial policy and massive manufacturing base, China can deploy AI at scale within these sectors and might unleash dramatic productivity gains that lead it to finally surpass the U.S. economy.
STACKING THE DECK
The world’s tech powers are also racing to provide the digital infrastructure that will undergird the global development, deployment, and use of AI. Although this is primarily a competition between the United States and China, other established tech powers (such as France, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom) and ambitious emerging players (such as Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) are joining the contest, too. Each participant aims to control the data, the chips and data centers, and the foundational models required for AI use, as well as exert influence over global AI norms and standards. As Sacks, the White House czar, recently put it, “If 80 percent of the world uses the American tech stack, that’s winning. If 80 percent uses Chinese tech, that’s losing.”
Export controls on semiconductor chips have given the United States a meaningful edge. U.S. companies have access to the chips they need for computational power, and much of the world wants U.S. chips because they are the best on offer. The Trump administration is seeking to capitalize on this advantage by “flooding the zone” with U.S. chips and data centers, starting in partner countries such as Saudia Arabia and the UAE. The idea is to lock in the use of U.S. technology in places where market forces encourage massive investments in digital infrastructure.
But in countries with lower incomes, fewer customers, and less basic infrastructure such as broadband connectivity and electricity, Washington’s strategy of following market forces will lead to underinvestment. This is the dynamic across a broad group of countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia that are turning to AI to boost their economic growth. China is positioned to outcompete the United States in these places by providing less advanced and significantly cheaper AI models—as well as subsidizing the physical and digital infrastructure needed to run them. It may not currently be able to export any top-of-the-line chips, but for many developing countries where cost and accessibility are more important than cutting-edge performance, China’s “good enough” offerings could prove highly attractive.
An AI chip on display in San Jose, California, June 2025 Max A. Cherney / Reuters
Ceding these emerging markets risks a future in which the United States wins the technological race at the frontier but surrenders leadership of the global AI ecosystem to China. The consequences for Washington extend beyond lost geopolitical influence and commercial opportunities. Chinese AI models and infrastructure frequently embody digital authoritarian values, enabling Beijing to export mechanisms of state control and shape historical and political narratives beyond its borders. They facilitate surveillance by powering facial and voice recognition systems and analyzing vast amounts of data to monitor individuals and flag “suspicious” behavior. They automatically censor content critical of the Chinese Communist Party or related to sensitive topics such as Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Uyghurs, or Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Their algorithms also curate and disseminate pro-Chinese propaganda. In contrast, U.S. AI models generally reflect stronger commitments to democratic norms, transparency, privacy safeguards, user choice, and data protection frameworks, helping reduce opportunities for government abuse. A critical step toward ensuring the technologies shaping modern life across the world align with democratic values is for Washington to proactively incentivize U.S. AI firms to invest and build infrastructure in developing countries.
Poor policy choices could set the United States back in the race to build and manage the world’s AI infrastructure. Overly restrictive export controls could alienate allies or drive countries currently on the fence toward Chinese products. Conversely, applying too little control over advanced AI chips could inadvertently create opportunities for Chinese companies to acquire or remotely access them, potentially accelerating China’s technological innovation. And if Washington cannot articulate a compelling vision for technological governance—one that carefully balances national security with economic openness and democratic values—potential international partners may turn elsewhere. China is not just selling AI; it offers a comprehensive toolkit for rapid modernization on financially and politically appealing terms to a substantial portion of the world. For a developing country eager to harness AI for economic gains and improved governance, the Chinese offer is often the most practical and readily available path forward.
A RACE TO THE BOTTOM?
Even as the United States and China compete in the AI race, they cannot forget that AGI and other highly capable AI models create potential threats. It is imperative that neither competitor allows its rapid development and deployment of AI to make a disaster more likely. A nonstate actor or rogue state weaponizing AI models, unintentional military escalation caused by AI, or a loss of control of superintelligent systems could prove catastrophic. Preventing such outcomes requires that AI powers avoid cutting corners on safety in their haste to compete.
The most pressing near-term catastrophic risks are that nonstate actors with access to advanced AI systems could launch large-scale cyberattacks that devastate financial systems or design and release highly lethal and transmissible pathogens. These hazards are no longer confined to the realm of science fiction. Companies at the forefront of AI development predict that their internally defined thresholds for dangerous capabilities—measured as “uplift,” or the degree to which an AI model significantly enhances a malicious actor’s abilities—are likely to be crossed this year. Another rapidly approaching threat is the potential emergence of a superintelligence misaligned with human values or intentions, pursuing actions that endanger human well-being because of flawed design, ambiguous instructions, or unforeseen consequences. Growing evidence of frontier AI models exhibiting deceptive or scheming behaviors makes this risk increasingly credible.
Both Washington and Beijing have an interest in preventing the proliferation of dangerous AI capabilities and the emergence of rogue AGI. This common ground creates an opportunity for cooperation between the two AI superpowers—even amid their intense technological competition—to better understand risks of misuse and misalignment and to identify and develop effective mitigation measures.
For Washington, seeking ways to mitigate threats from AI—an imperative the Trump administration has recognized—is sound policy regardless of what other AI powers do. Even if rogue AI does not lead to global calamity, a major AI-related incident originating from the United States, whether accidental or through negligence, would undermine confidence in American technology. And if the United States is seen as unable to manage the immense power of AI, its global leadership and moral authority would be called into question, and China could exploit the resulting power vacuum by promising stability and control.
RECIPE FOR SUCCESS
The trajectories of the various AI races between China and the United States are tightly intertwined. Winning the race to AGI development, for example, will boost the leading country’s national security, economic vitality, and global technological influence. And the competitive pressures unleashed by the races to develop and adopt AI exacerbate the risk of a catastrophic outcome as haste and rivalry undercut safety—a danger no country can outrun. Success in the AI race therefore requires a strategy that advances progress across several fronts simultaneously while managing the security risks of unchecked AI.
As part of a holistic strategy, Washington must make every effort to avoid being caught off guard by AI advances in Silicon Valley, China, and emerging AI hubs around the world. Being surprised could mean failing to recognize the emergence of new threats or missing opportunities to capitalize on AI progress ahead of China. To prevent this, the U.S. government must maintain close communication with domestic industry leaders and closely monitor imminent technological breakthroughs abroad. The Commerce Department’s repurposing of its AI Safety Institute, now called the U.S. Center for AI Standards and Innovation, to focus on working with industry to research and test frontier AI is a step in the right direction. National security departments and agencies, too, should remain apprised of the latest frontier AI developments and explore potential use cases. Likewise, the intelligence community must expand its monitoring of foreign AI efforts, particularly focusing on China’s advancements and objectives, as well as those of emerging AI powers in the Middle East.
The Trump administration should also identify ways to facilitate frontier AI development. It must ensure that AI companies have access to the resources they need for AI model development and deployment, including vast computational power (in the form of semiconductors), high-quality data, world-class talent, and sufficient energy supplies. It will be important not to create new problems in the process; to meet AI’s growing energy demands without exacerbating climate change, for example, Washington should invest in cleaner energy sources such as nuclear power.
The private sector could struggle to adopt AI quickly enough to capitalize on its benefits.
Washington must defend U.S. technological superiority, too. To ensure that AI advancements are not rapidly replicated by competitors, the U.S. government will need to enforce stringent controls over technologies such as advanced semiconductors and manufacturing equipment, strengthen security measures at research labs and data centers to prevent espionage and intellectual property theft, and require rigorous user verification on cloud computing platforms so that they do not become unwitting tools for an adversary’s technological advancement.
To keep the United States at the forefront of innovation while safeguarding national interests, the U.S. government must develop a scalable and adaptive public-private partnership model to cooperate with companies working on frontier AI. These initiatives should help the government ramp up its adoption of advanced AI and promote prudent security practices. U.S. AI companies can benefit from access to sensitive government intelligence about adversaries attempting to target them, and both the public and private sectors can benefit from co-developing AI applications that can enhance national security, such as advanced cybersecurity and biodefense tools.
As China expands its industrial capacity using AI and robotics, policymakers in Washington must also broaden AI adoption beyond the technology sector. The Trump administration should work with Congress to launch a dedicated “industrial AI” initiative to accelerate research, development, and investment in robotics and AI deployment across the manufacturing, logistics, energy, and infrastructure sectors. With tax credits, innovation grants, and public-private pilot projects, the government can incentivize factories, warehouses, and transportation hubs to integrate AI-driven systems, bridging the gap between the United States’ cutting-edge software capabilities and its lagging factory floors.
Policymakers must also act now to help the workers who will lose their jobs to AI in these industrial sectors. This means significantly increasing investments in STEM education, vocational training, and retraining and upskilling programs—services that would enable workers displaced by automation to swiftly transition into new roles, such as robot maintenance or AI system supervision. To provide clarity for businesses and protections for workers in an AI-centric economy, labor laws and regulations also require updates. As companies increasingly use algorithms to schedule work shifts and more employees work on short-term contracts, wage-and-hour laws should be modernized to ensure transparent, fair compensation and clearly defined working hours. Workplace safety guidelines will need to be revised to incorporate standards for safe human-robot interaction on factory floors. Strengthening unemployment benefits and other forms of direct income support for people disproportionally affected by automation will also be crucial to mitigating the potentially destabilizing consequences of significant labor displacement.
AI powers must avoid cutting corners on safety in their haste to compete.
If the United States is to lead the global AI technology ecosystem, it will also need to provide advanced AI and data centers to more than just wealthy countries. To compete with China’s “good enough” AI systems across the developing world, the Trump administration should explore public-private partnerships to offer generous access to U.S. cloud computing systems to researchers and entrepreneurs in these countries. It should also scale up government-backed financial tools—such as low-interest loans, loan guarantees, equity investments, political risk insurance, and tax incentives—through agencies such as the International Development Finance Corporation. These incentives should be geared toward building digital infrastructure in important emerging markets, such as in Brazil, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Finally, the Trump administration must take steps to reduce the risk of worst-case scenarios—and prepare for those contingencies should they arise. It should run tabletop exercises and crisis simulations of cases involving catastrophic misuse of AI or rogue superintelligence. Doing so would give senior leaders opportunities to rehearse crisis responses, identify gaps in readiness, and improve their decision-making under pressure.
The United States and China, moreover, have a profound obligation to themselves and the world to collaborate to reduce AI risks. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union built guardrails around their nuclear competition. They cooperated on negotiations for the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, recognizing that an uncontrolled race to the nuclear frontier could send humanity hurtling off a cliff. Washington and Beijing today need to chart a similarly narrow path between AI competition and collaboration. They could start with a bilateral agreement to share AI incident information and exchange best practices on AI safety, control, and alignment with human values. Further talks should focus on how to handle scenarios of misused or uncontrolled AGI.
The notion of a singular AI race between the United States and China fails to capture the true complexity of the rivalry unfolding today. The challenge is to win not one definitive contest but a multifront competition whose outcome will shape the international balance of power. Navigating these deeply intertwined domains of technological and strategic AI competition demands that Washington adopt a holistic strategy. Without it, success in one race could create vulnerabilities in another—and neglecting any of them risks irreparably weakening the United States’ global position.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Colin H. Kahl · July 9, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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