Quotes of the Day:
“Strategy is easy to understand, but hard to do. Long and sometimes frustrating debates with officials, soldiers, and scholars, has caused me to doubt the former claim; the latter comes close to being one of those truths that Americans can hold with confidence to be all but self-evident. To resort to a British term, concepts are part of the ‘kit’ that people pack when they set forth to do strategy. Action is fuelled by ideas — sound, unsound, and both. Infinity Journal has the mission of improving understanding of strategy, because that is an important way to help improve strategic performance. If people lack a grasp of strategy’s meaning, of why and how it should work, they must be unready to cope with practical challenges. Instinct and luck are not to be despised but neither should they be trusted. Some education in strategy must be regarded as prudent insurance.”
- Colin Gray
"The vast accumulations of knowledge - or at least of information - deposited by the nineteenth century have been responsible for an equally vast ignorance. When there is so much to be known, when there are so many fields of knowledge in which the same words are used with different meanings, when everyone knows a little about a great many things, it becomes increasingly difficult for anyone to know whether he knows what he is talking about or not. And when we do not know, or when we do not know enough, we tend always to substitute emotions for thoughts." - T.S. Eliot, “The Perfect Critic” for the literary journal Athenaeum in 1920
“… insurgency and counterinsurgency… have enjoyed a level of military, academic, and journalistic notice unseen since the mid-1960s. Scholars and practitioners have recently reexamined 19th- and 20th-century counterinsurgency campaigns waged by the United States and the European colonial powers, much as their predecessors during the Kennedy administration mined the past relentlessly in the hope of uncovering the secrets of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. The professional military literature is awash with articles on how the armed services should prepare for what the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) refers to as “irregular warfare,” and scholars, after a long hiatus, have sought to deepen our understanding of the roles that insurgency, terrorism, and related forms of political violence play in the international security environment.”
-William Rosenau, “Subversion and Terrorism: Understanding and Countering the Threat”
1. N.K. leader's sister warns S. Korea-U.S. military exercise will cloud inter-Korean relations
2. Vice unification minister plans to visit U.S. in September
3. Senior Japanese Embassy diplomat recalled home after disparaging remarks against Moon
4. Former EXO member Kris Wu detained in China on rape allegations
5. Unification official calls for delay in Korea-U.S. military exercises
6. Seoul faces dilemma in upcoming joint military drill
7. Untying Gordian knot on Korean Peninsula
8. Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong Releases Press Statement
9. Bill allowing politicians to take babies to work look set to pass
10. July exports best-ever in Korea’s history
11. Clean-up cost dispute delays US base move
12. Kim Jong-un hints at ‘hardships’, stoking fears of famine’s return amid North Korea’s pandemic isolation
13. Restoration Of Inter-Korea Communication Lines – Analysis
1. N.K. leader's sister warns S. Korea-U.S. military exercise will cloud inter-Korean relations
This is deja vu all over again. The Kim siblings think they can reprise June 2020 when Kim Yo-jong made the threat against the liaison building in Kaesong over the information operations of escapees from north Korea launch balloons from South Korea. And of course she carried through with that threat and had the liaison building partially destroyed. And then the South Korean national assembly appeased her in December with the passage of the so-called anti-leaflet amendment.
Now the regime wants to apply the same TTP form its playbook to not simply cancel the exercise in August but to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance and create further political divisions in South Korea between those who want to ensure the security of the ROK and those who think that appeasing the regime in the north will lead to peace and denuclearization.
As I wrote on twitter regarding Kim Yo-jong's threat: "Political Warfare, blackmail diplomacy, Kim Jong-un’s long con. We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the mafia like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime. Expect a possible provocation to drive a wedge in the alliance over the exercise."
Let me also add what I have previously written about responding to north Korean provocations:
We should keep in mind that the Kim family regime's political warfare strategy relies heavily on its blackmail diplomacy - the use of increased tension, threats and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. Part of our information and influence strategy should be to counter the criticism that a north Korean provocation is a US and South Korean policy failure. We should make the press, pundits, and public understand that this is fundamental part of north Korean strategy and its conducts provocations for specific objectives. It does not represent a policy failure on our part. I would offer the following framework for consideration:
First, do not overreact. But do not succumb to the criticism of those who recommend ending exercises.
Second, never ever back down in the face of north Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.
Third, coordinate an alliance response. There may be times when a good cop-bad cop approach is appropriate. Try to mitigate the internal domestic political criticisms that will inevitably occur in Seoul and DC. Do not let those criticisms negatively influence policy and actions.
Fourth, exploit weakness in north Korea - cause internal pressure on Kim and the regime from his elite and military. Always work to drive a wedge among the party, elite, and military (which is a challenge since they are all intertwined and inextricably linked).
Fifth, demonstrate strength and resolve. Do not be afraid to show military strength. Never misunderstand the north's propaganda - do not give into demands to reduce exercises or take other measures based on north Korean demands that would in any way reduce the readiness of the combined military forces. The north does not want an end to the exercises because they are a threat, they want to weaken the alliance and force the US troops off of the peninsula which will be the result if they are unable to effectively train.
Sixth, depending on the nature of the provocation, be prepared to initiate a decisive response using the most appropriate tools, e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, information and influence activities, cyber, etc. or a combination.
(2nd LD) N.K. leader's sister warns S. Korea-U.S. military exercise will cloud inter-Korean relations | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS details from 6th para, photo, byline)
By Koh Byung-joon and Kim Boram
SEOUL, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- The sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un warned Sunday that annual summertime military drills between South Korea and the United States will cloud the future of inter-Korean relations.
Kim Yo-Jong issued the warning in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, just days after the North restored long-severed communication lines with the South and raised hope for a new round of detente between the two sides.
"I surely see the military drill, which takes place at an important turning point like this, will become an unpleasant prelude to seriously hurting the will of the leaders of the North and South seeking to take the step toward rebuilding trust again and further clouding the path lying ahead for inter-Korean relations," Kim said.
"Our government and military will closely watch whether South Korea will carry out their hostile war exercise once again or make a bold decision," she added. "Hope or despair? The decision is not upon us."
On Tuesday, the North restored communication lines with South Korea more than a year after cutting them off in protest of anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent from the South. The surprise move raised hope for the resumption of long-stalled cross-border dialogue, including the possibility of summit talks.
Kim, however, cautioned against reading too much into the restoration, saying that it would be a "premature, careless judgment" to talk about an inter-Korean summit just because the communication lines were restored.
"I think the restoration of communication lines is nothing but physical reconnection of what had been severed. No more meaning than that should be attached to it," she said. "Hasty speculation and groundless interpretation could bring about only disappointment."
South Korea and the U.S. are expected to hold the annual summertime joint military exercise in August, though Seoul's defense ministry earlier said that the allies are discussing when and how to stage the exercise.
North Korea has long denounced Seoul and Washington's military drills as a rehearsal for an invasion of the North. The allies say that the exercises are defensive in nature.
On Friday, a high-ranking unification ministry official in Seoul told reporters that it is "desirable" for South Korea and the U.S. to suspend their summertime military exercise, citing the global coronavirus pandemic and the need to engage North Korea.
kokobj@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Vice unification minister plans to visit U.S. in September
Excerpt:
The unification ministry has been enhancing direct communication with the U.S.
Choi held high-level bilateral consultation with Sung Kim, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, when Kim visited Seoul in June. When Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman visited Seoul last month, the two sides also agreed to continue close communication.
Choi's envisioned trip, if realized, would make him the first senior unification ministry official to travel to the U.S. since the pandemic broke out.
Vice unification minister plans to visit U.S. in September | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- Vice Unification Minister Choi Young-jun plans to visit the United States next month to coordinate North Korea policy as South Korea seeks dialogue and reconciliation with North Korea after Pyongyang's restoration of inter-Korean communication lines, officials said Sunday.
Choi has been taking necessary steps for a U.S. trip expected sometime in September, such as receiving a COVID-19 vaccine and filing a request for exemption from coronavirus quarantine, ministry officials said.
"A trip to the U.S. by the vice minister is part of efforts to follow up on the May summit between the South and the U.S., and to form a consensus on North Korea policy after the inter-Korean communication lines were restored recently," a ministry official said.
Last week, the North restored four hotlines with South Korea that it had cut off in June last year in anger over anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets that activists in South Korea have sent across the border into the North.
The restoration was made under agreement that South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un reached after exchanging a series of personal letters, and raised hope for a new round of detente between the two sides.
Since the restoration, the South has made an official proposal to the North to discuss setting up videoconferencing systems for inter-Korean talks amid the pandemic while trying to determine the issues that need to be discussed with Pyongyang.
The unification ministry has been enhancing direct communication with the U.S.
Choi held high-level bilateral consultation with Sung Kim, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, when Kim visited Seoul in June. When Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman visited Seoul last month, the two sides also agreed to continue close communication.
Choi's envisioned trip, if realized, would make him the first senior unification ministry official to travel to the U.S. since the pandemic broke out.
jschang@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Senior Japanese Embassy diplomat recalled home after disparaging remarks against Moon
(LEAD) Senior Japanese Embassy diplomat recalled home after disparaging remarks against Moon | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with S. Korean foreign ministry official's comments)
SEOUL/TOKYO, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- A senior Japanese Embassy diplomat in Seoul has been recalled home after causing a stir with remarks disparaging South Korean President Moon Jae-in's efforts to improve relations between the two countries, a Japanese paper reported Sunday.
Hirohisa Soma, deputy chief of mission at the embassy, has been criticized both in Seoul and Tokyo after telling a South Korean reporter during a lunch meeting last month that Moon's efforts to improve ties with Tokyo were tantamount to "masturbation."
On Sunday, Japan's Nikkei Shimbun newspaper reported that Soma has been ordered to return home, saying the No. 2 post at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul has usually been replaced every two years and it's been over two years since Soma took the job.
In Seoul, a foreign ministry official said the report has been confirmed to be true.
"This is an issue that the Japanese government should provide specific details on," the official said declining to elaborate on the matter.
Soma has reportedly yet to leave South Korea but is expected to return to Japan soon.
Soma's remarks have added to tensions between Seoul and Tokyo over the long-simmering issues of Japan's wartime forced labor and sexual slavery, as well as its restrictions on exports of key industrial materials to South Korea.
The gaffe has been cited as one of the reasons that affected Moon's decision not to visit Tokyo for the opening of the Olympic Games, which dashed hopes for a potential summit with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on the occasion.
(END)
4. Former EXO member Kris Wu detained in China on rape allegations
Although not Korean, he was a member of a K-pop group. Will this complicate relations between China and Canada and to a much lesser extent with South Korea (only because of the former K-pop connection)? Probably not. Or this guy is just a criminal and all will agree he should be tried and if convicted experience the punishment from the full extent of the law.
Former EXO member Kris Wu detained in China on rape allegations | Yonhap News Agency
SHANGHAI, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- Chinese-Canadian pop star Kris Wu, a former member of the K-pop boy band EXO, has been detained in China over suspicions of rape.
Police in Beijing said in a posting on the Chinese social media platform Weibo late Saturday that they took the 30-year-old, whose legal Chinese name is Wu Yi Fan, into criminal custody on rape charges after looking into allegations that he seduced and had sex with female minors multiple times.
Police did not give further details on the rape charges.
The detention follows accusations raised by an 18-year-old surnamed Du, who claimed to be his ex-girlfriend. In a July interview with an online media outlet, the woman said Wu lured many women -- including two minors -- into sexual relationships.
Wu filed a complaint against the woman on charges of threat, which prompted the police to look into both cases.
In an interim investigation announcement, police said while there was a person who threatened Wu, the person was not Du but a man who pretended to be her.
The police, however, added that it has confirmed that Wu had invited Du to his home in December to hold an interview for a starring role in his music video and has since been in contact with her. It said investigations into allegations involving other women are under way.
Wu has denied the allegations. In a Weibo post uploaded upon the initial accusation, the pop star said he would "walk into prison on his own" if the suspicions are true.
The 30-year-old debuted as a member of EXO in 2012 before leaving the group in 2014 amid a legal dispute with South Korean entertainment agency SM. He has since become a top star in China with stints in singing and acting.
(END)
5. Unification official calls for delay in Korea-U.S. military exercises
Completely irresponsible. This usually causes me to comment on how the Ministry of Unification should stay out of forieng affairs and national security issues and focus solely on planning for actual unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea. The MOU should not infringe on what is the province of MOFA, MND, and the NSC in the Blue House.
But I won't focus on that now.
I have been told by friends in Korea that in reality the MOU has no significant influence. Yes it has a Minister with a very political agenda but he and the ministry do not have much influence with the Blue House. Basically the advice to us is that we should "pay no attention to the man behind the curtain."
But to delay the exercises is dangerous appeasement that will continue to harm ROK/US combined military readiness which of course is a major objective of the regime. Postponing the exercises will not restart north-South engagment or bring Kim to the denuclearization negotiating table. It will cause Kim to jduge his balckmail diplomacy successful and he will double down on increased tensions, threats, and provocations to try to gain political and economic concessions.
Sunday
August 1, 2021
Unification official calls for delay in Korea-U.S. military exercises
The flag of South Korea, right, and the flag of North Korea, left, stand close together in a border area between the two Koreas on July 27. [YONHAP]
Contrary to the Blue House’s denial of plans to postpone Korea-U.S. joint military exercises this month, a Unification Ministry official recently called for a delay in the exercises for the sake of inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogue.
“It would be best to postpone the Korea-U.S. joint military exercises,” the official told a group of reporters Friday.
Though the official first cited the country's spike in Covid-19 infections as reason for the delay, he added that “engagement with the North can be actively pursued” following a delay in the military exercises.
“This is a prime time to engage the North through Korea-U.S. cooperation,” the official said. “By taking this opportunity, Korea and the United States may be able to bring about a very effective achievement for peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Following the restoration of the inter-Korean hotline last week, the question of whether the Moon Jae-in government will plan an inter-Korean summit and whether it will consider postponing the U.S.-Korea military exercises scheduled in August has been floated by local media outlets.
The Blue House denied such plans.
“There have been no talks between the two Koreas on hosting an inter-Korean summit in person or virtually,” an official in the Blue House told the press on July 27, the day the hotline was restored.
The official emphasized that restoring the hotline and holding the U.S.-Korea joint military exercises “are two separate issues.”
The two Koreas re-instated their shared hotline last Tuesday, bringing back the direct communication channel that had been defunct for 413 days, after the North pulled the plug in protest of what it claimed were the South’s failures to prevent activists from sending propaganda leaflets across the border in June 2020. The direct line at Panmunjom dates back to 1971.
Pyongyang traditionally protests Seoul-Washington military drills, viewing them as war rehearsals.
Most recently, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has denounced the exercises during his meeting with commanders and political officers of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in Pyongyang from July 24 to 27.
“Saying that at present the hostile forces systematically keep bolstering up their capabilities for making a pre-emptive attack on the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] and increase armaments while intensifying all sorts of frantic and persistent war drills for aggression, he noted such situation has hardened the determination and fighting will of the KPA to eradicate the root cause of the evil cycle of escalating tensions,” North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency reported on Friday.
The regular U.S.-Korea joint military exercises have been scaled down since 2018, when North Korea-U.S. diplomacy kicked into high gear. Since last year, large-scale joint exercises have been held as computer-simulated tabletop drills or scaled down because of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The most recent set of exercises was held in March, in the form of a computer-simulated command post exercise.
A set of exercises are scheduled for this month.
The U.S. government has emphasized that all decisions on the joint military exercises should be made jointly between the United States and Korea.
“The ROK-U.S. Alliance remains at a high level of readiness, and continues to maintain a robust combined defense posture to protect the Republic of Korea against any threat or adversary while implementing and maintaining prudent preventive control measures to protect the force,” a spokesperson of the U.S. Department of Defense told the Voice of America on Saturday. “Combined training events are a ROK-U.S. bilateral decision, and any decisions will be a mutual agreement.”
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Korea’s Defense Minister Suh Wook held a call on Saturday but withheld details on their conversation. The call was made per request from the U.S. government, according to Korea’s Defense Ministry.
Some experts in Korea cautioned against giving into the North’s pressure to delay the military exercises with the United States.
“It is the principle of the Biden administration’s North Korea policy that there should be no inducement without active change from North Korea,” said Shin Beom-chul, researcher on foreign policies at the Research Institute for Economy and Society. “The administration has also emphasized the importance of the joint military exercises, to the point that it provided vaccines to the South Korean military.
“If the Moon Jae-in administration wants to postpone the joint exercises on the grounds of improving inter-Korean relations, the action must be premised on a new strategy,” he added. “This new strategy must be drafted based on the fact that even the reduced scale of joint exercises over the past three years has not brought about significant response from the North."
BY JEONG JIN-WOO, PARK HYUN-JU AND ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
6. Seoul faces dilemma in upcoming joint military drill
There should be no dilemma. Responsible leaders will put the national security of their nation and the safety of their people first. Certainly ahead of a fantasy hope that weakening defense will lead to engagement and denuclearization talks.
Cancelling, postponing, or scaling back the exercise will be playing into the hands of Kim Jong-un's long con. We should not be duped because someone answered a phone call or because a sister to the most despotic evil dictator in the world made a veiled threat.
I am very heartened to read this statement attributed to President Moon:
But Moon said he believes inter-Korean relations will not improve much even if the South accepts the demand, as the North did not show any commitment to improving inter-Korean ties in recent years when the South and U.S. replaced their springtime Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises, and the summertime Ulchi Freedom Guardian drills with scaled-down ones.
In effect he is reminding us that since Trump made the unilateral decision to cancel the exercise in the summer of 2018 we have spent 3 years cancelling, postponing, and scaling back exercises with no reciprocity or substantive response from the north. We have tested KimJong-un and he has been found wanting.
I am sure President Moon knows the words to the Who song: "Won't Get Fooled Again."
We'll be fighting in the streets
With our children at our feet
And the morals that they worship will be gone
And the men who spurred us on
Sit in judgement of all wrong
They decide and the shotgun sings the song
I'll tip my hat to the new constitution
Take a bow for the new revolution
Smile and grin at the change all around
Pick up my guitar and play
Just like yesterday
Then I'll get on my knees and pray
We don't get fooled again
Seoul faces dilemma in upcoming joint military drill
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un presides over the first workshop of the commanders and political officers of the Korean People's Army (KPA) held in Pyongyang from July 24 to 27, in this photo released by the country's state-run Korean Central Television, Friday. Yonhap
Joint exercise emerges as key variable in thawing inter-Korean relations
By Jung Da-min
Whether South Korea and the United States will carry out their annual summertime joint military exercises scheduled for August could affect the development of inter-Korean relations, according to North Korea watchers, Sunday.
Inter-Korean relations, which had been stalemated for some time and were exacerbated by North Korea blowing up a building housing the inter-Korean joint liaison office in Gaesong in the North in June 2020, have shown signs of a thaw with the two countries restoring communication hotlines, July 27, the 68th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War.
Moon Sung-mook, a senior researcher at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, said a reconciliatory mood between the Koreas has not been automatically created with the restoration of the hotlines, adding that the North could demand a cancellation of the exercises as a "corresponding measure" to it responding to the South's peace efforts by restoring communications.
"The North responded to the South's call for the restoration of communications July 27, the day which the North claims as an anniversary of its victory (in the Korean War). There is the possibility that the North has demanded the South cancel its joint military drill with the U.S.," Moon said. "At the eighth congress of the North's ruling Workers' Party of Korea, the country's leader Kim Jong-un said there were two preconditions for inter-Korean talks ― the first was the cancellation of South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and the second was stopping the introduction of advanced weapons from the U.S."
Pyongyang has long denounced the exercises, calling them a rehearsal for invasion. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said at a workshop for commanders and political officers of the Korean People's Army (KPA) held in Pyongyang from July 24 to 27 that "the hostile forces systematically keep bolstering up their capabilities for making a preemptive attack on the DPRK and increase armaments while intensifying all sorts of frantic and persistent war drills for aggression," according to the country's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The DPRK, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.
But Moon said he believes inter-Korean relations will not improve much even if the South accepts the demand, as the North did not show any commitment to improving inter-Korean ties in recent years when the South and U.S. replaced their springtime Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises, and the summertime Ulchi Freedom Guardian drills with scaled-down ones.
Members of a liberal civic group hold a press conference in Seoul, Monday, calling for the joint summertime military exercise between South Korea and the United States to be cancelled to boost President Moon Jae-in's peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Yonhap
While ruling bloc figures are expressing hopes for another reconciliatory mood on the Korean Peninsula and a resumption of the stalled nuclear talks between the U.S. and North Korea, some are calling for the joint summertime exercise to be cancelled to "boost the mood for talks."
A high-ranking Ministry of Unification official told reporters Friday that he thinks the joint exercise should be postponed, citing the recent surge in COVID-19 cases in both South Korea and the United States, and the possible resumption of engagement policies toward the North. "We think this is the right time to fully engage with North Korea through cooperation between South Korea and the United States," he said.
But members of the country's conservative bloc oppose the idea, saying the matter of the joint drill should be dealt with separately from efforts to boost any reconciliatory mood between the Koreas, as the former is about maintaining national security.
"The Republic of Korea-U.S. joint exercises have already been conducted with just command post training using simulations without the actual mobilization of troops, and even this was not conducted properly in the first half of last year," said Rep. Hwangbo Seung-hee, a spokeswoman of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP), Sunday.
"With such a cancellation of military exercises, it is has become difficult for the troops to maintain actual combat capability while the verification of the South Korean military's capabilities to lead joint operations has also become difficult."
Military helicopters at U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, are seen in this March 8, file photo. YonhapMilitary experts have expressed a mixed response over whether the summertime exercises will be cancelled.
Moon of the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy said there is the possibility that the government has raised the issue with the U.S. On Friday, Defense Minister Suh Wook and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin held a phone conversation at request of the U.S. Meantime, Vice Minister of Unification Choi Young-joon is planning to visit the U.S. to discuss North Korea policy with officials there in September, according to ministry officials.
But Park Won-gon, a professor at Ewha Womans University's Department of North Korea Studies, said he does not see the drill being cancelled at this last moment when it is set to kick off in about 10 days.
"The summertime exercises have already been scaled down to the point where they cannot be downsized anymore, leaving South Korea and the U.S. with only two options of either totally scrapping them or carrying them out as planned," Park said. "As it takes about three to six months to prepare for the joint drill, it would be difficult for the countries to cancel or adjust the plan at this last moment."
7. Untying Gordian knot on Korean Peninsula
Very interesting and useful analysis. I like the two clocks analogy. However, in effect what he is arguing for is a step by step negotiation process, e.g., action for action to try to "synchronize the two clocks." That sounds practical and logical but it is based on one fundamental assumption: that Kim Jong-un will become a responsible member of the international community. I am afraid such an assumption has proven false time and time again by Kim Jong-un's actions and policies. But Ambassador Kim correctly reminds us that one objective of the regime is to drive a wedge in the alliance.
Excerpts:
Synchronizing these two clocks is a tough task. But it is doable with creative and flexible thinking as well as long-term patience and persistence. It will help Pyongyang untie their Gordian knot in a peaceful and mutually beneficial way. Seoul must secure two things; domestic bipartisan consensus and tight alliance coordination.
Securing a domestic consensus is particularly challenging in Seoul, as it enters the political season with the next presidential election scheduled for March next year. Now is the time for political leaders here to desist from their past patterns of using North Korea policy for vote catching. The South's North Korea policy must be decoupled from domestic politics. Only that way, can Seoul prevent Pyongyang's drive-wedging between it and Washington as well as China's inertia. It is also the best way for Seoul to ensure effective coordination with Washington.
Untying Gordian knot on Korean Peninsula
By Kim Won-soo
Last week South and North Korea resumed operation of cross-border hot lines. The move came as a pleasant surprise after the North unilaterally severed them over a year ago. It was likely intended by Pyongyang as an initial response to the policy review performed by the Biden administration in the United States as well as the following summit between the presidents of the U.S. and South Korea.
This is good news. But whether and how it will be followed up with further dialogue remains to be seen. Given the complex array of challenges facing North Korea, its leadership may have spent sleepless nights agonizing over what steps should be taken. Their silence for the last couple of months was seen by some experts as a calm before the storm, which may have culminated in provocative actions by the North, as has been the case in the past.
The past couple of years have arguably been the toughest period North Korea has ever faced. The unprecedentedly harsh self-imposed restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic seriously aggravated the already growing pains caused by international sanctions on top of existing socioeconomic hardships. Pyongyang is facing a conundrum as arduous as the Gordian knot. It is entangled in a three by three equation; three levels (domestic, inter-Korean and international) and three domains (politico-security, socioeconomic and humanitarian/human rights).
Unfortunately for the North, there is no magic solution as the legend goes with Alexander the Great, who was said to have cut the Knot with one bold sword stroke. North Korea may have coveted its nuclear weapon capability development as a magic "sword." But to the contrary, its simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development has increasingly turned out to be unattainable in the real world. The economy is being hurt by the international sanctions that show no signs of being eased without corresponding denuclearization measures to be taken by North Korea.
It becomes all the more clearer that the North does not have any good options as long as it sticks to nuclear deterrence as its primary security guarantee. North Korea may want to emulate what India and Pakistan did. But the tragedy of North Korea is that it lacks the geostrategic value India has as a counterweight to China for the U.S. and Pakistan as that to India for China.
Conversely, a nuclear-armed North Korea is perceived both by the US and China as a geostrategic burden. A nuclear-armed North Korea runs the risk of a nuclear domino in Northeast Asia with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan likely to follow suit. This scenario is strategically unacceptable not only to the U.S. but also to China. It is also likely to cause the beginning of the end of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, which is unacceptable to other recognized nuclear weapon states including Russia.
Given the long history of North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons development, however, it is also unrealistic to expect it to make the strategic choice to forego the nuclear option upfront, before it is fully convinced about its security without its precious nuclear "sword." This puts North Korea in a Catch-22 situation. It does not want to give up the nuclear option until everything is secured as it wishes. But it cannot get anything either, unless it shows a willingness to give up the nuclear option.
Under this situation, North Korea may have chosen a safe path; that is to test the waters with the new Biden team in Washington through Seoul. Therefore, we have to assume that Pyongyang has made a tactical move this time and its next steps will be calibrated, depending on how Seoul and Washington react. In that sense, North Korea has kicked the ball back to us while waiting to see our next moves. Now is the time for Seoul and Washington to refine our common but differentiated strategy toward Pyongyang.
Biden team's policy review came out as safe and bland as expected. In a larger sense, it meets midway between the approaches of the previous Trump and Obama administrations; neither a top-down package nor strategic patience. But much remains to be filled in on the specifics. The Biden-Moon summit provided more optics than substance. The summit communique was positive but largely declaratory on the North Korea policy with a surprising quid-pro-quo compromise to reflect Washington's priorities on China and Seoul's priorities on North Korea.
On the Korean Peninsula, two clocks are ticking on the politico-security (nuclear) and the socioeconomic fronts. For North Korea, the nuclear clock is moving forward but the socioeconomic clock is going backward. The reverse is the case with South Korea. In this situation, Seoul's strategy should be geared on how to synchronize the two clocks to its advantage; using the socioeconomic clock to slow down, suspend and eventually reverse the nuclear clock. It can be done with step by step and tit for tat movements on the two clocks toward the end point of durable peace with full denuclearization and sustainable co-prosperity.
Synchronizing these two clocks is a tough task. But it is doable with creative and flexible thinking as well as long-term patience and persistence. It will help Pyongyang untie their Gordian knot in a peaceful and mutually beneficial way. Seoul must secure two things; domestic bipartisan consensus and tight alliance coordination.
Securing a domestic consensus is particularly challenging in Seoul, as it enters the political season with the next presidential election scheduled for March next year. Now is the time for political leaders here to desist from their past patterns of using North Korea policy for vote catching. The South's North Korea policy must be decoupled from domestic politics. Only that way, can Seoul prevent Pyongyang's drive-wedging between it and Washington as well as China's inertia. It is also the best way for Seoul to ensure effective coordination with Washington.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).
8. Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong Releases Press Statement
Here is the full text of Kim Yo-jong's statement that was just posted and translated into English. I will look for Korean linguists (such as Dr. Duyeon Kim, congratulations on completing your PhD) to compare the north Korea language and the Propaganda and Agitation Department's (PAD) english translation. We often make mistakes interpreting the English version due to poor translation by the PAD.
If this translation is accurate Kim Yo-jong and I are in agreement as I have been saying this since the north Korean duty officer picked up the phone on the north side of Panmunjom.
Excerpt:
What I think is that the restoration of the communication liaison lines should not be taken as anything more than just the physical reconnection.
Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong Releases Press Statement
Date: 01/08/2021 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source
Pyongyang, August 1 (KCNA) -- Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, released the following press statement on Sunday:
As it is already known to the world, on July 27 the north and the south took a measure of restoring all the communication liaison lines between them, which had been cut off for over one year.
But in this regard, those inside and outside south Korea are freely interpreting its meaning their own way and there is even a public opinion about the issue of the north-south summit. I think it is a premature hasty judgment.
What I think is that the restoration of the communication liaison lines should not be taken as anything more than just the physical reconnection.
Hasty speculation and groundless interpretation will only bring despair, instead.
My view can be easily understandable if one looks back on the past three years when the north-south relations underwent undesirable turns, twists and fluctuation and inched to the crisis even though the top leaders of the north and the south had held each other's hands and made and published such a momentous agreement as the joint declaration.
For some days I have been hearing an unpleasant story that joint military exercises between the south Korean army and the U.S. forces could go ahead as scheduled.
We have never discussed the scale or form of the joint military exercises, the ones on the way at such a crucial time as now.
I view this as an undesirable prelude which seriously undermines the will of the top leaders of the north and the south wishing to see a step taken toward restoring mutual trust and which further beclouds the way ahead of the north-south relations.
Our government and army will closely follow whether the south Korean side stages hostile war exercises in August or makes other bold decision.
Hope or despair? Choice is not made by us. -0-
9. Bill allowing politicians to take babies to work look set to pass
Hopefully a positive step forward in Korean domestic politics.
[Herald Interview] Bill allowing politicians to take babies to work look set to pass
Ruling, opposition floor leaders take part in the bill after Yong made headlines
Published : Aug 1, 2021 - 13:24 Updated : Aug 1, 2021 - 13:24
Rep. Yong Hye-in, 31, of the Basic Income Party, brings her 2-month-old son to her workplace on July 5. (Yonhap)
After Rep. Yong Hye-in, 31, of the Basic Income Party, brought her 2-month-old son to her workplace on July 5, her photos went viral on social media.
On the day, she held a press conference to urge the passage of her bill that would allow a lawmaker to enter a plenary session with an infant who needs nursing. Under the current law, only lawmakers, the prime minister, state council members and those authorized by the assembly speaker are allowed.
When her photos made headlines, opinions were divided. Some have shown support to Yong for her moves to strengthen women’s rights in political participation while others accuse her of bringing a baby to work and demanding preferential treatment for politicians.
“I was surprised for the attention and controversies as they were more than I thought,” Yong told The Korea Herald.
“But I soon realized this could be a chance,” said the leader of the nation’s progressive minor party.
The same bill, which was first proposed by Rep. Shin Bo-ra in 2018, did not gain much attention. But this time, after Yoon’s press conference came under the spotlight, she was able to persuade 60 lawmakers, including the floor leaders of the ruling and opposition parties, to participate in the bill.
“When I visited the floor leaders, both of them showed support. I didn’t see lawmakers who strongly oppose it. The bill looks set to be passed during the 21st assembly without much difficulty.”
Yong has denied the speculations that the bill was devised to give special treatment only for politicians. She believes this is more related to female political participation and suffrage.
“(Under the current political setting) when parenting and parliamentary activities collide, mother politicians have no choice but to choose child care. This is like telling a woman not to participate in politics.”
Many countries allow mother politicians to bring their babies to work. In the US, Australia, New Zealand and the European Parliament, politicians can enter a plenary session with young children and breastfeed.
“In those countries, female participation in politics is higher,” she said.
According to the latest OECD data as of 2019, the percentage of female parliamentarians in those countries was mostly higher than in South Korea.
The portion of female politicians in Sweden and Finland was 47.3 percent and 47 percent each. Spain, France and Portugal showed 41.1 percent, 39.7 percent and 35.7 percent, respectively. In New Zealand and Australia, the portion was 40 percent and 30 percent.
In more politically conservative countries, Korea and Japan, the portion of female politicians was 17.1 percent and 10.2 percent, each. In Japan, a female politician was kicked out of a conference by her colleague for bringing her baby in 2017.
Politicians’ parenting issue has not been much of an issue in Korea’s male-dominated assembly where so far only three politicians have become mothers during tenure.
The first politician who gave birth was Jang Ha-na in 2015, who did not take any maternity leave. The next one was Shin Bo-ra in 2018, who took 45 days of maternity leave. She asked for access to a plenary session with her baby but was rejected by an assembly speaker. The third is Yong, who took 60 days off.
“I hope the next mother politician can have longer maternity leave,” she said.
In Korea, there is no maternity leave for lawmakers because they are not considered workers under the Labor Standards Act. So Shin and Yong took days off by asking an assembly speaker for permission of absence for a plenary session.
Overseas, when female politicians give birth, there are more options, such as appointing a proxy or adopting remote voting besides maternity leave. But Korea has a long way to go.
“Korea’s assembly has been very slow in adopting electronic or remote voting systems. Appointing a proxy is also not easy because Korea is more politician-centered instead of party-centered like in Europe.”
Having said that, Yong believes the nation’s conservative assembly is changing.
“I believe controversies surrounding brining a baby to the assembly or politicians’ maternity leaves are a good sign that it is changing,” she said.
“Changes take place because, I believe, more young people participate in politics and they put new agenda on the table for discussion.”
Currently, out of the 300 lawmakers, a total of 13 lawmakers are in their 20s and 30s, the highest number in the nation’s political history. There were three in the 20th National Assembly.
The young politicians raise more liberal issues, such as gender equality, basic income, environment and animal rights.
Yong is now working to devise bills to increase male participation in child care, prevent women’s career breaks, reduce gender wage gaps and reduce the burden on individuals in pregnancy and childbirth.
“Thanks to the attention and controversies, I believe my next bills related to women and parenting will gain more attention in the assembly.”
10. July exports best-ever in Korea’s history
Good economic news.
July exports best-ever in Korea’s history
Published : Aug 1, 2021 - 14:39 Updated : Aug 1, 2021 - 14:47
Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Moon Sung-wook (Yonhap)
South Korea’s exports in July surged 29.6 percent to $55.4 billion on-year, a record monthly figure since the nation began compiling the data in 1956, according to the Trade Ministry Sunday.
In the first seven months of this year, Korea’s accumulated exports were worth $358.7 billion, setting another record. Also, this is the first time in 10 years that the country saw double digit growths for four consecutive months in 10 years -- 41.2 percent in April, 45.6 percent in May, 39.8 percent in 29.8 percent and 29.6 percent in July.
“For two straight months from June to July, exports of the nation’s 15 core products all increased, 13 of them witnessing double-digit growths. Also, for four consecutive months, Korea’s exports grew in all nine major markets,” a Trade Ministry official said.
Private and public experts, including those at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade and the Bank of Korea, estimate the nation’s exports this year at between $601.7 billion and $610.5 billion, while its trade volume is projected at $1.15 trillion to $1.19 trillion.
The record performance was propelled by robust exports in both conventional and new sectors.
Overseas sales of chips, fueled by global server demands, spiked 39.6 percent to reach $11 billion in July on-year, surpassing $10.4 billion in July 2018 when the world was enjoying a chip “super cycle.”
In January, RAMeXchange, a research division of market tracker TrendForce, set the average contract price of an 8-gigabyte DRAM at $3.25, $3.50 and $3.75 in the second, third and fourth quarters this year, respectively. In June, RAMeXchange raised the figures to $3.80, $4.09 and $4.23. The price hike is expected to give a further boost to Korea’s chip industry.
Thanks to surging demand in packaging and quarantine products, exports of petrochemical products jumped 59.5 percent to $4.7 billion, while those of automobiles surged 12.3 percent to $4.1 billion buoyed by the global demand for eco-friendly vehicles.
Among emerging industries, exports of rechargeable batteries enjoyed a stellar 31.3 percent growth to $790 million.
11. Clean-up cost dispute delays US base move
The 600 pound gorilla that hinders the turnover process.
Clean-up cost dispute delays US base move
Published : Aug 1, 2021 - 17:32 Updated : Aug 1, 2021 - 18:23
The area occupied by the US military in Yongsan is shown outlined in white. Areas to become part of Yongsan Park are shown in dark green. Areas in yellow indicate they have been returned to South Korea. (Yongsan-gu Office)
South Korea and the US have yet to reach consensus on clean-up costs for military bases that Washington is handing back to Seoul, despite years of talks, the first of which was held in 2002.
On Friday, the US military agreed to return about one-quarter of its Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul by early next year. This is the second time since last year the US military is giving up parts of its Yongsan base, the largest US installation here and one of 12 sites out of 80 it needs to hand over to Korea.
But Seoul is left wondering when it will take the remaining sites and if it could initiate development there, without a timeline to guide the projects, which involve putting up a signature park in Yongsan, like New York’s Central Park, and building residential, commercial facilities elsewhere.
Those plans have been essentially put on hold indefinitely until Seoul and Washington figure out how to burden clean-up costs and until the US military moves out to its new bases still under construction, according to Seoul officials familiar with the matter.
Debate over clean-up costs
The discussion over clean-up costs has reached nowhere as Seoul and Washington have yet to adopt clear rules in their Status of Forces Agreement to determine how serious the base contamination is to public health.
The SOFA, which governs the 28,500-strong US military stationed here, says the US is not responsible for returning bases to the host country the way they were, unless there is a “known, imminent, substantial endangerment” to human health. The agreement does not elaborate on what that means.
Washington has rejected Seoul’s argument that the base contamination poses that risk, and their squabbling will not be resolved anytime soon, according to a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
“Disagreement will run its course. There is nothing other than patience to give a shot at compromise,” said the official who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the matter.
He noted making the SOFA clearer on what endangerment means and what the parties should do in response is the priority, though he refrained from saying whether any revisions could actually take place. The US is seen as reluctant to introduce any changes to the agreement.
The US was not entirely ruling out an environment study, and there is still room for negotiation, the official added. But he admitted that the latest handover Friday saw little progress on that discussion.
So far, Seoul has spent at least $190 million cleaning up 24 military sites Washington returned, and plans to discuss costs with the US military as it retakes more sites.
No space for relocating troops
The US military, which still occupies much of Yongsan Garrison, has no place to move its troops in Seoul because facilities are still being built to accommodate them at the new, sprawling Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province.
The new US military headquarters started accepting troops in 2017 but runs short of spaces to accommodate more of them from Yonsgsan Garrison, who mostly work at the Combined Forces Command the two allies have run in the capital since 1978.
“We need facilities at Camp Humphreys to be ready but they aren’t quite there yet,” the Foreign Ministry official said.
An official at the Ministry of National Defense, which has been in charge of building those facilities since 2006, said there might be reasons for the delay.
“The CFC in Yongsan is more than just a command. It’s a symbolic bond that brings together Korea and the US. Taking it out could naturally take time to rethink options until the last minute,” the official said, adding however he believed relocation will take place eventually.
The Defense Ministry was emphatic that there were no delays that affected construction at the new US military headquarters, saying everything has been running smoothly and on schedule.
“We have not seen and are not seeing any impediment to relocating the Combined Forces Command in Yongsan,” the ministry said without elaborating.
Yongsan Park was scheduled to open by 2027, with many other areas left by the US military expected to go through redevelopment.
12. Kim Jong-un hints at ‘hardships’, stoking fears of famine’s return amid North Korea’s pandemic isolation
We need to be vigilant and observe for the indicators of instability, I will reprise these slides from Bob Collins and me in the 1990s (when Kim Jong-il was in charge).
Note the analysis from our good friends Tim Peters and Greg Scarlatoiu. They have tremendous insight into what is happening in north Korea and the level of suffering of the Korean people in the north.
Kim Jong-un hints at ‘hardships’, stoking fears of famine’s return amid North Korea’s pandemic isolation
- Three times this year, Kim has indicated his country is in trouble, raising the spectre of the deadly ‘Arduous March’ of the 1990s
- Sealed borders, severe weather, and the presumed spread of Covid-19 have combined to create a ‘gravely serious’ humanitarian situation, say observers
+ FOLLOW
Published: 9:30am, 1 Aug, 2021
North Korea’s autocratic leadership is not known for drawing attention to problems within the country, where a popular children’s song proclaims “we have nothing to envy in the world”.
So when Kim Jong-un used a recent commemoration of the 1950-1953 Korean war to acknowledge the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdowns had sparked a “crisis of hardships” to rival the conflict, aid groups took notice.
Kim’s acknowledgement of growing deprivation late last month was the third such public acknowledgement this year, including an admission in June that the secretive country’s food situation was “getting tense”.
In April, the third-generation dictator, who assumed power in 2011, told officials to prepare for another “Arduous March”, the term used to describe a famine during the 1990s that is estimated to have cost between 240,000 and 3.5 million lives.“During the famine of the late 90s, North Korea made indications that the country was in trouble. North Korea’s default disposition is bombast and bragging. If they say they are in trouble, they usually mean it.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un scolds officials for ‘great crisis’ caused by coronavirus lapse
Tim Peters, the founder of Seoul-based non-profit Helping Hands Korea, said Kim’s remarks hinted at the “enormous impact” of the pandemic and related restrictions on the country.
“Rarely do we agree with Kim Jong-un, but such an assessment coincides with all of the indicators that our NGO has of the immensely complex crisis that the pandemic poses for the DPRK’s ageing, brittle infrastructure on every level,” Peters said, using the acronym for the North’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Pyongyang has effectively sealed the country’s borders since January last year as part of measures to keep the pandemic at bay, severely curtailing cross-border traffic and trade with China, its main ally and trading partner.
Trade between the neighbours fell to a record low in the first six months of 2021, with Chinese exports declining more than 85 per cent to US$56.77 million, according to Chinese customs data.
Last week, South Korea’s central bank estimated the isolated country’s gross domestic product shrank 4.5 per cent last year, its sharpest drop since 1997.
GDP fell to 31.4 trillion won (US$27.4 billion), down from 33.8 trillion won in Kim’s first year at the helm, the report showed, while exports dropped 67.9 per cent to just US$90 million.
The North has officially reported zero Covid-19 cases throughout the pandemic, a record doubted by many observers, although Kim in June castigated officials over an unspecified “grave incident” related to the virus. Pyongyang has displayed little urgency about vaccinating its 25 million people, with no public indications it has taken delivery of any jabs.
While already challenging because of the government’s stranglehold on information, obtaining a clear picture of conditions has become more difficult following an exodus of foreign diplomats and aid workers, driven by shortages of basic goods and harsh restrictions including domestic travel controls.
Peters said he had received reports from sources in the country that pointed to a “gravely serious” humanitarian situation, including claims of emergency quarantine camps that provided minimal food and the stationing of armed guards around rice and corn fields.
“Every indication I’ve heard so far points to enormous stress on the North Korean population due to the direct and indirect impacts of the prolonged pandemic,” said Peters, adding that all channels for delivering aid had been effectively blocked for much of late 2020 and early 2021.
Peters said he believed there was a “very high” chance Covid-19 was spreading widely in the country despite official denials, a major concern given the dilapidated health system and a population with weakened immunity because of widespread malnourishment.
Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, said North Korean defectors with contacts in the country had reported an apparent increase in respiratory infections.
“This is anecdotal evidence provided via word of mouth,” Scarlatoiu said. “But it would be very difficult to believe that there are no Covid-19 cases in North Korea. Part of the reason may be the lack of testing kits. Also, the North Korean regime has tackled Covid-19 mostly as a political propaganda issue, and not a critical public health issue. The consequences could be devastating.”
Scarlatoiu said access to the country at present remained “nearly impossible”.
“There is no indication when foreign humanitarian NGOs may resume their operations,” he said.
A coordinator with a US-based non-profit organisation that works in North Korea said he was not convinced Covid-19 had spread widely within the country, citing the extreme measures taken by the government.
The coordinator, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said his experience also suggested the country’s “farmers are more resilient than most think” – but noted his organisation had not had people inside the country since 2019.
This Week in Asia could not independently confirm word of mouth reports on the conditions inside the country.
Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings, an associate director at the Centre of Humanitarian Leadership at Deakin University in Australia, said that whether or not Covid-19 had taken hold in North Korea, it was clear pandemic control measures were having a “negative impact on North Korean human security and well-being”.
“So even in the best case scenario where there is no Covid-19, people are still suffering,” Zadeh-Cummings said.
Chung, the head of Crossing Borders, said the international community needed to act without delay to avert a potential humanitarian disaster.
“If the world waits to verify that this is actually true, it might be too late and tens of thousands of lives might be lost,” he said.
This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Pandemic isolation fuels concerns of unfolding disaster
13. Restoration Of Inter-Korea Communication Lines – Analysis
I will add what is futile: Calls for trust between north and South and the north and US. There can never be trust as long as Kim jong-un is in power and he pursues his revolutionary goals through political warfare, balkacmail diplomacy and as a last resort, the use of force. The author recgonizes that negotiations and engagement attempts have been devoid of trust. But I do not think the "serious and consistent outreach to the Kim regime" by the Moon administration will result in sufficient trust due to the nature, objectives, and strategy for the Kim family regime.
Excerpts:
Right now there is general fatigue across the board. Engagement with North Korea has been futile, with it repeatedly backtracking after a brief indication of interest in negotiations. North Korea’s positive gestures appear to be aimed at immediate benefits such as economic assistance or regime legitimacy, or to buy more time for its nuclear and missile programmes.
However, one could also argue that in most of these engagement attempts, from the very beginning, North Korea was not expected to walk to the end of the negotiation line anyway. This means that these engagements have always been devoid of trust, and consequently did not bring forth any desired results. Fortunately, the Moon administration strongly believes in a serious and consistent outreach to the Kim regime, despite the unpredictability of the latter’s response.
Finally, rather than South Korea—where the Moon government is in its last leg—it will be more productive if the Biden administration takes on the challenge. Long-term, trust-based diplomacy towards Pyongyang, pursued by Seoul and Washington together, could bring positive results. For this, it is important to grab any small opportunity along the way.
Restoration Of Inter-Korea Communication Lines – Analysis
By Dr Sandip Kumar Mishra*
On 27 July 2021, cross-border communication lines between North and South Korea were restored. They had been severed for almost 13 months. North Korea initiated the disengagement on the pretext of propaganda leaflets entering from the other side. The restoration took place after almost three months of South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanging personal letters. Reportedly, the two leaders have agreed to bring back mutual trust in bilateral relations, and have also promised to promote reconciliation.
This is being seen as the beginning of another rapprochement between the two Koreas. The possibility of restarting the stalled Pyongyang-Washington denuclearisation talks has also been considered. In May 2021, President Moon met US President Joe Biden in the US. Both publicly announced that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy. The most important development here was their acknowledgement of previous US-North Korea agreements reached under the Trump administration, including the June 2018 Singapore statement.
Even though North Korea has not so far responded positively to the US offer to resume talks, the restoration of inter-Korea communication lines indicates that it may soften its stand. There may be a possibility of both parties coming back to the negotiating table. This one development could lead not only to an important breakthrough in the derailed inter-Korea relations, but also in US-North Korea denuclearisation talks. South Korea, too, is to be commended for welcoming the North Korean move. There is speculation that the leaders may have another summit in the coming months.
Having established the possibilities, it would still be premature to read too much into a single positive gesture. To assess what the future may hold, a look at the motivations driving North Korean behaviour should also be analysed.
On the surface, Pyongyang’s changed posture could be attributed to the letters exchanged between Moon and Kim over the past three months. However, it could also be because of the food and economic crisis in North Korea, especially during the pandemic. The country’s economic performance has been abysmal in the past few years. Despite a new five year plan announced in early 2021 and all the lofty discussions in the eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), reports indicate a dire economic and food crisis in the country.
The pandemic has led to the closing down of North Korea’s borders with China and Russia. The country’s exchanges with China have also been minimal. Even though Pyongyang does not officially acknowledge the spread of COVID-19 cases, foreign embassies and international organisations have gradually been recalling their staff posted there. This could lead to a substantial squeezing of economic and humanitarian assistance from abroad in the pandemic era. In such a scenario, North Korea’s olive branch towards South Korea is probably tactful manoeuvering geared for external support.
Of course, the Moon administration would be aware of these motivations driving Kim’s overture. Seoul however still sees this as an opportunity, and persists with its foresighted approach to the bilateral relationship. In fact Seoul has been consistent on Pyongyang, even though the latter’s position and actions keep oscillating. South Korea’s North Korea policy has been based on deep trust in the principle of engagement rather than an expectation of immediate reciprocity. The US should take a cue from this—take advantage of the window and try to think out-of-box in its outreach. Of course, Pyongyang’s role is going to be critical.
Right now there is general fatigue across the board. Engagement with North Korea has been futile, with it repeatedly backtracking after a brief indication of interest in negotiations. North Korea’s positive gestures appear to be aimed at immediate benefits such as economic assistance or regime legitimacy, or to buy more time for its nuclear and missile programmes.
However, one could also argue that in most of these engagement attempts, from the very beginning, North Korea was not expected to walk to the end of the negotiation line anyway. This means that these engagements have always been devoid of trust, and consequently did not bring forth any desired results. Fortunately, the Moon administration strongly believes in a serious and consistent outreach to the Kim regime, despite the unpredictability of the latter’s response.
Finally, rather than South Korea—where the Moon government is in its last leg—it will be more productive if the Biden administration takes on the challenge. Long-term, trust-based diplomacy towards Pyongyang, pursued by Seoul and Washington together, could bring positive results. For this, it is important to grab any small opportunity along the way.
*Dr Sandip Kumar Mishra is Associate Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, SIS, JNU, & Distinguished Fellow, IPCS.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
