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Quotes of the Day:
"We are entering a bifurcated world. Part of the globe is inhabited by Hegel's and Fukuyama's Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology. The other, larger, part is inhabited by Hobbes's First Man, condemned to a life that is 'poor, nasty, brutish, and short'"
– Robert Kaplan
"Your position never gives you the right to command. It only imposes on you the duty of so living your life that others may receive your orders without being humiliated."
– Dag Hammarskjold
"We believe in ordinary acts of bravery, in the courage that drives one person to stand up for another."
– Veronica Roth
1. Exclusive: North Korea wants to restart nuclear talks if Trump wins, says ex-diplomat
2. Does Kim Jong Un Really ‘Not Care’ About the US Election?
3. Number of North Korean Defectors Going to South Korea Remains Low, but They Are Receiving Increased Attention
4. North Korean escapees urge U.S. to promote human rights, information access
5. North and South Korea table tennis Olympic medalists pose for shared selfie
6. The Inexplicable Prosecution of Sue Mi Terry - Philip Rotner
7. Sue Mi Terry: Sometimes you get whacked by the revolving door
8. Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran
9. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Increasing pressure on housewives... Forced labor, ideological education, self-criticism - women complain loudly that there's "no time to do business"
10. Russia condemns US revamp of military forces in Japan – Moscow says it is ‘coordinating’ with Beijing and Pyongyang on the matter.
11. Editorial: Intelligence leak highlights gaps in South Korea's espionage laws
12. Korean Air to stop serving cup noodles in economy class
13. S. Korea proposes providing humanitarian aid to N. Korea over flood damage
14. N. Korea's top envoy to Tehran attends inauguration ceremony of Iran's new president
15. N. Korean youth face grueling military drills despite harsh weather
16. Some N. Koreans prioritize Kim portraits while fleeing homes due to flooding
17. N. Korean workers in Russia face rising tensions amid increased surveillance
1. Exclusive: North Korea wants to restart nuclear talks if Trump wins, says ex-diplomat
I am skeptical about this defector. He also has said the CUba is a paradise (which perhaps it is relative to north Korea).
But if this is an accurate report, we should assume that Kim Jong Un perceives an advantage for the execution of his political warfare campaign. We must deal with Kim Jong Un based on an understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Exclusive: North Korea wants to restart nuclear talks if Trump wins, says ex-diplomat
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-wants-restart-nuclear-talks-if-trump-wins-says-ex-diplomat-2024-07-31/
By Hyonhee Shin
July 31, 20247:10 PM EDTUpdated 2 hours ago
U.S. President Donald Trump meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, in Panmunjom, South Korea, June 30, 2019. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab
Summary
- Ri Il Gyu was highest ranking diplomat to defect since 2016Says Pyongyang would seek end of sanctions, economic aidBlames failure of 2019 Trump-Kim summit on 'clueless' militaryBelieves closer Russia ties have strengthened North's handRefusal of medical request final straw in decision to defect
SEOUL, Aug 1 (Reuters) - North Korea wants to reopen nuclear talks with the United States if Donald Trump is re-elected as president and is working to devise a new negotiating strategy, a senior North Korean diplomat who recently defected to South Korea told Reuters.
The escape of Ri Il Gyu from Cuba made headlines globally last month. He was the highest-ranking North Korean diplomat to defect to the South since 2016.
In his first interview with international media, Ri said North Korea has set Russia, the U.S. and Japan as its top foreign policy priorities for this year and beyond.
While bolstering relations with Russia, Pyongyang was keen to reopen nuclear negotiations if Trump - who engaged in both fiery brinkmanship and unprecedented diplomacy with North Korea during his previous term - won re-election in November, Ri said.
Pyongyang's diplomats were mapping out a strategy for that scenario, with the goal of lifting of sanctions on its weapons programmes, removing its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and eliciting economic aid, said Ri.
His comments signal a potential about-face from the North's current stance after recent statements ditching the possibility of dialogue with the U.S. and warning of armed confrontation.
A summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Trump in Vietnam in 2019 collapsed over sanctions, for which Ri partly blamed Kim's decision to entrust "inexperienced, clueless" military commanders with nuclear diplomacy.
"Kim Jong Un doesn't know much about international relations and diplomacy, or how to make strategic judgment," he said.
"This time, the foreign ministry would definitely gain power and take charge, and it won't be so easy for Trump to tie North Korea's hands and feet again for four years without giving anything."
RUSSIAN TIES, JAPAN AID
By forging closer ties with Russia, North Korea received help with its missile technology and economy. But a bigger benefit could be to block additional sanctions and undercut existing ones, Ri said, adding it would raise Pyongyang's bargaining power against Washington.
"The Russians got their own hands dirty by engaging in illicit transactions and, thanks to that, North Korea no longer needs to rely on the U.S. to lift sanctions, which essentially means they stripped the U.S. of one key bargaining chip," he said.
In Tokyo, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has said he wants to meet Kim, but the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 80s has long been a stumbling block.
According to Ri, Kim would seek to hold a summit with Japan, aiming to get economic assistance in return for concessions on the abductee issue.
Tokyo believes 17 of its citizens were abducted, five of whom returned to Japan in 2002. Pyongyang sees the issue as settled, having admitted to kidnapping 13 Japanese nationals and saying those unaccounted for had either died or their whereabouts were unknown.
Ri said Kim would be willing to change that position, established under his father Kim Jong Il, in order to obtain economic support.
"They're saying that the issue was resolved, but that's just to boost negotiating power until he makes concessions at a summit," he said.
RESENTMENT AND DEFECTION
Having studied at a French school in Algeria and lived in Cuba alongside his late father, who was a state media reporter, Ri says he had imagined a life in South Korea since his childhood, but never acted to flee until he was bullied by a diplomatic colleague for refusing his demand for bribes.
Then the defining moment came when Pyongyang instantly refused his request to get medical treatment in Mexico, at his own expense, for a ruptured disc in his neck.
"That exploded all the resentment I had been harbouring towards the regime," he said.
The COVID-19 lockdown deepened hardships at home and for those stationed overseas, with most telephone lines to Pyongyang cut to prevent any information from spreading in the outside world, Ri said.
Financial troubles have also forced North Korea to shut down a dozen of its 54 diplomatic missions.
"When they began reopening and summoning those working abroad in early 2023, they asked to bring everything from used toothbrushes to spoons back home, saying there's nothing there," he said.
Ri had also witnessed - and in his job tried to impede - the launch of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Cuba, a Cold War-era ally of North Korea.
"I had done everything to block that from happening, but establishing relations with Cuba was the best thing South Korea had done since last year," he said. "It was a model example of how the tides of history have turned, and where a normal civilisation of the international community is headed."
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Reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Alex Richardson
2. Does Kim Jong Un Really ‘Not Care’ About the US Election?
If Trump is re-elected, I hope his advisors will show him an alternative strategy and policy that includes a human rights upfront approach ,a sophisticated information campaign and the objective solution to the nuclear threat which is a free and unified Korea. And as importantly I hope they will help him understand Kim's political warfare strategy. But I am not optimistic.
Excerpts:
The previous Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea was “final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD),” the same policy other U.S. leaders have maintained, albeit with different terminology. However, Trump’s caprice suggests this is not set in stone, as he showed during his recent acceptance speech. His comment, “It’s nice to get along with somebody that has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise,” suggests that Trump might treat Kim as the leader of a nuclear state.
In addition, Trump previously proved willing to neglect North Korean human rights issues – which Pyongyang doesn’t want the international community to stir up – during his nuclear negotiations with Kim. Overall, if Trump is elected, this would buy time for Kim to deal with the economic, political, and diplomatic issues faced by North Korea.
However, keep in mind that Kim Jong Un experienced the breakdown of the Hanoi summit as a humiliating diplomatic failure. A Trump victory, and the possibility of a repeat summit, is unlikely to be an enjoyable alternative for Kim.
Although Kim Jong Un said he “doesn’t care” about the upcoming U.S. presidential election, he might secretly be hoping for Trump to win. Kim must have many worries as he watches the U.S. presidential election turnaround with Harris taking the Democratic candidacy. However, we can expect Kim to ultimately reaffirm his commitment to nurturing a “self-reliant” North Korea that no longer must suffer being dragged around by the great powers. There is no doubt that this commitment will result in Kim’s actions to accelerate the advancement of nuclear weapons.
Does Kim Jong Un Really ‘Not Care’ About the US Election?
thediplomat.com
Whatever Pyongyang says officially, the U.S. presidential race between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris will have big implications for North Korea.
By Taehee Lee
July 31, 2024
In this Feb. 27, 2019, file photo, then-U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Sofitel Legend Metropole hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, for their second summit meeting.
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In his speech accepting the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, former U.S. President Donald Trump flaunted his supposedly solid personal ties with Kim Jong Un and suggested the North Korean leader probably wanted him back in the White House, saying, “I think he misses me.” A few days later, however, the state-run Korean Central News Agency of North Korea delivered a stinging rebuke to Trump, saying, “No matter what administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this.”
However, it’s worth considering if Kim honestly “does not care” about the upcoming U.S. presidential election. I would argue that he does, and quite significantly, depending on who takes the helm in the White House. For Kim Jong Un, the next five years could be a period of profound uncertainty, with potential outcomes ranging from the worst-case scenario to a situation ripe for negotiations.
The worst-case scenario for Kim would be a victory by Vice President Kamala Harris, who has been endorsed by incumbent President Joe Biden as his successor as the Democratic presidential candidate. Harris’ approach to North Korea is anticipated to continue to mirror Biden’s. The Biden administration has primarily focused on pressuring the international community to enforce sanctions against North Korea, blocking illicit funds that Pyongyang could use for weapons of mass destruction, and highlighting human rights abuses under Kim’s rule. With close bilateral and trilateral cooperation with allies South Korea and Japan, strengthening deterrence against North Korea has been a critical focus of Biden’s North Korea policy. Harris’ past comments on North Korea also suggest that she would continue this policy, which would significantly impact Kim’s regime.
For Kim, a Harris administration would raise various concerns inside and outside North Korea. First, the constant updates to sanctions on North Korea, which the Biden administration has been eagerly leading, are one of the central obstacles to economic development. While the Bank of Korea recently reported that North Korea’s GDP rose 3.1 percent in 2023 due to eased COVID-19 restrictions and favorable weather conditions, assessments still suggest that this economic rebound would likely be temporary.
If Harris becomes president, the trend of ever-tighter economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. against North Korea will be firmly maintained, thereby reducing the number of options available to Kim Jong Un by further restricting trade, limiting foreign exchange earnings, and isolating financial institutions. In a worst-case scenario, economic suffering could make it difficult for Kim to maintain his regime.
The weakening royal status of North Korea’s ruling family, especially among young, tech-savvy North Koreans, is also one of the significant political challenges faced by Kim Jong Un. Many North Korean defectors report growing negative evaluations of Kim, increased dissatisfaction with Kim’s hereditary succession, and rising antipathy toward the “Baekdu bloodline” on which the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty is based. The Kim family’s divine presence has diminished significantly since Kim Jong Un came to power.
The influx of information into North Korea, such as South Korean drama and K-pop, has exposed North Koreans, especially young people, to alternative perspectives, economic disparities, and global culture – despite the Kim regime criminalizing such exchanges. The Biden administration’s effort to increase access of North Koreans to outside information, which Harris would continue, would keep threatening the state propaganda by broadening awareness of North Koreans and opening minds to reality – including the reality of human rights violations in North Korea, which is aiming to maintain the power of the royal family, not aiming for the prosperity of North Korean citizens.
Diplomatically, strengthening the trilateral security cooperation of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, an effort that will be maintained if Harris becomes president, is not good news for Kim, either. North Korea recently achieved a diplomatic accomplishment through the Russia-North Korea pact thanks to the intensified “new cold war” tensions. Some see this as evidence that the increasing trilateral partnership between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan has backfired. However, Kim knows the Russia-North Korea alliance is not as strong as the bilateral alliance between South Korea and the United States. Kim also recognizes that North Korea’s partnership with China, which considers Pyongyang an oddity, if not an outright burden, is not much different from Russia’s.
The South Korea-Japan-U.S. trilateral, which Harris will maintain or strengthen if she is elected this November, will keep strengthening deterrence against North Korean aggression, increasing regional security cooperation, and presenting a unified front in negotiations. This will limit Kim’s international influence and legitimacy, constraining North Korea’s diplomatic maneuverability.
Compared to Harris, Trump would be the lesser of two evils for Kim Jong Un. Trump may try to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, thinking that the U.S. troops are not needed on the peninsula. That is what Kim also wants. Additionally, Trump’s volatility could cause a rift in the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which could be disconcerting for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which has consistently pursued a North Korean policy based on pressure. Beyond that, a second Trump administration might damage the broad framework of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South Korea-Japan-U.S. trilateral, established by the Biden administration, which would be to Kim’s advantage.
The previous Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea was “final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD),” the same policy other U.S. leaders have maintained, albeit with different terminology. However, Trump’s caprice suggests this is not set in stone, as he showed during his recent acceptance speech. His comment, “It’s nice to get along with somebody that has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise,” suggests that Trump might treat Kim as the leader of a nuclear state.
In addition, Trump previously proved willing to neglect North Korean human rights issues – which Pyongyang doesn’t want the international community to stir up – during his nuclear negotiations with Kim. Overall, if Trump is elected, this would buy time for Kim to deal with the economic, political, and diplomatic issues faced by North Korea.
However, keep in mind that Kim Jong Un experienced the breakdown of the Hanoi summit as a humiliating diplomatic failure. A Trump victory, and the possibility of a repeat summit, is unlikely to be an enjoyable alternative for Kim.
Although Kim Jong Un said he “doesn’t care” about the upcoming U.S. presidential election, he might secretly be hoping for Trump to win. Kim must have many worries as he watches the U.S. presidential election turnaround with Harris taking the Democratic candidacy. However, we can expect Kim to ultimately reaffirm his commitment to nurturing a “self-reliant” North Korea that no longer must suffer being dragged around by the great powers. There is no doubt that this commitment will result in Kim’s actions to accelerate the advancement of nuclear weapons.
Authors
Guest Author
Taehee Lee
Taehee Lee studied International Security and International Negotiation & Conflict Resolution at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, for her master’s degree. She has work experience in human rights organizations in the U.S. and Seoul, focusing on North Korea.
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thediplomat.com
3. Number of North Korean Defectors Going to South Korea Remains Low, but They Are Receiving Increased Attention
Maps and data at the link: https://keia.org/the-peninsula/number-of-north-korean-defectors-going-to-south-korea-remains-low-but-they-are-receiving-increased-attention/
Number of North Korean Defectors Going to South Korea Remains Low, but They Are Receiving Increased Attention
Published July 30, 2024
Author: Robert King
Category: North Korea
The number of defectors fleeing North Korea and resettling in South Korea remains at very low levels. The number had begun to decline before 2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic led Pyongyang to enforce harsher border controls to prevent North Koreans (and others) from entering the country from abroad and potentially bringing the virus with them. This heightened border enforcement made it much more difficult for North Koreans to leave the country without government authorization, and few were given approval to go abroad. Yet while defections have decreased, defectors themselves have been elevated within South Korea by a South Korean administration intent on emphasizing human rights and a new vision for a unified Korean Peninsula.
With the election of President Yoon Suk-yeol in March 2022, South Korea was expected to move closer to and strengthen military links with the United States, which has clearly taken place. In addition, the Yoon administration has been more active and assertive on the issue of human rights in North Korea, highlighted when South Korea’s Ambassador to the United Nations, as President of the UN Security Council, presided over a recent discussion of North Korean human rights as a threat to international peace and security. And, domestically, the Yoon government established a national holiday, “Defectors’ Day,” to commemorate North Koreans who have settled in the south, celebrate forms of cultural expression from both Koreas, and provide space for diasporic activism not permitted in North Korea.
Data Shows Dramatic Drop in Defections
It was never easy for North Koreans to leave without official sanction, but the borders were far more porous before the pandemic forced tighter border control. By 2019, over a thousand North Koreans were successfully leaving the North annually and making their way through China to receive refuge in South Korea. There were a few who sought resettlement elsewhere, but those numbers were much smaller. During 2020, the number dropped dramatically. In 2019, South Korea reported that 1,047 defectors/refugees were resettled in South Korea. The following year, the number dropped to 229, and in 2021, the number was only 63. During the first six months of 2024, the number of defectors reaching South Korea was 105 – a very modest increase from the levels reported since the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020.
Official South Korean statistics report the number of defectors admitted into South Korea over the past 12 years:
Number of North Korean Defectors Admitted to South Korea
YearNumber of Defectors 20121,50220131,51420141,39720151,27520161,41820171,12720181,13720191,04720202292021632022672023196 (Full year)2024105 (First six months of the year)
The annual number of defectors remained relatively constant from the time Kim Jong-un assumed leadership in January 2012 until the pandemic began in early 2020. During the first eight years of Kim’s rule, the annual number ranged from 1,000 to 1,500. By comparison, during the last years of his father Kim Jong-il’s rule, official statistics show over 2,000 North Koreans were entering the South annually, with a peak of 2,914 in 2009.
It is noteworthy that the percentage of defectors entering South Korea includes a disproportionate number of women. Only during two years of the pandemic did defectors include a higher number of men than women – 23 women of 63 total defectors in 2021 (37 percent) and 35 women of 67 total defectors in 2022 (48 percent). Other than those two years, the percentage of female defectors fluctuated but showed significantly more women than men leaving – 85 percent were women in 2018 and 69 percent in 2020. Of the 105 North Korean defectors who entered South Korea in the first half of 2024, only 10 were men and 95 were women.
The Risks and Dangers of Crossing Through China
Few defectors are able to go overland or by boat from North Korea directly to South Korea. There are only very rare exceptions to this pattern. The border is strictly guarded, as are North Korea’s coastal waters. Border troops are under orders to shoot-to-kill if anyone gets too close to the border. Furthermore, the North Korean side of the border area is covered with land mines and other military devices to kill would-be escapees. Because North Korean military forces are so concentrated at the border, and because internal travel in the North is carefully regulated, it is difficult for North Korean residents to even get near the boundary along the 38th parallel unless they are among the military personnel guarding the border or the few civilians permitted to live in those areas.
The overwhelming number of defectors escape the North by crossing overland and going through China, a journey marked by severe risks and dangers. Those who successfully escape have the help of smugglers, many of them South Korean citizens who are paid for their knowledge of how to cross the border and travel through China. The defectors then generally cross out of China into Laos, Thailand, or Myanmar, again with the help of smugglers.
Vietnam is not a safe escape route because the country has a particularly close relationship with China. The Vietnamese border with China is guarded more strictly, and few, if any, defectors have successfully crossed into Vietnam and reached South Korea. The Vietnamese government has previously returned North Korean defectors to Chinese officials, who promptly returned them to North Korea. This was done despite the request of the South Korean government and pleas of international human rights organizations that the individuals be permitted to go to South Korea.
Because of the difficulty of internal travel in North Korea, defectors who have successfully left North Korea and resettled in the South are principally from two provinces that have lengthy borders with China – the provinces of North Hamyong and Ryangang. These two provinces comprise about 12 percent of the total North Korean population, but residents of these two provinces make up 76 percent of defectors who have resettled in South Korea over the last two-and-a-half decades. (See South Korean government data on North Korean defectors.)
At the beginning of the pandemic, a significant number of North Koreans were living and working in Northeast China, where they found better economic opportunities. Some were there with the North Korean government’s permission, and some were there without the knowledge or consent of Pyongyang. None of these individuals were permitted to return to North Korea after the pandemic struck, even though they were North Korean citizens. With the waning of the pandemic, the Chinese government sought to remove these “illegal immigrants,” and Pyongyang was under pressure to permit the return of the North Koreans to their homeland.
In October 2023, human rights groups and the South Korean government reported that as many as 600 North Koreans were being forcibly returned to the North, and the South Korean government has raised the issue with the Chinese government. UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea Elizabeth Salmon estimated that the number of North Koreans being held in China at that time was as high as 2,000 and called the forced repatriation a violation of international law and procedure. In December 2023, a Seoul-based human rights group reported that some 600 North Koreans had been deported from China to North Korea against their will and that all “vanished” when they reached North Korea.
Defectors’ Day: South Korea Honors Refugees with a New Public Holiday
Earlier this year, the South Korean government under President Yoon Suk-yeol established “Defectors’ Day” as a new national holiday to be celebrated annually on July 14. The holiday was established to recognize the legal, social, and other benefits for North Koreans who have made the decision to leave the North and become citizens of South Korea.
July 14 was the date on which the South Korean government enacted the North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Act in 1997. The legislation established government policies to aid the defector community. It provides help for new arrivals from the North and assures that they are given necessary assistance in the South. While some have argued that a special Defectors’ Day only serves to emphasize the differences between defectors and the South Korean population, others argue that it is a way of welcoming and acknowledging the new arrivals from the North.
The celebration of the first Defectors’ Day took place in Seoul and included performances of North Korean music and displays of North Korean objects brought by the defectors when they left their homes in the North. Some defectors also sold North Korean liquors, clothing, and food.
It is ironic that the holiday was created at a time when new arrivals from North Korea have dropped to their lowest level in 25 years. At the same time, however, it highlights the Yoon administration’s commitment to the human rights of North Korean defectors as an integral part of the government’s policy toward North Korea. President Yoon’s administration has highlighted South Korea’s concern and commitment toward North Korean refugees, reflecting his vision of unity between the people of North and South Korea. Kim Jong-un, on the other hand, is emphatically moving away from the idea of Korean unity and the belief in a shared history and heritage of the Korean people. The South Korean government’s increased attention toward defectors is a part of that broader policy on inter-Korean issues.
Robert R. King is a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). He is former U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights (2009-2017). The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
Photo from Ceosad on Wikimedia Commons.
KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
4. North Korean escapees urge U.S. to promote human rights, information access
It was a great week to spend with our escapee friends from north Korea. We need to listen to them and heed their advice. Change is coming and these are some of the future key leaders and ofunders of a future free and unified Korea.
Conclusion:
The members of the group want to highlight the suffering of the North Korean people and to prepare themselves to make a contribution to North Korea's future whenever change arrives.
North Korean escapees urge U.S. to promote human rights, information access
By Michael Marshall | Updated July 30, 2024 at 3:56 PM
upi.com
Soldiers walk alongside a barbed-wire fence in Goseong, South Korea, in 2019. A group of North Korean escapees recently have been pushing for a change in U.S. policy toward North Korea in meetings with officials and policy experts in Washington, D.C., and New York. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI
July 30 (UPI) -- A group of young, professional North Korean escapees has been pushing for a change in U.S. policy toward North Korea in meetings with officials and policy experts in Washington, D.C., and New York.
Yesterday they met with Ambassador Robert Wood at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and with members of the South Korean U.N. Mission. Last week they briefed staff at the National Security Council and the State Department's Korea desk, as well as staffers from Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio's office.
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They also spoke at public forums at the Hudson Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy and met with Northeast Asia experts at the Brookings Institution.
The group urged policymakers to give greater attention to North Korean human rights abuses and to expand access to information inside the tightly controlled nation.
In 2014, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea found the regime guilty of crimes against humanity. The regime, under current leader Kim Jong Un, fears the free flow of information to its people and has imposed draconian laws against the distribution and accessing of international media, including even public executions.
Hyunseung Lee, a Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation and organizer of the group, said, "The international community must be more proactive in abolishing these cruel laws and improving human rights."
He said that, while he was still in North Korea, three of his friends were sentenced to six months of hard labor for possessing foreign media.
Lee said that, for many North Koreans, outside information is like water for a thirsty man in a desert, and they will risk a lot to get it.
One of the group members, J.Y. Park, communicates with people living close to the border with China. She said they want to know more about the outside world and about aspects of the ruling Kim family history that are concealed in official propaganda.
Gumhyok Kim, a media commentator and adviser to the South Korean government, came from an elite family in Pyongyang. Growing up, he believed that North Korea was a paradise. When he went to study at a Chinese university, though, he had greater access to information on the Internet.
"I learned things I never knew about North Korea," he said.
He and some fellow North Korean students began to study about freedom, democracy and human rights, and to research information about the South Korean economy.
"Through information, people can begin to live lives of dignity," Kim said, adding that he wants North Koreans to learn about the success escapees like him now enjoy in a free society.
He also said that South Korean TV dramas have some effect but not enough to counteract the pervasive propaganda young people are subjected to at school and college. There was a need for information targeted at elite young North Koreans covering the topics he and his friends had researched in China, he said.
Harry Kim, a successful software engineer residing in Texas, wants North Koreans to know that almost all Americans and South Koreans own a car and a refrigerator since such a life is unimaginable to them.
Others, such as Sunghyuk An, a Fulbright scholar at Syracuse University, said he also wanted to see more information about the suffering of North Koreans, and he wanted that information spread across America and South Korea.
This was the second series of meetings and events undertaken by what the participants called the North Korean Young Leaders' Assembly. Its goal is captured in the title of the forum hosted by the National Endowment for Democracy: Preparing a Democratic Future for North Korea: Next Generation Leadership.
The members of the group want to highlight the suffering of the North Korean people and to prepare themselves to make a contribution to North Korea's future whenever change arrives.
upi.com
5. North and South Korea table tennis Olympic medalists pose for shared selfie
Can we have ping pong diplomacy?
People to people contact is what we need. I fear for the future of the Koreans from the north. How will the regime view this?
Photo at the link.
North and South Korea table tennis Olympic medalists pose for shared selfie
https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5671690/2024/07/31/north-south-korea-olympics-table-tennis/https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5671690/2024/07/31/north-south-korea-olympics-table-tennis/
By Colin Millar
Jul 31, 2024
Olympic medalists from North Korea, South Korea and China posed for a selfie following the table tennis mixed doubles medal’s ceremony.
China’s Sun Yingsha and Wang Chuqin beat North Korea’s Ri Jong-sik and Kim Kum-yong in the final to win gold, as South Korea won bronze with pair Lim Jong-hoon and Shin Yu-bin defeating Hong Kong.
South Korea’s Lim Jong-hoon took the photo of all the medalists together in which they were all smiling broadly. The picture was taken with a South Korean-made Samsung phone.
“I congratulated them when they were introduced as silver medalists,” Lim said after the photo, in quotes carried by Korean media.
South Korea and North Korea both claim to be the sole legitimate government of all of Korea — which has been partitioned since September 1945 — with military tensions between the two states and a heavily fortified border.
Prior to this Olympics, all individual items including mobile phones were banned from medal ceremonies, with photos only being allowed to be taken by official media.
All six mixed double medal winners posed for the selfie (Jean Catuffe/Getty Images)
However, an agreement between Samsung and the IOC allows their products to be used in ceremonies. “Athletes can take creative selfies with the Galaxy Z Flip6 in various angles due to its foldable nature,” Samsung said in a press release this week.
The Athlete 365 app is preloaded on Samsung’s Galaxy Z Flip6, which was given to competing athletes prior to its official launch earlier this month, into which the “victory selfies” of competitors can be added.
The shared photo comes just days after 143 South Korean athletes were incorrectly introduced as North Korean during the Olympics opening ceremony.
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) was forced to issue a “deep apology” for the incident which saw the South Korean delegation announced as the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” the full official name of North Korea, as their boat passed down the Seine. The formal name of South Korea is the Republic of Korea.
North Korea, which has 16 athletes as part of its first delegation since 2016 (it was not represented at the Tokyo Olympics in 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic), was properly introduced later in the program in French and English.
(Top photo: Jared C. Tilton/Getty Images)
Colin Millar is a Staff Writer for The Athletic. Prior to joining The Athletic, Colin was European Football writer at Mirror Football. From Belfast, he is the author of The Frying Pan of Spain: Sevilla vs Real Betis, Spain’s Hottest Football Rivalry, and he can be found on Twitter/X: @Millar_Colin Follow Colin on Twitter @Millar_Colin
6. The Inexplicable Prosecution of Sue Mi Terry - Philip Rotner
One analysis of the Sue Mi Terry affair. (criticizing the FBI/DOJ)
The Inexplicable Prosecution of Sue Mi Terry - Philip Rotner
https://philiprotner.com/2024/07/30/the-inexplicable-prosecution-of-sue-mi-terry/?utm
philiprotner.com · by Tiffany Tichota
Last week, the United States government indicted Sue Mi Terry, widely recognized as “one of the world’s foremost authorities on North Korea. . . an all-star analyst who is widely respected in the field of Korea studies,” for, well, being Sue Mi Terry.
The case alleged against Terry looks paper thin, practically nonexistent, and if there’s no more to it than what’s alleged in the Indictment there’s a strong likelihood that she will prevail when all is said and done. But vindication, for all its psychic virtues, will come, if at all, only after Terry has paid a terrible price. According to the New York Times, she has been placed on unpaid leave as a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She also faces millions of dollars of attorneys’ fees that could pile financial ruin on top of the destruction of her professional reputation.
Terry served as a senior CIA Korea analyst from 2001 to 2008. After leaving the CIA, Terry has held a number of prestigious governmental and private posts, including serving as a senior official of the White House National Security Council (“NSC”) under presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, as a Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and as a director at the Wilson Center. She is regularly quoted in print and on the web as an expert on US relations with North and South Korea and has made numerous television appearances.
It’s safe to assume that Terry’s contacts include pretty much everybody that counts in the world of Korean foreign policy. Three of those contacts were South Korean diplomats working in official governmental positions in the United States. One was a Minister for the South Korean Mission to the United Nations. Two others were diplomats at the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. According to the Indictment, these three individuals were in fact South Korean intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover.
The charge against Terry centers around her dealings with these three intelligence officers. From the Indictment alone, one might think that these three individuals dominated and controlled Terry’s entire professional and personal life, but that’s misleading. As one of the most connected and sought-after professionals in the foreign policy establishment, Terry’s views are likely informed by discussions with dozens, perhaps even hundreds of government officials, former government officials, academics, journalists and policy experts all over the world.
Before summarizing the charges against Terry, it is important to note what the Indictment does not allege:
- The Indictment doesn’t claim that the government was unaware that the three diplomats were also intelligence officers, or that Terry concealed their true positions. To the contrary, it makes clear that Terry herself “identified” the three individuals as intelligence officers in interviews with the FBI beginning in 2014;
- The Indictment doesn’t accuse Terry of stealing or passing any classified documents or information to the South Korean officers;
- The Indictment doesn’t accuse Terry of espionage;
- The Indictment doesn’t charge Terry with conspiring to commit any illegal act;
- The Indictment doesn’t accuse Terry of advocating any position contrary to official United States policy;
- The Indictment doesn’t accuse Terry of acting in the interest or for the benefit of our bitter adversary, North Korea. To the contrary, Terry is a fierce critic of the North Korean government, and last year co-produced a film, Beyond Utopia, documenting the inhumane conditions under which North Koreans are forced to live and the harrowing attempts to escape those conditions.
Rather, Terry is charged with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), which requires any person acting in the United States as “an agent of a foreign principal” to register with the Attorney General.
In other words, Terry is criminally charged for neglecting to fill out a form identifying herself, most likely incorrectly, as an agent of the government of South Korea.
Nothing in the Indictment supports branding Terry as an agent of the South Korean government. The Guidelines published by the FARA Unit of the Department of Justice, the office that administers the Act, certainly don’t support such a characterization. For instance, the Guidelines say that in cases where the political activities in question align with the person’s own interests, it is unlikely to be shown that the person was acting as an agent of a foreign principal, as opposed to on his/her own behalf. Likewise, a person who is persuaded on a matter by a foreign principal and then advances that position is unlikely to be found to be an “agent” of the foreign principal.
Sue Mi Terry has a decades-long history as an independent, vocal, highly acclaimed Korea expert. Writing an article titled “A Korea Whole and Free: Why Unifying the Peninsula Won’t Be So Bad After All,” the first act the Indictment alleges as evidence of her “agency” because the South Korean government allegedly paid her to write it, hardly qualifies as a departure from the world view Terry has expressed hundreds of times during her government and private service. The same can be said of her congressional testimony on “North Korea’s Perpetual Provocations: Another Dangerous, Escalatory Test,” and “Countering the North Korea Threat: New Steps in U.S. Policy,” and every other example cited in the Indictment of articles written or testimony given. There is nothing even remotely out of line with the views that Terry has been aggressively expressing in public for decades.
Moreover, the Indictment is highly misleading in describing the public opinions expressed by Terry. It conveys the false impression that Terry obediently did the bidding of the South Korean government. The truth is far different.
During the ten-year period in question, Terry was often a vocal and harsh public critic of the South Korean government and its then-president, Moon-Jae-in. Terry repeatedly criticized Moon for his naïve belief that North Korea’s dictator, Kim-Jong-un, was a “young and candid” strategist with whom he could negotiate denuclearization. She commented publicly that “we are smoking something” if we think North Korea denuclearization is achievable. When Moon announced plans to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Terry pushed back vigorously, warning that the South Korean government “should not reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex despite the controversy over how it was suspended by President Park, whether it was properly or improperly closed.” Terry also repeatedly criticized President Moon’s attempts to negotiate directly with North Korea to declare an end to the Korean War, calling the attempts “ill conceived” and insisting that “The Moon administration just needs to realize that they’re just not going to be able to appease the North.” And Terry has repeatedly chastised the South Korean government for not doing enough to prioritize human rights abuses in North Korea. Dozens of other examples of Terry’s criticism of the South Korean government could be cited.
In other words, nothing Terry said or did during the ten-year period in question demonstrated a deviation from the policy views that she has openly advocated throughout her entire career. The fact that some – but not all – of those views were also advocated by the government of South Korea isn’t surprising. Shared beliefs on some issues don’t magically turn Terry into an “agent,” especially in light of the fact that Terry and the South Korean government publicly disagreed about other issues.
The most serious allegation against Terry is that she disclosed to South Korean officials the details of a “private group meeting” with the U.S. Secretary of State at the Department of State building in Washington D.C. Characterization of the meeting as “private” is curious, given that this so-called “private” meeting included not only State Department staff, but “five Korea policy experts.” The meeting was allegedly “off the record.” If true, Terry’s disclosure of what was said at the meeting was, at most, a breach of professional etiquette. There is no allegation that Terry obtained or disclosed any classified information that was discussed at the meeting, and the presence of five non-governmental “Korea policy experts” establishes conclusively that nothing revealed by the Secretary of State was meant to be confined only to governmental officials with security clearances. According to a statement by Terry’s attorney, reported in the New York Times and elsewhere, Terry has not had a security clearance for over a decade, and therefore has no access to classified information.
Apparently aware of the thin substance of their case on the merits, the Indictment attempts to paint a picture that Terry was bought and paid for by South Korea. It charges that over a ten-year period from 2013 to 2023 Terry was “rewarded with luxury goods,” treated to a handful of meals, and “accepted” contributions totaling $37,000 to a think tank that she founded in Washington D.C.
The three “rewards” that Terry allegedly received over a ten-year period were a coat and two handbags that, collectively, amounted to less than the cost of an entry-level Birkin bag; being taken to lunch or dinner on a handful of occasions; and “accepting” donations, not to her personally, but to a think tank with which she was affiliated. The government attempts to make a mountain out of this molehill by cloaking it in overblown language. Gifts are not just gifts, but “rewards.” Handbags and coats aren’t just handbags and coats, but “luxury goods” and “designer” items. Restaurants aren’t just restaurants, but “upscale” and “Michelin-star” venues. Officials of the South Korean government aren’t just government officials, they’re “handlers.”
Terry has already paid a terrible price as a result of this indictment. In addition to losing her job at the Council on Foreign Relations, Terry has been falsely branded as a spy. The BBC reported on the Indictment under the headline, “Ex-CIA analyst charged with spying for South Korea.” False – Terry has not been charged with spying. USA Today led with “Former White House Employee, CIA analyst accused of spying for South Korea, Feds Say,” and accused Terry of disclosing “U.S. government secrets” to South Korean intelligence officers. False and false again. The Indictment makes no such allegations.
The Department of Justice appears to be prosecuting Sue Mi Terry for expressing the relatively non-controversial, anti-North Korea, pro-U.S. positions she has taken consistently throughout her entire career, and for accepting over a ten-year period – as a private citizen, not a government employee – a handful of gifts from grateful South Korean officials.
Saying that all Terry needed to do in order to avoid all of this was to fill out a form is not an acceptable position. It is a dishonest, cowardly way out. Nobody should be forced to falsely declare that they are an agent of a foreign government when in fact they are not.
Moreover, the danger here goes far beyond the persecution of one individual. The government should not be in the business of criminalizing the normal work of journalists, scholars and commentators whose opinions are rightly informed by developing relationships with countless sources, some of whom are necessarily officials of foreign governments.
Why the Department of Justice is doing this remains a mystery. I don’t have inside information from either the DOJ or Sue Mi Terry, and I don’t know the full story of what’s behind this case. My analysis is based on the four corners of the Indictment and the information I have been able to glean from open public sources.
What I do know, however, is that if DOJ prosecutors don’t have a whole lot more than what they have alleged in the Indictment, they are likely to suffer the same humiliating defeat they suffered when they brought ill-conceived FARA charges against Greg Craig and Tom Barrack, and they will have trashed the reputation and career of a highly respected foreign policy expert for no good reason.
philiprotner.com · by Tiffany Tichota
7. Sue Mi Terry: Sometimes you get whacked by the revolving door
More of a criticism of the Korea watcher community and think tanks than just Dr. Terry.
Sue Mi Terry: Sometimes you get whacked by the revolving door
responsiblestatecraft.org · by Dan Leaf · July 31, 2024
quincyinst.org
Former CIA and White House Korea analyst — and wife of columnist Max Boot — was indicted for playing the influence game a bit too hard.
- washington politics
- foreign influence
Jul 31, 2024
American Sue Mi Terry was indicted July 15th on charges of violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, including failure to register as a foreign agent.
The indictment alleges that she worked as an unregistered foreign agent for the government of South Korea in exchange for luxury goods and other gifts. It also accuses her of receiving and deploying talking points from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) and providing that agency with inside information from an off-the-record discussion with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, amongst other allegations.
While the accused is presumed innocent, this case offers important lessons for whoever takes the Oath of Office as President of the United States next January.
Terry is typical of foreign policy influencers in and around Washington. Regarding North Korea, she advocated denuclearization as the preeminent goal, promoted sanctions, and cautioned against engagement with Kim Jong-un and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
But these policies have not kept the DPRK from achieving real nuclear capability, nor have they improved the human condition there. Widely regarded and cited in the indictment as a North Korea “expert,” Terry was a CIA analyst until 2008, then served on the National Security Council and National Intelligence. Since leaving government, she has been affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Council on Foreign Relations and at the Wilson Center, where she was Director of Korean industrial giant Hyundai Motor’s Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy.
Terry and husband, Washington Post columnist Max Boot, both have ties to the Council on Foreign Relations. Boot is reported to have collaborated with her on a story spouting ROK NIS talking points. One of Sue Mi Terry’s friends is Jung Pak, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who oversaw North Korea matters but suddenly resigned in early July. Pak’s departure is rumored to be connected to Terry’s legal troubles.
The case offers three significant lessons for the next President:
Lesson 1: US policy on North Korea has failed. Time for a new vector.
The absence of full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula is not “success”. Establishing an enduring peace, reducing the risk of nuclear or conventional conflict, and alleviating the suffering of the non-elites of the North Korean population are the proper measures. We have not made any progress on those fronts. Denuclearization should be the ultimate objective, but not at the exclusion of progress on other matters.
As a recommendation, the U.S. should make ending the Korean War a formal U.S. policy priority. The armistice that was signed in July 1953 was intended to be a temporary matter, replaced with a permanent peace treaty. The Geneva Convention of 1954 was the last focused attempt to reach such an agreement but failed miserably. The adversaries — formally the DPRK and the United Nations Command, but in practice North Korea, South Korea and the United States — remain in a state of war. Resolution is a necessary step to enable progress on denuclearization, human rights, and privation.
Lesson 2: Think tanks and affiliated experts are vulnerable to financial pressure from foreign entities
A footnote to the Terry indictment noted: “a "think tank," or policy institute, is a research institute that provides expertise and insight concerning topics such as global affairs to policymakers” and “often present themselves as independent sources of expertise.”
These organizations are big businesses. CFR’s 2023 annual report boasted of an endowment of $565 million and most if not all think tanks rely heavily on grants and gifts to operate. The gifts are often attributed to “anonymous” donors. For example, the Brookings Institution received from $2 million (minimum) to $6.3 million (maximum) from such donors from 2022 to 2023.
Furthermore, according to the indictment, Terry allegedly used a gift account for one of the three think tanks she has been associated with to mask the source of a $37,000 NIS payment. Strategically and on the tactical level, the presence of murky money can corrupt expertise and influence.
Many of these influencers migrate from think tanks to government and back again. In January 2021, Brookings announced that 19 of their experts had been selected to serve in high-level positions in the new Biden Administration. The list included Sue Mi Terry and Jung Pak. Then-Brookings President John R. Allen expressed his pride in the appointments, but Allen suddenly resigned the following year while under investigation for undue foreign influence himself.
The Justice Department did not charge Allen after the investigation — but the allegations were serious enough to merit a sudden departure.
The U.S. government should also require full disclosure of the source of gifts and donations to non-profit organizations which seek to influence U.S. foreign policy, as would be required if Congress passed legislation like the Fighting Foreign Influence Act. The government should also limit the number of individuals hired for senior positions, whose most recent employment was at a think tank with significant foreign government funding.
Using the Terry case as an example, the government should also strengthen vetting procedures for incoming foreign policy officials regarding potential foreign influence or affiliation.
Lesson 3: Foreign intelligence services, even friendlies, can present a threat to US interests
The indictment says Terry was compensated by the “ROK Government.” While technically accurate, that is a dangerous oversimplification. ROK NIS has been a free radical since its birth as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in 1961. NIS and its predecessors have been alleged or proven to be involved in kidnapping, murder (in 1979 of ROK President Park Chung Hee), illegal surveillance, cyber crimes, bribery, and election interference.
Given its history, it should not be assumed that NIS — in this case or any other — is doing the bidding of its government rather than pursuing its own agenda.
ROK NIS may be a uniquely tawdry agency — but even our closest partners’ objectives do not always match ours. This case shows that our government officials — current and former — have become too comfortable with the presence of “friendly” spies in our midst, and improved safeguards are a must if the U.S. is to maintain sovereign independence in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.
There needs to be an in-depth investigation of ROK NIS activity regarding U.S. officials and policy influencers, ideally with South Korean government cooperation. Also, a comprehensive threat assessment of the intelligence agencies of allied nations, with a briefing of the findings to the President and members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Furthermore, an unclassified version of this document should be made publicly available.
The Sue Mi Terry case is so much more than the luxury purses and high-end sushi cited in the charges. It is a compelling call for the next President of the United States to increase safeguards against undue foreign influence on U.S. policy, especially when that influence contributes to enduring failure.
Dan Leaf
Lt. Gen (Ret) Dan Leaf is Managing Director of Phase Minus 1, LLC. He is a retired 3-star general and Air Force fighter pilot, former Deputy Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command and was the Director of the U.S. DOD’s Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. His 2017 essay, “An urgently practical approach to the Korean Peninsula” won the Oslo Forum’s first-ever Peacewriter Prize.
8. Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran
Excerpts:
Implications for Global Security
China’s, Russia’s, North Korea’s, and Iran’s collaborative and individual cyber strategies have significant implications for global security. Their activities undermine the stability provided by NATO and Western powers, posing complex, asymmetric, and irregular challenges to international norms and, more broadly, cybersecurity. State-sponsored cyber operations, like state-sponsored terrorism or political violence, are sophisticated attempts to erode trust in digital infrastructure and government or institutional functions by disrupting the integrity, availability or confidentiality of data, services, and other aspects of online and physical security. For example, China’s cyber activities, including Volt Typhoon, have heightened tensions with the US, particularly over Taiwan. Similarly, Russian cyber operations have exacerbated conflicts in the former Soviet Bloc nations and strained relations with Western nations.
The cyber collaboration between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran varies in scope; however, its aim always aligns with political goals that negatively impact the existing rules-based world order. For example, Russia leverages malware to attack Ukraine, which was developed by Scarab, a Chinese government-linked cyber group, and shares techniques on how best to leverage AI for attacking targets and “living off the land” persistence to avoid detection by cyber defenders.
Moreover, the cyber strategies’ collaborative and sophisticated characteristics pose significant challenges for cybersecurity defenders. Traditional cybersecurity measures are often insufficient to counter the advanced tactics used by state-sponsored actors. NATO and Western powers must adopt a comprehensive approach that includes enhancing defensive capabilities, leveraging advanced technologies, fostering international cooperation, and developing offensive cyber strategies to effectively counter these threats. By doing so, they can safeguard the stability and security that have been our world’s cornerstone since World War II’s end.
Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by Evan Morgan · August 1, 2024
Editor’s note: This article is part of Project Cyber, which explores and characterizes the myriad threats facing the United States and its allies in cyberspace, the information environment, and conventional and irregular spaces. Please contact us if you would like to propose an article, podcast, or event environment. We invite you to contribute to the discussion, explore the difficult questions, and help.
In recent years, declarations like “no-limits partnership,” “comprehensive agreement,” and “security partnership” between the United States’ adversaries have become increasingly common. On May 16, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party Leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed their comprehensive partnership during their historic 43rd meeting. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian-Iranian collaboration has reached new levels, with Iranian drones becoming a familiar site over the battlefields. North Korea too, has upped its cooperation with Russia, working closely on schemes to avoid Western sanctions and even signing a mutual defense pact on June 19, 2024. The extent to which America’s adversaries cooperate on cybersecurity remains less understood but is a growing concern.
However, as unified Western actions against rogue and adversarial states have increased (e.g., sanctions, public shaming, etc.) and hot wars roil Ukraine and Israel, the agreements and cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have similarly grown stronger and more unified. In this context, the cybersecurity strategies of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have emerged as significant and irregular threats to global stability, threatening the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, each nation has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities designed to asymmetrically attack the international security frameworks established by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Western powers. It is, therefore, important to assess how US adversaries collaborate in cyberspace and are using asymmetric and irregular tactics to undermine the liberal world order.
Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran – Insider: Short of War
Strategic Cybersecurity Alliances
State-sponsored malicious cyber actors from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran increasingly dominate the cyber threat landscape and are driven by geopolitical, economic, and military objectives. Moreover, adversaries develop capabilities for strategic ends, blurring the line between irregular and conventional warfare in cyberspace. Importantly, their efforts are not strictly unilateral, as evidence increasingly points toward formal and informal collaboration among rogue states in cyberspace. For example, Chinese and Russian cyber actors have been known to share malware and exploit kits, enabling more sophisticated attacks. Additionally, joint operations, like coordinated disinformation campaigns, have been observed, highlighting our adversaries’ willingness to coordinate influence operations.
Furthermore, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran also leverage emerging technologies, like artificial intelligence (AI) and generative AI, to enhance their cyber capabilities. Disruptive technologies can enhance already sophisticated cyber operations and allow for automated attacks, deep-fakes, and advanced social engineering tactics. AI in cyber operations poses new challenges for cybersecurity defenders as it increases the complexity, scale, and pace of potential attacks. How these nations use cyber capabilities, and leverage asymmetric advantages for strategic ends, underscores the need for greater international cooperation and more robust policy coordination to counter these irregular threats.
People’s Republic of China
China’s journey toward becoming a cyber power began in the early 2000s. At the helm is the Central Commission for Cybersecurity and Informatization (CCCI), chaired by President Xi Jinping, as well as the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Cyberspace Administration of China. The “Great Firewall of China” exemplifies China’s commitment to information control, both domestically and internationally, and allows government control over the internet and information. By limiting domestic information access, the government controls the population’s understanding of other nations and restricts external access to Chinese-focused content, sites, etc.
A key component of China’s cyber strategy is the concept of military-civil fusion, which encourages collaboration between the private sector and military and integrates resources. The fusion is evident in the activities of major Chinese tech firms like Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent, which play significant roles in advancing China’s cyber ambitions and provide irregular approaches to securing technological control over an increasing percentage of the world’s telecommunications and digital infrastructure outside China.
China’s cyber strategy is also characterized by its use of state-sponsored hacking groups to conduct widespread and far-reaching cyber espionage and sabotage campaigns. The discovery of Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group, and its activities underscores China’s focus on gaining asymmetric advantage over the US and its allies by gaining persistent access to their critical infrastructure. The group uses the unconventional and irregular warfare tactic of “living off the land,” utilizing existing resources in the operating system of the targeted devices and systems rather than introducing new files that could trigger cybersecurity sensors or be more easily detected through forensic analysis. Volt Typhoon’s objective appears to be long-term persistence within the target environment, or pre-positioning, giving China the placement and access to conduct future acts of sabotage and disruption.
Russian Federation
Russia’s evolution as a cyber power began in the late 1990s and early 2000s and is encapsulated in initiatives like, the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Russia’s cyber strategy is deeply rooted in the concept of political warfare and its understanding of cyberspace as a theater of military operations akin to land, sea, air, and space. However, political warfare for Russia includes a cognitive dimension that influences how they leverage cyberspace to achieve political outcomes. Russia’s approach to cyberspace, therefore, differs from the concepts espoused by US and other NATO-aligned nations and is characterized by a decentralized and asymmetric approach to cyber operations.
The Russian government views cyberspace as a critical domain for exerting influence and achieving geopolitical goals and their cyber ecosystem is a complicated tangle of state and non-state actors. The Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation all have cyber units that conduct operations domestically and internationally. These agencies also recruit cybercriminals to carry out operations on their behalf, providing them with legal protection and resources in exchange for their services.
A key component of Russia’s cyber strategy is the concept of information confrontation, an approach that integrates cyber operations, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and traditional military operations to achieve strategic objectives. Russia has been implicated in numerous cyber espionage and disruptive activities targeting both governmental and private sector entities worldwide. For instance, Russian cyber actors have been implicated in attacks on US election systems, energy grid, water systems, and other critical sectors. The operations are designed to foster instability, leveraging cyber operations, cyber espionage, influence campaigns, and other asymmetric tactics as force multipliers in geopolitical conflicts.
Furthermore, Russia has a long history of integrating cyber operations into its broader military strategy, relying on cyber capabilities during conflicts, like its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The integration of cyber operations into Russia’s broader political warfare framework, reminiscent of Soviet-era “active measures,” further complicates attribution and response measures. Importantly, Russia’s approach to leveraging cyber operations and capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure, spread disinformation, and conduct espionage underscores its asymmetric and irregular approach to confrontation with Western powers.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
North Korea’s growth as a cyber power also began in the early 2000s and is largely focused on leveraging its cyber capabilities to circumvent economic sanctions and finance its regime through illicit means. Directing North Korea’s cyber activity is its Reconnaissance General Bureau, with “Bureau 121” being responsible for conducting cyber espionage, financial theft, and disruptive cyberattacks. However, North Korea’s cyber capabilities are divided among several units, including the now-infamous Lazarus Group, Kimsuky, and APT37, known for their sophisticated cyber operations.
North Korea’s cyber strategy seeks to develop defensive and offensive capabilities. On the defensive side, North Korea has invested heavily in protecting its critical infrastructure and sensitive data from cyberattacks. On the offensive side, North Korea has developed various capabilities to conduct cyber espionage, disinformation campaigns, and disruptive cyberattacks.
North Korea has been implicated in numerous cyber espionage and disruptive activities targeting both governmental and private sector entities worldwide. One of the most notable North Korean cyber operations is the 2014 Sony Pictures hack but the most significant is likely the 2017 WannaCry ransomware. WannaCry ransomware infected more than 200,000 computers in over 150 countries, causing widespread disruption by encrypting files on infected computers and demanding ransom payments in cryptocurrency. The attack is an example of North Korea’s ability to conduct large-scale disruptive cyber operations and the regime’s willingness to engage in asymmetric and irregular attacks to fund its government.
Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran’s cyber proliferation began after the Stuxnet attack in 2010, an attack that targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Stuxnet highlighted the vulnerability of Iran’s critical infrastructure to foreign intervention and pushed the regime to invest heavily in developing cyber capabilities. As a result, Iran’s cyber strategy has been focused on retaliatory cyber capabilities and driven by its perception that it is engaged in an ongoing conflict with the West over its nuclear program and other geopolitical issues. Unlike China and Russia, which primarily engage in cyber espionage, or North Korea, which engages in cybercrime and theft, Iran’s regime views cyber operations as a means of retaliating against sanctions and other forms of pressure from the international community.
Similar to North Korea, Iran’s cyber strategy focuses on the development of defensive and offensive capabilities. On the defensive side, Iran has invested in protecting its critical infrastructure and sensitive data from cyberattacks and crafted defensive cyber doctrine to guide how the regime repels and mitigates cyberattacks against Iran. Offensively, Iran has developed various capabilities to conduct cyber espionage, disinformation campaigns, and disruptive cyberattacks.
Iran’s focus on retaliatory capabilities makes them a particularly volatile cyber actor, that is willing and able to launch disruptive attacks with little warning. For example, a significant Iranian cyber operation was Operation Ababil, which disrupted services at US financial institutions through a series of distributed denial-of-service attacks between 2011 and 2013. The Iranian hacking collective, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, carried out the attacks and is believed to be state-sponsored. The operation was designed to impact major US banks and is understood as the regime’s retaliation against economic sanctions.
To date, Iran has been implicated in numerous cyber espionage and disruptive activities targeting both governmental and private sector entities worldwide. The Shamoon attack, which targeted Saudi Aramco in 2012, is among the most notable Iranian cyber operations. The attack used malware to cause irreparable damage to thousands of computers, rendering them useless by overwriting the master boot record, partition tables, and most files with random data. Shamoon demonstrated Iran’s ability to conduct large-scale destructive cyberattacks and highlighted its willingness to use asymmetric attacks to achieve strategic goals.
Implications for Global Security
China’s, Russia’s, North Korea’s, and Iran’s collaborative and individual cyber strategies have significant implications for global security. Their activities undermine the stability provided by NATO and Western powers, posing complex, asymmetric, and irregular challenges to international norms and, more broadly, cybersecurity. State-sponsored cyber operations, like state-sponsored terrorism or political violence, are sophisticated attempts to erode trust in digital infrastructure and government or institutional functions by disrupting the integrity, availability or confidentiality of data, services, and other aspects of online and physical security. For example, China’s cyber activities, including Volt Typhoon, have heightened tensions with the US, particularly over Taiwan. Similarly, Russian cyber operations have exacerbated conflicts in the former Soviet Bloc nations and strained relations with Western nations.
The cyber collaboration between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran varies in scope; however, its aim always aligns with political goals that negatively impact the existing rules-based world order. For example, Russia leverages malware to attack Ukraine, which was developed by Scarab, a Chinese government-linked cyber group, and shares techniques on how best to leverage AI for attacking targets and “living off the land” persistence to avoid detection by cyber defenders.
Moreover, the cyber strategies’ collaborative and sophisticated characteristics pose significant challenges for cybersecurity defenders. Traditional cybersecurity measures are often insufficient to counter the advanced tactics used by state-sponsored actors. NATO and Western powers must adopt a comprehensive approach that includes enhancing defensive capabilities, leveraging advanced technologies, fostering international cooperation, and developing offensive cyber strategies to effectively counter these threats. By doing so, they can safeguard the stability and security that have been our world’s cornerstone since World War II’s end.
Evan Morgan is the Founder of Cyber Defense Army, a cybersecurity consultancy and services firm that incorporates geopolitical risk in their cybersecurity practices for clients. He is a United States Air Force veteran.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
Capt. Taiwan Veney, cyber warfare operations officer, watches members of the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group in the Hunter’s Den at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, MD, June 3, 2017. (U.S. Air Force photo by J.M. Eddins Jr.)
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9. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Increasing pressure on housewives... Forced labor, ideological education, self-criticism - women complain loudly that there's "no time to do business"
The regime is deliberately trying to prevent effective market activity (or at least activity it cannot control and "tax" for regime benefit.
＜Inside N. Korea＞Increasing pressure on housewives... Forced labor, ideological education, self-criticism - women complain loudly that there's "no time to do business"
asiapress.org
Women having a meeting in a corn field. They appear to be members of the women's union mobilized for harvesting nearby. Photographed in China across the border from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, in late September 2023. (ASIAPRESS)
◆ Strengthening control over the women's union
According to a reporting partner living in the northern region of the country, North Korean authorities are strengthening control over the "women's union" (Socialist Women's Union of Korea), which mainly consists of housewives who are not formally employed. Those who engage in trading or fail to participate in mobilizations are now being strictly punished as having committed "non-socialist behavior." By intensifying the "organizational life" of the women's union, the government intends to tighten control over housewives, who previously had relatively more free time without having to go to work. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)
◆ Central directive: "Crack down on trading activities"
In North Korea, it is mandatory to belong to a certain organization, starting with the "children's union," which children join in the second grade of elementary school. While workers are organized into the "General Federation of Trade Unions," housewives who become dependent on their husbands after marriage and do not have jobs belong to the "women's union."
Reporting Partner A, who lives in Ryanggang Province, reported recent changes in the organizational life of the women's union:
"From early July, crackdowns on 'non-socialist behavior' such as non-participation in organizational activities have become stricter. Teams of 3-5 people are formed in each area with officials assigned to report weekly on whether there are any 'non-socialist behaviors' or if anyone has expressed complaints or dissatisfaction."
"I've heard that a directive came down from the central authorities to officials stating, 'Illegal activities involving individual trading are occurring frequently within the women's union organization. Strengthen organizational discipline and intensify political and ideological work.'"
In fact, the frequency of people mobilized for gatherings has significantly increased.
"Originally, there was political study on Saturdays. Now, we've become busy with regular studies on Wednesdays, lectures on Fridays, and life review sessions and lectures on Saturdays. Attendance has become strict, with a system in place to investigate and report those who are absent."
※ Life review session: Refers to a self-criticism meeting that all people are supposed to participate in. It is held once a week in the organization to which one belongs.
◆ Is it an intention to strengthen state rule by stifling the private business?
Due to economic turmoil in the 1990s, North Korea's food rationing system collapsed, and black markets emerged across the country. While men were forced to go to work despite not receiving wages or rations, housewives engaged in economic activities to secure food and necessary goods to support their households.
When markets were legalized in 2003, women became even more active. Some succeeded in business and accumulated wealth. It was common practice to bribe officials and skip women's union activities to do business in the markets.
These women can be considered the "protagonists" who expanded North Korea's market economy. From the government's perspective, however, they are seen as the central force of "non-socialist behavior" that has gone beyond its control.
Previous investigations by ASIAPRESS have made it clear that the Kim Jong-un regime has tightened control over its people since around the time of the pandemic outbreak. This current movement can be seen as part of an effort to suppress the market economy and strengthen the state-controlled economy by regulating the economic activities of housewives that have been tolerated to some degree until now.
In fact, another Reporting Partner B living in Ryanggang Province reported in early January:
"Even if you belong to the women's union, there's no time to do business in the marketplace. They mobilize us, give us tasks, and demand organizational activities almost daily. While study sessions and temporary mobilizations usually last 3-4 hours, they can sometimes continue for up to 6 hours."
(FILE PHOTO) A scene from a political study gathering of the women's union held in the northern region. The gist of that day's meeting was demanding absolute loyalty to Kim Jong-un. Photographed in July 2013. (ASIAPRESS)
◆ Given insufficient income from jobs, people worry about livelihoods
How are women reacting to the government's increasing efforts to control them?
Reporting Partner A reported that "there's too much pressure from organizational life, with frequent mobilizations and demands to properly conduct life review sessions and self-criticism. In this situation, many people have decided to get jobs in enterprises, thinking it's better to be formally employed even if it means less income."
However, the reality is that even if they go to work, the rations people receive are not sufficient to survive.
Reporting Partner B said, "Recently, people are only worried about how to make a living. You have to stand in line to buy food at the state-run grain stores. We can't do business and can't earn money, so how are we supposed to eat with just what the country gives us? Everyone is worried."
※ State-run grain shops: State-run stores that sell food. For a long time, they were not functional, but resumed operations around 2019. As food trading in markets has been banned, dependence on grain sales offices, where food can be legally purchased, has increased.
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea
asiapress.org
10. Russia condemns US revamp of military forces in Japan – Moscow says it is ‘coordinating’ with Beijing and Pyongyang on the matter.
Russia condemns US revamp of military forces in Japan
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/russia-us-japan-07312024233536.html
Moscow says it is ‘coordinating’ with Beijing and Pyongyang on the matter.
By Taejun Kang for RFA
2024.07.31
Taipei, Taiwan
The Russian Foreign Ministry building and Moscow’s International Business Centre (Moskva City) on a foggy day in central Moscow on Dec. 16, 2021.
Alexander Nemenov/AFP
Russia is closely following the recent steps by the United States and Japan to strengthen their military-political alliance and it is coordinating with China and North Korea on the matter, Russia’s foreign ministry said.
Washington and Tokyo announced Sunday that the U.S. was overhauling its military forces in Japan as the two countries deepen defense cooperation.
“It seems that the two countries, under cover of threats allegedly emanating from the DPRK, China and Russia, are fully engaged in preparations for a large-scale armed conflict in the Asia-Pacific region,” said the Russian foreign ministry’s deputy director Andrey Nastasyin at a press briefing on Wednesday.
DPRK, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is North Korea’s official name.
“We have repeatedly warned that such activity can only increase the level of tension and accelerate the arms race in the Asia-Pacific region … We are coordinating on this issue with our Chinese and North Korean partners,” Nastasyin added without elaborating.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and their Japanese counterparts Minoru Kihara and Yoko Kamikawa announced the plan for a revamp in a statement following a meeting in Tokyo, where they also called China’s “political, economic, and military coercion” the “greatest strategic challenge” in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
The ministers also criticized what they called China’s “provocative” behavior in the South and East China Seas, its joint military exercises with Russia and the rapid expansion of its arsenal of nuclear weapons.
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Under the new plan, U.S. forces in Japan would be “reconstituted” as a joint force headquarters reporting to the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to “facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies,” the U.S. and Japanese ministers said.
“This will be the most significant change to U.S. Forces Japan since its creation, and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years,” Austin told a press conference following the meeting.
He pointed both to the “upgrade” of U.S. Forces Japan with “expanded missions and operational responsibilities” and Japan’s new Joint Operations Command, saying that the allies were reinforcing their “combined ability to deter and respond to coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”
Details of the implementation would be determined in working groups led by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, media reported.
U.S. Forces Japan, headquartered at Yokota Air Base, consists of approximately 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan.
Separately, the defense chiefs of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan voiced concerns over growing military and economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia, denouncing the North’s diversification of nuclear delivery systems and test launches of multiple ballistic missiles, as well as other actions that increase tension on the Korean Peninsula.
Edited by Mike Firn.
11. Editorial: Intelligence leak highlights gaps in South Korea's espionage laws
Editorial: Intelligence leak highlights gaps in South Korea's espionage laws
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/08/01/I5SLOIX4TZA3PJWFLW77JYF4BQ/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2024.08.01. 08:51
A Korea Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC) officer has been arrested on charges of leaking classified military information, such as the personal details of secret agents, to a Chinese Korean (Chaoxianzu). Following the leak, the KDIC immediately recalled overseas personnel who were operating under disguised identities. This is a serious incident that threatens decades of accumulated intelligence assets.
South Korean counterintelligence authorities have charged the officer with leaking military secrets, which carries a lighter sentence than espionage under the Military Criminal Act, which could result in the death penalty or life imprisonment. According to South Korean law, espionage is defined as activities conducted for an “enemy,” which in this context refers to North Korea. Since the espionage was conducted for a “foreign country” like China or Russia, it does not fall under the legal definition of espionage in South Korean law. Consequently, the officer can only be prosecuted for leaking secrets, with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison.
A full session of the Intelligence Committee is held at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul, on the afternoon of July 29, 2024, attended by Cho Tae-yong, head of the National Intelligence Service, among others. During a closed-door briefing, Cho announced plans to promote legal amendments that would expand the scope of espionage charges /News1
Most countries do not differentiate between enemy states and allies when it comes to punishing espionage. For instance, the United States convicted Robert Kim, a Korean American Navy officer, of espionage for sharing information about North Korea with South Korea. Conversely, in South Korea, the operator of a Chinese restaurant in Seoul, suspected of running a Chinese secret police station, was only charged under the Food Sanitation Act. Economic espionage should also be harshly punished, but the current law’s limitation to North Korea as the only “enemy” obstructs such efforts.
Han Dong-hoon, the leader of the People Power Party (PPP), has proposed expanding the legal definition of espionage from “enemy states” to “foreign countries.” Members of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) also proposed an amendment to the espionage clause during the 21st National Assembly. There is no significant disagreement between the ruling and opposition parties regarding the expansion of the espionage law. Thus, there is no reason to delay the legal amendment.
The DPK also acknowledges the severity of this incident. Kim Min-seok, a candidate for the party’s supreme council, expressed concerns that the leaked KDIC information might have reached North Korea and called for an investigation to determine if the leak was intentional. If military secrets were passed to North Korea via Chinese Koreans and North Korea successfully recruited South Korean officers, it would be a grave issue. While comprehensive counterespionage efforts are necessary, the current law prevents the National Intelligence Service (NIS), which has expertise in espionage investigations, from participating. This is because the Moon Jae-in administration transferred the NIS’s counterespionage authority to the police.
In the face of an information war that threatens national security and strategic industries, South Korea’s legal system is alarmingly inadequate, verging on self-harm. Both the PPP and the DPK have a responsibility to expand the scope of the espionage law and restore the National Intelligence Service Korea Act to reinforce counterespionage capabilities.
12. Korean Air to stop serving cup noodles in economy class
There will be a mutiny on KAL flights.
Korean Air to stop serving cup noodles in economy class
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2024/08/01/26MU2JWNV5G4VOH256OM7NUKIQ/
Published 2024.08.01. 14:52
Updated 2024.08.01. 14:53
Korean Air is replacing cup noodles with safer snack options in economy class on long-haul international flights, starting Aug. 15, due to increased burn risks from turbulence. /Nongshim
Korean Air has decided to stop providing cup noodles in economy class due to the increased risk of burns caused by the recent surge in turbulence.
Starting on Aug. 15, Korean Air announced that it will replace the cup noodle snack service in economy class on long-haul international flights with sandwiches, corndogs, pizza, and Hot Pockets. Hot pockets (a type of frozen food with various fillings inside a pastry crust).
Korean Air explained that due to the increasing trend of turbulence, burn accidents frequently occur with cup noodles, especially because hot water is involved. They noted that in economy class, flight attendants have to carry multiple cup noodles with hot water at once, and since passengers are densely seated, the risk of burns is significantly higher.
Accordingly, Korean Air plans to offer corndogs or pizza on long-haul routes departing from Korea, and Hot Pockets on outbound flights from overseas. The cup noodles will continue to be offered in first and prestige (business) classes, where the seat spacing and aisles are relatively wider, reducing the risk of safety accidents.
13. S. Korea proposes providing humanitarian aid to N. Korea over flood damage
Good. But will Kim accept it? How will he justify receiving aid from what he has decided is the north's mortal enemy?
(LEAD) S. Korea proposes providing humanitarian aid to N. Korea over flood damage | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · August 1, 2024
(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES with more info throughout; ADDS photo)
By Kim Han-joo
SEOUL, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- South Korea on Thursday proposed providing humanitarian aid to North Korea over damage from the recent downpours in its northern border areas along the Amnok River, as the North is believed to have sustained huge casualties.
The unification ministry said it is willing to urgently support the North Korean flood victims with the necessary supplies from a humanitarian and fraternal perspective through the Korean Red Cross.
"We are ready to discuss the items, scale and method of support with the North Korean counterpart. We expect North Korea's swift response," said Park Jong-sul, secretary general of the Korean Red Cross, expressing his "deep sympathy" for the victims.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 31, 2024, shows North Korea's border city of Sinuiju submerged due to the latest downpours. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korea's border city of Sinuiju and Uiju County in the northwestern province of North Pyongan were pummeled by heavy rains, with more than 4,100 houses and nearly 3,000 hectares of farmland left submerged, according to the North's state media.
The North did not disclose details about casualties, but the unification ministry said North Korea may have sustained "considerable" casualties amid a news report that the number of those who died or went missing probably exceeded around 1,000.
The latest aid proposal came despite heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea's continued provocative acts and its increased animosity toward South Korea.
The government has said it is ready to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea regardless of the political and security situation on the peninsula.
But it remains uncertain whether North Korea would accept the aid proposal.
The unification ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, noted that it marked the government's first proposal for flood damage relief to the North since 2012. At that time, North Korea rejected the offer.
"(If Pyongyang accepts the offer) we will discuss the items and scale of support with the North. The supplies of food and medicine for the displaced will be prioritized," said a ministry official on the condition of anonymity.
The latest offer marked the second proposal on humanitarian aid under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, the official said. The ministry proposed having working-level contact with North Korea in May 2022 over COVID-19 quarantine supplies.
The official said the government is ready to discuss details through various methods, including face-to-face meetings or coordinating through a third country.
The government chose to use the press to deliver its intent for aid, as North Korea has remained unresponsive to the inter-Korean liaison communication channel since April last year.
North Korea is vulnerable to natural disasters due to its lack of infrastructure, with heavy rains, in particular, displacing thousands of people in the impoverished country.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the flood-hit areas of Sinuiju and Uiju County on Sunday and guided an operation to rescue around 5,000 isolated residents.
Earlier this week, the country convened a rare emergency politburo meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea to discuss ways to cope with the flood damage.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 31, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) riding in a lifeboat to inspect flood-hit areas in North Korea's border city of Sinuiju. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Park Jong-sul, secretary general of the Korean Red Cross, speaks during a press briefing at the government complex in Seoul on Aug. 1, 2024, over proposed humanitarian aid to North Korea over flood damage. (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · August 1, 2024
14. N. Korea's top envoy to Tehran attends inauguration ceremony of Iran's new president
I heard a new characterization of the free world's adversaries: "the axis of upheaval." Of course north Korea and Iran are card carrying foundational members or plank holders in the axis of upheaval.
N. Korea's top envoy to Tehran attends inauguration ceremony of Iran's new president | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 1, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's ambassador to Tehran has attended the inauguration ceremony of Iran's new President Masoud Pezeshkian and delivered a "warm greeting" from leader Kim Jong-un, state media reported Thursday.
Ambassador Han Song-u attended the ceremony in Iran's capital Tuesday at the invitation of the Iranian government, according to the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's main newspaper.
Pezeshkian expressed his gratitude and asked Han to relay his "greetings from the heart" to the North's leader, it added.
In 2013 and 2017, North Korea sent Kim Yong-nam, then president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, to the inauguration ceremony of then Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.
After establishing diplomatic ties in 1973, Pyongyang and Tehran have maintained close ties while under international sanctions for their weapons programs. The two countries have been suspected of exchanging ballistic missile parts and technology, especially during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.
North Korea sent an economic delegation, led by its external economic relations minister, to Iran in April to attend a trade exhibition. It marked the first time in about five years that Pyongyang has sent a ranking official to Iran.
The North and Iran are known to be key providers of weapons to Russia for use in Moscow's war in Ukraine.
This photo, provided by EPA on July 30, 2024, shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian speaking after being sworn in as Iran's new leader. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 1, 2024
15. N. Korean youth face grueling military drills despite harsh weather
Safety is not a priority in the north. Human capital is to be expended for the regime's benefit only.
N. Korean youth face grueling military drills despite harsh weather - Daily NK English
An increasing number of students are shirking field exercises because instructors force them to crawl in mud or punish them to instill discipline
By Seon Hwa - August 1, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · August 1, 2024
A company of Red Youth Guards march in a military parade to mark the 75th anniversary of North Korea’s founding in Pyongyang on Sept. 8, 2023. North Korea’s official Rodong Sinmun wrote on Sept. 9, “A paramilitary parade took place with splendor at Kim Il Sung Square in the capital city of Pyongyang on September 8 to celebrate the 75th founding anniversary of the DPRK.” (Rodong Sinmun- News1)
North Korean youth are being forced to take part in outdoor military training despite sweltering weather as heavy rains and heat waves grip the nation amid monsoon season.
According to a source in North Pyongan Province, who spoke on condition of anonymity, second-year high school students 16 and under have been entering drill centers since June 30 for Red Youth Guards training.
The training involves military drills for North Korean high schoolers ages 14-16. Participants undergo 160 hours of classroom training and seven days of field exercises from late June to early September. Students learn paramilitary skills such as marching and tactical and shooting drills.
Because field drills occur during summer, prestigious schools in areas with workplaces visited by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un or top enterprises sometimes bribe local education departments to schedule training outside monsoon or heatwave season.
Most schools prefer drills in late August or early September, when rain lessens and temperatures fall. Students in isolated communities like agricultural villages often train during hot, rainy monsoon season.
Harsh training conditions
A Pihyon County resident said his child recently underwent training. “It rained constantly, and (my) child trained in the rain without protection,” he said. His child was distraught “because he couldn’t dry his clothes, so he had to wear soaked clothes until the end of the exercise.”
The source said forcing youth to drill in rain is not new, “but I feel bad as a parent since only students from powerless schools train when it’s hottest and it rains a lot.”
Even within schools, students from wealthy families pay bribes to undergo only shooting practice or serve in communication or desk positions.
“Those students simply undergo shooting practice if their parents prepare a bit of cash, even though they go to the same school as their classmates,” the source said. “Students experience discrimination because of money.”
Food shortages and discipline issues
Criticism has also emerged about meager food during field exercises. Some students bring their own food.
“Students have to ensure their own food by themselves even when they undergo Red Youth Guards training,” the source said. “They have to pay for five kilograms (11 pounds) of corn for seven days and a week of side dishes such as bean paste, salted seafood and roasted potatoes.”
An increasing number of students are shirking field exercises because instructors force them to crawl in mud or punish them to instill discipline.
“The training environment is too terrible and the drills too intensive for students to bear,” the source said. “I wish these sorts of drills for students would disappear since the kids will undergo military training when they enter the army.”
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · August 1, 2024
16. Some N. Koreans prioritize Kim portraits while fleeing homes due to flooding
True believers or is this a hedge for personal survival?
Some N. Koreans prioritize Kim portraits while fleeing homes due to flooding - Daily NK English
"While rescuing portraits may earn great praise later, it's absurd to ask about them before family members' safety," a source told Daily NK
By Seon Hwa - August 1, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · August 1, 2024
North Korea's state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on July 29 that leader Kim Jong Un personally visited flood-damaged areas in Sinuiju and Uiju county in North Pyongan Province the previous day. According to the report, Kim directly supervised rescue and evacuation efforts in areas affected by heavy rains and in regions at risk of disaster. (Photo: Rodong Sinmun-News1)
As the Yalu River overflowed its banks, flooding parts of North Korea, some people risked their lives to save portraits of the country’s former leaders as they fled their homes.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in North Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Wednesday that residents began evacuating from Sinuiju’s Sumun, Minpo, and Yeokjon neighborhoods around 5 a.m. on July 27 as floodwaters rose.
While most people hurriedly gathered clothes, food, and other essentials, some took time to carefully remove and wrap three portraits from their walls: individual images of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and a third showing the two leaders in discussion.
“Some people struggled to carry heavy framed portraits while evacuating, while others quickly removed just the photos from the frames and wrapped them in plastic to keep them dry,” the source said.
In a stark illustration of the portraits’ perceived importance, some evacuees who had forgotten the images ran back to their flooded homes to retrieve them, risking their lives in the process.
The prioritization of the portraits over personal safety extended to the evacuation sites. The source described scenes where evacuees asked about the safety of the portraits before inquiring about family members.
“There were people more concerned about whether the portraits were safely evacuated than whether their family members were safe, even as homes were being washed away and relatives were missing,” the source said. “Some household heads scolded their wives for bringing household goods but forgetting the portraits.”
North Korean authorities have long emphasized the sanctity of images depicting the country’s leaders, instructing citizens to treat them as they would the leaders themselves. Damaging these portraits can result in severe punishment.
This devotion to the regime’s iconography led some North Koreans to prioritize saving the portraits even in life-threatening situations, with some returning to flooded homes specifically to retrieve forgotten images.
“While evacuating portraits during a flood might be praised later, it’s absurd to ask about portraits before family safety,” the source said.
The flooding comes as North Korean state media reported leader Kim Jong Un personally directed rescue and evacuation efforts in flood-hit areas of North Pyongan Province on July 28. The Korean Central News Agency said Kim visited Sinuiju and Uiju county to oversee disaster response operations following heavy rains.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · August 1, 2024
17. N. Korean workers in Russia face rising tensions amid increased surveillance
Trying to eliminate another path to freedom.
N. Korean workers in Russia face rising tensions amid increased surveillance - Daily NK English
Security officers plant "spies" in every work group to report on their comrades' actions and words
By Seulkee Jang - August 1, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · August 1, 2024
North Korean workers in Russia. (Courtesy of Kang Dong Wan)
Tensions are rising among North Korean workers overseas as authorities intensify surveillance to prevent defections, Daily NK has learned.
A source in Russia, speaking anonymously for security reasons, said Monday that serious fights break out two to three times weekly in a group of military construction workers recently sent to Vladivostok.
Nearby workers rush to break up fights, but with tempers flaring, both fighters and peacemakers often end up injured.
These clashes stem from increased mutual surveillance among workers.
North Korean authorities have long assigned security officials to trading companies to monitor overseas workers. Recently, they have stepped up efforts, ordering on-site officers to “strictly block” escapes in Russia.
Security officers plant “spies” in every work group to report on their comrades’ actions and words.
“If three people gather, one is definitely a Ministry of State Security spy,” the source said. “People often face criticism after confiding in a supposed trusted comrade, only to be reported secretly.”
Violence abounds amid heightened tensions
One Vladivostok construction worker was reprimanded after complaining to a coworker that “work was too hard” and he “sometimes thinks he came overseas for nothing.” When he discovered who informed on him, he attacked the informer.
Another worker was criticized for speaking with an Uzbek coworker. He then fought with a colleague he suspected of snitching.
With workers facing criticism for unenthusiastic performance or merely complaining about work difficulties, the atmosphere in workgroups has become tense. Many no longer speak to one another, even during meals.
These tensions are not limited to specific locations. They are emerging in North Korean labor groups across several Russian regions.
“As mutual surveillance intensifies to prevent defections, stress is reaching a breaking point. More workers want to leave their groups,” the source said. “Workgroups are completely split due to the spies. If this continues, there could be mass defections.”
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · August 1, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
